

THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (CHP) AND TURKISH
FOREIGN POLICY
2003-2005

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

SEÇKİN BARIŞ GÜLMEZ

IN PARTIAL FULLFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 2006

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences.

Prof. Dr. Sencer AYATA
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŞIK
Head of Department

This is to certify that we read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Necati Polat
Thesis Advisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Necati POLAT (METU, IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Çağrı ERHAN (Ankara U., IR) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Oktay TANRISEVER (METU, IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: **Seçkin Barış Gülmez**

Signature:

ABSTRACT

THE REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY (CHP) AND TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY 2003-2005

Gülmez, Seçkin Barış

M.Sc., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Necati Polat

September 2006, 173 pages

This study aims to examine the foreign policy orientation of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) during 2003 and 2005. Thus, four major foreign policy issues during this period will be scrutinized. These issues are namely, Turkey’s EU membership process, the Cyprus problem, the US-Turkey relations and the Armenian question. Taking into consideration the current development concerning these issues, this study will focus on the views and reactions of the CHP. In this respect, the main determinant factors behind the foreign policy stance of the party will be discussed. Finally, comparing the foreign policy understanding of the CHP in the past, the study will focus on the question whether the CHP of today constitutes continuation or a shift from the past CHP administrations. At the end of the study, the results of a research issued at the current CHP deputies so as to evaluate their foreign policy orientations will be revealed.

Keywords: CHP, Republican People’s Party, Turkish Foreign Policy, Deniz Baykal, Onur Öymen.

ÖZ

**CUMHURİYET HALK PARTİSİ (CHP) VE
TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI
2003-2005**

Gülmez, Seçkin Barış

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Danışman: Doç. Dr. Necati Polat

Eylül 2006, 173 sayfa

Bu çalışma, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin (CHP) 2003 ve 2005 yılları arasındaki dış politika yönelimini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla, bu süreç içerisindeki dört önemli dış politika konusu incelenecektir. Bu konular, Türkiye'nin AB üyelik süreci, Kıbrıs sorunu, ABD-Türkiye ilişkileri ve Ermeni meselesidir. Çalışmada, bu konularla ilgili güncel gelişmeler göz önünde bulundurularak, CHP'nin görüş ve tepkileri değerlendirilecektir. Bu bakımdan, partinin dış politikadaki duruşunun arkasındaki belirleyici nedenler tartışılacaktır. Son olarak çalışmada, CHP'nin bugünkü ve geçmişteki dış politika anlayışı karşılaştırılacak ve bu açıdan bugünkü CHP'nin geçmiş CHP yönetimlerinin görüşlerini devam mı ettirdiği ya da onlardan ayrıldığı mı sorusu üzerine yoğunlaşılacaktır. Çalışmanın sonunda, dış politika yönelimlerini değerlendirmek amacıyla şuan ki CHP milletvekillerine uygulanmış bir araştırmanın sonuçları yayınlanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: CHP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Türk Dış Politikası, Deniz Baykal, Onur Öymen.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank all of the people for giving me the trust and help I needed. First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Necati Polat for coming up with the very idea of my thesis subject and assisting me anytime I needed. Secondly, I have my special thanks to my parents and my fiancée for giving me unconditional support during the preparation phase of the thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank METU for being a home to me and enabling me to live the best years of my life as a member of this great institution.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. THE EUROPEAN UNION.....	8
2.1. The EU and Turkey on Turkish Membership.....	10
2.2. The EU Copenhagen Summit of 2002 and Reactions of the CHP.....	11
2.3. Harmonization Process and Reactions of the CHP.....	13
2.4. The Progress Report of the EU Commission.....	19
2.5. The CHP's Concerns with the Progress Report.....	21
2.6. The EU Presidency Conclusions and Reactions of the CHP.....	24
2.7. Additional Protocol and the Declaration Issue.....	26
2.8. Negotiating Framework Document to Open the Negotiations and the Reactions of the CHP.....	28
2.9. Conclusion.....	32
3. THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.....	36
3.1. Europeanization of the Problem.....	40
3.2. The EU-Cyprus Link.....	41
3.3. The Annan Plan.....	43

3.4. The CHP and the Annan Plan.....	46
3.5. Failure of the Annan Plan and the Accession of the “Republic of Cyprus” to the EU.....	47
3.6. Revival of the Plan and the Road to Referenda.....	49
3.7. Cyprus Policy of the AKP.....	52
3.8. Referenda and Aftermath.....	54
3.9. Accession of the “Republic of Cyprus” and the Struggles to Reverse the Process.....	56
3.10. The CHP on Cyprus: Continuity with the Past.....	59
3.11. Conclusion.....	61
 4. THE US – TURKEY RELATIONS.....	 63
4.1. Changing Policies.....	65
4.2. The 1 March Motion.....	67
4.3. The Hooding.....	71
4.4. The Turkish Concerns over Iraq.....	73
4.5. Increasing Tensions: the AKP’s Critical Moves.....	74
4.6. Strategic Partnership.....	76
4.7. Greater/Broader Middle East Initiative.....	79
4.8. Moderate Islam.....	82
4.9. The CHP and the US.....	85
4.10. Conclusion.....	87
 5. THE ARMENIAN QUESTION.....	 89
5.1. The Armenian Question and the Conflicting Views.....	90
5.2. The Armenian Issue as a Means of Propaganda, Terror and Political Struggle.....	94
5.3. Current Developments Concerning the Existing Taboos	

on the Armenian Question.....	96
5.4. The CHP's Stance on the Armenian Issue.....	100
5.5. The AKP – CHP Alliance Concerning the Armenian Question.....	102
5.6. Conclusion.....	105
6. CONCLUSION.....	107
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	111
8. APPENDICES	
A: Survey on Foreign Policy Orientations of the CHP Deputies.....	122
A1: Introduction.....	122
A2: Questionnaire Sheet.....	123
A3: Survey Results.....	131

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Republican People's Party (CHP) is the oldest political party in the history of modern Turkey. Established right after the independence war, the CHP could be deemed as a political formation in whose hands the republic of Turkey was born. Founded by Atatürk, the founder of Turkish Republic, and later led by prominent persons such as İsmet İnönü, the party became the main political mechanism of the newly emerging republic. It was also the sole political mechanism, since there was no other party until 1947. Enjoying this advantage, the CHP was the government itself up until 1950. Concerning its foreign policy, Turkey has long set forth the dictum by Atatürk; "Peace at home peace in the world" as its main mentality. Correspondingly, as a nation having lived through an independence war and the construction of a new state, Turkey remained cautious during the interwar years. Avoiding the subsequent war, Turkey pursued policies in accordance with her national interests. Signing the Montreux treaty which once again enabled Turkey to have full jurisdiction over the straits, and joining of Hatay to Turkey could be counted as events illustrating the success in Turkish foreign policy in this era. Moreover, hatchets were buried with Greece, a war-time enemy.¹ The neutrality of Turkey during the Second World War could be understood as a culmination of this cautious approach to policy making. Consequently, a successful diplomacy was pursued during interwar years and the Second World War, though it had been expected to end up with failure.²

¹ See, William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p.72.

² *Ibid.*, 73.

The emergence of the Democratic Party (DP) as the governing body in Turkey from 1950 made a change in both the position of the CHP and Turkish foreign policy. The CHP became for the first time the opposition body in Turkish politics since the establishment of the Republic. Enjoying a single party administration, the DP chose to pursue an active and pro-western foreign policy. Sending troops to Korea to fight on the side of the US, the DP government tilted Turkey towards the Atlantic alliance. Turkey's membership to NATO further strengthened this notion. As another instance of this active policy understanding, the DP government conducted a "big brother" policy towards the Arabic countries and set Turkey as an example before them.³ According to the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his aides, the Arabs had long been neglected by the CHP governments. All in all, the DP government attached its policy stance to that of the US which was crystallized in NATO, a security umbrella against the Soviet Union, the common enemy.⁴

Following the DP period, the CHP's political position circulated from government to opposition. Whether in power or in opposition, the CHP continued its cautious foreign policy mentality. The post-DP İnönü premiership in Turkey reflected this cautious policy understanding.⁵ While Turkey under the DP government was a staunch ally of the US, under CHP governments the relations became tense. The Johnson letter against Turkey's possible military operation to the island deteriorated the relations. In turn, Turkey under İnönü administration chose to approach the Soviet Union and was rewarded with a considerable amount of credits.⁶ In Turkey even the debate whether to withdraw from NATO was discussed.⁷ Especially, members of the CHP, opposition

³ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, (Ankara: METU Press, 2001), p.42.

⁴ Ibid., 131.

⁵ Hale, op.cit., p. 149.

⁶ Ibid., p.151.

⁷ Ibid.

party at the time were uncertain to remain within NATO.⁸ Nevertheless, the CHP urged for equality in the US-Turkey alliance instead of leaving it.⁹

The Ecevit era of 1970s both in the CHP and in the government favored a more independent foreign policy especially within NATO.¹⁰ This stance was crystallized by two acts that brought about further deterioration of the US-Turkey relations. First, Ecevit permitted the replanting of opium, which had been prohibited under the US pressure.¹¹ Second, upon the *coup d'état* in Cyprus perpetrated by the Greek Colonels junta, Ecevit decided to intervene, following which the US inflicted arms embargo upon Turkey for three years.¹²

After the 1980 military coup in Turkey, the CHP was closed along with all other political parties. Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) was founded as the successor of the CHP and Erdal İnönü, the son of İsmet İnönü, became the leader. The notion of cautiousness in foreign policy continued in the Erdal İnönü leadership. However, the son was confined to opposition because the Motherland Party (ANAP) of Turgut Özal was on the rise.¹³ Like the DP government under Menderes leadership, the ANAP administration led by Özal enjoyed a single party rule. Özal chose to pursue a more active and pro-western foreign policy.¹⁴ Moreover, when he became the president of Turkey, Özal was so determined to conduct an activist policy that he chose to conduct Turkey's foreign policy on Iraq alone during the first Gulf War.¹⁵

⁸ George S. Harris, 'Turkey and the United States' in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), p.61-62.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Hale, op.cit., p.154.

¹¹ Harris, op.cit., p.69.

¹² Hale, op.cit., p.156.

¹³ Ibid.,164.

¹⁴ Ibid., p.180.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.221.

After reopening of the CHP under the leadership of Deniz Baykal in 1992,¹⁶ the party could not enjoy to become the main governing political body of Turkey until present day. Although involved in some coalition governments, the CHP remained as the opposition. The party even could not enter the parliament in 1999 elections getting less than the 10% of the total votes which was the threshold ratio. In 2002 elections, the CHP acquired 19.5% of the total votes and became the main opposition party in the parliament. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) enjoyed single party administration getting nearly 35% of the total votes. Seemingly, the AKP government too wanted to conduct an active foreign policy. For instance, the party officials put the European Union (EU) membership of Turkey as the top priority of Turkish foreign policy. Besides, the AKP wanted to solve the Cyprus issue as well. Moreover, the AKP had a tough bargain with the US officials over the Iraq campaign of the US. The CHP on the other hand, as an opposition party, hardened its tone both against foreign actors and the governing party in Turkey.

According to a well-known analysis of Maurice Duverger, opposition parties who remain too long in the opposition tend to act more violently and extravagantly.¹⁷ It could be true for the CHP, which did not happen to be the governing party since late 1970s.

In this study, the foreign policy orientation of the CHP as an opposition party mainly from 2003 to 2005 will be discussed along with the main foreign policy developments in Turkey. There will be basically four chapters in the study each touching upon distinct issues determining the foreign policy of Turkey. In each chapter, the stance of the CHP will be scrutinized along with some comparison with the stance of the CHP in the past. Even if the time frame of the study is limited to three years from 2003 to 2005, some important developments in the late 2002 and early 2006 are deemed important to dwell on.

In chapter II, Turkey's EU membership aspirations which were inflamed by the AKP government will be discussed. The developments concerning the EU – Turkey

¹⁶ Ibid., p.197.

¹⁷ Maurice Duverger, *Les Partis Politiques*, (Paris: Libraire Armand Colin, fifth edition, 1964), p.457.

relations which resulted in the opening of accession negotiations will be touched upon. For instance, the harmonization packages Turkey was obliged to fulfill in order to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria will be scrutinized. Moreover, the core documents the EU issued about Turkey, such as the progress report, presidency conclusions and negotiating framework will be analyzed in detail. The stance of the CHP towards the major developments concerning Turkey's EU bid will be on closer look discussing the underlying reasons.

In the chapter III, the changing pace of the Cyprus problem will be discussed along with the major developments starting from late 2002 to early 2006. Linkage of the Cyprus problem with Turkey's EU bid will be touched upon along with the much discussed Annan plan and the referenda in the respective communities in Cyprus. Discussing the eagerness of the AKP for a solution and the actual reason of an even more hardened policy conducted by the CHP on the issue will be the main purpose of this chapter.

In the chapter IV, the CHP's stance on the US-Turkey relations will be discussed with a closer look at the developments in the relations during 2003-2005. Like the other foreign policy issues, the CHP's active criticisms concerning the US – Turkey relations will continue this time reinforced by the added concern of 'International Legitimacy'. Moreover, three important concepts crucial to understand the nature of the US-Turkey relations will be discussed. These concepts are notably, *Greater/Broader Middle East Initiative*, *Strategic Partnership* and *Moderate Islam*, which were debated both in Turkey and in the US during this period. The CHP's views on the concepts will be dwelled on so as to fathom the party's approach towards the US – Turkey relations more soundly.

In the last chapter, the CHP's stance concerning the 'Armenian Genocide' issue will be analyzed regarding the developments from 2003 to early 2006. The study will begin with dwelling on the substance of the issue regarding the views of the conflicting sides. Then it will discuss the latest events that might be helpful in understanding the current situation. Moreover, the views of the CHP concerning the Armenian issue will be touched upon. It will be seen that the views of the CHP and the AKP overlapped and

probably for the first time a unified stance concerning a Turkish foreign policy matter was pursued.

At the end of the study the results of an opinion survey conducted for this study will be revealed. The survey entails a questionnaire answered by the CHP deputies. The aim has been to assess the foreign policy orientations of the CHP deputies.

While gathering materials about the foreign policy orientation of the CHP in general, I mostly came across the speeches, press conferences and interviews of three persons. These people are Deniz Baykal, the party leader, Onur Öymen, vice chairman of the party and retired ambassador and finally Şükrü Elekdağ, a deputy for Istanbul and a retired ambassador. It was obvious that these people due to their status in the party and their professional background acted as the spokesmen of the CHP concerning foreign policy. While their views were enough for me to have an idea about the discourse of the CHP on foreign policy, I also wanted to learn the opinions of other actors in the party. The deputies, in my view, constitute the apparent representatives of the party and at least have a vote for each in the parliament also for taking foreign policy decisions. Although the CHP deputies would not constitute the sole determiner of the overall foreign policy stance of the CHP, their views would be useful for me to have a healthier idea on what counts for the CHP concerning foreign policy. Understanding to what extent they share the general stance of the party and to what extent they play a role in the party on foreign policy issues would contribute to the study. Accordingly, I have been able to introduce some important views of the deputies into the four chapters I summed up above.

The questions put the CHP deputies include a wide range of foreign policy issues from Turkish – EU relations to the national enemy perception of the deputies. There are also questions asking the resources that they use for following the foreign policy issues to assess the degree and direction of interest expressed by the CHP deputies in foreign policy. Almost all of the questions have multiple choices changing in number from one to another. In order to enable the deputies to reflect freely, they were asked to go for more than one choice when necessary. Moreover, if they were not satisfied with the existing choices they were encouraged to write their own views in the space provided for this purpose. Finally in some questions they were asked to enumerate their choices in their individual order of importance. In processing the data, I first calculated all the

votes cast for the choices in order to have a general idea. Then I calculated the ones that the deputies deemed as their first choice. Therefore I was able to compare whether their general inclination overlapped with their first choice. In order not to get sucked into the pool of details, I did not calculate the second, third, fourth and fifth choices of the deputies. All the graphics material to this effect was prepared by the METU Statistics Society to whom I owe my special thanks.

From November 2005 to May 2006 the questionnaire sheets were handed out to the deputies and collected. With 42 deputies who did not want to fill in the blanks, I made personal interview and asked the very same questions. Consequently, 102 out 154 CHP deputies answered the questions. I am grateful to them for their patience and for sharing with me their views and time.

Studying the foreign policy orientation of the CHP, in my view, is crucial for a number of reasons. First, I did not come across any academic research on the CHP's foreign policy stance as an opposition party during the AKP administration. Thus this research will, in my opinion, contribute to fill this gap. Second, there has been, to my knowledge, no research scrutinizing the foreign policy reflexes of opposition parties in the parliamentary democracies. Instead, it was those of governing parties which were mainly touched upon. Hence, this work will be useful to look from a different perspective. And finally, it will be crucial to analyze the views of the oldest political establishment of Turkey even if it is in opposition. Hence it will be important to see whether the current foreign policy stance of the CHP constitutes continuity with the past or whether signaling a drift from it.

CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN UNION

Turkey's aspirations to be part of the European integration have been alive since the early 1960s. As a policy, this objective has always populated the main foreign policy agenda of Turkish politics. Especially, since Turkey's application for full membership in 1987, almost all governments declared their main objective as becoming a full member of the European Union (EU). Accordingly, they pursued their policies under the guidance of the membership objective. After the candidate status was granted to Turkey in the Helsinki Summit of 1999, the membership perspective of Turkey took a clearer shape. The constitutional reforms performed by the coalition Government headed by Bülent Ecevit showed Turkey's awareness for fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria. However, the 2001 economic crisis would be a dramatic setback. Subsequently, in the following general elections; the voters were determined to punish the leading political figures. The landslide victory of Justice and Development party (AKP) in November 2002 elections came out of this situation. Under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, a new leader though long in politics, the AKP formed a single party administration. No exception, the AKP government too declared the EU membership as the primary goal of its foreign policy. Accordingly, the government sought to get a proper date for the accession negotiations. However, the inexperienced AKP has been prone to make mistakes in the membership process. This has not only generated harsh criticisms in domestic politics but has also been claimed to endanger Turkey's membership bid.

The CHP, the main opposition party in the parliament is also in favor of the EU membership. According to the results of the survey conducted by the author of this study

with the CHP deputies, most of the CHP deputies are in favor of Turkey's EU membership. Accordingly, 97 per cent of the deputies said that Turkey should be or should definitely be a member of the EU.¹ Moreover, according to the CHP officials, their membership policy goes back to the Association Agreement which started Turkey's European vocation. Because, it was İsmet İnönü, the CHP leader and the prime minister of the time who signed the agreement.² İsmet İnönü had declared that they signed a treaty that would tie Turkey with Europe forever and this would be the most valuable legacy to the new generations.³ The CHP of today claims that they have always been in favor of Turkish membership starting from the very signature by İnönü of the association agreement.⁴ The CHP believes that it is the right of Turkey to become a member⁵ and this issue is the concern of Turkey above all the political parties.⁶ However, the party officials reflect a kind of protectionist tendency for pursuing this policy. Apparently, seeing reactions of the party officials, there are two main determinants affecting the EU policy of the CHP. First, the CHP officials strongly criticize the mentality of the EU bodies which in their view would hamper Turkey's chances for full membership. In their view, the way the EU acts shows its willingness to make Turkey a second class partner rather than a full member. In their view, the EU wants Turkey to stay as an eternal candidate, which will be more in the Union's interests. Secondly, the CHP criticizes the mentality of the AKP government. The CHP officials accuse the government of agreeing to serious concessions for the sake of membership. Besides, they criticize the AKP for having a hidden agenda behind their strong support for the EU membership. According to the CHP, the Islamic tendencies of the AKP government are sought to be satisfied under the pretext of membership

¹ See the Appendix, p. 143.

² Baykal's speech in the CHP Parliamentary Group reunion, July 1, 2003.

³ İlhan Turan, *İsmet İnönü: Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşileri 1961-1965* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2004) p.399.

⁴ Baykal, op.cit., July 1, 2003.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Baykal's speech in the CHP Parliamentary Group reunion, June 3, 2003.

obligations. The CHP, though in favor of membership, hardens its tone against Turkey's relations with the EU by putting forward these two main arguments.

Accordingly, in this chapter, Turkey's EU membership process starting from the 2002 elections until late 2005 will be analyzed. The CHP's stance on the major developments concerning Turkey's EU membership process will be detailed by taking into account the two determinants in its EU policy understanding.

2.1 The EU and Turkey on Turkish Membership

The European Union is quite confused about Turkey. Turkey signed the Association Agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963. Walter Hallstein, the president of the commission of the time had announced that Turkey was European and one day, it would become a member of the Community.⁷ Today, European politicians such as Valery Giscard d'Estaing state that Turkey is not European and its entry will be the end of the Union.⁸ Frits Bolkestein, the EU commissioner from the Netherlands claims that Europe will be "Islamized" by the Turkish membership.⁹ What's more, the leading figures in European political arena who oppose Turkish membership, like Angela Merkel of Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy of France are on the rise.¹⁰ Moreover, the referenda in France and Holland on European constitution signaled messages about Turkey's possible membership. Actually, these referenda were crucial for the EU in terms of its ability to become a unified political entity. At the same time, they were open to speculation for Turkey. Many French and Dutch citizens were claimed to cast their

⁷ Sylvie Goulard, *Le Grand Turc et la République de Venise*, (Paris : Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004) p.27.

