DELEUZE'S STRUGGLE AGAINST TRANSCENDENCE AND CRITICISMS ABOUT IT

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ABSTRACT

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AND CRITICISMS ABOUT IT

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In this study, I first studied the undecidability of immanence and transcendence. Then, I studied the demarcation problem between transcendence and immanence with its results in philosophy. Thirdly, I touched on the idea of the death of philosophy in relation to this demarcation problem. Fourthly, I tried to present Deleuze's dualist approach to concepts and I also studied Hume's effect on the emergence of this approach. As the fifth, I tried to relate the demarcation problem to ethics, concepts and the future of philosophy. Finally, I presented questions and criticisms about both Hume's and Deleuze's views on immanence and ethics.

Keywords: transcendence, immanence, concepts, strategy, Deleuze.

ÖZ

DELEUZE'ÜN AŞKINLIĞA KARŞI MÜCADELESİ VE BU MÜCADELEYE KARŞI ELEŞTİRİLER

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Bu çalışmada ilk olarak içkinlik ve aşkınlığın belirlenemezliğini inceledim. Daha sonra felsefedeki sonuçlarıyla beraber aşkınlık ve içkinlik arasındaki ayrım problemini çalıştım.Üçüncü olarak, bu ayrım problemi ile ilişkili olacak şekilde felsefenin ölümü fikrine değindim. Dördüncü olarak, Deleuze'ün kavramlara ikili yaklaşımını ve Hume'un bu yaklaşımın ortaya çıkışındaki etkisini ınceledim. Beşinci olarak, bu ayrım problemini ahlakbilime, felsefi kavramlara ve felsefenin geleceğine ilişkin düşüncelere bağlamaya çalıştım. Son olarak, Hume'un ve Deleuze'ün içkinlik ve ahlakbilimle ilgili görüşlerine yönelik eleştirilere yer verdim.

Anahtar sözcükler: aşkınlık, içkinlik, kavramlar, strateji, Deleuze.

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Introduction

While mentioning the adversaries of *Anti-Oedipus*, Foucault said "…the major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism… And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini-which was able to mobilize and use the desire of masses so effectively-but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior.."(1) Similarly, I say that Deleuze confronted transcendence not as a concept or an object/being or a theory or an idea; he confronts it everyway, in its all cases. I claim that all Deleuze said and wrote was entirely a struggle against transcendence. In whole history of philosophy, "a clear line of demarcation between transcendence and immanence" was lacked (2), thanks to which transcendence was impossible to determine and avoid successfully. Therefore, to overturn transcendence, Deleuze identified it in its varying forms, he followed the causal chains and processes within which it used to emerge, transform and interact. Deleuze saw that transcendence had object forms such as Christian God, state, subject; it was sometimes acting as a form of thought such as the habit of representation, dialectics, establishing binary oppositions and finally, he reached the conclusion that it always ended up with morals, repression, loss of gaiety and loss of capability to think differently. (In fact, this conclusion of him was the motive or the reason for which he struggled against transcendence and this struggle was for philosophy.) Discovering transcendence successfully in its all forms and ways, he started a complete assault. "What Is Philosophy?" was his confront with transcendence in philosophy. "Capitalism and Schizophrenia" was the challenge against transcendence in politics and psychology. And "Kafka: Toward A Minor

Literature" was another attack on transcendence in art and literature. Deleuze's was a war in which he not only hit all the means and appearances of transcendence but also the mind, the fate it acts along or behind. His every sub-concern, I suppose, was a strategy in his battle; they each were a part of a single interest. Therefore, I wanted to study the real thing lying beneath his philosophy, namely what, why, which, how, where transcendence was in his thinking.

However, I was aware that I had to narrow down Deleuze's complex concern with transcendence some way. Leaving aside how he investigated transcendence's interference in psychology, politics or art, I decided to deal with it only within philosophy. This, though, was still requiring some specification. I could study his claim that "the choice between chaos and transcendence is a necessary decision."(3) Or I could study his idea of "vital anecdotes"(4) and how transcendence manages or fails to enable them. Or I could study his question; "Can the entire history of philosophy be presented from the viewpoint of instituting a plane of immanence?"(5), namely his claim that history of philosophy requires a change to be supplied with perspectives. Or I could study transcendence as a concept within Deleuze's understanding of what a concept is. Or and or and…Finally, I decided to specify my study down to the following headlines:

a. Deleuze's dualist approach to concepts; his distinction between concepts as "strategies" versus concepts as "ontologies"(6) and his preference of the former over the latter.
b. Hume's effect on the emergence of this dualist approach.
c. How demarcation between transcendence and immanence is related to the issues above and what Deleuze was actually concerned with while insisting on clarifying this demarcation.

A. The Undecidability of Immanence and Transcendence

Deleuze was asking "Can the entire history of philosophy be presented from the viewpoint of instituting a plane of immanence?"(7) His this investigation was revealing that he was aware and not glad of "the absence of a clear line of demarcation between immanence and transcendence."(8) This uncertainty was of concern in epistemology, ethics, politics, psychology, and in any other field. And this uncertainty was the cause of many illusions, fascism, violence, repression and it was affecting the role (prescriptive versus descriptive roles), meaning, duty, definition and success of every science or human activity, primarily philosophy. This problem was necessitating "the transformation of the sciences of man."(9) Deleuze gave examples of this uncertainty and its results referring to many philosophers and thoughts. More bluntly, he examined the whole history of philosophy from the perspective of this uncertainty or confusion. His most severe criticism of Kant is to do with this confusion. The reason why he attacked Kant to the extent of calling him "enemy" is that Kant, too, was aware of this lack of demarcation and rolled up his sleeves to replace it; to make philosophy purely immanent (always within the limits of the experiencible) and thus separate it from theology(10) but he failed. Firstly, Deleuze appreciated "Kant's genius, in the Critique of Pure Reason, to conceive of an immanent critique"(11) but condemned that he implemented his own reason as if a transcendent, isolated judge over itself. The same mistake was repeated by Nietzsche as well, though he had criticized Kant for it. Nietzsche wanted to attain the immanence Kant had missed; he would abolish anything superhuman, anything transcendent that were representing man but he ended up with the "overman"(12), which was again another superhuman ideal, another defeat by transcendence. Marxism, too, was an attempt to free people from some transcendent effects like kings or God but after some time, it had

become a source of repression itself; it had created binary oppositions such as "the capitalist-the communist"(13) which were constituting a dialectics and representing man, like any religion did. Deleuze was seeing that no matter with how good intentions the philosophers and theories started and aimed at clearing man of anything nonhuman, they were just failing and leading to the opposite. So, how would Deleuze try the same "project of immanence" and avoid the unavoidable? Perhaps what he did was not something new but how he did it was different.

The difficulty of recognizing and avoiding transcendence within philosophy really had significant effects on the content, meaning and style of philosophy as Deleuze realized. To cure the ill-effects of this, Deleuze followed a stunning way. Instead of determining the criteria to identify and replace transcendence and later decide the duty of philosophy, he did the reverse; he first started redefining philosophy with its content, duty and limitations, thanks to which there would remain no need for the second thing; that is, transcendence would be eliminated itself automatically or naturally. The enemy was hard to notice while coming close, therefore, what he did was almost acting as an inherent "anti-transcendence scan program." He would define philosophy in such a way that transcendence would not already be able to intervene in. What was inviting transcendence into philosophy was the wrong deeds that philosophy had overtaken such as "contemplation, reflection, communication or truth-finding."(14) He asked the simplest but neglected (non-prescriptive) question; "What is philosophy? What is it I've been doing all my life?"(15) And he answered that philosophy is just the art of creating concepts. (16) He thought perhaps that if he reduced the job of philosophy to this, philosophy would become immune, impenetrable against transcendence because Deleuze thought creativity and transcendence were two things which could never exist together.(17)

If he managed to redefine philosophy in this way, Deleuze would achieve one more thing that was equally important beside impeding transcendence. The modern philosophy and many contemporaries of Deleuze were "tempted by the idea of the death of philosophy or the overcoming of metaphysics."(18) Many post-modernist

thinkers were insisting that philosophy had lost its capability of enabling systems and idea of "system" itself had lost its power.(19) But Deleuze remained loyal to the classical idea of philosophy as a system (20) and managed to evoke a new hope that philosophy would never vanish and it could still exist as a system. Deleuze's new definition that philosophy is the art of creating concepts was the key to form new mechanisms to keep creating constructions, systems, and concepts in and through philosophy.

I have just made a brief introduction hitherto uttering the demarcation problem between transcendence and immanence in philosophy and, in relation to this, Deleuze's opposition to the idea of "the death of philosophy." Now I want to detail these two issues.

B. The Demarcation Problem Between Transcendence and Immanence

This problem has had considerable effects on the content, methods, aims, disputes, problems, and ends of philosophy. For example, the lack of this demarcation leads to two sub-problems in epistemology. The external problem is: given some account of what knowledge is, can we determine in a principled way what sort of thing we might reasonably expect to know about? The internal problem is: are there important boundaries within the province of knowledge, for example, between knowledge that is a posteriori or empirical and knowledge that is a priori or non-empirical? (21) Apart from epistemology, ethics also faces the results of this demarcation problem: it cannot bring a consensus on what is vital, what is human, what is superhuman, etc. (22)

One can ask "why is it difficult to maintain this demarcation?" Deleuze rather dealt with the consequences of this problem; causes did not concern him much. (As this was the case for Hume, too.) Therefore, I will, just superficially, mention a few possible reasons for why separating the immanent from the transcendent is difficult. First of all, "the concept of immanence is not as simple as it is usually claimed to be. What is this immediate reality that is to completely absorb us? What is real in ourselves? Is it the immediate condition of juxtaposition, exhibited in its complete purity?" (23) Giving a brief history of the terms, Eucken says that the use of these terms goes as back as Aristotle but the now customary juxtaposition of immanent and transcendent does not go back further than the time of Kant. Until then, *immanens* and *transiens* stood in opposition to one another: from the thirteenth century onwards, an action or a cause was called *immanent* insofar as it remained within the acting subject; *transeunt* insofar as it went beyond to something else. It is in this sense we are to understand Spinoza's famous saying that God is the immanent but not the *transeunt* cause of all things. From this point of view, the

world is in God rather than God in the world. This only differs from scholastic philosophy in the exclusiveness of the immanence, for the former was quite prepared to recognize an immanent activity parallel with the *transeunt*. (24) In texts of ethics, theology, epistemology, ontology, etc., the terms have various-close or different- definitions, criteria and there have been disputes for or against each of them, which make them "undecidable." (25) Deleuze, too, recognized this difficulty; he said that the inability to determine transcendence precisely; in its double aspect of making immanence immanent to something and of rediscovering a transcendence within immanence itself bear illusions. (26)

The second reason for the undecidability of immanence could be human nature itself. It will be a little bit a romantic saying but I believe that man fears himself and what he can do. Sometimes he wants to be ruled and restricted himself. Estimating and fearing the possible consequences of our powers within the physics of the world, we want to be both free and directed. Besides, we are unable to cover and control all aspects of our nature which has relations with both what are defined as transcendent and what are immanent. Peter Railton calls this aspect of our nature "open-endedness." (27) How would, otherwise, it be so hard to avoid transcendence? Again our this nature welcomes or enables the pressure from transcendent sources. Otherwise people would not "be made to desire their own repression" (28), which means kings, capitalism, or anything over men do not have all the "success" alone. Russell says "the search for something permanent is one of the deepest of the instincts leading men to philosophy. It is derived, no doubt, from love of home and desire for a refuge from danger; we find accordingly, that it is most passionate in those whose lives are most exposed to catastrophe. Religion seeks permanence in two forms, God and immortality. In God is no variableness neither shadow of turning; the life after death is eternal and unchanging. The cheerfulness of the nineteenth century turned men against these static conceptions, and modern liberal theology believes that there is progress in heaven and evolution in the Godhead. But even in this conception there is something permanent, namely progress itself and its immanent goal. And a dose of disaster is likely to bring

men's hope back to their older super-terrestrial forms: if life on earth is despaired of, it is only in heaven that peace can be sought." (29) Although Deleuze always defended nomadism: having no home, no parents (any kind of refuge) (30), one side of our nature, as Russell claims, always contacts some form of transcendence, at least, for the sake of catching some permanence, safety or peace. (This means what naturalists call "unnatural", such as transcendence, is not definitely that unnatural. There lies a conflict in here, it seems.)

Thirdly, we can say that the world itself is desperately silent; not intelligible in one certain way. It lacks, at least in appearance, a single proven or objective reality. And it is far beyond man's control and wishes. Dilemmas bear new dilemmas; transcendence or immanence; the world as it is or the world(s) as we want it to be? This makes any choice –transcendent or immanent- equally legitimate or possible. Russell expresses this with a nice example: "The disbelief in objective truth makes the majority, for practical purposes, the arbiters as to what to believe. Hence, Protagoras was led to a defense of law and convention and traditional morality. While, as we saw, he did not know whether the gods existed, he was sure they ought to be worshipped." (31) (Here, we see that Deleuze was not the first to differentiate between ontology and strategies. Epicuros's philosophy, too, can be an example for this ontology-strategy dilemma or for the naturalism-unnaturalism conflict. Nature itself may force men to act against itself.) As we see, people usually do not care much about transcendence as a problem because life, social circumstances, economic or political phenomena or moods force men to take action fast and to take a side soon. People rather mind whether their choices work or not. This means, transcendence -no matter reasonable, right, useful or not at all- will always be of subject. This is just as this: although we always say that we hate wars or power battles, "politics becomes a naked struggle for power in the absence of any guiding principle; Machiavelli's *The Prince* gives shrewd advice as to how to play this game successfully." (32) Then rejecting, hating, even refuting transcendence is something but avoiding, abolishing or preventing transcendence is something else, I think.

Now, I want to move on to the consequences of the lack (and existence) of demarcation between transcendence and immanence in philosophy:

1-This demarcation problem has –straightaway or indirectly- had effects on defining what philosophy is, what it aims at, what should be its duties and concerns, what limits it should stay in and how it is different from other disciplines. (Perhaps, this demarcation problem made it happen, that philosophy turned its eyes on itself.) These questions have rather met confusions by philosophers and other disciplines. The reasons why these questions were asked and the expectations behind also lacked clarity:

> Philosophy, perhaps more than any other discipline, has been plagued by debates about what the discipline is or ought to be. Partly, this is due to the fact that philosophy has a currency in everyday parlance and ordinary self-reflection that linguistics or sociology or anthropology does not. One does not need an advanced degree to have a "philosophy of life", and this has bred an expectation even among those with advanced degrees, that the discipline of philosophy ought to be continuous with ordinary attempts to forge a philosophy of life. Most of philosophy, both contemporary and -importantly historical, does not alas, live up to this expectation. (This failure of philosophy is also among the reasons for why people do not care much about whether their beliefs are in something transcendent or not. If they leave their connections with transcendence aside, will philosophy supply a philosophy of life in their stead?) Earlier and contemporary philosophers worry, to be sure, about truth, knowledge, the just society, and morally right action, as well as the nature of science, beauty, death, law, goodness, rationality and consciousness. (Then, perhaps Deleuze, too, was running after ontology though he was saying or thinking that he was concerned only with strategies.) From reflections on these worries one might even extract a philosophy of life, though it would hardly be obvious, on an initial reading of Aristotle, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Hegel or Husserl that this was what they were after. Meta-philosophical questions, i.e. questions about what philosophy is, what its proper concerns, methods, limitations, and its rightful ambitions should be, are still incurably on the table in any consideration of philosophy's future. Yet, "what philosophy is" is also the implicit subtext anytime one "does philosophy." Indeed,

> one of the best (and most convincing) answers to the former question is given by the latter, by the doing of philosophy. (33) (Then, though Deleuze rejected or hated, what Hegel or Kant were doing was philosophy, too. It had been "done" and it was as real as any other way that philosophy could be done.)

Another touch on the problem:

> Those who persist in philosophy tend to justify participation in philosophical disputes in eccentric ways. Some deny that the participants really aim at knowledge of the answer to the disputed question. Romantic defeatists affirm the aim but revel in its quixotic nature. Others externally justify the dispute in terms of its good consequences (intellectual training, therapy, etc.). Still others stand pat on the intrinsic value of contemplating the Eternal Questions. None of those answers differentiates philosophical investigation from pseudo-scientific diversions. The correct justification of philosophy is the same as for all fields; it produces knowledge by resolving problems and exposes ignorance by revealing new problems. Most thinkers grant that philosophy unearths new problems. Historians credit David Hume with the discovery of the problem of induction and the is/ought gap, John Stuart Mill was the first to appreciate the problem of others minds, and we can thank Nelson Goodman for the grue-bleen paradox. The reason why we feel enlightened by these puzzles is that they liberate us from error. It is bad knowing that you do not know but worse to not know and think you know. As Russell noted, there is value to uncertainty as well as to knowledge. The value of uncertainty is not peculiar to philosophy. People, ranging from intelligence analysts to farmers, pay informants and experts to expose what they mistakenly believe they know. (34)

Another example showing the confusion in philosophy about what the philosophy is/ought to be:

> While the process of human knowledge and cognition had been important topics of philosophical investigation at least since Plato, for many eighteenth-century philosophers these processes became the objects of increasingly systematic investigations. For David Hume and Kant, at least, these investigations included theorizing about philosophical inquiry itself, considered as a manifestation of human cognitive process, and were

> undertaken partly with the aim of clarifying the inherent resources, limitations and potential paradoxes of metaphysical philosophy. (35)

An example of variety in answers to what limits philosophy should stay in: "If therefore philosophy were to succeed in creating a system such that in all cases mentioned it stood out clearly when a question is not justified so that the drive towards asking it would gradually die away, we should at one stroke have resolved the most obscure riddles and philosophy would become worthy of the name of queen of the sciences." (36)

Kant mentions the same problem: "To know what questions may reasonably be asked is already a great and necessary proof of sagacity and insight. For if a question is absurd in itself and calls for an answer where none is required, it not only brings shame on the propounder of the question, but may betray an incautious listener into absurd answers, thus presenting, as the ancients said, the ludicrous spectacle of one man milking a he-goat and the other holding a sieve underneath." (37)

Ernst Mach, realizing the role, aim or content problem in philosophy, gives science as a good example for having certain limits: "Science has grown almost more by what it has learned to ignore than by what it has had to take into account.) (38) His this suggestion reveals that philosophy lacked this certainty in its concerns.

Recognizing such meta-philosophical dilemmas, many philosophers, of course, tried to offer definitions and roles for philosophy. For example, philosophy has been suggested to be an adventure of experience between the clear and the obscure or it is thought to be an intentional thematization to enable experience. (39) Some thinkers have offered to describe philosophy as an intersection area of the main streams of thoughts it has gone through in its history, which are existentialism, analytic philosophy, Marxism and scholasticism. (40) Some other thinkers have tried to define philosophy regarding its disciplinary aspects and its concerns to do with these aspects: philosophy as art (on beauty); philosophy as science (on nature); philosophy as politics (on justice); and philosophy as religion (on God). (41)

Others offered different definitions of philosophy along with some classifications: “ousiodic” philosophy versus emancipatory philosophy. (42) The word “ousia” means household with its possessions and people, i.e. residual domesticity. And, thus, philosophy of ousia or ousiodic philosophy means a traditional kind of philosophy that truth has a dominance on and is claimed to include philosophers like Aristotle, Locke, Descartes and Spinoza. (I think Deleuze would not like to hear something like this about Spinoza) Conversely, emancipatory philosophy or the philosophy of liberation is a challenge against the hegemony of truth on philosophy and emancipatory in the sense of always enabling new, various discourses. (43)

The list of examples about questions and possible answers to what philosophy is can easily be multiplied. And these examples, i.e. the quotations show how the uncertainty of transcendence or immanence affects the comments on the role, limits and meaning of philosophy. And again it shows how right Deleuze was in asking what philosophy is and the question is always to welcome new perspectives.

