THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY POLICIES OF SWEDEN AND FINLAND WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

AHU ÖZSOLAK

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DECEMBER 2006

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

_____

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı	(METU, IR)	_____
Prof. Dr. Ramazan Gözen	(ÇANKAYA, POLS& IR)	_____
Assist. Prof. Oktay F. Tanrısever	(METU, IR)	_____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Ahu Özsolak

Signature :

ABSTRACT

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY POLICIES OF SWEDEN AND FINLAND WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Özsolak, Ahu

M. Sc., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

December 2006, 208 pages

This thesis aims to analyze the evolution of the security policies of Finland and Sweden within the European Union (EU) with a comparative perspective. The main argument of this thesis is that increasing European integration in the field of security and defense may lead to adaptations and modifications in the security policy formulations of two militarily non-allied EU member states, Finland and Sweden. However, the nature and extent of these adaptations will depend on each state's own security policy perspective and own perception of the ongoing European security integration. This thesis seeks answers to questions such as "How does the policy of non-participation in military alliances affect these countries' standpoints and their participation in general in the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and in the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP)?," "How do Finland and Sweden interpret and apply this policy perspective within the CFSP, and in the CESDP?" and "What does membership of the EU imply for the policies of the militarily non-allied countries?."

This thesis consists of nine chapters. The second chapter gives the conceptual framework of this thesis. The third chapter focuses on the evolution of their neutrality policies until the Second World War while the fourth one presents the evolution of their security policies from the Second World War until the end of the Cold War. The fifth chapter covers the transition period from their neutrality policy to their EU membership, while the sixth chapter focuses on the evolution of their security policies especially within the CESDP. The seventh chapter draws attention to their new security policy agenda and the eighth chapter presents the comparative analysis of their security policies in the EU. The ninth, and concluding chapter, offers an overall comparative perspective about the respective security policy profiles of the two countries within the EU. This thesis has reached the conclusion that owing to their different histories, geopolitical positions and security policy concerns during the Cold War, their ways of adapting to the changes within the EU were inclined to be different too. Even though their entry to the EU in 1995 may be accepted as the starting-point for the potential future convergence of their security policies, the similarities in their security policy considerations do not outweigh the differences for the time being.

Keywords: Finland, Sweden, the Common European Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, The Policy of Neutrality, The Policy of Non-participation in Military Alliances.

ÖZ

İSVEÇ VE FİNLANDİYA'NIN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NDEKİ GÜVENLİK POLİTİKALARININ EVRİLİŞİ: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZ

Özsolak, Ahu
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

Aralık 2006, 208 sayfa

Bu tez Finlandiya'nın ve İsveç'in Avrupa Birliği (AB) içindeki güvenlik politikalarının evrilişini karşılaştırmalı bir perspektif ile analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu tezin temel argümanı, güvenlik ve savunma alanındaki artan Avrupa entegrasyonunun, Finlandiya ve İsveç gibi askeri bir ittifaka katılmayan AB üye ülkelerinin güvenlik politikası tanımlamalarında bir takım adaptasyonlara ve değişikliklere neden olabileceğidir. Fakat, bu adaptasyonların doğası ve kapsamı, her bir devletin kendi güvenlik politikası perspektifine ve süregiden Avrupa güvenlik entegrasyonunu algılayış biçimine bağlı olacaktır. Bu tez, "Askeri ittifaklara katılmama politikası, bu ülkelerin görüşlerini ve genel anlamda AB'nin Ortak Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası (ODGP) ve Ortak Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası (OAGSP) içindeki katılımlarını nasıl etkilemektedir?," "Finlandiya ve İsveç bu politika perspektifini ODGP ve OAGSP içinde nasıl yorumlamakta ve uygulamaya dökmektedir?" ve "AB üyeliği, askeri bir ittifaka katılmayan ülkelerin politikaları için ne ifade etmektedir?" gibi sorulara cevap aramaktadır.

Bu tez dokuz bölümden oluşmaktadır. İkinci bölüm tezin kavramsal çerçevesini vermektedir. Üçüncü bölüm, bu ülkelerin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na kadar olan sürede tarafsızlık politikalarının evrilişine odaklanmakta, dördüncü bölüm ise İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Soğuk Savaş'ın bitimine kadarki süre zarfında ülkelerin güvenlik politikalarının evrilişini ortaya koymaktadır. Beşinci bölüm, tarafsızlık politikalarından AB üyeliğine geçişlerini kapsayan geçiş döneminden bahsetmekte, altıncı bölüm ise bu ülkelerin özellikle OAGSP içindeki güvenlik politikalarının evrilişine odaklanmaktadır. Yedinci bölüm, bü ülkelerin yeni güvenlik politikası gündemlerine dikkat çekmekte, sekizinci bölüm ise, AB'deki güvenlik politikalarının karşılaştırmalı bir analizini ortaya koymaktadır. Dokuzuncu, ve sonuç bölümü ise, bu ülkelerin herbirinin AB içindeki güvenlik politikası profilleri hakkında karşılaştırmalı genel bir perspektif önermektedir. Bu tez, bu ülkelerin farklı tarihlere, jeopolitik konumlara ve Soğuk Savaş sırasında farklı güvenlik politikası kaygılarına sahip olmalarından dolayı, AB içindeki değişimlere adapte olma yollarının da farklılık gösterme eğiliminde olduğu sonucuna varmıştır. Her ne kadar 1995'te AB'ye üye olmaları, bu ülkelerin güvenlik politikalarının gelecekteki potansiyel birbirine yaklaşımları için bir başlangıç noktası olarak kabul edilebilecek olsa da, bugüne kadar, güvenlik politikası değerlendirmelerindeki benzerlikler, farklılıklarına oranla fazlalık göstermemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Finlandiya, İsveç, Avrupa Birliği'nin Ortak Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası, Tarafsızlık Politikası, Askeri İttifaklara Katılmama Politikası.

To My Mother Meral Özsolak

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research. Without his help, this thesis would not be possible. Also I would like to mention my appreciation to the distinguished members of my thesis committee, Prof. Dr. Ramazan Gözen and Assist. Prof. Oktay F. Tanrısever for their advice, patience and useful comments. I am also grateful to the distinguished guests of my thesis presentation, Thomas Hansson and Niina Heino for their valuable contributions.

I am very much indebted to Prof. Dr. Bo Huldt, who greatly enriched my knowledge with his exceptional insights and guidance, for giving me the opportunity to conduct the research of this thesis at the Swedish National Defence College in Stockholm. I gratefully thank Alyson J. K. Bailes, Mika Kerttunen, Jan Hallenberg and Gunilla Herolf for their valuable contributions and constructive suggestions throughout my research in Stockholm. I am very grateful to Elisabeth Davidson and the members of the Swedish National Defence College for their full support during my research.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to Assist. Prof. Zuhal Yeşilyurt Gündüz who has always supported me during my master's education. I owe much to her. I would also like to thank Dr. Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun for her valuable comments on this thesis and suggestions for the editing.

Lastly, I would like to express my deepest thanks to my parents, Meral and M. İbrahim Özsolak, and my sister, Aslı Özsolak, who have supported and encouraged me not only in finishing this thesis but also in every step throughout my life.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CESDP	Common European Security and Defence Policy
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EU	European Union
FCMA	Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance
IFOR	Implementation Force- Operation Joint Endeavour in Bosnia and Herzegovina
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDI	Northern Dimension Initiative
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UN	United Nations
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
US	United States
WEU	Western European Union

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

One could argue that the foreign and security policies of countries have been based on the idea of the bipolarity of the international system during the Cold War. According to this view, there were two great powers and two global economic systems, led by the Soviet Union and the United States (US), whose relations determined the future of international relations. Within this framework, it is argued that differences in threat perceptions, geographical settings and security policy perspectives made it impossible for the Nordic countries[1] to reach a common Nordic security framework after the Second World War.[2] As a consequence, the understandings of security in the Northern Europe have focused on the term "Nordic stability" which indicates a particular system of security composed of different choices. Examples of these choices are: Denmark, Iceland and Norway joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), while Sweden retained its traditional neutrality, as well as Finland also wanting to pursue a neutral policy within the parameters set out in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), signed with the Soviet Union in 1948. It can be stated that at the time, the

[1] It is stated that in the current usage the term "Nordic region" involves Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland, as well as the Færo Islands and Greenland, which have autonomy under Danish sovereignty, as do the Åland Islands under Finland. However, Scandinavia is a collective term for Denmark, Norway and Sweden. It is emphasized that the term Scandinavia applies only to the fjord-indented Norwegian and Swedish peninsula, whereas, Denmark is included in Scandinavia, not in a geological sense, but on cultural and linguistic grounds. See Alastair H. Thomas, "The Concept of the Nordic Region and the Parameters of Nordic Cooperation," in *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*, ed. Lee Miles (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 15.

[2] For the security policy diversity in the Nordic region, see Steven E. Miller, "Nordic Security in a Europe without the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 512, The Nordic Region: Changing Perspectives in International Relations (November 1990): pp. 47-49.

framework of the different security arrangements of the Nordic countries became to be viewed as the Nordic balance.[3] The characteristic of the Nordic balance implied that pressure on one of the countries in the region would transform this area of stability into one of direct East-West confrontation and high tension. Hence, it can be asserted that the Nordic region was a kind of a strategic barrier and a buffer zone which was advantageous to both superpowers as long as the neutral countries maintained this buffer and the strategic objectives of the two superpowers remained essentially within the context of defensive matters.[4] Nonetheless, it is also alleged that the neutral countries in the region could not be regarded as absolutely neutral by the Soviet Union at that time in history. From the perspective of the Soviet Union, to some extent, these neutral countries tended to belong to the Western world.[5]

In this context, it can be stated that foreign and security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden were shaped by the priority of adaptation to the changing international environment after the Second World War. However, it can be alleged that they could not undertake this adaptation collectively, instead they had to accomplish it on an individual basis owing to their different geopolitical positions and the limits imposed on them as a result of the East-West confrontation in Europe. This culminated in different types of participation behavior in international politics.

---

[3] According to Arne Olav Brundtland, the Nordic Balance was a system of combining deterrence, against possible Soviet encroachment on the territories of the Nordic countries, with assurance of peaceful intentions towards the Soviet Union. It was based on an analysis of Soviet security interests which was described as keeping the non-Nordic NATO forces at a distance from the Nordic Region. See Arne Olav Brundtland, *On the Security and Defense Issues in Northern Europe with Special Emphasis on Sweden and Finland*, NUPI Notat Paper, Nr. 476 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1992), p. 2.

[4] Bo Huldt, "Neutrality and the Nordic Security Pattern: A Swedish Perspective," in *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Hanspeter Neuhold, Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 31-32.

[5] Jyrki Iivonen, "Perestroika, Neutrality, and Finnish-Soviet Relations," in *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Hanspeter Neuhold, Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 142.

The end of the Cold War and its bipolar system brought about significant changes in the foreign and security policy of these states. Since the politics of integration and cooperation in the field of security began to replace the politics of the blocs in Europe, Finland and Sweden began to feel the necessity to adapt their foreign and security policies to the ongoing European integration process in order to deal with the challenge of marginalization at that juncture. In this context, the development of the European Union (EU) as a result of the politics of integration and cooperation has a crucial impact on the process of change in Europe. Therefore, it is argued that after the end of the Cold War, there was a gradual transition from "alliance-based security in a divided Europe to EU-centred cooperative security comprising Europe as a whole."[6] Consequently, both of these countries started to consider improving their relations with Europe, which was a change from the earlier way of Nordic security thinking, namely keeping the Nordic region as "far away" as possible from the problems of continental Europe. Thus, they became members of the EU in 1995 as militarily non-allied states and began to feel the necessity to redefine and adjust their foreign and security policies to be in line with the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU (CFSP), and later the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). The most striking modification in their respective security policies may be considered to be the adaptation of their traditional policies of neutrality gradually to the changing conditions emanating from their membership in the EU and in the end abandoning the usage of the term in the official security policy definitions.

This thesis aims to analyze the evolution of the security policies of Finland and Sweden within the European Union with a comparative perspective. In this context, the main argument is that increasing European integration in the field of security and defense may lead to adaptations and modifications in the security policy formulations of two militarily non-allied EU member states, Finland and Sweden. However, the

[6] Martin Sæter, *The Nordic Countries and the Perspective of a 'Core' Europe*, Notat Working Paper, No.558 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 5.

nature and extent of these adaptations will depend on each state's own security policy perspectives, their perceptions of the ongoing European integration in the field of security and defense and the positions they aim to occupy in this process. It is argued that with the emergence of the EU, these militarily non-allied states of Europe began to feel the necessity, sometimes even the obligation, to adapt their security policies in accordance with the EU policies throughout the integration process. It is further argued that due to the possibility of military threat emanating from the East-West confrontation in Europe, Finland and Sweden felt the necessity to adapt their security policy perspectives in connection with the changing international conditions and power configurations under Cold War conditions. In this regard, it is asserted that the attitudes of Finland and Sweden in terms of the policy adaptations were also maintained within the EU, where only the nature of the perceived threat was changed. Accordingly, as being militarily non-allied EU member states, Finland and Sweden now began to face a new challenge which may be defined as the rapid development of the common defense dimension of the EU and the challenge of being marginalized in that evolving process. This steadily evolving defense dimension began to be conceived as the most problematic policy field of the EU in which these countries may not participate due to their respective policies of military non-alliance. Hence, they constantly felt the obligation to reconsider and modify their security policy formulations with reference to the evolving common defense dimension within the Union.

Nonetheless, due to their distinctive histories, past experiences, different geopolitical positions and diverse security concerns and policy perspectives during the Cold War, their ways of adapting to the changes within the EU were inclined to be different too. It is argued that their entry to the EU in 1995 may be accepted as the starting-point for the potential future convergence of their security policies, considerations and strategies. Likewise, it is asserted that they started to have much more similar, but yet not identical, approaches in adjusting their security policies to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common European Security and Defence Policy

(CESDP) of the EU. Nevertheless, it is argued that the similarities in their security policy considerations do not outweigh the differences for the time being.

There are not many studies focusing on the practices of the militarily non-allied EU member states within the contexts of the CFSP and CESDP of the EU with a comparative perspective. This thesis focuses on the security policy interpretations and perspectives of the small states in the EU due to the fact that literature on the relationship between the EU and its member states is mostly concerned with explaining the security policy perspectives of the larger member states such as France and Germany. Few scholars have focused on the security policy perspectives of the smaller members in the EU and the extent of their security policy adaptation to the rapidly evolving security and defense dimension of the Union. Hence, the comparative analysis of the security policies of Finland and Sweden is important in the sense that these states represent exceptional cases by insisting on the maintenance of their militarily non-allied status in a more integrated European security context in the post-Cold War era. However, in literature there is a tendency towards explaining the status of these militarily non-allied small states of the EU by accentuating mostly their similar standpoints, especially stemming from the shared common Nordic geography and peripheral status of these countries within the EU. However, in spite of the perceived common image and the similarities between the Finnish and Swedish policies from the outside, their foreign and security policy perspectives and strategic priorities are quite different from each other which make the subject of the thesis more worth of studying. In this thesis, primary sources, such as unrecorded interviews conducted at the Swedish National Defence College and the Embassy of Finland in Stockholm during the period of October-December in 2003, official white papers, government reports, speeches or press releases and secondary sources such as books, articles and research reports written in English and French were used. The secondary sources of this thesis were mainly obtained from the Swedish National Defence College, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm, as well as the Embassy of

Finland in Ankara. This thesis covers the developments and events regarding the Finnish and Swedish security policies within the EU until the end of year 2005.

This thesis consists of nine chapters. The second chapter gives the conceptual framework of this thesis where the definitions of the terms "neutrality," "non-participation in alliances" and "small states" and their possible security policy perspectives are clarified, in order to be able to understand the nature and content of the security policy definitions of the countries concerned better. In this part of the thesis, the different interpretations of these concepts are also presented.

The third chapter focuses on the evolution of the neutrality policies of Finland and Sweden until the Second World War, with the assumption that their neutrality policies in the past may also affect the content of their current security policies in the EU. In addition, the respective neutrality policies of these countries are analyzed from a comparative perspective in this chapter.

The fourth chapter presents the evolution of the security policies of these countries from the Second World War until the end of the Cold War, again with a comparative perspective, to be able to understand how past experiences and national traditions of neutrality policy have guided their security policies in the EU, and particularly in the CESDP. In this chapter, questions such as "What kind of neutrals were Finland and Sweden? What kind of a role did neutrality play in their security policy perspectives during the Cold War?" are addressed. Moreover, by means of a comparative perspective, similarities and differences of these countries are demonstrated.

The fifth chapter covers the transition period from their neutrality policy to their EU membership, where the national debates on Finland's and Sweden's EU membership, the modifications of their security policy definitions in accordance with the EU membership and their referendums on the EU membership are analyzed from a comparative perspective.

The sixth chapter focuses on the evolution of the security policies of Finland and Sweden, especially within the Common European Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Since the most problematic issue for these militarily non-allied states is the common defense dimension of the EU, the developments which may have serious implications in terms of the common defense were mostly dealt with in this chapter. Questions such as "How does the policy of non-participation in military alliances affect these countries' standpoints and their participation in general in the CFSP, and in the CESDP?," "How do Sweden and Finland interpret and apply this policy perspective within the CFSP, and in the CESDP?" and "What does membership of the EU imply for the policies of the militarily non-allied countries?," are addressed. With the intention of trying to answer the above-mentioned questions, this thesis aims to consider how and to what extent past experiences and the domestic legacies of neutrality have guided Finland's and Sweden's security policy practices and formulations in the EU, and particularly in the CESDP.

The seventh chapter discusses the new security policy agenda for Finland and Sweden where they felt the need to modify their security policy approaches once again. In this part of the thesis, their contributions to some of the peace-keeping and peace-promoting operations are debated with reference to some specific operations in the Balkans or in Afghanistan.

The eighth chapter presents the comparative analysis of their security policies in the EU. In this chapter, similarities and differences of Finland's and Sweden's security policy perspectives are determined and the factors that affect these differences are examined.

The ninth and concluding chapter offers an overall comparative perspective about the respective security policy profiles of the two countries within the context of the EU, examines the specific security policy behaviors of each state in the Union and presents some of the challenges they may face in the future.

CHAPTER II

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In the conceptual framework of this thesis the terms “neutrality,” “non-participation in alliances” and “small states” are used in order to identify the evolution of the security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden. Since the usage and contents of these terms in literature may change from one perspective to another it would be beneficial to define the contents of these concepts in order to be able to explain and analyze the evolution of the security policy conceptualizations and formulations of these countries both in the past and within the European Union today.

2.1 Defining the Concepts of Neutrality and Non-Participation in Alliances

2.1.1 The Definition of Neutrality

It is stated that in the international system, security policy orientations of the countries can be categorized basically as a membership in an alliance with other states or non-participation in alliances, namely non-alignment or the policy of neutrality. It is admitted that the term neutrality is closely connected with the concept of war where states staying outside of wars between other states have been generally designated as “neutral.” However, the nature of the neutrality policy of each state is deemed to have different characteristics because of the fact that interpretation and definition of neutrality in each nation are greatly influenced by historical, political and traditional factors peculiar to that state. Indeed, the President of Finland, Urho

Kekkonen (1956-1981), expressed these variations on the concept of neutrality by stating that "There are as many neutralities as there are neutral countries."[7]

In addition, it is affirmed that the concept of neutrality also required abstaining from military alliances. Thus, a neutral country sought to stand aside from the international conflicts of the great powers as well as military blocs established by them particularly during the Cold War period.[8] Even though there are various definitions and interpretations regarding the content of the term neutrality and the rights and duties of the neutral countries in literature and achieving conceptual clarity on what constitutes the policy of neutrality seems to be difficult, it can be stated that there are mainly three types of neutrality policy pursued by states in international relations.

The first type is the occasional (temporary, *ad hoc*) neutrality policy followed by states in a particular and specific war between other states without committing the state to neutrality in another war or to any rules of conduct in peacetime.[9] This policy can be defined as a tool used in a certain situation for limited purpose. It is stated that this policy line was codified in 1907 at the Second Hague Peace Conference in Hague Conventions V.[10] According to this, it is admitted that neutral states are obliged not to

---

[7] Hanspeter Neuhold, "The European Neutrals Facing the Challenges of the 1990s," in *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Hanspeter Neuhold, Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 256.

[8] See Kalevi Ruhala, "Alliance and Non-alignment at the onset of the 21st century," in *The New Northern Security Agenda: Perspectives from Finland and Sweden*, eds. Bo Huldt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg and Elisabeth Davidson, Strategic Yearbook 2004 (Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2003), p. 109.

[9] Paul Luif, *On the Road to Brussels, The Political Dimension of Austria's, Finland's and Sweden's Accession to the European Union*, Austrian Institute for International Affairs (Wien: Braumüller, 1995), p. 124.

[10] Surya P. Subedi mentions that principal instruments which govern the rules of neutrality are the Declaration of Paris of 1856 on maritime warfare and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. It is stated that Conventions V and XIII of 1907 concern themselves exclusively with neutrality. The Convention V deals with rights and duties of neutral states in land warfare, whereas Convention XIII deals with the rights and duties in naval warfare. See Surya P. Subedi, "Neutrality in a Changing World: European Neutral States and the European Community," *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 1993): p. 242.

support any belligerent parties and are responsible to guarantee that no attacks on belligerent states are launched from their own territories.[11] It is further pointed out that in the meantime international law used the term "neutrality" as an alternative policy line to participation in wars where an intermediate policy perspective between belligerency and neutrality was not recognized and defined. However, after the Second World War, with the acceptance of the right to self-defense by the states, the impact of third states on wars and armed conflicts began to be a more apparent aspect in international relations where third states may provide assistance to the victim of an armed attack without being combatant or belligerent. Thus, the concept of "non-belligerency" has become legally admitted attitude which indicates an approach between the policy of strict neutrality and participation in the armed conflict on the side of the victim.[12]

The second type of the policy of neutrality is the permanent (*de jure*) neutrality under international law which took shape in the early 19th century. It is affirmed that the status of permanent neutrality commits a state to be neutral in all wars as well as obliges it to avoid some peacetime ties and policies as would make its neutrality in war impossible. In fact, it is accepted that the status and rules of conduct of permanent neutrality are generally based on some binding international documents, such as agreements, treaties or on international guarantees. Nonetheless, it is claimed that since the peace time duties and rights of the permanently neutral states have not been codified precisely, they remained as part of customary international law and have been a subject of political debate in international relations.

The last type of neutrality policy is described as the conventional (continuous, *de facto*) neutrality which is not based on any international legal document. This policy

[11] Gustav Däniker, "Swiss Security Policy in a Changing Strategic Environment," in *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Hanspeter Neuhold, Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 6.

[12] Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 124.

may be regarded to be based on a firm commitment, but not linked to any external guarantees. It is acknowledged that this policy perspective began to emerge from examples of several repeated "occasional or *ad hoc* neutrality" of a state long before the institutional framework of the policy of permanent neutrality was established in international relations. It is argued that the states that pursue this policy mostly try to follow more or less a neutral line in their policy practices, but fail or resist committing themselves to the policy of permanent neutrality under international law by means of binding documents. Within this context, it can be said that among the European countries, Finland and Sweden are usually considered to be states following "continuous or *de facto* neutrality" without any legal basis.[13]

According to Paul Luif, defining the status of a state as a "neutral" state might not be very easy especially when the state declares its policy perspective as a *de facto* neutrality. Since there are no specific and widely admitted obligations, definitions or restrictions with regard to this policy approach, the only measure to judge the actions and policy practices of a *de facto* neutral country would then be the credibility of its behavior in peacetime. Hence, it is underlined that it might not be a simple task to recognize whether or not a country abandoned its neutrality policy and decided to follow another policy perspective.[14] However, Luif describes the overall obligation of neutral states as to avoid providing any military assistance for the belligerent parts in an armed conflict as well as not sending any war material or financial support for military purposes.[15]

[13] Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 125. Paul Luif declares that the beginning of their conventional or *de facto* neutralities is accepted as for Sweden between the years of 1815-1865 and for Finland 1955-1956. See p. 126. For a similar categorization of the neutrality policy see Ole Elgström, *Images and Strategies for Autonomy, Explaining Swedish Security Policy Strategies in the 19th Century* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), p. 29.

[14] Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, pp. 127-132.

[15] Ibid., p. 133.

On the other hand, Birgit Karlsson points out that even though the policy of neutrality has been one way for states to avoid being drawn into the conflict of great powers or belligerent countries, if the conflict enlarges to a great extent, then the possibility of countries to stay neutral decreases. According to Karlsson, from the historical perspective countries rarely have had the opportunity to interpret their policies of neutrality in the strictest sense. In this respect, it is asserted that a country could stay out of military alliances, but this did not guarantee that its policy of neutrality would be respected if a conflict emerges. Therefore, small states, such as Finland and Sweden, which try to remain neutral, often feel the necessity to adapt their interpretation of neutrality policy in accordance with the policies of the stronger power in a conflict or in a particular policy field.[16] In the same manner, it is also stated that since international law has not been very influential in precisely defining the rights of the neutral countries since the Second World War, small states have had problems in defining and sustaining their neutrality policy perspectives in world conflicts, particularly during the Cold War.

It is alleged that the two World Wars made it difficult for states to carry out a strict and impartial neutrality policy owing to the fact that neutral states were either occupied or had to compromise their status of neutrality in favor of the stronger belligerent country, both in terms of economic and military matters. Thus, Risto E. J. Penttilä argues that states which managed to stay out of the First and Second World Wars should be defined as "non-belligerent" instead of being "neutral" on the grounds that they generally violated the norm of impartiality which was a prerequisite for legally defined neutrality policy.[17]

---

[16] Birgit Karlsson, "Neutrality and Economy: The Redefining of Swedish Neutrality, 1946-52," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1995): p. 37.

[17] Risto E. J. Penttilä, "Non-alignment- Obsolete in Today's Europe?," in *European Security Integration: Implications for Non-alignment and Alliances*, eds. Mathias Jopp and Hanna Ojanen, The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 3 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 170.

Another categorization used in the literature concerning the definition of neutrality is based on the difference between "active neutrality" and "passive neutrality" policies followed by states. According to this conceptualization, the term "active neutrality" is used to describe a policy line of a state which tries to have an active role in international affairs as a mediator or bridge-builder in conflicts and emphasizes the importance of international cooperation in world politics. The term "passive neutrality"[18] mainly focuses on the reserved attitude of a state which tries to defend and improve its overall standing among the other states, in particular among other powerful states by way of making passive adjustments in its policy priorities to the changed international conditions.

2.1.2 The Definition of Non-Participation in Alliances (Non-alignment)

Another security policy orientation of countries in the international relations is defined with the concept of "non-participation in alliances" which is also used interchangeably with the term "non-alignment." Likewise, the terms "non-participation in military alliances" and "military non-alignment" are considered to have by and large identical meanings. In this sense, it can be pointed out that the difference between the concepts of "non-participation in alliances" and "non-participation in military alliances" is the emphasis put on the military characteristics of the alliance concerned.

It is stated that even though the policy of "neutrality" was the alternative policy line to membership in military alliances for a long time, this began to change with the end of the Cold War. The Cold War paved the way for abandoning the policy of neutrality gradually from the official security perspectives of the countries.[19] In this regard, it is accepted that the term "non-participation in alliances" may be conceived in Europe

[18] See Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 139.

[19] Laurent Goetschel, "Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 34 (2) (1999): p. 115.

today as the successor of the term "neutrality" used mostly during the Cold War period. In a similar vein, Kalevi Ruhala alleges that today's European countries, which do not participate in military alliances, such as Finland and Sweden, were yesterday's neutral states on the grounds that the essence of non-participation in military alliances, still consists of remaining outside military alliances and abstaining from membership in military alliances while allowing political or military cooperation with other states in order to maintain international peace and security.[20]

Indeed, according to Kalevi Ruhala, the concept of non-participation in alliances is defined in relation to the alliance, which can be described as a bilateral or multilateral agreement on security-political cooperation with regard to common action in case of a threat or aggression against one of the contracting parties. Thus, a military alliance requires a commonly perceived need for security and generally the obligation to defend or assist the allies in case of external threat. With reference to this definition, Ruhala describes the states which do not participate in alliances as "non-allied" and "non-aligned."[21] Alyson J. K. Bailes uses another conceptualization today by classifying the security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden as "non-Allied status" which corresponds with "non-NATO states."[22] Furthermore, it can be stated that the concepts such as "post-neutral," "ex-neutral" or "pre-allied" were used in literature by some authors to describe and analyze the security policy attitudes of Finland and Sweden.[23]

---

[20] Ruhala, "Alliance and Non-alignment at the onset of the 21st century," pp. 109, 117.

[21] Ibid., pp. 103-109.

[22] For this usage see Alyson J.K. Bailes, "European Security from a Nordic Perspective: The Roles for Finland and Sweden," in *The New Northern Security Agenda: Perspectives from Finland and Sweden*, eds. Bo Huldt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg and Elisabeth Davidson, Strategic Yearbook 2004 (Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2003), p. 60.

[23] See Tapani Vaahtoranta and Tuomas Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied? Finnish and Swedish Policies on the EU and NATO as Security Organisations*, UPI Working Papers 29 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000).

It can be stated that Risto E. J. Penttilä approaches this issue from a different perspective, by stating that while Cold War neutrality was maximalistic in scope, its successor, non-alignment within the European Union, was minimalistic in scope. Penttilä claims that the policy of neutrality conducted during the Cold War years covered nearly all foreign relations of a neutral country while the policy of non-alignment carried out within the European Union is in general restricted to the refusal formally to join a military alliance.[24] According to Penttilä, factors such as the expansion of the collective security system in international relations, the intensification of European integration, increasing globalization and the emergence and development of non-military threats such as international crime and environmental threats, diminished the space left for the policy of neutrality.[25] Within this context, the main argument of Penttilä is the fact that over time the policy of non-alignment will lose its significance gradually, as the European integration proceeds, as military cooperation between allied and non-aligned countries intensifies and as the EU continues to establish more binding common foreign and security policies.[26]

Within this framework, Hanna Ojanen emphasizes the inadequacy of the word "non-aligned" to define the security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden within the European Union. Accordingly, she acknowledges that the term "non-aligned" tried to be changed into the term "non-allied" due to its perceived confusing connotations with the non-aligned countries' movement of the early 1950s where states such as Yugoslavia and India declared themselves opposed to the bloc-building of the Cold War. Moreover, the difficulty of finding a precise and adequate expression for occasions in which a country is aligned in terms of political matters but not through military alliances, as in the case of Finnish and Swedish membership in the European Union, paved the way for a search for new formulation. Ojanen further argues that the

[24] Penttilä, "Non-alignment- Obsolete in Today's Europe?," p. 171.

[25] Ibid., p. 175.

[26] Ibid., pp. 167, 176.

concepts of "non-alignment" or "military non-alignment" were mainly created by Finland and Sweden to demonstrate their security perspectives, and thus the contents and scope of these terms solely depend on the will of these countries.[27] In this regard, it is thought that these countries might choose to use these terms or not, in order to define their security policies. In the same way, Hannu Himanen, Ambassador in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, points out that the English translation of the Finnish term *liittoutumattomuus*, which was used to describe the security policy of Finland and which was close to the Swedish *alliansfrihet*, led to a separate discussion among Finnish officials in the years 1992 and 1993. Ambassador states that since the word "non-aligned" was seen as politicized by the Non-Aligned Movement, the word "non-alliance" was chosen as the preferred term after consultation with linguistic specialists.[28]

The ambiguity of the term "non-alignment" was also expressed by some authors on various occasions. For instance, Robert L. Rothstein defines non-alignment as a "tactical principle designed to extract the widest range of advantages from a particular kind of power configuration."[29] As another example, according to Raj Krishna "…non-alignment has always been, in reality, an informal, unstated, unilateral alignment with unnamed powers."[30] In a similar way, when Swedish Minister for Defense Björn von Sydow explained the difference between a neutral and a non-aligned country, he accentuated that as a non-aligned country, Sweden has

---

[27] Hanna Ojanen, *Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP*, Occasional Papers 11 (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2000), p. 2.

[28] Hannu Himanen, "Finland," in *Neutrality and non-alignment in Europe today*, ed. Hanna Ojanen, FIIA Report 6/2003 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003), pp. 25-26.

[29] Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliances and Small Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 247, quoted in Olav Riste, " 'Janus Septentrionalis'? The Two Faces of Nordic Non-Alignment," in *Neutrality in History/ La Neutralite dans L'Histoire*, ed. Jukka Nevakivi (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993), p. 313.

[30] Raj Krishna, "India and the Bomb," *India Quarterly XXI* (1965): p. 122, quoted in Riste, "'Janus Septentrionalis'?," p. 313.

much greater chances to make free decisions. If the country declares itself in advance that it will be neutral, then it has already made a decision.[31]

As a consequence, it can be argued that the usage of the above mentioned concepts interchangeably in the literature concerning the Finnish and Swedish security policies has the possibility to create confusion in the meanings and definitions. Thus, in this thesis, the terms "non-participation in military alliances," "military non-alliance" and "militarily non-allied states" will be used in order to identify the security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden. In other words, Finland and Sweden are described as "militarily non-allied states" or states following a policy of "military non-alliance" and as a consequence the name of their security policy is defined as "non-participation in military alliances." The reason for this is the conviction that these terms may have the capacity to define and explain the policy lines of these countries better than the term "military non-alignment," without allowing a confusion that might be created by the use of the notion of "military non-alignment."

2.2 Defining the Concept of Small States and Their Security Policy Perspectives

It can be stated that Finland and Sweden are generally perceived and categorized as "small states" of Europe in literature. These states are deemed to have some particular attitudes, priorities and standpoints towards world politics. Thus, in order to be able analyze the evolution of Finland's and Sweden's security policy perspectives it would be beneficial to try to clarify the framework of the concept of "small states" and their possible policy perceptions, concerns and priorities especially with regard to the field of security policy.

In the literature of small states it is pointed out that there is still no completely satisfactory definition of a small state and smallness. However, some of the basic

[31] "Swedish Minister Views Country Defense Policy, Slovakia's Interest in NATO Entry," *Bratislava SME*, 4 April 2002, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-NES-2002-0405.

characteristics of small states may be defined as small territory, small population, relatively little military strength, limited raw materials or resources. In terms of the security policy framework, a small state, or a weak state as some authors refer to it, is one that itself recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own national capabilities.[32] In a similar vein, Laurent Goetschel defines the "small state" as one whose position towards its international surrounding may be characterized by a relative insufficiency in influence and in autonomy compared to other states.[33] Likewise, Ole Elgström asserts that since "smallness" involves a lack of required capabilities and creates a kind of dependence upon more powerful states, small states may voluntarily demand the support of a "protecting" great power to counter a threat from a potential aggressor. To put it another way, they may prefer to stay close to a dominant power in order to be able to feel secure against the other powers. Ole Elgström adds that weak states are often depicted as "active adapters" which are constantly reconsidering their proper profiles with regard to relevant power configurations in the international environment. In this sense they may be considered to play generally "passive, adaptive and reactive" roles in international relations, as well as, conceived to adjust their policy priorities and practices in accordance with the changing circumstances and expectations of great power preferences.[34]

With regard to the security policy perspective of small neutral/ militarily non-allied states in Europe, such as Finland and Sweden, it is pointed out that the most important task for these countries was to convince their neighboring great powers that the real cost of conquering their countries would be higher than the benefits from doing so. An example of this is, Finland in the Winter War period which will be stated in the following parts of this thesis. In fact, it can be alleged that for both of

[32] Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp, "Small States and the Europeanization of Public Policy," in *Adapting to European Integration, Small States and the European Union*, eds. Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp (London: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998), p. 4.

[33] Goetschel, "Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?": p. 133.

[34] Elgström, *Images and Strategies for Autonomy*, pp. 24-27.

these countries, the credibility of their respective neutrality policies had utmost importance in the sense that they tried to put much effort towards being able to be perceived as having both the will and the resources to remain neutral even if confronted by a great power threat. It is underlined that the major security policy objectives of these small states were deemed to protect their territorial integrity and to defend their autonomy, namely their freedom of action in the international environment.[35]

In addition, it is mentioned that a small non-allied state's capacity to act may be improved by means of the international norms that support its policy orientation. Therefore, it is considered to be crucial for small states that international law is respected by all states regardless of their power capacity and the role of the United Nations (UN) is improved and strengthened in world politics, as will easily be seen in the Swedish security policy perspective and formulations in the following parts of this thesis. However, it is also accentuated that faced with a threat from one power the small non-allied state may also decide to expand its capacity to act through an informal alliance, so that it may re-establish some security by approaching another great power, to have at least a potential protection against aggression. In this regard, Sweden's hidden contacts with the US and NATO during the Cold War years may be an indication of that policy line carried out by small states in Europe.[36]

As a matter of fact, it is acknowledged that the absence of a direct military threat to most of the states in the European continent today considerably enhanced the physical security of the small states and generally reduced their traditional security concerns. In this regard, it is worth nothing that small states may have various security policy alternatives to promote and safeguard their own national security interests, such as a bilateral alliance with a major power, as in the case of Finland's FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union in the post-war period, which will be mentioned later in this thesis;

[35] Elgström, *Images and Strategies for Autonomy*, pp. 32-34.

[36] Ibid., p. 35.

working through international organizations, such as their membership in the EU in 1995; membership in a military alliance around one or more major powers; and pursuing a policy of non alignment, whether aiming at neutrality in any war or without such a generalized commitment.[37] It can be alleged that these policy alternatives, except the membership in the military alliances, have offered several opportunities for both Finland and Sweden during the post-Cold War era.[38]

Within this framework, Allen Sens emphasizes the importance of multilateral organizations which offer small states several opportunities for membership and participation in a wide variety of forums where they can try to reach their predominant foreign and security policy objective, which may be defined as having a seat at the table or a voice in regional or international affairs with expectations of exerting some degree of influence.[39] By pursuing a strategy of cohesion, a small state can choose to promote its national interests within international organizations with the help of its role as a good institutional citizen. Consequently, it may gain influence and further its national security interests through the promotion of the values embedded in international organizations.[40] It can be asserted that Finland's ambition to be in the "core" countries of the EU, to promote its national security interests by means of integrating Russia into European structures through increased cooperation in its Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) in the EU and its attempts to being a

[37] Håkan Wiberg, "Security Problems of Small Nations," in *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*, eds. Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 8 (London: Brassey's Ltd., 1996), p. 36.

[38] Kent Zetterberg, "Swedish Security Policy 1945-1953, Finland in the Soviet Shadow," in *Security and Insecurity, Perspectives on Finnish and Swedish Defence and Foreign Policy*, eds. Gunnar Artéus and Jukka Nevakivi (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 1997), p. 39.

[39] Allen Sens, "Small-State Security in Europe: Threats, Anxieties and Strategies after the Cold War," in *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*, eds. Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 8 (London: Brassey's Ltd., 1996), pp. 76-77.

[40] Ibid., pp. 90-91.

constructive member state within the Union, in order to be able to be in the "core," may be a good depiction of that policy line.

In this regard, it is argued that membership in the EU may have the possibility to provide both opportunities and advantages for the small states of Europe, such as Finland and Sweden, where they may exert more influence and attain more of what they aim to acquire than if they were left alone to compete with the larger powers. It is claimed that the institutions, rules and procedures of the EU, may provide the small countries with the possibility of being heard, as well as, may protect them against being overwhelmed by the larger members. Hence, Ben Soetendorp and Kenneth Hanf allege that if this assumption is right then these small states of Europe would be expected to be aware of the need to adapt to changes in the institutional context within which they act at the European level.[41] Furthermore, it is asserted that small member states may be in a more favorable and superior position than any other countries to push particular issue areas onto the EU agenda where they may be better placed to build compromises between competing sides by way of acting as neutral negotiators between larger countries of the Union. With regard to the general profile of small member states within the Union, on the one hand it is put forward that small member states would mainly have reactive and flexible attitudes, while on the other hand it is supported that in selected prioritized areas, they would be expected to present more proactive and even inflexible stances, especially in defending their vital national interests.[42]

On the contrary, it is also highlighted that while the small member states of the EU may support the maintenance of closer cooperation and the process of

[41] Ben Soetendorp and Kenneth Hanf, "Conclusion: The Nature of National Adaptation to European Integration," in *Adapting to European Integration, Small States and the European Union*, eds. Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp (London: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998), pp. 193-194.

[42] See Tapio Raunio, "National Politics and European Integration," in *Finland in the European Union*, Tapio Raunio and Teija Tiilikainen (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), pp. 7-9.

institutionalization within the Union, it is the small states again which may be the most sensitive to the sovereignty implications of European integration. Consequently, it is underlined that while integration is in most cases may be considered to be a good development by small states, too much integration is not.[43] Accordingly, it is underlined that in an integrative environment small states may not only attain a high level of security from traditional threats, but also high levels of vulnerability in terms of sustaining their autonomies which enable them to take actions as distinct political entities. Moreover, it is emphasized that for small member states, an integrative Europe may provoke a fear of political marginalization in European institutions and decision-making procedures. One of the main concerns of many small states is the possibility that the benefits of integration in Europe may be concentrated in a core group of countries.[44] In a similar manner, it is accentuated that there is also a possible dilemma for a small country in an international organization, such as the EU, on the grounds that the increased influence may culminate in a decreased autonomy. Thus, each member state, particularly the small member states, generally attempts to create a balance between these two tendencies, influence and autonomy in the organizations. Within this context, it is advocated that a contradiction between influence and autonomy may be affected by how much the small state shares the foreign policy objectives of the other member states of the organization concerned.[45]

It is worth noting that Olav F. Knudsen approaches this issue from a different perspective by declaring that the small state experience may be familiar to any state which has had to deal with the potential threat of a significantly more powerful neighbor. Thus, he claims that it is not the size of the specific unit, but the kind of the relationship that is of particular concern here. Accordingly, he mentions that the

[43] Sens, "Small-State Security in Europe," p. 94.

[44] Ibid., p. 84.

[45] Karoliina Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic* (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2002), p. 16.

experience of power inequality and the manner of coping with it should be the primary focus in the usage of the term "small states." Knudsen further advocates that the process of European integration can be regarded as serious challenge to the continuing existence of smaller political units owing to the increasing pressure for common positions and solutions during this process. [46]

In brief, in this thesis the term "small states" will be used with reference to Olav F. Knudsen's definition which focuses on the power inequality of states in their relationship, instead of the size of their territories, populations or military power. Starting from this perspective, it can be argued that Finland and Sweden may be accepted as small states also within the Union, where there might emerge a power inequality between the militarily non-allied states and the so-called states belong to "core" group of EU which push for the common defense dimension within the Union. One could argue that even though there are not much direct military threats any more for these militarily non-allied small states, as was in the case of the Cold War period, the most serious challenge that Finland and Sweden may face today is the challenge of being marginalized in the increasingly cooperative security policy frameworks especially within the EU.

[46] Olav F. Knudsen, "Analysing Small-State Security: The Role of External Factors," in *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*, eds. Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 8 (London: Brassey's Ltd., 1996), pp. 5-6.