⁸ "Europe : Pour ou Contre la Turquie", *Le Monde*, November 9, 2002.

⁹ Graham Bowley, "As EU Debates Turkey's Membership, Assimilation and Identity are at Issue : For Many Turks, Germany is Home", *International Herald Tribune*, October 4, 2004.

¹⁰ Dan Bilefsky, "EU Talks on Turkey Threatened by Disputes", *International Herald Tribune*, September 29, 2005.

votes against Turkish membership.¹¹ France rejected the Constitution with 55 per cent of no vote¹² and Holland said no to the Constitution with 62 per cent.¹³

Turkey, on the other hand, seems to be determined on EU membership. Since the signature of the Association agreement of 1963, Turkish decision makers showed their eagerness to join the European club. Under the AKP administration, Turkey's enthusiasm for membership reached its zenith. What's more, while some people in Turkey watched the results of the referenda in France and Holland with concern¹⁴, Turkish government was confident that the results were the internal matters of these countries and nothing to do with Turkey's EU membership issue.¹⁵

2.2 The EU Copenhagen Summit of 2002 and Reactions of the CHP

The first important step was the Copenhagen European Council Summit which was held during 12 and 13 December 2002. The EU summit was mainly about the enlargement process and this was reflected in the concluding document. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia were announced to have finished the accession negotiations. They would become the EU members starting from 1 May 2004. This was an historic event in the history of the enlargement, since for the first time ten states were accepted to the EU. This enlargement would vastly increase the number of the members, and the population; and expand the borders of the Union. Besides, Bulgaria and Romania were planned to be welcomed as members in 2007. As for Turkey, the Union acknowledged that important steps had been taken by Turkey. However, it was pointed out that Turkey did not

¹¹ Graham Bowley, "Debate Must Continue, European Leaders Say", *International Herald Tribune*, June 2, 2005, "France Votes 'Non'", *International Herald Tribune*, June 1, 2005, Pierre Rousselin, "L'onde de Choc du 29 Mai", *Le Figaro*, June 2, 2005.

¹² "La France est le Premier Pays de l'Union à Rejeter la Constitution Européenne", *Le Monde*, May 30, 2005.

¹³ "Les Néerlandais ont Rejeté Massivement la Constitution Européenne", *Le Monde*, June 2, 2005.

¹⁴ "Many in Turkey Fear Defeat Could Hurt Application for EU Membership", *Reuters*, May 31, 2005.

¹⁵ Marie Jégo, "Ankara Minimise la Portée du Vote Français", *Le Monde*, June 1, 2005.

sufficiently meet its obligations since there were shortcomings in both legislation and implementation. Therefore, the Union found it convenient to start negotiations without delay provided that the European Council would decide that Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria.

The results of the summit brought about a quick curtailment of the harmony in the Turkish political elite. The government continued to act more optimistically while the opposition reacted more critically. The AKP government appeared to be glad with the results. According to the Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gül, Turkey was successful to get the date for accession negotiations, though with some delay.¹⁶ The AKP leader Erdoğan not a deputy at the time suffering from a ban, concurred with his partner that through tough bargaining they managed to get a proper date. He spelled out the word “Elhamdulillah”¹⁷ about the results which explained the AKP’s satisfaction.¹⁸

The Copenhagen summit could be counted as a turning point which enabled the CHP to raise its concerns against the stance of the EU overtly. Technically the CHP officials were in favor of EU membership. However, apparently the party officials did not want to make the impression that they were unconditionally in favor of the membership. It had to be “honorable”. In this respect, the CHP deputies were asked in our survey to define the “Honorable EU membership”. 83 per cent defined it as membership without experiencing a process different from other candidate countries. According to 69 per cent of the deputies, it meant having equal rights with other EU members.¹⁹ Hence, according to a clear majority of the CHP deputies, Turkey’s membership would be honorable provided that Turkey experienced the same candidacy process and had equal rights with other members once admitted.

Accordingly, the summit had not achieved the result the CHP had in mind. Hence, CHP’s first set of criticism was about the EU. The CHP leader Deniz Baykal regretted that the date was not 2003. December 2004 was given to Turkey as the date to

¹⁶ “Abdullah Gül İlk Tepkisinin Ardından Yumuşadı.”, *Milliyet*, December 13, 2002.

¹⁷ Thanks to God.

¹⁸ “Tayyip Erdoğan Kopenhag’ı Değerlendirdi: “Elhamdulillah””, *Milliyet*, December 14, 2002.

¹⁹ See the Appendix, p. 146.

determine the “real” date which would be most probably some time in 2005.²⁰ He criticized that no specific date to start negotiations was formulated but only the term “without delay” was spelled out. Baykal was especially concerned about the two years delay, because in 2005 Turkey would have to face with additional obstacles. The most important was that in year 2005, the number of the EU members would go up from 15 to 25. Since the enlargement decisions were made unanimously, Turkey would have to persuade 25 rather than 15 states. More critically, the Greek Cypriot Administration would enter into the EU as “The Republic of Cyprus”. The Greek Cypriot Administration would be one of the states to decide the fate of Turkey’s candidacy. Therefore, The EU would press on Turkey to deal with the Cyprus issue if it wanted to become a member. This was a double standard according to him, because the EU had not presented any obligation to the Greek Cypriot Administration about settling the issues with Turkey in order to become a member. According to Baykal, this was not acceptable to the European philosophical understanding either: “You can not make Aristotle accept this; you can not make Descartes accept this; you can not make Goethe accept this”, he said.

The first test of both the government and the opposition in terms of the EU membership issue, ended up with a date of two years delay. It also raised the concerns of the CHP and drove the party to the shores of pessimism and dissention. All in all, Turkey had to do additional “homework” given by the Union. Until the EU Council Presidency decision in December 2004, Turkey had to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria and had to get a positive report from the Commission on October 2004.

2.3 Harmonization Process and Reactions of the CHP

The homework was to adjust Turkey to the political and legal standards of the EU. Accordingly, in the two years time the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) discussed and adopted numerous harmonization packages consisting legislative and constitutional reforms. With this motive the GNAT enacted and amended numerous

²⁰ Baykal’s speech in the CHP parliamentary group reunion, December 17, 2002.

amounts of laws, thanks to the joint initiative by both parties in the parliament. These included the Law on the Right to Information, the Law on the abolition of some of the articles of the Law on National Security Council (NSC) and NSC General Secretariat, the Law on Public Financial Management and Control, the Law Amending the Law on Banking, the Law Amending the Law on the Establishment, Duties and Trial Procedures of Juvenile Courts, the 8th Harmonization Package implementing the Constitutional Amendments of May 2004, the amendments to the Law on Public Employees Trade Unions, the Law on Social Insurance, the new Law on Associations, the legislative package Reforming Public Administration, the Law on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts, the new Penal Code and the Law establishing the Intermediate Courts of Appeal.

While the harmonization process was underway, Turkey was faced with a by-election in Siirt on 9 March 2003. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used this chance to become a deputy and four days after the by-election, he became the prime minister of Turkey. The former prime minister, Abdullah Gül's position was shifted to Minister of Foreign Affairs and the vice prime minister.

The harmonization of the penal code and the civil code to the EU standards could be counted as the most striking reforms in the Turkish legal system. Besides, the army's role in the Turkish bureaucracy was one of the main concerns raised by the EU and Turkey took steps to decrease military role in the administrative affairs. For example, number of the civilian members of the National Security Council was increased. A civilian bureaucrat was for the first time appointed as the Council's Secretary General. Moreover, military representatives in civilian bodies such as the High Education Board (YÖK) and the High Audio-Visual Board (RTÜK) were removed.

The harmonization process directed the CHP's criticisms to the government. Especially, the CHP showed its concerns about the Islamic tendencies of the AKP. The governing party was blamed by the opposition for attempting to satisfy its Islamic inclinations under the pretext of harmonizing Turkey with the EU. The CHP leader claimed that some proposals for amendment of the laws were being introduced by the AKP as if they were the obligations dictated by the EU. However, these proposals were

nothing to do with the actual packages.²¹ Baykal gave the example of a proposal foreseeing the opening of small mosques in apartments. He stated that after the CHP's strong reaction, the AKP pulled the proposal out of the package. He claimed that the EU had no demand concerning this proposal and when it was pulled out, the Union had no reaction. Baykal also reacted to the number of the harmonization packages. The sixth package had been introduced and seventh, eighth and ninth would be underway. Therefore, the EU constantly kept giving Turkey a feeling as if it was always incompetent and insufficient. According to Baykal, the only solution was that the AKP would list all the obligations required and the GNAT would discuss and finish all its duties in a single package.

The CHP's claims about the AKP's Islamic tendencies took the scene several times. Baykal strongly criticized what Abdullah Gül had said in the Joint Parliamentary Commission composed of the members of the European Parliament and the members of the GNAT. When a European deputy argued that there was no religious freedom for the minorities in Turkey; Gül replied that even the majority didn't have religious freedom.²² Baykal argued furiously that Gül should not have said this kind of things to a European parliamentarian who was opposed to Turkish membership. Besides, when he complained about his own country to a foreigner, this would make people wonder whom he was working for and who would defend Turkey's rights. On another occasion, Baykal accused Gül for being an informer for the EU, since Gül complained to the EU Commission why they didn't include the headscarf issue in their progress report.²³ Baykal claimed that it was the first time when a foreign affairs minister of Turkey criticized an international body for not criticizing Turkey sufficiently.²⁴ The deputy chairman of the CHP, Onur Öymen, claimed that the AKP sent a message to the EU that there was a power above them even preventing the Muslim majority's religious

²¹ Baykal's speech in the CHP Parliamentary Group reunion, June 3, 2003.

²² Baykal's speech in the CHP Parliamentary Group reunion, July 1, 2003.

²³ "Baykal'dan Gül'e 'İhbarcılık' Suçlaması", *Radikal*, November 13, 2003.

²⁴ Ibid.

freedom.²⁵ Öymen argued that these expressions would degrade the democratic regime and raise doubts about the authority of the GNAT.²⁶ Furthermore, Haluk Koç, the CHP deputy for Samsun argued that these expressions would constitute disrespect to the founders of the secular and democratic Turkey. According to him, there was religious freedom in Turkey but there was no freedom to abuse religion for political purposes.²⁷

The discussions about the AKP's Islamic tendencies intensified with the famous adultery issue in the new Turkish penal code. Adultery used to be a criminal act according to the Turkish penal code until the Constitutional Court repealed it in 1996. While preparing the new penal code, the AKP introduced a proposal for re-criminalizing adultery. The interesting thing was that the CHP didn't oppose this proposal at first. The AKP committee visited Baykal and his aides in the CHP headquarters, and they negotiated the new penal code along with the adultery issue. The AKP's excuse was that they had hundreds of letters from Anatolia urging for adultery to be criminalized.²⁸ Baykal could not say no to the adultery issue but tried to show that this was not their decision but that of the AKP.²⁹

The adultery issue would be introduced to the Parliament in 14 September 2004 within the new penal code which was to be enacted before the EU Commission's critical October 2004 progress report.³⁰ Reactions from the EU came quickly. Günther Verheugen, the commissioner in charge of European enlargement, found the adultery issue as a "very worrying development".³¹ Jack Straw, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of

²⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, April 29, 2003.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Haluk Koç's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, June 16, 2003.

²⁸ "AKP'nin 'Zina' Çıkmazı", *Vatan*, August 31, 2004.

²⁹ Güngör Mengi, "Uçkur Mesaisi", *Vatan*, August 31, 2004.

³⁰ "La Turquie Semble Renoncer à un Projet de Loi Controversé sur l'Adultère", *Le Monde*, September 14, 2004.

³¹ Quoted in Graham Bowley, "EU Turns up Heat on Turkey as Decision Looms", *International Herald Tribune*, September 18, 2004 and also see "Le Ton Monte Entre la Turquie et l'UE Sur la Question de l'Adultère", *Le Monde*, September 17, 2004.

Britain, who was in favor of the Turkish membership argued that adoption of the proposal would create difficulties for Turkey's membership.³²

The Prime Minister Erdoğan perceived these expressions as an interference with the Turkey's internal affairs and said that nobody had the right to do it.³³ He argued that Turks could make their own decisions. He also added that the EU was not indispensable for Turkey.³⁴ Nevertheless, due to the persistent European criticism, the AKP pulled the draft bill back to the Justice Commission along with the penal code made of 343 articles. This action got criticism too. Europeans warned that if the code was not enacted immediately, this would be reflected negatively on the progress report.³⁵ Upon this, the CHP submitted a formal petition urging a plenary session of the GNAT be convened in order to enact the penal code without the adultery arrangement.³⁶ Baykal called in a press conference for a solution of the crisis. He was of an opinion that the withdrawal of the penal code was a grave mistake and because of it, the EU opportunity could be lost.³⁷

The CHP's demand was refused by the AKP government.³⁸ However, reactions of the EU officials proved to be convincing. Erdoğan met with Verheugen in Brussels. After the two leaders talked to each other, the adultery crisis was over. Erdoğan gave up insisting on the adultery amendment and assured Verheugen for a quick enactment of the penal code without accepting adultery as a criminal offense.³⁹ After this compromise, the penal code was enacted in an extraordinary session of the GNAT on 26 September

³² Graham Bowley, "Envoy Rejects Criticism by EU Members : Turkey is Advised to Drop Adultery Law", *International Herald Tribune*, September 14, 2004.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ "Erdoğan'dan Zina Resti", *Cumhuriyet*, September 18, 2004.

³⁵ "Opposition in Turkey Seeks Debate on Reforms", *International Herald Tribune*, September 22, 2004.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ "Baykal: AB Fırsatı Kaçmasın", *Sabah*, September 19, 2004.

³⁸ "AKP'den CHP'nin Olağanüstü Toplantı Çağrısına Ret", *Milliyet*, September 21, 2004.

³⁹ "Erdoğan ile Verheugen Buluştu, Türkiye'nin Önünde Engel Kalmadı", *Milliyet*, September 23, 2004.

2004.⁴⁰ To sum up, the EU forced the AKP to step back and ten days before the progress report was publicly announced, the adultery problem was solved.

The adultery issue was, according to the CHP, a major policy mistake of the AKP endangering Turkish membership. In Baykal's view, this incident strengthened the position of those against Turkish membership. He claimed that these views were reflected in the report in a more echoed way.⁴¹ Baykal asserted that according to the European colleagues, by introducing the adultery issue Turkey shot itself in the foot while everything was well underway. Hence, in his view, the Europeans against Turkey's membership gained ground in the making of the progress report.⁴² However, Baykal did not say anything about why he did not refuse the proposal in the first place but waited for reaction from the EU.

The concerns of the CHP about the Islamic tendencies of the AKP proved to have some ground especially because of the adultery issue. The CHP's second set of criticisms against the AKP came after the release of the EU progress report on Turkey. The AKP was blamed this time for being too optimistic even without analyzing the vital documents.

The EU Commission's progress report was announced on October 6, 2004. This was the most critical report by the Commission, because this was the final step before the EU Presidency's decision for Turkey. As the first statement, Abdullah Gül announced that the EU Commission took an historical step for the future of the Union but it was too soon to say anything about the content of the report.⁴³ However, The Prime Minister Erdoğan's quick comment populated the agenda. He declared that the report was *balanced and positive*. He further stated that the European colleagues congratulated them for undertaking a silent revolution. He announced his expectation to start negotiations in early 2005.⁴⁴ The report was 187 pages long and only couple of

⁴⁰ "AB İçin Fazla Mesai", *Sabah*, September 27, 2004.

⁴¹ Baykal's speech at the CHP Parliamentary Group reunion, October 26, 2004.

⁴² Baykal's speech at the plenary session of the GNAT, December 14, 2004.

⁴³ "Gül: Komisyon Tarihi Bir Adım Attı", *BBC Turkish*, October 6, 2004.

⁴⁴ "Erdoğan: Rapor Dengeli", *BBC Turkish*, October 6, 2004.

hours had passed after its release, so practically it was almost impossible to read and evaluate the report in such a short period of time.

The CHP criticized Erdoğan's hasty comment as another major mistake constituting an obstacle for Turkish membership. According to Baykal, this implied the perception of the AKP which was to accept report without scrutinizing it. Accordingly, he claimed that after this comment Turkey would not be taken seriously while trying to change some parts of the report in its favor.⁴⁵

2.4 The Progress Report of the EU Commission

The progress report of 2004 was composed of three main documents. First part was the progress report (186 pages). Second was the paper on Issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective (52 pages). Final document was the Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession (18 pages). The report welcomed the reforms that had been made by Turkey mostly with the cooperation of both the AKP and the CHP. The commission congratulated Turkey for adopting 261 new laws from October 2003 to July 2004. It was stated that with the adoption of the reform packages, a remarkable improvement was observed in fundamental rights and freedoms. The abolishment of both the death penalty and the State Security Courts were appreciated. According to the report however, the implementation of the reforms was not at a desired level. For example, it was stated that physical and psychological violence against women continued to be at a concerning level along with the continuing "honor killings". Report also claimed that ill-treatment was still widespread, religious freedoms, especially those of the non-Muslims were not provided sufficiently. According to the report, Alevis and Kurds were still not recognized as minorities. It also stated that the corruption continued to be the case in the country, and the military autonomy and influence in civil affairs still existed.

In the economic policy, it was pointed out that Turkey worked hard for reaching a functioning market economy. Important steps had been taken for achieving the

⁴⁵ Op.cit. October 26, 2004.

economic stability since the 2001 crisis. However, implementation was to be seen as it was the case for the political issues.

In foreign policy matters, the report welcomed the efforts taken by Turkey especially for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. That was because Turkey supported the Annan plan favoring a unified island to enter into the Union and for the improvement of the relations with Greece. Moreover, it was stated that Turkey complied with its commitment to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) especially by paying compensation to Ms Loizidou and releasing former deputy Leyla Zana and her friends.

In the second document, the possible future effects of accession of Turkey into the EU in many terms were discussed. Accordingly the report evaluated that the effect of Turkish membership to the EU would be at an enormous level. Given the population size of the country, it was stated that the EU would suffer a considerable amount of economic cost of the accession.

The Recommendation document was the most critical one. First of all the document was in favor of opening the accession negotiations with Turkey. It was suggested that a new report was to be prepared in late 2005 in order to observe the progress of Turkey. This was a good sign for Turkey to get a date in December summit for starting negotiations. On the other hand, in the document there were some expressions which would later be especially considered by the CHP as unacceptable. The first issue was that the negotiation process was stated as an open-ended one which did not have to end in membership. Whatever would happen at the end of the negotiations, it was urged that Turkey was to be deeply anchored into the EU. Secondly, it was pointed out that in some areas, such as structural policies and agriculture, permanent safeguards could be taken. These measures were stated to be taken against the free movement of Turkish workers in the EU in order to avoid serious difficulties in the EU labor market. Thirdly, it was stated that the Union had an absorption capacity for the EU enlargement. So according to the document this would also be a determining factor in terms of the fate of the candidate countries. Finally, in the cases of a permanent breach of rule of law, democracy, and human rights, the Commission would recommend a suspension of the negotiations. Correspondingly, the Council would decide to suspend negotiations with a qualified majority.

2.5 The CHP's Concerns with the Progress Report

While, the report was perceived as the green light for Turkish membership in the EU by the AKP, the CHP's reaction was very negative. Baykal defined the report as promising enough to keep Turkey's hopes alive, but preventive enough not to realize these hopes.⁴⁶ According to the party officials, in the progress report there were unacceptable terms which had never been introduced to any other candidates. First of all, the expression of "an open-ended process" had been put into the report. Besides, the negotiations would be suspended with a qualified majority, while negotiations would start with a unanimity vote. Baykal gave the example of an engagement, in which there was naturally no guarantee for getting married in the end. He argued that if the couple began with saying that they might not be married, then there was already a problem in their affair.⁴⁷

Baykal also argued about permanent safeguards issue stressing that the free movement of labor was a founding principle of the EU project. In his argument, these limitations would drive Turkey into a different path from the EU membership. Şükrü Elekdağ, the CHP Istanbul deputy and retired ambassador, claimed that this attitude of the EU for permanent prevention of Turkish labor seemed to have a racist tendency. He urged that Turkey strongly oppose this term and declare to the EU that she could not accept it.⁴⁸ Onur Öymen, vice chairmen of the CHP asserted that permanent prohibition of Turkish labor movement would mean something short of full membership. He argued that Turkey could not accept such an inferior position.⁴⁹

Another critical issue was about the way the notion of "minority" had been used in the report. Baykal criticized that the EU named some people as minorities although they said that they were part of Turkey and not a minority. He claimed that in Turkey, almost every family was mixed with at least one different ethnic root, since the

⁴⁶ Baykal's speech at the CHP Parliamentary Group Reunion, October 12, 2004.

