

AN EXAMINATION OF TWO TURKISH NGOs FROM A PLURALIST
PERSPECTIVE: HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION (İHD)
AND WOMEN FOR WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS- NEW WAYS (KİH-YÇV)

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ABSTRACT

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The major aim of this study is to evaluate the role of Turkish non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the consolidation of democracy in Turkey regarding the characteristics defined by the classical pluralist theories, starting with the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville, and by contemporary pluralist approaches to civil society. To that end, characteristics of two examples, İHD and KİH-YÇV will be examined using three dimensions: effectiveness, enhancing solidarity and responsibility, and the dimension of inner democracy.

As the methodology of the case study, in-depth interview techniques were adapted for capturing the qualities of the organizations in a detailed way. At that level, in-depth interviews from each organization were conducted with members having different positions. In addition to this, all written documents obtained from the organizations were scanned and the relevant ones have been examined for the sake of the study.

Since the aim of the study is to understand what part Turkish NGOs play in the consolidation of democracy in Turkey considering the assumptions of classical and contemporary pluralist school in their analysis of voluntary associations and interest groups, this study espoused an associational concept of democracy as the method of work, which is a contemporary concept that underlines the democratic role of free and voluntary associations.

In this context, this study tries to discuss the following questions: To what extent are Turkish NGOs independent from the state? To what extent can they have leverage on governmental policies? Do they mitigate conflict through overlapping interests? Do they enhance social trust, tolerance, compromise and a sense of solidarity in society and within their organization? To what extent are they democratic, pluralist and horizontally structured inside their organization and to what extent they are democratic regarding their decision making process? Are they open and inclusive enough in their membership recruitment techniques?

Keywords: Pluralism, associational life, NGO, voluntary participation, civil society, social capital, associative democracy.

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE’DEKİ İKİ STK’NIN ÇOĞULCU BİR BAKIŞ AÇISINDAN İNCELENMESİ: İNSAN HAKLARI DERNEĞİ (İHD) VE KADININ İNSAN HAKLARI-YENİ ÇÖZÜMLER VAKFI (KİH-YÇV)

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Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Türkiye’deki STK’ların Türkiye’de demokrasinin pekişmesindeki rolünü Alexis de Tocqueville’in düşünceleriyle başlayan klasik çoğulcu kuramların ve sivil topluma yönelik çağdaş çoğulcu yaklaşımların tanımladığı belirleyici özellikleri göz önüne alarak değerlendirmektir. Bu amaçla, çalışmaya örnek olarak alınan iki STK olan İHD ve KİH-YÇV etkililik, dayanışmayı ve sorumluluğu geliştirme ve iç demokrasi boyutları ile ilişkilendirilerek incelenecektir.

Vaka analizinde yöntembilimsel olarak bu iki örgütün niteliklerini detaylı bir biçimde anlamak için hem dokümanter ve hem de derinlemesine mülakat teknikleri kullanılmıştır. Bu yüzden, her örgütten farklı pozisyonlarda bulunan üyelerle derinlemesine mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Buna ek olarak, örgütlerden edinilen tüm yazılı dokümanlar gözden geçirilmiş ve çalışmayla ilintili olarak incelenmiştir.

Çalışmanın amacı klasik ve çağdaş çoğulcu okulların gönüllü dernekler ve çıkar grupları analizlerindeki varsayımları akılda tutarak Türkiye’deki STK’ların demokrasinin pekişmesine ne kadar katkı sağladığını anlamak olduğu için bu çalışma çağdaş bir kavrayış olan ve gönüllü ve bağımsız örgütlerin demokratik rolünün altını çizen birleştirici bir demokrasi kavrayışını benimsemiştir.

Bu bağlamda, çalışma aşağıdaki soruları cevaplamaya çalışmıştır: Türkiye’de STK’lar devletten ne derece bağımsızdır? Bu örgütler devlet ve hükümet politikaları üzerinde ne derece baskı oluşturabiliyorlar? Etnik, dini ve cinsiyet kaynaklı çatışmaları

örtüşen çıkarlar aracılığıla azaltıyorlar mı? Toplumda ve kendi örgütleri içerisinde güven, hoşgörü, uzlaşma ve dayanışma duygusunu geliştirebiliyorlar mı? İç yapılarında ne derece demokratik, çoğulcu ve yatay örgütlenmişlerdir? Karar alma mekanizmalarında ne kadar demokratikler? Üye alımlarında yeterince açık ve kapsayıcı mı?

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çoğulculuk, derneksel hayat, NGO, STK, gönüllü katılım, sivil toplum, sosyal sermaye, birleştirici demokrasi.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem to be investigated

The major aim of this study is to evaluate the role of Turkish NGOs (non-governmental organizations) in the consolidation of democracy in Turkey using the characteristics of NGOs defined by classical pluralist theories, starting with the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville and including some contemporary pluralist approaches to civil society by L. Diamond, R. Putnam and P. Hirst. According to the pluralist understanding, the most important characteristic of civil organizations is their independence from the state. In this view, representative democracy itself is not enough for the effective functioning of a democracy, because in order to provide legitimacy of state and prevent arbitrary functions, representative institutions should take different interest groups, namely the civil, voluntary or non-governmental associations, into consideration while setting the rules about social and political policies. This is not only necessary for increasing the legitimacy of the state but also for enhancing the social capital, –that will be explained in the second chapter in a detailed way- which paves the way for political compliance. Pluralist perspective, on the other hand, argues that the enhancement of social capital can be achieved through autonomous, self-organizing civil organizations. As Tocqueville points out, civil organizations not only prevent the tyranny of the majority but also they are great political schools in which people build the ability to pursue common affairs, while at the same time they teach how to sustain order among others and how to advance towards the same goal. In associations people communicate and understand each other, prepare themselves for any responsibilities, and make use of these skills in various instances of civil life. More importantly, “they learn to submit their will to that of all others and to subordinate their particular efforts to the common action” (Tocqueville, 2000: 497-499).

For this study, my objective is to test and compare the characteristics of two Turkish NGOs, regarding their expected roles, functions, and prescribed characteristics.

By focusing on these two organizations, İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association) İHD and Kadının İnsan Hakları-Yeni Çözümler Vakfı (Women for Women's Rights- New Ways) (KİH-YÇV), I am not claiming that I am able to achieve a comprehensive view of the general situation of NGOs in Turkey. However, I believe that by examining these two organizations, I can test the presuppositions of the pluralist understanding of NGOs more effectively, since both have built their main identity on independence from the state. This is obvious in their discourses and actions. Although the fact that they are human rights organizations also puts them in a position to confront the state, they can be taken as cases that are expected to be most independent from the state, promoting inner solidarity and democracy as a part of their *raison d'être*.

As the main axis of the study, I have pulled out three dimensions of analysis. My empirical research, the in-depth interviews I conducted, is designed on these dimensions. They are directly related to the characteristics and functions of NGOs as presupposed by the pluralist school in its analysis of voluntary associations/interest groups. The two cases in this study will be compared using the three dimensions and their operational indicators as stated below.

Effectiveness: Effectiveness of questioning and checking government policies, reforming existing democratic institutions and procedures.

Enhancing solidarity and responsibility: Mitigating conflict through overlapping interests, as pertaining to preventing ethnic, religious and sexual divisions; enhancing social trust and sense of cooperation; developing tolerance and compromise.

Inner democracy: Fostering democratic organizational culture, accountability of decisions and actions for members, having horizontal and pluralist decision-making structure, open recruitment and inclusiveness.

On the basis of the information collected and the analysis conducted on these three dimensions, several questions are raised: To what extent are Turkish NGOs independent from the state? To what extent can they have leverage on the government policies? Do they mitigate conflict through overlapping interests? Do they enhance

social trust, tolerance, compromise, and a sense of solidarity within their organization and in society respectively? To what extent are they democratic, pluralist and horizontally structured within their organization and to what extent do these characteristics reflect on the society at large through their activities, discourses and membership?

1.2. Limitations and Significance of the Study

One can argue that civil society has become the most popular term of the last two decades not only in political and sociological theories but also in European official discourse. Also, there is a huge literature underlining the importance of civil society organizations for an efficient democracy. Similarly, in Turkey there are many academic, semi-academic, and non-academic works on the issue providing a variety of ideas and interpretations about the extent of the term civil society. This is due to the twofold character of the term, which embodies compromising both the collectivism and individualism.

In the contemporary debates on civil society one can see the analysis of neo-liberals, post-moderns, and post-Marxists. In neo-liberal vision, civil society is held as a part of the structural adjustment economy programs. Thus, “neo-liberals believe that a liberal economy creates the conditions under which a civil society of associations autonomous from the state can flourish” (Hyden, 1998: 26). In this view NGOs tend to be considered as the products of recent neo-liberal economy policies.

Post-modernists, on the other hand, “emphasize the importance of national and religious identities as well as multiple identities as a precondition for civil society” (Kaldor, 2003: 10). According to this kind of understanding, as Kaldor implies, civil organized networks might include religious groups, nationalist networks, and ethnic groups, as well as human rights networks (ibid).

As an alternative Marxist view, Gramsci sees civil society as a hegemonic place

where all class struggles take place. Actually, he perceives civil society as a political and cultural hegemony of a social group over the whole society. Institutions of civil society standing between the state and the economy are also hegemonic institutions of this dominant social group's ideology (Bobbio and Texier, 1982). Gramsci differs from the Marxist vision by putting civil society in the sphere of ideology (super-structure) instead of the economy (infra-structure). Yet for him, civil society is still a sphere of domination. "The dominant class is able to exercise this hegemony when it comes to present some of the interests of subordinate groups..." (Macdonald, 1997: 20).

In their analysis of civil society, both Gramsci and Marxists believe in the role of the working class in consolidation of democracy and in strong social movements to change the existing power structure. They do not make a clear separation between the state and the civil society, as both believe that the role of civil society is to abandon the state totally in the end.

As for the Post-Marxists, non-class identities and members of the working class are seen as subjects of socialist change. (N. Poulantzas, 1975; James O'Connor, 1978, 1998; Habermas, 1979, 1981, 1990; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Cohen and Arato, 1992) According to these thinkers, new social movements are "radical potential to challenge the diverse forms of power and dominations which permeate contemporary society" (Macdonald, 1997: 20).

On the other hand, in the pluralist vision the most important actors of civil society are free associations that are horizontally organized and enhance democracy both on the outside and within the organization. Therefore, the most significant point that differentiates the pluralist school from the Marxist school in the analysis of civil society is that in the former, the agents of social change are organizations and these organizations are independent from state in their *raison d'être*, whereas in the latter the subject of social change is the working class or social movements.

Following the pluralist school in this work, civil society is understood as a part of

a participatory democratic and pluralistic governmental system; however, at the same time it is a realm of organized social life that is independent from the state and state institutions. (Tocqueville, 1835; Truman, 1951; Dahl, 1956; Dahl, 1971; Diamond, 1994; Diamond, 1999). To that end, in this study I look into above-mentioned examples of two relatively formally structured and/or officially established civil organizations in Turkey. In order to achieve the major task of this study, my focus will be on the position of voluntary organizations within classical pluralist and contemporary civil society theories, and the effects of conceptions of voluntary organizations and interest groups in Turkey in the 2000's.

Being itself theoretically in the liberal pluralist line of thought, this work will explain the idea of a *non-governmental organization (NGO)* as it was originally conceived. It is thought that in this way it will serve as a reminder that the term is not altogether new or recently invented, as thought by many, in recent years.

There is a considerable amount of literature that sees NGOs as the new tools of the liberal economy and connects their functions with the neo-liberal policy agenda. Parallel to this is the fact that from the 1990s on, international organizations and agencies including the UN (United Nations) and the EU (European Union) have not only allocated increased funds for NGOs, but also elevated their functions in devising solutions to emerging social problems and in the consolidation of democracy throughout the world. In fact, such attempts can be seen as adapting the functions of NGOs to the needs of markets and to new economic and social conditions. Yet, it has also been alleged by some scholars, such as Kaldor (2003), that concomitant to the shrinking of the state by reducing the social provinces and dominance of capitalist market economy after the 1980s, NGOs were attributed to the role of independent social actors, which would partially take the role of social state. This line of thought, however, bears striking affinity to the old-line pluralists' assumptions about the functions of NGOs, -enhancing solidarity and responsibility, independence from the state, etc. - as if such were very new roles for these organizations. As such, beyond the necessities of new economic circumstances, and with today's expression, the idea of an NGO is not simply new, but

rather takes its roots from the thoughts of Alexis de Tocqueville, who underlined the significance of voluntary organizations in the 19th century, and of the British pluralists G.D.H. Cole, John Neville Figgis and Harold J. Laski, who developed the background of today's pluralism in early 20th century. Moreover, the scholars who follow the pluralist line have long pointed out the alienable places of free and autonomous associations, pressure and interest groups for the consolidation of representative democracy (Dahl, 1956, 1971, 1986; Truman, 1951; Diamond, 1993, 1994; Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2002).

As I just mentioned above, pluralist democracy is based on the necessitude of pressure and interest groups, along with the elements of a parliamentary democracy. Through the participation of various interests groups in the political decision making processes, not only it is likely that consensus and moderation are generated among them, but also the legitimacy of political power is further maintained. On the other hand, it is important to consider that even pluralists themselves recognize that only in a utopia could all kinds of interests be equally represented in society without any element dominating the political sphere. Since this would be a total denial of any inequality in society, more specifically, unequal positions of interest groups, R. Dahl himself accepts that business groups have a greater chance of leveraging the state. So they are more effective in decision making processes. More importantly, Dahl (1989) also accepts the domination of males over women throughout the history and in all part of the society. Also, roles and characters of states are very critical for feasibility of pluralism. Here, what I try to denote is that, I am aware of the critics that have levelled to pluralist assertions before starting this work. Yet, notwithstanding the density of critiques, pluralist line is currently the core element of today's civil society discourse.

Also, in the case study, even though İHD is an extensive organization with thirty three branches all over Turkey¹ I made the analysis of its characteristics and their

¹ İHD has seven branches in the South-eastern, five in the Eastern, seven in the Marmara, four in the Central Anatolia, three in the Aegean, four in the Mediterranean regions. As such it is fairly evenly organized across the country. However in order to get a more accurate picture of its strength in different regions, one needs to look at membership and activity details on regional basis.

perception by its members was made on the bases of the claims and statements of members from the administration at the Head Office in Ankara. Admittedly, this can not disclose the whole picture of İHD but the ideas of members as representatives of their organization are considered as valuable for purposes of this study.

1.3. Organization of the Study

Within the scope of the study as mentioned above, this thesis aims to explore the roles and functions of Turkish NGOs from the perspective of classical and contemporary pluralist thought. At this level, the following chapter presents a theoretical framework through which I examined the place of NGOs and civil society in classical and contemporary pluralist approach of Western literature. In that chapter I try to explicate the conception of NGOs and civil society in classical pluralist theories. In the second part of the same chapter, I explore the impacts of the pluralist comprehension on the contemporary debates on civil society and NGOs again in the Western literature.

Chapter 3 presents a brief history of Turkish late modernization from the framework of associational experience of Turkey. In the second part of the chapter, I glance at the discussions on civil society and NGOs in Turkey in the post 1990 period and try to discover the ideas of some scholars referred to the pluralist thought.

Chapter 4 covers the methodology, research design and justification of the cases as well as the evaluation of the research results derived from the case study. The evaluation is presented according to four main subtitles:

- Foundation, Objectives and Principles
- Enhancing Solidarity, Responsibility and Compromise
- Effectiveness
- Inner Democracy

In the same chapter I also enumerate the research findings and compare the two NGOs related to those findings.

Eventually, in the last chapter, I conclude the study through a discussion of the outcomes derived from the literature reviews and the research. Inevitably, I do this in the light of the conceptual framework of the first two chapters.

CHAPTER 2

CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOs IN THE PLURALIST THINKING

2. Classical Pluralist Theory, NGOs and Civil Society

2.1 NGOs in Classical Pluralist Theories and Significance of American Debate

In order to understand the importance and meaning of NGOs, first of all it is better to go through theoretical roots of pluralism. Although taking its roots from classical liberal theory, pluralism brings a new perspective to liberal individualism. Classical liberal theories of J. S. Mill, J. Bentham, J. Locke and A. Smith denote that individual freedom should be understood within a utilitarian perspective and according to this perspective each individual should pursue his/her own self-interest as it will bring greater happiness for all. Moreover, private ends of individuals should be independent from state and protected by the rule of law. According to these theories non-governmental bodies, within which individuals represent the collective will, have not a primary role in democracy instead they are always subsidiary to protecting individual freedom. So that, “English and American liberals were inclined to defend groups in terms of the benefits they brought to individual” (Smith and Freedman, 1972:38). For example, in *Letter on Toleration* “Locke assumes that the individual has a natural and inalienable right to associate” (ibid) and similarly J. S. Mill (1910) in *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government* states that “in many cases, though individuals may not do the particular thing so well, on the average, as the officers of government, it is nevertheless desirable that it should be done by them, rather than by government, as a means to their own mental education” (Smith and Freedman, 1972:38).

As seen, classical liberal theories presupposed a relatively more direct relationship between individual and state because of their individualist orientation.

However in rapidly industrializing societies, significance of a mediated system was inevitably realised particularly in the mass politics of the 19th century. Idea of non-governmental organizations is, on the surface, product of those conditions and gained considerable popularity in both America and in many European countries. The French political scientist, Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) is mostly seen as the most important figure who recognised the significance of NGOs in his two-volume celebrated work, *Democracy in America* (1835-1840). De Tocqueville “thought that the pluralist nature of the American political system was owing to the well-developed voluntary associations in society” (Acar, 1976: 28). As understood here pluralism as a political system is based on firstly the diffusion of power and then the active participation of individual in politics. According to Schwarzmantel (1987), dispersion or diffusion of power refers to liberal idea of limited state. Furthermore, this vision of limited state “involves the purpose of checking and controlling all forms of power” (Schwarzmantel, 1987: 19). From the analysis of Schwarzmantel here, we see the liberal root of pluralist thinking.

On the other hand, de Tocqueville also strongly underlined the idea of active participation of individuals. According to Acar, this line of thought inherited from classical democratic theory which emphasizes the importance of political participation of rational individuals. But the very difference of traditional pluralism from the classical liberals is that this participation in voluntary organizations is not only the individual’s chance to express his will” but also they “contribute to the forming of the General Will” (Acar, ???: 18). Similar to classical pluralists “classical democrats insisted on maximum and equal participation of the people in the political process. They believed this would not only realize the Common Good but was essential for the full development of the individual’s capacities” (Acar, 1976: 20). In general, pluralism generates a position of affairs where two purposes are achieved:

- (a) the *liberal* aim of the limited state; restrictions on power holders;
- (b) the fulfilment of the democratic aim, by a network of parties, groups, associations, of all citizens exercising their democratic rights and participating in political action (Schwarzmantel, 1987: 28).

Here, it would be necessary to call attention to the distinction between European pluralism and American pluralism. While the former mostly refers to the classical meaning of pluralism the latter refers to the contemporary usage of the concept since 1950s. It might be argued that roots of American pluralism are mainly based on the ideas of de Tocqueville (1805-1859). On the other hand, European pluralism is formed in the early 1920s by some other British figures, such as, G.D.H. Cole, John Neville Figgis and Harold J. Laski. True enough, the most important difference between American and European pluralism is their conceptions of state. In British case, “pluralism is strongly anti-statist in its basic principles” (Hirst, 1989: 2). As regards the weight of state in politics in Europe, British pluralists “sought to replace a centralized state...with a state in which power and administrative capacity were diffused to autonomous functional and territorial bodies; to self-governing associations and to local authorities” (ibid). On the other hand in the American case, pluralism is based on the competition of interest groups to influence or take part in the government’s actions without excluding the state from the process of competition. Similarly, in American political theory democracy is defined “as a form of stable and institutionalized political competition” and the existence of independent organizations constitutes the social foundation of democracy (Hirst, 1989: 3). Different from European conception, American pluralism “tends to treat the state and government as intermediary networks through which competing interests strive to influence policy and through which the objectives of the dominant organized interests on any particular issue are carried out” (Hirst, 1989: 3). To put in other words, “in the US the state was as a broker of competing interests rather than all-powerful Leviathan. Thus, in the US, the goal of protecting the individual from the abuses of state power was never as prominent as in Europe” (Acar, 1976: 29). Another important difference between American and European pluralism is that, Europe pluralism is based on a normative doctrine whereas in the US, it is simply taken as an objective reality. “Americans, unlike Europeans, have tended to take pluralism for granted as a fact of life and therefore have found no need to develop a normative doctrine of pluralism similar to the Europeans” (Smith and Freedman, 1972: 51).

Before going through the ideas of de Tocqueville and the significance of American case, it would be beneficial to mention the NGO conceptions of British pluralists in brief. Hirst (1989) points out that, pluralism is generally known as American pluralism inspired by de Tocqueville. On the other hand, British thinkers, John Neville Figgis (1866-1919), Harold J. Laski (1893-1950) and G.D.H. Cole (1889-1959) have contributed to pluralist thinking as well. According to Hirst, when we look at their analysis on political pluralism we can both have the opportunity to become familiar with European conception of pluralism and have an idea about the contemporary role of state in democratization, relationship between state and civil society organizations in European countries.

In general anti-statist stance was dominant in each of these figures. They rejected collectivism lest it conduces to powerful state authority. For them it is through the “freely associated activities of citizens” that “true collective action” is performed (Hirst, 1989: 17). “The pluralist claimed that there is neither single entity ‘society’ nor a single common good. Persons develop through contributing to associations in order to fulfil definite purposes. Society is composed of associations freely formed of citizens” (ibid). However, legal rules assured by a legal system and a pluralist state that supports and facilitates the activities of civil associations are necessities of pluralist system they offered. Also, they were strongly opposed to the “Lockean individualism of earlier liberalism” (Smith and Freedman, 1972: 39) meaning they at the same time were opposed to the extreme individualism of free market liberalism. According to Figgis, state as a society of societies provides the continued existence and mutual interaction of free associations. In other words, according to Figgis, “the pluralist state will be a minimal state but one whose primary task is to create the conditions for associations, and through them individual citizens, to be free to pursue their purposes. A pluralist legal order, in defining the rights of associations, would pay due regard to their autonomy and their rights to develop as determined by their own internal decision procedures” (Hirst, 1989: 29). Particularly, he defends the “free life of associations against the claims of sovereign power” (Hirst, 1989: 30).

Harold Laski was the political theorist who paved the way for radical pluralism, which is an understanding of pluralism that refuses sovereignty of any power including the state. To him, the “state was not superior to associations, like trade unions” and also, he was “over-optimistic about the capacities of trade unions to seek political power and to exercise administrative responsibilities” (Hirst, 1989:13-14). In his thought it was simply not true that loyalty to the state superseded the loyalties to associations. Laski believed in the territorial decentralization and the decentralization of power in the form of functional federalism, which requires the participation of people through associations at the local level. For Laski, associations such as clubs, churches, and trade unions are the channels through which individuals can realize themselves and express their personalities (Newman, 1996: 230-232). Laski also believed in the democracy of the international community in that nation states are interdependent from one another and none of them could decide on an international affair that concerns all the nation states. Thus, he underlined the need for the transfer of nation states’ policy-making role to an international authority (Newman, 1996: 233).

Cole in his work named *The Social Theory* (1920),

...explores the social theoretic basis for a doctrine of democracy based upon function rather than the fiction of the representations of individual wills. It is pluralist in that it denies the need or legitimacy for a concentrated state power claiming sovereignty over society, and it seeks to the merging of state into society, of administration into functional-democratic self-organization, and of imperative authority into coordination by the active co-operation of self governing bodies (Hirst, 1989: 12).

For Cole,

...‘society’ is not an entity, a totality, but a grouping made up of specific associations and institutions performing definite purposes and interacting one with another. Associations are formed by persons coming together to fulfil definite purposes that they cannot accomplish as isolated individuals” (Hirst, 1989: 31).

For a more detailed glance at the idea of voluntary organizations and in order to understand the significance of the American case, one needs to take a look at the thoughts of Alexis de Tocqueville.

According to de Tocqueville,

Without *active* participation on the part of citizens in *egalitarian* institutions and civil association, as well as in politically relevant organizations, there will be no way to maintain the democratic character of the political culture or of social and political institutions (Cohen&Arato, 1990:19).

As I mentioned above, classical liberal theory, communitarian views, participatory democracy, and functionalist sociology have strongly affected the pluralist trend. Yet it was thanks to de Tocqueville that voluntary associations gained a political character. De Tocqueville is particularly important because, he “was first to realize, civil society itself is an important terrain of democratization, of democratic institution building” (Cohen&Arato, 1990: 16).

Allegedly, de Tocqueville was also the first to emphasize the independent existence of voluntary associations from both the economic sphere and the state sphere. He completes this idea with his concept of *habits of the heart and the mind* that

...provide reasons and design criteria for all sorts of rules. It is hard to imagine that constitutional arrangements, laws and regulations would work without being embedded in, and reflecting, particular values and norms upheld by groups and communities making up a given society (Hyden, 1998: 16).

By way of this concept, de Tocqueville exhibits his difference from the universal ethical ideal of Hegel, which is to be achieved at the level of the state, and brings fourth his original sociological view of solidarity, responsibility, and his political notion of democracy that is to be achieved not on the level of the state or the economy but rather at the very level of civil and voluntary associations, thereby marking his space as an ‘original’ in political sociological literature. Indeed, perhaps the most valuable justification of the importance of de Tocqueville is his genuine influence on the current

discourse of civil society which “focuses precisely on new, generally non-class based forms of collective action oriented and linked to the legal, associational and public institutions of society. These are differentiated not only from the state but also from the capitalist market economy” (Cohen and Arato, 1990: 2). De Tocqueville’s vision was

...not of a society divided by classes nor of one in which the state would dominate, views held respectively by Marx and Hegel. Instead his was a view of a society grounded in a specific and unique culture, supported and maintained by an array of associations and organizations through which American gave voice and expression to their inequality. It was in other words, a civil society through and through –civil in its nature and civil in its relations among its citizens. (M. Orum, 2001: 77).

While considering the civil associations as inevitable elements of democracy, de Tocqueville firstly mentions the danger of a new kind of despotism which denotes the modern paternal state whose control over people is mild and provident. He argues that one cannot describe this new despotism with old images of despotism because it will probably be a legitimate tyranny which renders the use of free will redundant by bending and softening the wills of people (Tocqueville, 2000: 662-663; Tocqueville, 1955: 336). De Tocqueville thinks that, after the French Revolution, the European countries divine power of state has been diffused and the old distinctions and privileges have been removed. On the other hand, political rights have been extended according to the demands of freedom and equality. In fact, this was nothing more than the replacement of an absolute monarch with a centralized administrative state. The monopoly of this public instruction of the centralized state raises the danger of modern state despotism. Because the state intervenes more and more in the social life, it guards over the whole society (Keane, 1988: 56-59). Actually, de Tocqueville did not oppose state institutions; he just saw the danger since he “was particularly afraid of an unmediated popular will” (Hyden, 1998: 20). Thus, he advocates “an active civil society made up of self-governing associations” and a civil society that “educates the citizenry and scrutinizes state actions” (ibid). He regards these civil associations as independent eyes of society and for him “an eye compromising a plurality of interacting, self-organized, and constantly vigilant civil associations is necessary for consolidating the democratic revolution” (Keane, 1988: 61). Again, for him, “a pluralistic and self-

organizing civil society independent of the state is an indispensable condition of democracy” (Keane, 1988: 62).

Owing to these civil associations that he saw in America, de Tocqueville predicts that the US will become more and more democratic since Americans have divided power into a great number of civil associations that will protect society against the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville, 2000: 381). In *Democracy in America* de Tocqueville argued that, “the guarantee of individual liberties was to be found in what he called ‘democratic expedients’; these included local self-government, the separation of Church and State, a free press, indirect elections, an independent judiciary and, above all, ‘associational life’” (Kaldor, 2003: 19). Accordingly, he points out the functions of civil associations in a sustainable democracy in the following words:

If man living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes, their independence would be in great jeopardy, whereas if they never acquired the habit of forming associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would be endangered. A people among whom individuals lost the power of achieving great things single-handed without acquiring the means of producing them by united exertions, would soon lapse into barbarism” (Smith and Freedman, 1972: 35).

Undoubtedly, all these descriptions of de Tocqueville are based on his observations of American society, a fact that naturally leads one to ask questions about the significance and particularities of the American experience for pluralist thought. According to Wolff (1968), there are three reasons why the American experience produces pluralism. First is the federal structure of the American political system, since “The United States, as its name implied, was an association of political communities, rather than of individuals” (Wolff, 1968: 126). Secondly, “dealing with social problems by means of voluntary associations” (Wolff, 1968: 127) is a part of American society. Wolff cites that, according to de Tocqueville, while other people turn to God or the state when they have a social problem, “Americans instinctively form a committee, elect a president and secretary-treasurer, and set about finding a solution on their own” (ibid). The last and perhaps the most important reason why the American experience produces

pluralism is “the American consciousness of religious, ethnic and racial heterogeneity.” (ibid). This is mostly because religion in America is a completely non-governmental issue due to “the prohibition of an established church” (Wolff, 1968: 128). “Having observed the Americans for two years during his visit in the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville concluded that they were a ‘nation of joiners’ and wrote that ‘Americans of all ages, all conditions and all dispositions constantly form associations’” (Smith and Freedman, 1972: 34). The question, however, is “why and how had the American society developed in the manner it had? How was it able to create a novel set of social political institutions that were keynoted by their emphasis on equality and democracy when all other societies...were unable to do so?” (M.Orum, 2001: 73). M. Orum has argued that, “in a fundamental sense, the basic answer to this question is simple: In all other societies people suffered under oppression, from the nobles or growing wealth of the manufacturing class, but in America, citizens, in effect, were born free” (M.Orum, 2001: 74). “A relatively new and unburdened set of peoples, most of whom came to America as immigrants and to escape oppression in Europe” (ibid), having formed the fabric of American society, enabled a different set of values -pluralist, and democratic- to characterize American social consciousness. In de Tocqueville’s opinion freedom and democratic equality would continue if the right of association is protected because, “all such organizations became the vehicle for expressing to the authorities their opinions and concerns” (M.Orum, 2001: 75). Freedom of press is also an important element of American democracy that makes freedom and democratic equality sustainable (ibid).

Not only de Tocqueville, but also the famous sociologist Talcott Parsons (1971), who led the contemporary structural functionalist school with his systems theory, has paid attention to the uniqueness of American tradition. In *The System of Modern Societies* he defines the concept of *societal community*, a term he uses instead of ‘civil society’. Similarly, analysis of Parsons gives many clues about the solidarity function of civil associations. To Parsons, American society has institutionalized a wider range of freedoms than any previous society. “The United States, in Parsons view, is not only the proper home of educational revolution with its emphasis on the ‘associational pattern’, but also the most successful synthesis of the results of the democratic and industrial

revolutions” (Cohen&Arato, 1990: 134). Similar to de Tocqueville, “Parsons roots the importance of a pluralistic version of associations deeply in American history” (Cohen&Arato, 1990: 135). He claims that, “the organization of American Protestantism has favoured both pluralism and associationalism, the latter by the internal structure of the organization of the many churches, the former by the multiplicity of denominations and the relatively long history of toleration” (ibid). The concept of *societal community*, which indicates a social integration through shared norms and values, is perhaps the most significant concept that Parsons generated.

In Parsons view “the work of societies, in effect, is to ensure that...values and norms are transmitted to and acted upon by their members” (M. Orum, 2001: 79). Therefore for Parsons, “an *association* represents a corporate body whose members are solidarity with one another, in the sense of having a consensual relation to a common normative structure” (Cohen&Arato, 1990: 131). Accordingly, he describes the characteristics of associations of modern societies as the following:

Voluntariness, allowing relatively easy entry and exit, based in the normative principle of the freedom of association. The second such principle is the *equality* of members, constituting a horizontal instead of a hierarchical pattern of organization. The third is *proceduralism*, in the sense of providing both definite and formal rules for regulating discussion and for voting (ibid).

Other classical philosophers such as G.W.F. Hegel (1821) in *the Philosophy of Right*, and sociologists such as E. Durkheim (1893) in *the Division of Labour in Society*, have also recognised the significance of civil associations. Perhaps what these two figures have in common is their perception of state. Although in conceptualising civil society they did not perceive civil society as completely apart from the state, they both accepted its controlling function over the excessive force of state.

