WHAT DOES THE TURKISH BUREAUCRACY REPRESENT?
MANIFESTATION OF THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP IN THE
MEANING WORLDS OF THE BUREAUCRATS

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ABSTRACT

WHAT DOES THE TURKISH BUREAUCRACY REPRESENT? MANIFESTATION OF THE STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP IN THE MEANING WORLDS OF THE BUREAUCRATS

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This dissertation is an exploratory research that analyzes the representation of the state and its relationship with society in the meaning worlds of the Turkish bureaucrats. Accordingly, the research question of this dissertation has to do with political representation in the mindsets of bureaucratic actors. Regarding this question, we focused on the theory of representative bureaucracy and addressed its inadequacies in analyzing the issue of bureaucratic representation. In our view, representation is a phenomenon related to a particular mode of understanding that creates commonsense. It involves the contextual varieties of taken for granted knowledge that constitutes the basis of one's social world, which the theory of representative bureaucracy fails to question. In this respect, our research intended to discover how do bureaucrats order and arrange the meaning of state-society relationship in their minds. We conducted our research in the Capital Markets Board of Turkey, the Ministry of Finance, and the Turkish Military Academy. We used the methods of multidimensional scaling and hierarchical cluster analysis to reveal the latent meaning patterns in the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. The results of our analysis pointed out two major findings. Our first finding indicated the reductionism of the theory of representative bureaucracy in understanding and interpreting the meaning worlds of the Turkish bureaucrats. Our second finding

involved the significant similarities as well as the differences in the meaning worlds of the bureaucratic organizations. These variations demonstrated how the organizations of the same state might differ due to distinct organizational ideologies.

Keywords: Bureaucracy, meaning world, representation, political culture.

ÖZ

TÜRK BÜROKRASİSİ NEYİ TEMSİL EDİYOR?
DEVLET-TOPLUM İLİŞKİSİNİN BÜROKRATLARIN ANLAM
EVRENLERİNDEKİ GÖRÜNTÜSÜ

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Bu çalışma Türk bürokratlarının anlam evrenlerinde devletin ve devlet-toplum ilişkisinin nasıl temsil edildiğini anlamaya ve yorumlamaya yöneliktir. Buna bağlı olarak, araştırmanın temel sorunsalı bürokratların düşünce yapılarına içkin siyasal temsiliyetle ilişkilidir. Bu doğrultuda temsili bürokrasi kuramına odaklanarak, kuramın bürokraside temsiliyet sorunsalını analiz etmedeki yetersizliklerini tanımladık. Kanımızca temsiliyet, ortak algıyı doğuran belirli bir anlayış biçimiyle bağıntılı bir olgudur. Temsiliyet, bireyin sosyal evreninin temelini oluşturan sorgulanmadan kabullenilmiş bilginin bağlamsal çeşitliliklerini içerir. Temsili bürokrasi kuramı ise temsiliyetin bu yönünün üzerinde durmamaktadır. Bu temel eksiklik doğrultusunda araştırmamızı bürokratların zihinlerinde devlet-toplum ilişkisinin nasıl anlamlandırıldığının keşfedilmesine yönelik olarak kurguladık. Araştırma, Sermaye Piyasası Kurulu, Maliye Bakanlığı ve Kara Harp Okulunda gerçekleştirildi. Bürokratların anlam evrenlerinde saklı anlam şablonları ortaya çıkartabilmek için çokboyutlu ölçeklendirme ve hiyerarşik gruplandırma yöntemlerini kullandık. Araştırmamızın sonuçları iki temel bulgu doğrultusunda özetlenebilir. İlk bulgumuz temsili bürokrasi kuramının Türk bürokratlarının anlam evrenlerini anlama ve yorumlamadaki eksikliğini gösterdi. İkinci bulgumuz

bürokratik kurumların anlam evrenlerindeki benzerlikler ve farklılıklarla ilgiliydi. Bu çeşitlilikler aynı devletin kurumlarının farklı kurumsal ideolojilere bağlı olarak nasıl değişkenlik gösterebileceklerini ortaya çıkardı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bürokrasi, anlam evreni, temsiliyet, siyasal kültür.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There has been a considerable tension between bureaucracy and democracy in modern societies. Democracy is considered a 'must' for the members of society, whereas bureaucracy is conceived another must for the effective and efficient administration of society. However, the anti-democratic bias of bureaucracy poses a threat to democratic ideals like loss of individual freedom, unequal treatment of populace, secrecy, alienation, and the superiority of bureaucracy over its political masters. Accordingly, such a bias engenders the core concern of rendering bureaucracy more compatible with democratic policy processes as well as the norms of a democratic culture. This concern is the central tenet of the theory of representative bureaucracy that prescribes for reconciling bureaucracy with democracy. The major question of the theory has to do with the means for enhancing bureaucratic responsiveness to society. In this respect, the remedy is to transform bureaucracy into a more representative characteristic. The taken for granted assumption of the theory involves capability of bureaucracy to represent demographic characteristics, values, opinions, and interests of entire societal strata in a 'mature' democratic context. Originating from such assumption, the academic debate revolves around 'who represents whom' on the grounds of demographic qualifications, opinions, and interests.

Leaving aside its fundamental assumptions, the theory of representative bureaucracy emphasizes an important notion; bureaucracy is either representing or has to represent something. Nevertheless, the theory ignores a critical issue inherent to the idea of representation; *what is being represented in the mindsets of the bureaucrats?* What are the latent and deeply embedded patterns in the minds of the bureaucratic actors? What kind of a commonsense is mirrored by these patterns? How do bureaucrats make sense of the political world they live in

through these patterns? What kind of contextual variables are influential in the institutionalization of these patterns? These questions are critical because such patterns are the rules that govern the actions of bureaucrats in political processes. Therefore, these rules are an essential part of the representation process. Besides, these patterns can be quiet different than the normative premises of a given democratic culture or worldview, which the theory of representative bureaucracy takes for granted. Thus, any inquiry on political representation cannot be considered apart from the representation of 'politics' in the mindsets of political actors. The notion of representation transcends a mere congruence between bureaucrats and their constituents in demographic characteristics, opinions on various daily political issues, values of a democratic culture, or concrete and observable interests. Accordingly, an adequate approach to the issue of representation requires a more profound level of analysis, directed to understand and interpret the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. Such analysis has to deal primarily with representation in the mindsets of bureaucrats rather than prescribing for the legitimacy of a supposedly democratic political system through corporate representation of organized interests. In this respect, this dissertation takes representation as a phenomenon related to a particular mode of understanding that creates commonsense. Representation involves the contextual varieties of commonsensical knowledge that constitute the basis of one's social world, which the theory of representative bureaucracy fails to question. Therefore, the research question of this dissertation is designed as *what does the Turkish bureaucracy represent?*

Regarding this question, the purpose of the research is 'not' to discover the 'single absolute fact' about what the Turkish bureaucracy represents. This study is constructed upon following premises; first, epistemologically there are multiple realities, not one ultimate truth; second, the goal is to produce idiographic knowledge, not universally generalizable principles; and third, inquiry is bounded with the subjectivity of the inquirer. Accordingly, this is an exploratory research that intends to understand and interpret various meaning patterns, mirroring

specific conceptualizations of politics in the meaning worlds of the Turkish bureaucrats. Here, the 'conceptualization of politics' implies the manifestation of state-society relationship in the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. In this sense, this study will attempt to reveal the variety of ruling ideas in the mindsets of the Turkish bureaucrats regarding the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. These ruling ideas are the cultural schemes, implying a society's fundamental tools of thought through which people make sense of the world. In addition, ruling ideas can be institutionalized in different ways in various organizations of the same social context. Therefore, they might involve conceptual and contextual varieties. Finally, there also might be some specific ruling ideas, governing the perceptions and interpretations of inquirers.

Within such framework, in the second chapter, the basic concerns, assumptions, and inadequacies of the theory of representative bureaucracy will be elaborated. This chapter will primarily focus on the reductionism of this theory, mainly originating from its embeddedness into a specific worldview. This specific worldview is liberal-pluralism. The premises of this worldview constitute the basis of the hypothetical assumptions of the theory of representative bureaucracy. Besides, the internalization of such worldview is considered a possibility or an inescapable choice for the entire societal strata, including the bureaucrats, in a 'mature' democratic context. Here, one might ask that what if the dominant worldview(s) in the mindsets of bureaucrats differ from the normative premises of liberal-pluralism? Furthermore, what if the mindsets of bureaucrats as well as their behaviors can be understood and interpreted more effectively by the imperatives of various perspectives other than liberal-pluralism? Accordingly, in this chapter an alternative framework, mainly borrowed from Alford and Friedland (1985), will be generated. This framework will incorporate to the analysis a variety of worldviews that problematize the various aspects of state-society relationship. In other words, such framework will provide a conceptual toolbox for understanding and interpreting the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats.

This conceptual toolbox involves the basic premises of three modern theories of the state, dominant in the Western tradition. These are namely the liberal-pluralist paradigm; the managerial paradigm; and the class paradigm, which will briefly be discussed respectively in this chapter. Each paradigm puts the emphasis on specific aspects of state-society relationship by utilizing different levels of analysis. The liberal-pluralist paradigm privileges the democratic aspect of the state by utilizing an individual level of analysis; the managerial paradigm focuses on the bureaucratic aspect of the state by utilizing an organizational level of analysis; and the class paradigm emphasizes the capitalist aspect of the state by employing a systemic level of analysis. Each paradigm is also a worldview that constitutes the meaning. They have to do with how actors make sense of the world. The mindset of an actor involves interrelated set of concepts and assumptions, and the 'worldview' is the core variable about how issues are defined and even whether or not they will be identified. The dominant worldview within a social group would probably include indicators that refer to the central meanings of concepts in that worldview simply because no concept is theory-free. More specifically, the notion of state-society relationship gains its meaning through these worldviews in the mindsets of actors. In addition, these worldviews motivate people to rationalize their political actions and preferences by locating themselves historically and politically in a specific context. Therefore, they are also ideologies, which have social functions.

To sum up, these theories might manifest themselves in the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. Furthermore, they might enable the inquirer to make specific suggestions regarding the conceptual dynamics of these meaning worlds. In this sense, any inquiry regarding the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats must take into consideration the variety of worldviews. Accordingly, the theories of the state will provide a conceptual framework for understanding and interpreting the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. These theories will be utilized in two ways; descriptively and interpretatively. The former will enable the inquirer to identify specific worldviews, prevailing or lacking in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. The

latter will maintain to make reasoning, assumptions, and alternative explanations about the meaning patterns of the bureaucrats.

The central concern of the third chapter originates from the idea that the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats involve historically institutionalized patterns, deriving from social production of knowledge in a specific context. Accordingly, the modern theories of the state might fall short to acknowledge some context-specific characteristics of the state-society relationship in a given totality. This requires the incorporation of political dynamics and culture of a specific context to the analysis. Therefore, the third chapter will generate a contextual framework as the second analytical toolbox for interpreting the mindsets of the bureaucrats. In this chapter, the crucial aspects of the Turkish politics and political culture will be discussed with an emphasis on the state-society relationship as well as the historical-institutional roles of the state, bureaucracy, and military.

In generating this framework four core perspectives will be utilized, which interpret the dynamics of the Turkish politics and political culture in their own domains. These perspectives are namely; the state-centric approach; the perspective of political economy; the sociological perspective; and finally the perspective of identity and democracy. Each perspective employs a specific worldview in interpreting the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. The state-centric approach privileges the history and characteristics of the nation-state by utilizing the managerial paradigm. The political economy perspective focuses on the development of the national capitalism by employing the class paradigm. The sociological perspective emphasizes the cultural basis of the state-society relationship by both utilizing the managerial and liberal-pluralist paradigms. Finally, the identity and democracy perspective underpins the prevalence of an authoritarian administrative mentality in the Turkish context by employing the liberal-pluralist paradigm. Each insight is crucial for generating the contextual framework of this dissertation. However, the major intention in generating this framework is neither to make a synthesis of these approaches nor to make diverse

descriptions of the same context within the framework of each approach. Thus, various assumptions and arguments of each approach will be utilized *to some extent* while generating this framework. Accordingly, the utilization of these approaches is bounded with the subjectivity of the inquirer. Hence, the core idea of this chapter is that the managerial and capitalist aspects of the Turkish state dominated its democratic aspect so that it did not become a genuine concern for the state, for its bureaucracy, and even for society. Such a dynamic dissociates the Turkish context from the premises of the theory of representative bureaucracy as well as constituting the essence of bureaucratic representation in this context.

In the fourth chapter, primarily the theoretical underpinnings of the methods used in this research will be discussed. This theoretical substructure is crucial because it establishes the critical relationship between the research question and the methods employed in the research. Most of the adequate methods for exploring such questions commonly depend upon a specific theoretical tradition, involving the reproductive relationship between meaning and action. This theoretical tradition involves the scholars such as Schutz, Berger and Luckmann, and Giddens, who developed the theoretical framework that guides the associated methods. Accordingly, the insights of this theoretical tradition will briefly elaborated. Afterwards, the sampling criteria will be identified. This study abandoned the random sampling approach and set the criteria for the type of the state organizations and their departments. Here, the major concern originates from the idea that the bureaucracy is not a monolithic entity. Considering the possibility of institutional variations, 'different bureaucracies' were chosen with different organizational histories, structures, roles, and functions. These organizations are The Capital Markets Board of Turkey, The Ministry of Finance, and finally, The Turkish Military Academy. The demographic characteristics of the sampling, generated from these three organizations will be identified subsequent to the summary of the characteristics of these organizations. The final discussion in this chapter will involve the strategy of analysis. The logic of the statistical methods, employed for analyzing the data will be elaborated. These methods are

multidimensional scaling and hierarchical cluster analysis, which would enable the inquirer to reveal the conceptual patterns as well as their meanings in the meaning world of the bureaucrats.

Finally, in the fifth chapter, the results of the analysis will be demonstrated and the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats will be interpreted by employing the generated conceptual and contextual frameworks. The results of the analysis point out two major findings. The first finding has to do with the reductionism of the theory of representative bureaucracy in understanding and interpreting the meaning worlds of the Turkish bureaucrats. This finding will demonstrate that there is a significant incompatible realm in the mindsets of the bureaucrats with the normative assumptions of the liberal-pluralist paradigm. Such demonstration will involve the paradigmatic definition of the bureaucrats' symbolic universe by utilizing the core normative assumptions of the liberal-pluralist paradigm. The second finding involves the similarities as well as the differences in the meaning worlds of the bureaucratic organizations. In order to demonstrate these variations, primarily the meaning clusters of each organizational meaning world will be defined and interpreted. Afterwards, the meaning worlds of the organizations will be compared with regard to these variations. These variations will demonstrate the commonsensical notions of the organizations as well as how the organizations of the same state might differ due to distinct organizational ideologies.

CHAPTER 2

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CONFIGURING THE ISSUE OF REPRESENTATION

In this chapter we will primarily discuss the theory of representative bureaucracy with particular emphasis to its core assumptions, underlying fundamentals as well as its inadequacies. We will argue that despite the theory underpins a crucial notion that the bureaucracy is either representing or has to represent something, it elaborates this notion within an extremely reductionist understanding. Accordingly, we will reconceptualize the notion of bureaucratic representation with an emphasis to the theories of the state as well as the meaning worlds of the actors, associated with the political milieu of a specific context.

2.1. The Premises and Shortcomings of the Theory of Representative Bureaucracy

The term 'representative bureaucracy' was first emphasized by J. Donald Kingsley in 1944 (Subramaniam, 1969; Van Der Meer & Roborgh, 1996). In his same-titled work 'representative bureaucracy,' Kingsley focused on the notion of social class, which he conceived as the most important demographic variable. Accordingly, his core claim pointed out that the nature of administrative arrangements always reflects the characteristics of the social structure of a nation. Analyzing the British civil service, Kingsley argued that the idea of a 'neutral' civil service was imaginary because the attitudes and the interests of the civil-service were middle-class biased (Van Der Meer & Roborgh, 1996). Thus, the concept of representative bureaucracy was primarily introduced as a critique of the 'neutral' civil service idea. The bureaucracy was the representative of the dominant class in society on the premise that the middle-class mirrored the dominant force in the British society.

If laws, policies and programs are implemented by only one segment of society, namely upper middle class white males, the interests of other segments are not likely to be well represented. The system itself is likely to be biased and unfair even if individual men do not intend to be so (Hale & Kelly, 1989: 7).

Attaining a more representative bureaucracy, Kingsley argued, would alleviate the problem of bureaucracy's sole responsiveness to the dominant class in a given society (ibid.). Hence, in Kingsley's framework, the representative bureaucracy implied a class-based diversification in the demographic background of the bureaucracy.

However, the recent literature[1] on the theory of representative bureaucracy incorporates additional types of social distinctions to the analysis as well as a class-based one. The common assumption rests on the idea that a solely class-based analysis is inadequate to identify the bureaucracy's realm of responsiveness. In this sense, a much more complicated societal stratum must be taken into consideration, involving various social categories such as race, gender, ethnicity, physical ability, age, work, income, martial status, religion, and education.

The subject matter of these recent theoretical debates can be analyzed within the framework of three core questions; (1) who and what should be represented?; (2) why the representativeness of the civil service have to be increased?; and (3) how can this objective be achieved?

In regards to the first question, Dolan and Rosenbloom (cited in Bailey, 2004: 247) define the *theory* of representative bureaucracy as "the body of thought and research examining the potential for government agencies to act as representative political institutions if their personnel are drawn from all sectors of society." In

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[1] See Hale & Kelly; 1989; Meier, 2000; Meier & Smith, 1994; Meier, Wrinkle & Polinard, 1999; Meier, Eller, Wrinkle & Polinard, 2001; Mosher, 1982; Nielsen & Wolf, 2001; Riccucci & Saidel, 1997; Selden, Brundey & Kellough, 1998; Selden & Selden, 2001; Van Der Meer & Roborgh, 1996.

this framework the representative bureaucracy implies a demographic congruence between the bureaucracy and society. Van Riper (cited in Meier, 1975: 527) defines the representative bureaucracy by emphasizing the significance of value congruence as well as demographic congruence between the bureaucracy and society;

> *[The representative bureaucracy is] ...the one in which there is a minimal distinction between the bureaucrats as a group and the community. ...To be representative a bureaucracy must (1) consist of a reasonable cross-section of the body politic in terms of occupation, class, geography, and the like, and (2) must be in general tune with the ethos and attitudes of the society which it is a part.*

Finally, Van Der Meer and Roborgh (1996) point out a third dimension, employed by various studies; the representation of the interests. Consequently, the theory of representative bureaucracy has to do with the three types of representation; the demographic representation; the value and opinion representation; and the interest representation.

The demographic representation implies the proportionality of bureaucratic positions occupied by a group with the same group's proportion in a relevant population (Greene, Selden & Brewer, 2001).[2] In other words, it is a descriptive pattern of representation that originates from the extent to which the demographic characteristics of the public is similar or comparable with the demographic characteristics of the bureaucracy. The opinion representation involves the value congruence among the bureaucracy and society. This can be considered a symbolic pattern of representation, based upon a system of shared values and opinions that mainly rest on the 'observable' conceptions, emotions, and attitudes. Finally, the interest representation indicates the harmony between the interests of bureaucracy and various social groups, so that the bureaucrats would act as the

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[2] Greene, Selden and Brewer (2001) point out the significance of the level of *stratification*, which has to do with the distribution of penetration over various levels in a bureaucracy as well as the level of *penetration* that refers to the extent to which various social groups are proportionally represented in bureaucracy.

sponsors of these groups to which they are attached. Thus, the interest representation is a substantive pattern of representation that has to do with 'acting for another' (Kelly, 1998). Accordingly, the answer to the first question –who and what should be represented?- can simply be stated as all demographic sectors of society in terms of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, region, class, caste *etc.* as well as the values, opinions, and interests of these sectors should be represented *in* and *by* the bureaucracy.

The second question –why the representativeness of the civil service have to be increased?- has to do with the efforts to reconcile the bureaucracy with democracy through enhancing the level of representation in the civil service. In other words, the main concern is to attain a more democracy-compatible bureaucracy, which in return would increase the legitimacy of the government actions. Here, the major problem is the discretionary powers of the 'non-elected' bureaucrats. The bureaucrats often exercise discretion, which renders them powerful actors in the policy processes (Meier, 1975). Accordingly, such discretionary power is troublesome for democratic societies because the bureaucrats are unaccountable to the ballot box. In addition, their specialization and expert power highly shield them from the traditional controls (-i.e. the laws, supervision, and budgeting). As a result, the bureaucratic adherence to public interest becomes a highly problematic issue.

However, the discretionary powers of the bureaucrats are also considered an opportunity for the liberal democracies on the premise that such power can be utilized for the representation of the diverse societal groups. In this sense, the genuine problem is not the power of the bureaucracy but the unrepresentative characteristic of such power; "it is not the power of bureaucracies but their unrepresentative power that constitutes the greatest threat to democratic government" (Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981: 21). In addition, it is assumed that a more representative bureaucracy is also a more controllable one by both the public and the official authorities. Thus, the theory of representative bureaucracy

generates a normative framework for enhancing the bureaucratic responsiveness to the public as well as the political system. Here, the core intention is to render the actions of the government more legitimate; "the acceptance of government action can be secured or increased by greater representativeness in the civil service" (Van Der Meer & Roborgh, 1996: 123)

Within the framework of the above assumptions, the bureaucracy is assigned with the duty of assuring the access of diverse societal segments to the policy-making processes. Sowa and Selden (2003) argue that a more representative workforce can lead to the exercise of discretion towards the achievement of policy outcomes, which would be more responsive especially to minority groups. Thus, a more representative bureaucracy can foster the fairness of policy processes by ensuring that all relevant interests are represented in the formulation and the implementation of policies (Selden, Brundey & Kellough, 1998). Meier (1975) points out that a more representative bureaucracy would underpin the transparency of the bureaucracy as well as enhancing (upwards) social mobility, the practices of participative management, and the equality of opportunity. The enhanced public participation to the administrative processes would not only allow the identification of a specific group with its representatives but it would provide the opportunity of career-making for the group members as well (Perkins & Fowlkes, 1980). Thus, the more the bureaucracy mirrors the characteristics of society, the more it would be responsive to the democratic values, and to the diverse needs and interests of the various social groups. This idea constitutes the rationale of the theory of representative bureaucracy.

The third question –how can the objective of bureaucratic representation be achieved? - is rather a pragmatic one, concerning with the assumptions and ways of attaining a representative bureaucracy. Here, the 'level' of representation constitutes a significant part of the debate. What is meant by the 'level of representation' is its extent of *passiveness* or *activeness* that has to do with the

behaviors of the bureaucrats as well as the characteristics of the bureaucratic organizations.

> *The central tenet of the theory of representative bureaucracy is that passive representation; or the extent to which a bureaucracy employs people of diverse social backgrounds, leads to active representation, or the pursuit of policies reflecting the interests and desires of those people (Selden & Selden, 2001: 308).*

Accordingly, the passive representation is identical with the demographic representation. It rests on the idea that "insofar the personnel in a public bureaucracy reflect those of its jurisdiction in demographic characteristics; the bureaucracy will be more responsive to the public interest" (Green, Selden & Brewer, 2001: 382). Thus, the crucial issue is to sustain a demographic congruence between the bureaucracy and society, which underpins a 'symbolic' commitment to equal access to power. The reflection of societal spectrum by the bureaucracy is supposed to automatically bring out the opportunity of transforming all relevant societal signals into actual policy processes. Therefore, an increased societal access to bureaucratic posts (especially high-level ones) is expected to result in policies that would improve the lives of various social groups.

Active representation, on the other hand, involves the situations in which the bureaucracies work to further the needs of a particular group of people (Meier & Bohte, 2001). Merely a demographic congruence is not enough since the representatives are expected to "fairly and accurately follow the interests of those whom they're supposed to represent" (Hale & Kelly, 1989: 10). Thus, the role of the bureaucrat is identified with the advocacy of specific interests or opinions.

Here, a crucial debate has to do with transforming the passive representation into an active one. At the core of this debate lies the belief that the "public organizations, while not designed to be active representatives of certain groups, can transform the passive representation of certain groups into active

representation to achieve more representative outcomes" (Sowa & Selden, 2003: 701). In this sense, the passive representation might involve a symbolic importance but the more crucial issue is to transform it into an active one for the sake of more equitable outcomes.

Within this general framework as discussed above, many studies focus on the issue of bureaucratic representation with particular emphasis to degree of demographic (passive) representation; the ways and conditions for sustaining active representation; the eligibility of the organizational contexts for representation; the effects of individual and organizational factors on the level of representation; and the methods for 'measuring' the level of representation. These studies include those by Bell and Rosenthal (2003), Downs (1966), Eulau and Karps (1977), Hale and Kelly (1989), Hindera and Young (1998), Hunold (2001), Keiser, Wilkins, Meier and Holland (2002), Meier (1975), Meier and England (1984), Meier and Stewart (1992), Meier (1993a), Meier (1993b), Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard (1999), Mosher (1982), Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1978), Perkins and Fowlkes (1980), Romzek and Hendricks (1982), Selden (1997), Selden, Brundey and Kellough (1998), Selden and Brewer (2001), Selden and Selden (2001), Sowa and Selden (2003).

Here, we will elaborate two crucial issues addressed by the same set of studies about achieving the goal of bureaucratic representation. These issues have to do with the bureaucrats' socialization patterns as well as their organizational configurations.

The socialization patterns of the bureaucrats are primarily conceived due to their pre-organizational lives. The matter of inquiry involves the effects of these socialization patterns on the processes of decision-making (Bailey, 2004). More specifically, these studies deal with the critical question of 'how the values related with the societal origin of the bureaucrats will manifest themselves in the administrative decisions?' Accordingly, the demographic backgrounds of the

bureaucrats are supposed to provide an early socialization experience that has primacy in the creation of values and beliefs (Krislov & Rosenbloom, 1981). The attributes leading to early socialization experiences (i.e. gender, race, and ethnicity) give rise to these values and beliefs that ultimately shape the behavior and decisions of the bureaucrats (Selden, Brundey & Kellough, 1998). Thus, the administrative decisions are a direct function of the background, training, education, and orientation of the bureaucrats (Mosher, 1982). In this respect, a causal relation is assumed between the bureaucrat's early socialization patterns and his/her policy decisions. Accordingly, a bureaucrat, sharing the same social background with his/her client, will perceive a specific situation in the same manner, therefore, respond more quickly and effectively to the problems, needs, and wants of the client.

However, for representation to occur, another crucial issue has to do with the characteristics of the organizations as well as the bureaucrats' realm of influence in these organizations, which would enable them to take actions in the light of the specific values they hold (Meier & Bohte, 2001). Nachmias and Rosenbloom (1986: 968) emphasize that the "bureaucrats have the potential to represent the values and attitudes of the groups from which they come. How well they do so, though, depend on a host of factors, including organizational dynamics." Accordingly, the organizations must have the capacity to empower their employees;

> *Empowered employees clearly have greater discretion and flexibility*
> *in trying to actively represent the groups which they are drawn. They*
> *are less constrained by supervisors, organizational cultures, and red*
> *tape. They may be better able to promote customer satisfaction…*
> *(Dolan & Rosenbloom cited in Bailey, 2004: 248).*

The organizational structures that allow a significant realm of discretion for their employees are more desirable for the attainment of active representation (Meier & Bohte, 2001). Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the 'activeness' of representation must be harmonious with the own goals of the organization because too much

adherence to the goals of the 'external' interest groups might reduce the organizational commitment of the bureaucrats (Romzek & Hendricks, 1982). Consequently, the necessary components of an active representation are; first, the existence of value congruence between the bureaucrat and his constituency, deriving from the same socialization patterns, and second, a significant realm of discretion in the organization. The former constitutes the basis of a commonsense, while the latter is functional in enabling the bureaucrats to act as interest group trustees.

To sum up, the theory of representative bureaucracy derives from the need to reconcile the bureaucracy with democracy for the further legitimation of government actions. In other words, the major concern has to do with to enhance the bureaucratic responsiveness, thus, to render the bureaucracy more democracy-compatible. The bureaucracy is assumed as a crucial part of the policy-making process, it is not a mechanism that merely carries out the mandates of the political superiors. Thus, the bureaucrats possess the potential of being powerful political actors; actors who can incorporate their own interests to the policy-making process. Although such power might engender a threat to the functioning of democracy, it can also be transformed into a means for broader public participation to the policy processes. Therefore, the bureaucracies are the political institutions, capable of representing the values, opinions, and interests of citizens just as legislatures do;

> *A bureaucracy can be representative just as a political body can. A*
> *representative bureaucracy has both a political and policy component*
> *and it is crucial for minorities to achieve bureaucratic representation*
> *to enjoy success in both areas (Meier & Smith, 1994: 801).*

Bureaucracies are not inherently anti-democratic because they are adaptive and dynamic entities, which can effectively function in a democratic system. If there is a problem of adaptation to the democratic norms "…then the reason is not because bureaucracies are non-adaptive entities. It is because there is nothing to adapt to" (Wood & Waterman, 1994: 154). Consequently, under an *eligible*

democratic system, a representative bureaucracy will; (1) enable the social control upon the bureaucracy, (2) assure administrative responsibility, (3) underpin the equality of opportunity, (4) sustain broader public participation to the policy processes, (5) legitimize government actions, and finally (6) reinforce the democracy and the democratic culture.

The theory of representative bureaucracy offers critical insights concerning with the problematic relationship between the bureaucracy and democracy. It acknowledges the crucial issues, involving the threat of bureaucratic domination and its anti-democratic consequences,[3] minority rights, political participation, equality of opportunity, social justice, and the elimination of the discriminative practices. Most importantly, *it emphasizes the general idea that the bureaucracy is either representing or has to represent something*. However, the theory of representative bureaucracy involves serious shortcomings, deriving from its excessive reductionism.

The core inquiry of the theory has to do with the harmonization of the bureaucracy as well as the bureaucratic behavior with the norms of a supposedly democratic culture and a democratic policy process. In this sense, the major question is *who represents whom* with regard to demographic characteristics, opinions, and interests. Nevertheless, the theory ignores another crucial question inherent to the notion of representation; *what is being represented in the mindsets of the bureaucrats*. Here, one might argue that the perspectives on opinion representation problematize such question. However, these perspectives merely focus on the overt, conscious, and expressible opinions and values that primarily have to do with the dynamics of daily politics. Accordingly, they ignore the latent and deeply embedded patterns that might be manifested in the mindsets of the actors, associated with their conception of politics. Besides, these patterns can be quiet different than the normative premises of a given culture or worldview,

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[3] Such as the loss of individual freedom, secrecy, alienation, superiority of the bureaucracy over the elected officials, the unequal treatment of people etc.

which the theory of representative bureaucracy takes for granted. Thus, we argue that *an inquiry on political representation cannot be considered apart from the representation of politics in the mindsets of the political actors.*

The reductionism of the theory of representative bureaucracy has to do with its context-bounded understanding. First, the theory is context-specific due to its extreme adherence to the American politics and political culture;

> *If bureaucracy, which involves in political decisions, has the same values as the American people as a whole, than decisions made by the bureaucracy will be similar to the decisions of the entire American public. ...If values are similar, rational decisions made so as to maximize these values will also be similar (Meier, 1975: 528).*

Second, since the prevalence of a 'democratic culture' in the American context is taken for granted, the theory merely offers a remedy for maintaining the culture-compatible behaviors of actors without questioning their mindsets. Such an 'ideal democratic culture' might also involve a variety of 'anti-democratic or undemocratic' notions that are internalized by the actors. To be more specific, it is also crucial to grasp the manifestation of a specific culture in the mindsets of the actors, which requires an inquiry that goes beyond the background socialization patterns of the actors in that culture. Accordingly, the theory merely focuses on the issue of political representation by ignoring the *representation in the mindsets of the bureaucrats* that might involve a variety of other notions than the norms of an idealized culture. Thus, although the theory of representative bureaucracy is aware of the pluralities in society, it underestimates the plurality of worldviews that might be found in the mindsets of actors as well as in society.

Third, and finally, the theory reduces the notion of representation to the utilitarian, pragmatic, and idealist boundaries of the liberal-pluralist paradigm, which is the central tenet of the American politics. Here, we will briefly describe these three aspects of the liberal-pluralist paradigm in order to elaborate the underlying fundamentals of the theory of representative bureaucracy.

The utilitarian aspect of the liberal-pluralist paradigm contends that the utility maximization of each individual and group reflects the utility maximization of society as a whole (Köker, 1987). In other words, the happiness of individual is the sum of satisfactions; and the happiness of community is the sum of individual happiness. There cannot be a general interest superior to the interests of individuals or groups because society is composed of atomistic individuals, each with their own interest. The individual preferences are primary and the sole organizing principle is the utility notion, which also constitutes the basis of individual freedom. Within such reasoning, liberty implies the absence of coercion and equality indicates the integrity and non-comparability of individual preferences that have to be maximized (Gilbert, 1963). Thus, a representative bureaucracy, purified from its authoritarian and dominative tendencies, is considered a means for the utility maximization of individuals.

The pragmatic aspect emphasizes the diverse nature of interests and values. The political processes are considered within a market metaphor that facilitates trading. Thus, the political market involves progressive adjustment of interests, which would sustain the maximum opportunity for individual expressions and choices. The diversity of interests and values necessitates the maximization of individual access and participation to the policy processes. Through such maximization, individual choice can be rendered frequent, informed, influential, and it is broadly affected by the choices of others. Accordingly, it is crucial to improve political organizations in a given context as well as their communication with society, which would promote easy access, broad participation, and accurate information (transparency). Here the representation mechanism is functional in (1) mirroring the "intensities of interest and to effect satisfactory adjustments of interest" (ibid: 611), and (2) reducing or preventing 'externalities,' which is crucial for the repression of conflict.

Finally, the idealist aspect underpins the core values "that attach to the polity and the community as wholes" (ibid: 605). Individuals are assumed to cultivate common and non-material interests; namely the values. These values might not mirror an overall consensus since they are diversified among social groups but the crucial issue is to reduce the apparent value distinctions. The value distinctions can be reduced by means of 'idealized' values, or ethical conceptions. These idealized values and conceptions function as social glue by sustaining the recognition of shared concerns, constituting the basis for interpersonal interaction. Accordingly, the theory of representative bureaucracy assumes the values of a democratic culture as the most eligible ones, which would establish the social bonds among groups by reducing the divisive effects of individualistic interests.

These three aspects also define the essence of the 'normative order,' taken for granted by the theory of representative bureaucracy. Accordingly, such order has to do with the coexistence of competitive capitalism with a moderating democratic culture. Here, the theory of representative bureaucracy, employing the core aspects of the liberal-pluralist paradigm, postulates a 'normative' relationship between the bureaucracy and society. However, such normativism as we mentioned before, ignores the political characteristics of the non-Western systems as well as the premises of various paradigms that question the relationship of the bureaucracy and society. Thus, one might ask that what if a specific context involves significant differences than the imperatives of such normative order? What if the bureaucrats in such a context are far from internalizing the values of a culture, taken for granted by the theory of representative bureaucracy? What if the mindsets of these bureaucrats as well as their behaviors can be understood and interpreted more efficiently by the imperatives of various perspectives other than the liberal-pluralist paradigm? Here, the theory of representative bureaucracy falls short to provide an adequate answer to these questions. A scholar of this theory would highly likely argue that such diversifications are quiet possible if the context is not democratic, or the democracy in a given context is immature. The problem in such an argument is that; the plurality in bureaucracy is equated with

democracy and an ideal-typical democracy is considered a possibility or choice for every institutional context. Thus, the theory fails short to understand the contextual variations that transcend the limits of its normative considerations. In this sense, one might evaluate the theory of representative bureaucracy as a local theory that has no concern in the contextual variations of bureaucratic representation as well as the premises of different paradigms.

Accordingly, an adequate approach to the issue of representation requires a more macro and complicated level of analysis, directed to understand and interpret the worldviews of the bureaucrats. Such analysis has to deal primarily with representation in the mindsets of the bureaucrats rather than prescribing for the legitimacy of political system through corporate representation of organized interests, which creates the vision of 'enhanced democracy.' Thus, there are a variety of other ways in which representation can be elaborated. At the core of this variety lies the diverse ways in which the state itself can be construed. In other words, *the core of bureaucratic representation lies in the complicated relationship between the state, society, and bureaucracy as well as the internalization of these relationships by the bureaucrats in a specific context*;

> *Representativeness must be viewed against the background of basic concepts of the raison d'etre of the state and more specifically the changing relationship between the population and the state. ...The differences in the political, administrative and societal setting have important implications for the content of and aspirations toward representativeness in varying contexts (Van Der Meer & Roborgh, 1996: 121).*

Thus, it is crucial to incorporate different worldviews to the analysis, inherent to the theories of the state as well as to consider the historical contextuality of the politics and political culture. In other words, we have to bring the politics back into the issue of representation because representation cannot be conceived within the bounds of a single paradigm. Representation occurs in a political realm, which involves the plurality of ideologies (worldviews), including how the relationship between the state, society, and bureaucracy is institutionalized and internalized.

Thus, we postulate the issue of representation in terms of *what is being represented* by actors. In this sense, rather than the 'observable' interests, opinions, or behaviors, we will focus on the *conceptualizations* that constitute the *meaning worlds* of actors. These conceptualizations will provide us clues on how specific structures are internalized or reproduced by associated actors. Accordingly, the major research question of this dissertation is *what does the Turkish bureaucracy represent?*

Any inquiry concerning with such question is destined to be biased by the theory of the state in the mind of the inquirer. Academics and practitioners alike are likely to be biased to judgments regarding this question that arises from their own worldviews. Alford and Friedland (1985) point out that the systemic power of a theory manifests itself in its historical significance; in the location of perspectives and their institutionally structured embodiments within a societal totality. To simply put, a theory 'locates' itself historically and politically in a specific context. Additionally, although the theories do not create politics, they motivate people to rationalize their political actions and preferences. In this sense, *the theories of the state are not merely issues for academic debate but they penetrate to a society's life as well*. Thus, each theory is also an *ideology* because the 'ideas' have social functions; they "create rationalizations for the power of dominant interests and persuade people of a variety on non-empirically grounded beliefs" (ibid: 393). The prevalence of a specific theory is therefore implies the existence of an ideological hegemony in a specific context. Accordingly, the theories of the state will provide our conceptual framework in understanding and interpreting the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. We will attempt to utilize these theories in two ways; descriptively and interpretatively. The former will enable us to identify specific worldviews, prevailing or lacking in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. The latter will enable us to make reasoning, assumptions, and alternative explanations about the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. In the next section, we will summarize the home domains and basic assumptions of three major theories that question the state-society relationship.

2.2. The Theories of the State as a Conceptual Framework

In this section, we will focus on the three dominant views of the state; namely the liberal-pluralist paradigm, the managerial paradigm, and the class paradigm. While doing so we will particularly employ Alford and Friedland's (1985) framework. Here, it must be noted that each paradigm notices a specific aspect of the state. The liberal-pluralist paradigm stresses the democratic aspect of the state; the managerial paradigm privileges the managerial aspect of the state; and the class paradigm emphasizes the capitalist aspect of the state.

2.2.1. The Democratic Aspect of the State: Aggregation of Preferences and Enhancement of Popular Participation

The liberal-pluralist perspective assumes society as an aggregate of individuals who are socialized into common cultural values. Accordingly, the cultural values and beliefs that pattern and give meaning to the interactions of individuals are primary for this perspective. The social system can be observed in the behaviors and actions of individuals in interaction.

> *It [the liberal-pluralist perspective] emphasizes self regulating nature of a modern society based on individuals acting in their own interest and accommodating themselves to the actions of other individuals. Shared values govern their interactions (Alford & Friedland, 1985: 39).*

Democracy is the central concept that provides the basis of shared cultural values. Despite society is assumed as structurally and functionally diversified, a democratic culture is supposed to integrate society. Accordingly, the liberal-pluralist inquiry involves the ways of individual socialization into democratic values; the influence of interest group participation to the policy processes; the consequences of participation for the stability of the democratic order; the costs of a deficiency in societal trust concerning with the political institutions; and the ways for transcending such problems of governance.

In this perspective, the role of political culture, as the aggregation of individual attitudes and behaviors in a specific context, is considered vital for the evolution of democratic states (Almond & Verba, 1963). A moderate and compromising political culture is conceived as the cause and consequence of democracy. Since culture is a causal factor in its own right, it cannot be associated with elite domination or class rule (Alford & Friedland, 1985). Democracy is conceived primarily as a process of control by the citizens; "democratic theory is concerned with processes by which ordinary citizens exert a high degree of political control over leaders" (Dahl, 1956: 3). The source of such control is the broadened rights and opportunities for political participation. Thus, democracy implies the individual rights to participate and the accountability of political leaders to citizens (Powell cited in Hirst, 1990). Accordingly, the liberal-pluralist paradigm views democracy as a set of procedures and processes.

The primary problem of the modern democracy is considered to facilitate mass participation, which is crucial for political stability. Political stability requires the internalization of the same societal values by all institutions of society as well as the trust of individuals to the system. Alford and Friedland (1985) point out that the notions of consensus and legitimacy is viewed as the consequences of such stability, not the causes of it. In this sense, social change merely involves changing the individual values, preferences and participation, not a radical change in the structure. The content of beliefs might not matter but the crucial and unacceptable issue is the individual deviation from the societal consensus, reflected by the public opinion.

The remedy against such 'deviational' tendencies is the social control through the self-regulation of social groups. Accordingly, the use of force and repression by the state or other institutions are unacceptable in the maintenance of social control. Individuals are free to join the social groups that are compatible with their values and norms. These groups are autonomous from the state and perform a role of mediator between the state and individual (Şaylan, 1974). Their basic function

is to prevent the demand overload upon the state by filtering and aggregating the interests before transmitting them to the state (Alford & Friedland, 1985).

In this framework, the notion of organization implies the aggregated preferences of individuals. Organizations are the associations that depend upon voluntary choice, thus, they have to be responsive to the diversified interests in order to maintain mass support, which is vital for their existence. They are the coalitions of interest rather than being the instruments of domination. Furthermore, the intra-organizational democracy requires the maintenance of internal diversity and competition, which would overcome the tendency toward oligarchic rule in organizations. Therefore, the organizations are also 'internally' viewed as shifting coalitions of interest groups that attempt to shape the organizations according to their own values.

Power is dispersed within society because no individual or group can completely dominate the political power. On the contrary, each individual or group has the opportunity to attain power either directly or through the organized interest groups (Şaylan, 1974). In this sense, the notion of power turns out to be 'influence' in the liberal-pluralist rhetoric. It is conceived as *situational* rather than being *structural* or *systemic* because it derives from the actions of individuals or groups in 'observable' political situations. The extent of participation to the policy processes and the scope of influence over these processes constitute the indicators of political power. However, an extreme participation also constitutes a major threat to orderly government and politics because it implies the "pathological lack of appropriately developed political institutions" (Beetham, 1996: 103). Accordingly, a political culture that fosters high levels of political participation cannot be stable because it detains the effectiveness and responsiveness of governments in governing (Almond & Verba, 1963).

Here, the issue of representation is conceived as the most plausible mechanism for an orderly participation. In this sense, representation functions as a mediator

between the issues of participation and consensus.[4] It maintains the balance between the particularistic interests of various social groups and the general interest of the public (Alford & Friedland, 1985). The ultimate public interest is the achievement of societal consensus through the integrative values and norms of a democratic culture. Such a consensus involves the formation of public opinion during the negotiations (on preferences and values) among various societal groups.

> *In a stable democratic state public opinion tend to change in the same direction for all social groups despite if there are sharp differences in beliefs. This is the evidence of consensus. ...Thus the democratic aspect of the state is a consequence of popular participation (ibid: 52).*

In the liberal-pluralist perspective the democratic aspect of the state is primary. It is assumed that a 'healthy' democracy can prevent pathological tendencies toward bureaucratic rigidity and class conflict. The stability of the system depends on a consensual political culture. Thus, the 'stable and democratic' state's core functions are considered as "either to serve as a neutral mechanism to aggregate preferences or to integrate society by embodying consensual values" (ibid: 43). The state institutions derive their legitimacy and power from their ability to represent popular preferences and aggregate them into policies. The state is considered internally pluralistic, consisting of many agencies with different internal and external functions. The internal organization of the state develops in response to the demands of the various interest groups. Thus, the state's power has to be the consequence of democracy, not a threat to it.

The state, as a political system, must not dominate the power belonging to other 'non-political' institutions. An enormously powerful state implies a pejorative image of a monolithic, hierarchical and centralized organization, immune from democratic accountability. The state repression indicates the weakness of the state

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[4]In Alford and Friedland's (1985) terms the tension between the participation and consensus implies the juxtaposition of private interests *vs.* public interest(s); participation *vs.* institutionalization; responsiveness *vs.* power.

rather than its strength and ability to govern. Given that an extremely centralized state involves the tendency of domination and repression, the limitation and decentralization of the state is vital. The ideal state must be a trustable entity, composed of diversified institutions, which mediate among interest groups, facilitate their participation, maintain the social order, and support the democratic values such as (political and economic) freedom.