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEUTRALITY POLICIES OF FINLAND AND SWEDEN UNTIL THE SECOND WORLD WAR

One could argue that the security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden were different from each other until the Second World War, due to their different geographical circumstances and distinctive security problems emanating from dissimilar threat perceptions. Thus, it would be beneficial to analyze the respective neutrality policies of these countries in that period in order to be able to explain the evolution of the security policies of Finland and Sweden, with the assumption that nature and characteristics of their neutrality policies in the past may also affect the content of their current security policy perspectives in the EU.

3.1 The History of Finnish Neutrality until the Second World War

It is pointed out that although the beginning of Finland's foreign policy in formal sense was the declaration of its independence on 6 December 1917, Finland started to have relations with other nations before the attainment of full sovereignty. Finland, which was a province of the Kingdom of Sweden, reached its first stage on the road to independence in 1809, when it was conquered by Russian troops and separated from Sweden. At that time, this new Grand Duchy was granted an internal autonomy which allowed it to have its own political institutions, laws, legislature and for a time even its own defense forces.[47] Another argument states that then Finland began to be perceived as an "internally sovereign" state with laws of its own, as a result of the

[47] Max Jakobson, *Finnish Neutrality, A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War* (London: Hugh Evelyn, 1968), p. 3.

Sovereign Pledge in 1809 granting Finland the right to maintain its own system of legislation. Therefore, at that point in time Finland was a state which was subject to the rule of the Russian administration without actually being a part of Russia and it could no longer be regarded as a province, as it had been in the Kingdom of Sweden. On the contrary, from a Russian perspective, Finland was an autonomous area with its own privileges and yet also an integral part of the Russian Empire.[48]

It is stated that the discussions on the question of neutrality started in Finland in 1863[49] owing to the general emergence, acceptance and codification of the notion of neutrality in Europe in the mid-19th century. At that point in time, a neutrality policy was deemed to offer small countries an opportunity to escape the sufferings of wars. Thus, it began to be a significant matter in the Finnish policy considerations. It is pointed out that the discussions regarding the neutrality policy were started by the newspaper *Helsingfors Dagblad* in April 1863, with the proposal that Finland should declare itself neutral. Even though the proposal attracted considerable attention in Finland at that time, it was impossible to implement it due to Russia which had already begun to deploy military equipments and personnel to Finland in order to preempt any unexpected military action. Furthermore, there was a conviction among some Finns that Finland should prefer loyalty and compliance with Russia, instead of a policy of neutrality which had the possibility to deteriorate relations with Russia and thus destroy the entire country. It is argued that when the Russification campaign was launched by the Russian civil servants in Finland in the 1890s, there emerged a very significant division among the Finns about the possibility to maintain the compliance policy with Russia. It is put forward that while some advocated that the Finns should resist the Russian impositions, for some other Finns, it was impossible to resist the superiority of Russia. As a consequence, the new formula of "restricted

[48] Risto E. J. Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe, A Historical Perspective* (Helsinki: National Defence College, 1994), p. 9.

[49] See Pertti Luntinen, "Neutrality in Northern Europe before the First World War," in *Neutrality in History/ La Neutralite dans L'Histoire*, ed. Jukka Nevakivi (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993), p. 108.

compliance" was proposed, according to which Finland should continue negotiations on condition that Russia recognized Finland's special status.[50] Hence it is affirmed that Finland tried to follow a policy of "restricted compliance" in its relations with Russia from the early 1890s until the year 1917 when Finland gained its independence on the date of 6 December. Since Finland had to fight for its independence in dire circumstances, the state-centric tradition was adopted by the country after the independence which mostly drew attention to the importance of values such as sovereignty and territorial integrity that would have predominant roles in the Finnish security policy conceptualizations in the future.

When Finland gained its independence and started to pursue a foreign policy of its own, the policy of neutrality, which could be followed by the Nordic countries in the region in a successful way throughout the First World War, impressed and encouraged the Finns to follow the same line. A characteristic feature of Finland ever since it gained its independence has been a determination to stay uninvolved in international disputes and in particular, armed conflicts. Indeed, a statement of neutrality was considered to be included in the Finnish declaration of independence. However, it is stated that, due to the presence of Russian troops on Finnish territory and the pro-German tendency of the Finnish cabinet which preferred to maintain the possibility of German intervention, the proposal of accepting the policy of neutrality was rejected.[51]

In this regard, Max Jakobson states that since the Soviet Union had been the first country to recognize the independence of Finland on 31 December 1917, it was maintained to be perceived as the enemy of Finland's freedom by the Finnish people. Owing to the forty thousand Russian troops which had remained in Finnish territories even after the declaration of independence, the conservatives who were then in power

[50] Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe*, pp. 8-12.

[51] See Jukka Nevakivi, "Finnish Neutrality," in *Neutrality in History/ La Neutralite dans L'Histoire*, ed. Jukka Nevakivi (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993), p. 34.

in Finland advocated that Finland's foreign policy attached to Germany's support would be in the interest of Finland.[52] This argument was reinforced with the fact that after gaining independence, Finland had to stand on its own feet. Indeed, standing alone in the shadow of an unpredictable Russia was not what the Finnish government wanted in the long term. In fact, in 1961, Urho Kekkonen, the President of Finland, mentioned in his one of the speeches that, at that time of the history the newly-independent Finland had only two alternative foreign policy options to choose from in order to safeguard its security interests, namely to join the anti-Russian front or to try to pursue a neutrality policy in its relations with its Eastern neighbors. Kekkonen states that the reason for Finland to choose the first option was the self-esteem that emerged after the newly-won independence.[53]

Therefore, it is said that Finnish neutrality has only been noted as an aspiration of the Finns that emerged in 1918, in the first weeks of the newly independent state. However, this was quickly replaced by the close relationship of Finland with Germany at that point in history.[54] Germany, indeed, assisted the Finnish government in getting rid of Russian troops from its territory. On the contrary, the Swedes had refused to support the military training of the Finns, due to their policy of neutrality.[55] With the belief that the German support was needed for Finland, a German prince was chosen as the King of Finland to ensure that Germany would continue to protect Finnish independence. However, this policy collapsed with the capitulation of

---

[52] Jakobson, *Finnish Neutrality*, pp. 4-5.

[53] Urho Kekkonen, "Finnish Foreign Policy and the Defence Forces," Speech given in Kouvola, Finland, on 28 December 1961, in *Neutrality: The Finnish Position, Speeches by Dr. Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland*, ed. Tuomas Vilkuna and trans. P. Ojansuu and L. E. Keyworth (London: Heinemann, 1970), p. 109.

[54] See George Maude, *The Finnish Dilemma, Neutrality in the Shadow of Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 60.

[55] See Jukka Nevakivi, "Finnish and Swedish Security Policy before 1945," in *Finnish and Swedish Security, Comparing National Policies*, eds. Bo Huldt, Teija Tiilikainen, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Anna Helkama-Rågård (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2001), p. 21.

Germany in November 1918.[56] Consequently, in 1919 Finland became a republic and K. J. Ståhlberg was elected as the country's first president.[57]

It is alleged that due to these historical experiences with the Russians, in the period between the First World War and the Second World War, there emerged a widespread "Russophobia" in Finnish society and the resulting description of the Soviet Union as Finland's inherited enemy. In addition, it is asserted that the Finns widely saw themselves as "the Western World's outpost in the East" facing a powerful communist country.[58]

Thus, it is stated that in 1918, the idea of declaring neutrality was no longer a relevant option for Finland and the Finnish government would not consider neutrality until a peace agreement was signed with the Soviet Union in October 1920. Owing to the subsequent period of tension in Finnish-Soviet relations at the beginning of 1922, the Finns started to search for other alternatives that could support them against the Soviet Union. Within this context, Finland tried to take part in a Baltic cooperation which was trying to form an alliance against the Soviet Union in 1922. However, it realized that this cooperation was not in the national interests of Finland due to its weakness. In the same way, Finland became the member of the League of Nations with the conviction that the organization would protect the independence of the country without compromising the policy of neutrality.[59] In this respect, Finland tried to establish contacts with the League of Nations up to the 1930s, it was recognized by

[56] Nevakivi, "Finnish Neutrality," p. 34.

[57] Joe Brady, "Chronology of Finnish history," April 2002, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Department for Communication and Culture/Unit for Promotion and Publications, Virtual Finland, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25911 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

[58] Christopher S. Browning, *Coming Home or Moving Home? 'Westernizing' Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Re-interpretation of Past Identities*, UPI Working Papers 16 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 9.

[59] Nevakivi, "Finnish Neutrality," pp. 34-35.

the time that this organization was not capable enough to protect and promote Finland's security interests.[60] In this period, it is underlined that Finland could not improve its relations with Moscow, in spite of the non-aggression pact signed in 1932 with that country.[61]

3.2 The History of Swedish Neutrality until the Second World War

It is acknowledged that the roots of the Swedish neutrality, which went from being a practical policy choice to protect the country after several military defeats to becoming an institutionalized and internalized part of foreign policy, has first been added to the Swedish foreign and security policy by newly crowned King Karl XIV Johan at the end of the 1810s. According to King Karl Johan's strategic plan for the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway, a balanced position between the major European powers was required to be established as a result of the significantly changed geopolitical and strategic position of Sweden. In fact, Sweden which lost most of its possessions and power on the eastern and southern shores of the Baltic Sea during the 18th century, began to lose its status as a Northern great power in those years. It is assumed that the final stage of this severe period of the country was its loss of Finland to Russia in 1809.[62] It was reduced to a small-state status on the European periphery after the Napoleonic Wars. [63]

---

[60] Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe*, p. 14.

[61] Nevakivi, "Finnish Neutrality," p. 35.

[62] Gunilla Herolf and Rutger Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," in *Non-Alignment and European Security Policy, Ambiguity at Work*, Hanna Ojanen, Gunilla Herolf and Rutger Lindahl, The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 6 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p. 157.

[63] Bo Huldt, "Comments on the Swedish Position," in *Challenges to Neutral &Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*, ed. Emily Munro (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005), p. 42. For how the Northern Europe became a periphery of Europe see Jyrki Käkönen, "Local Dimension and Regionalisation: The Northern Peripheries," in *The New North Europe, Perspectives on Northern Dimension*, eds. Lassi Heininen and Jyrki Käkönen, Research Report No. 80 (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1998), pp. 49-54.

In 1818, the new situation for Sweden was expressed in the declaration by King Karl Johan stating that "Separated as we are from the rest of Europe our policy and our interests will always lead us to refrain from involving ourselves in any dispute which does not concern the two Scandinavian peoples."[64] As a matter of fact, in 1833-1834, Russian ambitions in the region threatened British interests and as a result the possibility of great power conflict suddenly emerged with the possibility to spread to the Baltic Sea region. At that point in time, Sweden had been perceiving itself as a relatively weak power, surrounded by powerful neighbors such as Russia, which was deemed to be a constant threat to Sweden.[65]

As a consequence, as tensions rose around the Baltic Sea region, King Karl Johan, concerned with being dragged into a serious war without any apparent national interests, declared a "strict and independent neutrality as the inevitable, only solution" in that circumstance by way of the memorandum of 4 January 1834.[66] It can be commented that as a result of this action, the neutrality policy which was a practical policy choice before, started to become a part of the long term security policy strategy of Sweden. However, it is stated that this "strict and independent neutrality" policy of King Karl Johan, proved difficult to follow unambiguously, as in the case of the Crimean War, when Sweden permitted British and French ships to use its ports.[67] Therefore, Sweden was regarded to pursue an *ad hoc* policy of neutrality at that

---

[64] Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," p. 157.

[65] See Ole Elgström, "Do Images Matter? The Making of Swedish Neutrality: 1834 and 1853," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 35(3) (2000): pp. 252-256.

[66] Johan Eliasson, *The European Security and Defense Policy Process and The Legacy of Neutrality as a Guide to Non-Allied Members' Security Policies*, Campbell Public Affairs Institute (24 October 2003), p. 3. Retrieved from http://scholar.google.com (Accessed 2 September 2005).

[67] Regina Karp, "Security Integration in the Baltic Sea Region: Adaptation of National Preferences to New Challenges," 28 July 2004, p. 20. Online Conference Paper Archive of the Fifth-Pan European International Relations Conference on 9-11 September 2004, The Hague, retrieved from http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/papers/Karp%20-%20Security%20Integration.pdf (Accessed 3 January 2006).

juncture.[68] In the same manner, it is put forth that Swedish neutrality in the 19th century was motivated with pragmatic considerations where the need to abstain from involvement in the rivalries of the great powers and international crises were the main concerns to declare neutrality.[69] Indeed, it is also emphasized that at that point in time, Swedish foreign and security policy was considered to involve a wide spectrum of policy stances. Since these policy stances were referred to as "neutrality," in fact they indicated choices of *Alleingang*, namely armed neutrality in isolation, and of international cooperation.[70]

It is put forward that at this time in Swedish history, certain attempts were made to give the Sweden's neutrality policy a formally permanent character, which were disapproved by the Parliament on the grounds that there was no need for Sweden to abandon its freedom of action, especially since there was no ideal or national interest connected with the permanent neutrality.[71]

It is emphasized that in Sweden the support for neutrality increased over time owing to the stability in politics, the rising living standards and domestic prosperity as a result of the industrialization and the development of welfare-state system. Within this context, it is said that the Swedes started to perceive a kind of superiority of "being better than continental Europe." In the same way, the support for neutrality was so strong that it started to become an inherent part of Swedish policies in the first half of the 20th century. Additionally, it is alleged that neutrality became a

---

[68] Torbjörn Norman, "Stages in Swedish Neutrality," in *Neutrality in History/ La Neutralite dans L'Histoire*, ed. Jukka Nevakivi (Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993), p. 304.

[69] See Jakob Gustavsson, *The Politics of Foreign Policy Change, Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1998), p. 72.

[70] Bo Huldt, "Sweden and European Community-building 1945-92," in *Neutral States and the European Community*, ed. Sheila Harden, The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies (London: Brasseys's Ltd., 1994), p. 108.

[71] Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," p. 158.

constitutive part of Swedes' self-image, that is to say, "being Swedish was equivalent to being neutral."[72]

It is affirmed that the period of increased great power tensions leading up to the First World War caused Sweden, Denmark and Norway to declare their determination to remain neutral in case of a conflict. Consequently, they issued identical declarations of neutrality on 25 October 1912, prompted by the war in the Balkans.[73] After the break-out of the First World War, this stance was again repeated on 3 August 1914. With regard to the nature of Swedish neutrality policy, it is underlined that Sweden's neutrality was different in the sense that it is neither constituted or guaranteed by any international arrangements nor confirmed in the Swedish constitution itself. Furthermore, it is put forward that Swedish neutrality, which was a means rather than an end, was a self-chosen policy. Thus, the Swedish government always has the power to reinterpret the content and definition of that policy in this period.[74]

In addition, the reason for Sweden to be able to keep its position of neutrality at that time in history was considered to be its strong defense capabilities and its protected and secure geographical position. In the same manner, it is argued that Sweden mostly feared Russia and therefore it chose to have good relations with Germany.[75] Despite being successful in following a policy of neutrality and having a position of a neutral state which was not questioned during the First World War, Sweden was deemed to favor Germany and to be against Russia.[76]

---

[72] Eliasson, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, p. 4.

[73] Riste, " 'Janus Septentrionalis'?," p. 314.

[74] Gustav Lindström, "Sweden's Security Policy: Engagement- the Middle Way," Occasional Paper 2, October 1997, European Union: Institute for Security Studies, retrieved from http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ02.html (Accessed 20 February 2006).

[75] Luntinen, "Neutrality in Northern Europe before the First World War," p. 113.

[76] Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," p. 158. According to Nevakivi, since Sweden felt less exposed to the Russian threat at that time, it preferred to keep the Germans at a distance from Sweden. See Nevakivi, "Finnish and Swedish Security Policy before 1945," pp. 20-21.

After the First World War, Sweden had a very secure environment in which Germany was defeated, the newly established Soviet Union was weak, Finland and the three Baltic states were independent, Denmark and Norway strengthened their power in a friendly manner. Within these circumstances, Sweden did not have any serious strategic security concerns. Thus, in the interwar period, it always supported the creation of a stable and just world order through the strengthening of international law and diplomacy. However, it is argued that the establishment of the League of Nations caused a reconsideration of the future conceptualization of the Swedish foreign and security policy. The reason for this was that the neutrality policy could no longer be pursued to the same extent as before, if Sweden became the member of the League of Nations. Some remained hesitant about the prospects of that membership on the grounds that it might cause Sweden to enter into war, while those who supported its membership emphasized the importance of acting in solidarity with the European countries in the formation of the new system for collective security. As a consequence, in 1920, the Parliament decided to approve Sweden's membership in the League of Nations and thus its neutrality policy was temporarily abandoned. Conversely, in the first half of the 1930s, Sweden was faced with the reality that the League of Nations had not been an influential international actor, as was expected. The power vacuum that emerged as a result of this development made Sweden to return to its previous policy of neutrality in case of war.[77]

3.3 A Comparative Perspective

It can be stated that the security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden were very different until the Second World War, due to their different geographical circumstances and distinctive security problems emanating from dissimilar threat perceptions. During that period of history, at first Finland had to fight for gaining its independence and define itself as an independent nation-state in dire circumstances. The position of Finland was much more sensitive than Sweden owing to the fact that

[77] Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," p. 159.

Finland had to deal with a very strong eastern neighbor, Russia. Therefore, it tried to pursue a much more flexible and pragmatic foreign and security policy than Sweden. Correspondingly, it did not hesitate to cooperate with Germany explicitly in order to resist the Russian threat. In the same manner, the image of Russia as the inherited enemy was the most important factor in the security policy considerations of the country in a sense that most of the security policies were formulated with reference to the Russian threat. Likewise, the adoption the neutrality policy in Finland was postponed due to the tensions with the Russians.

On the contrary, it can be asserted that Sweden had a totally different profile at that point in history. Sweden, with a more secure geographical situation, did not feel much concern regarding the maintenance of its state sovereignty. Even though Sweden declared its neutrality, it is alleged that it was in favor of Germany during the First World War, like Finland. Nevertheless, it can be said that Finland's cooperation with Germany was more obvious than Sweden's alleged contributions to the country, which may be interpreted being out of the neutrality policy limits. Furthermore, Sweden had more suitable conditions than Finland to adopt a policy of neutrality very early, which was a self-chosen policy for the country with an open-ended definition. Sweden is said to be able to maintain its neutral position even in the war conditions. The only aspect that can be considered common for these countries was the fact that neither of them considered to accept the permanent neutrality for the security policy formulations in the future, even though there was an uncompleted endeavor in Finland to put the term neutrality in the Declaration of Independence.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY POLICIES OF FINLAND AND SWEDEN FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR UNTIL THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1939 -1990)

It can be stated that in order to be able to understand how past experiences and national traditions of neutrality policy have guided Finland's and Sweden's security policy perspectives in the EU, it would be beneficial to explain the evolution of their security policies and considerations from the Second World War until the end of the Cold War and the content of their respective neutrality policies.

4.1 The Evolution of the Security Policy of Finland

4.1.1 The Security Policy Perspective of Finland during the Second World War

It is stated that in the beginning of the Second World War, Finland, together with Denmark, Norway and Sweden, declared their neutrality in a meeting on 18-19 September 1939. According to their common perspective, neither of the confrontational parties wanted them to be involved in the war.[78] Nonetheless, on 23 August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non aggression pact, namely the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which included a secret protocol leaving Finland in the Soviet sphere of influence. Since Finland refused to allow the Soviet Union to build military bases on its territory, the Soviet Union canceled the nonaggression pact of 1932 and attacked Finland on 30 November 1939. The war defined as the "Winter

[78] Nevakivi, "Finnish Neutrality," p. 36.

War" ended with a peace treaty which was outlined on 13 March 1940, giving southeastern parts of Finland to the Soviet Union. It is underlined that in the Winter War, Finland could resist to the Soviet Union alone and, unlike all other states on the European continent that were involved in the Second World War, Finland was never occupied by foreign forces.[79]

It is stated that the Winter War can be accepted as one of the milestones in the security policy formulation of Finland, which raised Finnish self-esteem showing that even a small nation can survive in an unequal struggle with a major power. Additionally, it demonstrated that the conquest of Finland might be more costly than it was considered to be. On the other hand, from the perspective of the Soviet Union, it showed that Finnish neutrality lacked credibility in reality, which would deteriorate the security framework of the country. Nevertheless, the most striking aspect of the Winter War was claimed to be the failure of the Finns to gain the assistance of other neutral states to protect the integrity of their neutrality, especially Sweden.[80] Indeed, the fact that Sweden did not intervene in the Winter War, was claimed to have an impact on the Finnish security policy thinking in the following years. It was considered that the Finns deceived themselves with the positive presumption that they would not be left alone in that war.[81] Conversely, it is also argued that the fact that Finland hoped Sweden to help guarantee its own security in this process, did not fail completely. The fact that Sweden allowed arms from its own stocks, including the

[79] Seppo Zetterberg, "Main outlines of Finnish history," November 2001, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Department for Communication and Culture/Unit for Promotion and Publications, Virtual Finland, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25909 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

[80] Nevakivi, "Finnish Neutrality," p. 37.

[81] Nevakivi, "Finnish and Swedish Security Policy before 1945," p. 29. On the contrary, from the perspective of Sweden, when the Soviet Union invaded Finland in November 1939, it was Sweden which at first declared its status as a strictly neutral country but then changed its position to "non-belligerent," in order to be able to organize aid for Finland and supply the Finns from its own military stockpiles. See Norman, "Stages in Swedish Neutrality," p. 305.

equipment in which Finland was almost entirely lacking, to be delivered to Finland after 1939 was an important indication in this respect.[82]

In August 1940, the Germans secretly proposed to the Finns some armaments in order to obtain the right to transit troops through the territories of Finland, to and from the occupied Norway. Consequently, Finland accepted the proposal with a resulting agreement which can not be considered to be consistent with the rules of neutrality.[83] Certainly, Germany attacked the Soviet Union from Norway through the northern parts of Finnish territory in 1941. Finland entered the war as a cobelligerent with Germany which enabled the country to defend itself successfully against the Russians. In consequence, the "Continuation War" ended in armistice in September 1944, whose terms were confirmed in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.[84]

4.1.2 The Security Policy Perspective of Finland after the Second World War

It is affirmed that Finland's policy of neutrality in the post-Second World War period grew from the starting points of these wars after which the Finns had to rebuild their war-ravaged country and tried to build good relations of cooperation with their eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union. In the same manner, Tomas Ries asserts that the conclusions perceived by Finland's political leaders after the Winter War, as well as the experiences of the Continuation War with the Russians between the years of 1941-1944, became the basis for Finland's security policy thinking during the Cold War.[85] Indeed, it is argued that Finnish nationalism and the wars with the Soviet

[82] See Phillip A. Petersen, "Scandinavia and the "Finlandization" of Soviet Security," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, Vol. 38, No. 1, The New Europe: Revolution in East-West Relations (1991): p. 60.

[83] Nevakivi, "Finnish Neutrality," p. 38.

[84] Zetterberg, "Main outlines of Finnish history."

[85] Tomas Ries, "Lessons of the Winter War," November 2001, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25937 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

Union reinforced the state-centric tradition in Finnish policy considerations which strongly emphasized the values connected with the state, such as sovereignty and territoriality.[86]

Finland had two foreign and security policy lines in the period after the Second World War. On the one hand, it tried to pursue a policy of conducting bilateral relations with the Soviet Union following the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). On the other hand, it aimed to follow a policy of neutrality. It is acknowledged that after the Second World War, it was very difficult for Finland to maintain a policy of resistance to the Soviet Union to any further extent. Thus, there was a conviction that the only realistic possibility for the country was to ensure its position and security by establishing a mutual understanding with the Soviet Union. It is expressed that after Juho Kusti Paasikivi became the President of Finland in 1946, Finland again started to pursue a policy of "restricted compliance," similar to the one it followed from the early 1890s until 1917. The President Paasikivi was of the opinion that it was the Finnish perception of the Soviet Union as an enemy in the inter war period which was particularly responsible for Finland's wars with the Soviet Union.[87] Hence, it was assumed that the policy of "restricted compliance" would provide a stable and peaceful atmosphere for Finland where the country could acquire freedom of movement in its foreign policy matters.[88] However, the optimistic perspective of the President and the positive developments in this respect did not continue for a long time.

At the beginning of 1948, the Soviet Union submitted its proposal for the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance which was regarded as one of the

[86] Teija Tiilikainen, "The Finnish Presidency of 1999, Pragmatism and the Promotion of Finland's Position in Europe," in *European Union Council Presidencies, A Comparative Perspective*, ed. Ole Elgström (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 105.

[87] Browning, *Coming Home or Moving Home?*, p. 9.

[88] Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe*, p. 15.

most significant developments in the formation of Finland's security policy until the end of the Cold War. Even though the Treaty was considered by the President Paasikivi, as harmful for Finland, Finland felt the need to enter the negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to prevent any conflict with that country. It is mentioned that the main purpose of Finland during the negotiations was to reach an agreement providing the Soviets with the guarantee of the security of its north-western border, while at the same time, preserving Finland's freedom of action in terms of its foreign and security policy.[89]

As a consequence, Finland signed The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) in 1948 which defined the basic features of Finnish-Soviet relations in the Cold War.[90] The preamble of this treaty contains a specific sentence recognizing Finland's desire to remain outside of the conflicts between the great powers. This has been interpreted and admitted by some as the Soviet Union's recognition of Finland's right to pursue a policy of neutrality. Accordingly, it is alleged that the treaty might be accepted as an important and new starting point, although not an essential one, for Finland to begin to pursue a neutrality policy.[91]

In order to understand the nature of Finnish-Soviet relations and Finland's own security policy considerations in the Cold War period, it would be beneficial to examine the first article of the treaty. Accordingly, it is asserted that the central idea of the treaty is contained in Article 1 which notes that in the possibility of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed attack by

---

[89] Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe*, p.16.

[90] For further detailed information and analysis with regard to Finland's relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War years, see Roy Allison, *Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-84* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1985); Timo Vihavainen, "Finland's relations with the Soviet Union 1944 - 1991," November 2001, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Department for Communication and Culture/Unit for Promotion and Publications, Virtual Finland, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=26480 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

[91] Jukka Nevakivi, "Finnish Security Policy in a Geostrategic Perspective," in *Security and Insecurity, Perspectives on Finnish and Swedish Defence and Foreign Policy*, eds. Gunnar Artéus and Jukka Nevakivi (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 1997), p. 23.

Germany or any state allied with Germany, Finland will fight to repel this attack and defend its own territorial integrity. It is reported that in such a case, the Soviet Union will give Finland the help required. It is claimed that the fact that the Soviet interests in Finnish territory were mostly based on the Soviet defense strategy was indicated in this article. In other words, Finnish independence would be safeguarded, if Finland could assure that its territory would not be used for any aggression against the Soviet Union.[92] It is regarded that with the treaty, while Finland accepted not to permit its territory to be used as a base or a route of aggression against the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union on its part recognized Finland's desire to remain outside the conflicts of interests between the two great powers, which was conceived by some as its recognition of Finnish neutrality.[93]

Nonetheless, it is argued that, through this treaty, Finland was committed to defend not only its own territory but also of the Soviet Union, if the Soviet Union is attacked by way of the Finnish territory. Therefore, this article of treaty was criticized as being a strange, may be controversial, obligation imposed by the Soviet Union for a neutral state to undertake.[94] Thus, to defend a great power under certain circumstances might not be in line with the policy of neutrality and would have some policy implications in practice for the country such as jeopardizing the credibility of its neutrality policy stance.

Nevertheless, it is pointed out that, Paasikivi's successor Urho Kekkonen (1956-1981) adopted this treaty as a basis for the foreign and security policies which he conducted during his Presidency, making the Western powers acknowledge the

[92] Pekka Visuri, "Neutral Military Security in a Changing Europe: A Finnish View," in *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Hanspeter Neuhold, Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 49.

[93] Nevakivi, "Finnish Security Policy in a Geostrategic Perspective," p. 23.

[94] Maude, *The Finnish Dilemma*, p. 67.

neutrality policy of Finland.[95] According to Kekkonen, the FCMA was the first document of international law where Finland's neutrality policy was set forth. Kekkonen described the logic of Finnish neutrality by stating that a small country like Finland can not have a great impact on what is happening in the world. Therefore, for its national interests, it had to adapt itself to actual conditions of history rather than to strive at a change in them.[96] He always underlined the importance of conducting good relations with the Soviet Union to be able to extend Finland's relations with other countries in Europe. As a result of his policy, Finland began to play a more active role in the international policy. However, it is also argued that the relationship of Finland and the Soviet Union at that point in time was described as a continuous trench warfare in which the Soviet Union highlighted the FCMA Treaty as the basis of Finnish foreign and security policy, in order to keep Finland in the Soviet sphere of influence, whereas Finland underscored the importance of neutrality policy to keep a distance from the Soviet Union.[97]

In this respect, Finland was regarded to pursue a "passive neutrality policy" in a real sense in the mid-1950s, in particular starting from the year of 1955.[98] It is pointed out that the urgent aim of the neutrality policy of Finland, carried out during that period, was to improve Finland's standing between the two blocs, as a small country with a

---

[95] Nevakivi, "Finnish Security Policy in a Geostrategic Perspective," p. 23.

[96] Urho Kekkonen, *Puheita ja kirjoituksia* 2 1956-67 (Helsinki: Weilin+Göös, 1967), p.12 quoted in Teija Tiilikainen, *Europe and Finland, Defining the Political Identity of Finland in Western Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1998), pp. 153-154.

[97] Keijo Korhonen, *Sattumakorpraali* (Otava: Helsinki 1999), pp. 156-193, quoted in Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?*, p. 10.

[98] See Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 139. On the other hand, there is also another argument about the nature of Finnish neutrality. Accordingly, it is alleged that during its history Finland was a truly and genuinely neutral country only for a few months- from the expiry of the Treaty of FCMA with the Soviet Union in January 1992 to its candidature for the EU membership in March 1992. See Johanna Vesikallio, "La Finlande et la Suède dans le processus de réforme de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l'Union européenne," Université Robert Schuman Strasbourg, DESS Eurojournalisme- Centre universitaire d'enseignement du journalisme (CUEJ), Mémoire (1997) retrieved from http://cuej.u-strasbg.fr/formation/euroj/euroj_memoire/96_97/vesikallio.pdf (Accessed 23 October 2006).

long common border with the Soviet Union. Teija Tiilikainen confirms that the Finnish neutrality policy, which was conducted at that juncture, had a political nature, rather than a legal nature or commitment and emphasizes that it was intended primarily to give the country more room for maneuver.[99]

On the other hand, at the beginning of the 1950s, the continuous increase of the Soviet armed forces and the gradual development of the Soviet Union into a super power, affected the morale and self-confidence of the Finnish people. Additionally, it is affirmed that in Finland all major foreign and even domestic policy decisions were carried out with an a priori assessment of possible Soviet reaction. Therefore, a very well-known concept, "finlandization," appeared as early as the beginning of the 1950s, indicating the erosion of the country's capability for resistance to external pressures or powers, particularly the Soviet Union.[100] It also became a concept used to describe a country whose obedience to the Soviet Union reduced its ability to pursue an independent foreign policy.[101]

Since the foundation of the Nordic Council in 1952, the Soviet Union objected to Finland's participation in the organization owing to the conviction that the Council was linked to the North Atlantic bloc. Likewise, even Finland's membership in the United Nations was postponed until 1955,[102] when the international atmosphere became peaceful enough for this membership, due to the suspicion of the Soviet

---

[99] Teija Tiilikainen, "Finland in the EU," in *Finnish and Swedish Security, Comparing National Policies*, eds. Bo Huldt, Teija Tiilikainen, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Anna Helkama-Rågård (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2001), p. 61.

[100] Nevakivi, "Finnish Security Policy in a Geostrategic Perspective," p. 23.

[101] Daniel F. C. Austin, *Finland as a Gateway to Russia: Issues in European Security* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996), p. 2. However, it is asserted that from the Finnish perspective, the use of the term "finlandization" might be unfair due to the fact that Finland's dependence on the Soviet Union had started to decrease, not to increase, during the post-war period. See Martti Häikiö, *A Brief History of Modern Finland* (Lahti: Lahti Research and Training Centre of the University of Helsinki, 1992), p. 97.

[102] See Risto E. J. Penttilä, *Finland's Search for Security through Defence, 1944-89* (London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991), p. 63.

Union concerning the credibility of Finland's neutrality policy. In the end, Finland became a member of the Nordic Council in October 1955 and the member of the United Nations in December 1955. Nonetheless, in order to alleviate Soviet fears of Nordic military cooperation, the Finnish government felt the need to assure the Soviet Union that Finland would not participate if security related matters were debated in the Council.[103]

During the 1960s, it was still believed that Finland's ability to preserve its neutrality under conditions of growing international tension was quite limited.[104] Indeed, in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union discarded its unconditional recognition of Finland's neutrality and began to impose some pressure on the country and started to criticize the neutrality policy as being in opposition to the treaty. It is mentioned that, although Finland did not interpret its neutrality as being inconsistent with the treaty, from the Soviet perspective, they were inconsistent with each other and the treaty was essential for the Soviets, whereas neutrality was simply an aspiration of the Finns.[105]

It can be claimed that the concerns related to the neutrality of Finland may be very reasonable, when some of the words of the President of Finland are taken into consideration. In 1965, Urho Kekkonen, the President of Finland, expressed in one of his speeches that the neutrality policy is not and must not be an end itself; instead the purpose of neutrality is to promote the country's own vital interests. Also, it was confirmed that the policy of neutrality is a means not an end and value. Therefore, if the national interests and the neutrality policy of Finland contradict with each other, the national interests should always have the priority and be much more important

[103] Penttilä, *Finland's Search for Security through Defence*, p. 64.

[104] Iivonen, "Perestroika, Neutrality, and Finnish-Soviet Relations," pp. 143-144.

[105] Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe*, p. 19.

than the policy of neutrality.[106] On another occasion, he asserted that the policy of neutrality of the same country may even change as a result of the changes and developments occurring in the international relations,[107] indicating the pragmatic approach of Finland in terms of neutrality policy.

In fact, Finland started to show increased activism in the 1960s. Active bridge-building between the military blocs of the West and East, which was seen in Finland as a means to promote the country's own security interests in a divided Europe, was an important aspect of its foreign policy since the 1960s. According to Eero Waronen, after the Second World War, neutrality policy of Finland was an optimal solution for the country itself mainly because of two reasons. First, it is alleged that Finland was able to exploit its neutral position for its own national benefits, not only in terms of military security but also in terms of the country's prosperity. It is asserted that the neutrality policy made it possible for Finland to develop an efficient and growing economy, by having good trade relations at the same time with both of the West and East during the 1970s and the 1980s. Second, it is claimed that the position of Finland as a neutral bridge builder between the blocs, enabled the country to better contribute to the formation of a European security environment.[108] It is also highlighted that Finnish activism, in terms of security issues, increased especially when it became a member of the Security Council in 1969-1970.[109] However, it is also alleged that

---

[106] Urho Kekkonen, "Neutrality," Speech given at a lunch held by Prime Minister Tage Erlander at Harpsund, Sweden, on 11 April 1965, in *Neutrality: The Finnish Position, Speeches by Dr. Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland*, ed. Tuomas Vilkuna and trans. P. Ojansuu and L. E. Keyworth (London: Heinemann, 1970), p. 179.

[107] Urho Kekkonen, "Finland's Path in a World of Tensions," Speech given at the General Church Meeting in Vaasa, Finland, on 6 January 1967, in *Neutrality: The Finnish Position, Speeches by Dr. Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland*, ed. Tuomas Vilkuna and trans. P. Ojansuu and L. E. Keyworth (London: Heinemann, 1970), p. 199.

[108] Eero Waronen, "Finnish Bridge-Building in a Changing Europe," in *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Hanspeter Neuhold, Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 211-215.

[109] See Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 137.

since confidence in Finland's ability to maintain its way of life between the West and East, was increased as a result of its attempts[110] made in the early 1960s, there were still doubts concerning Finland's strong trading ties with the Soviet Union.[111] Likewise, with regard to the characteristics of Finnish neutrality, it is argued that the way Finland conducted its policy of neutrality was sometimes different from that of the other neutrals due to the impact of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Within this international context, the European integration process was interpreted from a realist perspective, in the sense that its meaning was mainly related to the division of Europe into two conflicting blocs for Finland, a country which belonged to the losers of the Second World War. Tiilikainen argues that in Finland, European integration was perceived as a Western European project of economic integration which could be beneficial for the Finnish economy, however being a Western project, it was considered to be inconsistent with the policy of Finnish neutrality. Therefore, membership in the European Community (EC) was not a possible policy alternative for Finland until the disintegration of the Soviet Union which caused an "identity crisis" for the country itself.[112]

The official Finnish view regarding membership to the European Community was presented in the Government's Report to Parliament in November 1988. Accordingly, Finland's policy of neutrality was not compatible with the membership but in order to protect its national interests in West European integration process, Finland had to have close cooperation with the Community itself.[113] In fact, before its European

[110] Such as trying to strengthen its commercial interests in the west, while at the same time both emphasizing its neutrality policy and modernizing its armed forces with the help of the Soviet Union.

[111] Jukka Nevakivi, "Independent Finland between East and West," in *Finland, People, Nation, State*, eds. Max Engman and David Kirby (London: Hurst& Company, 1989), p.143.

[112] Tiilikainen, *Europe and Finland*, pp. 158-159.

[113] *Finland and Western European Integration-The Government's Report to the Parliament on the Finnish Position on West-European Integration*, 1 November 1988, Helsinki 1988, quoted in Waronen, "Finnish Bridge-Building in a Changing Europe," p. 216.

Union membership, Finland's policies towards European integration were basically aimed to have as closer cooperation as possible with the European organizations within the limits of its neutrality policy. However, EC membership was thought to be incompatible with Finnish policies on the grounds that it was perceived to be closely associated with the bloc division in Europe. In the same way, it was believed that Finland's involvement in the Western economic cooperation would also culminate in ensuring political cooperation with the Western countries as well. Thus, this process would enable Finland to be much closer to the Western sphere of influence, which would cause some suspicion in the Soviet Union about the position of Finland. Furthermore, from Finland's perspective, EC membership implied binding political commitments that were not well-suited with a continuation of the neutrality policy which required more autonomous decision-making capacity in foreign policy.[114] Thus, Finland could not join the EC even though economic cooperation with Western countries was deemed to be very important for the national interests of the country at that time.

4.2 The Evolution of the Security Policy of Sweden

4.2.1 The Security Policy Perspective of Sweden during the Second World War

With regard to Sweden's position, it is explained that, even though the neutrality policy of Sweden was re-established in 1936, following the failure of the League of Nations, it was again challenged during the Second World War.[115] When war broke out in September 1939, the Swedish government's primary objective was to keep the

[114] Hanna Ojanen, "Finnish non-alignment: drills in flexibility," in *Non-Alignment and European Security Policy, Ambiguity at Work*, Hanna Ojanen, Gunilla Herolf and Rutger Lindahl, The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 6 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p. 89.

[115] For a detailed analysis of Sweden's foreign and security policy during the Second World War, see Wilhelm M. Carlgren, *Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, trans. Arthur Spencer (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977); see also, M. Gunnar Hagglof, "A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (April 1960): pp. 153-167.

country out of a conflict that caused much suffering and damage in Europe. With this in mind, it declared its strict neutrality policy because it was believed that Sweden's policy of neutrality was a very important factor that would enable the country to come out of the Second World War unharmed. In spite of the fact that Sweden tried to follow a strict neutrality policy during the war,[116] there were some doubts regarding the content and interpretation of that policy. For instance, the neutrality of Sweden in that period is defined as the "pragmatic neutrality"[117] which indicates a policy allowing for tactical modifications.

Indeed, several examples concerning Sweden's assistance to its neighbors and its attempts to safeguard the independence of the country, which can not be considered as a passive neutrality policy, were underscored. For example, it is said that when the Soviet Union invaded Finland in November 1939, it was Sweden which at first declared its status as a strictly neutral country but then changed its position to "non-belligerent." This new position, different from being neutral, permitted Sweden to organize aid for Finland and to supply the Finns from its own military stockpiles if need be. In addition to this, Sweden did grant Germany some military-political concessions, such as the right given to the Germans to use the Swedish territory with the aim of transporting German soldiers on leave to and from Norway during the first years of the War.[118]

[116] There are different interpretations regarding the situation of Sweden in the Second World War. For example, it is advocated that it was not the declaration of neutrality that kept Sweden out of the Second World War. Instead, it is argued that Sweden's isolated geopolitical position behind German frontiers made it possible for Sweden to stay outside of the war. See Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," p. 161.

[117] Karlsson, "Neutrality and Economy": p. 38.

[118] Norman, "Stages in Swedish Neutrality," p. 305.

According to Bengt Sundelius, these activities were all apparent deviations from a strict definition of neutrality.[119] It is also mentioned that there were some nuances in Sweden's policy of neutrality which was a flexible strategy allowing for tactical modifications, depending on time and circumstance. In the same way, it is claimed that during the Second World War the policy of Sweden bent one way to adjust to the pressures coming from Germany in the beginning of the war, on the other hand, it bent later on to accommodate the demands from the Western powers.[120]

In the same way, it is stated that the first indirect usage of neutrality at that time in Swedish history was the term "alliance freedom" in peacetime, which essentially implied Sweden's abstention from Great Power military alliances and its aversion to Great power blocs. The new symbol was a product of second half of the 1940s as a result of the fact that events and developments required a more explicit understanding of the rather battered and damaged term "neutrality." Therefore, to be able to define the security policy perspective of the country, this term started to be used sometimes in place of neutrality, interchangeably.[121] Hence, the Swedish policy of freedom from alliances in peacetime in order to stay neutral in war time, has often been labeled in short as the Swedish policy of neutrality.[122]

---

[119] Bengt Sundelius, "Sweden: Secure Neutrality," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 512, The Nordic Region: Changing Perspectives in International Relations (November 1990): p. 118.

[120] See Ake Sandler, "Sweden's Postwar Diplomacy: Some Problems, Views, and Issues," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December 1960): p. 924.

[121] I. William Zartman, "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1954): p. 156.

[122] For the same definition, see Brundtland, *On the Security and Defense Issues in Northern Europe*, p. 3; Karlsson, "Neutrality and Economy": p. 38.