Some, none the less, had alternative perceptions that were less dependent on the relation to the state. Having limited the activities of civil society associations within the economic sphere, T. Paine (1791-92) in *the Rights of Man* might be seen as anti-statist

in regard to his concept of associational life. Also, A. Ferguson (1767) in *An Essay on the History of the Civil Society* dwells upon the issue of civil associations in a relatively different way.

It will be useful to briefly mention the ideas of these classical theorists here to see their contribution to the contemporary pluralist discourse of civil society and civil society associations.

Surprisingly, some of Hegel's ideas are very similar to the ideas of Tocqueville in that, "he sought an intermediate level of power between individual and state; he feared the powerlessness of atomized subjects and sought to control the potential arbitrariness of state bureaucracy" (Cohen&Arato, 1990: 107). When stressing upon the political aspect of social life, Hegel asserts that, "the associations and assemblies of social life acquire a connection to politics in the same act that gives politics a foundation in organized social life" (Cohen&Arato, 1990: 110). In the theory of corporation, "he proposed and defended a version of the corporation that was open to entry and exit that was based on no ascriptive or hereditary principle..." (Cohen&Arato, 1990: 106).

In another place Hegel also points out that, "the deputies of civil society are the 'deputies of the various corporations'" (Cohen&Arato, 1990: 110). In line with this vision,

...he also knew that a voluntary association was more than the liberal model of an interest group, because it is capable of generating new ties, solidarities and even collective identities. As *voluntary*, the association must allow for free entry and exit. As an *association*, presumably of peers, it should accord equal voice to its members and mutual recognition as members sharing a collective identity" (G.W.F. Hegel, *the Philosophy of Right*, par. 238 quoted in Cohen&Arato, 1990: 633).

Besides all these perceptions, it should not be forgotten that the real place of freedom was always the state itself because in Hegel's vision, contrary to the state, corporations could represent only the particularistic interests in society. The point was

that, all these particular interests in civil society reunited in the very existence of modern state (Cohen&Arato, 1990: 114, 108). Therefore, Hegel believed “in constant need of state supervision and control” (Cengiz, 2005:19) over civil society, including associations and corporations. In order to have a brief understanding of Hegel’s standpoint on the relationship between the state and the family and civil society, perhaps the most pertinent statement belonging to Hegel would be the following:

In contrast with the spheres of private rights and private welfare (the family and civil society), the state is from one point of view an external necessity and their higher authority; its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate to it and dependent on it. On the other hand, however, it is the end immanent within them, and its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end.....(Hegel, 1967:161 in *Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*).

For Durkheim, on the other hand, social order is the major end of modern societies. In spite of the growing division of labour, Durkheim is not pessimistic about the enhancement of solidarity and moral order. As such, a normal state of division of labour would contribute to solidarity by producing a new morality in which everyone needs one another, because it is the core element of social integration. “To Durkheim, the state is essentially a police force, responsible for ensuring that the norms and the rules of society are in fact, obeyed” (M. Orum, 2001: 71). In fact, “states represent the whole society, seeking to engender overall agreement and consensus...They represent the articulate norms and laws of the underlying social disorder, and thus to oppose them is to oppose the social order, or society itself” (M. Orum, 2001: 70). Durkheim mentions non-governmental organizations as social groups, as a collective force outside of the state, and more importantly as workers organizations; however, surprisingly, the functions of these organizations could not be in opposition to the state in any way. The functions and the relations of NGOs with the state would be the following:

The only way to resolve [the antinomy between excessive force and excessive neglect by the State] is to set up a cluster of collective forces outside the State, though subject to its action, whose regulative influence can be exerted with greater variety...To [such corporations] falls the duty of presiding over companies of insurance, benevolent and pensions, the need of which are felt by so many good minds but which we rightly hesitate to place in the hands of the State, already so

powerful and awkward...(Suicide, p.380 quoted in M.Orum, 2001: 71).

What Durkheim actually means is that, in modern societies with the increase in division of labour there is a growing gap between the workers and the states so that we need some intermediary institutions to which states will provide means to voice the concerns of workers. To Durkheim this is apparently important for protecting the social harmony and integrity. In another place, Durkheim points out that, “such organizations must be connected integrally to the workings of the state, the highest level of authority in society” (M.Orum, 2001: 72)

Representing the Scottish Enlightenment tradition, Ferguson’s concept of civility and civilization is primarily based on the idea of progress. According to him, civil society is a process that will be achieved not only through the establishment of liberal political institutions, but also by a developed free market economy and a commercial life. In addition to this, civil society, for Ferguson, also represents the moral association of citizens, as he “viewed human being as a social and political animal and as a member of community rather than as the individual” (Pietrzyk, 2001: 17). More importantly, similar to Tocqueville, his understanding of civil society “puts special emphasis on the ability of associational life in general and the habits of association in particular to foster patterns of civility in the actions of citizens in a democratic polity” (Foley&Edwards, 1996: 38-52). In *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*, he uses the meaning of civil as the opposite of rude. In this sense, “not every advanced society can be called ‘civil’ but only those in which individuals might enjoy civil liberty under government protecting their rights and interests” (Pietrzyk, 2001: 13). However, the matter in *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* is that he does not make a clear distinction between the state and civil society as spheres of life. Therefore, due to the increase in division of labour and overdevelopment of commerce and manufacturing, civil society itself might be the subject of erosion and corruption in the public spirit. Yet, as civil society needs a central power for its survival, it leads to despotism. Actually this is the unintended consequence of civilization process (Cengiz, 2005: 17, Nişancı, 2003: 127). Even if this is the situation, there is a solution of this dilemma. “Ferguson sees the solution of the dilemma in the creation of the independent social organizations as the

guarantor and the protector of the so-called public spirit” (Cengiz, 2005: 17). According to Dan Galin (2001), “from Ferguson, we have the idea that one must guard against authoritarianism by developing independent ‘societies’ within civil society” (Galin, 2000: 1). Furthermore, “Ferguson’s emphasis on the civic participation that is active citizenry based on virtues of active public life” (Pietrzyk, 2001: 22), indicates a vision pertaining to the current concept of civil society. In a nutshell, “Ferguson suggests the creation and development of independent civil social associations and institutions as the guarantee against the despotism within the realm of civil society which implies the material ground of our modern civilization” (Cengiz, 2005: 18).

To proceed with the Scottish Enlightenment line, another important figure who adopts an anti-statist position is Thomas Paine, who describes civil society as a sphere within which individuals pursue their private economic interests. In Paine’s view “it is the market rather than the state that provides the best opportunity for the growth of civil society, because the limits of individual capacity to satisfy natural desires can only be transcended by commercial exchanges” (Hyden, 1998: 20). According to him, “the state may threaten the very liberties that cause civil society to flourish” (ibid). Besides his impression on libertarian view owing to his distinction between government and society and acceptance of state despotism risk, according to Hyden (1998), he has been a primary influence in the American debate of civil society as he has stressed upon the market economy and importance of civil associations as separate from the state. Different from the European tradition, in the American understanding of civil society, civil society is “good in and of itself because it is in civil society that democratic norms are lodged” (Hyden, 1998: 21). Active consent of individuals in order to have an empowered and legitimate state has been also underlined by Paine, and his positioning civil society against the state also proves his influence not only on pluralist thinking but also on the recently recognised discourse of civil society and the functions of civil society organizations (Cengiz, 2005: 18).

2.2. NGOs in Contemporary Pluralism and Debates on Civil Society

While in classical theories civil organizations are mostly called *voluntary organizations*, in contemporary pluralist debates they have been called *interest or pressure groups*. It is known that, after the Second World War the pluralist wave first began in the United States. Held (1989) points out that, “..a school of empirical democratic theory, widely referred to as ‘pluralism’, gained a commanding position within American university studies of politics beginning in the 1950s” (Held, 1989: 57). According to John Higham and Nathan Glazer (1963), America “sought to differentiate itself from totalitarian states and their demand for uniformity” (cited in Scott, 2004: 69-83). In the post war era Americans adopted individual pluralism, “emphasizing the voluntary basis for collective identities,” instead of the “confederation-of-nations pluralism” (ibid). Put in other words, “in contrast to the interwar years, when ethnic, racial, and religious advocacy groups tended to promote their own causes, in the post-war era it was common for them to join ranks with others, advocating equal rights, tolerance, and individual acceptance” (ibid). Looking at European countries one can say that pluralist liberalism has come upon the new period of industrialization after the war. The increasing division of labour, specialization, and complex political institutions in nation states brought about the need for compliance, harmony and integration. Societies became diverse from the effect of a high rate of industrialization, education and urbanization. All these developments resulted in the birth of pluralist theories based on group participation through interest and pressure groups, which also shows the responsive capacity of industrial nations. According to this vision, the state is an arbitrator and cannot act in the direction of one interest; instead, it actually represents the compromise between various interest groups. (Dowse&Hughes, 1986: 133-135, Riley, 1988: 22).

However, it should be pointed out that the 1950’s were also the time of rising mass democracies and the forerunner of the welfare state period in Europe. Therefore, it can be argued that pluralism developed in Europe concomitant with a centralized state power aiming at “maintaining order and stability rather than promoting active political

participation” (Howel&Pearce, 2001: 42). This picture only began to change with the interrogation of the role of state that came into being in Europe from 1968 or with the social movements.

According to David Held (1989) pluralism was an application of a Weberian notion of power in order to the study Western parliamentary democracies. This empirical democratic theory “widely referred to as ‘pluralism’, gained a commanding position within American university studies of politics, beginning in the 1950s” (Held, 1989: 57). “The pluralist view developed out of the concept of pressure or interest groups- organizations which seek to influence policy decisions affecting their views or interests” (Rush, 1992: 68).

Robert Dahl is perhaps the most important author who has contributed to pluralist thinking with his original works. The most important concept that he suggests is *polyarchy*. He (1971) states in *Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition* that, for a democratic political system a responsive and an inclusive government taking the preferences of its’ citizens into account is inevitable. Also, in such democratic systems all citizens should be given the opportunity of formulating their preferences; signifying their preferences to other citizens and taking individual or collective action; being assessed equally or facing no discrimination by the government due to the content of the preference (Dahl, 1971: 1-2). To provide all of these there are seven institutions specified by Dahl: Universal suffrage; “suffrage coextensive with the right to run for public office” (Dahl, 1986: 230); free and fair elections; “extensive protection of free expression, including criticism of government, the regime, society, the dominant ideology and so on” (ibid); autonomous competing and alternative sources of information; “a high degree of freedom to form relatively autonomous organizations of great variety, including, most crucially, opposition to political parties” (ibid); high responsiveness of the government to voters (ibid). By drawing up all seven conditions Dahl implies that universal suffrage and free elections are not enough for an efficient democracy or polyarchy. The organizational practices of competing minorities to achieve political consensus are also needed. In other words, as Dahl (1956) states in A

Preface to Democracy Theory, although elections are important in determining policy and controlling leaders, they are not sufficient as indicators of majority preference or the preference of ordinary citizens (Dahl, 1956: 131). On the other hand, in a system described by a constitution and supplemented by organizational practices at key positions in the decision making process, “an influential minority at any of these stages may veto the alternative preferred by a majority” (Dahl, 1956: 103). In other words, “given sufficient diversity of interests and a large enough geographical area, no majorities can be organized and made effective in national decisions” (Dahl, 1956:104). Therefore, in polyarchies, neither a minority nor a majority takes political decisions, since it is the *government by minorities* (Dahl, 1956:133). This is also the point on which pluralists have countered both Marxist and elitist assumptions in which state and civil society are dominated by a minority. Particularly, as Hirst underlines,

...polyarchy is a system in which plurality of organizations compete for influence and specifically where formally equal electors have a choice between a number of parties in elections. It leads not to ‘majority rule’ but to *minorities rule*: such a polity does not consist of an amorphous citizenry who cast their votes directly for policies, but of a highly differentiated body of supporters of secondary organizations, who cast their votes for parties related to those organizations (Hirst, 1990: 49).

Furthermore,

...polyarchy avoids de Tocqueville’s dilemma of majority tyranny because the ‘people’ never are an equal and amorphous citizen body; rather, the populace is structured into mutually conditioning interests and organizations. Polyarchy avoids Weber’s authoritarian plebiscitarianism because of political competition between a plurality of organized interest and parties; individual votes in organizational and national elections may count for little but in aggregate they do not count and voters can be organized to replace one party or leadership by another and to influence one policy rather than another (Hirst, 1990: 50).

As Smith and Freedman notes, according to George Sabine (1952) who is a distinguished American student of political theory, in a democratic society there should be a complex of societies upholding the personal and shared interests of their members and giving them a sense of participation by encouraging them to take part in decision

making. “Collectively they have to be self-governing in the sense that they set the standards of their own performance, gauge their own interests and in general live their own lives in their own way” (Smith and Freedman, 1972: 40). Furthermore,

pluralists maintain that a democratic system requires a multitude of independent, voluntary, nongovernmental associations as buffers between the individual and the state. These associations prevent the arbitrary exercise of government power and contribute to the maintenance of the polity by educating or socializing the citizenry (Smith and Freedman, 1972: 34).

David Truman (1951) who is another leading figure of pluralist thinking states in *The Governmental Process* that growing structural complexity and specialization concomitant with the multiplicity of interests in industrial societies has brought about a new political practice, namely, the group politics through the organized associations and potential groups, each based on a different interests (Truman, 1951: 502). The character or the function of this new political practice is to stabilize and counterbalance the interactions among different interests. According to Truman, each shared attitude has the potential of becoming a political interest group as far as it is able to put pressure upon any of the governmental institutions (Truman, 1951:37). Governmental decision is therefore the “product of effective access, of the claims of organized and unorganized interests that achieve access with varying degrees of effectiveness” (Truman, 1951: 507).

In fact, Truman was influenced by Arthur F. Bentley (1908), who in *The Process of Government* asserted that, “the state of government in any given time simply is the balance of group pressures and resistances and of government adjustment to those pressures” (McLennan, 1989:19). James Madison (1787), who in his work called *The Federalist* stressed on the necessity of *factions* for a stable political life, not only influenced Truman’s work but he is often credited with giving inspiration to the modern American empirical democratic theory. In fact, empirical democratic theorists think that Madison’s factions, who were creditors, debtors, mercantile interests etc., continue in the form of today’s voluntary organizations, interest groups, and organizations of business and labour. Furthermore, they are seen “as the structural source of stability and

the central expression of democracy” (Held, 1989:57). Madison suggests that “the process of diverse interests competing for power is a source of democratic equilibrium” (Held, 1989: 56) in American political life. In accordance with this vision, Truman states that the presence of many groups of opposing interests acts to maintain a kind of balance in society (Acar, 1976: 29), and this maintaining balance could be achieved through stabilizing or relating the different interests among persons. Furthermore, Truman also points out that not all interests in society are organized. There are also unorganized or potential interests that are influential in governmental processes owing to their potential pressures. Multiple or overlapping memberships of potential group interests also provides an additional safeguard against the danger of one group’s domination and extremism. Furthermore, as McLennan argues, to Berelson “multiple group membership provides the very glues which binds society together” (McLennan, 1989:21). That is,

...since most individuals in society belong to more than one interest group cross-cutting loyalties develop. The different groups’ individuals belong to do not have similar or parallel attitudes on political issues. Thus, they pull individuals in different directions which cause moderation of political views and promote compromise (Acar, ???: 21).

Truman’s overall contribution to pluralism could be summarized using the publication of *The Governmental Process* in 1951, saying “pluralists took interest group theory a step further by arguing that if an interest existed it would develop organisational representation, since this was the only means of making its presence felt” (Rush, 1992: 68).

To sum up, as stated by McLennan Dahl and Lindblom (1953) in *Politics, Economics and Welfare* perceived the

...political effect of interest groups as central, in five ways. In the first place, groups are more politically effective than individuals, and this encourages greater all-round participation in voluntary associations. Secondly, group organization facilitates healthy political competition, the condition of a democratic public sphere. Third, the group bargaining

process creates a barrier to extremism and provides a springboard for responsive political negotiators to emerge, in a climate conducive to the formation of alliances. Fourth, overlapping membership of social groups discourages unilateral thought and action. Fifth, an extensive network of social groups helps to ensure the spread of information and communication channels (McLennan, 1989:20).

We see from the above stated opinions of well-known pluralists that today's NGOs are called either as interest/pressure groups or as voluntary organizations, and their roles and functions are considered as if they are the major elements of democratic politics, that is, pluralistic democracy. Emphasis upon the human groups and organisations instead of isolated individuals indicates pluralist democracy's inclination to a communitarian understanding and a sociological perspective. Parallel to the developments of such communitarian view, pluralists have come to approach the classical liberals and their emphasis on individualism rather suspiciously (Cohen and Arato, 1990: 9-10). Moreover, pluralism embraces a conservative perspective, a vision of social order and a good life as well. There is also the fact that, especially in the American case, "voluntary associations" implies religious, ethnic groups, or groups bound to traditional ties. Indeed, "plural democracy presents itself in the sense that it '...champions the virtues of moderation and consensus, conceiving society as a cooperative venture undertaken for mutual advantage, a natural harmony reconciling individual interest with the pursuit of the common good'" (Riley, 1988: 23). Thus, when thinking of pluralist democracy, as Wolff recognises, one can realize that it might be perceived as an attempt for synthesizing the elements of "*liberal* principles and *conservative* sociology" (Wolff, 1989: 148).

To summarize, the pluralist idea not only considers non-governmental organizations –apart from state and market- in fostering democracy, but also pays attention to compromise, moderation, and compliance in politics. Additionally, pluralism is about a political culture and the idea of a good life as well as a common good. Also, it involves a social capital to work more effectively. Furthermore, it adopts a liberal vision of state, namely, a restricted and limited one.

So far in this study I have tried to draw a picture of the relationships between non-governmental/voluntary/civil organizations, pluralist thinking, and thoughts of some classical and contemporary figures who underline the importance of associations in a democratic society. The work will continue with the repercussions of this picture on today's thinkers. In this part I intend to focus especially on the contentions after the 1990s when the pluralist thinking takes its second upturn after the 1950s. With the dissolution of the Soviet Block, the anti-statist wave met with liberal pluralism under the titles of revival or reinvention of civil society, identified particularly with the rebellion of Eastern European countries as a response to "a situation characterised by the actual experience of an overbearing state" (Kaldor, 2003: 5). Indeed, elements of contemporary pluralism have been shaped by various developments, including an immigration wave and physical closeness of different ethnic and national groups. In such conditions, it became important to recognize different interests of different nations and different ethnic groups both politically and socially. Therefore, it is not a surprise that pluralist thinking is as important now as it was in the 1950s when thinking about the need for stability and compliance, especially in a globalized world. Furthermore, similar to the situation described in the 19th century by de Tocqueville, in contemporary debates on civil society NGOs are once again being considered as headstones of democracy in Europe.

In this matter, there are leading figures that could be mentioned as the inheritors of de Tocqueville and other classical pluralist thinkers. Such thinkers and authors such as L. Diamond (1994, 1999), R. Putnam (1993, 1995, 2002) and P. Hirst (1996, 1997, 2002) are already mentioned in this study. There are many others who were also influenced by pluralist thinking. For example, E. Gellner (1994), A. Seligman (1992), M. Walzer (1998), C. Taylor, (1989, 1990), J. Hall (1995) and J. Keane (1988, 1998, 2003) are some other prominent names that have correlated civil society organizations and democracy in a positive way in their analysis of civil society.

In the following part, after taking a brief look at the works of L. Diamond, R. Putnam and other scholars, I will lastly touch upon P. Hirst and his concept of

associative democracy which is a critical concept regarding the contentions about NGOs, the recent capturing of civil society and pluralism.

Larry Diamond describes civil society “as the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating (largely), self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules” (Diamond, 1994: 5; Diamond 1999: 221). Civil society, for him, involves acting collectively in the public sphere. It actually stands between individuals and the institutions of the state; it excludes economic society and any profit making activity of it. It is also distinct from political society, encompassing political parties whose aim is to seize the state power. Because, if civil society organizations are captured by political parties they lose their ability to scrutinize state power and mediating functions (Diamond, 1999: 221).

In Diamond’s analysis civil society organizations differ from other organizations by several respects: First, “civil society is concerned with public rather than private ends. Second, civil society relates to the state but does not aim to win formal power or office in the state” (Diamond, 1994: 6). Third, civil organizations embrace pluralism and diversity. That means if an organization claims that it represents the only legitimate way and it monopolizes a political space, it contradicts with pluralism and diversity. Fourth, civil society should be partial, meaning that no group claims to represent the whole society, but rather different groups represent different interests. So, religious fundamentalist, ethnic chauvinist groups can not a part of a democratic society (Diamond, 1994: 6-7).

Diamond also specifies the features of civil society organizations. According to them, civil society organizations “must function democratically in their internal processes of decision making and leadership selection” (Diamond, 1999: 228). The more they encourage active participation of their members, the more they will generate trust, tolerance and cooperation. Other than this civil society organizations should not contain undemocratic elements in their objectives. Furthermore, their leaders should be accountable and responsive to law and they should consider the interest of their

members and organization's public goal. Pluralism is another feature of civil society without which cooperation and negotiation can not be sustained in organization. Diamond also underlines that in corporatist systems pluralism is more needed since it can hinder the way of monopolistic civil society and helps to the emergence of overlapping interests. Relating to this, diversity is also an indispensable feature of civil society because not only more and more citizens will find an opportunity to express themselves in associations, but also it helps build trust in a political culture (Diamond, 1999: 233).

Limitation of state power is the first democratic function of civil society that Diamond draws upon. This function of civil society has two dimensions: "to monitor and restrain the exercise of power by democratic states and to democratize authoritarian states" (Diamond, 1994: 7). This implies that, for Diamond, civil society does not have to be in opposition to the state. In democratic governments civil society has the function of sustaining and consolidating democracy through "checking their potential abuses and violations of law and subjecting them to public scrutiny" (ibid). Furthermore, a rich associational life increases political efficiency and the skills of democratic citizens since they can be considered, as Tocqueville remarks, as public schools where all members learn how to associate with others for public purposes. Tolerance, moderation and a sense of compromise and respect for opposing approaches are also likely to develop in civil society as far as the practice of participation is efficiently performed (Diamond, 1994: 8). Creating channels other than political parties through organized pressure from below is another democratic function of civil society. "This function is particularly important for providing traditionally excluded groups -such as women and racial or ethnic minorities-" (ibid) with access to power. Also, a richly pluralistic society has an important democratic function since Diamond argues, it "will tend to generate wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict" (Diamond, 1994: 9).

Encarnacion remarks that Diamond privileges advocacy groups -like human rights organizations- rather than a choral society, which is a network of civil

engagement such as a bird watching club. As such, he

...deems the work of advocacy NGOs as central to the limitations of state power, empowerment of minorities, the promotion of democratic values among the citizenry, increased political participation in the new democratic system, and enhanced prospects of economic reform (Encarnacion, 2002: 120).

Larry Diamond carries the elements of neo-conservative thinking considering his overemphasis on political stability and moderation. Also, he not only relates a well-developed capitalism and democracy in a positive way but also he denotes the role of political elites in the emergence of democracy (Diamond, 1993: 3).

From the 1980s on NGOs have begun to be considered as actors in promoting democracy in the third world countries. For many writers like Diamond, NGOs are important political actors in transformatory development of the developing world. This is apparently a process of liberal-pluralist transformation of state and society, as well as an opposition to authoritarian regimes.

Similarly, pluralist development analysts view NGOs and grassroots organizations as contributors to the pluralism of the social order in the Third World. NGOs take the place normally assigned to interest groups, as intermediaries between the unorganized masses and the state (Macdonald, 1997: 17).

Larry Diamond as the editor of the journal of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) attributes NGOs very key role to democratizing the developing world. In this context, in Diamond' analysis concepts of democratic transition and democratic consolidation are distinguished. In the developing world, civil society has the role of democratic transition through civil pressures, such as student movements, women's groups, human right organizations, occupational organizations and so on (Diamond, 1994: 5; Mercer, 2002:7). As in relatively developed democracies, civil society has the role of consolidating and maintaining democracy. (Diamond, 1994: 7, Mercer, 2002:8).

To sum up, for Diamond, civil society enhances democracy in several ways:

Containing the power of the state through public scrutiny, stimulating political participation by citizens, developing such democratic norms as tolerance and compromise...mitigating conflict through cross-cutting or overlapping interests....questioning and reforming existing democratic institutions and procedures (Hyden, 1998: 22-23).

As stated in Burnell and Calvert, to Diamond “there is a strong correlation between the strength and autonomy of associational life and the presence and vitality of democracy” (Burnell and Calvert, 2004: 57).

Robert Putnam is another representative of recent pluralist thinking in his civil society analysis. In his famous work, *Making Democracy Work* (1993), Putnam “weds the work of sociologist James Coleman on “social capital” (1990) with Alexis de Tocqueville’s theories about the virtues of voluntary associations, which Putnam regards as synonymous with civil society” (Encarnacion, 2002: 118). According to Putnam, “organizations and associations are critical to sustaining the work of modern societies. Among other things, they help to promote a strong sense of civility and trust among citizens; or, as he put it....they furnish the critical social capital necessary to making democratic institutions work” (Orum, 2001: 217). For Putnam (1993), joining voluntary organizations contributes to the effectiveness of democracy in two ways; internally and externally. “Internally, associations instil in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity and public-spiritedness” (Putnam, 1993: 90). Furthermore,

...participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation as well as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavours. Moreover, when individuals belong to ‘cross-cutting’ groups with diverse goals and members, their attitudes will tend to moderate as a result of group interaction and cross-pressures (Putnam, 1993: 90).

Externally,

...a dense network of voluntary groupings contributes to effective social collaboration of the kind that extends onto the wider polity. This intense horizontal interaction aids democracy by forming the foundation

for effective self-government and socioeconomic development (Encarnacion, 2002: 118).

Different from Diamond, Putnam's understanding of civil society is based mostly on choral societies -which are the groups that did not join to advocate something- rather than advocacy groups. Rather, for Putnam civic engagement of people is important since it is a nominator of *social capital*. Actually, the most crucial debate in *social capital* is "the value of voluntary organizations in curbing the power of centralizing institutions, protecting pluralism and nurturing constructive norms, especially 'generalized trust and cooperation'" (Edwards, 2004: 7). In spite of this difference, both Diamond and Putnam find that civil society represents a virtue. That means both believe in virtuous roles of NGOs in creating and sustaining democracy (Encarnacion, 2002: 121). "Putnam (2000) argues that social networks have a high societal value because of 'the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them...'" (Rossteutcher, 2002: 514). In this sense, the closely related concepts of *civic virtue* and *social capital* are necessary elements of democratization. Actually, Putnam borrows the term *social capital* from J. Coleman who is a brilliant sociologist and the writer of *Foundations of Social Theory* (1990). According to the economist Glenn Loury "social capital refers to the social resources that individuals possess and on which they can draw in making critical decisions and taking critical action" (Orum, 2001: 85). Drawing his inspiration from Loury, however, Coleman uses the term in a broader sense; for him, social capital not only refers to "the social relations of people, but also to the sense of underlying trust and confidence that people have in one another" (ibid). Accordingly, in *Democracies in Flux* (2002) Putnam and Goss describe *social capital* as "social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity, because like physical and human capital (tools and training), social networks create value, both individual and collective..." (Putnam and Goss 2002: 8). Civic virtue, which is another crucial concept in Putnam's analysis, is "a steady recognition and pursuit of the public good at the expense of all purely individual and private ends" (Putnam, 1993: 88). The importance of civic virtue for Putnam could be understood from his famous article entitled "Bowling Alone: America's Decline Social Capital" (1995) in which he complains about the decline of civic engagement, trust, and the *social capital* in

America.

His interpretation is based, among other things, on the results of sample surveys that show that while more people are bowling than ever before, more are bowling alone, not in bowling leagues. This included declines in churches attendance, participation in fraternal organizations, and in other public forms of association (Orum, 2001: 217).

Furthermore, for Putnam,

...networks of civic engagement, like the neighbourhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, sports clubs, mass-based parties...represent intense horizontal interaction. Networks of civil engagement are essential forms of social capital: The denser such networks in a community, the more likely that its citizens will be able to cooperate for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1993: 173).

More importantly, networks of civic engagement, even if they are apolitical, “have political effects because of their influence on overall levels of political participation, including voting...” (Edwards, 2004: 26). If we remember the importance of civic networks for de Tocqueville, one can say that, “both Tocqueville and Putnam therefore draw a close link between trust, norms, civic virtues, in general, and associations, on the one hand, and good democratic government, on the other” (Rossteutcher, 2002: 514). In *Making Democracy Work* (1993), Putnam tests his ideas empirically by underlying the civic community tradition, if not also the existence of the *social capital*, in the north Italy instead of in the south. The conclusion of his study was following:

Civic regions were characterized by a dense network of local associations, by active engagement in community affairs, by egalitarian patterns of politics, by trust and law-abidingness. In less civic regions, political and social participation was organized vertically, not horizontally. Mutual suspicion and corruption were regarded as normal. Involvement in civic associations was scanty. Lawlessness was expected. People in these communities felt powerless and exploited...Tocqueville was right. Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a vigorous civil society. (Howell and Pearce, 2001: 47).

Following Putnam's ideas, one can see the patterns of pluralism easily. In any case, he gives references to de Tocqueville, D. Truman, M. Lipset or A. Lijphart in his works. However, it should be underlined that there are considerable amount of works that criticize and/or disprove Putnam's theory due to its over-optimism about the functions of civic networks. (Encarnacion, 2002, Howell and Pearce, 2001)

In addition to Diamond and Putnam, there are other authors who underline the relationship between democracy and civil society (organizations). Ernst Gellner (1995) in "The Importance of Being Modular" states that:

Civil society is that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society (Gellner, 1995: 32 in Hall).

Here, the role of NGOs is considered as a balance mechanism concerned with controlling the role of the state. In addition to this, Gellner lays on the voluntary characters of NGOs by writing that "civil society is a cluster of institutions and associations strong enough to prevent tyranny, but which are, nevertheless, entered freely rather than imposed either by birth or by awesome ritual" (Gellner, 1995: 42 in Hall). Accordingly, a modular man as he describes "can combine into specific-purpose, ad-hoc, limited associations, without binding himself by some blood ritual. He can leave an association when he comes to disagree with its' policy without being open to the charge of treason" (ibid). With the rise of modernization, traditional ties or bonds of individuals gave their place to modern institutions and high degree of division of labour. While explaining the importance of modularity, Gellner in *Conditions of Liberty* points out that it is still possible to combine people around a morality in modern times. This would show that "society is still a structure; it is not atomized, helpless and supine" (Gellner, 1994: 100). Civil society organizations that are developed by modular individuals make it "possible to have atomization, individualism without a political emasculation of the atomized man, and to have politically countervailing associations without these being stifling" (Gellner, 1994: 99). For this,

“what is required is that a man should be capable of undertaking and honouring, and deeply internalizing commitments and obligations by a single and sober act” (Gellner, 1994:103). Therefore, “modularity with its moral and intellectual pre-conditions makes Civil Society, the existence of non-suffocating, optional yet effective segments possible...” (Gellner, 1994: 106). He also replies to the critiques from the Marxist front to the current popularity of civil society since the beginning from 1989, the collapse of Eastern Block. He states that:

The currently operational notion of Civil Society is useful, and not quite so tortuous. It did not acquire its recent popularity and potency for nothing. But giving it a down-to-earth sociological meaning – institutional pluralism *of a certain kind* – is more useful than turning back to the turgid ideological tradition from which it sprang (Gellner, 1994: 60).