⁴⁷ Baykal's press conference about the progress report, October 8, 2004.

⁴⁸ Şükrü Elekdağ's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, October 7, 2004.

⁴⁹ Onur Öymen's speech in the EU seminar by the Union of the Turkish Parliamentarians, November 1, 2004.

Ottomans had gathered numerous ethnic groups under one umbrella. Then, he argued that almost everybody in Turkey could demand different identities, which was impossible.⁵⁰ Baykal said that he could understand the concerns of the EU about the rule of law, democracy and human rights but could not understand these attitudes.⁵¹

According to Öymen, terms in the report concerning minorities were against the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty, the founding treaty of the Turkish republic. Moreover, he argued that these people did not accept to be a minority.⁵² Öymen also claimed that the expressions in the report concerning the Cyprus issue and border management problems with Armenia implied the recognition of the “Republic of Cyprus” and of the so called “Armenian genocide”.⁵³ These are two important issues that populated Turkish foreign policy agenda for years. The substance of these problems and the stance of the CHP against them will be discussed in the coming chapters.

The absorption capacity of the EU was another main concern of the CHP. According to Baykal, this meant that even if Turkey would successfully finish the negotiations, the EU could review their position and reject Turkey’s accession to the Union. He asserted that this was against the provisions of the Helsinki Summit. He reminded of the decision of the summit which states that once fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey would become a member to the Union as it had been the case for all other members.⁵⁴ In addition, he pointed out the constitutional amendment in France which would submit the EU enlargement to referendum.⁵⁵ According to Baykal, Turkey would rescue the princess kept as prisoner in a giant’s house which was on the seventh floor of a cave on the highest mountain and get through all the traps to climb down.

⁵⁰ TV Channel Interview with Baykal, *TRT 1*, October 19, 2004.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Öymen, *Op.cit.*, November 1, 2004.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Baykal, *op.cit.*, October 8, 2004.

⁵⁵ 1 March 2005 amendment of The French Constitution, TITLE XV - on the European Communities and the European Union -Art. 88-7. – “Any legislative proposal authorising the ratification of a Treaty pertaining to the accession of a State to the European Union shall be submitted to referendum by the President of the Republic.”

However, at that point the EU would say: let's ask what French people would think.⁵⁶ Onur Öymen argued that this referendum issue was very risky for Turkey's EU bid. He asked why the French had not resorted to this kind of measure for thirty two years. He also asked why the French people did not feel the need to implement such a legislation while accepting the ten countries as members in 2004. He finally asked why they did not extend this referendum issue to Bulgaria and Romania whose accession was spelled out as the year 2007 but to Turkey.⁵⁷

Both these terms in the report and the amendment in the French constitution were not acceptable for the CHP. According to the party leader the provisions in the report inflict double standard on Turkey overshadowing its membership.⁵⁸ Besides, in his argument the Constitutional change in France might be as perilous as the open-ended negotiation process for Turkey.⁵⁹

Finally, the CHP criticized an expression in the issues paper, in which it says:

A key issue in the region is access to *water* for development and irrigation. Water in the Middle East will increasingly become a strategic issue in the years to come, and with Turkey's accession one could expect international management of water resources and infrastructures (dams and irrigation schemes in the Euphrates and Tigris river basins, cross border water cooperation between Israel and its neighbouring countries) to become a major issue for the EU.⁶⁰

The CHP claimed that this expression meant an international management of the Euphrates and Tigris river basins.⁶¹ The AKP on the other hand argued that the CHP was wrong in its interpretation,⁶² and Abdullah Gül argued that these claims were immoral and gave wrong information to people.⁶³

⁵⁶ Baykal, op.cit., October 8, 2004.

⁵⁷ Öymen, op.cit., November 1, 2004.

⁵⁸ Baykal's speech at the CHP Parliamentary Group reunion, October 19, 2004.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Quoted in "Issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective", October 6, 2004.

⁶¹ Baykal's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, December 14, 2004.

⁶² İsmet Berkan, "CHP'nin Çeviri Sorunu", *Radikal*, December 22, 2005.

At the end of the day, the CHP showed its discomfort with the report. The leading figures of the party strongly opposed the attempts by the AKP to show it as a victory for Turkey. According to the party officials, there were many terms unacceptable in the report, with which the Union was determined to implement a process to Turkey different from other candidates. Thus, the CHP insisted that Turkey altogether should read and learn this report and discuss it so that she could fight for her right.

2.6 The EU Presidency Conclusions and Reactions of the CHP

The EU Presidency Conclusions were finalized on 17 December 2004 with a two pages long decision for Turkey.⁶⁴ The Union decided to start negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 along with some articles open to debate. In the article 19, Turkey's willingness to sign a protocol to extend the terms of the Ankara agreement to the ten new members of the Union was appreciated. Although, the recognition of Southern Cyprus as "Cyprus" was not spelled out, Southern Cyprus was one of the ten new members. The article 20 urged for the conflicts between Turkey and the neighboring states to be brought before the International Court of Justice if not resolved yet. In the article 21, it was stated that the resolution adopted by the European Parliament in 15 December 2004 was noted. According to the article 22, provided that Turkey would bring into force the six crucial pieces of legislation, she would have fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. The article 23 stressed that there may be *Long transition periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses* to be applied to Turkey in some areas. The document stated that these areas would include the *freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture* with regard to the impact of these measures *on competition or the functioning of the internal market*. The *maximum role of the member states* would be taken into account for deciding *the eventual establishment of freedom of movement of persons*. The same article introduced

⁶³ Erdal Şafak, "Dicle-Fırat ve AB'nin Talepleri", *Sabah*, October 27, 2005.

⁶⁴ The part for Turkey in the document is comprised of the paragraphs from 17 to 23.

2014 as the earliest date to finish negotiations due to Turkey's economic burden on the EU. The document also included the previously debated expressions such as open-ended process, suspension of the negotiations with qualified majority and anchoring Turkey with the strongest ties.

Once returned to Turkey, Erdoğan was welcomed gloriously. The celebrations had started at the airport where Erdoğan's plane had landed. He was announced as "the world leader" and the airport was echoed with the slogan; "Turkey is proud of you".⁶⁵ Erdoğan's first comment was that they got the full membership.⁶⁶ When he went to Ankara, a bigger festival was waiting for him. Fireworks were fired under the sun. The mood was that as if Turkey already became an EU member.

While there was a festive mood in the AKP, the CHP was again irritated and uncomfortable. After the Copenhagen summit and the progress report, the conclusions in Brussels was the third and maybe the most critical development for Turkey. Accordingly, dissatisfied with the result, CHP officials further raised their voices. Baykal seemed disappointed to see the concluding document full of unacceptable terms for Turkey.⁶⁷ He criticized again the terms, *open-ended process* and *permanent safeguards*. According to him, the recognition of "Cyprus" was implied, and he reminded of the words of Silvio Berlusconi saying that Erdoğan had promised him to recognize the Southern part as Cyprus. He claimed that accepting the decision, Turkey also accepted to recognize Cyprus until 3 October 2005. He also regretted that the referendum in France would be a determining factor even if Turkey got through all the difficulties and 51% of votes saying "NON" to Turkey would prevent Turkish membership. However he argued that an artificial celebration was created with fireworks under the sun making people think that Turkey already became an EU member. Nevertheless he claimed that nobody had explained to Turks about what to celebrate and no official translation had yet been made.⁶⁸ Baykal asserted that the EU defined for the

⁶⁵ "Erdoğan: Hedef Tam Üyelikti, Onu da Aldık...", *Milliyet*, December 18, 2004.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ Baykal's press conference in December 17, 2004.

⁶⁸ Baykal's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, December 20, 2004.

first time a new type of membership special for Turkey, which would be against the concept of the European Union.⁶⁹ He asserted that getting a date was not something to celebrate, because in 1999 Turkey had been promised for it. His concern was that with the above conditions the EU would not take Turkey to the road of full membership. Baykal reminded of the words of Göran Persson, the prime minister of Sweden that if they had been in the place of Turks, they would not have accepted these unfair terms. He claimed that Sweden wanted to support Turkey, but since Turkey accepted these terms, there was nothing for Sweden to do. He also mentioned about Erdoğan's attitude in the morning of 17 December. Erdoğan had decided to return to Turkey since he could not accept those terms for Turkey. Baykal asked what changed his decision which made him stay and accept all the terms.

These criticisms seemed to draw attention since on 23 December 2004, the Turkish permanent delegation to the EU issued a diplomatic note to the European Council Presidency. The note stated that the terms about the permanent safeguards in the fields of free movement of labor, agriculture and structural policies could not be accepted since those terms were against the foundations of the EU. This move was not effective practically on the EU but got further criticism from the opposition. Haluk Koç, the CHP Deputy for Samsun argued that this note was issued to the Prime Minister Erdoğan rather than the EU, because of his hasty comments without waiting for the Turkish officials to read and work on the documents.⁷⁰

2.7 Additional Protocol and the Declaration Issue

On July 29, 2005, the Turkish government signed the additional protocol extending the Ankara agreement of 1963 to the newest ten members of the Union, fulfilling the last obligation before October 3. The Southern Cyprus was one of the ten countries and with the signature of the protocol that Turkey had pledged to extend its commitments to. As a way out of this problem, Turkey issued a declaration to the Union announcing that it did

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Haluk Koç's press conference in December 26, 2005.

not recognize the Southern Cyprus as the republic of Cyprus.⁷¹ It declared that the said authority only represented the southern part of the island, thus had no authority on the Turkish Cypriots. Turkey's willingness to form relationship with the said state would emerge only after a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue.

The EU's response came with a counter declaration on 21 September 2005. The EU regretted that Turkey had issued a declaration for Cyprus and stated that it had no legal effect on the responsibilities of Turkey arising from the protocol. The Union emphasized that Turkey had to fulfill all its obligations arising from the protocol. Any failure to fulfill those obligations, particularly the failure to open the ports and the airspace to those states, would affect the fate of the accession negotiations. The Union stressed that it was crucial to recognize Cyprus, a member of the EU, thus urged for the normalization of the relations between Turkey and Cyprus as soon as possible.⁷²

Dominique de Villepin, French Prime Minister was of the opinion that Turkey must recognize Cyprus, an EU member, if it wanted to start the accession negotiations.⁷³ He also pointed out that it was also up to the French people whether to accept Turkey as a member or not since the referendum in France would determine the outcome of the Turkish venture to join the Union. The issuance of the Union's counter declaration to Turkey satisfied Villepin's demands.⁷⁴

The CHP officials blamed the AKP government for already promising to sign the protocol which would one day create problems about the Cyprus issue. They argued that the government did not listen to their calls for withdrawing from signing it and now they had the trouble. According to Onur Öymen, the AKP government even did not know how to act in accordance with the norms of International Law. He asserted that while signing treaties, parties had a right to put reservations on certain subjects which were not

⁷¹ "AB'yle İşlem Tamam", *Radikal*, July 30, 2005.

⁷² Graham Bowley, "EU Agrees on Key Point for Turkey", *International Herald Tribune*, September 21, 2005.

⁷³ "Turkey Affirms Anti-Cyprus Stance for EU Talks", *Reuters, Agence France-Presse*, August 3, 2005.

⁷⁴ Graham Bowley, "A Standoff Threatens EU-Turkey Negotiation", *International Herald Tribune*, September 30, 2005.

compatible with their interests. Hence, in his view the government should have done the same concerning the Cyprus issue. According to his argument, issuing a declaration had no legal binding. Seeing the developments, this argument proved to be practically true.

2.8 Negotiating Framework Document to Open the Negotiations and the Reactions of the CHP

Approaching the promised date, the dissenting voices within the Union against Turkey's membership were further raised. Austria insisted on a privileged partnership perspective to be given to Turkey. Moreover, Wolfgang Schüssel, Austrian Chancellor demanded the term "absorption capacity" to be put into the document. This expression would provide a proper excuse for ones who believe that the EU is not ready to grant Turkey membership.⁷⁵ Therefore if Turkey could not finish negotiations with the EU, she would be motivated with privileged partnership. Even if she finished them, the absorption capacity mechanism of the EU to tolerate the accession of Turkey would be activated. The EU countries were concerned that Austria's insistence could provoke Turkey to marginalize herself withdrawing her more than forty years of membership quest.⁷⁶

On October 3, 2005 the EU states made Austria withdraw its dissention and agreed upon starting negotiations with Turkey. Jack Straw, the British Foreign Minister, happily declared that they made history.⁷⁷ The Union issued a negotiating framework determining the ultimate details of the negotiation process. The framework document included almost all the conditions that had been previously debated. Technically, the document laid out 35 chapters of the negotiations and there would be shift from one chapter to another before finishing the former and the Council would decide with unanimity to close one chapter in order to open another. Finally, only with the overall

⁷⁵ Goulard, p.139.

⁷⁶ Graham Bowley, "Austria Demands Turkey's Sights be Lowered in Talks on EU Participation", *International Herald Tribune*, September 29, 2005.

⁷⁷ Graham Bowley, "News Analysis: For Turkey, Journey to EU is Just Starting", *International Herald Tribune*, October 5, 2005.

evaluation and decision to close all the chapters, the decision to close each chapter would be final, therefore, the decisions for each chapter could be revised and updated before the overall agreement of all the chapters.

CHP was again unhappy with the results. Baykal stated that there was no reason for him to be pleased because of the adopted document.⁷⁸ He began with criticizing that there was no information provided them about the draft documents and the government's stance.⁷⁹ Baykal blamed the government of inflicting *fait accompli* to Turkish people about one of the most critical issues for their future. About the framework document, Baykal argued that it was much worse than the December presidency conclusions.⁸⁰ In his view, all the debated expressions stood their ground along with more unacceptable conditions. He argued that even if there was no expression like privileged partnership, there was no need to write it down either. According to him, with all the expressions ranging from open-ended process to permanent safeguards, a perspective other than membership was already stationed in the document.

The Cyprus issue was another source of his criticism. He criticized that the Government's declaration went nowhere since it was not taken seriously by the EU. Instead, the EU issued a counter declaration implying that Turkey had to recognize Greek Cypriots as Cyprus. This meant that the recognition of Cyprus was put forward by the EU as a precondition to fulfill before accession. Moreover, Baykal argued that, according to the document, Turkey could not use its right to veto Cyprus' membership to NATO. According to the seventh article, Turkey should act in line with the Union's policies concerning relations with other organizations, especially the membership of the EU members to these organizations. Baykal furiously furthered that in the Helsinki Summit, the EU had pledged not to put forward the Cyprus issue as a precondition for Turkey. However, in his view they withdrew from their word.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Fikret Bila, "Baykal: Şimdi de Müzakere Basını", *Milliyet*, October 8, 2005.

⁷⁹ Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary group reunion, October 4, 2005.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

In the article 10 of the negotiating framework, the *acquis* that would be implemented by Turkey upon the accession were outlined. The part Baykal criticized was the implementation of acts within the framework of the EU no matter if they were legally binding or not. These acts were written down as *interinstitutional agreements, resolutions, statements, recommendations, guidelines*. Baykal claimed that with these expressions Turkey would be forced to be bound by the resolutions and recommendations of the European Parliament which were not legally binding. All in all, according to his argument, the EU was trying to make Turkey an eternal candidate.⁸² For the EU, he claimed, the best Turkey was the candidate Turkey.⁸³ Baykal warned that the governments come and go, but Turkey would continue to negotiate with the EU. Hence, even if the EU could make the AKP government accept the negotiating framework, the Europeans must know that tomorrow the AKP would be gone and Turkish nation would not let this process end with something inferior to full membership.⁸⁴

According to Onur Öymen, the AKP tried to handle the EU process alone.⁸⁵ He claimed that all member states had brought the membership issue into their parliaments. Accordingly, both opposition and the governing parties discussed and came up with a joint decision for the fate of their countries, he claimed. However, according to Öymen, the AKP government bypassed the parliament while making decisions. Öymen also pointed out that the AKP pleased the European counterparts who were against Turkish membership by accepting the framework document. He emphasized that Wolfgang Schüssel of Austria declared to be proud of putting the expression “absorption capacity” into the document.⁸⁶

The article 11 of the document urged Turkey as a member state to terminate all its bilateral or multilateral agreements that were *incompatible with the obligations of*

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Onur Öymen’s speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, October 5, 2005.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

membership. Öymen claimed that London and Zurich treaties which had established the Republic of Cyprus in 1960 would be treated in accordance with this article. He also asked whether the Lausanne Treaty, the founding document of Turkish Republic fell within the scope of this article, since some provisions of the Lausanne Treaty had been criticized in the progress report.⁸⁷

Öymen's last concern was about the expression in the October 2004 paper on issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective. He claimed that the document foresaw an international management of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. He argued that Abdullah Gül had found this report as an internal matter of the EU, which would not be Turkey's concern. However, in the article 3 of the framework document, this paper would be entirely utilized while monitoring the absorption capacity of the Union.⁸⁸

The CHP's strong opposition to the negotiating framework however, could not hide different views in the party. To begin with, six CHP deputies, including İnal Batu, a former ambassador, claimed that the decision of the EU to start accession negotiations provided Turkey with more credibility.⁸⁹ Moreover, Zeynep Damla Gürel, CHP deputy for Istanbul, wrote an article in *Radikal*, a Turkish national newspaper. She argued that the terms of the framework document were not perfectly in conformity with Turkey's desires. Yet in her view there was the fact that Turkey became in a position to start accession negotiations with the EU after forty two years of struggle. She claimed that Turkey reached the most important crossroads in her history. According to her, this would be a great opportunity to reverse the biases of the European nations about Turkey.⁹⁰ After the article was published, Gürel asserted that many people in the party called and congratulated her sharing her views.⁹¹ Deniz Baykal's reaction was cautious. He appreciated that there were different views in the party and many people in Turkey

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ "CHP'de 'Sevinen' Altı Milletvekili", *Milliyet*, October 11, 2005.

⁹⁰ Zeynep Damla Gürel, "3 Ekim'in Tarihi Önemi", *Radikal*, October 12, 2005.

⁹¹ "Atacaksa Atsın", *Hürriyet*, October 14, 2005.

thought positively about the issue. According to Baykal, however, they were wrong in their optimism and Gürel was wrong too.⁹²

2.9 Conclusion

At the end of the day, Turkey started the accession negotiations with the EU. This was Turkey's aim for more than forty years. However, the years ahead will be quite difficult for Turkey. First, there are 35 chapters to negotiate with the EU. Moreover, the European Union is quite confused about Turkey. When Turkey signed the Ankara agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963, Walter Hallstein, the president of the commission of the epoch had announced that Turkey was European and one day, she would become a member of the Community.⁹³ Today, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, the president of the European Convention and former president of France publicly states that Turkey is not European and her entry will be the end of the Union.⁹⁴ What's more, the leading figures in European political arena who oppose Turkish membership, like Angela Merkel of Germany and Nicolas Sarkozy of France, are on the rise.⁹⁵

Inside Turkey, the AKP government most probably showed the most passionate eagerness for EU membership and acted in order to get a proper date for starting negotiations. However, most probably due to lack of experience in foreign policy, the government faced with inappropriate situations. For instance, comments by Premier Erdoğan on the EU documents later faced with official corrections. Moreover, issuing declaration rather than putting reservation on the additional protocol did nothing to justify Turkey's stance against Cyprus issue. Conversely, the EU urged Turkey to extend customs obligations to "Republic of Cyprus".

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Goulard, p.27.

⁹⁴ "Europe : pour ou contre la Turquie", *Le Monde*, November 9, 2002.

⁹⁵ Dan Bilefsky, "EU talks on Turkey Threatened by Disputes", *International Herald Tribune*, September 29, 2005.

The main opposition party, CHP, though in favor of integrating with the EU, is uncomfortable with deeds and aims of both the EU and the AKP. Accordingly, the party officials pursue a hard-line policy on the EU membership issue. In this respect, the CHP firstly criticizes the mentality of the EU. According to the CHP, defending the national interests of Turkey is in line with the spirit of the EU.⁹⁶ However, according to the party officials, double standard attitude of the EU towards Turkey is not in line with its spirit.⁹⁷ In their view, expressions in the core documents like “open-ended process” and constitutional amendment in France to go to referendum show the intention of the EU countries not to accept Turkish membership. Moreover, according to the CHP, *permanent safeguard clauses on the freedom of movement of persons, structural policies or agriculture* will make Turkey something short of full member. Consequently, these concerns cause the CHP officials to act in a more conservative way.

Secondly, the CHP criticizes the mentality of the AKP. The party officials accuse the AKP government for giving major concessions for the sake of EU membership. Behind this, they believe that the AKP has a hidden agenda formed by its Islamic tendencies. The CHP, oldest political establishment in the history of the Turkish republic, sees itself as one of the main protectors of secularism in Turkey. The leading figures of the party are concerned that the AKP uses the EU card in order to move Turkey from secularism to Islamism. The adultery issue coupled with some other proposals within the harmonization packages seem to give some credit to this claim. Besides, statements of the Prime Minister Erdoğan on a couple of issues cause one to have further doubts. Fore instance, On November 10, 2005 the Grand Chamber of the ECHR made its final judgment on the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey that Islamic headscarf ban at Turkish universities was not against human rights.⁹⁸ Erdoğan advanced critical comments on the decision, while on a visit in Denmark. He claimed that courts had no right to issue judgments about the religious beliefs of people. It was the *Ulema*⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Şükrü Elekdağ’s speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, July 1, 2003.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ See the case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, (Application no. 44774/98), November 10, 2005.