4.2.2 The Security Policy Perspective of Sweden after the Second World War

It is expressed that during the post-war period, the Swedish government had a two dimensional approach in its security policy perspective. On the one hand, it committed to its traditional neutrality policy with a credible national defense by means of its undamaged industrial base and well-built defense force.[123] There was an agreement in Sweden to have a strong defense due to the conviction that it would strengthen the position of the country in a way that would deter aggression and to make the defeat of Sweden much more costly for the great powers. Therefore the neutrality policy pursued by Sweden at that time in history was also described as the armed neutrality.[124]

On the other hand, it continued to promote international cooperation and understanding with the belief that security can be enhanced not only by national defense but also by an international environment less conducive to conflicts. It is underlined that national security interests were best served in a more stable environment in which there is a less possibility for conflict. Within this context, it is also supported that to increase the security condition of the Nordic region and try to remain outside of the bloc formation of two superpowers were utmost importance for Sweden. Sundelius acknowledges that the concept of "active neutrality"[125] is used to describe the policies of Sweden at that juncture, indicating all the Swedish efforts regarding its commitment to the United Nations, including its multinational

[123] It is stated that at that point in Swedish history, Sweden had the ambition to be a "moral great power" and at the same time wanted to stay far from military alliances. This condition demanded a high degree of military self-reliance. Hence, Sweden maintained domestic production of technologically advances submarines, military aircrafts and tanks. It is emphasized that at that time even the Swedish Air Force was the fourth largest air force in the Western world. See Gunnar Åselius, "Swedish Strategic Culture after 1945," *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol. 40 (1) (2005): p. 27.

[124] Zartman, "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia": pp. 145-147.

[125] It is pointed out that this active neutrality policy was closely connected with the personality of Olof Palme who became the Prime Minister of Sweden in 1969. See Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 136.

peacekeeping forces and its active role in international affairs as a mediator and bridge-builder in conflicts.[126] In brief, throughout this period, the major principle of Swedish foreign and security policy was to support as much international cooperation as possible on the condition that it would be consistent with the principle of "alliance freedom" which had the basis of lessening world tension but not contributing to further world division.

It is worth nothing that there were two important initiatives concerning the international and regional cooperation in the field of security, which had the possibility to affect the future shape of Sweden's security policy perspective and objectives in the second half of the 1940s: the establishment of the United Nations and the Scandinavian Defense Alliance.

Sweden became a member of the United Nations in 1946. Since there were some doubts regarding the compatibility between the policy of neutrality and the future probable commitments in the military field as a result of this membership, Sweden emphasized the importance of the solidarity aspect of this organization symbolizing universal values. In this sense, it was pointed out by Sweden that the credibility of the neutral policies would be judged in terms of their contribution to the formation of new system of international relations. It is pointed out that the support of collective security as well as participation in peacekeeping activities became one of the cornerstones of Swedish foreign and security policy from the late 1940s onwards. Sweden took an active role in the United Nations especially demonstrating a specific interest in the mediation and peace-keeping activities.[127]

[126] Sundelius, "Sweden: Secure Neutrality": p. 119.

[127] The UN's role as the primary platform for Swedish foreign policy became especially apparent when Dag Hammarskjöld from Sweden was appointed the Secretary General of the UN in 1953. Sweden participated in most of peacekeeping activities that were undertaken within the framework of the UN, namely all the peacekeeping missions in the Middle East, as well as the missions to Korea and Congo. Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," pp. 166-167.

In the mid-1960s, Sweden began to take part in international opinion-building activities concerning violations of international law and human rights in some of the international conflicts, in order to contribute much more to the international affairs. It is stressed that Sweden mostly worked for the strengthening of international law because it supported that strengthened international law was more beneficial to small states than to large states, on the grounds that international law was applicable to every state in a conflict, irrespective of how powerful they are. It is affirmed that Sweden contributed to a peaceful solution of regional disputes by way of its mediation and bridge-building efforts, which also helped the state to enhance its national status and prestige, and possibly also its influence, in the international politics.[128]

In 1948, Sweden proposed a project to keep the Scandinavian region out of the Cold War; this was the Scandinavian Defense Alliance. It would be outside of the bloc division. This project was not realized due to the decision of Denmark and Norway to be members of NATO in 1949 and Finland's recently concluded treaty with the Soviet Union on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). It is argued that although this initiative was recognized to be a break with neutrality owing to being a defense alliance, it was admitted as being compatible with the Swedish long-standing security policy since the defense alliance was to be outside of the bloc division.[129]

Consequently, with the failure of this attempt, Sweden again returned to its traditional policy of neutrality, formulated as "freedom from alliances in peacetime, aiming at

---

[128] Ulf Bjereld, "Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics, 1945-90," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1995): p. 23.

[129] Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," p. 162.

neutrality in the event of war"[130] which had considerable domestic support based on the belief that it helped to protect the country from the devastations of wars since 1814.[131] Within this framework, there was a conviction in Sweden that being a non-participant in alliances, Sweden could not count on anyone else to help if attacked. The armed forces therefore continued to be built up to provide the country with a proportionately strong territorial defense.[132] In that period, although it is claimed that the neutrality policy of Sweden was more of a strategic necessity than a moral virtue, there is a counter- argument stating that a policy which can protect people from the sufferings of war, may be regarded as morally superior to any other policies that would create a risk against these fundamental values.[133] According to this argument, the Swedish neutrality at that time in history had been based on some moral values as well.

In this sense, the Finnish scholar Harto Hakovirta underlines the importance of the principles of credibility and respectability for the neutral states to have successful peacetime neutrality. Hakovirta defines the basic problem of neutrality pursued by the states at that time in history, as its inherent partiality occurring from the neutral states' Western ties. Hakovirta further argues that this type of neutrality is not real neutrality, but it is "Western neutrality" or a kind of contradictory effort at maintaining a neutral image despite having some kind of Western tendency and inclination. Accordingly, it is pointed out that at that juncture the Swedish government found a formula to balance the credibility and respectability components

[130] The Swedish definition of this formulation is *Alliansfrihet i fredstid syftande till neutralitet i krigstid*. See Ruhala, "Alliance and Non-alignment at the onset of the 21st century," p. 113. This definition is also termed "non-alignment in peacetime aiming at neutrality in wartime" or "non-participation in alliances in peacetime aiming at neutrality in the event of war" where the terms "non-alignment" "non-participation in alliances" and the "freedom from alliances" are used interchangeably in literature, in order to identify the security policy of Sweden.

[131] Sundelius, "Sweden: Secure Neutrality": p. 118.

[132] Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," p. 164.

[133] Sundelius, "Sweden: Secure Neutrality": p. 122.

of its neutrality policy, namely used the term "the committed neutral" which describes Sweden's strong commitment to its policy of neutrality.[134] I. William Zartman defines the Swedish security policy from a different perspective. According to Zartman, the Swedish neutrality was "ideological non-neutrality" and proves his argument with the statements of the then Prime Minister of Sweden, Tage Erlander (1946-1969), in 1951 which affirms that Sweden recognizes ideological affinity with Western democracy.[135] On the other hand, Simon Moores asserts that at that juncture, the US decision makers were well aware that despite Swedish detachment from the Atlantic Alliance and appeals from the Erlander Government for the relaxation of tensions between the two superpowers, Sweden's military connection was firmly with the Western countries.[136] In brief, at that point in time, Sweden was regarded as a neutral country which maintains close connections with and inclination towards the Western world in practice. Hence, the nature and content of Sweden's neutrality policy was very imprecise in terms of both its discourse and the actual policy practices.

During the Cold War, although the official policy conducted was neutrality, it is presently known that Sweden trusted that it would be supported by the West and made secret preparations for military cooperation with NATO in case the Soviet Union attacked Sweden. It is also claimed that Sweden might have made some hidden preparations with NATO for situations perhaps even before such an attack of the Soviets. In February 1994, The Commission on Neutrality Policy, whose task was to investigate the actual content of Swedish neutrality for the period 1949-1969,

[134] Harto Hakovirta, *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 26, quoted in Sundelius, "Sweden: Secure Neutrality": p. 123.

[135] Zartman, "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia": p. 150.

[136] Simon Moores, "'Neutral on our Side': US Policy towards Sweden during the Eisenhower Administration," *Cold War History*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April 2002): p. 30.

revealed its report which proved that Sweden had some hidden links with the West[137] as well as extensive cooperation with NATO but did not find any evidence of formal contacts to have taken place between Sweden and NATO on this matter during the investigated period.[138] According to the Commission, Sweden predicted that it would necessitate Western assistance to defend itself against a Soviet attack and the West noticed that to support Sweden would be in accordance with its own interests. It is also mentioned that even though possible arrangements for cooperation were made in that period, Sweden neither took measures for receiving any large-scale direct assistance and support from NATO, nor obtained any formal security guarantees from any Western great powers. Instead of this, the form of the assistance which Sweden would receive was indirect assistance. Thus, it is said that Sweden made some preparations and planning which would have enabled the United States to take military actions against the possible targets in the Soviet Union across the Baltic Sea, as well as it maintained high-level personal contacts with the prominent Western states in this process.[139]

In order to make the coordination of air operations between Sweden and NATO possible, some secure ways of communications were established with Norway and Denmark and also Sweden exchanged air defense intelligence with NATO, all of which continued until the end of the Cold War. It is also asserted that the cooperation of Sweden and NATO was not solely based on the Swedish desire to receive some

[137] For detailed information about the United States' relations with Sweden in the Cold War, see John Martin Pederson, "The United States' relations with Norway and Sweden: Ideology and Culture in the Cold War, 1949-1961," Proquest Digital Dissertations Full-Text (Ph.D. diss., The University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1998).

[138] In this sense, Ola Tunander affirms that in spite of being a neutral state, Sweden was, according to various sources, an "unofficial ally" of NATO and Sweden's ties to NATO were not defined in written documents, but the links were only on the basis of trust between a few individuals. For a detailed analysis of Sweden's NATO ties during the Cold War years, see Ola Tunander, "The Uneasy Imbrication of Nation-State and NATO, The Case of Sweden," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 34(2) (1999): pp. 169-203.

[139] Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?*, p. 8.

assistance; also it was NATO which considered crucial to defend all the Scandinavia, including Sweden itself. The Commission on Neutrality Policy proved this statement with reference to the United States' decision in 1960 concerning the significance of being prepared to help Sweden in the event of Soviet aggression. This indicated the fact that Sweden was in reality protected by NATO's security guarantees and the United States. Furthermore, as regards to the nature of the Swedish neutrality, it is pointed out that during the Cold War, NATO did not really trust that Sweden could sustain its neutrality policy if a war broke out. Also, it did not regard Sweden's neutrality policy as a hindrance to its military cooperation, thus, it always perceived Sweden as a possible member of the Western family and expected that Sweden would unite with the Western countries in the struggle against the attacks of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it is commented that Sweden is also regarded as "pro-Western neutral" due to its close relations with the West during the Cold War years.[140]

It can be advocated that the 1994 Report of the Commission on Neutrality Policy also substantiated the concern regarding the content of Swedish neutrality and revealed the fact that Sweden was much more a part of NATO's European contingency planning than was a completely neutral country during the Cold War. Furthermore, this report demonstrated that even though Sweden officially pursued a policy of neutrality, in reality it also searched for other possible guarantees which go beyond the traditional neutral boundary. During that time, Sweden carried out a policy of neutrality which could have easily been abandoned in favor of alignment. Hence, if its policy of neutrality was failed, Sweden would have easily cooperated with the West in the field of security.

It can be stated that in spite of its policy of neutrality, Sweden was deemed to have a western orientation which was especially noticeable with regard to its market connections during the Cold War period. It is asserted that Sweden became economically integrated with the Western Europe from the beginning of the Cold

[140] Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?*, p. 9.

War. Such integration process was perceived to be solely an economic matter that could be consistent with the policy of neutrality.[141]

However, a full membership in the European Community was not on the political agenda of Sweden at that juncture. On 22 August 1961 this policy was announced by the Social Democratic Prime Minister Tage Erlander who declared that Sweden's full membership in the EC was out of the question and asserted that Sweden's policy of non-alignment would be incompatible with the European integration process in the long term.[142] However, it is stated that Sweden's tendency towards having closer institutional cooperation with Europe began to emerge in 1961 when Britain applied for the membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). In fact, it is stated that Sweden wanted to open negotiations on closer connection with the EC three times in the years 1961, 1967 and 1969-1970, but never expressed interest in becoming a full member.[143] Since both countries were members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Britain's departure was not consistent with Swedish economic interests. As a result, there was significant discussion in Sweden concerning the goals of the EEC and potential threats that European integration might create. Sweden decided not to apply for membership in view of the negative political atmosphere in the country. It is regarded that the main reason for that decision was the concern for the credibility of Swedish non-participation in alliances. As a consequence, Sweden submitted its application for associate membership of the EEC instead. When Britain applied for membership again in 1967, Sweden once more made an application without declaring explicitly whether it was searching for full

[141] Mikael af Malmborg, "Sweden in the EU," in *Finnish and Swedish Security, Comparing National Policies*, eds. Bo Huldt, Teija Tiilikainen, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Anna Helkama-Rågård (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2001), p. 39.

[142] Anders Widfeldt, "Sweden and the European Union, Implications for the Swedish Party System," in *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*, ed. Lee Miles (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 101.

[143] Anjariitta Rantanen, "Northern Exposure: Sweden, Finland and Norway Join the European Union," (Master Thesis, Bilkent University, 1994), p. 25.

membership or not. For Sweden, the application to the EEC led to formal negotiations, starting in November 1970.[144]

Sweden's possibility to be a member of the European Community vanished and its worries about the future of the European integration were confirmed in 1971, when Prime Minister Olof Palme canceled Swedish negotiations with the EEC owing to the institution's purpose of extending economic integration also to the foreign policy realm.[145] At that juncture, it is also argued in Sweden that the idea of closer European integration may be regarded as a threat to Swedish cultural tradition and national foreign and security priorities. It is pointed out that for many Swedes the term "Sweden" signified "democracy, prosperity, modernity and neutrality." With reference to neutrality, it is argued that Sweden felt itself to be more "moral" in its behavior in conducting its foreign and security policy, rejecting the "amoralism" of Realpolitik of great powers. From Dag Hammarskjöld to Olof Palme, the Swedish way has been one of support for binding international law, handling international conflicts in a rational, lawful and peaceful manner with a deeply moralist vision of a world order. Some Swedes saw Europe as the symbol of conservatism, capitalism, Catholicism and colonialism. In this respect, it is asserted that in that period of Sweden's political history, Europe represented the conceptual opposite of Sweden.[146]

4.3 A Comparative Perspective

In sum, it can be stated that after the Second World War, the foreign and security policies of the neutral countries developed in three different phases which have

---

[144] Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," pp. 169-170.

[145] Karp, "Security Integration in the Baltic Sea Region," p. 20.

[146] Lars Trägårdh, "Sweden and the EU, Welfare State Nationalism and the spectre of 'Europe'," in *European Integration and National Identity, The Challenge of the Nordic States*, eds. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 152-154. See also, Sieglinde Gstöhl, "Scandinavia and Switzerland: small, successful and stubborn towards the EU," *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9 (4) (August 2002): p. 538.

distinctive characteristics for each country. The first phase of "passive neutrality policy" started in Finland in 1955-56 and in Sweden in 1945. This period involved a more passive adjustment to the changed international conditions, in particular to the circumstances in the Cold War.

The experiences of the Second World War were different for the independent Finland, a small state trying to adapt itself to its external environment to maximize its security and freedom of movement, and neutral Sweden. The widely divergent paths of the countries during the Second World War had profound outcomes for their perceptions of their national security conditions, which also shaped their respective security policy formulations. Finland considered Germany as the only discernible counterbalance to the Soviet threat. It subsequently became Germany's co-belligerent against the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Sweden constantly accommodated its neutrality in accordance with the changes in the power configuration as the war processed.

It is argued that when Finland tried to follow a policy of neutrality after the 1945, the meaning and content of that policy was diverse. For Sweden, neutrality, which was a necessity for the country, and at the same time a continuation of its tradition positively associated with its peaceful past. Indeed, there was a deep-rooted belief among the Swedes that the policy of neutrality worked well in keeping Sweden out of wars during the last two hundred years, thus it was portrayed in a more value-added manner. In this sense, it can be claimed that the Finnish-style of neutrality in the 20th century was mainly characterized by pragmatism and flexibility, where the impact of moral or ideological concerns might be very little. Finns were inclined to connect the policy of neutrality with maintaining the independence of the country, so they perceived this policy as a required tool and tactic to defend nation-state without having any value-based background. Hence, for Finland, the policy of neutrality was a kind of strategic necessity rather than a choice.

In the same way, after the Second World War, Finland constantly tried to avoid making political and especially military commitments that might have drawn the country into conflicts between the great powers. Moreover, it embarked on a policy of neutrality with the purpose of clarifying and strengthening its international position. Again the nature and content of the neutrality policies of Finland and Sweden have very significant divergent characteristics. Accordingly, during the Cold War period, Finnish neutrality policy was an important political instrument to keep the country away from the Soviet influence and maintain its sovereignty. On the contrary, Swedish neutrality policy was a symbolic sign of its separation from Western security associations. Additionally, it is argued that during the Cold War, while Finland tried to keep a low profile on issues dividing the Soviet Union and the West, Sweden did not hesitate to criticize some of the policy actions of both sides.[147]

Within this context, it is also worth noting that Sweden constantly tried to find a suitable place for itself in the power positions in world politics. During the Second World War this meant adaptation to the stronger power, which in the beginning was Germany. During the Cold War the policy was the same, but now the strong power was the US. In this respect, it can be argued that may be Finnish neutrality policy was more credible and maintained than the Swedish neutrality at that time in history due to the fact that Sweden followed in a sense contradictory security policy discourse and policy practices. Sweden's connections with the US and NATO during the Cold War may be an indication of that argument.[148] Therefore, it is asserted that Sweden's

[147] Max Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe*, The Washington Papers/ 175 (Westport: Praeger Publishers and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), p. 96.

[148] It is argued that during the Cold War, it was Sweden which regarded as genuinely neutral by the Western countries, whereas Finland was often identified as the possible supporter of the East, because it was a "Finlandized" country, to put it another way, controlled by Moscow. Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani Vaahtoranta also put forward that it was Finland, not Sweden, which really aimed to remain neutral in the event of a war. They substantiate their argument with reference to the information concerning Sweden's secret preparations for cooperating with NATO during the Cold War years. They claim that despite the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union, Finland was always ready to fight and defend itself against all possible foreign troops on its territory. See Tuomas Forsberg and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "Inside the EU, Outside NATO: Paradoxes of Finland's and Sweden's Post-Neutrality," *European Security*, Vol. 10, No.1 (Spring 2001): p. 70.

use of the policy of non-participation in alliances as a tactical exploitation of an existing power relationship may be useful to describe the basis of Sweden's policy of non-participation in alliances between the two World Wars. On the contrary, it is argued that Finland's policy of non-participation in alliances in the inter war period was more parallel with the self-reliant neutralist point of view.[149]

In addition, it can be affirmed that in the case of Sweden, the neutrality policy had its own self-defined character on the grounds that no country apart from Sweden itself was involved in its creation. In other words, Sweden neither felt the need to decide to follow this policy as a response to the pressure of another power, nor it defined the content of this policy with reference to another country. Thus, the practical content of the policy of neutrality of Sweden was defined unilaterally. However, the FCMA Treaty limited the room for maneuver of the Finnish government in its formulation of neutrality policy.[150] The treaty caused Finland to have a less active approach in terms of international activities than Sweden. Hence, there were not many positive evaluations of the country's neutral past in Finland, obviously different from Sweden. In this regard, it is argued that the restrictions of neutrality policy were more apparent in Finland than in Sweden due to its particular historical experiences. Thus, the Finns were eager to cancel the FCMA Treaty and have, since then, been faster and more willing than the Swedes in establishing links with the organizations such as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU).

It can be pointed out that the second phase, more active phase of neutrality policy, could be suitable for both of the countries after the East-West tensions in Europe started to calm down. However, Finland was in the most sensitive position due to its geographical condition. It can be said that "active neutrality policy" was pursued in

---

[149] Riste, "'Janus Septentrionalis'?," pp. 318-319.

[150] Jan Hallenberg, *The Extension of the European Security Community to the Periphery: France in the Mediterranean and Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Countries*, A NATO Fellowship Final Report (Stockholm: National Defence College, 2000), p. 6.

Finland from 1965 until around 1980. At that juncture, Finland started to show increased activism in international relations with the conviction that active bridge-building between the military blocs of the West and East, may be a means to promote the country's own security interests in a divided Europe. In Sweden this phase of more activism was from 1960s until 1990. During this process, Sweden tried to take part in international opinion-building activities concerning violations of international law and human rights in some of the international conflicts, in order to contribute much more to the international affairs.

The third phase started during the high tension period of the 1980s. In that period, they started to follow more realistic foreign and security policies. In order to protect their national interests, they tried to sustain close cooperation with the European countries and organizations, within the limits of their neutrality policies. This policy approach was much more obvious in Finland than in Sweden. Their immediate national interests especially with regard to the integration in Western Europe may be an indication of the beginning of a change in their policy perspectives.[151]

[151] Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, pp. 139- 140.

CHAPTER V

THE TRANSITION PERIOD FROM THE POLICY OF NEUTRALITY TO EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP (1991-1994)

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the declaration of independence by the countries of Eastern Europe, and the unification of Germany, the bipolar system of the Cold War came to an end. For a long time, being Nordic meant being part of Europe, but being a little better off than the rest. However, the end of the Cold War indicated a new period in the foreign and security policy making of these countries. Within this framework, they started to feel the need to find a new policy formulation because of the fact that being Nordic no longer meant "being above Europe," instead it was increasingly threatened to the point at "being peripheral."[152]

Iver Neumann alleges that the conditions that gave shape to the security policy perspective of the countries in the northern Europe homogenized after the end of the Cold War which brought new possibilities for them to choose from.[153] Indeed, at that juncture, neutral bridge-building was no longer relevant in many emerging cooperation structures where the interests and policies of the countries were different from the traditional bloc divisions. Hence, Finland and Sweden felt the necessity to find a suitable role and position for themselves in the new kind of cooperation that is emerging. In fact, since in the new order, there were to be neither East nor West, these countries started to consider whom they are to be neutral against because they

[152] Ole Wæver, "Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War," *International Affairs*, (68) 1(1992): pp. 77-84.

[153] Iver B. Neumann, "Nordic Security Cooperation in a Homogenized Political Setting," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 31 (4) (1996): p. 418.

lost their principal frame of reference. In the same way, the policy of neutrality which these countries followed during the Cold War years was no longer a viable line of action after the end of the East-West division.[154] Thus, only after the end of the Cold War, they were able to reconsider their foreign and security policies and take new initiatives towards greater participation in international affairs, mostly within the framework of international organizations. With reference to the concept of small states it can be pointed out that Finland and Sweden started to consider to adapt their policy perspectives in accordance with the requirements of emerging security environment, where there were not as many direct military threats, as was in the case of the Cold War period, but now there was a challenge of being marginalized in the cooperative security policy frameworks. Within this context, it can be argued that Finland and Sweden had to continue to modify and adapt their foreign and security policy formulations in order to deal with the challenge of marginalization after the end of the Cold War.

It is alleged that the one of the main reasons for the small states to join the international organizations and to prefer cooperation and collective security is to protect their own interests by way of yielding their own national sovereignties and at the same time benefiting from the restrictions put upon the freedom of action of powerful states. Additionally, they tend to perceive international organizations as a means to protect the principle of the equality of states,[155] regardless of their size or power. In this respect, it can be put forward that small states have the possibility to promote and safeguard their own national security interests by working through international organizations such as the European Union. The European Union seems to be the most advantageous institution where small states may exert more influence

[154] Kari Möttölä, "Military Cooperation and Military Non-Alliance: An Analysis of the Policies of Finland and Sweden in Transatlantic Relations," Paper prepared for 43rd ISA Annual Convention New Orleans, LA, 23-27 March 2002, retrieved from http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/mottola.html (Accessed 23 March 2006).

[155] Johan J. Holst, *European Security, A view from the North*, Notat Paper, Nr. 438 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1990), p. 16.

and achieve more of what they seek than if they were forced to compete on their own with the larger powers. Furthermore, membership in the Union may provide small states both opportunities for being heard and protection against being overwhelmed by the larger members. Hence, Finland's and Sweden's membership application to the European Union, which was deemed to have a crucial role in creating a new peace and security order in Europe, may be taken into consideration within this context.

It can be pointed out that since Finland and Sweden have different political, economic, social, and cultural characteristics, the arguments related to the possible implications and consequences of EU membership on their foreign and security policies were also interpreted slightly in different ways. The differences in their historical experiences also had a considerable impact on their perception of the European integration process. At the same time it affected their reactions and concerns about closer cooperation in the field of security within the framework of the EU. In addition, the position they envision for themselves in the prospect of this integration process in a way was shaped in this transition period. Therefore, it is very important to take into account the process of their membership negotiations in order to better understand their security policy considerations during that transition period when they started to adjust their security policies to be in line with the post-Cold War environment.

5.1 The Process of Negotiating EU Membership Issues in Finland

5.1.1 The National Debate on EU Membership

The end of the Cold War provided a significant opportunity for Finland to reconsider its relations with the rest of the world. Finland was accustomed to conduct its policies within the framework of a divided Europe by balancing between the interests of the major powers but suddenly it was acquainted with the reality that it had to modify its policies in accordance with the changes in the world politics.

Hence, in 1990, Finland was quick to denounce the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 which restricted its sovereign rights and later in 1991, it agreed with the disintegrating Soviet Union on the irrelevance of the FCMA Treaty of 1948 in the new international environment. As a consequence, at the end of the Cold War, Finland's relationship with Russia was conducted within the path of European issues, by means of a new bilateral treaty signed on 20 January 1992, in line with the contemporary European standards without mentioning any obligation of military assistance or military cooperation.[156] Within this context, Finland also had to decide whether or not to follow other European countries in applying to the European Community, which was emerging as a stabilizing structure around which the countries can build their political future. In this regard, it is stated that Finland's consideration of EC membership was a very careful process in which the Finnish government had favored the "wait and see" approach. Only after political relations with Russia were stabilized in a new treaty, the politicians in Finland started to consider EC membership in a more positive way.[157] It is asserted that during the Cold War years, to have closer economic relations with Europe had relatively little significance for Finland compared to the necessity to maintain a functioning relationship with Moscow and defend Finnish independence. In this sense, it is argued that Finland may not be categorized as a genuine reluctant European due to the fact that generally external limitations and factors, such as the relations with Moscow, had kept the country distant from considering the membership in the EC.[158]

In fact, it is asserted that once the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Cold War ended, Finland wanted to defend its independence by joining European countries with the objectives such as acquiring more freedom of action, having a broader sense of

[156] Himanen, "Finland," p. 20.

[157] Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 235; Austin, *Finland as a Gateway to Russia*, p.10.

[158] Gstöhl, "Scandinavia and Switzerland": p. 531.

security and receiving political support generally from the West.[159] Thus, serious discussions on a Finnish application for EC membership started in 1991 and the compatibility of neutrality and EC membership was debated. Tiilikainen argues that when EC membership started to be discussed in Finland, the state-centric approach of the country was very predominant in the first stage on the grounds that state security being one of the key motives behind the national decision to apply for membership. In this regard, it is further affirmed that Finland, with a small state tradition situated on the periphery of Europe, was looking for protection for its territory and people, and therefore the security policy motivations of the country were very high at that point in time.[160]

It is stated that at the beginning of the 1990s, EC membership was perceived as incompatible with Finland's policy of neutrality. It is claimed however, that EC membership and Finnish policies have intentionally been made compatible with each other, through the redefinitions and adaptations of Finnish neutrality as well as through interpreting the nature and content of the later EU's common foreign and security policies in a proper way. Thus, it is argued that it is difficult to define this compatibility as natural; instead it is created and shaped on purpose.[161]

According to the then President of Finland, Mauno Koivisto (1982-94), the strongest reason for Finland to start to consider EC membership was related to the security policy considerations of the country, where the economic reasons had secondary importance.[162] It is also pointed out that membership was accepted to clarify

---

[159] See Stephen J. Blank, *Finnish Security and European Security Policy* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 1996), p. 1.

[160] Tiilikainen, "The Finnish Presidency of 1999," p. 106.

[161] Ojanen, "Finnish non-alignment: drills in flexibility," p. 86.

[162] Mauno Koivisto*, Witness to History. The Memories of Mauno Koivisto. President of Finland 1982-1994* (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 246, quoted in Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, "Inside the EU, Outside NATO": p. 71.

Finland's international position in general terms, as part of Western Europe, as well as, it was seen to improve Finland's possibilities of promoting its interests.[163] Thus, EU membership was seen to imply an enhanced international role through increased decision-making capacity and increased ability to have an influence in crises. Also, it is underlined that Sweden's membership application before Finland, was among the most immediate and important reasons for Finland to follow suit and to submit its own application.[164] Accordingly, it is declared that President Koivisto was not very pleased with the fact that the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Sten Anderson, publicly called for a joint Nordic application to the European Union on 26 October 1990, without consulting him in advance,[165] a fact which is still considered to be important today for Finns in their policy considerations.[166] In the same way, it is claimed that Finns were suspicious of Sweden's decision to apply to the EC, in the sense that, Sweden could be expected to align itself with the other EC countries in the case of a possible confrontation between the West and East, whereas Finland would have the risk of being left alone as an isolated buffer between major powers. In addition, it is argued that Sweden's membership to the EC without Finland could be

[163] Johan J. Holst argues that the reason for Finland and Sweden to search for integration into the structures of European cooperation was also to cope with the probable consequences of Russian uncertainties. Holst adds that the growing interest in membership in the European Community of these countries was an important evidence of this concern. See Holst, *European Security, A view from the North*, p. 7.

[164] Ojanen, "Finnish non-alignment: drills in flexibility," p. 96.

[165] Martti Häikiö, "Changes in Finnish Security Policy: the Koivisto Presidency, 1981-94," in *Security and Insecurity, Perspectives on Finnish and Swedish Defence and Foreign Policy*, eds. Gunnar Artéus and Jukka Nevakivi (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 1997), p. 91.

[166] This argument is based on the author's interview conducted with a Finnish Diplomat at the Embassy of Finland in Stockholm, on 8 December 2003. It is stated that the Finnish people still have in their minds that Sweden had applied to the European Union without consulting or informing Finland before. Thus, they have a kind of subtle mistrust for Sweden in terms of choosing different policy options. The Finnish Diplomat mentions that the reason for Finland to discuss the NATO option lively may also be depended on this mistrust. Finland would like to feel ready at least for NATO now, in order not to feel at a loss as to what to do, as in the case of the European Union membership application. Accordingly, the Finnish Diplomat said that "in the future, the Finns may be the ones who apply to NATO membership first." However, he mentioned that the Iraqi war affected the Finns in a negative way and increased the NATO opposition in Finnish people who generally do not want their country to get involved in every international conflict.

regarded as the termination of the Nordic orientation, as Sweden would probably have paid its attentions much more on the European politics.[167] With reference to this, it can be argued that although Finland was trying to modify its policies in accordance with the changes in the world politics, in this transition period, in some sense it still continued to have some structured perceptions and mentality shaped with the Cold War perspective in dealing with some current events and interpreting some developments, as in the case of Sweden's membership application to the EC.

Finnish integration process entered a new phase when the centre-right coalition government, led by Esko Aho, came into power in Finland. It is declared that at the time in Finland, when ministers had been advised not to make any comments publicly on the subject of Finland's EC membership, Prime Minister Esko Aho (1991-1995) revealed, in a speech given in September 1991, that a committee has been established to investigate the possible advantages and disadvantages of EC membership, particularly for the Finnish economy and security policy.[168] In this manner, it is declared that common foreign policy of the EC should not present any problems to the neutral countries on the condition that there is a space for national policy priorities. However, concerning the probable EC's common security and defense policy in the future, it is added that a neutral applicant will have to decide whether it would be able to secure its independence in the field of defense policy.[169]

---

[167] Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe*, p. 24.

[168] *Suomi Euroopassa* (Finland in Europe), UKK commemorative lecture given by Prime Minister Esko Aho at the Paasikivi Society, Helsinki 3 September 1991, quoted in Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe*, p. 29.

[169] Paavo Lipponen, "Finnish Neutrality and EC Membership," in *Neutral States and the European Community*, ed. Sheila Harden, The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies (London: Brasseys's Ltd., 1994), pp.78-79.

5.1.2 The Modification of Finland's Security Policy in accordance with EU Membership

During this period, a debate concerning the abandoning of the term "neutrality" from official formulations of security policies began to emerge in Finland. This was based on the argument that in the new Europe, in which there was no more any Cold War division into two different blocs having contradictory interests, the concept of neutrality would be an irrelevant and inappropriate term to identify the policy of Finland. Therefore, arguments for and against the policy of neutrality and its redefinitions were surpassed by a consensus about the need to change this policy in accordance with the transformation of the political situation in Europe.

In this respect, Prime Minister Esko Aho made a speech to Parliament on 16 March 1992 and stated that the core of the neutrality policy of Finland may be characterized as "military non-alignment[170] and an independent defence," in line with developments in Europe.[171] It can be said that the term neutrality was used but defined as military non-alliance. Hence, in its White Paper to Parliament in 1992, the government of Finland created a new security policy formulation, namely military non-alliance and independent defense, which was then described as "hard core of neutrality,"[172] implied staying outside military alliances in order to enable neutrality in war. Finnish Ambassador Hannu Himanen points out that, at that juncture Finland would accept the EU's future defense dimension as formulated in the Maastricht Treaty, so, by means of the new security policy formulation, Finland did not have to apply neutralist vocabulary during the negotiation process of its membership with the European

[170] The terms "military non-alignment" and "military non-alliance" and "non-participation in military alliances" are said to identify the same concept and therefore are used interchangeably in literature. In order to be respectful to the quotations of the other writers, the formulations of the writers and their preference of terms were kept the same.

[171] Lipponen, "Finnish Neutrality and EC Membership," p. 80.

[172] See Himanen, "Finland," p. 21.

Union. Nonetheless, Ambassador Himanen stated that Finland's objective was not to abandon the idea of non-participation in the military alliances in that policy motion.[173] It is alleged that this new formulation was very similar to that of Sweden's new formulation in 1991, where the expression of "hard core of neutrality" had been borrowed from the Swedes.[174]

When the Finnish policy of neutrality was reduced to its essence and reformulated as military non-alliance, the limits of the policy became narrow, so that deeper integration could be a possible option for Finland, and thus EC membership. Indeed, it is stated that the Finnish government preferred to accept the new form of the old policy instead of making a profound change in the security policy formulation of Finland.[175] Indeed, Finland's EU membership was tried to be demonstrated as a logical continuation of the country's previous policies towards European integration, in the post-Cold War period. In this respect, during this transition process, the domestic audience tired to be reassured by stressing that the EU membership of Finland would actually not entail any remarkable changes in the basis and essential aims of Finnish foreign and security policy.[176] Similarly, it is argued that, the

[173] Himanen, "Finland," p. 21.

[174] However, Risto Penttilä argues that there was a difference between Finland and Sweden with regard to the abandoning of the term "neutrality" from the official policy formulations. Accordingly, in Sweden the reasons for this were, first, to prevent any future misunderstanding within the EC about Sweden's future attitudes and position towards closer cooperation with other member countries, and second, the term was no longer considered justified due to the profound change in Sweden's foreign and security policy at the end of the Cold War. See Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe*, p. 34.

[175] Ojanen, "Finnish non-alignment: drills in flexibility," pp. 95-96. For a similar argument see Penttilä, *Finland's Security in a Changing Europe*, p. 25.

[176] Klaus Törnudd argues that some of the elements that have had a crucial impact on the formation of Finnish security policy perspective during the Cold War years were still present and relevant in the new security policy perspective of the country evolved during the early 1990s. Törnudd defines these as "ties that bind to the recent past" and describes some of them as, the policy of neutrality, the idea of the nation-state which puts emphasis on the need for Finland to maintain her preparedness to defend the country with her own resources and capabilities and the emphasis on Russian factor in its security policy formulations. See Klaus Törnudd, "Ties that Bind to the Recent Past- Debating Security Policy in Finland within the Context of Membership of the European Union," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 31 (1) (1996): pp. 62-63.

transformation of foreign and security policy of Finland in the early 1990s was seen more as an expression of "continuity in adapting to change" than a "break from traditional security policy."[177]

It can be acknowledged that after having considered the pros and cons, Finland started to identify the membership of the Community as influential in maintaining stability in its vicinity and developing friendly relations with Russia. Moreover, its EU membership was motivated by the purpose to maximize its international influence, in line with its key principle of participation in all contexts where decisions affecting Finland are made. In the early 1990s, it was also considered in Finland that as a small country Finland can only make its voice better heard within the Union.[178]

As a consequence, the Finnish government made its decision to apply for membership into the European Community on 2 March 1992. On 18 March 1992, Finland applied for EC membership without any neutrality clause. At the time of its application, Finland accepted all the objectives of the Maastricht Treaty, including the defense dimension.[179] As a result, negotiations with the Community at the ministerial level started on 1 February 1993 and ended after 13 months.[180] Paavo Lipponen alleged that in the meantime Finland refrained from describing its stance regarding its membership in the Western European Union (WEU), because it was difficult for Finland to imagine an EC or WEU defense capability that would be able to provide

---

[177] Himanen, "Finland," p. 20.

[178] "At the Core of Europe as a Non-participant in Military Alliances - Finnish Thoughts and Experiences," Guest lecture by President of the Republic of Finland Tarja Halonen at the University of Stockholm on 2 May 2000, retrieved from http://www.tpk.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=9695&intSubArtID=6328 (Accessed 5 September 2006).

[179] Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 252.

[180] Timo Kivimäki, "Finland, A Case of Beneficial Integration," *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 1999).

the country with a full military guarantee. From Finland's perspective, no other Western European security system can replace NATO.[181]

In October 1993, the Finnish government did not feel the need to consider the issue of NATO membership, but on the other hand, it did not exclude accession to NATO in the future as well. In this regard, Luif underlines the fact that public opinion in Finland was less in favor of maintaining the policy of neutrality when compared to Sweden. Luif points out that in the spring of 1992, 46 percent of Finns agreed to abandon neutrality, whereas solely 34 percent wanted to sustain this policy line.[182]

Finland's negotiation result with the European Union was affirmed in Prime Minister Esko Aho's Statement to Parliament on 4 March 1994. Accordingly, it is mentioned that in the post-Cold War era, Finnish foreign and security policy was based on military non-alliance and independent, credible defence which defined the core of the neutrality policy of the country. Additionally, it is mentioned that the foundations of Finnish national foreign and security policy are not in conflict with the obligations arising from European Union membership so that the outcome of the negotiations with the Union fulfils the basic national objectives and thus corresponds to Finland's national security interests. In the statement it is also pointed out that, as Finland becomes a member of the European Union, it will be able to participate with countries which will decide on the development of common foreign and security policy within the Union.[183] Furthermore, in the Government Bill of 1994 to Parliament on the agreement concerning the membership of Finland in the European Union, the government also stated it believed military non-alliance and independent

[181] Lipponen, "Finnish Neutrality and EC Membership," p. 97.

[182] Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 252.

[183] *Statement by the Prime Minister to Parliament on the negotiation result with the European Union, 4 March 1994*, retrieved from http://www.parliament.fi. (Accessed 17 April 2006).

defense**,** which would guarantee freedom of action for Finland, would retain their importance for the country even if the country were to join the EU.[184]

5.1.3 Finnish Referendum on EU Membership

The first Nordic country to vote on EU membership was Finland. On 16 October 1994, 74 percent of the Finnish people attended the referendum in which 57 percent of the Finnish population voted in favor of membership while 43 percent of the population voted against it. In the end, Finland joined the EU at the beginning of 1995. It is indicated that "no" votes were concentrated heavily in the northern part of the country, whereas those living in the more urbanized and densely populated south voted in favor of membership.[185] It is stressed that for many Finnish people, the vote on EU membership represented an important symbolic moment in the country's history. Especially, many people in eastern Finland feared that rejecting EU membership would transfer their country to a "twilight zone" between East and West, verifying the probable impact of geographical considerations for Finnish people on the interpretation of the EU.[186] Therefore, the military security concerns of the Finnish voters were very significant. It is also claimed that the frequent use of the "Western cultural identity" as a "yes" to EU membership by the Finns, was deemed to have also some security connotations, which was not expressed generally by the voters in Sweden.[187] Additionally, it is stated that despite security matters being the

---

[184] "The Government Bill no. 135/1994 to Parliament on the agreement concerning the membership of Finland, Austria, Norway and Sweden in the European Union," quoted in Himanen, "Finland," p. 21.

[185] Alexander B. Murphy and Anne Hunderi- Ely, "The Geography of the 1994 Nordic Vote on European Union Membership," *Professional Geographer*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1996): pp. 284-285. For the map of the geographical distribution of the 1994 Nordic Vote on European Union Membership, see Appendix A, p. 208.

[186] Murphy and Hunderi- Ely, "The Geography of the 1994 Nordic Vote": p. 293.

[187] Anders Todal Jenssen, Mikael Gilljam and Pertti Pesonen, "The Citizens, the Referendums and the European Union," in *To Join or Not to Join, Three Nordic Referendums on Membership in the European Union*, eds. Anders Todal Jenssen, Pertti Pesonen and Mikael Gilljam (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1998), pp. 310-311.

major consideration for many Finnish people, the future of the neutrality policy itself was not of major importance at that time in Finland.[188]

5.2 The Process of Negotiating EU Membership Issues in Sweden

5.2.1 The National Debate on EU Membership

According to Prof. Dr. Bo Huldt, with the end of the Cold War, its bipolar system, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Sweden experienced a brief period of "identity crisis" which was quickly overcome in the 1990s.[189] It is stated that when the bloc system, which had constituted the basis of Sweden's security policy aiming at neutrality in wartime, suddenly disappeared, the need for a mediator or bridge-builder between states on different sides of the blocs began to be perceived to be irrelevant by the time. Since, Sweden was not a member of the organizations that were now actively shaping the new Europe, namely the European Community and NATO, it found itself with few possibilities to have an impact among the other countries in world affairs. At the same time, it was recognized by Sweden that full participation in European cooperation started to be required for countries which had the ambition to contribute towards creating a new peace and security order in Europe.

In this respect, it can be stated that the post-Cold War period witnessed how Sweden decided and tried to modify its foreign and security policies, to make them more consistent with the new world order. Sweden's decision to apply to the European Community may also be regarded as an illustration of this modification and adaptation process. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989, debate on Swedish entry into the European Community started to accelerate. Owing

[188] Toby Archer, "Keeping out of it: The hangover of Finnish neutralism and the limits of normative commitments," in *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 2003* (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003), p. 61.

[189] Huldt, "Comments on the Swedish Position," p. 42.

to the antagonism between the big powers during the Cold War era, Sweden had been unable to reconcile EC membership with its traditional policy of neutrality. Now, it could either declare its policy of neutrality obsolete, thereby eliminating all security political barriers to full accession to the EC, or it could modify its interpretation of the European integration from a political to a purely economic issue. According to Mikael af Malmborg, Sweden chose both of the options in that process.[190]

It can be said that the Swedish government proclaimed repeatedly during the years 1989 and 1990 that it did not have a plan to apply for membership into the European Community. In this respect, several arguments were presented for this preventive official position such as the supranational character of the EC which has the possibility to limit state sovereignty and thus affects the neutrality policy of the country and the security and defense aspirations of the Community which may not be consistent with the policy of neutrality.[191] From a different perspective, it is argued that the Russians were very suspicious about the stance of Sweden which seemed to be tied to the Western bloc, both by means of ideological affinity and increasing economic integration. Thus, in order to compensate for this perception, the Swedish policy-makers found it best for the country to keep at least a formal distance to the EC.[192]

Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson (1986-1991, 1994-1996), who replaced Olof Palme after his assassination on 28 February 1986,[193] reiterated the government of the Social Democratic Party's opposition to the membership of the European Community in

[190] Malmborg, "Sweden in the EU," p. 39.