Also, Gellner emphasizes the importance of pluralism in several places of his work, namely in *Conditions of Liberty*. He proposes a special kind of pluralism which is “different from the pluralism of segmentary societies, ancient or tribal” (Gellner, 1994: 54). Although though they are not central and tyrannical at all, they are still stifling. Interesting enough, he prefers to use civil society instead of democracy, since, for him, democracy is an abstract general ideal and it is universally defended. On the other hand, civil society “is a more realistic notion, which specifies and includes its own conditions...” (Gellner, 1994: 189). In addition to this, in some places he underlines the necessity of state pluralism, while in other places he calls for institutional, economic and political pluralism. According to him,

...society needs economic pluralism for productive efficiency, and it needs social and political pluralism to counteract excessive tendencies to centralism. But above all, it uses social and political pluralism, but of a special, modular, *ad hoc* kind which does not stifle individuality, while at the same time acting as a countervailing force to the centre...What is essential to it is the absence of either ideological or institutional monopoly (Gellner, 1994: 188)

A. Seligman (1991) in *The Idea of Civil Society* describes the third use of civil society as “an ethical ideal, a vision of the social order that is not only descriptive but prescriptive, providing us with a vision of good life” (Seligman, 1992: 201). Seligman

argues that the roots of civil society go back to the 18th century. The developments like commercialization of land, discoveries, and revolution, brought about the need of social order. And, the reasonable men of the Enlightenment age can do their affairs by themselves, without the help of the state (Seligman, 1992: 15-16). According to this one can argue that the vision of civil society, including de Tocqueville's, is based on the needs of this conjuncture. In line with this vision and inspired by A. Ferguson, Seligman emphasizes the normative or ethical content in uses of civil society and writes, 'The idea of civil society thus embodies for many an ethical ideal of the social order, one that, if not overcomes, at least harmonizes, the conflicting demands of individual interest and social good'" (Seligman, 1992: x). According to Seligman, morality always refers to the public just as for Machiavelli, Rousseau and H. Arendt. "Morality, or the stuff of virtue, is less a private attribute and more a public or communal enterprise. It is realized by the active and continual participation of collective members in communal affairs..." (Seligman, 1995: 204 in Hall). Also, this community that constitutes civil society is not the source of morality, but rather it is moral in itself. As such, the idea of "the notion of community as morality" is "at the heart of the civic virtue tradition, where a community of virtue is one where the social good is defined solely by the subjugation of the private self to the public realm" (ibid). In my view, although understanding Seligman merely in the line of pluralism is not easy, as far as his stresses on common good, morality, civic virtue and community are concerned, he could be seen as close to traditional pluralism and classical democratic theory as I have mentioned in previous section.

After mentioning Seligman, to continue with Micheal Walzer and Charles Taylor's emphasis on morality, common good and democratic participation in a communitarian line would be suitable.

In contrast to the classical liberal vision of the individual, for them, individuals are not burdened with given rights and preferences, but rather their social ties and communities are determining them. In the same manner, they can be moral within their own community, but not by themselves (Bienen, Rittberger, Wagner, 1998: 301 in

Archibugi, Held, Köhler). This point is similar to Seligman's moral community, in the presence of which, the possibility of an efficient functioning civil society has been approved by Walzer. That means that, although for Walzer civil society is "the sphere of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks formed for the sake of family, faith, interest and ideology that fills this space" (Glasius, Lewis, Seckinelgin, 2004: 19), the sustainability of the uncoerced nature of human associations depends on the presence of a democratic state and a democratic civil society. First of all, he sees civil society as a "setting of settings". For him, "both voluntary associations and state agencies are obliged to help people in finding the resources for achieving decent lives and social citizenship" (Wesolowski, 1995: 127 in Hall). The state should arrange institutions to help groups and communities cope with their problems. "The state he agrees is an indispensable agent" (Burnell&Calvert, 2004: 153), although associations always resist state bureaucrats. Actually, while accepting the enabling role of state, Walzer also presupposes that an efficiently functioning civil society, which is the realm of solidarity, depends on a democratic state. It is clear from this argument that the state should be a pluralist state. For Walzer, the "relationship between state and civil society need not be only one of opposition" (Burnell&Calvert, 2004: 152), but can be cooperative.

Walzer, like other communitarians, also argues that a sense of solidarity, trust, and cooperation are difficult to flourish from a universal ethic, universal human rights, or from liberal individual rights given by nature. For him, commonalities of history, belief and civil culture "supply the feelings of reciprocity, trust and commitment" (Archibugi, Held, Köhler, 1998: 164). "Such moral qualities have an important influence on the character of political life, since they increase people's willingness to engage in cooperative behaviour by raising their expectations and confidence in others" (ibid). Such feelings of reciprocity, for Walzer, also signify the obligations that come with citizenship due to the sense of belonging to the particular nation, just as in the case of welfare state (Archibugi, Held, Köhler, 1998: 164). Similar to Walzer, Charles Taylor, as a communitarian, "roots the social good in the traditions of a particular human community, posits this good over against a universal idea of rights (or justice)

not so embedded” (Seligman, 1992: 192). Parallel to Tocqueville and Ferguson, for him, a despotic state is a threat for democratic participation and civic virtue. (Fina&Rai, 1997: 46). As such, in his view civil society is composed of networks of autonomous institutions and “comprises those dimensions of social life which cannot be confounded with, or swallowed up in, the state” (Burnell&Calvert, 2004: 146).

Glancing at the J.Hall and J.Keane’s concepts of civil society, it is not so difficult to derive that pluralist thinking has influenced them. According to J. Hall (1995), "civil society *is* complicated, most notably in being at one and at the same time a social value and set of social value and a set of institutions" (Mc Lavery, 2002: 304). In the same place, Hall argues that "civil society must depend upon the ability to escape any particular cage; membership of autonomous groups needs to be both voluntary and overlapping; if society is to become civil" (ibid). In addition to this, he reminds us that traditionally the role of civil society has been depicted as controlling and balancing the state power. But, this function of society could be achieved when the inner democracy of non-governmental organizations has been provided (Mc Lavery, 2002: 304). As for John Keane (1998), civil society is

...a complex and dynamic ensemble of legally protected non-governmental institutions that tend to be non-violent, self-organizing, self-reflexive and permanently in tension with each other and with the state institutions that ‘frame’, construct and enable their activities (Keane 1998:6).

The crucial point regarding the membership of those organizations for Keane, is that “membership is consensual rather than legally required, meaning that ‘exit is possible without loss of status or public rights or benefits’” (Edwards, 2004: 20).

Along with the above approaches, there are also approaches that reconcile the concepts of civil society and the public sphere. For example, Cohen and Arato write:

We understand ‘civil society’ as a sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary

associations), social movements and forms of public communication (Cohen and Arato, 1993, ix).

J. Habermas conceives of civil society as a sphere of public communication or deliberation without ignoring the importance of voluntary associations. They see public communication, dialog, and bargaining processes as the key elements of society, and they try to develop a sociological procedure based on true or uncontaminated communication (Habermas, 1983). Thus, NGOs are not the major domain of their analysis. Because of this, these theories are not expected to be a major source of reference considering the scope and the concern of this study. Yet, it can be said that their analysis carries considerable traces of pluralist understanding of 19th and beginning of 20th century.

The major figure, at least for this study, of recent pluralism or radical pluralism is famous social theorist Paul Hirst (1946-2003), who puts self-governing free associations at the centre of his theory. As a radical pluralist, P. Hirst (1994) in *Associative Democracy* tries to overcome the contradiction between state and civil society. That means he attempts to present a model of democracy that provides a trade off between the state and civil society. Hirst offers a liberal state, as he believes that solving problems through the standard state interventions is not appropriate in the very diverse and pluralistic society of today. So, he agrees with Giddens in the need of a generative politics² (Faulks, 1999). However, the difference is that Hirst's suggestion "is an attempt to constitute generative politics through the notion of associationalism" (Faulks, 1999: 184). Actually, he offers a complete system that entails renewing political institutions, which gives to people a chance to build "their own self-governing communities in civil society" (Hirst, 1994: 12). For this, the decentralization of the state is a must, since for Hirst, "the decentralization of democracy would help to prevent the tyranny of a majority at a state level" (ibid). The role of the state is to

² "A notion of 'generative politics' is put forward by Giddens as a mechanism for achieving that 'active trust'. This 'generative politics' would require the state to enter negotiations with social groups in an 'open' and non-prescriptive attitude as regards the outcomes of those negotiations"(Giddens 1998: 71 quoted in http://www.sociologyonline.co.uk/politics/Giddens_3way.shtml).

provide an atmosphere in which to encourage citizens to make their own decisions through the channel of self-governing associations (Faulks, 1999). In other words, “the state will have mainly a regulatory role rather than an active governing one. Such a state will act as a ‘facilitator’ to voluntary associations” (Fitzgerald, 2006³). Furthermore, the state may empower associations with public money. Yet, the point is that each organization “would be able to organise themselves in any matter they chose, provided they did not infringe upon the basic rights of individuals, including the right to exit from the group” (Faulks, 1999: 184).

According to Fitzgerald, “Hirst’s model of associative democracy is a modern development of Guild Socialism of the late 19th early 20th centuries. The chief exponents of this Guild Socialism were the British socialist authors Harold Laski and GDH Cole” (Fitzgerald, 2006). It is in fact true that P. Hirst not only gives many references to those two authors in his *Associative Democracy* (1994), but also he edited a book entitled *The Pluralist theory of the state: selected writings of G.D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis, and H.J. Laski* in 1989, within which he tries to retrieve pluralism with the help of these classical pluralist thinkers. “Hirst partly defines ‘associationalism’ in opposition to both free market individualism (neo-liberalism) and state socialism” (Fitzgerald, 2006). He believes that if many activities of society -especially the social provisions- are managed by self-governing voluntary organizations of citizens, then the contradiction between public and private sphere will be diminished since both individual freedom and social welfare are ensured. As he states “voluntary self-governing associations are the best way of organizing human affairs that combine liberty with social obligation” (Hirst, 1993: 121, quoted in Fitzgerald, 2006).

In Hirst’s theory of associative democracy, self-governing civil organizations have a primary role in conducting social affairs, whereas the state has a secondary role with the functions of an arbitrator, facilitator, right protector or fund holder (Hirst, 1993: 117). Actually, this secondary role of the state is necessary for the protection against the centralising tendencies of the internal bureaucratic elite. Hirst agrees with

³ http://www.sociologyonline.co.uk/politics/Giddens_3way_comments1.shtml

English pluralists of the early 20th century, namely D.H. Cole, J.N. Figgis, and H.J. Laski, in that “the primary purpose of the central public power was to police and protect the pluralist system, ensuring that self-governing voluntary bodies did not damage one another or the rights of citizens” (Hirst, 1994: 32).

According to P Hirst, representative democracy is in crisis since there is the problem of regulation and coordination that states can no longer carry out successfully. Therefore, Hirst (1993) offers a system in which “the scope of public governance is not reduced, but the form in which it is provided ceases to be directly administered by the state” (ibid). Furthermore, “associationalism argues that, far from there being one welfare state, there should be as many as citizens choose to organize, catering for their different values of individuals, but based on common basic public entitlements” (Hirst, 2002: 409).

Associationalism also offers a principle of administrative renewal, a way of restoring the ideal committed public service in the face of widespread bureaucratic failure and retreat. Voluntary-based organizations can be tenacious and effective. They tend to endure as forms of organization, where they are supported by the right kinds of laws and institutions (Hirst, 1994: 6).

So, it does not mean that the organizational life brings democracy automatically; it cannot do this unless it slips out of the hierarchical forms of relationships. In order for this to happen, organizational life as well as that of the state must become pluralized. In a pluralist organizational life, public participation is meaningless if citizens are not really consulted. A mechanism is needed that could give citizens a sense of redressed, especially in the provision of public services. Pluralism in this sense does not only mean the plurality of organizations working for the same issue, but also the opportunity to exit from one organization and enter into another. As a result of this flexibility, according to Hirst, decisions raised from that issue would be the result of choice, not of fate.

Hirst advocates “a process of building-up associations from below”(Hirst, 1997:

126, Hirst, 1994: 39) and on all occasions he makes it clear that self-governing organizations should be protected from top-down management mechanisms. Of course, for this protection a social constitution is required that provides “a definition of those institutions that require a definite sphere of guaranteed autonomy and the forms of democratic self-governance they should enjoy” (Hirst, 1997: 124). That means:

The organizations themselves need to be guaranteed a definite degree of autonomy, a freedom from interference which is consistent with their members having the power to make democratic decisions within their own sphere of operation. Thus organizations need to have their autonomy protected not just against central state encroachment, but also against the kinds of top-down management by external funding agencies and internal bureaucratic elites...(Hirst, 1997: 126)

Hirst’s endeavour to expand the concept of freedom is also worth mentioning. While criticizing liberals, he states that liberals confine freedom to private life, meaning that “citizens cease to identify with politics and come to see freedom as what they do outside of formal organizations, in the spheres of private life and leisure” (Hirst, 1994: 124). He also criticizes those who are satisfied with representative democracy and legally protected human rights, because for him, institutions of representative democracy are necessary but not enough for a fully developed individual freedom and an effective government (Hirst, 1994: 54). On the other hand, in associationalism, restrictions expected from bureaucratic elites are eliminated with the help of a social constitution. Thus, communities come into being spontaneously and they are free to arrange/conduct their affairs as they wish. Such associations contribute to individual freedom in two ways: first, “by banding together individuals attain some purpose or govern some activity defined by them as important to their interests,” and second, “by banding together individuals to develop themselves; they are further individuated by associating others” (Hirst, 1994: 50). “Rules applied to the governance of associations must be as few as are consistent with preventing them oppressing their members and denying them choice” (Hirst, 1994: 51-2).

Ultimately, several conditions can be enumerated for an ideal associative

democratic system. Firstly, people should associate around common purposes on the basis of their free choice. Moreover, voluntary associations should not only develop freely, but also they should arrange their internal affairs from the point of their members. Lastly, state or public power may restrict freedom only if individual freedom and the interests or freedoms of other organizations are to be under attack (Hirst, 1994: 44).

To sum up, in this chapter classical and contemporary Western scholars who have followed pluralist thought in their analysis of voluntary associations, interest/pressure groups and non-governmental organizations have been reviewed. The review underlines the emphasis scholars placed on the three dimensions namely, effectiveness; enhancing solidarity, responsibility and compromise, and inner democracy, thereby providing justification for selecting these as important veins of analysis in the present study.

It also makes clear that the characteristics and functions attributed to NGOs by scholars in the post-90 period are very similar to those underlined in the works of scholars of classical and pre-90 period. All in all, this chapter indicates the influence of classical theories over more recent works by tracing the lines of continuity in their analysis.

In the next chapter, a review of the Turkish associational life from the 19th century onwards and the literature on Turkish will be made. It is hoped that the examination of academic and quasi-academic literature on civil society in Turkey will help in the positioning of the two contemporary NGOs taken as case-studies in this research, against their historical and socio-political backgrounds.

CHAPTER 3

NGOs AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TURKEY

In this chapter, after mentioning the history and development of NGOs in Turkey, I am going to examine academic and semi-academic discussions around civil society, NGOs and democratization in Turkey, especially in the post-90 period. I expect that the former review will help constitute a background for analysing the discussions in the latter part.

3.1. Historical Context

3.1.1. NGOs in the post 19th Century Westernization Period of Ottoman Empire

It has been argued by some that civil society, within the context of democratization and in a Western sense, did not develop in Turkey, since in the Western case civil society appeared as a manifestation of the economic freedom of the bourgeoisie. (Mardin, 1992; Küçükömer, 1994a, 1994b). According to these views, civil society refers to a Western social stage that resulted in the recognition of the legal personality of citizens. As no such stage was experienced in Turkey, neither civil society nor non-governmental organizations (NGOs) could develop and function in the Western case.

On the other hand, according to Yücekök, the development of non-governmental organizations in a society depends on the increase in the division of labour and the degree of industrialization. So, NGOs peculiar to the Ottoman organizational model can be seen as early as the beginning of the 19th century when Westernization and capitalization started in the Ottoman Empire (Yücekök, 1998: 13). *Sened-i İttifak* (1808) was signed between the Ottoman Sultan and *ayan*⁴ as a document that recognized a division of the absolute rule of the Sultan, thus indicating the first break between

⁴ Notables prevailing in Ottoman provinces.

“centre” and “periphery” (Mardin, 1992). Although it did not remain in force for a long time, it was the first time that the central state authority was restricted. Some scholars have, in fact, argued that the Ottoman state was never as moderate to an independent class apart from itself as it was at the time. However, in the ensuing Westernization the influence of economic pressures forces the state to follow policies in favour of the newly emerging merchant bourgeoisie (Toprak, 1996; Özbudun, 1995; Yücekök, 1998).

According to Yücekök, the most striking difference between the Western political structure and the Turkish one is that, in the former, owing to the capital accumulation, the new bourgeoisie class had the opportunity to become more autonomous. The economic system of the Ottoman state, on the other hand, did not allow for the development of any free element including a free bourgeoisie, and/or a capital accumulation. Thus, economic and political power was concentrated in the hands of one single authority until the beginning of 19th century, when the first traces of capitalism started to appear.

From the 19th century onwards, a new bourgeoisie appeared concomitant with the process of imperialist exploitation. New commercial treaties damaged the Ottoman industry. A merchant bourgeoisie fed from external resources became the owners of new power apart from administrative functionaries and bureaucrats.

As a result of this development, some organizations emerged from among the new class to effectively impact the Ottoman bureaucracy. This emergence was especially obvious after 1838 when the foreign trade agreements were signed between the Ottoman Empire and European states. In fact, in this period not only the merchant bourgeoisie but also the non-Muslim ethnic communities started to be organized (Yücekök, 1998: 20-21). Another result of the economic invasion of the industrialized West was the weakening of the central authority and emerging power of local notables, namely *esraf* and *ayan*, who were the mediators between the central state and the leaseholders in Anatolia (Mardin, 1992: 106-107; Tosun, 2001: 230).

In the ensuing period *Tanzimat* (1839) and *Islahat* (1856) reforms changed many things in the life of Ottomans, as they provided privileges to different ethnic groups living in the Empire. The majority of the Muslim population in the Empire, however, did not adopt many of the reforms of the social and political life undertaken during these times. These reforms provided a legal guarantee for the rights to life and property, and recognized the equality of Muslim and non-Muslim subjects through a public law. “It was in that period that concepts such as public opinion, freedom of association, and freedom of press entered Ottoman discourse” (Toprak, 1996: 90). Clearly, these were the top-to-bottom processes and the product of external pressures. Thus, even though these reforms constituted a precondition for the formation of civil society, one could not claim to find non-governmental or secondary organizations mediating between the state and the most individual subjects of the Ottoman Empire (Yücekök, 1998: 19-20, Tosun, 2001: 232).

Silier (2002) argues that, in the midst of the 19th century one can see two kinds of organizational models in the Ottoman realm. The first model is a kind of association founded by non-Muslims. These associations were independent from the church and worked on areas including education and mutual-aid. The second was *cemiyets*, founded under the auspices of the Sultan around the court, which worked on medical science, natural science, education etc. In the same period one can also see the first secret political parties, first secret workers organizations, brigandage, and gangs etc. (Silier, 2002: 30). According to Tosun (2001), in the same period, the first political alignments appeared and came to an end, ostensibly when The Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) that was the political organization of Young Turks (Jön Türkler) held power. After the Second Constitutional Era beginning in 1908, ideologies of pan-Turkism and nationalism became prevalent rather than Islamism (Tosun, 2001: 236).

Unfortunately, our knowledge about NGOs in the 19th century is very limited. After the declaration of the Second Constitution in 1908 and with the amendments in the *Law of Associations* (Cemiyetler Kanunu) in 1909, the right of association was

taken under legal guarantee. On the other hand, during its reign (1908-1919), The Committee of Union and Progress also brought broad limitations on associational freedom (Bianchi, 1984: 109; Yücekök, 1998: 55). Indicating to the acclival existence and proliferation of such organizations in the Empire, in fact “the formation of associations that violate the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state, that operate to change the [constitutional] regime and government, and that are contrary to civility and order” (Bianchi, 1984: 110) were prohibited.

In the post 1908 period, some associations were transformed to political parties as projections of political trends, such as Islamism, Westernism, and pan-Turkism. The Committee of Union and Progress took power and officially became a political party in 1913. In its period of rule, it founded many associations working in various spheres of social life, such as economic associations, professional associations, social clubs, women’s associations, etc. Those associations were founded within a statist perspective in order to control and modernize the society. In fact, organizations that are difficult to supervise and control, such as trade unions, were not supported by the state. Rather, associations including tradesman and artisans were supported. Also, opposition political parties were founded, two of the most important being the *Ottoman Liberal Party* (Osmanlı Ahrar Fırkası) and *Liberty and Entente Party* (Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası). The latter emerged as the main opposition party with a wide dissident membership, and constituted the potential threat to the rule of the Union and Progress.

Analysts have argued that in spite of a statist environment, these associations and parties were helpful in the formation of a civil society and a general citizenship consciousness (Tosun, 2001: 245-252). Consequently, as Alkan points out, the first five years of the Second Constitution Era was important with respect to the institutionalism of organized life and provided a base for a pluralist societal and political organizational structure (Alkan, 1998: 117).

3.1.2 .NGOs in the Single Party Period of Republican Era

After the First World War, the vacuum of power in Turkey led to the formation of a large amount of associations and organizations. Some of them were Turkish nationalist and some of them were separatists. The Istanbul government took strict control over them because it was thought that the Western powers supported the associations in order to destroy Ottoman Empire. Perhaps the most powerful of them was the Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelian (Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti), which defended the country during the Independence War and transformed the political party, the *Republican People's Party* (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası), after the war (Alkan, 1998: 118; Hatemi, 1996: 204; Tosun, 2001: 263). After the foundation of Grand National Assembly (GNA) in 1920, *Law against High Treason* (Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu) came into force on 29 April 1920. Although it aimed “to end the power of religion and its exponents in political, social and cultural affairs,” as well as to disestablish religious policy from state (Lewis, 1961: 406), according to the law anyone who opposed the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly would be punished (Yücekök, 1998: 55-56). The *Republican People's Party* (Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası) (CHP) was the single party in power under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk. It was accepted that, the leader of the party was also the leader of the Assembly and the state. The initial Constitution of the Republic came into force in 1921 and it is with this basic legislation that the popular will was accepted. However, forming associations was still another matter. In 1923 an amendment made to the *Law of Associations* ensured executive control, including the suspension of the right of the state when they violate the law (Bianchi, 1984: 112).

Eventually, “the constitution of 1924 proclaimed freedom of association to be a ‘natural right of the Turks’” (Yücekök, 1998: 46; Bianchi, 1984: 110). Actually, the constitution of 1924 was progressive considering the rights and freedoms provided; innovations in the character of state; and the institution of secularization and democratization. However, implementation of these laws was not easy due to the

immature legitimacy of the Republic and the martial law applications that were later enforced.

After the *Sheikh Said Rebellion*, which was a religious reactionary Kurdish rebellion that broken out in 1925, *Independence Tribunals* (İstiklal Mahkemeleri) were established under the *Law for the Maintenance of Public Order* (Tahrir-i Sükun Kanunu), and until 1938 there was little freedom for any type of organization (Tosun, 2001: 259). In this period, existing organizations, such as the *Progressive Republican Party*, (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası), the *Union of Turkish Women* (Türk Kadınlar Birliği), the *Turkish Societies* (Türk Ocakları), the *Union of Teachers* (Muallimler Birliği) and the Masonic Lodges were abolished (Yücekök, 1998: 57). Furthermore, according to the *Law for the Maintenance of Public Order*, not only were associations and political parties banned, but also all press, information and mass communication channels opposing the state were suppressed (Gevgili, 1990: 125). On the other hand, after 1930 “the major form of association promoted by the regime was *People’s Houses* (Halkevleri), which disseminated nationalist and secularist propaganda through lectures, libraries, concerts, sport events and social aid groups” (Bianchi, 1984: 112). Through this new model of organization not only did the illiterate rural population learn the values of the Republican regime, but also they were on notice about the policies of *Republican People Party* (Ahmad, 2002: 81). According to Alkan, the increase in the number of *People’s Houses* between 1932 and 1939 is salient, because while in 1932, their number was 14, one year after it increased to 55 and by 1939, between 25 and 30 new *People’s Houses* were created (Alkan, 1998: 125).

“*The Law of Associations* of 1938 introduced detailed restrictions to the freedom of association. Association formation was, in effect, impossible without prior permission from the government” and their rules and regulations needed to be approved by provincial governors (Bianchi, 1984: 113). According to the definition made in the first section of the law, associations were to be gatherings that came into being for purposes other than the material interest of the members, and they were to integrate individuals’ knowledge and actions rather than create difference among them (Alkan,

1998: 57). There was also a very long list describing the characteristics of illegal associations. Most notably, the class-based organizations were prohibited and this dealt a heavy blow to the labour unions and the workers organizations which had increased in number since 1918. Severe pressure on workers' organizations and others with leftist tendencies came partially due to the influence of the fascist regimes in Europe, especially in Germany (Ahmad, 2002: 88). Furthermore, Tosun points to the attempts in the early 1930's for constituting left-oriented political parties, such as *Ahali*⁵ *Republican Party*, (Ahali Cumhuriyet Fırkası), *Turkish Republic Workers and Farmers Party* (Türk Cumhuriyet Amele ve Çiftçi Partisi). Their foundations were not permitted by the state due to their communist tendencies (Tosun, 2001: 264). With the operation of this law in 1938, associations were also prohibited from engaging in political activities and the Ministry of Interior was granted a very broad discretion regarding the permissibility of their international relations (Bianchi, 1984: 113).

The events that marked the single party period's characteristic stance on the freedom of organization was the abolishment of *Progressive Republican Party* (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası) in 1925, the *Free Party* (Serbest Fırka) in 1930, the *Turkish Hearths* (Türk Ocakları) in 1931, and *Union of Turkish Women* (Türk Kadınlar Birliği) in 1935. The first two organizations had been deliberately created elements of a controlled democratic experience and were very short-lived. Having been founded earlier during the Second Constitution Era of the Ottoman Empire, *Turkish Hearths* promoted Turkish nationalism and was not initially affiliated with the state. They were, however, taken under state control in 1927. This action resulted in a rise of the opposition party, namely the *Free Party* (Serbest Fırka), and eventually caused the abolishment of *Turkish Hearths* (Alkan, 1998: 122). *Union of Turkish Women* (Türk Kadınlar Birliği) was the most important feminist association since the Second Constitution Era. It not only promoted the social standing of women, but also demanded political rights for women. While the patriarchal establishment did not meet such demands favourably, parallel developments in the economic sphere whereby women had started to join the labour market in increasing numbers also helped aggravate

⁵ A word that means public, people or community in old Turkish.

traditional male disapproval. Thus after hosting the World Feminist Congress in 1935, the *Union of Turkish Women* abolished itself with a message that the state had declared that the organization had already attained its objective (Ahmad, 2002: 110-111).

Considering all these events in the single party period, it can be understood that “the Ottoman-Turkish state did not develop alongside politically influential social groups, but aimed to consolidate all power in the centre by rendering all civil societal elements into virtually impotent entities” (Heper and Evin, 1984: 18). For this reason, “during single party period one cannot say that freedom of union, organization, political parties and unionization were carried out in the proper sense”⁶ (Tosun, 2001: 262). Some analysts have justified this situation on the notion that carrying out social designs, like constituting a modern civil society, depends not only on the thoughts and desires of those who envision these, but also on the juxtaposition of ideals with the societal organization and institutions (Gevgili, 1990: 113).

3.1.3. NGOs in Multi-Party Period Until 1980

After the defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War, President İsmet İnönü declared that it was time to take the necessary steps in democracy. Accordingly, in the opening speech of the Turkish Grand National Assembly he openly noted that an opposition party was needed (Eroğul, 2003: 116). However, Eroğul points out that, the character of the multi-party period that İnönü projected did not embrace leftist organizations and parties. However, all the sections of the rightist ideology were not included in this project either (Eroğul, 2003: 116). Likewise, Tosun also states that it was not a competitive and a pluralist multi-party regime but rather a hegemonic party regime through which the government could maintain its legitimacy (Tosun, 2001: 270). In fact, the emergence of the *Democrat Party* (Demokrat Parti) as a liberal and rightist organization constituting the legitimate opposition was thus possible. The rapid development and growing popular support of the DP, nonetheless, disturbed CHP and its leadership. Thus, in order to slow down the growth of the opposition, CHP

⁶ Translation is mine

immediately moved some anti-democratic articles from the Constitution and other legislation (Eroğul, 2003: 116). For instance; with the amendment to the *Law of Associations* in 1946, associational development was encouraged; hereafter, associations could be established without prior permission from the government. “The section prohibiting groups that destroyed ‘political and national unity’ was discarded. The ban on “class-based” associations was lifted and labour unions were again permitted to organize” (Bianchi, 1984: 113; Işıklı, 2003:333). Thereby, new political parties, press institutions, associations, and trade unions increased in number. Even a Human Rights Association was founded in October 1946. Importantly, in that period with the dissolving of The Press Union, which had been founded by the government in 1939, the media once again started to be effective in impacting public opinion. At this point, it should be remembered that some leftist oriented press institutions, as well as the political parties such as the *Turkish Socialist Workers and Peasant Party* (Türkiye Sosyalist Emekçi ve Köylü Partisi), the *Turkish Socialist Party* (Türkiye Sosyalist Partisi), and trade unions that were related to them, were suppressed under the martial law that had been declared during the war. Moreover, Human Rights Association was seen as the agent of communism (Tosun, 2002: 271; Işıklı, 2003:333).

In light of all these developments, the 1946 elections were not democratic enough and resulted in an upsurge of the opposition party. In the first big convention in 1947, the DP adopted the *Freedom Pact* (Hürriyet Misakı), an agreement asking for a fair election system, a separate and impartial presidential election system from and cancellation of anti-democratic laws (Tosun, 2002: 270; Eroğul, 2003:117). “The Freedom Pact authorised the DP members of parliament to leave and boycott the national assembly if the government would not withdraw a number of undemocratic laws” (Zürcher, 1994: 223). This development showed that the DP was becoming a real opposition party instead of a “puppet” one in a hegemonic party system, and that with every passing day it was gaining more support from the public.

Eventually, in 1947 President İnönü declared that the DP was not an insurgent organization but rather a legal opposition party. According to the declaration, “the

opposition party would enjoy the same privileges as the party in power and that İnönü himself would remain equally responsible to both parties as the head of the state” (Özbudun, 1995: 229). The 1950 elections resulted in an overwhelming victory of the DP and from 1950 onwards CHP was replaced by the DP, which became the main ruling party of the republic.

According to many analysts, the DP diverged from its program based on economic and political liberalism soon after taking office and started to make anti-democratic laws curtailing political freedom. One of its early anti-democratic actions was the abolishment of the *Nation Party* (Millet Partisi), which actually had a single deputy in the assembly (Eroğul, 2003: 121). “According to the press law made after the 1954 elections any publications destroying the respectability of a public official were bound to heavy penal sanctions”⁷ (Eroğul, 2003: 124). Especially after *Istanbul Riots*⁸ (6-7 Eylül Olayları) in 1955 and with the impending martial law, not only were new limitations against the press brought, but also the autonomy of universities was curtailed. Political activity and publications of faculty members were forbidden, in addition to judicial and academic independence being curtailed. To inquire into and penalize political opposition, *Investigating Commissions* (Tahkikat Komisyonları) were established in Turkish Grand Assembly (Timur, 2003: 150; Tosun, 2001: 275). The DP forgot its promise to grant trade unions the *right to strike*. Instead it attempted to transform the local trade unions into support organizations for the party called *Country Front* (Vatan Cephesi), and in the process it disrupted them totally (Işıklı, 2003: 335). Such action was justified in the name of “preventing the unions from establishing contacts between different industrial sectors or with international organizations” (Zürcher, 1994: 238). Worst of all, according to Eroğul, was the adoption of the highly limiting *Law on Public Assemblies and Demonstrations* (Toplantı ve Gösteri Yürüyüşleri Yasası), which denied the right to public assembly, except at election time (Eroğul, 2003: 128).