⁹⁹ Muslim Scholars

who had a right to decide.¹⁰⁰ A month later Erdoğan stated, this time on a visit in New Zealand, that Islam was the supra-identity of Turkey, binding all the people under one umbrella.¹⁰¹ These expressions were strongly criticized as having anti-secular tendencies not only by the opposition in Turkey¹⁰² but also abroad notably in the US.¹⁰³

To sum up, there were two main determinants behind the CHP's hardship on the EU – Turkey relations. First, the party officials believed that the EU inflicted a double standard attitude upon Turkey concerning Turkey's membership process. From the speeches of the leading figures of the party it could be understood that the CHP was convinced that the EU was unwilling to accept Turkey's membership. In their argument, in all the documents ranging from the progress report to negotiating framework document the EU put forward unacceptable provisions for Turkey which had never been the case for previous candidates. The CHP's tone was further hardened with an over-intent AKP government for EU membership. In this respect, the CHP claimed that the AKP government sought to satisfy its Islamic tendencies linking them to the EU membership process. Hence, the CHP pursues a hard-line policy concerning the EU membership issue. Still these criticisms do not change the CHP's willingness for the EU membership. As the results of our survey show, the CHP deputies are in favor of Turkey's EU membership with an overwhelming majority. Moreover, they are also more or less optimistic concerning Turkey's possibility to become an EU member. 52 per cent of the deputies think that Turkey will probably become a member and 13 per cent

¹⁰⁰ “The AKP Government's Attempts to Move Turkey from Secularism to Islamism (Part II): Defying European Human Rights Court Decision on Headscarf Ban; PM Erdoğan: ‘Ulema, Not Courts, Have Right to Speak on Headscarf’”, Special Dispatch Series - No. 1048, *Middle East Media Research Institute*, December 13, 2005.

¹⁰¹ “The AKP Government's Attempts to move Turkey from Secularism to Islamism (Part III): PM Erdoğan: Islam is Turkey's Supra-Identity”, Special Dispatch Series - No. 1086, *Middle East Media Research Institute*, February 7, 2006.

¹⁰² “Ulema' Sözü Muhalefeti Ayağa Kaldırdı”, *Radikal*, November 17, 2005.

¹⁰³ See Frank J. Gaffney Jr., “No' to Islamist Turkey”, *The Washington Times*, September 27, 2005., “Neo-cons Take on Erdoğan”, *Turkish Daily News*, May 23, 2005., and Barak A. Salamoni, “Turkey's Summer 2003 Legislative Reforms: EU Avalanche, Civil-Military Revolution, or Islamist Assertion?”, *Strategic Insights*, Volume 2, Issue 9, September 2003.

believe that Turkey will definitely become a member. While the positive views amount to 65 per cent, ones who are pessimistic equal to 32 per cent.¹⁰⁴

In the next chapter, I will discuss the Cyprus problem along with the major developments starting from late 2002 to early 2006. Linkage of the Cyprus problem with Turkey's EU bid will be on focus along with the UN (Annan) plan of 2004 and the referenda. Eagerness of the AKP for solution and even more hardened stance of the CHP will be detailed at some length.

¹⁰⁴ See the Appendix, p. 143.

CHAPTER III

THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Cyprus is an island of conflict. Surviving under the yoke of various rules throughout its history, the island was finally able to form a republic in 1960 under the joint rule of Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks. However, the eruption of violence between the two ethnic communities alerted the island again. Turkey as a guarantor state intervened in 1974 in order to protect the lives of Turkish Cypriots. Concomitantly, the establishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983 changed the island's administrative shape and brought a new dimension to the conflict. Since 1964, it is the Southern part which is recognized by international society as the Republic of Cyprus representing the whole island. The TRNC is only recognized by Turkey, which is viewed by the international community as an invading force occupying the northern part with its troops amounting to 30.000.

While the European Union (EU) membership process of Turkey took a new shape during 2002 and 2005, the existing Cyprus issue took a new shape too, this time very much linked to the EU. Long considered under the auspices of the United Nations, the Cyprus issue moved onto the coast of the EU when the Greek Cypriot administration applied for the EU membership with the Greek backing. The Greek Cypriot application carried the aim of solving the issue in their favor within the EU.¹ On the one hand, the EU membership would reinforce the political legitimacy of the Greek Cypriots as “the Republic of Cyprus”. On the other hand, it would provide a security umbrella against a possible Turkish aggression.² Once “Cyprus” became a member, Turkey would be

¹ Clement Dodd, *Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A Briefing*, (Huntingdon : Eothen Press, 2002) p.54.

² *Ibid.*, p.40.

considered to be occupying the territories of the EU.³ This would create trouble for Turkey's EU membership. In the EU, the motivation for the Cypriot membership was different. The EU thought that the membership perspective of "Cyprus" would play a "catalyst" role for finding a solution to the ongoing issue on the island.⁴

In the Copenhagen Summit of 2002, "Cyprus" was announced to be one of the ten states to be granted membership in the near future. It was stated that in the case of a failure to unite the island, the southern part would accede as "the Republic of Cyprus" representing the whole island. This option had a potential to greatly inhibit a solution to the problem.⁵ During this process, a United Nations (UN) sponsored initiative known by the name of the Secretary General as "Annan Plan" was introduced to the parties. It foresaw a federal Cyprus composed of two components; north and south. Amended five times, the plan was put into referenda by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Voted by the two sides a week before "the Republic of Cyprus" would accede to the EU, the plan was adopted by the Turkish Cypriots, while rejected by the Greek Cypriots. Albeit the EU officials felt deceived by the Greek Cypriots, the EU granted membership to "the Republic of Cyprus" solely composed of the Greek Cypriots. Putting the Turkish Cypriots outside the Union, the EU catalyst project became successful in only further dividing the island. Furthermore, Turkey was forced to recognize "the Republic of Cyprus", an EU member, in order to continue with the accession negotiations. Coming to the end of 2005, no promise was kept by the EU in terms of lifting the embargo from the Northern Cyprus and granting it 259 millions Euros. The Turkish Foreign Ministry declared to open the ports for the Greek Cypriots only in the case of a removal of the embargo inflicted upon the North. However this initiative could not create the desired impact. At the end of the day, the South entered into the EU as planned, and the North remained isolated. Although there were some positive developments such as the direct flights to the North from Azerbaijan and the visit of the US Congressmen to the TRNC, they were yet futile to get rid of the isolation.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid., p.41.

⁵ Nathalie Tocci, "Cyprus and Turkey: Europe's Historic Opportunity – Part I. Cyprus", *Centre for European Policy Studies*, January 2005.

In terms of domestic politics in Turkey, the country saw a dramatic shift from its Cyprus policy of forty years. Since 1974, Turkey's Cyprus policy had remained stable in the sense that both governments and opposition parties of Turkey favored the idea that Cyprus was composed of two states, giving full support to the TRNC. When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, this policy began to change. R. Tayyip Erdoğan, the party leader and the then Prime Minister of Turkey emphasized his party's eagerness to solve the problem. On November 21, 2002, in Ireland, he announced that they were not going to be *hawks* in Turkey's Cyprus policy.⁶ Two days later, while presenting its program, the AKP government announced its determination to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.⁷ Erdoğan's famous expression, "no solution is not a solution" became the rhetoric of the party's Cyprus policy.⁸ Furthermore, the Foreign Minister, Yaşar Yakış pointed out, while speaking to the parliament, that they were ready to give concessions in the Cyprus issue on behalf of Turkey's EU bid.⁹ All these developments indicated one main point: Turkey's stance on Cyprus was radically changed by the new government. It was only one year ago that İsmail Cem, Turkish Foreign Minister of the time had emphasized the importance of the TRNC's survival and well-being refusing any solution dissolving it.¹⁰ Erdoğan, however, construed this stance as no solution. After coming to power he strongly supported the Annan plan as the main asset for solution. Whether good or bad for both Turkey and the Northern Cyprus, it was evident that Cyprus was on the brink of a turning point.

Raising its voice loudly in the EU process, the main opposition party of Turkey, Republican People's Party (CHP) reiterated its policy of *the tough man* concerning the Cyprus issue. The party's critics were mainly focused on three main pillars. First of all the party was strongly against any possibility of linking the Cyprus issue to Turkey's EU

⁶ "Erdoğan: Şahinlik Sonuç Vermez", *Hürriyet*, November 21, 2002.

⁷ TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 2nd term, Vol.1, Legislative year.1.

⁸ Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, "Uniting Cyprus: A Settlement That Needs a Final Push", *International Herald Tribune*, February 3, 2004.

⁹ Yakış's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, November 19, 2002.

¹⁰ İsmail Cem, "Turkey's Cyprus Policy", *Kıbrıs, Northern Cyprus Monthly*, November 2001 as appendix 6 in Dodd, 2002, p.96-97.

membership process. According to the December 2002 summit, “the Republic of Cyprus” would accede to the Union even if there would be no solution. According to Deniz Baykal, the CHP leader, the membership of the Southern part was in contravention with the main documents of the EU. In his view, it was also in breach of the London and Zurich Treaties on Cyprus and the Cyprus Constitution.¹¹ The EU membership would be quite costly to Turkey according to the CHP since the EU would force Turkey to recognize “the Republic of Cyprus” if it would like to become a member.¹²

The second pillar was the Annan plan. It was too unacceptable for the CHP. Baykal claimed that the plan had many difficult provisions for both the Northern Cyprus and Turkey. However, in his view, most importantly the said plan foresaw the dissolution of the existing bi-zonality on the island. According to his analysis, thousands of Greek Cypriots would be settled in the North and thousands of Turkish people would be sent to the motherland. Since 1974, the island has two separate zones occupied by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. In Baykal’s view the existence of these homogeneous zones enabled the island to preserve peace and stability. According to him, the Annan plan, if accepted, would spoil this peaceful situation and bring back the conditions before 1974.¹³

The CHP’s third pillar of criticism was the AKP government and its Cyprus policy. Firstly, according to the CHP officials, the government did not inform them and share their views about the issue, but chose to go the path alone. Secondly, in CHP’s view, the AKP focused too much on the EU membership issue. Therefore, for its sake, the AKP was ready to give concession on the Cyprus issue even standing against Rauf Denktaş, the President of the TRNC at the time.¹⁴ All in all, the CHP blamed the AKP of

¹¹ Baykal’s speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, April 15, 2003

¹² Baykal’s speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, December 17, 2002.

¹³ Baykal’s speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, January 7, 2003.

¹⁴ Baykal’s speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, January 28, 2003.

giving up the forty years of established foreign policy of Turkey. In CHP's view, during this term national identity and pride were undermined by the government.¹⁵

In this study, the period starting from the aftermath of the parliamentary elections in Turkey in 2002, until the first months of the year 2006 concerning the developments in Cyprus problem will be addressed. Moreover, I will focus on the reactions and analyses of the main opposition party of Turkey, the CHP with reference to its three main pillars of criticism. In the last part, I will try to deal with the actual reason behind the tough stance of the CHP on the Cyprus issue.

3.1 Europeanization of the Problem

What made the Cyprus problem revive during this period was the finalization of the establishment of the link between Turkey's EU aspirations and the Cyprus issue. The application of "the Republic of Cyprus" to the EU in 1990 could be regarded as the starting point of this link. In the 1999 Helsinki Summit, it was declared that "Cyprus" achieved a considerable progress for accession. It was emphasized that although the settlement of the existing problem would facilitate the membership of "Cyprus", it would not constitute a precondition for accession.¹⁶ The Southern Cyprus had been given a clear opportunity to enter the EU even without having to solve the existing problem. Nevertheless, the UN worked for a solution which would enable the Cypriots to join the EU unified.

On November 11, 2002, United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan came up with a comprehensive peace plan for Cyprus. The Annan plan envisaged a federation composed of two constituent parts. The interesting point was that the plan was announced to be adopted by the concerned parties until the Copenhagen Summit of the European Council on December 12 and 13, 2002. This automatically linked the UN peace mediation with the EU's emerging Cyprus policy. However, the timing of this

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ See paragraph 9 (b) of the Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 10 and 11, 1999.

move by the UN Secretary General was criticized. Because, Rauf Denktaş, the Turkish Cypriot leader, was just recovering from a heart surgery, therefore was unlikely to attend the Summit. Furthermore, in Turkey, following the elections the new government was not formed yet and the parliament started functioning only after November 14.¹⁷

In the Summit, the EU Presidency accepted “the Republic of Cyprus” to accede to the Union with or without a solution to the ongoing conflict. Nevertheless, the Presidency urged for a political settlement of the issue under the auspices of UNSG until February 28, 2003. In the case of a non-settlement it was stated that the application of the *acquis* would be suspended to the Northern part. This would definitely enable the Greek Cypriots to enjoy being inside the European Community gaining legal and political leverage without having to find a solution to the conflict.

3.2 The EU-Cyprus Link

The first pillar of CHP’s concerns was the link established by the EU between the Cyprus issue and Turkey’s membership. The CHP claimed that the Greek Cypriot administration, as an EU member would be one of the states to decide the fate of Turkey’s EU candidacy. In legal terms, according to Baykal, the membership of the Southern part alone was in contravention of the main documents of the EU. In his view, it was also in breach of the London and Zurich Treaties and the Cyprus Constitution.¹⁸

For the effects of the Cypriot membership to Turkey, the CHP claimed that the EU would pressurize Turkey to deal with the Cyprus issue. According to the party officials, eventually, the EU would force Turkey to recognize the South if it wanted to become a member. This was a double standard according to CHP. Because the EU had not presented any obligation to the Greek Cypriot administration about settling the issues with Turkey in order to become a member. According to Baykal, this was not acceptable to the European philosophical understanding either: “You can not make

¹⁷ Bilal Şimşir, *AB, AKP ve Kıbrıs*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2003), p.59.

¹⁸ Baykal’s speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, April 15, 2003

Aristotle accept this; you can not make Descartes accept this; you can not make Goethe accept this”, he said.¹⁹

Moreover, as the results of the survey conducted for this study indicate, the CHP deputies believe that the Greek Cypriot membership will cost Turkey one way or another. Precisely, 53 per cent of the CHP deputies believe that the EU membership of the “Republic of Cyprus” will hamper the solution of the Cyprus problem. They also believe that it will inhibit the EU membership of Turkey. Since in their view, the EU will become a party to the problem and will endorse the Greek Cypriot position. On the other hand, 16 per cent believe that Turkey will recognize the “Republic of Cyprus” in order to become an EU member. They also acknowledge that Turkey will dismiss the TRNC and relegate Turkish Cypriots to minority. Only 14 per cent of the deputies seem to be optimistic. They say that this will lead to de facto recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the problem will have been solved. Accordingly, in their view, the Cyprus impediment to Turkey’s accession to the EU will be overcome. Hence, most of the CHP deputies are pessimistically of the opinion that the membership of the “Republic of Cyprus” will either hamper the solution of the Cyprus problem or Turkey’s membership. Only 14 per cent seem to believe that this will provide chances for Turkey to solve the both problems.²⁰

The CHP was also furious with the AKP government because the CHP asserted that with their speeches and deeds the AKP officials contributed to the link. For example, speaking on a TV program, Yaşar Yakış, the Minister of Foreign Affairs underlined the importance of the date February 28 as a deadline for the fulfillment of the hopes for a settlement. If no solution could be gathered till then, he claimed that there was the danger that the EU would try to show Turkish Armed Forces deployed there as invaders.²¹ Baykal furiously attacked Yakış by asking how he dared to say that the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) could be viewed as invaders. In Baykal’s view, Yakış should be the last person to say this kind of things even foreigners could not dare to say.

¹⁹ Baykal’s speech in the CHP parliamentary group reunion, December 17, 2002.

²⁰ See the Appendix, p.149.

²¹ “28 Şubat’ta Anlaşma Olur”, *Milliyet*, December 16, 2002.

This stormy day was seen by the Turkish media as the curtailment of the honeymoon between the government and the opposition.²² One could clearly see that the CHP started to harden its tone against the government on the Cyprus issue as early as 2002.

3.3 The Annan Plan

Upon its presentation on November 11, 2002, the Annan plan went through changes five times in accordance with the concerns of the parties. Inspired by previous UN proposals,²³ the said plan could be counted as the most comprehensive proposal for solving the Cyprus issue formulating a federal Cyprus composed of two constituent states of equal status. Acknowledging the long-lasting divide between the two communities, there would be clear-cut territories and borders between the two states.²⁴ The Plan favored the application of the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance, the founding documents of the Cypriot Republic. These treaties would apply “*mutatis mutandis* to the new state of affairs”.²⁵ Setting out March 1, 2004 as the accession date of Cyprus to the EU, the plan also urged for the would-be Cypriot state to bolster Turkey for EU membership.²⁶ The United Cyprus Republic would have a Constitution enshrining *the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bi-zonality, and the equal status of the constituent states*.²⁷ The legislative body of the United Cyprus Republic would be named as the Federal Parliament consisting two chambers notably the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.²⁸ Each chamber would have forty eight

²² “Baykal – Yakış Düellosu”, *Radikal*, December 12, 2002.

²³ *Amanda Akçakoca*, “Cyprus – Looking To A Future Beyond The Past”, *European Policy Center*, Issue Paper No. 32, May 12, 2005.

²⁴ Ahmet Sözen, “A Model of Power-Sharing In Cyprus: From The 1959 London-Zurich Agreements To The Annan Plan”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 2004, p.71.

²⁵ Art. 1.3 of *The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*, March 31, 2004.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Quoted in art. 2.1.a of *ibid.*

²⁸ Art. 5.1 of *ibid.*

members. The seats of the Senate would be distributed equally whilst those of the latter would depend on the proportionality of the two states' citizens. However, the plan guaranteed at least a quarter of the seats for each state.²⁹ The executive powers would be vested in the Presidential Council. It would be composed of six voting members and additional non-voting members nominated by the Senate and ratified by Chamber of Deputies. The proportionality was also applied for the Council members and minimum representation number of both sides was given as one third of the all members.³⁰ The president and the two vice presidents (one for each constituent state) would be elected by the legislative chambers for five years.

For the security concerns of the island, demilitarization would be the main principle. Accordingly, the number of guarantor forces on both sides would be diminished to 6000 in all ranks until 2011 and 3000 until 2018 or when Turkey got the membership. Then the numbers would not exceed 950 in the Greek forces and 650 in the Turkish.³¹ Moreover, all the Cypriot conscripts would be dissolved along with a comprehensive prohibition of weapons except for ones used for sports.³² In order to provide a control mechanism, a monitoring committee composed of all concerning parties would be established.³³

The total amount of territories settled by the Turkish Cypriots would decrease from 36 per cent to 29 per cent with the implementation of the plan. Moreover, the property issue would be dealt in accordance with international law considering the rights of dispossessed people in the island. Full compensation would be granted to these people either turning them back their properties or paying the costs.³⁴ Therefore, the territorial and property adjustments would make some thousand Greek Cypriot people settle in the

²⁹ Art. 5.1.a of *ibid.*

³⁰ Art. 5.2.a of *ibid.*

³¹ Art. 8.1.b.i.ii.iii of *ibid.*

³² Art. 8.2 of *ibid.*

³³ Art. 8.1.f of *ibid.*

³⁴ Art.10 of *ibid.*

North, while especially for the new citizenship regulations some thousand Turkish citizens would leave the North for good.

Kofi Annan backed his plan strongly urging for the parties to adopt it as soon as possible. He saw the plan as *a chance for Cyprus to be transformed from a seemingly insoluble international problem to a beacon of international hope*.³⁵ According to Annan, the EU membership of a united Cyprus would be the main instrument of establishing peace on the island. He claimed that it would also make it easier for Turkey to join the EU achieving the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece.³⁶ He also warned that if a divided Cyprus joined the Union, the division would be more accurate. In his view, this would also deteriorate the fate of both Greece-Turkey relations and Turkey's EU membership.³⁷

In Turkey, the AKP government adopted the plan as the main document for negotiation and a basis for a solution. The AKP leader Erdoğan started with declaring that non-solution was not a solution. He reflected his party's aim of working for a fair solution especially in terms of Turkish Cypriots.³⁸ According to Erdoğan the policies on Cyprus pursued by Turkey for forty years were wrong.³⁹ Blaming Denktaş for the non-solution, Erdoğan argued that Cyprus problem was not the personal issue of Denktaş.⁴⁰ Moreover, the government published a document analyzing and embracing the Annan plan. This document reflected the government's views upon the plan.⁴¹ Mostly explaining the advantages for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, the document emphasized

³⁵ Quoted in Kofi Annan, "My Plan for Cyprus : Opportunity Beckons for Peace, Unity And EU Entry", *International Herald Tribune*, March 10, 2003.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Fikret Bila, "Erdoğan'ın Kıbrıs'a Bakışı", *Milliyet*, December 18, 2002.