[191] Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius, "Sweden: The State Joins the European Union," in *Adapting to European Integration, Small States and the European Union*, eds. Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp (London: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998), p. 134.

[192] Gustavsson, *The Politics of Foreign Policy Change*, p. 86.

[193] "1986: Swedish Prime Minister Assassinated," *BBC News*, 28 February 1986, retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/28/newsid_2802000/2802181.stm (Accessed 6 May 2006).

May 1990, for long-standing reasons such as its probable implications for Swedish neutrality and the risk to the credibility of Sweden's role as a reliable bridge-builder and mediator in world politics. It can be admitted that departure from the belief, that the credible neutrality policy of the country would be inconsistent with the membership of the Community, was made possible by way of interpreting the European security setting in a more positive manner. Accordingly, on 2 October 1990 the then Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson presented a vision of an evolving Europe which had a new peace order without any bloc divisions.[194] According to Carlsson, in such a future situation in Europe Sweden's EC membership would be compatible with its policy of neutrality. Additionally, it is argued that the previous cautious attitude of Sweden regarding the Europe's future security arrangements began to change to a more optimistic approach also owing to the peaceful reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990.[195]

Consequently, even though in the beginning the Social Democratic government supported that it would be unwise to commit Sweden to a European integration project whose outcome was still difficult to predict, on 26 October 1990, the Swedish government stated its opinion that Sweden should apply to join the EC as a full member[196] as soon as possible, with the judgment that it would be possible to combine Swedish EC membership and continued neutrality policy in the new security setting of Europe. On 12 December 1990, the Swedish Parliament took a decision which proposed that Sweden should apply for EC membership while maintaining its policy of neutrality. In addition, on 14 June 1991 the government reaffirmed the policy of neutrality as the basis for Swedish security policy and supported that Swedish membership of the EC is compatible with the policy of neutrality. The

[194] Ekengren and Sundelius, "Sweden: The State Joins the European Union," p. 134.

[195] Lauri Karvonen and Bengt Sundelius, "The Nordic Neutrals, Facing the European Union," in *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*, ed. Lee Miles (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 247.

[196] Widfeldt, "Sweden and the European Union," p. 103.

government substantiated its stance by emphasizing the fact that the actual decision-making structures of the European Community guarantee individual member countries' possibility of safeguarding their own fundamental security policy interests. The government also mentioned that membership to the EC would bring considerable advantages to Sweden, outweighing its disadvantages.[197] It is acknowledged that after these positive tendencies towards EC membership began, a series of comprehensive pre-membership national adjustments to the Community started to emerge in Sweden. It is alleged that these policy modifications were considered to be demeaning to the national heritage of Sweden, being distinct from the traditionally less progressive countries of the European continent.[198]

In fact, the Swedish application for EC membership was presented by Ingvar Carlsson on 1 July 1991 as a result of the change in the government's position. It is asserted that not only the end of the Cold War, but also a severe recession in the domestic economy made it possible for Sweden to reconsider the membership application and modify some of its national policies.[199] In the same vein, from Jakob Gustavsson's point of view, it was the combination of Ingvar Carlsson's leadership and the occurrence of an economic crisis that determined the timing of Sweden's EC policy change in October 1990.[200] Indeed, it is argued that when the Swedish government announced in October 1990 that Sweden should become a member of the EC, it was regarded to be a part of an economic crisis prevention and reform package, in order to find a solution for the deteriorating economic situation of the country. On

[197] *Utrikesfrågor* (1991): pp. 25-31, "Statement to Parliament by the Prime Minister, Mr. Ingvar Carlsson, on Sweden's application for membership of the European Community," 14 June 1991, quoted in Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," pp. 173-175.

[198] See Ekengren and Sundelius, "Sweden: The State Joins the European Union," p. 136.

[199] Peter Lawler, "Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 35 No. 4 (December 1997): p. 582.

[200] Gustavsson, *The Politics of Foreign Policy Change*, p. 195.

the contrary, it was also perceived as the silent *de facto* abandonment of neutrality.[201] It is worth mentioning that according to Bengt Sundelius, this Swedish orientation towards EC membership may be explained in terms of a national policy adjustment to the European power balance emerging after 1990. Sundelius accentuates that small states tend to go with the international power balance, rather than moving against it. Therefore, the notable redirection of Swedish EC policy during 1990-1991 can be understood in terms of the impact of international structure on a small state behavior.[202]

5.2.2 The Modification of Sweden's Security Policy in accordance with EU Membership

It is expressed that in September 1991, a few months after the Swedish application to the EC had been submitted, the Social Democratic government lost the general elections and was replaced by a four-party non-socialist coalition, in which the strongest party was the Moderates, led by Carl Bildt. The new Prime Minister, Carl Bildt (1991-1994), leader of the Moderates (Conservative Party), emphasized the importance and necessity of reformulating and adjusting the concept of neutrality in accordance with the new realities and dynamics of the transformed international situation where there is a threat of marginalization and to bring Sweden into line with the rest of Europe.[203]

There emerged a conviction among some of the administrative staff that the term neutrality had become an irrelevant and misleading description. This argument was reinforced with the fact that Sweden was a neutral country which wanted to stay

[201] Lawler, "Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union," p. 583.

[202] See Bengt Sundelius, "Changing Course: When Neutral Sweden Chose to Join the European Community," in *European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith, Sage Modern Politics Series Vol. 34 (London: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 182-183.

[203] Karp, "Security Integration in the Baltic Sea Region," p. 21.

outside of the alliances of two confronting blocs in a divided Europe. However, Sweden never pursued a permanent neutrality policy throughout its history. Therefore, when there was no longer any bloc division in Europe after the end of the Cold War, it was assumed that Sweden kept its right to consider different policy options if the situation changed. Accordingly, it is argued that the reason for Sweden to abstain from giving its foreign and security policy a particular and clear name, was to be able to consider other policy alternatives too, as can be seen in the situations occurred after the two World Wars.[204]

In this regard, Krister Wahlbäck, a former Ambassador in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, defined the changes in the Swedish neutrality policy by stating that Sweden used to describe its neutrality policy as a "policy of neutrality" when there was a risk of war between the military blocs but in today's Europe this policy has become an irrelevant label and to talk about the neutrality in the old way is impossible. Ambassador Wahlbäck further recalled that if Sweden would continued to use this term, it would give a false image of its assessments of European security prospects and a false impression of Swedish approach to security policy cooperation in Europe.[205]

Indeed, another significant step in the foreign and security policy adaptation process of Sweden was the removal of the term neutrality and the change in the scope of non-participation in alliances, namely non-alignment. It is claimed that Prime Minister Bildt, made a more radical break with the past of Swedish traditional policy, in his remarks entitled "Sweden-from a reluctant to an enthusiastic European" delivered to the office of the EC Commission in Bonn on 13 November 1991.[206] Bildt identified

[204] Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," p. 177.

[205] Krister Wahlbäck, "Swedish Security in a Changing Europe," Paper presented at the AIIA/WEU Institute Seminar. "European Security after Maastricht: What Role for our Countries?," Baden, Austria, 10-12 June 1993, quoted in Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 146.

[206] Malmborg, "Sweden in the EU," p. 41.

"non-participation in military alliances" rather than "neutrality" as the core of Sweden's foreign and security policy and stated that the term "policy of neutrality" can no longer be relevant in describing Sweden's foreign and security policies which the country would like to follow within the European framework.[207]

There emerged an extensive debate concerning the redefinition of Swedish security policy. In 1992, it was declared that Sweden should be more active in the new form of international relations so that its security policy definition should be reformulated in line with the new realities and dynamics of the world. As a result, Bildt's government tried to get the word "neutrality" out of the public discourse in Sweden. Bildt clarified his statement with "The hard core of our security policy is still non-participation in military alliances, with its obligation to maintain an adequate independent defense capability *to enable us to remain neutral* in the event of a war in our immediate vicinity." Bildt further mentioned that "Sweden is not defended by anyone else and our defense is for Sweden only."[208] Consequently, in May 1992, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs decided to preserve the word neutrality in the new policy formulation, however in a conditional and geographically more restrictive manner. The new conceptualization of the Swedish security policy became "non-participation in military alliances with the aim of making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of war in our vicinity remains unchanged."[209] Thus, in the spring of 1992, Sweden's security policy definition was changed from "non-participation in alliances in peacetime *aiming* at neutrality in wartime" to "non-participation in *military* alliances with the aim of *making it possible*

---

[207] *Utrikesfrågor* (1991): pp.100-101, "Sweden-from a reluctant to an enthusiastic European," Remarks by the Prime Minister, Mr. Carl Bildt, at the Office of the Commission of the European Communities in Bonn, 13 November 1991, quoted in Herolf and Lindahl, "Sweden-Continuity and Change," p. 177.

[208] *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy*, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1992, p. 25, quoted in Malmborg, "Sweden in the EU," p. 42.

[209] Malmborg, "Sweden in the EU," p. 42.

for our country to remain neutral in the event of war in our vicinity remains unchanged."

It is asserted that the consequently adopted formulation paved the way for European Community membership, according to which, Sweden still remains outside of military alliances and thus reserves only the possibility to remain neutral in case of war in its immediate neighborhood. In other words, by way of the new formulation, Sweden would be able to be a member of the later European Union due to the fact that, since the concept of "non-participation in military alliances" was used in the definition, there was no obstacle for Sweden seeking membership in an organization which could not be categorized as a military alliance. The concept of "non-participation in alliances" became a narrow term as being formulated as "non-participation in *military* alliances" which was only limited to a membership in a military alliance and its scope was only military issues. Also, this new formulation meant that while during the Cold War period the policy of non-participation in alliances was defined as automatically implying neutrality in wartime, now Sweden may stay neutral in the event of a war in its vicinity, if it wishes to do so. It can be said that the official change in vocabulary once and for all removed the ideological neutrality from the agenda and turned non-participation in alliances into solely a matter of absence of military obligations. However, it is also argued with regard to the new formulation that this new wording may not create a dramatic change for the country in the sense that the new formulation better matches with the actual policy pursued by Sweden during the Cold War.[210]

Moreover, the new security policy formulation also indicated that there were several policy alternatives for Sweden to choose from in wartime, one of which could be the policy of neutrality. It can be argued that the uncertainty as regards the contents of different policy options in the case of war, gave Sweden an opportunity for greater

[210] Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?*, p. 20.

freedom of action and maneuver. Moreover, it can be claimed that the new definition provided the country with greater space, especially for participation in areas which were traditionally sensitive, as well as it allowed the preserving at least the core values of neutrality.[211]

During 1993, there were extensive discussions among political parties about the different policy "options" of Sweden in case of war or serious crisis in its neighborhood. It was seen that the Left, Center, and Green Party argued that Sweden should try to maintain its neutrality policy in crisis or war in all conditions, even if one the Baltic states was attacked. On the other hand, the Conservative and Liberal Parties supported that the Swedish government should not determine a priori whether it should be neutral or participative in a crisis emerging in its vicinity. Moreover, they advocated that the actual circumstances and conditions should be taken into consideration in order to reach a conclusion regarding any particular issue. The opinion of the Social Democratic Party was a kind of combination of these two views. According to this party, if a war broke out in Sweden's surrounding area, the most probable option would be to remain neutral. Whereas, the fact that the alternative of staying neutral had a high possibility of being chosen did not imply that it would be selected in each particular event. Thus, if one of the Baltic states or another member of the European Union were to be attacked, the government of Sweden should have a freedom of choice and action.[212]

Additionally, in these pre-accession debates, the CFSP of the EU caused some problems, owing to the fact that the content and extent of the CFSP was neither comprehensive nor very well known at that time. The pro-EU parties in Sweden generally tried to demonstrate the EU as a "peace project" for Europe while critics of the EU supported that membership would be the first phase of an unavoidable

[211] Lindström, "Sweden's Security Policy: Engagement- the Middle Way."

[212] Ibid.

membership of Sweden in the WEU and NATO.[213] Additionally, there were some concerns related to opposite ideas of how Sweden could be loyal to the goals of the Maastricht Treaty and at the same time claim that "Sweden will defend only Sweden."[214]

It can asserted that the change of terminology in the Swedish security policy, which was considered to be a result of the transition from an image of Sweden as the committed neutral to a committed European country, may be regarded as an important indication of Sweden's policy adaptations in line with the EU standards. In fact, Sweden started to do all the required adaptations in its security policy in that process. Even the Swedish troops were sent to Bosnia in 1993, with the conviction that it would confirm, as Prime Minister Carl Bildt said, that Swedes are good Europeans.[215]

In 1994, the then Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Margaretha af Ugglas (1991-1994), stated that European Union membership will serve to increase Sweden's potential to contribute to stability and security in the Baltic states and Russia. The Minister defined Sweden's security policy as a term broader than the Cold War concept of military security alone and affirmed that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, there are no longer two alliances to be neutral between. Thus, she highlighted that the policy followed by Sweden could no longer be defined as neutrality. With respect to the nature and origin of the old policy formulation, namely "non-participation in alliances in peacetime aiming at neutrality in wartime," she emphasized that earlier policy was a conscious

[213] Rutger Lindahl, "The Swedish Debate," in *The 1996 IGC-National Debates (2) Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK*, Discussion Paper 67 (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 46.

[214] Luif, *On the Road to Brussels*, p. 247.

[215] Huldt, "Comments on the Swedish Position," p. 41.

and pragmatically chosen means to be able to stay outside of any possible war in Europe, in other words, it was never an end for Sweden.[216]

As a consequence, in February 1993 formal negotiations began in Brussels and lasted for over a year. During the process of negotiation, the European Union was created through the Maastricht Treaty. On 30 March 1994, Sweden and the members of the EU agreed terms on the membership of Sweden, and in the end, the agreement was signed at the Corfu Summit in the summer of 1994.[217]

5.2.3 Swedish Referendum on EU Membership

The Swedes voted on EU membership in a national referendum on 13 November 1994. 83 percent of the Swedish people attended the referendum in which a total of 52.3 percent voted in favor of EU membership, 46.8 percent voted against and 0.9 percent registered blank votes. As a consequence, Swedish Parliament, the *Riksdag*, formally approved the decision on 15 December 1994.[218] Nonetheless, it is stressed that in a post-referendum opinion poll conducted in Sweden in 1995 between the dates of 10 January-14 January, 55 percent of the population claimed that they would vote against EU membership if there was another opportunity for voting.[219] With reference to this, it is asserted that the Swedish state joined the European Community and started to adapt its policies in accordance with the Community at the governmental level a long time ago, whereas only some parts of Swedish society have done so after accession. In other words, it is claimed that committed neutrals of

[216] Margaretha af Ugglas, "Sweden's Security Policy in Post-Cold War Europe," *NATO Review*, Web edition, No. 2, Vol. 42 (April 1994): pp. 10-15.

[217] *Sweden's road to EU Membership*, retrieved from the Government Offices of Sweden, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/3470/a/20685 (Accessed 25 June 2006).

[218] Ibid.

[219] Murphy and Hunderi- Ely, "The Geography of the 1994 Nordic Vote": p. 296.

Sweden have not yet been transformed into committed Europeans who are the supporters of the evolving EU for a long time.[220]

5.3 A Comparative Perspective

It is stated that although the referendums concerning the EU membership of these countries were conducted at the same point in time, differences in the political and economic contexts of the countries influenced the outcome. It is asserted that in Finland, the fall of the Soviet Union dramatically changed the conditions of the country mostly for its security policy but also for its economy. On the other hand, in Sweden, the referendum took place in time of its deepest recession since the 1930s and at a time when the traditional welfare state was in a deep economic crisis.[221]

In brief, it can be said that for Finland, security concerns were the main motivation for joining the European Union whereas particularly political and economic reasons paved the way for Swedish membership.[222] In its EU membership application process, the basic consideration of Finland was that membership in a union with progressively deeper integration, interdependence, mutual responsibilities and political commitments, would enhance security of the country, by making it unlikely that Finland would again be left alone to deal with its easterly neighbor. The fact that the EU is not a military alliance, nor is it an independent actor in the field of defense also paved the way for EU membership in Finland. It was also considered by Finland that even the foreseen eventual common defense policy of the Union would be based on the respect for the national security and defense considerations and arrangements

---

[220] Ekengren and Sundelius, "Sweden: The State Joins the European Union," p. 145.

[221] See Maria Oskarson and Kristen Ringdal, "The Arguments," in *To Join or Not to Join, Three Nordic Referendums on Membership in the European Union*, eds. Anders Todal Jenssen, Pertti Pesonen and Mikael Gilljam (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1998), p. 151.

[222] Unto Vesa, "Legitimacy Pressures upon Finland and Sweden," in *Finland, Sweden and the European Union*, Pertti Pesonen and Unto Vesa, Research Report No. 77 (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute of the University of Tampere, 1998), p. 49.

of the member states. Finland perceived the principle of taking into account all the member countries' opinions in issues having defense implications in the CFSP as an important assurance in that sense. Correspondingly, it can be asserted that Finland interpreted the CFSP in a narrow manner, by mostly underlining the intergovernmental decision-making characteristics of the CFSP and described it merely as a complement to its national foreign and security policies. The debate about the CFSP and the possibility of NATO membership was more alive in Finland than Sweden.

Likewise, the main subject in the Swedish accession debate was whether membership in the EU would oblige the country to join a common defense structure. Sweden, finding itself in a similar situation, seemingly depicted the CFSP very much like Finland did. However, the discussion on the issue was not that alive, as in Finland. It can be affirmed that the EU membership was deemed to present a warning, signaling the end of Sweden's policy of military non-alliance. Additionally, it can be argued that there was distance between the Swedish government and the Swedes in this process that most of the discussions on the implications of EU membership were conducted in the governmental level. In Sweden, discussions seemed to be focusing on the general national and domestic concerns and therefore, the influence factor was not very predominant in this regard. The most striking difference is that the Finns were more eager to abandon the policy of neutrality than the Swedes who are very reluctant. Even after the referendum, the Swedes were very suspicious about the adaptation process to European integration. The fact that they would vote against EU membership if there was another opportunity for voting, may be a significant indication of this reluctant attitude.

Notwithstanding the differences, it can be noted that people who were in favor of EU membership both in Finland and Sweden, generally focused on the enhanced political influence in Europe and the importance of the EU as a framework for ensuring peace and security. On the other hand, for those who were against the EU membership in

Finland and Sweden attached importance to issues such as the possibility of losing national sovereignty and the economic cost of membership, where the sovereignty issue was regarded as the most dominant of all.[223] In addition, both Finland and Sweden did not pay much attention to the possible relations with Western European Union (WEU) and wanted to use this process as a time-out for considering their relations with WEU.

In the meantime, the most striking example of commonality in their security policies of Finland and Sweden was the similar and simultaneous change, the step from neutrality to non-participation in alliances taking place in the early 1990s. Both of the countries rephrased and redefined their security policy formulations in a similar way in 1992. In the same manner, for both of the countries the change from neutrality to non-participation in alliances was understood to give greater freedom of action, which would enable the widening cooperation in foreign and security policies possible for the countries. In this respect, it was admitted that non-participation in military alliances was thus a policy that did not hinder the countries' active participation in international security cooperation, including military cooperation. Nonetheless, in this military cooperation, the only problematic areas that Finland and Sweden could not participate in were the bilateral defense alliances, or mutual military security guarantees. Hence, it can be argued that while the importance of territorial defense continued to be the main concern in the overall security policy perspectives of these countries, there began to emerge an increased recognition in both of the countries concerning the importance of the EU in terms of the maintenance of security and stability in Europe.

Therefore, it can be asserted that as a result of this transition period, these countries began to be aligned with the European Union with regard to the political issues. However, in terms of military matters, the policy of non-participation in military alliances was preferred, not as an end in itself, but as an important means in achieving

[223] Murphy and Hunderi- Ely, "The Geography of the 1994 Nordic Vote": p. 291.

security policy stability in Europe's north as well as making the EU membership a possible option for themselves.

CHAPTER VI

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY POLICIES OF FINLAND AND SWEDEN IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (1995-2005)

One could say that since the end of the Cold War, Finland's and Sweden's security policy situation changed dramatically. On the one hand, old threats to their national securities disappeared or were reduced. On the other hand, new opportunities for their security policies emerged. It can be pointed out that even though the Finnish and Swedish security policies were not similar during the Cold War, their entry to the European Union in 1995, may be accepted as the starting-point for the potential future convergence of their security policies, considerations and strategies. It can be said that together with Finland, Sweden has confirmed its desire to participate fully in the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. They also accepted the policy as defined in the Maastricht Treaty, including its integration goals in the security and defense sector, without reservations or legal obstacles. In other words, the fact that the Maastricht Treaty stipulated "the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence"[224] did not discourage Finland and Sweden to apply for EU membership. In addition, although they had different profiles, they had common interests as well which would allow them to pursue joint initiatives within the EU, particularly in the field of security and defense policy, making their similarities more discernible. Certainly, it can be underlined that they started to have much more similar, but yet not identical, approaches in adjusting their security policies to the CFSP and later the CESDP. Hence, it would be more beneficial to begin to analyze their security policy perspectives and attitudes

[224] See Article J. 4 of the *Maastricht Treaty, Treaty on European Union*, p. 8, 7 February 1992, retrieved from http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf (Accessed 7 July 2006).

simultaneously within the EU, particularly with reference to the developments which have influenced the security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden. Some of these include: the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996-1997, the Cologne European Council 3-4 June 1999, Finland's EU Presidency in 1999, the Helsinki European Council 10-11 December 1999, Sweden's EU Presidency in 2001 and the European Convention and the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

6.1 The Reformulation of Security Policies of Finland and Sweden in the First Year of Membership

It is pointed out that Finland's security in Europe changed in general due to its membership to the European Union at the beginning of 1995. The Finnish governments' security policy reports or White Papers indicate the apparent change occurring in the security policy considerations of Finland. Hanna Ojanen argues that after Finland's EU membership, these reports started to have statements related to the positive considerations of the EU policies which show Finland's loyalty and belongingness to the Union.[225]

Certainly, Finland was seemed ready to adapt the definition and context of its own security and defense policy in accordance with the scope of the EU policies. In fact, according to the Report by the Council of State to the Parliament in June 1995, EU membership, an aspect of international post-Cold War transformation, was presented to be in line with Finland's active and pragmatic approach in its security policy. Subsequently, it is conceived that EU membership would provide Finland with many opportunities for influencing the decisions taken in the Union aiming to establish lasting security and stability. It is added that Finland joined the Union as a non-participant in military alliances, wishing to play a constructive role in the creation of a common foreign and security policy. However, it is confirmed in the report that

[225] Hanna Ojanen, *Theories at a loss? EU-NATO Fusion and the 'Low-Politicisation' of Security and Defence in European Integration*, UPI Working Papers 35 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p. 16.

Finland had not made any decisions or given commitments on the issues of military security guarantees or common defense in that process. In addition, it is noted that Finland had not made any security policy reservations with regard to its obligations under the Maastricht Treaty. From the Finnish point of view, there was no conflict either in the clauses of the Maastricht Treaty or in Finland's prospects as a member. Thus, the policy of non-participation in military alliances was presented as not to constitute an obstacle for Finland to pursue its membership objectives and to fulfill its undertakings. On the other hand, the report underlined that in the long term, the Maastricht Treaty allows the EU to form a common defense policy and a common defense which will necessitate finding new solutions. However, according to Finland, these policy solutions must be agreed on unanimously by the EU member states in the future.[226]

With reference to above mentioned report, it can be asserted that at that time there was paradoxical situation concerning the future of the Finland's security policy within the framework of the European Union. Finland did not make any commitments on the issues of military security guarantees or common defense in the process of its membership application; it also did not make any security policy reservations with regard to its obligations under the Maastricht Treaty, including the possibility of common defense. Finland substantiated its argument by emphasizing that the possible shape of common defense would be decided unanimously by the member states and believing that it would have the ability to influence this process as a member state in the future. It can be argued that this argument does not change the reality that Finland became a member of a Union whose future defense dimension is obscure and always has the possibility of being shaped in a direction that might not be in accordance with the national policy priorities of Finland.

[226] *Security in a Changing World: Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy*, Report by the Council of State to the Parliament 6 June 1995, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/tpseng7.html (Accessed 27 January 2006).

It is affirmed that when Sweden became a member of the EU, it was forced to modify its policy perspectives in line with the requirements of the Union. Indeed, it is argued that Sweden started to feel the necessity "to adapt" all its policies, especially its security and defense policies, to the new policy priorities of the EU.[227] In fact, Sweden's overall security policy framework in the post-Cold War period, including its stance in the European Union, was also exemplified in the Government Defense Bill 1996, which accentuated that Sweden's non-participation in military alliances with the aim of making it possible for the country to be neutral in the event of a war in its vicinity, continued to be a relevant policy formulation within the new circumstances. It is added that Sweden will continue to contribute to the security and stability in the Northern Europe, by way of both its non-participation in military alliances and its adequate defense system. With regard to Sweden's position in the EU, it is reported that the EU is of fundamental importance for stability and security in Europe. According to Sweden, it seems unlikely today that all the members of the EU could agree on establishing a common defense system; however, the EU could play a greater role in humanitarian operations, crisis management and peace-keeping operations.[228]

It can be asserted that the above-mentioned security policy reports of Finland and Sweden, which were revealed just after their membership in the EU, seem to involve similar security policy perspectives to be followed within the EU. Nevertheless, there is one significant difference that is discernable: the fact that Finland was much more cautious than Sweden about the possibility of an EU common defense being established in the future. It was again Finland which emphasized the importance of the EU in terms of influencing the policies of other states in world politics. Indeed,

---

[227] See Olof Petersson, *Le Débat Suédois sur l'Europe*, Notre Europe, Etudes et Recherches No. 12 (Décembre 2000), p. 27, retrieved from http://www.const.sns.se/olofp/notreeurope_fr.pdf (Accessed 26 September 2006).

[228] *The Renewal of Sweden's Defence: Phase 2*, Unofficial shortened version of the Government Defence Bill 1996/97:4 passed by Parliament on 20 November and 13 December 1996, pp. 8-9, Ministry of Defence, Information Material 1996, retrieved from the Government Offices of Sweden, http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/56/49/e043d837.pdf. (Accessed 12 October 2006).

the fact that Finland's EU membership was also motivated by the desire to maximize its international influence can be exemplified in the words of the former President of the Republic of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari (1994-2000) stating that "…now that we are members, we sit as an equal partner at the table where decisions that affect us are made." Ahtisaari further declared that "If we had remained outside the EU, we would once again have been accommodators; now we have a say. For Finland the European Union is a means of pursuing our own interests."[229]

6.2 The Security Policy Perspectives of Finland and Sweden towards the Common European Security and Defence Policy of the EU

It is affirmed that the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996-1997 reviewing the Maastricht Treaty, was of utmost importance for both of Finland and Sweden, as being two militarily non-allied new EU members, in terms of demonstrating their all security and defense policy perspectives, priorities within the EU. Moreover, it was significant in the sense that now they had the opportunity to influence the decisions on security policy of the Union, in accordance with their own national security considerations.

It was believed in Finland that the Intergovernmental Conference 1996-1997 would provide an opportunity for Finland, as a new member state, in order to influence the future shape of the Union. In this respect, there were national debates in Finland prior to the IGC, between the integrationists who prefer deeper cooperation and the intergovernmentalists who want to develop the Union as a loose association of sovereign states. According to integrationists, the IGC provides an opportunity to improve the performance of the Union. On the contrary, the intergovernmentalists

[229] "Finland's Evolving Role as a European Partner," Speech by President Martti Ahtisaari of the Republic of Finland at Chatham House, London on 24 November 1997, retrieved from http://www.tpk.fi/ahtisaari/puheet-1996/P971106.chaten.html (Accessed 5 September 2006).

were hesitant about the possible institutional changes that might affect the power balance within the Union.[230]

The Report by the Council of State to the Finnish Parliament in June 1995, prior to the Intergovernmental Conference 1996-1997, clearly indicated the position and policy priorities of Finland concerning the European Union and its developing common foreign and security policy. The report declared Finland's desire to see the "intergovernmentalism" as the core principle in developing the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. From Finland's perspective, solutions based on common interests would strengthen the mutual solidarity of the member states. Furthermore, it was confirmed in the report that this Intergovernmental Conference would not decide on the future shape of the Union's long-term goal of common defense, even though it is still a matter of discussion among the Finns.[231] Additionally, the national position of Finland in the IGC of 1996 was formulated in the Government's Report to Parliament, which emphasized that even though the Treaty on European Union (TEU) identified common defense as a possible long-term objective of the Union, in the present circumstances, the development of defense dimension in the Union only means the enhancement of crisis management and peacekeeping capabilities.[232]

On the other hand, it can be stated that at that juncture the Swedish political administration were skeptical and cautious about the future of the formulation in the Maastricht Treaty concerning the development of an eventual common defense within the Union. In this regard, Sweden's official attitude towards this issue in the forthcoming Intergovernmental Conference was exemplified in the report of its IGC 96 Committee. It is noted in the report that close cooperation with NATO and WEU

---

[230] Alexander C.-G. Stubb, "The Finnish Debate," in *The 1996 IGC-National Debates (1) Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands*, Discussion Paper 66 (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), pp. 2-3.

[231] *Security in a Changing World: Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy*.

[232] Tiilikainen, "Finland in the EU," p. 65.

is essential for Sweden, which do not participate in military alliances, to be able to continue its contribution to peace-keeping operations. It is reiterated that a clear boundary must always be maintained between the Petersberg tasks and other activities governed by Article V of the WEU Treaty on military guarantees for the member states. It is reaffirmed that Sweden can not take part in a common defense, due to its militarily non-allied status. Nonetheless, it is confirmed that it shall not prevent other states from advancing towards such a goal either.[233] The government declared that all actions in the CFSP field must be based on respect for Sweden's desire to maintain its militarily non-allied status.[234]

6.2.1 The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996-1997

One could say that the future relationship between the EU and WEU created the most important dispute within the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996-1997 reviewing the Maastricht Treaty, to strengthen the crisis management capability of the European Union. The most immediate reason for strengthening the CFSP was to enable the EU to handle crises around its environment and to do this more independently. The proposals for the future EU-WEU relationship, such as the preservation of the WEU as an autonomous organization representing the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, the then position of the United Kingdom, to the eventual full integration of the WEU into the EU, which was supported mainly by France and Germany, were presented during the Conference. With regard to the policy stances of two militarily non-allied EU member states, Finland and Sweden, discussions started as to whether their positions might cause problems or difficulties in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), particularly concerning the field of defense, since neither of them were members of NATO, nor full members of the

[233] *Sweden, the EU and the Future, Assessments by the Swedish IGC 96 Committee prior to the Intergovernmental Conference*, Report by the Swedish IGC 96 Committee, Government Official Reports 1996:19 (Stockholm: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996), pp. 42-44.

[234] Lindahl, "The Swedish Debate," p. 48.

WEU. Therefore, it was very important for Finland and Sweden to demonstrate a constructive position, while maintaining their distinctive security policy perspectives, during the Intergovernmental Conference 1996-1997.

It is worth noting that since the public in Finland were very hesitant about the common defense dimension of the EU, the Finnish officials most of the time felt the need to reassure the Finns that there was not any development as regards the establishment of common defense within the framework of the Union. Indeed, throughout the IGC, the government of Finland had a relatively integrationist approach in other policy areas, except the second pillar, namely the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, where it was very cautious about the possibility of collective defense.[235] However, it is asserted that at that juncture Sweden can not be characterized as either an "integrationist" or an "intergovernmentalist" member due to the fact that it has generally pursued a policy of a mixture of both since the beginning of its membership.[236] Nonetheless, in terms of the second pillar, Sweden, like Finland, had an intergovernmentalist perspective.

6.2.2 The Swedish- Finnish Initiative on the Petersberg Tasks

It is noted that Finland and Sweden, which were observers in WEU since 1995 while trying to preserve their non-participation in military alliances, realized the possibility of making a compromise proposal that would be acceptable for all sides having different security policy perspectives. It is asserted that at that juncture, Finland and Sweden wanted to draw attention to the value of soft security issues such as crisis management and conflict prevention, in order to distract the other member states'

[235] Stubb, "The Finnish Debate," p. 4.

[236] Lindahl, "The Swedish Debate," p. 50.

attention from the vision of an EU with a defense pillar, which would be unacceptable for both of the militarily non-allied countries.[237]

The joint initiative on including the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 1996-1997 may be accepted as one of the most significant endeavors of Finland and Sweden within the EU, which emerged as a reaction to these continuing discussions in the IGC and to a joint document on the gradual integration of WEU into the EU, proposed and presented by some of EU member countries in March 1997.[238] It is pointed out that this initiative can be interpreted as using the attack as the best means of defense, in the sense that, they preferred to propose their own policy in advance, without having to approve the other's plans.[239] It is mentioned that by means of their joint memorandum on the development of the security and defense dimension of the Union on 25 April 1996 entitled "The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension-towards an enhanced EU role in crisis management,"[240] they wanted to demonstrate their will to strengthen the links between the EU and WEU in undertaking the Petersberg tasks.

---

[237] Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira, "The Militarily Non-Allied States in the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Solidarity 'ma non troppo'," *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (April 2005): p. 24.

[238] Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*, p. 6.

[239] However, in the author's interview with a Finnish Officer in the Swedish National Defense College in Stockholm, on 5 December 2003, it is argued that both Finland and Sweden, were surprised with the result of their joint initiative on the grounds that they were not expecting to be that influential in the future design of the policies of the CFSP at that point in time. It is also claimed that Finland and Sweden were successful in influencing this process owing to the lack of cohesion among the other EU members on the future shape of the CFSP at that juncture. See Malmborg, "Sweden in the EU," p. 47.

[240] They proposed the following: "an enhanced EU competence for taking relevant decisions by including the Petersberg tasks in the CFSP as membership tasks; to make a reinforced link between the EU and WEU on implementing military crisis management decisions; EU member-states participation in joint peacekeeping and crisis management operations, conducted by the WEU on the basis of 'equal opportunity for all' (Memorandum, 25 April 1996, p. 2); the WEU would be expected to implement the EU decisions, with EU states disclosing the forces they had available for 'EU-enacted and WEU-conducted operations,' and with the EU having no capability for using military resources; collective defence commitments would be separate from such EU/WEU military crisis management." Clive Archer, *Finland, Sweden, the IGC& Defence*, ISIS Briefing Paper No. 8 (January 1997), International Security Information Service, retrieved from http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/bp-8.pdf (Accessed 6 September 2006).

Their proposal envisaged the revision of Article J. 4 of the Maastricht Treaty, firstly, by means of including the Petersberg tasks, that is, "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making," in the CFSP. Secondly, by establishing a reinforced link between the EU and the WEU concerning the implementation of decisions related to the field of military crisis management adopted by the EU. With the approval of their opinions in the proposal, the Petersberg tasks were included in the CFSP and referred to in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed on 2 October 1997 and came into effect in the end of May 1999.

Article J. 7 of the Treaty of Amsterdam underlined the fact that the Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union, which provides the Union with access to an operational capability and supports the Union in structuring the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy. In the treaty, it is pointed out that "The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications."[241] However, it is also mentioned that if the European Council decides there is always a possibility of integrating the WEU into the EU. In addition, according to the article J. 7 of the treaty, the progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported as member states consider it appropriate. On the other hand, in order to clarify the different positions of a few of the member states, such as the militarily non-allied Finland and Sweden within this context, the treaty further declared that "The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States."[242] As a consequence, their joint proposal formed the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) that

---

[241] *The Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts*, Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, p. 10, retrieved from http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf (Accessed 7 July 2006).

[242] Ibid., p. 9.

enhanced the capability of the EU in conflict management by including the Petersberg tasks into the CFSP of the Union.

The joint Swedish-Finnish initiative was important in the sense that firstly, it was an indication of their activism and constructivism within the Union, demonstrating that militarily non-allied small countries do not necessarily hinder the developments in the field of security.[243] Secondly, they accomplished the revision of Article J. 4 of the Maastricht Treaty which was at first only directly signifying the "the eventual framing of a common defence policy and common defence" within the Union. Then, the result of the initiative ensured the political control of the EU over the WEU, by trying to separate the scope of two organizations from each other. In addition, by means of this initiative, both Finland and Sweden managed to draw a line between crisis management and defense. They would be able to put forward the crisis management within the EU which reaffirmed their more traditional international engagement through the United Nations where both countries already have considerable experience. With the Amsterdam Treaty, they accepted the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks as an area of EU activity, whereas they rejected the view of including the collective defense guarantees contained in the Article V of the Brussels Treaty, in the scope of the Petersberg tasks.[244] Thirdly, their initiative provided states, which pursue the policy of non-participation in military alliances, with the right to participate on an equal footing in planning and decision-making in the

[243] Indeed, it is stated that some of the countries in the EU had concerns regarding the possible impact of the militarily non-allied states in the EU policies. For instance, it is said that from Maastricht until Amsterdam, the official position of France was an indication of these kinds of concerns. According to France, "North-European states do not contribute to the security of Europe as they should do. Non-alignment and non-participation in military defense agreements generate uncertainties that are harmful to an EU in need of concrete solidarity between its members." See Fabien Terpan, "French concern: Northern Europe as a key point in the European debate on power and security," in *The Northern EU, National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension*, eds. Gianni Bonvicini, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Wolfgang Wessels, The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 9 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p. 245.

[244] Richard G. Whitman, *Amsterdam's unfinished business? The Blair Government's initiative and the future of the Western European Union*, Occasional Papers 7 (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1999), p. 20.

operations within the WEU, even though they were not the full members. Indeed, both Finland and Sweden had been trying to avoid all developments that would inevitably compromise their full and active participation in the CFSP. This development was important in the sense that they were against the idea of several different membership categories and various decisions in the field of defense cooperation, with the possibility of accepting or not, within the framework of the EU.[245]

In addition, in the case of crisis management with more military operations, NATO's military capability would be very important. According to these countries, this case has the risk that non-NATO members of the EU might lose their influence in that circumstance even if the operations were conducted by the EU. Therefore, to obtain the right to participate on an equal footing in these operations was very imperative for them. The fact that the WEU would be authorized to carry through operations on behalf of the EU was suitable, whereas, the full merger of WEU and EU was not consistent with their militarily non-allied status.[246] Thus, they considered that they would be able to solve their most important problem related to defense issues within the EU at least for that period of time. However, it is worth nothing that the Amsterdam Treaty underlined the continuous possibility of establishing a common defense structure within the EU, which might jeopardize the policies of military non-allied countries by the time, even though their specific character of security policies seemed to be guaranteed in the treaty at that juncture.

Throughout this period, Finland, unlike Sweden, seemed to be much more willing to make itself ready for every possibility in the evolving and deepening security and defense arrangements in Europe, as in the beginning of its membership. As a matter

[245] See Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*, p. 7; Ferreira-Pereira, "The Militarily Non-Allied States in the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union": p. 33.

[246] Malmborg, "Sweden in the EU," p. 46.

of fact, it can be asserted that Sweden's reserved attitude towards its own traditional security policy was exemplified in its foreign policy statement of 1997, highlighting that "Each country has the right to make its own security policy choices and this right must be respected. We expect others to respect our choice, in the same way as we respect theirs."[247] Furthermore, it can be stated that Sweden was slower and more resistant than Finland in perceiving the increasing evolution within the EU in terms of security policy and adapting to it. Even in its 1998 foreign policy statement, Sweden's firm attitude is expressed by stating that "Sweden's policy of non-participation in military alliances with the aim of making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of war in our vicinity remains unchanged." Additionally, it was pointed out in the statement that "As a non-participant in military alliances with a strong commitment to the United Nations, Sweden has always differentiated between defence of our territory and peace promotion efforts at the request of the United Nations."[248] Nevertheless, the expression of the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Lena Hjelm-Wallén (1994-1998) confirming that "Sweden's non-participation in military alliances is a means to an end, not an objective in itself,"[249] may be accepted as the indication of possible change that might occur in the security policy formulation of Sweden in the future.

However, it can be alleged that Finland was continuously re-assessing its policies in light of developments in the security policy of the EU, and thus the change in its security policy and the level of adaptation to the changes in the Union, was much more fundamental than Sweden. Hence, Tiilikainen argues that there was a clear

---

[247] *Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs*, 12 February 1997, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/8552652a.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

[248] *Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs,* 11 February 1998, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/da095403.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

[249] "Options in Swedish Security Policy," address by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, at the Central Defence and Society Federation National Conference, Sälen, 19 January 1998, quoted in Malmborg, "Sweden in the EU," p. 53.

softening of the official attitude of Finland in terms of its security and defense policy at that point in time, especially at the beginning of the 1990s. According to Tiilikainen, the first remarkable notice of this policy change was the so called "option doctrine." This doctrine, which entails that Finland has always the option of policy change was expressed in the 1997 White Paper on security policy of Finland, stated that "Finland will assess the effectiveness of the policy of non-alliance and military cooperation against the background of an evolving security configuration in Europe and as a part of the development of the EU."[250] In addition, the basic factors of Finnish security policy were defined in the White Paper as military non-alliance, an independent defense and membership of the EU.[251] In this regard, especially the use of the term "independent defense" as an important component of the security policy definition of the country was notable. Furthermore, the 1997 White Paper implied that "if Finland's own resources are not sufficient, she can, in accordance with the UN Charter, request the assistance of other countries in repelling the attack."[252] This conceptualization is important in the sense that receiving outside military assistance was now considered as an alternative for Finland, which tried to stay away from any military cooperation with third countries throughout the Cold War period. It can be commented that the wording of the paper may be accepted as a sign of Finland's pragmatic and adaptive approach in terms of its security policy within the EU. To put it another way, Finland started to recognize that the developments in the EU were evolving towards a military dimension as well therefore it should undertake all possible modifications and adaptations in its security policy, in order to safeguard its

---

[250] "The European Security Development and Finnish Defence," Report of the Council of State to the Parliament on 17 March 1997, quoted in Teija Tiilikainen, "A Finnish Perspective on European Security," in *The New Northern Security Agenda: Perspectives from Finland and Sweden*, eds. Bo Huldt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg and Elisabeth Davidson, Strategic Yearbook 2004 (Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2003), p. 309.

[251] "The European Security Development and Finnish Defence," Report of the Council of State to the Parliament on 17 March 1997, p. 47, quoted in Ruhala, "Alliance and Non-alignment at the onset of the 21st century," p. 114.

[252] "The European Security Development and Finnish Defence," Report of the Council of State to the Parliament on 17 March 1997, p. 52 quoted in Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?*, p. 21.

own national security interests in advance. Likewise, it can be alleged that Finland might have chosen integration instead of resistance to this ever closer security cooperation within the EU, although it was mostly reserved to express a very clear standpoint in terms of its options.