⁷ translation is mine

⁸ Street violence and vandalism directing mainly at the property of ethnic minorities (primarily Greek) and carried out by groups claiming to act with a nationalist reflex vis-à-vis perceived Greek aggression in Cyprus has been attributed by recent analysts to (state) instigation. For further information see Dilek Güven, 6-7 Eylül Olayları, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul 2005

Notwithstanding the anti-democratic policies of DP, during 1950s the rise of social and economic discrepancies, greater consciousness of civil liberties and a notable increase in social mobility resulted in the expansion of the idea of participation (Tosun, 2001: 273) Eroğul suggests that, it is interesting that a conservative party like the DP succeeded in mobilizing a mass population and gave people the opportunity to transmit their demands to the political leaders differently than during the single party period (Eroğul, 2003: 116). Moreover, particularly in the earlier period of the DP rule, the multiplication of voluntary organizations and the founding of trade unions were striking, and this was often conceived as a success of the public policy and the development of pluralist democracy. On the other hand, some have strongly argued, “the promotion of such a large number of rival, fragmented, and financially feeble groups was part of a general policy of discouraging well-organized and effective collective action, especially in the major occupational sectors” (Bianchi, 1984: 114). Following the views of Bianchi, it is possible to denote that the DP period was “a perverse version of the Madisonian strategy of trying to contain factionalism by encouraging the proliferation of fragmented associations whose questionable legitimacy makes them all insecure” (ibid).

Accordingly, referring to Frey (1965), Özbudun (1999) argues that, due to the strong character of Turkish political party organizations, the base of the relationship between political parties and non-governmental groups during that period was always informal (Özbudun, 1999: 112); that is to say; non-governmental organizations were open to the personal influence and exploitation of political parties and leaders. To put in another way, the existing trade unions and voluntary groups were under the control of a corporatist and a tutelary government (Tosun, 2001: 273). Consequently, severe antidemocratic applications and the continuation of the authoritarian single-party mentality of the DP in the post-1950 period helped prepare the conditions for the coup d'état in 27th May 1960.

The 1960 coup d'état was the beginning of a transition process regarding democracy and Turkish political life. Immediately after that *National Unity Committee* (Milli Birlik Komitesi) (MBK), a junta of mid-level military officers took power and the founding military cadres of the Republic were once again in command until the 1961 elections. Oddly enough, the major aim of the MBK was to provide democratic conditions to civilian life. For this reason they embarked on a mission to prepare a democratic constitution. A *Constituent Assembly* (Kurucu Meclis) was formed to draft the new constitution. Representatives from various sections of the society, such as political parties, universities, bar associations, media, teacher's organizations, agricultural organizations, and the chambers of commerce and industry, were selected to serve in this body. (Tosun, 2001: 277). While the Constituent Assembly was "dominated by pro-CHP bureaucrats and intellectuals, reflecting the basic political values and interests of these groups" (Özbudun, 1995: 233) it prepared a progressive and liberal new Constitution. In order to limit the power of elected representatives in the GNA and to prevent tyranny of the majority, the new Constitution brought a new structure providing checks and balances. The reflection of this paradigm is seen in the establishment of the *Constitutional Court* (Anayasa Mahkemesi), the formation of an effectively independent judiciary from the executive and legislative agencies, and the creation of a second legislative chamber (the Senate) in the GNA. Also, increasing the President's term of office to seven years would help to reinforce the independent and balancing position of the President. The new Constitution also ensured individual and social rights and fundamental freedoms on the basis of a state predicated on human rights and granted substantial autonomy to universities and media agencies. Paradoxically however, the same constitution gave the advisory and coordination authority to the *National Security Council* (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu), jointly composed of the highest-level political civilians and governmental officials, and the highest ranking military officers (Eroğul, 2003: 146-147; Özbudun, 1995: 233; Tosun, 2001: 279). In fact, some analysts of the Turkish scene have marked this as a turning point in Turkish political life thereafter, as "MGK gradually extended its influence over government policy and became a powerful watchdog, sometimes replacing the cabinet as the centre of real power and decision making" (Zürcher, 1994: 258).

One important character of the interim military regime should be pointed out. Within the MBK there was a serious cleavage; while one group was highly extreme and in favour of a permanent military regime, the other group was in favour of the return to civil life as soon as the necessary democratic regulations were carried out. In fact, it has been claimed that the execution of the death penalties for the three leaders of the dissolved DP was upon the insistence of the extremists who wanted yet to further suppress the DP's support. However, the outcome of the 1961 elections showed that such action did not work since the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi) (AP), which was a direct descendant of the DP, won the elections with an absolute majority. This triggered the existing cleavages even further not only within the military but also in the society.

In general, by the end of 1960s there were numerous political parties, associations, student organizations, trade unions etc. on the Turkish political scene. Moreover, having taken the social state principle as a basic premise, the 1961 Constitution created a suitable environment for strikes, workers' demonstrations, meetings etc. At the same time, violent acts and ideological polarization of extremists youth groups increased. Nevertheless, the twenty-fold increase in numbers of associations from 1960 to 1971 indicates that the 1961 Constitution guaranteeing free speech and free association indeed fostered pluralist, participatory and democratic politics.

According to Bianchi, between 1960 and 1971 voluntary and occupational groups basically had the character of interest groups thanks to the encouragement and support of the 1961 Constitution and amendments of the Law of Associations.

Furthermore, the gradually more open attempts of the major occupational groups to influence policy and public opinion through lobbying, electoral endorsements and public demonstrations received such clear encouragement from all of the competing political parties that the formal ban on associations engaging in political activities became increasingly irrelevant and unenforceable (Bianchi, 1984: 115).

On the 12 March 1971, a military memorandum demanded a government “which would be able to end the ‘anarchy’ and carry out reforms ‘in a Kemalist spirit’ . If the demand was not met, the army would ‘exercise its constitutional duty’ and take over power itself” (Zürcher, 1994: 271). Actually, “it was a last-minute move by the top military commanders to forestall a radical coup” that was raising from the distrust the military had for the JP and its chief, Süleyman Demirel (Özbudun, 1995: 234). Following this “coup by communiqué,” the Constitution was once again amended, reinforcing not only the executive authority, but also most of the social and civil liberties, including the restricting the freedom of press. With a declaration of martial law, the military began to arrest many people who were suspected of engaging in ‘anarchy’ or communism.

Preserving the right to establish associations without prior permission, the 1972 Law of Associations nonetheless introduced detailed and comprehensive abridgments to the freedom of associations. The list of illegal associations was even longer than in the previous Law of 1938. With this law, the Ministry of Interior and its supervision bureau in the directorate of the police would control all operations and internal organizations of associations. Furthermore, special government officers would observe all meetings of associations (Bianchi, 1984: 117). Not surprisingly, this undemocratic u-turn resulted in a more centralized and bureaucratic government with weak and again highly bureaucratized non-governmental organizations. For instance, many provincial and rural branches of occupational associations were legally affiliated with the central association, which meant that such bureaucratic and hierarchically organized associations were easy to control and supervise by the state (Tosun, 2001: 283).

In the elections of 1973, the CHP considerably increased its votes and gained the majority in the GNA. Undoubtedly, the leadership of *Bülent Ecevit* and the new image of the CHP played a key role in this surprising success. Another new actor in politics was the *National Action Party* (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi) (MHP), lead by *Alparslan Türkeş*, who had been one of the extremist officers of the 27 May 1960 coup d’état. *Necmettin Erbakan’s National Salvation Party* (Milli Selamet Partisi) (MSP) was

another standing party that took part in the *Nationalist Front* coalition of right wing parties formed on the 12 April 1975 (Özbudun, 1995: 235; Zürcher, 1994: 274-275).

Analyses by Turan and Tosun could shed light on the situation of the so-called non- governmental organizations from 1970 to 1980. According to Turan, towards the end of the 1970s ascending political polarization began to strongly influence the lives of associations. In these circumstances, each political party supported the associations close to their political colour in order to reach electorates from different bases. Thereby, most of the associations become a part of political polarization albeit their apolitical interest areas and problems (Turan, 1998: 199). In a similar way, Tosun underlines that, during the 70s *The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions* (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) (TÜRK-İŞ) acted as a government agency instead of a civil society organization. That is, all the parties in power controlled it in a way. Also, the *Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey* (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) (DİSK) declared its approval of the 12 March military memorandum (Tosun, 2001: 284).

On the other hand, in the second half of the 1970s left-wing extremist groups, such as the Turkish People' Liberation Party- Front (THKP-C) and the Turkish People' Liberation Army (THKO), were very effective in socio-political life with their illegal actions. There were also right-wing extremist groups, such as the *Hearths of Ideal* (Ülkü Ocakları) founded by *Alparslan Türkeş* and its armed branch, the *Turkish Revenge Brigade* (Türk İntikam Tugayı). The government was mostly engaged in efforts of fighting against the leftist groups during this period. Therefore, supporting and even establishing the *Associations to Combat Communism* (Kömünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri) the National Front Government also ignored the commando camps of rightist militants (Eroğul, 2003: 153).

Despite improvement in the variety and activism of voluntary associations, neither for the 1960s nor for the 1970s can one say that there was a pluralist understanding in the political life of Turkey. On the contrary, by basing developmental

policy on planning and state control of the economy, this period could best be characterized as a state of corporatism. Especially during the times of the JP we see “a general corporatization of associational interest representation” (Bianchi, 1984: 142). That means that existing voluntary associations were not free in determining their own interest areas, their organizational structure was hierarchically ordered due to their dependence on the state apparatus, and they always sought to be recognized by the state.

As a result, not only the character of the 1961 Constitution, but also the development of capitalism, the crystallization of social classes, and different interest groups played a vital role in the proliferation of political parties and civil associations between 1960 and 1980 (Yücekök, 1998: 43). On the other hand, “the politics of these two decades were shaped by the confrontation of anti-system movements, which increasingly turned into armed conflict between the Left and the Right, a conflict that locked the regime and ended with the 1980 coup” (Toprak, 1996: 91).

3.1.4. The Post 1980 Period

On September 12, 1980 the *National Security Council* (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi) (MGK) composed of five generals took political power. The major aim of the council was to reconstruct Turkish democracy in order “to prevent a recurrence of the political polarization, violence and crises that had afflicted the country in the late 1970s and thus to make the military’s continued involvement in politics unnecessary” (Özbudun, 1995: 238). A *Consultative Assembly* (Danışma Meclisi) was formed and a new Constitution drafted. The 1982 Constitution was accepted with a high rate of approval (91.37 percent) and a high rate of voter participation (91.27), as a result of a public Referendum on 7 November 1982. This meant the approval of the seven-year Presidency of General *Kenan Evren* who was the Chief of the General Staff and head of the MGK as well as the head of state. With the implementation of the new Constitution, many individuals were tried or arrested, and many, if not all associations and organizations such as political parties banned, the leaders of which were not allowed to deal in politics for ten years. Also, the autonomy of universities was abolished with the

establishment of *Board of Higher Education* (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu) (YÖK) (Toprak, 1996: 94).

Only three political parties were allowed to participate in the 1983 elections resulting in a clear victory for the *Motherland Party* (Anavatan Partisi) (ANAP) of *Turgut Özal*. The most important feature of this party was its civilian, moderate to centre-rightist stands, which was different from the pre-1980 parties. It has been believed that a pluralist understanding depending on political tolerance could be flourished through the policies of this party (Özbudun, 1995: 240). According to Göle, the success of the ANAP could be explained through its successful synthesis between liberal and conservative values (Göle, 1994: 214-220).

Looking at other arrangements in the 1982 Constitution that are directly related to the activities of non-governmental organizations, it says that:

Civic associations through new legislation on political parties, unions and interest groups were prevented from organizational expansion, such as, establishing of party-affiliated youth and women's branches and were banned from forming organic links with each other. At the same time, the Constitution spelled out a long list of conditions under which basic rights and liberties could be curtailed (Toprak, 1996: 94).

In addition, trade unions and associations and cooperatives could not relate with political parties and could not give any financial support to one another. Also, political parties could not be organized abroad and/or establish foundations (Özbudun, 1995: 239). According to Tosun, the restrictions on relations between political parties and trade unions and associations were the demonstration of state control by separating political parties from public life, banning associations and other civil organizations from any activity other than the aims specified in their founding objectives, and putting them under the financial and administrative inspection of the state (Tosun, 2001: 307).

In contrast to the restrictions in the Constitution, when we look at the developments of especially the second half of the 1980s we can see a flourishing free civil society promoting democracy. Trade unions, associations, foundations,

professional organizations, informal citizen's groups, and discussion platforms were all the actors of civil society becoming more and more autonomous. According to Turan, the outcome of the regulation on banning political relationships between political parties and associations was a restriction to the major role of political parties establishing associations. In this way, it discouraged the state sponsored civil society understanding to some extent and could not retain them to engage in political debates (Turan, 1998: 208). The strengthening of local governments with a considerable increase in their revenues also resulted in the promotion of civil society by making democratic values widespread. Furthermore, the ascending importance of the NGOs in the international arena enabled the use of some funds that could only be used for non-governmental organizations (Özbudun, 1995: 256, Tosun, 2001: 327).

The 1980s were also the years when the state controlled economy was discarded. An economic reform package issued on the 24 January 1980 brought about radical changes, such as an export-oriented strategy in development and a reduction of state control over private enterprises. It can be argued that this liberalization in the economy changed the relationship between the state and society, as well as changing the standing of the society towards the state. In fact, the state's withdrawal from the economy reduced the expectations for the state in social and political sphere as well. Thus, some analysts have explained the rather significant strengthening of voluntary organizations in the post-1980 period, as different from the previous era, with reference to these changes in the economic policies (Turan, 1998: 206-208; Tosun, 2001: 298).

In the post-1980 period, one also cannot ignore the global political discourse highlighting the importance of NGOs in democratization. The European Union was effective in changing the relationship between the state and society at the European level. Thus, Turkey's integration process to the European Union also played an important role in moving political practice from the state to the society by promoting NGOs (Keyman and İçduygu, 2003: 224).

The domestic political discourse and the discourse of the media channels on civil society and democracy were also salient in the rising importance NGOs. According to Toprak, “the political discourse since the mid-1980s in Turkey has centred around two themes: the consolidation of democracy and the strengthening of civil society” (Toprak, 1996: 92). Recognition of different groups in forming the political agenda also caused increasing isolation of the military from politics, which now depended more and more on the democratic consensus of groups. At this level, commitment to civilian politics, consensus building, civil rights and issue oriented associational activity increasingly became the essence of the political discourse (ibid).

The impact of Turkish intellectuals in the formation of this discourse is also worth mentioning. In the post 1980 period, Turkish intellectuals gradually began to discuss democracy with reference to concepts like human rights, individual rights and freedoms, civil society, liberalism, and associational activity, etc. (Çaha, 1996: 137). These discussions reflected not only a renewed interest in democracy, but also a novel approach and an “until then unused” contemporary connotation of these concepts.

Private radios and television channels and their unprecedented proliferation in society also contributed to the promotion of democracy as they play the role of pressure groups over the state. They questioned state policies and voiced opinions of various social segments in their broadcasts. Meanwhile, the press reflected information on and criticism of state corruption (ibid).

Critical stances of feminist groups and women’s organizations have also played a vital role in the development of civil society and NGOs in Turkey. Their critiques of the state’s patriarchal form and all the similar institutions were highly radical and effective. Beginning with the ceremonies of the International Women’s Day in 1986, the women’s movement became one of the most visible and vocal parts of the civil society in Turkey, through street protests and demonstrations (Çaha, 1996: 140). In addition to this, as they aimed at a total change in the social, political and cultural structure,

women's organizations introduced a completely new form of organization which is non-hierarchical, participatory, and democratic into Turkish civil life (Yılmaz, 2005: 451).

As a result, since the 1980s, the political and social scene of Turkey has been changing in a different direction than the pre-1980 period. Concepts of civil society, democratization, and NGOs have probably become the central issues of political discourse and academic literature. From the 1980s on, the public policies themselves rather than the total political system began to be interrogated by getting people together in associations. Their diversified interests, such as environmental issues, human rights, ethnic and religious rights and women's rights, began to increasingly impact the political agenda of the country (Çaha, 1996: 138).

3.2. Literature Review of Post-90 Period

Parallel to the developments from the 1980s on, and especially during the 1990s, the concept of civil society entered into the Turkish literature, places, roles, and characteristics of NGOs, opening a discussion among Turkish intellectuals and scholars. There was no consensus among scholars on either the meaning of the civil society and character of Turkish civil society, or what the term NGO denoted in the Turkish context.

In the first half of the 1980s, leftist intellectuals had tackled the problem of finding a new strategy for socialism around *Yeni Gündem Newspaper* and *Saçak Journal*. Inspired by Gramsci, Murat Belge, Asaf Savaş Akat and Aydın Köymen discussed a model of democratic participation and described civil society as a sphere of political struggle within which alternative policies to the state policies are produced (Erdoğan, 1999: 107). In this model Köymen was reminded of the top-to-bottom character of modernization in Turkey, and underlined the necessity of public participation in the administrative sphere, while Murat Belge specified the normative and liberal content of civil society through concepts such as, autonomy, legality, difference, pluralism and participation.

İlter Turan, who was one of the *Yeni Gündem* writers pursuing pluralist thought, suggested that free citizens and the autonomous organizations built by those citizens are the preconditions for the functioning of democracy. Furthermore, in his view, the distinction between interest-based and social-based organizations was important. In fact, social based organizations, such as human rights organizations and peace and environmental organizations, aim to raise the public's consciousness, responsibility and sensitivity among citizens, whereas interest based ones pursue their member's private interests. Belge (?) and Bora's (1998) ideas favoured the social-based organizations (Erdoğan, 1999: 108-115). Interestingly, using their ideas, intellectuals from the socialist left were the main contributors to the definition of public understanding and comprehension of civil society and its organizations in Turkey in the 1990s.

In the earlier periods, on the other hand, a somewhat different discussion on whether it was possible to see the existence and flourishing of a Western form of civil society in Turkey or not had been on the intellectual agenda. Some scholars had argued that there was no civil society in Turkey due to the weight of the state in politics. They claimed that due to this fact, pluralist democracy in Turkey was almost impossible. Among them was Küçükömer (1994), who had argued that there is no civil society in Turkey like that of the West. According to him, civil society can only be created if the bureaucratic tradition of the Turkish state was effectively transformed and institutions pertaining to the Western economic and political organization were adopted (Somer, 2000: 32). Mardin emphasized that civil society refers to the idea of emancipation from the power of political authority and did not develop as a cultural tradition in both the Ottoman Empire and in Turkey (Mardin, ???: 1920).

The genealogy and rationale for the popular adaptation of the term *Sivil Toplum Kuruluşu* (Civil Society Organization) (STK) in place of the internationally used term non-governmental organization - the exact Turkish equivalent of which would be *Hükümet Dışı Kuruluş* (HDK) - also requires analysis. (NGO) Uğur states that the term *STK* become widespread in Turkey with the *STK* symposium series in 1994. He claims that as it has a broader connotation than the term NGO, *STK* actually covers NGOs,

grass-root organizations and voluntary associations together in its meaning (Uğur, 1998b: 222). Another scholar who has carried the problem of the definition of NGO to the agenda is Mithat Sancar. He argues that when you translate the term non-governmental into Turkish as *hükümet dışı*, it does not meet the meaning of the original term i.e. NGO. In the Economic and Social Council of the UN, NGOs are merely defined as being not based on any legal agreement between the states. However, for Sancar this definition is too wide, since it does not meet the non-state and non-profit character of NGOs. For this reason, he claims that while it may be acceptable for the purposes of international organizations to use the abbreviation NGO to denote all civil society organizations, in Turkey this description has not been sufficient to describe the nature of these organizations as non-state actors (Sancar, 2000:21). In light of such discussion and based on the fact that in the Turkish context reference is mostly made to STKs, the term STK (instead of NGO) has been adopted in this thesis as well.⁹

Especially from the second half of the 1990s on, scholars started to see that the proper development of a civil society and the idea of free organization were possible in Turkey. Most of those scholars attributed this evolution to the positive role of STKs, seeing them as the major actors of pluralist democracy in Turkey.

Aydın Uğur, for instance, claims that while serious obstacles to the development of civil society, such as the strong state traditions and the military interventions in 1971 and 1980, had occurred earlier, with the increase of diversification and differentiation in society, and with the rising importance of principles like subsidiarity and governance, civil society in Turkey gained significant popularity and became an inseparable component of democratic life from the beginning of 1990s on (Uğur, 1998a: 77). In fact, the proliferation of Islamic associations and foundations that were the product of this atmosphere accounted for the electoral power of Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) that gained power in 1996. In Uğur's (1998) view, it is disputable whether or not Islamic organizations can be included in civil society. In this level, Uğur prefers to use the ideas

⁹ For further discussion on this issue see Kuçuradi, I. (1998) *Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları: Üç Sempozyum içinde*, Pp.24-31; Tunçay, M. (2003) *Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları ile İlgili Kavramlar*, *Sivil Toplum Dergisi*, Yıl: 1, Sayı: 1

of Norton (1997), who argues that, so far as they participate in the legitimate democratic processes, do not act as close communities, and do not deny the legitimacy of other groups in society, any organizations could be considered as part of the civil society. Accordingly, Uğur suggests that in such a discussion and in order to assess an organization like *STK*, our reference point should be based on certain criteria, such as respecting the voicing of different preferences, respecting the right to assembly and think freely, and respecting the thought of the “other” and seeing other civil actors as equal although perhaps rivals, rather than using criteria such as the place of religion -as a fact- in society (Uğur, 1998b: 220).

Another important criterion for being a *STK* is the effective involvement of citizens in dealing with their society’s problems. Importantly, the support of this criterion was the leading idea of the UN Habitat Summit held in İstanbul in 1996. The event positively influenced not only the development of *STKs* in Turkey, but also helped to improve their relations with one another on the basis of solidarity. In the Habitat Summit, *STKs* demanded a legal arrangement that would enable the partnership between them and official authorities. Moreover, as an outcome of the Summit, the need for a civic ethics among *STKs* came to the agenda. At that level, it was thought that trust, responsibility, and solidarity were the natural ethical values that *STKs* should adopt (Uğur, 1998b: 225).

While mentioning the characteristics of the proper form of civil society organizations in Turkey, Tekeli (2000) counts several features. First of all, voluntariness is important. Related to this, the requirement that there should not be any imposition on people is underlined. In other words, there should not be any intention to create and use power over them. Next, civil society organizations are horizontal rather than hierarchically structured, not only within their own organizational structure, but also in their relationship with other *STKs*. Both of these features are necessary for strengthening democracy in the society at large. The last feature of *STKs* is considered their issue-specific character. This is also a significant feature because it enables

diversification and by cross-cutting different interests it brings different viewpoints together around one specific issue (Tekeli, 2000: 114).

According to Keyman and İçduygu, during the 1990s,

Quantitatively, civil society organizations have begun to play an important role in articulating and representing the various ideological interests and political demands voiced by different segments of society, as well as in transmitting to the political actors the societal calls for democratization and the need for effective governing (Keyman and İçduyu, 2003:221).

Furthermore, in the article entitled *Globalization and Turkey: Possibility of Radical Democracy*, Keyman (1998) mentions the characteristics of a modern pluralist society which requires the participation of *STKs* in the political decision making processes. Keyman underlines the necessity for financial, organizational, and cultural arrangements to make this participation process possible.

Firstly, the state should support *STKs* financially in order to help them produce alternative policies and demands. Secondly, three conditions are mentioned as needs; equality of impact between the state, political parties and *STKs*; equality of impact among *STKs* and equality of impact among decisions taken by *STKs*. Thirdly, adoption of a political culture that includes an ethical responsibility to the “other” enables participatory democracy among its agents (Keyman, 1998: 50-53). Keyman underscores this ethical demand by referring to the ethical vision of Alexis de Tocqueville in his pluralism. Keyman supposes that;

A public sphere based on the pluralist ethos is a concept that describes the relationship between state and different identities, who conducting their partnership and competition on the basis of the acknowledged limitation of their own demands and of the principle of critical responsibility to the other (Keyman, 2005: 113).¹⁰

Similar to Keyman, Sarıbay (1992) points out the necessity of a political culture that symbolizes the border between the state and society. This symbol further

¹⁰ Translation is mine.

individualizes people based on their participation into communities that are voluntarily organized, autonomous and independent. Having accentuated the “rule of individual” in a pluralist democracy, Sarıbay’s conception of this autonomous individual has ethical responsibility to other individuals as well as to the community and exists as a part of the civil society. To put in another way, the more autonomous the individual is, the more responsibility and democratization required for a civil society. Undoubtedly, Sarıbay’s emphasis on the political culture and ethical responsibility to others rises from his attention to the insufficiency of *STK*’s independence from the state. Organizing democratically, acting with solidarity and feeling responsibility to different groups rather than dominating one another are all necessary conditions for a democratic form of civil society (Sarıbay, 1992: 113; Sarıbay, 1998: 26). Referring to Diamond, Sarıbay also points out the necessity of legal order based on an institutionalization guaranteeing the freedom and the autonomy of individuals as well as civil organizations. Accordingly, in such a legal order preventing the domination of any social group and the ideology formation of a democratic relation between state and civil society can be possible (Sarıbay, 1998: 29).

Murat Belge distinguishes *STKs* from bureaucratic organizations by reference to several points, one of which is the *STK*’s non- hierarchical internal organization. *STKs* are seen as against the hierarchical structures such as a “management board,” as *STKs* do not intend to rule people or hold power. Instead, they are intended to communicate and coordinate on the basis of horizontal relations. Another point that differentiates *STKs* from classical organizations is their distance or independence from the state. Belge exemplifies these organizations with human rights organizations, such as *Amnesty International* and the *International Helsinki Federation*. These organizations not only question state actions, but also pressure to change themselves by influencing international public opinion. In fact, while such organizations do not ignore the existence of states, for them the aim is to help create a ‘civil society’s state’ rather than contribute to ‘the state’s civil society’. As a result, Belge argues, thanks to these organizations different people become part of a more radical ongoing reaction that is

braver and clearer than that of a classical party organization since it is issue-based and targets many people from different parts of society (Belge, 1998: 23- 33).

In Tunçay's view, in a modern pluralist society, only a great number of *STKs* and a great number of people who join these *STKs* based on their concerns and interests can provide the democratic balance and public good. For a healthful democracy, *STKs* should compromise on all sections of society. Plurality should be represented through the great number of civil organizations (Tunçay, 2003: 3). On the other hand, in order to explain the participatory character of *STKs*, Gümüş argues that *STKs* do not aim to represent anyone; however, they do try to form participatory platforms within which different interests can be represented (Gümüş, 2005: 141).

Çelikkan states that regarding the process of globalization and the perspective of the European Union, the inner democracy of *STKs* should be more strongly considered. *STKs* should certainly give up the leadership authority that resembled the organizational structure of political parties. He further argues that, “*STKs* are not only struggle organizations they are also educational organizations in establishing inner democracy and in the matter of democracy in general” (Çelikkan, 2002: 41). Tosun also pays attention to the inner democracy of *STKs*. According to her, to the extent that *STKs* encourage democratic participation in their decision making process, communication, and dialog and deliberation within the organization, they are able to serve the democratization or democratic consolidation in the society in general (Tosun, 2000: 54).

In the symposium entitled *STKs and Ethics* in 1999, Tarhanlı picks up several principles that *STKs* should adopt in order to be respected by the United Nations and the international regimes. These are: Neutrality, objectivity and non-selectivity. Neutrality means not being a supporter of one side in a conflict over the field of activity. Objectivity is being objective while assessing a case and non-selectivity is showing equal respect to all issues within the field of activity. Actually, those principles cannot be thought of as separate from one another (Tarhanlı, 2000: 153-155). In the same manner, while mentioning the properties of *STKs*, Keskin underlines the fulfilment of

ethical principles such as openness, transparency, consistency and approaching different ethnic, religious and sexual groups equally (Keskin, 2000: 123). Uğur pays attention to the importance of feeling trust among *STKs* in working together or making partnerships, since he thinks that if there is no trust, voluntary work becomes impossible. Partnership between the state and *STKs* is also necessary since both have similar intentions, i.e. public service (Uğur, 2000: 176-177). According to Şenatalar, the function of *STKs* gains its meaning only if they are able to diffuse the state power and loose the state authority over society. For him, the weakening of the state is directly related to the process of democratization (Şenatalar, 2002: 134).

According to Balkır and Nitelik, *STKs* are currently the shareholders of social and political life. They promote democratic participation of individuals and they convert the individual responsibility into the social responsibility. In relations with the state, *STKs* should restrict the state power and balance its sanctions to come out in favour of the public good. Every kind of despotism and extremism should be rejected by *STKs*. As such, “they should carry responsibility as carriers and defenders of pluralist, participatory and democratic values as against every kinds of despotism” (Balkır and Nitelik, 2005: 461). Furthermore, they suggest that human rights organizations are the major actors in enhancing pluralist democracy, especially at the international level, since they fight for the legal recognition of fundamental rights and freedoms by the states (Balkır and Nitelik, 2005: 457).

In a panel organized by TÜSES in 1990 (Türkiye Sosyal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırmalar Vakfı) and entitled *State and Civil Society*, Alpay suggests that for autonomous and voluntarily organized civil organizations, having rights and freedoms independent from the state is the basis of the libertarian and pluralist democratic regime, in the absence of which, neither any democratic constitution nor body of legislation are sufficient to guarantee the permanency of this regime (Alpay, 1991: 19). Moreover, according to Üstünel, only in a country where pluralist democracy is experienced with all its institutions and conditions, and the balance of rights and responsibilities is protected, can one talk about the existence of a proper civil society (Üstünel, 1991: 49).

Likewise, Kongar argues that, civil society organizations are established in order to provide individuals with the opportunity to realize their interests as well as to influence and check state power (Kongar, 1991: 109).

Furthermore, several scholars underline *STKs'* function of sharing and conveying information to the state. According to them, in addition to the opposition and collaboration, *STKs* also have the role of influencing state policies and transforming public institutions by conveying information and presenting projects to them (Önen, 2002: 137-138; Argüden, 2002: 142; Gümüő, 2005: 137). Moreover, *STKs* working especially on human rights and environmental issues have been influential in changing the sovereignty concept of nation-states, thanks to their specialization and capacity to inform the governments as well as the public. As such, they create new norms and provide them with considerable legitimacy. At the end of the day; *STKs* could create a consensus on new legal and behavioural norms among international public opinion (Belge, 1998: 135).

Dinçer describes the lobbying activities of *STKs* as communicating with government officials and bureaucrats, searching the issues on the agenda, presenting proposals during the preparation of draft statutes and governmental decisions, and forming coalitions among groups having similar interests, etc. Concerning the last one, he pays particular attention to the importance of *public based lobbying* (halka dayalı lobcılık), meaning forming solidarity networks among *STKs*, educating each *STK* member as an activist, providing them with the capacity to lobby directly, educating them about designing action plans, leadership, communication skills etc. According to Dinçer, this kind of lobbying has an important mission in protecting the general interest and continuance of democracy. He also argues that as pressure groups, *STKs* put pressure on political power holders, political parties, and public opinion according to their interest areas directly or indirectly. (Dinçer, 2005: 133-136).

In the article entitled “*Can Associative Democracy Be a Tool of Analysis for Restructuring the Relationship between State and Civil Society?*” Tosun suggests Paul

Hirst's concept of associative democracy that I was mentioned at the end of the first chapter. Referring to Hirst, Tosun examines the possibility of a partnership between the state and *STKs* through the democratization process of the state. Increasing the efficiency of the *STKs* in the process of policy decisions and the constitution of social capital will impact the character of the relation between the state and *STKs* (Tosun, 2005: 23-51).

In this chapter the salient opinions in the intellectual and academic circles expressed in Turkey in the 1990's on the matter of civil society development and roles and functions of non-governmental organizations have been reviewed. We have seen that scholars mentioned the social, political, legal and ethical requirements for an effective development of democracy, civil society and NGOs in Turkey, with reference to the assumptions of pluralist democracy. Accordingly, they were concerned not only with a description of the nature of the relationship between the state and NGOs, but also with the analyses of NGOs relations to one another, their internal structures, their social responsibilities, and their role in creating an ethical political culture based on a sense of trust and compromise. Clearly, elements of Western pluralist theory and democracy have strongly influenced the content of these discussions Turkish scholars depicted the desired characteristics and roles of Turkish NGOs in line with the characteristics attributed to such structures by Western scholars who followed the pluralist thought. The emphasis on such aspects of NGO analysis as effectiveness, enhancing solidarity, responsibility and inner democracy, as well as the references to the ideas of scholars such as de Tocqueville, Larry Diamond, and Paul Hirst, frame the analysis of orientation of Turkish scholars reviewed, shedding light on their intellectual dependence on Western pluralist thought.

In the next chapter, the two specific Turkish NGOs will be studied as cases of contemporary nature with the intention to see to what extent theoretical conception and theory –based description of NGOs are reflected in the structure and functioning of real-life cases.

CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDY

4.1. Methodology and Justification of Cases

4.1.1. Methodology

This study utilizes qualitative analysis. In qualitative research, subjective meanings, definitions, metaphors, symbols and descriptions of specific cases are important. The researcher tries to capture aspects of the social world that are difficult to express as numbers. To put in another way,

Qualitative analysis does not draw on a large, well-established body of formal knowledge from math and statistics. The data are the form of words, which are relatively imprecise, diffuse and context-based and can have more than one meaning (Neuman, 2000: 405).

The major aim of this study is to examine the characteristics and functions of NGOs in Turkey using pluralist concepts. As such, I intend to test the theoretical assumptions of pluralist thinking and explore its influence in the Turkish context through scrutinizing the discourses and practices of two NGOs. Self-perception of NGO members, their own perceived impact on society, and their relations with other NGOs and the state indicate civil society development in Turkey; these are the specific dimensions observed in this piece of qualitative research.

Additionally, I use an interpretive approach and inductive research strategy for the purposes of this study.

In epistemology of the interpretative approach knowledge is seen to be derived from everyday concepts and meanings. The social researcher enters the everyday social world in order to grasp the socially constructed meanings and then reconstructs these meanings in social scientific language (Blaikie, 1993: 96).

Referring to Wolfe and Hempel, Blaikie lists the characteristics of inductive strategy in the following way:

1. All facts are observed and recorded without selection or guesses as to their relative importance.
2. These facts are analyzed, compared and classified, without using hypotheses.
3. From this analysis generalizations are inductively drawn as to the relations between them.
4. These generalizations are subjected to further testing (Blaike, 1993: 137).

Due to limited research time and content, as well as the training of the researcher, this strategy was not followed to the fullest extent in this work. However, the general approach that entertains particularly those characteristics described in number two and three of the above model was adopted.

Also while, I used the in-depth interview as my main methodological tool. The interviews used in this study could best be described as “semi-in-depth” interviews in that they conformed to the basic approach of this technique but remained short of fully fulfilling its criteria. In-depth interviews are different from formal survey research interviews in many ways. The interview session is unstructured and non-directive allowing for free expression and follow-up questioning on the spot. In in-depth interviews, participants are active individuals whose feelings, gestures, expressions and thoughts are the essential part of the analysis (Neuman, 2000). In this research, I have attempted to utilize the fundamentals of such an approach.

In addition to the interviews, I have also examined written materials, such as activity reports and publications released by the NGOs themselves, in addition to outside sources.

In total, I have conducted twelve interviews, nine of them being with members of İHD and three of them from KİH-YÇV. Each interview lasted about three hours on average. In the interviews, participants were asked some questions on personal feelings and experiences about their organizations, relations with state agencies and other NGOs, organizational structures, and decision making processes. Interviews consisted of three

loosely defined sections, corresponding to the three dimensions of my research. However, these three sections are only separate in an analytical sense, since in many of the questions, I inquired about more than one dimension of the research.

Participants from the İHD were mostly from the Board of Directors of this organization, either in its head office or the Ankara Branch. Three were also founding members. One was an honorary member and old chairman, one was from the Istanbul Branch and an old founding member, and the other was a professional member working as secretary at the head office. Two of the participants were women. The average age of the interviewees was 47, and all were university graduates except for the secretary. They all worked voluntarily for the NGO while continuing work in their own professions.

Participants from KİH-YÇV were all professional workers of the organization, as well as professionals in their own right. All were women, the average age was 37, and all were university graduates. Two studied in America, and one had Ms. Degree. There is an official Board of Directors, but they said that it is not so apparent; they worked together and divided the labour according to need and their own professional capacity.

4.1.2. Justification of Cases

The reasons behind choosing to study human rights organizations are diverse. First of all, by definition, human rights organizations address the main themes of this study, considering the theoretical assumptions behind human rights discourse. Human rights discourse refers to a distance from the state and thus implies independence and autonomy. Furthermore, it adopts peaceful democratic action as its main reaction strategy and always uses legal action as a pressure mechanism. Accordingly, human rights organizations are expected to adopt peaceful strategies in changing state policies in their inner affairs. Their major aim is to introduce and disseminate human rights consciousness not only among people, but also among state agencies. For them, doing

this means learning to be open, tolerant and inclusive to others. It also minimizes ethnic-, religious- and gender-based conflicts and enhances trust and solidarity among the people in general, as well as among NGOs and between the NGOs and the state. Furthermore, as seen in my literature review of the post-90s period, scholars exemplify women's and human rights organizations and describe the recently expected characteristics NGOs. Picking up these two NGOs as samples was also meaningful; they have the potential to assess the democratization process of Turkey, since they reflect the two salient characteristics of the Turkish state: militarist authoritarianism and patriarchy. These two characteristics are useful in analyzing and understanding the democratization process of Turkey.

Examining only two organizations, this study cannot possibly draw any conclusions about the general situation of NGOs in Turkey. On the other hand, this selection provides one with the opportunity to assess the extent and dimensions of the actual realizability of the claims of this theoretical approach in real life, in the case of a seemingly "most conducive" medium; in this instance, such a case is the pluralist viewpoint in Turkish civil society.

İHD is the most powerful, oldest, most well-rooted and the best recognized human rights organization in Turkey.

KİH-YÇV, on the other hand, is a women's organization. Officially, it is a foundation. Choosing a women's organization has been a deliberative choice in that, in contemporary Turkey, the women's movement is recognized as the most effective, vital and dynamic part of Turkish civil society. In fact, in the recent past, women's organizations have been most likely to impact such critical areas as law reform; through their lobbying, they have claimed to be more democratic in their internal organizations, owing to their feminist outlook and work ethics. They also make a strong appeal for solidarity with groups with different interests, cross-cutting the identity of being a woman.

There are already countless studies on civil society and NGOs in Turkey looking at this phenomenon from different angles and shedding light on the various components of this vast field (Sarıbay, 1994; Küçükömer, 1994; Çaha, 1996; Güneş and Güneş 2001; Çulhaoğlu et al., 2001; Güler, 1998). This research focuses on the role and characteristics of the two above-described human rights organizations exclusively from the perspective of pluralist thinking. Therefore, the findings of the research are also interpreted according to the claims, assumptions and arguments peculiar to the pluralist approach. To the extent that pluralist theory constitutes one of the universally valid foundations of political sociological analysis, it has been peculiarly underused nature in recent civil society analyses. Thus, the added-value of the present research may lie in contributing to a fuller grasp of social movements, civil society relations and/or human rights-based mobilization in Turkey from a neglected, if not novel, perspective.

4.2. İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association) (İHD)

4.2.1. Foundation, Objectives and Principles

İHD is the first NGO to be examined in this study. It was established in 1986. It has 34 branches and about 13.000 members all over the Turkey. The foundation process of İHD was related to the post-1980 conditions of Turkey. After the military coup in 12th September 1980, pressures have mostly continued in prisons. Thousands of people, including intellectuals, journalists and university members, were arrested and subjected to torture. Furthermore, all kinds of organizations were banned, including political parties. These actions indicated that there were human rights violations such as, right to life, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of organization, freedom of press and information, violations in the judicial process and unacceptable conditions in prisons, among others. İHD's own web site describes its founding aim in the following way:

The attempt to set up a human rights organization which was initiated by relatives of the detainees and convicted prisoners was concluded on 17 July 1986 after nearly a year of discussions. A total of 98 people, including writers, journalists, doctors, lawyers, architects and engineers signed the foundation petition of the Human Rights Association. Many

intellectuals could not be founder members due to the obstacles caused by the Law on Associations.¹¹

İHD was the first attempt to organize shortly after the military coup. Two years after its establishment, it had opened 16 branches in the country. This was a considerable success because of the restrictions the 1980 coup d'état had caused. One year before İHD's establishment, discussions on "what kind of an organization it should be" had begun. Some argued that the name of the association should be the "association of solidarity with relatives of the detainees and convicted prisoners." However, it was concluded that this name would be too extensive. Therefore, the name of the association became the Human Rights Association. Hereafter, İHD gathered members from all sections of society, from trade unionists to feminists, under its roof. Founders of İHD determined the sole aim of the association in its statute:

The explicit and sole purpose of the association is to carry out efforts in the field of human rights and liberties.¹²

To realize its objective Association was to investigate, identify and make known to individuals, to the public and to the relevant authorities human rights practices in this country; to conduct or commission scientific research studies and surveys in connection with human rights and make known to the public developments in this field; to organize public debates, conferences, seminars, panel discussions, symposia, all sorts of meetings and demonstrations, exhibitions and competitions; to publish information; to award prizes; to carry out investigations and make observations in order to ensure that convicted prisoners, persons under arrest and detainees, regardless of their race, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, are treated in a manner respectful of human dignity and to keep the public informed about these matters.¹³

If one tries to describe İHD from the eyes of its members,^{*} it is the "oldest and most rooted" human rights organization in Turkey. It is also "long standing in spite of the pressures on it" and a "very important success." It is the most "civil" civil society organization in Turkey. It is the "most important organization that has introduced the

¹¹ <http://www.ihd.org.tr/eindex.html>

¹² *ibid*

¹³ *ibid*

^{*} The following reflect the views expressed by those interviewed.

conception of human rights to the minds of people all over the Turkey.” It is the “most important organization in the Eastern region” of Turkey. It is “favourable to the discussion of different ideas and compromise.”

According to a member of the administrative board in the head office, İHD is a “street organization;” “it has learnt human rights theory from its practical actions”. He said the following:

For one thing, it is misconceived in the eyes of public. Second, it is extremely self-denying and always learning. Its objection to double standard is the most significant feature of it. Also it does not feel as victim if not it does not identify itself with victims. If so, there would no chance to look at the violations as objective. We try to do that, we take pains over looking objectively to the results of the violations and since a long time İHD has succeeded this both through its jargon and practices.* (i)

Parallel to the social and political developments in Turkey throughout the twenty years, interest areas of the organization changed depending on the changes in prior violation areas. Most of the participants say that in the early years, İHD was intensively interested in prison problems, since in those times there were considerable amount of human rights violations in prisons. In 1992 many prisoners were pardoned and released. After this time, the Kurdish question became a part of İHD’s agenda. In light of these developments, İHD experienced some inner conflicts and ruptures. They argue that İHD tried to extend its interest field not only in theoretical manner, but also in a practical one. They only reached this goal after inner discussions and practical field experience. A female member from the general administrative board stated the following:

As Turkey’s domestic problems have undergone a change, the problems which İHD put on the agenda have also changed. If we look at the changes, we see that İHD was a place within which the victims of the 1980 coup gathered in 1986, whereas it became a place in which the victims of the Kurdish problem were members since 1995. The jobs and policies of İHD might also change. İHD is the one who organized the first and most important campaign for eliminating the death penalty. At the beginning, personal and political rights were more

* These texts are translated from the interview transcripts in Turkish by the author. See Appendix 1.

important, of course. İHD was busier with freedom of expression and torture matters and it was monitoring them. Today, these problems still exist. Also, the Kurdish issue is still an area of violation and İHD is following it. But, for the last 4-5 years, a range of rights that cover economic, social and cultural rights have been on the agenda. We do not prioritize among these rights, because we believe that human rights are undivided and universal. By reason of Turkey's conjuncture, İHD is the indivisible organization that comes to mind when it comes to personal and political rights. For the last 4-5 years, İHD has been fighting for the elimination of discrimination against the handicapped and women. It also carries out important works about the rights of children and the rights of refugees. It is an organization that has been trying to widen its scope, but because of the prejudices in Turkey and the government's point of view, outsiders can not get İHD out of the frame of personal and political rights. (ii)

Additionally, another member of the administrative board argues that:

A lot of things have changed in İHD since then. By now, some specific principles have already been formed. They have been formed with the experience that İHD earned from its struggle in the last 10 years. There have been significant changes in the method of work and the aims. In the initial years, even being against the death penalty was not considered appropriate; people used to think that someone who murdered our children should be killed, but right now we consider that there is a violation of human rights in the headscarf issue. The right to self-determination, which is in our principles, was discussed in respect to the Kurdish issue. At that time, these discussions lead to separations from the organization. For example, when we said that we were against the war, militarism and race riots, some people said, "Are you against the right to resistance? This principle is not correct." The principles and guidelines have been formed after discussions. We see human rights as a whole. (iii)

In fact, this transformation that İHD experienced can be seen as a reflection of the transformation of the notion of civil society from a sphere of specific political struggle to a sphere which articulates and provides room for various ideological viewpoints, interests and political demands to be expressed.

Relatedly, the former chairman also notes the embracing character of İHD through the conception of human rights. He actually relates the impact of the organization and the flourishing sense of cooperation among people with different

interests to the ideas of that well-known 19th century political thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville described NGOs as political schools in which people learned to subordinate their particular interests to common actions. In the words of the former İHD chairman,

At first, prisoners' relatives were participating only in the activities about prisons, but later, these people started to deal with other human rights problems. They started to support other people's children, people who were convicted for their opinions or Bergama villagers. Although the association focused on the problems of prisons and prisoners' relatives in the beginning and although its founders are mostly leftists, the association pays attention to all kinds of human rights. I can say that the managers who have been in İHD for a long time also think that there should be activities concerning violations of every kind of human rights. (iv)

Looking over the principles that İHD has adopted would be illuminating to analyze as a last point:

- *The İHD upholds the principle that the human rights are universal in nature and indivisible.*
- * The İHD is a non-governmental and voluntary organization.*
- * The İHD is not a body of any political parties or of a single political tendency.*
- * The İHD stands up for the oppressed individual, people, nation, sex and class.*
- * The İHD is against the death penalty regardless of geographical location and circumstance.*
- * The İHD is against torture regardless of the individual, the geographical location and circumstance.*
- * The İHD defends the right to fair trial everywhere, for everyone and in any circumstances.*
- * The İHD strongly supports the idea that the right of nations to self-determination is a human right.*
- * The İHD works are based on humanitarian law. The İHD also calls for the fighting parties to implement the Geneva Convention, especially Common Article 3 of the Convention.*
- * The İHD defends unconditionally and without any restriction the right to freedom of expression.*
- * The İHD, similarly, defends the right to freedom of religion.¹⁴*

¹⁴ <http://www.ihd.org.tr/eindex.html>

4.2.2. Enhancing Solidarity, Responsibility and Compromise

In the previous chapters, I discussed the literature on the roles of NGOs in building trust, solidarity, cooperation and responsibility both in general and in the Turkish context. In order to assess this for İHD, I asked interviewees the questions, “What does it mean to you to be affiliated with İHD?”, “How has being a member of İHD changed your life?” and “When you compare your life prior to and after being a member, what differences do you see?”

Almost all the participants expressed pride in being affiliated with İHD, albeit for different reasons. Furthermore, almost all had experienced some changes in their life after joining the organization. For them, being in the İHD was almost a “sacred thing;” they thought of themselves as the “conscience” of Turkish society. For some, it was experienced as a school, a place where they learned new ideas, roles and attitudes. All characterized the association as “a transparent organization,” where there is not any hidden agenda.” Member felt that, if you were in İHD, you paid the cost; that is, there was always a risk of being taken to court, being arrested and being harassed or oppressed by the police. An individual has to take all these risks, since all over the world; the struggle for human rights involves these dangers. Members felt İHD made them feel “responsible” towards the problems of Turkey. The former chairman of the association said the following:

It is an honour to be a part of İHD. It does not have anything to do with money or fame at all. You want to help someone that you do not know and have no interest-based relationship with. You insist on a right. You make an effort just because a freedom or a right is violated. Because you work consciously, the satisfaction you get is not like any other. Even if Ahmet does not like me and he is my ideological enemy, I put in effort for his rights. Lots of MHP members and nationalists have similar stories. One time, a citizen with a 12-year-old daughter with him came by me, told me about his problem and said he wanted to reach the minister A. Şener on behalf of the workers in Sivas. We made a massive effort to solve his problem. Then he said “Hey brother, I am from MHP, I am a nationalist.” And I said “Did I ask whatever you are? Did I ask whether you are a Kurd, Turk, Armenian or Circassian? Did I ask if you are Sunnite or Alewite? They say we are for Kurds, but we do not ask people what they are for. We don’t care.” (v)

For most interviewees, İHD was a school that taught them about the field of human rights. They learned the universality of human rights and how to monitor and report the violations. Since the founders of İHD were mostly left-oriented intellectuals, exploring the universality of human rights was particularly important. For example, an anti-corporal punishment stance was not adopted by many members who suggested that those who cause the death penalty should be executed. However, in the course of time, as members further adopted the ideology of human rights, they changed their minds about the issue. Furthermore, some members say that they thought that human rights violations occurred only in prisons before joining İHD. However, after joining İHD, they learned that the human rights universal declaration has twenty seven headlines, including women rights, rights of children, social rights and environmental rights, among others. Coming from the socialist tradition, they say that they looked at the relationship between the individual and power differently before joining İHD. This may indicate that, since İHD members cross-cut ideological loyalties, political views became more moderate in the course of time. Accordingly, one of the participants states the following:

İHD is like a school in my opinion. Because we come from socialist traditions, I did not use to comprehend the world or at least the relationship between power and individual as I do today. Now I have the opportunity to have a different point of view. I could live in peace, even if I were hungry or unemployed. I find living in peace more meaningful. That is the kind of contribution that İHD makes to my life. Peace is just an example. As a whole, I have the chance to see class struggle, political power and the power-individual relationship in a different frame. (vi)

As the above statements suggest, İHD enhanced not only members' feelings of responsibility, compromise and tolerance, but also their awareness towards themselves. The awareness of individual power as a result of cooperative action justifies the ideas of Paul Hirst (1994) and Ali Yaşar Sarıbay (1992); they suggest that individuals further individuated through associating with others, as a result of their participation in communities. The members said the following:

There were Kurdish friends in our neighbourhood, but we used to call them Easterners. When we went to the areas Kurdish people lived, we realized that it was not true. They were speaking in another language. In the headscarf issue, at first we thought that people with headscarves would be bigots, but in the meetings, I saw that they had their own problems and had difficulty in expressing their problems. (vii)

Before being a part of İHD practice, I knew the fact that human rights were universal only on paper. İHD practice taught me the necessity of interdependency and acting together, which means, this is not a domestic problem. When there is a violation of human rights in a country, it is not enough to fight against it only in that country. I also had a chance to know myself better. Thanks to İHD and other human rights organizations in the world, I became aware of my own individual power as a result of acting together. Now I feel like a person that no authority could make obey. (viii)

İHD can easily touch the problems of Turkey. It is very important to me since it made me confront myself and question a lot of notions such as nationalism and discrimination. It means a lot to me in terms of my own personal development. I understood my responsibility to my country and I felt more responsible. I met homosexuals here for the first time and I learned to see them in a different way than everybody else does. (ix)

I used to think as an individual before I came here, but I learned to think together after I came. (x)

Recalling the ideas of Putnam (1993) and Diamond (1999), participation in civil organizations instils habits of cooperation and solidarity in members, so far as the democratic and active participation of members is encouraged by such organizations. Accordingly, I asked interviewees about the relations among İHD members, disagreements and conflicts, the nature of topics on which rifts occurred and the attitude of the association, as an entity, towards these conflicts. Generally the answers did not indicate a very close and strong relationship between members of İHD. While its size accounts for this weak relationship to some extent, it was also obvious that there is a lack of communication among members. This is both due to the disinterest of people in administration and of members themselves. Committees are important opportunities for the betterment of relations between members. Members who work in communities know each other better, trust and help each other. Also, active members gather in anti-

periodical meetings with other members. According to one participant in the western region, member relations are frostier in the West, whereas in the eastern region, there are more intimate relations between members. The diversification of NGOs in western region, with many alternative organizations, explains this phenomenon. Another respondent says that members who know each other share lots of experiences, from playing football to being jailed. So, these experiences inspire confidence and trust in them. Accordingly some others say that,

In terms of helping people whose human rights were violated, when we look at people's level of humanistic sensitivity, we can see that there is a similarity in İHD members and this brings along cooperation. (xi)

Let's assume that you encounter 10 torture cases in a month and right there all the personal differences disappear. The unjustly treated person might be very poor, might be a gypsy who was discriminated against, might be a woman that was beaten up by her husband or might be a refugee. İHD leaves all personal differences aside to help this person. It is possible to talk about collectivism. Otherwise, it would not have been possible to keep İHD alive with such limited opportunities and such a small amount of active members. It is an association that involves individual sacrifices. (xii)

Here, emphasis on the need for individual sacrifices once again justifies the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville that I have just mentioned above.

All the participants pointed out that there are lots of disagreements and conflicts in the past and now. In the past, the most striking conflicts experienced concerned the death penalty, torture, the Kurdish question and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Now the problems are mostly methodological. When I asked the attitude of the association, they said that there is not a hierarchical relationship between members and administrators; line relationship is only in paper. The chairman never acts by himself, everything can be discussed and deliberated and members come to a compromise. Problems are usually solved in a peaceful way. A participant from the board of direction confesses that:

I can not get along with most of the managers in the association ideologically. We and lots of people here know this fact. We also have very harsh arguments; we had and we will. But then, we reach a consensus in most of the cases, we take the middle course and a result comes out of every meeting. (xiii)

Another participant states that if there is a problem in a branch,

The headquarters goes to the branch office as a mediator. İHD always has a system that makes people understand and compromise with each other and it never fails. It might not solve the problem perfectly but it has a mechanism to remove the problem a bit with the way of compromise. The method is not voting or conflict. (xiv)

Since 1994, İHD has agreed on the notion that any type of violent action, whether from states or from non-state violent political organizations, should be rejected and criticized. Similarly, its position on torture is clear in that it is against torture of any kind. It defends the right to live. It considers the headscarf ban and the discrimination of homosexuals as human rights violations. In spite of its anti-state roots, it protects the rights of police officers. It fights for the cultural and social rights of Kurds. Such official positions of İHD indicate to its potential in developing cross-cutting loyalties.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the inclusive and open character of NGOs, as well as the existence and potential existence of overlapping memberships within them, are significant features in a pluralist democracy. According to Dahl (1956), diversity of interests is an indispensable feature of democracy, thanks to which no majorities can be organized. Undoubtedly, the member profile of an organization is an important criterion in the examination of its diversity. There are different and contradictory İHD member profiles even in the eyes of the organization's own leaders. Some descriptions include the following:

There are three kinds of member profiles. The first one is democratic, intellectual and with a high average age. The second one is prisoners' families and the third one is Kurdish people and leftists. The general average age is between 35 and 40. (xv)

It is very hard to talk about a general member profile of İHD. There are very different people, everybody works in a different area, but they are all İHD members. There is no person whose only job is İHD. There are

few people whose financial situation is good and there are mostly poor people. Most of the members are male, but the number of female members is not very low. Lots of women can take part in the management, but in their opinions, it is still not sufficient. The level of education is a little bit low in the East, but there are lots of members who have a profession. (xvi)

I can say that the members are people who see the world from a leftist point of view. I do not know how much they are now, but a lot of members are from a Marxist origin. Lots of them are sensitive to the Kurdish issue, lots of them have a socialist point of view and a lot of them have a liberal view. There are ones who do not feel close to any political view but say they are sensitive about human rights and democracy. Their common point is sensitivity about human rights. If there is an activity, you can see they all gather around, no matter which politics they have. From liberalists to Marxists, from Kurds to Turks, from Alewites to Sunnis. (xvii)

Members are with high average age, mostly male and leftists or with socialist point of view. (xviii)

It is an organization in which legal practitioners, educators and teachers participate. (xix)

It is an organization mostly with a potential of young average age and women. Now the women in the management account for three-fourths of the members and half of the associate members. The percentage of women goes up to 75% in Istanbul. We have homosexual members too. (xx)

They are usually people whose rights were violated (xxi)

Of course, these different descriptions correlate to the different positions or viewpoints of the participants in this research. For instance, when the respondent from Istanbul branch asserts that the average age is low, this is probably true only for the Istanbul branch.

There is no specific work to determine a target group that is to be approached to take part in İHD. The target group might be understood as those who come to the organization for help, namely victims of human rights. As far as the respondents argue, those who come to İHD are mostly minorities, people from a low-income level, people

who confront the state in any way, refugees, asylum seekers, women exposed to violence, homosexuals and torture victims, among others. Sometimes there are extraordinary clients such as army and police officers, nationalists exposed to torture in military service, a transsexual beaten by the police, children subjected to violence from their families and hi-jacked taxi drivers. Nationalists, Islamists and right-oriented people also consult the organization. This shows that, compared to its past, İHD brings more diverse groups of people, as members, clients or targets, together. Diamond's assertions (1994) are realized by İHD as an actor in civil society; it creates channels in favour of the traditionally excluded groups (such as women and racial or ethnic minorities) to provide access to political power. On the other hand, in my opinion, İHD's most striking problem in terms of diversification is its lack of appeal to the youth. This is the source of some of its "troubles".

Pluralist theories suggest that in a diverse civil society people have more of a chance to express themselves and this produces moderation and consensus. Therefore, diversity and its positive or negative effects on the association are important criterions as well, considering the expected outcome of pluralist analysis. As an answer to this question, participants suggested that diversity is a positive thing because it is necessary for understanding the importance of human rights. In spite of different identities and viewpoints, they can join under the conception of human rights and their members become aware of that. Diversity is also necessary for sharing information. For example, members with knowledge on environmental problems or women issues share this knowledge with other members. Since there is diversity among members, there is always dynamism in the association. In this way, members get know each other better and learn to be tolerant even if they do not accept each other's ideas. Any positive or negative role of İHD in the relationships between different groups within the organization was another important matter related to this issue. According to some participants, İHD does not play such a role because it is not necessary. They think that this role is not the organization's but rather the role of human rights concepts; the concepts themselves should provide members with such a conclusion. On the other hand, some members mention such a role and state that

For example, socialists and Islamists come together in a panel meeting, tell each other their ideas and contribute to their opinions, or a Kurd and an Islamist meet each other in a discussion about AKP. These [events] are what İHD make possible. The only issue İHD fails in is the Kemalist bloc because after the Kurdish issue has come up, our relationship with that block has ended. (xxii)

As far as answers are concerned, İHD plays the role of a public school, within which members learn to associate with each other and develop tolerance and moderation. However, İHD's relationship with the Kemalist block is still somewhat problematic.

As McLennan (1989) pointed out, extensive networks among social groups ensuring the spread of information is a necessary condition for the political effectiveness of an interest group (McLennan, 1989: 20). Accordingly, partnerships with different NGOs, political parties and other human rights organizations are also a concern in this analysis. These partnerships test potential cross-cutting loyalties and solidarity networks that İHD could develop. Trade unions and women's organizations are leading organizations that work with İHD. Among trade unions, İHD works with *inter alia* KESK (Public Workers Union and Confederation), SES (Health Workers Union) and Dev-Maden-Sen (Revolutionary Miners Union). Among women's organizations, they work with KADER (Association of Supporting and Educating Woman Candidates), Başkent Kadın Platformu (Woman Platform of Capital City), Amargi Kadın Akademisi (Amargi Woman Academy), Gökkuşluğu Kadın Platformu (Rainbow Woman Platform) and Şahmaran Kadın Dayanışma ve Araştırma Merkezi (Şahmaran Woman Solidarity and Research Center) which represent secular as well as Islamist national as well as ethnic contingents. Similarly, in terms of human rights organizations, TİHV (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey), Mazlum-Der (Organization for Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People), Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch are the organizations with which İHD are most in touch with. They give press releases and create various campaigns, street actions, meetings, education programs and projects together. In addition, there is a common

platform founded in 2005 named IHOP (Human Rights Common Platform) including İHD and all the human rights organizations mentioned above. The reason for founding such a platform was to develop the relationships of human right organizations with occupational organizations, trade unions and other NGOs; support their agenda and create a common agenda with them. They do not work with political parties in principle, but sometimes they undersign public announcements with them.

I also asked interviewees the following question: “To your knowledge, are there any İHD members who are also affiliated with or are a member in other NGOs?” Answers were generally yes. Trade unions, women’s organizations, occupational organizations and political parties are the organizations with which members were affiliated aside from İHD. However, there is a rule that an administrative member of İHD cannot become an administrator in another organization or political party. However, he or she could become a member of that organization without taking an administrative position. This information indicates that İHD usually makes partnerships with left-oriented trade unions, Islamic and liberal women’s associations and human rights organizations. Members are usually affiliated with other NGOs besides İHD and this makes the development of cross-cutting loyalties possible.

In pluralist democracies, joining ranks with others and advocating equal rights and tolerance for all the ethnic or religious groups of the society actually results in a compromise among those groups and society at large. This cooperation also results in an increase in political effectiveness. İHD’s role in social and political life was therefore an important question for participants in the organization. It raised issues such as the mitigation of conflicts, prevention of ethnic and religious divisions and the development of tolerance and compromise.

Relatedly, I asked the following question: “Considering the ethnic and religious conflicts in Turkey, what kind of roles do İHD play in political and social spheres?” In order to point out the important role İHD played in Turkish society, many participants gave the same examples. One of them concerned research on human rights

organizations conducted by the Liberal Thought Society in 2002. According to that research, İHD is the most popular and trusted human rights organization in Turkey. Another example dealt with the respectability of İHD's human rights violation reports at international platforms. The interviewees mentioned that İHD has worked with Amnesty International for many years and it often considers İHD's reports. When government authorities go abroad, they face İHD's reports, since many reputable international NGOs respect them. In fact, these answers refer to an increase in political effectiveness, thanks to the constituted networks and compromise among different social groups that I mentioned earlier. In a more relevant answer, one participant said the following:

Everybody knows that İHD is for democracy. The Alewites say İHD puts effort for me to improve my culture freely. The Kurds say İHD resists pressure and defends my cultural rights. The other minorities consider the same thing, too. Religious groups and people with headscarves too. We do not provoke different groups against each other. The society cares about what İHD says, not what is said in the media, but the government is angry at us because we care. (xxiii)

From a more pessimistic perspective, another respondent said that

Especially for the last two years, we have been trying to explain in the public statements that we are concerned with violence. But the problem is that the public media and the government constantly manipulate people in Turkey. We lay stress on a culture of peace whenever possible, but the society does not hear us and the government doesn't take any steps about it. On the contrary, the government provokes reaction against organizations and defenders of human rights in every funeral of a cop or a soldier, whenever possible. Therefore, your effort against violence for social peace does not pay. Neither in government nor in society or in the media. (xxiv)

Accordingly, another participant argues that

İHD is against nationalism and supports all human rights victims. When we look at its reflection in society, İHD members are seen as the spies who are against the government and try to knock it down. This is something inevitable because in this country, there are people who always try to provoke nationalism. Supporting the victims means supporting all the victims. Any kind of selection is out of question. There is not an ethical problem as long as İHD defends a homosexual victim as much as a Kurdish victim. İHD does not see the Kurdish issue in accordance with Kurdish nationalism and you can not see such

a thing in any of its publications. It sees it from the perspective of human rights. (xxv)

A lawyer member participant states that:

İHD has never sided with the political discourse of the Kurds, but it has looked after people who were humiliated just because of their ethnic identity and exposed to the violation of their human rights. The person whose right was violated might be a Muslim or a Christian; it doesn't matter, but if he suffered it because of his religious belief, then this is a problem. If there is a violation of human rights in question, the identity is not important. With this concept, İHD has significantly contributed to the improvement of human rights consciousness in Turkey. (xxvi)

Aside from one optimistic answer, these answers refer to the tension between different ethnic groups, namely Kurds and Turks, in society at large and the unstable public opinion of İHD. Furthermore, this conflict does not rise from the exclusive and provocative character of İHD, but rather from the public opinion created by the attitude and actions of the state, in addition to the mainstream media channels. Here, I should point out that although participants emphasized the peaceful discourse adopted by İHD, one of the founders and the former member of İHD asserted that, especially in the 1990s when PKK increased its violent actions in the Eastern regions, there were some administrators in İHD that had been supported by PKK. Some other members also think that during that period İHD followed some false policies and did not express itself properly. The attitude of the state and the media did not solely cause the İHD's difficulties with disseminating its mission properly.