³⁹ Sami Kohen, "Kıbrıs İçin Yeni Bir Yaklaşım", *Milliyet*, January 4, 2003.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ *Çözümüne Doğru Kıbrıs Notları*, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2004).

the guarantees given to Turkish Cypriots for an equal partnership in the Unified Cyprus.⁴²

3.4 The CHP and the Annan Plan

The CHP's view on the Annan plan constituted the second pillar of CHP's overall Cyprus concerns. According to the CHP, the said plan would destroy the existing bi-zonality since 1974 which enabled the island to remain safe and secure. According to Baykal, any proposal for solution should not distort the homogeneity of Turkish Cypriots. Otherwise in his view, the Cypriot state would be a Greek Cypriot state confining Turkish Cypriots to minority.⁴³ Baykal argued however that the Annan plan would threaten the bi-zonality. The first clue for this possible outcome, in Baykal's view was that the plan had been prepared as if the TRNC never existed. Secondly, he stated that after thirty years, Greek Cypriots were promoted to have a right on capturing the ex-Greek houses in the North as if no one had been living there since then. Thirdly, In CHP's view, according to the plan in nineteen years time, one third of the population of the North would be Greek. This would be seventy thousand, according to CHP, as opposed to the AKP's estimation of thirty nine thousand. According to Baykal, this policy would end the dominant Turkish identity in the North. The CHP's another concern was the territories. According to the plan, some areas in the North would be delivered to the South, for instance Güzelyurt and Karpaz peninsula. Therefore, Baykal asserted that accepting the plan would mean a clear diversion from the solid Cyprus policy of the eighty year old Turkish Republic resulting in havoc for Turkey.⁴⁴ Never the less, the leading figures of the CHP in almost all occasions spelled out their willingness for a solution to the long-lasting Cyprus issue. Deniz Baykal even said that they did not

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Baykal's speeches in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, January 7, 2003.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

oppose a united Cyprus which would level the TRNC.⁴⁵ However in CHP's view, this could not be an excuse for undermining the vital interests of both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.

3.5 Failure of the Annan Plan and the Accession of the “Republic of Cyprus” to the EU

At the outset of the New Year, the presidential elections were held in Southern Cyprus. This could be considered as the first development of 2003 in the island. On February 16, Tassos Papadopoulos of Democratic Party was elected as president of “Republic of Cyprus”. He got 51.5 per cent of the total votes while Glafkos Clerides, former president was confined to 38.8 per cent.⁴⁶ Once totally refusing the Annan plan, after becoming president, Papadopoulos pledged to work for a solution under the aegis of the plan.⁴⁷ He got less than two weeks to get prepared until the deadline.

Although preconditioned as the deadline for the concerning parties to agree for a settlement under the aegis of the UN plan, February 28 could not succeed in forcing the Cypriots to make an effort for solution. While a deal was not reached, it was mainly Rauf Denктаş, the President of the TRNC who was held responsible for no solution. Turkish Foreign Minister Gül urged Denктаş to adapt his views to the changing world and its realities.⁴⁸ Kofi Annan raised his complaints about Denктаş in his report to the UN Security Council (UNSC) showing him as the main stumbling bloc against the solution.⁴⁹ Correspondingly, the UNSC adopted a resolution regretting for the failure of striking a deal for referenda in the island before April 16, because of the negative attitudes of Denктаş.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Baykal's speeches in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, April 15, 2003.

⁴⁶ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Cyprus, Access date: May 16, 2006.

⁴⁷ “Cyprus Elections Threatens Peace Plans”, *BBC News*, February 17, 2003.

⁴⁸ “Gül'den Denктаş'a 'Artık Değiş' Mesajı”, *Milliyet*, April 6, 2003.

⁴⁹ “Annan, Denктаş'ı BM'ye Şikâyet Etti”, *Milliyet*, April 8, 2003.

⁵⁰ “Denктаş'a Suçlama Annan'a Tam Destek”, *Milliyet*, April 15, 2003.

April 16, 2003 was the date when “Republic of Cyprus” signed the accession treaty with the EU in Athens guaranteeing the formal entry on May 1, 2004. Accordingly, the EU accepted the southern part to the Union representing the whole island showing the Northern part as region not under the control of the “Republic of Cyprus”.⁵¹ The Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos was glorious. He stressed in his speech that it was because of the walls carved by violence the Turkish Cypriot citizens could not be together with them.⁵² He also stated that the unconditional entry of the “Republic of Cyprus” would not change their determination to solve the Cyprus problem.⁵³ Coming to power several weeks ago, he was successful to secure membership for the South, once the Turkish Cypriot leader took all the flaks. Turkish foreign minister, Abdullah Gül could only show Turkey’s reaction by not attending the Summit.⁵⁴ Later in his press conference, Gül stated that the doors were still open for the solution of the Cyprus conflict. He also claimed that they would not let this unilateral accession to overshadow the membership process of Turkey.⁵⁵

As for the reactions of the CHP, Baykal asserted that the membership of the Southern part was in contravention of the main documents of the EU, it was in breach of the London and Zurich Treaties and the Cyprus Constitution.⁵⁶ In his view this situation was unfair and wrong. In the light of these developments, he claimed that the Annan plan became nonsense. He also asserted that embargoes on the North and refusal to recognize TRNC became also nonsense since these actions had been taken in order to force the North to agree upon a solution based on the Annan plan. Thus, in his view, in order to end this unfair situation the TRNC should be recognized immediately. As for Abdullah Gül’s non attendance to the Summit, Onur Öymen, vice chairman of the CHP

⁵¹ “Keyifleri Yerinde...”, *Milliyet*, April 17, 2003.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ “Kartlarını İyi Oynadılar”, *Milliyet*, April 17, 2003.

⁵⁵ “Bizi Ecevit İle Karıştırma”, *Milliyet*, April 18, 2003.

⁵⁶ Baykal’s speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, April 15, 2003

asserted that it was a symbolic move which could have no effect on the Council's decision. According to Öymen, Turkey should have taken a firm stance by warning the EU not to grant membership solely to the Southern part or face the consequences.⁵⁷

3.6 Revival of the Plan and the Road to Referenda

The parliamentary elections were held in the North on December 14, 2003. Accordingly, the governing party the National Union Party (UBP) could only gather 32.5 per cent of the total votes and the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), a new political formation lusting for a solution under the aegis of the Annan Plan rose to the first rank getting 35.7 per cent of the votes. Aggregately, the former opposition got 51 per cent and former government got 49 per cent of the votes sharing the seats in the parliament equally which was 25 to 25. Mehmet Ali Talat, leader of the CTP became the prime minister forming a coalition with the Democratic Party (DP) led by Serdar Denktaş, son of Rauf Denktaş. The results showed that the increase in the willingness for a solution was reflected to the bullet box in the island. However, the balanced composition of the parliamentary seats indicated the cautiousness of the voters not to make a radical move for the fate of the island.

The Turkish government took the result of the elections as the best result for the North. It was stated that in the case of a result largely in favor of the governing party, it could have been interpreted that the quest for solution under the auspices of the Annan plan was undermined. It was also claimed that in the case of a landslide victory of the pro-solution CTP, it would have been interpreted that the North was willing to say 'yes' to the plan without bargaining process. According to the government officials, the electors firstly warned Denktaş to increase his willingness to compromise and secondly warned the opposition not to give excessive amount of concessions for the sake of a solution.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Interview with Öymen, *Cumhuriyet*, April 17, 2003.

⁵⁸ Taha Akyol, "Ankara Sonuçlardan Memnun", *Milliyet*, December 16, 2003.

The CHP's stance was balanced. In Baykal's view, the elections first of all showed that TRNC was not an artificial body but a real democracy respecting the rule of law. According to him, Turkish Cypriots were in favor of change and reformation, and had a will to be in the European Community getting rid of their problems.⁵⁹ He also asserted that according to the results, Cypriots did not resign to the opposition party's willingness of surrendering to the Annan plan. In his view, Turkish Cypriots did not choose to alienate Denktaş from the process either.⁶⁰

The election results in the North encouraged the AKP government to send a request to the UN for the resumption of the negotiations under the Annan plan. Erdoğan made his suggestion to Annan stating that Turkey was ready to resume talks under the aegis of the plan.⁶¹ Turkey's move was understandable because the Southern Cyprus was going to become an EU member on May 1, 2004. This was perilous both for the solution of the Cyprus issue and the membership aspirations of Turkey.

The AKP's proposal became fruitful since Kofi Annan decided to revive the negotiations by inviting the Cypriot leaders to New York in order to resume talks.⁶² After some tough talks, the parties accepted to resume bilateral negotiations starting from February 19, 2004.⁶³ The two Cypriot leaders would also present their proposals for amendments in the plan and reach a compromise.⁶⁴ In the case of disagreement, Annan would be authorized to fill the blanks in the plan. The parties promised to put the final plan to referenda even if no compromise was reached. On March 24, 2004, the parties met in Burgenstock, Switzerland where Annan introduced the fifth and the final version of the plan. Besides, he announced the referenda to be issued on April 24.⁶⁵

⁵⁹ Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, December 16, 2003.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Karl Vick, "Turkey Asks U.N.'s Annan To Restart Cyprus Talks", *Washington Post*, January 25, 2004.

⁶² "Annan'dan Denktaş Ve Papadopulos'a Davet...", *Milliyet*, February 5, 2004.

⁶³ "Kıbrıs'ta Anlaşma Sağlandı", *Milliyet*, February 13, 2004.

⁶⁴ "Kıbrıs'ta Çözüm Artık Çok Yakın", *Milliyet*, February 14, 2004.

⁶⁵ "Annan Planının Son Halini Taraflara Sundu", *Milliyet*, March 31, 2004.

Whether satisfied or not the Cypriots were forced to come up with a solution until the South was admitted to the Union on May 1.

The victory of Papadopoulos in the South had made Annan's quest difficult. Although claiming to be in favor of a solution, he seemed definitely not in favor of the Annan plan. Not surprisingly, when the referenda date was revealed, he overtly vented his views about the plan. Papadopoulos urged the Greek Cypriots to a "thunderous NO" (*vronderón Óhi*) to the plan in a TV channel bursting into tears.⁶⁶ In spite of the obvious stance of Greece in favor of the Annan plan, this emotional move of Papadopoulos became fruitful to influence Greek Cypriot inclinations. Polls in the South indicated an overwhelming no to the plan.⁶⁷ There were also some critical factors behind their negative stance. Greek Cypriots thought of making too many concessions to the Turkish Cypriots. For instance, they would have to swallow the entry of the Turkish Cypriots into the EU along with themselves. Furthermore, they could not consent giving 28 per cent of the island to Turks amounting to 19 per cent of the total population. Moreover, continued presence of the Turkish troops would be unacceptable for the Island Greeks.⁶⁸ Besides, the EU had given them an opportunity to enter the Union even if no solution was reached. This imminent no vote of the South worried the EU. The leading figures of the Union began to regret that they were deceived by the Greek Cypriots.⁶⁹

In the Northern part, Denktaş had already opened a war against the plan. Although he got support mainly from the opposition parties of Turkey⁷⁰, unlike Papadopoulos, his acts became futile to convince his own people.⁷¹ Unlike South,

⁶⁶ "Papadopoulos, Gözyaşları İçinde Halkını "Hayır" Demeye Çağırıldı", *Milliyet*, April 8, 2004.

⁶⁷ "Rum Kesiminde Yeni Bir Anket Ve Yüzde 73 "Hayır"...", *Milliyet*, April 17, 2004.

⁶⁸ "The Cyprus Divide", *International Herald Tribune*, April 8, 2004.

⁶⁹ "Verheugen: Rumlar Beni Aldattı!" and "Patten: Verheugen'in Hislerini Hepimiz Paylaşıyoruz...", *Milliyet*, April 21, 2004.

⁷⁰ "Denktaş Koalisyonu!", *Milliyet*, March 5, 2004.

⁷¹ "KKTC'nin Yüzde 62'si Hemen Çözüm İstiyor", *Milliyet*, April 18, 2004.

Northern Cypriots were largely in favor of the plan which would grant them both unification and EU membership if it was taken into force.

The pointers of the compasses in both sides of the island showed the opposite directions. The imminent culmination would be 'no' for the South and 'yes' for the North. This would make the South EU member alone while further isolating the North. Respectively, the AKP government was firmly of opinion that a 'yes' vote of the Turkish Cypriots in spite of a Greek Cypriot 'no' vote would enable TRNC to be recognized by the international society.⁷² However, the US state Department announced that this would not be the case.⁷³ Normally, lack of consent by the US for recognizing TRNC would inhibit the desires of the AKP.

3.7 Cyprus Policy of the AKP

The AKP's Cyprus policy constitutes the third and the main pillar of CHP's criticisms on the issue. As early as November 2002, Baykal underlined his concerns about a possible sharp change in the Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus. He stated that foreign policy required continuity. In his view, governments come and go but the essence of their foreign policies must remain the same. Therefore, he asserted that on behalf of securing the national interests, the fundamental policies should be maintained. He regretted however to see Erdoğan, the AKP leader complaining about the foreign policies of the previous governments. He argued that if the AKP could not provide better conditions for the Turkish Cypriots then giving up the status quo would be costly.⁷⁴ Hence, Baykal emphasized the importance of keeping the support for Denktaş and advised the government not to be impatient about the Cyprus issue. Because in his view, impatience could make them give undesirable concessions.⁷⁵ All in all, Baykal reflected

⁷² "Gül: 'Türk Tarafı 'Evet', Rum Tarafı 'Hayır' Derse KKTC Tanınır'", *Milliyet*, April 9, 2004.

⁷³ "ABD: Referandum Rumlar Yüzünden Çökerse Türkleri Koruruz Ama...", *Milliyet*, April 9, 2004.

⁷⁴ Baykal's speech in the plenary Session of the GNAT, November 26, 2002.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

the CHP concerns for a shift from the stable Cyprus policy of Turkey for the sake of entering the EU.

Approaching to the date of referenda for Annan plan, criticisms eventually aggravated. The CHP argued that the government undermined the views of others but chose to go alone for tackling the Cyprus problem. Although lacking experience especially in foreign policy, the AKP government however, did not feel the need to consult with other political actors. Apart from presenting the famous 1 March motion about the deployment of US troops in Turkish soil, the government hardly shared the foreign policy matters with the GNAT. The Foreign Affairs Minister, Abdullah Gül, came to the meetings of the foreign affairs commission of the GNAT only once a year. According to Onur Öymen, Gül just spoke and left without asking for the views of the commission. Even the President of Turkey, Ahmet Necdet Sezer complained about lack of information by the government especially in terms of vital foreign policy issues.⁷⁶

The CHP's another concern was the lack of information about the Annan plan. All they were provided with was the 200 pages long plan which was insufficient compared the whole document of 9000 pages, they argued. Moreover, according to Öymen the Cypriots were forced to say yes or no to a document which they did not read and did have a chance to compromise on. Concomitantly, he regretted that Turkey let Kofi Annan fill all the blanks that the Cypriots left disagreed.⁷⁷ Hence, the CHP blamed the government of accepting a document nobody read and let the Secretary General determine the uncompromised articles of the plan in his desired ways. Prime Minister Erdoğan was also criticized by the CHP because of his tough stance against Denktaş especially while the deadline of 1 May approached. Erdoğan opposed Denktaş when he came to Turkey in order to raise his voice against the plan few weeks before the referenda. He admonished Denktaş not to make propaganda in Turkey but in his own state. The CHP, obviously bolstering Denktaş, condemned Erdoğan for his blunt and inappropriate statements against him.

⁷⁶ "Sezer: "Türkiye'nin Kabul Ettiği Davos Tutanağından Öğrenildi"", Milliyet, April 14, 2004.

⁷⁷ Öymen's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, April 6, 2004.

Denktaş was the symbol of Turkish Cypriot cause for more than forty years. He fought for the rights of his people for many years and became the first president of the TRNC which is now only recognized by Turkey. In all the negotiations and proximity talks, he worked for his state to survive and he strongly rejected anything he saw as a danger for the TRNC. After the presentation of the Annan plan his tough rhetoric began to lose support. Turkish Cypriot hopes for a settlement began to rise especially with the said plan. Ravenous for economic and political freedom, Turkish Cypriots tended to leave aside the old rhetoric and focused on a settlement along with a membership to the European Union. This inclination was in a sense precipitated by the new government in Turkey. The AKP government's decisive quest for the EU membership along with a permanent solution to the Cyprus problem opened the way for the islander Turks. In this respect, it was the political figures in the opposition side of Turkey who gave their full support to Denktaş. The CHP strongly supported him.

3.8 Referenda and Aftermath

The referenda results were not unexpected. While Greeks rejected the plan with 76 per cent, Turks adopted it with 65 per cent of the total votes. This would mean the end of all hopes for unification under the aegis of the Annan plan. It would also guarantee the membership of the South alone on behalf of the whole island while further marginalizing the North. The EU had taken a risky stance in order to generate a solution to the problem. The Union was going to be the main ground for conciliation catalyzing the solution. Yet this policy backfired because of apparent Greek Cypriot dissatisfaction with the plan. Seemingly it brought about catalysis of the problem getting the South in, the North out.

The Greek Cypriot leader, all in all, did not seem to be happy after all. Papadopoulos stated that it was not a night to celebrate because in his view there were no winners or losers. He emphasized his country's willingness for solution but not under the auspices of the said plan. According to him this would not mean they turned their

backs to the Turkish Cypriots.⁷⁸ Nonetheless, his comments would not change the reality that they would become the EU member not the North. On the other hand, obviously waiting for a reward, Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat stated that they did everything they were told. Now he expected a payback. He urged the international community to lift the embargoes and leave its isolationist policy from the TRNC.⁷⁹ Conversely, Denktaş was happy with the result since in his view the Republic was saved.⁸⁰ Kofi Annan had failed to become the Secretary General to solve the infamous Cyprus Conflict. He regretted that an historical opportunity was missed.⁸¹ The Greek motherland was more cautious and urged for the EU to work for a solution. Yet they had already become successful in their joint action with the Greek Cypriots.

In Turkey, the AKP government was definitely not glad with the result. Because, it not only prevented the AKP's attempts to solve the problem but also created obstacle to Turkey's future membership to the EU. Foreign Minister Gül could only say that they did as good as they could. Prime Minister Erdoğan commented that it was the Greek Cypriots who were the real losers and from then on, the political isolation of Turkish Cypriots would come to an end.⁸²

Contrary to the AKP's disappointment, the CHP seemed to be happy with the results. The CHP saw the referenda results as an opportunity to push for recognition of the TRNC. In CHP's view, the results showed that it was the Greek Cypriots who were the real obstacle against the solution since they even could not accept a document like the Annan plan.⁸³ According to Baykal, the Greek Cypriot rejection was the second major mistake of the Greek Cypriots, referring to the Greek Cypriot attempt to achieve

⁷⁸ "In Quotes: Cyprus Reunification Fails", BBC News, April 24, 2004.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, April 27, 2004.

Enosis in 1974 coup d'état as the first one.⁸⁴ Thus, in Baykal's view, this provided Turkey with a unique opportunity to seek for recognition of the Northern Cyprus, to finish what Turkey started in 1974. He demanded Erdoğan to work together in order to enable the recognition of the North. However, after a while, Baykal blamed the government of nearly recognizing the South instead of convincing the world recognize the North.⁸⁵ Accusing the government as being clumsy in foreign policy, Baykal argued that the mistakes of the clumsy government had been prevented several times by other actors, notably the CHP in the 1 March proposal,⁸⁶ the USA on 7 October⁸⁷ and the Greek Cypriots in the 24 April referenda.

3.9 Accession of the “Republic of Cyprus” and the Struggles to Reverse the Process

When 1 May came, the South became officially an EU member. The disappointment of the EU officials and their furious statements against the Greek Cypriots went up in smoke soon later. After the referenda, it had been expected that the EU and the US would lift the economic sanctions to the North and decrease aid to the South in order to force the parties to come closer to the terms for reunification.⁸⁸ However, not only the economic sanctions were not lifted, but also the EU's pledge to grant 259 million euros to the North was soon forgotten because of the persistent objection of the “Republic of Cyprus”.⁸⁹ The only sound news from the EU came two years later, however decreasing

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, June 29, 2004.

⁸⁶ It was a proposal presented to the GNAT on 1 March 2003 in order to allow the US ground forces to be deployed on Turkish soil in order to conduct an invasion to Irak. The proposal was rejected by the parliament; the CHP deputies vetoed with unanimity along with a hundred AKP no votes.

⁸⁷ Turkish parliament adopted a proposal for sending Turkish troops to Irak on October 7, 2003. However, the US rejected and hampered the entry of Turkish Troops to the country.

⁸⁸ “A Destructive Vote In Cyprus”, *International Herald Tribune*, April 28, 2004.