2-The demarcation problem (between transcendence and immanence) secondly brings forth a pluralism of methods and means in philosophy. Sometimes different philosophers approach the same methods or means with different perspectives. Kant’s offering practical reason, not the pure reason, for judging the concepts like God is an example for the arousal of distinct ways in philosophy. Or Deleuze’s suggestion that it is better to judge concepts like God not regarding their ontological aspects but considering the strategies they make is perhaps the same thing. Another example; “The dialectic method-or, more generally, the habit of unfettered discussion-tends to promote logical consistency, and is in this way useful. But it is quite unavailing when the object is to discover new facts.” (44) Sorensen exposes the method of disputation in another way: “A few philosophers (Friedrich Nietzsche, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey) view disputation as natural, life-affirming, even inevitable. They may concede the need to control and formalize conflict but they view it as basically healthy. For them, the mystery may be the extent of human agreement. However, most philosophers (Descartes,

Leibniz, Spinoza) regard disagreements as abnormal, as deviations from the proper course of harmony, coordination, unity. Thus disagreement becomes an embarrassment to reason- a disorder calling for explanation and remedy. Belief in the intrinsic evil of dispute is compatible with disputation. Descartes viewed dispute as a regrettable but necessary means to end dispute. Interestingly, the philosopher who most influenced Wittgenstein, Arthur Schopenhauer, viewed dispute as bad and inevitable. Wittgenstein finessed this deep pessimism by conditionalizing it: if one persists in philosophy, then one faces interminable disagreement and fruitless research. (45) Again to illustrate, another discussion on another means, that is, theories and about discussions on concerns of philosophy; "Content changes are sometimes recommended as a matter of policy. Instrumentalists advise as to routinely ask whether a theory is useful rather than whether it is true. Indeed, revolutionary changes in a field often amount to the widespread adoption of policies of erotetic metamorphosis. For example philosophy took a mentalistic turn when disputes about F-ness were transformed into disputes about our ideas of F. The mood turned grammatical in the twentieth century. The key policy change was semantic ascent: philosophical disputes should be changed from disputes about things to disputes about talk of those things.." (46) As the uncertainty about immanence was there; beside disputation, dialectics, theory-making, etc., philosophers kept offering new ways for philosophy. Nietzsche used "story" way to enhance immanence and liberation. His story "The Great Getting-Loose" is emancipatory because disjointed and imaginative rather than true. Its imaginative dimension is due that the protagonist, the free spirit, is not identified or defined except as someone who goes through the process narrated in the story. (47) Nietzsche suggests this story way and the plot in this story as a new method or route for philosophy: "The Great Getting-Loose" process is getting-loose of the house, escape from domesticity. The escape progresses through four stages; 1-rejecting everything that once was loved, 2-wandering in radical solitude, 3-viewing from distant heights, 4-returning to a renewed world. (48) The examples

of disputes on philosophical methods can be many more. However, this much is enough for our concern.

3-The transcendence-immanence confusion is also one of the causes of oppositions in history of philosophy. These oppositions are mainly; natural laws-moral laws, necessity-contingency, needs-desires, need for social cohesion-individual liberty, ought-is, virtue-pleasure, soul-matter, thing-in-itself—thing-as-we-know, theory-practice, reason-emotions, prescriptive-descriptive, rationalism-mysticism, science-religion, perpetual flux-perpetual duration/steadiness, monism-pluralism, monism-dualism…(49)

4-The conflict between transcendence and immanence leads to discussions about criteria to decide on theories, ideas, debates, etc. in philosophy. For example, Nietzsche cared much about "gaiety" to decide on ideas, he did not care truth. He was questioning whether an idea led to pessimism or not. Deleuze's idea of "vital anecdotes" is another criterion. He offered to see if a belief was able to maintain vital anecdotes for life. He, like Nietzsche, did not give importance to rationality of beliefs. About theories and systems, many criteria have been offered. To explain, Sim says ,"to speak of the legitimation of a theory or political system is to speak of what gives it authority" (50) "Occam's razor" is another famous criterion in philosophy; the principle of parsimony which is derived from Occam's famous maxims, "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity" and "It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer."(51) This principle of parsimony refers that theories must be as simple and clear as possible. Sorensen gives an interesting list of criteria to decide whether a philosophical debate is defective or not:

1-Meaninglessness: no question has been expressed.

2-Equivocality: different questions are being unwittingly addressed.

3-Presupposition failure: none of the question's direct answers is true.

4-Compatibility: too many of the direct answers are true.

5-Insincerity: one side is being deceptive about his true position.

6-Inaccessibility: the answer is out of reach.

7-Powerlessness: debate cannot force both to the same answer.

8-Unworthiness: the question does not deserve discussion.

9-Inefficiency: the dispute should be modified to eliminate waste. (52)

Michael Williams claims the necessity of immediacy as a criterion of knowledge in epistemology; "The reason for insisting on such absolute immediacy is that representation seems always to involve the possibility of misinterpretation." (53) Because representation and repression are disapproved about human behaviors, the same principle of immediacy is something demanded in ethics, as well.

I am sure there are many more criteria offered in history of philosophy for the evaluation of theories.

5-The problem that there must be a demarcation maintained between transcendence and immanence but that it cannot be maintained is also related with the illusions in philosophy. Many philosophers have tried to detect what the illusions in philosophy are and how they emerge. Deleuze himself mentioned four illusions; the illusion of transcendence, the illusion of universals, the illusion of the eternal and the illusion of discursiveness. (54) And he thought these illusions were born since people and especially philosophers could not form an exact plane of immanence, since their brains were sluggish and since there were some ready-made facilitating paths of dominant opinions. (55) But Deleuze did not deal with what that sluggishness of our brain meant and how those dominant opinions had become dominant, which is a fault or lack of perspective to me and which does not coincide with naturalism at all. Nietzsche spoke of three illusions in philosophy which had determined all the old image of thought of philosophy. First illusion was truth; we were told that thought as thought possessed or formally contained truth (innateness of ideas, a priori nature of concepts); that thinking was the natural exercise of a faculty, that it was therefore sufficient to think "truly" or "really" in order to think with truth (sincere nature of the truth, universally shared good sense.) (56) Nietzsche was offering sense and value, instead of truth, as the aim of philosophy. The second illusion was the idea that we are "diverted" from the truth by forces which were foreign to it; body, passions, sensuous interests. This idea was an illusion of philosophy taken from Christian ascetism. (57) The third illusion was

that all we needed to think well and truthfully was a *method*; through method, we warded off the effects of the foreign/alien forces which altered the truth or distracted us from it. And time and place would not matter if we had a method and through method we would ward off error. Nietzsche rejected this opinion and offered to have no method; to do philosophy by hammer. (58) Francis Bacon, too, described three falsities in philosophy and named them as the idols of the mind. These were four; idols of the tribe, idols of the cave, idols of the theatre, and idols of the fair. He thought these idols, that is, some prejudices or false ideas about being, prevented us from sensing and experiencing the nature in immanence, in its own reality. (59) The transcendence-immanence problem and the illusions mentioned above are also related with the emergence of problems and pseudo problems in philosophy. "Pseudo problems drums out three myths about dissolution: a-the myth of neutrality, the belief that the dissolver is an impartial referee who calls off a dispute on independent, theory-neutral grounds (Wittgenstein relished this role saying 'don't think: look and see'); b-the myth of uniqueness, the belief that pseudo-problems are peculiar to philosophy; c-the myth of absoluteness, the thought that pseudo problems are static, stable entities." (60) It is thought, at least Deleuze thought so, that philosophy was full of problems which were not problems in fact. And if the transcendence problem was removed, those pseudo problems would vanish themselves.

6-The demarcation problem is connected with the fundamental problems in philosophy. I do not know exactly whether they would still arise if there were a demarcation of transcendence and immanence managed, but these problems are mainly: a-is being one or many?, b-is reality objective?, c-is reality static?, d-is reality physical or spiritual?, e-what is the source of knowledge?, f-can man attain knowledge?, g-what are objective reality of concepts and thoughts?, h-is human's will free?, i-what does the morality of human acts depend on? (61) Are these merely pseudo problems? Would they emerge any how-regardless of a problem of immanence? Should they be studied in relation with the anxiety of immanence or

independently of it? I think these are equally important questions as drawing a line between what is immanent and what is not?

7-The ability and sometimes the inability to distinguish immanence and transcendence bring forth endless possibilities of reading; reading the philosophical texts differently. Or, we can say, this demarcation bears the probability that philosophical concepts and problems are approached with quite various perspectives and ends, even contradictory among themselves sometimes. To exemplify, whereas Descartes's "I" was, once, the key to get rid of the representations by the Church, it (the subject) later became another source of representation itself and it happened to be a part of some binary oppositions (like the state-the individual) according to some philosophers such as Deleuze. Another example is that Hobbes was recognized as a materialist philosopher rejecting anything transcendent and anything repressing men but, interestingly, he ended up with writing "the Leviathan". A cliché example, although Kant had aimed to organize a purely immanent philosophy, cleared off metaphysics, he could not help bearing another source of transcendence; the "transcendental I." Concerning this turn and similar turns, Alain Renaut says:

> Contemporary philosophy is full of attempts to overcome its past: one consequence of the dominant interpretation of this past has been that "overcoming metaphysics"-a move that for the great post-Hegelian philosophies has been almost obligatory- often gave the impression, first in Nietzsche and Heidegger, of radically calling into question the idea of the subject. If, however, it is agreed that since the Leibnizian turn, philosophical modernity has consisted more in the forgetting of subjectivity than its triumph, overcoming the past now means something different: hence forth it must consist in the recomposition of the subject in reaction against the individualistic drift of humanism, even though this recomposition is not to be thought of as a return to the metaphysics of subjectivity as it appeared at the time that the Cartesian cogito emerged. More precisely, it must consist in making the vanished dimension of the subject, which fell into obscurity during the era of monadologies, reappear. Thus the "overcoming of metaphysics" is to be understood as an attempt to overthrow the monadological

> perspective, which since Leibniz has in various ways dominated the history of subjectivity. The monadological conception of the subject makes it a totality defined by immanence to itself. To deconstruct the monadological idea requires investigating that rupture of immanence which makes it appear that subjectivity, unlike monadic individuality, can take cognizance of itself only on the basis of an opening to exteriority or otherness. In this case we encounter the problem of transcendence in immanence. (62)

As we see, it is really mysterious when something immanent or something aimed to be immanent becomes transcendent; or when something transcendent happens to catch some connection with immanence. The history of philosophy is full of turns from transcendence to immanence, from immanence to transcendence; full of different definitions of these terms and different understandings of moves between. Perhaps the saying is right that "too much treatment kills the patient."

I want to continue clarifying how the moves between transcendence and immanence lead to numerous perspectives which are difficult to handle with at times. For instance, some thinkers almost curse the idea of representation whereas some others see it inevitable and useful. This, too, is due to that they cannot agree on what is transcendent or when something is transcendent. Or, more bluntly, since they cannot determine and agree on when a representation is about to become a means of repression, a gate to transcendence; they cannot decide on whether to tolerate representations or abstain them altogether. And Jean-Yves Lacoste mentions even the difficulty of maintaining the distinction between representation and concepts. (63) The philosophers of the post-structuralist school, with Lyotard and Derrida, for example, point to the impossibility of representing reality (64), therefore representations are just misinterpretations or reductions or prescriptions or source of transcendent rulings over men. However, there are other views that representations, on the contrary, enables immanence and experience because they are the necessary "organizing frames" that integrate our minds, our beings to the world. …(65) Another comment for the favor of representations is "philosophy, in search of the transcendental operations of the apperception of the 'I think', is not some unhealthy and accidental curiosity, it is representation, the reactualization of

representation, that is, the emphasis of presence, being's remaining-the-same in the simultaneity of its presence, in its always, in its immanence. Philosophy is not merely the knowledge of immanence, it is immanence itself. Consciousness is the identity of the same, the presence of being, the presence of presence. Presence is only possible as a return of consciousness to itself. Presence is only possible as an incessant taking up of presence again, an incessant representation. The incessance of presence is a repetition, its being taken up again is an apperception of representation. Representation is not to be described as a taking up again. Representation is the very possibility of a return, the possibility of the 'always', or of the presence of the present." (66) Again two different attitudes towards another event in philosophy; the binary oppositions. Deleuze saw them as restrictions on human mind and ethics; they were just false dilemmas. But some other thinkers, for example Roy A. Sorensen, think that binary oppositions or the pseudo-problems they make are the way how philosophy, especially analytic philosophy, gets done. (67) They are again our inevitable means to understand the reality and integrate to it. Even if they cannot give the exact or complete reality, they are still necessary for us to contact and experience the world in one way. And no matter we like them or not, this is the way how our minds work. We always do it; we create and use oppositions.

To do with the difficulty of differentiating between transcendence and immanence, I cannot help thinking sometimes that perhaps this is a vain attempt. Instead of maintaining this demarcation, perhaps we could think on why we cannot maintain it and if we really should do it. Russell says "when an intelligent man expresses a view which seems to us obviously absurd, we should not attempt to prove that it is somehow true, but we should try to understand how it ever came to *seem* true." (68) Similarly, I think, regardless of the decision on whether a thought is transcendent or immanent, we had better also think if it were possible not to think that way, and why that thought was thought. And this attitude would be a more naturalist one. In my opinion, real naturalism should not prescribe what is natural, that is, what is immanent. It must take man and his tendencies as they are,

without judging or despising. Otherwise, it would be another idealization, not liberation.

8-The demarcation problem has also been an important reason for the formation of philosophical schools; opposite ones, mid-ones, neo-ones…Since the reality itself was so silent, so open to be commented or represented, men had to do much by reason rather than experience. With so much contemplation, schools emerged. They were emerging through simple beliefs or principles but later they were woven so that they would cover all the scenes of life. Yet they were missing, too much insistent and strict on certain principles, therefore, some mid-schools were emerging to relent them or to make them negotiate a little more with the reality, as in the case for interactionism, parallelism and occasionalism. Due to the gaps that a clear demarcation could not fill, philosophical estimations or simple thoughts were turning into schools, traditions and philosophical politics.

9-The insistence on the demarcation between transcendence and immanence, perhaps most important of all, has caused philosophy's rupture from life. In his introduction to *The Wild Mind,* Claude Levi-Strauss says that philosophy has nothing to do with life and reality, it just helps to present an elephant as a bus or a bus as an elephant. Today philosophy itself is aware of its long-time isolation from life. To express this realization and regret, Philip Pettit says, "Philosophy has meditative, methodological, and moral lessons to teach and these impact, by any criterion, on ordinary practice. They reshape the perceptions and dispositions that pre-exist the philosophical enterprise and, without amounting to the sort of thinking envisaged in existentialism, they certainly give the lie to the quietist picture that seemed to loom as the only alternative. Philosophy is not something, then, for the armchair alone. It teaches lessons that philosophers ought to be able to bring home from the office and take out of the study." (69) Philosophy has been so busy with meta-philosophy, with organizing and idealizing itself with the worries like being purely immanent, it ended up with the opposite; it has become something isolated from life and practice. To explain such vain or too-obsessive discussions in philosophy, Wittgenstein says, "If someone says: 'There is not a difference', and I

say: 'There is difference', I am persuading, I am saying, 'I don't want you to look at it like that.'… I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another. I am honestly disgusted with the other. Also I am trying to state what I think. Nevertheless, I am saying: For God's sake don't do this." (70) To sum up, while investigating what is immanent and what is not, philosophy also should always be aware of "what the *lived* world is like." (71)Perhaps, this investigation is occasionally turning into an obsession due to which philosophy idealizes itself and, indirectly, the life as opposed to its will to save men from over-idealizations and representations.

10-This demarcation problem is, finally, connected with ethics and the changes in its history. According to Brian Massumi, the absence of a clear line between the physical, the vital, the human, and the superhuman; the undecidability of immanence and transcendence has implications for ethical thought. (72) To express in a superficial way, this lack of demarcation has brought about the following dilemma or confusion: Do moral concepts, by their nature, presuppose some extraordinary metaphysical domain of moral truth, or should they? Or can those moral issues be discussed in non-metaphysical terms? (73) More bluntly, the lack of demarcation has born a second uncertainty: Is a non-religious ethics possible both in theory and practice and can it be equally efficient? To present this uncertainty or the tides in between historically, Ian Adams says;

> First and most important, is the relationship between political and moral philosophy. There is a great tradition, going back at least to Socrates, of substantive ethics, of seeking to determine the fundamental principles by which men ought to live. Indeed it is widely believed that this is philosophy's central concern, an assumption summed up in the common phrase "philosophy of life." But there is a gulf between the popular conception of philosophy and its systematic pursuit as an academic discipline. This has arisen because the traditional pursuit of ethical certainty through philosophy has, in the twentieth century, faltered and almost come to a stop. Although the logic goes back to David Hume, modern philosophers have increasingly doubted that any moral system can be given a foundation in objective reality; and if this is taken away it is difficult to see

> upon what secure theoretical foundation of whatever sort morality can be based. And if there is no such basis, then it is questionable whether it is possible to have an objective decision-procedure of any kind that could determine whether one set of moral beliefs is better than any other. Certainly none had been found that enjoys any degree of consensus among philosophers. This implies that it is not the business of philosophy to determine by which moral principles men ought to live, and that philosophers have nothing that qualifies them better than anyone else to pronounce upon substantive ethical questions. This point is elegantly made by Peter Winch: 'Philosophy can no more show a man what he should attach importance to that geometry can show him where he should stand.' But if this is correct then much that passes for philosophy, and much that has long been accepted as philosophy, is not strictly philosophy at all and must be something else.(74)

Here we understand clearly that the inability to decide what is transcendent in ethics has gone as far as to question if ethics is a part of philosophy; and to question what philosophy is. What lies beneath these crackles can also be expressed through the following question: Should ethics be tightly tied with ontology or, should it be completely strategic; open to creation or imagination or wills? Levinas presented this tide originally and briefly: " 'I think' comes down to 'I can'-to an appropriation of what is, to an exploitation of reality" (75) According to Robert Eaglestone, what Levinas was doing was analyzing the "omnivorous philosophy" to show how the ethical response to the events of the past and present underlies postmodernism. (75) With regard to Deleuze's position in these questions, he was a participant in "what might be described as the advent of a 'postmodern ethics' posed in the light of the dissolution of both the rational, judging subject and the contract-based liberal accounts of the individual's allegiance in the social community" (76) and posed in the rupture from ontology for the sake of naturalism and immanence.

However, this post-modern ethics or any alternative non-religious ethics, within itself bears many new questions, perhaps problems. Peter Railton presents the case as:

> These days, moral philosophers often speak as though we face a similar choice. Ethics should either give up the outdated, quasi-intiutionistic pretense of being a special non-natural domain, and become more integrated into the nomothetic sciences -"naturalized" in terms of a scientific psychology, evolutionary history, etc.-or it should turn away from such inappropriate "science-aping" ambitions, and try to work with-rather than reduce or replace-our moral concepts and the lived character of lived moral experience. Defenders of the first approach tend to reject the idea of the autonomy of moral philosophy, while defenders of the second approach tend to be skeptical of the idea of moral theory. It sometimes looks as if contemporary moral philosophy is shaping up for a fight along just this line. Theory or anti-theory? Reductionist scientism or autonomist intuitionism? Naturalism or non-naturalism? Causes or reasons? Functions or meanings? (77)

Railton, finally, ends his remarks with a wish that can be a good aim: "The philosophical 'critique of theory' at the turn of the twentieth century has been a salutary counter-weight to the impractically-abstract and psychologically-and-historically-underinformed trends in ethical theory that went before. Let us hope that it helps create the climate for a sober, sophisticated, and realistic flourishing of ethical theory-ethical theories that better inhabit the world, so that we ourselves might better inhabit that world." (78)

Here, seeing the intentions at beginnings and the points arrived, one may not help asking; is it not a dilemma that those naturalist philosophers had wanted to rid people of all those systematic, and therefore burdensome, principles of religious ethics but they had to realize that ethics, perhaps by its nature or due to the functions it was supposed to fulfill, was requiring itself to be systematic, extensive, neat, well-organized so that it could be welcomed efficiently by masses. Is human nature peaceful in itself? Is human nature easygoing with human wills or are all human wills at peace with each other? And finally, how natural is naturalism?

To sum up this section, Deleuze was seriously concerned with this demarcation problem in philosophy owing to its effects mentioned above and perhaps owing to the ones I have missed. And he thought that all the fate of philosophy was

depending on dealing with this problem, which could no more be postponed. The effects listed above support Deleuze's rightful obsession with clarifying the limits of transcendence and immanence in philosophy. This demarcation problem is the cause of why philosophy is what it is now. And again this demarcation is the key to what the new routes are for philosophy.