I also asked about the place of education and the content of other projects, since they are very important in disseminating the mission of the organization in an effective way. İHD implemented an educational project for lawyers and teachers between 1995 and 1996. For lawyers it was an educational program that informs lawyers about the civil applications to European Human Rights Courts. The class for teachers informed them how to teach human rights to children. There was also an educational program for human rights activists telling them the definition of human rights and how human rights violations are monitored and reported. The Istanbul branch has a human rights library and has invited competent scholars to it. They implemented an educational program for

their members and for people from any profession lasting six months. Currently they can not make solely educational projects due to financial deficits, but they never neglect the educational dimensions of other projects on issues like, migration, forced migration, rights of refugees, rights of minorities, rights of asylum seekers, prisons, torture, land mines and rights of disabled people. The last two are newly finished projects and members, in addition to other NGOs working on similar areas, were invited and informed. There is also a future project on a continuing educational centre titled the “Human Rights Academy.” It aims at giving members and advocates of administrators a basic human rights education. Generally, İHD are of the opinion that there is not enough human rights consciousness in society; people are not aware of the significance of the concept. Because of this, İHD should provide this consciousness through education. Furthermore, in my opinion, building communication channels among different NGOs contributes to the political effectiveness of the NGO.

4.2.3. Effectiveness

Recalling the significance of dispersion or diffusion of power in a pluralist democracy and Diamond’s (1994) emphasis on the roles of NGOs in subjecting the state to public scrutiny in order for a sustainable democracy, reforming existing democratic institutions and procedures are all important criteria when assessing the effectiveness of a NGO at questioning and checking government policies. For this reason I have asked whether participants think İHD was effective or influential in Turkey and if so, how and on which areas they see this influence. There appeared distinctive areas where İHD is more effective. These areas include the betterment of prison conditions, forestalling torture and improving the evacuation of villages in the Eastern region. Also, by means of various campaigns, İHD has carried certain human rights problems into the public agenda, such as freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and the abandonment of the death penalty. Generally speaking, İHD played an important role in introducing human rights concepts to the Turkish society and state and it accordingly initiated the establishment of other human rights organizations, such as

TİHV (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey) and state departments working on human rights.

Follow-up questions concerned the İHD's influence on the state's sensitivity to human rights and the transformation of the state's policies and agencies. In answering these questions, some of the participants mention the deterrent effect İHD has on the state. In other words, the state realized that people could apply to İHD when they were exposed to a violation and the state took measures accordingly. Furthermore, in spite of the efforts to put İHD in a black list, the state could never close down İHD and feels obliged to meet with İHD and listen to and follow its actions. According to the former chairman, İHD has influenced the establishment of human rights units within state departments, such as the Human Rights Department, established by the Prime Minister in 1990; the creation of a minister responsible for human rights in 1992 and the establishment of human rights councils in provinces and counties in 2000. He argues that,

For example, in 1995 Ministry of Internal Affairs founded arrest-monitoring units. Why? Because at that time, İHD was the power behind the Saturday Mothers' action. For two years in front of Galatasaray High School, Saturday mothers protested. We were the power behind them. What did the government do? First it brought a bus to the mothers and said, "If you say your children got lost when under arrest, then inform us." After that, a monitoring unit was founded. The government might have done this in order for people not to go to İHD, or it might have done it in order to pay attention to what İHD said with good intentions. Whatever the reason is, we were one of the leading actors in the government's decision to take a positive step about that issue. (xxvii)

Another participant points out that

We refused to participate in the province and district human rights councils, since we believe that they must be independent. Because they would have a power and authority to make a change only if they were independent. Besides, in order for a victim to consult them, he/ she has to believe that those committees will solve his/her problems. Since we did not take part in them, they said, "We can't discuss human rights because İHD is not here". This example shows our effect on the government and contribution to the democratization, but there are

question marks about the government's sensitivity to human rights.
(xxviii)

According to many participants, the state's sensitivity to human rights is only for show. In fact, to achieve such an objective, a collective struggle of all the actors in civil society is needed. A renewal in public cadres and an educational program for government officials is also needed. However, members were more optimistic about the transformation of public agencies and policies. For example, a lawyer member stated the following:

I think İHD changes state government policies and institutions to an extent because, thanks to İHD, not only common people but also the press have become sensitive. For instance, a family comes to us telling that their son is in harsh prison conditions in Sincan. At this point, we write to the Ministry of Justice and Director's Office of Sincan F-type Prison. Sometimes the director sets himself in order or the Ministry of Justice wants response from the prison. Therefore, İHD is efficient not only about laws but also about the action. For example, İHD gives human rights lessons to the police and gendarmerie in Hacettepe University. They can say very terrifying ideas at the beginning of the term, but towards the end when we chat again, I observe that there are some positive differences. I can see how much İHD helps their negative consciousness to change and I find that kind of education very helpful. (xxix)

Questions continued concerning the İHD's influence on legal arrangements, relations with the parliament and lobbying activities of İHD. Almost all the participants mentioned the influence of İHD in legal arrangements. İHD is a contact organization for the Secretariat General for European Union Affairs and European Union Delegation of Turkey, both of which take İHD reports as resources. As a result of this, İHD indirectly contributes to the legal process related to the European Union (EU). Moreover, İHD also sends its annual reports to the Parliament and İHD sometimes contacts the Parliamentarians in The Examination of Human Rights Committee one by one on the eve of legal changes related to human rights. However, participants believe that İHD is more influential in changing the rules while struggling for human rights rather than in lobbying activity. It strives to increase human rights consciousness in society. In the recent past, they worked for amendments in some legal rules such as the prevention of terrorism act, act of return home, torture and bad treatment and act on meetings and

demonstrations and they succeeded to change some sections of them. However, they could not amend the recently prepared prevention of terrorism act. A participant said that

We inform the Human Rights Inquiry Commission in Parliament about the violations that come to us. Then the Commission writes to the relevant public institution and notifies İHD of the response they get in a written way. This might be effective in some incidents. For instance, in the long-term arrests, in the freedom of association or in the freedom of expression. For example, the institution to which The Examination of Human Rights Committee sends a report about freedom of expression can accept the suggestions from the committee. The Examination of Human Rights Committee sometimes wants to meet with İHD itself, too. (xxx)

On the other hand another participant argues that:

When we say “relationship,” a mutual bond comes to mind. But it does not exist here. We send our violation reports and demands, but the Human Rights Inquiry Commission in Parliament does not evaluate them. We only get this feedback: Your application about X person has been recorded. That’s it. (xxxi)

It is understood that there is not a stable relationship between İHD and members of the Parliament. Similarly, İHD cannot reliably change the rules. They think that establishing good or bad relations with the Parliament depend on the attitude of the Parliamentarian and changing the rules depends not only on the struggle of human rights organizations, but also on some other factors peculiar to the structure of Turkish state. For them, that means there is no political power which considers the demands of society in any way.

In relationships with government agencies, the picture is similar to relations with the Parliament. Relations are sometimes good and sometimes bad. One can understand from their answers that there again is not a stable form of dialogue between the government and İHD. However, communication tends to be more positive with the minister of foreign affairs and the responsible minister of human rights. In general, İHD is not prejudiced towards the state agencies but prefers frosty relations. Most of the

participants complain about the ambiguous character of the relationship between the state and İHD. Accordingly, one of them states that,

İHD has always kept a distance with the government, but in certain issues, it discovers the problems that are under the domain of ministries and presents them to them. But they usually do not give us any feedback. Because that is not the way the government works. Right now the government feels an obligation to give feedback because of the freedom of information law. But they just give the same info. This is not an effective mechanism of questioning. For example, they say, “Thank you for sharing. I will take care of this issue,” but you never hear from them again. (xxxii)

Another participant mentions the necessity of a legal base that determines the form of the relationship and argues that

In order for a relationship to be healthy, there should be a legitimate basis and a basis of a democratic tradition, but there isn’t. Abdullah Gül is sensitive and he accepts different suggestions, but the Prime Minister does not. This does not make sense. They are not open to do something together, not open to agreement. So the issue in question is totally up to the person’s intention. If you do not have a legitimate way to work things out, good intentions can not be enough. (xxxiii)

All these answers indicate that there is not a systematic relationship between government officials and İHD. This is due to the absence of a pluralist state in Turkey that supports and facilitates activities of NGOs and the absence of a pluralist legal framework that formulates the nature of the relationship between the state and NGOs.

As mentioned before, İHD has strong relationships with international human rights organizations, especially with Amnesty International, Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly and Human Rights Watch. İHD is also a member of an international federation, namely the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH). The ways in which the relations are established are through correspondence, visitation from international organizations, sharing information, reports and urgent actions plans, joint meetings, joint works on international criminal courts and projects. Furthermore, relating to the EU process, many authorized people visit İHD and ask for their thoughts on the adjustment of laws and their applications. Another international relationship

which has been recently established is that with the newly founded Iraqi human rights organization. İHD gave them training on human rights. According to one participant, it is very pleasant to develop relations with Middle Eastern countries through human rights organizations because especially after the September 11th attack, European human rights organizations highlight the concept of security before freedom; this is a problem. Regarding effectiveness, participants agree that İHD has become more effective when they have carried human rights problems to international platforms.

Strong international relations, including relations with EU officials, positively influence İHD's effectiveness, since it has the chance to pressure the state through the creation of international public opinion and international solidarity networks.

4.2.4. Inner Democracy

According to pluralist thought, civil organizations can control and balance state power as far as they have pluralist decision-making processes, consider and provide the participation of their members and consider inclusiveness. With this principle as a basis, I asked several questions to participants to gather to what extent İHD has the potential for creating a democratic organizational culture through its internal structure functions. Before moving on to the members' ideas about the İHD's decision-making process, I will discuss those processes briefly. As mentioned earlier, İHD has 34 branches in different provinces throughout Turkey. In İHD, administration changes twice every year. The general assembly branches' assembly meets and selects the delegates who will participate in the general assembly. The number of delegates depends on the number of members in that branch, that is, each fifteen members have one delegate. In general assembly, the delegates select the General Administration Board (Genel Yönetim Kurulu) (GYK), with 24 full members and 24 assistant members. GYK meets monthly and there is no difference in attendance between full and assistant members. Out of GYK, the Central Executive Committee (Merkez Yürütme Kurulu) (MYK), composed of eleven members, is selected. MYK meets weekly and deals with the implementation of the decisions made in GYK. GYK also selects one chairman, three

assistants of the chairman, one general secretary, three assistants of the general secretary and one accountant out of MYK. Furthermore, seven regional representatives are selected out of MYK in order to maintain communication with the organization's various branches.

Almost all the respondents point out that decisions are not reached through "counting fingers," but are always discussed and negotiated. Administrative members use the method of persuasion in GYK. If there is an objection, it is discussed. At the end of the process, a compromise is usually provided. There are commissions under the structure of GYK that work on projects and campaigns. Other members of the GYK who are not in MYK become responsible for those commissions and work on the determined issues by doing research, inviting some authorities, making meetings, preparing reports and sharing them with the organization.

According to some participants, ordinary members cannot be as effective in participating in decision-making processes as the members in administration. This problem arises not only from a lack of communication between members and the administration, but also from a lack of interest to participate in the branch meetings. Sometimes physical impossibilities and members' main professions prevent them from participating. Only 100 members participate out of 2000 total members. This situation causes problems with the representative power of delegates selected in branches.

Respondents also argue that İHD tries to provide forums in which members can easily participate and bring forward an argument to the organization, whether it is in a branch or head office. Accordingly, they have implemented a member relations action plan for the last two years. In this framework, all those who have enrolled have renewed their membership. It is an important outcome according to pluralist theories; Sabine (1952) points out the significance of encouraging members to take part in decision-making in a pluralist organization.

In order to strengthen participation, commission organizations are suitable tools in İHD. Ordinary members can work in commissions in branches according to their interest area. Some of the commissions' topics include prisons, torture, women's rights and environmental rights. These subjects firstly appear in General Assembly and then become definite in GYK. GYK asks for volunteers from each branch. In the branches, these headings are once again determined according to the needs and agenda of that province. For example, the environmental commission in Bursa, branch workers in Bergama and Rize branch workers on the Firtina Valley. On the other hand, the commissions that work on prisons and torture are always the strongest and the most active groups. This is partly because there are always applications to these commissions, since it is a part of the İHD tradition and partly because the members who work in these commissions have the chance to communicate with prisoners since they are old prisoners. Although commissions are seriously considered, there are two important problems about the commissions. Firstly, members do not have enough knowledge about the specific areas. In other words, it is almost impossible to find members who specialize in specific human rights problems. However, according to a participant, this is not the fault of the members because in Turkey there is no proper way to gain that knowledge; there is a deficiency of resources about the specific areas of human rights translated in Turkish. Secondly, commissions do not work according to a definite plan and program. To put it in other way, there is not a systematic or technical working style of those commissions. The former chairman explains this problem in the following speech:

I can not say we have conducted efficient commission works. By giving up the method of assigning tasks, we have set our members free about issues. We wanted them to say, "We are the commission." For example, we wanted every commission to have a secretary and the commissions that work in similar fields in other branches to prepare an annual report. We wanted the commissions to propose an action and make plans. We did those for the communication between the central commissions and commissions in the branches, but they did not yield satisfactory results because people are not used to working in accordance with a plan and organizing. We have problems with organizing, planning the time that is needed, filing the right and appropriate applications and approaching the aim. This is a serious

problem in Turkey and this culture would not be formed all of a sudden. Since we live in a country in which anything can happen any time, we are not successful at having a long-term perspective, making plans and making a proper division of labour. (xxxiv)

The nature of relations between the head office and İHD branches is also important when assessing the inner structure of the association. As mentioned earlier, there are regional representatives selected in GYK. According to some participants, regional meetings are held in three or four months, headed by the regional representatives. Furthermore, especially in Eastern and South-eastern Anatolian regions, meetings are held periodically. Through these meetings, branches forward their demands or problems to the head office. To some other interviewees, there is not a certain period for assembling with branches. It depends on the need. When there is a subject is important to the head office or there is a problem in any branches, then the branches and the head office come together. Sometimes a group is sent to the branch in order to solve the problem. Furthermore, according to circumstances, GYK may hold the gathering in a branch. There is no systematic and periodical communication between branches and head office. It should be noted that assessing inner democracy for the whole organization, including 34 branches, is very difficult. However, as far as I have observed, there are democratic relations between the members of the administration in the head office, as well as in the Istanbul branch. Although they have different ideas, they come together and communicate with each other in a democratic way. In order to assess the whole picture, one should talk with the members of all the branches, which would be the subject of another research project.

Open recruitment and inclusiveness were other variables related to İHD's inner democracy. The aforementioned question regarding affiliation with other NGOs also referred to the openness of the organization and the diversity of its members. Furthermore, I investigated the criteria for membership eligibility to learn whether anybody can become a member at İHD or not. It is stated in İHD's charter that people from any region, ethnic origin and religion can be a member. Within thirty days, the association decides on the membership. However, a participant adds that member candidates should adopt the principles that İHD has adopted; they should be against

war, against violence, against torture and the death penalty in any case and advocate the freedom of expression and thought. When I asked about disapproved memberships, they say that memberships are denied when the two references requested of the applicant are negative. Sometimes the association waits for six months and during that, candidates are given training about İHD and human rights. İHD holds discussions with them in order to get to know them closer. At the end of the process, membership is approved. Moreover, sometimes people want to be a member in order to become a political asylum more easily abroad. However, participants argue that İHD does not play such a role and those applications are denied. Sometimes applications are denied after complaints. For example, if a woman complains about her husband's violence towards her, his application is denied. Men who have plural marriages also cannot be members.

Resignations and relations with former members are also taken into consideration since in a pluralist organization, membership should be consensual and exit should be possible without any loss of status or charge of treason, as Gellner (1994) stated. There are naturally some resignations from the association due to several reasons. In the past there were political divergences and a group of Kemalist people resigned from the membership after 1991. Recently, a radical leftist group has resigned and organized a political party. Instead of discontinuing their membership, some people prefer to suspend them. However, in the course of time, the association automatically cancels their memberships. One remarkable answer to this question came from the professional member; she stated that, "Sometimes administrators leave in order to be parliamentary candidate." Furthermore, there are people who leave on physical or personal grounds. If there are friendships, relations with the former members might continue in any way, but the number of those who break off all connections cannot be disregarded. Adalet Ağaoğlu, Haldun Özen and Muzaffer Erdost are famous founders who resigned from the association due to similar reasons. About resignations and relations with former members, the former chairman said the following:

There are just a few people who left like Adalet Ağaoğlu. Maybe one or two people left here just because she left. Here's something: You should not speak if you do not know enough. Adalet Ağaoğlu didn't

know who the chairman was. We were inviting her to the general meeting, she didn't come. She was not in a need of coming. I think she drew some hasty conclusions and didn't act responsibly enough. After ones who leave, not ten or five or three people follow. If I left, maybe one or two people would come after me. Therefore, there is no concept of being a gang here because this is an activity. İHD is the spine and the leader of this activity. Not Ahmet or Mehmet. This fact is very important. Despite all its frailties and deficiencies, İHD has been institutionalized and survived independently from persons. It has proved its power. It is important that none of us could take away a piece of stone from İHD. That means people can't overbear İHD individually and this is a crucial assurance for us. (xxxv)

In spite of the above statement, the former chairman doubts whether İHD has a successful democratic inner structure with the collective resignations and subsequent disconnection with those former members.

4.3. Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümler Vakfı (Women for Women's Human Rights- New Ways) (KİH-YÇV)

4.3.1. Foundation, Objectives and Principles

Women for Women's Human Rights-New Ways (KİH-YÇV) is the second NGO examined in this study. Although it works in a small office in Istanbul, it actually is a very big and highly effective Turkish women's organization, working both at the national and international level. One of the founders of KİH-YÇV is Pınar İlkcaracan. She was living in Germany when she founded the organization together with her friend who was living in America. During the years they spent in Europe and America, they closely dealt with women's human rights and did much work to introduce it to United Nations' (UN) literature. They took part in the struggle of many other international women's NGOs working on the issue. At the end, the UN Conference recognized women's human rights as human rights. As Turkish citizens, they thought that this should be introduced in Turkey as well. To that end, they decided to found a women's organization in Turkey, after which they immediately conducted field research to discover Turkish women's demands and needs, in addition to what extent Turkish women are aware of their rights. The field research was conducted in Istanbul, Ankara and Diyarbakır between 1994 and 1996. Results of the research showed that Turkish

women are ignorant about their rights. This outcome resulted in the birth of an educational program, the Women's Human Rights Education Program for Women (Kadının İnsan Hakları Eğitim Programı) (KİHEP). KİHEP has been in effect since 1998 with the partnership of a state institution, the Social Services and Society for the Protection of the Children (Sosyal Hizmetler ve Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu) (SHÇEK). It is perhaps the longest-running educational program depending on the partnership between a NGO and a state institution in Turkey. It has lasted in community centres thanks to social workers affiliated with SHÇEK.¹⁵ The brief story of the organization's establishment and mission are described on their web sites as the following:

Women for Women's Human Rights (WWHR) was founded in December 1993, inspired by the success of the international women's human rights movement at the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna with the aim of advancing women's human rights in Turkey and around the globe. In 1999, WWHR co-founded an international NGO called NEW WAYS-The International Alliance for Social Innovation and also works as its liaison office in Turkey. WWHR's mission is to promote women's human rights and to support the active and broad participation of women as free individuals and equal citizens in the establishment and maintenance of a democratic and peaceful order at national, regional and international levels.¹⁶

KİH-YÇV is not a member-based organization; it works with professionals, usually between three and eight persons at their office. However, they say that they have a lot of natural members working as trainers at community centres as a part of KİHEP. Those trainers are civil servants of SHÇEK, but they take classes from KİH-YÇV. There are also NGOs founded by women who participate in KİHEP, for instance, associations in Van and Çanakkale.¹⁷ Those women are also considered natural members and are always in contact with the organization.

To the question asking for a brief description of the foundation, one of the participants answered the following:

¹⁵ KİHEP will be explained in a more detailed way later.

¹⁶ http://www.wwhr.org/id_789

¹⁷ *Van Kadın Derneği and Çanakkale El Emeğini Değerlendirme ve Kadın Dayanışma Merkezi(ELDER)*

We are an independent, non-governmental organization, but at the same time, we are a women's organization. We work in local areas both nationally and internationally. We have a human rights education programme. We have been advocating and lobbying intensely, so that laws in Turkey could change. We are an organization that approaches everything in a holistic way. We are not an organization that says, "Let's start a project about that issue!" We are mostly trying to carry out long-term complementary projects and we think this is very important to change something. (xxxvi)

In order to make clear the meaning of advocacy and the difference between the advocacy and lobbying, I asked for further information from Pınar İlkkaracan and she said that

Advocacy and lobbying are different things and they complement each other. Lobbying is directly aimed at the parliament, government or a ministry whereas advocacy is something that involves public awareness too. If laws could be changed just by seeing a ministry, then only lobbying would exist, but that's not the way it is. Every time, you have to run unbelievable campaigns and you make a big effort to change the laws. So in Turkey, we can change something only after we form a public opinion and put some pressure on the issue. By the way, for advocacy and lobbying, networking is very important. We had to do networking all the time both among women's organizations and between women's organizations and other organizations. (xxxvii)

It should be added that they do not do advocacy work and lobbying only on the national level, but also on the UN level. They actively participate in the UN process and organize international meetings and conferences. It is understood that advocacy and lobbying has a very central place; it is even mentioned when describing the organization. This shows KİH-YÇV does not only function as a public school, but also as a pressure group and both functions are mentioned in pluralist theories. The advocacy function of KİH-YÇV clearly refers to Dinçer's (2005) description of "public-based lobbying," referring to forming solidarity networks among STKs.

I also asked the difference between women's rights and women's human rights to grasp the importance of the term more clearly. Participants think that the concept of human rights is gender-biased and ignores many problems peculiar to women. After the recognition of women's human rights as separate terminology at the UN level, it should be accepted in the minds of people that woman's human rights are basic human rights.

Glancing at the objectives of KİH-YÇV might be helpful in knowing the organization better:

WWHR initiates and implements programs (in cooperation with other NGOs or governmental agencies) which aim at

****Linking** local, national and international efforts to advance gender equality and social justice*

****Promoting** widespread human rights education in Turkey through the implementation of WWHR's Women's Human Rights Training Program*

****Enabling** women to create their own strategies to mobilize at the grassroots level through the Women's Human Rights Training Program*

****Initiating** legal, policy and social change towards human rights, women's human rights, democratization and peace-building through advocacy and lobbying tools such as action alerts, extensive use of both mainstream and alternative media, public or other targeted campaigns and networks at national and international levels*

****Disseminating** information and raising consciousness through outreach materials and publications on selected human rights issues*

****Facilitating** information-exchange, solidarity and mutual support on issues of common interest by networking with NGOs and activist groups in Turkey and in other countries.¹⁸*

4.3.2. Enhancing Solidarity, Responsibility and Compromise

Being affiliated with KİH-YÇV is a great responsibility for all the participants. They think that there are many things that should be done about the issue. They attempt to make an impact and help the progress and democratization of Turkey instead of observing all the problems passively. In fact, working in KİH-YÇV is a part of their world view. For many of them it is a place where they develop a feminist outlook. They

¹⁸ http://www.wwhr.org/id_789

think that, in spite of its established and professional structure, KİH-YÇV succeeded to work with the heart and soul. Also with a stable working style, it has succeeded to change many things in the last ten years.

After joining KİH-YÇV, they have felt awareness in their daily lives. For example, when reading a newspaper or watching news on T.V., they begin to notice the gender-biased expressions more easily. Moreover, they feel active; they feel their impacts on the development of democratization and human rights in Turkey. They feel personal satisfaction. Furthermore a participant argues that

I was a feminist and interested in women's issues before being a member but being active personally is very different. You become more sensitive and this becomes an important issue in your life. As a matter of fact, being here makes you see how important an issue this is. Therefore, you see everything from a different angle. (xxxviii)

Another participant states that

I saw what violence and psychological violence is. Knowing what to do when you hear a case of violence from your friends is very nice and it gives a sense of freedom. One feels more in control, more sensitive and responsible. One starts to see the gender point of view in society more clearly. (xxxix)

As far as my observation and the answers I received are concerned, the working environment at the organization is pleasant and relations between workers are intimate as well as coordinated. This arises from a horizontal form of organization and their participatory approach in decision-making processes. There is an administrative board, but it is only on paper because all decisions are made through discussion and the exchange of ideas. There sometimes occur disagreements and conflicts, yet they are either about content or methods of the activities, about subjective personal problems rather than ideological conflicts.

The target group of KİH-YÇV is very wide and includes targets within and outside the country. Within the country, it is women who participate in KİHEP in community centres and policy makers, parliament, and government agencies. Outside the country, it is all the governments in the world and UN officials. Naturally, there are

people who differ in their political preferences and identities within the organization, especially among the trainers and participators of KİHEP. They think that those differences do not have any negative effect on the organization; on the contrary, it has a positive effect, since it prevents overlooking many things. The cross-cutting factor for all of them is women's human rights.

KİH-YÇV is in contact with many women's NGOs in Turkey and the international arena. In fact it networks among them through organizing meetings, campaigns, projects and conferences. Relations with other NGOs such as trade unions, human rights organizations and occupational groups are not so effective. According to Pınar Ilkcaracan, it is because their abstention from woman issue. She argues that

This is very hard in terms of the women's movement because most organizations want you to take part in their own work, but when it comes to women issue, they abstain. As if there was a hierarchy of rights. For example, the death penalty is more critical. We used to work a lot collectively, but now it is unfortunately at a minimum even though there should be more work. Of course we have connections, but they are not effective. (xl)

According to another participant,

We see trade unions all the time. We even have an idea to put a project with KİHEP into practice with them, but we do not have solid cooperation yet. There is solidarity with the human rights organizations even though it's not constant. It's usually in the way of a meeting, activity or a campaign. We have a lot of common work with the Helsinki Citizen's Assembly and they attend our meetings. In addition, we work together with the homosexuals on sexual and bodily rights. (xli)

Especially in Istanbul, relations with other women's organizations are very effective. For example, they work with the Foundation of Solidarity with Women (KADAV), Purple Roof Foundation (Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınma Vakfı), Lambda İstanbul, KAOS-GL, Amargi Woman Academy and İstanbul Bar Woman Rights Implementation Centre (İstanbul Barosu Kadın Hakları Uygulama Merkezi). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, there are sister organizations that come into being as a result of KİHEP. They share experiences, organize and attend meetings together. According to a participant,

Solidarity and support is a commonly seen situation among women's organizations. This cooperation is the key to success. There are organizations whose views are different, but mainly we aim at the same thing. This common point dominates everything else. (xlii)

There are also many international organizations that are in contact with KİH-YÇV. However, there is one that should be pointed out. It is a coalition formed and coordinated by KİH-YÇV embracing Muslim societies of Middle East such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The title of the coalition is *The Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies*. It is a solidarity network in every respect of the word. Including KİH-YÇV, there are 60 women's organizations and 15 countries that are always in touch; they share experiences and ideas and do common research and activities at international level. They also make partnerships with some international NGOs such as the International Women Self Coalition, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and ILGA-Asia-Pacific.

On the basis of the interviews and my observation, the role of KİH-YÇV in Turkish social and political life is very significant. In fact, KİHEP not only raises women's consciousness about their rights, but also encourages them to organize in their own organizations all over Anatolia. There are now 15 women's organizations springing from KİHEP. KİH-YÇV is also very effective in exerting pressure on law-makers and changing the rules using *advocacy and lobbying*. KİH-YÇV has an important role in almost every one of the amendments since 1995. Importantly enough, it is a pioneer in using and promoting women's human rights' terminology in Turkey. Furthermore, experience in the international arena and the UN is an advantage in influencing the Parliament and the government.

Thanks to the universality of women's problems, KİH-YÇV makes compromises between different interests and identities. As an example of this, Pınar İlkaracan says that

In our meetings in KİHEP, there are Kurdish women or women with headscarves, but these issues never come up. I have never heard any conflicts caused by these issues because the problems of just being women are so cross-cutting and the cross-cutting problems are so solid that the other problems don't seem so important any more. For example, violence in the family, the problem of education, economic problems, problems of young girls, sexual problems and problems with fertility are what bring all those women together... (xliii)

Furthermore, according to another participant KİHEP enhances solidarity among women, that is

There is solidarity among women in KİHEP; they usually keep in touch after the programme is over. They can attend other courses in community centres; they volunteer, become a member of another organization or found an organization themselves. (xliv)

The role of KİH-YÇV among different interests and identities has also had a transforming effect on the trainers. Accordingly, another participant argues that

With KİHEP, our own educators change themselves; they say so too. Their attitude and points of view change and I personally think this has a positive effect on them. Besides, we see that this change is reflected in the Head Office of Social Services and this is a very positive thing too. (xlv)

KİHEP carries considerable importance in educating the target group in community centres. It is not an ordinary educational program; it does not include a series of panels or conferences. Rather, it is a program that adopts the participatory approach, aiming at behaviour change and internalization of values. In fact it aims at permanently affecting women's lives and their world views by making them conscious of women's human rights and the ways in which they use those rights. Within the scope of the program, social workers are first trained with 10 days of education. Next, they open groups, each of which are composed of 15 women and apply the program for four months. The group and the group facilitators* come together once a week for half of a day. In the first meeting, they begin to know each other and they talk about the needs of women. The program consists of sixteen modules and one module is covered in each

* They use this description purposively since describing the trainer as educator might imply a hierarchical relation between the trainers and women. Using guider or facilitator is more suitable to logic of the program.

week. Modules includes titles such as women's human rights, constitutional and civil rights, violence against women and violence in family, strategies against violence and economic rights. In fact all these titles are partially determined in the first session at the beginning of the program. There are also modules which have been recently attached to the program, including women and politics, feminism and the women's movement and women's organizations. These modules are especially important in removing the negative connotations of political organization from women's minds. During the program, small illustrated booklets written in plain language, with titles such as "Our New Legal Rights!", "Our Sexual Rights" and "Our Reproductive Rights!", are distributed. With them women can understand the issues more easily. Furthermore, this program has not only been applied to women in community centres, but also to women in different occupations, such as policewomen, female teachers, nurses and midwives. However, the program requires very professional cadres and KİH-YÇV does not want to make concessions about the format and the content of the program; this kind of education is implemented in a very controlled way. One of the participants argues this issue:

It's very important that people who put this into practice are qualified. In this sense, giving up these qualifications in order to reach more women is out of question. The content is understandable and it is simply explained with pictures. However, it's a heavy programme psychologically. For example, violence is a tough subject. There are traumatic cases. But group therapy and an atmosphere of trust are created here. When the education begins, there is no coming in and out of groups, which means the groups are closed. So there is big sharing inside. Women talk about some things here that they never told anyone before and this changes them. (xlvii)

KİH-YÇV comes together with the trainers of SHÇEK every year in order to evaluate the progress of KİHEP in Istanbul. Also, KİH-YÇV visits community centres periodically in order to supervise and update the program especially at the end of the four months. Communication between trainers and KİH-YÇV is continuous. Furthermore, KİH-YÇV tries to facilitate communication among groups by conveying information about the activities of different groups all over the Turkey, as well as those in other countries. KİH-YÇV prepared a report evaluating the progress and the

outcomes of the program between the years 1995 and 2003. Beyond its significance as an educational program, KİHEP, in my opinion, clearly contributes to the constitution of social capital that will impact the character of the relations between state and STKs, as Tosun (2005) argued.

4.3.3. Effectiveness

KİH-YÇV become influential in especially two areas: KİHEP and campaigns aiming to change laws, such as the *Turkish Penal Code* (Türk Ceza Kanunu) (TCK) Campaign between 2002 and 2005. Via KİHEP, they pioneered a partnership between NGOs and the state. Of course, KİH-YÇV was not the sole contributor to the Turkish Penal Code Campaign, but it provided the coordination, implementing the campaign together with thirty six NGOs in Turkey. As mentioned before, advocacy and lobbying are very important tools when trying to influence law and civil society. In the TCK Platform, in order to create public opinion, they organized street demonstrations, parades and held daily press briefings for about 100 people, including newspaper journalists. They lobbied Parliament and delivered letters to government officials. At the end of the campaign, the platform succeeded to change 30 articles out of 35. Other than the TCK campaign, along with the Law for Protecting Family in 1999, they passed statute number 4320, guaranteeing the removal of an abusive husband from the home for six months to protect women who were exposed violence.