6.2.3 The Franco-British Summit in Saint Malo and Beyond

In reality, the initiatives to develop the CFSP, with particular emphasis on security and defense policy, began to emerge rapidly on the common agenda of the member countries, may be as predicted correctly by Finland before. It can be stated that the ground-breaking changes that occurred in the defense policy of the EU resulted from the major change in the United Kingdom's attitude towards a more active EU role in the field of defense, which constantly resisted pressure that existed for the CFSP to take an active defense role, during the Maastricht negotiations themselves, and throughout the 1996 IGC leading to Amsterdam Treaty.[253]

First signals to this change were made by Prime Minister Tony Blair at an informal EU meeting of Heads of State and Government in Pörtschach, Austria, on 24 and 25 October 1998, where he expressed Britain's position and expressed the possibility of future changes in the defense policy and defense capability of the EU.[254] Consequently, the United Kingdom and France declared their joint willingness to establish a European Union capacity to act militarily at the Franco-British Summit in Saint Malo on 3-4 December 1998. They agreed on a joint declaration stating that "…the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to

[253] Jolyon Howorth, "Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, No. 5 (2000): pp. 378-380.

[254] "Informal European summit Pörtschach, 24-25 October 1998," in Maartje Rutten, *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Paper 47, Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (May 2001) retrieved from http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#1 (Accessed 15 January 2006).

respond to international crises."[255] It is also emphasized in the declaration that "Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks."[256] In fact, the proposals presented in this initiative brought not only significant momentum to the defense debate in the Union, but also unforeseen difficulties to the two militarily non-allied EU members, Finland and Sweden.

Thus, in order to demonstrate their positions regarding the Franco-British Summit in Saint Malo, the then Finnish and Swedish Foreign Ministers, Tarja Halonen and Anna Lindh, published a joint newspaper article on 5 December 1998. It can be said that the two Ministers wanted to underline in their article that crisis management is the most important task of the EU in the field of defense now, not the policy of common defense. Hanna Ojanen argues that within these circumstances, to make such a clear distinction between the crisis management and common defense was very important for the two militarily non-allied EU member small states, in order to secure their own positions.[257] In this sense, the two Ministers strongly affirmed that the Petersberg tasks would play a central role for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. They added that European crisis management is based on both volunteerism and on the preparedness to make a joint effort for peace and security. For that reason, it is important to use the resources of all member states, irrespective of whether they are non-participant in alliances or NATO countries. Furthermore, they underlined the importance of acquiring a UN mandate in the usage of force and having close relationship with NATO and the US, as regards the development of EU and WEU crisis management structures. They supported the opinion that if necessary, the WEU could resort to using NATO resources, but stressed, overlapping structures should be

[255] "British-French summit St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998," in Maartje Rutten, *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Paper 47, Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (May 2001) retrieved from http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#3 (Accessed 15 January 2006).

[256] Ibid.

[257] Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*, p. 10.

avoided because of the limited international resources.[258] Indeed, it can be stated that Finland and Sweden were in favor of a close EU-NATO relationship because they had the conviction that this close relationship would promote EU's crisis management profile while keeping collective defense in the framework of NATO. Thus, such a division of labor would not threaten their status of non-participation in military alliances within the EU.[259]

Subsequently, in the Vienna European Council, 11-12 December 1998, all member states approved that "in order for the European Union to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities."[260] After the Vienna European Council, serious debate on the future shape of the EU's defense dimension among the EU members started rapidly. Proposals such as the merger of the EU and WEU with the territorial defense guarantee in Article V and the inclusion of some kind of mutual defense obligations within the framework of the Union, were discussed, triggering a particularly difficult time for the militarily non-allied small states, such as Finland and Sweden.

6.2.4 The Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999

It is asserted that Finland and Sweden did not have much concern with regard to the decisions taken at the Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, where the EU decided to develop more efficient military capabilities, in order to be able to better counter the international crises and transfer the functions of the WEU to the EU. The position of the two countries was further strengthened and emphasized in the

[258] *Finnish Foreign Policy 1998*, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/chronology/chrono1998_12.html (Accessed 21 September 2006).

[259] Karp, "Security Integration in the Baltic Sea Region," p. 14.

[260] "European Council Vienna, 11-12 December 1998, Presidency Conclusions," in Maartje Rutten, *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Paper 47, Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (May 2001) retrieved from http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#5 (Accessed 15 January 2006).

conclusions of the Cologne EU summit, which confirmed the equal right of participation, recognizing the variety of perspectives and institutional memberships of all the countries concerned. It can be said that both Finland and Sweden went along with the decisions of the Summit, but only on the condition that they did not have to sacrifice the status of their non-participation in military alliances during this process.

Indeed, The European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence declared that "We want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members, of the EU can participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU operations."[261] It can be commented that this decision allowed space for national considerations and priorities of the militarily non-allied states, as well as, giving them the same opportunity to influence the evolution and implementation of these policies, with other allied countries. With regard to the inclusion of some of the capabilities of the WEU, which will be required by the EU to fulfill its new responsibilities in the field of the Petersberg tasks, the Declaration further stated that "… the WEU would have completed its purpose. The different status of Member States with regard to collective defence guarantees will not be affected. The Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defence."[262] The Declaration goes on to say that the European Union must have the proper capabilities and instruments in order to be able to fully undertake its tasks in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. Furthermore, it is reaffirmed in the Presidency Report that "The policy of the Union

[261] *The Cologne European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, and the Presidency Report on Strengthening of the common European policy on security and defence*, Annex III to the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3 (Accessed 23 April 2006).

[262] Ibid.

shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States."[263]

Nonetheless, the most important issue that might cause problems in the declaration was related to the requirement of the maintenance of a sustained defense effort and the efforts to adapt, exercise and bring together national and multinational European forces. In this sense, since the Cologne Declaration did not have articles and regulations related to the collective or mutual defense guarantees, both Finland and Sweden did not have any doubts regarding the fact that the declaration would contradict their policy of non-participation in military alliances.

However, according to Ojanen, with the help of the new developments, crisis management was put into a larger context, which allowed for further development of military cooperation and the link between the WEU and EU was made stronger than the Treaty of Amsterdam implied. Ojanen points out that the Petersberg initiative was made almost obsolete and the new situation became very similar to that of the first proposal made in March 1997 and a *de facto* merger of the EU and WEU came closer, which might put the two militarily non-allied states under pressure in the forthcoming days.[264]

Within these circumstances, it is affirmed that in April 1999, in Finland's Prime Minister Lipponen's second government program, the word "national" was deleted from the previous expression of "credible national defense capability" which was accepted as the basis of Finnish security policy. This policy change has been interpreted as the softening of Finland's position in order to be able to cope with and adapt to the developments in the security and defense policy of the EU and proved

[263] *The Cologne European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, and the Presidency Report on Strengthening of the common European policy on security and defence*.

[264] Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*, p. 11.

that Finland does not have the lack of solidarity with the other member states. Nevertheless, it is stated that this change in definition was perceived as an important step towards the acceptance of alliance membership in the future, even though the Finnish government declared its intention as not to change the country's basic security political orientation, and it underlined that this new formulation had no particular significance.[265] Also, it is commented that within this context, the program of Lipponen's second government did no longer refer to "independent" defense, but only addressed "credible" defense as the basis of Finnish security policy, in order to be able to receive also military assistance from other countries in the future.[266] Hence, it can be affirmed that a remarkable change in the definitions of security and defense policy between the years 1997 and 1999 was the change from "independent defense" to "credible defense capability." At that point in time, the establishment of a defense core with explicit security guarantees and mutual defense obligations in the Union was deemed to be the worst scenario for Finnish security policy.

It can be asserted that during this period, there was a slight change in the Swedish stance in terms of its security policy, even though it was not as significant as the Finnish case. For instance, in its foreign policy statements, Sweden started to discuss that its policy of non-participation in military alliances did not mean exclusion from world affairs, so that Sweden could take an active part in cooperation to promote peace and prevent conflicts in Europe. Additionally, Sweden underlined the fact that it chose this policy of non-participation in military alliance by itself, so only Sweden defines the content of that policy.[267] In this sense, it can be argued that Sweden started to emphasize its active position within the EU and to give a signal that it can always reformulate the content of its security policy in line with the changing

---

[265] Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*, p. 18.

[266] Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?*, p. 21.

[267] See *Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs,* 10 February 1999, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/4927d21f.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

circumstances, thus at the same time allowing itself a freedom of action within the security policy framework of the EU.

In brief, it can be alleged that both of the militarily non-allied states started to soften their positions, although at different rates, in order to be able to cope with and adapt to the developments in the security and defense policy of the EU.

6.2.5 Finland's EU Presidency in 1999

It can be noted that the development of the EU's security policy was one of the main issues on the agenda of Finland's EU Presidency in the second half of 1999. The general aim of Finland was to use the Presidency as a means to reinforce Finland's reputation as a good and constructive European partner. On 17 June 1999, the then Prime Minister of Finland, Paavo Lipponen (1995-2003), stated that some of the main features of Finland's EU Presidency were: strengthening the image of the Union as an open, effective and responsible actor, as well as supporting the enlargement of the Union which deemed to be very necessary to ensure the stability and prosperity of Europe.[268] Indeed, the main priorities of Finland's EU Presidency were reported as the promotion of a globally active, influential and enlarging Union, as well as, supporting a transparent and efficient Union with a stable and competitive economy.[269] Furthermore, it is stated that during the Presidency the Finnish government had underlined the importance of forming a strong EU which would be in line with the country's perceived security interests.[270]

---

[268] *Statement by the Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen to Parliament on the EU programme for Finland's Presidency*, 17 June 1999, retrieved from http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/toiminta/selonteot/selonteot/en.jsp?oid=130196 (Accessed 17 April 2006).

[269] See *Summary of the Programme for the Finnish EU Presidency, A Strong and Open Europe into the New Millennium*, 24 June 1999, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, retrieved from http://presidency.finland.fi/doc/agenda/summary.rtf (Accessed 25 June 2006).

[270] Tiilikainen, "The Finnish Presidency of 1999," p. 108.

Hence, the Presidency was considered to be an important instrument in strengthening the Finnish position and prestige as an EU member, where Finland had the responsibility of dealing with the crucial phase in the shaping of defense dimension of the Union. Nonetheless, it is also emphasized that the Presidency was not perceived in Finland as a means for enforcing national priorities in the short run, instead conceived as a vehicle for achieving a more rewarding EU membership in the long run. Thus, Finland was regarded to downplay its short term national priorities[271] with a pragmatic perspective.

Many of the security policy priorities of Finland's EU Presidency in CFSP matters were defined by the Secretary of State, Jukka Valtasaari, as managing the post-conflict issues in Kosovo and the stabilization of the situation in the Western Balkans by and large, as well as, reinforcing the CFSP by implementing the Treaty of Amsterdam and developing the common security and defence policy of the Union.[272] However, one of the most important security policy priorities of Finland during its Presidency was also related to the promotion of its Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI)[273] which was launched by Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen in September 1997

[271] Rikard Bengtsson, Ole Elgström and Jonas Tallberg, "Silencer or Amplifier? The European Union Presidency and the Nordic Countries," *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004): p. 317.

[272] See Speech by the Secretary of State Jukka Valtasaari, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU; Priorities of the Finnish Presidency," The Conference of the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Parliaments of the Member States of the European Union, of the European Parliament, and of the Parliaments of the Applicant States, Helsinki, 20-21 July 1999, retrieved from http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle561.html (Accessed 5 September 2006).

[273] Secretary of State of Finland Jukka Valtasaari affirmed in the speech made at London School of Economics and Social Sciences, that the Northern Dimension is based on four assumptions. First, with the membership of Finland and Sweden, the EU obtained a new dimension reaching also to the northern region of the European continent as well as it began to have a long common border with Russia. According to the second assumption, in Europe, organizations such as the EU and NATO are extending eastwards, while the centre of gravity of Russia has moved towards north-west. Third, nearly half of Russia's export transit routes are located in the Baltic Sea region. Fourth, most of Russia's raw materials, including its energy resources, are in the northern region. Jukka Valtasaari emphasized that the agenda of the Northern Dimension of the EU combines regional, European-wide and global interests. See Speech by Jukka Valtasaari, "Finland and the EU Presidency - an Agenda for the New Millennium," Nordic Policy Studies Centre, London School of Economics and Social Sciences, London, 4 May 1999, retrieved from http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle1108.html.

and adopted as an official EU policy at the end of 1998.[274] According to the initiative, the EU needed a policy for the Northern Dimension with its main objectives of peace, stability and security in the region, including Russia, by means of the soft security measures, such as closing the social and income gap in the region by economic cooperation, environmental cooperation and sustainable development.[275] In this regard, Clive Archer points out that the Northern Dimension had security implications as well due to the fact that one of its motivations was the Finnish desire to integrate Russia into European structures through increased cooperation and positive interdependence.[276] Even though the goals of the NDI project were not achieved in all full during the Finnish Presidency, Finland succeed in drawing the attention of the EU towards the territories and problems around its northern borders. Nevertheless, the establishment of the Northern Dimension within the Union by

[274] Based on the Finnish initiative in September 1997, the Luxemburg European Council in December 1997 accepted the opinion and decided to start to establish a Northern Dimension in the EU and after the Vienna European Council of December 1998 the Northern Dimension came to the political agenda of the EU. See Lassi Heininen, "Ideas and Outcomes: Finding a Concrete Form for the Northern Dimension Initiative," in *The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?*, ed. Hanna Ojanen, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 12 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2001), pp. 29-30.

[275] Holger Moroff, "The EU's Northern Soft Security Policy: Emergence and Effectiveness," in *European Soft Security Policies: The Northern Dimension*, ed. Holger Moroff, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 17 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), pp.159-160. For the background of Northern Dimension initiative, see Pertti Joenniemi and Alexander Sergounin, *Russia and the European Union's Northern Dimension: Encounter or Clash of Civilisations?* (Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod LinguisticUniversity Press, 2003), pp. 14- 27. Sweden's attitude towards this initiative was also very positive. In fact, the Swedes were strong supporters of Finnish proposals to initiate a policy of an EU Northern Dimension since the beginning and they were satisfied with the fact that "hard" security issues were not to be included in this dimension which is mostly based on a "low tension" policy. For further information about Sweden's policy towards the EU's Northern Dimension policy, see Lee Miles and Bengt Sundelius, " 'EU Icing on a Baltic Cake': Swedish Policy towards the Baltic Sea and EU Northern Dimensions," in *Sweden and the European Union Evaluated*, ed. Lee Miles (London: Continuum, 2000), pp. 43-45; Jennifer Novack, "The Northern Dimension in Sweden's EU Policies: From Baltic Supremacy to European Unity?," in *The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?*, ed. Hanna Ojanen, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 12 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2001), pp. 78-106.

[276] Clive Archer, "The Northern Dimension as a soft-Soft Option for the Baltic States' Security," in *The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?*, ed. Hanna Ojanen, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 12 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2001), p. 202.

Finland was important in the sense that it was conceived by some as the indication of the ability of small states to influence decisions within the CFSP.[277]

It is asserted that the Presidency helped Finland to get rid of its self-image of a peripheral small state which stemmed from the Cold War experiences. In addition, it is claimed that the Presidency forced the country to identify its place and objectives in the common policies of the Union. In this regard, it is put forward that the Finnish Presidency may have challenged the state-centric approach of Finland with regard to its security policy considerations.[278]

Furthermore, with reference to the Finnish Presidency it is argued that Finland was very anxious not to violate norms of impartiality and neutrality, even in cases where such behavior ran contrary to its own national interests. It is underlined that the Finnish government simultaneously used the Presidency to promote its long-term national objective of tying Finland closer to the core of the EU.[279] In brief, it can be affirmed that Finland's EU Presidency seemed to match the expectations with regard to the role of Finland, as small, new, militarily non-allied and northern member state. The basic principle of the Finnish leadership was to keep the EU machinery

[277] For this argument see Helene Sjursen, "Making Sense-or not-of the EU's External Policy," in *Europeanization of Security and Defence Policy*, eds. Elisabeth Davidson, Arita Eriksson and Jan Hallenberg (Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2002), p. 39. In addition, it can be stated that there are very different interpretations regarding the Finland's initiative of Northern Dimension in the European Union. On the one hand, it was conceived as a very successful project by which Finland, as a small state, would be able to influence the policy direction of the Union. On the other hand, it is argued that the idea of the Northern Dimension was accepted in the Union in a relatively short period of time only due to the fact that the idea was broad enough to serve the interests of many EU member states at that juncture while at the same time the concept was vague enough not to constitute a particular threat to any states' own national interests. For this argument see Esko Antola, "The Presence of the European Union in the North," in *Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension*, ed. Hiski Haukkala, Working Papers No. 4 (Turku: Jean Monnet Unit of the University of Turku, 1999), p. 115.

[278] Tiilikainen, "The Finnish Presidency of 1999," p. 116.

[279] Bengtsson, Elgström and Tallberg, "Silencer or Amplifier?": pp.312- 322.

functioning and most notably the EU's attention was drawn to the territories and problems around its northern borders.[280]

6.2.6 The Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999

The Helsinki European Council of 10-11 December 1999 was another important Summit for both Finland and Sweden, on the grounds that it had the possibility to affect their security policy concerns. In fact, the decisions of the Council gave concrete form to the notion of developing an autonomous European crisis management capacity. In this sense, the member states decided to develop more effective military capabilities and to improve and make more effective use of resources in civilian crisis management. They set a military capability target known as the Headline Goal: by the year 2003, of sustaining military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons which should be deployed within 60 days. In addition, they decided to establish new structures, as had been envisioned in the Cologne European Council, involving defense ministers in what is now called the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). The European Union was not clear at the Helsinki Summit on the necessity of the UN mandate for EU crisis management. According to the Presidency conclusions, the Union will contribute to international security "in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter."[281] However, it does not confirm whether the EU will directly need a UN mandate to launch and conduct its military operations.

It is also worth mentioning that the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy into a Common European Security and Defence Policy meant the

---

[280] Teija Tiilikainen, "Finland's First Presidency of the European Union," in *Finland in the European Union*, Tapio Raunio and Teija Tiilikainen (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), pp. 123-124.

[281] *Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence*, Helsinki European Council 10-11 December 1999, retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (Accessed 14 May 2006).

beginning of the challenging times for the two militarily non-allied EU member countries, Finland and Sweden, due to the fact that the room for their non-participation in military alliances seems to be diminishing within this process.[282]

It can be pointed out that in reality the notion of a CESDP and the subsequent closer integration of defense forces seemed to signify something broader than crisis management. In addition, there was a conviction that during this process, the EU started to become more of a self-mandatory, autonomous crisis management organization, where the WEU institutions are being gradually transferred to it and deeper cooperation in the field of defense among states is becoming more obvious and structured in the European integration process. As a consequence, the borderline that Finland and Sweden wanted to draw between defense and crisis management is being continuously thinned. Consequently, Finland and Sweden, the two small militarily non-allied member states, started to feel under pressure due to the ever-developing defense dimension within the EU. Since their fundamental concern is to maintain a distinction between the activities in which they can participate and those in which they can not, owing to their distinctive security policy perspectives, they always felt the necessity to distinguish the military crisis management from common defense related matters.

Thus, firstly Sweden had some objections to the Headline Goal. It is stated that with the reassurances of Javier Solana that Sweden's policy of neutrality was not in jeopardy and that no state would be obliged to defend other member states in case of any attack or aggression, Sweden left its oppositions to the Headline Goal and decided to ensure EU's autonomous capabilities.[283]

---

[282] For Finnish perspective see, Pentti Sadeniemi, "National interest at the heart of security policy in the EU," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 9 December 1999, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/today/091299-03.html (Accessed 25 January 2006).

[283] Eliasson, *The European Security and Defense Policy*, p. 11.

In this respect, the Helsinki Summit also approved a report on non-military crisis management of the EU,[284] as a result of the initiative of Finland and Sweden, with which particularly Sweden wanted to prevent the possible dominance of military means in EU crisis management, as well as, worked for putting *civilian* crisis management on an equal footing with military crisis management. Also it was again Sweden which worked actively for the inclusion of conflict prevention in the list of priorities in the field of security and defense during the Helsinki Summit.[285]

It is argued that Sweden tried, but failed to make the new EU structures less military oriented in that process, owing to the fact that Sweden, a militarily non-allied country, was perceived to have low military credibility.[286] Conversely, it can be affirmed that Finland, unlike Sweden, adopted a much more unreserved and flexible policy even towards the EU's military dimension. The reason for this was the idea that Finland had comprehensive expectations from its EU membership and conceived that this necessitated a constructive approach in all dimensions of European integration.[287]

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that Sweden started to express explicitly that its security has a clear European dimension and to demonstrate its changed opinion that all the members of the European Union are getting ever closer to one another through cooperation and shared values, which serve to create mutual solidarity and common

---

[284] See, *Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union*, Helsinki European Council 10-11 December 1999, retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (Accessed 14 May 2006).

[285] Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*, p. 21.

[286] Lars Wedin, "Sweden in European Security," in *The New Northern Security Agenda: Perspectives from Finland and Sweden*, eds. Bo Huldt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg and Elisabeth Davidson, Strategic Yearbook 2004 (Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2003), p. 329.

[287] Tiilikainen, "A Finnish Perspective on European Security," p. 314.

security.[288] In this respect, it can be alleged that Sweden became much more explicitly oriented towards the security policies of the EU, although not as much as Finland. Nevertheless, this modification in the policy perspective of Sweden may be a clear indication showing that Sweden, as a militarily non-allied small state in the EU, could not resist the evolving security cooperation within the EU. Hence, it preferred to adapt and modify its security policy approach in accordance with the EU in order to preserve its national interests as well.

It can be mentioned that these developments within the defense dimension might cause some future problems for the two militarily non-allied countries in maintaining their security policies. First, since both Finland and Sweden underlined the importance of transatlantic relations and United States' commitment to Europe, the developing European autonomy particularly in defense related matters *vis-à-vis* NATO might present some difficulties for these countries, in terms of mandates and means to be used, in the future. Especially from the Finnish point of view, as long as the future of an EU-based security system is unclear, the existing transatlantic system should not be questioned.[289] Furthermore, whether the EU will need a mandate by the UN for its peacekeeping operations in the future would be considered a vital issue for these countries, which attach much importance to the UN mandate for such military operations in order to obtain the consent of the international community. It is argued that in that case, Sweden was the one which always emphasized the need for a UN mandate more convincingly than Finland. Besides, these countries whose policies were mostly based on territorial defense capabilities[290] now started to feel the need to

---

[288] *Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs*, 9 February 2000, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/af5cf8ec.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

[289] See Tiilikainen, "Finland in the EU," p. 67.

[290] For instance, Gustav Hägglund acknowledges that as a small power, Finland has adopted a doctrine of total defense due to the fact that in the use of military force there are fundamental differences between major powers and small countries. For these differences see Gustav Hägglund, "Finnish Defence Policy Aims to Protect Against External Pressures," *NATO Review*, Web edition, No. 4, Vol. 43 (September 1995): pp. 19-21.

adapt their defense policies to be in line with the EU, where the idea of increasing convergence among the armed forces of the member countries is developing. Hence, they had to take part in the process of increasing the convergence of their defense forces to be able to participate in the operations within the framework of the EU. For instance, throughout this period, Sweden accelerated the development of its defense system by improving the adaptability of its armed forces, in order to make them to be able to respond more quickly to new threats. According to the Swedish perspective, threats have not disappeared but they only changed in character. Thus, threats to security have emerged which may be geographically far away from the territories of Sweden. It is therefore crucial for Sweden that wide international cooperation with regard to security is continuing to develop.[291]

Within this context, it is worth noting that the Finnish elite made a distinction between the concepts of "common defense" and "common defense policy," in order to clarify the scope of the policies within the EU. Common defense is regarded as being belligerent in integrated armed forces with mutual assistance guarantees. Conversely, a common defense policy is based on the Petersberg tasks as set in the Amsterdam Treaty and corresponded to a broad concept which included military crisis management and armaments technology cooperation in the CFSP pillar. It is asserted that the official understanding of Finland concerning the common defense was that the EU did not necessitate a defense dimension based on Article V defense guarantees, but rather a military capacity to play a stronger role to operate in crisis situations.[292] However, one could say that, this distinction of Finland was not clear enough with regard to the circumstances where military crisis management with soldiers can easily use the belligerent means to resolve crises. The ambiguity between the military crisis management and common defense was also expressed by the

[291] Frank Rosenius, "Sweden's Defence Forces- in a radical change," in *Security in the North, Change and Continuity*, ed. Mika Kerttunen, Series 2, Research Reports No:9 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 2000), p. 42.

[292] Ferreira-Pereira, "The Militarily Non-Allied States in the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union": p. 31.

President of Finland Tarja Halonen, who affirmed that in the broad sense of the concept, military crisis management often serves the security interests of the countries participating in the operation.[293]

In this respect, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Erkki Tuomioja and the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Anna Lindh, addressed their views and concerns on civilian crisis management in their common newspaper article, which appeared in two Finnish newspapers, *Helsingin Sanomat* and the Swedish-language *Hufvudstadsbladet*, and in the Swedish daily *Dagens Nyheter* in 2000. The Ministers of the two militarily non-allied states said that the European Union must decide on the goals of its civilian crisis management and urged the European Union to increase its ability to manage crises through civilian means. According to the ministers, relying only on the military crisis management is not enough.[294] It can be pointed out that they mostly underlined the significance of establishing a stronger European crisis management capacity to create a more influential Union in dealing with the issues of international security. In one of the interviews with regard to the Swedish perspective concerning the EU, Sweden's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anna Lindh, recalled that Sweden was worried about any federal structure that might occur within the Union which may culminate in dividing the EU into a core of states that are centers of gravity and other countries with lesser status and influence. According to Lindh, this kind of division would be problematical and generate new pressures among the states in the Union. With regard to the establishment of the EU force of 60,000, she affirmed that these troops would be required to be able to react faster for crisis

[293] See "At the Core of Europe as a Non-participant in Military Alliances - Finnish Thoughts and Experiences," Guest lecture by President of the Republic of Finland Tarja Halonen. at the University of Stockholm on 2 May 2000.

[294] "Foreign Ministers Tuomioja and Lindh: EU needs more efficient civilian crisis management," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 2 May 2000, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/today/020500-06.html (Accessed 25 January 2006).

management and adds that this EU force could be useful for the United Nations and it will not have the form of a standing army in the Union.[295]

6.2.7 Sweden's EU Presidency in 2001

From a Swedish perspective, Sweden's EU Presidency during the spring of 2001 was the most important European event since the country's accession to the Union in 1995. It can be affirmed that during its membership Sweden mostly put emphasis on the intergovernmental perspective in the construction of the EU and perceived this organization as a democratic peace project that can be more influential on the wider Europe in the future. During its Presidency, the country preferred to focus on the three Es, namely Enlargement, Employment and Environment, areas where Sweden would make a difference within the Union.[296]

In a similar vein, the main goals of Sweden during its Presidency were exemplified in its program, which was centered on the promotion of a Union which is open and transparent to the world around it and that stands for the principles such as democracy, respect for human rights, gender equality, cultural diversity and environmental concern. In addition, from the Swedish perspective, the EU, which should display solidarity and take an active role in international matters, must be in a better position in terms of preventing and managing crises. Therefore, during its Presidency, Sweden tried to put emphasis on the strengthening of the Union's capacity in the areas of military and civil crisis management as well as conflict prevention. In this regard, it can be stated that Sweden underlined the importance of maintaining cooperation with the UN as well as with the countries outside the EU

---

[295] Joseph Fitchett, "Anna Lindh, Foreign Minister of Sweden: A Warning Against Creating 2 Classes of EU Members," *International Herald Tribune*, 3 June 2000, http://www.iht.com/articles/2000/06/03/qna.2.t.php (Accessed 27 May 2006).

[296] Bo Bjurulf, "The Swedish Presidency of 2001, A Reflection of Swedish Identity," in *European Union Council Presidencies, A Comparative Perspective*, ed. Ole Elgström (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 140-141.

within the field of crises management.[297] However, it is affirmed that high expectations were not placed on Sweden as a leader in terms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union before the Presidency, owing to the fact that it was perceived as a "reluctant European" with its long tradition of neutrality and non-participation in military alliances. Conversely, it is asserted that Sweden, despite being a small state, managed to be active in the field of CFSP during its Presidency and the image of Sweden as a reluctant European, particularly in the field of security policies, began to change.[298] To put it differently, the Presidency was accepted as a good representation of Sweden's reorientation from hesitant to proactive player in the field of security affairs in a broad sense, not in terms of defense issues.

With regard to Sweden's EU Presidency, it is also argued that Sweden utilized its Presidency to push forward several key national concerns by way of commissioning cooperation agreements. It is asserted that Sweden rarely had to sacrifice its national positions and interests in order to do this and it did not hesitate to leave the principle of impartiality when key national concerns and vital interests were at stake. On the other hand, the Swedish Presidency put emphasis on the vital importance of sustaining and strengthening close relations between the EU and US, which were generally advancing during the Presidency. Moreover, it is asserted that the institutional relationship between the EU and NATO was also promoted during the Presidency due to the fact that as a small and militarily non-allied state, it was in Swedish national interest to advance these relations. Hence, Swedish activism in this area was of principal interest for the country throughout its Presidency.[299] From a comparative perspective, it is claimed that even though the content of the program of the Swedish Presidency was not very different from the Finnish one, Sweden was

[297] See *Programme of the Swedish Presidency of the European Union 1 January to 30 June 2001*, 14 December 2000, pp. 5-22, retrieved from http://eu2001.se/static/pdf/program/ordfprogram_eng.pdf (Accessed 25 June 2006).

[298] Bjurulf, "The Swedish Presidency of 2001," p. 148.

[299] See Bengtsson, Elgström and Tallberg, "Silencer or Amplifier?": pp. 323- 330.

perceived to have a more globally oriented perspective in its policy priorities than Finland which mostly utilized the technically EU oriented policy formulations.[300]

6.2.8 The New Modifications in the Security Policies of Finland and Sweden

All through this period, as a reaction to the evolving security cooperation within the EU, Finland and Sweden again started to feel the need to modify their security policy perspectives in order to cope with the changing circumstances, especially concerning the eventual framing of common defense in the Union. As a consequence, comprehensive discussions about the prospect of the change in the security policy definitions commenced both in Finland and in Sweden.

The modified version of Finnish security policy perspective[301] within the EU was officially stated in its 2001 White Paper on Finnish Security and Defense. Accordingly, one of the basic components of the Finnish security and defense policy is defined as remaining militarily non-allied under the prevailing conditions. The emphasis put on the "under the prevailing conditions" meant that Finland is constantly re-assessing its military non-alliance and taking into consideration the changes in the regional security environment and developments in the European

[300] See Hanna Ojanen, "Hopes, Expectations and Worries- the Challenging Task of Heading the Development of the CFSP/ESDP in a Diversifying Union," in *The Baltic Room- Extending The Northern Wing of the European House*, Strategic Yearbook 2001, eds. Hans Zettermark, Magnus Hägg and Caroline von Euler (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2000), p. 24.

[301] With regard to the characteristics of Finland's foreign and security policy during the first decade of the 21st century Klaus Törnudd, the former diplomat, whose career in the Finnish Foreign Service continued from 1958 to 1996, supports that a great deal of Finnish earlier foreign policy remained the same. Törnudd advocates that there are four important concepts that were left from the Cold War period of Finland's foreign policy to its policies in the 21st century, namely "continuity, stability, neutrality, and sovereignty." According to Törnudd, continuity is generally considered as a useful characteristic of Finnish security policy. Consistency and predictability are also deemed to be important for Finland. He states that the Finns think that a long and unchanged foreign policy is familiar and safe, as well as, it enhances confidence and ensures credibility. However, he adds that sudden changes in security policy perspective can be difficult to justify and accept for the Finns, although to maintain constancy is not an end in itself. See, Klaus Törnudd, "Finnish Neutrality Policy during the Cold War," February 2005, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Department for Communication and Culture/Unit for Promotion and Publications, Virtual Finland, p. 6, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=32643 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

Union. Thus, Finland always has the possibility to modify its stance in a very flexible way. Moreover, it is underlined that Finland is able to strengthen its influence in international affairs and to promote its own security goals, by actively seeking to develop the European Union's common foreign and security policy. On the other hand, it is also mentioned in the security report of 2001 that Finnish security policy will focus primarily on crises that may affect Finland wherever they emerge.[302] This new security conceptualization of Finland was different from the one in the security report of 1997 in the sense that it put a new emphasis on international military cooperation whereas the old formulation predominantly drew attention to the protection of the Finnish territory and its integrity. In fact, after the report was released, it was reiterated that international military cooperation is of growing importance for the Finnish security policy perspective owing to the fact that to put more emphasis on the international perspective is a type of prerequisite for Finland's ability to make a notable contribution to the increasing cooperation in the field of security. Hence, it is affirmed that participation in demanding international crisis management operations will strengthen military interoperability as well as contribute positively to the country's overall international position in security matters.[303]

In the 2001 White Paper "independent defense" was replaced by "credible defense" as indicated before in the program of Paavo Lipponen's second government of April 1999. According to Hanna Ojanen, Finnish defense changed from being a "credible national defence" to one that is accepted to be more credible if internationalized and Finnish security and defense objectives were made more consistent with other countries' objectives within the Union. Ojanen further argues that in this period Finland was also adopting new security perceptions from other European countries. She is of the opinion that if Finland really would like an enhanced role for the EU, it

[302] *The Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2001*, Report by the Government to Parliament on 13 June 2001, Ministry of Defence of Finland, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=184 (Accessed 14 May 2006).

[303] "Finland's Security Policy," in *Finnish Military Defence* (Helsinki: The Information Division of the Defence Staff, 2002), p. 7.

should support the supranational development of the defense dimension within the Union.[304]

In the same manner, in October 2001, the principles and viewpoints of the Finnish government concerning the future development of the European Union were illustrated in the Finnish government's report to the Parliament. In the report, the government highlighted the fact that Finland would like to see the EU continue to be developed as a close-knit community of independent states.[305] With reference to this definition, one could argue that, Finland both wanted to draw attention to its intergovernmental approach by emphasizing the independence of individual states, and also, expressed how much importance it attached to the solidarity and cohesion among the member countries by underlining the supportive and interdependent nature of this community. Thus, it can be asserted that by the time, Finland began to pursue a more integrationist perspective within the Union.

In a similar way, in 2001 Sweden decided to review its security policy formulation of 1992, which indicated that "Sweden's non-participation in military alliances, with the aim of making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of war in our vicinity, remains unchanged." In this sense, it is argued that the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent war on terrorism also has given new dynamics to this debate in Sweden owing to the fact that the Swedish government began to have the conviction that the threat posed by terrorists might radically change the security requirements and priorities of Sweden.[306] Nevertheless, at first it is announced that since the policy of non-participation in military alliances

---

[304] See Ojanen, *Theories at a loss?*, pp. 16-17.

[305] *Government Report to Parliament on the Future of the European Union*, 25 October 2001, p. 4, retrieved from http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tiedostot/julkinen/vn/selonteot-mietinnot/2001/eu-tulevaisuus-25.10.2001/131951.pdf (Accessed 17 June 2006).

[306] Pernille Rieker, *From territorial defence to comprehensive security? European integration and the changing Norwegian and Swedish security identities*, No. 626 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2002), pp. 32-33.

is an asset for Sweden, it has the strong support of the Swedish people and it allows the country freedom of action, so the policy of non-participation in military alliances would not be abandoned at least for some time.[307] However, in February 2002, Sweden's Parliament again adopted a new doctrine which dropped neutrality from the actual definition. According to the new conceptualization, "Sweden pursues a policy of non-participation in military alliances. This security policy, making it possible for our country to remain neutral in the event of conflicts in our vicinity, has served us well."[308] In addition, the Swedish Parliament confirmed that the concept of security is more than the absence of military conflict in today's world, thus threats to peace and Sweden's security can best be prevented by acting concertedly and in cooperation with other countries.[309]

According to the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, Anna Lindh, the new wording is more in line with reality. She is of the opinion that it is unrealistic to think that Sweden would remain neutral in a situation in which another EU member or one of Sweden's neighbors was attacked.[310] It can be stated that this security policy perspective of Sweden was accentuated one again in its 2003 Foreign Policy Statement highlighting that "Sweden does not participate in military alliances. This is

[307] See *Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs,* 7 February 2001, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/06a8da7b.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

[308] *Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs*, 13 February 2002, Unofficial Translation, p. 9, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/d86a5e1c.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2006).

[309] Ibid.

[310] "Sweden to adopt new security policy doctrine - drops neutrality," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 12 February 2002, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020212IE11 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

a policy that has served us well in different phases of history for almost two hundred years. It allows us freedom of action."[311]

With regard to this new definition, it can be argued that Sweden would continue to pursue this policy line as long as it serves the country well in terms of promoting its national foreign and security policy priorities. It may suggest a possibly different interpretation in the future. It can be alleged that the security policy revision of Sweden seems quite similar with the one adopted by Finland, emphasizing the impact of "prevailing conditions" on its security policy adaptations.

6.2.9 The European Convention and the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

Another crucial development for the two militarily non-allied EU members within the framework of the EU was the European Convention on the Future of Europe convened by the European Council which met in Laeken, Belgium, on 14 and 15 December 2001 and its project of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,[312] which was adopted by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 and then submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome on 18 July 2003.

The Convention, gathered with the purpose of simplification and clarification of the Union treaties, decided to submit its recommendations as a new constitutional treaty project that would modify and supersede the content of existing treaties. The project was presented to the Thessaloniki European Council on 19 June 2003. The Council welcomed the European Convention's proposal for a Treaty on the European

[311] *Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs*, 12 February 2003, Unofficial Translation, p. 16, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/ce922612.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2006).

[312] For the full text of the *Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*, 18 July 2003, see http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf (Accessed 7 July 2006).

Constitution and also welcomed a security doctrine offered by Javier Solana, the Secretary General of the Commission of the European Union and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.[313]

The European Security Strategy, which was approved by the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003, identified the more diverse but less predictable key threats to European security, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state failure, organized crime and regional conflicts and focused basically on the new dynamic global challenges. The strategy also accentuated the importance of multilateral cooperation and the primary responsibility of the UN for international security.[314] It is stated that Sweden was intensely involved in the development of the strategy, with the conviction that the strategy would be helpful for concentrating on how to achieve unity by reforming policies and improving the EU's ability to act. In addition, according to the Swedish perspective, the European Security Strategy provided the member countries with the mechanism that would strengthen the Union's ability even further.[315] The government of Sweden declared its strong support to meet the security threats identified in the EU Security Strategy.[316] Likewise, in one of his speeches, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Erkki Tuomioja, mentioned that the European Security Strategy would be a natural reference point for Finland in preparing its next White Paper on security and defense of 2004, in terms of its analysis of the security atmosphere, the definitions of the new dynamic threats, as well as, its determination in dealing with these threats. The Minister underlined that this strategy, which includes several suggestions about

[313] Wedin, "Sweden in European Security," p. 324.

[314] See *A Secure Europe in a Better World- European Security Strategy*, Brussels, 12 December 2003, The Council of the European Union, retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed 27 January 2006).

[315] Anders Bjurner, "Sweden," in *Challenges to Neutral &Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*, ed. Emily Munro (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005), p. 39.

[316] *Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs*, 11 February 2004, Unofficial Translation, p. 11, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/13aaf50b.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2006).

making the Union a more coherent and consistent actor, would also be a useful instrument for the Union to display its main characteristics to the other actors in the world.[317]

It can be stated that for the period of the European Convention, Finland and Sweden declared they were ready to positively consider the proposals aiming to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to improve the Union's ability to take responsibility for more challenging operations. However, they repeated once again that the starting point of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy was the legitimacy and power that come up from the common and concerted action of the member countries. As far as the proposals presented in the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003 and due for discussion at the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2003-2004 were concerned, these two countries, particularly, reacted on the proposal related to the "structured cooperation" solely among a limited number of member countries that are willing and able to work to enable the EU to perform relatively more demanding and challenging crisis management activities.[318] Germany and France have consistently called for some kind of "structured cooperation" in which a core group of countries would take the lead to develop defense policies. In this sense, Finland and Sweden were concerned that the Franco-German approach would lead to a European defense structure independent from NATO, which would not be in line with their traditional security perspective.

Sweden's attitude regarding the suggestions of "flexible integration" between groups of member states in the field of defense was negative through the European Convention, owing to its conviction that this might create and increase divisions

[317] "Speech by the Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja on the European Security Strategy," Finlandia Hall, Helsinki, Finland, 25 February 2004, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, retrieved from http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=61143&nodeid=32281&contentlan=2&culture=en-US (Accessed 5 September 2006).

[318] Erkki Tuomioja and Laila Freivalds, "We want a stronger EU security policy," 11 November 2003, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3212/a/4541 (Accessed 1 October 2006).

within the Union. Thus, the EU's influence would be weakened if the member countries did not present a joint position in defense matters. It was further recalled that Sweden's primary concern was to see the EU strengthened as one unified actor.[319] Another important proposal for Sweden was the "Solidarity Clause," aiming to strengthen the EU as a solidarity-based security community. In view of the inclusion of a "Solidarity Clause" in the convention's draft, which was related to provide assistance to the member states which are under the threat of terrorist attack, Sweden warned that the wording of this clause should not be interpreted as to constitute a mutual defense clause.[320]

Finland's position throughout the Convention was similar to that of Sweden. The Prime Minister of Finland, Matti Vanhanen (2003-present), expressed his country's apprehension in the areas of defense and security, as the possibility of mutual security guarantees being introduced into the constitution and closer defense cooperation among capable members. During its EU membership, Finland had a tendency towards supporting the policy suggestions in defense and security, provided that they manifest the unity of the membership. Thus, closer defense cooperation among capable and willing members was not something acceptable for Finland. The main purpose of the country was to refuse the development of collective defense, because of that, during the discussions in the Convention, it presented its objections towards the mutual security guarantees within the Union.[321] However, Finland supported the approval of a clear and binding document as the Union's new constitutional treaty and emphasized the importance of a closer and more coordinated cooperation

[319] See Anders Bjurner, "Sweden," in *Neutrality and non-alignment in Europe today*, ed. Hanna Ojanen, FIIA Report 6/2003 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003), p. 44.

[320] Karp, "Security Integration in the Baltic Sea Region," p. 27.

[321] Ibid., p. 28.

between the Union's institutions in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the enlarging Union.[322]

The Finnish government expressed its country's stance in the Government Programme of the Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen's Government on 24 June 2003, by stating that the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy should be strengthened on the basis of the values and principles shared by all the member states. In addition, the program noted that the development of the Union's Common Security and Defence Policy should be promoted by emphasizing the military and civilian crisis management objectives shared by all members. Similarly, the contribution of Finland to the international cooperation particularly in the field of combat against terrorism was underlined in order to show the solidarity of the country with other members.[323]

One could say that to put emphasis on the combat against terrorism in the Government program demonstrates the fact that Finland was eager to cooperate with other countries and play an active role in dealing with one of the most important security problems of international community after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.[324] In this respect, it can be stated that the fight against terrorism gradually became a new component of the security policy considerations of Sweden as well. As a militarily non-allied country, Sweden participated enthusiastically in international

---

[322] *The Government Programme of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen's Government on 24 June 2003*, p. 6 retrieved from http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/tiedostot/julkinen/vn/hallitus/Paeaeministeri_Matti_Vanhasen_hallituksen_ohjelma_24.6.2003/131539.pdf (Accessed 12 October 2006).