⁸⁹ Morton I. Abramowitz, Donald K. Bandler, Frances G. Burwell, William Drozdiak and Eric Melby, “Turkey And The United States At The Crossroads: The Impact Of EU Accession Negotiations”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol.6, Num.4, October-December 2004, p.89.

the amount to 139 million euros.⁹⁰ What is more, when Turkey was given October 3, 2005 as the date for negotiations, it was perceived by the Europeans as Turkey pledged to recognize the South, an EU member.⁹¹ Therefore, the CHP's claims about the *clumsiness* of the government seemed to have a ground. In spite of strong opposition of the CHP, the government signed the additional protocol of the Ankara Association agreement extending the provisions to the new members. This would nearly mean recognition of the South. The declaration⁹² of the AKP government stating that Turkey would not recognize the South as the "Republic of Cyprus" did not represent the North. Soon later the EU presented a counter declaration to Turkey undermining her declaration and urging her to come to the terms of the Union. Consequently, the link between the Cyprus problem and Turkey's EU aspirations, which started with the Greek Cypriot application to the Union, was crystallized.

From the time the South became an EU member, until the end of the year 2005, the AKP government was involved with a series of actions concerning the TRNC. Not having been recognized by any state since then and not having been granted the economic aid the EU had promised, the Northern Cypriots badly needed some improvements.

The first step was taken in Istanbul Summit of Organization for Islamic Conference (OIC) on June 14-16, 2004. The OIC had previously named the TRNC as Turkish Cypriot Muslim Community. Then the Organization agreed TRNC to attend the meetings as the Turkish Cypriot State, the name given to Turkish Cypriots in the Annan plan.⁹³ Nevertheless, this would not mean political recognition by the member states.

⁹⁰ "EU Approves Turkish Cypriot Aid", BBC News, February 27, 2006.

⁹¹ Graham Bowley, "Membership Talks Get The Green Light After Deal On Tacit Recognition Of Cyprus : A 'Historic Event' For EU And Turkey", *International Herald Tribune*, December 18, 2004, and Graham Bowley, "EU Warns Turkey That Talks Hinge On Quick Recognition Of Cyprus", *International Herald Tribune*, March 1, 2005.

⁹² "Turkey Called Ready To Sign Protocol Including Cyprus", *Reuters*, July 26, 2005.

⁹³ "İKÖ, KKTC'ye 'Kıbrıs Türk Devleti' Diyecek", *Zaman*, June 3, 2004 and "İKÖ, KKTC İçin 'Kıbrıs Türk Devleti' İfadesini Kabul Etti", *AB Haber*, April 13, 2006.

The visit of some members of the US House of Representatives to Northern Cyprus was another interesting development for the North. Undermining the Greek Cypriot warnings, the US deputies gave their support for the lifting of sanctions to Northern Cyprus.⁹⁴

Another support came from Russian Federation. Russian leader Putin, in a joint press conference with Erdoğan urged the economic sanction be lifted from the Northern Cyprus.⁹⁵

Perhaps the most positive news came from Azerbaijan, whose people are of Turkic origin and have close cultural and political ties with Turkey. Thanks to Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan's close correspondence, İlham Aliyev, President of Azerbaijan promised to help get rid of the isolation of the island Turk. He announced his country's will to accept the TRNC passports along with direct flights to TRNC and direct trade with the North.⁹⁶ On July 27, 2005, an Azeri plane landed on Ercan Airport in Northern Cyprus and it took off Ercan heading on Baku on 31 July. On August 29, Turkish Cypriot plane landed on Baku airport in spite of the present international embargo.⁹⁷ Although these developments did not amount to recognition of the North by Azeris, it was an important step for it.

These developments, though remarkable, were not sufficient to end the isolation of the Northern Cyprus. The final action came from the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In the first month of 2006, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül announced Turkey's new action plan on Cyprus. Composed of ten articles the plan foresaw the opening of Turkish harbors and airspace and airports to the Greek Cypriots. In return, Turkey demanded that International Community put an end to the isolation of the Northern Cyprus.⁹⁸

⁹⁴ "ABD Heyeti Ercan'a İndi", *Radikal*, May 31, 2005.

⁹⁵ "Putin'den Kıbrıs'a Destek", *BBC Turkish*, July 18, 2005.

⁹⁶ "Azeris Give Support To Turkish Cyprus", *The Associated Press, Reuters*, July 1, 2005.

⁹⁷ "Turkish Cypriot Jet Flies To Baku", *BBC News*, August 29, 2005.

⁹⁸ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/guncel/yeni_acilim.htm, accessed on June 3, 2006.

This final initiative of the AKP government, though pulled some attention in Europe,⁹⁹ had no serious consequence. Instead, it succumbed to a quarrel between the government and the opposition. The CHP naturally was not satisfied with the new initiative. Because, according to Baykal the EU and the US had already promised to lift the isolations inflicted upon the TRNC if Turkish Cypriots would approve the Annan plan. Although they voted in favor of the plan, these international actors did not fulfill their pledge, he argued. Thus, the CHP believed that Turkey already had a right to claim the lifting of the isolations from the EU and the US without having to give something in return. However, in CHP's view, the Turkish government chose to give them another concession in order to claim its right.¹⁰⁰ The CHP leader also argued that in the new initiative the AKP government even could not say Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) but Turkish Cypriot side or Turkish Cypriot Administration.¹⁰¹ Besides, Baykal strongly condemned Gül that the AKP government did not introduce this proposal first to the attention of the parliament. He argued that the government rather chose to go it alone. Consequently, the CHP viewed this action plan as short of being viable for a solution. Off course, the CHP's reaction to the initiative appalled the Prime Minister Erdoğan. Already tense because of the tough discussions on internal politics, the debate between Erdoğan and Baykal came to one of its most tense moments when both leaders likened each other to Papadopoulos because of their attitudes about the Cyprus issue.¹⁰²

3.10 The CHP on Cyprus: Continuity with the Past

According to Maurice Duverger, opposition parties who remain too much in the opposition tend to act more violently and extravagantly.¹⁰³ It could be true for the CHP,

⁹⁹ "KKTC'yi Tanıyabilirler", *Radikal*, February 11, 2006.

¹⁰⁰ Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, February 1, 2006.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² See the details in ibid and Erdoğan's speech in the AKP parliamentary Group reunion, February 1, 2006.

¹⁰³ Duverger, p.457.

which could not become the governing party since 1970s. Criticisms raised by the CHP on the Cyprus issue could be taken as *aggressive* struggling to preserve the *status quo*. Yet the CHP under the leadership of Baykal doesn't seem to be so different from the CHP's Cyprus policies under previous leaderships. In fact it seems to constitute a continuation of the previous policies of the party with a harder tone. The CHP under İsmet İnönü leadership had also faced with one party government (Democratic Party) during 1950-60. Similar to the reaction of the CHP to the Annan plan, the CHP officials reacted to the London and Zurich Treaties. The said treaties were to constitute the backbone of the emerging Cyprus Republic. The CHP officials strongly rejected the treaties because they claimed that the treaties maintained the danger of *Enosis*.¹⁰⁴ Hence, they cast no votes in the parliament.¹⁰⁵ According to the CHP under Baykal leadership, the Annan plan would destroy the bi-zonality relegating the Turkish Cypriots to minority position. This implies the similar concerns for an outcome which would threaten the survival of the Turkish Cypriots.

The resolute stance on the Cyprus problem both by İsmet İnönü and Bülent Ecevit which resulted in military intervention on the island constituted the backbone of traditional Cyprus policy of Turkey. The tradition was to adopt the Cyprus issue as the top priority in Turkish foreign policy agenda even if the relations with allies deteriorated. Accordingly, tough within a different political party, in the last Ecevit government during 1999-2002, Cyprus policy of Turkey remained intact. For instance, Prime Minister Ecevit rejected the Annan plan. Şükrü Sina Gürel, Foreign Minister of the time threatened to get unified with the Northern Cyprus if the South entered the EU.¹⁰⁶ These expressions imply that the Cyprus policy of the former CHP leaders was also more important than Turkish policy for joining the EU. Furthermore, the questionnaire in this study shows that according to the CHP deputies, the most important

¹⁰⁴ Unification of Cyprus with Greece.

¹⁰⁵ Mümtaz Soysal, *Dış Politika ve Parlamento*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1964), p. 240-241.

¹⁰⁶ "AB'ye Kıbrıs Resti", *Akşam*, July 21, 2002.

issue concerning Turkey seems to be the Cyprus problem.¹⁰⁷ All in all, Turkey's long lasting Cyprus policy was that of the CHP. Hence, the CHP under Baykal leadership sought to continue this established Cyprus policy. The new perspectives that the AKP government formulated for the Cyprus issue raised concerns which further radicalized the CHP's stance.

3.11 Conclusion

The period starting from the aftermath the parliamentary elections in Turkey, right until the first months of the year 2006 was sensitive and crucial especially in terms of the Cyprus problem. During this period, the membership perspective of the Southern Cyprus to the EU became much clearer. This gave the Greek Cypriots an impetus to bind the Cyprus issue even more overtly to Turkey's EU membership bid. These developments during this period coincided with one party government in Turkey acting for an absolute solution to the issue on the one hand and struggling decisively to enter the EU on the other. Therefore, in order to enjoy a smooth passage to the EU, the AKP government worked for reaching a solution as soon as possible. The Annan plan was adopted as the ultimate document for peace in the island.

Nevertheless, rejecting "no solution as solution"¹⁰⁸ the AKP government could not yet achieve a solution for the long lasting problem. Apparently the AKP leading figures had not considered the Greek Cypriot factor. Being guaranteed the membership without having to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, the Greek Cypriots comfortably cast "NO" to the ballots. Albeit condemned by the EU officials, they never the less enjoyed their membership which indeed exacerbated the Turkish Cypriot isolation. The EU had envisaged that the membership project would play a "catalyst" role both for the unification of the island and for facilitating Turkey's membership perspective.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ See the Apeendix, p. 156.

¹⁰⁸ Aydıntaşbaş, February 3, 2004.

¹⁰⁹ Oliver P. Richmond, "Shared Sovereignty and the Politics of Peace: Evaluating the EU's 'Catalytic' Framework in the Eastern Mediterranean", *International Affairs*, Vol.82, Num.1, January 2006, p.162.

However, the Union should not have guaranteed membership to the South before reaching a settlement.¹¹⁰ This was the obvious mistake of the Union. At the end of the day, in spite of the obvious struggles of the EU, Greece, Turkey and TRNC in favor of solution under the aegis of the Annan plan; the Greek Cypriots said the final word.

The CHP's stance on Cyprus during this period was tough. Mainly on three issues the CHP chose to raise its voice. Firstly, the party was appalled with the establishment of a link between Turkey's EU membership process and solution to the Cyprus problem. Seeing the two as separate issues, leading figures of the party harshly criticized the attitudes of the EU. Secondly, the CHP strongly rejected the Annan plan which, according to the CHP, was a *document of surrender*.¹¹¹ Finally, it was the AKP who took most of the flaks. According to the CHP, the government gave unbearable concessions on the Cyprus issue for the sake of Turkey's EU membership even standing against Rauf Denktaş, the President of the TRNC of the time.¹¹² The CHP leader blamed the AKP of giving up the forty years of established Turkish foreign policy.

The CHP's stance on issues like Turkey – EU and Turkish – US relations had always been hard to digest for the government. However, In the Cyprus problem, the CHP's opposition reached the zenith. The CHP's rhetoric became so cruel that the party even blamed the AKP of sacrificing Cyprus for the sake of the EU membership. It was mostly because the CHP saw Turkey's long established Cyprus policy as the only valid way for Turkey. And this policy was that of the CHP dating back to period of İsmet İnönü and Bülent Ecevit. Therefore, the CHP under Baykal leadership sought to preserve this policy against that of the AKP.

In the next chapter, the CHP's stance on the US-Turkey relations will be discussed with a closer look at the developments in the relations during 2003-2005. Like the other foreign policy issues, the CHP's active criticisms concerning the US – Turkey relations will continue this time over the issue of 'International Legitimacy'.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.174.

¹¹¹ Baykal's speeches in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, April 13, 2004.

¹¹² Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary Group reunion, January 28, 2003.

CHAPTER IV

THE US – TURKEY RELATIONS

Turkish – American relations have usually been solid and promising. Taking especially the Cold War alliance into consideration, Turkey has been a “staunch ally” of the United States (US). Turkish troops fought on the side of the US troops in the Korean War. Turkey became a promising member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Bordering the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Turkey became one of the most solid wings of the Atlantic Alliance. This partnership was not free from problems, though. The popular Johnson letter to Turkey preventing an operation to Cyprus in 1964 and arms embargo inflicted by the US on Turkey soon after Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus could be regarded as pitfalls of the long lasting alliance. Nevertheless, against a common enemy, the Soviet Union, Turkish- American alliance was maintained.

Right after the Cold War, the existing International System composed of two rigid political blocs faded away. Though established on threat perspectives, some form of stability had been maintained in the Cold War era. This stability faded away too. The September 11 attacks indicated that nowhere in the world was secure ultimately. Correspondingly, the US formulated new policies concerning its own security. This shift along with the demise of the Cold War era also changed the nature of Turkish – American relations. The US had taken the Turkish support for granted throughout the Cold War years. Thus, Americans could hardly understand the change in their relations with Turkey up until the Turkish parliament’s famous rejection on March 1, 2003 to allow the US troops on the Turkish soil. The US officials could not hide their deep disappointment. Correspondingly, the relations became worse. The hooding of Turkish officers by the US troops in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq on July 4, 2003 further deteriorated the relations.

Especially in the EU membership process and the Cyprus issue, the AKP government seemed to pursue a decisive and in a sense unified policy. However, when it came to relations with the US, this was not the case. Besides, the AKP's Islamic orientation coupled with reactions against Israel worried the US officials and raised doubts about Turkey's future partnership with the US.

As for the CHP's stance concerning the US-Turkey relations, the applicable parameters were twofold. Inside, the party attacked the government, while outside, it adopted a cautious policy. Accordingly, on the one hand, the CHP officials criticized the AKP's inability to formulate a compact policy towards the US – Turkey relations especially concerning the Iraq issue. They even asserted that the AKP had no foreign policy on Iraq. Apparently the CHP enjoyed using the *opposition card* raising its voices overtly. On the other hand, they were in favor of legitimizing their views on US – Turkey relations referring to International Law and Turkey's main interests. Respectively the CHP was also able to use the *diplomatic card* thanks to the retired diplomats in the party whose backgrounds made the party's policy towards the US compact, mostly free from political rhetoric. All in all, the CHP's stance towards the US was cautious and more functional compared to its performances in other issues. The CHP was concerned with the US policy on *Greater/Broader Middle East* in a broader sense and Iraq in particular. On the one hand, the CHP did not hesitate to raise its voice against the government for acting hesitantly to reject the US claims in the region. On the other hand, the CHP officials chose to reflect these concerns depending on the provisions of International Law that could legitimize their views. Besides the party officials did not forget to send warm messages to the US for cooperation in the region unless the US undermined Turkish concerns. Therefore, unlike its predecessors, the CHP got away with confronting the US outright.

In this chapter, the main developments and changing trends in Turkish – American relations especially in the security area during 2003 - 2005 will be analyzed. The work will focus on the policy of the CHP towards Turkey-US relations. In this respect, three important concepts notably; *Strategic Partnership*, *Greater/Broader Middle East Initiative*, and *Moderate Islam* will be on closer look. During this period, the substances and functions of these three terms were widely debated. Hence, a closer

look will be crucial first to fathom the views of the two states vis-à-vis each other better and those of the CHP within its overall policy towards the US.

4.1 Changing Policies

The end of the Cold War brought uncertainty in the security perspectives of the world. The dissolution of the Soviet Union paved the way for new threats coming from unidentified and mostly non-state foes wielding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Accordingly, for the US, the fight against terrorism became the primary agenda of its national security policy. The September 11 attacks emphasized that even the US was vulnerable to terrorism. A decisive and rapid action should be taken against these devilish formations. However, as the Bosnia and Kosovo crises had indicated, the capability of NATO, the most important security link of the Atlantic alliance was quite inefficient especially in terms of decision-making and implementation.¹ The new security perceptions of the US required rapid action by *the coalition of the willing*. Referring to Donald Rumsfeld, The US defense Secretary, from now on, it would be the missions which would determine coalitions and coalitions should not determine the missions. This ‘pseudo-multilateralism’ became the essence of the US foreign policy understanding in the new millennium.² Accordingly, the vengeance of the September 11 attacks was sought first by invading Afghanistan. The second target was Iraq of Saddam Hussein. Never the less, weapons inspectors could not find any nuclear facility or WMD in Iraq. Moreover, the US attempts to make the UN Security Council issue a resolution enabling an operation had failed. Germany, France, Russia and China were all against a US led operation to Iraq in the first place. Even more critically, the world public opinion opposed this war. However, the US was determined to go ahead.

Turkish Republic’s “staunch ally” status was still taken by the US officials for granted even if the demise of the Cold War dynamics brought about a clear shift in the

¹ Sean Kay, “What Went Wrong with NATO?”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.18, No.1, April 2005, p.72.

² Eric Jones, “Debating the Transatlantic Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality”, *International Affairs*, Vol.80, No.4, 2004, p.597.

security perceptions. Turks had been quite instrumental in the first Gulf War though subsequently facing huge economic costs.³ Moreover, Turkish armed forces were utilized in Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia for peace keeping purposes.⁴ Finally, the support given by Turkey to the US following the September 11 attacks gave both sides a feeling that the relations enjoyed the zenith.⁵ Formulating their policy on *the defiant* Iraq, Turkey was seen by the US officials as a facilitating factor, if not indispensable in the quest for a second comprehensive campaign against Iraq.⁶

In Turkey, a new government had just been formed under single party rule. The AKP government, though having Islamic inclinations, proclaimed to embrace democratic and secular values. Rather inexperienced especially in foreign policy, the AKP was quite unlucky to face the US proposal to use Turkey's soil for its military purposes in the first months of its terms in the government. The AKP got stuck between Turkish nation's objection⁷, and the decisive request of the US for triggering the operation. Respectfully, the Turkish government chose to conduct a *dual policy*.⁸ On the one hand, the Prime Minister Abdullah Gül met with the leaders of Arab countries to strike a peaceful deal to prevent the imminent war. On the other hand, Turkey went through a bargaining process with the US on how to compensate Turkey's potential losses out of the war.⁹ However, relations became tense, since the Turkish government

³ The estimated costs range from \$40 Billion to \$100 Billion. See, Philip Robins, "Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq", *International Affairs*, Vol.79, No.3, 2003, p.560.

⁴ Mark R. Parris, "Starting over: US-Turkish Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.1, Spring 2003, p.7.

⁵ Rachel Prager, "Turkish – American Relations: Historical Context and Current Issues", *TUSIAD Background paper*, 2003, p.4.

⁶ Michael Rubin, "A Comedy of Errors: American – Turkish Diplomacy And The Iraq War", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Spring 2005.

⁷ More than 90 per cent of Turkish public was against the War on Iraq. See, William Horsley, "Polls Find Europeans Oppose Iraq War", *BBC News*, February 11, 2003.

⁸ Ertan Efeğil, "Why Did the Turkish Parliament Reject the Memorandum of March 1?", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.6, No.1, January-March 2004, p.106.

⁹ *Ibid.*

was in favor of a tough bargaining. This attitude was perceived especially by the US media as Turkey bargained *money for blood*.¹⁰ The US President Bush remarkably likened this process to *horse trading*.¹¹ Nevertheless, the outcome of the bargain did not come out as Turkey expected. Starting by demanding \$50 billion, Turkey came up with \$6 billion in cash along with some other \$ billion in loans. The money would not come easily though. First it would be approved by the US Congress then transferred in close surveillance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).¹²

4.2 The 1 March Motion

The AKP government presented a motion to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) as the last resort. The motion foresaw the permission for deployment of foreign troops to Turkish soils, ports, and harbors allowing also the usage of the airspace. Moreover, it also allowed Turkish troops to be dispatched to foreign lands. The logic behind the motion was to enable the US to invade Iraq through Turkish soil. Yet it was perhaps the first time throughout all of its terms in power the AKP government let the GNAT decide on a foreign policy matter. Although representing a clear majority with more than 360 seats in the parliament, however, the AKP leaders failed to make their members cast a unified vote approving the motion. More than ninety ‘no’ votes were cast by the AKP deputies. Along with the unified ‘no’ vote of the CHP members, the negative votes amounted to 250. Votes in favor of the motion remained at 264, short of 267 which was the needed number according to the article 96 of the Turkish Constitution. Consequently, the motion failed lacking 3 votes to reach the least possible number. A great majority of the CHP deputies are glad with the result. They believe Turkey was not a party to the war.¹³

¹⁰ Aylin Güney, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From ‘Cold War’ to ‘War on Iraq’”, Turkish Studies, Vol.6, No.3, September 2005, p.354.

¹¹ Ibid., p.355.

¹² Ibid., p.351.

¹³ See the Appendix, p.161.