C. The Idea of "The Death of Philosophy"

The death or "end"(79) of philosophy is one of the most serious concerns of philosophy today. The word "end" can be taken in the sense of "a purpose, a destination, etc." or in the sense of "death." In both senses, the question is "Is there still a purpose, a way for philosophy or has philosophy lost all its ends and come to an end?" The discussion concerning the end of philosophy is to do with philosophical concerns, philosophical form of writing, philosophical purpose and form of thinking, philosophical state of affairs…(80) Brian Leiter presents the situation with the end of philosophy in a usefully-detailed way:

> Philosophy today-especially, though not only, in the English-speaking countries-is not a monolith, but a pluralism of methods and topics. Analytic philosophy, for example, the target of many polemics by those with little knowledge of the discipline is defunct. As Philip Kitcher has written elsewhere, there was "a period"-roughly, the 1940s to the 1970s in the Anglophone world-when analytic philosophers could be confident of their professional standing, priding themselves on the presence of a method-the method of conceptual analysis-which they, and they alone, were trained to use. Under the pressure of many different arguments deriving from Ludwig Wittgenstein and W.V.Quine, in particular, philosophers began to doubt that the analysis of concepts was informative and worthwhile. The Wittgensteinian response to this loss of professional confidence was quietism. Philosophy, the quietists concluded, has no distinctive methods and philosophy can solve no problems; philosophy becomes a kind of therapy, dissolving philosophical problems, rather than solving them. One way it dissolves them is through the history of philosophy, which shows us how we came to think there were such things as philosophical problems and philosophical methods in the first plate…The naturalists (largely) agree with the Wittgensteinians that the philosophers have no distinctive methods that suffice for solving problems but, unlike the Wittgensteinians, the naturalists

> believe that the problems that have worried philosophers (about the nature of mind, knowledge, action, reality, morality, and so on) are indeed real. For the naturalists, the key is for philosophers either to adopt and emulate the methods of successful sciences, or for philosophers to operate in tandem with the sciences, as their abstract and reflective branch. In the latter role, philosophy analyzes only those concepts that figure in successful empirical theories and try to develop philosophical answers that win support from, or are entailed by scientific evidence…(For example, psychologists and biologists teach us about motivation and its sources, and philosophers try to discern how these discoveries fit with our understanding of morality and the demands it makes on us.) (81)

As we see, the base for the questions about what philosophy is, what it can be, what it should be, whether it can perform what it is supposed to do or not was formed long ago. Again according to Leiter, the net result is that the educated reader these days is likely to have been exposed to all the following (not even consistent!) myths about philosophy:

> 1) Postmodernism- that is, far-reaching skepticism about the objectivity of morality, truth, knowledge, and science-is now triumphant in philosophy.
> 2) We have reached the "end of philosophy"-the consequence of quietism- thanks to the pervasive influence of figures like Wittgenstein and Heidegger, and their contemporary interpreters like Rorty.
> 3) Those remaining benighted "professors" of philosophy-the remaining few who have evaded postmodernism and Wittgenstein-are now so hopelessly "technical" and "professionalized" that their work is inaccessible and irrelevant to ordinary people; they thus betray the philosophical tradition which spoke to the immediate concerns of all reflective, educated people.(82)

To sum up the question how philosophy has come to this point, Leiter says that no one made the point more trenchantly than Nietzsche: "Kant wrote against the scholars in favor of popular prejudice, but for scholars and not for the people."(83)

I am not sure if the reason for philosophy's being stuck was only being too professional and writing only for scholars but I want to come to what Deleuze's

stand was in relation to the death of philosophy. He and Felix Guattari declared, “the overcoming of philosophy has never been a problem for us: it is just tiresome, idle chatter.” (84) Deleuze thought “if you play and philosophize just for taste, you never find time for the end of philosophy and metaphysics can never overcome.”(85) Deleuze was so relaxed in this sense because “he had an interest in new conceptions of events, bodies, and images; a new thinking beyond the existing logics of sense and representation” (86)

When we think of Deleuze’s approach to the problem or his attitude to the pessimistic comments, we may be hopeful and conclude that it is, perhaps, an “end of philosophy” in one sense but a new beginning in another one. For a man who was feeling that he was about to live whole new creativities, it was quiet normal not even to think of death.

Chapter 1:
Deleuze's Dualist Approach To Concepts

Recognizing the clogs in philosophy listed above, Deleuze must have followed an advice or an instinct like "find out what cage you are in and climb out if it." (87) And the way he found to climb out of those cages must have been something similar to Nietzsche's way; Nietzsche said he approached deep problems like cold baths: quickly into them and quickly out again.(88) But what was the way to simplify those deep problems as cold baths and to jump out of them easily? Concepts in philosophy, obscure most of the time and always deprived of consensus, were really deep problems and Deleuze was trying to make them problem no-more. He, too, knew that "the abstract does not explain, but must itself be explained." (89) But he did not approve of the "philosophy of representation which had dominated European thought since Plato(89)" and which used to approach concepts as though they were objects that could be deciphered easily by asking questions like "what is happiness?" Deleuze thought this sort of questions and their possible answers were devoid of perspective, which was a cause of poverty and hardships for philosophy. Deleuze was after "replacing representation by expression or actualization of ideas, where this was understood in terms of the complex notion of different/ciation."(90) For Deleuze, concepts had to be described not ontologically but in relation to their results, the feelings they led to or they turned into. This was because if you took concepts ontologically, you would end up with a position where man was always to be passive since he could not interfere in things' ontologies. But if you took concepts as practical names, with their strategical realities, you could raise man to an active position where he could be able to intervene on events. To clarify Deleuze's approach, we can liken it to "Spinoza's dualist approach to the concepts of 'power' and 'Power' in metaphysics

and in politics; he rejects plurality and divisibility of power in metaphysics but he recognizes it in politics."(91) Spinoza's rejecting divisibility of power in metaphysics was perhaps strategic; like ridding men of the idea of a transcendent God who would always be revealed along with some sort of repression. However, his recognizing the divisibility of power in politics was certainly strategic; no matter if power is divisible ontologically or not, it has to be regarded so for practical purposes like determining a government which is to gather all the authority and force needed to meet some needs that each person feels but cannot meet on his own. Here, it may be useful to make a definition of the term "strategy" in order to understand what "strategic" means. "The word strategy is currently employed in three ways. First, to designate the means employed to attain a certain end; it is a question of rationality functioning to arrive at an objective. Second, to designate the manner in which a partner in a certain game acts with regard to what he thinks should be the action of the others and what he considers the others think to be his own; it is the way in which one seeks to have the advantage over others. Third, to designate the procedures used in a situation of confrontation to deprive the opponent of his means of combat and to reduce him to giving up the struggle; it is a question therefore of the means destined to obtain victory. These three meanings come together in situations of confrontation-war or games-where the objective is to act upon an adversary in such a manner as to render the struggle impossible for him. So strategy is defined by the choice of winning solutions." (92) This means, Deleuze offered that we should not deal with the ontology of concepts; "what they are" should not be our concern but we should study what strategies they become (especially if they make transcendent strategies) or what strategies they serve in life. To clarify Deleuze's suggestion, Philip Goodchild makes the following explanation;

> Deleuze criticizes all transcendent presuppositions but this critique is strategic: he did not aim to show the error of presuppositions, but opposed to the strategy by which these are elevated to an unquestionable and unaffectable status. Objective

> presuppositions might include unique, totalizing and unchanging concepts, such as 'God', the 'world', and the 'subject' or the 'one', the 'whole', 'objectivity', 'identity' and 'opposition', or the 'State', 'labour', 'communication' and 'exchange'. Deleuze and Guattari had no interest in questions of the existence of God or the subject, but only in criticizing the strategies by which such questions are raised. Subjective or inter-subjective presuppositions might include totalizing conditioning factors that govern the way we think , such as concepts of 'being', 'history', 'language', 'society', 'culture', 'economic production', 'discourse', 'power', 'desire', 'death instinct', or 'gender difference'. Here again, Deleuze and Guattari questioned the strategy by which such empirical concepts are raised to the status of transcendentals. Moreover, one should be sensitive to the degree to which such factors, whether or not they are mentioned by philosophers or theorists, do indeed govern thought in practice. For Deleuze and Guattari, as we saw earlier, there exists differences that cannot be contained by such encompassing concepts; there are desires and becomings which may even affect God. Deleuze and Guattari's critique is nomadic in style: it does not aim at simple destruction, but aims to bring all fixed identities and elevated transcendentals back down to earth; forcing them to flee across the desert. All terms will appear upon a single plain of thought where there are no longer any ultimate and unchanging distinctions, and any term can be affected by any other.(93)

Then, we understand that for Deleuze, expression and content are entirely relative.(94) Georges Braque expresses this quite simply; "I do not believe in things, I believe only in their relations" (95) Deleuze's approach, which can be regarded as a sort of irrationalism, may lead us to infer that most concepts, or "all belief is motivated, interested, an instrument for the exercise of power." (96) The situations where people sense the differences between the definitions of concepts (or contents of beliefs) and the strategies they refer to in practical life and thus feel confused are exemplified nicely by Hume in the *Dialogues*: "Don't you remember, said Philo, the excellent saying of Lord Bacon on this head? That a little philosophy, replied Cleanthes, makes a man an atheist; a great deal converts him to religion."(97)

Intentionally ignoring the ontologies of concepts, Deleuze wanted to draw attention to that "every concept shapes and reshapes the events in its own way"(98), that is, concepts should be discovered as practical, immanent beings. With this understanding of concept, Deleuze wanted to "introduce empiricism into his very image of thought, and saw the philosopher as an experimentalist and diagnostician, not as a judge, even of a mystical law."(99) Deleuze found first in Hume the principle: "Think with AND instead of thinking for IS; empiricism has never had another secret" (100) and then he applied this principle to concepts; thinking not what a concept IS but thinking a concept AND its relations. For example when he applied this principle to the concept of theory, he got that "theory becomes an attempt to think 'otherwise', to explore new kinds of thoughts and relations, new kinds of subjectivity and society."(101) And when he applied this principle to the concepts of knowledge and power he produced the following ideas: "Knowledge is concerned with kinds of multiplicities and relations that exist in society; power is concerned with strategies for production and transformation of relations; desire is concerned with the driving force behind creation and relation."(102) As we see, this principle replaces definitions with concerns and perspectives. The sort of philosophy that such a principle enables "gives permission to throw out all the old models, structures, traditions, values, and practices that human thought had struggled for so long to acquire; it gives freedom to play and experiment with thought as far as one's fancy and imagination was able to lead one…"(103) and "there are no longer any true or false ideas, there are just ideas. There is no longer any ultimate goal or direction, but merely a wandering along a multiplicity of lines of flight that lead away from centers of power. Aborescent models of structured thought and activity are replaced by an exploratory rhizome. Any move of thought on social relation is desirable, so long as it does not lead back into an old or new convention, obligation, or institution."(104) And, in the end, when we ask what the situation is going to be exactly with concepts, we get the answer that the concepts such as force, difference, becoming, etc. only take on their own consistency and force, nevertheless, when they are no longer represented in dialectical contrast with

their polar opposites, which means, concepts must begin to post and think themselves. (105)

I want to explain Deleuze's understanding of concept in detail, which, I believe, will help understand the claim above that concepts begin to post and think themselves. Deleuze said that there was no heaven for concepts(106), which means they needed to be created. To create a concept, he said, we must know;

1) There are no simple concepts. Every concept has components and is defined by them. (107) Every concept relates back to other concepts, not only in its history but also in its becoming or its present connections. Every concept has components that may, in turn, be grasped as concepts.(108) Concepts render their components inseparable within themselves. Components define the consistency of the concept. The components are distinct, heterogeneous, yet inseparable.(109) For example, Descartes's concept of "I" has three components; doubting, thinking and being.(110)

2) All concepts are connected to some problems without which they would have no meaning.(111)

3) Each concept has a history of its own. For example, the concept of "other person" goes back to Leibniz, his possible worlds and his "monads" as expression of the world.(112)

4) A concept has a becoming which refers to its relations with other concepts situated on the same plane (it must be plane of immanence).(113)

5) Creation of concepts presupposes a plane immanence that refers to "the image of thought", that is, what it means to think. (114) One must also know that before creating his concepts, he has to lay a plane of his own which means "turning toward somewhere" on the infinite plane of immanence.(115)

Now I want to move on to how concepts-as-being-created and concepts-as-strategies are possible. Thanks to what do they become strategies, or what enables that we differentiate and choose between their ontologies and their strategic aspects? According to Hume, man is by nature partial rather than egotistical as a simple

nuance. (116) This nature of us leads us to focus on the ontological aspects of concepts sometimes and sometimes to deal only with their strategic properties. To prove or exemplify this partiality of our nature, we can give some examples. I want to remind Hume's example in the *Dialogues* again, "Don't you remember, said Philo, the excellent saying of Lord Bacon on this head? That a little philosophy, replied Cleanthes, makes a man an atheist; a great deal converts him to religion."(117) A second example is, although Deleuze hated all sorts of transcendence, he said that there could still be vital anecdotes produced out of transcendent concepts. For example, one of Kierkegaard's conceptual personae called "the knight of faith" is a good life strategy, in spite of its being born out of Christian pessimism. (118) (Although we may not believe in Christianity or the truth of Christian God, we may find the concept of "the knight of faith" a useful life strategy.) Thirdly, it must be our partial nature that made will-to-power the cause of pessimism for Schopenhauer, whereas, it was the key to gaiety for Nietzsche.(119) As a fourth example, we may think of how Kant approached to "transcendence and freedom" in his first *Critique* and in the second one, or we may remember his saying that it was necessary to believe in a god no matter he did not. Let us remember, being the fifth example, Spinoza's presenting power and its divisibility differently in metaphysics and in politics. Also the speculations like "Darwin, in the last chapter of 'Origin of Species', wrote that God may have created the first simple forms because his beloved wife was a religious woman and Darwin did not want to sadden her and his theory was not yet able to answer the criticisms about the conflict between the time required by natural selection and the predicted geological age of the earth." illustrate well our partiality and inclination (perhaps ability) to take ontology and strategy independently at times. Or perhaps this is a drawback that we always stay between, at hesitation, being unable to belong to somewhere completely and in satisfaction. Literature is full of expressions of the various discoveries of this partiality;

To be wroth with one we love

Doth work like madness in brain. (a famous verse by Samuel Taylor Coleridge)

In relation to this, agreeing with Hume, Deleuze himself said; "The passions have the effect of restricting the range of the mind, fixating it on priviledged ideas and objects, for the basis of passion is not egotism but partiality, which is much worse. We are passionate in the first place about our parents, about those who are close to us and one like us (restricted causality, contiguity, resemblance) This is worse than being governed by egotism, for our egotisms would only have to be curtailed for society to become possible."(120) And perhaps this partiality is responsible for the conditions preparing schizophrenia, to which Deleuze especially drew attention and which he saw as an aspect of history of philosophy and the history of subject.

The idea that human nature is partial and, consequently, the preference of strategy over ontology also lay under Hume's views of political legitimacy. Concerning this, Hume rejects the idea of social contract and he shows how experience of the benefits of political rule could have grown up without our having to invent political authority from nothing, as in the societies without government such as American Indians, who acknowledged a chief in time of war, and this could have enabled men to experience briefly the benefits of government, gradually extending it to a more regular operation. (121) For Hume, the idea of government as a social contract is fiction and obedience lasts only if government provides protection and security; that is, obedience does not depend on whether government was established legally, based on a contract or not. In other words, obedience depends just on our interests and "the only rule of government is long use and practice."(122) We see that the preference of strategies, for Hume, was the basic principle of relating everything to experience and staying within immanence. This can be primarily due to his skepticism about all the content of ontology; for Hume and perhaps for Deleuze, history, subjectivity and the meaning of Being are products in consciousness; to take any particular form of these as the starting point for interpretation and understanding cannot reach the underlying level of the processes by which forms of consciousness are produced. Therefore, Deleuze and Hume wished to understand processes of life that are prior to consciousness and upon which meanings are formed. (123) And since "the unconscious is a place of

production, not expression and, therefore, meaning is a surface effect"(124), strategies are better to deal with than the ontological aspects.

Now I want to go on with the question why concepts taken as strategies are useful and necessary or what they are solution to. Deleuze claimed that the mistake by which concepts were regarded "discursive" and used as if they were propositions would cause repressive strategies of concepts" (125).Then that Deleuze offered not to regard concepts ontologically was to prevent them from becoming source of repression. He thought that assessing concepts and images of thought not by their content but according to their mode of expression or the way in which they were thought could help to undermine all pretensions to transcendence.(126) "For although there exist certain self-positing absolutes in philosophy, such as the Idea, Being, the One, the whole, or the Subject, Deleuze and Guattari were concerned with the mode of expression of such absolutes, rather than viewing all of life from the perspective of their content. Whose interests do they serve? What power relations do they express? Are they affirmative of desire? This strategy is able to distinguish philosophy from its precursors in religious or wisdom traditions."(127) Then we can infer that in addition to preventing repressions, Deleuze also wanted to prevent transcendence and clarify the domain of philosophy. The reason why Deleuze abstained from transcendence so was that he thought "whenever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial state in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is philosophy, whenever there is immanence, even if it functions as arena for agon and rivalry."(128) Thirdly, we must remember that Deleuze's philosophy is often associated with a spirit of irreverence, indulgence, gaiety, transgression, liberation and destruction of the past (129) and he may have thought that the principle of regarding concepts strategically helps to attain that liberation and gaiety. His this perspective reminds that of Nietzsche's; "while talking on the misunderstandings about the concept 'will-to-power', Nietzsche said that those misunderstandings would not have been important if they had not introduced an extremely unfortunate tone (pessimism) into the philosophy of the will."(130) In relation to this, we must remember that

one of Deleuze's aims was to maintain the aliveness of philosophy, to prove that philosophy was not dead and the strategy of taking concepts as strategies could enable philosophy to find new paths and new forms to stay alive. And one of these new paths for philosophy, as Deleuze put forward, could be a manifestation of the will-to-ecstasy. "The will to joy, the transformation of being through consciousness was, for Deleuze, the telos of metaphysics,"(131) And a final reason for his insistence on this principle can be to bring a solution or an alternative way to the confusions in ethics. Deleuze was aware that "the region of the ethical embraces a wide variety of phenomena: ideologies, religions, myths, visions and images of all kinds. Many of these may capture the same ethical imagination at different times, yet they cannot be simply all put together to form a composite whole, and this may be expressed by saying that the region of the ethical is the region where there are truths but no truth."(132) The problems with ethics is so old; Kant had said "we need only to look at the attempts of moralists in this style, and we shall find appeals to human nature…perfection…happiness, here moral sense, there fear of God, a bit of this, a bit of that, an amazing mishmash."(133) And Deleuze must have thought that the principle of concepts-as-strategies might make a good way-out. And in relation to this principle or strategy, his politics of desire was aiming "to break down the dichotomy between desire and interest, so that people could begin to desire, think, and act in their own interests, and become interested in their own desires."(134) As Kant, too, had pointed the ethics is still full of dichotomies, hesitations and dilemmas. People suffer from these uncertainties, of course, because they can decide neither on a better point to start acting nor on a worthier form of living. Deleuze's principle is at least a criterion, a perspective among others.

Chapter 2:
Hume's Effect on the Emergence of Deleuze's Dualist Approach to Concepts

I want to start this chapter asking "What did Hume do?". I want to study this question both in terms of history of philosophy in general and in terms of Deleuze's philosophy specifically. Where do critics place Hume in history of philosophy, what is his philosophy regarded to have done? Concerning such questions, Armstrong's following explanation can be a good beginning to get close to the point;

> If a philosopher is concerned primarily with the character of the cause rather than with the idea or nature of the mind, he is ontologically oriented(Hobbes); a philosopher concerned with the nature of ideas and the working of the mind is epistemologically oriented (Locke). Characteristic of the historical development of British empiricism is a gradual shift of philosophical interest from ontology to epistemology. All the philosophers we have studied in the line of development of British empiricism had some concern for the ontological problem of the nature of the cause of our sense ideas. However, in the work of David Hume, strong and persuasive arguments are offered which have the effect of severing the ontological thread.(135)

Agreeing with Armstrong, Harre summarizes that according to Hume, epistemology rules ontology.(136) And this is high likely the cause of many changes in all other fields of philosophy, especially in ethics. Armstrong takes it further and says that Hume is the start of an "epistemology without ontology"(137). In the following, Railton explains this process of shifting from ontology to

epistemology, which was coming along with some shifts within epistemology itself as well:

> Hard-nosed empiricists like Hume felt no embarrassment about giving a large role to the imagination in epistemology, and the skepticism he voiced against Reason as a foundation for morals or science was meant in part to highlight the assistance Reason needed from the imagination, and the feelings and expectations imagination helped to generate. The imagination serves action and deliberation not only by helping us to weigh alternatives and feel their force; it helps us enlarge and elaborate the range itself. Experience, rich as it is, does not typically wear its alternatives on its sleeve. On the contrary it tends to encourage a settling of the mind into a view of what is, and what always will be, the normal course of events-the "natural" yet to be prudent or moral I must do more than project the familiar and actual- I need to represent to myself an appropriate range of the unfamiliar but possible. Inference is essential here, by helping us explore the full content of what we currently suppose or imagine, but successful inference calls for imagination, too, even in the case of mathematical logic. A logician seeking to prove a new theorem cannot content himself with drawing the implications of a fixed set of premises simply by consistently applying a fixed strategy. She must be able to think flexibly and intelligently about appropriate choices and mixtures of premises and proof strategy, keeping alternative courses of action and starting points open even as she works through the path she has chosen. Imagination is thus not opposed to the exercise of series, theoretically-constrained reason-ideally, it is an active part of it. Historically, many of the chief contributions of theoretical morality and moralizing to social and political practice have come at precisely this point-proposing and developing imaginatively alternatives not taken seriously in the range of reasonable possibilities entertained by their more practical and level-headed contemporaries.