[323] Ibid., p. 4.

[324] Nonetheless, it is argued that Finland remains to be an unlikely target for the terrorist attacks thanks to its politically and geographically peripheral status. It is further claimed that Finland is an unlikely target due to the fact that the cost of attacking this country would be too high while the symbolism of the attack would too low for the international terrorists. For this argument see Toby Archer, *International Terrorism and Finland*, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs Report No.7 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2004), p. 89.

cooperation to fight against terrorism. Sweden supported the fact that international cooperation should be intensified in dealing with the underlying causes of terrorism. According to the Swedish perspective, the rule of law and the respect for human rights should be followed in dealing with this security issue.

6.2.10 The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2003-2004

The European Convention adopted the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe on 10 July 2003 and then completed its work. After the end of the European Convention, the EU member states started to enter very intensive and demanding negotiations on the draft constitutional treaty prepared by the Convention and its possible implications for the Union. It can be stated that particularly the questions, such as how to develop the EU's future Common Security and Defence Policy further within the framework of the draft constitutional treaty, how to increase the solidarity among the members of the Union and how to reach an overall agreement on the draft treaty, were discussed by the member states. It is acknowledged that the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2003-2004 of the European Union, which was convened on 4 October 2003, addressed many issues concerning the draft treaty.

Within this context, Finland and Sweden were afraid of the possibility of being excluded from a European defense force dominated by larger members such as France and Germany. However, one could argue that the position of Sweden at the IGC was relatively weak due to the result of the referendum where Sweden voted against the introduction of the euro on 14 September 2003, with approximately 56 percent of the voters voting against the euro. Therefore, it is asserted that Sweden did not want to attend the discussions related to security issues in order not to have a negative reaction as a result of the referendum.[325] It is alleged that the referendum was perceived as an indication of the fact that many Swedes "distrust European

[325] Author's interview with a Swedish Diplomat in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden in Stockholm on 16 December 2003.

cooperation."[326] Thus, it was thought that the result of the referendum had the possibility to deteriorate Sweden's overall position, influence in the Union and its integration speed in European structures, also in the field of security and defense.[327]

At that juncture, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Erkki Tuomioja and Laila Freivalds, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, expressed together that the two militarily non-allied countries were in accord regarding their conviction that the EU must make a stronger contribution to global security. The Ministers stated that the Intergovernmental Conference 2003-2004 would give Finland and Sweden an opportunity to improve the EU's ability to make use of its mechanisms in a unified and effective way. They also declared their desire to see the conflict-prevention measures, actions against terrorism, crisis management activities and stabilization measures in support of peace-building after wars and conflicts, as the obvious tasks for the EU. However, they highlighted the maintenance of conducting all EU crisis management activities, by acquiring the common decisions of member countries, as in the present circumstances. According to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Finland and Sweden, if the peace-support operations can not acquire the required political support of all member countries, then the name of the Union must not be used to identify these operations.[328]

Both countries reiterated their opinion on the proposal of "structured cooperation." In their view, the "structured cooperation" was not the right way to proceed for the strengthening of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. According to the Finnish and Swedish stance, this proposal had the risk of dividing the Union and the possibility to deteriorate the cohesion in the area of foreign and security policy, which might also result in a weaker security and defense policy in the future. Furthermore,

---

[326] "FMA 23 Sep: European Media See Swedish 'No' Vote Tied to Euro Zone Deficit," *FBIS Report*, 25 September 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-WEU-2003-0923.

[327] Wedin, "Sweden in European Security," p. 319.

[328]Tuomioja and Freivalds, "We want a stronger EU security policy."

they strongly rejected the Convention's proposal allowing some member countries to establish a "mutual defense" within the framework of the EU. In their opinion, this proposal had a possible risk of dividing the positions of members on the very important issues of international security, as well as, creating unnecessary tensions in transatlantic relations. In the same way, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Finland and Sweden described their common standpoint related to the future structure and character of the EU, by stating that they would like to see the EU developing as a political alliance with mutual solidarity and deeper political cooperation. In this respect, the fact that Finland and Sweden do not support the development of the EU as a military alliance with binding defense guarantees and commitments strongly emphasized by the Ministers of the two militarily non-allied EU members.[329] With regard to the Swedish perspective in this ongoing process, the then Prime Minister of Sweden, Göran Persson, stressed that "The common defense and security policy could be improved but it must remain open for all member states and be transparent."[330] In the same way, Persson criticized "small clubs within the EU," and said EU-led Defense initiatives would cause "tension for non-allied countries like Sweden." Sweden emphasized its opposition to any security and defense initiatives that would be taken by the European Union to compete with NATO.[331]

It is worth noting that, in the period of the IGC 2003, the Finnish delegation presented a proposal for a new Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty. Finland wanted to underline that the EU should deepen the solidarity among the peoples of Europe while also respecting their own history, culture and tradition.[332] With reference to this proposal, it can be argued that Finland would like to safeguard the space for different

[329] Tuomioja and Freivalds, "We want a stronger EU security policy."

[330] "Sweden, Poland Oppose Any EU Military Planning in Competition with NATO," Paris Agence France Presse (AFP), 2 December 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-WEU-2003-1202.

[331] Ibid.

[332] *Finnish Proposal for a new Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty*, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, IGC 2003, CIG 61/03, DELEG 29, December 2003, p. 2.

foreign and security policy perspectives of the militarily non-allied small states in the Union. In addition, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland jointly prepared and submitted a letter to the President of the Council of the European Union on 4 December 2003, covering their overall attitudes about the issues that were being debated. They jointly expressed their full support for the efforts to finalize the Constitutional Treaty and stressed the importance of enhancing mutual solidarity among member states. They noted their support of the proposal regarding the inclusion of a solidarity clause in the Constitutional Treaty which would take into consideration terrorism and natural and man-made disasters.[333]

The "mutual defense clause" which proposes that if any member state is "the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance" was a problematic issue for these countries due to their respective security policy concerns. The proposed clause, which was deemed to be very similar to NATO's Article V commitments, suggested that if a member state is attacked, other member states are automatically obliged and responsible to provide assistance in accordance with the United Nations Charter.[334] Thus, Finland, Sweden, Austria and Ireland found the provisions containing formal binding security guarantees, inconsistent with their respective security policy traditions. They proposed a new wording that "if a Member State is victim of armed aggression, it may request that the other Member States give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter."[335] By means of that new formulation, they tried to prevent defending another member

[333] See *Cover Note* from Erkki Tuomioja, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland; Brian Cowen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland; Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria; Laila Freivalds, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, to Franco Frattini, President of the Council of the European Union, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, CIG 62/03, IGC 2003, DELEG 29, 4 December 2003, p. 2.

[334] Judy Dempsey, "Europe: Nations at loggerheads over neutrality," *Financial Times*, 9 December 2003, retrieved from http://search.ft.com/searchArticle?sortBy=datearticle&page=70&queryText=Sweden+and+Finland&y=8&javascriptEnabled=true&id=031209000756&x=10 (Accessed 27 May 2006).

[335] *Cover Note*, p. 2.

state to be an automatic obligation for all the member states,[336] which would be in line with their distinctive security policy considerations. In this regard, when the Swedish-Finnish Initiative on the Petersberg tasks in 1996 is compared to their joint proposal in 2003, it is said that the first may be described as a "pre-emptive strike which indicates an active approach" and the second as a "reactive approach" where these countries felt the need to emphasize their exceptional status which might have the possibility of creating a "loyalty crisis" in this process.[337] Similarly, with regard to the Swedish position in this process, a Swedish diplomat in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden underlined that "It seems that we are pulling towards a development that we do not have much opinion about it."[338]

As a consequence, in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, it is mentioned that "If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter." It is further stated in the treaty that "This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States."[339] Additionally, in the Solidarity Clause of the treaty it is pointed out that "The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster."[340] According to the treaty, the member states shall assist a member state in its territory, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster or a terrorist attack, at the request of its political authorities.

---

[336] Dempsey, "Europe: Nations at loggerheads over neutrality."

[337] Author's interview with a Professor in the Swedish National Defence College, in Stockholm on 16 December 2003.

[338] Author's interview with a Swedish Diplomat in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden in Stockholm on 16 December 2003.

[339] *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*, CIG 87/2/04 REV 2, 29 October 2004, p. 46, retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/igcpdf/en/04/cg00/cg00087-re02.en04.pdf (Accessed 29 October 2006).

[340] Ibid., p. 48,

In fact, it is declared that the finalized article on aid and assistance in the case of armed aggression on the territory of a member state was agreeable for the national objectives of Finland. The reason for this was the fact that the finalized wording was not making the EU a military alliance, with mutual and binding security guarantees, while it provided a mutually binding commitment in terms of the political solidarity in the Union. It is also commented that Finland was satisfied with the result on the grounds that the article did not have the possibility to affect the transatlantic security relations in a negative way.[341] Nevertheless, Tapani Vaahtoranta points out that Finland's reaction to the defense clause and the motivations behind it are still being debated in Finland. Vaahtoranta mentions that the question "why Finland is ready to assist other EU members if they are attacked by terrorists but perhaps not if they are attacked by other states?" is being discussed among Finns nowadays.[342]

On the other hand, according to the Swedish perspective, the solidarity clause, which is involved in the new European constitution, indicates the solidarity embedded in the political alliance established by the Union. However, it is accentuated by Sweden that each member state has the right to decide on whether to put this political solidarity into practice. Additionally, each member state can make its own decisions with regard to its own contributions in the event of a terror attack or other disasters. From Sweden's perspective, this clause also implied a new dimension to the security efforts of the EU.[343] In this regard, Anders Bjurner, Ambassador in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, affirms that it would be natural, as an act of solidarity, for Sweden to come to a member state's assistance in case of a terrorist attack or a natural

---

[341] Kari Möttölä, "Finland," in *Challenges to Neutral &Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*, ed. Emily Munro (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005), p. 20.

[342] Tapani Vaahtoranta, "Comments on the Finnish Position," in *Challenges to Neutral &Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*, ed. Emily Munro (Geneva: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005), p. 24.

[343] *Swedish Government Bill 2004 / 05:5, Our Future Defence, The focus of Swedish Defence Policy 2005–2007*, Swedish Ministry of Defence, October 2004, p. 8, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/03/21/19/224a4b3c.pdf (Accessed 12 October 2006).

disaster.[344] In the same manner, Huldt argues that even though this new structure of solidarity in the Union, is neither an alliance nor a guarantee, it offers some reassurances for all the member states.[345]

Nonetheless, it can be said that even though Finland and Sweden succeeded in their attempts at preventing the wording in the EU constitution, which had the possibility to oblige the militarily non-allied EU members to participate in a kind of collective defense issues, the application and consequence of the new formulation might be damaged by unexpected developments which can not be manipulated either by Finland or Sweden in the future. Since the nature and form of the assistance to be provided within this framework was still not determined very clearly in that process, it might always cause problem or challenge for the militarily non-allied states in the future.

In consequence, the EU member countries reached an agreement on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, at the European Council on 17- 18 June 2004 which brought the IGC 2003 to an end. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, referred to as the Constitutional Treaty, was signed in Rome on 29 October 2004.[346] However, in June 2005, the European Council decided to launch a period of reflection for the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, in order to give time to discuss it. As a result, the Finnish government decided not to ask Parliament for an immediate approval of the Constitutional Treaty and delayed it until after 2005.

Certainly, it can be stated that both Finland and Sweden were satisfied with the final form of the Constitutional Treaty and its articles related to security and defense

---

[344] Bjurner, "Sweden," in *Challenges to Neutral &Non-Aligned Countries*, p. 40.

[345] Huldt, "Comments on the Swedish Position," p. 44.

[346] For the full text of the *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*, CIG 87/2/04 REV 2, 29 October 2004, see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/igcpdf/en/04/cg00/cg00087-re02.en04.pdf (Accessed 29 October 2006).

issues. From Finland's point of view, the European Union has changed noticeably and this process of change is still in progress due to changes in the global environment and steadily deepening cooperation especially in the field of security. Therefore, the Constitutional Treaty would provide a balanced and an acceptable general solution that would reinforce the Union's capacity to meet the challenges of the future.[347] Finland affirmed its stance regarding the fact that the Unions' capabilities to safeguard its own security must be improved. The fight against terrorism and new threats also necessitate an integrated approach that takes into account the Union's various operational sectors, including military capabilities.[348]

The then Prime Minister of Sweden, Göran Persson, declared that Sweden would continue towards ratification of the European Union's Constitutional Treaty, despite the disapproval of France, and added that he expected the Treaty to be ratified in the end. Likewise, the Prime Minister of Finland, Matti Vanhanen, stated that he would proceed with the ratification process and expressed the hope that other EU states would do the same.[349] In addition, the Prime Ministers of both the Baltic states and the Nordic countries, which are members of the European Union, expressed their positions with regard to the latest developments within the Union in their meeting in June 2005. According to their joint perspective, ratification of the EU Constitutional

---

[347] *Government Report to Parliament on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for the European Union*, Unofficial translation, 25 November 2005, p. 4, retrieved from http://www.vn.fi/tiedostot/julkinen/vn/selonteot-mietinnot/Valtioneuvoston_selonteko_Euroopan_unionin_perustuslakisopimuksesta/145494.pdf (Accessed 7 July 2006). For discussions about the Constitutional Treaty in Finland, see "Finnish Parliament takes positive view of EU constitution treaty," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 30 November 2005, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Finnish+Parliament+takes+positive+view+of+EU+constitution+treaty/1101981802160 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

[348] *Government Report to Parliament on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for the European Union*, p. 12.

[349] Clare Mac Carthy, "Nordic countries to plough on with ratification," *Financial Times*, FT.com site, 30 May 2005, retrieved from http://search.ft.com/searchArticle?sortBy=datearticle&page=30&queryText=Sweden+and+Finland&y=8&javascriptEnabled=true&id=050530002134&x=10 (Accessed 27 May 2006).

Treaty which provides the best framework for European cooperation must continue.[350]

[350] "Baltic, Nordic Prime Ministers Conclude EU Constitution Ratification must Continue," *BNS*, 10 June 2005, FBIS Transcribed Text, NewsEdge Document Number: 200506101477.1_90be003ce66625c6

CHAPTER VII

THE NEW SECURITY POLICY AGENDA FOR FINLAND AND SWEDEN

It can be stated that the rise of important issues of security and defense policy on the EU's agenda in the framework of the Union's constitutional process caused Finland and Sweden to reevaluate their security policy perspectives in 2004. As a result of the developments in the EU, these two militarily non-allied countries started to adjust their security and defense policies to be in line with the EU standards once again.

7.1 The New Modifications in the Security Policies of Finland and Sweden

In its White Paper on security policy 2004, some of the key threats affecting Finland's security were described as terrorism, the threat of the proliferation and use of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts. Within this context, the capability and influence of the EU is presented as the most important point for Finland. The most striking aspect in the paper is the statement that Finland contributes to strengthening the EU as a "security community" and "participates fully in developing and implementing its common security and defence policy."[351] Membership in the EU, which is based on solidarity and mutual commitments in all areas, is stated in the paper to serve to increase Finland's own security. Therefore, it is affirmed that Finland will contribute to the formation of permanent structured cooperation and to develop its own capabilities, including rapid response forces and the necessary military resources for actions required under Union obligations. With

[351] *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004*, Government Report 6/24, 24 September 2004, p. 6, Ministry of Defence of Finland, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/files/311/2574_2160_English_White_paper_2004_1_.pdf (Accessed 21 June 2006).

the paper, Finland confirmed that its military crisis management capability will be developed in accordance with the changes in the actual security environment, which will necessitate the adoption of new types of operation.[352]

As a matter of fact, this last White Paper of Finland, on its security and defense policy, may be accepted as an indication of the noticeable change in Finnish security policy thinking within the framework of the EU. As far as the objectives and obligations that Finland promised as an EU member in the paper were concerned, it is alleged that the militarily non-allied status of the country may no longer be relevant, particularly regarding the increasing defense cooperation in the EU. Subsequently, it is asserted that the main problem related to the EU is its deepening military cooperation and its principle of solidarity and mutual commitment. Indeed, it is believed that these aspects have the possibility to make the commitments in the Union closer to the obligations of the Article V, collective defense, of the NATO Charter, which would not be acceptable for the militarily non-allied small states.

In addition, after the paper, an argument appeared that to support the permanent structured cooperation, meant helping the establishment of the EU's most challenging project of developing a core of the member states consisting of the greatest military capability. Therefore, Finland was criticized to help that process and considered to no longer be a militarily non-allied country in a real sense. In addition, even though the Finnish administration did not make any political comment in that issue, for some of the Finns the term "militarily non-allied" no longer has any content, and they think that may be the time has been arriving to abandon this concept in Finland. In the same manner, some of the Finns conceive that Finland has already approved comprehensive military cooperation within the EU and closer contacts with NATO.

[352] *Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004*, pp. 5-7.

Thus, even Finland's membership application to NATO would be a natural phase in that process. [353]

In a similar way, in October 2004, the government of Sweden presented a new Defence Policy Bill to Parliament, covering the years of 2005-2007, whose main point was the strong emphasis on increased capabilities for international peace-support operations, including capabilities for rapid response. According to the new Defence Policy Bill, the Swedish Armed Forces shall be able to successfully undertake crisis management tasks given to them, such as confidence-building, conflict prevention, humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks and peace-enforcement measures.[354] It can be pointed out that the contribution of the Swedish Armed Forces to the peace-enforcement measures, which are carried out where the conflicting parties can be kept apart and the population can be protected through the legitimate use of violence, is a very important development. The approval of the legitimate use of violence by Sweden may be accepted as a very significant departure from its former security policy perspective and formulations. It is further noted that Sweden will contribute to a multinational rapid reaction force to be led by Sweden itself, in collaboration with other countries such as Finland. Sweden intends to assume responsibility for one EU battle group together with Finland. This force shall be developed as part of the EU rapid reaction capability, which shall be functioning no

[353] "Non-allied has become an empty and unnecessary phrase," Editorial, *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 29 September 2004, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Non allied+has+become+an+empty+and+unnecessary+phrase/1076154135042 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

[354] Swedish Government Bill 2004 defines these concepts as follows: "The term 'peace-promoting and humanitarian operations' refers to international cooperation in the event of peace and the safety of human beings coming under threat. Peace-promoting and humanitarian operations cover: 1- Conflict prevention measures, including the deployment of military resources, to mediate and prevent the escalation of violence into armed conflicts. 2- Peacekeeping operations using both civilian and military resources to maintain an agreed ceasefire or to prevent conflicts. 3- Peace-enforcing operations where conflicting parties can be kept apart and the population can be protected through the legitimate use of violence. 4- Humanitarian efforts are made using mostly civilian resources although military measures may be taken to help people adversely affected by conflicts, natural disasters or other extraordinary situations." See *Swedish Government Bill 2004 / 05:5,* p. 9.

later than the 1 January 2008.[355] In this respect, Huldt accentuates that the 2004 Defence Plan dramatically downsized the armed forces of the country due to the fact that the emphasis is now put on international operations, as already observed, and on the importance of high technology. As a consequence, territorial defense takes second place in the security policy considerations of the country.[356]

Within this framework, both of the militarily non-allied EU members started to adjust their security and defense policies to be in line with the EU standards. Hence, Finland and Sweden agreed to arrange a joint military unit for the rapid action forces of the EU, whose objective is the establishment of ten battle groups to be ready for deployment by 2007,[357] which would enable the Union to carry out the tasks set out in the European Security and Defence Policy and the European Security Strategy. Sweden declared that it would commit about 1,000 soldiers to this effort. On the other hand, Finland also decided to take part in a rapid deployment force of the EU, commanded by Germany and supported by the Netherlands, with around 130 soldiers.[358]

7.2 The Contributions of Finland and Sweden to Peace-Keeping and Peace-Promoting Operations

The end of the Cold War has also provided new opportunities for Finland and Sweden to participate in international activities to promote peace, security and

---

[355] *Swedish Government Bill 2004 / 05:5*, p.14.

[356] Huldt, "Comments on the Swedish Position," p. 42.

[357] See "Finland and Sweden agree to set up common EU military force," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 5 October 2004, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/1076154139551 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

[358] See "Finland decides to take part in German-Dutch EU battle group," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 4 November 2004, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Finland+decides+to+take+part+in+German-Dutch+EU+battle+group/1076154436763 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

stability all over the world. In this respect, they tried to contribute to the peace support activities and military operations, within the EU, UN and also together with NATO. These two militarily non-allied EU member states are participating in such operations under UN mandates in a wide geographical extent ranging from the Balkans to the Middle East and Africa. Participation in these activities and operations was seen as compatible with their security policies. In addition, they considered that these activities support the maintenance and further development of their national defence policies. Accordingly, they have the opinion that participation in these operations increase the skills and expertise of their defense forces due to the fact that their troops have the opportunity to be trained in the actual crisis area.[359] Thus, both Finland and Sweden underlined the importance of participating in the peace support operations on the grounds that contribution to common global security is part of their own national security interests and also the indication of their solidarity in dealing with the security problems of the world. They are of the opinion that these operations have opened up a channel for them to have extensive participation and to have a more active international role than would otherwise have been possible. Hence, in order to understand the position they envision for themselves in the global security matters, it would be true to examine their contributions to some of the peace-support activites and military operations which had significant impact in world politics.

7.2.1 The Balkans

Finland and Sweden have participated in many peace-support activites and military operations conducted in the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. For instance, Sweden contributed to the international community in dealing with the problems arising from the situation of former Yugoslavia, although this preceded EU membership. Swedish troops of around 1,400 soldiers were sent to the former Yugoslavia as part of the first peacekeeping mission, the United Nations

[359] See Ilkka Hollo, "Finnish Defence Forces- The Present and the Future," in *Security in the North, Change and Continuity*, ed. Mika Kerttunen, Series 2, Research Reports No:9 (Helsinki: National Defence College, 2000), p. 39.

Protection Force (UNPROFOR), during 1994-1995.[360] Finland also contributed to the UNPROFOR with 463 troops as of 30 November 1994.[361] Additionally, Sweden has participated in the Implementation Force- Operation Joint Endeavour in Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR) under the command of NATO which was replaced by the UNPROFOR mission in former Yugoslavia on 20 December 1995. Similarly, Finland was among the first countries to contribute to IFOR. At that time, involvement in IFOR was regarded as an expression for a common European responsibility for the security in Europe. Therefore, Sweden participated with 840 men and a mechanized battalion in that mission, whose main purpose was to help implement the Dayton Peace Agreement and create a stable environment so that other organizations would have the opportunity to carry out civilian tasks connected with the Peace Agreement. That way, Sweden believed to contribute to the establishment of a new security order in Europe.[362]

Finland and Sweden were active contributors to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) too. This mission was started on 10 June 1999 when the Security Council Resolution 1244 authorized the Secretary-General to establish an interim civilian administration led by the United Nations in Kosovo under which people in the region would be able to obtain their substantial autonomy. The fact that Mr. Harri Holkeri from Finland served from August 2003 to June 2004 as the head of UNMIK,[363] and the former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as the representative of the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan

---

[360] Gunilla Herolf, "The Swedish Approach: Constructive Competition for a Common Goal," in *The Northern EU, National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension*, eds. Gianni Bonvicini, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Wolfgang Wessels, The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 9 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000), p.149.

[361] *United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)*, retrieved from http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm (Accessed 4 October 2006).

[362] Lindström, "Sweden's Security Policy: Engagement- the Middle Way."

[363] See *UNMIK at a Glance*, retrieved from http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm (Accessed 1 September 2006).

in talks on the final status of Kosovo in November 2005,[364] demonstrate how much importance Finland attached to this mission and to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. Similarly, Sweden has been contributing police officers to the UN in Kosovo since the end of 1999. In addition, since 1999, Sweden has been contributing to Kosovo Force (KFOR), the NATO-led crisis management force, at present with approximately 330 troops.[365]

On 31 March 2003, the EU launched the Concordia mission in Macedonia, its first-ever military operation, with the aim of contributing further to a stable and secure environment in Macedonia. The two militarily non-allied states Finland and Sweden have also been participants in the first EU military operation in Macedonia, named Operation Concordia, which was taken over by the EU from NATO and was completed on 15 December 2003.[366] Operation Concordia which was conducted using NATO assets was of great symbolic significance due to the fact that it signified that the EU was no longer an organization using only civilian instruments.

Furthermore, on 12 July 2004, the Council of the European Union decided to undertake a peace-keeping operation after the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which would be undertaken in the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy. The EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,[367] named EUFOR-Althea operation, was launched on 2 December

---

[364] See "Kofi Annan appoints President Ahtisaari to lead Kosovo talks," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 2 November 2005, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Kofi+Annan+appoints+President+Ahtisaari+to+lead+Kosovo+talks/1101981494817 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

[365] "More Swedish police to Kosovo," *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 15 September 2005, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/49827 (Accessed 14 October 2006).

[366] See *Concordia Mission in Macedonia*, retrieved from http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/mission.htm (Accessed 1 September 2006).

[367] See *EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR - Althea)*, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=745&lang=EN (Accessed 1 September 2006).

2004. It is stressed that the mission in Bosnia is regarded as an indication that European countries were taking greater responsibility for defense in their own continent. To conduct an operation in Bosnia was deemed to be very important in the sense that, Bosnia has been perceived as the EU's political failure of the past two decades. Thus, the EU's takeover of NATO's mission in Bosnia, is considered to be intended to demonstrate that the EU member countries are serious and determined about having a credible military capability.[368] As a matter of fact, the government of Sweden presented a bill to Parliament on 1 October 2004, demanding authorization to contribute to the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which aims to preserve security to support general peace efforts in the country, with a Swedish contingent.[369] Also, Finland was among the countries which participated in the EUFOR-Althea operation of the EU. It is acknowledged that after the President of Finland consulted the Parliament's State Council, on 20 August 2004, Finland decided to deploy a maximum of 200 troops and 30 additional staff who would work on the renewal of the military base, in order to contribute to the Operation Althea. It was the framework nation for Operation Althea until the summer of 2005 and contributed 1.52 percent of the total cost of the EU's participation in that operation.[370]

7.2.2 Afghanistan

After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by NATO was established in Kabul, through the

---

[368] Daniel Dombey and Eric Jansson, "Comment & Analysis: The mission beginning today in Bosnia marks a new phase in peacekeeping, but the Union has to find a way to co-exist with NATO," *Financial Times*, 2 December 2004, retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/133188e4-4407-11d9-af06-00000e2511c8,ft_acl=.html (Accessed 27 May 2006).

[369] "Government Bill on Swedish contribution to EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 1 October 2004, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/31098 (Accessed 14 October 2006).

[370] *Parliaments and the Althea mission*, Report, Document A/1911, Assembly of WEU, Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, 7 December 2005, retrieved from http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2005/1911.php?PHPSESSID=5c7ca41908957ad71cc97b8998ff0dec (Accessed 1 September 2006).

Resolution 1386 of the UN Security Council in 2001. According to the Gallup International questionnaire study, 52 percent of Finns approved of the United States' military action in Afghanistan. However, Finns expressed that they do not wish the country to take part alongside the United States in military operations directed against terrorists. Accordingly, 84 percent of Finns opposed this idea and only 7 percent of them were in favor.[371] Nonetheless, after the United States' military action, Finland was also among the countries which joined the ISAF security force and operated under British command, with its soldiers, serving as liaison officers, and in tasks involving cooperation between the soldiers and local civilians.[372]

Sweden, like Finland, has participated in this force since the beginning of 2002 with a strong commitment. Even when the geographical mandate of the force was extended beyond Kabul in October 2003, Sweden decided to send new troops which would constitute a part of the ISAF expansion in northern Afghanistan, with an attempt to make the number of Swedish personnel stationed there around 110.[373] Moreover, in November 2005, the government of Sweden suggested to increase Sweden's contribution to ISAF, by taking the command of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mazar-e-Sharif, located in northern Afghanistan.

With regard to the Swedish contribution to this force in Afghanistan, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Laila Freivalds, stated that "The Government views the Swedish contribution to ISAF as a long-term commitment of high priority. It is therefore natural that we wish to assume greater responsibility in this important

[371] "52% of Finns polled approve of US military action in Afghanistan," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 2 January 2002, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020102IE4 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

[372] "Finnish peacekeepers to remain in Afghanistan until summer," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 28 March 2002, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020328IE9 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

[373] "New Swedish troops to Afghanistan," *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 15 April 2004, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/16930 (Accessed 14 October 2006).

mission"[374] and demonstrated the importance attached to this mission by Sweden, in terms of its contribution to international security. In fact, Sweden still continues to take part in the reconstruction of order in the region with the main objective of creating suitable conditions which will enable poor people to improve their lives and to promote respect for human rights.

7.2.3 Iraq

On 20 March 2003, a coalition led by the United States started a war against Iraq. As far as the Iraqi war is concerned, there was a very obvious division among the European Union countries. On the one hand, Germany and France, which are the two important EU countries, presented their strong opposition to war because they believed that they had to give the UN inspectors more time and insisted on exploring all possibilities for a peaceful solution before launching any military action against the country. They were supported by Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece and Austria. On the other hand, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal were the six European Union countries which supported the United States' point of view.[375] However, it is stated that Ireland, Finland and Sweden were somewhere in between, sitting on the fence, anxious not to offend the United States but deeply worried about the military build-up against Iraq.[376]

The then Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson, said in an interview published in January 2003, before the Iraqi war, that he did not believe the European Union would be able to agree on a common position with regard to the US-led military action

[374] "Increased Swedish presence in Afghanistan," *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 3 November 2005, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/52513 (Accessed 11 October 2006).

[375] Ian Black and Michael White, "EU gives Iraq final chance to avoid war but splits remain," *Guardian Unlimited*, 18 February 2003, retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,897887,00.html (Accessed 27 May 2006).

[376] "EU Summit set for stalemate," *Guardian Unlimited*, 17 February 2003, retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,897454,00.html (Accessed 27 May 2006).

against Iraq. Persson commented that the EU was divided on Iraq and if the EU managed to find a common policy, the EU would become a stronger organization.[377] Sweden's view concerning the war in Iraq in 2003 was that it did not have a very acceptable basis in terms of international law. According to Sweden, even though the fall of Saddam Hussein's administration was welcomed by many countries, one of the main reasons for the vulnerability of coalition forces and the increasing violence and insecurity in Iraq, was the absence of international unity on the issue. According to the Swedish perspective, the United Nations should play a key role at least in the reconstruction of Iraq after the end of the war.[378]

Finland's position regarding the war in Iraq was quite similar to Sweden. In February 2003, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Erkki Tuomioja, expressed that Finland would not take part in any military activities against Iraq on the grounds that only the UN Security Council can authorize a military operation. The Minister also stated that Finland is prepared to take part in military operations only under UN auspices and possible humanitarian and peace-keeping operations. It is emphasized by the Minister that the international inspectors should continue to work in Iraq until it is discovered that there are no weapons of mass destruction there.[379]

However, Finnish public opinion regarding the Iraqi war was demonstrated clearly in a survey conducted by *Taloustutkimus Oy*, on behalf of the Advisory Board for Defence Information of Finland between the dates of 25 to 27 March 2003. Since this survey was carried out just after the Iraqi war, the survey was very beneficial in order to understand the Finns' point of view regarding the situation in Iraq and its possible implications. According to the survey, 76 percent of Finns did not approve of the

---

[377] "Swedish Prime Minister Says EU Divided on Iraq," *Paris Agence France Presse (AFP)*, 14 January 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-WEU-2003-0114.

[378] "Chirac, Sweden's Persson Agree on Need for 'Key' Role for UN in Postwar Iraq," *Paris Agence France Presse (AFP)*, 15 April 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-WEU-2003-0415.

[379] "Russian FM 'pleased' with relations with Finland," *Moscow ITAR-TASS*, 7 February 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-SOV-2003-0207

attack on Iraq led by the United States. Furthermore, 63 percent of Finns believed that the status of the United Nations as an organization maintaining peace and stability in the world would become less important after the incident. Concerning the policy that Finland followed throughout the war, 71 percent of Finns believed that Finland has pursued its foreign policy well concerning Iraq. According to 62 percent of Finns, Finland should participate in rebuilding Iraq.[380] It is also worth noting that according to the second survey conducted by the same institution between the dates of 22 to 24 April 2003, 69 percent of Finns still did not approve of the attack on Iraq led by the United States.[381]

In June 2004 the United Nations Security Council unanimously endorsed Resolution 1546,[382] welcoming the end of the occupation, affirming the restoration of Iraqi sovereignty and setting out the democratization process. In this respect, Sweden's then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Laila Freivalds, declared that "It is gratifying that the resolution has been adopted unanimously and that there is international consensus on the future political process in Iraq." Minister Freivalds added she welcomes the fact that the UN will continue to have a central role in the democratization process of Iraq. In addition, she pointed out that the world's commitment to create a stable and

[380] In addition, the 58 percent of Finns considered that Finland has approved mostly the same opinion and stance with the United Nations in the Iraqi war. On the other hand, almost 90 percent thought that Finland should contribute to humanitarian assistance that will be given to the Iraqi population. 72 percent supported Finland's participation in a possible peace support operation. See "1.4.2003 Bulletins and Reports 1/2003, Opinions of Finns on the war in Iraq," 27 October 2003, Ministry of Defence of Finland, The Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI), Bulletins and Reports, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?641_m=646&l=en&s=263 (Accessed 15 September 2006).

[381] "7.5.2003 Bulletins and Reports 2/2003, Opinions of Finns on the war in Iraq," 27 October 2003, Ministry of Defence of Finland, The Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI), Bulletins and Reports, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?641_m=645&l=en&s=263 (Accessed 15 September 2006).

[382] See *The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004)* Adopted by the Security Council at its 4987th meeting, on 8 June 2004, UN Security Council: Resolutions 2004, retrieved from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed 1 September 2006).

independent Iraq must continue on the grounds that all the countries have a common responsibility to assist and support Iraq on its road towards democracy.[383]

In December 2004, the government of Sweden made a decision regarding the Swedish contribution of EUR 1.5 million to a UN fund, for setting up a special protection force for the UN staff in Iraq. Concerning the importance of the UN for Sweden in that process, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Laila Freivalds, stated that "We regard the UN presence in Iraq and its participation in the democratic process as essential in efforts to create peace and development. The contribution to a protection force is one means of helping the UN to return to Iraq." [384]

Likewise, in order to demonstrate their positions with regard to the developments in Iraq, five Nordic Ministers for Foreign Affairs, including Laila Freivalds, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden and Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, wrote a joint article in June 2005, where they emphasized their satisfaction with the fact that the UN has been given a leading role in support for Iraq. They stressed that the international community can not allow the establishment of a democratic Iraq to be hampered by the terrorist attacks. In addition, they underlined that the Nordic governments will strengthen their own commitments and continue to make an active contribution to the security and reconstruction of Iraq.[385]

---

[383] "Laila Freivalds welcomes agreement on new Iraq resolution," *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 9 June 2004, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/25453 (Accessed 1 October 2006).

[384] "Swedish contribution to UN protection in Iraq," *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 22 December 2004, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/36011 (Accessed 1 October 2006).

[385] *Article on Iraq by the Nordic Foreign Ministers*, Laila Freivalds, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden; Per Stig Möller, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Denmark; David Oddsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iceland; Jan Petersen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway; Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland published in Berlingske Tidende (DK), Dagbladet (NO), Helsingin Sanomat (FI), Svenska Dagbladet (SE) and Morgunbladid (IS), 23 June 2005, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3212/a/46917 (Accessed 1 October 2006).

7.2.4 The Democratic Republic of Congo

When the UN urged the international community for immediate support in preventing an escalation of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU carried out a military operation, namely Operation Artemis, which sought to contribute to the stabilization of security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in the country. The Operation Artemis was important in the sense that it was the EU's first out-of-area military operation conducted in June 2003. In the summer of 2003, Sweden participated in the EU's Operation Artemis,[386] under a UN mandate, in the north-east of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Finland did not participate in the EU Military Operation (Artemis) in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003.[387]

[386] "The EU's operation, code-named ARTEMIS, was conducted in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1484 (30 May 2003). It was aimed at contributing to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia. The EU's Operation, Artemis, ended officially on 1 September 2003." See, *EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC/ARTEMIS)*, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=605&lang=en&mode=g (Accessed 1 September 2006).

[387] Möttölä, "Finland," p. 20.

CHAPTER VIII

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SECURITY POLICIES OF FINLAND AND SWEDEN WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION

8.1 Similarities between the Security Policy Perspectives of Finland and Sweden in the EU

One could say that Finland and Sweden became closer to each other in issue of security policy than they have ever been since the year 1809, when Sweden lost Finland to Russia. Their entry to the European Union in 1995 may be accepted as the starting-point for the potential future convergence of their security policies, considerations and strategies. It can be pointed out that even though the Finnish and Swedish security policies were not similar during the Cold War and, are still not totally identical, today there are various similarities which should be highlighted as well. The reason for these similarities was parallel pressures and conditions, which had the potential to influence their security policy considerations, motivations and conceptualizations in that period. In addition, their intense bilateral relationship and cooperation on security and defense related issues, which intensified since the end of the Cold War, provided a suitable atmosphere to pursue similar policies and to coordinate their actions in the entire field of the security.

In a similar vein, the importance of acting together is emphasized through the joint public statements and the common articles written by the foreign and defense ministers of two countries in the newspapers published in Finland and Sweden, explaining their positions and proposing new policy initiatives in the field of security. The reason for this was the belief that they would be more influential if they act

together in the Union. It is also mentioned that the reason for these countries to have sometimes similar policy preferences within the EU, might be their pre-negotiation talks and a strong EU policy co-ordination between them. It is also underlined that even though they are perceived by some as the "hesitant Europeans," Finland and Sweden demonstrate a strong performance when they jointly would like to influence the EU policy-making.[388]

For instance, both countries were functioning in the formation of the European Union's security and defense policy while trying to preserve their militarily non-allied status. Both Finland and Sweden supported the fact that the European Union should be a more influential international actor in dealing with the issues of international security while paying attention to the vital role of non-military issues in the field of security, stemming from their cultural traditions.[389] In this regard, it may be admitted that in some policy areas a commonality of their priorities can be considerably discernible emanating basically from not belonging to the core countries of the European integration process. It can be further stated that being situated in a border area, both in terms of geographical considerations and also with regard to the ideas and tradition of European integration, some of interests of these militarily non-allied small states were parallel as well.[390] In fact, from a different perspective it is claimed that their security policies were considered to be predominantly realist in conception but legitimized through the language of idealist internationalism within the Union.[391] In a similar vein, in both of these countries the contents of their policies of neutrality have been significantly scaled down and narrowed in scope from that of the Cold War period. They constantly reconsidered their foreign and security policy

[388] Torsten J. Selck and Sanneke Kuipers, "Shared hesitance, joint success: Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in the European Union policy process," *Journal of European Public Policy*, (12) 1 (February 2005): pp.167-168.

[389] Bailes, "European Security from a Nordic Perspective," p. 60.

[390] See Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*, p. 1.

[391] Lawler, "Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union," p. 571.

perspectives, continued to modify and redefine their security policy formulations in accordance with the changing circumstances in international relations and tried to adapt their security policy priorities to that of the European Union.

The domestic debate concerning the security policy alternatives of these countries may be considered to be parallel as well. The policy of non-participation in military alliances is supported by a majority of public opinion in both countries, but membership in NATO does not have too many advocates for now.[392] Both of these countries are in accord that new members will strengthen the Union's role as an international player. Therefore, they perceive enlargement as a central task of the Union which is considered to have a vital role for the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Europe.

8.2 Differences between the Security Policy Perspectives of Finland and Sweden in the EU

One could say that despite the perceived common image and the similarities between the Finnish and Swedish policies from the outside, their foreign and security policies, strategic priorities and respective roles in ensuring security and stability were quite different from each other during the Cold War. In order to demonstrate the fact that Finland and Sweden still have some different characteristics even after the end of the Cold War, the then Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen described the countries as "sisters but not twins"[393] indicating that they are not identical or indistinguishable. Although Finland and Sweden had more opportunity to pursue similar security policies at the end of the Cold War, especially by means of their membership to the European Union, there are still some very significant divergent points that differentiate their security policy priorities and approaches. Notwithstanding some

[392] See Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?*, p. 4.

[393] Unto Hämäläinen, *Lännettymisen lyhyt historia*, (Helsinki: WSOY, 1998), p.155, quoted in Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, "Inside the EU, Outside NATO": p. 69.

joint proposals and initiatives in the EU, there are discernable differences in their European policies including issues concerning security and defense.

First of all, it can be stated that there are some interesting differences between Finland and Sweden in terms of their overall adjustments to the policies and structures of the EU. Accordingly, it is mentioned that the administration of Finland may be admitted as one step in front of Sweden in its adjustments to the EU standards. It is underlined that the process of Finland's adaptation to the EU standards takes place within a more pragmatic, closed, technocratic culture by means of a central administrative mechanism with great autonomy. On the other hand, it is stressed that this process in Sweden may be more characterized by greater public accountability and participation by the government and the political leadership. Additionally, Finland, in contrast to Sweden, has also had a more flexible, adaptive and integrative approach in terms of EU policies, including the field of security and defense. This is also expressed, among other things, with the fact that Finland is the only Nordic country which is a member of European Monetary Union.[394] On the other hand, it is acknowledged that Sweden is deemed to be a "reluctant European," which is one of the most Euro-negative of all the member countries in the Union. Sweden was also one of the few member states which preferred to wait and see the developments related to the adoption of the euro as a common currency in the Union. Nevertheless, the Swedes are still very skeptical about the acceptance of the euro as a currency and they do not still use this currency today.[395]

In this regard, it can be asserted that the unreserved attitude of Finland to modify its security policy orientation steadily from the policy of neutrality to active EU oriented security policy perspective can be regarded as an indication of Finnish pragmatism as

[394] Per Laegreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson, "Europeanization of Central Government Administration in the Nordic States," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (2004): p. 365.

[395] Trägårdh, "Sweden and the EU," pp.130-131.

well. Accordingly, it is alleged that it has been easier for Finland, than Sweden, to give up the Cold War neutrality policy owing to the fact that the Finnish neutrality policy was a means to achieve distance from Moscow[396] rather than an end itself. Since Finnish history was composed of conciliations with great powers and adjustments to new power balances in the international environment, it is claimed that Finland was more ready and experienced for further transformation and adaptation also within the EU framework. Similarly, it is asserted that Finland, unlike Sweden, has been able to have a more positive orientation to the European integration, without claiming that its national values or traditions are being threatened.[397] Furthermore, Finland has had fewer difficulties in adapting itself to the strengthening of the EU as an international actor including the construction of its common defense dimension.