Making the state more sensitive towards women's human rights is very hard work because the state does not intend to do much for women's rights. However, there are some positive developments. For example, they did not even take women's organizations into consideration in the past; now they feel obligated to do so. Discussing the last campaign on TCK, a participant argues the following:

Time will tell if the government has become sensitive or not. Because the law has just changed, we will be able to see it at the stage of practice. If the government has knowledge of the law in time and puts it into practice, we can say that it has become sensitive. The government's sensitivity depends on how much it informs its own officers and police. In Turkey, this act of informing should be done systematically and widespread, but unfortunately it is not. (xlvii)

There is not a stable relationship between members of the Turkish assembly and KİH-YÇV. In fact, it depends on the sensitivity of the deputy towards women's human rights. It is the same for commissions about women's problems founded in the fabric of the Parliament. However, it can be argued that it is relatively easier to find deputies who are sensitive to the demands of women's organizations and with whom the organization can work among social democrats and liberal parties rather than the conservative parties. This once again demonstrates the unsystematic relationship between the state and NGOs.

4.3.4. Inner democracy

In KİH-YÇV important decisions like three-year programs are made after discussion and deliberation. Depending on the level of the decision, trainers at the local level can make decisions about KİHEP. In KİH-YÇV, there are two teams, namely the national and international. Decisions at the national level are usually made by the national team and those at the international level are made by the international team. Sometimes there are decisions that come from the international network and the international organization in France. At the international level, there is a participatory decision-making mechanism to the extent that it is possible. However, Northern NGOs sometimes dominate decision-making processes. There is not a single decision-making mechanism for KİH-YÇV. However, considering internal and national decisions, there is a highly horizontal and accountable decision-making strategy.

All women can participate in KİHEP without any qualifications. However, usually women from lower socio-economic levels participate since community centres are located in districts where lower-income people live. Openness and inclusiveness are salient characteristics of KİHEP. In order to work at the Istanbul office however, one should have the necessary professional qualifications for the job.

Among trainers, there are people who are affiliated with other NGOs, especially women's organizations, human rights organizations, occupational organizations and sometimes political parties. This indicates the potential development of cross-cutting loyalties which could positively influence the development of the pluralist vision among the trainers and it probably reflects on KİHEP and its participants.

The reasons for leaving the organization are mostly personal. Sometimes employees burn out from the work load, they find another job or they want to continue their university education. Relations between former employees and the organization usually continue. Most of the time, they support the organization from the outside and sometimes they become contact persons. For example, a former employee who began to work at the European Court of Human Rights works as a trainer in a training program of the organization. Another former worker is a journalist and helps the organization in its translations. Continuing relations with the former employees indicates the possibility of free exit without the loss of status; modern civil organizations should have voluntary and consensual membership.

4.4. Research Findings and Comparison of two NGOs

First of all, the two NGOs discussed are different in their legal status and organizational structure. İHD is an association and has an extensive and widespread organizational structure with its 13,000 members and 35 branches in 35 provinces. Although it does not work exactly like a foundation, KİH-YÇV is legally a foundation, with has no branches and members. It was first founded as a liaison office of an international NGO called New Ways International Alliance for Social Innovation, a foundation of French origin. It intended to work as a research office, but it later found itself struggling with advocacy and lobbying work.

Both NGOs have an administrative board, but in KİH-YÇV they work as a core professional cadre with a flexible number of persons, changing between three and eight

people. On the other hand, the İHD administrative board has 48 members, including 24 full and 24 alternate members, who all have voting rights in decision-making.

İHD has a political identity; it is a leftist oriented organization in its character and it describes most of the members of the association as close to leftist ideology. They experience inner conflicts rising from different political preferences. Time to time this makes embracing all the sections of society problematic. On the other hand, KİH-YÇV hardly experiences political and ideological conflicts and they are able to cross-cut the interests of all women who are the victims or potential victims of human rights violations.

They are similar in their relationships with the Parliamentary and state bureaucrats. Both try to change the Parliament and governmental policies through various efforts and meet difficulties. KİH-YÇV not only lobbies, but also does advocacy work. Advocacy and lobbying activity involve both pressure on the state institutions and law-makers and forming public opinion through campaigns, joint actions and press releases. İHD also starts campaigns, projects and demonstrations in order to create public opinion. KİH-YÇV thinks that not even one law has changed without their efforts as a women's movement in general. On the other hand, some members of İHD think that some changes in law or the abolishment of some laws are independent from their efforts.

İHD has more of a chance to participate in local areas because of its extensive organization structure and its members in local areas, whereas KİH-YÇV has no members and communicates with local women through KİHEP, conducted by trainers that KİH-YÇV trains. Those trainers are from a state institution, SHÇEK. On the other hand, İHD is not very successful in taking advantage of its many branches and tries to improve member relations through an action plan. Both organizations come together with their local agencies periodically.

They both work independent from the state. They do not take any material assistance from states. Sources of income for İHD include club money, donations from

its members and funds for projects founded by European Union. Though KİH-YÇV has no club money, it benefits from some funds gained from independent international NGOs, or it demands general support from these independent organizations. It does not take projects funded by the EU.

Both organizations are successful in enhancing solidarity and responsibility within their organizations. While KİH-YÇV perceives coordinating solidarity networks among women's organizations at both national and international level as a mission, İHD experiences some problems in creating solidarity at a national level. For KİH-YÇV, there is no need to prevent ethnic and religious divisions among women. It believes that being a woman is a sufficient criterion for creating trust and sense of cooperation. In İHD solidarity within the organization is prevalent, especially when considering human rights violations; members generally trust each other and cooperate. They can mitigate ethnic and religious conflicts by evoking human rights discourse. Generating trust, cooperation and mitigating ethnic conflicts in society at large are somehow difficult tasks for İHD, thanks to some unfavourable attitudes in local branches. Nonetheless, however peaceful and all-embracing İHD's discourse, campaigns, projects and press releases, it is still difficult to change the organization's "evil reputation" in the minds of people.

In terms of inner democracy and horizontal organization, KİH-YÇV is more successful. This undoubtedly arises from its small organization structure and feminist world view. It uses participatory approaches in KİHEP. That means the program proceeds in accordance with the tendencies of the women who participate in the program. In İHD decision making-processes at the level of administration board are also pluralistic, horizontal and participatory. However there are problems with the participation of members in decision-making processes. This problem arises from its massive size, with thousands of members and delegates. In fact, İHD sometimes works like a political party.

Both have an impact on society in different ways. KİH-YÇV creates a difference in the lives of women who participate in the education program by raising human-rights consciousness and causing a change in behaviour. However creating those same results in political bodies is not that easy. In spite of the amendments they helped pass, changing the attitudes of state bureaucrats, institutions and members of Parliament toward women's issues is a very difficult task. Sometimes there is a positive relation with state bureaucrats, but this does not reflect the general tendency, since these good relations can only be held at the individual level. This is also the case for İHD. Furthermore, İHD creates a difference in the lives of people by following up on violations day to day and creating urgent action plans with Amnesty International. Human rights victims can easily reach and give their applications to any branch of İHD and their grievance is addressed as soon as possible. In addition, those people who are affiliated with the association raise consciousness about human rights. On this point İHD differs from KİH-YÇV, since KİH-YÇV raises consciousness in a more systematic way and as a major aim. On the other hand, as opposed to İHD, KİH-YÇV does not make urgent plans to save a female victim; rather they try to show women the paths they should take and the methods they should utilize when they experience a human rights violation. Along with this, İHD administrators are aware that they are not successful in giving its members a theoretical grasp of human rights. They say that they could create this only at the administrative level and for a limited number of members. They plan to overcome this problem through a continuous training program in the near future.

KİH-YÇV has two committees: national and international teams. Both teams are equally important to them. The national committee works within the country by starting campaigns, protest marches, advocacy work and lobbying and training programs. The international committee works very actively on international platforms, most importantly at the UN level by constructing solidarity networks, exerting pressure on the UN and shaping the policies at the international level. Also it bridges the national and international fields successfully. It collaborates with liberal international NGOs and they play a leading role in enhancing solidarity at the international level. İHD similarly works both at the national and international level, yet they work a bit differently from

KİH-YÇV at the international level. It works together with certain NGOs such as the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and International Federation for Human Rights, sharing documents and reports and visiting and corresponding with each other. On the other hand, in respect to urgent action plans, İHD activates the international public opinion and authorities in the struggle to prevent a human rights violation in Turkey. It thinks that it has the mission of bringing a single person's human rights violation to the world's attention. Both organizations try to be more effective in Turkey by working at the international level.

There are so many obstacles and challenges that both organizations face. Financial problems are an issue for both organizations. They both complain about the state's misperception of their organizations and disregard of civil society. They also complain about the expectations of the public. İHD complains about the manipulated and distorted meaning of human rights in Turkey portrayed by popular media channels and the state. It thinks that the state carries out a smear campaign against İHD. KİH-YÇV complains about the wide area of work; there are too many things that should be done, but people expect miracles. It is difficult to explain that they cannot work on all the areas concerning women's problems and what they try to achieve could only be possible when women's empowerment in the long run has been achieved. Thus, being understood properly by people and state officials is a problem for both organizations. Of course, the reason for this problem is not the total failure of the organizations, but rather various other variables, including the general understanding of civil society in Turkey, the dominant role of the media and the official ideology that shapes the political attitudes of the people. There are other obstacles like the scarcity of specialized people working for the organization, insufficient training on human rights or women's human rights, the lack of an established understanding of volunteerism and the absence of solidarity between NGOs.

In order to fulfil its role more effectively, İHD thinks that training members and people from different sections of society are of vital importance. In this way İHD would

not only create a difference in the world views of its members, but also express itself more properly. Furthermore, communication with members should be strengthened and become systematized. For KİH-YÇV too, being more effective depends on reaching more women through educational programs.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this study I attempted to analyse the functions and characteristics of two Turkish human rights organizations (İHD and KİİH-YÇV) from the perspective of the pluralist democratic tradition against the background of the historical evolution of civil society and NGOs in Turkey.

Hoping to underline facts and viewpoints not only regarding the evolution of pluralist thinking in both Western and Turkish literature, but also on the structures and characteristics of the two NGOs case studies, the study aimed to provide information on the interface of political sociological literature with the concept and practices of civil society in Turkish context. To that end, along with some basic structural and ideological features of those values, function oriented characteristics of the two NGOs in civil society were scrutinized by active members and leaders of these organizations. Concomitantly, I inquired into their positions towards the state; their perception of the pressure mechanisms they utilized; their assessment of the organizations' transformative potential and effects on the state; their ways of creating compromise and moderation between different political views within the organization and society at large, and their decision making procedures and participation channels. All in all, information about their perception and practice of democracy, in the case of their human rights organizations, constituted the study's fundamental purpose.

At the outset of the study I drew attention to the fact that non-governmental organizations and their role in democratic societies is indeed, far from being 'new'. In fact, most of the recent analyses of civil society and NGOs have things in common with the analysis of the classical pluralist thinkers and theorists of democracy that were popular in the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries.

The second chapter elaborated on the work of many recent scholars who built on the arguments of classical pluralists such as Alexis de Tocqueville and later British thinkers like G.D.H. Cole, John Neville Figgis, and Harold J. Laski.

The third chapter presented a brief history of Turkish modernization from the viewpoint of the development of associational life and freedoms. Having covered the stages of associational life and development of Turkish democracy in social and political spheres, it also attempted to assess the operational capacity of the concepts and assumptions of pluralists in the Turkish case. From this review one can derive that Turkey's political development reflects an experience of restrictions on the freedom of thought, expression and organization in the recent past. On the other hand, in the post-90 period the transformation in Turkish society's comprehension of organization, its grasp of freedom of thought and its perception of civil society and human rights has been remarkable. It is also interesting that, Turkish scholars discussing civil society and NGOs since the 1990s make references to the pluralist assumptions of Western scholars mentioned in the second chapter (Sarıbay, 1998, Tosun 2005). It is my impression that this fact indicates pluralist analyses, later associated with American and British thought vis-à-vis the Marxist leaning reflection of continental political sociological analyses, have strongly influenced some of the prominent students of NGOs and civil society in the Turkish literature. In the same way, the interviews reflected that the two selected human rights organizations were influenced by the same analyses in their actions, discourses and expectations.

Also, considering the liberal roots of pluralism, it was interesting that the first nucleus of NGOs in Turkey appeared in response to the need of the emerging merchant bourgeoisie in the early 19th century of Ottoman Empire for economic independence. To put it another way, NGOs first emerged as an expression of individual interest not only in the Western experience, but also in the Turkish experience. I attach significance to this fact considering the discussions on the non-existence of a Western concept of civil society and its organizations in Turkey (Küçükmer, 1994; Mardin, 1992). The literature review in chapter three also indicated that functions of "social based organizations," like

raising public consciousness and responsibility, are not independent from the realization of the interests of free and autonomous individuals. Scholars have, in fact, come to the conclusion that NGOs had the potential of converting the individual interest into social responsibility (Sarıbay, 1998; Balkır and Nitelik, 2005; Kongar, 1991) in the various examples of the Turkish context.

Another striking point was the contribution of Turkey's socialist intellectuals to the increasing pluralist comprehension of NGOs, particularly in the post-90 period. In fact, it can be argued that early discussions of the socialist left on civil society laid the groundwork and shaped the recent conception of pluralist civil society and NGOs in Turkey. The role of the socialist left was described in the following way by İHD member:

In this country, no water flows in its own course. A basic struggle about human rights that should be carried on by every individual who has humane sensitivity is now incumbent upon Turkey's socialists. It was the same for the feminism, too. There was not any women's struggle which ran in its own course. Socialists encouraged feminism. Socialist women learned a lot from that time period. Same thing happened during the foundation of İHD. Relatives of people who went to prison because of socialist movement were the initiator of foundation of this association.¹⁹

In chapter 5, I covered the findings of field research and examined the outcomes of the interviews under three headings for each NGO.

Effectiveness was the first dimension which was referred "to be effective in questioning and transforming the state's policies". In general, one can argue that in the case of both NGOs, members saw the NGOs as effective to some extent, but particularly not effective in certain areas. Actually, they use all the proper ways to be effective, such as, lobbying activities, creating public opinion, and meeting government officials etc. However, arbitrary responses of the state, probably raised from the traditional

¹⁹ Bu ülkede hiçbir dere kendi yatağında akıyor. Yani çok net bir biçimde sadece insani duyarlılığa sahip bireylerin yürütmesi gereken bir insan hakları mücadelesi sonuç itibari ile Türkiye sosyalistlerinin üstüne kalmış durumda. Feminizm için de aynısı geçerliydi. Kendi yatağında akan bir kadın mücadelesi yoktu. Sosyalistler feminizmi teşvik etmiştir. Sosyalist kadınlar o süreçten çok da şey öğrendi, İnsan hakları derneğinin kuruluşu da öyle. Sosyalist hareketten içeri giren insanların yakınları bu derneğin kurulmasında ön ayak olmuştu.

authoritarian structure of Turkish state, sometimes prevent them from being effective. It caught my attention that, in order to be more effective, İHD advocates the necessity of certain pluralist ideals such as independence, the necessity of a certain distance from the state, and the necessity of a legal base arranging the relationship between the state and the NGOs. In other words, as a response to the instable standing of the state towards İHD, İHD underlines the necessity of a model of democratization within which monitoring and interrogation of state policies and a systematic and horizontal relationship between the state and civil organizations are guaranteed. It is understood from this İHD is conscious about the necessity of a pluralist comprehension in the democratic functioning of political power.

KİH-YÇV faces similar challenges as İHD faces, that is, the traditional patriarchal character of the state and that of the society. In order to struggle with this, they clearly point out the significance of advocacy and lobbying activity, as well as a partnership with the state. This implies that like İHD is aware of the necessity of the adoption of a pluralist understanding in the political arena in order to have a well functioning democracy and to be more effective as a civil society organization representing specific causes and interests.

As an outcome of their activities, these two NGOs succeeded in being effective in certain manners. For example, KİH-YÇV continues a long-standing educational program in partnership with a state institution, namely, SHÇEK. Furthermore, by means of an effective and extensive campaign, it strongly contributed to the amendments to the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) in 2001.

By regularly monitoring and reporting human rights violations, the İHD gained respect and consideration from the state, which was clearly reflected in some positive and responsive reactions of state officials and law-makers.

On the other hand, in spite of these successes, both organizations complain about the “undependability” of these gains with reference to unstable character of Turkish politics.

Enhancing solidarity and responsibility was the second dimension measured. It referred to the NGOs potential in creating solidarity, a sense of cooperation and in mitigating conflicts not only within the organizations but also in society at large. As a result of the theoretical overview and interviews, both organizations came across as quite successful in spreading a pluralist vision in their target groups and members. They created a sense of solidarity and compromise among different members having different interests. This is understood from their member profiles, different affiliations, partnerships with different NGOs, and expressed views on tolerance and compromise etc. However, it is clear that, due to the limitations of this particular study, no generalization can be made on positive outcomes to the society at large.

Inner democracy was the third dimension of the case study, referring to the NGOs’ potential in fostering democratic organizational culture, pluralist decision-making structures, and inclusiveness and openness. Admittedly, due to their different organizational and legal structures, comparing these two NGOs on the same basis was difficult. Still, a comparison reveals that KİH-YÇV takes decisions according to a participatory and horizontal manner of organization, to such an extent that its administrative board is almost invisible. On the other hand, considering its extensive organizational structure, İHD is much less likely to realize this. However, it should be pointed out that, being aware of its inadequacy in participatory decision-making, İHD members in the administration express a desire to strengthen communication between ordinary members and the administration, as well as the communication among members through the “membership action plan project”. In this way it hopes to further encourage participation of members and enhance a more horizontal decision-making structure.

As far as their objectives are concerned, neither organization falls far from the objectives recited in pluralist theory as “should be” characteristics of NGOs. They embrace pluralist decision making structures and favour making decisions through discussion, the exchange of ideas and consensus. So far as their degrees of openness and inclusiveness are concerned, İHD’s past tendency to act like “a political party” and its reputation as the “Kurds’ association” have been, in my opinion, a negative impact on these NGOs’ openness and inclusiveness. It is beyond dispute that, on the other hand, KİH-YÇV embraces all women from all sections of society.

These two cases indicated that as human rights organizations in Turkey, they adopted the fundamental premises of pluralist understanding within their organizations, discourses, activities, missions, and visions. However, both the literature reviews and the field research conducted for this study confirm that the insufficiency of development in this regard is attributed to a number of reasons peculiar to Turkey.

First and foremost, for the Turkish state to adopt a true vision of the inability of pluralism preparing the conditions for an open dialogue with NGOs and providing legally -well- protected platforms through which NGOs could easily monitor and question the policies of state is seen as a basic handicap. The non-transparent character of the state is claimed to be responsible for the difficulty for NGOs to combat and help eliminate the highly bureaucratic, militarist, authoritarian and patriarchal elements in it. This obstacle is particularly relevant for NGOs.

Secondly, the insufficiency of human resources, particularly people who are trained and specialize in NGO work as professionals, presents a problem for human rights organizations and capacity building in the areas of human rights. Such insufficient development of ‘social capital’ in Turkey, in addition to a large population counts, makes it a hard task for NGOs to effectively contribute to the flourishing of a democratic culture, human rights, and women’s human rights awareness in Turkish society.

Thirdly, it is a fact that everywhere in the world, media channels' propaganda strongly influences people's political attitudes and choices. In this context it has been argued that in Turkey, one can see the reflection and condonement of certain traditional patterns of behaviour of the Turkish state and society in the news presentations or overall discourses of mainstream media channels discrediting of civil society. For example, according to the statement of one participant from İHD, it is the mainstream media that are exclusively interested in İHD's position vis-à-vis the Kurdish issue, even though the organization itself is not specifically interested in the Kurdish question but rather in discrimination of all kinds related to human rights. Similarly, according to another participant from KİH-YÇV, as can be easily noticed in ads and the news, mainstream media channels are completely gender biased, thereby undercutting the work of feminist NGOs. Both organizations develop some strategies in order to address more people either through using alternative media channels or preparing their own T.V. programs. For example, KİH-YÇV has completed a T.V. program project that was broadcasted in NTV entitled "Kadınlarla Mor Dizi". İHD also uses independent media channels and web sites, such as Bianet and Medyakronik. Still, both organizations complain that it is a very hard task to weaken the influence of mainstream media channels over the masses in regard to their respective missions.

While neither NGO can be considered totally successful in combating these forces, the fact that they have gone far identifying obstacles and developing specific strategies in order to realize their objectives, shows that the dedication they express towards their causes is important. Yet, perhaps their conviction that a pluralist understanding should initially be adopted by the state only to be later perfected by NGOs and civil society in general, in itself defines them as products of Turkish political reality.

In conclusion, although the Turkish state and society do not represent the vision of a pluralist democracy in full, the two Turkish human rights NGOs studied here are indeed playing a critical role in contributing to the process of promoting pluralist democracy in Turkey. Their peaceful discourses, pluralist visions, the nature and

context of the campaigns, lobbying and advocacy activities and education programs they carry out all fall into the pattern described as “fitting” for NGOs in classical pluralist understanding.

On the other hand, these two Turkish NGOs also have some deficiencies with respect to their internal organizational structures, in promoting an efficient social capital, gaining sufficient material resources and reaching more people in society. Such problems and deficiencies however, are mostly seen as resulting from the general deficiencies in the structure of the Turkish state rather than as organization-based problems that need to be also addressed at this level. To the extent that as civil society organizations, bent on transforming state attitudes and policy in Turkey, these NGOs’ willingness to “blame the state” as the main source of civil society’s ineffectiveness in Turkey none the less, begs-for further explanation, perhaps into the nature of Turkish political culture.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

- i. Bir tanesi İHD kamuoyunda son derece yanlış algılanmış bir örgüt. Diğer İHD son derece fedakâr bir örgüt, öğrenen bir örgüt. İHD'nin en belirgin özelliği çifte standarda karşı olması...Ve kendisini mağdur hissetmeyen, pratiği içinde mağdurla özdeşleşmeyen bir örgüt. Eğer mağdurların başvuruları ile özdeşleşirseniz ihlale ve ihlalin sonuçlarına objektif bakma şansınız yok. Bunu yapmamaya çalışıyoruz buna özen gösteriyoruz ve uzun bir süredir İHD hem diliyle hem pratiği ile bunu tutturmuştur
- ii. Türkiye'nin iç sorunlarının farklılaşması ile birlikte İHDnin de gündeme aldığı sorunlar farklılaşmıştır. Değişikliğe bakarsak 1986'da, 1980'den mağdur olanların toplandığı bir yerken 1990 dan sonra daha çok Kürt sorunundan mağdur olanların olduğu bir yer. Yaptığı işler ve politikaları da değişebiliyor. Ölüm cezası ile ilgili en önemli ve ilk kampanyayı yapan İHD dir. Ama tabii ilk dönemler kişisel ve siyasal haklar daha önemli idi. İfade özgürlüğü ve işkence ile daha çok meşgul ve onları izliyordu. Şimdi ise baktığımızda aynı sorunlar hala ortada. Kürt sorunu da hala önemli bir ihlal alanıdır ve İHD izliyor. Ama son dört beş yıldır ekonomik, sosyal, kültürel haklara doğru giden farklı hak alanları gündeme gelmiştir. Her ne kadar biz bu haklar arasında bir önem sıralaması yapmasak da, çünkü biz insan haklarının bütüncül ve evrensel olduğuna inanırız, Türkiye'nin konjonktürü nedeniyle İHD kişisel siyasal haklar denince akla gelen bir örgüt olmuştur. Son dört beş yıldır İHD engellilere karşı ayrımcılık, kadınlara karşı ayrımcılık ile mücadele alanlarında kendi çapında mücadele eder. İzler ve destek verir. Çocuk hakları, mültecilerin hakları ile ilgili önemli çalışmalar yürütür. Yani yelpazesini genişletmeye çalışan bir örgüt ama Türkiye'de önyargılar ve devletin bakış açısından dolayı İHD'ye dışardan bakanlar İHD'yi kişisel siyasal haklar çerçevesinden çıkarmazlar.
- iii. İHD'de o zamandan bu zamana çok şey değişti. Şu anda belli prensipleri oluşmuş durumda. Son on yılını vermiş olduğu mücadeleden çıkarttığı önemli değerlerle şekillendirmiştir. Çalışma tarzı ve amaçlarla ilgili büyük değişiklik olmuştur. İlk yıllarda idama karşı olma doğru bulunmazdı bizim çocuklarımızı asanlar asılsın gibisinden bir düşünce vardı ama şu anda başörtüsü meselesi ile ilgili bir insan hakları ihlali olduğu kanaatindeyiz. İlkelerimiz içinde yer alan ulusların kaderini tayin etme meselesi Kürt sorunu etrafında tartışılmıştır ve o dönemde bu tartışmalar ayrılmaya yol açmıştır. Örneğin savaşa ve militarizme her türlü şiddete karşı olduğunuzu söylediğimiz zaman direnme hakkına karşı mısınız bu madde doğru değil diyenler oldu. Prensipler ve ilkeler tartışarak oluştu. Biz insan haklarını bir bütün olarak görüyoruz.
- iv. Önceleri tutuklu yakınları sadece cezaevi ile ilgili etkinliklerine katılıyordu ama daha sonra bu insanlar başka insan hakları sorunlarına da müdahale etmeye başladılar, başkasının çocuğu için, düşünceleri nedeniyle yargılanan insanlar için ya da Bergama köylüleri için yani çevre konusu ile ilgili olarak çalışan insanlara destek vermeye başladılar. Dernek her ne kadar kuruluş aşamasında tutuklu yakınları ve cezaevleri sorunlarına odaklanmış olsa da ve kurucuları çoğunlukla sol görüşten insanlar olsa da dernek tüm insan hakları ile ilgileniyor ve her türlü insan hakları ihlali alanında faaliyette bulunmaktan yana. Yani şu anda uzun yıllar İHD'de bulunmuş yöneticilerin bu şekilde düşündüğünü söyleyebilirim.
- v. İHD'li olmak bir şeref, onur verici bir şey. Bunun parayla şanla şöhretle ölçülecek bir tarafı yok. Hiç bilmediğiniz hiç menfaat ilişkiniz olmadığınız bir insana katkıda bulunmak istiyorsunuz, hakkını arıyorsunuz, tıpkı hekimler gibi sadece özgürlüğü ihlal edilmiş, hakkı ihlal edilmiş olduğu için yani o değer için çalışıyorsunuz. Ve bunu bilinçli olarak yaptığınız için onun verdiği haz başka hiçbir şeyle ölçülemez. Ahmet beni sevmese de ideolojik düşmanım da olsa ben onun hakları için çaba gösteriyorum... Pek çok MHP'li ve ülkü ocaklı anlatmıştır. Sivas'tan işçileri temsilen bir vatandaş geldi yanında 12 yaşında kız çocuğu da var problemini anlattı ve bakan

A.Şener'e ulaşmak istediğini söyledi. Pek çok çabalar gösterdik. Sonra yahu ağabey dedi ben MHP'liyim ülkü ocağındanım. Ben de dedim ki ne olursan ol, sordum mu? Kürt müsün, Türk müsün, Ermeni misin, Çerkez misin dedim mi? Alevi misin, Sünni misin dedim mi? Bizim için Kürtçü diyorlar ama biz kimseye necisin diye sormuyoruz.

- vi. İHD benim açımdan bir okuldur. Çünkü biz sosyalist geleneklerden geliyoruz ve dünyayı en azından iktidar birey ilişkisini bugün algıladığım gibi algılamıyordum. Şimdi başka bir açıdan başka bir pencereden de bakabilme şansına sahibim... Aç da kalsam, işsiz de kalsam yine barış içinde yaşayabilirim, barış içinde yaşamayı daha anlamlı buluyorum. Böyle bir katkısı var benim hayatıma İHD'nin. Barış sadece bir örnek. Bütünsel olarak sınıf mücadelesine, siyasal iktidara, devlet birey ilişkisine hep başka bir pencereden bakma şansına sahibim.
- vii. Oturduğumuz mahallede Kürt arkadaşlar vardı ama biz onlara Doğulu derdik. Kürtlerin yaşadığı bölgelere gidince öyle olmadığını gördük. Başka bir dil konuşuyorlardı. Başörtüsü meselesinde bunlar yobazdır diye yaklaşıyorduk başta ama onlar geldiğinde toplantılara katıldığımızda onların da dertleri olduğunu kendilerini ifade etme sıkıntılarının olduğunu, kendilerinin sevdiği yazarla olduğunu gördüm.
- viii. İHD pratiği içerisine girmeden insan haklarının evrensel oluşunu sadece kâğıt üzerinde bilirken İHD pratiği bana dayanışmanın, ortak hareket etmenin zorunlu olduğunu öğretti yani bunun bir iç sorun olmadığını bir ülkede insan hakları ihlali olduğunda sadece o ülke içerisinde mücadele etmenin yetmediğini öğrendim. Kendimi tanıma imkanını da elde ettim. Bu birlikte hareket etmenin sonucu olarak, İHD'nin ve dünyadaki diğer insan hakları örgütleri sayesinde birey olarak da kendi gücümün farkına vardım. Şimdi asla otoritenin boyun eğdiremeyeceği bir insan gibi hissediyorum.
- ix. İHD Türkiye'nin sorunlarına çok kolay dokunabiliyor, beni kendimle yüzleştirdiği ve milliyetçilikten ayrımcılığa kadar bir sürü kavramı sorgulattığı için benim için çok önemli, kendi kişisel gelişimimi açısından da çok şey ifade ediyor...Ülkeye olan sorumluluğumu anladım daha sorumlu hissettim...Eşcinsellerle ilk defa ben burada buluştum, bir eşcinselle herkesin baktığının dışından bakmayı öğrendim.
- x. Buraya gelmeden önce kişi olarak düşünüyordum ama geldikten sonra birlikte düşünmesini öğrendim.
- xi. İnsan hakları ihlaline uğramış kişilere yardımcı olma anlamında insani duyarlılık düzeyine bakıldığı zaman İHD üyelerinin bir benzerliği aynılığı var bu bir dayanışmayı beraberinde getiriyor.
- xii. Diyelim ayda on tane işkence vakası ile karşılaşıyorsunuz orada bütün kişisel farklılıklar ortadan kalkıyor. Başvuran kişi çok yoksul birisi olabilir, ayrımcılığa uğramış bir çingene olabilir, kocasından dayak yiyen bir kadın olabilir, ya da bir mülteci olabilir. İHD bu kişiye yardımcı olmak için kişisel farklılıkları bir yana bırakır. Bir kolektivizmden söz etmek mümkündür. Çünkü aksi takdirde bu kadar kısıtlı imkân ve az sayıdaki aktif üye ile İHD yi bu kadar sene yaşatmak pek mümkün olmazdı. Bireysel olarak fedakârlıkların olduğu bir dernektir.
- xiii. Dernekteki pek çok yönetici ile ben ideolojik olarak anlaşılamam. Anlaşılamayacağımızı da biliriz dernekteki pek çok kişi de bunu bilir...ama çok sert tartışmalarımız da olur, olmuştur, olacaktır. Yüzde doksan beş uzlaşma sağlanır, orta yol bulunur, tansiyonu düşer, her toplantıdan mutlaka bir sonuç çıkar.
- xiv. Genel merkez şubeye aracı olarak gider. İHD'nin her zaman için birbirini anlama ve uzlaşmaya götüren bir sistematigi vardır ve başarılı olur. Problemi tam olarak çözemeyebilir ama problemi bir parça giderme mekanizması uzlaşma yoluyla. Oylama ya da zıtlama şeklinde gitmez.