> Political democracy, national identity, the rule of law, the existence of a benevolent supreme being or moral order, the abolition of slavery, gender equality, ecological responsibility-these ideas took initial form as imaginative speculations at a time when they must have seemed the farthest thing from political or social reality. But thanks to the work of devoted moralizing and philosophizing speculators, these ideas attained forms sufficiently forceful that sufficiently many people felt a compelling desire to struggle to put them into practice.(138)

Such changes brought into philosophy new tendencies such as irrationalism, which was used about Hume, too.(139) Being classified sometimes as empiricist, sometimes as irrationalist, Hume is in fact specific for setting up the science of human nature as the foundation for all other sciences, replacing metaphysics with anthropology and phenomenological psychology and, thus, his empiricism is defined by the complete reduction of reality to the fact of its presence to the human mind.(140) As to how Hume approaches the human nature, "he constructs quasi-speculative theories of human nature to explain an array of human beliefs-philosophical, common-sensical, moral-precisely because they find that these beliefs do not admit of rational vindication. We must look beyond human reason to explain why humans hold these unjustified beliefs. Thus Hume argues that our belief in causation cannot be rationally justified, that is, justified on the basis of experience."(141)

How, then, is Hume's empiricism and his understanding of human nature related to ethics? In the twentieth century, the main streams of ethics are mainly emotivism, prescriptivism and universalism. Hume's moral account is regarded to be by the emotivist side against the universalist moral account. In somewhere between the emotivist and the universalist account, there is Wittgenstein's approach which argues that moral rules only have meaning within the context of shared moral practices and a shared way of life; an abstract set of rules, divorced from any practice, cannot have sense and constitute morality.(142) To clarify these

main accounts better, we must know that "much of the twentieth-century moral philosophy has centered on the question of the relationships between fact and value."(143) Concerning the nature of morality, Emotivism and Prescriptivism have taken as their starting point Hume's strict separation of fact and value, which denies any possibility of deriving one from the other. Therefore, moral statements are characterized by their prescriptivity, particular judgements being syllogistically derived from these general statements. If an individual decides that certain rules of conduct should apply to everybody, then these rules constitute his morality, irrespective of their content. All moral rules ultimately derive from such individual decisions. An individual can accept prevailing norms of course, which is still his own decision and the origin of these norms must have been the decisions of individuals in the past. But once an individual has decided on his principles, nobody can prove that he has the wrong ones, or that some other set is morally superior. Hence, there is no decision procedure to solve the moral disputes.(144) Apart from Emotivism, Hume is claimed to be closer to relativism as well. Being opposite to Absolutism, Relativism is welcomed as a liberation or as a charter of toleration.(145) This aspect of it must have appealed to Hume because he had contrasted the tolerance of the traditional faiths of classical antiguity with the intolerance of scriptural religion and its exclusive claims.(146) Indeed, all these movements in ethics are only to do with the question of "avoidance of emotions in ethics".(147) More bluntly, the basic question is "should ethics consider the humans' emotions or should it be completely ideal?" In other words, we can say that all the differentiations in moral accounts are to do with the hesitation: should ethics take man as he happens to be or as he could be?(148) Of course, Hume believes that man-as-he-happens-to-be, that is, man within his own nature should determine the foundations of ethics. Thinking that revealed religions or traditional morals ignore this principle, i.e. the human emotions, the human passions, etc., Hume proposes a natural religion, which is claimed to be depending on reason and experience. Natural religion is not based on a faith or revelation, therefore, the beliefs it brings forth are rational beliefs that are subject to precisely the same laws

of logic and evidence which are employed in the support or refutation of any proposition of science. So, whoever has religious beliefs founded exclusively upon the teachings of Natural Religion must regard them with the same limited skepticism and tentativeness with which he regards any statement about the natural world.(149)

How can Hume have inspired Deleuze? First of all, Deleuze followed Hume in choosing the priority of practical over theoretical reason: This is a political choice that cannot be validated by theoretical reason.(150) This is absolutely a support to Deleuze's approach to concepts differently regarding their meanings and strategies separately, which is another political choice. Deleuze must have been educated a lot by Hume also in terms of valuing human emotions; just as Hume had focused a lot on "passions", Deleuze placed "desire" before many things. Both philosophers had tried to abolish the strict boundaries between reason and emotions in philosophy, which also constituted the base of Deleuze's thesis of schizophrenia. Deleuze had alarmed philosophy again of the repressive effect of the dichotomy of "man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be." Deleuze, like Hume, tried to abandon this fictive, mostly the repressive distinction and unite man, complete man within himself.

Now, I want to go on with the rightness of preferring strategies over ontological concerns. In other words, I want to ask why it is right or better to deal with concepts as strategies instead of focusing on their ontological aspects. The first reason is, I think, that we are already incapable of knowing the universe. The world is not intelligible exactly. This claim is almost the basis of *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion.* He believes that the ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and inquiry.(151) He does not trust in metaphysical investigations at all. Furthermore, he even doubts about the claims of science. He says, "..weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason; let us duly consider its uncertainty and endless contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice; let the errors and deceits of our very senses be set before us; the

insuperable difficulties which attend first principles in all systems; the contradictions which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and effect, extension, space, time, motion, and, in a word, quantity of all kinds…"(152) He is such a skeptical man that, leave aside proving something transcendent, he rejects the possibility of justifying even things we suppose to be in this world. He denies any rational demonstration of the existence of anything; "existence, for him, is surd. Hence, any attempt to prove the existence of God must inevitably lead in the end to disillusionment."(153) Since, he objects to claims on the existence of God, he of course refuses the claims on His nature, too. He thinks that if the nature of God is impossible to determine, and no proof of His existence is valid, then the admission that He exists is wholly vacuous. Such admissions which like Kant's belief in things-in-themselves or Locke's belief in substance, have no content.(154) In *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,* He is not satisfied with setting the impossibility of knowing such things, he also plays with the rules of his rivals; he tries to show the falsities of claims on God, His nature, etc. within themselves. The following part from the *Dialogues* is a good example;

> Cleanthes leads off with a statement of the argument from design: the world appears to be ordered in the manner of a great machine whose parts are so wonderfully contrived as to suggest inevitably the existence of a great Artificer, somewhat similar to the human mind, although 'proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed.' The argument is thus based upon a supposed empirical analogy, and Philo's criticisms of it are based, above all, upon the defects of such an analogy. In the first place, the argument presupposes that the entire universe belongs to the same species as a human machine or artifact such as a house or ship. But this is extremely dubious. Before one can argue to the existence of a Divine Planner, one must first establish that the nature of the world actually exhibits a plan. Does our very imperfect knowledge of a small part of this system give us an adequate basis for pronouncing decisively concerning the whole?(155)

This example reminds me of Deleuze's hatred of representation, too. Rejecting the possibility of representing the world by analogies, Hume goes further and says that if an analogy about the world is intelligible, any other analogy can be equally right or legitimate. He offers his own analogies and shows how easy it is to suggest analogies about the world. He demonstrates how easy it is to make analogies, thus, he proves how equally easy it is to accept any analogy and how equally difficult it is to refute any of them again. This means analogies or representations about the world are neither certainly true nor certainly false, which means that they are just beliefs or assumptions, but not facts. On pages xv and xvi in *Dialogues*, Hume explains his reasons to go against the thesis of Divine Order. This is a great support for Deleuze because he could place his thesis of chaos and indeterminism on a world without a God or an order. Interestingly, the difficulties within ontology itself help Deleuze and Hume to struggle against ontology and replace it with epistemology and, thus with life strategies. As Deleuze said that the proofs against Platonic understanding of concepts are already hidden in Platonism itself (156), the evidences for the impossibility of ontological knowledge are available in ontology itself. This is a common point between Hume and Deleuze that they are desperately good at reading the philosophical texts or ideas against themselves. They even make fun of those philosophical claims because they do not need exterior criticism; it is they, themselves, that supply evidence against their own.

The claim that the world is unintelligible needs more persuasion; at least one thing, at least this should be certain. To enhance this persuasion, Hume studies and presents the characteristics of human mind with its drawbacks. These drawbacks and incapabilities, or just the peculiarities are to support Hume's thought that the world is not to understand but to experience. Hume's findings of human mind are detailed and to the point of its complications which make ontology a failure, a vain risk. Agreeing with Hume, Deleuze thought that human mind moves from an idea to another at random, in a delirium even in a way to create fire dragons, winged horses and monstrous giants.(157) In this delirium, the principles of our nature has

to impose some rules to determine the illegitimate, inconsistent, invalid associations. The rules of human thinking, the laws of passage, of transition, of inference should be in accordance with Nature itself.(158) However, a strong battle starts here, for if it is true that the principles of association shape the mind, by imposing on it a nature that disciplines the delirium or the fictions of the imagination, conversely, the imagination uses these same principles to make its functions or its fantasies acceptable and to give them a warrant they would not have on their own. (159) This means that it belongs to fiction to feign these relations, to induce fictive ones, and to make us believe in our follies. We see this both in the gift fantasy has of doubling any present relation with other relations that do not exist in a given case and in the case of causality where fantasy forges fictive causal chains, illegitimate rules, simulacra of belief, either by conflating the accidental and the essential or by using the properties of language (going beyond experience) to substitute for the repetition of similar cases actually observed a simple verbal repetition that only simulates its effect. Thus the liar believes in his own lies by dint of repeating them; superstitions, education, eloquence and poetry work in this way. (160) One cannot go beyond experience in a scientific way anymore, which means that any confirmation by Nature or by a corresponding calculus is not available. Therefore, one goes beyond experience in a delirium which forms a counter-Nature, allowing for the fusion of anything.(161) In this delirium, fantasy uses the principles of association to turn them around, giving them an illegitimate extension. Hume, at this point, effects a great displacement in philosophy which consists in substituting for the traditional concept of error a concept of delirium or illusion, according to which there are beliefs that are not false but illegitimate-illegitimate exercises of faculties, illegitimate functioning of relations. (162) However, the fictions of fantasy keeps on turning the principles of human nature against themselves. Illusions about nature, for example about causality, can be corrected by a strict calculus of probabilities which can denounce delirious extrapolations or feigned relations but what can be done with the illusions about human nature? (163) What can be done when the illegitimate

exercise or belief is incorrigible, inseparable from the legitimate ones, and indispensable to their organization?(164) This is the kind of the situation where fanciful usage of the principles of human nature becomes principle and Hume shows this in his analyses of the self, the world, and God. Hume draws attention to how the positing of the existence of distinct and continuous bodies, how the positing of an identity of the self require the intervention of all sorts of fictive uses of relations, and in particular of causality, in conditions where no fiction can be corrected but where each instead plunges us into other fictions, which all form part of human nature. (165) Hume applies his this critical method to revealed religions, to teleological arguments, and to his natural religion and concludes that all the more form part of our nature as they are completely illegitimate from the point of view of the principles of human nature. Unlike the ancient skepticism which was based on the variety of sensible appearances and errors of sense, Hume's skepticism is based on the status of relations and their exteriority. This new skepticism naturalizes belief and makes it the basis of knowledge (166), which is a great strategy for the struggle against ontology and for the view of taking concepts as life strategies. Hume's skepticism, in a final refinement, leads to the idea that illegitimate beliefs in the Self, the world, the God appear as the horizon of all legitimate beliefs, or as the lowest degree of belief. In other words, if everything is belief, including knowledge, then everything is a question of degree of belief, even in the delirium of non-knowledge.(167) This conclusion supports Deleuze's claim that there is no absolute knowledge for man and knowledge cannot be the concern of philosophy, for which concepts as strategies are the only way-out in the mess of human mind's random, fanciful associations and fictions about the world. In a world of no-knowledge, man should not waste time on contexts that are transcendent for him but he must find his way considering the immanent effects of what he believes.

Hume's views on human thinking are really rich and difficult to cover altogether. His views both bring perspectives against errors and dissolve new problems. To know his philosophy better and to see how it backs up Deleuze's

claims on concepts, we can have a look at the problem of testimony for instance. This problem is one of the leading items of today's epistemology because it constitutes an internal reason for epistemology to explore the social dimension.(168) A first position on the problem of testimony is that the testimony of others lack the same fundamental epistemic status as perception, memory or inductive inference; the latter sources of belief are justificationally basic in the sense that they confer or transfer prima facie justifiedness even if one has no independent justification for regarding the sources as reliable.(169) Even though you cannot non-circularly support the reliability of your memory, you are entitled to depend on it unless you have specific evidence that undercuts what you ostensibly remember.(170) Nevertheless, you are not analogously entitled to trust in testimony without independent support; reliance on the statements of others is warranted only if you first establish their reliability by means of basic sources like perception, memory and induction.(171) If you compare a given speaker's statements with the facts that you have observed yourself and if you thereby determine that the speaker has generally been accurate in the past, then you can induce that a new statement by the same speaker is also likely to be true, and you are justified in accepting it.(172) However this necessitates an inductive inference from beliefs that are justified by independent sources, that is, by perception and memory. Thus, the justificational status of testimony beliefs is not fundamental but must be derived from other sources. This is a position endorsed by Hume and called Reductionism. (173) As we see that in all epistemic issues, even in the ones with social dimensions, Hume always tries to be remain within the limits of immanence, which loads more role to each person and thus which forces the thinking and choosing for strategies. Hume's skepticism objects to the testimony of others both on daily concerns and on metaphysical issues such as miracles. "Hume argues that the weakness and contrariety of all evidence for miracles, taken together with the overwhelming probability of laws of nature discovered by science and common sense is sufficient to establish it 'as a maxim' that no human testimony can have sufficient force to prove a miracle, or, which is perhaps more

important to the present purpose, to make it 'a just foundation' for any religious system."(174) This means that all beliefs resting on miracles are contrary to reason. "It is religious faith alone which justifies belief in the miracle of 'revelation', not the supposed miracle which supports the faith."(175) Such opinions of Hume illustrates how he distrusts mind, and therefore, ontology. His views call men to the sphere of emotions and judgements that are based on vital strategies because reason cannot be true, consistent, constant and independent guide. He thinks that beliefs in a Supreme Being are traditional because they are not within the immanent experience of people, and these faiths are supported by nothing but their own intensity.(176) At this point, "we may conclude that the Christian religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity; and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience."(177) As we see, in Hume's philosophy, reason and ontological contents do not have true roles in determining one's faith or life styles. It is rather one's own wills or passions that force him to keep certain beliefs. This means, if it is not facts or Nature itself that feed our beliefs, then those beliefs are not necessary and we do not have to raise them up to absolute or transcendent status. There is nothing bad or wrong in giving priority to our wills or passions instead of trying to remain rational all the time because this is already impossible. And the former is not in fact a shift in our conducts, it is just a confession because our mind has never been clear from passions already. Here, one can ask what is mind doing in reality or what is it supposed to do according to Hume? Hume thinks that reason has two roles:

a) extensive role in inventing beliefs and institutions due to some passions, interests and needs,
b) corrective/critical role in detecting or correcting the illegitimate beliefs, illusions, testing

these false beliefs (accidentally related data) against experience. (178)

Here, a second question may arise; how to distinguish the legitimate beliefs from the illegitimate ones? According to Hume, the legitimate beliefs correspond to experience. For example, the sun will rise tomorrow, I believe, because it has risen everyday so far. The illegitimate beliefs are those that do not correspond to experience and these beliefs are born out of accidentally related data. (179)

As to why Hume lessens the authority of reason and how illegitimate beliefs are so inevitable, Hume puts forward that our reason and what we call knowledge are not free from passions. Furthermore, passions constitute a great deal of our reasoning. He thinks that "the principles of association acquire their sense only in relation to passions: not only do affective circumstances guide the associations of ideas, but the relations themselves are given a meaning, a direction, an irreversibility, an exclusivity as a result of the passions. In short, what constitutes human nature, what gives the mind a nature or a constancy, is not only the principles of association from which relations derive but also the principles of passion from which 'inclinations' follow."(180) Deleuze admitted the role of passions in human thinking and he emphasized the importance of passions in relation to immanence:

> We've seen that with knowledge the principles of human nature instituted rule of extension or extrapolation that fantasy in turn used to make acceptable simulacra of belief, such that a calculus was always necessary to correct, to select the legitimate from the illegitimate. With passion, on the other hand, the problem is posed differently: how can we invent an artificial extension that goes beyond the partiality of human nature? It is up to imagination to reflect passion, to make it resonate and go beyond the limits of its natural partiality and presentness. In this process, as they resonate in the imagination, the passions do not simply become gradually less vivid and less present; they also change their color and sound, as when the sadness of a passion represented in a tragedy turns into the pleasure of an almost infinite play of the imagination; they assume a new

> nature and are accompanied by a new kind of belief. Thus the will moves easily in all directions and produces an image of itself, even in the places where it is not fixed. (181)

It is not difficult to infer that the negligence of passions in epistemology so far has been something that increases schizophrenia and partiality of humans, which Deleuze always abhorred and saw as a factor of forming transcendent rules over life.

Hume, goes on enumerating the interventions in our rationality, one of which is passions. Such another intervention is pseudo-emphaty, something which is perhaps a job of passions. "Hume complains of the universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves, and to transfer to every object those qualities, with which they are intimately conscious"(182) Hume thinks such a drawback within human reasoning, may easily end up with 'illusions' like 'divine order'. And, following after, such illusions tear men from a plane of immanence and experience. To support the thesis that our reasoning is not independent and therefore unsafe, Hume tells about wishful thinking, too. This is another obstacle before ontology and justifies the idea of concepts as strategies. "Wishful thinking presents a different aspect of Hume's idea of the mind 'spreading itself' on the world. Hume himself thinks that many of our beliefs have such wishful origins, including, for example belief in the immortality of the soul: 'all doctrines are to be suspected which are followed by our passions; and the hopes and fears which gave rise to this doctrine are very obvious."(183) This quality of mind, 'spreading itself on the world', perhaps leads it to see what is not there. Thus the mind is inclined to yield to a transcendence it created itself.

Another obstacle that Deleuze saw before immanence is the concept of "self". Hume, too, rejects the self as a distinct being. "In Hume's thinking, the impression thus function as an atom- a mental atom, I'd say, constituting an independent unity subsisting in itself and complete; or if you prefer, a monad such that all ideas, including that of the self, bear the same relation to the impressions as in the Leibnizian monadology. Phenomena bear to the monadic principles. Hume's

account of impressions are related to monads' features: simplicity, indivisibility, individuality, self-sufficiency, independence, unity, closure on itself."(184) Then, Hume thinks that the subject or the self is merely an effect of impressional individuality; nothing but a possible product of imagination, conceived in the context of impressional individuality.(185) In other words, the self is just a habit and Hume's subject is decomposed.(186) This Humean perspective of self really helps Deleuze's idea of body-without-organs which can decompose and experience new organizations. The self, if a composition and able to decompose as Hume's philosophy permits, do not have to become a transcendent issue. It is always open to test and immanent empiricism. People can test many organizations of self and choose among them considering immanent strategies. Considering the relation between immanence and idea of self, "Deleuze remarks that the very idea of a 'plane of immanence' requires a kind of radical empiricism-an empiricism whose force begins from the moment it defines the subject: a habitus, a habit, nothing more than a habit in a field of immanence, the habit of saying I. among the classical empiricists, it is Hume who poses such questions, Hume who redirects the problem of empiricism toward the new questions."(187) More clearly, "what the young Deleuze found singular in Hume's empiricism is then the idea that this self, this person, this possession, is in fact not given. Indeed the self is only a fiction or artifice in which, through habit, we come to believe, a sort of incorrigible illusion of living; and it is as this artifice that the self becomes fully part of nature- our nature. Hume thus opens up the question of other ways of composing sensations than those of the habits of the self and the 'human nature' that they suppose. A new or 'superior empiricism' becomes possible, one concerned with what is singular yet 'in-human' in the composition of ourselves. Deleuze would find it in Bergson and Nietzsche, who imagined a 'free difference' in living, unconscious and no longer enclosed within a personal identity." (188) To sum up, man no more has to be a slave of his "self" because he can see that it is not absolute.

Hume does not leave "how habits are formed" unexplained. Habits are formed due to what men perceive as "repetitions". However, Hume thinks that repetition

changes nothing in the object repeated, but does change something in the mind which contemplates it. (189) "Hume takes as an example the repetition of cases of the type AB, AB, AB,A…Each case or objective sequence AB is independent of the others. The repetition (although we cannot yet properly speak of repetition) changes nothing in the object or the state of affairs AB. On the other hand, a change is produced in the mind which contemplates…"(190) Then a perspective arises here that everything is a synthesis in the imagination. If we think this way, we can also conclude that we can change things if it we are doing them.