The state is also reduced to a market institution or conceived as a substitute for the market mechanism by some liberal-pluralist scholars. Furthermore, the state is conceived as a "micro-decision unit" which merely does "what society decides" (Auster & Silver cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985: 43). In this framework, the state does not have any dominant societal function, power or rule.

> *Although markets are the best way to express the preferences of individuals, a societal consensus on what is in the interests of everyone may lead to state action to realize common interests that are not realized by social choices made in private markets. ..... A democratic state is a limited one which carries out only those activities in the common interest that cannot be performed by free markets (Baumol cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985: 114).*

Luhmann (cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985) points out that the state does not completely monopolize power because the power based on land, ownership, property, education, family, and financial system also prevails outside the political system. In this view, the sole distinctive characteristic of the state from other institutions is its duty of 'enforcement'. The conflicts among the individual interests require a state as an enforcing agent and the most crucial enforcement is needed for the protection of individual rights to do things (Buchanan cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985).

Within the general framework of the liberal-pluralist perspective, the state and its bureaucracy encounter three fundamental and interrelated problems as the demand overload; the excessive autonomy; and the crisis of confidence (Alford & Friedland, 1985). The first problem is inherent in the process of democracy, which

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might create excessive expectations as well as a problem of extreme participation. Thus, the state turns out to be insufficient to handle the new programs, policies, and issues that appear in the political agenda because of 'too much democracy.' The second problem points out the dialectical nature of the state's autonomy and power. It implies a pathological development in the state when the bureaucratic autonomy required for effective and efficient administration grows too strong and unresponsive, thus invulnerable to any challenge. Finally, as a result of the first two factors, a crisis of confidence in public opinion might occur, mainly deriving from the state's inability in meeting the demands of interest groups as well as the political and social unaccountability of its bureaucracy.

Therefore, having a mass support is crucial for maintaining the legitimacy of the state's and its bureaucracy. Such support is generated by the beliefs of individual citizens and interest groups. Here, the basic dynamic is a give and take relationship. The belief in the effectiveness and responsiveness of the state and its bureaucracy is assumed to foster the individual or group expectations about gaining more benefits, which would engender greater participation. Thus, the crucial issue is the maintenance of a popular belief in the neutrality of the state and bureaucracy, which respond equally, equitably, and efficiently to the demands of the diversified interest groups. Legitimacy, as Lipset (1960) argues, is the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for society. Here, two major issues constitute the basis of state legitimacy. First one is the state's ability in contributing to a wider societal consensus, which can compensate the state's ineffectiveness as well as reduce the conflict between the ruler and the ruled. Second issue has to do with the state's capacity in generating a 'normal' political process, which renders the interests of the state and society identical. What is meant by a 'normal' political process is the absence of political violence, conceived as any collective attack against the political regime (Gurr cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985). Any kind of political violence (including the state's exercise of force) endangers the political system by destroying the 'normality' of

politics. It occurs when a gap emerges between the expectations of the public and the genuine opportunities provided by the system (ibid). However, in a 'healthy' democracy, political conflict is expected to arise mainly over the choice of political leaders to govern and the specific decisions of the state, not over the basic structures. Thus, the sole remedy for a healthy democracy and politics is the internalization of same values by all institutions of society, including the bureaucracy.

Within the liberal-pluralist framework, the notion of bureaucracy is identified with the functions of the democratic institutions of the state, subject to public opinion and electoral choice. Bureaucracy is considered a medium to achieve a consensual societal order. The bureaucracy not only reflects the common norms and interests of a society but it is the only apparatus for defining and realizing those common norms and interests as well. Thus, the bureaucracy is not an 'inherently' anti-democratic institution because the part of a genuine and mature democratic system cannot differ fundamentally.

The maturity of the democratic culture in a given context determines the bureaucracy's internalization of democratic norms and values. In a democratic culture, bureaucracy cannot be controlled by any particular elite or class. If the bureaucracy transforms into a structure of elite domination or an instrument of class rule, it cannot be identified with democratic values and becomes vulnerable to internal and external challenges (Alford & Friedland, 1985). However, under an 'immature' democratic culture, there is no reason for bureaucracy to function as a democratic institution because there is 'nothing to adapt to.' Issues such as the bureaucracy's eligibility for public participation (its transparency, accessibility, and responsiveness), its accountability, and the availability of bureaucratic posts to the different segments of society are assumed to secure the democratic processes by eliminating the undemocratic tendencies of bureaucracy. Accordingly, the bureaucracy is conceived as a mechanism subject to external influences, involving the diverse individual or group interests. The bureaucracy

must respond to these interests because they are open and vulnerable to the external constituencies.

> *Bureaucratic decisions are quasi-electoral. Because bureaucrats know that their decisions, reputations and careers are subject to ratification by various constituencies. They are not insulated from external influences and able to make cool and rational decisions. Bureaucrats do not manage resources by calculating the most efficient way to achieve legally mandated tasks; however they operate within the framework of legislative pressure and interest group surveillance (Wildavsky, 1974: 186).*

Given that the bureaucracies primarily arise from the diverse needs of individuals, each agency has its own culture and internal set of values, which guide its actions and policies (Seidman cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985). In this sense, the bureaucracy is internally pluralistic, consisting of the 'bureaucracies' with different functions and internal cultures. These 'organizational' cultures are crucial in determining the functions (behavior) of the organizations.

Bureaucratic organizations also compete with each other for support and resources like any other interest group who seeks to maximize its own benefit (Hughes, 1998: Tullock, 1997). However, the bureaucrats' sole interest in their own power constitutes a serious problem because they're attributed the role of leadership in creating a political community. Despite they can engage with irresponsive and arbitrary practices and attempt to enhance their personal power, such practices can be reduced or prevented by maintaining effective top-down[5] or bottom-up[6] controls (Hill & Gillespie, 1996). The effective functioning of these control mechanisms maintains the adjustment of bureaucracy to a democratic culture.

To sum up, the liberal-pluralist perspective emphasizes the democratic aspect of the state. It also points out that a democratic political culture creates individuals

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[5] The legislature might render the bureaucrats vulnerable to removal as well as the budget of their organizations subject to cuts.

[6] The bottom-up control mechanism involves societal control, which renders the bureaucrats subject to public opinion and electoral choice.

who demand participatory rights in all institutions. The social systems are considered a byproduct of the interdependencies among individuals, whose roles are differentiated by function and integrated by values. Culture implies the aggregation of individual beliefs, perceptions, and values and it constitutes the basis of the liberal-pluralist paradigm in explaining the state, society, bureaucracy, and their relationship. Considering the centrality of culture, the solutions to problems, as well as their causes, are postulated as a change in the individual beliefs, perceptions and values.

The state implies a collectivity of political institutions. It is not a dominant coercive organization or the executive branch of the ruling class. The state is either a central integrating institution or one of the market institutions. The state's maintenance of legitimacy considerably depends upon its capacity and willingness in representing the diversified interests. The liberal-pluralist perspective offers a crucial insight that the individual actions, created by the system, also have the potential to transform the normative basis of that system. It acknowledges social diversities as well as the requirement for their mediation by the state as the requisites of democracy. However, this perspective's utilitarian and pragmatic logic merely employs the individual level of analysis that deals with the 'observable' interactions and expressible values of political actors and institutions. Thus, it ignores the structural and systemic levels of power intrinsic in bureaucratic domination and the dynamics of capitalism and class rule. In other words, it underestimates the managerial and capitalist aspects of the modern state, which we shall discuss in the following two sections.

2.2.2. The Managerial Aspect of the State: Domination of the State and Elites

The managerial perspective basically focuses on the dynamics of bureaucratic domination over society. The term 'managerial' implies the domination of the state over society and the control of the state by the elites. In this perspective, the pluralist assumptions are considered inadequate because they underestimate the

organized power of the executive, corporate, and military bureaucracies and as a result, overemphasize the power of citizens in the democratic processes. These bureaucracies absorb the power of democratic institutions such as the legislature, political parties, and elections. Thus, the normative (democratic) order of the liberal-pluralist paradigm proves to be utopian and illusionary. On the other hand, the class perspective is also insufficient because in the modern industrial societies power is not exercised by the capital and capitalists but by the organizations and bureaucrats.

In this perspective, the core matter of inquiry has to do with the inter-organizational networks that constitute the state. Those organizations are considered significantly autonomous from society because the organizational goals are strategic choices, thus, they do not reflect societal values. The invaluable organizational goal has to do with the survival of the organization. Power is considered structural and it is observed in the capacity of the state and other organizations to dominate each other. Contrary to the 'consensus' notion of the liberal-pluralist perspective, the managerial perspective privileges the notion of 'conflict.' The core reason of conflict is assumed as the elite struggle for controlling the scarce organizational resources and jurisdictions. In this framework individuals, who occupy the command posts, control the structures of power. The conflict of power among organizations has the potential of creating a change in the institutional structure of society.

Society is considered a set of organizations, operating in a complex environment with scarce resources, which are controlled and shaped by elite strategies. Political and administrative elites govern the state and economy and while doing so they do not merely respond to political and economic markets (Dahl, 1961). The structure of such domination derives from the history of various elite strategies for controlling the organizations as well as the success of these strategies in shaping the actions of the associated actors (Alford & Friedland,

1985). Military and political control is considered the ultimate basis of elite domination over society in general and over rebellious populations in particular.

The domination of the elites also has to do with an increasingly complicated society as well as the intensively technical processes of decision-making, which justify the roles and positions of elites. Under such circumstances democracy and representation become more fictitious. However, society is always capable of limiting the elite strategies by demanding participation and political power. Thus, as a precaution against such challenge, the societal groups must be forced, or persuaded to have appropriate beliefs, which ensure their obedience to the rules of the game, largely determined by the elites (ibid).

Who are these elites? There is a considerable debate in identifying elites, who control the resources and institutions. Armstrong (cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985) defines elite simply as the 'roles in a societal control center.' He contends that a small proportion of society exercises a very disproportionate authority in the maintenance of social control as well as the allocation of resources. Bell (1976) identifies the basis of elite domination with the centrality of theoretical knowledge, thus, the dominant elites are the technocratic and scientific ones. Mills (1956) uses the term 'power elite' for identifying these elites. In his framework, power lies in the domains of economy, politics, and military. Economy is dominated by giant corporations, political order is a central executive establishment, and the military is transformed into the most enhanced and expensive feature of governments. Accordingly, democratic organizations are secondary in a context, which the political power is increasingly dominated by giant organizations. The commanding posts in society are held by the corporate rich, the military establishment, and the political executive. These power elites are in fact the allies, who make the major decisions that affect the societal life. Mills' approach has similarities with the notion of 'ruling class,' central to the class theory. However, he rejects the class theory, arguing that it confuses the political power with the economic power and underestimates the autonomous decisions of

the power elite. In his framework, there is no systemic power of capitalism because the power is manifested in the organizational structures, in which the elites dominate the resources.

In the managerial paradigm, the notion of ruling class not only involves those who own the means of production but the dominant groups in the political arena as well. Aron (cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985: 224) emphasizes that "the operations of the state apparatus is never independent of the social classes but yet is not adequately explained by the power of only one class". Accordingly, *political class* implies the minority who exercise the political functions of government, and the *ruling class* is the privileged ones who influence those who govern. Class relations cannot be identified on the distinction of the owners of the means of production and labor because the legal ownership and the control of the capital are historically separated on the institutional, political, and economic grounds. Consequently, in the modern industrial societies power has shifted from classes to the bureaucratically governed state and large corporations.

On the other hand, Touraine (1977) criticizes the liberal-pluralist assumption that the 'social order can merely be attained by the effective functioning of representative organizations.' Accordingly, an extensive realm of negotiation does not imply the prevalence of genuine participation because there are structural limits upon these negotiations. Touraine (ibid.) identifies two major elite strategies for domination; namely social integration and cultural manipulation. The former involves forcing individuals to participate in social organizations and power system by means of job, consumption, and education. Here, the participation is not autonomous but pressured. The latter has to do with controlling the needs, values, and attitudes of individuals by incorporating them to the strategies of elite.

> *Individuals will orient to values only if they know that other persons,*
> *especially the most powerful persons are also oriented to them. Hence*
> *the important values are those that are publicly expressed by*

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> *individuals who clearly occupy places in dominant political institutions (Collins cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985: 172-3).*

Accordingly, the liberal-pluralist emphasis on the integrative democratic values is insignificant because the organizations create values, values do not create organizations. Social classes attain their distinctive features in organizations, mainly through their organizational occupations and the goals of these organizations do not reflect societal values. They are the strategic choices of elites that are legitimized by the notion of rationality. Thus, rationalization is the *sine qua non* component of the organizations and the basis of such requirement is justified by the gradually increasing societal dependence upon the scientific knowledge, technical capacity, and administrative expertise (Alford & Friedland, 1985).

In the managerial paradigm, the attainment of an elite coalition rather than a competition is vital for the enhancement of elite power. The decentralization of power implies a loss in the capacity of elites to rule and an extensive decentralization might lead to revolutionary transformations (Rokkan cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985). Thus, a centralized power is required primarily for leaving the challenging societal interests and demands out of the political agenda. The oligarchic tendencies of bureaucratic organizations are invaluable for limiting the participation, thus, assuring the elite domination. Democracy is primarily considered an instrument for elite competition; a fiction, which in return legitimates the elite control. Through such fiction, the citizens are merely left with the right to vote and the elites can regularly control the lives of the citizens by their authoritarian decisions. The elections are merely functional for the legitimacy of the state actions; the maintenance of citizen obedience; and the assurance of the posts of elites. Thus, the citizens of a democratic state are not a suppressed but a subjected class (ibid.). The formal democratic institutions preserve stability and order rather than responding to public opinion.

The managerial perspective conceives the state as an instrument of elite coalition, primarily functional for the maintenance of control over the economy and society. It is conceptualized as either a set of bureaucratic organizations, each with its own interest and base of domination, or a single giant organization, composed of various departments (Alford & Friedland, 1985). Accordingly, the state has the monopoly of the legitimate use of coercion in a specific territory and its distinctive organizational features are autonomy, centrality, and formal coordination (Pierson, 1996).

Similar with the liberal-pluralist approach, the state regulates the conflict by determining the rules of the game *via* the constitution and the legal system. However, its primary concern is not to maintain political participation or to regulate the competition of the diversified interests but to assure a stable control upon society. In this sense, participation depends upon how well a group is organized. Well-organized groups have greater opportunity of transforming into a dominant interest group as well as securing permanent access to the center of power by controlling specific organizations of the state (ibid.). However, this does not mean that the state is directly an instrument of these groups or classes. Controversially, these groups or classes are highly dependent to the state because of the state's uniqueness in accessing to the instruments of coercion.

Nordlinger (1981) defines the state as an organization that has rules and procedures for maintaining fair, regular, and open elections. He criticizes both the class and the liberal-pluralist approaches. The former overemphasizes the coercive domination of the state and bourgeoisie upon the subordinate class and the latter overestimates the legitimacy of the state authority. In his framework, a democratic state is highly autonomous in transforming its own preferences into authoritative actions and those preferences are usually different than the preferences of the influential groups in society. Thus, focusing on the civil society is not adequate for understanding and explaining 'what the state does and why it does'. Accordingly, the class perspective as well as the liberal-pluralist paradigm is

inadequate for analyzing the state because both are extremely society-centered. The state itself must be in the center of analysis.

Following the same tradition, Skocpol (1979) defines the state as an actual organization for controlling territories and people. The administrative and coercive organizations constitute the basis of state power. State is an autonomous entity and cannot be considered the byproduct of a specific social or economic formation (Skocpol, 1997). In this sense, an adequate inquiry about the state requires a non-Hegelian, non-Marxist, and non-Weberian approach. The state has its own interests, originated from the need to maintain the internal order and the external defense. These interests also determine the state's relationship with the dominant classes in society. Despite the state's structure can be interdependent to capitalism, it cannot merely be reduced to it. Neither the requirements of capitalism nor a democratic culture are the forces that shape the state because the primary issue is the state's relatively autonomous organizational power. Such power and autonomy implies a monopoly of coercion, required mainly for managing the conflict with the other states. Thus, the structure of the state cannot be explained by the requirements of capitalism or democracy but by the role of the state in the transnational arena and military competition. Consequently, a centralized and autonomous state is necessary for administering a complex society; maintaining the internal order; and attaining or enhancing the defensive power against the other states.

Likewise, Bell (1976) focuses on the autonomy of the state and emphasizes that a mere focus on the interest group activity is not adequate for understanding the government policies. In his framework the dynamics of the state autonomy originates from foreign policy requirements as well as the need for administering the societal change. These two processes require the 'rationalization' of the state, implying a centralized state capable of integrating the fragmented programs of its agencies. Such centralization is also crucial for enhancing the state power, necessary for territorial defense and effective administration. On the other hand,

the fragmentation of the state's power indicates a loss of elite capacity to rule. Accordingly, the plurality of state agencies is not considered the source or outcome of a democratic system but a problem that has to be handled. The extreme levels of such fragmentation are assumed to reveal multiple centers of state authority, which would lead to revolutionary transformations. As a result, the 'rationalization' of the state and its 'unfragmented' power underpin the processes of technocratic decision-making that centralizes the power in the executive branch.

> *Real power has shifted out of the hand of the elected representatives to the technical experts. Now begins a new type of government neither democracy nor bureaucracy but technocracy. Technocracy is undermining the normal political framework of democracy. Technocrats play predominant role in the society's political life. Democracy is conflictual with a technocrat dominates bureaucracy since increased participation reveals increased frustration. Increase in participation connotes the existence of many different groups that control each other thus a sense of impasse (ibid: 78-9).*

In the managerial perspective, the power of bureaucracy originates from its centrality in the process of modernization (Beetham, 1996). This process is assumed to engender environmental complexity and large-scale organizations, which necessitate a rational decision-making process. Here, a rational decision-making process implies logic of efficiency as well as a source of legitimacy. The rationalization rhetoric privileges the increasing complexity of society that requires an effective technocracy, dealing with corporate planning. In this sense the state regulations is considered crucial for reducing the uncertainty of the market. Given the complexity of market transactions, bureaucratization becomes inescapable for the maintenance of efficiency, reliability, and accountability. Accordingly, the rationalization rhetoric justifies the autonomy of bueraucracy, which originates from the bureaucracy's monopoly on expert power and information in such a 'complex and uncertain' environment. On the other hand, the political participation is conceived as a challenge to the rationality of the

decision making processes because it sustains the involvement of the non-competent actors to the policy processes.

Here a crucial debate has to be elaborated; whether the bureaucracy is the ruling class or not. Burnham (cited in Şaylan, 1974) argues that the bureaucracy is a new class that emerged as a consequence of industrialization. This new class attained the political control mechanism by using its expertise. These professionals largely dominate the power and they are immune from the characteristics of the political system. Aron (cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985) emphasizes that although the societal domination cannot be handled without bureaucracy, this does not imply that the whole bureaucracy is the ruling class. However, the ruling class can be found among the heads of bureaucratic hierarchies; the people who have the authority to give directions to the administrative staff. Parkin (1979) postulates bureaucracy as a 'powerful stratum' distinct from social classes. It is not an agent of class-rule because it is a unified entity that pursues its own corporate interests. In this framework, bureaucracy is an autonomous interest group that determines the rules of the game. Bureaucratic elites control the paths of access to information and they shape the public opinion by controlling and manipulating the accessibility of political issues to the political agenda. Such exercise of power limits the decision-making realm of the legislature, which has no other option than to approve the decisions of the executive branch.

Suleiman (1978), in his remarkable study, focuses on the 'state created' elites. These elites are trained by the state for the public service and they dominate the key posts in the political, financial, industrial, and educational sectors. The state institutions not only sustain the selection and training of elites but assign them in the key posts of core sectors in a given context as well. There is a significant correlation between the schools and the types of the bureaucratic organizations of elites because the graduates of specific state schools constantly fill specific bureaucratic posts. Graduating from these schools is a source of legitimacy in

itself, and in return, these schools maintain their power just because their graduates are considered successful.

The state created elites share a common social psychology and they are deeply committed to a certain view of society, which is centralized, non-participatory, and fundamentally conservative (ibid.). They have a common interest in the stability of economy and state because such stability maintains their institutional positions at the command posts. The invaluable criteria of efficiency and merit are also the means for elite domination because their primary function is to sustain the recruitment and placement of elites in the bureaucracies.

To sum up, the managerial perspective emphasizes the prevalence of elite alliances as well as the autonomy of the state and bureaucracy. The organizations and organizational relations are the primary level of analysis (structural level) in which societies and individuals must be understood and interpreted. The established power 'structures' dominate society, economy, and culture. The dynamics of modern and industrial societies can be explained adequately by the power of giant organizations, which are the instruments of elites to control the political and economic resources of society. Despite the mechanisms of domination may vary, the state domination is considered the most crucial and inescapable historical development. The state functionally implies the technical capacities of organizations in managing complex tasks, and politically indicates the capacity of powerful organizations to dominate the groups whose interests are incompatible with the goals of elites (Alford & Friedland, 1985). In this sense, the state-society relationship involves the affiliation of autonomy and dependence between the dominant and subordinate actors in society.

The managerial perspective subordinates the state's capitalist and democratic aspects to its managerial aspect. Thus, it underestimates the possibilities and ways of non-elite participation to the policy process. It also overemphasizes the power of elites and state institutions because it neglects the power of capitalism and

capitalists that might appear as a constraint upon the autonomy of the state and bureaucracy.

2.2.3. The Capitalist Aspect of the State: Capitalism and Class Interests

The class perspective is crucial for understanding the constraints, which are constituted by capitalism upon the democracy and the autonomy of the state. In this perspective, the main factors that shape the policies of the state are the dynamics of class struggle and the required conditions for capital accumulation. The actions of individuals and organizations are considered in harmony with the logic of the capitalist system, thus, the essential role of social actors is assumed as the reproduction and transformation of capitalism. Accordingly, the efficacy of political participation as well as the structure of political authority is limited by the logic of capitalism. Either the pluralist approach that focuses on societal differentiation, or the managerial approach that underpins the complexity of modern industrial societies neglect the systemic power of capitalism, thus, they cannot generate an adequate explanatory framework. In this sense, the explanatory framework of this perspective has to do with the roles of the state and bureaucracy in a society, guided by capitalism.

This framework focuses on specific conditions such as (1) individuals selling their labor as a commodity to those who owns the means of production, (2) the dependence of economic organizations to capital accumulation, and (3) the domination of the economy by privately controlled production. The central matter of debate is the power of capitalism, which is conceptualized as a system that maintains the class rule and capital accumulation through reproducing the exploitative social relations.

In the class perspective, the notion of society implies the collectivity of social relations, deriving from the materialistic conditions of human life. The economic dimension of society is central to the analysis. The organizations, individuals,

politics, and culture are interpreted within the framework of class relations. The organizations and individuals are conceived as either the agents of classes or the bearers of class relations. These relations derive from the historically developed patterns of production in society. The relationship of commodity between the capital and labor constitutes the essence of capitalist society. The core dynamic of the capitalist system is capital accumulation, which involves the concentration (increased scale of production in large factories) and centralization (increased control of profit by fewer corporations and families) of the capital. Capital accumulation occurs simultaneously with class formation because it gradually polarizes the class structure as the ones who own the means of production and the ones who do not own it (Alford & Friedland, 1985).

The class perspective employs the systemic level of analysis in which the systemic power of capitalism historically determines the real environment of organizations as well as the context and content of individual behavior (ibid.). Power is observed in the reproduction of hegemonic social relations, which are unquestioned by most of society. In a capitalist society there is no genuine public interest but there are various class interests. However, the legitimacy of these particularistic interests has to do with their formulation and presentation as the public interest. Such capability requires the acquirement of political power because merely the coercive authority of the political power can define what the public interest is (Şaylan, 1974). Consequently, the actors may change but the public interest is constantly formulated in a way that regulates and stabilizes the capitalist exploitation, which in return sustains the growth of private profitability.

The politicization of class interests is prevented by false consciousness,[7] working-class disorganization, cooptation, and state repression (Alford & Friedland, 1985). The democratic rights can be destroyed by a repressive state or a capitalist strike (the refusal of capitalists to invest) whenever a challenge occurs against the capitalist mode of production (ibid.). Democratic institutions are the mechanisms

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[7] Failure to identify one's own objective class interests due to the hegemony of capitalist ideology.

that legitimate and reproduce the capitalist social order, thus, they are subordinated to the needs of capitalism. The capitalist relations of production can prevail under democratic conditions and exploitation can be maintained by the consent of the exploited. Thus, democracy is nothing but an illusion under the conditions of capitalism.

In the class perspective, the state is considered a historical product of class struggle, which is fundamentally biased to the interests of the capitalists and/or capitalism. Capital accumulation requires the expansion of the state because of the contradictory logic of capitalism; its inability to reproduce itself. However, the state is able to deal merely with the consequences of the capitalist crisis, not with its causes. Thus, in the final analyses, the state is subordinate to the dynamics of capitalism.

Controversial to the pluralist approaches, the state is not the regulator of societal contradictions but it is a mechanism that fosters those contradictions (Şaylan, 1974). In this sense, the state is not a referee that secures the environment for the competition of interests. On the other hand, it is not an object of elite domination, or an autonomous entity that pursues its own interests. The state's most important aspect is its role in the reproduction of capitalist relations of production.

> *The class perspective views the existence of a state apparatus as necessary to reproduce the conditions required for capital accumulation but as simultaneously undermining those conditions and creating the possibility of transformation. The state, thus, has a dialectical and contradictory relationship to the mode of production and to the population under its control. This relation is the capitalist aspect of the state (Alford & Friedland, 1985: 286).*

The main debate about the role of the state has to do with the instrumentalist, functionalist, and structural-functionalist approaches of the class paradigm. The instrumentalist approaches postulate the state as a *machine* that is directly controlled by the capitalists, who merely pursue their own interests. Similar with the managerial perspective, the capitalists, bureaucrats, and political leaders are

assumed as a single cohesive group that coordinate the public policies and share common societal origins, lifestyles, and values (Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1997). The state is fundamentally biased in favor of those who control the means of production because the ruling class has its hegemony on the definition of political issues as well as the limits of the state mechanism. This class is the sole source of power that shapes the institutions. The state and its organizations are secondary because they are the subjects of capitalist interests. Thus, the state merely plays a role in the emergence of a new class rule (Anderson cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985).

The functionalist approaches conceive the state as an apparatus for the reproduction of the capitalist social relations of production. In a capitalist context, the institutions and their relationship (including the state and society) are inescapably directed towards the reproduction of that context. Capitalism requires a state that should (1) absorb the class struggle, and (2) prevent the economic crisis, stagnation, and the politicization of production relations. The state has a vital function in the creation of a working class (as a productive force), as well as preventing the transformation of this class into a revolutionary force. In this sense, the state has to deal with the 'social costs' of capital accumulation while leaving the privately controlled profits untouched. These requirements engender the contradictory functions of the state. On the one hand, it has to provide the necessary conditions for profitability. On the other hand, it must maintain the support of the working class in order to preserve the social order. However, the maintenance of such support challenges the capitalist profitability because it requires a considerable state spending and redistributive policies that would legitimate the state activity in the minds of the working class; "the legitimation function directs much state activity toward coopting potential sources of popular discontent by attempting to transform political demands into economic demands" (Wright cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985: 310). Therefore, the state's legitimacy depends upon its prosperity because its legitimation function requires welfare budgets in order to retain the support of the working and unemployed population.

The welfare policies such as subsidized housing, health, transportation, and social security are also considered functional in reducing the direct costs of labor on the behalf of the ruling class (ibid.).

Castells (cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985) criticizes the instrumentalist approaches because the state cannot be considered a machine, directly dominated by the capitalists. Accordingly, the state has functions that cannot be handled by any other social institution such as regulating the competition among capitalists, concealing the social costs of production, producing foreign policies, and maintaining the continuity of labor power. The representative function of the state requires its relative autonomy from the capitalists because an intensive state support to the capitalist class undermines the state's 'image' as the representative of general interest. However, the public decisions are always constrained by the criteria of profitability because there is a causal relationship between the economic success and legitimacy of the state.

Przeworski (ibid.) argues that the core function of the state is to buffer the institutional contradiction between democracy and capitalism. It has to manage the conflict between the democratic pressures (such as the demands for employment opportunities and higher wages) and the inherent tendencies of capitalism (such as the poverty, unemployment and economic crisis). The capitalists do not need a direct control on the state because the requirements of the capitalist mode of production (attainment of surplus labor) cannot be realized in the state's (political) realm but in the economic realm. Thus, the core function of the state is to safeguard the social order through the preservation of private property and capital accumulation.

Finally, the structural-functional approaches emphasize that the state and its structural variations are dependent upon the historical requirements of capitalism. Similar to the functional approaches, the structural-functional approaches assume a systemic relationship between the state and capitalism but interpret this

connection within the historical requirements of class struggle and capitalist rule. Accordingly, the structure of the state derives from the historical requirements for the reproduction of capitalism, and these requirements, on the other hand, render the state relatively autonomous from the capitalists and the capitalist mode of production.

Poulantzas (cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985; Şaylan, 1994) criticizes the instrumentalist and functionalist perspectives because they postulate the state as a 'thing' or as a 'subject.' The former postulates the state, similar with the managerial perspective, as a machine that can be easily manipulated and controlled by the dominant classes. The latter derives from the Hegelian conception that assumes the state as an organism independent from society and above it. In both perspectives the classes are considered to act outside the state. Poulantzas emphasizes that the state is not a thing or a subject but a 'relation' with its own internal contradictions. It is the "specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among classes and class fractions" (Alford & Friedland, 1985: 367). Class contradictions exist in the state's material framework and pattern its organization; therefore, the state policies are the results of class contradictions. Accordingly, the state cannot be considered a unified entity outside the class struggle. In addition, the state cannot be a rational mechanism because the contradictions of capitalism are internalized by it.

There can be relatively autonomous organizations and diverse interest groups that attempt to influence the decisions of the state. However, given that the whole framework is defined by the capitalist mode of production, all the decisions and actions of the capitalist state are, in the final analysis, reproduces capitalism. The reproduction of capitalism requires a relatively autonomous state because the state's class-neutral appearance is functional for preserving the long-run interests of the capitalist class. Here, the democratic (representative) aspect of the state maintains the state's relative autonomy by preventing the direct control of the capitalist class upon the state. However, when the dynamics of the class conflict

necessitate the excessive control of the ruling class, it can efficiently centralize and decentralize the state. A centralized state is not only crucial for repressing the class struggle but to justify the necessity of executive action for an efficiently operating economy as well (Alford & Friedland, 1985). On the other hand, the decentralization of the state is crucial for countering the popular movements by changing the location of the state decisions. These class-biased decisions about centralization and decentralization are justified through the notion of rationality. Accordingly, the 'rationalization' of the state has a strong ideological character because it renders the criteria of efficiency as the core aspect of the state, justifying the minimum democratic participation. Thus, given the hegemony of capitalism, the notions such as planning, coordination, rationality, are inherently ideological.

The diversified approaches of the class perspective about the state are also relevant with the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is postulated as (1) an instrument of specific class interests, (2) a mechanism for implementing certain kind of state policies that are functional for capitalism or (3) a political manifestation of the contradictions within the state (ibid.). It is the main source of alienation that cannot be controlled by society. It is a societal organization that controls and regulates the lives of people irrespective of their wills and persuades them about the absence of any available alternatives (Şaylan, 1974).

The instrumentalist approaches conceptualize the bureaucracy as an instrument of the ruling class. However, the bureaucracy does not necessarily involve the direct *informal* control of the capitalists because it can also be controlled *formally* by this class' political representatives or financial power (Alford & Friedland, 1985). Domhoff (cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985), likewise the Mills' approach, focuses on the power elite and argues that the members of the upper class control the top-level employees. This upper class involves families that are listed in social registers, educated in private schools, members of social clubs and share a common lifestyle and class-consciousness. However, unlike the Mill's argument,

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the power elite are not autonomous because they pursue the interests of the upper class. Thus, they are the operating arm of this class; the power elite "yield an amazing proportion of its wealth to an upper class of big businessman and their descendents" (ibid: 301). The major foreign policy institutions, including the military posts, are staffed by the members of the power elite. The network between the power elite and upper class is highly influential on the national goals and international relations. The members of military (especially high ranking) interact with the upper class during their periods of office and when they retire they are usually employed by the big business institutions. Likewise, Neuman (ibid.) conceptualizes the bureaucracy as the executive branch of the capitalists. He argues that an increase in the number of bureaucratic organizations and the expansion of bureaucratic behavior do not imply the bureaucracy's systemic power. These dynamics derive from the requirement of the ruling class for more bureaucracy in order to cope with the exercise of political power. In this sense, the bureaucracy is subordinate to the requirements of the capitalist rule.

Within the framework of the functionalist approaches, the bureaucracy is not subordinate to a particular power structure such as the ruling class but it is subordinate to the *system* of capitalism. The power of bureaucracy derives from its function in a class-based society. The structure and functioning of the bureaucracy is subordinated to the logic of capitalist profit and cannot be analyzed apart from the capital-labor relationship. The bureaucracy, as the executive branch of the state, serves to the interests of capitalism through providing the required conditions for capital accumulation, maintaining the societal order, and securing the private property. The extensive power of the bureaucracy does not imply the existence of a bureaucratic domination because it is merely a requirement for safeguarding the social control of labor and capital accumulation. Bureaucratic ideologies legitimate such extensive power by obscuring the bureaucracy's class function behind claims to serve the general interest, the requirements of order, and the demands of technical necessity or efficiency (Alford & Friedland, 1985).

Its professional creed that commits to abstractly defined goals such as growth, productivity and efficiency is ideally suited to the needs of capital but they serve the objective requirements of accumulation while mystifying its true nature and thereby lifting it beyond the range of criticism (Kay, cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985: 364).

Likewise, Mandel (cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985: 365) argues that the "bureaucratic mechanisms arise to do what capitalists cannot; assure the reproduction of capitalism". The state and bureaucracy have two core functions to maintain the conditions of production, which cannot be assured by the members of the ruling class. These functions are first, the repression of any threat to the prevailing mode of production through the military, police, judiciary and prison systems, and second, to integrate the dominant classes.

The reproduction of the capitalist system requires the centralization of the state by the top executives. The crisis of capitalism necessitates a centralized executive power for handling the political demands. The centralized power of the state and bureaucracy not only has to suppress the class struggle by repression but to sustain the economic efficiency of the state as well. Meanwhile, the bureaucrats are mystified about whose interests they are serving as well as the origins of the state structures. They create and believe in a self-image about the indispensability of their functions on the behalf of society and public interest (Şaylan, 1974). Society might also believe in the neutrality and efficiency of the bureaucracy if the latter is (re)organized with a professional staff of managers; the technocrats (Beetham, 1996). Therborn points out that the legality of bureaucracy is now a secondary aspect because it is substituted by the criteria of efficiency and the power of technocracy;

The last few decades, a new mode of organizing the bourgeois state has developed alongside the legal bureaucracy. Like the latter it is characterized by specialization, impersonality and stratified monopolization of intellectual knowledge by the professionals. But it does not rely on the same degree upon calculable rules and fixed hierarchies. We may term this form as managerial technocracy. Its rationality is substantive rather than formal; and instead of juridical knowledge, it promotes technical and scientific expertise, applies with

discretion and consideration of scientific effects, rather than with calculable legal precision. In the internal control system, cost-benefit analysis and budgeting policy have overtaken legal reviews in importance (Therborn, 1978: 54).

Finally, the structural-functionalist approaches emphasize the relative autonomy of the bureaucracy against the demands of the capitalists and capitalism. Accordingly, Willis (cited in Alford & Friedland, 1985) emphasizes that the state institutions are modified for overcoming the problems that are produced but cannot be resolved by capitalism. However, this does not imply their sole function. The state personnel (in the short term) might resolve, delay or confuse the problems of capitalism because they also privilege their own professional goals independent from the functional requirements of capitalism. Likewise, as Deutscher (ibid.) argues, the functionalist approaches postulate the bureaucracy relatively optimistic because they do not consider it an independent source of power. In fact the bureaucracy is a distinct social group, which emerged during the capitalist development. It is a form of interclass organization within the state. However, its autonomy is a 'relative' one because of the constraints engendered by the historical demands of the ruling class for capital accumulation. In addition, the technocratic power of the bureaucracy is not the consequence of the technical complexity of industrial economy but it is a means for bypassing the representative institutions in society. Such sidestepping is functional in the maintenance of the capitalist power as well as overcoming the political incapacity of the capitalist class.

To sum up, all class approaches agree that the state and bureaucracy function on the behalf of capitalism as either an instrument of the capitalists and class rule, or a semi-autonomous power structure, indispensable for the requirements of the capitalist system. The managerial and democratic aspects of the state are secondary to its capitalist aspect because it is assumed that the social relations of production penetrate to all organizations as well as individual behavior. The process of capitalist accumulation shapes the institutions either in forms that reproduce capitalism, or in forms that lead to the transformation of capitalism.

Thus, the state is the central institution for the reproduction and transformation of the capitalism. The institutions (including the states) can vary in many ways but these variations are also determined by the requirements of capitalism.

The class perspective stresses the hegemony of the ruling class as well as the system of capitalism over the boundaries of the state and the politics. The class regulating function of the state and bureaucracy is crucial because the class power depends upon the state and the state is shaped by class power. However, the class perspective almost completely ignores the structural and situational levels of power through subordinating each dynamic to the hegemony of capitalism and capitalists. Thus, it underestimates the extensive concentration of bureaucratic power as well as the dynamics of culture and participation.

2.3. Reconfiguring the Notion of Representation: The Theories of the State as Worldviews

Each theoretical perspective has something to offer regarding the conceptualization of relationship between the state, bureaucracy, and society. The liberal-pluralist perspective emphasizes the democratic aspect of the state and the cultural dimension of society. The managerial perspective emphasizes the bureaucratic aspect of the state and the political dimension of society. Finally, the class perspective stresses the capitalist aspect of the state and the economic dimension of society. In other words, each aspect emphasizes a specific notion of the state, or a specific state-society relationship. Thus, within the framework of each perspective the state is understood either as an entity apart from society (set of organizations with legal authority and monopoly on violence) or as a relation, expressing the values and interests that can be understood solely by considering the state as a part of society.

Each perspective has an explanatory theoretical power that involves 'taken for granted' assumptions. However, the assumptions of each perspective either

underestimate or ignore the powers of the other perspectives. In this sense, neither the internalized values of a democratic political culture, nor the organized interests that seek control upon the state and society, or the hegemony of capitalism can permanently dominate all institutions and actions. Furthermore, it cannot be argued that a specific perspective is more proper or useful than the others because they deal with the same issues by utilizing different levels of analysis. Accordingly, the liberal-pluralist paradigm employs the individual level of analysis; the managerial paradigm utilizes the structural level of analysis; and the class paradigm has to do with the systemic level of analysis. Thus, a multilevel approach is required to interpret the representation in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. What is meant by a multilevel approach is not the synthesis of these paradigms but to utilize the power of each theory to some extent within the historical, political, and cultural aspects of a specific context.

The significance of these theoretical perspectives for our purposes has to do with their assumptions regarding the institutional logics that compose a societal totality. Thus, they provide a framework for interpreting the institutionalized logics that might manifest themselves in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. More specifically, each theory underpins a specific worldview regarding the state-society relationship that might be evident in the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. On the other hand, these theories would enable us to make specific suggestions, and alternative explanations regarding the mindsets of the bureaucrats. Here, the crucial issue has to do with revealing the contents of the concepts as well as their associations in the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats.

No concept is theory-free. Thus, the dominant theory within a social group will include the indicators that refer to the central meanings of the concepts in that theory. In this sense, each theory is a worldview that attributes meaning to the concepts. Given that these worldviews constitute the meaning, they also constitute the content of representation in the mindsets of the actors. The mindset of an actor consists of an interrelated set of concepts and assumptions, and the 'worldview' is

the core variable about how issues are defined and even whether or not they will be identified (Alford & Friedland, 1985). Defining a concept in a specific way is a crucial choice because it allows one to recognize specific aspects of reality, while ignoring the others. In this sense the language itself carries the content of theories; what is *seen* and what is *said* are related and they are both theoretically constructed (ibid.).

The theories of the state –which are also ideologies as noted earlier - shape the consciousness of specific groups mainly by defining the boundaries between the state and society in terms of legitimacy. To the extent that a particular theory is dominant, the secondary meanings of a given concept will not be accepted or even debated. Hence, the 'choice' of concepts involves political judgments. The definitions of these concepts mirror deeply embedded meaning structures, hidden in the foundations of social order. Therefore, these concepts are the taken for granted foundations of a culture or society. In other words, the concepts imply historically institutionalized patterns, which derive from the social production of knowledge. Furthermore, they are not questioned until an eligible context for their inquiry and change of usage arises through the dynamics of social conditions.

The clusters of concepts, which provide us the conceptual relationships, constitute the discourse of a given totality. The description of a concept involves its relations with other concepts because it defines the boundaries of this concept with other concepts. Such conceptual relationships constitute the ruling ideas of an epoch. In our perspective, representation is the *ruling ideas* that dominate the meaning worlds of actors. Representation is the *worldview* that constitutes the basis of core assumptions within a given perspective. Thus, representation involves historically constructed realities in the mindsets of the actors, organizations, and societies. However, these 'realities' might involve specific variations. In the case of bureaucrats, a primary source of variation has to do with their institutional experiences. Simply, the history, function, and organizational ideology of the agency that a bureaucrat works for also play a significant role in shaping the

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theory of the state in the mind of that bureaucrat. In other words, although there is a macro culture, which *determines* and is *determined by* the worldviews of the actors, there is also significant room for institutional variation among bureaucrats originating from their micro organizational cultures.

In order to acknowledge contextual varieties it is crucial to incorporate the characteristics of a specific context to the analysis. The theories of the state outlined above are the ideal types, free from the unique characteristics of any particular context. Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate their assumptions with particular reference to the Turkish context;

> *When assessing representativeness in one political, administrative and societal setting, one must therefore use criteria appropriate to that situation. In fact, one of the thing we can learn studying the different meanings of representativeness across civil service systems is the assessment of the unique characteristics of systems as a consequence of the political and societal environment in which they are operating (Van Der Meer & Roborgh, 1996: 122).*

The next chapter will discuss the characteristics of the Turkish politics and political culture in this respect. The historical experience and cultural characteristics of the Turkish context involve a unique process of modernization, questioned by specific approaches that utilize the three theories of the state in particular ways. It is therefore crucial to delineate the Turkish context in light of these theories in order to understand and evaluate the prevailing patterns in the mindset of the Turkish bureaucrats.

CHAPTER 3

THE CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK: AN OVERVIEW OF THE TURKISH POLITICS AND POLITICAL CULTURE

Political culture is one of the core aspects of a society that shapes its thoughts, behaviors and institutions associated with politics (Parla, 1994). It can be defined as the collectivity of political traditions, tendencies, norms, beliefs, feelings and knowledge that underpins the attitudes and orientations towards political institutions (Almond & Powell, 1978). Political culture typically involves a variety of components determined by the historical processes and the socio-economic structures, some of which are more central than others in determining the political life and institutions. Accordingly, political culture mirrors a reciprocal interaction between structures and the actors. On the one hand, it shapes commonsense by socializing political actors into the institutionalized conceptions of political issues and concepts. On the other hand, the political culture itself is constituted, maintained, or transformed by associated actors. Therefore, the meaning clusters, embedded in the mindsets of actors, have to do with the intrinsic components of a specific culture. In this respect, political culture will be one of our analytical tools in understanding and interpreting the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats.

In this chapter, we will elaborate the aspects of the Ottoman-Turkish politics and political culture in a historical perspective with particular emphasis on the patterns of state-society relationship as well as the institutional roles of the state, bureaucracy and the military in the Turkish context. Here, we will not intend to make a very detailed narration, or to propose unique arguments. Our aim is to generate an interpretive framework; a contextual toolbox for exploring the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. Accordingly, we will primarily elaborate the core paradigmatic perspectives that constitute the literature on Turkish politics

and political culture with an emphasis to Turkish modernization. Afterwards, within the framework of these perspectives, we will review the prevailing or transformed aspects of the political culture, considering the institutional and political milieu in the Turkish context.

3.1. The Core Interpretive Perspectives on the Turkish Politics and Political Culture

In generating our framework we will utilize four core perspectives, which interpret the dynamics of the Turkish politics and political culture in their own domains. These perspectives are namely; (1) the state-centric approach (2) the perspective of political economy, (3) the sociological perspective, and (4) the perspective of identity and democracy.