Sweden, which seems to be more focused on the state as a main actor than Finland, gives the impression of working more through various organizations while Finland has a much more EU centric orientation with the conviction that the EU will strengthen the position of Finland and promote its national interests. Furthermore, it is argued that unlike the Finns, the Swedes do not perceive their EU membership as an insurance against isolation in an international crisis; on the contrary, many Swedes are deemed to believe that isolation from world affairs, namely neutrality, may not be the problem but the solution for the country instead. Therefore, it is asserted that the reason for Sweden to be out of military alliances was presented as to preserve its freedom of action in international affairs.[398] On the other hand, it can be argued that the ideal and need of being in the "core" of the Union in order to be able to influence the structure and developments of the EU policies, has affected the content and priorities of Finnish EU policies. Thus, Ojanen describes the attitude of Finland

---

[396] Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?*, p. 13.

[397] Pertti Joenniemi, "Finland in the New Europe, A Herderian or Hegelian Project?," in *European Integration and National Identity, The Challenge of the Nordic States*, eds. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (London: Routledge, 2002), p.182.

[398] See Jakobson, *Finland in the New Europe*, p. 142.

towards the CFSP as "allegiance, activism and non-alignment."[399] Owing to the desire to be in the "core," not in the "periphery," Finland's policy of military non-alliance was thought to be flexible and adaptive enough to be, if needed, accommodated to allow increasing military cooperation. Conversely, Sweden seems to lack its eastern neighbor, Finland's desire to belong to the "core" countries in the Union.[400] With reference to these abovementioned arguments, one could say that although Finland wants to retain intergovernmental cooperation as the main form of cooperation in foreign and security policy of the EU, Finland may be accepted to have more "integrationist" attitude, compared to Sweden, towards the increasing European integration, including the evolving security and defense policies of the Union. However, Sweden's preferred approach within the EU may be described in general as "intergovernmentalism." Furthermore, Finland may be conceived to have a "Europeanist" perspective which pushes for more European unity in its security policy considerations, whereas Sweden may be perceived to have a more "Atlanticist" perspective which always puts emphasis on the importance of maintaining close relations with the US and supports vigorously the notion that the US plays a crucial role for the security and stability in Europe.

It is accentuated that unlike Sweden, Finland has entered the EU with few ambition of changing or transforming the Union to fit its own national image and foreign and security policy priorities. It is supported that the dominant strategy in the Nordic countries of having a positive attitude towards economic integration and intergovernmental cooperation, while being doubtful about the future of the close political, military integration and supranational features, seems to be weaker in Finland than in Sweden.[401] On the contrary, Sweden is generally perceived as less inclined to

---

[399] See Hanna Ojanen, *Finland and the CFSP: Allegiance, Activism and Non-Alignment*, UPI Working Papers 3 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1998), p. 1.

[400] Ojanen, "Hopes, Expectations and Worries," p. 24.

[401] Laegreid, Steinthorsson and Thorhallsson, "Europeanization of Central Government Administration": p. 350.

take initiatives and less productive in its objectives regarding the EU policies than Finland. Thus, Sweden is sometimes being criticized due to the lack of the feeling of "Europeanness."[402] Likewise, Sweden is perceived by some as an EU member which may be considered to be more defensive than offensive and more reactive than active within the framework of EU policies.[403]

Within this context, it can be alleged that while Sweden preferred to concentrate on debates over the possibility of maintaining its own national self-image, foreign and security policy traditions and values within the Union, Finland seems less concerned about its self-image and has paid more attention to contributing to the overall image and policies of the EU instead. In this context, it is put forth that even the EU-symbols, notably, the flag, are displayed much more often in Finland than in Sweden, which accepted the EU norms more easily than Sweden.[404] Unlike its Swedish neighbor, Finland did not have a tendency towards perceiving the European integration as a threat to its national self-perception. Indeed, Sweden seems to draw more attention to the protection of its national characteristics within the European Union. In this respect, for instance, even to see the Swedish language as an official EU language is of great symbolic importance to Sweden. In fact, according to the Swedish language policy, which was established in 1996, Swedes, who are elected representatives to the European Parliament and other high-level bodies, must have the opportunity to communicate in the Swedish language.[405]

---

[402] Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*, p. 20.

[403] For this argument see Karl Magnus Johansson, "Avslutning: Sverige som EU-medlem," in *Sverige i EU*, ed. Karl Magnus Johansson (Stockholm: SNS Förlag., 1999a), p. 288, quoted in Novack, "The Northern Dimension in Sweden's EU Policies," p. 84.

[404] Pertti Pesonen, "The Finns and the Swedes in the European Union," in *Finland, Sweden and the European Union*, Pertti Pesonen and Unto Vesa, Research Report No. 77(Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute of the University of Tampere, 1998), p. 36.

[405] See *Sweden's road to EU Membership.*

8.3 Factors Affecting the Differences between the Security Policy Perspectives of Finland and Sweden in the EU

The aforementioned differences between the security policy perspectives and priorities of two militarily non-allied states Finland and Sweden within the EU today, are originating mainly from the two permanent factors such as their distinctive histories and past experiences and their different geopolitical positions. Additionally, the other factor, which is temporary in character, is the attitudes towards the membership in NATO.

With regard to their different national histories and past experiences one could argue that although the Cold War system has radically changed, past experiences and memories still shape the attitudes in Finland and Sweden towards the EU. Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from these experiences still affect the security policy formulations, considerations and orientations of these two militarily non-allied EU member states. Indeed, it is stated that since Finland was not a nation-state but an integral part of Sweden, followed by a rule as the Grand Duchy of Russia for a long time, it was considered as a vulnerable and defenseless country that needs the guidance and protection of Sweden. It was believed that this powerless country had a tendency towards being dependent on Sweden in dealing with some of the vital security issues, until its international position was normalized by abolishing the FCMA Treaty. As a consequence, the membership in the European Union was also interpreted in a way that both Finland and Sweden were discerned as equal sovereign countries in many issue areas and fields.[406] Accordingly, it is stressed that Finland, which wanted to escape its past and to liberate itself from its dependency to Moscow, was much more eager to join the European Union in order to have a more secure

[406] In fact, it is argued that with EU membership, Finland, in a sense, hoped to find a way for the final emancipation with respect to the Swedish supervision, after a long period of Swedish domination in its all political history. See Vincent Simoulin, "L'Union Européenne au regard des Pays Nordiques," Les Études du CERI, no. 66 (Paris: Centre d'études et de recherches internationals, Sciences Po, 2000), p. 19.

future.[407] Thus, obvious support for EU membership in the Finnish referendum is considered to be an indication of a vote for the West in general, not specifically for the Maastricht Treaty of the Union. This fact demonstrates the strong impact of historical experiences, especially concerning the troubled relations with Moscow, on the security policy consideration of Finland also during the process of the consideration of its EU membership.

With reference to historical background, Krister Wahlbäck makes a notable distinction between these militarily non-allied countries of the EU. For instance, Wahlbäck defines Finland as the "threatened country" and Sweden as the "protected" one[408] with a Finnish *de facto* "buffer" to its east and NATO to its west. Certainly, for a long time Sweden lacked a direct territorial threat, thereby having much more space for political maneuverability to a greater extent than Finland during the Cold War. Likewise, it is pointed out that there are more historical memories of wars in Finland than in Sweden, which reiterates the fact that national sovereignty is not an entity given once and for all. Similarly, the struggle for independency is still in living memory of many Finns, while Sweden does not have a living memory of a real war since it has been living in peace nearly for two hundred years. Thus, today, it can be recognized that the Finns, different from the Swedes, often emphasize the importance of the "mutual solidarity" within the European Union, which is assumed to provide some kind of protection to the members of the Union. Finland's search for more protection even in the European Union and its more integrationist perspective than Sweden may be interpreted in connection with these historical experiences of Finland which was regarded as a "threatened country" with a subtle apprehension of being left alone. In a similar manner, it is alleged that the fact that EU skepticism and resistance to closer political integration continue to influence the Swedish approach in many

[407] Joenniemi, "Finland in the New Europe," p.183.

[408] Krister Wahlbäck, "Uhattu maa ja sen varjeltu naapuri," *Helsingin Sanomat* (11 February 1999) quoted in Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, "Inside the EU, Outside NATO": p.70. For a similar argument see Holst, *European Security, A view from the North*, p. 5.

policy areas within the Union, stems basically from the country's past experiences as a militarily protected and internationally active state.

Another important factor creating some divergent points between the security policy perspectives and priorities of two militarily non-allied states Finland and Sweden within the EU is the impact of geopolitical conditions, namely the influence of Russian factor. The fact that they are closer together today than the Cold War period, does not change the reality of the permanent impact of geographical considerations on their security policy formulations today. The President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, expressed this common concern of Finland and Sweden explicitly in one of the speeches by emphasizing that "despite the similarities in our societies and cultures, we have occupied different geopolitical positions. This fact has affected our international status and our choices of foreign policy." Ahtisaari further underlined that "The significance of geopolitics will not disappear rapidly."[409]

Indeed, it is worth nothing that Finland, still bordering Russia, continues to be Sweden's buffer towards east. Moreover, despite all changes, the threatening image of Russia is still alive in a way, in Finland rather than in Sweden. According to Sergei Medvedev, the Finns were very much influenced by the "fortress mentality" which was shaped by the historical experiences like in the Second World War period. It is asserted that many of the aspects of this mentality which is claimed to involve a self-sufficient and relatively isolated outpost are in a way still effective in Finland today, despite significant changes occurred in this image after Finland's EU membership. This fortress mentality portrays Finland as a fighter for Western values against enemies which try to threaten these values. Medvedev also accentuates that the phenomenon of "finlandization" emerged as a result of the subconscious fears and

[409] See Speech by President Martti Ahtisaari at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm 14 April 1994, "Relations between Finland and Sweden in a Changing Europe," retrieved from http://www.tpk.fi/ahtisaari/puheet-1994/P9404.UIE.html (Accessed 5 September 2006).

concerns of the Finnish people about the Soviet Union at that time in history.[410] He reiterates that even though the "Russian threat" was diminished dramatically in reality, it is still deeply rooted in the collective mind of many Finns in today's world. Medvedev further claims that the "Russian threat" which has a psychological characteristic, is still a painful part of the national perceptions of the Finnish people.[411]

In fact, it can be said that these different geopolitical positions also affected the content and nature of their respective policies of neutrality. To put it another way, even though both Finland and Sweden were officially neutral during the Cold War, in reality they pursued different policies of neutrality because of their different geopolitical positions, which also influenced their security policy priorities today. Finland had to fight two wars against the Soviet Union during the Second World War. As a consequence of the Second World War, it was mainly left in the Soviet sphere of influence and thus, Finnish neutrality was very connected with the dependence of Helsinki on Moscow. Moreover, neighboring a powerful, unpredictable and constantly suspicious state meant that Finnish security policies from their initiation were mostly dominated by the geopolitical concerns. On the contrary, Sweden has been at peace with its neighbors for nearly two hundred years due to its neutrality and its geographical position which provided the country with the opportunity to stay outside the Soviet sphere on influence.

In brief, because of the geographical adjacency with Russia, Finland became more likely to perceive Russia as a potential threat to its sovereignty and security than Sweden. As a consequence, it is asserted that for Finland, EU membership was

---

[410] See Sergei Medvedev, *Russia as the Subconsciousness of Finland*, UPI Working Papers 7 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1998), pp. 4-15. See also Heikki Luostarinen, "Finnish Russophobia: The Story of an Enemy Image," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1989): pp. 123-137.

[411] Medvedev, *Russia as the Subconsciousness of Finland*, p. 19.

regarded as balancing the problems caused by the long common border with Russia by bringing them into a multilateral context. Indeed, in most of the policy areas within the Union, Finland tries to incorporate the Russian factor into the agenda, as can be exemplified in its Northern Dimension Initiative. On the contrary, this emphasis for the Russian factor was not very apparent in the case of Sweden, given the different historical experiences and geographical conditions of these two nations.

The last important factor creating some nuances between the security policy perspectives and priorities of two militarily non-allied states Finland and Sweden in the EU, is their general attitudes towards membership in NATO. Certainly, Finland's and Sweden's policies, attitudes and perceptions of NATO were significantly different from each other during the Cold War. It can be claimed that Sweden had a much more positive attitude towards NATO than Finland owing to its conviction that the success of its old policy of non-participation in alliances was dependent on a cohesive and strong NATO as well as on the political presence of the United States in Europe. However, it is alleged that during the Cold War, for many Finnish politicians, NATO was "taboo" with which contacts were kept to a minimum level due to the Soviet Union's perception of NATO as a hostile organization. In this regard, it is alleged that Sweden's cautious attitude towards having an open cooperation with NATO during the Cold War era was to alleviate Finland's situation with regard to the Soviet Union.[412]

It can be declared that even though Finland's and Sweden's policies, attitudes and perceptions of NATO were significantly different from each other during the Cold War, their relationship with NATO are also similar, yet not identical, today. Both countries are increasingly cooperating with NATO in spite of their security policies of military non-alliance. They joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme in

[412] Christer Pursiainen and Sinikukka Saari, *Et tu Brute! Finland's NATO Option and Russia*, UPI Report 1/2002 (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p. 40.

1994,[413] PfP's Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1995 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1997, which enabled them to reach a high degree of interoperability with NATO structures. Additionally, they have participated in the NATO-led IFOR, SFOR and KFOR operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In this context, it can be acknowledged that with regard to the cooperation with NATO, the only point that is not acceptable for these militarily non-allied countries is the mutual security guarantees of Article V.[414] Despite the fact that they underline the importance of having close cooperation with NATO, neither of them have announced that they would give up the policy of non-participation in military alliances, while still keeping the option of joining NATO open for the future. Both Finland and Sweden support the idea that cooperation between the EU and NATO must be close although their institutional distinctiveness is maintained.

After the end of the Cold War, particularly the perception of the Finnish politicians began to change positively in regard to NATO which did not culminate in applying for the membership. In this sense, it is argued that even though the EU is moving towards creating a common security and defense dimension, it will take time for this organization to have enough capability for action. Therefore, it is asserted that the reason for Finland to have closer relations with NATO was based on its conviction that the only organization which can provide such capabilities is still NATO.[415] However, it is mentioned that the reason for not taking into account the membership of NATO until now was that the Finns, similar to the Swedes, did not believe that they are militarily threatened in today's world and they did not have any urgent

[413] The Partnership for Peace (PfP) which is a program of bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO, allows Partner countries to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. The Partnership for Peace Framework Document was signed by Foreign Minister of Finland Heikki Haavisto on 9 May 1994 and Foreign Minister of Sweden Margaretha Af Ugglas on 9 May 1994. See "NATO's Partnership for Peace Signatures by Country," retrieved from http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm. (Accessed 1 September 2006).

[414] Vaahtoranta and Forsberg, *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied?*, p.16.

[415] See Tomas Ries, *Finland and NATO* (Helsinki: The Department of Strategic and Defence Studies of National Defence College, 1999), p. 74.

security problem to be solved through NATO membership. Subsequently, it is argued that if Russia develops into a more stable democracy that continues to cooperate both with NATO and the EU, NATO membership may not constitute a political necessity for Finland and Sweden in the future.[416] Indeed, the Government's White Paper, presented to Parliament on 17 March 1997, indicated that "Finland is not the focus of any military threats for which security guarantees provided by a military alliance could be considered necessary for their prevention or repulsion."[417] In addition to this, it is believed that any evaluation in that policy would be early because of uncertain factors such as the unpredictable line of Russia and the still evolving European security structure.[418] Finland reiterated on various occasions that it pursues a policy of military non-alliance which is considered to be the best way to preserve the stability in northern Europe under the present circumstances. However, as the situation changes, Finnish policy can always be redefined.

Nonetheless, in the past few years a striking difference between the attitudes of Finland and Sweden towards the possible NATO membership began to emerge. This was on the grounds that Finland started to discuss this option openly in its political agenda especially after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001,[419] owing to the assumption that the EU's closer ties to NATO, is said to have the possibility to make NATO membership an increasingly logical and natural step for Finland. In addition, it is asserted that the fact that Russia also seeks close cooperation with NATO has the

---

[416] Kristina Spohr Readman, "New Global Security Threats, NATO's Enlargement into the Baltic, and the Alliance's New Relationship with Russia: Why Finland and Sweden may want to consider a future in NATO positively," in *The New North of Europe*, Final Conference Policy Memos, 8 October 2002, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p. 105.

[417] "The European Security Development and Finnish Defence," Report by the Council of State to Parliament, 17 March 1997, p. 52, quoted in Pauli Järvenpää, "What comes after Madrid? A View from Helsinki," *NATO Review*, Web edition, No. 5, Vol. 45 (September-October 1997): pp.30-33.

[418] Hägglund, "Finnish Defence Policy Aims to Protect Against External Pressures": pp.19-21.

[419] Honkanen, *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making*, p. 7.

possibility to make NATO membership a policy option for Finland in the future.[420] Conversely, it can be stated that in Sweden membership in NATO was never officially considered as a possible policy choice because of the strong reluctance on the part of the political leaders to acknowledge explicitly this view on declared political positions. Similarly, the Swedes were also very reluctant about discussing the NATO option than the Finns, in a sense that there is not much debate also in the media about that issue in Sweden. In this regard, it is argued that it is unlikely that the public opinion in Sweden will be shaped in favor of NATO membership faster than in Finland and there is a possibility that Finland seems to be able to make its decision on the membership application sooner than Sweden.[421]

Hence, it can be argued that the fact that the NATO option was started to be debated explicitly in Finland may have some implications for its security policy perspective in the EU, especially concerning the common defense dimension of the Union in the future. In this regard, it can be asserted that to be more open to the NATO membership option may be considered as the logical continuation of the country's "integrationist" attitude, compared to Sweden, towards the increasing European integration and cooperation in the field of security and defense. Nonetheless, this new attitude of Finland may exert some pressure on Sweden on the grounds that Sweden may start to feel alone in expressing the reluctant attitude of military non-allied states towards the security arrangements with mutual security guarantees in the evolving defense dimension of the Union.

---

[420] Katrin Bastian, "Finnish Non-alignment, the ESDP and the new Russia-NATO Council, Why Finland should use every opportunity to deal with Russia in Multilateral Settings," in *The New North of Europe*, Final Conference Policy Memos, 8 October 2002, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p. 7.

[421] Pursiainen and Saari, *Et tu Brute!*, p. 42.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

As it was shown, the security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden were totally different until the Second World War, due to their different geographical circumstances and distinctive security problems emanating from dissimilar threat perceptions. In that part in history, at first Finland had to fight for gaining its independence and define itself as an independent nation-state in dire circumstances whereas Sweden, with a more secure geographical situation, did not feel too much concern as regards the maintenance of its state sovereignty. The position of Finland was much more sensitive than Sweden due to the fact that Finland had to deal with a very strong eastern neighbor, the Soviet Union. Therefore, it tried to pursue a much more flexible and pragmatic foreign and security policy than Sweden. The only aspect that can be considered common for these countries was the fact that neither of them considered to accept permanent neutrality for security policy formulations in the future.

Since the experiences of the Second World War were different for the independent Finland and neutral Sweden, the nature and content of the policies of neutrality they tried to follow in the post-war period were also diverse in character. Accordingly, during the Cold War period, the Finnish neutrality policy was an important political instrument to keep the country away from the Soviet influence and maintain its sovereignty; on the contrary, Swedish neutrality policy was a symbolic sign of its separation from Western security associations. In this respect, it is alleged that the Finnish neutrality policy might be considered to be more credible and sustained than the Swedish neutrality at that time in history due to the fact that Sweden's hidden

connections with the US and NATO during the Cold War. Furthermore, for Sweden neutrality, which was a necessity for the country and at the same time a continuation of its tradition, was positively associated with its peaceful past. Hence, it is deeply rooted in the national self-perception of Sweden. However, it can be claimed that the Finnish-style of neutrality in the 20th century was mainly characterized by pragmatism and flexibility, where the impact of moral or ideological concerns might be very little. At that juncture, the policy of neutrality, which was a kind of strategic necessity for the Finns, was perceived to be a required tool and tactic to defend nation-state. In addition, in the case of Sweden, the neutrality policy had its own self-defined character on the grounds that no country apart from Sweden itself was involved in its creation and content. However, the FCMA Treaty limited the room for maneuver of the Finnish government in its formulation of neutrality policy during the Cold War era.[422] As a consequence, the Finns were deemed to be eager to cancel the FCMA Treaty and have, since then, been faster and more willing than the Swedes in establishing links with organizations such as NATO and the WEU.

The end of the Cold War and its bipolar system has brought about significant changes in the foreign and security policy of these states. Since the politics of integration and cooperation in the field of security began to replace the politics of the blocs in Europe, now Sweden and Finland began to feel the necessity to adapt their foreign and security policies to ongoing European integration process, in order to deal with the challenge of marginalization in the new international conditions. The emergence of the European Union and their applications for the membership were important developments in this sense owing to the fact that membership in the EU may have the possibility to provide both opportunities and advantages for these small states of Europe, where they may exert more influence, have more protection against being overwhelmed by larger states and attain more of what they aim to acquire than if they were left alone to compete with the larger powers.

[422] Hallenberg, *The Extension of the European Security Community to the Periphery*, p. 6.

In fact, one could say that for Finland, security concerns were the main motivation for considering the European Union membership whereas especially political and economic motivations paved the way for Swedish membership application within these circumstances. In its application process to the European Union, the basic consideration of Finland was that membership in a union with progressively deeper integration, interdependence, mutual responsibilities and political commitments, would enhance security of the country, by making it unlikely that Finland would again be left alone to deal with its easterly neighbor. Thus, Finland described the CFSP merely as a complement to its national foreign and security policies. In the transition period, the debate about CFSP and the possibility of NATO membership was more alive in Finland than Sweden. Sweden, finding itself in a similar situation, seemingly depicted the CFSP very much like Finland did. However, the main subject in the Swedish accession debate was whether membership to the EU would oblige the country to join a common defense structure while discussion on the issue was not as alive as it was in Finland. However, it can be affirmed that EU membership was deemed to present a warning, signaling the end of Sweden's policy of military non-alliance. The "influence" factor was not very predominant in Sweden, as in the case of Finland. In this context, the most striking difference is that the Finns were eager to abandon the policy of neutrality than the Swedes who are more reluctant in that sense. On the other hand, in the meantime, the most striking example of commonality in their security policies of Finland and Sweden was the similar and simultaneous change, the step from neutrality to non-participation in alliances taking place in the early 1990s, where both Finland and Sweden rephrased, redefined and modified their security policy formulations in a similar way which would enable the countries' active participation in international security cooperation, including military cooperation and their possible EU membership. At the end of this transition period, these countries began to be aligned with the European Union with regard to the political issues. However, in terms of military matters, the policy of non-participation in military alliances has been preferred, not as an end in itself, but as an important

means in achieving security policy stability in Europe's north as well as making EU membership a possible option for themselves.

Consequently, Finland and Sweden became members of the EU in 1995 as militarily non-allied states. It can be pointed out that even though the Finnish and Swedish security policies were not similar during the Cold War, their entry to the European Union in 1995 may be accepted as the starting-point for the potential future convergence of their security policies, considerations and strategies. It can be said that together with Finland, Sweden has confirmed its desire to participate fully in the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and began to feel the necessity to redefine and adjust their foreign and security policies to be in line with the evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, the most striking modification in their respective security policies may be considered to be the adaptation of their traditional policies of neutrality gradually to the changing conditions emanating from their membership in the EU and in the end abandoning the usage of the term in the official security policy definitions.

Even though, they were described as "sisters but not twins"[423] and they had different profiles within the EU, they had common interests as well which would allow them to pursue joint initiatives in this organization, especially in the field of security and defense policy, making their similarities more discernible. Certainly, it can be underlined that they started to have much more similar, but yet not identical, approaches in adjusting their security policies to the CFSP and later the CESDP. The reason for these similarities was the parallel pressures and conditions which had the potential to influence their security policy considerations in that period. It can be argued that the most important aspect for both Finland and Sweden within the EU structures was not to be accused of free-riding and lack of solidarity towards the other member states of the Union especially in the field of security and defense. Therefore,

[423] Hämäläinen, *Lännettymisen lyhyt historia*, p.155, quoted in Forsberg and Vaahtoranta, "Inside the EU, Outside NATO": p. 69.

they always paid attention to emphasize their constructive and responsible attitudes in this organization. Both countries are functioning in the formation of the European Union's security and defense policy while trying to preserve their militarily non-allied status. Non-participation in military alliances, in two countries, is conceived as a policy that does not hinder their active participation in international security cooperation, including military cooperation. Conversely, both Finland and Sweden have emphasized the importance of cooperation as an important part of their security policy perspectives. Thus, both Finland and Sweden share the common interest in making the EU a more influential international actor in dealing with the issues of international security. They try to contribute to the development of the common European security policy with the conviction that it will also improve their own security indirectly.

In this regard, they also have tried to bring a perspective of Northern Europe to the EU by trying to underline the importance of non-military issues in the field of security within the Union, as in the case of Sweden's EU Presidency in 2001. In the same vein, both countries have acted together to develop the EU's crisis management capabilities. Both have also tried to make their military forces interoperable with NATO structures and have been active participants in NATO and EU crisis management and peace-promoting operations. Moreover, they have constantly reconsidered their foreign and security policy perspectives, continued to modify and redefine their security policy formulations in accordance with the changing circumstances in international relations and tried to adapt their security policy priorities to that of the European Union particularly with reference to the EU's evolving security and defense dimension after 1995.

Even though Finland and Sweden had more opportunity to pursue similar security policies at the end of the Cold War, especially by means of their membership to the European Union, there are still some very significant divergent points that differentiate their security policy priorities and separate their security perceptions and

perspectives within the EU. As a matter of fact, differences between the security policy perspectives and priorities of two militarily non-allied states Finland and Sweden within the EU today, are based on factors such as their distinctive historical memories and past experiences, their different geopolitical positions and in a way their changing attitudes towards the membership in the NATO. During the Cold War, Finland was bordering the Soviet Union and today its neighbor is Russia while Sweden is separated from the eastern great power by Finland and now also by the independent Baltic States. Additionally, to some extent owing to the geopolitical difference, their historical experiences and memories are different in the sense that Finland had to fight against the Soviet Union in the Second World War, while Sweden has experienced a long period of peace and stability.

With reference to abovementioned factors, one could argue that the EU membership itself is perceived in some sense differently in the two militarily non-allied countries. For instance, in Sweden, membership is mostly perceived and evaluated in terms of its economic consequences and the different obligations it requires, while in Finland, membership is perceived as something that gives the country more room for action and influence, as well as, a secure atmosphere. Since Finland's foreign policy after the Cold War may be characterized as having a seat at all tables where decisions affecting Finland are made, its active participation in the EU may be interpreted as the logical continuation of this policy line. Hence, it can be alleged that the ideal and need of being in the "core" of the Union in order to be able to influence the structure and developments of the EU policies, has affected the content and priorities of Finnish EU policies. Unlike its Finnish neighbor, Sweden has taken a more distant position within the Union and has a tendency towards perceiving the European integration as a challenge to its national self-perception and some of its national values. In this context, it can be claimed that the policy of neutrality which was perceived as a safe and familiar theme for Swedish policy makers in unstable times when state sovereignty is considered to be challenged by closer economic or political integration was deemed to leave behind a kind of policy tradition in Sweden.

In general terms, Sweden has been a Nordic country with global concerns and a strong supporter of the United Nations with the conviction that obedience to international law and the UN Charter gives international actions legitimacy and popular support, as well as the Security Council is the ultimate guarantee for international peace and security. Nonetheless, in Sweden, EU skepticism is still affecting the Swedish policies. In addition, doubts concerning Sweden's commitments to the EU and CESDP still remain a part of the political discussion. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that it is more difficult to understand the real nature of Sweden's foreign and security policy than Finland especially within the context of the EU, an organization which has far-reaching plans for a common foreign and security policy. Even though Sweden seems more sensitive in terms of maintaining its policy of non-participation in military alliances than Finland, it also increasingly participates in cooperative endeavors including the field of defense within the EU. It is more hesitant compared to Finland, in terms of giving a clear definition of its security policy. Accordingly, a Swedish diplomat states that "today our policy of non-participation in military alliances gives us a chance to follow an independent foreign policy without too much restriction."[424] In this context, Jan Hallenberg defines this dual policy approach of Sweden within the Union with reference to Kjell Goldmann's distinction between the "verbalized policy" and "non-verbalized policy."[425] According to Hallenberg, Sweden's increasing participation in cooperative frameworks within the EU gradually makes it difficult to understand the real content of its policy of non-participation in military alliances. Thus, he argues that "verbalized" aspects of Swedish policy in the EU context do not involve or correspond with the important "non-verbalized" aspects of the same policy. It is

[424] Author's interview with a Swedish Diplomat in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden in Stockholm on 16 December 2003.

[425] According to Kjell Goldmann, "verbalized policy" indicates "a line of action that an agent declares he is following or intends to follow with regard to an object" which may involve all spoken and written declarations issued by official representatives. "Non-verbalized policy" indicates "a line of action that is in fact followed by an agent with regard to an object." This may involve all aspects of external behavior and policy practices. For this distinction, see Kjell Goldmann, *Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Détente* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 9.

asserted that although the policy of non-participation in military alliances is continuously present in the "verbalized policy," it was undermined by the policy practices or actions of the Swedish government after 1995. In other words, Hallenberg underlines that there is a difference between what the Swedish government declares and what it practices in reality in the field of Swedish foreign and security policy within the EU.[426] In a similar vein, it is argued that the Swedish government is not very coherent in terms of the Swedish position in the EU's security and especially in defense policies and it has mainly a reserved attitude towards giving a clear answer to the question of "Why Sweden can not accept common defense in NATO today?."[427]

In addition, differences are also reflected in the way in which the countries reformulated their foreign and security policies within the Union. Finland, in contrast to Sweden, has had a more flexible, adaptive and integrative approach in terms of EU policies, including the field of security and defense. It can be asserted that Finland was more ready and experienced for further transformation and adaptation within the EU framework and has had fewer difficulties in adapting itself to the strengthening of the EU as an international actor including the construction of its common defense dimension. The unreserved attitude of Finland to change its security policy orientation steadily from the policy of neutrality to active EU oriented security policy perspective can be regarded as an indication of Finnish pragmatism. In this context, the most prominent aspect of the Finnish policy of non-participation in military alliances may be accepted to be the continuous adaptation and flexibility with which Finland reformulates its policy positions. On the contrary, Sweden has seemed more eager to accentuate its policy non-participation in military alliances on various occasions and secure its position as a militarily non-allied state than the more

[426] Jan Hallenberg, "Swedish Foreign and Security Policy," in *Sweden and the European Union Evaluated*, ed. Lee Miles (London: Continuum, 2000), pp. 27-31.

[427] Author's interview with a Journalist in the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* in Stockholm on 24 November 2003.

pragmatically oriented Finland. In the EU, Sweden seems to be less interested than Finland in the security and defense matters while it prefers to concentrate on issues such as employment policy, gender equality and environmental policies.

With reference to aforementioned assessments Finland may be accepted to have a more "integrationist" attitude, compared to Sweden, towards the increasing European integration, including the evolving security and defense policies of the Union. It is worth noting that the overall purpose of Finland in the EU is to substantiate its opinion that unity is the best way towards a more capable EU. In the same vein, the President of the Republic of Finland, Tarja Halonen (2000-present), confirms this approach by underlining the fact that even though a loosely tied union might seem more preferable, if democracy is preserved, small countries are more centrally involved in decision making in a closely tied union and the collective effect is greater. She further accentuated that a loosely tied union provides its members with more freedom of action but bigger countries may have better opportunities to utilize this freedom.[428] However, Sweden's preferred approach within the EU may be described in general as "intergovernmentalism." One could argue that within the framework of the EU, Sweden seems to prioritize its traditional policy concerns while Finland mostly prefers to adapt its national policy priorities to the larger settings. Furthermore, from a different perspective, Finland may be conceived to have a "Europeanist" perspective which pushes for more European unity in its security policy considerations, whereas Sweden may be perceived to have a more "Atlanticist" perspective, which always puts emphasis on the importance of maintaining close relations with the US and supports vigorously the notion that the US plays a crucial role for the security and stability in Europe, with a subtle belief that the US would in any case provide protection for the Nordic region, including Sweden. Moreover, Finland, which tries to direct its policies primarily through the EU and to adapt its national goals to what is already on the agenda of the Union, may

[428] "At the Core of Europe as a Non-participant in Military Alliances - Finnish Thoughts and Experiences," Guest lecture by President of the Republic of Finland Tarja Halonen at the University of Stockholm on 2 May 2000.

be conceived to have a much more EU centric orientation, particularly in terms of security policies than Sweden.

According to the Survey of the Advisory Board for Defence Information of Finland, conducted between the dates of 7-22 September 2005, to establish the opinions of the Finnish people on Finnish foreign policy as well as on security and defense policy, the activities of the European Union are perceived as increasing Finland's security. In the opinion of the citizens, Finland's participation in the establishment of the EU's common defense (59 percent positively supported by the citizens), the EU's counter-terrorist activities (58 percent positively supported by the citizens) and Finland's membership in the EU (56 percent positively supported by the citizens) were accepted as factors that increase the security of Finland. Accordingly, 65 percent of Finns trust the way the EU's foreign and security policy is conducted. Nonetheless, today the majority of Finnish people, namely 58 percent, is still in favor of Finland's military non-alliance and thinks that Finland must remain militarily non-allied.[429]

Similarly, according to the Eurobarometer survey, which was carried out in Finland in October and November 2005 about the attitudes of Finnish people towards the EU, 45 percent of Finns think that Finland has benefited from its membership in the European Union, as well as, considering that being in the European Union has had a positive effect especially on Finland's security.[430] On the other hand, according to the same survey, which was conducted in Sweden, Swedes seem to be, in general, still reluctant to transfer decision-making to the EU level and prefer that the national government makes decisions in most policy areas. However, it is worth mentioning

[429] The survey was carried out by interviewing 990 persons in Finland. For further results of the survey see "The European Union must have a UN mandate for military intervention. The Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI) Survey 1/2005," 24 November 2005, Ministry of Defence of Finland, Bulletins and Reports, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/files/416/ABDI_survey05.doc (Accessed 15 September 2006).

[430] *Standard Eurobarometer 64, Public Opinion in the European Union, Autumn 2005, National Report,Executive Summary, Finland*, p. 4, retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_fi_exec.pdf (Accessed 15 September 2006).

that fighting against terrorism is an exception to this in the sense that 87 percent of Swedes think that the EU is better at fighting against terrorism. The survey also demonstrates that Swedes are most reluctant to transfer power to the EU when it comes to the field of foreign policy and defense compared to citizens of other member states. It is further pointed out in the survey that about half of Swedes (53 percent) think of themselves as both Europeans and Swedes and about half of Swedes (46 percent) never think of themselves as Europeans. In addition, Swedes are also less pleased with the benefits of EU membership, 56 percent of the Swedes think their country has not benefited from being a member of the European Union.[431] These results may be accepted as the reasons of the fact that Sweden seems to prefer working more through various organizations than Finland. Moreover, geographical considerations of these countries are still important in shaping national security priorities within the EU. The potential of Russia to cause a traditional security challenge to Finland is acknowledged. Hence, one could argue that Finland's foreign and security policies still consider the Russia factor, as in the case of the Finland's Northern Dimension Initiative, whereas Sweden's policy considerations depend more on domestic factors.

As a consequence, one could say that the two militarily non-allied EU states, Finland and Sweden, continued to adapt, rather than to adopt, their security policy perspectives in accordance with the EU's security policy priorities. Hence, it can be pointed out that the evolution of their security policy perspectives even within the EU has a characteristic of some kind of continuity as well, on the grounds that both Finland and Sweden did not necessitate a dramatic split with their past security policy perspectives, but rather they modified their approaches gradually by building upon their respective national standpoints within the EU. To put it in a different way, they continuously feel the need to redefine their respective positions within the Union. It can be stated that this was more discernible in the field of foreign and security policy

[431] *Standard Eurobarometer 64, Public Opinion in the European Union, Autumn 2005, National Report, Executive Summary, Sweden*, pp.3-4, retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_se_exec.pdf (Accessed 15 September 2006).

where the emphasis on "military non-alliance" has remained essential in spite of the membership to the Union and there was a support for a crisis management and peacekeeping capacity for the Union while remaining hesitant about collective defense and mutual defense guarantees within the Union owing to their militarily non-allied status. On the other hand, they are increasingly participating in the cooperative arrangements within the EU including the defense field, which may diminish the room for their non-participation in military alliances in the future. For instance, particularly the contribution of the Swedish Armed Forces even to the peace-enforcement measures as indicated before in the Swedish Government Bill 2004, where the population in the problematic region can be protected through the legitimate use of violence, is a striking development for a country which is very sensitive about its militarily non-allied status.

The continuing development of the common defense dimension within the EU has also created a need to review the legislation on Finland's participation in peacekeeping and military crisis-management missions where the authorization of the United Nations Security Council may not be required by Finland in peacekeeping operations in the future. In addition, Finnish peacekeepers may also be authorized to use force more than the present law allows. The proposal of the working group of civil servants set up by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs further mentions that the reference to Article 42 of the UN Charter in the current law of Finland on peacekeeping which prevents the country from taking part in coercive peace enforcement actions would also be dropped.[432] However, Finns still think that in addition to the EU's own decision, an EU military intervention should also be mandated by the UN and they seem to approve of a possible EU military intervention when the intention is to guarantee humanitarian assistance or prevent genocide.[433] In

[432] "New legislation would ease restrictions governing peacekeeping operations," *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 11 May 2005, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/New+legislation+would+ease+restrictions+governing+peacekeeping+operations/1101979457647 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

[433] See "The European Union must have a UN mandate for military intervention. Survey 1/2005."

brief, one could argue that all these simultaneous developments in Finland and Sweden may be accepted as the indication of their continuous adaptation process to the evolving security and defense dimension of the EU where the room for their militarily non-allied status seems to be diminishing gradually while at the same time making the content of their policy of non-participation in military alliances increasingly ambiguous in this process.

In terms of their contribution to the EU's evolving security and defense dimension, it can be argued that as small states they could exert some kind of influence in the EU's policies, especially with their two most significant initiatives, namely the Petersberg tasks and the Northern Dimension Initiative. However, from an overall perspective, Ojanen claims that they seem more influenced by the EU policies than capable of influencing the Union itself being obliged to continuously redefine their security policy perspectives.[434] In this context, it can be asserted that deepening security and defense integration within the EU may constitute a challenge to Finland's and Sweden's capabilities for adaptation and modification of their security policies in the future. Additionally, in the future, continuous adjustments in their security policies are more likely to happen due to the developments within the security and defense dimension of the EU itself. In this sense, one could argue that Finland, which aims to pursue a more flexible and adaptive policy of military non-alliance to be able to participate in increasing military cooperation, may be more rapid than Sweden in changing, modifying or abandoning its security policy perspective, if the new conditions require this change in the future. Furthermore, Finland's security integration may proceed faster because the relationship between integration and national self-perception is weaker and constraints to maintain a balance between national policy traditions and security integration are lesser, relative to Sweden. It is worth nothing that NATO seems to be the favored membership option in terms of military alliance for Finland while the EU's role is on the increase. The majority of

---

[434] See Ojanen, *Participation and Influence*, p. 3.

Finns still support the policy of military non-alliance but the number of those supporting Finland's membership in a military alliance has increased in the last years.[435] With reference to these results, one could argue that Finland, in a geopolitically more sensitive position than Sweden, seems to keep its option of a membership in a military alliance more open than its western neighbor.

With regard to their future position within the EU, it can be put forward that these militarily non-allied small EU states may be confronted continuously with the question of how they define and perceive their respective roles in a changing European security environment. Likewise, it can be asserted that because of their exceptional security policy status, they may face the obligation or necessity of clarifying their standpoints on the future of the European security order and their own place in it, particularly within the framework of the EU.

For instance, as militarily non-allied states, Finland and Sweden may face a few challenges within the EU in the future, one of which is related to the possible scope of tasks and operations the EU will have to be ready to undertake in the future. In this regard, to make a distinction between what is to be seen as military crisis management and what is not seems to be very difficult since both countries now try to be prepared for participation even in peace-enforcement operations where there is a possibility of a legitimate use of violence. The solidarity clause of the Constitutional Treaty underlines that member states of the EU shall act in a spirit of solidarity if another member state is the victim of a terrorist attack. This clause may be interpreted as a probable challenge for these militarily non-allied small states owing to the fact that if the terrorist attack to a member state is sponsored by not a terrorist group, but a state, then the EU may have to use military mechanisms against another state to deal

[435] According to the survey, 61 percent of citizens think that Finland should remain military non-allied (it was 64 percent in 2003) whereas 34 percent are of the opinion that Finland should ally itself militarily (it was 24 percent in 2003). See "The question on military alliance divides opinions even more clearly than before. The ABDI Survey, carried out 29.9.-19.10.2004," 5 July 2004, Ministry of Defence of Finland, Bulletins and Reports, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?641_m=643&l=en&s=263 (Accessed 15 September 2006).

with terrorism. Thus, the solidarity clause may have the possibility to come closer in practice to mutual defense guarantees which may pose a serious challenge for Finland and Sweden since they do not participate in cooperation on mutual defense due to their militarily non-allied status. Another important challenge may be related to the issue of mandate of the EU's peace operations, if a mandate is needed, who will provide it, may cause an important debate among the militarily non-allied states in the future. In this regard, Finland seems to support the fact that the EU may need to maintain a possibility for mandating its own operations, whereas Sweden seems to emphasize the importance of acquiring the authorization of the United Nations for these operations.

As a consequence, it can be emphasized that since both the security policy perspectives of Finland and Sweden and the EU's CESDP are evolving and they are in continual development, predictions for both are difficult to make for the future. The fact that their policy of non-participation in military alliances were presented as a means rather than an end itself and the content, definition and application of this policy line may change with regard to the changing circumstances contributes to the difficulty to foresee the role of these countries and the possible challenges they may face within the EU in the future.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

af Malmborg, Mikael. "Sweden in the EU." In *Finnish and Swedish Security, Comparing National Policies*, eds. Bo Huldt, Teija Tiilikainen, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Anna Helkama-Rågård. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2001.

af Ugglas, Margaretha. "Sweden's Security Policy in Post-Cold War Europe." *NATO Review*, Web edition, No.2, Vol. 42 (April 1994): pp. 10-15.

Allison, Roy. *Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944-84.* London: The Macmillan Press, 1985.

Antola, Esko. "The Presence of the European Union in the North." In *Dynamic Aspects of the Northern Dimension*, edited by Hiski Haukkala. Working Papers No. 4. Turku: Jean Monnet Unit of the University of Turku, 1999.

Archer, Clive. "The Northern Dimension as a soft-Soft Option for the Baltic States' Security." In *The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?*, edited by Hanna Ojanen. Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 12. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2001.

Archer, Clive. *Finland, Sweden, the IGC& Defence*. ISIS Briefing Paper No.8 (January 1997). ISIS Europe, International Security Information Service, retrieved from http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/bp-8.pdf (Accessed 6 September 2006).

Archer, Toby. "Keeping out of it: The hangover of Finnish neutralism and the limits of normative commitments." In *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 2003*. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003.

Archer, Toby. *International Terrorism and Finland*. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs Report No.7. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2004.