Another reason that justifies approaching concepts as strategies is the impossibility of keeping transcendent ideals and illegitimate beliefs alive. To do with this strength, Hume says:

> In this view, there appears a great resemblance between the sects of Stoics and Pyrrhonians, though perpetual antagonists; and both of them seem founded on this erroneous maxim that what a man can perform sometimes, and in some dispositions, he can perform always and in every position. When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a sublime enthusiasm of virtue and strongly summit with any species of honor or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will nor prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a philosopher, in his school and support, in imagination, the acutest pain or most calamitous event which he can possibly conceive. But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind relaxes and cannot be recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him unawares; and the philosopher sinks, by degrees into the plebeian…(191)

In addition to the difficulty of maintaining sublime feelings, Hume adds:

> The worst effect of organized religion is its subversion of sincerity and self-knowledge. No man can at will command his own inner-faith, which depends on 'grace', the most he can do is force himself to *profess* it, whether he believes it or not. Thus unlike the inescapable human propensity to causal inference and the belief in an order of nature

> upon which all action depends, ordinary religious belief is a form of make-believe which, treated as a religious obligation, becomes a chain of hypocrisy which leads by degrees to dissimulation, fraud and falsehood. 'Hence the reason of the vulgar observation that the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being inconsistent, are often, or commonly united in the same individual character'. (192)

As we see, Hume objects to making sublime feelings or enthusiasm the basis of ethics as it is difficult to keep them alive all the time. Moreover, he discovers that in time man becomes alien and dishonest to himself because he does not admit that his enthusiasm has weakened but he is behaving as though he still has the same motives. Hume's such ideas remind us of Deleuze's tight concern with schizophrenia; man's partiality, his alienation to himself, his thinking on himself as if a transcendent being, his cutting himself into pieces, his breaking with his own emotions and desires, his suppressing his own inner experiences, his ignoring or despising his senses, his becoming something else…

What should be the foundation of our conducts then? Hume asserts that emotions, too, should be acknowledged within our reasoning and regarded to be equally constituting the basis of our acts. Similarly, Deleuze placed "desire" at the basis of his ethics. Both of these conceptions can be perceived as an emphasis on liberation and naturalism. Hume's naturalist ethics is particularly dependent on the concept of "sympathy", which is still a popular issue and deserves this popularity in the violence of today's politics and power battles. We can define sympathy as " imaginatively experiencing another's emotion"(193)

> Proper attunement to moral considerations, including effective moral motivation- not just "I wish I could help" but "I want to help"- has similarly come to be seen by psychologists as deploying emphatic simulation of the state of others more than abstract principles. Pioneers in understanding this phenomenon were David Hume and Adam Smith, who attempted to explain the possibility of moral knowledge and corresponding motivation via a mechanism they called "sympathy", in which each of us internally

> reflects and models the conditions of others by a complex process of resonance and internal emulation, rather than via a moral and strategic judgement. (194)

Mary Warnock says that the merit of Hume's theory of morality is that he sees not only that it is founded on sympathy, that is, our ability to be moved by the pleasures and pains of other people, but that dependent as our moral sense is on our feelings of pleasure and pain in the contemplation of actions, it is not just any sentiment of pleasure or pain which denominates an action virtuous or vicious.(195)

Hume's reason for suggesting benevolence, the spontaneous inclination to promote another's good (196), and sympathy as the foundation of ethics is his distinction between knowledge and practicality; he says "Tis one thing to know virtue and another to conform the will to it."(197) Hume, here, is trying to show that religions, schools or traditions may tell people not to be indifferent to others' needs and feelings but may not supply the necessary motive to follow such advices. Only if people themselves senses the will to help, only by a feeling of sympathy, they can manage it. The enthusiasms raised by exterior factors may fade and stop moving us to be good, but a constantly experiencible, immanent sense of sympathy- fed by man's own continuous needs- can give man the right reason to be moral. Through Deleuze's language, perhaps we can say that what Hume tries to do is a shift from transcendent to immanent in ethics, an effort to convince people for strategies that are really more direct to their lives. Deleuze tried to achieve the same thing with "desire".

Trying to establish such a naturalist, perhaps a utilitarian ethics will raise many questions: how is to be the legitimation of every rule, law and government? Or does Hume think that legitimation is necessary?

I have enumerated a few reasons for the rightness of strategies' priority over ontology such as the unintelligibility of the world, intervention of passions on reasoning in the form of pseudo-emphaty or wishful thinking, and the impossibility of keeping sublime and transcendent enthusiasm alive to be moral, and finally man's becoming hypocritical about himself… And I tried to study these reasons in

relation to Hume. Now I want to discuss what kind of ethics or strategies can follow from Hume's interesting, self-critical empiricism and how these may have affected Deleuze.

First of all we must remember and start from the point that Hume is radically skeptical to the degree of doubting the contents of sciences due to their sameness with metaphysical issues in terms of being inconceivable to mind and being explained by exterior relations:

> The nourishment of bodies by food is still an inexplicable mystery; the cohesion of the parts of the matter is still incomprehensible. These skeptics, therefore, are obliged, in every question, to consider each particular evidence apart, and proportion their assent to the precise degree of evidence which occurs. This is their practice in all natural, mathematical, moral and political science. And why not the same, I ask, in the theological and religious? Why must conclusions of this nature be alone rejected on the general presumption of the insufficiency of human reason, without any particular discussion of the evidence? Is not such an unequal conduct a plain proof of prejudice and passion? Our senses, you say, are fallacious; our understanding erroneous, our ideas, even of the most familiar objects-extension, duration, motion-full of absurdities and contradictions. You defy me to solve the difficulties or reconcile the repugnancies which you discover in them. I have not capacity for so great an undertaking; I have not leisure for it. I perceive it to be superfluous. Your own conduct, in every circumstance, refutes your principles, and shows the firmest reliance on all the received maxims of science, morals, prudence and behavior. (198)

Having asserted his skepticism, Hume admits the hardships of living with such uncertainties about life, which reveals that he is not satisfied with the situation and he has solutions in his mind:

> It seems certain that, though a man, in a flush of humor, after intense reflection on the many contradictions and imperfections of human reason, may entirely renounce all belief and opinion, it is impossible for him to persevere in this total skepticism or make it appear in his conduct for a few hours. External objects press in upon him; passions

> solicit him; his philosophical melancholy dissipates; and even the utmost violence upon his own temper will not be able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of skepticism. And for what reason impose on himself such a violence? This is a point in which it will be impossible for him ever to satisfy himself, consistently with his skeptical principles. So that, upon the whole, nothing could be more ridiculous than the principles of the ancient Pyrrhonians if, in reality, they endeavoured, as is pretended, to extend throughout the same skepticism which they had learned from the declamations of their schools, and which they ought to have confined to them.(199)

After stating the elegiac difficulty of living with skepticism, he goes on mentioning the absurdity of acknowledging the reality that there is no knowledge, which comes along with the obligation to keep on living as if the opposite is true; this is a clash of two realities:

> In reality, would not a man be ridiculous who pretended to reject Newton's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow because that explication gives a minute anatomy of the rays of light-a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension? And what would you say to one who, having nothing particular to object to the arguments of Copernicus and Galilaeo for the motion of the earth, should withhold his assent on that general principle that these subjects were too magnificent and remote to be explained by the narrow and fallacious reason of mankind? (200)

To these admissions of reality, Hume adds the inevitability of man's curiosity about metaphysical issues in spite of their impenetrability:

> What truth so obvious, so certain, as the being of a God, which the most ignorant ages have acknowledged, for which the most refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and arguments? What truth so important as this, which is the ground of all our hopes, the surest foundation of morality, the firmest support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations? But, in treating of this obvious and important truth, what obscure questions occur concerning the nature of that Divine Being, his attributes, his decrees, his plan of providence? These have been always subjected to the disputations of men; concerning

> these human reason has not reached any certain determination. But these are topics so interesting that we cannot restrain our restless inquiry with regard to them, though nothing but doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction have as yet been the result of our most accurate researches. (201)

As we see, Hume is not completely indifferent to humans' relation to metaphysics. If he were so, he would not have the right to defend naturalism. However, he states a desperate paradox; we are most curious about what we are most incapable of knowing. And he states the troubles arising out of this paradox. He says he has not any bad or prior intentions about metaphysics but he has worries about the way the metaphysical concerns are treated in practical life: he tells that he is not attacking religion but its vulgar forms.(202) This is followed by that "Hume is unalterably opposed, on moral grounds, to all varieties of traditional religious belief and practice, and on intellectual grounds willing to concede no more than the 'simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence' But this proposition affords no basis for any inference that can affect human life, nor any support to any moral action or forbearance.(203) Hume, here, concludes that "if there were a God who was disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly mortals, he would regard with extreme disfavor the votaries of most popular superstitions, and would regard with compassion and indulgence only those rare philosophical skeptics who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend or endeavor to suspend all judgement with respect to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects" (204)

As we see, being very similar to Deleuze's attitude, Hume is not against man's interest with transcendental topics but both are against that man gives these topics priority before practical issues despite they lack the certainty that most practical concerns have. In other words, both are against the situation that the metaphysical issues, such as God, lack the clarity to do with their ontological aspects, but man still evaluates them with those uncertain speculations about them whereas they

could start from the very clear, testable point, which is their effects on, or relation to people's practical lives. Deleuze was aware of his intimacy to Hume about this attitude and he explains their this common point as: "Hume suggests that God as well as the self be regarded as a fiction required by our nature. The problem of religion is then no longer whether God exists, but whether we need the idea of God in order to exist, or, in terms of Pascal's wager, who has the better mode of existence, the believer or the non-believer."(205) To sum up what Hume thinks to be the man's utmost relation to God, we can say that God is to remain a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery whose nature is forever beyond the cognitive powers of man to penetrate. (206) Therefore, Hume is reluctant to concede to God any rational bearing upon the destiny of man, or to the belief in Him any relevance to the conduct of life.(207) Hume is determined to remain a humanist and utilitarian in his conception of what is a good life and how it can be achieved.(208) For Hume, the foundation of all our obligations is interest; there can be no basis of duty without any natural concern on our part for the ends of the moral life. (209) Thus, "the utility of morals is subverted when anything other than the satisfaction of men's desires is taken as the justification of conduct."(210)

Hitherto we have understood that for Hume does not approve of ontological knowledge of things as the basis of conduct. Then, we understand that Hume bases all our conduct on relations; relations of things to our understanding, senses, and actions. As to how Hume conceives relations, Deleuze said:

> What is a relation? It is what makes us pass from a given impression or idea to the idea of something that is not presently given. For example, I think of something 'similar'…when I see a picture of Peter, I think of Peter, who is not there. One would look in vain in the given term for the reason for this passage. The relation is itself the effect of so-called principles of association, contiguity, resemblance, and causality, all of which constitute, precisely, a human nature. Human nature means that what is universal or constant in the human mind is never one idea or another as a term but only the ways of passing from one particular idea to another. Hume, in this sense, will devote himself to a concerted destruction of the three great terminal ideas of metaphysics: the Self, the

> World, and God. And yet at first Hume's thesis seems disappointing: what is the advantage of explaining relations by principles of human nature, which are principles of association that seem just another way of designating relations? But this disappointment derives from a misunderstanding of the problem, for the problem is not of causes but of the way relations function as effects of those causes and the practical conditions of this functioning. (211)

Hume's replacing ontology with epistemology for the purpose of making ethics immanent and justifiable in terms of human emotions; his emphasizing "interest" as the legitimation of morals or governments; his proving that what we call causal relations are just exterior, arbitrary relations; his proving that the Self and the God, which are taken to be the basis of traditional or religious ethics, are habits or riddles must have been really helpful for Deleuze to set his philosophy on that the world is not to represent in one certain or legitimate way and therefore no certain sort of ethics is necessary, thanks to which both the world and ethics are always open to multiple, various perspectives and creativity. Hume helped Deleuze "to escape from the dominant traditions of continental philosophy which presupposes that we already live in a meaningful world, and that we can only begin to build knowledge within the context of a pre-given meaning, whether this meaning is produced by history, subjectivity, or fundamental ontology or, in the terms given by later developments in the continental tradition, structure, language, society, communication, or culture." (212)

To explain how Hume's empiricism is applied to ethics or how it was in favor of Deleuze's philosophy of desire, Philip Goodchild says:

> Hume's main problem was the constitution of human nature, by which a human being can become a conscious subject. Deleuze used Hume to investigate the constitution of meaning, prior to all interpretation. Hume was concerned with the production of the kind of meaning which is not directly given in experience: he replaced the model of knowledge with that of belief. Reason, then, works through the inference of probabilities: we may believe that the sun will rise tomorrow but we cannot know it

> will. Hume took as base the data of sense-impressions, and these are spoken about as though they were entirely separate, independent, and atomistic. Now the essence or meaning of individual, phenomenal impressions was of no significance for Hume; what is relevant is the way in which these can be associated in the human mind. Questions of meaning, essence and existence are displaced in favor of extrinsic principles of association. Human nature is able to associate diverse sense-impressions through principles of resemblance, contiguity, and causality- these being regarded as rules or principles of human nature. Although such principles determine the form which beliefs may take, they do not tell us which beliefs or associations we actually choose to form. Another input is required-in addition to these principles, the human mind is also subject to a variety of passions. We only form a belief for a specific, practical purpose, determined by a need, interest, or passion. Human nature is composed of both the rules governing its reasoning and the passions motivating that reasoning. Each subject will be produced from this nature as a specific set of beliefs and expectations. As such, the knowledge of human nature is entirely practical: it is a morality, concerned with governing or directing the passions. Philosophy is the theory of what we do, not what we are. (213)

Since Hume's philosophy essentially asserts the improbability of any certainty, truth, or knowledge, the only useful reason is practical; the reason imaginatively constructs beliefs and institutions for the purpose of fulfilling the passions directing it. (214) Just as Hume sees ethics as a means of realizing human passions, Deleuze offered ethics as the way to help men actualize and improve their desires. Their this emphasis on feelings and needs is not only within individual frames but approved for the social and political concerns, too. In other words, just as the ethics is to enhance and involve human emotions, politics is also for the sake of practical benefits of people in such a way that this relevance is the only necessary basis of its legitimacy. Otherwise, no theories of contract or any other abstract definition of state, etc. is actually or directly relevant to human interests. Just as the Self is a habit or fiction, the legitimacy of governments along with contracts is fiction, too. In other words, Hume destroys ontological foundations on the side of governments and politics as well, which is a consistent attitude for his part:

> Although the government as a social contract is a fiction, the principles which are derived from it are nevertheless roughly those on which government stands or falls. Obedience does last only as long as government provides protection and security. However, the reason is not because government is based on a contract; but because protection and security are in our interests. 'There is evidently no other principle than common interest; and if interest first produces obedience to government, the obligation to obedience must cease, whenever the interest ceases, in any degree, and in a considerable number of instances.' So much for the nature of obligation. But having explained the origin of political obligation in general, there remains another question: to whom is it due? And the stunningly simple answer is to whoever, or whatever, has long held it. 'The only rule of government is long use and practice.' An established government has an infinite advantage, by that very circumstance, of its being established. Custom and habit tell us who is the rightful government. Disputes over the origins of titles long held is pointless. Neither history, nor reason is capable of providing authoritative answers to disputes about legitimacy.' (215)

It is not to our point here but I think it is a good claim that Hume's views of obedience, government, legitimacy and titles could really help to remove the obstacles before democracy and reconciliations both in world and in our country, especially as it could contribute to the flexibility and easiness in forming and changing the laws, constitutions and in the ways of presenting the social or national identities. Because Hume "prepares the way for a view of society not as contract but as experiment-experiment with what in life is prior to both possessive individuals and traditional social wholes."(216) Deleuze must have discovered, with admiration, this comfort and luxury in Hume's philosophy which approaches everything strategically no matter it is in epistemology, ethics, or politics. He said that Hume's empiricism is a sort of science-fiction universe avant la lettre; as in science-fiction, one has the impression of a fictive, foreign world, seen by other creatures, but also the presentiment that this world is already ours, and those creatures, ourselves.(217) This luxury, this magic or this simplicity in thinking can transform all sciences and replace all the difficulties we ourselves put in front of

experience and action. Deleuze realized this probability of transforming everything and clarified where it could lead us to: “A parallel conversion of science or theory follows: theory becomes an inquiry…Science and theory is an inquiry, which is to say, a practice: a practice of the seemingly fictive world that empiricism describes; a study of the conditions of legitimacy of practices in this empirical world that is in fact our own. The result is a great conversion of theory to practice.”(218)

To sum up, Deleuze and Hume tried to make the world more belong to us. Deleuze used Hume as a transition from knowledge to desire, a mid-period between closed, obligatory, atomistic, prescriptive, wholistic philosophies and local, multiple, open, experimental, naturalist philosophies. “Where Hume replaced the model of knowledge with that of belief, Deleuze and Guattari replaced belief with desire, so as to bring all the pre-human dimensions of subjectivity back into thought: no longer subordinated to a pseudo-scientific paradigm, the simulacra, phantasms, and mythical refrains that fill the mind, they allow subjectivity, both individual and collective, to be described in terms of an ethico-aesthetic paradigm.”(219)

What Hume and Deleuze were after was to restart everything with the untutored human nature (220), with man-as-he-happens-to-be, which has been lost and needed for a long time. Perhaps we can say that the traditional morals have just been placebo, and Deleuze wanted to find the real treatment. His this trial may be evaluated within the moral philosophy of the modern world; it is Emotivism (221) and we owe it mostly to Hume. This tendency is to do with the view that moral utterances only express personal preferences and are essentially persuasive in purpose. It is not difficult to see that this tendency is close to Deleuze’s preferences of concepts’ strategical aspects to their ontological foundations.

In this chapter, I have tried to study how Hume may have inspired Deleuze to develop a philosophy, rather an ethics in which everything is aimed to be immanent and therefore, everything, especially, concepts are treated with their practical ends, with their strategical reflections instead of their ontological meanings.

Chapter 3:
How The Demarcation Between Transcendence and Immanence Is Related To Ethics, Concepts, and The Future of Philosophy

This chapter is in fact a summary or revision of the disputes so far. All the debates about transcendence, immanence, morals, life, etc. were a conscious or unconscious blow of stress, of years' compiled pressures, were a scream against the necessities that men do not understand but is obliged to obey. And postmodernism, whether it is a solution to problems or not, has been at least the expression of men's exhaustion of, first time his emotional admits about the civilization they created. Every attempt to get rid of the vicious circles of debates on the truth, the good etc. were worse returns to those circles. Especially the modern age, though it tried to make a difference, could not overcome the desperate cycles classical questions. Technology did not alter those basic problems, just masked, renewed or complicated. All these boredoms gathered around particularly two concepts: difference and repetitions. Like the discovery "the king is in nude", Deleuze had found that there was nothing different in what was called "changes, new perspectives, democracy, liberty." All these were, as Deleuze supposed, sheltering not-yet realized repetitions of old fascisms, repressions, representations and totalizations: "Modern life is such that, confronted with the most mechanical, the most stereotypical repetitions, inside and ourselves, we endlessly extract from them little differences, variations and modifications. Conversely secret, disguised and hidden repetitions, animated by the perpetual displacement of a difference, restore bare, mechanical and stereotypical repetitions, within and without us. In simulacra, repetition already plays upon repetitions, and difference already plays upon difference. Repetitions repeat themselves, while the differenciator differenciates

itself. The task of life is to make all these repetitions coexist in a space in which difference is distributed."(222)

As an example for the renewed repetitions of old problems, which are seemingly new perspectives but infact are any other roundabouts about the real problem (transcendence versus immanence, repetition versus difference), we can mention the discussion on relativisim and absolutism. "Relativisim may indeed be welcomed as a charter of toleration. It was clearly this aspect of it which appealed to Hume, who contrasted the tolerance of the traditional faiths of classical antiquity with the intolerance of scriptural religion and its exclusive claims."(223) I do not mean that such debates or conceptions are completely in vain. However, as Deleuze thought, we must see that these are just polishing the problem, creating new but again binary oppositions, presenting other representations, not removing the fascism, not unveiling the real trouble, our obsession with modelling or moulding others and ourselves.

Postmodernism, though criticized a lot for this, has been pessimist or quietist most of the time perhaps because it has sensed that all attempts at liberations have been failure. Yet it has managed to underline and gather some conditions of success against totalizations: indeterminacy, immanence, deconstructionism…Some may think of such approaches to be extremities but they are one the presently available, presently alternative views of the problem. Deleuze has been considered to be by the postmodernist side. This is open to discussion, yet I have to see whether Deleuze had parallel lines with postmodernist flows. Hans Bertens says that indeterminacy and immanence together characterize the postmodern age; the play of indeterminacy and immanence is crucial to the episteme of postmodernism.(224) The emphasis on immanence and indeterminacy is of course a common point between Deleuze and postmodernism. Bertens, again, says that Deleuze contributed to the postmodern episteme, which is called "the age of indetermanence."(225) Deleuze's epistemology-exactly abstaining from ontology and tightly relating concepts to the criterion of involvement in practical life strategies, is surely parallel with postmodernist episteme.