The state-centric approach,[8] utilizing the imperatives of the managerial paradigm, emphasizes the centrality and relative autonomy of the state as the core determinant of political culture, and politics in a given context. The state is conceived as the primary organization that shapes the dynamics of politics, economy, and society. Each state is assumed to have a unique history, thus, they cannot be considered the byproducts of specific societal or economic developments such as the capitalism, and democracy. The state is able to formulate and realize its own goals apart from societal and economic forces. It is also independent in working out its internal organization. Thus, the state is an autonomous entity, institutionalized around specific norms with a changing locus.[9] Such an approach provides critical insights for the dominant role of the state and its bureaucracy in the process of Turkish modernization; a process which

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[8] See Heper (1985; 1987; 1990a; 1990b; 1991a; 1992b)

[9] As Heper (1985) argues, during the Ottoman Empire the locus of the state oscillated between the Sultan and the bureaucracy; during the War of Independence the locus of the state was the Turkish Grand National Assembly; until the 1960's the state located in the party bureaucracy; between 1960 and 1972 the locus of the state was the military and civil bureaucracy; and after the 1982 constitution, the military and the president of the republic constituted the locus of the Turkish state.

significantly shaped the political culture as well as the socioeconomic structures in Turkey. However, it underestimates the societal and economic aspects of the modernization process by attributing an ontological primacy to the state.

The political-economy approach[10] focuses on the ideological and economic restructuring processes of political and societal systems by utilizing the class perspective. Dominant here are the analytical tools of (Neo) Marxism such as class, conflict, economy, and hegemony. Within the framework of this paradigm the process of modernization is conceived as an instrument of imperialism and capitalism (Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1998). Accordingly, the Turkish modernization is identified with the development of the national capitalism; a vital process for the prevalence of the capitalist hegemony. The major issues have to do with; (1) the peripherization of the Ottoman-Turkish system through the integration with the capitalist world economy, and (2) the reproduction of the hegemonic alliance, involving the state, bureaucracy, and bourgeoisie, over the major policies and the relations of production. Unlike the state-centric approach, the centrality and dominance of the state are considered the part of a development strategy, which was essentially functional for the establishment of a national economy and adjustment to the world capitalism.

The sociological approach utilizes both the managerial[11] and the liberal-pluralist[12] paradigms. It analyses the effects of modernization on the structure of the state-society relationship in the Ottoman-Turkish context. This approach incorporates crucial notions to the analysis of the Turkish modernization such as the change or continuity of the political culture, and the political socialization of the actors. In this framework, modernization implies a process of cultural transformation, involving simultaneous ruptures and continuities, thus, is cannot be reduced to the

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[10] See Kazancıgil (2000), Keyder (2003), Şaylan (1974), Yalman (2002).

[11] See Mardin (2003a, 2004a, 2004b); Öğün (2002, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e, 2004f, 2004g, 2004h, 2004i), Sunar (1974).

[12] See Göle (2000, 2004).

establishment of the 'modern' institutions as well as the national economy (Keyman, 2001). This perspective is crucial for understanding how the Turkish modernization generally faced the historical residues of the political culture, thus, the past reproduced itself (Öğün, 2002). On the other hand, it does not pay enough attention to the established power structures that have variety of interests in the 'reproduction of the past.'

The final paradigm is the identity and democratization,[13] which utilizes the imperatives of liberal-pluralism. This paradigm basically focuses on the continuity of an authoritarian and suppressive mentality in the Turkish context. Accordingly, it emphasizes the authoritarian characteristic of the Turkish modernization by conceiving it as a 'project' that attempted to transform society *from above* within the framework of the Kemalist ideology. The tutelary characteristic of this process construed society not as a 'subject,' who imagines, thinks and transforms but as an 'object of the state' that has to be transformed, controlled, and educated (Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1998). Thus, the Turkish modernization was not considered a means for political liberalization but an end in itself by the modernizing elite. It was institutionalized on an epistemic ground as a 'telos of state,' which identified the will of society with the will of the state and (re)produced the authoritarian characteristic of the Turkish politics and political culture (Kahraman, 2002). Consequently, the state-society relationship was established upon the duties of the latter against the former, which undermined the liberating dimension of modernization. The identity and democratization approach acknowledges the significance as well as the absence of a democratic and liberating politics and political culture in the Turkish context. However, it also involves the potential to over-mystify the notions of democracy and civil society as a cure for every pain. Such an approach might in turn underestimate the complexity of the state-society relationship and reduce the state into a scapegoat as the sole responsible of the authoritarian political context.

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[13] See Kadıoğlu (2002); Kahraman (2002); Kasaba (1998); Keyder (1998); Parla, (1994; 1995).

Given the limitations of each approach, the Turkish politics and political culture cannot adequately be understood merely in regards to the history and characteristics of the nation-state; the development of the national capitalism; the cultural basis of the state-society relationship; or the prevalence of an authoritarian mentality. In this sense each insight is crucial for generating our contextual framework. However, it must be noted that our intention is neither to make a synthesis of these approaches nor to make diverse descriptions of the same context within the framework of each approach. We will just employ various assumptions and arguments of each approach *to some extent* while generating our contextual framework. Accordingly, *the utilization of these approaches is bounded with the subjectivity of the inquirer*. Thus, in this chapter we will follow our idea that the managerial and capitalist aspects of the Turkish state dominated its democratic aspect so that it did not become a genuine concern for the state, for its bureaucracy, and even for society. In our view, such a dynamic dissociates the Turkish context from the premises of the theory of representative bureaucracy as well as constituting the essence of the bureaucratic representation in this context.

3.2. The Ottoman Legacy: Patrimonial Roots of the Turkish Political Culture

The word *state* signifies *greatest happiness* in the Ottoman-Turkish semantics (Sarıbay, 2000). There is a consensus on the patrimonial characteristic of this 'greatest source of happiness,' which indicates a strong, dominant, and centralist state presence *vis-à-vis* the Ottoman society.[14] Indeed, the Ottoman politics is characterized by the absence of challenging social classes against the hegemony of the bureaucratic center (Heper, 1990b; Kılıçbay, 2000; Özbudun, 1995). Such single-sided concentration of political power brought about a political cleavage among the strong center and the weak periphery by subordinating the latter to the will of the former. Accordingly, the public philosophy of the Ottoman era involved the subordination of the public to the interests of the 'holy state,' which

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[14] See Göle, 2004; Heper, 1985; 1990a; 1991a; 1991b; Kılıçbay, 2000; Köker, 1995a; Mardin, 2003a; Öğün, 2004g; Özbudun, 1988; 1995; Sarıbay 2000; Sunar, 1974

the holiness of the state grew and became ever more mystical as the state diverged from society (Sarıbay, 2000).

In the Ottoman administrative system the power was concentrated in the person of the Sultan, whose will was the sole source of authority that set the limits of politics and economy. The exercise of political power was realized through the military, civil, and religious bureaucrats, who were the members of the ruling strata; a distinct group above the rest of the population (Heper, 1991a).

> *...Civil servants were conceived as the extensions of the ruler; they were to be entirely devoted to the will and commands of the Sultan ...The concept of merit included the idea of being religiously loyal to the sultan. ...Each official was autonomous within his own sphere. By the same standard the individual bureaucrat had to limit his own interests entirely to his own sphere... The individual civil servant could not transgress the constraints placed on his day to day activities. ...The absolute power of the sultan made necessary an executive body with absolute loyalty to him (Heper, 1985: 28-9).*

The excessive dominance of central authority and the relative weakness of local powers constituted the basic distinctive features of the Ottoman patrimonalism in contrast to the feudalism of the West. Köker (1995a) emphasizes that 'it is virtually impossible' to consider the existence of a local government or corporate bodies that had relative autonomy in the Ottoman state. Hence, the notion of civil society was not a part of the Ottoman conception of politics. Local politics merely involved following the orders of the center and collecting taxes; "participation at the local level meant nothing more than the participation of local notables as the members of local advisory councils who were accountable not to the people but to the center" (ibid: 55). Society was conceived as a subject that unquestionably had to accept any state action as well as to remain outside the political realm. Such conception resulted in the absence of effective communicative and confrontational networks between the administrative and societal realms (Mardin, 2003a). Consequently, the process of policymaking remained the privilege of a narrow group that occupied the center (Öğün, 2004a).

The distinction between the center and the periphery can be elaborated in regard to the interrelated issues of; (1) the weight of the militaristic concerns in the politics of the center, (2) the primacy of the politics *vis-à-vis* the economy, and (3) the center's insecurity against any kind opposition that endangers the status quo.

The Ottoman center had a militaristic structure, thus, the militaristic concerns were one of the major issues that shaped the center's public philosophy. The issues of conquests and territorial expansion as well as the maintenance of a strategic position in international diplomacy were very influential on the conception of politics by the center (Heper, 1985, 1991a). Accordingly, the Empire's pattern of institutionalization manifested itself upon the notion of a ruling center that could easily collect resources from periphery for waging successful wars (Heper, 1985). The deal was a simple one; the patrimonial state collects the necessary resources from its subjects and in return, provides justice and protection to these subjects. Heper (ibid: 25) summarizes this process as the 'circle of justice' that constituted the administrative philosophy of the Ottoman era; "a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the wellbeing of subjects, no popular wellbeing without justice." Hence, society was conceived merely as a provider of tax funds and manpower to the military.

In addition to the militaristic concerns, the economy was dominated by the center and the ownership of private properties were extremely restricted; both the property and the people belonged to god and were in the trust of the Sultan (Sunar, 1974). The Ottoman *fief* system involved granting the land to its temporary owners and to revoke the ownership whenever needed. The rights of the owners were reduced to the duties of collecting the taxes in the name of the Sultan, and controlling the villagers within their realms (Özbudun, 1988). Thus, the *fief* system was functional in reinforcing the power of the central authority by creating local groups, acting as the agents of the state (Özbudun, 1995). It engendered a noble class with communitarian and clientalistic tendencies, who

were unable to develop an autonomous base of power against the domination of the center (Öğün, 2004d). The wealth was contingent upon the political power, thus, there was not much opportunity for converting the economic resources into political power (Mardin, 2004b; Özbudun, 1988). Consequently, the source of power and societal status was institutionalized as the state itself.

Another critical issue was the insecurity and intolerance of the Ottoman state against any opposition, which primarily had a divine foundation. The social order was considered immutable and no person or structure was able to intervene in the relationship between the state (the will of god) and society (god's subjects). In addition to such divine conceptualization, the center was highly insecure against the challenging and disintegrative powers within the very heterogeneous social structure of the Empire. Such insecurity institutionalized the concern about the periphery as the 'bearer of mischief' against the state as well as the intolerance of the center to any kind of peripheric reaction (Sarıbay, 2000). In this respect, politics was conceived merely as a tool for the preservation of the political and social order (Öğün, 2004a). The bureaucracy was primarily responsible for the maintenance of social stability through sustaining a close control upon social movements as well as preventing the formation of the challenging groups (Mardin, 2003b). Here, the paternalist aspect of the political culture facilitated the maintenance of such control. Paternalism, a notion that derives from the authoritarian relationship between the father and his children, reinforced the conceptualization of the state as a father figure who protects and favors his children in response to their obedience (Kazancıgil, 2000). Consistent with this analogy, the Ottoman state suppressed the oppositional political movements of the periphery much like a father's punitive or, at times, merciful behavior against his naughty child (Öğün, 2004g). The rigidness of this pattern was strategically determined by the state's varying level of power (ibid.). Consequently, the paternalistic and divine aspects of the political culture, involving the holiness of the state as the 'will of god,' underpinned the excessive praise of state authority and an excessive respect to it. The result was the absence of an opposition culture,

which could provide the opportunity for societal mobilization to transform the restricted role of the periphery in the sphere of politics.

Although there was a sharp distinction between the Ottoman center and the periphery, a crucial mechanism brought about the mutual penetration of the state and society. This was namely patronage, which offered a share from the centralized power of the state through maintaining a network of alliance with the power holders. Accordingly, patronage was a crucial mechanism that enabled the periphery to infiltrate into the political realm. Sunar (1974) emphasizes that the Ottoman center was not completely alien to society since it did not rule society merely by the use of direct force but by the reciprocal ties of patronage as well. Although the bureaucratic center was perceived as a fearsome entity by the periphery, the occasional authorization of the local notables by the center resulted in a decline in the hostile manner of the periphery against the center (Mardin, 2003a). In this sense, rather than building a countervailing power, the local notables cooperated with state, which reproduced the state's domination over the distribution of power (Öğün, 2004b). Thus, the patronage practices filled the gap of a reconciliation mechanism between the center and the periphery because they functioned as a substitute for the social contract culture of the feudal West by establishing a clientalistic network between the state and society (Öğün, 2004a).

In the 17th century the Ottoman Empire gradually began to weaken due to various financial and militaristic shortcomings, which necessitated an essential transformation in terms of modernization. The requirement for modernization derived from two major dynamics; (1) the Empire's need to integrate with the developing capitalist world economy (Şaylan, 1974; Kazancıgil, 2000), and (2) to reestablish the weakening power and income of the state (Heper, 1985; 1991a; Mardin 2003a; Özbudun, 1995; Sunar, 1974). Under such conditions, the primary notion of the Ottoman modernization emerged; 'saving the state.' Accordingly, the core intentions of the Ottoman modernization can be summarized as the establishment of a modern and more central bureaucracy, including the military;

the reinforcement of the central control over the local forces; and integration to the capitalist world order for responding to the challenge of the Western imperialism. In this sense, the Ottoman modernization was on the one hand conservative, since it attempted to revitalize the good old days of the Empire and on the other hand it was reformist since such a goal necessitated core structural changes (Öğün, 2004b).

Towards the end of the 19th century the bureaucracy transformed into a more dominant center of power in the Ottoman politics as the pioneer of the modernization process. Consistent with the logic of the Ottoman modernization, the bureaucracy's role was a dialectical one. Although it was the guardian of the order and stability, it was also the origin of societal, political, and economic changes. The state and the Sultan were no longer identical in the mindset of the new generation of bureaucrats. The state was conceptualized as the provider of order, and the bureaucracy was responsible for the protection, permanence and welfare of the state (Heper, 1985; 1991a; 1991b).

This new generation of bureaucrats, educated in the modern institutions imported from the West, was devoted to the modern, secular, and universalistic ideologies of the West (Göle, 2004). They developed an understanding of politics within the framework of complex and conflicting cultural patterns such as patrimonialism, paternalism, constitutionalism, populism, and libertarianism (Öğün, 2004b). Thus, their conceptualization of politics was stuck in between the traditional and the modern. The notion of individuality was still unacceptable because it involved the potentially divisive issues such as citizen rights, participation, and individual freedom (Kasaba, 1998; Sarıbay, 2000). The praised values were societal homogeneity and solidarity under a unifying identity, which was either the Ottoman state or the Islam religion (Öğün, 2004f). They still held a paternalist belief that "if a good and strong father can be found everything would be alright" (Öğün, 2004b: 12). In this sense the modernizing elite conceived of politics as the

sovereignty *for* the people rather than sovereignty *of* the people, which constituted the absolutist characteristic of the Ottoman modernization (Göle, 2004).

Accordingly, the Ottoman modernization equipped the political sphere with the modern bureaucratic institutions but it was alien to the social institutions of the periphery. Thus, the institutional transformation was not accompanied by a relevant societal transformation since it was expected that the former will automatically bring about the latter. As a result, the old pattern of state-society relationship reestablished itself in a new institutional context. Öğün (2002) criticizes the Ottoman modernization process as being insufficient, alienated, and dysfunctional since it reproduced nearly the same relations of power, societal configurations, and an understanding of politics as before. The monopolistic power of the Sultan was replaced by the monopolistic power of the modern state and its bureaucracy. Consequently, the patrimonial logic prevailed; 'as long as the father state confers, it maintains its power.' This formulation remained as the prerequisite of the forthcoming modern state's *raison d'etat*.

3.3. The Early Republic Period 1923-1949: Integrating the Traditional and the Modern

The establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 mirrors a complex and tense modernization process that revealed both ruptures and continuities with the Ottoman past of the political culture. The years between 1925 and 1950 were the single-party period, namely the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), which had a statist, centralist, and nationalist administrative mentality (Kalaycıoğlu, 2000). The major concerns of this period can be summarized as; (1) to establish a modern nation-state; (2) to integrate and culturally transform the nation; and (3) to sustain economic development through the state mechanism.

In this period, the notion of modernization was no longer associated with the original concern for *saving the state*. Instead it became the core ideology of the

modern state. In other words, modernization turned out to be the core paradigm of the republican discourse and policies. Accordingly, the modernizing elite sought to replace the divine principle of legitimacy with a rational-legal one and therefore to change the regulative principle of the order. The Ottoman notion of governance, implying the 'equitable administration by the Sultan,' was replaced by the democratic principle of 'administration of the public by the public.' However, the dominance of the center over the political realm and the periphery persisted during that period. This time the 'modern state' occupied the center as an instrument of modernization, nationalism, and economic development. The state elites, who adopted the role of the 'real guardians of the state and the pioneers of modernization' were still above and relatively autonomous from the society. Politics was perceived by these elites as a means to create a model society; a solidaristic one where the *parts* had no meaning in their own right (Turan, 1988). Individualistic interests were unacceptable because the only legitimate interest was that of the nation. In this sense, the subject of the Ottoman state and the citizen of the Turkish Republic shared more or less the same narrow political realm (Öğün, 2004i). During the process of nation building, the state elites aimed to institutionalize societal standardization by equipping society with a cognitive reference map permeating the total social, political and economic life. This reference map was Kemalism, which also sustained political homogeneity among the state elites (Özbudun, 1995).

Kemalism, as the official ideology of the Turkish Republic is very crucial because constitutes the public philosophy of the modern Turkish state and the unchangeable ethic of the Turkish political system (Öğün, 2004g; Parla, 1994). It functions as a parameter of legitimacy for each attitude, idea and comment in the political life (Parla, 1994). Its philosophical background derives from the positivism, solidarism, and scientism of the 19th century West (Kazancıgil, 2000). The contradictory logic of that ideology can be viewed as modernization in terms of Westernization, which ironically hopes to overcome the Western imperialism (Gülalp, 1998; Turan, 1988).

However, despite its transformative intentions, Kemalism inherited the Ottoman policymaking culture with slight changes (Öğün, 2004a). It pragmatically utilized some crucial foundations of the Ottoman political culture for engineering and institutionalizing the modernizing reforms by means of developing a theory of legitimacy and a specific political ideology (Parla, 1995). Here, the most crucial inheritance can be considered the authoritarian understanding as well as the state-centric framework of the Ottoman politics so that the whole political realm was dominated by the state. Accordingly, as Mardin (2004c) points out, the Turkish Republic inherited a symbol of the state that was oriented to sustain societal control through feelings of fear and respect. Such symbolism of a glorious state and the fetishism of worshipping to it, in fact, concealed the truth about the inadequately organized state especially in the rural areas. Consequently, the mythos of the state, functional for its managerial aspect, grew stronger during the early republic period (ibid.).

Although the notion of political power was 'secularized,' it was still dominated by the central modernizing elites, who were able to determine the common good above society, and reproduce the patrimonial tutelary understanding of the Ottoman politics (Köker, 1995b; Öğün, 2004g). Accordingly, the people could not have sovereignty until they attain a certain level of consciousness, which require the creation of rational and civilized individuals by the state (Heper, 1985; 1987). Thus, during the early republic period, the Kemalist center employed the politics of culture to create a nation that shares the same values, norms, education, and emotions (Mardin, 2003b). In this sense, Kemalism was not merely the official ideology of the state elites but it was a culture of socialization. It constituted a social bond between the state and society through socializing the political sphere by populism as well as nationalizing society by paternalism (Öğün, 2004h). Such a bond was constructed upon the notion that there could be no conflict between the political authority and society since the nation was a self-governing body and the former reflected the solidaristic will of that body. In this sense, the state and society were organically tied to each other.

Here, it is crucial to discuss the Kemalist principles of etatism and populism, which were highly effectual in the constitution of the capitalist and managerial aspects of the modern state. Accordingly, the principle of etatism involved the establishment of a national economy and bourgeoisie controlled by the state. It primarily had to do with the state capitalism in creating the necessary conditions for the accumulation of private capital. The principle of populism, as an organic societal theory, disavowed the heterogeneous societal structure of the periphery, composed of the ethnic, local and religious differences and it attributed the role of 'social equalizer' to the center (Mardin, 2003a). Şaylan (1974) evaluates the emergence of state capitalism as a practical solution for the problem of economic development. This solution involved a strategy that intended to fuel the process of industrialization within social harmony by suppressing the potential societal conflicts. On the one hand, the state had to establish a market mechanism, which was vital for the economic development as well as for integrating to the capitalist world order. On the other hand, the same state had to overcome the divisive effects of the market by fostering cohesion among the nation. Thus, the etatist policies not only intended to create a bourgeois class but maintained the state control upon that class, who owes its position to the state as well. Such a solidaristic ideology also required its own representatives, who were supposed to maintain and enforce the reforms that the nation should adopt: *the bureaucrats*.

The bureaucratic cadres of the early republic were in part an extension of the Ottoman bureaucracy. Ninety-three percent of the military officers and 85 % of the civil bureaucrats continued to serve the Turkish Republic after the collapse of the Empire (Özbudun, 1995). However, this new generation of bureaucrats was already internalized the republican values primarily through the processes of education. The two major schools responsible from such socialization as well as

the relative homogeneity of the bureaucratic worldview were *Harbiye*[15] and *Mülkiye*[16] (Szyliowicz, 1971).

The period between 1923 and 1946 intensified the integration of the civil and military bureaucracy as well as the political elites around the same ideology and political mission (Cizre, 1992). The basic mission was to generate a homogenous society and to consolidate the nation-state through the indoctrination of a secular and prescriptive value system; Kemalism. In addition to that the capital accumulation and adjustment to the capitalist world order had to be accomplished. Within the framework of these self-assigned duties, the bureaucracy established itself not as an instrument of political power but as the political power itself, guided by the Kemalist principles (Heper, 1985). The worldview of the bureaucrats involved a mechanical conception of social life, and social mobilization that could be predetermined and open to administrative control and interference (Öğün, 2004i). Their basic duty was not to *serve* but to *command* society (Şaylan, 1974).

Accordingly, the bureaucrats shared the Hegelian notion of the state; the one that would safeguard the general interest without overwhelming society (Heper, 1987). Democracy implied freedom from the absolutism of the majority since the bureaucrats were the ones who would decide the rational common good for society (Heper, 1991b). They were very sensitive about the national and territorial integration in which no hostile and oppositional forces could exist (Heper, 1990a). Likewise the conceptualization of the state, the notion of society was perceived in Hegelian sense; a sphere of universal egoism (Heper, 1987). It was the realm of insurgency, dissension, and rebellion whose influence on the national policy making process had to be restricted (Kalaycıoğlu, 2000). Thus, the Ottoman conceptualization of 'society as a bearer of mischief against the state' prevailed in

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[15] The military academy founded in 1834

[16] The school of administration and civil service founded in 1859

the early republican period alongside the modern political institutions (Sarıbay, 2000).

3.4. The Multiparty Period 1950-1980: A Dilemma of Transition

The single-party rule ended on 14 May 1950 with the first free elections in Turkey, which was won by the opposing Democratic Party (DP). The popular base of the DP was composed of the peasants, commercial middle classes (craftsmen, merchants), local notables, urban liberals, religious conservatives, and the urban poor (Özbudun, 1988; Sunar, 1974). The DP's electoral victory can be interpreted within the framework of two the major factors; (1) the peripheric reaction against the RPP's coercive policies of modernization, and (2) the state dominance over the economic realm, derived from the etatist policies of the RPP administration. Especially the latter issue was highly influential in dissolving the alliance between the bureaucratic center and its peripheric allies by provoking the influential landowners and urban commercial groups against the policies of the RPP.

In a managerial perspective, the etatist policies of the RPP enhanced the realm of bureaucratic domination and constituted a serious obstacle against bourgeoisie, who wanted to invest freely (Sunar, 1974). Such an interest conflict weakened the alliance between the bureaucratic elite and the landowners/businessmen. However, Yalman (2002) notes that the anti-elitist and anti-etatist rhetoric of the DP cannot simply be considered a pragmatic utilization of the interest conflict between the RPP bureaucracy and the periphery. In fact, such rhetoric underpinned the effort to configure a new project of hegemony under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, which had no genuine concern in its independence from the state. The bourgeoisie was not challenging the state since it was still being constituted *by* and *in* the state (ibid.). Accordingly, transition to the multi-party period implies the prevalence of the same capitalist power structure because

the DP rule involved an effort to construct a new historical bloc so as to revitalize the hegemonic coalition.

Considering the different assumptions above, the explanations about the core objective of the DP administration involves paradigmatic variations. The managerial perspective postulates this objective as to seize the power of the central elites; the class perspective identifies it with the reproduction of the capitalist hegemony; and the liberal-pluralist perspective assumes it as an effort to liberate the market and society. Whatever the genuine objective was, the DP administration reinforced the old insecurity code between the center and the periphery. However, this time it morphed the notion of *society as a bearer of mischief against the state* into the notion of *state as a bearer of mischief against society* (Sarıbay, 2000). Thus, the DP administration pragmatically utilized the center-periphery distinction for the sake of the latter's votes, thus had no genuine concern in the liberalization of politics (Cizre, 1999a). The political power was considered irreducible; any kind of opposition was not welcomed and tightly restricted; the state institutions were arbitrarily used; and the principle of the separation of powers was ignored (Turan, 1988; 2000). Consequently, despite its liberal rhetoric, the DP's understanding of politics remained the same with the single-party period (Özbudun, 1988).

During the DP period the bureaucrats' societal esteem, status, income, influence, and their dominance in the parliament weakened. The DP administration attempted to subordinate the bureaucracy to the party in power, which intensified the struggle between the elected and the appointed officials (Heper, 1980; 1998; Kalaycıoğlu, 2000). That struggle divided the Kemalist unity between the institutions of the state by engendering a bureaucratic opposition against the DP legislation (Eryılmaz, 2002). In such a context, the bureaucracy struggled to maintain its position of 'the genuine representative of the state,' and it also worked to preserve its autonomy against the legislative forces, intended to control the bureaucracy (Kalaycıoğlu, 2000).

The rhetorical claim of the DP in representing the 'national will' was not a significant matter of concern for the bureaucratic alliance because such a will could easily be ignored under the specific circumstances; "democracy is not a regime where crowds should have a say. It is a regime of persuasion; however, when passions rise high, crowds should definitely be overlooked" (Heper, 1985: 76). The particularistic interests of the DP were perceived as 'selfish' as well a threat for the regime, which the civil and the military bureaucracy were the 'sole' protector.

The DP government was abolished by the military intervention in 27 May 1960. The major intention of the 1960 intervention was to restructure the sociopolitical realm through a new constitution and institutional reforms. The 1961 constitution extended the basic rights and liberties while ironically establishing a barrier against the power of the elected elites (Özbudun, 1988; 1995). Accordingly, the spirit of the new constitution mirrored the insecurity of the Kemalist alliance against the elected elites. The autonomy of the public institutions was increased, which aimed at to minimize the government intervention to these institutions. In addition, the scope of the judicial review of governmental action; legislative enactments; and individual liberties were expanded (Özbudun, 1988). The main concern was to sustain close control upon the elected governments, thus ironically, the principle of government control upon the bureaucracy was reversed. Now, the bureaucracy would control the governments.

Alongside the new constitution, another crucial outcome of the 1960 intervention was the intensifying autonomy of the military in the Turkish politics. The military took an active role in shaping the boundaries of political life as well as determining the legitimate ways to conduct politics within those boundaries. The establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) and the separation of the General Staff from the Ministry of National Defense, which were put in place by the 1961 constitution, were the institutional arrangements to consolidate the

autonomy of the military. The military effort for autonomy also involved an economic aspect by the foundation of the Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Foundation (OYAK) in 1961. The establishment of OYAK signified the military concern for sustaining its own capital accumulation, and to reduce its fiscal dependence to the civil powers. Consequently, these institutional arrangements divided the administrative realm between the civil and the military forces, contrary to the principle of the *unity of administration*.

The 60's and 70's were the years of planned economy, involving an intensive effort for industrialization through the policies of import substitution. During the 60's the Justice Party (JP) was in power, which pursued the DP tradition. The end of 60's witnessed the emergence of an intensified class conflict and political violence between the extremist right and left groups. This was accompanied by the failures in economic development, which intensified the socioeconomic inequalities.

In 12 March 1971 the military intervened to the politics once more. This time, the major issue was the gradually increasing domestic terrorism and the JP government's insufficiency in struggling with the economic, international and internal problems that engendered a crisis of legitimacy (Turan, 1988). The major aim of this intervention was justified as to reestablish the societal order and to boost the economic development (Göle, 2004). Not surprisingly, these aims brought about the formation of a technocratic government to reinstitutionalize the public interest. The civil liberties granted by the 1961 constitution were deemed the scapegoat for growing societal polarization, extremism and violence, thus, the constitution was revised to strengthen the executive and central authority (Özbudun, 1988; 1995). The constitutional reform restored the governmental power for the sake of security concerns that privileged an effective struggle with the domestic terrorism. However, such expansion in the governmental power did not include the subordination of the military to that power. Rather, the military gradually began to identify itself with the state and the status quo, which

reinforced the vacuum between the ruling elite and the military (Cizre, 2000). In 1973, the portfolio and the power of the National Security Council were extended. Henceforth, it was not just a platform for the military to express its ideas but it was donated with the power to *advise* the governments directly on the national security issues (Cizre, 1999b).

The years between 1973 and 1980 were the period of the nationalist front governments in which the domestic terrorism, left-right conflict, political extremism, and economic crisis intensified. Heper (1987) evaluates that period as a turning point in the civil bureaucratic elite's dominant role in Turkish politics. The coalition governments promoted the spoils system as an unofficial employment strategy, which constituted the major criteria for appointments and promotions. The bureaucracy intensively became a realm of political bribery and the personnel practices were determined not by the criterion of merit but by the patrimonial notions of obedience and loyalty to the party in power (Eryılmaz, 2002). A change in the ruling party brought about an arbitrary reshuffling of bureaucrats; the creation of new posts in the bureaucracy for the party supporters; and the placement of each ministry under the jurisdiction of a specific party (Heper, 1985; Turan, 1988). Many bureaucrats were insecure in their positions since they were subjected to patronage practices more than ever. During that period the notion of bureaucracy, which formerly implied a prestigious job as well as a source of societal status, transformed into a pejorative concept that signifies the realm of corruption, and arbitrariness.

The 1970's also witnessed a relative fragmentation in the worldviews of the central elites. Kemalist ideology relatively lost its unitary function since the political elites, the bureaucrats, and the intelligentsia polarized into different ideologies (Özbudun, 1995). The polarization in the civil bureaucracy also weakened the alliance between the civil and the military bureaucracy, which the former was considered too insufficient to protect the Kemalist values and to resolve the socio-economic problems by the latter (Heper, 1976). Özbudun (1995)

points out that, during the 1970's, the only institution that preserved its ideological unity was the military, given its extremely indoctrinative education in an isolated environment from the rest of the population. At the end of the 1970's the insecurity of the military regarding the civil governments was similar to that of the DP period. In the military's view, the governments were undermining the national interests through privileging their own material or ideological interests. They were also capable of manipulating the uneducated and/or deviant segments of the public, which in return jeopardizes the regime. The perception of such a threat engendered the military's *right to intervene in politics* once more to reestablish the *order*. Accordingly, the 1980 coup d'etat was justified through the claims of eliminating the internal threats; guarding the unity of the state, and the national integration; and to protect the Kemalist principles.

3.5. 1980's: The Neo-Liberal and the Neo-Patrimonial Turn

The 1980's can be considered a crucial period that infused the Turkish context with the neo-liberal as well as the neo-patrimonial values, which are highly influential on the contemporary political culture. Accordingly, we will focus on the two major dynamics of this period. First, a new constitution was put in place to shape and organize the post-coup d'etat political life. Second, the etatist institutionalization on the economic realm was eliminated through the market oriented reforms.

The coup d'etat in 12 September 1980 was very influential on the nature of the forthcoming political life primarily in terms of reestablishing the state's totalitarian control over almost every realm of society (Sarıbay, 2000). The apparent impetus of the 1980 coup d'etat was the significant erosion in the authority of the state, originating mainly from extreme political polarization, civil violence, and economic breakdown (Heper, 1985; Özbudun, 1988; Turan, 1988). The previous political and economic arrangements were held responsible for the current crisis of the state, which also provided the rationale for the military

intervention (Keyder, 2003). Thus, the primary intention of the 1980 coup d'etat had to do with the revival of the state's authority through a fundamental restructuring process. Such project implied the revival of the Kemalist formulation; the maintenance a classless nation subject to the will of the sovereign state for the sake of harmony and order. The individual and institutional liberties had to be restricted, given their 'ill effects.'

It was in this context that the new constitution was prepared and came into force in 1982. The spirit of the constitution privileged the protection of the state against the individuals, implying the absence of the intermediary structures that would protect the individuals against the state (Sarıbay, 2000). The prevailing ideological and institutional norms were restructured by the constitution in a restrictive and state-dominated manner. The new arrangements extensively narrowed the basis of political participation, weakened the processes of parliamentary democracy, and strengthened the institutions of the state (Cizre & Yeldan, 2000).

The military was the foremost institution whose autonomy was significantly increased by the 1982 constitution. The constitution concentrated the political power in the National Security Council as well as the presidency (Heper, 1987; Özbudun, 1995). Accordingly, The National Security Council was equipped with the power to execute sanctions to the Council of Ministers, which significantly increased the veto power of the military in the political system (Cizre, 1999b). Thus, the military turned out to be the center of Turkish politics through the elevation of its autonomy above constitutional authority of the democratically elected government (Cizre, 2000). The best concept that explains the core concern of the post-1980 military, as Cizre (ibid.) notes, is their desire for complete autonomy. Such autonomy involves both an institutional aspect, implying the unaccountability of the military to the parliament and the public, as well as a political aspect, that underpins the autonomy of the military's political goals (Cizre, 1999b). The military desire for autonomy also mirrors an intolerance and

suspicion towards the civil dominance in the political realm. The civil world implies a domain of instability, clumsiness, power fetishism, imprudence, populism, corruption, and irresponsiveness for the officers (ibid.).

Hence, the civil bureaucracy, who belongs to such a corrupted world, was not a reliable ally anymore. The civil bureaucrats did not command the respect of the post-1980 military, and they were conceived as an obstacle to economic development as well (Heper, 1985; 1990b). A close hierarchical control had to be maintained over the unreliable institutions of the state, including the universities;

> *The autonomy of certain institutions, which had been granted by law, led to the rejection of the idea that an omnipotent authority known as the state existed. These so-called autonomous agencies thought that the public authority they were to exercise was their own personal domain and tended to act accordingly (Kenan Evren cited in Heper, 1985: 137).*

In the absence of a trustable ally, the military viewed itself alone as the most patriotic institution that safeguards the state, Kemalist principles, public interest, and national integrity (Cizre, 2000; Heper, 1985; 1991a). The democracy was conceived merely as a tool for protecting and developing the state, and the constitutional rights were subordinated to the security concerns regarding any sense of threat against the state (Cizre, 2000). The major problem here is not the dominance of a notion of constant threat in the meaning world of the military. The problem is the definition of the threats not by the constitutionally elected authorities but by the military itself in the political realm (ibid.).

In addition to the authorization of politics and the domination of military, another crucial issue was the rise of the neo-liberal ideology at a global scale as a normative framework in which states and societies should function. This ideology mainly proposed a set of principles geared towards a minimal, thus, more efficient state, which in return would sustain 'greater human freedom.' It also privileged the market economy in the place of the welfare state by restricting the state's

economic and societal roles. Society was identified with market, where pragmatism, political moderation, and various conservative values were predominant (Cizre, 1999a; Köker, 1995b). Those values are highly influential on the political culture of the post-1980 Turkey, which mirror a neo-patrimonial bias.

In the 1983 elections, the Motherland Party (MP) came into power. The political agenda of the MP, consistent with the neo-liberal prescriptions, included the financial liberalization of the economy mainly through the restriction of the state's role. The major policies of the 80's involved; (1) development of a domestic financial market open to competition; (2) determination of prices by the market rather than the state; (3) liberalization of the foreign trade by means of replacing the policy of import substitution with an export oriented one; (4) cutting the red tape; (5) privatization of the State Economic Enterprises, (6) decentralization of the central government and devoting greater power to localities, (7) reducing the wages and the budgets in the state's bureaucracy; and (8) restricting the social expenses (Heper, 1990a; 1998; Keyder, 2003; Kalaycıoğlu, 2000). These policies were justified through utilizing the values of economic pragmatism and democratic conservatism (Göle, 2000).

Being a good implementer of the neo-liberal principles, the MP government attempted to transform the dominant view of the state through a process of *demystification*. This process was primarily oriented towards to eliminate the patrimonial characteristics of the state through materializing the state. The state would no longer be a father, caring for the needs of the population as well as an instructing the principles of accurate morality and behavior (Köker, 1995b). It was not a *mystical entity* but a *technical tool* under the supervision of the technocrats. The etatist and populist policies of the state had to be abandoned and the economic realm had to be occupied by the private enterprises, which supposedly function more efficiently given their orientation for profit. The state held responsible for all economic and societal problems; it was powerless to adapt to the global change, therefore it had to be decentralized and minimized (Yalman,

2002). In this framework, the discourse and the economic policies of the MP government involved a shift from the patrimonial notion of the *state as a father* towards the neo-liberal understanding of the *state as a scapegoat*. However, the critical emphasis was not on the withdrawal of the state from the political realm but its removal from the economic realm. As such, the disintegration of economy and politics was postulated as the *sine qua non* solution of economic, social and political problems. Yalman (ibid.) underlines that such disintegration was the basis of a hegemony project, which construed the market as a state-free realm. The adoption of the free market economy, in fact, was a requirement of the bourgeoisie in reestablishing its political and economic hegemony (ibid.). Thus, the neo-liberal turn implies a shift in the project of hegemony because its core objective was the structural adjustment to the world capitalist system; a system that replaced the old capitalist paradigm of 'industrialization through the state mechanism.' In our own terminology, the neo-liberal shift transformed the capitalist aspect of the state.

One of the most crucial outcomes of such transformation was the postulation of effectiveness and efficiency as the sole criteria for the state's performance. The individualistic logic of the market mechanism, which had always been subject to the state's suspicion, was now being put forth by the state as a cure for every pain (Keyder, 2003). However, despite the discursive concern for the withdrawal of the state from the economic realm, its role in the economy continued to increase (Cizre, 1999a). Accordingly, the primary paradox of the post-1980's economy involved the conflict between the rationality of the market and that of Turkish politics (Öniş, 1991). The former sought to maintain fiscal discipline and minimal state intervention to economy, while the latter pursued the populist and corrupted practices through the exploitation of state's fiscal power for the sake of votes. Thus, the financial liberalization policies were accompanied by strategies of power that enlarged the public sector. As a result, the state did not withdraw from the economic realm but instead reorganized and more centralized.

It is also necessary to elaborate another paradox as the one between the liberalization of economy and the authoritarization of politics (Köker, 1995b). Such paradox had to do with the subordination of the state's democratic aspect to its capitalist and managerial aspects. The state had to be efficient and effective since its political success was identified with the economic performance. In this sense, the state had to be limited in the economic realm. This, however, did not imply a concern for limiting the power of the state in the political realm. Beginning with the 1980 coup d'etat, the Turkish society was forced into the process of 'purification from politics' for the sake of the maintenance of 'order' (Sarıbay, 2000). The policies of decentralization were not meant to sustain democratic participation at the local level but rather to render the state less costly and more efficient (Köker, 1995a). The notion of the state was not grounded in law but in the prosperity (security and wealth) of the state, mirroring the traditional Ottoman understanding that equates the society's prosperity with the state's prosperity.

Consequently, the neo-liberal turn transformed the capitalist aspect of state from the duty of initiating to the duty of facilitating. On the other hand, it maintained the centrality of the state's managerial aspect by revitalizing the state's power and domination in the political realm, which undermined the state's democratic aspect. In addition to that, the neo-liberal turn incorporated many pejorative values to the prevalent political culture, which constituted the neo-patrimonial characteristic of the transformation in the Turkish context. Öğün (2004b) summarizes these values as the praise of populism; postulation of mediocrity as a virtue; indoctrination of the anti-political attitudes by introducing them as meta-political notions; assuming the state as the sole source of corruption; declaration of the market as the new leviathan; abandonment of the idea of separation of powers; conceptualization of justice as an obstacle; and reducing the realm of politics by equating it merely with the dynamics of the daily politics. Consequently, the political problems were conceived as technical problems, and the notion of anti-politics infused the political ideas with pragmatism, which was a tool for justifying the inconsistent

policies (Cizre, 1999a). In this context, society was considered either an economic entity identified with the market or an organic component of the state. However, both conceptualizations at best ignored, or at worst undermined the normative premises of the participation and plurality.

The pragmatic logic of the neo-liberal ideology, as mentioned before, prescribed for a program oriented bureaucracy, adherent to the criteria of efficiency. Accordingly, Heper (1990a; 1990b) points out a process of debureaucratization in the Turkish context during that period, consistent with the neo-liberal prescriptions. This process involved two major aspects. First, the bureaucracy was scaled down through the simplification of the bureaucratic procedures. Second, the traditional bureaucracy was excluded from the market mechanism as well as the process of decision making. The traditional bureaucracy was considered incompatible with the market logic because it was ideologically committed to state intervention, hence it was too incompetent to achieve the required transformations (Heper & Sancar, 1998). Consequently, the traditional bureaucracy was bypassed by creating a new one. This new bureaucracy was composed of the *program oriented* bureaucrats who have the *ability to get things done* for the sake of effectiveness and efficiency. In other words, it was a technocracy and pragmatism oriented bureaucracy in which the notion of legality was subordinated to the notion of efficiency. The laws could be undermined by means of arbitrary personal rule whenever a requirement arises from specific economic and social contexts.[17]

The technocrats, known as the *princes*, were appointed as the heads of the critical state institutions such as the Central Bank in order to sustain close governmental control upon these institutions. The notion of merit was ignored and the board members of each State Economic Enterprise were directly appointed by the Prime Minister (Heper, 1990a). Extra budgetary funds, which were exempt from any

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[17] The Prime Minister Turgut Özal's infamous phrase "no harm would be done by violating the constitution once" is a good example of such pragmatism.

kind of control, were created and arbitrarily used during that period (Kalaycıoğlu, 2000). The bureaucracy was exploited as a tool for finance and employment, which reinforced the tradition of 'state oriented enrichment.' It was a means to confer legitimacy to the governments by providing job opportunities to the politicians' relatives, constituents, partisans as well as the general populace in return for their votes. Thus, the personnel policies were largely determined by patronage, based on the criteria of loyalty to the party in power (Eryılmaz, 2002; Heper, 1990a; Özbudun, 1995). Consequently, the number of public personnel significantly increased during that period, despite the policies of privatization and minimization (Eryılmaz, 2002). In short, ironically, the neo-liberal prescription for an efficiency oriented bureaucracy underpinned a corrupted one, dominated by personal rule, arbitrariness, clientalism, and cumbersomeness.

3.6. The Contemporary Period: Rising Frustration and Declining Confidence

It is hard to emphasize a major change in the fundamental dynamics of the Turkish politics and political culture during the 1990's and the early 2000's. The 90's witnessed the domination of the center-right parties, and administration by the coalition governments.[18] In the 2002 elections The Justice and Development Party (JDP) came into power. During this period the economic instability was accompanied by social instability, involving increased poverty, violent terrorism, ethnic and religious polarizations, and rising nationalism (Cizre & Yeldan, 2000).

This contemporary period can be summarized in terms of an intensified commonsense about the corruption of the state and the governments; the doubtful independence of the judiciary; a statized civil society that lacks an autonomous power; the civilian powerlessness in sustaining control upon the military; and the intensification of the Kemalist ethics as the source of political legitimacy (Cizre &

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[18] The coalition governments were; between 1991-1995 The True Path Party and The Social Democrat People's Party; 1995-1996 The Motherland Party and The Right Way Party; 1996-1997 The Welfare Party and The Right Way Party, 1997-1999 The Motherland Party, The Democratic Left Party, and The Democratic Turkey Party; and finally 1999-2002 The Democratic Left Party, The Motherland Party, and The Nationalist Action Party

Yeldan, 2000; Öğün, 2004g). Within such a framework, the irony of the Turkish politics has to do with an increasing societal frustration, polarization, and insecurity on the one hand, and the diffusion of pragmatism and lawlessness on the other hand.

In such a context, the corrupted relationships between the politicians, the mafia, businessmen, bureaucrats, and the security officers, manifested themselves during the 1990's and the 2000's. The most striking symbol of such corrupted relationships was the Sususluk Case, which became synonymous with the Turkish state's slide into mafia activities. This case significantly drew the attention of the Turkish society to the established links between organized crime and senior political figures. The Susurluk Case was revealed after a 1996 traffic accident in which a car carrying a member of the parliament, a senior police officer, and a far-right Turkish mafia boss, crashed into a truck near the town of Susurluk. Besides, the mafia boss with a dreadful record of atrocities to his name was hailed by the prime-minister Tansu Çiller as a 'great patriot,' after his death in this accident. A more recent case was experienced in the town of Şemdinli, which two senior Turkish non-commissioned officers were convicted in bombing of a bookstore on November 2005. The attackers were confronted merely by an angry crowd of locals seeking to block their escape, while a person was killed and a further six wounded by the gunfire of the attackers. Consequently, such cases reinforced the decreasing societal trust to the institutions and the power of the state. Thus, the 'purification of the state institutions' constitutes a crucial rhetoric of the contemporary period in order to reestablish the legitimacy of the political system.