Consequently, the AKP government could not pursue a decisive policy in Turkey's relations with the US that brought about the rejection of the motion. On the other hand, CHP appeared to be much more decisive and solid in the sense that they were successful to prevent the US from using Turkey as a port to invade Iraq. There were three basic tenets of the CHP's overall view on Iraq. First, there had to be international legitimacy concerning the operation on Iraq. Second, Turkey should not be a military front or headquarters of the war on Iraq, even if international legitimacy existed. Finally, the CHP was of the opinion that a military operation should not result in a division of the country, which would most probably trigger the establishment of a Kurdish state.¹⁴

The CHP spokesmen emphasized the article 92 of the Turkish Constitution, according to which a declaration of war can be legitimate only when International Law holds it legitimate. Onur Öymen, the vice-chairman of the party asserted that there were mostly two important factors determining legitimacy. First was, according to article 51 of the UN Charter, the self defense which would give a state the opportunity to reciprocate in a case of an attack to its territories. Second was, according to the chapter 7 of the UN Charter, a resolution of the UN permitting a military intervention. According to Öymen, none of these conditions were present concerning Iraq. Therefore, an operation to Iraq, in Öymen's view would be illegitimate.¹⁵ In this respect, the CHP believed that any support to the US by Turkey in conducting an illegitimate war against Iraq would be in contravention with the Turkish Constitution.¹⁶ What is more, Öymen further stated that the resolution 3314 of the UN General Assembly in 1974 was the legal constraint against Turkey to cast the 'yes' vote. He asserted the resolution foresaw that any state, which enabled any other state to use its territory to attack another state, would be counted as having attacked that state.¹⁷ Therefore, in his view, contrary to that

¹⁴ Deniz Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary group reunion, January 28, 2003.

¹⁵ Interview with Onur Öymen, *Star TV Channel*, February 20, 2003.

¹⁶ Efeğil, p.111.

¹⁷ Onur Öymen's speech in a conference in Zonguldak, March 3, 2003.

of the government, allowing the US to use Turkey's territories to attack Iraq would also make Turkey a party in the war against Iraq.¹⁸ To sum up, constructing their arguments on legal terms, the leading figures of the CHP indicated the lack of legitimacy in a US-led military operation to Iraq. Then they pointed out the second variable, which was the inability of the Turkish government to stand firm and formulate a decisive policy. According to the CHP, the AKP government could not even say 'yes' or 'no' to the US while the stance of the US was quite clear respectively.¹⁹ At the end of the day, it was the AKP's failure to make the motion pass through, in spite of its clear material dominance in the parliament. On the other hand, the CHP was successful along with approximately a hundred AKP deputies in its policy to reject the motion.

In the first Gulf War, contrary to the AKP government, the Turkish president Turgut Özal was so determined to reinforce alliance with the US that he chose to conduct Turkey's foreign policy on Iraq alone. The opposition strongly reacted to the individual policy undertakings of Özal. Opposition leaders Süleyman Demirel of DYP and Erdal İnönü of SHP, successor of the CHP after the 1980 *coup* along with Mesut Yılmaz, reflecting the opposition within the governing party were able to take some decisions against Özal's will.²⁰ The article 92 of the Turkish constitution urged for a parliamentary decision for going into war, dispatching Turkish troops abroad and accepting foreign troops on Turkish soil. The opposition parties were successful to empower the government only in the case of an attack against Turkish soil.²¹ Moreover, they were successful not to give the government the right to declare war.²² However, a decision by the parliament empowering the US to use Turkish airbases including Incirlik for the operations was taken thanks to the majority of the governing party voted in favor

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Deniz Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary group reunion, March 18, 2003.

²⁰ Ibid., p.220.

²¹ Ibid., p.221.

²² Ibid.

of it.²³ Erdal İnönü, son of İsmet İnönü and leader of SHP reacted that the opening of Incirlik base to the US use would make Turkey a second front in the war, which meant declaration of war.²⁴ Consequently, the SHP and other opposition parties failed to keep Turkey away from the war.

In the first Gulf war, the SHP, successor of the CHP was in the opposition and opposed the war as did the CHP for the second Gulf War. However, in the first war, Özal, the president backed by his party on the government was quite decisive in his policy to side with the US against Iraq. In the second war, the AKP government was far from being decisive and this triggered the rejection of the US troops. Coupled with the negative votes of some ninety AKP members, the CHP was successful to make the parliament reject the motion which kept Turkey away from the war.

The rejection by the GNAT on March 1, 2003 of the motion meant a watershed in the Turkish – American relations. It became a reference point for Americans to show that relations deteriorated. The disappointment of the US did not mitigate even after the GNAT adopted other motions to let the Americans use Turkey’s airspace and Turkish troops be dispatched to Iraq.²⁵ The US top officials spoke in a threatening tone as if Turkey had done a very big mistake. Turkey all of a sudden became an unreliable state for the US.²⁶ The GNAT’s rejection was perceived as the worst moment for the relations after the US arms embargo against Turkey in 1975.²⁷ Nevertheless the rejection had to be seen as a democratic act by the Turkish Parliament. Instead, Americans tended to take it as a sort of *backstabbing*.

However, if one scrutinizes the history of the Cold War meticulously; it will be evident that the US decision makers had also inflicted this kind of *backstabbing* upon its

²³ Philip Robins, ‘Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis’ in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992), p.79.

²⁴ Ibid., p.80.

²⁵ Güney, p.352.

²⁶ Jonathan Eric Lewis, “Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner?”, *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol.13, No.2, Spring 2006, p.47.

²⁷ Kemal Kirişçi, “Between Europe and the Middle East: the Transformation of Turkish Policy”, *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.8, No.1, March 2004.

allies, including Turkey. For instance, the letter by the US President Lyndon Johnson to Turkish premier İsmet İnönü in 1964 was not less problematic. In a threatening tone, Johnson warned İnönü not to conduct an operation to Cyprus. Otherwise, he furthered, the US would not save their back if the Soviet Union intervened. This letter had only delayed the Turkish operation though. After the 1974 military operation to Cyprus was implemented by Turkey, the US inflicted an arms embargo to Turkey.

In addition, the US had also pursued similar policy against Britain and France in the Suez crisis in 1956. The US President Eisenhower had used the similar stick threatening to leave them in the mercy of the Soviet Union, if they conducted an operation to Egypt.²⁸ He firmly stated that the US did not see the use of force as the right way to tackle international problems.²⁹ The US even went further to make the UN General Assembly adopt a resolution urging for the withdrawal of the troops from Egypt.³⁰ Seeing the use of force as not a valid option in 1956, the views of the US decision-makers must have changed drastically in fifty years. The US had pursued a somewhat 'stick' policy to its closest allies. However the US had it hard to swallow a comparably less irritating reaction from Turkey in 2003 causing to delay its operation to Iraq.

4.3 The Hooding

The tension did not seem to cool down soon. Another unfortunate development concerning the US – Turkey relations was the hooding and detention of eleven Turkish military officers in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq on July 4, 2003. Behind this act, there lied an allegation that the Turkish officers were going to assassinate the elected governor of the city. Whether it was a pursuit of vengeance by the US soldiers or something else is still

²⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomasi*, translated by Ibrahim Kurt, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2002), p. 513-514.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.520.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.521.

not certain. However, exacerbating the unpopularity of the US in Turkish public³¹, the incident further deteriorated the present status of the relations.

The AKP government was cautious not to overreact. Albeit condemning the US and talking to the top level US officials, Erdoğan and Gül did not warn the US officially. The Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that they were not in favor of a rapid reaction which would most probably harm the relations. He even scoffed at the ones in favor of the issuance of a diplomatic note to the US. He scornfully asked that whether it was a musical note.³²

The CHP regarded this incident quite differently. The CHP leader strongly condemned the US. He argued that this action was a gravely degrading act against the pride of the Turkish nation with no precedent in history. According to him, allied countries should be in solidarity and cooperation and respect each other completely, which was not the case for the US troops in Sulaymaniyah. The CHP's arrows also hit the AKP government for not having shown the necessary reaction. The AKP leaders were attacked by the CHP officials for not even canceling their daily programs once learning about the incident.³³ Besides, the CHP leader stated that at least a diplomatic note must have been issued to the US indicating the graveness of the incident. However, in his view, the AKP leader's reaction indicated that he was not aware of the seriousness of the incident.³⁴ According to the CHP leader, the latest incident showed that the government could not carry the weight of the 1 March decision of the GNAT on its shoulders.³⁵ This was the second time the AKP officials were hesitant to formulate policy vis-à-vis the US and this had provided enough space for the CHP to throw its arrows on the government. Meanwhile, the party was getting more and more concerned on the relations with the US.

³¹ Frank Carlucci and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Revitalizing U.S.-Turkey Relations", *Washington Times*, June 8, 2005.

³² "Erdoğan: Yanlış Hesap Bağdat'tan Döndü", *Radikal*, July 8, 2003.

³³ "Muhalefet 'müzik notası'na tepkili:'Başbakan Erdoğan dünyadan habersiz'", *Milliyet*, July 7, 2003.

³⁴ Deniz Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary group reunion, July 8, 2003.

³⁵ Ibid.

4.4 The Turkish Concerns over Iraq

Not taking part in the war against Iraq, nevertheless Turkey watched the US invasion with anxiety. The one of the main concerns of Turkey had always been the preservation of the territorial integrity of Iraq so that a Kurdish state would not be the case in Northern part. Turkey fought the PKK terrorist organization more than twenty years. In the name of protecting the Kurds and self-proclaiming a quasi-Kurdish state on Turkish territory, PKK had killed more than thirty thousand innocent Turkish people. Turkey definitely did not want a Kurdish state across its borders which could spark a false enthusiasm in the minds of Turkish citizens having Kurdish origin to stand against their own state. Another concern was the fate of Turcoman people living in Iraq. Turkey strongly defended the rights of the Turcoman inhabitants for preventing the relegation of them to inferior status. Another issue that Turkey was sensitive about was the demographic status of Mosul and Kirkuk, the oil rich regions of the country where dozens of Turcoman families resided.

Apparently, all the Turkish concerns were deteriorated with the invasion of Iraq. Albeit recognizing the PKK as a Kurdish terrorist organization, the US had not done anything to stop them. Concomitantly, in the absence of the material support of Turkey in its quest, the US chose to develop intimate relations with the Iraqi Kurds.³⁶ It was the strong opposition of the Kurdish friends dominating the US-founded Iraqi Governing Council which made the US reject the deployment of Turkish troops to Iraq.³⁷ Moreover, the US did nothing to prevent Kurdish families to settle in Kirkuk radically changing the demographic structure of the region on their behalf and rendering the Turcoman inhabitants as almost minority. Accordingly, there emerged a fear in Turkey that the US' embracing policy for the Kurds could trigger the establishment of a Kurdish state.³⁸ The

³⁶ Rubin, Spring 2005.

³⁷ Kirişçi, March 2004.

³⁸ Ibid.

rejection of Turkish troops to the area tied the arms of Turkish ruling elite watching the developments with preoccupation.

For the main opposition party, the policies of the AKP in this regard were disastrous. According to the CHP officials, Turkey had no policy on Iraq but an attempt to adjust to the foreign policy pursued by the US. The CHP leader criticized the government for not being able to protect the Turkish borders in spite of the decision of the GNAT. Baykal asserted that the safety of Turcoman inhabitants in Iraq was not pursued. In his view, also nothing was done to prevent the Kurdish families from settling down and changing the demographic structure of Kirkuk at the expense of the Turcomans. He also argued that the military officials announced a considerable rise in PKK terrorist acts almost in equal intensity compared to its wildest times. According to Baykal, the safety of Turkish truck drivers in Iraq could not be provided either. Respectively, in his view, one who could not reverse the whole process tried to put blame on the 1 March decision. Conversely, according to him, even if Turkey took part in the invasion accepting the 1 March motion, it was obvious that the US would not permit her to have a say in restructuring Iraq. For the CHP it was the AKP government who was the main body responsible for the undesired developments.³⁹

4.5 Increasing Tensions: the AKP's Critical Moves

On the other hand, the AKP government started to adopt a highly debated stance on Israel, long time *protégé* of the US largely influenced by the party's Islamic tendencies. For instance, Turkish Prime Minister and the AKP leader Erdoğan accused Israel of undertaking 'state terrorism' by bombing the civilian Palestinians.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal was invited to Turkey by the AKP officials. Having killed hundreds of Israeli civilians with suicide bombings, Hamas had won the parliamentary

³⁹ Deniz Baykal's speech in the CHP parliamentary group reunion, March 22, 2005.

⁴⁰ Chris McGreal, "Turkish PM Accuses Israel of Practising State Terrorism", *The Guardian*, June 4, 2004

elections in Palestine.⁴¹ Abdullah Gül, the Foreign Minister, firmly stated that Hamas was elected in a democratic way; therefore it was convenient to meet them as long as they would pursue peace.⁴² Condemning outrageously, one Israeli top official in a threatening tone said: "I wonder what the Turkish authorities would think if we were to invite [the insurgent PKK Leader] Abdullah Öcalan for talks in Israel?"⁴³

In the US, it was believed that the radical tone of the AKP government became an obstacle in front of the West's war on terrorism.⁴⁴ Moreover, Turkey's attempts to heal relations with Syria were also not comforting for the US. Free trade agreement between Turkey and Syria, and especially Turkish Resident Sezer's visit to Syria could be counted as tough moments for the US.⁴⁵ Fortunately, while tensions increased dramatically both inside and outside Turkey especially concerning the Turkey-United States-Iraq triangle, joint US- Turkey attempts to reverse the deterioration proved successful. The NATO Summit was undertaken in Istanbul, and the US President Bush gave a speech praising the alliance. Turkish parliament's decision to allow the United States to use the Turkish airbase at İncirlik as a logistics hub for transporting cargo to Iraq and Afghanistan enabled a relief in relations. Moreover, the signature of a \$1.1 billion deal for upgrading 117 F-16 fighter jets on April 2005 helped a way out of the tension triggered by the 1 March decision.⁴⁶ The US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice visited Turkey and Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan visited the United States on June 2005, meeting with the US President. What is more, the support given by Turkey to the international community against the uranium enrichment travails of Iran further contributed to the attempts for curing the once shattered relations.⁴⁷

⁴¹"Hamas Leaders Invited to Russia", *BBC News*, February 20, 2006.

⁴² Simon Freeman, "Exiled Hamas Leader in Turkey for Talks", *The Times*, February 16, 2006.

⁴³ Quoted in "Turkey Rejects Israeli Criticism", *BBC News*, February 20, 2006.

⁴⁴ Lewis, Spring 2006, p.46.

⁴⁵ "Sezer: Suriye Büyük", *Radikal*, April 15, 2005, and "Sezer Esad'la Görüştü", *Voanews.com*, April 13, 2005, <http://voanews.com/turkish/archive/2005-04/2005-04-13-voa9.cfm>, accessed on June 17, 2006.

⁴⁶ Carlucci and Larrabee, June 8, 2005.

⁴⁷ Ilan Berman, "Mending US-Turkey Ties", *Washington Times*, September 19, 2005.

During the three years in focus, three concepts were raised and debated concerning the US-Turkey relations. These concepts were *strategic partnership*, *Greater/Broader Middle East initiative* and *moderate Islam*. The CHP was able to use its *diplomatic card* to have a compact policy view regarding these concepts. The explanation of views on these concepts will further reveal the status of US- Turkey relations and the CHP's stance regarding the relations.

4.6 Strategic Partnership

Bill Clinton, the former US President, gave a speech in the Turkish parliament urging a new partnership between Turkey and the US to be forged adjusting to the new era.⁴⁸ At that time it was understood that he addressed a *strategic partnership*.⁴⁹ Turkey had been the 'staunch ally' of the US during the Cold War era representing the southern flank of the Western Alliance against the *Iron Curtain*. With the demise of that era, upon changing conditions and perspectives, the nature of US-Turkey relations began to change its shape from a mere security alliance to a more comprehensive partnership. Clinton had signaled this process in his speech. Mostly taken his rhetoric for granted, the US officials started to regard the strategic partnership as dead right after the rejection by the GNAT of a motion letting the US troops use Turkish soil to invade Iraq.⁵⁰ Furthermore, even some authors tended to search for a new *strategic partner* replacing Turkey, such as Romania and Georgia.⁵¹ In Turkey, however, discussions about the concept gained ground after the 1 March rejection. It was not until Bush-Erdoğan

⁴⁸ Remarks by the US President Bill Clinton in address to the GNAT, November 15, 1999.

⁴⁹ Güney, September 2005, p.346.

⁵⁰ See, statement by Rep. Robert Wexler to the US House of Representatives in a hearing on the state of US-Turkish relations, May 11, 2005, http://www.house.gov/international_relations/109/wex051105.pdf, accessed on June 13, 2006 and Speech by Mark Parris, retired US Ambassador to Ankara, in a conference held by Turkish-American Architects, Engineers and Scientists Association in New York, May 17, 2005, <http://www.voanews.com/turkish/archive/2005-05/2005-05-17-voa4.cfm>, accessed on June 13, 2006.

⁵¹ Lewis, Spring 2006.

meeting in White House, June 8, 2005, the concept was highly debated in Turkish media.⁵² Erdoğan⁵³ and his aides⁵⁴ strongly argued as there existed a *strategic partnership* between US and Turkey. Nevertheless, no sound explanation had ever been made on the substance of the concept by both parties.

Strategic partnership is defined in business sector as “a relationship between two or more organizations that involves building mutual long-term goals and commitments”.⁵⁵ However, in order to establish long-term mutual commitments in International Relations, *strategic partnership* must have a more comprehensive meaning.

The US has deeply rooted ties with Britain and Israel and its relations with these states could be counted as having a strategic nature. Having strong political, economic, historical, cultural, linguistic and in a sense ethnic ties with the US, Britain remains its closest partner in world affairs. As the Iraq war proved, Britain can even take the side of the US especially in security matters undermining the views of the European Union, it is a member of. Israel has also very strong ties with the US most of which are established thanks to the powerful Jewish lobbies in the US. Seeing these instances, it will be highly debatable to see Turkey and the US as *strategic partners*.⁵⁶ The views of the two retired ambassadors, now the CHP deputies seem to have a viable ground concerning the *strategic partnership* discussions and also reflect solidly the CHP’s view about the concept.

Şükrü Elekdağ, retired Ambassador, now a CHP deputy for Istanbul, is the first person whose views will be addressed. He mostly touches upon the sources of intimate relations between the US and Britain; and between the US and Israel. According to Elekdağ, the influential position of the Anglo-Saxon and Jewish communities living in

⁵² “İlişki mi Yoksa Ortaklık mı?”, *Sabah*, June 10, 2005.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Press Conference by Mir Dengir Fırat, the Vice Chairman of the AKP, June 13, 2005.

⁵⁵ Quoted in http://www.glencoe.com/sec/busadmin/marketing/dp/mktg_mgmt/gloss.shtml, accessed on June 13, 2006.

⁵⁶ See, Seçkin Barış Gülmez, “Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri = Stratejik Ortaklık?”, *Mücadele* (Local Newspaper), February 12, 2004.

the US constitutes the main ground for this partnership. Moreover, in Elekdağ's view, existing cultural, historical, social, economic and political commonalities among the said states make them indispensable partners in their foreign policy undertakings. For instance, Elekdağ highlights that when the US decided to bomb Libya in 1988, Britain did not hesitate to allow its partner to use its airbases while two NATO allies, France and Portugal refused to do so.⁵⁷ Corresponding, he states, Britain was able to defeat Argentina for Falkland Islands crisis in 1982 thanks to the logistic and intelligence support of the US.⁵⁸ Elekdağ also asserts firmly that six and a half million Jewish people living in the US lobby for Israel in the States and this power makes the US act especially in the Middle East in the advantage of Israel.⁵⁹ In Elekdağ's view, however the same relationship could not be applied for Turkey. According to him, far from having an influential Turkish lobby in the US, conversely Turkey suffers Greek and Armenian lobbies which affect the US policy on Turkey. He gives the example of arms embargo issued to Turkey in 1975 especially as result of works of Greek lobbies following the Turkish military intervention to Cyprus.⁶⁰ Hence, Elekdağ states that there is no strategic partnership between Turkey and the US.

Onur Öymen, a retired Ambassador, vice chairman of the CHP and a deputy for Istanbul is the second person to whose views I will refer. Supporting Elekdağ, he argues that if the US was Turkey's strategic partner, it would not have issued arms embargo to Turkey and hooded the Turkish soldiers. He also argues that the US doesn't do anything to confiscate the PKK militias in Northern Iraq and does not support Turkey in its national causes like Cyprus. Thus, Öymen claims that The US can not be a *strategic partner* for Turkey.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Şükrü Elekdağ's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, March 6, 2003.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Interview with Onur Öymen, *NTV Channel*, June 12, 2005.