Postmodernism is also “an attack on the lawful.”(226) Edith Wyschograd says that “For some postmodernists, thought is the captive of a politics that shapes it so that thought qua thought is discredited when its embedding politics is rejected. This case is stated in an extreme form by Deleuze and Guattari: ‘thought as such is already in conformity with a model that it borrows from the state apparatus, and which defines for it goals and paths, channels, organs, an entire organon.’”(227) Here we see that Deleuze was against the situation where exterior, arbitrary relations among some thoughts are made into as-if-necessary structures, wholes, then institutions, then transcendent reigns over life, torn and separated from plane of immanence. Thoughts become politics, but totalizing and overruling politics.

Another step to understand postmodernism and its concern with Deleuze brings forth that postmodernism is a break with formalism; in a Nietzschean account “divorce with structuralisms” and Deleuze was a prophet of postmodernity.(228) Or we can say that postmodernism, and perhaps Deleuze, is associated with delegitimation and dedifferentiation. (229) These concepts tell that “authority and legitimacy were no longer so powerfully concentrated in the centers they had previously occupied; and the differentiations-for example, those between what had been called centers and margins, but also between classes, regions, and cultural levels (high culture and low culture)-were being eroded and complicated. Centrist or absolutist nations of the state, nourished by the idea of the uniform movement of history towards a single outcome, were beginning to weaken.”(230) The erosion of “centres”, in Deleuze’s terms the erosion of “binary oppositions”, is of course an interruption, a quake in the process of things’, institutions’, concepts’ attaining transcendent status. These transcendents are ignorant of, perhaps worse than that, indifferent to man’s passions, his practical needs, his actual emotions, his concrete natures, which are not as cared as fictions about him; i.e., artificial, prescribed or presupposed characteristics about man. Therefore, “the postmoderns seek to have the universal concretized, to see the particular as numinous, not as representative…Postmodern poets have been seeking to uncover the ways man and

nature are unified, so that value can be seen as the result of immanent processes in which man is as much object as he is agent of creativity."(231)

To describe postmodern thought and Deleuzean ethics from another point of view, we can say that it is a denial of the reality of cause and effect and of traditional "meaning."(232) Beside, it calls into question man's being the measure of all things, the center of universe.(233) To clarify, "man has been measured and found to be an undistinguished bit of matter different in no essential way from bacteria, stones and trees. His goals and purposes; his egocentric notions of past, present, and future: his faith in his power to predict and through prediction, to control his destiny-all these are called into question, considered irrelevant, or deemed trivial."(234) Man's putting himself in the center of universe was infact his giving himself a transcendent status, his separating himself from nature and also from himself. Man's seeing himself to be nothing different from a plant, an animal, as Deleuze suggested, was an expression of getting back to earth, taking place in the plane of immanence. Man's taking over a transcendent role over everything and over himself has brought dichotomies and dilemmas to his life; reason versus emotions, man versus nature, man-as-he-happens-to-be versus man-as-he-could-be, ethics versus morals…All Hume and Deleuze wanted to do was uniting man with nature and with himself back again. Concepts' being evaluated by their meanings with no reference to their effects on man's practical life, raising them to ideal, over status was one of the many appearances of transcendence. These dichotomies, especially the distinction between morals versus ethics, were a significant concern to Deleuze. Morality, or social morality is regarded to be speaking for civilization, for life of reasons but the personal ideal ethics is taken to be speaking for life and life of instinct. (235) To put more bluntly, "the region of the ethical is a region of diverse, certainly incompatible and possible practically conflicting ideal images or pictures of a human life, and it's a region in which many such incompatible pictures may secure at least the imaginative, though doubtless not often the practical, allegiance of a single person." (236) However, the sphere of morality refers to the principles or rules governing human behavior which apply universally

within a community or class. Here the class can be thought of as a definite social group or the human species as a whole.(237) It is not obvious how these contrasting conceptions, these diverse ideals and rules are related to each other…(238) Morality is bare rules of honesty, refraining from harming others, etc. which make social life possible but there is not any corresponding attempt to define the region of the ethical and there is not any attempt to characterize the relations between the two regions. (239) Deleuze was tired of this hesitation, the dilemmas between morality and ethics; he was stuck with the question "why does man have to give up all his desires, instincts, emotions to be moral?" And Deleuze had made his choice for human desires. Morals insensitive to human emotions would not already be successful; the approval by our nature was already compulsory. Hume had underlined this reality, too and said that morality had to be tied to human feelings; therefore he had offered sympathy as the basis of ethics. If the same principle applied to epistemology, we would see that concepts had to be tied to human experience, practical strategies, as Deleuze stated. The western philosophy, the modern civilization, the institutions, laws and anything had followed the opposite way. Thus, Deleuze was an anti-foundationalist, an anti-authoritarianist; he was against transcendence and ,therefore, the foundations that enhanced and preserved transcendence.(240) As Foucault said, Deleuze formed his own ethics, *Anti-Oedipus* was a book of ethics, a guide to non-fascist art of living.(241) For Deleuze, non-fascist way of living is the synonym of living in the plane of immanence where no transcendence interferes. His ethics, in other words, is a manifestations of the will to ecstasy, the will to joy, which were lacked and missed for so long.(242) While the western philosophy had given priority to the experience of the other, which means a sort of transcendence and insensitivity to joy, senses in one's self; Deleuze gave the priority to the experience of force, which means immanence.

To sum this chapter and study Deleuze's understanding of immanence and how he differentiated it from transcendence more directly, we can have a look at what transcendental field meant to him. He said that the transcendental field can be

distinguished from experience in that it does not refer to an object or belong to a subject (empirical representation). Therefore, "it appears as a pure stream of a-subjective consciousness, a pre-reflexive impersonal consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without a self. It may seem curious that the transcendental be defined by such immediate givens: we will speak of transcendental empiricism in contrast to everything that makes up the world of the subject and the object."(243) To clarify his definition, Deleuze said, "the transcendental field is defined by a plane of immanence, and the plane of immanence by a life? What is immanence? A life…"(244) Here we again come to the difference between the transcendent and the transcendental. Deleuze said the transcendent is not the transcendental and he went on that;

> Were it not for consciousness, the transcendental field would be defined as a pure plane of immanence, because it eludes all transcendence of the subject and the object. Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a subject. In Spinoza, immanence is not immanence to substance; rather, substance and modes are immanence. When the subject or the object falling outside the plane of immanence is taken as a universal subject or as any object to which immanence is attributed, the transcendental is entirely denatured, for it then simply redoubles the empirical (as with Kant), and immanence is distorted, for it then finds itself enclosed in the transcendent. Immanence is not related to Some Thing as a unity superior to all things or to a Subject as an act that brings about a synthesis of things: it is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence. No more than the transcendental field is defined by consciousness can the plane of immanence be defined by a subject or an object that is able to contain it. We will say of pure immanence that it is a LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss.(245)

In these conceptions of transcendence, immanence, and life, Deleuze thought of consciousness as a fiction; He said consciousness became a fact only when a

subject was produced at the same time as its object, both being outside the field and appearing as transcendents.(246) And Deleuze's "life" is a new philosophical concept. He said that we might think of a life as an empiricist concept in contrast to what J. Locke called "the self."(247) According to Deleuze, a life has quite different features than those Locke associated with the self-consciousness, memory and personal identity. (248) He said, a life unfolds according to another logic: logic of impersonal individuation rather than personal individuation, of singularities rather than particularities, therefore it can never be completely specified, it is always indefinite-a life. (249) A life is only a virtuality in the life of the corresponding individual that can sometimes emerge in the strange interval before death; briefly, contrary to the self, a life is impersonal yet singular and so requires a wilder sort of empiricism- a transcendental empiricism.(250)

To explain the sort of that impersonal individuation, Deleuze mentioned children; he said that the small children all resemble one another and have hardly any individuality but they have singularities such as a smile, a gesture, a funny face but not any subjective qualities. (251) He said that the small children, through all their sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an immanent life that is pure power and even bliss.(252) The indefinite aspects in a life, as in that of children's, lose all indetermination such that they fill out a plane of immanence or, what amounts to the same thing, to the degree that they constitute the elements of a transcendental field (individual life, on the other hand, remains inseparable from empirical determinations.)(253) Thus, the indefinite as such is the mark of not of an empirical indetermination but of a determination by immanence or a transcendental determinability.(254) The indefinite article is, then, the indetermination of the person only since it is determination of the singular; the One is not the transcendent that might contain immanence but the immanent contained within a transcendental field.(255) Then, as he said, one is always the index of a multiplicity: an event, a singularity, a life.(256) In this way, though it is always possible to invoke a transcendent that falls outside the plane of immanence, or that attributes immanence to itself, all transcendence is constituted solely in the flow of

immanent consciousness that belongs to this plane.(257) This means, as Deleuze said, that transcendence is always a product of immanence and a life contains only virtuals, i.e., it is made of virtualities, events, singularities. By "virtual", Deleuze meant not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in a process of actualization following the plane that gives it its particular reality.(258) As to the immanent event, it is actualized in a state of things and of the lived that make it happen; the plane of immanence is itself actualized in an object and a subject to which it attributes itself but, nevertheless, inseparable an object and a subject may be from their actualization, the plane of immanence is itself virtual, so long as the events that populate it are virtualities. (259) Deleuze said that it is events and singularities that give to the plane all its virtuality, just as the plane of immanence gives virtual events their full reality. Finally, the event considered as non-actualized, indefinite is lacking in nothing; it suffices to put it in relation to its concomitants: a transcendental field; a plane of immanence, a life, singularities. (260) For example, a wound is incarnated or actualized in a state of things or of life; but it is itself a pure virtuality on the plane of immanence that leads us into a life and I can say then that my wound existed before me; not a transcendence of the wound as higher actuality, but its immanence as a virtuality always within a plane.(261) Thus, there is a big difference between the virtuals that define the immanence of the transcendental field and the possible forms that actualize them and transform them into something transcendent.(262)

Now we come to what this impersonal individuation, these singularities will lead us to, or how we can concretize them. Deleuze said that a life of impersonal individuation, a life of pure immanence is neutral, beyond good and evil, because it was only the subject that incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or bad. (263) He said that the life of such individuality fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other. (264) However, Deleuze said that we should not enclose life in the single moment when individual life confronts universal death which means that a life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes

through and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects.(265) Deleuze said that this indefinite life does not itself have moments, close as they may be one to another, but only between-times, between moments; it does not just come about or come after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the absolute of an immediate consciousness.(266)

To sum up what Deleuze thought of immanence, we can say that he thought immanence was pure when not immanent to a prior subject or object, mind or matter, only when neither innate nor acquired, it is always yet in the making; unlike the life of an individual, a life is thus necessarily vague or indefinite, and this indefiniteness is real. (267) In other words, the real itself is indeterminate or inexact, beyond the limits of our capacities to measure it and we thus, Deleuze said, have the pre-predicative vagueness of Adam in Paradise that Leibniz envisaged in his letters to Arnauld; we are always quelconque-we are and always remain "anybodies" before we become "somebodies".(268)

If we apply this understanding of immanence and singularity to concepts, we reach the conclusion that concepts should not and already do not have absolute meanings outside our experiences. They are rather singularities, always in the making, always and each are new, different. They are gaining virtuality as long as they are lived within a plane of immanence. They do not have transcendence thanks to which they always remain the same and independent. They exist just when they are experienced and they are only what is lived; nothing else than pure life strategies. They are not some absolute forms ruling our experiences but it is our experiences that bear and constantly make them. They are not ontological objects to analyze or understand. However, they are tools that we use to help ourselves move on within a plane of events, always events. What does this new definition of concept bring to philosophy? Deleuze thought "concepts and images of thought are assessed not by their content, but according to their mode of expression or the way in which the are thought. This strategy undermines all pretensions to transcendence.

For although there exist certain self-positing absolutes in philosophy such as the Idea, Being, the One, the Whole, or the Subject, Deleuze and Guattari were concerned with the mode of expression of such absolutes rather than viewing all of life from the perspective of their content. Whose interests do they serve? What power-relations do they express? Are they affirmative of desire? This strategy is able to distinguish philosophy from its precursors in religious or wisdom traditions."(269) And through this new image of thought of concepts, Deleuze wanted to open a way against the postmodern claim that philosophy is dead and can neither produce systems nor be itself a system. Deleuze was an interesting figure, or let us say in his words; he was an interesting life, a real singularity because he had many parallel thoughts with postmodern thought such as destructuralism, anti-authoritarianism but he was against the postmodern claim that philosophy is no more living. Postmodern thought defended indeterminacy as if an ontological aspect against philosophical study. But Deleuze took it as a strategy for philosophy to keep creating. In general postmodern thought, indeterminacies are what prevents producing systems and concepts. But for Deleuze, it is just what enables thinking, philosophizing and creating new concepts and images of thoughts. For Deleuze, man can produce only in the absence of representations and certainties. Therefore, immanence and uncertainties are necessary for the future of philosophy .Philosophy is now needed more than any other time, because we have no more absolutes over us, no transcendents that show our way. Philosophy and man are now on their own; now they are real, direct speakers to each another. With his this exceptional thinking, he also exemplified that every life, every mind, every thought is a singularity, an indefiniteness. No thought necessarily follows another. And therefore there is not any transcendent order ruling over this world and our thoughts.

Chapter 4:
Conclusion-Criticisms About The Struggle Against Transcendence

In this thesis, I wanted to study, first, Deleuze's serious connection to the demarcation problem in philosophy between transcendence and immanence. Secondly, I tried to present Deleuze's dualist approach to concepts; his distinction between concepts as "strategies" versus concepts as "meanings" and his preference of the former over the latter. Thirdly, I studied Hume's effect on the emergence of this dualist approach. Then, I wanted to relate this issue of concepts both to the demarcation problem in philosophy and to the dispute on the future of philosophy; I tried to set this relation from Deleuze's perspective.

In this chapter, I want to present some criticisms about Hume and Deleuze. Patton says that Deleuze was a pioneer of the deconstructive technique of reading philosophical texts against themselves. For example, he demonstrated that the means to overturn Platonism are provided by Plato himself and he applied this technique of critical reading to produce a systematic Nietzsche and Kantian foundations for a transcendental empiricism.(270) Reading this, I wanted to see if the means to reject some of Hume's or Deleuze's thoughts were already supplied within those thoughts themselves.

I want to start with the criticisms about Hume. He seemed a genuine skeptic. However, he ridiculed skepticism himself. He did not yield to science even; he had said that the nourishment of bodies by food was an inexplicable mystery, the cohesion of the parts of the matters was incomprehensible (271). Nevertheless, he also stated that a would be ridiculous if he pretended to reject Newton's explication of the wonderful phenomenon of the rainbow because that explication was giving a minute autonomy of the rays of light-a subject, forsooth, too refined for human comprehension.(272) He was both saying that the explanations of even science

were unintelligible to human mind and he was telling that man had no other chance than surrendering the claims of sciences.

A second conflict in Hume was his saying that God or any other metaphysical issue were illegitimate issues for men since they were beyond the limits of experience and Hume was abstaining from this issues for the sake of, or in the name of naturalism but also he was admitting that no other truth was as obvious, as certain as the being of God, which the most ignorant ages acknowledged, for which the most refined geniuses have ambitiously striven to produce new proofs and arguments; and he said no other truth was so important as this because it was the ground of al our hopes, the surest foundation of our morality, the firmest support of society, and the only principle which ought never to be a moment absent from our thoughts and meditations. (273) We see that Hume was trying to ban what was most immediate and inevitable for man. He was, however, aware of the paradox that the most unintelligible was the most important to human concern and curiosity. Then what was really natural? The experiencible or the unignorable? Hume's philosophy cannot be said to have achieved a certain answer to this.

Thirdly, Hume's skepticism was for the sake of saving men from erroneous traditions that were suppressing their passions and happiness. But he also stated the agonies coming along with skepticism. He was saying that it was impossible for a man to persevere in this total skepticism or to make it appear in his conduct for a few hours because external objects would press in upon him, passions would solicit him, his philosophical melancholy would dissipate, and even the utmost violence upon his own temper would not be able, during any time, to preserve the poor appearance of skepticism and, he asked, for what reason a man would impose on himself such a violence.(274) Yes, the skepticism was violence. It was the only right attitude toward the world but it was violence. Then what was good for man or what was natural for him to do? To deceive himself but be saved from violent thoughts or to seek only the certain but fail to find it and torture himself? Does Hume's ethics actually solve this dilemma?

A fourth conflict in Hume's ethics, I believe, is to do with his claim about sublime enthusiasms. He was against the maxim that what a man could perform sometimes, and in some dispositions, he could perform always and in every position.(275) He was saying "When the mind, by Stoical reflections, is elevated into a sublime enthusiasm of virtue and strongly summit with any species of honor or public good, the utmost bodily pain and sufferings will not prevail over such a high sense of duty; and it is possible, perhaps, by its means, even to smile and exult in the midst of tortures. If this sometimes may be the case in fact and reality, much more may a philosopher, in his school or even in his closet, work himself up to such an enthusiasm and support in imagination, the acutest pain or most calamitous event which we can possibly conceive. But how shall he support this enthusiasm itself? The bent of his mind relaxes and cannot be recalled at pleasure; avocations lead him astray; misfortunes attack him unawares; and the philosopher sinks, by degree into the plebeian." (276) As we see, Hume rejected the sublime enthusiasms as a means to be moral because he did not believe that they could be constant. However, the same question can be asked about the principles in his ethics; if men cannot keep the sublime enthusiasm for morality, how can he keep his "sympathy" for others' benevolence, how can he keep, or rather endure, the skepticism against illusions? How can we know these? Beside these questions, It seems absurd, inconsistent to me that Hume looked for an absolute, constant principle to justify morality. He had always been against absolutes and the claims of truth and constancy of some traditional and metaphysical principles about the world and morals, but he himself was rejecting a principle since it was not constant or absolute in every situation. As a man trusting only in experiences and cases, he should not have rejected a working principle just because it does not work in every situation. Should it really matter for an empiricist that a man is sometimes a believer and enthusiastic to be good but sometimes he loses his belief and his ecstacy weakens? Why not? Are not such worries are the worries of religious people or priests? Does man absolutely and exactly be a believer or non-believer?

Is the world or are our experiences so certain, so clear, so narrow, so intelligible, so able for one type of explanation that people do never hesitate between feelings?

The fifth contradiction in Hume's views is about the bad effects of organized religions. He said, "the worst effect of organized religion is its subversion of sincerity and self-knowledge. No man can at will command his own inner faith, which depends on grace, the most he can do is force himself to profess it, whether he believes it or not. Thus, unlike the inescapable human propensity to causal inference and the belief in an order of nature upon which all action depends, ordinary religious belief is a form of make-believe which, treated as a religious obligation, becomes a chain of hypocrisy which leads by degrees to dissimulation, fraud and falsehood. Hence the reason of the vulgar observation that the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being inconsistent, are often, or commonly united in the same individual character."(277) Hume said that organized religions carry the probability of hypocrisy because one may not always have the same belief with the same sincerity. However, is not the same risk of question with disbelief or skepticism? Can a man always abstain from organized beliefs and religious faith with the same certainty in his heart? Can a man really manage to remain indifferent to sublime feelings or to be capable of not bothering religious anxieties? Is not the same case of hypocrisy true for a skeptic or an atheist who is determined not to believe but who cannot help thinking of those religious feelings and yet who pretends not to have any of those inner dilemmas? I think just as man does not have command over his inner faith, he does not have control over his skepticism or disbelief, either. On the other hand, what Hume thought about the religious beliefs is true for all wills, all beliefs of men. In philosophy of psychology, there is a concept of "second-order wills." For example, I smoke but I want not to have willed smoking. Or I do not believe that the world will get better but I want to have been believing this. This lack of control on our thoughts and wills is true for all types of thoughts. Many times we behave in contrast to our inner faiths because of some life strategies, some obligations or for some expectations.