However, despite such awareness, the existence of a concrete mechanism that would transform this rhetoric into reality is highly doubtful;

> *Turkey's political class does not want to lose the benefits it reaps from the system as it stands, nor does it have the power necessary instigate such change. There is a consensus on the diagnosis, a consensus on prescription and overwhelming public support for reform. But there is no mechanism to translate it into reality (Cizre & Yeldan, 2000: 505).*

Accordingly, Cizre and Yeldan (ibid.) point out the presence of an 'illusionary civil society' during this period. Such society, they contend, cannot be identified with an effective public sphere because it cannot bring the governments under democratic control. In this sense, there is no genuine political participation, representation, pubic debate, or societal opposition (Cizre, 1999). The 'individual' is construed as a liberal actor in the economic realm but it is constrained as the 'citizen of the state' in the political realm. The latter delimitation primarily has to do with the security concerns of the state; "a security-first state took precedence over democracy and other developmental objectives in Turkey of the late 1990's" and "it continues to dominate the parameters of political life in the 2000's" (Cizre, 2000: 95). Such a concern derives from a sense of threat, which reinforces the rise of nationalist movements as well as the autonomy of the military in the Turkish context. If we take this criterion as a basis, there's nothing Turkey has more of than threats, which some of them are about contingent and some permanent. In example, the Armenian threat; the Greek Cypriot threat; the US threat since the 'sack' incident in Iraq; threat of ethnic separatism; threat of fundamentalism; threats from unfair income distribution; economic threats due to globalization and international capital movements; and finally threats deriving from the imposed changes that have to do with the Turkey's European Union membership bid.

The centrality of threats in Turkish politics, in return, enhances the power and autonomy of the military conceived as the most trusted institution of the state by the significant segments of the Turkish society (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995). The crisis in the meeting of National Security Council on 28th February, 1997 is a good example of such reproduction. The crisis was mainly originated from the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, against the survival of the secular republic and Kemalist principles in the absence of a stable and effective government. Accordingly, the military got involved in politics at the micro level by demolishing one government and establishing another that resulted in the removal of the fundamentalist Welfare Party and the unification of the center-right forces under the Motherland

Party (Cizre, 2000). This process also entailed the mobilization of the disturbed Kemalist and urban-secular basis of society by the military to attain societal support and legitimacy for its own goals on the political sphere. Consequently, the military redefined, and reconstructed the social order by (re)forming actors consent to that order during the February 28 affair (ibid.).

To sum up, the contemporary period mirrors increasing insecurity, poverty, lawlessness, and nationalism; intensifying religious and ethnic polarizations; and the continuity of excessive military involvement in politics in the Turkish context. It is also hard to mention a fundamental transformation in the political culture since, despite the rhetorical variations, the tutelary and centralist understanding of politics is reproduced in different historical contexts by different actors. Thus, the constitutive and the transformative aspects of politics are either ignored or undermined by the associated actors. Accordingly, the economic concerns central to the capitalist aspect of the state and the security concerns central to the managerial aspect of the state are still dominating the democratic aspect of the state as well as the rule of law. In other words, the legitimacy of the state does not primarily derive from its democratic aspect but from its capitalist and managerial aspects, which are suggested to maintain the moral, economic, and political stability of the system as well as reproducing the various power structures. Consequently, the democratic aspect of the state is not and had never been a genuine concern for the state, for its bureaucracy, and even for society in the Turkish context.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH

In this chapter we will discuss; (1) the theoretical underpinnings of the methods used in our research, (2) the sampling criteria, (3) the characteristics of our sampling, (3) the data collection methods, and finally (4) the logic of the statistical methods, employed for analyzing our data.

4.1. Methodological Background: Comprehending the Meaning World of the Bureaucrats

Our research question had to do with the meaning world of the bureaucrats. In this chapter we will primarily discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of meaning world. This theoretical substructure is crucial because it establishes the critical relationship between our research question and the methods we used in this research. Most of the adequate methods for exploring such questions commonly depend upon a specific theoretical tradition, involving the reproductive relationship between meaning and action. This theoretical tradition involves the scholars such as Schutz, Berger and Luckmann, and Giddens, who developed the theoretical framework that guides the associated methods.

The issue of representation has to be explored through an attempt for understanding the meaning world of the bureaucrats; a world which might promote specific actions while constraining the others. In this sense, as we argued before, the theory of representative bureaucracy has serious shortcomings.

The theory of representative bureaucracy focuses on the issue of political representation within the normative framework of the liberal-pluralist world view. The core of such representation depends upon a mere congruence between the

public and the bureaucrats in terms of (1) demographic characteristics, (2) opinions on various daily political, social or economic issues, or (3) observable interests. In this sense the social groups have to be represented not only in the parliament but in the bureaucracy as well. However, in our view, the issue of representation is a more complicated matter that is primarily evident in the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. Accordingly, we consider the notion of representation as the ruling ideas that dominate the meaning world of the actors. Representation is the world view, involving the assumptions within a given perspective. It is a phenomenon related to particular modes of understanding, and communicating, which engender the commonsense of the actors. The issue of representation also has a historical aspect because it mirrors the meaning world of a collectivity, deriving from an ongoing interaction with some existing social structure. Therefore, in order to understand and interpret the fundamentals of political representation, one might focus on the meaning worlds of the actors; a world which evolved within the historical and cultural imperatives of a specific context. On the other hand, the notion of meaning world must not be considered a monolithic issue in a given context. There might be institutional variations among the meaning worlds of the actors because each organizational actor might acquire a variety of characteristics, mirroring the traditions, functions, or historical processes of their own milieu. Thus, employing a comparative perspective is crucial for revealing the variety of conceptualizations, originating from the characteristics of each organization. Within the framework of the argumentations emphasized above, we will briefly discuss the methodological background regarding the notion of meaning world. This background guides the empirical methods, indented to reveal such a world as well.

Husserl (cited in Craib, 1992) points out that the world we live in is created in consciousness. There exists an external world but it has meaning only through our consciousness of it. Schutz (1967) offers the term 'meaning contexts' as the sets of criteria through which individuals organize their experience into a meaningful world and stocks of knowledge. These taken for granted and commonsensical

knowledge constitute the basis of one's social world. Although the meanings develop and are objectivated in social institutions, they are capable of socializing new members of society (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Moscovici defines the contextual dynamics of meaning creation, which socializes the members of society through generating commonsensical knowledge as follows;

> *A tremendous stock of words is in circulation in every society referring to specific objects and we are under constant compulsion to provide their equivalent concrete meanings. ...A society makes a selection according to its beliefs and the pre-existing stock of images. ...Once a society has adopted [a] paradigm the words referring to it are used more often. Then formulae and cliches emerge that sum it up and join together images that were formerly distinct ...The issues are classified by comparing them to a prototype, then we will inevitably tend to notice and select those features which are most representative of the prototype (Moscovici, 1984: 38-9).*

Thus, the meaning of a word is its use in a social context. On the other hand, another crucial issue is the situational and grammatical context. Wittgenstein (cited in Craib, 1992) points out that the meaning of each term in a language refers to its context; the situation in which it is used and the words around it. In this sense the context is determined by other words because the *significance* does not exist within a word but in its relation to others (ibid.). Accordingly, revealing the meaning worlds of the actors involves the discovery of how certain words are related to one another. It must be clarified that how the words and concepts are ordered, associated or contrasted meaningfully in certain domains of culture. In this sense, language is the means for accessing to the meaning world of the members of a community.

Another crucial issue about the notion of meaning word is its relationship with the actions. Swidler (1986) points out that the publicly available meanings facilitate certain patterns of action, while discouraging others. In this sense, the meaning world does not merely imply conceptualization of objects but it leads to certain types of action as well. The more the cultural repertoire of a meaning world limits the strategies of action, the vastly culture shapes action (ibid.). The publicly

available meanings are created, maintained and generated through intersubjectivity, which involves sharing the understanding of others (Chikudate, 1997). Thus, these meanings are not merely the means of one's sense-making of the world but they constitute the norms of being 'normal' in a specific community as well. Hence, intersubjectivity engenders the standards of judgment as well as the norms of action and the social construction of reality is governed by such intersubjectivity as well as the language (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). The socially constructed reality is both the outcome and the source of ruling ideas that dominate the meaning world of actors, which we conceive as *representation*. These ruling ideas are the scripts that guide action, thus, they have the power to generate the (re)production of social practices and the more they are taken for granted the further their power enhance.

Here we must emphasize once more that the meaning world is not the external structure itself but it is the scripts about how the actors make sense of that structure. On the other hand, the meaning world is itself a structure because it mirrors a pattern of institutionalization. It is the outcome of a hegemonic relationship between the structure and the actors. In this sense the notion of structure implies both a form and a process, which involves sets of rules that identify the bounds of adequate conduct (Barley, 1986). In order to clarify this notion of structure we will use Giddens' (1979; 1999) theory of structuration, in which the term structure refers to the rules as well as the resources.

In Giddens' framework, resources imply anything that can serve as a source of power in social interactions. They are classified into two types as the authoritative resources involving the capabilities generating command over persons and the allocative resources that underpin the capabilities generating command over objects. On the other hand, the rules are the taken for granted knowledge; the sense of the world, which is learnt during the processes of socialization. These rules are in fact the cultural schemes; a society's fundamental tools of thought (Sewell, 1992). The institutions derive from these schemes that imply the

symbolic orders or modes of discourse through which people organize and make sense of the world (ibid.).

Structures are not the patterned social practices but the principles that pattern these practices. On the other hand, structures are also modified by the practices they inform. In other words, structures not only shape the people's practices but they are constituted and reproduced by people's practices as well. "Through the interplay of action and tradition [rules], institutional practices shape human actions which in turn reaffirm or modify the institutional structure" (Barley, 1986: 80). Thus, the thoughts, motives, and intentions of the agents are constituted by the structures but the agents always have the opportunity to reconfigure the structures through improvisation or innovation (Giddens, 1999). In this sense the structure is both constraining and enabling, which mirrors the *duality of structure* (Giddens, 1979; 1999). Thus, the structure, as the collectivity of rules and resources, limits what we can do but enables us to do something.

> *Structure should be defined as composed simultaneously of schemes, which are virtual and of resources, which are actual. ...Structures are sets of mutually sustaining schemes and resources that empower and constrain social action that tend to be reproduced by that social action" (Sewell, 1992: 13, 27).*

Structures empower agents in different ways. Different social positions equip people with different and various schemes as well as paving the way for accessibility to diverse resources. In this sense, the crucial issue is the institutional situations, which determine the behavior by engendering obligations, power, and activities (Giddens, 1999).

> *Structures tend to vary significantly between different institutional spheres, so that kinship structures will have different logics and dynamics. Those logics may sometimes operate in harmony but they can also lead to conflicting claims. Social actors are capable of applying a wide range of different and even incompatible schemas (Sewell, 1992: 22).*

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However, some structures can be so deeply embedded and powerful that they are able to shape the experiences of entire society over many generations (Giddens, 1999). Thus, such structures are the taken for granted assumptions or modes of procedures that are applied relatively unconscious by the actors. Here the crucial issue is the *power* because the meaning of a pattern cannot be socially constructed (institutionalized) without the exercise of power. The meaning must not be questioned for a while, which can only be sustained by the exercise of power. Thus, domination is the prerequisite of meaning regarding the stabilization of meaning. Such approach reminds the hegemony concept of the class perspective. However, Giddens' approach involves dissimilarities with the hegemony concept of the class perspective.

In the class perspective the *system* reproduces itself through the actions of the actors. In Giddens' framework the subject matter is the actions of the actors (their agency), not the system. The *actors* might reproduce the system but they also have a genuine opportunity for transforming it because they are not so passive against the system. The class perspective subordinates actors to the structure (as a system) with a mere opportunity of interfering to such structure in an instance of capitalist crisis. The process of reproduction might be relatively unconscious or inevitable but the possibility of awareness as well as the opportunity of change is always possible because all human action, in the final analysis, is conscious. In this sense no system is so dominant to rule the whole world and no human being is so unconscious or falsely conscious to reproduce a structure that he/she has no genuine interest. However, it is always possible that a specific structure might enable some people more than the others or a beneficial system can turn against its beneficiaries and become a constraint against them.

In our view, Giddens's theory of structuration also overcomes the inadequacies of the managerial paradigm as well as the liberal-pluralist paradigm in conceiving the notion of structure. The liberal-pluralist paradigm underestimates (if not ignores) the structure because the structure is taken for granted and it is by

definition desirable. The desirable structure implies a democratic context, in which each individual has to internalize the norms of that structure and act in conformity with them. The managerial approach acknowledges the capability of *few* dominant agents to change the structure but merely in the way that they desire. Thus, it subordinates the structure merely to interests and desires of the ruling actors. In this sense, Giddens' framework underpins not only the incapacity of the actors against the power structures but their capacity or will of agency to change these structures as well. In this sense his approach paves the way for a more adequate understanding of how the systems change in time and how the actors, in some historical instances, might quit reproducing the system. His approach is not completely unfamiliar with the class, managerial, and liberal-pluralist perspectives but it involves significant differences deriving from its eclectic characteristic.

The theory of structuration, for our purposes, offers a framework for illuminating the bureaucrats' mutual relationship with the existing structure(s) in a specific context. The meaning world of the bureaucrats is a social construction that derives from their interaction with these structures. Such meaning world, on the one hand, enables the bureaucrats in terms of making sense of the world they live in as well as it facilitates them to attribute meaning to their actions. In this sense the meaning world of the bureaucrats can be considered the seedbed of their purposeful actions. The same meaning world, on the other hand, constraints the actions of the bureaucrats because it sets the norms of conduct, restricting the generation of alternative understandings, and explanations. In this sense the meaning world, as the outcome of the institutional practices, paves the way for the reaffirmation or modification of the prevailing institutional structure of a specific context by the agents. To sum up, within the framework of the theory of structuration, it can be argued that; (1) the bureaucrats' meaning world is an outcome of a domination relationship, (2) such meaning world both enables and constraints the bureaucrats, thus, it is also a seedbed for their specific actions, which always involve the potential of transforming the structure as well as

reproducing it. The meaning world is a means of justification, legitimacy, or rationalization that brings out transformative alternatives as well as conformity to the prevailing structures. (3) The meaning world of a community is not a monolithic structure, thus, institutional variations among the structures (cultural schemes) might exist. These structural patterns might equip those who hold them with various capacities.

The purpose of our research is to explore the structures of knowledge that guides the actions of the bureaucrats. Our object of research is not the physical phenomenon themselves but the way they are organized in the minds of the bureaucrats. Here, our major reasoning is that; it will be inadequate to interpret structures without exploring how the agents related with these structures interpret them. Thus, it is crucial to reveal and interpret the meaning of the state-society relationship in the symbolic universe of the bureaucrats. In our view, such commonsense constitutes the core of representation, which guides the actions of the bureaucrats as well. Accordingly, the bureaucratic actions can be interpreted more accurately by revealing the symbolic universe of the bureaucrats, in which each concept acquires its unique meaning. In this sense, we will attempt to discover how do bureaucrats order and arrange the meanings of the state, society, and bureaucracy in their minds. In addition, we will attempt to reveal the institutional variations among these conceptualizations. Here, language will be our means for accessing to the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. Thus, this dissertation undertakes the inquiry on; (1) the collection of socio-cognitive/semantic data from Turkish bureaucrats regarding their meaning worlds about the state, society and bureaucracy in contemporary times, (2) using this data in conjunction with the historical patterns of the Turkish context as well as the managerial, democratic and capitalist aspects of the state, (3) to demonstrate the inadequacy and narrowness of the theory of representative bureaucracy's normative background, and (4) to generalize from the findings the institutional variations in the bureaucrats' mindsets.

4.2. Methodology

In this section we will discuss the characteristics of our sampling; the data collection methods employed in the study; and the logics of the methods used in the analysis of the data.

4.2.1. Sampling

In this study we abandoned the random sampling approach and set the criteria for the type of the state organizations as well as their departments. The bureaucracy is not a monolithic entity, thus, we chose 'different bureaucracies' with different organizational histories, structures, and functions, considering the possibility of institutional variations. Accordingly, our first criterion was to incorporate the newly established bureaucratic organizations to our analysis as well as the traditional ones. Our second criterion was to choose the organizations that have moderately different organizational milieus. In this sense our first choice was the technocratic institution of The Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB), established in 1984; a period in which the neo-liberal turn in Turkey gained impetus. Our second choice was a traditional institution, which had always been a central and decisive organization of the Turkish state; The Ministry of Finance (MOF). Finally, we also decided to incorporate the military bureaucracy to our analysis because of its crucial and dominant position in the Turkish politics and political culture. Hence, we chose The Turkish Military Academy (TMA), which is a crucial institution in shaping the meaning worlds of the officers.

Our third criterion was to access primarily to the task departments, executing the main functions of these organizations. We think that these departments are relatively more important than the staff departments, considering the role of an organization in the policy processes. This in return renders the meaning world of the bureaucrats, working in these departments, more significant for our purposes. On the other hand, considering the intra-organizational variations, we chose our

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respondents from various departments of an organization as possible. While accessing the departments, we used the snowball technique that implies a process of; (1) contacting with a (preferably) high-level person who could be our key-informant in directing us to the various departments of the organization, (2) expanding our intra-organizational sampling, using the references and guidance of the secondary contacts in these departments. However, we had two major constraints during this process that restricted the achievement of a more intense and diversified population. The first constraint had to do with the self-closure of Turkish bureaucracy; the bureaucrats hardly cooperated in this research because of either an insecurity concern or a pragmatic lack of faith in the value and benefits of this research. The second constraint had to do with our inability in finding an influential person for accessing to some major departments of the organizations.

In the next three sections, we will elaborate the characteristics of our data. We will define the core duties as well as the organizational structures of the organizations that constitute our sample. We will also describe some specific demographic characteristics of our sampling in each organization. Here, it must be emphasized that, we instructed the respondents to leave a blank space if they do not want to answer a specific demographic question. Therefore, some of the demographics lack to provide a precise idea about the general population of this research.

4.2.1.1. The Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB)

The CMB is an 'autonomous' state institution, found for the 'adequate functioning of markets' in 1984; an epoch that Turkey's neo-liberal turn gained impetus. The autonomy of the institution implies a financial autonomy as well as a political autonomy. The board is a self-financing institution, which all its expenditures are compensated by a particular fund established for this purpose. On the other hand, its political autonomy is the outcome of an economic liberalization strategy,

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intended to safeguard the economic realm against the political intrusions, thus, to sustain the 'rational' administration of economy. However, the autonomy of the CMB can be questioned because it has a considerable dependence to the government. Although the political parties had no legal right for a direct influence on those boards, they sought indirect control by appointing their agents to the executive boards of these institutions.[19] The upper echelons of the boards were filled with people from the 'traditional' public bureaucracies, implying the diffusion of 'traditional' bureaucratic culture as well as the clientalistic networks to these boards. Their financial autonomy is also in question because the financial control of the boards is not executed by the independent associations or the Turkish Court of Accounts but by the relevant minister of the government (Eryılmaz, 2002).

The new draft bill of higher boards predicts that the regulatory decisions of the 'autonomous boards' have to be inspected by the relevant ministry and when necessary the ministry is authorized to initiate an action for rescission in the Council of State (Kıvanç, 2005). Besides, the Council of Ministers can replace the chairmen and the members of the board before the decision of the relevant court (ibid.). Accordingly, we do not consider the CMB as a unique bureaucratic organization, independent from the characteristics of the traditional bureaucracy as well as the political milieu of the 'dependent' bureaucratic organizations. However, its organizational distinction manifests itself in the duty of fostering the capital market, thus, the functioning of capitalism. In addition to that it is relatively a new bureaucratic organization, composed of the technocrats; a typology prescribed by the neo-liberal ideology.

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[19] -i.e. In the meeting of the Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) in May 2005, three executive vice presidents and six chairmen of the departments were replaced by the 'agents' of the Justice and Development Party (Ayaydın, 2005). Five members of the executive board, who were appointed by the same party, implemented this operation (ibid.).

The mission of the CMB is defined in its annual report of 2004 (9) as follows;

> *...to regulate and supervise the capital markets for their secure, fair, transparent and efficient functioning within the framework of objectivity and accountability, conducting supervision and making clear and easy to understand regulations that are in conformity with international norms and developments, and that meet the requirements of a constantly changing market environment.*

Accordingly, the CMB is the regulatory and supervisory authority in charge of the securities markets in Turkey. It deals with market regulations in order to organize the capital markets as well as to develop the capital market instruments and institutions in Turkey. The CMB's core duties involve to sustain the fair and orderly functioning of the markets and to protect the rights of investors. It contributes to the efficient allocation of financial resources while ensuring the protection of investors. In this sense, the core duty of the CMB mirrors the capitalist aspect of the state; to foster the capital market, and to protect the capitalist investments.

The organizational structure of the CMB consists of the Chairman, the Executive Board, four Executive Vice Presidents and ten main departments. The Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is at the top of the hierarchy and has two major responsibilities: (1) acting as the chairman of the decision making body, which is the Executive Board, and (2) supervising the executive vice-presidents.

The Executive Board is the highest level decision-making mechanism and it is empowered to decide on any issue within the authority of the CMB. It is composed of seven members. The Council of Ministers appoints two of the members out of four nominations by the Ministry of State Responsible for the Economy. The other five members are appointed by the nominations of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Board, the Association of Trade Chambers and Exchanges, and the Association of Capital Markets Intermediary Institutions. All Board members are appointed for a six-year period. The Council of Ministers

appoints one of the members as the Chairman and the Board elects one member as the Vice Chairman.

There are four Executive Vice Presidents who are authorized and responsible for the coordinated operation and administration of the entire organization. The nine main departments of the CMB are organized on the basis of their functions under those vice presidencies. Those departments are the (1) Department of Enforcement, (2) Department of Corporate Finance, (3) Department of Intermediary Activities, (4) Department of Institutional Investors, (5) Department of Market Regulation and Surveillance, (6) Department of Research, (7) Department of Accounting Standards, (8) Department of Data Processing, Statistics and Information, and (9) Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs. The organizational chart of the CMB is stated below:[20]

Figure 4.1: The Organization Chart of the CMB

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[20] Source: http://www.spk.gov.tr/Hakkinda/hakkinda.htm?tur=orgseTMA

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We conducted our research in ten departments of the CMB and acquired 102 usable questionnaires out of 120. No questionnaires returned from the Department of Intermediary Activities. The departmental distribution of our sampling is stated in the table below:

Table 4.1: Departmental Distribution of the Sampling in the CMB

Department	Frequency (# of persons)	Percent
Dept. of Enforcement	20	19,61%
Dept. of Corporate Finance	18	17,65%
Dept. of Institutional Investors	13	12,75%
Dept. of Legal Consultancy	12	11,76%
Dept. of Data Processing, Statistics and Information	9	8,82%
Dept. of Research	7	6,86%
IOSCO and EU Relations	7	6,86%
Dept. of Administrative and Financial Affairs	4	3,92%
Dept. of Accounting Standards	5	4,90%
Dept. of Market Regulation and Surveillance	1	0,98%
Not Indicated	6	5,88%
Total	**102**	100%

The age intervals of our sampling are as follows; 20,59% of the total sampling were between the ages of 21 and 30; 22,55% were between 31 and 40; 12,75% were between 41 and 50; 2,94% were between 51 and 60 and 52,94% of the sampling did not indicate their ages.

Of the total respondents, 53,92% were male; 43,14% were female and 2,94% did not indicate their gender.

The education level distribution of our sampling was; 62,75% were holding an undergraduate degree; 35,29% were holding a graduate degree and 1,96% did not indicate their education level.

Of the total respondents 11,26% indicated their positions in the organizational hierarchy as low level; 80,58% indicated as middle level, and 8,16% indicated as high level.

The sampling was relatively experienced in the bureaucracy because 34,31% of the total population had experience between 1 and 5 years; 39,22% had between 6 and 10 years; 21,57% had between 11-20 years; 3,92% had more than 20 years and 0,98% did not indicate their work experience in bureaucracy. The organizational experience of our sampling is as follows; 39,22% had experience in the CMB between 1 and 5 years; 39,22% had between 6 and 10 years; 17,66% had between 11 and 20 years; 1,96% had more than 20 years and 1,96% did not indicate their work experience in the CMB.

4.2.1.2. The Ministry of Finance (MOF)

The MOF was established in 1838, known as *Maliye Nezareti*. In 1840, it turned out to be the sole responsible institution from the financial administration of Ottoman Empire. In 1880, *Maliye Nezareti* was reorganized into its central and provincial organizations. In the early years of the Republic, the Ministry (*Maliye, Rusumat ve Defter-i Hakani Vekilliği*) dealt with the duties of customs and deeds in addition to its traditional tasks of financial planning and treasury. The first financial plan prepared by the ministry came into force in 1926, and ever since, the cadres of the ministries as well as their salaries are determined by the budget laws. The MOF is one of the traditional and crucial bureaucratic institutions of the Turkish State, which determines, controls or directly implements all monetary transactions of the state. It is the central organization in the collection and distribution of the state's resources.

The contemporary duties of the MOF are stated by the decree law that came into force in 1983.[21] These duties are as follows; (1) to facilitate the preparation of finance policies and to implement them, (2) to accomplish the legal consultancy of the state, (3) to develop and implement the policies of expenditure as well as to prepare, implement, and control the implementation and allocation of the state's budget, (4) to keep the accounts of the state, and to accomplish the service of accountancy, (5) to develop the income policy, (6) to administer the properties of the state, and to determine the principles of administration about the real properties of the public institutions and enterprises, (7) to prepare or to engage to the preparation of the bills about the transactions of income and expenditure, (8) to follow the international studies related with the ministry's services, to prepare the vision of the ministry, and to execute domestic and overseas activities, (9) to make the required investigations and inspections in order to prevent money laundering.

The central organization of the MOF is composed of three major units. The first unit involves five counseling and controlling departments, which four of them are directly connected to the Minister of Finance. Those departments are; (1) The Board of Finance Inspectors, (2) The Board of Tax Inspectors, (3) Research, Planning and Coordination Board, (4) Ministry Advisors, and (5) The Consultancy of Press and Public Relations. The second major unit involves eight main task departments that are; (1) The Chief Legal Advisory Office, (2) The General Directorate of Budget and Fiscal Control, (3) The General Directorate of Public Accounts, (4) The General Directorate of National Estate, (5) The General Directorate of Liquidation and Revolving Funds, (6) The General Directorate of Revenues, (7) Financial Crimes Investigation Board, and (8) The European Union and Public Affairs Department. The third unit is composed of five staff divisions: (1) The General Directorate of Personnel, (2) The MOF High Training Center, (3) The Department of Administrative and Financial Affairs, (4) The Secretariat of

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[21] Decree of law, established in 13/12/1983 – No. 178

Defense, and (5) The Principal Clerk. The organizational chart of The MOF is stated below:[22]

Figure 4.2: The Organization Chart of the MOF

We conducted our research in eight departments of the MOF and acquired 107 usable questionnaires out of 150. No usable questionnaires returned from the department of General Directorate of Public Accounts. The distribution of the sampling manifests a departmental bias in our case of MOF. The department of General Directorate of National Estate is considerably dominant in our overall sampling. The MOF was the most resistant institution in participating to our research, thus, we could not set the control for more equitable departmental distribution. The departmental distribution of the sampling is stated in the table below:

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[22] Source: http://www.TMAliye.gov.tr/pergen/teskilat/TMAliyeteskilat.html

Table 4.2: Departmental Distribution of the Sampling in the MOF

Department	Frequency (# of persons)	Percent
General Directorate of National Estate	44	41,12%
Board of Finance Inspectors	22	20,56%
Chief Legal Advisory Office	10	9,35%
Board of Tax Inspectors	9	8,41%
Gen. Dir. of Budget and Fiscal Control	9	8,41%
General Directorate of Revenues	6	5,61%
Research, Planning and Coordination Board	2	1,87%
Ministry Advisors	1	0,93%
Not Indicated	4	3,74%
Total	**107**	100%

The age intervals of our sampling are as follows; 15,89% of the total sampling were between the ages of 21 and 30; 23,36% were between 31 and 40; 12,75% were between 41 and 50; 2,80% were between 51 and 60; 0,94 were above 60 and 52,34% of the sampling did not indicate their ages.

Of the total respondents, 66,36% were male; 32,71% were female and 0,93% did not indicate their gender.

The education level distribution of the sampling was as follows; 77,57% were holding an undergraduate degree; 25,56% were holding a graduate degree and 1,87% did not indicate their level of education.

Of the total respondents, 11,21% indicated their positions in the organizational hierarchy as low level, 48,60% indicated as middle level, 36,45% indicated as high level, and 3,74% did not indicate their positions.

The sampling's distribution of work experience in the bureaucracy is: 12,15% of the total sampling had experience less than one year; 15,89% had between 1 and 5 years; 14,95% had between 6 and 10 years; 33,64% had between 11-20 years; 22,43% had more than 20 years, and 0,94% of the total respondents did not

indicate their experience in the bureaucracy. The work experience of the sampling in the institution of the MOF distributes as follows; 14,02% had experience in the Ministry less than 1 year; 19,63% had between 1 and 5 years; 17,76% had between 6 and 10 years; 27,09% had between 11 and 20 years and 21,50% had more than 20 years.

4.2.1.3. The Turkish Military Academy (TMA)

Military was the primarily affected institution by the scientific and technological developments intrinsic to the process of modernization in the early 19th century. The first modern institution of the military education, *Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun* was found in 1795. It was assigned with the duty of fulfilling the requirement of Ottoman army for modern and educated officers. In this respect the Janissary, which constituted the basis of traditional Ottoman military structure, was abolished in 1826 and the military academy (*Mekteb-i Harbiye*) was founded in 1834 in Istanbul. It was equipped with the duty of implementing a mental revolution through the modern educational processes, involving to socialize the officers into a rationalist and positivist worldview (Karaosmanoğlu, 1993). These officers would soon be the pioneers of Turkish revolution and the guardians of the forthcoming Republic.

The TMA maintains such traditional duty in contemporary times, which renders it a crucial institution of Turkish modernization and politics. The key to the military's cohesiveness and homogeneity under every circumstance is the long, secular and doctrinaire process of education based on Kemalism in a boarding school (ibid.). The process of education isolates the students from the outer world and transfers the educational and normative functions of the family to the school and the schoolmates (Mardin, 2003c). Thus, socialization in school is primary in shaping the political culture of the military; a culture that socializes the students into a positivist and Weberian (managerial) worldview (ibid.). In short, the members of the military meet the iron cage of bureaucracy at an early age, which

heavily influences their socialization patterns as well as their meaning worlds, involving a disappointment about the civilians. In this sense the TMA constitutes a crucial sampling for revealing the meaning world of the military about the state-society relationship.

The students of the TMA were able to have their BS degrees in the fields of mechanical engineering, civil engineering, electric and electronic engineering, and management between the years of 1974 and 1991. Ever since 1991, the candidates can merely have their BS degrees in systems engineering due to a rearrangement in the system of education. The statuses of the TMA and the civil universities are rendered alike by the Military Academies Code, which came into force in May 17, 2000.

The 'general' objective of the TMA is stated as follows;

> *To educate and train commissioned officers who possess necessary military qualities with developed leadership qualities and efficient physical competence determined by the Turkish Armed Forces Military Code, dated 4.1.1961 and numbered 211; and to educate and train commissioned officers who have acquired a BS degree on the scientific branches determined in accordance with the needs of related Service and to provide post-graduate education related with the Service needs.[23]*

The 'special' objective of the TMA is defined as;

> *(1) to provide each graduate officer with the ability to command and control at the infantry platoon commander level, to teach the tactical, logistics and technical principles about various branches and weapons at the level of company and task force and to teach combat support and combat support service systems at the levels ranging from the infantry company to brigade, the essence of duty at the corresponding headquarters and to provide them acquire with the prerequisite qualifications to fulfill more advanced tasks, (2) To provide cadets with a level of a foreign language knowledge sufficient to pursue the publications concerning their career and branches and contribute to the progress of armed forces in accordance with*

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[23] See http://www.kho.edu.tr/english/ontTMA/index.htm

contemporary demands and scientific necessities, (3) To provide cadets with a general knowledge of the other branches, (4) To enhance cadets' physical, psychological, scientific and intellectual skills and to make them successful leaders in the face of difficulties.[24]

The Academy's mission is to train prospective commissioned officers who (1) have the required characteristics for the military service, stated by Turkish Armed Forces Military Code and Turkish Armed Forces Military Regulations, (2) attained the ability to understand and analyze their mission within the framework of a contemporary and scientific approach, compatible with Atatürk's principles and reforms, (3) acquired the capabilities of commanding, administrating, leadership, teaching and training required by the military profession, (4) have an accurate personality in terms of morality and mentality, (5) developed a social and scientific intellect as well as the required professional knowledge, (6) is aware of the professional values and acquired the physical abilities required by the military profession.[25]

Accordingly, the two major principles of education and training, determined by the Military Academies Law, are as follows; (1) Trainees are provided to acquire the sense of responsibility and values based on Atatürk's principles and reforms. They have to be committed to Atatürk nationalism and the prevalence of a democratic, secular and social state of law, (2) the Turkish national culture have to be preserved and developed harmoniously with the universal values. The trainees have to be donated with the courage and willpower to strengthen the national unity.

The organizational departments and their duties are stated as follows; (1) The Academy Headquarters, responsible for all the planning and control of the activities, (2) The Dean's Office, responsible for the planning, implementation, and improvement of the academic program (3) The Cadet Regiment Command,

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[24] ibid.

[25] ibid.

responsible for the planning, application and evaluation of the cadets' command, control, military training, leadership training, physical training and sport activities, (3) The Supporting Unit Headquarters sustains the academy's security and deals with the activities that support the general administration, (4) The Institute of Defense Sciences, (5) Land Forces Equestrian Center and Command, (6) Combat Physical Training Group, and (7) ATAT (firing and exercise area) Troop Command located in İzmir.

The academic cadres are located in the Dean's Office. The Dean's Office is composed of four departments as the military sciences, basic sciences, system management sciences, and foreign languages. Our sampling involves the academic cadres of the institution as well as its graduate students, who are currently assigned in different military quarters. These graduate students are in fact the student-officers, temporarily assigned in the Academy for having their master or PhD degrees.

We conducted our research in all departments of the Dean's Office, as well as the Institute of Defense Sciences and acquired 101 usable questionnaires out of 150. The student-officers were instructed to indicate the main military quarters as their current workplaces. The distribution of our sampling is stated in the table below:

Table 4.3: Departmental Distribution of the TMA Sampling

Department	Frequency (# of persons)	Percent
Turkish Land Forces Command	24	23,76%
The Dean's Office	24	23,76%
The Institute of Defense Sciences	10	9,90%
Gendarme General Headquarters	2	1,98%
Turkish Naval Forces	1	0,99%
Turkish General Staff	1	0,99%
Ministry of National Defense	1	0,99%
Not Indicated	38	37,62%
Total	**101**	100%

The age intervals of our sampling is as follows; 34,65% of the total sampling were between the ages of 21 and 30; 14,85% were between 31 and 40; 7,92% were between 41 and 50; 1,98% were between 51 and 60, and 40,60% of the sampling did not indicate their ages.

Of the total respondents, 86,14% were male; 11,88% were female and 1,98% did not indicate their gender. In addition, 67,33% of the total sampling were holding an undergraduate degree, and 32,67% were holding a graduate degree.

The 29,70% of the total respondents indicated their positions in the military hierarchy as low level, 51,49% indicated as middle level, 6,93% indicated as high level, and 11,88% did not indicate their hierarchical positions.

The experience of our sampling in the military bureaucracy is as follows; 0,99% of the total sampling had experience less than one year; 25,74% had between 1 and 5 years; 37,62% had between 6 and 10 years; 22,77% had between 11-20 years; 10% had more than 20 years and 1,98% of the total respondents did not indicate their work experience. The experience intervals of the sampling in their current organizations were: 6,93% had experience less than 1 year; 39,60% had between 1 and 5 years; 25,74% had between 6 and 10 years; 18,81% had between 11 and 20 years; 5,94% had more than 20 years and 2,97% did not indicate their level of experience.

In the next section we will identify the aggregated demographic variables of our total sampling in the three institutions.

4.2.1.4. Aggregated Demographics of the Total Sampling

Our overall sampling involves a totality of 310 bureaucrats, who responded accurately to the applied questionnaire. Out of the 310 respondents; 23,55% were between the ages of 21 and 30; 20,32% were between 31 and 40; 4,52% were

between 41 and 50; 2,58% were between 51 and 60; 0,32% were above 60 and 48,71% did not indicate their ages.

Of our total sampling, 68,71% were male, 29,35% were female and 1,94% did not indicate their gender.

The respondents, holding an undergraduate degree constituted 69,35% of the total sampling; 29,36% were holding a graduate degree, and 1,29% did not indicate their education level.

Of the total respondents, 18,39% indicated their positions in the organizational hierarchy as high level, 59,03% indicated as middle level, 17,42% indicated as low level, and 5,16% did not indicate their hierarchical positions.

Our overall sampling can be considered relatively experienced in bureaucracy because 3,55% have work experience less than one year in bureaucracy; 26,13% between 1 and 5 years; 30,32% between 6 and 10 years; 26,13% between 11 and 20 years; 12,58% more than 20 years, and 1,29% of the total population did not indicate their experience in bureaucracy. Furthermore, 7,10% of our total population had been working in the same organization less than one year; 32,58% between 1 and 5 years; 27,42% between 6 and 10 years; 21,29% between 11 and 20 years; 10% more than 20 years and 1,61% did not indicate their experiences in the current organizations.

4.2.2. Data Collection

Our research included two major stages; (1) free-listing of the critical words, describing Turkish State's relationship with Turkish society, (2) pair-comparisons to measure the relationship between these words. We chose twenty upper-level and experienced bureaucrats from each organization for the first stage. They were requested to reply the question of *can you tell me the crucial words, defining the*

place of the Turkish state within the Turkish society?[26] The respondents were instructed to feel themselves free in the number of words that they produce. Fifty-five bureaucrats out of sixty responded to the first stage of our research, and produced a total of 323 words. In the next step, we grouped the words that imply essentially equivalent meanings. In example, we assumed the words oppression, ruthless, cruel, and suppressive essentially equivalent to the word *tyranny*; a word which is more commonly used by the respondents in defining an oppressive state. Likewise, we considered the concepts of powerful, authority, unbeatable, strength, omnipotence, sovereignty, majestic, obedience, and dependence equivalent to the word 'power.' These groupings were crosschecked by two other people, the final changes were made, and the most recurrent eleven words were chosen by the researcher. The table below demonstrates these words, the number of hits for each word, and the frequency distribution of the words among the organizations;

Table 4.4: Frequency Distribution of the Words

	CMB	MOF	TMA	TOTAL
Power	21	12	14	50
Father	9	11	15	35
Tyrant	15	5	1	21
Assurance	9	4	6	19
Holy	3	6	9	18
Corruption	3	4	10	17
Justice	3	10	3	16
Inefficient	8	4	3	15
Obstacle	8	6	1	15
Security	3	9	3	15
Order	2	5	8	15

In addition to these eleven words above, we incorporated the concepts of *state, bureaucracy,* and *society* to our variables and generated our questionnaire. The second stage was to measure the relationships of the selected words by a process of free-listing. This is realized by the method of pair-comparisons. The respondents were asked to estimate the similarities between the N (N-1)/2 pairs of

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[26] See Appendix A

concepts (N = the number of words, in our case was 14). In our case, the respondents estimated the similarities between 91 pairs of words. The estimation of similarities is generated from the following question form; *how close are the following pairs of concepts within the range of 1 (closest) to 6 (furthest)?*[27]

We applied a total of 420 questionnaires. The return rate was 81,6%. Of the total returning questionnaires 9,6% were not usable. We eliminated 33 questionnaires, which are left with blank spaces or involve constant/irrelevant patterns of marking. In order to analyze the results, we used the methods of multidimensional scaling, and hierarchical cluster analysis. These two methods of analysis enabled us to reveal the cognitive maps as well as the meaning clusters of the organizations. We will briefly elaborate the logic of these methods in the following section.

4.2.3. Analysis Strategy

Our strategy of analysis involved two techniques. The first technique was the Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). This is a prevalent technique used by the researchers, concerning with the meaning worlds.[28] MDS enabled us to explore the meaning spaces of the bureaucrats as well as the core dimensions in these spaces through associated statistical procedures.

Our second technique was hierarchical clustering. This technique reveals the groupings as well as the decompositions within a specific set of data through statistical procedures. In our case, the hierarchical cluster analysis enabled us to reveal the meaning clusters in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. This technique is highly effective used together with the MDS[29] because it reveals the clusters in space, determined by the MDS. In this sense, the MDS provided us the

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[27] See Appendix B

[28] See Chikudate 1991, 1997.

[29] See Chikudate 1991.

dimensions of the meaning space as well as the exact locations of the concepts in that space, while hierarchical clustering enabled us to explore the existing structural variations in the same space.

4.2.3.1. Multidimensional Scaling (MDS)

MDS is a set of mathematical techniques that can be used to reveal the hidden structure of a data. It enables the researcher to understand the judgments of respondents regarding the similarities between the components of a set of objects. MDS uses the proximities between the objects as an input. Proximity is the number that indicates how (dis)similar two objects are. MDS also visualizes the structure of a set of objects through locating the objects in a map. This map is the geometric configuration of points in a space, which mirrors the hidden structure in the data (Kruskal & Wish, 1989). The further the objects in the map, the more dissimilar they are (ibid.). Hence, MDS provides a visual representation of a complex set of relationships, enabling the researcher to explain the distances between the objects. In more technical terms;

> *MDS moves objects around in the space defined by the requested number of dimensions and checks how well the distances between objects can be reproduced by the new configuration... It uses a function of minimization algorithm that evaluates different configurations with the goal of maximizing the goodness of fit.*[30]

In this method, the measure of evaluating the reliability of a particular configuration is the stress measure. The smaller the stress score, the better the representation. A high stress score means that the dimensional configuration of data is poor and highly distorted.[31] Using more dimensions in reproducing the distance matrix results in a low stress score and high goodness of fit. On the other hand as the dimensions increase, the complexity of the distance matrix increases as well. This renders the adequate interpretation of the solution space extremely

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[30] http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stmulsca.html

[31] ibid.

difficult. However, even when the stress score is high, the longer distances tend to be more accurate than shorter distances, thus the larger patterns are still visible and reliable.

> Even the stress score is high, you can rely on the larger distances as being accurate. This is because the stress function accentuates discrepancies in the larger distances and the MDS program therefore tries harder to get these right.[32]

In this sense, the cluster analysis is crucial because it is more reliable in the analysis of shorter distances.

4.2.3.2. Hierarchical Cluster Analysis

Cluster analysis is a multivariate procedure for discovering the groupings in the data. The researcher is able to classify a set of objects into meaningful groups or categories by using this analysis. In other words, it is an exploratory data analysis tool, aiming at sorting different objects into groups in a way that the degree of association between two objects is maximal if they belong to the same group and minimal otherwise.[33] In the hierarchical method, clustering begins by finding the closest pair of objects (cases or variables) according to a distance measure and combines them to form a cluster. The algorithm continues one step at a time, joining pairs of objects, pairs of clusters, or an object with a cluster, until all data are combined in one cluster. The method is hierarchical because once two objects or clusters are joined they remain together until the final step. In other words, a cluster formed in a later stage of the analysis contains clusters from an earlier stage that contains clusters from a still earlier stage.

A hierarchical cluster analysis can reveal the patterns within a multidimensional space because it primarily focuses on the small distances in the data (Kruskal &

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[32] ibid.

[33] http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stcluan.html

Wish, 1989). This method lacks an underlying body of statistical theory; therefore it is heuristic in nature.[34] Accordingly, "cluster analysis requires decisions to be made by the user relating to the calculation of clusters, decisions which have a strong influence on the results of the classification."[35] We employed Ward's method, which is one of the methods eligible for analyzing the interval data. This method uses an analysis of variance approach to evaluate the distances between clusters. It minimizes the Sum of Squares of any two (hypothetical) clusters that can be formed at each step. Our choice had to do with the efficiency of this method in creating clusters of small size.[36] The small sized clusters can prove to be inefficient while coping with a large amount of variables. In other words, this method might cause to miss the big picture while dealing with the large amount of variables. However, in our research the number of variables is merely fourteen. Thus, small sized clusters would be an advantage for us in acknowledging the sub-clusters of the major meaning clusters more accurately. This would enable us to make more precise and detailed interpretations.