- xv. Üye profili üçe ayrılır. Birincisi yaş ortalaması yüksek demokrat aydın kesim diyebiliriz...İkincisi tutuklu yakınları aileleri, üçüncüsü ise tüm bunlardan ayrı sola yakın ve Kürt olanlar. Genel yaş ortalaması ise 35-40.
- xvi. İHD'nin üye profilini anlatmak çok zordur. Çok farklı insanlar vardır, herkes kendi işinde gücünde farklı faaliyet alanlarındadır ama bir yandan da İHD üyesidir...İHD ile yatıp kalkan çok fazla yoktur. Maddi durumu iyi olan az kişi vardır, fakirler çoğunluktadır, çoğu erkek ama kadın sayısı da azımsanamaz, yönetimde çok sayıda kadın görev alınabilir onlara sorarsan bu hala yetersizdir...Eğitim seviyesi doğuda biraz daha düşüktür, meslek unvan sahibi insan çok fazladır.
- xvii. Siyasal anlayış açısından dünyayı sol pencereden görenler diyebilirim. Bugün ne kadar savunurlar bilemem ama Marksist kökenli olanlar çoktur, Kürt sorununa duyarlı olan insan fazladır, sosyalist görüşü paylaşan fazladır, liberal anlayışı paylaşan hayli fazla arkadaşımız vardır. Kendini hiçbir siyasal anlayışa yakın hissetmeyip sadece insan hakları konusuna duyarlıyız, demokratiz diyenler de var ama bunların birleştiği tek nokta insan hakları konusunda duyarlılık... Bir etkinlik olacaksa liberalinden Marxistine, Kürdünden Türküne Alevisinden Sunnisine hepsinin bir araya geldiğini görebilirsiniz.
- xviii. Yaş ortalaması yüksek, erkek ağırlıklı, siyasal düşünceleri itibari ile sol ve sosyalist düşüncede insanlar.
- xix. Hukukçular eğitimciler, öğretmenlerin yer aldığı bir örgüt.
- xx. Yaş ortalaması genç ve kadın potansiyeli fazla olan bir örgüttür.Yönetimde kadınlar şu anda dörde üç. Yedek üyelerde yarı yarıyadır. İstanbul'da yüzde yetmişe varıyor kadın kotası. Ayrıca, eşcinsel üyelerimiz de var.
- xxi. Daha çok hak ihlaline uğramış insanlardır.
- xxii. Örneğin sosyalistlerle İslamcılar bir panelde bir araya gelip kendi fikirlerini söyleyip birbirlerinin fikirlerine önemli bir katkıda bulunuyor ya da Kürtçüyüm diyen birinin İslamcı biriyle buluşup AKP ile ilgili bir tartışma ortamında bir araya gelmesinin imkanını sağlıyor İHD. İHD'nin tek beceremediği Kemalist blok meselesidir çünkü Türkiye'de Kürt meselesi gündeme geldikten sonra o blokla tüm ilişkimiz koptu.
- xxiii. Herkes biliyor ki İHD demokrasiden yana. Alevi diyor ki İHD benim kültürümü özgürce geliştirmem için çabılıyor diyor. Kürt diyor ki baskılar karşısında İHD direniyor, benim kültürel hakları savunuyor diyor. Diğer azınlıklar da aynı şeyi düşünüyorlar. Dini gruplar da öyle, başörtülü insanlar da. Biz kışkırtıcılık yapmıyoruz. İHD farklı grupları birbirine kışkırtan bir söylem tutturuyor... Toplum İHD'nin ne dediğine bakıyor medyadakini dikkate almıyor, ama devlet bize kızıyor. İlgilendiğimiz için kızıyor.
- xxiv. Biz toplumsal alanda özellikle son iki yıldır hemen her açıklamamızda şiddet konusunda ne kadar kaygılı olduğumuzu anlatmaya çalışıyoruz ama problem şu ki Türkiye kamuoyu medyası ile siyasal iktidarı ile çok güdülenmiş durumda. Biz her koşulda barış kültürünün altını çiziyoruz ama sesimiz ne topluma gidiyor ne de devlet bizim söylediğimiz bildiği halde buna yönelik bir adım atıyor. Tam aksine Türkiye'de hemen her fırsatta her asker ya da polis cenazesinde devlet insan hakları örgütlerine, savunucularına yönelik tepki örgütüyor. Dolayısıyla sizin toplumsal barış konusunda şiddete karşı yaptığınız vurgu karşılığını bulmuyor. Ne devlette ne toplumda ne de medyada.
- xxv. İHD milliyetçiliğe karşıdır ve mağdurdan yanadır. Bunun toplumda yansımalarına bakınca İHD devlete karşı devleti yıkmaya çalışan ajanlar olarak görülüyor. Bu kaçınılmaz bir şey çünkü bu ülkede milliyetçilik her zaman kışkırtılmaya çalışılıyor. Mağdurdan yana olmak demek bütün

mağdurlardan yana olmak demektir, her hangi bir seçim söz konusu değildir. İHD mağdur olan Kürdü savunduğu kadar, eşcinseli de savunduğu müddetçe hiçbir etik problem yoktur... İHD Kürt sorununa Kürt milliyetçiliği doğrultusunda bakmaz, hiçbir yayınında böyle bir şey göremezsiniz insan hakları perspektifinden bakar ve buradan doğru da söyleyeceğini söyler.

- xxvi. İHD hiçbir zaman Kürtlerin siyasal söylemine taraf olmadı ama insanların sırf etnik kimliklerinden dolayı aşağılanmalarına insan hakları ihlallerine maruz kalmalarına sahip çıktı... İhlale uğrayan kişi Müslüman olabilir Hristiyan olabilir, bunun bir önemi yok ama dini anlayışı yüzünden bir sıkıntı yaşamışsa o zaman bu bir sorundur. Ortada bir insan hakları ihlali var ise kimliğe bakılmaz...İHD bu anlayışı ile Türkiye’de insan hakları bilincinin gelişmesine ciddi anlamda katkı sağlamıştır.
- xxvii. Örneğin devlet 1995’te İçişleri Bakanlığı gözetli izleme birimleri kurdu. Neden kurdu? Çünkü o dönem Cumartesi Anneleri eyleminin arkasındaki güç İHD idi. İki yıl boyunca her hafta Galatasaray Lisesi önünde Cumartesi Anneleri eylem yaptı. Onların arkasındaki güç bizdik. Devlet ne yaptı? Önce otobüs getirdi annelere ve dedi ki; çocuklarınız gözetiminde kayboldu diyorsunuz bize bildirin. Sonra gözetli birimi oluşturuldu aynı dönem biz kampanya başlatmıştık. Devlet bunu insanlar İHD’ye gitmesinler diye de yapmış olabilir, İHD’nin söylediklerini dikkate aldıkları için de...İnsan hakları il ve ilçe kurullarına bizce bağımsız olmaları gerektiği için katılmayı reddettik. Çünkü ancak bağımsız olursa bir şeyleri değiştirmeye gücü ve yetkileri olur. Ayrıca mağdurun başvurabilmesi için mağdurun o kurulların sorunu çözeceğine inanması gerekiyor. Katılmadığımız için dediler ki İHD olmadığı için kurullarda malesef insan hakları konularında tartışmıyoruz. Bu bir şekilde bizim devlete etkimizi ve demokratikleşmeye katkımızı gösteriyor ama devletin insan haklarına duyarlılığı konusunda soru işaretleri varalım, araştıralım diye de yapmış olabilir, iyi niyetle. Ama hangi amaçla yapmış olursa olsun biz devletin bu konuda olumlu adım atmak üzere harekete geçmesinde en önemli aktörlerden birisiydik.
- xxviii. İnsan hakları il ve ilçe kurullarına bizce bağımsız olmaları gerektiği için katılmayı reddettik. Çünkü ancak bağımsız olursa bir şeyleri değiştirmeye gücü ve yetkileri olur. Ayrıca mağdurun başvurabilmesi için mağdurun o kurulların sorunu çözeceğine inanması gerekiyor. Katılmadığımız için dediler ki İHD olmadığı için kurullarda malesef insan hakları konularında tartışmıyoruz. Bu bir şekilde bizim devlete etkimizi ve demokratikleşmeye katkımızı gösteriyor ama devletin insan haklarına duyarlılığı konusunda soru işaretleri var.
- xxix. İHD’nin devlet politikalarını ve kurumlarını bir ölçüde dönüştürdüğünü düşünüyorum çünkü İHD sayesinde sadece sokaktaki insan değil basın da duyarlı hale geldi... Mesela bir aile benim oğlum Sincan’da hücre koşullarında sıkıntılı bir biçimde bulunuyor diye başvuruyor bize. Anlatıyor. Bunun üzerine biz Adalet Bakanlığı’na ve Sincan F tipi Cezaevi Müdürlüğü’ne yazı yazıyoruz. Bazen cezaevi müdürü kendine çeki dozer veriyor ya da Adalet Bakanlığı cezaevinden cevap istiyor. Yani İHD sadece yasalar konusunda değil fiili anlamda da etkili bence...Örneğin İHD Hacettepe Üniversitesinde polis ve jandarmaya insan hakları eğitimi dersleri veriyor. Dönemin başında çok ürkütücü fikirler söyleyebiliyorlar ama sene sonuna doğru tekrar konuştuğumuzda bir takım olumlu farklılıkların oluştuğunu gözlemliyorum. İHD’nin burada onların olumsuz bilincinin değişmesine ne kadar katkısı olduğunu görebiliyorum ve bu tür eğitimleri çok faydalı buluyorum.
- xxx. Meclis İnsan Hakları Komisyonuna bize gelen ihlalleri bildiririz. Onlar da başvuru hangi devlet kurumu ile ilgili ise oraya yazı yazarlar ve oralardan aldıkları cevapları İHD’ye yazılı olarak bildirirler. Bazı olaylarda bu etkili olabiliyor Örneğin uzun süreli gözetimlerde, dernek ya da sendikaların örgütlenme özgürlüklerinde, ifade özgürlüğünde.. Örneğin meclis insan hakları komisyonunun ifade özgürlüğü ile ilgili rapor gönderdiği kurum komisyonun önerilerini alabiliyor. Meclis insan hakları komisyonu zaman zaman İHD ile kendileri görüşmek de istiyorlar.

- xxxı. İlişki deyince akla karşılıklı bir şey gelir. Ama böyle bir şey yok. İhlal rapor ve taleplerimizi taşıyoruz ama Meclis İnsan Hakları Komisyonu bunları değerlendirmiyor çoğunlukla. Sadece şu şekilde bize geri bildirim yapılıyor: Şu kişi ile ilgili başvurunuz kayıtlarımıza alınmıştır. Bu kadar.
- xxxii. İHD her zaman devlete belli bir mesafede durur, belli konularda bakanlıkların alanına giren problemleri ortaya çıkarır ve onlara sunar. Ama bunun genelde bir geri dönüşü olmuyor. Çünkü zaten devlet öyle çalışmıyor. Şu anda sadece bilgi edinme yasasından ötürü bir mecburiyet hissediyor. Ama aynı bilgilerle geri dönüyor. Bu etkili bir sorgulama mekanizması değil...Örneğin, paylaştığınız için teşekkür ederim ben bu konuyla ilgileneceğim araştıracağım diyor ama sonrası gelmiyor.
- xxxiii. Bu ilişkinin sağlıklı olabilmesi için bir yasal zeminin olması gerekiyor, bir demokratik gelenek zemininin filan olması gerekiyor ama yok. Abdullah Gül duyarlıdır kabul eder ama Başbakan kabul etmez. Bu anlamlı bir şey değil. Yani birlikte bir şey yapmaya açık değil, katılıma açık değil. Bu tamamen kişinin niyetine kalmış bir şey. Sizin bunu sağlayacak yasal bir kanalınız olmadığı sürece iyi niyet çözüm olamaz.
- xxxiv. Verimli komisyon çalışmaları yürüttüğümüzü söyleyemem. Görevlendirme yöntemini bırakarak, üyelerimizi konular konusunda serbest bıraktık. Üyeler kendileri biz komisyonuz desinler istedik, örneğin her komisyonun bir sekreteri olsun, diğer şubelerde benzer alanlarda çalışan komisyonlar yıllık rapor çıkarsın dedik. Komisyonlar eylem önerin, planlamalar yapsın dedik. Merkez ve şubelerdeki komisyonlar arasındaki iletişim için bunları yaptık. Ama bunlar memnuiyet verici sonuçlar doğurmadı...Bunun sebebi insanlar planlı çalışmaya ve organize olmaya alışık değil. Organize olup, geçecek zamanı planlayıp, doğru ve yerinde uygulamaları yapıp hedefe yürümekte problemlerimiz vardır. Bu Türkiye’de de ciddi bir problemdir ve bu kültür birdenbire oluşmaz. Biz her an her şeyin olabileceği bir ülkede yaşadığımız için olaylara uzun erimli bakmak, planlar yapmak, doğru iş bölümleri yapmak konusunda başarılı değiliz.
- xxxv. Adalet Ağaoğlu gibi ayrılan üç beş kişi var. O ayrıldı diye belki bir iki kişi ayrılmıştır. Ama şu var ki bilmediğiniz zaman susmanız lazım. Adalet Ağaoğlu başkanın kim olduğunu bilmiyordu. Genel kurula çağırıyorduk, gelmiyordu. Bilgilenme ihtiyacı içerisinde değildi. Tek yönlü bazı kanılara vardı bence ve yeterince sorumlu davranmadı... Ayrılanların arkasından on kişi beş kişi üç kişi ayrılmamıştır. Ben ayrılısam benim arkamdan bir kişi ya da üç kişi ancak gelir. Yani sürü mantığı yoktur, çünkü bu bir hareket. Bu hareketin omurgasını teşkil eden İHD’dir. Öncü rolünü oynayan İHD’nin kendisidir. Yani Ahmet ya da Mehmet değil. Bu çok önemli. Bütün zaafalarına ve eksiklerine rağmen İHD kurumsallaşmıştır ve kişilerden bağımsız olarak varlığını sürdürür. İHD gücünü kanıtlamıştır. Hiç birimizin İHD’den bir taş sökemecek olması önemlidir. Yani kişilerin tek tek İHD’yi yıpratmaya gücü yetmez bu da önemli bir güvencedir hepimiz için.
- xxxvi. Biz bağımsız bir sivil toplum örgütüyüz aynı zamanda da bir kadın örgütüyüz. Hem yerel alanda, hem ulusal hem uluslararası düzeylerde çalışıyoruz. İnsan hakları eğitimi programımız var. Türkiye’de yasaların değişmesi için çok yoğun bir şekilde savunuculuk (advocacy) ve lobicilik yapıyoruz. Her şeye çok bütünsel (holistic) yaklaşan bir örgütüz. Hadi şu konuda da bir proje yapalım diyen bir örgüt değiliz. Daha çok uzun soluklu ve birbirini tamamlayan programlar yürütmeye çalışıyoruz. Ve bir şeyleri değiştirebilmek için bunun çok önemli olduğunu düşünüyoruz.
- xxxvii. Advocacy and lobbying birbirini tamamlayan şeyler ve farklı şeyler. *Lobbying* den anlaşılan direk meclisi, hükümeti ya da bir bakanlığı hedef almak, *advocacy* ise bunun yanında kamuoyu bilinçlenmesini de içeren bir şey. Eğer bir tek bakanlıkla görüşülüp yasalar değiştiriliyor olsaydı o zaman sadece lobbying olacaktı ama öyle olmuyor her seferinde inanılmaz kampanyalar yapılıyor ve zorla değiştiriliyor yasalar. Dolayısıyla Türkiye’de hakikatten büyük bir baskı

sonucunda ve kamuoyu oluşturduktan sonra ancak bir şeyleri değiştirebiliyoruz. Bu arada advocacy and lobbying yapmak için networking çok önemli. Sürekli networking yapmak durumunda kaldık hem kadın örgütleri arasında hem de kadın örgütleri ile diğer örgütler arasında.

- xxxviii. Buraya girmeden önce de feministim, kadın konularına ilgilidim ama birebir içinde olmak çok farklı. Daha duyarlı oluyorsunuz, bu hayatınızda daha temel bir mesele haline geliyor. Daha doğrusu burada olmak bunun ne kadar temel bir mesele olduğunu görmeyi sağlıyor. Bundan dolayı da herşeye daha farklı yaklaşıyorsunuz.
- xxxix. Şiddetin ne olduğunu ve psikolojik şiddetin ne olduğunu gördüm. Eşten dostan bir şiddet olayı duyunca ne yapılması gerektiğini bilmek çok güzel ve hürriyet verici bir şey. İnsan daha kontrolde, duyarlı ve sorumlu hissediyor. Toplumsal cinsiyet bakış açısını daha net görmeye başlıyor.
- xl. Kadın hareketi açısından bu çok zor çünkü çoğu örgüt kendi alanlarında çalışmalarına katılmanızı istiyorlar ama iş kadına gelince onlar çekimser kalıyor ve yanaşmıyor. Sanki hak hiyerarşisi var. Ölüm cezası daha kritik örneğin. Dolayısı ile zamanında çok ortak çalışma yaptık ama şu anda minimumda yani çok daha fazla işbirliği olması lazım ama maalesef minimumda. Tabii ki ilişkimiz var ama çok effective bir ilişkimiz olamıyor.
- xli. Sendikalarla hep görüşüyoruz hatta onlarla KİHEP uygulama gibi bir fikrimiz var ancak henüz aramızda somut bir işbirliği yok. İnsan hakları örgütleri ile sürekli olmasa da bir dayanışma var. Bu genelde toplantı, eylem ya da kampanya çerçevesinde oluyor. Helsinki Citizens' Assembly ile bir sürü ortak çalışmamız oluyor, bizim toplantılarımıza katılıyorlar. Bunların dışında eşcinsel örgütlerle özellikle cinsel ve bedensel haklar konusunda çalışıyoruz.
- xlii. Dayanışma ve destek kadın örgütleri arasında çok yaygın bir durum. Zaten başarının nedeni de bu. Elbirliği oluyor. Farklı bakış açıları olan örgütler var ama hepimiz temelde aynı şeyi hedefliyoruz. Ortak noktamız ağır basıyor.
- xliii. Bizim KİHEP'teki gruplarımızda türbanlı ya da Kürt kadınlar da var ama bunların hiç sözü açılmıyor bunlar yüzünden bir çatışma çıktığını hiç duymadım çünkü kadın olmanın sorunları o kadar ortak ve ortak sorunlar o kadar yoğun ki bunların önüne geçebiliyor. Örneğin aile içi şiddet, eğitim sorunu, ekonomik sorunlar, kız çocuklarının sorunları, cinsel sorunlar, doğurganlık sorunları kadınları o kadar birleştiren bir şey ki...
- xliv. KİHEP'li kadınlar arasında ortak bir dayanışma oluşuyor, genelde program bittikten sonra da birbirleriyle ilişkilerini sürdürüyorlar, toplum merkezlerinde başka kurslara katılabiliyorlar, gönüllü işler yapıyorlar, başka örgütlere de üye olabiliyorlar, ya kendileri örgüt kurabiliyorlar.
- xlv. KİHEP ile birlikte bizim eğiticilerimiz de önce kendileri değişiyorlar, kendileri de değişikliklerini söylüyorlar. Onların duruşu hayata bakışı değişiyor ve bunun onlarda olumlu bir etki yarattığını düşünüyorum. Ayrıca bu değişikliğin Sosyal Hizmetler Genel Müdürlüğüne de yansıdığını görüyoruz bu da çok olumlu bir şey tabii.
- xlvi. Uygulayan insanların nitelikli olması çok önemli. Bu anlamda daha çok kadına ulaşalım diye bu niteliklerden ödün vermemiz söz konusu değil. İçerik anlaşılır, basit ve resimlerle anlatılmış ama psikolojik açıdan ağır bir program. Çünkü örneğin şiddet ağır bir konu. Travma yaşayan da oluyor. Aslında bu bir grup terapi ve güven ortamı yaratılıyor. Eğitim başlayınca gruplara dışarıdan girme çıkma olmuyor, yani gruplar kapalı, içeride büyük bir paylaşım söz konusu. Kadınlar daha evvel kimseye söylemediği şeyleri burada söylüyor ve bu da onları değiştiriyor.

- xlvi. Devletin duyarlı hale gelip gelmediğini zaman gösterecek. Çünkü yasa yeni değişti ve ancak uygulama aşamasında bunu görebileceğiz. Eğer devlet zaman içinde yasanın bilgisine sahip olup uygularsa o zaman duyarlı hale gelmiş diyebiliriz. Devletin duyarlılığı kendi memurunu, polisini ne derece bilgilendireceğine bağlı. Türkiye’de bu bilgilendirmenin sistematik ve yaygın bir biçimde yapılması gerekiyor ama maalesef yapılmıyor.

APPENDIX 2

SOME SELECTED ACTIVITIES OF İHD AFTER 2000

A- Projects and Campaigns

- ⇒ **Campaign of “Do not Silence for Torture”** (2003-2004) aims at prevention of torture and impunity of perpetrators. HRA created a network between other human rights organizations on the issue, gave educational seminars to lawyers, medical experts and human rights defenders about monitoring torture, issued a special bulletin on the issue, monitored and reported the trials of torture.
- ⇒ **Project on the Rights of Disabled People** (2003-2004) aims at revealing the practices of discrimination against disabled people. HRA made educational meetings in branches about the rights of disabled people, encouraged the commissions work on the issue, created network between NGOs working on the problems of disabled people and HRA, organized meetings with them, introduced the project to the media channels, followed up the laws and legal regulations about the issue, made lobbying activity.
- ⇒ **Land Mines Project** (2005-2006) aims at preventing human rights violations due to the land mines. HRA made educational seminars, searched international campaigns on the issue, made pressure on state about sweeping the mines in Eastern region.
- ⇒ **Project on Refugees** (2000-2003) aimed at informing human rights defenders about national and international legislation on the rights of refugees. HRA went to the places where refugees live in and interviewed them, created networks among other NGOs on the issue.

B-Conferences, Meetings and Seminars

- ⇒ **“War and Human Rights”** within *Conferences on Turkish Human Rights Movement* (14-16 November 2003) , Mardin

- ⇒ **“Poverty and Human Rights”** within *Conferences on Turkish Human Rights Movement*, (15-17 November 2002), Ürgüp, Göreme
- ⇒ **“Violence against Women and Women in Life”** within the activity of HRA Şanlıurfa Branch, (22-23 November 2003), Şanlıurfa
- ⇒ **“Democratization and the Solution of Kurdish Question in Turkey”** (5-6 July 2003), Dedeman Oteli, Ankara

C- Publications

1- Books

- ⇒ **Conceptual Principles of Human Rights** (2000)
- ⇒ **Copenhagen Political Criteria and Turkey** (2000)
- ⇒ **Torture in the Turkish Juridical Legislation** (2004)
- ⇒ **Refugees and the Right of Asylum** (2001)

2- Booklets and Reviews

- ⇒ **Monthly Reviews and regular annual reports on human rights violations since the foundation**
- ⇒ **Booklets on CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The United Nations Convention on Child Rights, The United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT).**
- ⇒ **Special issues on Newroz (2003), Losses (2004), World Peace Day (2003), Torture (2003) etc.**

3- Research Articles

- ⇒ **Protecting the Human Rights (The Practice of HRA), Hüsnü Öndül, 8 December 2002**
- ⇒ **European Union and Turkey, Hüsnü Öndül, Aralık, 1999**

D-Memberships to the national and international platforms

- ⇒ **HRA is the constituent member of Human Rights Common Platform (IHOP) together with *Human Rights Foundation of Turkey* (İnsan Hakları Vakfı), *Organization for Human Rights and Solidarity with Oppressed People* (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği), *Amnesty International* (Uluslararası Af Örgütü) and *Helsinki Citizen's Assembly* (Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği)**
- ⇒ **Membership of International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)**

SOME SELECTED ACTIVITIES OF KIH-YÇV AFTER 2000

A- Projects and Campaigns

- ⇒ **Women's Human Rights Education Program for Women** (since 1998) aims to raise women's awareness of their rights and equip them with the necessary knowledge and skills towards their realization, serves as a catalyst in the mobilization of women's local grassroots organizing, supports the struggle for women's human rights not only on an individual but also on an organized collective basis, has led to the emergence of 15 independent women's grassroots organizations in 10 provinces of Turkey, remains to be the most widespread, sustainable and comprehensive human rights education program in Turkey.
- ⇒ **The Campaign for Full Equality in the Civil Code** (2000-2001)
- ⇒ **The Campaign for the Ratification of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW by Turkey** (2001)
- ⇒ **The Campaign for the Reform of the Penal Code from a Gender Perspective** (2002-2004)

B-Conferences, Meetings and Seminars

- ⇒ **“Sexuality and Human Rights in Muslim Societies in South/Southern Asia: Conference”** (September 2004, Jakarta, Indonesia)
- ⇒ **“2nd Human Rights Education Program Regional Grassroots Organization Meeting”** (July 2004) Van, Turkey
- ⇒ **“Dialogue on the Turkish Penal Code, Gender & International Human Rights Law: Conference”** (December, 2003) Ankara, Turkey
- ⇒ **“Grassroots Organizing, the Turkish Penal Code and Program Evaluation of the Human Rights Education Program Conference”** (November, 2003), Istanbul, Turkey
- ⇒ **“Campaign on Women’s Human Rights Violations in the Turkish Penal Code Draft Law: 2nd Press Conference on the Reform of the Turkish Penal Code from a Gender Perspective”** (November, 2003), Istanbul, Turkey
- ⇒ **“Sexual and Bodily Rights as Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Workshop”** (May, 2003), Malta
- ⇒ **“The Repercussions of International Gender Politics in Turkey: The State, Civil Society and Democratization during the Beijing +5 Process: Conference”** (July 2000), Istanbul, Turkey

C- Publications

1- Books

- ⇒ **Women and Sexuality in Muslim World** (2000, 2003, 2004) in English, in Turkish, in Arabic respectively
- ⇒ [The Myth of a Warm Home: Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse \(1996\)](#) in Turkish
- ⇒ [Women’s Human Rights Education: A Training Manual](#), (1998) in Turkish

2- Booklets and Reviews

- ⇒ **Turkish Civil and Penal Code Reforms from a Gender Perspective: The success of two nationwide Campaigns (2005) in English**
- ⇒ **Sexual and Bodily Rights as Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: A workshop report (2004) in English**
- ⇒ **Gender Discrimination in the Turkish Penal Code Draft Law and Proposed Amendments (2003) in English and Turkish**
- ⇒ **The Legal Status of Women in Turkey (2002) in English**

3- Research Articles

- ⇒ **Gender, Sexuality and the Criminal Laws in the Middle East and North Africa: A Comparative Study (2005) in English**
- ⇒ **Feminism and Women's Movements in Turkey (2003) in Turkish**
- ⇒ **Women, Sexuality and Social Change in the Middle East and the Maghreb (2002) in English**
- ⇒ **The “Natasha” Experience: Migrant Sex Workers from the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in Turkey (2002) in English**
- ⇒ **Islam and Women's Sexuality: A Research Report from Turkey (2001) in English**

D-Memberships to the national and international platforms

- ⇒ **WWHR-NW is a member of the National Committee for Human Rights Education since 1998 and the Human Rights Advisory Council established under the prime ministry since 2002.**
- ⇒ **WWHR-NW initiated and coordinated the Coalition for Sexual and Bodily Rights in Muslim Societies: The first solidarity network to promote sexual and reproductive rights as human rights in Muslim societies.**

APPENDIX 3

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- Your age, education, occupation, (last school you graduated), birthplace, monthly salary?
- How long have you been working for İHD/KİH-YÇV? What are your responsibilities?
- What is the mission of İHD/ KİH-YÇV? Why there was a need for such an organization to be established?
- Could you briefly talk about İHD/ KİH-YÇV? How does the organization work? What mission and principles does the İHD/ KİH-YÇV based on?
- How many active and volunteer members does the organization have?

Enhancing Solidarity, Responsibility and Compromise

1. What it means to you to be affiliated with İHD/ KİH-YÇV?
2. Have being a member of İHD/ KİH-YÇV made any changes in your life? When you compare your life prior to and after being a member at İHD/ KİH-YÇV, what differences do you see? Was it a learning experience for you?
3. How are the relations between the members of İHD/ KİH-YÇV? Is there a trusting environment?
4. Are there disagreements and conflicts between the members? If so, could you tell me on which topics and to what extent does it occur? In such cases, what is the attitude of the organization?
5. Considering the ethnical and religious conflicts (conflicts about gender) in Turkey, what kind of role does İHD/ KİH-YÇV play in terms of politics?
6. How would you describe the member profiles in İHD/ KİH-YÇV?
7. How would you describe the İHD's /KİH-YÇV' target groups?
8. Are there people who differ in their world view, identities and political preferences among the İHD/KİH-YÇV members, victims and target groups? If so, could you talk about these a little bit? Do these differences have any positive or negative effect on the organization?

9. Does İHD/KİH-YÇV have any positive or negative role in the relationships between those groups? If so, how would you evaluate the role of İHD? Is it sufficient? Is it functional? If not, what could be the reason for that?
10. How is the relationship between İHD/ KİH-YÇV and its target groups? If the response is negative, how should it be? How would it be better? What kind of means are you utilizing to reach the target group?
11. What kind of training activities are taking place for members and target groups among other activities? What kinds of projects are taking place for training? What are the outcomes of those projects? How do you provide feedback for these education projects?
12. Are there any other projects? How are you maintaining the sustainability of these projects?
13. How do committees work at İHD? What do you think about the way these committees work? If the response is negative, how would these committees work better?
14. Does İHD/KİH-YÇV have partnerships with unions, environmental foundations, and occupation? All foundations and religious groups? If so, what kind of projects do they work on together?
15. Does İHD/KİH-YÇV have any partnerships with political parties? If so, what kind of projects do they work on together?
16. How are your relationships with other non-governmental organizations that work on human rights? Do you work on projects together? Which organizations do you work more often?

Effectiveness

17. As a human rights organization, do you think İHD/KİH-YÇV was effective/influential in Turkey? If so, how? On which areas do you see İHD's influence?
18. Has İHD/KİH-YÇV been influential in the state becoming responsive toward human rights (women's human rights)? If so, to what extent or in what respects the state became responsive? If not, what are the most important obstacles or challenges that İHD encounters?
19. Do you think that İHD/KİH-YÇV could transform the state institutions and policies through its actions?

20. Do you think that İHD/KİH-YÇV has been influential in legal arrangements made especially in human rights area in last years? If so, how? By which ways this influence has been ensured?
21. How are the relationships between İHD/KİH-YÇV and the Parliament?
22. Are there any lobbying efforts on the part of İHD/KİH-YÇV?
23. How are the relationships between İHD/KİH-YÇV and Human Rights Department established within the Prime Minister, Human Rights Councils and Human Rights Inquiry Commission in Parliament?
24. How are the relationships between İHD/KİH-YÇV and government and local administrations?
25. Does İHD KİH-YÇV have international contacts? Mostly with whom İHD/KİH-YÇV does have communications?
26. Does İHD/KİH-YÇV have any relationships or partnerships with international (women's) human rights organizations? In what areas and in what ways do these relationships are being established?
27. What are the most important obstacles or challenges that İHD/KİH-YÇV encounters in its activities? How could these obstacles be tackled?
28. What are the financial resources that İHD/KİH-YÇV has?

Inner Democracy

29. What are the eligibility conditions for memberships? Can anybody become a member at İHD/KİH-YÇV?
30. Has there been anyone whose application for membership was denied? If so, why was it denied?
31. How does decision making mechanism work in İHD/KİH-YÇV? Who does get to decide and how?
32. Are there different mechanisms working for different kinds of decisions?
33. How and by whom the projects, actions, activities and campaigns are decided?
34. How are the relationships between İHD/KİH-YÇV head office and local branches? How often and for what purposes do they get together? In what ways and to what extent the local branches are influential in making decisions?

35. To what extent members are effective in administration and decision making processes? In this respect, do you feel if there are any deficiencies in the decision-making mechanism in İHD? If so, how could you describe those deficiencies and what could be done to address those deficiencies?
36. Do you see any problems in active participation of those members? If so, what are the reasons? What could be done to address this problem?
37. To your knowledge, are there any İHD/KİİH-YÇV members who are also affiliated with or a member in other nongovernmental organizations? (Rightwing, leftwing, fundamentalists, environmentalists, feminists etc.)
38. Do you know the number of İHD/KİİH-YÇV members who also has membership or affiliation with political parties?
39. Are there any members who leave İHD/KİİH-YÇV? Approximately how many members left İHD/KİİH-YÇV? What do you see the reasons are?
40. What could you tell us about the relationships between former members and those who are still active members?
41. Considering the present conditions in Turkey, what are İHD's/KİİH-YÇV roles and responsibilities in creating consciousness among public and preventing human rights violations? To what extent İHD/KİİH-YÇV is successful in carrying out this mission (or these responsibilities)? Do you see anything additional that İHD/KİİH-YÇV can do to become more influential in Turkey?

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