Austin, Daniel F. C. *Finland as a Gateway to Russia: Issues in European Security.* Aldershot: Avebury, 1996.

Åselius, Gunnar. "Swedish Strategic Culture after 1945." *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol. 40 (1) (2005): pp. 25-44.

Bailes, Alyson J. K. "European Security from a Nordic Perspective: The Roles for Finland and Sweden." In *The New Northern Security Agenda: Perspectives from Finland and Sweden*, eds. Bo Huldt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg and Elisabeth Davidson. Strategic Yearbook 2004. Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2003.

Bastian, Katrin. "Finnish Non-alignment, the ESDP and the new Russia-NATO Council, Why Finland should use every opportunity to deal with Russia in Multilateral Settings." In *The New North of Europe*, Final Conference Policy Memos. 8 October 2002. Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

Bengtsson, Rikard., Elgström, Ole and Tallberg, Jonas. "Silencer or Amplifier? The European Union Presidency and the Nordic Countries." *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (2004): pp. 311-334.

Bjereld, Ulf. "Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics, 1945-90." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1995): pp. 23-35.

Bjurner, Anders. "Sweden." In *Challenges to Neutral &Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*, edited by Emily Munro. Geneva: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005.

Bjurner, Anders. "Sweden." In *Neutrality and non-alignment in Europe today*, edited by Hanna Ojanen. FIIA Report 6/2003. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003.

Bjurulf, Bo. "The Swedish Presidency of 2001, A Reflection of Swedish Identity." In *European Union Council Presidencies, A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Ole Elgström. London: Routledge, 2003.

Blank, Stephen J. *Finnish Security and European Security Policy*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 1996.

Brady, Joe. "Chronology of Finnish history." April 2002, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Department for Communication and Culture/Unit for Promotion and Publications, Virtual Finland, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25911 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

Browning, Christopher S. *Coming Home or Moving Home? 'Westernizing' Narratives in Finnish Foreign Policy and the Re-interpretation of Past Identities*. UPI Working Papers 16. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1999.

Brundtland, Arne Olav. *On the Security and Defense Issues in Northern Europe with Special Emphasis on Sweden and Finland.* NUPI Notat Paper, Nr. 476. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1992.

Carlgren, Wilhelm M. *Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War*, translated by Arthur Spencer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977.

Däniker, Gustav. "Swiss Security Policy in a Changing Strategic Environment." In *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Hanspeter Neuhold. Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Ekengren, Magnus and Sundelius, Bengt. "Sweden: The State Joins the European Union." In *Adapting to European Integration, Small States and the European Union*, eds. Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp. London: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998.

Elgström, Ole. *Images and Strategies for Autonomy, Explaining Swedish Security Policy Strategies in the 19th Century.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.

Elgström, Ole. "Do Images Matter? The Making of Swedish Neutrality: 1834 and 1853." *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 35 (3) (2000): pp. 243-267.

Eliasson, Johan. *The European Security and Defense Policy Process and The Legacy of Neutrality as a Guide to Non-Allied Members' Security Policies*. Campbell Public Affairs Institute (24 October 2003) retrieved from http://scholar.google.com (Accessed 2 September 2005).

"Finland's Security Policy." In *Finnish Military Defence.* Helsinki: The Information Division of the Defence Staff, 2002.

Forsberg, Tuomas and Vaahtoranta, Tapani. "Inside the EU, Outside NATO: Paradoxes of Finland's and Sweden's Post-Neutrality." *European Security*, Vol. 10, No.1 (Spring 2001): pp. 68-93.

Goetschel, Laurent. "Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?." *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.34 (2) (1999): pp. 115-139.

Goldmann, Kjell. *Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Détente.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Gstöhl, Sieglinde. "Scandinavia and Switzerland: small, successful and stubborn towards the EU." *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 9 (4) (August 2002): pp. 529-549.

Gustavsson, Jakob. *The Politics of Foreign Policy Change, Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership.* Lund: Lund University Press, 1998.

Hagglof, M. Gunnar. "A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* Vol. 36, No. 2 (April 1960): pp. 153-167.

Hallenberg, Jan. "Swedish Foreign and Security Policy." In *Sweden and the European Union Evaluated*, edited by Lee Miles. London: Continuum, 2000.

Hallenberg, Jan. *The Extension of the European Security Community to the Periphery: France in the Mediterranean and Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Countries*. A NATO Fellowship Final Report. Stockholm: National Defence College, 2000.

Hanf, Kenneth and Soetendorp, Ben. "Small States and the Europeanization of Public Policy." In *Adapting to European Integration, Small States and the European Union*, eds. Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp. London: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998.

Hägglund, Gustav. "Finnish Defence Policy Aims to Protect Against External Pressures." *NATO Review*, Web edition, No. 4, Vol. 43 (September 1995): pp. 19-21.

Häikiö, Martti. *A Brief History of Modern Finland.* Lahti: Lahti Research and Training Centre of the University of Helsinki, 1992.

Häikiö, Martti. "Changes in Finnish Security Policy: the Koivisto Presidency, 1981-94." in *Security and Insecurity, Perspectives on Finnish and Swedish Defence and Foreign Policy*, eds. Gunnar Artéus and Jukka Nevakivi. Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 1997.

Heininen, Lassi. "Ideas and Outcomes: Finding a Concrete Form for the Northern Dimension Initiative." In *The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?*, edited by Hanna Ojanen, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 12. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2001.

Herolf, Gunilla and Lindahl, Rutger. "Sweden-Continuity and Change." In *Non-Alignment and European Security Policy, Ambiguity at Work*, Hanna Ojanen, Gunilla Herolf and Rutger Lindahl. The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 6. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000.

Herolf, Gunilla. “The Swedish Approach: Constructive Competition for a Common Goal.” In *The Northern EU, National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension*, eds. Gianni Bonvicini, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Wolfgang Wessels. The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 9. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000.

Himanen, Hannu. “Finland.” In *Neutrality and non-alignment in Europe today*, edited by Hanna Ojanen. FIIA Report 6/2003. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003.

Hollo, Ilkka. “Finnish Defence Forces- The Present and the Future.” In *Security in the North, Change and Continuity*, edited by Mika Kerttunen. Series 2. Research Reports No: 9. Helsinki: National Defence College, 2000.

Holst, Johan J. *European Security, A view from the North*. Notat Paper, Nr. 438. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1990.

Honkanen, Karoliina. *The Influence of Small States on NATO Decision-Making: The Membership Experiences of Denmark, Norway, Hungary and the Czech Republic.* Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2002.

Howorth, Jolyon. “Britain, NATO and CESDP: Fixed Strategy, Changing Tactics.” *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2000): pp. 377-396.

Huldt, Bo. “Neutrality and the Nordic Security Pattern: A Swedish Perspective.” In *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Hanspeter Neuhold. Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Huldt, Bo. “Comments on the Swedish Position.” In *Challenges to Neutral &Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*, edited by Emily Munro. Geneva: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005.

Huldt, Bo. “Sweden and European Community-building 1945-92.” In *Neutral States and the European Community*, edited by Sheila Harden. The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. London: Brasseys’s Ltd., 1994.

Iivonen, Jyrki. “Perestroika, Neutrality, and Finnish-Soviet Relations.” In *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Hanspeter Neuhold. Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Jakobson, Max. *Finnish Neutrality, A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War.* London: Hugh Evelyn, 1968.

Jakobson, Max. *Finland in the New Europe*. The Washington Papers/ 175. Westport: Praeger Publishers and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998.

Järvenpää, Pauli. "What comes after Madrid? A View from Helsinki." *NATO Review*, Web edition, No. 5, Vol. 45 (September-October 1997): pp. 30-33.

Jenssen, Anders Todal., Gilljam, Mikael. and Pesonen, Pertti. "The Citizens, the Referendums and the European Union." In *To Join or Not to Join, Three Nordic Referendums on Membership in the European Union*, eds. Anders Todal Jenssen, Pertti Pesonen and Mikael Gilljam. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1998.

Joenniemi, Pertti and Sergounin, Alexander. *Russia and the European Union's Northern Dimension: Encounter or Clash of Civilisations?*. Nizhny Novgorod: Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University Press, 2003.

Joenniemi, Pertti. "Finland in the New Europe, A Herderian or Hegelian Project?." In *European Integration and National Identity, The Challenge of the Nordic States*, eds. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver. London: Routledge, 2002.

Karlsson, Birgit. "Neutrality and Economy: The Redefining of Swedish Neutrality, 1946-52." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (February 1995): pp. 37-48.

Karp, Regina. "Security Integration in the Baltic Sea Region: Adaptation of National Preferences to New Challenges." 28 July 2004. Online Conference Paper Archive of the Fifth-Pan European International Relations Conference on 9-11 September 2004, The Hague, retrieved from http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/papers/Karp%20-%20Security%20Integration.pdf (Accessed 3 January 2006).

Karvonen, Lauri and Sundelius, Bengt. "The Nordic Neutrals, Facing the European Union." In *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*, edited by Lee Miles. London: Routledge, 1996.

Käkönen, Jyrki. "Local Dimension and Regionalisation: The Northern Peripheries." In *The New North Europe, Perspectives on Northern Dimension*, eds. Lassi Heininen and Jyrki Käkönen. Research Report No.80. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1998.

Kekkonen, Urho. "Finnish Foreign Policy and the Defence Forces." Speech given in Kouvola, Finland, on 28 December 1961. In *Neutrality: The Finnish Position, Speeches by Dr. Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland*, edited by Tuomas Vilkuna and trans. P. Ojansuu and L. E. Keyworth. London: Heinemann, 1970.

Kekkonen, Urho. “Neutrality.” Speech given at a lunch held by Prime Minister Tage Erlander at Harpsund, Sweden, on 11 April 1965. In *Neutrality: The Finnish Position, Speeches by Dr. Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland*, edited by Tuomas Vilkuna and trans. P. Ojansuu and L. E. Keyworth. London: Heinemann, 1970.

Kekkonen, Urho. “Finland’s Path in a World of Tensions.” Speech given at the General Church Meeting in Vaasa, Finland, on 6 January 1967. In *Neutrality: The Finnish Position, Speeches by Dr. Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland*, edited by Tuomas Vilkuna and trans. P. Ojansuu and L. E. Keyworth. London: Heinemann, 1970.

Kivimäki, Timo. “Finland, A Case of Beneficial Integration.” *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (June 1999).

Knudsen, Olav F. “Analysing Small-State Security: The Role of External Factors.” In *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*, eds. Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen. Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries No. 8. London: Brassey’s Ltd., 1996.

Laegreid, Per., Steinthorsson, Runolfur Smari. and Thorhallsson, Baldur. “Europeanization of Central Government Administration in the Nordic States.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (2004): pp. 347-369.

Lawler, Peter. “Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 35 No. 4 (December 1997): pp. 565-594.

Lindahl, Rutger. “The Swedish Debate.” In *The 1996 IGC-National Debates (2) Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK*. Discussion Paper 67. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996.

Lindström, Gustav. “Sweden’s Security Policy: Engagement- the Middle Way.” Occasional Paper 2, October 1997, European Union: Institute for Security Studies. Retrieved from http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ02.html (Accessed 20 February 2006).

Lipponen, Paavo. “Finnish Neutrality and EC Membership.” In *Neutral States and the European Community*, edited by Sheila Harden. The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies. London: Brasseys’s Ltd., 1994.

Luif, Paul. *On the Road to Brussels, The Political Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s Accession to the European Union*. Austrian Institute for International Affairs. Wien: Braumüller, 1995.

Luntinen, Pertti. “Neutrality in Northern Europe before the First World War.” In *Neutrality in History/ La Neutralite dans L’Histoire*, edited by Jukka Nevakivi. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993.

Luostarinen, Heikki. “Finnish Russophobia: The Story of an Enemy Image.” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1989): pp. 123-137.

Maude, George. *The Finnish Dilemma, Neutrality in the Shadow of Power.* London: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Medvedev, Sergei. *Russia as the Subconsciousness of Finland*. UPI Working Papers 7. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1998.

Miles, Lee and Sundelius, Bengt. “ ‘EU Icing on a Baltic Cake’: Swedish Policy towards the Baltic Sea and EU Northern Dimensions.” In *Sweden and the European Union Evaluated*, edited by Lee Miles. London: Continuum, 2000.

Miller, Steven E. “Nordic Security in a Europe without the United States.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 512, The Nordic Region: Changing Perspectives in International Relations (November 1990): pp. 46-57.

Moores, Simon. “‘Neutral on our Side’: US Policy towards Sweden during the Eisenhower Administration.” *Cold War History*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April 2002): pp. 29-62.

Moroff, Holger. “The EU’s Northern Soft Security Policy: Emergence and Effectiveness.” In *European Soft Security Policies: The Northern Dimension*, edited by Holger Moroff. Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 17. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

Möttölä, Kari. “Military Cooperation and Military Non-Alliance: An Analysis of the Policies of Finland and Sweden in Transatlantic Relations.” Paper prepared for 43rd ISA Annual Convention New Orleans, LA, 23-27 March 2002, retrieved from http://www.isanet.org/noarchive/mottola.html (Accessed 23 March 2006).

Möttölä, Kari. “Finland.” In *Challenges to Neutral &Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*, edited by Emily Munro. Geneva: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005.

Murphy, Alexander B. and Hunderi- Ely, Anne. “The Geography of the 1994 Nordic Vote on European Union Membership.” *Professional Geographer*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1996): pp. 284-297.

Neuhold, Hanspeter. "The European Neutrals Facing the Challenges of the 1990s." In *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Hanspeter Neuhold. Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Neumann, Iver B. "Nordic Security Cooperation in a Homogenized Political Setting." *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 31 (4) (1996): pp. 417-432.

Nevakivi, Jukka. "Finnish Neutrality." In *Neutrality in History/ La Neutralite dans L'Histoire*, edited by Jukka Nevakivi. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993.

Nevakivi, Jukka. "Finnish and Swedish Security Policy before 1945." In *Finnish and Swedish Security, Comparing National Policies*, eds. Bo Huldt, Teija Tiilikainen, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Anna Helkama-Rågård. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2001.

Nevakivi, Jukka. "Finnish Security Policy in a Geostrategic Perspective." In *Security and Insecurity, Perspectives on Finnish and Swedish Defence and Foreign Policy*, eds. Gunnar Artéus and Jukka Nevakivi. Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 1997.

Nevakivi, Jukka. "Independent Finland between East and West." In *Finland, People, Nation, State*, eds. Max Engman and David Kirby. London: Hurst& Company, 1989.

Norman, Torbjörn. "Stages in Swedish Neutrality." In *Neutrality in History/ La Neutralite dans L'Histoire*, edited by Jukka Nevakivi. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993.

Novack, Jennifer. "The Northern Dimension in Sweden's EU Policies: From Baltic Supremacy to European Unity?." In *The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?*, edited by Hanna Ojanen. Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, No. 12. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2001.

Ojanen, Hanna. *Participation and Influence: Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam Development of the CFSP*. Occasional Papers 11. Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 2000.

Ojanen, Hanna. "Finnish non-alignment: drills in flexibility." In *Non-Alignment and European Security Policy, Ambiguity at Work*, Hanna Ojanen, Gunilla Herolf and Rutger Lindahl, The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 6. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000.

Ojanen, Hanna. *Theories at a loss? EU-NATO Fusion and the 'Low-Politicisation' of Security and Defence in European Integration*. UPI Working Papers 35. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

Ojanen, Hanna. “Hopes, Expectations and Worries- the Challenging Task of Heading the Development of the CFSP/ESDP in a Diversifying Union.” In *The Baltic Room- Extending The Northern Wing of the European House*, eds. Hans Zettermark, Magnus Hägg and Caroline von Euler. Strategic Yearbook 2001. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2000.

Ojanen, Hanna. *Finland and the CFSP: Allegiance, Activism and Non-Alignment*. UPI Working Papers 3. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1998.

Oskarson, Maria and Ringdal, Kristen. “The Arguments.” In *To Join or Not to Join, Three Nordic Referendums on Membership in the European Union*, eds. Anders Todal Jenssen, Pertti Pesonen and Mikael Gilljam. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1998.

Penttilä, Risto E. J. *Finland’s Security in a Changing Europe, A Historical Perspective.* Helsinki: National Defence College, 1994.

Penttilä, Risto E. J. “Non-alignment- Obsolete in Today’s Europe?.” In *European Security Integration: Implications for Non-alignment and Alliances*, eds. Mathias Jopp and Hanna Ojanen. The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 3. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1999.

Penttilä, Risto E. J. *Finland’s Search for Security through Defence, 1944-89*. London: Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd., 1991.

Pereira, Laura C. Ferreira-. “The Militarily Non-Allied States in the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Solidarity ‘ma non troppo’.” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (April 2005): pp. 21-37.

Pesonen, Pertti. “The Finns and the Swedes in the European Union.” In *Finland, Sweden and the European Union*, Pertti Pesonen and Unto Vesa. Research Report No. 77. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute of the University of Tampere, 1998.

Petersen, Phillip A. “Scandinavia and the ‘Finlandization’ of Soviet Security.” *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, Vol. 38, No. 1, The New Europe: Revolution in East-West Relations (1991): pp. 60-70.

Petersson, Olof. *Le Débat Suédois sur l'Europe*. Notre Europe, Etudes et Recherches No. 12, Décembre 2000, retrieved from http://www.const.sns.se/olofp/notreeurope_fr.pdf (Accessed 26 September 2006).

Pursiainen, Christer and Saari, Sinikukka. *Et tu Brute! Finland’s NATO Option and Russia*. UPI Report 1/2002. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

Raunio, Tapio. "National Politics and European Integration." In *Finland in the European Union*, Tapio Raunio and Teija Tiilikainen. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.

Readman, Kristina Spohr. "New Global Security Threats, NATO's Enlargement into the Baltic, and the Alliance's New Relationship with Russia: Why Finland and Sweden may want to consider a future in NATO positively." In *The New North of Europe*. Final Conference Policy Memos. 8 October 2002. Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

Rieker, Pernille. *From territorial defence to comprehensive security? European integration and the changing Norwegian and Swedish security identities*. No. 626. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

Ries, Tomas. *Finland and NATO*. Helsinki: The Department of Strategic and Defence Studies of National Defence College, 1999.

Ries, Tomas. "Lessons of the Winter War." November 2001, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25937 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

Riste, Olav. "'Janus Septentrionalis'? The Two Faces of Nordic Non-Alignment." In *Neutrality in History/ La Neutralite dans L'Histoire*, edited by Jukka Nevakivi. Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1993.

Rosenius, Frank. "Sweden's Defence Forces- in a radical change." In *Security in the North, Change and Continuity*, edited by Mika Kerttunen. Series 2. Research Reports No: 9. Helsinki: National Defence College, 2000.

Ruhala, Kalevi. "Alliance and Non-alignment at the onset of the 21st century." In *The New Northern Security Agenda: Perspectives from Finland and Sweden*, eds. Bo Huldt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg and Elisabeth Davidson. Strategic Yearbook 2004. Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2003.

Sandler, Ake. "Sweden's Postwar Diplomacy: Some Problems, Views, and Issues." *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December 1960): pp. 924-933.

Selck, Torsten J. and Kuipers, Sanneke. "Shared hesitance, joint success: Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in the European Union policy process." *Journal of European Public Policy* (12) 1 (February 2005): pp. 157-176.

Sens, Allen. “Small-State Security in Europe: Threats, Anxieties and Strategies after the Cold War.” In *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*, eds. Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen. Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries No. 8. London: Brassey’s Ltd., 1996.

Sæter, Martin. *The Nordic Countries and the Perspective of a ‘Core’ Europe*. Notat Working Paper, No. 558, Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1996.

Simoulin, Vincent. “L’Union Européenne au regard des Pays Nordiques.” Les Études du CERI, no. 66. Paris: Centre d’études et de recherches internationals, Sciences Po, 2000.

Sjursen, Helene. “Making Sense-or not-of the EU’s External Policy.” In *Europeanization of Security and Defence Policy*, eds. Elisabeth Davidson, Arita Eriksson and Jan Hallenberg. Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2002.

Soetendorp, Ben and Hanf, Kenneth. “Conclusion: The Nature of National Adaptation to European Integration.” In *Adapting to European Integration, Small States and the European Union*, eds. Kenneth Hanf and Ben Soetendorp. London: Addison Wesley Longman Limited, 1998.

Stubb, Alexander C.-G. “The Finnish Debate.” In *The 1996 IGC-National Debates (1) Finland, France, Italy and the Netherlands*. Discussion Paper 66. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996.

Subedi, Surya P. “Neutrality in a Changing World: European Neutral States and the European Community.” *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 2 (April 1993): pp. 238-268.

Sundelius, Bengt. “Sweden: Secure Neutrality.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 512, The Nordic Region: Changing Perspectives in International Relations (November 1990): pp. 116-124.

Sundelius, Bengt. “Changing Course: When Neutral Sweden Chose to Join the European Community.” In *European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes and Steve Smith. Sage Modern Politics Series Vol. 34. London: Sage Publications, 1994.

Terpan, Fabien. “French concern: Northern Europe as a key point in the European debate on power and security.” In *The Northern EU, National Views on the Emerging Security Dimension*, eds. Gianni Bonvicini, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Wolfgang Wessels, The Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP, Vol. 9. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000.

Thomas, Alastair H. "The Concept of the Nordic Region and the Parameters of Nordic Cooperation." In *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*, edited by Lee Miles. London: Routledge, 1996.

Tiilikainen, Teija. "The Finnish Presidency of 1999, Pragmatism and the Promotion of Finland's Position in Europe." In *European Union Council Presidencies, A Comparative Perspective*, edited by Ole Elgström. London: Routledge, 2003.

Tiilikainen, Teija. *Europe and Finland, Defining the Political Identity of Finland in Western Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1998.

Tiilikainen, Teija. "Finland in the EU." In *Finnish and Swedish Security, Comparing National Policies*, eds. Bo Huldt, Teija Tiilikainen, Tapani Vaahtoranta and Anna Helkama-Rågård. Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2001.

Tiilikainen, Teija. "A Finnish Perspective on European Security." In *The New Northern Security Agenda: Perspectives from Finland and Sweden*, eds. Bo Huldt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg and Elisabeth Davidson. Strategic Yearbook 2004. Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2003.

Tiilikainen, Teija. "Finland's First Presidency of the European Union." In *Finland in the European Union*, Tapio Raunio and Teija Tiilikainen. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.

Törnudd, Klaus. "Ties that Bind to the Recent Past- Debating Security Policy in Finland within the Context of Membership of the European Union." *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 31 (1) (1996): pp. 37-68.

Törnudd, Klaus. "Finnish Neutrality Policy during the Cold War." February 2005, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Department for Communication and Culture/Unit for Promotion and Publications, Virtual Finland, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=32643 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

Trägårdh, Lars. "Sweden and the EU, Welfare State Nationalism and the spectre of 'Europe'." In *European Integration and National Identity, The Challenge of the Nordic States*, eds. Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver. London: Routledge, 2002.

Tunander, Ola. "The Uneasy Imbrication of Nation-State and NATO, The Case of Sweden." *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 34(2) (1999): pp. 169-203.

Vaahtoranta, Tapani and Forsberg, Tuomas. *Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied? Finnish and Swedish Policies on the EU and NATO as Security Organisations*. UPI Working Papers 29. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2000.

Vaahtoranta, Tapani. “Comments on the Finnish Position.” In *Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*, edited by Emily Munro. Geneva: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2005.

Vesa, Unto. “Legitimacy Pressures upon Finland and Sweden.” In *Finland, Sweden and the European Union*, Pertti Pesonen and Unto Vesa. Research Report No. 77. Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute of the University of Tampere, 1998.

Vesikallio, Johanna. “La Finlande et la Suède dans le processus de réforme de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l’Union européenne.” Université Robert Schuman Strasbourg, DESS Eurojournalisme- Centre universitaire d’enseignement du journalisme (CUEJ), Mémoire (1997) retrieved from http://cuej.u-strasbg.fr/formation/euroj/euroj_memoire/96_97/vesikallio.pdf (Accessed 23 October 2006).

Vihavainen, Timo. “Finland’s relations with the Soviet Union 1944 - 1991.” November 2001, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Department for Communication and Culture/Unit for Promotion and Publications, Virtual Finland, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=26480 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

Visuri, Pekka. “Neutral Military Security in a Changing Europe: A Finnish View.” In *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Hanspeter Neuhold. Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Waronen, Eero. “Finnish Bridge-Building in a Changing Europe.” In *The European Neutrals in the 1990s, New Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Hanspeter Neuhold. Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Wedin, Lars. “Sweden in European Security.” In *The New Northern Security Agenda: Perspectives from Finland and Sweden*, eds. Bo Huldt, Tomas Ries, Jan Mörtberg and Elisabeth Davidson. Strategic Yearbook 2004. Stockholm: The Swedish National Defence College, 2003.

Wæver, Ole. “Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War.” *International Affairs*, (68) 1 (1992): pp. 77-102.

Whitman, Richard G. *Amsterdam’s unfinished business? The Blair Government’s initiative and the future of the Western European Union*. Occasional Papers 7. Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1999.

Wiberg, Håkan. "Security Problems of Small Nations." In *Small States and the Security Challenge in the New Europe*, eds. Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F. Knudsen. Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 8. London: Brassey's Ltd., 1996.

Widfeldt, Anders. "Sweden and the European Union, Implications for the Swedish Party System." In *The European Union and the Nordic Countries*, edited by Lee Miles. London: Routledge, 1996.

Zartman, I. William. "Neutralism and Neutrality in Scandinavia." *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (June 1954): pp. 125-160.

Zetterberg, Kent. "Swedish Security Policy 1945-1953, Finland in the Soviet Shadow." In *Security and Insecurity, Perspectives on Finnish and Swedish Defence and Foreign Policy*, eds. Gunnar Artéus and Jukka Nevakivi. Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 1997.

Zetterberg, Seppo. "Main outlines of Finnish history." November 2001, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Department for Communication and Culture/Unit for Promotion and Publications, Virtual Finland, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=25909 (Accessed 22 July 2005).

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, REPORTS AND SPEECHES

A Secure Europe in a Better World- European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, The Council of the European Union, retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (Accessed 27 January 2006).

Article on Iraq by the Nordic Foreign Ministers, Laila Freivalds, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sweden; Per Stig Möller, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Denmark; David Oddsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iceland; Jan Petersen, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway; Erkki Tuomioja, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Finland published in Berlingske Tidende (DK), Dagbladet (NO), Helsingin Sanomat (FI), Svenska Dagbladet (SE) and Morgunbladid (IS), 23 June 2005, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3212/a/46917 (Accessed 1 October 2006).

"At the Core of Europe as a Non-participant in Military Alliances - Finnish Thoughts and Experiences." Guest lecture by President of the Republic of Finland Tarja Halonen at the University of Stockholm on 2 May 2000, retrieved from http://www.tpk.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=9695&intSubArtID=6328 (Accessed 5 September 2006).

"British-French summit St-Malo, 3-4 December 1998." In Maartje Rutten, *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Paper 47, Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (May 2001) retrieved from http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#3 (Accessed 15 January 2006).

Concordia Mission in Macedonia, retrieved from
http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/en/Concordia/mission.htm
(Accessed 1 September 2006).

Cover Note from Erkki Tuomioja, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland; Brian Cowen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ireland; Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria; Laila Freivalds, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, to Franco Frattini, President of the Council of the European Union, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, CIG 62/03, IGC 2003, DELEG 29, 4 December 2003.

Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 18 July 2003, retrieved from http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf (Accessed 7 July 2006).

EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR - Althea),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=745&lang=EN
(Accessed 1 September 2006).

EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC/ARTEMIS),
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=605&lang=en&mode=g
(Accessed 1 September 2006).

"European Council Vienna, 11-12 December 1998, Presidency Conclusions." In Maartje Rutten, *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Paper 47, Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (May 2001) retrieved from http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#5 (Accessed 15 January 2006).

"Finland's Evolving Role as a European Partner." Speech by President Martti Ahtisaari of the Republic of Finland at Chatham House, London on 24 November 1997, retrieved from http://www.tpk.fi/ahtisaari/puheet-1996/P971106.chaten.html (Accessed 5 September 2006).

Finnish Foreign Policy 1998, retrieved from
http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/chronology/chrono1998_12.html
(Accessed 21 September 2006).

Finnish Proposal for a new Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty, Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, IGC 2003, CIG 61/03, DELEG 29, December 2003.

Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004, Government Report 6/24, 24 September 2004, Ministry of Defence of Finland, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/files/311/2574_2160_English_White_paper_2004_1_.pdf (Accessed 21 June 2006).

Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, 12 February 1997, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/8552652a.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, 11 February 1998, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/da095403.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, 10 February 1999, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/4927d21f.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, 9 February 2000, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/af5cf8ec.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

Foreign Policy Statements, Statement of government policy in the parliamentary debate on foreign affairs, 7 February 2001, Unofficial translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/06a8da7b.pdf (Accessed 10 September 2006).

"Government Bill on Swedish contribution to EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 1 October 2004, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/31098 (Accessed 14 October 2006).

Government Report to Parliament on the Future of the European Union, 25 October 2001, retrieved from http://valtioneuvosto.fi/tiedostot/julkinen/vn/selonteot-mietinnot/2001/eu-tulevaisuus-25.10.2001/131951.pdf (Accessed 17 June 2006).

Government Report to Parliament on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for the European Union, Unofficial translation, 25 November 2005, retrieved from http://www.vn.fi/tiedostot/julkinen/vn/selonteot-mietinnot/Valtioneuvoston_selonteko_Euroopan_unionin_perustuslakisopimuksesta/145494.pdf (Accessed 7 July 2006).

"Increased Swedish presence in Afghanistan." *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 3 November 2005, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/52513 (Accessed 11 October 2006).

"Informal European summit Pörtschach, 24-25 October 1998." In Maartje Rutten, *From St-Malo to Nice: European defence: core documents*, Chaillot Paper 47, Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union (May 2001) retrieved from http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai47e.html#1 (Accessed 15 January 2006).

"Laila Freivalds welcomes agreement on new Iraq resolution." *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 9 June 2004, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/25453 (Accessed 1 October 2006).

Maastricht Treaty, Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, retrieved from http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf (Accessed 7 July 2006).

"More Swedish police to Kosovo." *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 15 September 2005, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/49827 (Accessed 14 October 2006).

"NATO's Partnership for Peace Signatures by Country," retrieved from http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm. (Accessed 1 September 2006).

"New Swedish troops to Afghanistan." *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 15 April 2004, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/16930 (Accessed 14 October 2006).

Parliaments and the Althea mission, Report, Document A/1911, Assembly of WEU, Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, 7 December 2005, retrieved from http://www.assemblee-ueo.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2005/1911.php?PHPSESSID=5c7ca41908957ad71cc97b8998ff0dec (Accessed 1 September 2006).

Presidency Progress Report to the Helsinki European Council on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, Helsinki European Council 10-11 December 1999, retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (Accessed 14 May 2006).

Presidency Report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the European Union, Helsinki European Council 10-11 December 1999, retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm (Accessed 14 May 2006).

Programme of the Swedish Presidency of the European Union 1 January to 30 June 2001, 14 December 2000, retrieved from http://eu2001.se/static/pdf/program/ordfprogram_eng.pdf (Accessed 25 June 2006).

Security in a Changing World: Guidelines for Finland's Security Policy, Report by the Council of State to the Parliament 6 June 1995, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, retrieved from http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/tpseng7.html (Accessed 27 January 2006).

Speech by the Secretary of State Jukka Valtasaari, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU; Priorities of the Finnish Presidency." The Conference of the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Parliaments of the Member States of the European Union, of the European Parliament, and of the Parliaments of the Applicant States, Helsinki, 20-21 July 1999, retrieved from http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle561.html (Accessed 5 September 2006).

Speech by Jukka Valtasaari, "Finland and the EU Presidency - an Agenda for the New Millennium." Nordic Policy Studies Centre, London School of Economics and Social Sciences, London, 4 May 1999, retrieved from http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle1108.html. (Accessed 5 September 2006).

Speech by President Martti Ahtisaari at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm 14 April 1994, "Relations between Finland and Sweden in a Changing Europe." retrieved from http://www.tpk.fi/ahtisaari/puheet-1994/P9404.UIE.html (Accessed 5 September 2006).

"Speech by the Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja on the European Security Strategy." Finlandia Hall, Helsinki, Finland, 25 February 2004, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, retrieved from http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=61143&nodeid=32281&contentlan=2&culture=en-US (Accessed 5 September 2006).

Standard Eurobarometer 64, Public Opinion in the European Union, Autumn 2005, National Report, Executive Summary, Finland, retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_fi_exec.pdf (Accessed 15 September 2006).

Standard Eurobarometer 64, Public Opinion in the European Union, Autumn 2005, National Report, Executive Summary, Sweden, retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_se_exec.pdf (Accessed 15 September 2006).

Statement by the Prime Minister to Parliament on the negotiation result with the European Union, 4 March 1994, retrieved from http://www.parliament.fi. (Accessed 17 April 2006).

Statement by the Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen to Parliament on the EU programme for Finland's Presidency, 17 June 1999, retrieved from http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/toiminta/selonteot/selonteot/en.jsp?oid=130196 (Accessed 17 April 2006).

Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2002, Unofficial Translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/d86a5e1c.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2006).

Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, 12 February 2003, Unofficial Translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/ce922612.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2006).

Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, 11 February 2004, Unofficial Translation, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/13aaf50b.pdf (Accessed 2 September 2006).

Summary of the Programme for the Finnish EU Presidency, A Strong and Open Europe into the New Millennium, 24 June 1999, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, retrieved from http://presidency.finland.fi/doc/agenda/summary.rtf (Accessed 25 June 2006).

Sweden's road to EU Membership, retrieved from the Government Offices of Sweden, http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/3470/a/20685 (Accessed 25 June 2006).

Sweden, the EU and the Future, Assessments by the Swedish IGC 96 Committee prior to the Intergovernmental Conference, Report by the Swedish IGC 96 Committee, Government Official Reports 1996:19. Stockholm: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1996.

"Swedish contribution to UN protection in Iraq." *Press Release of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden*, 22 December 2004, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/637/a/36011 (Accessed 1 October 2006).

Swedish Government Bill 2004 / 05:5, Our Future Defence, The focus of Swedish Defence Policy 2005–2007, Swedish Ministry of Defence, October 2004, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/03/21/19/224a4b3c.pdf (Accessed 12 October 2006).

The Cologne European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, and the Presidency Report on Strengthening of the common European policy on security and defence, Annex III to the Presidency Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/june99/annexe_en.htm#a3 (Accessed 23 April 2006).

"The European Union must have a UN mandate for military intervention. The Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI) Survey 1/2005." 24 November 2005, Ministry of Defence of Finland, Bulletins and Reports, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/files/416/ABDI_survey05.doc (Accessed 15 September 2006).

The Finnish Security and Defense Policy 2001, Report by the Government to Parliament on 13 June 2001, Ministry of Defence of Finland, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=184 (Accessed 14 May 2006).

The Government Programme of Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen's Government on 24 June 2003, retrieved from http://www.valtioneuvosto.fi/tiedostot/julkinen/vn/hallitus/Paeaeministeri_Matti_Vanhasen_hallituksen_ohjelma_24.6.2003/131539.pdf (Accessed 12 October 2006).

"The question on military alliance divides opinions even more clearly than before. The ABDI Survey, carried out 29. 9. -19. 10. 2004." 5 July 2004, Ministry of Defence of Finland, Bulletins and Reports, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?641_m=643&l=en&s=263 (Accessed 15 September 2006).

The Renewal of Sweden's Defence: Phase 2, Unofficial shortened version of the Government Defence Bill 1996/97:4 passed by Parliament on 20 November and 13 December 1996, Ministry of Defence, Information Material 1996, retrieved from the Government Offices of Sweden, http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/02/56/49/e043d837.pdf (Accessed 12 October 2006).

The Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Amsterdam, 2 October 1997, retrieved from http://www.eurotreaties.com/amsterdamtreaty.pdf (Accessed 7 July 2006).

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4987th meeting, on 8 June 2004, UN Security Council: Resolutions 2004, retrieved from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed 1 September 2006).

Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, CIG 87/2/04 REV 2, 29 October 2004, retrieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/igcpdf/en/04/cg00/cg00087-re02.en04.pdf (Accessed 29 October 2006).

Tuomioja, Erkki. and Freivalds, Laila. "We want a stronger EU security policy." 11 November 2003, retrieved from http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3212/a/4541 (Accessed 1 October 2006).

United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), retrieved from http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm (Accessed 4 October 2006).

UNMIK at a Glance, retrieved from http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm (Accessed 1 September 2006).

"1. 4. 2003 Bulletins and Reports 1/2003, Opinions of Finns on the war in Iraq." 27 October 2003, Ministry of Defence of Finland, The Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI), Bulletins and Reports, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?641_m=646&l=en&s=263 (Accessed 15 September 2006).

"7. 5. 2003 Bulletins and Reports 2/2003, Opinions of Finns on the war in Iraq." 27 October 2003, Ministry of Defence of Finland, The Advisory Board for Defence Information (ABDI), Bulletins and Reports, retrieved from http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?641_m=645&l=en&s=263 (Accessed 15 September 2006).

THESES

Pederson, John Martin. "The United States' relations with Norway and Sweden: Ideology and Culture in the Cold War, 1949-1961," Proquest Digital Dissertations Full-Text (Ph.D. diss., The University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1998).

Rantanen, Anjariitta. "Northern Exposure: Sweden, Finland and Norway Join the European Union," (Master Thesis, Bilkent University, 1994).

NEWS AGENCIES AND NEWSPAPERS

"Baltic, Nordic Prime Ministers Conclude EU Constitution Ratification must Continue." *BNS*, 10 June 2005, FBIS Transcribed Text, NewsEdge Document Number: 200506101477.1_90be003ce66625c6.

Black, Ian and White, Michael. "EU gives Iraq final chance to avoid war but splits remain." *Guardian Unlimited*, 18 February 2003, retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,897887,00.html (Accessed 27 May 2006).

"Chirac, Sweden's Persson Agree on Need for 'Key' Role for UN in Postwar Iraq." *Paris Agence France Presse (AFP)*, 15 April 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-WEU-2003-0415.

Dempsey, Judy. "Europe: Nations at loggerheads over neutrality." *Financial Times*, 9 December 2003, retrieved from http://search.ft.com/searchArticle?sortBy=datearticle&page=70&queryText=Sweden+and+Finland&y=8&javascriptEnabled=true&id=031209000756&x=10 (Accessed 27 May 2006).

Dombey, Daniel. and Jansson, Eric. "Comment & Analysis: The mission beginning today in Bosnia marks a new phase in peacekeeping, but the Union has to find a way to co-exist with NATO." *Financial Times*, 2 December 2004, retrieved from http://www.ft.com/cms/s/133188e4-4407-11d9-af06-00000e2511c8,ft_acl=.html (Accessed 27 May 2006).

"EU Summit set for stalemate." *Guardian Unlimited*, 17 February 2003, retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,897454,00.html (Accessed 27 May 2006).

"Finland and Sweden agree to set up common EU military force." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 5 October 2004, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/1076154139551 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

"Finland decides to take part in German-Dutch EU battle group." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 4 November 2004, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Finland+decides+to+take+part+in+German-Dutch+EU+battle+group/1076154436763 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

"Finnish Parliament takes positive view of EU constitution treaty." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 30 November 2005, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Finnish+Parliament+takes+positive+view+of+EU+constitution+treaty/1101981802160 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

"Finnish peacekeepers to remain in Afghanistan until summer." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 28 March 2002, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020328IE9 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

Fitchett, Joseph. "Anna Lindh, Foreign Minister of Sweden: A Warning Against Creating 2 Classes of EU Members." *International Herald Tribune*, 3 June 2000, http://www.iht.com/articles/2000/06/03/qna.2.t.php (Accessed 27 May 2006).

"FMA 23 Sep: European Media See Swedish 'No' Vote Tied to Euro Zone Deficit." *FBIS Report*, 25 September 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-WEU-2003-0923.

"Foreign Ministers Tuomioja and Lindh: EU needs more efficient civilian crisis management." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 2 May 2000, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/today/020500-06.html (Accessed 25 January 2006).

"Kofi Annan appoints President Ahtisaari to lead Kosovo talks." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 2 November 2005, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Kofi+Annan+appoints+President+Ahtisaari+to+lead+Kosovo+talks/1101981494817 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

Mac Carthy, Clare. "Nordic countries to plough on with ratification." *Financial Times*, FT.com site, 30 May 2005, retrieved from http://search.ft.com/searchArticle?sortBy=datearticle&page=30&queryText=Sweden+and+Finland&y=8&javascriptEnabled=true&id=050530002134&x=10 (Accessed 27 May 2006).

"New legislation would ease restrictions governing peacekeeping operations." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 11 May 2005, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/New+legislation+would+ease+restrictions+governing+peacekeeping+operations/1101979457647 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

"Non-allied has become an empty and unnecessary phrase." Editorial, *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 29 September 2004, retrieved from http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Non-allied+has+become+an+empty+and+unnecessary+phrase/1076154135042 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

"Russian FM 'pleased' with relations with Finland." *Moscow ITAR-TASS*, 7 February 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-SOV-2003-0207.

Sadeniemi, Pentti. "National interest at the heart of security policy in the EU." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 9 December 1999, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/today/091299-03.html (Accessed 25 January 2006).

"Sweden, Poland Oppose Any EU Military Planning in Competition with NATO." *Paris Agence France Presse (AFP)*, 2 December 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-WEU-2003-1202.

"Sweden to adopt new security policy doctrine- drops neutrality." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 12 February 2002, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020212IE11 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

"Swedish Minister Views Country Defense Policy, Slovakia's Interest in NATO Entry." *Bratislava SME*, 4 April 2002, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-NES-2002-0405.

"Swedish Prime Minister Says EU Divided on Iraq." *Paris Agence France Presse (AFP)*, 14 January 2003, FBIS Document Number: FBIS-WEU-2003-0114.

"1986: Swedish Prime Minister Assassinated." *BBC News*, 28 February 1986, retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/28/newsid_2802000/2802181.stm (Accessed 6 May 2006).

"52% of Finns polled approve of US military action in Afghanistan." *Helsingin Sanomat*, International Edition, 2 January 2002, retrieved from http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20020102IE4 (Accessed 25 January 2006).

INTERVIEWS

Interview with a Finnish Diplomat in the Embassy of Finland in Stockholm/Sweden, 8 December 2003.

Interview with a Finnish Officer in the Swedish National Defense College in Stockholm/Sweden, 5 December 2003.

Interview with a Journalist in the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* in Stockholm/Sweden, 24 November 2003.

Interview with a Professor in the Swedish National Defence College, in Stockholm/Sweden, 16 December 2003.

Interview with a Swedish Diplomat in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Sweden in Stockholm/Sweden, 16 December 2003.
(Names to be cited pending written permission of the interviewees.)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A



The 1994 Nordic vote on European Union membership. **Source**: Bergens Tıdene 1994, 8; Skjorstad 1994, 7, Huvfudstadsbladet 1994, 9, quoted in Alexander B. Murphy and Anne Hunderi- Ely, "The Geography of the 1994 Nordic Vote on European Union Membership," *Professional Geographer*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (August 1996): p. 286.