Finally, we used SPSS 13 computer program to implement these two analyses. We utilized the Proximity Scaling (PROXSCAL) module of this program for realizing the MDS analysis. The outputs (distances) of this analysis were subjected to a secondary analysis by the hierarchical clustering module of the same program. In the next chapter we will analyze and discuss the results of our research.

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[34] http://www.pfc.cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/profiles/wulder/mvstats/cluster_e.html

[35] ibid.

[36] http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/stcluan.html

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The research question of this dissertation is *what does the Turkish bureaucracy represent?* Regarding this question, in the second chapter, we focused on the theory of representative bureaucracy and argued that it is inadequate for questioning and analyzing the issue of bureaucratic representation. This theory is highly reductionist because of its (1) ethnocentric orientation, (2) embeddedness in a specific worldview, and consequently (3) narrowness in conceptualizing the issue of representation. In this perspective, representation is conceived merely as 'who represents whom' in a supposedly democratic milieu. Accordingly, representation is reduced to a mere congruence between the bureaucrats and their constituents in terms of demographic characteristics; opinions on various daily political issues; values of a democratic context; or interests. Such reductionism ignores the representation in the mindsets of the actors, which guides their political concerns, beliefs, and actions.

Addressing the major inadequacies of the theory of representative bureaucracy we (re)conceptualized the issue of bureaucratic representation. In our view, representation is a phenomenon related to a particular mode of understanding that creates commonsense. It involves the contextual varieties of taken for granted and commonsensical knowledge that constitute the basis of one's social world, which the theory of representative bureaucracy fails to question. Thus, *it is inadequate to interpret the bureaucracy and its relationship with the state and society without exploring how the bureaucrats interpret them*. In this sense, we argued that the issue of bureaucratic representation cannot be considered apart from the bureaucrats' meaning worlds. These meaning worlds constitute the essence of bureaucratic representation. Here, we conceive meaning world as an interpretive symbolic universe, reflecting the 'institutionalized structures' in the minds of the

bureaucrats. Accordingly, we employed Giddens' framework in which the *structure* implies *ruling ideas* that dominate the meaning worlds of the actors. Consequently, we postulated representation as the worldview that involves the ruling ideas, which are the scripts that guide action.

In order to understand and interpret the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats, we generated a *conceptual framework*, involving the three modern theories of the state in the Western tradition. Here, we utilized Alford and Friedland's approach that idealize the core logics of those theories. In this framework, the liberal-pluralist theory privileges the democratic aspect of the state; the managerial theory focuses on the bureaucratic aspect of the state; and the class theory emphasizes the capitalist aspect of the state. Each theory is also a worldview that constitutes the meaning, which composes the content of representation. These theories locate themselves historically and politically in a specific context and motivate people to rationalize their political actions and preferences. Therefore, they are also ideologies which have social functions. In this sense any inquiry regarding the meaning worlds the bureaucrats must take into consideration the variety of worldviews identified by these three paradigms. In this dissertation, these paradigms are crucial for two purposes. First, they can be used descriptively for the identification of specific worldviews, prevailing or lacking in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. Second, they can be used interpretatively to make reasoning and assumptions about the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats.

We also argued that the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats involve historically institutionalized patterns that derive from the social production of knowledge in a specific context. This requires the interpretation of their mindsets within the framework of the culture as well as the historical dynamics of a totality. Thus, in the third chapter we focused on the Turkish political culture as a *contextual framework* that provides our second analytical toolbox for interpreting the mindsets of the bureaucrats. We discussed the crucial aspects and periods of the Turkish politics and political culture with particular emphasis on patterns of state-

society relationship as well as the institutional roles of the state, bureaucracy, and military. We argued that, throughout the history the managerial and capitalist aspects of the Turkish state undermined its democratic aspect, thus, the theory of representative bureaucracy proves to be inefficient to understand, interpret and prescribe in such a context.

In the fourth chapter we planned the analysis strategy of our research. We discussed the theoretical underpinnings of the methods, used in our research. We defined our sample and the empirical basis of our methodology. Our sampling was composed of the bureaucrats from three crucial and dissimilar institutions of the Turkish bureaucracy; (1) Capital Markets Board of Turkey, (2) The Ministry of Finance, and finally (3) The Turkish Military Academy. Here, it must be emphasized once more that the object of this research is to understand how the physical phenomenon is organized in the minds of the bureaucrats, not to understand the physical phenomenon itself. Thus, we constructed our research in order to discover how do bureaucrats order and arrange the meaningful elements of the state-society relationship in their minds. In this respect, we used the statistical methods of multidimensional scaling and cluster analysis to reveal the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats.

The results of our analysis point out two major findings. Our first finding indicates the reductionism of the theory of representative bureaucracy. This finding empirically supports our theoretical arguments on the reductionism of this theory. More specifically, such finding has to do with the empirical demonstration of the non liberal-pluralist notions, dominant in the mindset of the bureaucrats regarding the state-society relationship. These notions can be considered the major obstacles for the normative order of the liberal-pluralist paradigm, which the theory of representative bureaucracy takes for granted.

Our second finding goes beyond the inadequacy of the theory of representative bureaucracy. We also have empirical results that demonstrate the variations

among the bureaucratic organizations as well as their similarities. In this sense we will primarily reveal and interpret the meaning world of each organization. Afterwards, we will compare these meaning worlds on the basis of their most significant similarities and diversities.

5.1. Discovering the Major Dimensions of Thought

The dimensions of thought constitute the foundations of the concepts in a specific meaning world. In other words, such dimensions determine the contents of the concepts as well as the conceptual relationships, evident in the meaning worlds of the actors. Accordingly, we will primarily attempt to discover the major dimensions of thought by using our aggregated data. While making such discovery, we will utilize the logic of the multidimensional scaling method (MDS).

Before demonstrating our first finding, we briefly have to discuss its empirical reliability. The appropriateness of solutions in MDS is judged by the stress and fit measures. Lower stress measures (to a minimum of 0) and higher fit measures (to a maximum of 1) indicate better solutions. In our three dimensional solution the normalized raw stress score, which measures the misfit of data, is 0.061 and Tucker's coefficient of congruence[37] that measures the fit is 0.97. These scores indicate a less distorted, thus, a fairly reliable solution. We chose a three dimensional solution because increasing the dimensionality from two to three offered the largest improvement in the stress. The scree plot in figure 5.1 shows the normalized raw stress of the solution at each dimension.

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[37] Tucker's coeficient of congruence is a measure devised to compare factor solutions and is a form of correlation between the distances in the model and the data.

Figure 5.1: Scree Plot

As seen in figure 5.1 we started the MDS procedure with a ten dimensional solution and worked down to a two dimensional one. In this respect, dimensionality from two to three offers a significant improvement in the stress score. In addition, dimensionality from three to four offers a fair improvement in the stress score as well. After the fourth dimension, the improvements are relatively small. Accordingly, we chose to analyze the aggregated data using a three dimensional solution because it provides a moderately close-up dimensionality, which would be more effective in interpreting our data. Increasing the dimensionality of the meaning space might provide better fit measures. However, it involves the risk of revealing an extremely complicated and fragmented meaning space, which would constrain us in understanding the 'big picture.' Thus, a three dimensional solution is optimum for our aggregated data. Figure 5.2 represents the three dimensional meaning space of the aggregated data, involving the totality of three institutions.

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
Figure 5.2: The Meaning Space of the Aggregate Data

This three dimensional space represents the meaning world of our aggregated data. The most crucial element of this meaning space is its dimensions because the concepts are dissociated or associated by these dimensions. Accordingly, these dimensions sustain the context of the concepts in this meaning world. What we mean by context is the place of each concept as well as the concepts around it in this meaning space. The context, as mentioned in the fourth chapter, is determined by other words because the significance does not exist within a word but in its relation to others. Thus, these dimensions, by associating or dissociating the concepts, determine the context of each concept. The correlations between the concepts and dimensions define the impact level of each dimension upon these concepts. Table 5.1 below demonstrates the correlations of each concept with the dimensions of the meaning space;

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Table 5.1: The Meaning Space Coordinates of the Concepts

	Dimension		
	1	2	3
Power	-,210	-,304	-,531
Father	,318	,463	-,394
Tyrant	-,409	,392	-,456
Security	,529	,015	-,388
Holy	,269	,645	,284
Corruption	-,664	-,081	-,174
Justice	,597	,087	,267
Order	,220	-,425	-,356
Assurance	,495	-,462	,081
Inefficient	-,508	-,142	,467
Obstacle	-,487	,447	,213
State	-,011	,184	,278
Society	,160	-,243	,599
Bureaucracy	-,298	-,575	,110

Accordingly, the concepts of *security* and *justice* show the most significant positive correlations with the 1st dimension. On the other hand, *corruption* and *inefficiency* show the most significant negative correlations with the same dimension. In addition, the concept of *holy* shows the most significant positive correlation with the 2nd dimension, and the concept of *bureaucracy* shows the most significant negative correlation with the same dimension. Finally, the concept of *society* shows the most significant positive correlation with the 3rd dimension, and the concept of *power* shows the most significant negative correlation with the same dimension. Here, we need a more simplistic visual representation of the three dimensional space, which would enable us to clearly spot the precise place of each concept. Therefore, we will use the two dimensional images of the three dimensional space and attempt to define the meaning of each dimension. Figure 5.3 below demonstrates the final coordinates for the objects in dimensions 1 and 2.

Figure 5.3: Most Significantly Dissociated Concepts by the 1st Dimension

In figure 5.3 each dimension explains the perceived dissimilarities between the concepts. The further the concepts the more they are dissimilar. Thus, the concepts that are positively correlated with a dimension dissociate from the concepts that are negatively correlated with that dimension. Such dissociation reveals the 'meaning' of that dimension. Figure 5.3 demonstrates the most dissimilar concepts on the coordinate of dimension 1, which are marked with a circle. In this respect, dimension 1 most significantly dissociates the concepts of *justice* and *security* from the concepts of *corruption* and *inefficiency*. Accordingly, the former concepts have to do with the state's positive aspects, while the latter concepts signify the state's negative aspects. In other words, this dimension dissociates the negative and positive aspects of the state in the meaning world of the bureaucrats. Consequently, we label this dimension as the *dimension of*

legitimacy that has to do with the legitimate and illegitimate aspects of the Turkish state in its relationship with society. Thus, *the most legitimate aspect of the Turkish state for the bureaucrats is the maintenance of justice and security.* On the contrary, *the most illegitimate aspects of the Turkish state for the bureaucrats involve the state's corruption and inefficiency*. This dimension provides a crucial insight about the bureaucrats; under what circumstances they consider the actions of the state valid, which reinforces their consent for obedience.

The legitimacy of the modern state involves the state's appropriateness as the embodiment of a consistent system of abstract laws (Pierson, 1996). Accordingly, the concept of justice signifies such legitimacy, implying lack of arbitrariness, rule of law, and a sense of fairness, which are crucial for social stability. On the other hand, security concerns justify the modern state's monopoly on coercive power, its sovereignty, and its rule over an undivided social order. In this respect, a fair and security-oriented state is the most legitimate one that can be unquestionably obeyed for the bureaucrats. Such a notion is also consistent with the central tenet of the Ottoman-Turkish politics. The Ottoman notion of legitimacy, as discussed in the third chapter, had to do with the image of a state that delivers justice and protection to its subjects. This notion was reproduced by the Turkish modernization, which attributed the roles of social equalizer, and guardianship to the state. Therefore, the legitimacy of the state primarily institutionalized on the grounds of security and justice. Consequently, the most desirable aspects of the state attuned with the general interest of society mirrors the image of an 'equitable and security-oriented stabilizing force' in the mindsets of the bureaucrats.

The most illegitimate aspects of the state are perceived as the state's corruption and inefficiency by the bureaucrats. Accordingly, in this mindset, these aspects constitute the most troublesome issues of the state-society relationship in the Turkish context, which complicates citizen obedience to the state. Such

commonsense about the illegitimate aspects of the state reminds us the primary paradox of the post-1980, involving the conflict between the premises of the neo-liberal ideology and that of the Turkish politics. The former centralized the notion of efficiency as the major criterion of state performance by identifying the state's political success merely with its economic performance. Not surprisingly, the inefficiency of the state is considered a more significant delegitimating issue than its tyranny in this mindset. The latter, on the other hand, pursued the populist practices that intensified the corruption and inefficiency of the state. Thus, the ultimate value of efficiency was undermined by the intensified corruption and inefficiency, which put the state's legitimacy in doubt. In addition, the ongoing practices of patronage, clientalism, bribery, and arbitrariness in the state institutions were accompanied by the state's unlawful use of force as well as its relationship with the illegitimate sources of powers, expressed by the term deep-state. These practices reinforced the societal mistrust to the institutions of the state in the contemporary period, and institutionalized the commonsensical notion of 'purification of the state institutions from corruption and inefficiency.'

To sum up, the first dimension dissociates the legitimate and illegitimate aspects of the Turkish state in the mindset of the bureaucrats. Thus, *the legitimacy of the state constitutes the first dimension of thought regarding the state-society relationship in the meaning world of the bureaucrats*. In addition, this dimension is a good example of the duality of structure notion that we discussed in the fourth chapter. Accordingly, the same state is considered *enabling* primarily through providing justice and security on the one hand, and it is *constraining* mainly by its corruption and inefficiency on the other hand. Now, we will focus on the second dimension of thought and attempt to clarify its meaning. Figure 5.4 below demonstrates the most significantly disassociated concepts by the 2nd dimension;

Figure 5.4: Most Significantly Dissociated Concepts by the 2nd Dimension

The most dissimilar concepts on the coordinate of dimension 2 are *holy* and *bureaucracy*, which are marked with a circle. The concept of holy signifies the traditional image of the Turkish state, involving its divine and metaphysical aspects. Accordingly, the concept of bureaucracy signifies the non-divine, thus, the worldly and materialized image of the Turkish state in this mindset. In other words, the bureaucracy is considered a non-holy entity distinct from the divine image of the Turkish state. Such conceptualization renders the bureaucracy as a worldly, thus, a modern aspect of the state in this mindset. Hence, the 2nd dimension of thought dissociates the modern aspects of the Turkish state from its traditional aspects. Consequently, we label this dimension as the *dimension of orientation* that has to do with the modern and traditional aspects of the Turkish state in its relationship with society. In our view, such disassociation is quite reasonable, considering the coexistence of the modern and the traditional in the

Turkish political culture. Accordingly, this dimension demonstrates the complex cultural patterns, stuck in between the traditional and the modern, about the conceptualization of the state-society relationship.

The most significant traditional aspect of the state in the mindsets of the bureaucrats is its holiness, which originates from the state's association with the will of god in the Ottoman period. Such an image underpinned the notion that no 'worldly' entity was able to intervene to the relationship between the state and its subjects. This image was also reproduced by the official ideology of the modern Turkey, namely Kemalism. The Kemalist ideology utilized the spiritualized image of the state by maintaining its unintelligible and unreachable outlook for the sake of nation building process. In this sense, the traditional aspects of the state were functional in the nationalization of society through paternalism, which constituted a social tie between the state and society. The commonsense about the holiness of the state also persisted in the post-1980 period although the neo-liberal turn involved serious attempts to *demystify* the state. Thus, the divine image of the Turkish state still prevails, in which the state's holiness implies its primacy and tutelary control over society.

However, the notion of bureaucracy implies the worldly aspect of the state as an entity that constitutes the concrete image of the state. The modernity of bureaucracy derives neither from its feature of being the first modernized institution in the Turkish context, nor from its pioneering role in the Turkish modernization process. On the contrary, the non-holiness of the bureaucracy has to do with its pejorative conceptualization because on the coordinate of dimension 1 it associates with the state's illegitimacy. Thus, the bureaucracy is considered a pejorative aspect of the state that undermines its divine and metaphysical image, which such consideration materializes the bureaucracy as a worldly concept. In other words, the modern outlook of the bureaucracy has to do with its pejorative image in this mindset. Such conceptualization supports the assumed meaning-shift in the Turkish political culture; although the state maintains its divine image, its

bureaucratic aspect, which was previously considered an invaluable tool of modernization, historically turned out to be a pejorative feature of the state. Accordingly, the intensified demystification of the state in the post-1980 period does not involve a holistic shift in the patrimonial image of the state but it implies a significant transformation in the conceptualization of its bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is perceived even by its own members as an illegitimate feature of the state, which underpins the notion of an 'efficiency, technocracy, and pragmatism' oriented bureaucracy, required for the capitalist aspect of the state.

To sum up, the 2nd dimension of thought dissociates the traditional (patrimonial) and modern (worldly) aspects of the Turkish state in the mindset of the bureaucrats. Thus, *the orientation of the state constitutes the second dimension of thought regarding the state-society relationship in the meaning world of the bureaucrats*. Finally, we will focus on the 3rd dimension of thought. Figure 5.5 below demonstrates the final coordinates of the objects within the 1st and 3rd dimensions.

Figure 5.5: Most Significantly Dissociated Concepts by the 3rd Dimension

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The most dissimilar concepts on the coordinate of dimension 3 are *power* and *society*, which are marked with a circle. In our view, such dissociation implies the perceived power distance between the state and society. The essence of this variation has to do with the state's exercise of authority *above* society as well as the state's exercise of authority *for* society. To be more specific, the former implies the centralized and relatively autonomous power of the state above society, which renders society powerless for the sake of sustaining social control. The latter implies the state's exercise of authority mainly for public service and public welfare, which involves the capacity of society to impose its demands upon the state. Accordingly, we argue that the 3rd dimension of thought has to do with the state's exercise of *authority*, which dissociates its control aspect from its public service aspect. Consequently, we label this dimension as the *dimension of authority,* including the control and service aspects of the Turkish state in its relationship with society.

The roots of such dissociation in the mindsets of the bureaucrats can be found in the political cleavage among the strong center and the weak periphery, which had been a central pillar of the Turkish politics. The major inheritance of the Ottoman political culture was a strong and centralized state authority as well as a powerless civil society with weak corporate and intermediary structures. The Turkish modernization process reproduced such inheritance by maintaining the subordination of the citizens to the high interests of the state, which constitutes the basis of 'weak politics' in the Turkish context (Cizre, 1999). The tutelary control of the state upon society was replicated mainly through the elitist notion of the modernization process; people cannot have sovereignty until they attain a certain level of consciousness. Thus, society is construed as an object that has to be closely controlled by the centralized power of the state. Accordingly, the civil society lacks a relatively autonomous power because no societal group or oppositional movement is able to postulate itself outside the prevailing relations of formal power (Öğün, 2004i). However, this does not mean that the state merely

exercises its political power autonomous from society for the sake of social domination. The legitimacy concern of the state requires the exercise of state authority for the public service and welfare, which involves sharing the centralized power with society to some extent. The state and its elites have to persuade various social strata for the accuracy, benevolence, and generosity of the state simply because as long as the state confers it maintains its power. Such exercise of authority relatively reduces the assumed power distance between the state and society by creating sense of affiliation. Thus, in our view, the discrepancy between the state's power and society in the meaning world of the bureaucrats does not simply indicate a powerless society but it also mirrors a notion on 'how the state exercises and has to exercise its authority.' Therefore, the 3rd dimension of thought dissociates the state's exercise of authority for public control from its exercise of authority for public service in the mindset of the bureaucrats. Consequently, *the authority of the state constitutes the third dimension of thought regarding the state-society relationship in the meaning world of the bureaucrats*.

5.2. The Taxonomies of the Meaning Space

In this section we will demonstrate the taxonomies, inherent in the meaning world of the bureaucrats. These taxonomies are crucial because; (1) they justify that the meanings of the dimensions make sense, and (2) they reveal the content of each concept in the mindset of the bureaucrats. Accordingly, we will primarily focus on the dimensions of legitimacy and orientation. Figure 5.6 below demonstrates the taxonomy of the concepts within these dimensions.

Figure 5.6: Taxonomy of the State's Legitimacy and Orientation

The first quadrant involves the concepts of assurance, order, and society, which are associated with the legitimate and modern aspects of the state. Such association is highly reasonable because a legitimate and modern state has to sustain assurance, security as well as maintaining its relationship with modern society on the basis of its legitimate aspects. Accordingly, these concepts render the state as a concrete and a desirable entity in the meaning world of the bureaucrats since they imply a modern and legitimate state.

Quadrant 2 represents the legitimate and traditional aspects of the Turkish state, involving the concepts of father, holy, and justice. This conceptualization makes sense, considering the patrimonial characteristics of the Turkish state. Accordingly, the image of a fatherly, just, and holy state has to do with the legitimate-traditional aspects of the state in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. Quadrant 3 represents the illegitimate and traditional aspects of the state.

Accordingly, the illegitimate and traditional features of the Turkish state have to do with its tyranny and obstructiveness. Such conceptualization makes sense considering the strong state tradition in the Ottoman-Turkish politics. The obstructive and tyrannical characteristics of the state do not merely engender a sense of illegitimacy in the mindsets of the bureaucrats but they are associated with the patrimonial characteristics of the Turkish state as well. Therefore, these concepts are considered the negative outcomes of the state's transcendental and traditional authority. Finally, quadrant 4 involves the concepts of bureaucracy, power, inefficiency, and corruption, associating with the Turkish state's illegitimate and modern aspects. Such pejorative concepts do not merely delegitimate the state but also materialize it in the mindsets of the bureaucrats.

In this taxonomy, security and state are the most simplistic concepts because of their unidimensional characteristics. The concept of security significantly associates with the legitimacy of the state and the state's orientation nearly has no effect upon this concept. Thus, the Turkish state's duty of sustaining the security legitimates the state, independent from its traditional and modern aspects. This can be interpreted as sustaining security had always been a primary duty of the state in the Turkish context. In addition, the state is itself a traditional concept in the meaning world of the bureaucrats. The notion of state alone does not make any sense of legitimacy for the bureaucrats but its functions, roles, and duties constitute the basis of its legitimacy. Figure 5.7 below demonstrates taxonomy of the concepts within the space of legitimacy and authority.

Figure 5.7: Taxonomy of the State's Legitimacy and Authority

The first quadrant represents the desirable aspects of the Turkish state, originating from its role of serving to the public. It involves the concepts of society, holy, justice, and assurance, associating with the state's legitimacy as well as its exercise of authority for the public service. Accordingly, the state that serves to public involves the image of a just state that assures society. In addition, such state is the holy one, affiliated with its society. Quadrant 2 represents the legitimate aspects of the Turkish state, originating from its exercise of authority for public control. It involves the concepts of security, father, and order. Thus, a fatherly state that sustains order and security has the legitimate exercise of power for social control.

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Quadrant 3 involves the negative aspects of the Turkish state, originating from its exercise of authority for public control. These aspects are the state's power, tyranny, and corruption. Accordingly, the state can at times exercise its authority in a tyrannical and corrupted way, involving the arbitrary and improper exercise of power. Here, the state's power is perceived a moderately delegitimating aspect of the state. In addition, the basis of corruption is not viewed as the state's role in public services but its role in sustaining control. This reminds us the emergence of the state's relationship with the illegitimate sources of power in the contemporary period such as the mafia and the 'deep state' for the sake of security and order. In this meaning world, the notion of order legitimates the state's control upon society while corruption delegitimates such control. Here, we will argue that this distinction implies a contradictory logic because although corruption implies a 'ruined order', it is the dialectical outcome of the status quo; "what *order* indicates is the *disorder* concealed by various centers of power" (Öğün, 2004d: 69).

Finally, Quadrant 4 represents the illegitimate aspects of the state, originating from its exercise of authority for public service. This quadrant involves the concepts of inefficiency, obstacle, and bureaucracy. Accordingly, the state's exercise of authority for public service also renders the state bureaucratic, and inefficient, thus, an illegitimate and obstructive entity against society. The interesting issue here is that the major source of obstruction is not considered the state's tyranny and corruption but it is associated with the state's bureaucracy, and inefficiency in public service. Such conceptualization reminds us the capitalist aspect of the state, which explicitly manifested itself in the Turkish context due to the neo-liberal turn. Lastly, the concept of state is itself perceived as an entity functional for public service. It almost has no correlation with the first dimension (-0,011).

Finally, we will focus on the dimensions of orientation and authority. Figure 5.8 below demonstrates the taxonomy of the concepts within these dimensions. The

remarkable issue about this taxonomy is that; each quadrant demonstrates the contradictory institutional logics in the meaning world of the bureaucrats about the state and its relationship with society. The legitimacy dimension was dissociating the state's negative and positive aspects. In the absence of this dimension, the taxonomy of the state's orientation and authority reveals the irreconcilable dualities inherent in the Turkish politics. These dualities, in particular, reflect the complex structure of the Turkish modernization, which is stuck in between the traditional and the modern. On the other hand, they mirror the duality of structure by means of the complex and conflicting patterns in the meaning world of the bureaucrats about the state-society relationship.

Figure 5.8: Taxonomy of the State's Orientation and Authority

Quadrant 1 involves the concepts that are related with the traditional-public service aspects of the Turkish state. This quadrant involves the concepts of holy,

obstacle, state, and justice. Accordingly, as mentioned before, the state is itself perceived as a traditional entity, functional for public service. The notion of justice also has to do with the state's traditionality as well as its duty of serving the public. In this quadrant the major contradiction manifests itself due to the concepts of holy and obstacle. In this respect, the patrimonial aspects of the Turkish state, functional for public service render the state as a holy entity as well as an obstacle in the mindset of the bureaucrats.

Quadrant 2 represents the traditional aspect of the state related with its exercise of authority for social control. This quadrant involves the concepts of father and tyranny. In this sense the traditional aspects of the Turkish state aimed at the maintenance of social control renders the state as a father as well as a tyrant. This reminds us one of the major administrative principles of the patrimonial Ottoman state; to sustain the obedience of subjects by maintaining the feelings of fear and respect.

Quadrant 3 represents the modern-social control aspects of the state, involving the concepts of power, order, and corruption. Such association is highly reasonable considering the modern theories of the state, in which the *raison d'etre* of the modern state is conceived as to maintain and reproduce the existing social order. In this meaning world the maintenance of the order is primarily associated with the state's tutelary control upon society rather than its duty of serving to the public. In addition, the state's power is conceptualized as a modern, thus, a legal-rational one, primarily functional for public control. However, the state's modern and control aspects also have to do with a corrupted state in exercising its power and sustaining the order.

Quadrant 4 involves the concepts that are associated with the modern aspects of the state and its exercise of authority for public service. In other words, it represents the materialized image of the state by means of its public service functions in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. This quadrant involves the concepts

of bureaucracy, assurance, inefficiency, and society. Accordingly, the modern aspect of the Turkish state and its exercise of authority for public service render the state on the one hand bureaucratic and on the other hand a source of assurance. Likewise, these aspects affiliate the state with society but they also have to do with the state's inefficiency as well. Finally, the concept of security is perceived merely as a matter of public control because it almost has no correlation with the orientation of the state (0,015).

This taxonomy, as argued before, mirrors the duality of structure, evident in the meaning world of the bureaucrats. It reflects the contradictory rules, internalized by the bureaucrats about the state's exercise of authority as well as its orientation. These rules identify the coexistence of the Turkish state's enabling and constraining aspects in its relationship with society. Each contradiction is related with the same aspects of the state and each positive concept has a negative counterpart. A holy state can also be an obstacle for society. A fatherly state protecting his children can, at times, turn out to be a tyrannical one. Social order requires the state control upon society but such control might reveal a corrupted state. The state's duty of serving to the public renders the state inefficient and bureaucratic but it is also a matter of assurance and public accessibility to the state. These rules, on the one hand, enable the state through justifying its actions but, on the other hand, they constitute the basis of its illegitimacy. Likewise, they enable society regarding the maintenance of order by a fatherly, just, protective, and assuring state. However, the same aspects also constrain society through revealing the state's tyranny, inefficiency, obstructiveness, corruption, and improper exercise of power.

As we mentioned in the fourth chapter, social actors are capable of internalizing and applying incompatible schemas. These schemas, as the principles that pattern the practices, empower the agents differently in various contexts. In our view, considering the conservative bias of the bureaucracy as well as the bureaucrats who owe their positions to the state, these incompatible schemas empower the

bureaucrats in the reproduction of the same power structure. They sustain a 'rhetorical awareness' functional for the self-justification of the bureaucrats, which also enables them to externalize their political responsibilities; the system is inaccurate but unchangeable; the state is tyrant but the subjects must be obedient; the bureaucracy is illegitimate but it is the sole initiator of change and assurance; the state is corrupted but the maintenance of order is invaluable. Such reasoning reinforces the belief in the lack of available alternatives, involving the possibility of change in the content of power. As a result, the rhetorical awareness merely reproduces the same power relations as well as originating an incompatibility between the actions and the rhetoric of the actors.

To sum up, the three dimensions of thought constitute the contents of the concepts in the meaning world of the bureaucrats regarding the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. In other words, the concepts gain their meanings within the framework of these three major dimensions. Despite more dimensions can be discovered, we think that these dimensions are the most relevant ones. Considering the dynamics of the Turkish politics and political culture as well as the characteristics of the modern state, these dimensions are fairly meaningful. In the next section, we will attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of the theory of representative bureaucracy in comprehending the mindset of the Turkish bureaucrats.

5.3. The Limitation of the Theory of Representative Bureaucracy

We argued that our first finding supports the reductionism of the theory of representative bureaucracy, which the liberal-pluralist paradigm constitutes its basis. In this section, we will demonstrate the inadequacy of the theory of representative bureaucracy in understanding and interpreting the mindset of the Turkish bureaucrats. However, it must be noted that, *such demonstration involves a paradigmatic definition of the bureaucrats' symbolic universe*. More specifically, we will attempt to demonstrate the concepts that associate or

dissociate with the norms of the liberal-pluralist paradigm in the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucrats.

The democratic aspect of the state, as discussed before, is primary for the liberal-pluralist paradigm. Such democratic state is a modern one, dissociated from its divine and traditional roots. The primacy of reason and individualism constitutes the basis of the liberal-pluralist paradigm, which conceives the state and society on rational and material grounds. Thus, a liberal-pluralist mindset will perceive the state as a modern and secular entity, in which there will be no room for its 'irrational divine' aspects.

In the normative framework of the liberal-pluralist paradigm, the state is conceived a positive and legitimate entity, purified from its pejorative aspects as well. This is simply because all states have to make their rule appear legitimate. The legitimate state is a democratic one that does not dominate society, economy, and culture. In addition, it is not a subject of the hegemony of a specific societal group. The criterion of legitimacy is the state's capacity to maintain mass support regarding the public belief in the appropriateness of the existing political institutions. The key issue for the maintenance of such support is the state's role in sustaining societal participation because the state is considered primarily functional for the representation of popular preferences and their aggregation into policies. Consequently, a liberal-pluralist mindset will perceive the state as a democratic, legitimate, and non-dominant entity, in which there is no room for its pejorative aspects that endanger the democratic norms.

The legitimacy of the state has to do with its exercise of authority as well. In the normative framework of the liberal-pluralist paradigm the state's exercise of authority primarily has to be functional for public service. The state's exercise of authority for its own interests as well as for the interests of a specific group reveals a crisis of confidence in public opinion. The enormous power of the state and its hegemonic control over society imply an illegitimate monolithic

organization, immune from democratic accountability. The legitimate state cannot suppress the freedom of society, composed of atomistic individuals. Thus, a democratic state is a limited one, which carries out only those activities on the behalf of public interest. Such interest involves a responsive state to the diverse societal interests by aggregating them into policies. In addition, some approaches postulate the state as a micro decision unit, which does not have any dominant societal function, power, or rule. In this sense, the state is considered an entity that merely does what society decides. It is a means for public service, which the public is equated with the market. Thus, the core matter of debate about the state's exercise of authority in this paradigm derives from the question of 'what will serve the public good?' Accordingly, a liberal-pluralist mindset will perceive the state as an entity that exercises its authority primarily for public service.

However, despite an excessive state power and domination is unacceptable, a considerable state control upon society is required for the maintenance of order and effective administration. The state's basic duty of sustaining the order through the mediation of social diversities necessitates the state's limited use of authority for social control. Here, the basis of such limitation has to do with the functionality of the state control for the individual freedom. The state enforcement is acceptable merely for the protection of individual rights to do things. The state has to secure the rights and freedom of the individuals, implying their private properties. Therefore, the state is donated with the right to use force for the sake of social order and security. Accordingly, a liberal-pluralist mindset will perceive a moderate the state control for the maintenance of order and security legitimate.

To sum up, the normative prescriptions of the liberal-pluralist worldview emphasize the state's modern and legitimate aspects, as well as its public serving feature. In addition, a limited social control by the state is considered legitimate for the sake of order, and security. Therefore, the concepts, mirroring the illegitimate, patrimonial, and suppressive control aspects of the state are incompatible with the normative configuration of the liberal-pluralist worldview.

Accordingly, the basis of bureaucratic representation derives from these core assumptions regarding the state-society relationship, which both the bureaucrats and the public are expected to internalize.

Here, we will refer to the contents of the concepts, evident in the mindset of the Turkish bureaucrats, regarding the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. The association of each concept with the specific aspects of the state signifies its content in the mindset of the bureaucrats. The table 5.2 below demonstrates the location of the concepts within the framework of the three dimensions of thought.

Table 5.2: Contents of the Concepts

CONCEPT	CONTENT
Security	Legitimate-Social Control
Inefficiency	Modern-Illegitimate-Public Service
Bureaucracy	Modern-Illegitimate-Public Service
Power	Modern-Illegitimate-Social Control
Corruption	Modern-Illegitimate-Social Control
Assurance	Modern-Legitimate-Public Service
Society	Modern-Legitimate-Public Service
Order	Modern-Legitimate-Social Control
Obstacle	Traditional-Illegitimate-Public Service
Tyrant	Traditional-Illegitimate-Social Control
Holy	Traditional-Legitimate-Public Service
Justice	Traditional-Legitimate-Public Service
Father	Traditional-Legitimate-Social Control
State	Traditional-Public Service

In the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucrats, merely four concepts out of fourteen can be considered 'paradigmatically harmonious' with the normative imperatives of the liberal-pluralist worldview. These concepts are *assurance*,

society, *order*, and *security*. The concepts of assurance and society are directly associated with the modern, legitimate, and public service aspects of the state. These concepts are paradigmatically the most relevant ones with the normative premises of the liberal-pluralist paradigm. On the other hand, the concept of order is associated with the social control aspect of the state but it is related with the state's legitimate and modern aspects as well. Thus, the concept of order also paradigmatically fits to the normative premises of the liberal-pluralist paradigm. The fourth concept, security, is related with the legitimate and social control aspects of the state. The orientation of the state has no effect on this concept. Accordingly, it can be considered harmonious with the premises of the liberal-pluralist paradigm because of its legitimacy as well. The marked area in the Figure 5.9 below demonstrates the realm, compatible with the normative imperatives of the liberal-pluralist paradigm in the mindsets of the bureaucrats.

Figure 5.9: Paradigmatically Compatible Concepts with Liberal-Pluralism

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In the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucrats, the realm which can represent the normative premises of the liberal-pluralist paradigm as well as the democratic aspect of the Turkish state is restricted with that area. Here, it must be noted once more that such demonstration involves the paradigmatic definition of the bureaucrats' symbolic universe. Thus, *we are not arguing that these concepts essentially mirror the liberal-pluralist logic or the democratic aspect of the state in this mindset*. This area merely represents the maximum realm that might conform to the premises of the liberal-pluralist paradigm, which takes a specific state-society relationship for granted. The concepts, exterior to the marked area, represent a non liberal-pluralist sense making regarding the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. These concepts are related with the traditional, illegitimate, or suppressive-control aspects of the Turkish state, which different paradigmatic logics would be more effective in understanding and interpreting them. Consequently, this outer realm signifies the issues about the state-society relationship, which the theory of representative bureaucracy either ignores or explains it merely by emphasizing the absence of a 'mature' democratic culture.

In this dissertation our major argument emphasized the reductionism of the theory of representative bureaucracy. The theory overlooks to the crucial issue of what is being represented in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. Accordingly, we argued that bureaucratic representation is a much more complicated issue, thus, an adequate approach has to incorporate the mental representations of the actors to the analysis. The patterns in the mindsets of the actors, as we demonstrated above, can be quiet different than the normative premises of a given culture or worldview, which the theory of representative bureaucracy takes for granted. Accordingly, the mindset of the political actors is not only limited by a specific structure (the normative rules of a paradigm) but it sets the limits of that structure as well. Thus, an ideal-typical democracy or a democratic culture cannot be considered a possibility or choice for every institutional context.

In this respect, our first finding supports that the normative assumptions of the liberal-pluralist paradigm is highly restricted in explaining the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucrats. Regarding the mindset demonstrated above, a scholar of the theory of representative bureaucracy would highly likely suggest that; there seems to be a problem of democracy simply because there is no democracy or a democratic culture in that context. In the lack of a democratic culture, quite naturally, the state's democratic aspect will not be dominant in the mindset of the political actors. However, whether there is a democratic culture or not, the theory fails to explain the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucrats, particularly regarding its context-specific characteristics. Besides, such non-liberal pluralist sense making cannot be considered merely the byproduct of an immature democratic culture but it is inherent to the state itself. In every context, the state has a managerial aspect as well as a capitalist aspect, manifested in its relationship with society. As argued in the third chapter, the managerial and capitalist aspects of the state undermined its democratic aspect in the Turkish context and this is explicit in the meaning world of the bureaucrats.

In the Turkish context, the state also has a significant fourth aspect as it is observed in the meaning world of the bureaucrats. This aspect is not acknowledged by the modern theories of the state. This is the *patrimonial aspect* of the Turkish state that has to do with the traditional features of the state-society relationship. In this respect the 'modern' state maintains its 'traditional' aspects in the mindset of the bureaucrats. Accordingly, a theory that can prescribe for the Turkish context primarily has to acknowledge the managerial, capitalist, and patrimonial aspects of the state as well as the state's democratic aspect. Hence, despite the theory of representative bureaucracy derives from the acknowledgement of diversities in society, it fails to acknowledge the diversity of worldviews that problematize various aspects of the state. Here, we will not discuss how these perspectives would interpret the outer realm that signifies a non liberal-pluralist sense making. In our view, incorporating these paradigms to the

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analysis while attempting to reveal the meaning world of each organization would be more effective.

To sum up, in general, the theory of representative bureaucracy is insufficient in understanding the issue of bureaucratic representation in an otherwise democratic context. In specific, the assumptions as well as the remedies of this theory can be considered irrelevant in the Turkish context. Its core idea that 'an appropriate political/institutional environment and eligible socialization patterns will lead to the representation of the public by the bureaucrats' is an oversimplification. Without analyzing the patterns of the state-society relationship in the mindsets of the bureaucrats, one cannot make any accurate judgment about what do/shall they represent.

5.4. The Meaning Worlds of the Organizations

Yet, we realized our analysis on the aggregated data, including the totality of three institutions. However, the Turkish bureaucracy involves many different organizations with a variety of meaning worlds. Thus, the bureaucracy is not a monolithic entity but a dispersed totality. Quiet naturally, the issue of representation might vary from one organization to the other. Therefore, as emphasized in the fourth chapter, we did not make a random sampling and chose specific institutions that are not so similar. The Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) is an 'autonomous' and contemporary state institution, carrying out the duty of sustaining the adequate functioning of the financial market. It is the regulatory and supervisory authority in charge of the securities markets in Turkey. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is one of the traditional bureaucratic institutions of the Turkish state, established in the Ottoman era. It is a crucial state institution since it determines, controls, or directly implements all monetary transactions of the state. The military bureaucracy also constitutes a vital aspect of the Turkish state, considering its significant role in the Turkish politics. Accordingly, our third institution is another traditional one, Turkish Military Academy (TMA), which

trains the officers that hold the top commanding posts of the military. In our view, these organizations will demonstrate reasonable variations about the notion of the state within the Turkish bureaucracy. However, within the limitations of the research, it is impossible to demonstrate all relevant variations in the Turkish bureaucracy but it is possible to reveal some interesting dissimilarities.

We have a second finding that goes beyond the inadequacy of the theory of representative bureaucracy as mentioned before. We have empirical results, demonstrating the variations among the bureaucratic organizations as well as their similarities. These organizational variations have to do with the consideration of the state-society relationship in the meaning world of each organization. Accordingly, we will primarily question the contentual validity of the dimensions of thought in each organization. Then we will demonstrate, interpret, and compare the meaning clusters, evident in the symbolic universe of these organizations.

We argue that each organizational meaning space renders our major finding more robust regarding the contents of the dimensions of thought. The basic concepts, dissociated by each dimension, are nearly the same with our aggregated data. Although there are some minor changes, they do not falsify our core logic in interpreting these dimensions. Table 5.3 below represents the final coordinates of the concepts in the CMB meaning world. It demonstrates the most significant concepts dissociated by each dimension;

Table 5.3: Final Coordinates of the Concepts for the CMB Data

	Dimension		
	1	2	3
Power	,143	-,400	-,512
Father	-,307	,234	-,589
Tyrant	,395	,330	-,490
Security	-,519	-,263	-,314
Holy	-,208	,708	,149
Corruption	,644	-,030	-,194
Justice	-,535	,077	,383
Order	-,473	,278	-,090
Assurance	-,461	-,477	,211
Inefficiency	,533	,012	,398
Obstacle	,402	,487	,167
State	,028	-,483	,027
Society	-,034	,047	,650
Bureaucracy	,394	-,519	,204

As seen in the table, the 1st dimension most significantly dissociates the concepts of *corruption* and *justice*. Secondarily, it dissociates the concepts of *security* and *inefficiency*. Such dissociation is entirely congruent with the legitimacy dimension of our aggregated meaning space. Likewise, the 2nd dimension most significantly dissociates the concepts of *holy* and *bureaucracy*, which is identical to the orientation dimension of the aggregated space. The 3rd dimension most significantly dissociates the concepts of *society* and *father*. Here, the concept of *power* in our aggregated space is replaced by the concept of *father*. The concept of power is slightly less correlated (-0.512) with that dimension relatively to the concept of father (-0,589). In our view, such a shift does not signify a major change in the core logic of this dimension. Since the notion of a fatherly state derives from the authoritarian relationship between the father and his children, it still makes sense that this dimension has to do with the state's exercise of authority for social control. Table 5.4 below represents the final coordinates of the concepts in the MOF meaning world.

Table 5.4: Final Coordinates of the Concepts for the MOF Data

	Dimension		
	1	2	3
Power	-,195	-,428	-,443
Father	,353	,386	-,463
Tyrant	-,423	,285	-,525
Security	,407	-,115	-,501
Holy	,262	,674	,247
Corruption	-,659	-,153	-,138
Justice	,605	,160	,187
Order	,184	-,573	-,085
Assurance	,581	-,347	,101
Inefficient	-,509	,017	,497
Obstacle	-,470	,506	,051
State	-,009	,229	,168
Society	,173	-,131	,626
Bureaucracy	-,299	-,510	,277

The 1st dimension of the MOF meaning world most significantly dissociates the concepts of *corruption* and *justice*, which is exactly the same with the legitimacy dimension of the aggregated space. Secondarily, this dimension dissociates the concepts of *assurance* and *inefficiency*. Accordingly, the concept of *security* in our aggregated space is replaced by the concept of *assurance*. This does not imply a major change in the core logic of this dimension because the concept of assurance signifies a positive aspect of the state as well. The 2nd dimension most significantly dissociates the concepts of *holy* and *order*. In this sense the concept of *bureaucracy* in our aggregated space is replaced by the concept of *order*. The concept of order has a slightly more negative correlation with that dimension (-0,573) than the concept of bureaucracy (-0,510). Considering the core logic of this dimension, such a shift seems reasonable because the maintenance of order can be associated with the duties of a 'modern' state. Besides, in the aggregated space, the concept of order was related with the modern aspect of the state as well. Finally, the 3rd dimension most significantly dissociates the concepts of *society* and *tyranny*. Here, the concept of *power* in our aggregated space is replaced by

the concept of *tyranny*. This is also a reasonable shift because the state's tyranny can be considered the outcome of the state's domination, involving its social control aspect. Finally, table 5.5 below represents the final coordinates of the concepts in the TMA meaning world.

Table 5.5: The Final Coordinates of the Concepts for the TMA Data

	Dimension		
	1	2	3
Power	,125	-,115	,603
Father	-,407	,500	,148
Tyrant	,401	,474	,401
Security	-,398	,165	,459
Holy	-,267	,542	-,424
Corruption	,700	-,012	,077
Justice	-,595	-,054	-,273
Order	-,186	-,581	,101
Assurance	-,535	-,281	,291
Inefficient	,472	-,313	-,434
Obstacle	,489	,428	-,240
State	-,003	,123	-,428
Society	-,196	-,411	-,477
Bureaucracy	,401	-,464	,196

The 1st dimension of the TMA meaning world most significantly dissociates the concepts of *corruption* and *justice*, which is entirely congruent with the legitimacy dimension of our aggregated meaning space. Secondarily, it dissociates the concepts of *assurance* and *obstacle*. Accordingly, the concept of *security* in our aggregated space is replaced by the concept of *assurance* and the concept of *inefficiency* is replaced by the concept of *obstacle*. Consistent with the logic of this dimension, assurance implies a legitimate aspect of the state and obstacle connotes an illegitimate aspect. Likewise the meaning world of the MOF, the 2nd dimension most significantly dissociates the concepts of *holy* and *order*. Such dissociation is harmonious with the core logic of this dimension as mentioned above. Finally, the 3rd dimension most significantly dissociates the concepts of

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society and *power,* which is exactly the same with the authority dimension of our aggregated space.