As the sixth contradiction, I want to discuss Hume's views on miracles. "Hume argues that the weakness and contrariety of all evidence for miracles, taken together with the overwhelming probability of laws of nature discovered by science and common sense is sufficient to establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have sufficient force to prove a miracle, or, which is perhaps more important to the present purpose, to make it a just foundation for any religious system. Thus all revealed religion, resting as it must upon a miracle, is contrary to reason. It is religious faith alone which justifies belief in the miracle of revelation, not the supposed miracle which supports the faith."(278) We see that Hume did not accept miracles and he thought that everything is explicable in terms of natural events. This means that everything is natural; miracles, too, are natural events. I do not discuss here if there are really miracles but I want to ask this; if there is no proof for anything extraordinary or miraculous in nature, how can we claim that some thought associations are legitimate but some are not; some beliefs are natural for man but some are not; some relations are right but some data are accidentally related; some wills are ill (279) but some natural? If we cannot speak of miracles or an order in a universe, we cannot speak of accidents, either. Both are equally illegitimate, and against the spirit of empiricism and skepticism. To defend skepticism against the belief of immortality, One should also defend skepticism against inexistence if he wants to be really sceptic and objective; if he wants to avoid bias. But, considering these, I do not think that Hume was actually objective. Aiken, too, states that Hume was actually standing beyond skepticism and ambiguity about philosophical theism; he was unalterably opposed to all varieties of religious belief.(280) How can the kind of a naturalist man like Hume separate man from nature? How can he deny miracles in nature but accept them in mind? Is not man a real part of nature? Beside, in the *Dialogues* (281), he said that determination to belief is contrary to human nature and if one did this, it was a miracle. I do not understand how does a naturalist philosopher attempt to decide on what is natural and what is not? Can he judge on this, though he criticizes prescriptions by religions about man and his nature? Will not he have done the

same mistake, will not he have exceeded his limits ethically daring to decide on the natural? And, a second thing I do not understand is that, why does an empiricist first defend that truth and knowledge are not concern of philosophy but then he rejects some ideas for the reason that they are false, erroneous, fiction, or illusion? If the foundation of our beliefs are our interests, needs and passions, why shall we care if they are met by truths or illusions? Why does it matter to prove the miracles rationally or empirically instead of evaluating them in terms of their being good life strategies, good practical tools? Would not an empiricist take the second way? And if we are really naturalists or utilitarians and if it is we who see a natural event as a miracle, why does it matter to believe in miracles or not? Why to get rid of "bigotry and superstitions"(282) if our foundation for beliefs is not truth but interest? And why to eliminate some beliefs if there is really no truth or knowledge? Does the fact that our beliefs do not depend on reason but on passions make our beliefs less valid or less natural? Does not the fact that human nature is partial (283) and the world is indefinite make our all choices equally legitimate, equally justified?

The seventh doubt about Hume's views can be the following; Hume said that he was not against religion but its vulgar forms.(284) However, I want to ask, is this risk true only about religious beliefs? Do not political beliefs, scientific beliefs, even, carry the same risk of transforming into traditions, institutions and gain transcendent status and vulgar forms? I think, this is not about the kind of beliefs but this is to do with our nature, our tendencies. In *Anti-Oedipus*, Foucault and Deleuze described well how Marxism turned into a sort of fascism, though it had emerged against it. We also know how Nietzsche was trying to save humans from repressive and heavy ideals but he had ended up with another representation; "overman". Hume, too, was aware that whether based on revelation or not, all beliefs had the probability of losing their rationality and becoming transcendent principles. Therefore he said: "natural religion (versus the revealed one) is claimed to be founded, not on faith or revelation, but on reason and experience; such beliefs are rational beliefs and subject therefore to precisely the same laws of logic and evidence which are employed in the support or refutation of any proposition of

science. Hence, anyone whose religious beliefs are founded exclusively upon the teachings of Natural Religion must regard them with the same limited skepticism and tentativeness with which he regards any statement about the natural world."(285) Also, from Hume's these statements, we can easily infer that he set a binary opposition, a strict dichotomy between religious beliefs and non-religious ones. He thought as though religious beliefs had no rationality and people were converted to them completely out of reason; and the beliefs in Natural Religion were not irrational at all, were entirely empirical and rational. Is such a sharp distinction possible or available? On the other hand, we know that Deleuze was exactly against binary oppositions and false dilemmas. This is a point where Hume and Deleuze could not reconcile, I think.

Another criticism about Hume, and a difference between him and Deleuze perhaps could be that; Hume has been criticized for bearing a gap between cognition and reality; "the only solution to Humean skepticism is to insist that there is no gap between cognition and reality because they are infact one. There is no mind-independent world. Subject and object, self and other are all aspects of the absolute."(286) If Hume's skepticism can really bring a gap between reason and world, if it really contains a risk of dualism, the dualism of world versus man, this can never reconcile with Deleuze's understanding of immanence. If immanence is not completely attainable; naturalism cannot be achieved, transcendence cannot be prevented, and binary series cannot be avoided. Warnock also mentions the inconsistency in Hume's ethics; "Hume is here accurate about the nature of moral judgements at the expense of his general epistemology. For he is, in general, committed to the view that we have no access, in perceiving or judging, to anything except our own feelings, coming one by one like images on a screen, and made up by us, through imagination, into objects independent of us in the outside world. But here, talking about morals, he supposes that we are able to consider the world apart from our immediate, unfocused feelings, and distinguish those that are based on a general judgement of the world and those that are not. But this internal inconsistency is not my concern here…" (287) In his epistemology, Hume said that

our senses could always deceive us, we could not trust our reason, our feelings might always interfere in our rationality, and therefore, there could not be true knowledge in fact. However, in his ethics, he told the opposite that morals had to be rational, as if we could really perceive and think on the world as independent from our feelings. How could our rationality be pure and free in ethics whereas it was unable to do this in epistemology. This is a dualism, an inconsistency, a double standard and against Deleuze's immanence, I think.

A final question is about Hume's moral predicates. "The chief moral sentiments in Hume's scheme are benevolence (the spontaneous inclination to promote another's good) and sympathy (imaginatively experiencing another's emotion.)"(288) I want to apply Hume's skepticism about the maintenance of sublime enthusiasm to his own moral predicate "sympathy". Hume was telling that sublime enthusiasm could encourage us for behaving morally and against wicked treatments but it might not be always possible to keep this feeling.(289) Similarly, I would like to ask, can assure that one can always maintain his sympathy for others? Or can we assure that this feeling is able to remain independent from the intervention of our other feelings? If we remember that we are partial beings (290) and our mental associations, thought relations and feelings are never independent or simple, as Hume said, we cannot give affirmative answers to these questions. Beside, there appears another inconsistency here. If we remember Hume's skepticism about testimony (291), how can we assure ourselves that sympathy suffices to be benevolent and moral towards others? Hume was telling that we cannot trust in others' testimony about the claims on world (for example, claims of miracles) Such claims require independent sources like our own memory or experience (as if these were reliable). However, Hume thought that another's sympathy was enough to maintain my well-being. Or how can I be sure that another person will treat me well, without the guaranty of any independent principle, just because he is able to imagine my pain and pleasures? Others' thoughts are unreliable in epistemology but more reliable, in ethics, than some rules, traditions or laws! And can I be satisfied that another's experiences of pain

and pleasure are parallel, similar-qualitatively and quantitively- with mine? And is not it just an induction that all humans have the same senses of pains and pleasure? Remember the degree of reliability of inductions for Hume. Warnock mentions this question as well; "The huge merit of Hume's theory of morality is that he sees not only that it is founded on sympathy and our ability to be moved by the pleasures and pains of other people, but that dependent as our moral sense is on our own sentiments of pleasure and pain in the contemplation of actions, it is not just any sentiment of pleasure and pain which denominates an action virtuous and vicious." (292) Besides, I cannot help thinking that even if one really imagines my pains and feels sympathy towards me, there can still be other factors, exterior or in his thinking, that prevents him from helping me. Hume, too, uttered this contingency and said "Tis one thing to know virtue and another to conform the will to it." (293) Sympathy, hence, is not sufficient on its own to constitute the basis of ethics. And, immanence alone is not a sufficient criterion to decide between moral predicates.

After the specific criticisms about Hume's ethics, I want to move on to more general questions about transcendence-immanence distinction in philosophy and Deleuze. In his book *What Is Philosophy?*, Deleuze mentioned the risk that transcendence could always be reintroduced into the "plane of immanence."(294) He mentioned the same risk in *Pure Immanence-Essays On A Life:* "It is always possible to invoke a transcendent that falls out of the plane of immanence or that attributes immanence to itself, all transcendence is constituted solely in the flow of immanent consciousness that belongs to this plane. Transcendence is always a product of immanence."(295) First of all, I want to study this constant risk of transcendence in immanence. What makes transcendence so easy, so ready, so inevitable? And I want start with the questions about human nature as a factor that calls transcendence back into the "plane of immanence." As we remember, Hume was saying that the nature of God was impossible to determine, and no proof of His existence was valid, the admission that He existed was wholly vacuous.(296) This is a fact on one hand. On the other, are humans the kind of beings who clear their hands of whatever vacuous for them? I do not think so at all. Sorensen tells this

feature of us very nicely: "I suppose it may be use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in quiet ignorance of those things which, upon examination, are found to beyond the reach of our capacities."(297) Hume had said that it was one thing to know virtue and another to conform the will to it.(298) Similarly, I want to say that it is one thing to know that you cannot reach something but another to stand wondering and willing it. Again Sorensen's sentence "kNOw limits" visually explains the case with humans.(299) And I do not think this is an abnormal thing considering that we are passionate beings and even our reason is not free from those passions. What I do not understand is that Hume, though he admitted the significance of passions, thought as if we really could hold ourselves before the concerns that are beyond our comprehension. And if we really want to move approach the situations and ourselves from the naturalist perspective, we must accept and not judge that the edge of reason is not parallel with the edge of imagination, wishes, and concerns. This is a desperate peculiarity of us.

The second factor welcoming transcendence can be the unintelligibility of universe, which justifies our over-curiosity. Hume was telling about the weakness of human reason even in the subjects of common life, practice and scientific issues such as matter, cause and effect, space, time, extension, etc., which are, though, open to experimenting.(300) The case is: on one hand we are very curious beings, on the other the universe is silent to us. Almost a paradox, this situation can always enable transcendence, which is a helpless way. The man has to fill the gaps some way. Deleuze was also aware that the plane of immanence was chaotic and full of gaps, requiring some "mortar."(301) The "neutrality of experience"(302) is not a new issue in philosophy and man will always feel have to transform this neutrality himself. However, I think that the insistence on man's leaving things beyond his comprehension aside would not in fact reconcile with Deleuze's opposition to schizophrenia; the man's splitting into pieces. How can we ignore one aspect of our character for the sake of enhancing another. If we do this, it can be justified as a

preference but it cannot be forced as the ultimate and true choice. This is man's own nature that he meddles with things whether they are within the limits of experience or not, and we have to accept this nature as it is if we are really naturalists and against the suppressions on our nature. The suppressions are suppressions we do and we cannot avoid naturally. Even if we manage to abstain from one sort of transcendence, we are caught by another; because it is we who necessitates it. Milne expresses this fact well: "When we stop obeying God, the state, our parents, reason appears and persuades us to continue being docile because it says to us: it is you who are giving orders. Reason represents our slavery and our subjection as something superior which make us reasonable beings."(303) The subjection to transcendence here, I think, becomes a matter of persuasion, preference or consent, not a matter of suppression alone. Perhaps man consents to rules over him because he is aware of his troublesome, risky assets and estimates the possible wicked destinations; "Montaigne's essay 'How The Soul Discharges Passions On False Objects When The True Are Wanting" contains a precocious reference to transference: 'it seems that the soul, once stirred and set in motion, is lost in itself unless we give it something to grasp; and we must always give it an object to aim and act on. We see that the soul in its passions will sooner deceive itself by setting up a false and fantastical object, even contrary to its own belief, than not act against something.'" (304) As we see, our nature is something we may not approve but we cannot help.

Thirdly, concerning what may be welcoming transecendence, I want to ask a related question. Deleuze and Hume were against transcendence because it was so prescriptive over man. But is prescription something bad and out of our nature altogether? We must know that there are counterviews to Deleuze's. "When describing, I try to make my words fit the world. When prescribing, I try to make the world fit my words. It is the difference between reporting 'the music stopped' and demanding 'stop' the music. The prescriptive group contains orders, suggestions, rules and questions (because questions are requests); other non-descriptive functions are emotive, that is, they serve to express or evoke emotions.

Optatives, cheers and curses live in this category."(305) Then we do not have to choose between prescription and description, rather we must not because both are serving different and unquittable functions and needs. And from another perspective, prescriptions are not bad at all, because they are our wishes, demands, needs, activity before the world, which are again not independent from our passions. If descriptivity is to do with the expression of our emotions, prescriptions are to do with the performance or actualization of those emotions, especially passions to change and control. Not one of them is irrelevant to emotions or out of our nature. Both attitudes are a part of us. Prescription does not mean passivity of man alone.

Another difficulty with transcendence-immanence separation is to do with the shift from ontology to epistemology. Deleuze and Hume are known for their insistence on this shift; their insistence on the claim that ontology should not constitute the basis of ethics because it is not completely within our comprehension and experience, but epistemology makes a better base for ethics since it is, at least, more capable of involving human emotions and practicality. Here, we see another false dilemma, another unnecessary separation that ontology is, as if, totally irrelevant to human emotions and only epistemology provides it. However, we must bear in mind that no matter if true or not, man s capable of being moved by the contents of ontology. The differences among man's attitudes and conducts towards various theses of God (think of deism, pantheism, etc.) demonstrate that there are relations between ontology and ethics; between contents, meanings and practices. Any thesis about the existence and nature of God is equally unempirical but yet each one has different effects on man's feelings and acts. Though all are beyond full comprehension, each have references to different contingencies, probabilities in life. And, even if all probabilities do not come true, they are still within immanence, I think. Even if ontology is out of man's reach in terms of true knowledge, it is not outside human concern and sensation in terms of conduct. Sorensen, too, utters this relation between ontology and actions, using reference to language: "The sentence 'Chemical weapons are evil' is a hidden imperative of the

form ‘don’t use chemical weapons.’ Since imperatives do not describe anything, they lack a truth value. As George Berkeley first emphasized, language serves purposes beyond the exchange of factual reports: ‘the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action: the putting the mind in some particular disposition: to which the former is in many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language’” and Austin agrees: “It is a curious point, of which idealist philosophers used to make much at one time, that ‘real’ itself, in certain uses, may belong to this family. ‘Now this is a real carving-knife!’ may be one way of saying that this is a good carving-knife. And it is sometimes said of a bad poem, for instance that it isn’t really a poem at all…” (306) When we think of ontology from such a perspective, we may infer that ontology is not just the study or the knowledge of existence alone. The sentence “God exists” is perhaps a way of saying “we need to be moral” or “beware of what you do”. Thus we can say that ontology is as good a strategy, a good basis of ethics as epistemology. Remember Nietzsche’s famous saying “God is dead” and think of the uncertainty about whether this is an epistemological sentence or an ontological one. Sometimes their functions and effects overlap.

The fifth question on Deleuze’s obsession with immanence is about the quality and frame of human concerns. Do our concerns play a role in determining what is immanent? Are, for example, the explosions in other galaxies more to our interest than the metaphysical issue of God’s existence? Which is more immanent, more immediate to our concerns? Does empiricality play a sufficient role in determining the area of immanence? Concerning this fear of metaphysics, Russell, too, asks some questions: “Nobody really worries much about what is going to happen millions of years hence. Even if they think they are worrying much about that, they are really deceiving themselves. They are worried about something much more mundane, or it may merely be a bad digestion: but nobody is really seriously

rendered unhappy by the thought of something that is going to happen to this world millions and millions of years hence."(307) It is no need to think of that further, I think. I suppose, people mostly do not think on what is happening in another continent, on a war in a country, on some problems in their country or on some health problems of themselves. And I suppose transcendents are not less significant to their interests even if not more. Then what is really immanence, immediacy, in terms of our emotional lives? This is not as an easy question as Deleuze would respond, I think. And the relation between ethics and immanence or transcendence is more complicated than Deleuze's taking it only in terms of repression or desires. Remember Kant' saying: "We need only to look at the attempts of moralists in this style, and we shall find appeals to human nature…perfection…happiness, here moral sense, there fear of God, a bit of this, a bit of that, an amazing mishmash" (308) Considering these, I do not think that all these questions can be solved by a single strategy or criterion. Moreover, there cannot be, should not be determined one single end for ethics and philosophy. "Question of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof…however considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or to withhold its assent." (309) The end Deleuze suggested for ethics, actualization of desires; and the end he proposed for philosophy, creation and taste, are perhaps one of the greatest ones, yet they cannot claim by right to meet all expectations. Otherwise, it would be a mere representation like others.

As the sixth, I want to ask some questions about the dichotomy of man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be. Is this a real separation? Can there really be made a decision? Does one necessarily make a choice? I remember that Deleuze was against binary opposition, then I think that he should have rejected to emphasize only one side of this series. Then, I remember that the second fold of this series can easily be attributed some transcendence, and here emerges the paradox. Human nature contains both parts, I think. We both like to live all our instincts as they are and we also like to behave against ourselves. We both enjoy being what we are and sometimes we like to be something else. Life, full of

indefiniteness and infinities, put all these feelings before us. And this issue, i.e., being what we are or forcing to become some ideal being, is not only to do with metaphysical or heavy topics; psychology tells that we have many "second-order wills" (310) about very simple, daily life matters, such as smoking, biting our nails, thinking to what side to comb our hair…We always utter sentences like "I wish I had not been so fond of desserts, I wish I were thirty again, I wish I were born fifty years ago, I wish my eyes were a little bigger, I wish I could go to that concert…" Is it really possible to ignore willing those second-order wills? Is it really possible not to will those wills? Is this really a drawback, wishing to be different, or is not it a capability as well? I think that both the alley cat and the apartment cat are cats. We are both what we are and what we want to be.

The seventh question is about the use, the role of problems about transcendence, prescription and representation in philosophy. The problem of transcendence has long been a problem, not only in ethics, but also in science. Readhead's an explanation about Popper reveals this problem; "Popper is another philosopher who attacked what he called methodological essentialism, the thesis that 'it is the task of science to discover and to describe the true nature of things.' Rather he advocated the methodological nominalism which aims at describing how a thing behaves in various circumstances and especially whether there are any regularities in its behavior." (311) It is clear that many disciplines have been after narrowing down the roles of themselves. And perhaps this is for the sake of avoiding as many errors as possible. (312) Again many thinkers, one of whom is Deleuze, have been discussing on the duty or basis of philosophy. And this question has been discovered to be tightly related with transcendence-immanence struggle. When transcendence was not avoided, the role of philosophy was widening but along with the increasing risk of errors or illusions. When immanence was demanded, the role was narrowing but along with the complaint that philosophy was becoming a bad simulation of science. Then the question came; was this tension of transcendence a real problem? Have philosophers really bothered or wondered it so? Stove does not agree and say: "That philosophy begins in wonder is a stupid

remark which has repeated for 2500 years, although anyone might easily have observed that any time philosophers are often the most incurious of men. No, philosophy typically begins in pseudo-wonder, expressed by asking 'questions' which are really no questions at all." (313) And North agrees that "There are no problems; only opportunities."(314) Sorensen agrees that "Asking pseudo-question might cause benefits."(315) and he hopes that pseudo-problems will curb the rejection of genuine problems. (316) Against the philosophy's or sciences' efforts to get rid of their pasts, their degradation of other fields and making these nobility or role discussions a problem, Nietzsche says, "do you really believe that the sciences would ever have originated and grown if the way had not been prepared by magicians, alchemists, astrologers and witches whose promises and pretensions first had to create a thirst, a hunger, a taste for hidden and forbidden powers? Indeed, infinitely more had to be promised than could ever be fulfilled in order that anything at all might be fulfilled in the realms of knowledge."(317) Russell, too, is flexible and tolerant about this matter. For example, he tells that the philosophical theories can still be useful and valuable even if they are false and refuted because they still can help to reach the better comprehension of the job.(318) Therefore, I want to think that the transcendence-immanence problem can be taken as a means to grasp better the other problems in philosophy, no matter it is solved itself or not. Even if transcendence is really a curse as it is commonly supposed, I am sure it has evoked many perspectives and thought images. Instead of, or let us be more flexible, apart from doing philosophy to find how to eliminate transcendence altogether, we can do philosophy to discover and compare how the ways would be with and without transcendence. This is a richer and more challenging attempt for philosophy, I think. And perhaps these confusions, uncertainties, absences of answers, problems make philosophy what it is and this is what gives it the taste. As to Deleuze's obsession, Marcus Aurelius's following words could be a good advice: "Is your cucumber bitter? Throw it away. Are there briars in your path? Turn aside. That is enough. Do not go on to say, 'Why were things of this sort ever brought into the world?'"(319)

As another criticism against the obsession with immanence and the crazy enmity toward metaphysics, the negligence of the satisfaction of some human needs is mentioned. Adams, for instance, says: "Along with the rupture from Aristotelian metaphysics and science, from the eighteenth century, various thinkers, including Hume, Kant, and Kierkegaard, all attempted to put morality on new foundations. But all such attempts were doomed to failure because they only had two of Aristotle's elements to work with: man-as-he-happens-to-be and moral prescription. What they lacked was the concept of a telos, the fulfillment of the human essence, which gives coherence and meaning to the other elements. The ultimate consequence of their inevitable failure has been the moral and cultural emptiness of the modern world."(320) I really appreciate this criticism because it reveals two ignored facts. The first is, no matter the religions and traditions were full of suppressive transcendents or not, they were providing people with telos, civilization and culture which are important needs. Apart from their role of regulating social or personal life, they were serving other functions, too and perhaps these strategies were making them so long-lasting even when they were full of absurdities. Epicureans, too, were mentioning this reality saying that they were seeing no hesitation to worship non-existing gods together with the society because this was a socializing, uniting strategy. The second fact or question is about the source of religions and metaphysics: if we think that metaphysics is a human product, why to kick it out so outrageously, because our production is our nature. If we think that metaphysics is really fed by revelation, then this means that we are accepting that revelation is real and this also means that we are challenging against a God or powers over us. What to do with this paradox? In anyhow, the claim of right to remove metaphysics altogether requires to be more persuasive and sound.