As a result, the core logics of these dimensions make sense in the meaning world of each organization, which have considerably different characteristics. Thus, each organizational meaning space justifies the substance of these major dimensions of thought. These dimensions of thought, as mentioned before, are the core variables that sustain the meanings of the concepts. Therefore, they determine the content of representation in the mindsets of the bureaucrats. Accordingly, we argue that *the state's legitimacy, orientation, and authority are the core dimensions of thought that frame the state-society relationship in the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucracy*. This is the essence of representation in the Turkish context. Although this research involves few organizations, in general, it can be argued that these dimensions are uniform among the bureaucratic organizations of the Turkish state. In specific, these dimensions mirror the universal space of the three organizations included in our research. Here, the crucial issue is to discover the organizational variations as well as the similarities within this universal space. Accordingly, the key question has to do with how these variations can be understood.

There are two major ways for understanding these variations. The first method is to compare the place of each concept among the three organizational meaning spaces. The second method is a more complicated one, involving to reveal the meaning clusters of each organization and to make comparisons by using these clusters. We employed the latter option because we think that the meaning clusters would be more effective in understanding the context of each concept. The meaning of a word, as discussed in the fourth chapter, is its use in a context and the context is sustained by other words because the significance does not exist within a word but in its relation to others. Accordingly, the method of hierarchical cluster analysis would enable us to reveal the latent meaning clusters in the

meaning world of each organization by demonstrating the hierarchical groupings of the concepts.

Here, we faced with two major obstacles. First, the cluster analysis sustains the discovery of the latent the patterns in the data but it does not explain the fundamental logic regarding the commonalities of the concepts that are assembled in a cluster. In this sense, we had to discover the core logic behind the formation of these meaning clusters. Accordingly, we realized that the core logic of each cluster has to do with a specific aspect of the state. In other words, the components of each cluster associate with a specific aspect of the state in common. Thus, *the meaning clusters are formed in relation to the most sensemaking aspects of the state in the meaning world of each organization.* Second, the cluster analysis does not explain the causal relationships between the concepts within these clusters. However, since we used the method of hierarchical cluster analysis, it revealed the order of association between the concepts. Therefore, it enabled us to evaluate the hierarchical linkages (the primacy of similarities) between the concepts within a specific cluster. In addition, the relationality of each concept with specific dimensions guided our interpretations as well. Accordingly, we suggested a causal structure and established our reasoning by utilizing the conceptual and contextual frameworks.

5.4.1. The Meaning Clusters of the CMB

The meaning clusters characterize a variety of ruling ideas and scripts that might guide the actions of the organizations as well as their members. In this sense, they constitute the basis of bureaucratic representation by indicating that what kind of a state and what kind of a state-society relationship are being represented in the meaning world of each organization. Therefore, we will primarily attempt to understand and interpret the clusters, evident in the meaning world of the CMB. Table 5.6 below demonstrates the vertical icicle using the Ward's method for the CMB data.

Table 5.6: Vertical Icicle for the CMB Data

Number of clusters	13:Society		11:Obstacle		10:Ineffici		6:Corrupti		3:Tyrant		8:Order		7:Justice		5:Holy		2:Father		9:Assuranc		4:Security		14:Bureaucr		12:State		1:Power
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
6	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
7	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X
8	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X		X
9	X		X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X		X
10	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X	X	X		X
11	X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X		X		X	X	X		X
12	X		X		X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X		X		X	X	X		X
13	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X	X	X		X

Accordingly, there are three major clusters in the CMB meaning world. The first cluster involves the concepts of *state, bureaucracy, power, security,* and *assurance*. The second cluster includes the concepts of *justice, order, holy,* and *father*. Finally, the third cluster combines the concepts of *tyrant, corruption, inefficiency, obstacle,* and *society*. Figure 5.10 below visualizes the hierarchical aggregation of the clusters.

Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine

```
CASE       0      5     10     15     20     25
Label  Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+

State       12
Bureaucracy 14
Power        1
Security     4
Assurance    9
Justice      7
Order        8
Holy         5
Father       2
Tyrant       3
Corruption   6
Inefficiency 10
Obstacle    11
Society     13
```

Figure 5.10: Dendrogram of the CMB Data Using Ward's Method

As shown in figure 5.10, the first cluster is composed of two sub-clusters. In the first sub-cluster the concepts of *state* and *bureaucracy* associate with each other. Then they merge with the concept of *power*. The second sub-cluster, involves the concepts of *security* and *assurance*. In the final phase these two sub-clusters merge with each other. In the second cluster, the concepts of *justice* and *order* combine with each other. Afterwards, they respectively merge with the concepts of *holy* and *father*. Finally, the third cluster involves two sub-clusters. The first sub-cluster includes the concepts of *tyrant* and *corruption*. In the second sub-cluster primarily the concepts of *inefficiency* and *obstacle* merge with each other. Then they merge with the concept of *society*. In the final phase these two sub-clusters combine with each other and constitute the third major meaning cluster of this meaning world. Figure 5.11 below demonstrates the three dimensional meaning space of the CMB as well as the core meaning clusters of this organization. The normalized raw stress score of this solution, which measures the misfit of data, is 0.058 and Tucker's coefficient of congruence that measures the fit is 0.97. These scores indicate a fairly reliable solution.

Figure 5.11: The Meaning Clusters of the CMB Data

It would be easier to observe the exact location of each concept in this space by demonstrating it on two dimensional diagrams. Accordingly, figures 5.12 and 5.13 below illustrate the location of each concept within the dimensions of the legitimacy, orientation, and authority.

Figure 5.12: Legitimacy and Orientation Taxonomy of the CMB Data

Figure 5.13: Legitimacy and Authority Taxonomy of the CMB Data

Considering these diagrams, we generated the table below, which summarizes the association of each concept with specific aspects of the state in the CMB mindset. In other words, this table demonstrates the content of each concept in the CMB meaning world.

Table 5.7: Contents of the CMB Meaning Clusters

CLUSTER	CONCEPT	CONTENT
1	**State**	Modern
	Bureaucracy	Modern-Illegitimate-Service
	Power	Modern-Illegitimate-Control
	Security	Modern-Legitimate-Control
	Assurance	Modern-Legitimate-Service
2	**Order**	Traditional-Legitimate-Control
	Justice	Traditional-Legitimate-Service
	Holy	Traditional-Legitimate-Service
	Father	Traditional-Legitimate-Control
3	**Tyrant**	Illegitimate-Traditional-Control
	Corruption	Illegitimate-Control
	Inefficiency	Illegitimate-Service
	Obstacle	Illegitimate-Traditional- Service
	Society	Service

As seen in the table 5.7, the state's modern aspect constitutes the core logic of the first cluster. Thus, these are the concepts that constitute the notion of a modern and concrete state in the meaning world of the CMB. Accordingly, we labeled this cluster as *secular manifestation*. Each concept in the second cluster involves the state's traditional and legitimate aspects in common. In our view, these are the concepts that render the state a divine, desirable, and respectful entity in the mindset of the CMB. Therefore, we labeled the second cluster as *transcendental esteem*. The third cluster involves the concepts that are associated with the state's illegitimate aspects in common except the concept of society. These are the

pejorative aspects that reveal a doubtful state, thus, an unsettled state-society relationship in this mindset. We think that the concept of *society* constitutes the subject matter of this cluster, which is associated with the illegitimate aspects of the state. In this sense this cluster manifests the scapegoat in the meaning world of the CMB, which is conceived as society. We labeled this cluster as *technocratic exaltation* because, as elaborated later, it mirrors the logic of technocratic rationalization evident in this mindset.

5.1.1.1. The Cluster of Secular Manifestation

The cluster of *secular manifestation,* as mentioned above, involves two major sub-clusters, which all of the concepts in these sub-clusters associate with the Turkish state's modern aspect in common. In the first sub-cluster primarily the concepts of *state* and *bureaucracy* merge with each other, and in the next step they associate with the concept of *power*. In addition, the concept of *bureaucracy* associates with the *illegitimate* and *service* aspects of the state and the concept of *power* associates with the state's *illegitimate* and *control* aspects. This can be interpreted as follows; the CMB conceives the state as a *modern* entity, identical with its bureaucracy. The state and bureaucracy dominate the power and such power is functional for social control. However, the Turkish state does not utilize its bureaucracy and power in a legitimate way. The second sub-cluster involves the concepts of *security* and *assurance,* which the former associates with the state's *legitimate* and *control* aspects and the latter associates with the state's *legitimate* and *service* aspect. Accordingly, the modern and legitimate state is considered the one that maintains security through control, and sustains assurance by serving to the public. Consequently, the secular manifestation of the Turkish state implies the preservation of security by the state's exercise of power and the maintenance of assurance by the state's bureaucracy. While doing so, the state and bureaucracy dominates the power.

The interesting issue in this cluster is that despite the concepts of power and bureaucracy are conceived as the illegitimate aspects of the state they are not a part of the third cluster, involving the illegitimate aspects of the state. This means that they are more relevantly associated with the state's orientation rather than its legitimacy, probably because of their functionality in providing the security and assurance. Thus, in our view this cluster underpins the notion of a security-first state, which has to do with the modern aspect of the state in the CMB meaning world. Accordingly, we argue that this cluster mirrors the managerial perspective since *secular manifestation* of the state implies a state and bureaucracy that dominates the power for the sake of security and assurance in this mindset.

Using the imperatives of the managerial paradigm, one might highly likely argue that in this meaning cluster; (1) the state is perceived as a set of bureaucratic organizations because the state and its bureaucracy are viewed identical, (2) the state is materialized as a source of power, having unique access to the instruments of coercion for providing security and assurance. Accordingly, the concern for security has to do with the internal order and external defense, which in fact mirror the state's own interests as well as its autonomy. Thus, the CMB reproduces such autonomy by privileging a security-first state with its centralized power. This is quiet meaningful because a decentralized state power implies a loss in the elite's capacity to rule, involving the bureaucrats. Therefore, this mindset predicts the centralization of power in the hands of the state and its bureaucracy by employing the legitimative claims of security and assurance. In this sense, the state is not construed as an intermediary mechanism of diversified interests but as an instrument of domination. To put it differently, the secular manifestation of the state does not imply a democratically accountable state but it underpins a dominant one. Besides, this mindset reflects that the state exercises its power as a means of coercion since the concept of power by itself is considered illegitimate. Consequently, this cluster does not imply a democratically accountable state that enhances participation, regulates diverse interests, or functions as a substitute to the market mechanism without a dominant social role. Controversially, the

concerns of security and assurance legitimize the state dominance through paving the way for the centralization of power in the hands of the state and bureaucracy. In this sense, the secular manifestation of the state involves the notion of a powerful, central, and autonomous state, composed of bureaucratic organizations. Such state has a dominant role in society by sustaining social control for security as well as assuring its populace by its service aspect. This is the managerial aspect of the state that manifests itself through a managerial sensemaking.

Accordingly, the secular manifestation of the state does not reflect the state's capitalist aspect within the mindset of a bureaucratic organization, dealing with the regulation of monetary markets. Here, the class perspective would probably argue that the concerns of security and assurance legitimate the hegemony of the state and its bureaucracy by obscuring their class functions. Therefore, the managerial notion in the secular manifestation of the state is, in the final analysis, functional for the security and assurance of capitalism as well as the capitalist class. The belief in the necessity of a centralized state power reproduces the prevention of politicized class interests by state repression. Here, the security and assurance rhetoric constitutes the means for cooptation or false consciousness because, in fact, this rhetoric is functional for destroying all democratic rights that challenge to the capitalist mode of production. Thus, a hegemonic state power is primarily required for securing the conditions of capital accumulation through the image of a security-first state. Consequently, the notions of security and assurance, introduced as the general interest, conceal the state's class functions. At the systemic level of analysis such assumption of the class perspective makes sense. However, we cannot make any precise suggestion about the bureaucrats' sense making in this cluster by using this perspective. Thus, we argued that the CMB bureaucrats represent a managerial worldview in the secular manifestation of the Turkish state even it might reflect the false consciousness of the bureaucrats. Such interpretation is also reasonable considering the tutelary role of the Turkish state in the Turkish politics, in which the bourgeoisie cannot completely be conceived with respect to the market or class relations.

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The notion of a security-first state is one of the major constituents of weak politics in the Turkish context because it subordinates the state's democratic aspect to the issues of national security and integrity. The primacy of security notion scales down the state's democratic aspect into its plebiscite limits, involving merely the election of representatives, who would determine the public interest and formulate rational policies without endangering the unity of the nation as well as the central power of the state. In the meaning world of the CMB, the secular manifestation of the state can be considered analogous to a guardian state that dominates the power for security and assurance concerns. This cluster not only implies the core notions that render the state worldly in the mindsets of the CMB bureaucrats but it reflects the internalization of a tutelary public philosophy by these bureaucrats as well. In one sense, such internalization can be considered the outcome of the policies of fear in which many social problems are defined as a matter of national security and integrity in the Turkish context.

The interesting issue here is the notions of security and assurance are associated with the state dominated power, not with the justice. The remedy of security and assurance has to do with an unrestricted state power even though such power is exercised in illegitimate ways. Ironically, this is the core understanding that reproduces the powerlessness of justice in the Turkish context because such taken for grantedness prevents the transformation justice into a means of power that would equip the individuals, groups or, classes against the domination of 'official' political forces. The centralization of political power in the official realm involves high costs for various social groups/classes, which remain out of such realm. The centralized power of the state and bureaucracy are a means of assurance through the distribution of political and economic resources to the loyal constituents, who established connections with the official realm. In this sense, political bribery prevails beneath the discourse of political loyalty, which implies a reciprocal network between actors on the basis of patronage and protection. Accordingly, the private accumulation of wealth is contingent upon the degree of accessibility to such centralized power (Özbudun, 1988). Therefore, the progress and survival of

the capitalist class primarily depends on a network of political patronage, not the entrepreneurship. Thus, the secular manifestation of the state in this mindset also mirrors the powerlessness of civil society in a context, which the power is centralized in the hands of the state and its bureaucracy. Therefore, we argued that this cluster mirrors the managerial aspect of the state, involving its relatively autonomous power. In addition, such sense making might be functional in enhancing the power of the state elites as well as various social classes who managed to establish ties of patronage with them.

5.1.1.2. The Cluster of Transcendental Esteem

The second meaning cluster of the CMB, *transcendental esteem*, involves the concepts of *justice*, *order*, *holy*, and *father*, associated with the state's *traditional* and *legitimate* aspects in common. Thus, this cluster mirrors the divine and respectful aspects of the Turkish state in the mindset of the CMB bureaucrats. In other words, this cluster represents the divine characteristics of the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. In this cluster, primarily the concepts of *justice* and *order* merge with each other. In the next step they merge with the concept of *holy* and in the final step the concept of *father* joins to this cluster. We argue that the cluster of transcendental esteem essentially identifies the state's role of father. Accordingly, a fatherly state is the one that maintains the order and justice, and such function also has to do with the state's holiness. Thus, controversial to the first cluster that signifies the modern aspect of the state, the cluster of transcendental esteem signifies the state's patrimonial aspect. In this cluster the state's political authority is personalized due to its identification with a father figure; a just and holy father that maintains the status quo. This notion constitutes the legitimate-traditional aspect of the Turkish state in the CMB mindset. In our view, the cluster of transcendental esteem evokes the Ottoman notion of governance; 'the equitable administration of the subjects by the Sultan as the will of god above society.' However, such notion also spiritualizes the state's duty of sustaining the justice and order within the framework of this

cluster's patrimonial logic. Thus, the cluster of transcendental esteem, in fact, renders the justice and the desirable order unintelligible and unreachable because they are not conceived as concrete concepts but associated with the state's divinity.

We argue that the bureaucrats are able to externalize their political responsibilities for the solution of problems through the spiritualization of these concepts. Such an externalization reinforces their anti-political or apolitical stances; the order is inaccurate but unchangeable, injustice prevails but only a good father can handle this *etc.* Consequently, all expectations are oriented towards a metaphysical savior, which is either a transcendental institution or a patriotic person. Salvation is associated with the emergence of this savior. In the CMB mindset this savior is a father that would bring justice and order to its populace. In other words, the maintenance of justice and order implies purification from the dynamics of daily politics because these divine concepts can only be handled by a transcendent entity. This reinforces the belief that 'if a good father can be found everything will be alright', involving the externalization of political responsibilities as well as reproducing the patrimonial power relations between the state and society. In this sense, the achievement of a 'worldly and concrete' justice becomes illusionary or unattainable.

This cluster also reveals the CMB's concern in the preservation of the status quo because the state's holiness has to do with the maintenance of order. It can be argued that such conceptualization reinforces the insecurity of the bureaucrats against any kind of alternatives, challenging to the existing order. Here, the managerial perspective would highly likely emphasize that this is functional for the preservation of the bureaucratic power. The bureaucrats owe their dominant positions to the current order, thus, they have an interest in the preservation of that order. The patrimonial aspect of the Turkish state was not transformed because it had always been functional in the preservation of the power structure through the spiritualization of the order granted by the state. On the other hand, using the class

perspective's systemic level of analysis, one might argue that the patrimonial aspect of the state serves to the interests of capitalism because the current 'holy' order is a capitalist one, which the state is responsible for its preservation. Accordingly, the CMB bureaucrats hold a narrow view of structural and social change; the one that highly likely focuses on economic reforms rather than a change in the power structure. Such a narrow view is also compatible with their organizational duty of regulating the market, hence, the reproduction of capitalism.

In our view, this data set is insufficient for making precise estimations about the genuine functionality of the state's patrimonial aspect but one thing for sure is that; the father figure implies the one that controls society by means of maintaining the order and justice, which have to do with the holy image of the state in the CMB mindset. This father figure has to do with the state's traditional and legitimate relationship with society and it reinforces the state's transcendental image, involving its dominance or hegemony.

5.1.1.3. The Cluster of Technocratic Exaltation

The third meaning cluster of the CMB involves the concepts of *tyrant*, *corruption*, *inefficiency*, *obstacle*, and *society*, which are grouped into two major sub-clusters. Each concept in this cluster is related with the state's illegitimate aspect in common. The first sub-cluster is composed of the concepts of *tyranny* and *corruption*. Both concepts have to do with the state's *control* aspect. Thus, in this mindset, the state's tyranny and corruption has to do with the state's illegitimate exercise of authority for social control. In the second sub-cluster primarily the concepts of *inefficiency* and *obstacle* merge with each other and in the next step they combine with the concept of *society*. These three concepts associate with the state's exercise of authority for public service. Accordingly, the state's inefficiency in public service is considered the major obstacle for society. In the final step these two sub-clusters merge with each other. Considering the contents

of the concepts, this cluster signifies that society primarily has to do with the service aspect of the state. However the state cannot adequately serve to society because it is inefficient, thus an obstacle against society. On the other hand, the state's control aspect engenders a tyrannical and corrupted state in its relationship with society.

In our view, such hierarchical associations underpin two crucial issues manifested by this cluster; (1) inefficiency is perceived as the major obstacle for society, thus, it has primacy against the tyranny and corruption of the state within a ruined the state-society relationship, (2) the association of the state's tyranny and corruption with its control aspect underpins the perception of a suppressive state. Consequently, this cluster involves the demystification of the state, in which there exists a scapegoat related with the state's illegitimate aspects. This scapegoat is *society*, which cannot be efficiently served by the state as well as being suppressed by the state's tyranny and corruption.

We labeled this cluster as *technocratic exaltation* because we assume that dominant here is the rhetoric of technocratic rationalization, which privileges the efficiency of the state in its relationship with society. In this sense we consider this cluster primarily as a means for enhancing the organizational power of the CMB. On the other hand, we also think that such rhetoric is also functional for capital accumulation because the state's relationship with society is primarily defined in terms of its economic performance. Thus, in our view, the cluster of technocratic exaltation is related with the state's managerial aspect as well as its capitalist aspect that mirrors the primary paradox of the post-1980 Turkey.

This cluster represents the contradictory logics manifested by the liberalization of economy and the authorization of politics in the Turkish context. The former implies the postulation of the state's efficiency as the sole criteria of performance as a requisite of the state's capitalist aspect, while the latter involves the intensification of populist, corrupted, and unlawful practices through the

exploitation of the state's power. This paradox is inherent to the neo-liberal turn in the Turkish context, which transformed the capitalist aspect of state from the duty of initiating to the duty of facilitating. On the other hand, the same transformation maintained the centrality of the state's managerial aspect by revitalizing the state's power and domination in the political realm by undermining the state's democratic aspect. In addition to that, the neo-liberal turn incorporated many pejorative values to the political culture, which reinforced the neo-patrimonial characteristic of the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. These values, as discussed in the third chapter, also privileged a technocratic mentality that conceives the political problems as technical problems as well as infusing the political ideas with pragmatism. In this context, society was considered either an economic entity identified with the market or an organic component of the dominant state. The cluster of technocratic exaltation mirrors such decomposition by revealing the inefficiency of the state as the primary problem for society in one sub-cluster as well as and underpinning the state's tyranny and corruption in maintaining social control in the other sub-cluster. Accordingly, we argued that the managerial and capitalist aspects of the state coexist in this cluster.

The managerial paradigm conceives society as a set of organizations that operate in a complex environment with scarce resources. Technocratic rationalization is an inevitable process to cope with these obstacles. Therefore, technocratic rationalization, as mentioned in the second chapter, involves both the logic of efficiency, and a sense of legitimacy. In this mindset, the logic of efficiency manifests itself through the centrality of inefficiency as the major obstacle for society. In the meaning world of the CMB, the major obstacle for society is not considered the state's tyranny, corruption, or 'illegitimate' power but its inefficiency. On the other hand, the centrality of inefficiency for society engenders a sense of legitimacy so that the notion of an efficient administration, implying bureaucratization and technocratic power, is taken for granted as the remedy of this major obstacle. Therefore, the increasing complexity of society justifies societal dependence upon the technical capacity of organizations. In other

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words, such complexity maintains the belief that only an effective technocracy can handle the social, political, and economic problems through its expertise and technical decisions. This commonsense, as we discussed in the third chapter, maintains its dominance in the Turkish context. Therefore, the commonsense manifested in the cluster of technocratic exaltation provides the basis for the CMB's technocratic domination because; (1) it reproduces the taken for granted belief in the necessity of technocracy as well as its adherence to corporate planning and public service for struggling with problems of society, (2) it underpins the recruitment and placement of technocratic elites in the bureaucracies, (3) it legitimates the domination of technocrats by justifying the centralization of power in the executive branch, which in return undermines the democratic aspect of the state. Consequently, such sense making not only privileges technocracy but it rationalizes minimum societal participation to the policy processes for the sake of efficiency as well.

Considering the dominant aspects of the Turkish political culture, this cluster mirrors the ideology of social engineering, which reduces the societal problems into technical variables that have to be resolved and controlled through scientific rationality rather than negotiation. A society-wide debate upon the political, economic and social decisions would be useless because these decisions require scientific rationality of the technocratic experts. Within the framework of 'rational' policies, democracy is subordinated to a totalitarian public philosophy; an understanding of general interest, limited by the notions of national security and integrity. Ironically, such philosophy is privileged at the expense of basic constitutional rights, reinforcing lawlessness and insecurity as the origin of the corrupted and tyrannical relationship between the state and society. In this sense, the logic of technocratic rationalization, by privileging the notion of efficiency, reinforces the authorization of politics through engendering or justifying the irrational, arbitrary, and unlawful exercises of power as well. This is evident in the perception of power as an illegitimate aspect of the state as well as the tyrannical and corrupted relationship between the state and society in this mindset. However,

such sense making does not reveal a concern for the CMB bureaucrats regarding the limitation of the state power because a dominant state is required for the sake of security and assurance. Referring to Therborn (1978), the notion of legality is a secondary aspect because it is substituted by the criteria of efficiency and the power of technocracy.

We also argued that the cluster of technocratic exaltation also has to do with the class paradigm, considering the CMB's core duty of sustaining the functioning of the capital markets. Accordingly, one might think that the capitalist aspect of the state constitutes the genuine basis of the CMB's technocratic power. In this respect, the managerial notion of technocratic rationalization is a means for the justification of the state's capitalist aspect.

If the state institutions reproduce the capitalist social order, CMB is probably the most eligible one for such reproduction. It was established in the 1980's that Turkey's neo-liberal turn gained impetus and market oriented reforms were initiated to eliminate the etatist institutionalization on the economic realm. Such a turn involved the praise of efficiency as the core criteria for the state's performance; a criteria that involves the restriction of social expenses along with a significant increase in profits. In this context, the core duties of the CMB were established as to regulate and to supervise the capital markets for their efficient functioning, which are vital tasks for capital accumulation as well as the regulation of the competition among capitalists. In the definition of the CMB's duties it is clearly stated that 'CMB is responsible for protecting the rights of the investors', which can be identified with interests of the capitalist class. Another crucial task involves sustaining the conformity of the Turkish capital markets with the international norms and developments that underpins the CMB's responsibility in structural adjustment to world capitalism. Consequently, the perception of an inefficient state as the major obstacle for society is not so surprising in such an organizational context.

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In this sense, one might argue that the logic of this cluster transcends a mere technocratic desire for power because it also justifies the capitalist state by postulating efficiency as the ultimate aspect of the state in its relationship with society. Technocrats might privilege their own interests independently from the functional requirements of capitalism; however, technocracy maintains the capitalist order through bypassing or repressing the representative institutions in society. While doing so, the technocratic ideology legitimates its power by obscuring its class function behind the claims to serve the demands of technical necessity or efficiency, constituting the sole criteria of organizational decisions. In addition, the state has to deal with the social costs of capitalist accumulation, which require a considerable level of public service in order to repress the class conflict. This requires an efficient state that can effectively coopt the source of the popular discontent by its welfare budgets. An inefficient state, on the other hand, undermines the assurance of capital accumulation because it is unable to reduce the direct cost of labor. This is one of the reasons why the efficiency of the state regarding its public service aspect is institutionalized as a primary obstacle for society in this mindset. The state's inefficiency, accompanied by its repression ruins the state's legitimacy, which is required for the reproduction of capitalism as well as the interests of the capitalist class. This is evident in this mindset. Accordingly, such commonsense might not originate from a genuine consciousness regarding the capitalist aspect of the state but it mirrors that the Turkish state is incompetent in applying the criteria of profitability to its decisions, thus, to conceal its repressive characteristic by means of its economic performance and welfare budgets.

Yet we discussed the three major meaning clusters that identify the Turkish state and its relationship with society in the CMB's mindset. In this sense the cluster of *secular manifestation* is composed of the concepts that are associated with the Turkish state's modern aspect in common. This cluster points out a state and bureaucracy that dominates the power for the sake of security and assurance concerns, which constitutes the state's modern aspect in this mindset. We argued

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that the cluster of secular manifestation reflects the managerial aspect of the state in the CMB meaning world. The cluster of *transcendental esteem* is composed of the concepts that represent the state's legitimate and traditional aspects, primarily defining the state's role of father. This cluster underpins the patrimonial aspect of the Turkish state. The cluster of *technocratic exaltation* is composed of the state's illegitimate aspects, which associate with the concept of society. This cluster mirrors the interdependent but contradictory logics of the authorization of politics and liberalization of economy that signify the state-society relationship in the Turkish context particularly in the past three decades. We argued that this cluster mirrors the coexistence of the managerial and capitalist aspects of the state, which we conceive as being functional for the reproduction of the technocratic power as well as the capitalist order.

5.4.2. The Meaning Clusters of the MOF

In this section will discuss the meaning clusters evident in the MOF mindset. The vertical icicle, as shown in the table 5.8 below, demonstrates the formation of these clusters, attained by using the Ward's method for the MOF data.

Table 5.8: Vertical Icicle for MOF Data

Vertical Icicle

Number of clusters	7:Justice		12:State		5:Holy		9:Assuranc		8:Order		4:Security		2:Father		13:Society		14:Bureaucr		10:Ineffici		11:Obstacle		3:Tyrant		6:Corrupti		1:Power
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
5	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X
6	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X
7	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X
8	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X		X
9	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X		X
10	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X
11	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X
12	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X	X	X		X
13	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X

Accordingly, three major clusters exist in the MOF meaning world. The first cluster involves the concepts of *bureaucracy*, *society*, and *inefficiency*. The second cluster includes the concepts of *order*, *assurance*, *father*, *security*, *holy*,

state, and *justice*. Finally the third cluster merges the concepts of *tyrant*, *obstacle*, *corruption*, and *power*. Figure 5.14 below visualizes the hierarchical aggregation of the clusters.


```
                    Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine

        C A S E      0      5     10     15     20     25
        Label   Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+

        Order     8   ┐
        Assurance 9   ┘   ┐
        Father    2   ┬──┘ │
        Security  4   ┘          ├────────────────────────┐
        Holy      5   ┬┐    │                             │
        State    12   ┘├──────┘                            │
        Justice   7   ┘                                    │
        Inefficiency 10 ┬┐                                 │
        Bureaucrac14  ┘│                        │          │
        Society  13   ┘                  ├──────┘
        Tyrant    3   ┬─┐               │
        Obstacle 11   ┘ ├──────────────┘
        Power     1   ┬─┘
        Corruption 6  ┘
```

Figure 5.14: Dendrogram of the MOF Data Using Ward's Method

As shown in the figure, in the first cluster, the concepts of *bureaucracy* and *inefficiency* primarily merge with each other. In the next step they combine with the concept of *society*. The second cluster is a populous one, composed of three sub-clusters. The first sub-cluster is composed of *order* and *assurance*. The second sub-cluster is composed of *father* and *security*. In the next step these two sub-clusters combine with each other. In the third sub-cluster primarily the concepts of *holy* and *state* merge with each other, and then they combine with the concept of *justice*. In the final step the first and second sub-clusters merge with the third sub-cluster. Finally, the third cluster is composed of two sub-clusters. In the first sub-cluster the concepts of *tyrant* and *obstacle* associate with each other. The second sub-cluster merges the concepts of *power* and *corruption*. In the final phase these two sub-clusters merge with each other and constitute the third meaning cluster of the MOF data. Figure 5.15 below demonstrates the three

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dimensional meaning space of the MOF as well as the core meaning clusters of this organization. The normalized raw stress score of this solution, measuring the misfit of data, is 0.06 and Tucker's coefficient of congruence that measures the fit is 0.97. These scores indicate a fairly reliable solution.

Figure 5.15: The Meaning Clusters of the MOF Data

The two dimensional presentations of this three dimensional space, as shown in the figures 5.16 and 5.17 below, facilitate to observe the exact location of each concept in this space.

Figure 5.16: Legitimacy and Orientation Taxonomy for the MOF Data

Figure 5.17: Legitimacy and Authority Taxonomy for the MOF Data

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Considering these diagrams, we generated the table below, which summarizes the association of each concept with specific aspects of the state in the MOF mindset. This table demonstrates the content of each concept in the MOF meaning world as well as the common aspects of the meaning clusters.

Table 5.9: Contents of the MOF Meaning Clusters

CLUSTER	CONCEPT	CONTENT
1	**Inefficiency**	Service-Illegitimate
	Bureaucracy	Service-Modern-Illegitimate
	Society	Service-Modern-Legitimate
2	**Order**	Legitimate-Modern-Control
	Assurance	Legitimate-Modern-Service
	Father	Legitimate-Traditional-Control
	Security	Legitimate-Modern-Control
	Holy	Legitimate-Traditional-Service
	Justice	Legitimate-Traditional-Service
	State	Traditional-Service
3	**Tyrant**	Illegitimate-Traditional-Control
	Obstacle	Illegitimate-Traditional-Service
	Power	Illegitimate-Modern-Control
	Corruption	Illegitimate-Modern-Control

As seen in the table 5.9, each concept in the first cluster associates with the state's service aspect in common. The state's duty of serving to the public constitutes the core logic of this cluster. Therefore, we labeled this cluster as the state's *bureaucratic accountability*. The core logic of the second cluster involves the state's legitimate aspects, which directly associate with the concept of state. We assume that this cluster implies the idealization of the state within the framework of the norms that render it legitimate, thus, we labeled it as the cluster of *normative idealization*. Such a label might seem inadequate by considering that idealization involves normativity or *vice versa*, however, within the expressed reasoning above this label makes sense. Accordingly, we use the term normative

idealization as the establishment of the norms of an ideal state in this mindset. Finally, the third cluster has to do with the state's illegitimate aspects. These aspects constitute the basis of an unsettled state-society relationship in the MOF mindset. We labeled this cluster as *moral puritanism* because we assume that this cluster does not merely mirror the criticism of the state but it involves the concerns for the social desirability, thus, legitimacy of the MOF bureaucrats.

5.4.2.1. The Cluster of Bureaucratic Accountability

The cluster of bureaucratic accountability involves the concepts of *bureaucracy*, *society*, and *inefficiency* that are associated with the state's service aspect in common. We think that it is difficult to make a precise reasoning and interpretation about the paradigmatic bias in this cluster because it is a narrow one. In this cluster, primarily the concepts of *bureaucracy* and *inefficiency* merge with each other and form a sub-cluster. Both concepts are associated with the *service* and *illegitimate* aspects of the state. In addition, the concept of bureaucracy has to do with the *modern* aspect of the state. Afterwards, the concept of *society*, which associates with the *service*, *legitimate*, and *modern* aspects of the state, combines with this sub-cluster. We labeled this cluster as bureaucratic accountability because, in our view, these hierarchical combinations point out that; (1) the basis of bureaucratic accountability is identified with an efficient bureaucracy that serves to society, (2) however, the Turkish state's bureaucracy is considered inefficient in serving to society. In this sense, this cluster not only mirrors how the MOF bureaucrats perceive the bureaucracy-society relationship but it also involves a normative concern regarding 'on what grounds this relationship is considered.' In our view, the most interesting issue about this narrow cluster is the perception of the Turkish bureaucracy as an inefficient and delegitimating aspect of the state by its own members. The MOF bureaucrats obviously conceive the bureaucracy in its pejorative meaning, which implies organizational inefficiency.

Utilizing the liberal-pluralist paradigm one might argue that this cluster signifies a crisis of confidence to the Turkish state and its bureaucratic institutions in serving to the public. This crisis is a serious one because even the bureaucrats don't have faith in their organizational domains. In this sense the Turkish bureaucracy is unable to maintain the belief that it is the most appropriate organization in serving to the public. This is probably because of its inability to realize the interests of society, which constitutes the basis of its inefficiency. These interests can be particular such as the economic interests of the specific social groups as well as the common ones such as to maintain social participation to the policy processes. Thus, this cluster simply underpins the unresponsivess and unaccountability of the bureaucracy to the public needs and interests in the Turkish context.

Within the framework of the managerial paradigm one might highly likely argue that the MOF bureaucrats consider the bureaucracy in an instrumentalist and technical understanding. This is the managerial idealization of the bureaucracy; the one that is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency. Thus, the bureaucracy is conceptualized as an efficient and rational means for public service in this mindset. However, within the framework of such Weberian idealization, the MOF bureaucrats conclude that the Turkish bureaucracy is distant from such an ideal because of its inefficiency. Here, efficiency implies "to find arrangements under which experts are best able to exercise their distinctively professional capacities" (Beetham, 1996: 16). Therefore, this cluster manifests the MOF bureaucrats' complaint about finding the eligible conditions for the effective application of their expertise to technical problems. In this sense, the Turkish bureaucracy is considered unresponsive to the requirements of technical complexity.

Nevertheless, for the managerial paradigm the crucial issue has to do with the survival of such an inefficient organization that cannot handle its core duty. This inefficient organization survives because the Turkish bureaucracy turned out to be an end in itself. The perception of bureaucracy by its own members in a pejorative

manner cannot otherwise be explained. The survival of an inefficient bureaucracy signifies its autonomous power and domination in the Turkish context. The bureaucracy cannot be subordinated to the goal-directing and value-determining agencies, or these agencies are inefficient in directing the bureaucracy. This is in fact functional for the bureaucratic elites, who govern the state. These elites do not merely respond to the efficiency requirements of the political and economic markets but they follow their own interests that render the bureaucracy as an irrational and illegitimate state apparatus. Consequently, the perception of an inefficient, thus, irrational bureaucracy by its own members implies that the bureaucracy is a means of elite power rather than a means of rational administration in the Turkish context.

Finally, similar with the managerial logic, the class perspective would probably interpret this cluster as the cause and the consequence of a domination relationship. However, this time the major question would be a different one; efficiency for whom and for whose expense? The most basic activity of society is production for the satisfaction of material needs and efficiency is the key issue for such satisfaction. This cluster clearly signifies the capitalist aspect of the state by implying the importance of an efficient bureaucracy in satisfying the material needs of society. However, efficiency does not mirror the common interests of society but it has to do with particular class interests. Here, efficiency implies to sustain the general conditions of order and property, which are crucial for the interests of the capital. The entrepreneurial profit lies in the accurate and successful supervision of an efficient bureaucracy. Therefore, in the final analysis this cluster implies that the MOF bureaucrats, dealing with the financial administration of the state, perceive an inefficient state in coping with the conditions of capital accumulation. Thus, the Turkish state cannot maintain the conditions for profitability, involving its own finances as well as the national economy, through its bureaucracy.

Although we cannot make a precise judgment about the paradigmatic bias in this cluster, we think that this cluster mirrors the social desirability concerns of the MOF bureaucrats. In our view, this cluster not only reflects the criticism of the bureaucrats about the deficiencies of a structure, which they take part. It also mirrors their concerns for social approval, thus, legitimacy. Such concern derives from their discomfort in being a member of a pejoratively quoted organization. In this sense, what we mean by social desirability is the rhetorical condemnation of the bureaucracy by its own members because of its institutionalized image as a socially undesirable trait of the state.

The Turkish bureaucracy, as we discussed before, gradually lost its social esteem ever since the 1970's. The notion of bureaucracy, implying a prestigious job as well as a source of societal status, turned out to be a pejorative concept that signifies the realm of corruption, cumbersomeness, unaccountability, and inefficiency. Such transformation was reinforced by the prescriptions of the neo-liberal ideology that called for a minimal and efficient state. This ideology cursed the traditional bureaucracy as an undesirable scapegoat and such rhetoric is accompanied by a process of debureaucratization in the Turkish context. Consequently, the notion of bureaucracy is institutionalized as a pejorative aspect of the state.

It is noticeable in this cluster that the MOF bureaucrats exculpate themselves through expressing the bureaucracy as a burden upon society. If the bureaucracy is socially or ideologically undesirable, the desirable manner is to criticize it. In this sense one might externalize the personal responsibility in the inefficiency, and irrationality of an organization, which he/she takes part. In addition, it is possible to create a feeling of self-worth, involving dissociation from the 'others,' which are considered to have genuine accountability in the irrationality of the bureaucracy. Here, it is crucial to emphasize an assumption of the class perspective about the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats create and believe in a self-image about the indispensability of their functions on the behalf of society and

public interest. In the MOF mindset such positive self-image is created ironically through a pejorative commonsense about the bureaucracy itself. To be more specific, such positive self-image involves a 'rhetorical awareness' regarding the inefficiency of the bureaucracy in serving to the public. We will observe the same concern for social desirability in the third cluster of the MOF mindset, thus, we think that such concern is dominant in the meaning world of the MOF bureaucrats.

5.4.2.2. The Cluster of Normative Idealization

The second meaning cluster of the MOF involves the concepts that are associated with state's legitimate aspects in common. This cluster is a populous one, composed of three sub-clusters involving the concepts of *order*, *assurance*, *father*, *security*, *holy*, *justice,* and *state*. In the first sub-cluster, the concept of *order* associates with the concept of *assurance*. This can be interpreted as either the state has to preserve the order for sustaining assurance or it has to sustain assurance for preserving the order. The second sub-cluster is composed of *father* and *security*. In this sense a father figure primarily indicates the maintenance of security by the state. In the next step these two sub-clusters combine with each other, signifying a father figure that maintains security, order, and assurance. In the third sub-cluster primarily the concepts of *holy* and *state* merge with each other, and then they combine with the concept of *justice*. These three concepts associate with the *service* aspect of the state as well as its *legitimacy*. Accordingly, this sub-cluster points out that holy state is a just one in serving to the public. In this sense, the concept of justice has to do with the state's holiness. In the final step the combination of the first and second sub-clusters merge with the third sub-cluster. Consequently, this meaning cluster implies that the holy state is a just one, which protects its population as a father, and maintains the order and assurance. Besides, this is the image of a desirable and legitimate state in the MOF mindset. Such an idealization might remind the patrimonial aspect of the state but this cluster does not merely involve the traditional aspects of the

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state. It is a combination of the state's modern, traditional, control, and service aspects. Accordingly, this cluster mirrors a combination of the managerial and patrimonial aspects of an ideal state. We labeled this cluster as the cluster of *normative idealization* because, in our view, all of these conceptual relationships are the norms that constitute the image of an ideal and trustable state in the MOF meaning world. Given that these norms render the state legitimate in the MOF mindset, they are also the sources of the state power. In other words, the state is able to force the population to do things, which they do not wish to do by utilizing or maintaining its symbolic image, apparent in this cluster.

The concepts, associated with the legitimate aspect of the state, has to do with the notion of 'what should the state be and what should it do.' In other words, the cluster of normative idealization defines the ideal political authority as well as its relationship with its populace in this mindset. This ideal political authority is a holy, fatherly, just, protective, regulating, and assuring state. These aspects constitute the basis of how the state should act morally in relation to society as well.

In our view, the need for safety and protection constitutes the major concern of this cluster. The underlying fundamental of such concern is 'fear' as an essential component of the social processes; "the ability to inflict physical damage on the other and the vulnerability to physical damage from others" (Popitz cited in Poggi, 2001: 31). The legitimate state is the one that successfully eliminates the insecurity of its populace. Therefore, fear is the core issue that institutionalizes the norms of the adequate state conduct, which in return enhances the state's legitimacy and power. Accordingly, what renders the state legitimate in the MOF meaning world is the need for physical and moral well being through the maintenance of security, order, assurance, and justice by the state.

Here, the cluster of normative idealization also indicates the dialectical relationship between fear and power; "political power arises as a remedy to fear

but works by awakening fear" (Poggi, 2001: 31). In this cluster the legitimate aspects of the state constitute the remedy to fear and in the third cluster, as we will elaborate later, it is possible to observe how the same state works by awakening fear. The individuals can counter insecurity by developing a sense of trust in the solidity and validity of an intrinsically artificial mode of existence (ibid.). The cluster of normative idealization mirrors such sense of trust by combining the *metaphysical* aspects of the state with its *worldly* aspects. In other words, it reveals the belief in this mindset regarding the validity of a half-metaphysical and half-concrete entity, conceived as a legitimate state. Such artificial body is considered the remedy for the insecurity of the populace.

In the cluster of normative idealization, as mentioned before, the legitimate-traditional aspects of the state (father, holy, justice) associate with its legitimate-modern aspects (order, assurance, security), within a concern for safety and protection. Besides, the state itself is viewed as a traditional entity. Therefore, the notion of a legitimate state is stuck in between the traditional and the modern. Accordingly, in the MOF mindset, the legitimacy of the state is not merely a legal-rational issue but it derives from traditionalism as well. In this sense the cluster of normative idealization also mirrors the irony of the Turkish modernization; to achieve the new by preserving the old. Considering the dynamics of the Turkish context, we evaluate this cluster as the evidence of the prevailing societal respect to the divinity, omnipotence, and supremacy of a guardian state; a holy, fatherly, and just one that is materialized on the grounds of assurance, security, and order. The basis of such respect is the fear that engenders the need for order, safety, and certainty as well as the will of obedience to the state's power. In this sense, this cluster involves the cultural codes that constitute the criteria of societal obedience to the state, thus, it reflects the basis of hegemonic relationship between the state and society in the meaning word of the MOF bureaucrats.

5.4.2.3. The Cluster of Moral Puritanism

The third meaning cluster of the MOF, likewise the CMB's cluster of technocratic exaltation, reflects the demystification of the state. In this cluster each concept associates with the illegitimate aspects of the state in common. This cluster is composed of two sub-clusters. In the first cluster the concepts of *tyrant* and *obstacle* merge with each other. Both associate with the *illegitimate* and *traditional* aspects of the state. Nevertheless, the former associates with the state's *control* aspect, while the latter is related with its *service* aspect. In our view, these relationalities point out the notion of a traditionally tyrannical and dominant state that had always been an obstacle in serving to society. The second sub-cluster involves the concepts of power and corruption, which are associated with the state's illegitimate, modern, and control aspects. This implies that the state exercises its authority for social control in a corrupted way, which renders the state a concrete but negative entity in this mindset. In the final phase these two sub-clusters merge with each other. Consequently, the illegitimate aspect of the Turkish state implies a traditionally tyrannical state and its corrupted power as an obstacle against society. Within this framework, we think that the subject matter of this cluster is the domination of the state, thus its political power. Likewise the CMB mindset, there exists a scapegoat related with the state's illegitimate aspects. However, this time the scapegoat is not society, but the state's power. In this sense, we argue that this cluster is related with the managerial aspect of the state because it manifests a dominant and tyrannical state as an obstacle against society. This cluster exhibits the Turkish state's illegitimate aspects in exercising its authority for sustaining control. These aspects restrain the state from being a public-serving entity. Within the managerial perspective, this cluster mirrors the Turkish state's autonomy in transforming its own preferences into authoritative actions.

The Turkish context, as discussed in the third chapter, involves a strong state tradition and an authoritarian view of administration. A strong and centralized

state authority as well as its tutelary control over society prevails ever since the Ottoman times. Accordingly, it is quiet reasonable that the image of a 'tyrannical state as an obstacle against society' associates with the *traditional* aspect of the state in the MOF mindset. On the other hand, the contemporary state's exercise of power in sustaining social control is considered corrupted. It can be argued that this notion is reinforced ever since the 1990's, in which society closely witnessed the exercise of the state power in a corrupted and unlawful manner for the sake of 'internal security' and 'national unity' concerns. The phrase of 'deep state' emerged during that period, implying the corrupted network between the politicians, mafia, bureaucrats, and security officers. The emergence and diffusion of these corrupted relationships exhibited the dark side of the state power, which is not subject to democratic control. Therefore the 'purification' of the state and its institutions from the tyrannical, arbitrary, and unlawful practices, and the reestablishment of the state's legitimacy constituted the crucial concerns of the contemporary period. Accordingly, this cluster can be considered the complementary part of a vicious circle in the MOF mindset; 'political power arises as a remedy to fear but *works by awakening fear.*' The tutelary state, which was idealized as a remedy against fear in the previous cluster, can itself be a source of fear as it is apparent in this cluster. Thus, the state's corrupted and tyrannical power can be either the cause or the outcome of the guardian state notion. This is the main paradox –the contradictory logic- in the meaning world of the MOF.

We labeled this cluster as *moral puritanism* because we think that this cluster goes beyond a mere perception and critique of the state's corrupted power and tyranny. In our view, this cluster does not mirror a *genuine* concern for opposition against such power, but it implies a *politicized morality* against the 'socially undesirable.' This cluster might be interpreted in itself as the evidence of consciousness about the state's tyrannical aspect and corrupted power in the Turkish context. However, the meaning world of the MOF does not mirror a will about the transformation of

such corrupted power structure. In this sense such awareness can be interpreted merely as a 'rhetorical opposition' against the status quo.

Quiet naturally a sense of genuine transformation in the 'corrupted' power structure cannot be expected from a mindset that associates the notion of *order* primarily with *assurance*. No power structure can be transformed without changing the imperatives of the order, thus, endangering the 'assurance' of the 'assured' ones. Consequently, we consider the essence of this cluster in terms of a *politicized moral* concern for *purification* from the state's corrupted power, which the bureaucracy constitutes a significant part of it. Accordingly, the basic concern has to do with the need for social approval;

> *The self-image of the elite is partly a psychological state that affects the members of the elite as individuals; the elite's acceptance by the society concerns its actions, its behavior, its role, which are judged by those who do not belong to it. The task of the elite is therefore a difficult one, for it needs to reconcile two goals that are seemingly irreconcilable: to believe in itself—to have, in other words, the kind of self-image that is required of a leadership group —it must embrace norms that run counter to those that govern the society; to fulfill, at least minimally, what the society expects of it, it must act in accordance not with the norms that govern its image but with those that govern the society. The more successful the elite is in transferring the key elements of its self-image to the society, the greater will be its chance for endurance (Suleiman, 1978: 127).*

In our view, unfortunately, the legitimacy concerns of the MOF merely manifest itself in a rhetorical opposition. What we mean by rhetorical opposition is the absence of a genuine opposition culture, which would restrict the 'absolute power' of the state and give voice to alternatives. In this meaning world the MOF bureaucrats, on the one hand, criticize the state's dominant power, on the other hand, they legitimate a tutelary state. In fact, such a paradox reinforces their anti-political stances; the system is inaccurate but unchangeable; the state is tyrant but the subjects must be obedient, *etc*. Since 'nothing can be done' against these transcendent problems, the salvation is associated with the emergence of a metaphysical savior as it was portrayed in the cluster of normative idealization.

As a result, expectations are oriented towards a change in the locus but not the content of power. The 'savior' should be the new despotic center of power instead of the one who would transform the despotic power structure. Thus, the 'rhetorical opposition' cannot attain its autonomy by developing its own tools that would generate alternatives against the 'undesirable.' It is restricted with the notion of replacing the 'irresponsible and unjust father' by a 'responsible and just one,' which reproduces the same power structure.

In this section we discussed the three major meaning clusters that identify the Turkish state and its relationship with society in the MOF mindset. The first cluster of *bureaucratic accountability* was composed of the concepts that are commonly associated with the Turkish state's exercise of authority for public service. This cluster pointed out an inefficient bureaucracy in serving to the public as well as constituting the basis of bureaucracy-society relationship upon efficiency. Thus, the core of bureaucratic accountability was associated with efficiency. We argued that it is hard to make a precise judgment about the paradigmatic bias in this cluster but it involves a concern for the social desirability of the bureaucrats. The cluster of *normative idealization* was composed of the concepts that are associated with the state's legitimate aspects. This cluster implied a holy and just state that protects its citizens as a father and maintains the order and assurance. We argued that such image constitutes the state's basis of power as well as demonstrating 'what should the state be and what should it do?' in the mindsets of the MOF bureaucrats. We also argued that this cluster mirrors the patrimonial as well as the managerial aspects of the Turkish state by underpinning the state's tutelary characteristic. Finally, the cluster of *moral puritanism* was composed of the state's pejorative aspects, which associate with the state's power and domination. We argued that this cluster also reflects the state's managerial aspect; a dominant state as an obstacle against society. However, we emphasized that the critical characteristic of this cluster involves a politicized morality, which the bureaucrats have no genuine interest in the transformation of such dominant and corrupted power.

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5.4.3. The Meaning Clusters of the TMA

In this section we will discuss the meaning clusters manifested in the meaning world of the TMA. The vertical icicle, as shown in the table 5.10 below, demonstrates the formation of these clusters, attained by using the Ward's method for the TMA data.

Table 5.10: Vertical Icicle for the TMA Data

Vertical Icicle

Case

Number of clusters	10:Inefficiency		14:Bureaucr		6:Corrupti		11:Obstacle		3:Tyrant		13:Society		7:Justice		12:State		5:Holy		4:Security		2:Father		9:Assuranc		8:Order		1:Power
1	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
2	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
3	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
4	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
5	X	X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
6	X	X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
7	X	X	X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X
8	X	X	X		X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X
9	X	X	X		X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X
10	X	X	X		X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X
11	X	X	X		X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X
12	X		X		X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X
13	X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X		X	X	X		X		X		X

Accordingly, there are three major clusters in the TMA data. The first cluster involves the concepts of *father*, *security*, *order*, *assurance*, and *power*. The second cluster involves the concepts of *holy*, *state*, *justice*, and *society*. The third cluster associates the concepts of *tyrant*, *obstacle*, *corruption*, *bureaucracy,* and *inefficiency*. The figure 5.18 below visualizes the hierarchical aggregation of the clusters;

Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine

```
C A S E      0     5    10    15    20    25
Label   Num  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+

Father    2  ┐
Security  4  ┘ ┐
Order     8  ┐ │
Assurance 9  ┘ │
Power     1    ┘
Holy      5  ┐
State    12  ┘
Justice   7  ┐
Society  13  ┘
Tyrant    3  ┐
Obstacle 11  ┘
Corruption 6 ┐
Bureaucrac14 ┘
Inefficiency10 ┘
```

Figure 5.18: Dendrogram of the TMA Data Using Ward's Method

As shown in the figure, the first cluster is composed of two sub-clusters. In the first sub-cluster the concepts of *father* and *security* merge with each other. In the second sub-cluster primarily the concepts of *order* and *assurance* merge with each other and then they merge with the concept of *power*. The second cluster is composed of two sub-clusters as well. The first sub-cluster involves the concepts of *holy*, and *state*. The second sub-cluster involves the concepts of *justice*, and *society*. In the final step these two sub-clusters merge with each other. Finally, the third cluster, likewise the first two clusters, involves two sub-clusters. In the first sub-cluster the concepts of *tyrant* and *obstacle* merge with each other. In the second sub-cluster primarily the concepts of *corruption* and *bureaucracy* combine with each other, and afterwards they merge with the concept of *inefficiency*. Figure 5.19 below demonstrates the three dimensional meaning space of the TMA. The normalized raw stress score of this solution, measuring the misfit of data, is 0,059, and Tucker's coefficient of congruence that measures the fit is 0,97. These scores indicate a fairly reliable solution.

Figure 5.19: The Meaning Clusters of the TMA Data

The two dimensional presentations of this three dimensional space, as shown in the figures 5.20 and 5.21 below, facilitates to observe the exact location of each concept in this space.

Figure 5.20: Legitimacy and Orientation Taxonomy for the TMA Data

Figure 5.21: Legitimacy and Authority Taxonomy for the TMA Data

Considering these diagrams, we generated the table 5.11 below, which summarizes the association of each concept with specific aspects of the state in the TMA mindset. This table demonstrates the content of each concept in the TMA meaning world as well as the common aspects of the meaning clusters;

Table 5.11: Contents of the TMA Meaning Clusters

CLUSTER	CONCEPT	CONTENT
1	Father	Control-Legitimate-Traditional
	Security	Control-Legitimate-Traditional
	Order	Control-Legitimate-Modern
	Assurance	Control-Legitimate-Modern
	Power	Control-Illegitimate-Modern
2	Holy	Service-Legitimate-Traditional
	State	Service-Traditional
	Justice	Service-Legitimate-Modern
	Society	Service-Legitimate-Modern
3	Tyrant	Illegitimate-Traditional-Control
	Obstacle	Illegitimate-Traditional-Service
	Corruption	Illegitimate-Control
	Bureaucracy	Illegitimate-Modern-Control
	Inefficiency	Illegitimate-Modern-Service

As seen in the table 5.11, each concept in the first meaning cluster associates with the state's *control* aspect in common. In addition, except the concept of power, each concept associates with the state's *legitimate* aspect. We labeled this cluster as *authoritarian legitimacy* simply because it mirrors the notion of an authoritarian and legitimate the state in the mindset of the military officers. In the second cluster each concept associates with the state's *service* aspect in common. Except the concept of state, each concept also associates with the state's *legitimate* aspect. We labeled this cluster as *social liability* because, in our view, this cluster mirrors the officers' perception about the state's core social duty, which would render it legitimate as well as a respectful entity in the public's view. Finally, in the third cluster, each concept associates with the state's *illegitimate* aspects. We labeled this cluster as *divine guardianism* because we think that this cluster reflects the military suspicion regarding the civilian realm that has to be closely controlled. Now, we will discuss these meaning clusters respectively.

5.4.3.1. The Cluster of Authoritarian Legitimacy

The cluster of authoritarian legitimacy involves the concepts of *father*, *security*, *order*, *assurance*, and *power* that are associated with the state's *control* aspect in common. Each concepts also associates with the state's *legitimate* aspect except the concept of *power*, which is considered an *illegitimate* aspect of the state. The cluster of authoritarian legitimacy involves two sub-clusters. The first sub-cluster is composed of the concepts of *father* and *security*. These two concepts also associate with the state's *traditional* aspects. This can be interpreted as the state's traditional role of father implies the maintenance of security in this mindset. In the second sub-cluster primarily the concepts of *order* and *assurance* merge with each other, and then they merge with the concept of *power*. These three concepts are also associated with the state's *modern* aspect. This sub-cluster can be interpreted as the modern state has to sustain the order and assurance through exercising its power for social control, even if such power is exercised in an illegitimate way. To sum up, this cluster portrays the image of an authoritarian state that sustains order and assurance through exercising its authority for social control and secures its population like a father does. This is clearly a managerial sensemaking that privileges the managerial aspect of the state. Besides, we think that each cluster in this mindset would highly likely reflect the managerial aspect of the state as well as the conceptualization of the state-society relationship within a managerial worldview. Cohen (cited in Poggi, 2001: 193) claims that;

> *Military service means participation in a total institution, an institution that can control every minute of a man's working hours and every facet of his behavior. This total institution differs greatly from normal liberal-democratic society. Whereas such a society tolerates diversity of dress and behavior, the armed forces must insist on uniformity of both. Whereas society frowns upon or prohibits violence and killing, a military organization must prepare men for them. Whereas free societies tell their members that one citizen is the equal of any other, the military must insist on rank, order, and deference.*

Accordingly, it can be considered that the TMA socializes its members into a managerial worldview; a worldview that privileges the power and domination of the state as the core aspects of the state's legitimacy. This does not mean that the military institution is completely autonomous from the dynamics of the capitalist world order. However, in our view, it would be more accurate to interpret the meaning world of the TMA by using the imperatives of the managerial paradigm, considering the considerable autonomy of the military within the Turkish context that we discussed in the third chapter.

The cluster of authoritarian legitimacy combines the state's legitimate, traditional, and modern aspects that are functional in the exercise of its authority for control. Within the framework of this cluster, the officers conceive the notion of power in the state's capacity to dominate. However, the state's power in itself is considered an illegitimate aspect of the state. Nevertheless, it does not appear in the third cluster, which involves whole illegitimate aspects of the state in this mindset except the power. In this sense, the exercise of state power for control is considered *sine qua non* for the security concerns, even though such power is conceived as individually illegitimate.

Consistent with the managerial paradigm, this cluster mirrors an authoritarian understanding about the duty of the state in the maintenance of territorial and social control. Such security-oriented conceptualization reinforces the need for sustaining a stable control upon society because all of these concepts associate with the control aspect of the state in common. Given that the military is the predominant part of the state mechanism in maintaining control and protection; we conceive this cluster as an institutionalized meaning pattern that justifies the military control upon society. On the other hand, it is also functional in identifying the societal interest with the interest of the military regarding the maintenance of the security, order, and assurance. Besides, it can be argued that in this meaning cluster the protective father figure implies the military itself because

the military is the major institution responsible from the security of the state and society.

The security-oriented state notion constitutes the basis of military desire for autonomy and control that requires a distinctive institutional realm. "In a given society social life may go on as if war were not a possibility, only if in a specialized part of that society all of social life goes on all the time as if war were an impeding possibility, a continuous threat" (Poggi, 2001: 189). Accordingly, this cluster also mirrors the military concern about the permanence of threats, which in return justifies the autonomy and power of the military institution. Thus, the cluster of authoritarian legitimacy, reflecting the belief in the necessity of being alerted against a possible threat, constitutes the basis of military reasoning in the need for an institutional autonomy, which dissociates military from the rest of society. It is the basic meaning pattern that justifies the military's self-assigned duty of redefining, transforming, and reconstructing the order by forming subjects consent to that order. Such proposition especially makes sense considering the Turkish context, in which the military is not the instrument of political power but the political power itself, guided by the Kemalist principles.

In the Turkish context, as we discussed in the third chapter, the military commonsense involves a notion of genuine guardianship, implying the protection of national interests such as national unity and Kemalist principles. The officers are very sensitive about national and territorial integration in which no hostile, oppositional forces or particularistic interests could exist. The power and interests of the state is the major issue, which the democratic rights can be trimmed for the maintenance or reestablishment of such power. The erosion in the state authority and control is unacceptable since it implies a weak and illegitimate state in the military meaning world. A good example of such conceptualization is the statement made by the chief of the general staff Kenan Evren, after the 1980 coup'detat;

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We do not have the right to put the state into a powerless and inactive position. The state cannot be turned into a helpless institution to be governed by private associations…The state in question protects the individual. This state, too, has a will and sovereignty of its own. Individual freedoms can be protected to the extent that the will and the sovereignty of the state are maintained. If the will and the sovereignty of the state are undermined, then the only entity that can safeguard individual freedoms has withered away (cited in Heper, 1985: 131).

This statement underpins the identification of societal interests with the state interests as well as the primacy of the state's managerial aspect against its democratic aspect. The underlying fundamental of such statement is the 'security-first state' notion, which equates the state's legitimacy with its power and domination. This 'equation' is evident in the cluster of authoritarian legitimacy. Besides, the cluster of authoritarian legitimacy reminds us a specific imperative of the Kemalist ideology. As discussed in the third chapter, paternalism was one of the strategies of Kemalism in nationalizing society. Such process utilized and reproduced the traditional notion of a fatherly and protective state. It is possible to observe such paternalist notion in this mindset; the fatherly state is the one that sustains security, order, and assurance through exercising its authority for social control.

In our view, there is a significant notion of common good in this mindset. Through this notion the officers are able to identify the interests of the state and society. The cluster of authoritarian legitimacy constitutes the first component of this common good notion by defining the control aspect of the state. It underpins the cruciality of social control for the sake of common good. The second component has to do with the *social liability* of the Turkish state. This constitutes the core logic of the second meaning cluster, involving the *legitimate* and *service* aspects of the state.

5.4.3.2. The Cluster of Social Liability

The cluster of social liability involves the concepts of *holy*, *state*, *justice*, and *society* that are associated with the state's *service* aspect in common. Each concept also associates with the state's *legitimate* aspect except the concept of *state*. This cluster involves two sub-clusters. In the first sub-cluster the concepts of *holy* and *state* merge with each other. In this sense the state itself is conceived as a traditional and holy entity, and its holiness has to do with public service. The second sub-cluster associates the concepts of *justice* and *society*, which are related with the state's *service*, *legitimate*, and *modern* aspects. This cluster implies that the state's core duty in public service is considered to maintain justice. In our organizational sampling the concept of justice directly associates with society merely in the meaning world of the military. In the final step these two sub-clusters merge with each other. Consequently, the cluster of social liability reveals the image of a legitimate and holy state that serves to public by sustaining justice. In other words, the holiness of the state has to do with its public service aspect and the core of this aspect is the maintenance of justice.

In our view, the central tenet of this cluster is the irony of the traditional and the modern because the maintenance of a secular issue (justice for society) has to do with the traditional and divine characteristic of the state (holiness, implying the will of god). If a state that serves to society by maintaining justice is considered a holy entity, such consideration, on the other hand, underpins the inability of the justice mechanism in limiting this divine entity. To simply put, a *holy* entity that grants *worldly justice* cannot be the subject of it. The justice granted by a holy state cannot constitute the legitimate limits of the state action. Thus, in this mindset, the state's duty of serving to society does not render the state a genuine servant of society but controversially a spiritual master above society.

The cluster of social liability reminds us one of the major principles of military education, stated in the Military Academies Law; 'trainees are provided to acquire

a sense of commitment to the prevalence of a secular and social state of law.' Thus, the academy education can be considered highly effective in indoctrinating a sense of commitment to the state of law and justice. The first military announcement after the 1960 coup d'etat is a good example that mirrors the substance of this meaning cluster; "the state, which has to execute the laws, justice, morality and public interest, for months and even for years, turned out to be a materialistic power that represents the class interests, personal passions and power" (cited in Göle, 2004: 108). In this sense, the state is conceived as a *non-materialistic* source of power since the *materialization* of the state ruins its legitimate image as the executor of justice above all particularistic interests. Accordingly, a just state is not the one that articulates the divergent demands but it is the one, oriented towards the attainment of common interest, which is determined above society. If the institutions of the state undermine the state's social liability in sustaining justice, the military is able to intervene to politics in order to reestablish the authority and 'holiness' of the state. Thus, what we have is a solidaristic understanding of justice, which is primarily functional in sustaining unity both within society as well as between the state and society. Therefore, the notion of justice does not involve the articulation of divergent demands in the policy processes but the orientation of society towards a privileged common good, defined by the 'eligible and capable' state elites. This common good constitutes the limits of justice maintained by the holy state.

The official limits of justice are the Kemalist norms and the indivisible integrity of the nation, and any issue that transcends these limits can be exempted from the realm of justice. Such proposition seems quite reasonable considering the significant institutional autonomy of military in the Turkish context. The institutional autonomy of the military, as mentioned in the third chapter, implies the ability to go above and beyond the *constitutional* authority of elected governments. Thus, on account of the *holy* state's own interests guarded by the military, it is possible to undermine the *justice* as it was recently observed in Semdinli case, which two noncommissioned officers involved to the bombing of a

bookstore. The latent and illegitimate structure of the deep state, involving security officers, demonstrates that justice is not the primary criterion that sustains the legitimacy of the political power. The core criterion, as we observed in the first cluster, is the maintenance of security and solidarity, which any kind of erosion in the state's power is absolutely unacceptable in comparison with the erosion in justice. Consequently, the 'holiness' of the state is superior to the 'concreteness' of justice. The latter is subjected to the former within the framework of a manipulative common good notion, internalized by the military.

To sum up, this cluster reveals the foundation of the Turkish state's social liability in the mindsets of the officers. However, in the final analysis, such liability does not underpin an understanding of a modern state; on the contrary, it renders the state as a metaphysical entity above society. In addition, considering the role of the military in the Turkish context, such liability had always been subordinated to the concerns of security, order, and a manipulative notion of common good. Thus, we think that the social liability of the Turkish state is secondary to its liability of control in this mindset. The third meaning cluster of the TMA renders this argument more robust because it reveals the insecurity of the officers against the civil institutions of the state. Such insecurity manifested itself in various military interventions to politics, which the military appeared as the executor of justice by sidestepping the civil institutions of the state for the sake of security and order.

5.4.3.3. The Cluster of Divine Guardianism

The third meaning cluster of the TMA involves the concepts of *tyrant*, *obstacle*, *corruption*, *bureaucracy*, and *inefficiency*, which are associated with the state's *illegitimate* aspect in common. This cluster is composed of two sub-clusters. In the first sub-cluster the concepts of *tyrant* and *obstacle* merge with each other. Such combination and the contents of these two concepts are exactly the same with the MOF data. Thus, similar with the MOF data, this sub-cluster implies a traditionally tyrannical and dominant state that had always been an obstacle in

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serving to society. In the second sub-cluster primarily the concepts of *bureaucracy* and *corruption* merge with each other. Both concepts are associated with the state's *control* aspect as well as its *illegitimate* aspect. In the next step they associate with the concept of *inefficiency* that has to do with the state's *service* aspect. This sub-cluster mirrors that the bureaucracy is primarily conceived as a tool for social control; a tool that cannot execute its core duty because it is corrupted. Additionally, the major inadequacy of the state in serving to the public is associated with its bureaucracy. Consequently, the cluster of divine guardianism underpins the notion that the tyrannical and obstructive aspects of the Turkish state have to do with a corrupted and inefficient bureaucracy.

This cluster reflects the demystification of the Turkish state as well as involving the subject matter of such demystification likewise the third clusters of the CMB and the MOF. This time, the scapegoat is the state's *bureaucracy,* which constitutes the source of the state's illegitimate aspects. In our view, the foundation of this meaning cluster has to do with the insecurity of the military against the civil realm, which the notion of bureaucracy implies a pejorative type of state organization, belonging to such suspicious realm. Thus, the military bureaucrats do not consider themselves as a part of the state's bureaucracy. We argue that this cluster has to do with an institutionalized belief regarding the self-assigned role of the military about being the genuine guardian of the state and the republic above all other institutions. Accordingly, we labeled this cluster as *divine guardianism*; a cluster that mirrors the military mistrust against the civil realm as well as constituting the rationale of the military desire for autonomy.

> *The political role of the army as either the defender of the status quo or an agent of change which is organized around a specific transformative ideology is justified by its self assigned historic mission as the ultimate guardian of the regime, an idea shared by the general population and civilian political elites. Although the idea of military guardianship has always been an integral part of Turkish socialization transmitted in schools and society, no legitimacy has historically existed for a permanent military rule (Cizre, 2000: 26).*

In this cluster the bureaucracy is conceived as a tool for social control. Such perception reminds us a traditional notion that constituted the basis of the alliance between the civil and military bureaucracy. This notion involved a policy initiating bureaucracy rather than a policy implementing one, which the former implied to command society rather than serving to it. In this sense such traditional notion prevails in the mindsets of the officers, idealizing the bureaucracy as a rational guide for society, which would decide for the common good. Accordingly, it can be argued that this mindset mirrors a traditional desire for an authoritarian and dominant bureaucracy that commands and controls society in the light of the official ideology of Kemalism. However, the Turkish bureaucracy is considered far from such an ideal primarily because of its corruption that prevents an adequate social control, and secondarily, because of its inefficiency in serving to society. Consequently the bureaucracy associates with the state's tyrannical and obstructive aspects in this mindset. It is the scapegoat that spoils the state's relationship with society.

The military, as mentioned in the third chapter, conceives the Turkish bureaucracy as too insufficient and clumsy to guide society and to resolve socio-economic problems. The civil bureaucrats did not command the respect of the post-1970 military more than ever and the 'old ally' bureaucracy implied the domain of instability, corruption, imprudence, clumsiness, populism and irresponsiveness for the officers. On the other hand, such pejorative conceptualization also involved an ideological aspect since Kemalism relatively lost its unitary function between the civil and the military bureaucracy, which reinforced the suspicion of the latter about the former.

However, such suspicion cannot merely be considered the outcome of a 'dysfunctional bureaucracy that turned out to be the playground of the irresponsive and disloyal politicians' but it involves a strategic aspect as well. This strategy has to do with the military's desire for autonomy. If the state's bureaucracy is a source of corruption and inefficiency, which is unable to control

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and serve society then there is only one institution left for the adequate exercise of the state authority; the military itself. In this sense, the cluster of divine guardianism also mirrors the rationale for the power, autonomy, and the role of the military in the Turkish politics.

> *Military elites often feel on all these counts that the holders of political power have largely lost contact with the ultimate issues of political life. They work for party rather than country; they operate chiefly through words; they waste time; they have no commitment to authentic, abiding political interests, no taste for the prime political resource, organized violence, no sense of its significance or understanding of its requirements. Thus, military leaders often see their mission as guarding and asserting the forgotten, unwelcome truth about politics and statesmanship, and perform that mission in various ways....Sometimes the military elites conspire among themselves to induce the appropriate state organs to make favorable legislative or budgetary responses to their claims, or to circumvent unfavorable ones. On other occasions, they go over the brink and challenge their constitutional subordination to civilian personnel, proclaiming that it jeopardizes supreme political interests of which only military elites are aware and to which that personnel is regrettably blind (Poggi, 2001: 197-8).*

To sum up, the cluster of divine guardianism reflects the military mistrust against the civil bureaucracy, thus, the military's institutionalized insecurity against the non-military institutions of the state. However, such mistrust is also functional for the enhancement of the military power and autonomy in the Turkish politics. Thus, we conceive this cluster as both the cause and the consequence of a specific notion about the Turkish military; the most patriotic, valuable, and reliable institution of the state in the Turkish context. It is the cause because, by emphasizing the dysfunctionality of the civil state institutions, it justifies that there is a gap in the state mechanism. This gap is filled by the military as the 'most trusted institution in the Turkish context' (Kalaycıoğlu, 1995). It is the consequence because such taken for grantedness about the dysfunctionality of the civil institutions reproduces the belief in the unreliability of the civil domination in politics. Ironically, the *illegitimate* aspects of the Turkish state in the cluster of divine guardianism *legitimate* another state institution; the military.

In this section we discussed the three major meaning clusters that identify the Turkish state and its relationship with society in the mindsets of the TMA's graduate students as well as their instructors. The first cluster of *authoritarian legitimacy* is composed of the concepts that are commonly associated with the Turkish state's exercise of authority for social control. This cluster underpinned the image of an authoritarian state as well as mirroring the military concern against the permanence of threats. It constituted the control aspect of the common good notion in the military mindset. The cluster of *social liability* is composed of the concepts that are associated with the state's service aspect in common. Therefore, it constituted the second part of the common good notion that has to do with the state's service aspect in the military mindset. This cluster mirrored the notion of a holy state that 'grants' justice for society. We argued that the officers, in fact, conceive the maintenance of justice as a process that renders the state a metaphysical entity. Thus, the maintenance of justice by the state, which is conceived as a secular notion, on the contrary, rendered the state as an unreachable entity, identified with the will of god in this mindset. Finally, the cluster of *divine guardianism* involved the state's illegitimate aspects. We evaluated this cluster as the evidence of the military insecurity against the civil bureaucracy, which such notion is highly likely functional in the justification of the military desire for autonomy. In the next section we will compare the meaning worlds of the organizations with particular emphasis to their similarities as well as their differences.

5.5. Comparison of the Organizational Meaning Worlds

In this section we will elaborate the variations between the meaning worlds of the three organizations. Accordingly, first, we will focus on the variations in the content of each concept. Second, we will compare the contents and the core logics of the meaning clusters that we discussed above. There are differences as well as the similarities between the conceptualization of each concept among the

organizational meaning worlds. Table 5.12 below demonstrates the association of each concept with specific aspects of the state in the mindset of each organization;

Table 5.12: Comparison of the Concepts

	CMB	MOF	TMA
Assurance	Modern-Legitimate-Service	Modern- Legitimate-Service	Modern-Legitimate-Control
Bureaucracy	Modern-Illegitimate-Service	Modern-Illegitimate-Service	Modern-Illegitimate-Control
Corruption	Illegitimate-Control	Modern-Illegitimate-Control	Illegitimate-Control
Father	Traditional-Legitimate-Control	Traditional-Legitimate-Control	Traditional-Legitimate-Control
Holy	Traditional-Legitimate-Service	Traditional-Legitimate-Service	Traditional-Legitimate-Service
Inefficiency	Illegitimate-Service	Illegitimate-Service	Modern-Illegitimate-Service
Justice	Traditional-Legitimate-Service	Traditional-Legitimate-Service	Modern-Legitimate-Service
Obstacle	Traditional-Illegitimate-Service	Traditional-Illegitimate-Service	Traditional-Illegitimate-Service
Order	Traditional-Legitimate-Control	Modern-Legitimate-Control	Modern-Legitimate-Control
Power	Modern-Illegitimate-Control	Modern-Illegitimate-Control	Modern-Illegitimate-Control
Security	Modern-Legitimate-Control	Modern-Legitimate-Control	Traditional-Legitimate-Control
Society	Service	Modern-Legitimate-Service	Modern-Legitimate-Service
State	Modern	Traditional-Service	Traditional-Service
Tyrant	Traditional-Illegitimate-Control	Traditional-Illegitimate-Control	Traditional-Illegitimate-Control

As seen in the table, five concepts out of fourteen are similarly located in the meaning space of each organization. These concepts are *father*, *holy*, *obstacle*, *power*, and *tyrant*, which associate with the same aspects of the state in each meaning world. Thus, *they are the most commonsensical concepts, essentially conceptualized in the same way by the three organizations*. Political culture, as mentioned in the third chapter, involves a variety of components determined by the historical processes and socio-economic structures, some of which are more central than others in determining the political life and institutions. Hence, we argue that these concepts represent the most central, deeply embedded and powerful structures (read as the rules) in the mindsets of the organizational actors. In other words, they are the most taken for granted roles of the Turkish state in its relationship with the Turkish society. These roles involve the state's holiness, fatherhood, hindrance, tyranny, and power by representing the state's most significantly institutionalized conduct against society.

The construction of role typologies is a necessary correlate of the institutionalization of conduct. Institutions are embodied in individual experience by means of roles. ...All roles represent the institutional order. ...Some roles, however, symbolically represent that order in its totality more than others. ...Historically, roles that symbolically represent the total institutional order have been most commonly located in political and religious institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 72, 76).

Four of these concepts, namely *father*, *holy*, *obstacle*, and *tyrant,* associate with the state's *traditional* aspect in common. Such an association renders our argument regarding the taken for grantedness of these concepts more robust because they are conceived as historically intrinsic characteristics of the Turkish state. Besides, as mentioned in the fourth chapter, if the stabilization of the meaning requires the exercise of power, these five concepts are the most significant ones that can be considered the outcome of an enduring hegemonic relationship between the state and society.

In our view, these five concepts underpin a commonsense regarding the basic role of the Turkish state; a role that mirrors the state's dualistic relationship with society. Accordingly, the state can be either an obstacle or a holy, generous, and conceding entity in serving to society. Likewise, the state can act either as a punitive and suppressive tyrant or it can be a benevolent and protective father while controlling society. However, in the final analysis, the Turkish state exercises its power illegitimately in sustaining control. Such notion has to do with the managerial as well as the patrimonial aspects of the Turkish state because it underpins the state's dominance and transcendent characteristic in administering society. Thus, the state is capable of administering society much like a punitive and obstructive entity or, at times, as a merciful and generous body in the mindsets of the bureaucrats.

Nevertheless, the contents of the nine other concepts slightly differ in the mindsets of the organizations. Interestingly, each concept is perceived in a similar manner at least in two of the three organizations. Accordingly, the CMB and the

MOF associate five concepts out of nine with the same aspects of the state in common. These concepts are *bureaucracy*, *assurance*, *security*, *justice,* and *inefficiency*. As a result, a total of ten concepts out of fourteen are commonsensical for these two organizations. The notions of *bureaucracy* and *assurance* have to do with the *service* aspect of the state in the CMB and the MOF meaning worlds, whereas they are a matter of state *control* for the TMA. Additionally, the notion of *security* is associated with the *modern* aspect of the state by the CMB and the MOF. However, it is considered a *traditional* aspect of the state by the TMA. Thus, the maintenance of security is conceived as a more customary and established duty of the Turkish state in the meaning world of the TMA. On the contrary, the notion of *justice* is associated with the *modern* aspect of the state by the TMA, whereas the CMB and the MOF conceive it as a *traditional* aspect of the state. These relationalities point out that the military bureaucracy conceives the state as a *traditional security provider*, while the civil bureaucracy assumes it as a *traditional justice implementer*. Finally, the concept of *inefficiency* has to do with the *modern* aspect of the state in the TMA meaning world. Hence, the TMA associates the notion of inefficiency with the contemporary state, whereas it is irrelevant with the *orientation* of the state in the CMB and the MOF meaning worlds. In short, *the concepts of bureaucracy, assurance, security, justice, and inefficiency constitute the basis of commonsensical distinction between the civil and the military bureaucracy* in our organizational sampling.

Likewise, a significant distinction prevails between the traditional and the contemporary bureaucratic organizations in our sampling. The MOF and the TMA associate the three concepts out of nine with the same aspects of the state in common; namely the *state*, *society,* and *order*. As a result, a total of eight concepts out of fourteen are commonsensical for the MOF and the TMA. Accordingly, the state itself is conceived as a *traditional* and *serving* entity in the mindsets of these two organizations. The CMB, on the other hand, conceptualizes the state in a relatively simplistic manner since it is merely considered a *modern*

entity, irrelevant with the dimension of authority. Here, we must emphasize a crucial finding; the concept of state itself does not imply a notion of legitimacy or illegitimacy for the entire organizations. Therefore, the legitimacy of the state is contingent upon the state's functions for each organization.

Society is also a more simplistic concept for the CMB, which merely associates with the state's *service* aspect. Controversially, it is a more complicated concept in the meaning worlds of the MOF and the TMA because it associates with the state's *modern* and *legitimate* aspects as well. In our view, the CMB perceives a more detached state-society relationship in terms of public service. In this mindset society is conceived as an entity that has to be served by the state; however the state itself is not a serving entity. On the other hand, the MOF and the TMA share a more advanced and concrete understanding of society that has to do with the modern aspect of the state, which the state attains legitimacy by serving to society. Finally, the notion of *order* implies the *traditional* aspect of the state in the CMB meaning world, while the MOF and the TMA associate it with the *modern* aspect of the state. Here, there is an irony of the modern (CMB) and the traditional organizations (MOF & TMA). Even though the traditional bureaucratic institutions perceive the state as a traditional entity, they associate its duty of sustaining the order with its modernity. Controversially, a relatively contemporary bureaucratic organization perceives the state as a modern entity but it associates the state's duty of sustaining the order with its traditionalism.

Finally, the most significant organizational distinction is the one between the CMB and the TMA. These two organizations associate merely one concept out of nine with the same aspects of the state in common; the *corruption*. Consequently, a total of six concepts out of fourteen are commonsensical for the CMB and the TMA. The concept of *corruption* has nothing to do with the *orientation* of the state in the mindsets of the CMB and the TMA but it associates with the *modern* aspect of the state in the MOF meaning world. Accordingly, the notion of corruption is perceived as a problem of the contemporary Turkish state by the

MOF, whereas it is just a matter of illegitimate state control for the CMB and the TMA.

To sum up, each concept about the state-society relationship manifests significant similarities and dissimilarities between the organizational meaning worlds. Consequently, *the most dissimilar meaning worlds are that of the CMB and the TMA*, which the former represents more contemporary, and civil bureaucracy and the latter represents the traditional military bureaucracy. The ratio of conceptual similarity between these two organizations is 42,9%. On the other hand, *the meaning worlds of the CMB and the MOF are the most similar ones*, which have a conceptual similarity ratio of 71,4%. Finally, the TMA and the MOF meaning worlds indicate a moderate ratio of conceptual similarity as 64,3%. Accordingly, the contents of the concepts that define the state-society relationship are more similar for the civil bureaucratic organizations (CMB & MOF) than the traditional bureaucratic organizations (MOF & TMA). In addition, the MOF is in the middle. Such that, while in certain respects it is similar to the CMB, in totally other respects it is similar to the TMA. The similarities between the MOF and the CMB, as noted earlier, have to do with the concepts of bureaucracy, assurance, security, justice, and inefficiency. On the other hand the similarities between the MOF and the TMA have to do with the concepts of order, society, and state. Therefore, the MOF borrows different notions from the meaning universes of both the CMB and the TMA and it has a unique understanding of merely one concept; corruption.

The source of conceptual distinctions between the organizational meaning worlds primarily has to do with the *orientation* of the Turkish state. Seven concepts, namely corruption, inefficiency, justice, order, security, society, and state, mirror different organizational notions about the state's orientation. Accordingly, there is a lack of consensus among the organizations about the traditional and the modern aspects of the Turkish state. Thus, *the most ambiguous aspect of the Turkish state is its orientation* for our sample bureaucracy. The secondary source of distinction is the state's *authority* that manifests itself in three concepts; namely assurance,

bureaucracy, and state. The dominant organization here is the TMA since it associates two of these concepts with the state's control aspect, which are otherwise conceived by the other two organizations. Finally, the *legitimacy* of the state constitutes the source of organizational differentiation merely in one concept; society. Thus, there is a significant consensus about the legitimate and the illegitimate aspects of the state among the organizations. Accordingly, *the most unambiguous aspect of the Turkish state is its legitimacy* for our sample bureaucracy.

In our view, the ambiguity regarding the orientation of the state has to do with the dualistic characteristic of the Turkish modernization as we discussed before. Such ambiguity mirrors the conceptual complexity deriving from the conjunction of the traditional and the modern in the Turkish context. Thus, the organizations of the same state reflect a conceptual confusion about the traditional and the modern aspects of the state. Accordingly, one might argue that the norms, beliefs, and knowledge about the authority and the legitimacy of the Turkish state are more institutionalized, whereas the modern and traditional aspects of the state mirror an institutional complexity. Therefore, the political actors, even they intend to do so, are highly restricted in transforming the notions about the legitimacy and the authority of the state, while on the other hand the orientation of the state appears as a more manipulative issue.

Yet we discussed the organizational variations in the content of each concept about the state-society relationship. Another crucial issue here is to compare the meaning clusters of each organization. These clusters not only sustain the contextuality of each concept but they identify the dominant aspects of the Turkish state in each organizational meaning world as well. The table 5.13 below demonstrates the meaning clusters of each organization.

CMB			MOF			TMA		
	State	Modern		**Inefficiency**	Service-Illegitimate		**Father**	Control-Legitimate-Traditional
	Bureaucracy	Modern-Illegitimate-Service	1	**Bureaucracy**	Service-Modern-Illegitimate		**Security**	Control-Legitimate-Traditional
1	**Power**	Modern-Illegitimate-Control		**Society**	Service-Modern-Legitimate	1	**Order**	Control-Legitimate-Modern
	Security	Modern-Legitimate-Control		**Order**	Legitimate-Modern-Control		**Assurance**	Control-Legitimate-Modern
	Assurance	Modern-Legitimate-Service		**Assurance**	Legitimate-Modern-Service		**Power**	Control-Illegitimate-Modern
	Order	Traditional-Legitimate-Control		**Father**	Legitimate-Traditional-Control		**Holy**	Service-Legitimate-Traditional
2	**Justice**	Traditional-Legitimate-Service	2	**Security**	Legitimate-Modern-Control	2	**State**	Service-Traditional
	Holy	Traditional-Legitimate-Service		**Holy**	Legitimate-Traditional-Service		**Justice**	Service-Legitimate-Modern
	Father	Traditional-Legitimate-Control		**Justice**	Legitimate-Traditional-Service		**Society**	Service-Legitimate-Modern
	Tyrant	Illegitimate-Traditional-Control		**State**	Traditional-Service		**Tyrant**	Illegitimate-Traditional-Control
	Corruption	Illegitimate-Control		**Tyrant**	Illegitimate-Traditional-Control		**Obstacle**	Illegitimate-Traditional-Service
3	**Inefficiency**	Illegitimate-Service	3	**Obstacle**	Illegitimate-Traditional-Service	3	**Corruption**	Illegitimate-Control
	Obstacle	Illegitimate-Traditional- Service		**Power**	Illegitimate-Modern-Control		**Bureaucracy**	Illegitimate-Modern-Control
	Society	Service		**Corruption**	Illegitimate-Modern-Control		**Inefficiency**	Illegitimate-Modern-Service

The CMB meaning world, as discussed before, involved three major meaning clusters. The first cluster was the *secular manifestation* of the state, which also had to do with the state's *managerial* aspect. This cluster mirrored the image of a modern state in the CMB meaning world. The second cluster, *transcendental esteem*, underpinned the traditional aspects of the state that render it a legitimate, respectful but a metaphysical entity as well. Dominant here was the patrimonial aspect of the state. The third cluster mirrored the notion of *technocratic exaltation*, involving a combination of the managerial and capitalist logics.

These clusters are essentially constituted by the four aspects of the state. These dominant aspects, as shown in the table, have to do with the state's modernity, traditionality, legitimacy, and illegitimacy. Accordingly, the *orientation* and *legitimacy* of the state constitutes the basis of the CMB meaning world about the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. In addition, these two aspects are weighted equally in this meaning world. The orientation of the state is the dominant aspect in the first and second clusters, while the legitimacy of the state is dominant in the second and third clusters. On the other hand, the authority of the state is not a significant factor in the formation of these clusters. Consequently, the representation of the state and its relationship with society primarily has to do with the orientation and legitimacy of the state in the CMB

meaning world. Thus, *in the symbolic universe of the CMB, the state is an entity that predominantly has modern, traditional-legitimate, and illegitimate aspects, which constitute the basis of its relationship with society.*

The three major meaning clusters of the MOF were *bureaucratic accountability, normative idealization, and moral puritanism*. The first cluster portrayed an unaccountable bureaucracy that is unable to serve society. We couldn't make any precise suggestions about the paradigmatic bias in this cluster because it was a narrow one. The second cluster mirrored a legitimate state notion, composed of the state's traditional, modern, service, and control aspects. This cluster had to do with the state's managerial and patrimonial aspects. The core issue of the third cluster was the state's illegitimate power, which the MOF constitutes a significant part of it. Dominant here was the managerial aspect of the state.

The MOF meaning clusters are essentially constituted by the three aspects of the state. These aspects have to do with the state's legitimacy, illegitimacy, and its exercise of authority for public service. Accordingly, the *legitimacy* and *authority* of the state constitutes the basis of the MOF meaning world about the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. However, these two aspects are not weighted equally as it was in the CMB meaning world. The legitimacy of the state is dominant in the second and third clusters, while the authority of the state is dominant merely in the first cluster. Therefore, the legitimacy of the state is the predominant issue in this mindset. On the other hand, the orientation of the state is not a significant factor in the formation of these clusters. Consequently*,* the representation of the state and its relationship with society primarily has to do with the legitimacy and authority of the state in the MOF meaning world. Thus, *in the symbolic universe of the MOF, the state is an entity that predominantly has legitimate, illegitimate, and service aspects, which constitute the basis of its relationship with society.*

Finally, the TMA meaning world involved three major meaning clusters as well. The first cluster was *authoritarian legitimacy,* which underpinned the authoritarian image of the state with respect to the security concerns. The second cluster revealed the notion about the state's *social liability* in the military mindset. The third cluster, *divine guardianism*, mirrored the military insecurity against the civil bureaucracy. We argued that all of these clusters had to do with the managerial aspect of the state considering, in general, the organizational characteristics of the military, and in particular its historical role in the Turkish context.