A ninth question is related to the past experiences about this transcendence-immanence battle. Ree warns about the unwanted results of this struggle: "In other words, everyone has, for each and for all, a possible dimension of escape or of tyranny, insofar as integration, though a free, practical unity, refers everyone who

has been integrated back to an 'immanence-transcendence' tension which is in danger of breaking into transcendence or into a false immanence which conceals a dominating transcendence. In any case, we shall call the individual's being-in-the-group, insofar as it is mediated by the common praxis of a regulatory third party, his interiority or bond of interiority in relation to the group."(321) Ree's this warning was about politics, ideology and Marxism. We must remember that many movements to save people from tyranny ended up with worse tyrannies; many attempts to clear off transcendence ended up with pseudo-immanence. Distinct and open ideas turned into ideologies and institutions. That is, the over-insistence on immanence may bring extremities or marginalities but not the immanence expected. Sorensen expresses this risk as "the unity of opposites" and as "from illusion to inclusion." (322) Here I infer that immanence and transcendence is not so easy to differentiate, there are lines they overlap or become one. The ones who claim that this distinction is easy are just mistaken, I believe, at least in philosophy. About this distinction, some examples are given like, "Many scientists complain that the medieval school men had an irrational loyalty to a priori methods such as conceptual analysis. Instead if arguing about whether women have fewer teeth than men, the armchair biologists should have simply counted." (323) However, I do not think that the situation is not that easy or simple with God, morals, justice, etc… We cannot say "Instead of discussing whether God exists or not, let us go to space and see".

The tenth criticism about over-insistence on immanence comes from Renaut. Renaut reminds us of Husserl's saying "transcendence in immanence" and refers to the fact immanence may not be immanent as well. Renaut explains this risk probability as: "In shattering the illusions of immanence, the human sciences, far from leading to a dissolution of the idea of the subject, have created instead the conditions under which an inquiry can be launched into what is most irreducible in subjectivity: the self's non-coincidence with itself, its openness to an irreducible otherness and exteriority."(324) In his another criticism, he mentions "the extraordinary obsession with immanence: convinced that knowledge is a

relationship of the same to other" and relates this to the case that "man shuts himself like a monad" (325) Here, I want to remind again Sorensen's expression "the unity of oppositions"(326), which best pictures the situation. Deleuze's philosophy is claimed to be an over-insistence on immanence and containing the danger of bringing transcendence back. Wyschograd says: "Deleuze and Guattari's antinomianism derives from an account of desiring production that conceals a metaphysical monism beneath the differential and pluralistic character of their vision of the real…This single-minded quest for ecstasy by way of a hidden monism is bound up with the coercive seam in the otherwise an archaic postmodernism of Deleuze."(327) Ward makes a similar criticism and says: "Deleuze affirms a radical immanentism, a nihilistic monism or ontology which is at odds with what is evidently a search for a transcendental empiricism in postmodern thinking…"(328) Then we can say that Deleuze's philosophy is somewhere between hope and despair. Pseudo-Heracleitus says: "Difference in sameness is the root of all delight. Sameness in difference is the root f all despair."(329) Will Deleuze's immanentism manage to make a difference or will it be a mere repetition of failure? And should we really hope its success or escape it? This question is because "There are two tragedies in life: One is not to get your heart's desire. The other is to get it." (said Bernard Shaw)(330)

The eleventh question is about the objections to representations. We know that Deleuze hated them. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* he said that representing and being represented are a mania that is common to all slaves.(331) However, there are ones thinking differently. I had read two interesting articles about whether economics was a science or not. Both articles were published in 1992, in *Chem NZ,* a journal of the New Zealand Institute of Chemistry. Arthur Williamson was defending that economics was different from natural sciences, especially from physics. Seamus Hogan was defending that economics is not a less natural science than physics. What attracted me in Hogan's article was his conception of representations: "One similarity between the physical sciences and economics is that both involve the systematic investigation of complex phenomena. The human

brain has only a limited capacity to comprehend complex systems of interacting forces without an organizing framework. One way of providing such a framework is to invent ideal worlds that contain many of the interactions that we wish to comprehend but are still relatively simple and can be used as benchmarks against which the real world is analyzed." (332) Hogan was claiming that representations, i.e., the organizing frameworks were our tools to understand the world, we were using them in fact to make the world more immanent, immediate and intelligible for us. Then, the correlation between transcendence and representations is not true, at least is not a necessary one. Sometimes the representations are our ways of removing some sort of transcendence and feeling the world as more open and direct to us. Hogan also claimed that each scientific experiment was a representation because they were controlled, they were attempts to create the conditions of an imagined "ideal" world (a simplified world) in order to isolate a small number of phenomena from the distractions of real-world interactions. (333) In fact every experiment was an interference with the object of a theory. This means that our any experience, which we think immanent, is in fact a simplification of reality, otherwise, there cannot be really an experience. Representations are inevitable for our reason and experiences, hence, they are natural. Levinas also mentions some good aspects of representations: "Representations is an assembling, a lucidity, an activity of mind which allows nothing to escape. In short, representation or the representational ground consists in immanence."(334) We see that contrary to taking representations as gates to transcendence, some philosophers see them as the condition of immanence; both because they are unavoidable activities and nature of our mind and since they help us to get closer to the world. Some may think that if we should see ourselves as separate from universe, we feel obliged to get close to it. However logical this explanation can be, if man cannot help feeling him apart from the world and feels such anyway, we cannot despise the reality and him for his feelings and for forming representations. Bertens also justifies representations from another point of view: "Progress depends on ever new representations that do not represent the world. On process, not on resolution." (335) One can infer,

then, that if a representation works, this means we have grasped an aspect of reality, if it does not work or fit to reality, we will have lost nothing but learnt something again about the reality or another aspect of than the one we have been examining. May be the world-as-it-is-not moves us closer to the-world-as-it-is. And the-man-as-he-could-be helps us to learn nature of the-man-as-he-happens-to-be, no matter we see each of them as distinct things or as things which in fact are one. Finally, representations, "reproblematizations and deproblematizations" (336) are all our natural mental activities; no need to despise them, which would mean despising ourselves. The world still can be unintelligible and indefinite but it is no use to turn this to an all-or-nothing matter; even if we may not find a truth or knowledge about the universe, it is nothing bad to try or to learn smaller, partial things. Then, perhaps the question is not representations but forcing them to be absolute or repressive, political strategies; i.e. the problem is the distinction between representation and reduction/ totalization.

As for the twelfth, Goodchild explains the relation between transcendence and ethics from another point. He renders transcendence a necessity, a strategy for practicality. Transcendence can actually be a source of " bad ressentiment"(337), yet the ways going to it were not so arbitrary because: "a notion of truth is essential for practical living. Yet truth is not something self-evident: the truth-value of any particular proposition is independent of the content of the proposition in all cases except for tautologies and self-contradictions. Apart from such purely analytic propositions (and who is to judge that a proposition is analytic?), a proposition does not disclose its relationship to the state of affairs that it designates. If knowledge is attached to a notion of truth, then philosophy must make appeal to some transcendent term that will guarantee the conditions under which truth is produced, so that the gap between thought and being is bridged; philosophy has not restricted itself in the metaphysical foundations it has invented to guarantee truth. The problem remains, however, of the truth of such foundations, leading to an infinite regression; the problem also remains of whether thought does, or indeed can, conform to being."(338) Then we can catch a different view from Deleuze's

that we can still know that transcendents and so-called truths do not have truth-value or proof, yet they can still serve as working strategies in ethics; remember Epicureans and Kant's saying "It is necessary to believe in a God, even if I don't". And we have also seen that there is not a single-line relation between pluralities/ multiplicities and transcendence. It can be true that transcendence is mostly a barrier before pluralities but sometimes it is that pluralities which obliges man to transcendence. Adams, also, justify one of the ways to transcendence: "We may ignore or be entirely ignorant of intellectual pursuits but we cannot avoid the need to act, or to judge the consequences of our actions for others, and we cannot, unless our circumstances are peculiarly desperate, avoid making choices about how we ought to live. Such actions and judgements and decisions involve beliefs, and it is in this sphere of social belief that the nature of ideology lies."(339) Considering these circumstances, we may think that Deleuze's radical immanentism is a bit luxurious. And again we see that there is not a single-way relation between transcendence and practicality; It is not true that transcendence is always opposite of practice, but sometimes it is the necessary condition, the starting point of action.

There are also less philosophical but literary and artistic looks at transcendence, which can inspire philosophy as well. For instance, Altieri says: "God for the contemporaries manifests himself as energy, as the intense expression of immanent power." (340) Perhaps God is the impression of what we would like to be and therefore it evokes a will and power in us to be more active and live more. It is a source of inspiration. And I believe that "a life made of only virtualities"(341) would be like a film with no film music. We can complain about director's imposes on our sensations through the film, yet the films are really more fantastic, emotional, full with music, illusory effects, etc. which are of course means of directors. These, yet to be fiction, help to create the mood. Films without famous faces, with unknown actors, with no music, words, etc. are the most boring ones, I think. Sometimes people like to surrender to the perceptions, conceptions of another person. And I think that if transcendence was that bad, Paris would not look so beautiful. Sometimes, transcendence, or even illusions, are our

psychological mechanisms to see only the beauties and thus endure living because the world can be so exhausting, so painful and so boring to be seen as it is. Sorensen, about such cases, says: "We cannot help but believe that the future will resemble the past. We cannot abjure the belief that we act freely. Since an unchangeable cannot be changed by dispute, dispute over compulsive belief is futile. For example, when Hume reached the question whether bodies existed independent of our perceptions, he stated that debate about the matter was futile. We are built to believe that external things exist: 'Nature has not left this to the skeptic's choice, and has doubtless esteemed it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasoning and speculations. We may well ask, what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body?, but it is in vain to ask whether there be a body or not. That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings'" (342) Similarly, I infer, that we may ask what things enables transcendence, what ways bring it to our lives but it is useless to think if it could be not real or how silly that people were believing it. Wittgenstein is told to reject the questions on rationality of such issues, for instance: "Wittgenstein took a similar stand on the question of other minds. We might be able to entertain the possibility of other people being mindless automata, but it is difficult tot sustain the supposition: 'Just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the street, say. Say to yourself, for example: 'The children over there are mere automata: all their liveliness is mere automatism.' And you will either find these words becoming quite meaningless; or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.' There is probably a biological basis for this incapacity. Early primates who readily attributed beliefs and desires to others would outperform solipsistic rivals. For belief-desire explanations make other people more predictable and so are avenues to social success. Thus human beings should be strongly predisposed to attribute mentality. Skepticism about other minds just cannot take root in the human mind-set. Such an asocial hypothesis can be entertained but not believed." (343) Thus, we can infer that the theses about the existence or non-existence of God, or other

transcendent beings can be entertained intellectually, nevertheless, their status as strategies in ethics, their being compulsive beliefs, their relation to our mind-set/ our natural way of reasoning, to moral efficiency and success cannot be denied altogether. We must bear in mind also this: "the factors influencing a belief are sometimes neither rational nor irrational. Often these belief-makers herd us into consensus. For instance, communities really in the face of disasters. Residents adopt a present orientation that deemphasizes concerns about the past and future. They become egalitarian, so status-driven conflicts dissipate. Debate is further curtailed by the appearance of obvious, urgent, concrete remedies. This three-fold reorientation (presentism, egalitarianism, practicalism) is collectively rational in the sense that the psychological transformation of community members bestows a large group benefit. However, each individual's conversion is neither rational nor irrational. The consensus inspired by earthquakes and floods has little to do with the argument or rational calculation of self-interest or moral reasoning."(344) Williams also asks questions on the complexity of the belief-matters, on their incapability to be evaluated only in terms of rationality and empiricality: "In bringing up such bizarre possibilities-I am the only conscious being, the world sprang into existence five minutes ago, laws of physics are about to undergo abrupt change- I am not suggesting that anyone does or should accept them. The question is whether there is any reason to ignore them? Or is it just-as Hume suggested- that skeptical worries are simply ignored without reason?.. So What we like to think of as knowledge is just assumption, however, psychologically natural?" (345) As it has been clear, the discussions of naturalism or immanence requires more than the questions about rationality and empiricality, etc. And finally When I remember Gestalt's psychology of perception, his thesis that our perception completes the missing parts and always sees the pictures as a whole, not partial or in pieces, I cannot help thinking that our mind would do it anyway and complete the gaps in our comprehension, in the intelligibility of universe and in our experiences with some kind of dough no matter that dough is called transcendence or not. Rejecting

the gaps is our natural tendency or need. What we think that should be is not naturalism; the natural is what you have already done.

I also want to talk about illusions. Do illusions deserve only curse? Do not they ever make useful life strategies? As example for illusions that had made good strategies, I had heard that some nations and tribes used to use music and animal costumes (as in the famous novel Dead-Eaters", of which I could not remember the writer) at wars when they lost power so that they gave the impression that they were still strong, resolute, passionate to fight and thus they were frightening their enemies and damaging their psychological power. Another example for unexpected favors of illusions or transcendence is "spandrels", a term of biology and architecture. In biology, it means a product of evolution which is not an adaptation. It may serve a function, but it was not favored by natural selection for serving that function (like useful side-effects in pharmacology). Transcendent factors or illusions may be irrational but they can still perform some surprising strategical uses in practical life.

Finally, I want to speculate a little on why Deleuze, personally, may have chosen a radical immanentism. I have the idea that there were familiar moods behind Deleuze's extraordinary philosophy. My this idea depends on Nietzsche's "tragic question" and method of "dramatization" (346). Deleuze had asked himself the question "What is philosophy? What is it I have been doing all my life?" (347) Urged by Nietzsche, I wanted to ask "What was Deleuze's philosophy? What was it he had been doing all his life?" According to Nietzsche's tragic method, all objects, ends, phenomena and our behaviors are symptoms of some feelings, moods, internal forces and wills. (348) Therefore, while studying any kind of phenomena, instead of asking "what is x?", we must ask "which x? which will is behind it?"(349) If my phenomenon is Deleuze, I need to ask "Which feelings, which forces were behind Deleuze's philosophy?" Again according to Nietzsche, some seemingly different or irrelevant symptoms may be stemming from the same type of forces.(350) In agreement with this, I guess that while forming his philosophy of desire, Deleuze's mood was very close to the moods of the "Lotos-

Eaters". The "Lotos-Eaters", a poem by Alfred Lord Tennyson, is based on a short episode from Odyssey in which the weary Greek veterans of the Trojan War were tempted by a desire to abandon their long voyage homeward. "As Odyssey reported later, 'on the tenth day, we set foot on the land of the lotos-eaters who eat a flowering food. I sat forth certain of my company who mixed with the men of the lotos-eaters who gave them the lotos to taste. Now whosoever of them did eat the honey-sweet fruit of the lotos had no more wish to bring tidings nor to come back but there they chose to abide, forgetful of his homeward way.' Tennyson expands Homer's brief account into an elaborate picture of weariness and the desire for rest and death." (351)

In Tennyson's poem we see that the weariness of veterans and their desire to rest and die are as influential as the intoxicating effect of the lotos. Veterans fought in the Trojan War for high ideals; honour, courage, patriotism… They had to save the esteem of their king and country. But the war and voyage took so long that they reached a limit, a dilemma; to live for themselves, to have a rest for a moment or to keep fighting for sublime ideals. They were exhausted, they had fought against themselves as well. The king was still calling: "Courage! This mounting wave will roll us shoreward soon." The scream "courage" was not seeming as meaningful as it was once. Yet they kept rowing and came unto a land where "the charmed sunset lingered low down"; where there were sweet flowers, fruits, yellow sandy beaches, palm trees, pines, galingales (a plant resembling tall coarse grass)…; where sweet music, softer falls and petals from blown roses on the grass fascinated…(352) The veterans gave up fighting and the voyage homeward. Even the idea of meeting their wives, children, slaves and fatherland was not moving them. They were half-forgotten things now and they decided;

> "Let what is broken so remain
> The gods are hard to reconcile;
> 'Tis hard to settle order once again.
> There is confusion worse than death

Trouble on trouble, pain on pain,
Long labour unto aged breath,
Sore tasks to hearts worn out by many wars…"(353)

When I consider all I know about Deleuze and his attitudes and try to look at him through his own perspectives, I felt as though all the weariness of a whole history of philosophy had been heaped up in his mind as he went through it. For so long, philosophers and philosophies had fought for high ideals; truth, knowledge, freedom, universals… But for what price? Philosophy or Deleuze himself needed a rest. They wished a death which would be better than confusions; living or knowing, reason or senses...? Thus Deleuze decided to give up ideals and the voyage truthward. And he decided to construct a new island of philosophy evoking all desires of man, inviting to taste, to sense, to enjoy. Deleuze is all looking like a lotos-eater to me who is seeking for salvation from past contexts. And in time his philosophy has become the lotos itself. To sum up, what turns out to be marginal and abnormal about Deleuze is in fact the most normal and expected. It is the power of pressure that creates rebels. It is a limit where any human could go and that philosophy would come anyhow. The last question is; how long can we stay on the lotos island, and what if the rebel changes into another weary ideal?

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3. Deleuze, 1991; p.51.

4. Ibid; p.73.

5. Deleuze, 1991; p.44.

6. Goodchild, 1996; pp.47-48.

7. Deleuze, 1991; p.44.

8. Massumi, 1996; p.231.

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10. Kant, 1982.

11. Deleuze, 1983, *Nietzsche And Philosophy;* p.91.

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13. Deleuze, 1983, *Anti-Oedipus;* p.xvi.

14. Deleuze, 1991; p.6.

15. Ibid; p.1.

16. Ibid; p.2.

17. Ibid; pp.43,51.

18. Patton, 1996; p.1.

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21. Williams, 2001; p.245.

22. Massumi, 1996; p.231.

23. Eucken, 1913; p.468.

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25. Massumi, 1996; p. 231.

26. Deleuze, 1991; pp.49-51.

27. Railton, 2004; p.280.

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32. Ibid; p.xix.

33. Leiter, 2004; p.1.

34. Sorensen, 1993; p.212.

35. Garret, 2004; p.48.

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37. Ibid; p.68.

38. Ibid; p.258.

39. Levinas, 1997; p.54.

40. O'Hear, 2001; p.171.

41. Ibid; p.172.

42. McCumber, 2000; p.13.

43. Ibid; pp.1-19.

44. Russell, 1945; p.93.

45. Sorensen, 1993; p.221.

46. ibid; p.254.

47. McCumber, 2000; p.3.

48. Ibid.

49. Russell, 1945; pp.xiii-xxiii.

50. Sim, 1998; p.259.

51. Russell, 1945; p.472.

52. Sorensen, 1993; p.82.

53. Williams, 2001; p.97.

54. Deleuze, 1962; p.49.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid; p.103.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Ulas, 2002; p.149.

60. Sorensen, 1993; p.3.

61. Ulas, 2002; p.539.

62. Renaut, 1999; p.141.

63. Lacoste, 1997; p.255.

64. Sim, 2005; p.296.

65. Woolman, 2000; p.167.

66. Levinas, 1997; pp.55-56.

67. Sorensen, 1993.

68. Russell, 1945; p.39.

69. Pettit, 2004; p.327.

70. Sorensen, 1993; p.163.

71. Railton, 2004; p.280.

72. Massumi, 1996; p.231.

73. Railton, 2004; p.266.

74. Adams, 1989; pp.xi-xii.

75. Eaglestone, 2004; p.185.

76. Ibid; 192.

77. Railton, 2004; p.268.

78. Ibid; p.284.

79. Sheehan, 2004; p.24.

80. Ibid; pp.21-22.

81. Leiter, 2004; pp.2-3.

82. Ibid; p.18.

83. Ibid; p.19, note:103.

84. Sheehan, 2004; p.20.

85. Goodchild, 1996; p.1.

86. Milne, 2003; p.153.

87. Sorensen, 1993; p.130.

88. Ibid; p.4.

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90. Ibid; p.11.

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133. Gellner, 1974; p.1.

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135. Armstrong, 1970; pp.145-146.

136. Harre, 2001; p.95.

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140. Renaut, 1999; p.106.

141. Leiter, 2004; p.90.

142. Adams, 1989; p.68.

143. Ibid; p.66.

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145. Gellner, 1974; p.48.

146. Ibid.

147. Sousa, 1987; p.303.

148. Adams, 1989; p.126.

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152. Hume, 1969; p. 6.

153. Ibid; p.viii.

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181. Ibid; pp.47-48.

182. Langton, 2004; p.298.

183. Ibid; p.293.

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