The TMA meaning clusters are essentially constituted by the three aspects of the state. These aspects have to do with the state's illegitimacy, its exercise of authority for the public service as well as for the public control. Accordingly, the *authority* and *legitimacy* of the state constitutes the basis of the TMA meaning world about the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. Similar to the MOF meaning world, these two aspects are not weighted equally. However, this time the predominant issue is not the state's legitimacy but its authority. The authority of the state is dominant in the first and second clusters, while the legitimacy of the state is dominant in the third cluster. Additionally, analogous with the MOF mindset, the orientation of the state is not a significant factor in the formation of these clusters. Consequently, the representation of the state and its relationship with society primarily has to do with the authority and legitimacy of the state in the TMA meaning world. Thus, *in the symbolic universe of the TMA, the state is an entity that predominantly has control, service, and illegitimate aspects, which constitute the basis of its relationship with society.*

To sum up, the meaning clusters identify the dominant aspects of the Turkish state in each organizational meaning world. These dominant aspects have to do with on what grounds the state-society relationship is represented in the mindsets of the organizations. Accordingly, the state's legitimacy and orientation are the dominant issues in the meaning world of the CMB; the MOF privileges the state's

legitimacy; and finally the authority of the state dominates the meaning world of the TMA.

The orientation of the state is not a major issue in the meaning worlds of the traditional bureaucratic organizations. We argue that the traditional institutions share a more integrated image of the Turkish state in terms of modernity and traditionality. What we mean by integration is the coexistence of the traditional and the modern in the meaning clusters of the traditional institutions. Thus, the orientation of the state in its relationship with society does not constitute a dominant category in the mindsets of these institutions. However, the meaning clusters of the CMB reflect a significant disintegration about the orientation of the state. Therefore, in this mindset, the state-society relationship is conceptualized primarily within the framework of a clear-cut distinction about the state's modern and traditional aspects. Consequently, *the supposedly modern and traditional aspects of the state dissociate in the mindsets of the contemporary organizations while they coexist in the traditional ones.*

In addition, each meaning world involved a meaning cluster that denoted the illegitimacy of the state. In our view, these clusters were the evidence of the *duality of structure* in the mindset of each organization. To be more specific, these clusters highlighted the *constraining* aspects of the Turkish state; a state which on the other hand *enables* society by protecting and caring it. However, the subject matters as well as the core logics of these constraining aspects involved significant differences among the organizations. In our view, these clusters are functional in the reproduction of the organizational ideology of each organization with reference to the state-society relationship. In other words, the bureaucrats make sense about the dysfunctional aspects of the state within the framework of their own organizational ideologies, which such sense making, in return, reinforces the power of these ideologies as well as the *raison d'etre* of the organizations.

The clusters of *technocratic exaltation*, *moral puritanism*, and *divine guardianism* were composed of the illegitimate aspects of the state, involving the state's tyranny, obstructiveness, and corruption in common. However, the subject matter of these illegitimate aspects as well as their priorities varied among the organizations. In example, the CMB considered the state's inefficiency as a major obstacle for society. Here, the tyranny of the state was a secondary problem. Such sensemaking seems quiet reasonable for an organization that deals with the efficiency and effectiveness of the financial markets. We argued that such consideration mirrors the logic of technocratic rationalization as well as a concern for the capitalist aspect of the state. Consequently, the cluster of technocratic exaltation is crucial for the justification of the role and the importance of a technocratic organization, responsible for the healthy functioning of the capitalist processes.

On the other hand, the political power of the state was the core concern of the MOF in the cluster of moral puritanism. Here, the state's exercise of power constituted the subject matter of its illegitimacy. We argued that such consideration had to do with the self-image of the bureaucrats as well as the legitimacy of the MOF. As mentioned before, the more successful the MOF bureaucrats in transferring this self-image to society, the greater will be their chance for endurance. Such self-image underpins a mythos of heroic bureaucrats, who are *aware of* and *purified from* the distorted power of the state, thus, able to exercise their own power in the right way. In addition, the state's legitimacy was the dominant aspect in the meaning world of the MOF. Such sensemaking is quiet reasonable in an organization responsible from the state's budget and its allocation considering the traditional Ottoman understanding of 'no money without the wellbeing of subjects.' Thus, the legitimacy of the state, involving the adequate exercise of state power, constituted the core concern of the MOF, compatible with its organizational ideology.

Finally, the TMA held the civil bureaucracy accountable for the state's illegitimacy in the cluster of divine guardianism. Accordingly, such a corrupted and inefficient structure was not able to handle its core duty of social control adequately, thus, it was the basis of state's tyranny and obstruction. Hence, there is only one institution left to handle the duty of control adequately; the military itself. Consequently, this cluster underpinned the organizational ideology of the TMA by rendering the military as the ultimate organization that safeguards the state, the Kemalist values, and the national unity, which is also officially stated by the Military Academies Law.

As a result, ironically, *the clusters those have to do with the illegitimate aspects of the state mirror a concern for the legitimacy of each state organization*. These concerns involve the efforts to generate and reproduce a self-image about being the right institution, which acknowledges the cause of state's illegitimacy as well as capable of eliminating it. In other words, these meaning clusters enable the institutions to maintain their own distinctive identities. Through these meaning clusters the bureaucratic organizations are able to transform themselves from an expendable instrument for the accomplishment of externally imposed goals to an institution, which is a system with a life of its own. Thus, these clusters especially have to do with the institutionalization of each bureaucratic organization not as a means but as an end in itself. In Weberian terms, they are the cognitive means for goal displacement.

> *They [the bureaucratic organizations] take on a distinctive character; they become prized in and of themselves, not merely for the goods or services they grind out. People build their lives around them, identify with them, become dependent upon them. The process of institutionalization is the process of organic growth (Perrow cited in Mintzberg, 1983: 153).*

Accordingly, the bureaucratic organizations develop and institutionalize their own organizational ideology, which their members share. Thus, these clusters not only mirror the ideologies of the organizations but their members' conformity to these

ideologies as well. Consequently, *the clusters that have to do with the illegitimate aspects of the state are either the cause or the consequence of socialization into the organizational ideologies, which sustain the identification of the bureaucrats with their organizations.* Hence, the bureaucrats acquire an organizational personality distinct from their personality as an individual; an efficiency oriented technocratic expert; a legitimacy oriented symbol of accuracy; or a security and control oriented guardian.

Here, referring to the theory of representative bureaucracy, there is 'plurality' of identities between these bureaucratic organizations. However, such 'plurality' has nothing to do with the democratic aspect of the state that involves the participation of constituencies to the policy processes *via* their representatives in the bureaucracy. It is just the 'plurality' of sense making, which is 'singularly' oriented to maintain the organizational domains of power; a domain which might be directly functional for the reproduction of capitalism or not.

Finally, we will briefly describe the organizational variations regarding how some core concepts are represented within the meaning clusters of the organizations. Accordingly, for the MOF and the TMA the state is essentially a traditional and holy entity that sustains the justice. In the CMB meaning world the state is a modern entity, composed of the bureaucratic organizations, which the state and the bureaucracy both dominate the power. Thus, *the state itself is considered within the framework of its patrimonial aspect in the mindsets of the traditional institutions, while it is considered within the context of its managerial aspect in the mindset of a contemporary organization.*

Additionally, the bureaucracy is considered identical to the state in the CMB mindset; a part of the state's power in terms of serving to the public. In the MOF mindset, the bureaucracy is identical to inefficiency, but it is also closer to society, thus, constitutes the basis of the state's relationship with society. In the TMA meaning world the bureaucracy is identical with corruption, and it is the scapegoat

responsible for the state's tyranny, and inefficiency. Thus, *the bureaucracy itself implies a more pejorative notion for the military bureaucracy; it is considered an inefficient tool dedicated to public service for the traditional-civil bureaucracy; and it is a crucial part of the state power for the modern bureaucracy.*

Furthermore, society is the scapegoat in the CMB mindset. It is the victim of the state's inefficiency as well as its tyranny. Accordingly, we argue that the state-society relationship is primarily conceived in a descriptive-functional manner in this mindset. In the MOF mindset society is an entity that cannot be served by the state because of an inefficient bureaucracy, which in fact have to be the mediator between the state and society. In this sense, the state-society relationship is primarily conceived within a descriptive-functional as well as a normative-functional manner. In the TMA meaning world, society is an entity that has to be equipped with justice sustained by the holy state. This is a normative-functional consideration. Thus, essentially, *the military bureaucracy shares a normative-functional notion regarding the state-society relationship; the MOF mirrors a combination of the normative-functional and descriptive-functional understandings about such relationship, while the CMB reflects a descriptive-functional conception of the state-society relationship.*

Another interesting distinction among the organizations involves the notion about the state's role of father. In the TMA and the MOF mindsets the notion of father is primarily identified with the concept of security. However, in the CMB mindset it is a more complicated notion since it does not directly associate with another concept but with a sub-cluster. Accordingly, for the CMB, the concept of father implies a holy state that sustains justice and order. Thus, *the state's role of father is a more concrete and authoritarian notion for the traditional institutions by implying a security-first state, while for the CMB it signifies a more metaphysical and lenient image of the state.*

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Finally, we will emphasize a crucial finding about the notion of justice. In neither organization the notion of justice directly associates with security or assurance. In our view, such consideration provides a crucial insight regarding the weakness of justice mechanism in the Turkish context. Justice is not perceived as the primary source of security and assurance, however, it attains a divine characteristic by associating with a metaphysical state notion. The notions of security and assurance manifest themselves through an authoritarian understanding in each organization. These concepts directly associate with the state's exercise of power, or its authoritarian father figure. This finding supports our reasoning about the 'rhetorical opposition,' evident in the mindset of each organization. It can be argued that such a mindset is capable of justifying tyranny and corruption of the state by considering these illegitimate aspects as natural consequences of the maintenance of security and assurance. Consequently, *the desire for an authoritarian state undermines justice, which is not conceived as a concrete mechanism for security and assurance, but as a divine issue granted by a holy state*.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The research question of this dissertation was what does the Turkish bureaucracy represent? Such question might stimulate a search for an absolute fact in a deterministic manner. However, the whole point of this dissertation was to demonstrate that there is no such single and absolute answer of this question. The unique characteristics of the political systems as well as the unique premises of specific worldviews render to generate a single answer impossible. Accordingly, the 'answers' regarding this question can be generated by incorporating the assumptions of various paradigms as well as the political dynamics of a certain context. In doing so, one might acknowledge that political representation cannot be reduced to the issue of who represents whom in a supposedly democratic context, which enables the actors to internalize the values of a democratic culture. Such reductionism was the major inadequacy of the theory of representative bureaucracy that ignored the variety of worldviews in considering the issue of representation. The process of representation involves the ruling ideas of the actors, which govern their actions and these ideas can mirror specific worldviews, inherent in their meaning worlds. Besides, the mindsets as well as the actions of the bureaucrats and bureaucratic organizations can be understood and interpreted more effectively by the premises of various paradigms other than liberal-pluralism. Therefore, the core idea of this dissertation implicated that an inquiry on political representation cannot be considered apart from the representation of 'politics' in the mindsets of political actors.

Accordingly, this dissertation took the notion of representation as the ruling ideas that dominate the meaning world of the actors. Representation is a phenomenon related to particular modes of understanding, and communicating, which engender the commonsense of the actors. The issue of representation also has a historical

aspect because it mirrors the meaning world of a collectivity, deriving from an ongoing interaction with some existing social structure. Therefore, in order to understand and interpret the fundamentals of political representation, one might focus on the meaning worlds of the actors; a world which evolved within the historical and cultural imperatives of a specific context. On the other hand, the notion of meaning world must not be considered a monolithic issue in a given context. There might be institutional variations among the meaning worlds of the actors because each organizational actor might acquire a variety of characteristics, mirroring the traditions, functions, or historical processes of their own milieu. Therefore, a comparative perspective would allow the exploration of organizational varieties, mainly originating from the institutional context of each organization. These ideas constituted the essence of this dissertation. Accordingly, we designed a research aimed at to reveal and interpret the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucrats as well as to comprehend the varieties among the meaning worlds of the bureaucratic organizations. The statistical methods of multidimensional scaling and hierarchical cluster analysis were used to reveal the conceptual similarities and differences in the mindsets of the actors regarding a crucial aspect of 'politics'; the state-society relationship.

In this respect, our first finding demonstrated that the normative premises of the liberal-pluralist paradigm fall short to understand and interpret the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucrats. Here, we demonstrated the concepts that associate or dissociate with the norms of the liberal-pluralist paradigm in the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucrats. Consequently, a highly restricted realm was 'paradigmatically harmonious' with the normative imperatives of the liberal-pluralist worldview. Our second finding involved how various state organizations make sense of the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. Such sensemaking mirrored specific similarities as well as differences in the meaning worlds of the bureaucratic organizations. In our view, the primary source of variation had to do with the organizational ideology of each state institution.

Throughout the study, we discovered that there are three major dimensions of thought, which enable the bureaucrats to attribute meaning to the state-society relationship in the Turkish context. These dimensions signified the three aspects of the Turkish state. These aspects were the legitimacy of the state, the orientation of the state, and finally the authority of the state. Thus, the concepts regarding the state-society relationship acquired their meanings within the framework of these three major aspects in the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. These three dimensions were common to all organizations in our sampling. Accordingly, we argued that the state's legitimacy, orientation, and authority are the core dimensions of thought that frame the state-society relationship in the meaning world of the Turkish bureaucracy. Such generalization might be inadequate, considering the quantitative limitation of our sampling. However, the significant differences in the organizational characteristics of the sampling guided us to make such generalization.

Furthermore, alongside the major dimensions of thought, we recognized that there is a fourth aspect of the state that can be added on to its democratic, bureaucratic, and capitalist aspects. This aspect is not acknowledged by the three modern theories of the state simply because it had to do with the patrimonial characteristics of the state-society relationship in the Turkish context that did not transform ever since the Ottoman times. Thus, we labeled it as the patrimonial aspect of the state, which was highly significant in the definition of the concepts in the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats. This aspect justified that the 'modern' state maintains its 'traditional' aspects in the mindset of the bureaucrats, which reflects the dualistic characteristic of the Turkish modernization; to establish the new by preserving the old.

The meaning patterns of each organization emerged within these three dimensions of thought. The meaning of the concept is its use with regard to other concepts; hence, the conceptual relationships within these meaning patterns determined the context, accordingly, the meaning of the concepts. These patterns were crucial

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because they characterized a variety of ruling ideas and scripts that might guide the actions of the organizations as well as their members. In this sense, they constituted the basis of bureaucratic representation by indicating that what kind of a state and what kind of a state-society relationship were being represented in the meaning world of each organization. Here, the method of hierarchical cluster analysis enabled us to reveal the latent meaning clusters in the meaning world of each organization by demonstrating the hierarchical groupings of the concepts.

The conceptual relationalities, associated with the dimensions of thought, exhibited that the bureaucrats privilege the managerial aspect of the state through a managerial worldview. Considering the managerial role of the bureaucracy such sensemaking might seem quiet natural. However, a scholar by utilizing the class paradigm would highly likely suggest that such a worldview reflects a mystification because the managerial worldview, in the final analysis, is functional in the reproduction of capitalism or capitalist interests. Such sensemaking not only conceals the genuine duty of bureaucracy from the external actors but from the bureaucracy as well. Therefore, such sensemaking is the evidence of alienation within the bureaucracy. The dominance of managerial sensemaking, mirroring the extensive respect and desire of the bureaucrats for the authority of the state, reinforces the mystification of the bureaucrats regarding their genuine duty and interest in the reproduction of capitalism. This interpretation is quiet reasonable within the internal consistency of the class paradigm but, whether it is a matter of mystification or not, 'in the final analysis' the bureaucrats make sense of the state-society relationship in a managerial worldview.

We evaluate the dominance of such worldview both as the cause and the consequence of a hegemonic relationship between the state and society in the Turkish context. It is the cause because it functions as means of justification that enhance the capabilities of political actors and institutions to generate commands over other persons or organizations. It is the outcome because it mirrors the

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fundamental tools of thought, which are institutionalized by the state's exercise of power. Therefore, the bureaucratic actors reproduce a specific power structure through these taken for granted rules, evident in their mindsets. On the other hand, these taken for granted rules are the means of goal displacement because they are functional in the justification of bureaucratic organizations not as a means but as an end in themselves. In other words, they are the means for maintenance of organizational power and survival. In addition, this hegemonic relationship is an enabling and constraining one as observed in the meaning patterns of the organizations. On the one hand it maintains the respect and the 'desire' of the actors for an artificial body that goes beyond a mere approval of this body. On the other hand it reinforces a sense of repression involving powerlessness, insecurity, and furiousness against the actions of the same body.

Our second major finding, as mentioned before, involved the variations among the bureaucratic organizations. In this sense, we defined, interpreted, and compared the meaning clusters of each organization for understanding the differences and similarities among the meaning worlds of the organizations. The cluster analysis primarily demonstrated that the core logic of each cluster had to do with a specific dimension of thought that signifies a particular aspect of the state in its relationship with society. In other words, the meaning clusters are formed in relation to the most sensemaking aspects of the state in the meaning world of each organization. Accordingly, in the CMB meaning world the state's orientation and legitimacy were the dominant dimensions of thought in the formation of the meaning clusters. In the symbolic universe of the CMB, the state appeared as an entity that predominantly has modern, traditional-legitimate, and illegitimate aspects, which constitute the basis of its relationship with society. In the MOF meaning world the main concern was the legitimacy of the state, whereas in the TMA meaning world the major issue had to do with the authority and the legitimacy of the state. The symbolic universe of the MOF mirrored a notion of the state that predominantly has legitimate, illegitimate, and service aspects, which constitute the basis of its relationship with society. In the symbolic universe

of the TMA, the state-society relationship was conceived on the basis of the state's control, service, and illegitimate aspects.

The CMB meaning world, involved three major meaning clusters. The first cluster was the *secular manifestation* of the state, which also had to do with the state's *managerial* aspect. This cluster mirrored the image of a modern, thus, worldly and concrete state in the CMB meaning world. The second cluster, *transcendental esteem*, underpinned the traditional aspects of the state that render it a legitimate, respectful, and a metaphysical entity. Dominant here was the patrimonial aspect of the state. The third cluster mirrored the notion of *technocratic exaltation*, involving a combination of the managerial and capitalist logics. Likewise, we labeled the three major meaning clusters of the MOF as *bureaucratic accountability, normative idealization, and moral puritanism*. The first cluster portrayed an unaccountable bureaucracy that is unable to serve society. We couldn't make any precise suggestions about the paradigmatic bias in this cluster because it was a narrow one. The second cluster mirrored a legitimate state notion, composed of the state's traditional, modern, service, and control aspects. This cluster had to do with the state's managerial and patrimonial aspects. The core issue of the third cluster was the state's illegitimate power, which the MOF constitutes a significant part of it. Dominant here was the managerial aspect of the state. Finally, the TMA meaning world involved three major meaning clusters as well. The first cluster was *authoritarian legitimacy,* which underpinned the authoritarian image of the state with respect to the security concerns. The second cluster revealed the notion about the state's *social liability* in the military mindset. The third cluster, *divine guardianism*, mirrored the military insecurity against the civil bureaucracy. We argued that all of these clusters had to do with the managerial aspect of the state considering, in general, the organizational characteristics of the military institution, and in particular the historical role of the military in the Turkish context.

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Considering these meaning clusters, we elaborated the variations between the meaning worlds of the three organizations. We compared the contents and the core logics of these clusters as well as the variations in the content of each concept. The most commonsensical concepts for these organizations were *father*, *holy*, *obstacle*, *power*, and *tyrant*, which associated with the same aspects of the state in each meaning world. Thus, they were the most commonsensical concepts, essentially conceptualized in the same way by the three organizations. On the other hand, the most dissimilar meaning worlds were that of the *CMB* and the *TMA*, in the conceptualization of the concepts that define the state-society relationship. On the contrary, the *CMB* and the *MOF* meaning worlds were the most similar ones. In addition, the MOF was in the middle. Such that, while in certain respects it was similar to the CMB, in totally other respects it was similar to the TMA.

The source of conceptual distinctions between the organizational meaning worlds primarily had to do with the *orientation* of the Turkish state. Thus, the most ambiguous aspect of the Turkish state was its orientation for the bureaucratic organizations. On the contrary, the *legitimacy* of the state was the most unambiguous aspect of the Turkish state in the mindsets of the bureaucratic organizations. Thus, the concepts that are associated with the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the state had hardly differed in the mindsets of the bureaucrats.

In our view, the most striking distinction was manifested by the clusters of *technocratic exaltation*, *moral puritanism*, and *divine guardianism*. These clusters were composed of the illegitimate aspects of the state, involving the state's tyranny, obstructiveness, and corruption in common. However, each cluster signified a different scapegoat that associates with the illegitimate aspects of the state. Accordingly, for the CMB it was society, for the MOF it was the state's power, and for the TMA it was the state's bureaucracy. We argued that these clusters in fact mirror a concern for the legitimacy of each state organization, thus they signify how the meaning patterns of the bureaucratic organizations might

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differ due to distinct organizational ideologies. We evaluated these clusters as either the cause or the consequence of the socialization of actors into their own organizational ideologies, which sustain their identification with the organizations. Finally, we discussed the variations among significant conceptual relationships in the organizational meaning clusters, which implied the differences in the meanings of the same concepts.

This dissertation demonstrated that how the notion of meaning world can be employed to reveal the cognitive maps of the individual and organizational actors. Furthermore, this study applied this notion to the field of public administration and generated specific findings regarding the conceptualization of the state-society relationship in the meaning worlds of the bureaucrats and their institutions. The major point of this dissertation involved that epistemologically there are multiple realities. Therefore, the interpretations in this thesis can be realized in different ways by the scholars of different worldviews. We do not evaluate this as the deficiency of this dissertation, but on the contrary, as its strength.

The primary limitation of this research involved the number of organizations in our sampling. Despite our sample organizations were the crucial institutions of the state, an extended sampling might enable inquirers to generate more affluent findings and variations about the bureaucratic representation. Besides, our MOF data involved a significant departmental bias. However, we think that throughout this study we revealed crucial findings about the Turkish bureaucracy even we were unable to make an entire demonstration because of the scope of this study. Consequently, the scope of this study can be extended by incorporating more state organizations as well as the private organizations to the analysis in order to compare the meaning worlds of the former and the latter. Besides, the same study can be restated in the same organizations after a while in order to discover and interpret the changes in the meaning worlds of these organizations. Finally, the inquirers must keep in their minds that how political actors make sense of the

world is a crucial component of politics in a specific context. It will be inadequate to interpret the structures or actions without understanding how these structures are represented in the mindsets of the political actors, which the mindset is itself a structure.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Questionnaire 1

Bu çalışma, ODTÜ Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü Doktora öğrencisi Çağkan Sayın'ın Doktora tez araştırması kapsamındadır ve tamamen bilimsel amaçlıdır. Araştırmaya katılım gönüllüdür. Araştırmanın hiçbir safhasında katılımcılara isimleri sorulmayacak ya da katılımcıları şahsen deşifre edebilecek bilgiler kullanılmayacaktır. Araştırmadan elde edilecek veriler kesinlikle başka şahıslarla/kurumlarla paylaşılmayacak ve bilimsel olmayan amaçlar doğrultusunda kullanılmayacaktır.

Ekteki soru kağıdında, çalışmanın ilk aşamasını oluşturan bir soru sorulmuştur. Bu sorunun amacı devlet-toplum ilişkisinin sizin tarafınızdan nasıl anlamlandırıldığı hakkında fikir edinebilmektir. Sizden, bu sorunun çağrıştırdığı ***kelimeleri*** yazmanız beklenmektedir. Eğer bazı kelimelerin, niyetinizi ifade etmek konusunda yetersiz kalabileceği endişesi duyuyorsanız, bu kelimelerin yanına açıklayıcı cümleler yazılabilirsiniz. Üretilecek kelimeler konusunda bir sınırlama yoktur, istediğiniz kadar çok kelime üretilebilirsiniz.

Katılımınız için teşekkür ederim.

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Saygılarımla

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Sizce ***Türk Devleti***'nin Türk toplumu içerisindeki yerini tarif eden ***kelimeler*** nelerdir?

Appendix B: Questionnaire 2

Bu çalışmanın amacı, devlet-toplum ilişkisine dair farklı kavramların sizin tarafınızdan nasıl ilişkilendirildiği hakkında fikir edinebilmektir. Araştırma tamamen bilimsel amaçlıdır, şu anda üç farklı kurumda yürütülmektedir ve araştırmacının doktora tezi projesinin bir parçasıdır. Araştırmadan elde edilecek veriler kesinlikle başka şahıslarla/kurumlarla paylaşılmayacak, katılımcıları şahsen deşifre edebilecek biçimde ve bilimsel olmayan amaçlar doğrultusunda kullanılmayacaktır.

Ekteki anket 2 bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölümde 15 adet demografik soru yer almakladır. Eğer bu demografik sorular içerisinde yanıtlamak istemediğiniz sorularla karşılaşırsanız boş bırakabilirsiniz. İkinci bölüm ise kavram eşleşmelerinden oluşmaktadır. Burada sizden beklenen, eşleştirilmiş kavramların *sizce birbirlerine olan mesafesini* gösteren rakamı *yuvarlak içine* almanızdır. Rakamlar l'den 6'ya doğru ilerledikçe iki kavram birbirinden *uzaklaşmaktadır*. Her kavram eşleşmesi bir kez tekrar edilmiştir.

Bilimsel bir araştırmaya verdiğiniz destek ve katılımınız için teşekkür ederim.

Saygılarımla
Çağkan Sayın

Araştırmacı: Tez Danışmam:
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Yaşınız:

Cinsiyetiniz:　　○ E　　○ K

Eğitim Durumunuz (en son bitirdiğiniz):　○ Üniversite　　○ Yüksek Lisans

Mezun olduğunuz üniversite ve bölümünüz:

10-18 yaş aralığında çoğunlukla nerede yaşadınız?

○ Köy　　　　○ Kasaba　　　○ İlçe　　　　○ Küçük şehir　○ Büyük metropol şehir

Siz 10-18 yaşları arasındayken ailenizin ekonomik durumu nasıldı?

○ Çok fakir　　○ Fakir　　　○ Orta halli　　○ Varlıklı　　○ Çok varlıklı

Meslek seçiminizde en önemli etkiyi yaptığını düşündüğünüz kişinin mesleği neydi?

Kendinizi ifade edebilmeniz konusunda aile ortamınız genellikle nasıldı?

○ Çok katı　　　　○ Katı　　　○ Orta　　　○ Rahat　　　○ Çok rahat

Ne kadar zamandır devlet bürokrasisinde çalışıyorsunuz?

○ 1 yıldan az　　○ 1-5 yıl　○ 6-10 yıl　○ 11-20 yıl arası　○ 20 yıldan fazla

Ne kadar zamandır aynı kurumda çalışıyorsunuz?

○ 1 yıldan az　　○ 1-5 yıl　○ 6-10 yıl　○ 11-20 yıl arası　○ 20 yıldan fazla

Ne kadar zamandır aynı konumda çalışıyorsunuz?

○ 1 yıldan az　　○ 1-5 yıl　○ 6-10 yıl　○ 11-20 yıl arası　○ 20 yıldan fazla

Konumunuz:　　○ Üst Kademe　　○ Orta Kademe　○ Alt Kademe　　○ Danışman

Şu anda hangi birimde görevlisiniz?

Biriminizde yaklaşık kaç kişi çalışıyor?

○ 10'dan az　　○ 11-30　　○ 31-50　　○ 51-70　　○ 70'den fazla

Şu anda yerine getirdiğiniz görevin içerdiği süreçlerin sıradanlık derecesini nasıl tanımlarsınız?

○ Aşırı sıradan ○ Sıradan ○ Biraz sıradan ○ Pek sıradan sayılmaz ○ Sıradan değil ○ Hiç sıradan değil

Sizce aşağıdaki kavram eşleştirmelerinin birbirlerine olan yakınlık derecesi nedir?
Lütfen uygun gördüğünüz rakamı *yuvarlak* içine alınız.

	Çok Yakın	Oldukça Yakın	Yakın Sayılır	Uzak Sayılır	Oldukça Uzak	Çok Uzak
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**

Devlet	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Toplum	Güvenlik	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Engel
Baba	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Yolsuzluk	Erk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Toplum
Erk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Zorba	Zorba	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Yolsuzluk
Engel	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Toplum	Güvenlik	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Toplum
Erk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Kutsal	Adalet	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Devlet
Baba	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Güvenlik	Erk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Engel
Yolsuzluk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Düzen	Güvence	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Devlet
Baba	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Kutsal	Adalet	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Verimsizlik
Güvenlik	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Verimsizlik	Güvenlik	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Güvence
Kutsal	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Engel	Düzen	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Engel
Yolsuzluk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Güvence	Güvence	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Engel
Erk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Devlet	Kutsal	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Devlet
Güvence	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Toplum	Yolsuzluk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Devlet
Zorba	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Bürokrasi	Zorba	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Engel
Düzen	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Verimsizlik	Güvenlik	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Devlet
Baba	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Adalet	Adalet	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Güvence
Devlet	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Bürokrasi	Verimsizlik	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Devlet
Verimsizlik	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Engel	Yolsuzluk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Toplum
Kutsal	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Düzen	Güvenlik	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Kutsal
Erk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Verimsizlik	Adalet	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Bürokrasi
Güvenlik	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Düzen	Düzen	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Güvence
Adalet	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Toplum	Engel	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Devlet
Zorba	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Güvence	Erk	1 -- 2 -- 3 -- 4 -- 5 -- 6	Güvenlik

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Sizce aşağıdaki kavram eşleştirmelerinin birbirlerine olan yakınlık derecesi nedir?
Lütfen uygun gördüğünüz rakamı yuvarlak içine alınız.

Çok Yakın	Oldukça Yakın	Yakın Sayılır	Uzak Sayılır	Oldukça Uzak	Çok Uzak
1	2	3	4	5	6

Güvence 1--2--3--4--5--6 Verimsizlik   Baba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi

Baba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Güvence   Kutsal 1--2--3--4--5--6 Adalet

Adalet 1--2--3--4--5--6 Düzen   Zorba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Toplum

Erk 1--2--3--4--5--6 Güvence   Erk 1--2--3--4--5--6 Adalet

Baba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Devlet   Güvence 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi

Zorba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Güvenlik   Yolsuzluk 1 2 3 4 5 6 Engel

Düzen 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi   Zorba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Düzen

Kutsal 1--2--3--4--5--6 Güvence   Erk 1--2--3--4--5--6 Baba

Verimsizlik 1--2--3--4--5--6 Toplum   Yolsuzluk 1--2--3--4--5--6 Adalet

Güvenlik 1--2--3--4--5--6 Yolsuzluk   Verimsizlik 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi

Erk 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi   Zorba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Devlet

Baba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Zorba   Toplum 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi

Düzen 1--2--3--4--5--6 Toplum   Yolsuzluk 1--2--3--4--5--6 Verimsizlik

Zorba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Adalet   Kutsal 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi

Erk 1--2--3--4--5--6 Düzen   Baba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Düzen

Adalet 1--2--3--4--5--6 Engel   Engel 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi

Baba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Verimsizlik   Erk 1--2--3--4--5--6 Yolsuzluk

Yolsuzluk 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi   Güvenlik 1--2--3--4--5--6 Bürokrasi

Zorba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Kutsal   Kutsal 1--2--3--4--5--6 Toplum

Düzen 1--2--3--4--5--6 Devlet   Baba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Toplum

Baba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Engel   Zorba 1--2--3--4--5--6 Verimsizlik

Güvenlik 1--2--3--4--5--6 Adalet   Kutsal 1--2--3--4--5--6 Yolsuzluk

Kutsal 1--2--3--4--5--6 Verimsizlik

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PUBLICATIONS

1. Sayın, Ç. "Türk Devlet Bürokrasisinde Bürokratların Oynadıkları Politik Oyunlar Üzerine Uygulamalı Bir Araştırma", 8. Ulusal Yönetim ve Organizasyon Kongresi Bildiriler, 495-510 (2000)

Appendix D: Türkçe Özet

Bürokrasi ve demokrasi birbirleriyle çelişen ancak modern toplumlar açısından kaçınılmaz olduğu varsayılan iki kavram olarak düşünülebilir. Bu iki kavram arasındaki gerilimin temeli, bürokrasiye içkin olduğu düşünülen demokrasi karşıtı eğilimde görülmektedir. Toplumun etkin ve verimli yönetimi açısından bir zorunluluk olarak konumlandırılan bürokrasi, diğer yandan birey özgürlüğünü kısıtlayıcı, eşitsizliği ve yabancılaşmayı arttırıcı, içine kapalı ve seçilmişler üzerinde egemenlik kurmaya eğilimli bir yapı olarak demokratik ideallere tehdit oluşturma potansiyeline sahiptir. Bu negatif eğilim, bürokrasiyi demokratik siyasa süreçleri ve demokratik bir kültürün normlarıyla daha uyumlu hale getirebilmeye yönelik çabaların temelini oluşturmaktadır. Temsili bürokrasi kuramı, bürokrasiyi demokrasiyle uzlaştırabilmeye yönelik normatif önermelerde bulunarak, bürokrasinin nasıl daha demokrasi-uyumlu bir yapı haline getirilebileceğini sorgulamaktadır. Kuramın temel sorunsalı bürokrasinin topluma karşı sorumluluğunun ve duyarlılığının nasıl daha fazla arttırılabileceğine yöneliktir. Bu noktada temel çözümün bürokrasiyi daha temsili bir yapıya büründürmek olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Kuramın temel varsayımı, bürokrasinin, yeterince olgunlaşmış bir demokratik bağlamda, bütün toplumsal katmanların demografik özelliklerini, değerlerini, fikirlerini ve çıkarlarını temsil etme kapasitesine sahip olduğuna yöneliktir. Bu varsayımdan hareketle kuramın temel tartışma alanı, birtakım demografik özellikler, fikirler ve çıkarlar doğrultusunda kimin kimi temsil ettiği ekseninde gerçekleşmektedir.

Temsili bürokrasi kuramı, temel varsayımları açısından ciddi eksiklikler barındırmakla birlikte, önemli bir fikri de vurgulamaktadır; bürokrasi bir şeyleri temsil etmektedir ya da etmelidir. Ancak bu noktada kuram, temsil fikrine içkin önemli bir konuyu atlamaktadır. Bu konu bürokratların düşünce biçimlerinde, anlam evrenlerinde neyin, nasıl temsil edildiğiyle ilişkilidir. Bürokratların zihinlerindeki gizli düşünce/anlam şablonları nelerdir? Bürokratlar bu şablonlar

aracılığıyla içinde yer aldıkları siyasal dünyayı nasıl anlamlandırmaktadırlar? Bu şablonların kurumsallaşmasında ne tür bağlamsal değişkenler etkili olmaktadır?

Sözü edilen şablonlar bürokratların siyasal süreçlerdeki davranışlarını yönlendiren kurallar olarak düşünülebilir. Dolayısıyla bu kurallar temsil sürecinin önemli bir bileşenidir. Bunun yanı sıra bu kurallar, temsili bürokrasi kuramının sorgulamadan kabullendiği liberal-çoğulcu dünya görüşünün normatif varsayımlarından farklı ve hatta bu varsayımlarla taban tabana zıt olabilirler. Bu noktadan hareketle, siyasal temsil konusunda gerçekleştirilecek akademik bir araştırmanın, siyasal aktörlerin zihinlerinde 'siyasetin' nasıl temsil edildiğinden bağımsız olmaması gerektiğini düşünüyoruz. Böylesi bir araştırma ise bürokratların anlam evrenlerinin açığa çıkartılması ve bu anlam evrenlerindeki 'anlam şablonlarının' yorumlanmasını gerektirmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu tez temsil kavramını aktörler arası sağduyuyu oluşturan belirli bir anlayış biçimine ilişkin bir olgu olarak ele almaktadır. Temsil kavramı, aktörün sosyal dünyasını oluşturan bilgiyi ve bu bilginin bağlamsallığını kapsamaktadır. Bu anlayış doğrultusunda, tezin temel araştırma sorusu *'Türk bürokrasisi neyi temsil ediyor?'* biçiminde tasarlanmıştır. Ancak bu soruya bağlı olarak, araştırmanın amacının Türk bürokrasisinin neyi temsil ettiğine dair tek ve mutlak gerçeği keşfetmek olduğu kanısına varılmamalıdır. Araştırmanın altyapısını oluşturan temel varsayımlar özetlenecek olursa; epistemolojik olarak tek bir gerçeklikten ziyade gerçekliğin çoğulluğundan söz edilebilir; amaç evrensel değil idiografik bilgi üretebilmektir; ve tez araştırmacının öznelliğiyle sınırlıdır.

Bu araştırma Türk bürokratlarının anlam evrenlerinde siyasete dair belirli kavramsallaştırmaları yansıtan çeşitli anlam şablonlarının anlaşılması ve yorumlanmasına yöneliktir. Burada 'siyasete dair kavramsallaştırmalar' olarak ifade edilen, devlet-toplum ilişkisinin bürokratların anlam evrenlerindeki görüntüsüdür. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma Türkiye bağlamında, bürokratların anlam evrenlerinde devlet-toplum ilişkisine dair başat fikirlerin ortaya çıkartılmasına yöneliktir. Bu fikirler insanların dünyayı anlamaları ve anlamlandırmalarını

sağlayan temel düşünce araçlarını oluşturan kültürel şemalardır. Ayrıca, bu fikirler aynı sosyal bağlama için farklı kurumlarda, farklı biçimlerde kendilerini gösterebilirler. Dolayısıyla kavramsal ve bağlamsal çeşitlilikler içerebilirler. Bütün bunlara ek olarak, araştırmacıların görüşlerini ve yorumlarını yönlendiren belirli egemen fikirler de olabilir.

Bu kuramsal çerçeve ve argümanlar doğrultusunda, tezin ikinci bölümünde temsili bürokrasi kuramının temel varsayımları, yönelimleri ve yetersizlikleri tartışılmaktadır. Bu bölümün temel noktası kuramın liberal-çoğulcu dünya görüşünü verili kabul etmesinden kaynaklanan indirgemeciliğidir. Bu dünya görüşünün, bürokratları da içeren tüm toplumsal katmanlar tarafından içselleştirilebileceği, 'olgun demokrasilerde' kaçınılmaz bir seçim ya da bir olasılık olarak düşünülmektedir. Bu varsayım bürokratların anlam evrenlerindeki egemen paradigma ya da paradigmaların liberal-çoğulcu paradigmanın normatif varsayımlarından farklılıklar gösterebileceğini dikkate almamaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, bürokratların düşünce biçimleri ya da davranışlarının liberal-çoğulcu paradigma dışında kalan perspektiflerle de –kimi zaman daha etkin bir biçimde- anlaşılıp yorumlanabileceği alternatifi göz ardı edilmektedir. Bu temel kaygıların doğrultusunda, ikinci bölümde, Alford ve Friedland'in yaklaşımı esas alınarak kavramsal bir çerçeve oluşturulmuştur. Kavramsal çerçevenin içeriği, devlet-toplum ilişkisinin çeşitli boyutlarını sorunsallaştıran dünya görüşlerinin, bürokratların anlam evrenlerini yorumlamada analitik bir araç olarak kullanılabilmesine yöneliktir. Bu dünya görüşleri Batı geleneğine egemen olan üç modern devlet paradigmasıdır; liberal-çoğulcu paradigma, yönetimci paradigma ve sınıf paradigması. Her bir paradigma kendisine özgü farklı analiz seviyesiyle, devlet ve devlet-toplum ilişkisinin farklı boyutlarını irdelemektedir. Liberal-çoğulcu paradigma bireyci analiz seviyesini kullanarak devletin demokratik bileşenine odaklanmakta; yönetimci paradigma örgütsel analiz seviyesini kullanarak devletin bürokratik bileşenini vurgulamakta; ve sınıf paradigması sistemik analiz seviyesini kullanarak devletin kapitalist bileşenini temel almaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, her bir paradigma 'anlam'ı oluşturan birer dünya

görüşüdür. Aktörlerin dünyayı nasıl algıladıkları ve anlamlandırdıklarına yöneliktir. Diğer bir deyişle devlet-toplum ilişkisi, anlamını aktörlerin zihinlerinde egemen olan dünya görüşü ya da görüşleri aracılığıyla kazanmaktadır. Bu dünya görüşleri, kendilerini belirli bir bağlamda tarihsel ve siyaseten konumlandırarak, siyasal aktörlerin faaliyetlerini ve tercihlerini meşrulaştırmalarını sağlamaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla bu dünya görüşleri aynı zamanda sosyal işlevlere sahip birer ideolojidir. Bu görüşler (kuramlar) kendilerini bürokratların anlam evrenlerinde bir biçimde göstermektedirler. Bunun yanı sıra araştırmacının, anlam evrenlerindeki kavramsal dinamikleri yorumlayabilmesini sağlamaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla bu üç temel devlet kuramı bürokratların anlam evrenlerinin anlaşılması ve yorumlanabilmesi açısından gerek duyulan *kavramsal* çerçeveyi oluşturmaktadır.

Üçüncü bölüm ise Osmanlı-Türk siyaseti ve siyasal kültürünün en temel yerleşik özelliklerinin kısa ve tarihsel özetini içermektedir. Bu bölümün temel dayanağı, herhangi bir sosyal grubun anlam evreninin, belirli bir bağlamda sosyal olarak üretilen bilgiyi yansıtan ve tarihsel olarak kurumsallaşmış şablonları içermesidir. Dolayısıyla, belirli bir bağlama özgü devlet-toplum ilişkisinin özelliklerinin anlaşılabilmesi açısından modern devlet kuramlarının kapsayamadığı birtakım alanların/anlayışların var olabileceğinin dikkate alınması gerekmektedir. Bu durum, analize belirli bir bağlamın siyasal dinamiklerini ve siyasal kültürünü katma zorunluluğunu doğurmaktadır. Buna bağlı olarak üçüncü bölüm bürokratların anlam evrenlerini yorumlanabilmesi için gereksinim duyduğumuz *bağlamsal* çerçeveyi oluşturmaktadır. Bu çerçeve doğrultusunda Türk siyasetinin ve siyasal kültürünün önemli bileşenleri, devlet-toplum ilişkisi ve devlet, bürokrasi ve ordunun tarihsel-kurumsal rolleri ekseninde tartışılmaktadır.

Dördüncü bölümde ilk olarak araştırmada kullanılan yöntemin kuramsal altyapısına değinilmektedir. Bu altyapı Schutz, Berger ve Luckmann, Giddens gibi düşünürlerin çalışmalarından türeyen ve anlam-faaliyet arasındaki karşılıklı üretken ilişkiye odaklanan bir kuramsal geleneği içermektedir. Bu kuramsal

geleneğin temel altyapısı kısaca tartışıldıktan sonra araştırmanın örneklemine değinilmektedir. Araştırma üç farklı devlet kurumunda gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu kurumlar Sermaye Piyasası Kurumu, Maliye Bakanlığı ve Kara Harp Okulu'dur. Bu kurumların seçilmesindeki temel ölçüt aynı devletin tarih, işlev, yapı ve rol bakımından farklılaşan kurumları arasında, eğer varsa, çeşitli kurumsal çeşitlilikleri yakalayabilmektir. Bu bölümde seçilen kurumların kısa tarihçeleri, örgüt yapıları ve her kurumdaki örneklemin demografik özellikleri detaylandırılmaktadır. Ayrıca bu kurumlardan elde edilen verilerin analizinde kullanılan yöntemler de bu bölümde tartışılmaktadır. Bu yöntemlerden ilki, bürokratların ve kurumlarının anlam evrenlerinin belirlenmesini ve görselleştirilmesini sağlayan Çok Boyutlu Ölçeklendirme yöntemidir. İkinci yöntem ise elde edilen anlam evrenlerindeki anlam şablonlarını ve bu şablonlar içerisinde yer alan kavramsal ilişkilerin belirlenmesini sağlayan Hiyerarşik Gruplandırma Yöntemidir.

Beşinci kısımda ise analizin sonuçları tartışılmakta ve bürokratların anlam evrenleri, geliştirilen kavramsal ve bağlamsal çerçeveler doğrultusunda yorumlanmaktadır. Yapılan analiz sonucunda dört temel bulguya ulaşılmıştır. Bunlardan ilki bürokratların devlet-toplum ilişkisine dair temel düşünce boyutlarıdır. İkinci bulgu temsili bürokrasi kuramının sınırlılığının gösterilmesidir. Üçüncü bulgu her bir kurumun anlam evrenine içkin anlam gruplarının belirlenmesi, nitelendirilmesi ve yorumlanmasıdır. Dördüncü bulgu ise kurumsal anlam evrenleri/grupları arasındaki farklılıkları ve benzerlikleri ortaya koyan karşılaştırmalı yorumları içermektedir.