As the survey results show, the views of other CHP deputies mostly overlap with those of Öymen and Elekdağ. According to 61 per cent of the CHP deputies, Strategic Partnership means to have both common economic and political interests and maintain a military alliance with other states. Accordingly, an overwhelming majority, namely 75 per cent think that Turkey does not have a strategic partner. 24 per cent think otherwise and mainly see the US, the EU and the NATO as the strategic partners.⁶² All in all, the CHP's stance is clear. Turkey and the US are not strategic partners which is the case only for Britain and Israel. For the CHP, Turkey is seen by the US nothing more than a player within the context of the global security strategy of the US.⁶³

4.7 Greater/Broader Middle East Initiative

Another concept is the *Greater/Broader Middle East Initiative*. First introduced by the US President, George W. Bush, in G8 Summit in Savannah on June 2004, *Greater/Broader Middle East* comprises a region free from geographic concerns and focusing on political concerns. This region includes Arab countries, Turkey, Israel, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and to some extent the Central Asian countries and the lower Caucasus.⁶⁴ Populated mostly by Muslim people, *Greater/Broader Middle East* is according to the US, the main source of international terrorism.⁶⁵ Bush pointed out in a press conference in the aftermath of the G8 Summit, democracy and freedom should be nurtured in this region by the joint efforts of the Western powers.⁶⁶ Accordingly, in his view, when these nations adopted democracy the terrorists would fail to achieve their twisted aims.⁶⁷ The Iraq case would be a role model for democratizing these nations.⁶⁸

⁶² See the Appendix, p.152.

⁶³ Elekdağ, op.cit.

⁶⁴ See, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater Middle East](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Middle_East), accessed on June 14, 2006.

⁶⁵ Gilbert Achcar, "Greater Middle East: the US Plan", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 2004.

⁶⁶ Remarks by the US President in Press Conference after G8 Summit in Savannah, Georgia, June 10, 2004, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040610-36.html>, accessed on June 13, 2006.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

This *Greater/Broader Middle East* initiative would be both a justification not only for invading Iraq and but also constitute a just pretext behind the war against terrorism.⁶⁹ The US also wanted to regain the support of Germany and France, who had opposed the US operation on Iraq.⁷⁰ Turkey was too, on the agenda of the US initiative. Bush stated in his speech in NATO Summit in Istanbul that Turkey was part of both the Western World and the Muslim World. In this respect, according to him Turkey, as a democratic state would become a model for the *Greater/Broader Middle East* countries and a bridge for Europe to the wider world.⁷¹ Most probably, the US saw the change in the Turkish attitudes on military support especially in Iraq. Therefore, it wanted to use Turkey in its initiative in terms of spreading democracy to the region.

The AKP government embraces this initiative with some reservations. The AKP wants this initiative to contribute to the Middle East peace process. Secondly, according to AKP, the initiative should not be shown as a project forced by the US. Finally, the government wishes all the countries in the region work together in this initiative.⁷² Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan seems to embrace the idea of the US that Turkey will be a leader in the region.⁷³ Moreover, according to the AKP; Turkish support to the initiative will help heal the wounds in the US-Turkey relations that were damaged after the 1 March rejection.

The CHP's view on the *Greater/Broader Middle East initiative* is a cautious one if not entirely negative. According to Onur Öymen, the US has three basic aims in the region. First aim is to support Israel, the main ally of the US. Second is to support pro-American states like Egypt and Jordan. Third is to maintain its dominance on the energy

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Achcar, op.cit.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Remarks by the US President in Galatasaray University, Istanbul, June 29, 2004, <http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Jun/29-566559.html>, accessed on June 13, 2006.

⁷² Aslı AYDINTAŞBAŞ, "Erdoğan'ın BOP Pazarlığı", *Sabah*, June 8, 2004.

⁷³ Murat Yetkin, "Büyük Ortadoğu'ya Evet", *Radikal*, June 9, 2005.

resources of the region.⁷⁴ Öymen states, however that terrorism is the primary threat against the US interests. Therefore, the US works for spreading freedom and democracy to the region in order to achieve stability in the region which will be useful in fighting against terrorism.⁷⁵ According to Öymen there are certain deficiencies in this initiative. First, in his view, there can be no democracy without adopting secularism. According to Öymen, it is not possible to embrace democracy implementing religious rules in all segments of the society, especially in Muslim countries.⁷⁶ He argues however that both the US officials and the AKP government think the contrary. Öymen gives some examples. Accordingly, first the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell stated previously that it was possible to establish a religion-based democracy in Iraq. Moreover, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül told Öymen that it was possible to establish a democracy without adopting secularism.⁷⁷ However, in Öymen's view, Turkish democracy is successful thanks to the secularism. Öymen also stresses that the US has strong ties with Middle Eastern states that have totalitarian regimes. Accordingly, he asks whether the US will make these states democratic too. Since these states are comfortable to have the monopoly over the ruling mechanism, he asks how come they will sacrifice this power and give it to people. Moreover, he asks why the US did not spread democracy to the region before, if the answer lies in democracy. Öymen asserts that it is the oil and security concerns which force the US act like that.⁷⁸ As for Turkey's stance to *Greater/Broader Middle East initiative*, Öymen says that it is wrong to throw it to waste bin without reading. In his view, it is also wrong to totally embrace it without discussing on it. Therefore, he states that Turkey should take its place in the initiative in accordance with its national interests. In this respect, Öymen asserts that Turkey can even be a

⁷⁴ Remarks by Onur Öymen in a conference on the Greater/Broader Middle East initiative held by Bilkent University, Ankara, June 6, 2004.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

model as a democratic and secular state but without forcing the countries of the region.⁷⁹ As for the parliamentarians of the CHP, the results of the questionnaire signal a parallel view. An obvious majority (72 per cent) of the CHP deputies regard the *Greater/Broader Middle East initiative* as a project of the United States aiming at taking the Middle East into its politico-economic sphere of influence. 24 per cent define the term as a tactical move by the United States to gain dominance in the Middle Eastern region at the expense of other competing actors, namely Europe and Russia. Hence, the CHP parliamentarians tend to see the project as that of the US in order to pursue its interests in the region.⁸⁰

All in all, the CHP sees the *Greater/Broader Middle East initiative* as an instrument for the US to pursue its fight against terrorism by means other than using hard power. Never the less, though seeing the lack of secularism as a vital deficiency in the initiative, the CHP is not against it and even accepts to play a role model in the region provided that the said countries accept Turkey to be the one.

4.8 Moderate Islam

Being a model to the countries of *Greater/Broader Middle East* however, was not welcomed by some top officials of Turkey, notably, the Turkish President and the Chief of the Joint Staff.⁸¹ These discussions brought another concept to the fore front: *Moderate Islam*.

Although the precise date when it was first introduced is unknown, the usage of the concept of *Moderate Islam* dates back to 1994. According to Daniel Pipes, one of the most arduous supporters of the concept, *Moderate Islam* is the antithesis of Radical Islam. Daniel Pipes argues that Radical Islam is predominant only in 10 or 15 per cent of the whole Muslim Society. The rest is the silent majority, which in his view, should be assembled under the *Moderate Islam* umbrella. According to him, the Moderate Islam

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ See the Appendix, p.162.

⁸¹ Carlucci and Larrabee, June 2005.

concept is the means to build an Islamic community compatible with the democratic world community.⁸² Thomas Friedman, an American columnist, states that Turkish people live in a free and democratic state where extremisms are not tolerated. In this respect, he praises Turkish democracy, modernism and moderate Islam which should be an example to the shattered Middle East countries.⁸³ According to Paul Wolfowitz, the US deputy Secretary of Defense, Turkey is the symbol of the importance of bolstering Moderate Muslims so as to build a better world.⁸⁴

On the other hand, the *Moderate Islam* concept is understood by the two main bodies of Turkey, the President and the Army, as a threat to secularism. The President of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer warns firmly that Turkey is neither an Islamic country nor an example of *Moderate Islam* so as to be used in the *Greater/Broader Middle East project* of the US.⁸⁵

Deputy Chief of the Staff İlker Başbuğ announces the Army's stance that it is not possible to adopt secularism and moderate Islam at the same time. He furthers that it is the secularism which is the main driving force behind the development of democracy.⁸⁶

The AKP government, too rejects the *Moderate Islam* but with different motives. According to Erdoğan, terms like moderate or immoderate Islam are not valid. In his view, there is only one Islam. According to Erdoğan, secularism is not a religion, answering Gen. Başbuğ in his way, thus it is not wise to compare the two. In his view,

⁸² Lawrence Auster, "The Search for Moderate Islam", *Front Page Magazine*, January 28, 2005.

⁸³ Thomas Friedman, "Turkey, a Vital Bridge between Two Civilizations", *Taipei Times*, January 16, 2004.

⁸⁴ Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, The World Affairs Council and the Commonwealth Club, San Fransisco, December 6, 2002.

⁸⁵ "Sezer's Warning: Turkey is neither an Islamic Republic, nor an example of Moderate Islam", *Turkish Daily News*, October 2, 2004.

⁸⁶ Strategic Overview On Defense & Security Affairs by General İlker Başbuğ, June 6, 2005, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/konusma/gnkurIIncibsk_atckonusmasi_eng_06062005.htm, accessed on June 15, 2006.

the duty of secularism is to provide people with living their religions in their desired ways.⁸⁷

The CHP's stance is similar to those of the President and the Generals. The CHP officials understand the concept as something to replace secularism in Turkey. In Öymen's view, the Western powers tend to introduce Turkey to the *Greater/Broader Middle East* countries as a model for moderate Islamic state, pro-western and not secular. According to Öymen, this view is shared by the AKP government. Öymen claims that the AKP wants to see secularism as something to provide people with a smooth ground to live their religious lives however they like. However, in his view, it is not. Its aim is to separate religion from the state. In this respect he asserts that Turkey is a true secular state. Accordingly, he urges that the US accept Turkey as a secular, democratic state and show her as a model for democracy and secularism to the region.⁸⁸

Consequently, it can be concluded that Americans and Turks understand different meanings by the term, *Moderate Islam*. Americans tend to see two forms of Islam. First is Radical and second is Moderate. Accordingly, somebody is either radical or moderate.⁸⁹ They seem more to refer to religious understanding rather than running the state with religious norms, when dwelling on *Moderate Islam*. Therefore, they most probably see Turkey as a Moderate Muslim country. Amazed with solid and stable Turkish democracy, the US officials seem to have a will to establish a similar system to the countries of the *Greater/Broader Middle East* so as to diminish terrorism. However, the missing variable, according to the CHP is secularism. According to CHP, secularism is the tool to establish a modern life style in a predominantly Muslim society.⁹⁰ Moreover, in CHP's views, it is the means to check the well functioning of democracy

⁸⁷ "İlımlı İslam Sözü Erdoğan'ı Kızdırdı", *Radikal*, June 14, 2004 and Press Conference by the Prime Minister Erdoğan, http://www.akparti.org.tr/haber.asp?haber_id=7899&kategori=8, accessed on 15 June 2006.

⁸⁸ Mustafa Balbay, "CHP Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Öymen, Akp'nin Türkiye'nin Kırılma Noktalarını Zorladığını Söyledi: 'Hükümet Halktan Kaçıyor'", *Cumhuriyet*, April 27, 2005.

⁸⁹ Auster, January 28, 2005.

⁹⁰ Remarks by Onur Öymen, June 6, 2004.

free from religious infestations.⁹¹ It may be because of this secularist preoccupation why the President of Turkey and the Turkish Armed Forces fathom the concept as a threat to secularism and oppose to be named as a country adopting *Moderate Islam*.⁹² Although, Americans may not be aware of secularist sensitivities in Turkey, all in all they do not seem to transform Turkey but transform the *Greater/Broader Middle East* countries adopting Turkey as a role model.

4.9 The CHP and the US

All in all, the CHP remains cautious concerning the relations with the US. Seeing the US as a partner though not amounting to have a strategic nature, the CHP is willing to take part in the *Greater/Broader Middle East* initiative if it will be instrumental to bring democracy and peace to the region. However, the party officials refuse to play a moderate Islamic country role for the sake of the US policy. Because, not only the CHP but also other secular bodies like the Armed forces and the president see *Moderate Islam* issue as against secularism which was the main asset for democracy in an Islamic society. This cautious but not antagonistic view helps the CHP remain balanced and free from becoming the center of the tension between the US and Turkey. This cautiousness was quite normal if one looks at the history of the party. While parties like Democrat party of Adnan Menderes and Motherland party of Turgut Özal were pro-American, the CHP was always cautious with the US. Therefore, it will not be wrong to say that it was mainly the CHP governments who faced tension with the US.

İsmet İnönü gave value to the US - Turkey relations. Once he said that the relations should not only be between the governments but also between the nations, which would strengthen the partnership.⁹³ However, over the Cyprus issue the relations became tense. The Johnson letter against Turkey's possible military operation to the

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Carlucci and Larrabee, June 2005.

⁹³ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam : 1950-1964*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, Vol.3, 6th edition, 2000), p. 341.

island deteriorated the relations. Respectively, Turkey chose to approach the Soviet Union and took considerable amount of credits from the Union.⁹⁴ In Turkey even the debate whether to withdraw from NATO was discussed.⁹⁵ Especially, members of the CHP, opposition party of the time, were uncertain to remain within NATO.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, the CHP urged for equality in the US-Turkey alliance instead of leaving it.⁹⁷

The Ecevit era both in the CHP and in the government favored a more independent foreign policy especially within NATO.⁹⁸ This stance was crystallized by two acts that brought about further deterioration of the US-Turkey relations. First, Ecevit permitted the replanting of opium, which had been prohibited under the US pressure.⁹⁹ Second, upon the *coup d'état* in Cyprus perpetrated by the Greek Colonels junta, Ecevit decided to implement an operation to the island due to which the US inflicted arms embargo upon Turkey for three years.¹⁰⁰

The cautiousness and somewhat dissenting stance of the party was preserved during the Baykal leadership. Nevertheless, this doesn't mean that the party undermines the relations between the US and Turkey. According to the questionnaire, the CHP deputies mostly believe that it is the US which is the most important actor for Turkey. The EU and then Russia follow the US in terms of their importance to Turkey.¹⁰¹

⁹⁴ Hale, p.151.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Harris, p.61-62.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Hale, op.cit., p.154.

⁹⁹ Harris, op.cit., p.69.

¹⁰⁰ Hale, op.cit., p.156.

¹⁰¹ See the Appendix, p.158-160.

4.10 Conclusion

Starting from the 1 March motion, the US- Turkey relations deteriorated. The parties gave each other the message that the relations would not be as they had been during the Cold War. Turkey's tolerance of adapting to the changing US priorities had its limits, which were revealed in the eve of the Iraq War. And the US had also limits to harmonize their policies with the Turks, these limits were apparent in Iraq War. In Turkey, the AKP government was not able to formulate a sound policy to determine Turkey's stance towards the changing security perception of the US. The AKP officials first conducted a dual policy, which resulted in the rejection of the 1 March motion. Then they could not react sufficiently to the hooding affair. What is more, the Islamic tendencies of the governing party made the officials pursue anti-Israel policy. On the other hand, the main opposition party, the CHP pursued a somewhat decisive policy on the US- Turkey relations especially compared to the CHP in previous terms. There were two parameters in CHP's views. First, the party officials made use of the AKP's indecisiveness for how to relate the US. Second, the CHP officials averted attacking the US outright and rather embraced legitimate concerns for their criticisms. Accordingly, the CHP was totally against a war on Turkey's borders, which did not hold international legitimacy even if the war was declared by Turkey's ally. The party officials enjoyed using the *opposition card* raising their voices overtly against both the government and the US. The CHP was also able to use the *diplomatic card* thanks to the retired diplomats in the party.

During this period, three concepts were highly debated on the US- Turkey relations. Accordingly, the US, according to its *Greater/Broader Middle East Initiative* tended to see its once *strategic partner*, Turkey as a role model with its democratic values and *moderate Islamic* understanding. On the other hand, though adopting the US as an ally, the CHP believed that the relationship never amounted to *strategic partnership*. The CHP, although having the willingness to contribute to the US initiative, understood the *Moderate Islam* concept, along with other secular bodies, as against Turkey's secular identity. Secularism was the missing part in the *Greater Middle East* riddle, according to the CHP's point of view. It was the secular understanding, the CHP believed, which could keep the Muslim Turkish society as a modern democratic country.

Under this condition, the CHP officials were in favor of being a model for the region in order to promote democracy and peace in the *Greater/Broader Middle East*.

All in all, the CHP's stance towards the US could be seen as reasonable and decisive. Even if the CHP shared little of the US policies, the party officials did not seek to pursue a totally aggressive and independent policy against the US. The CHP officials tried to remain within the limits of legitimate concerns, and not to attack the US outright with political concerns. Taking this stance towards the US, unlike the previous foreign policy occasions, the CHP succeeded not to get marginalized during this process. Accordingly, the CHP enjoyed the AKP take the critics of the US holding the AKP responsible for the rising tensions. Accordingly, unlike previous CHP administrations the party officials averted becoming the main source of tension between Turkey and the US.

In the following chapter, the CHP's stance concerning the 'Armenian Genocide' issue will be analyzed on the basis of the developments from 2003 to early 2006. In this issue, it will be witnessed that surprisingly, perhaps for the first time, the views of the CHP and the AKP overlapped and a unified stance concerning Turkish foreign policy was pursued.

CHAPTER V

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

During the period under the scrutiny of this research, another highlighted issue is the so-called Armenian question and the policy of Republican People's Party (CHP) towards the issue. Through years, the Armenian diaspora lobbied against Turkey for the recognition of the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Turkey as "Armenian genocide".¹ With this motive, they were successful to make numerous parliaments adopt resolutions to share their view through which they aimed at pressuring Turkey. Relations with Armenia also deteriorated since after getting its independence from Soviet Union, Armenia fought with Azerbaijan. Accordingly, they occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region which was inside Azerbaijan. As a result, Azerbaijan lost 16 per cent of its total territory and more than 500.000 Azeris remain internally displaced.² Moreover Armenia hinted at the Eastern Anatolia as part of its territory without recognizing the already existing treaty between the two states.³ Therefore, Turkey decided not to develop any diplomatic relations with Armenia.⁴ As for the "genocide" allegations, Turkey continuously rejected them and put pressure on states who decided to recognize the "genocide". This stalemate was further deteriorated due to the political taboos in all the parties to the question. As one looks at the period in focus by this research, denying the "genocide" was

¹ Since according to the author of this research, Armenian genocide is not scientifically proved, the word "genocide" will be written in quotations.

² See Azerbaijan, CIA World Fact Book, www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/aj.html, (accessed on June 27, 2006)

³ Mustafa Aydın, 'Kafkasya ve Orta Asya ile İlişkiler' in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası : Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Vol. 2, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlar, 2002), p. 408.

⁴ Ibid.

criminalized in especially European countries which brought about trials against Turkish scholars and politicians. Vice-versa was true for Turkey, which tried Turkish journalists and authors who spoke against the official view.

During the period in focus, the CHP sponsored the established official view of Turkey concerning the Armenian question. It was most probably because the said issue was one of the most sensitive ones that would transcend the political struggles between the parties. Most probably that is why the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) chose to do the same which enabled unanimity between the existing two major political blocks in Turkey. This unanimity provided a partnership concerning the Armenian issue thanks to which, maybe for the first time during 2003-2005, Turkish foreign policy was pursued smoothly in collaboration between the major political parties of the time.

Consequently, the CHP's policy towards Armenian question was nationalistic. It could also be viewed as not only the continuation of the stance of its predecessors but also that of Turkey. However, the CHP's stance was hardly a *hardliner* one. Because, its active policy on the issue was most instrumental for the smooth functioning of Turkish foreign policy compared to its policies pointed out in the previous chapters of the research. It was also mostly free from political struggles with the AKP. Hence, the CHP was able to pursue one of its most rational, collaborative and functional policies during 2003-2005.

5.1 The Armenian Question and the Conflicting Views

The most crucial question concerning the Armenian issue is most probably whether there was a deliberate annihilation or was it just a war time situation, which cost the lives of thousands of Armenian people. Not having been revealed sufficiently so far, the issue is about the relocation of Ottoman Armenians to the Southern border during the First World War, when the Russian army and Ottoman army fought in the Eastern front. During this period numerous Armenian people lost their lives, tough exact number is far from being certain. There might be many views but there are seemingly two main views

being just the opposite notably, the view claiming “genocide” and the view seeing the incident as *relocation*.

According to the supporters of the “genocide” view, it was a premeditated act of the Ottoman Empire in order to annihilate the race of Armenians. Zeidner claims, during 1894-96 Armenians ranging from 250.000 to 300.000 had already been massacred deliberately by the Ottomans.⁵ Respectively, it is claimed that the 1915 events were the culmination of a *militaristic doctrine* with the purpose of destroying all the *autonomous components*, especially the ones who were dubbed as agents of Russia.⁶ According to Astourian, this doctrine was implemented with the Young Turks administration in the Ottoman Empire, which triggered the rise of Turkism. In Astourian’s opinion, there was a quest for a “pure Turkish race”, which would not leave any room for other components.⁷ Therefore, according to Astourian, during 1914 and 1925, Ottoman Greeks were exchanged with Turks living in Greece, Kurds were killed massively and the identity of the rest was denied. Finally, in his view, Armenians were annihilated.⁸ There are also Turkish academics who share the view of “Armenian genocide”. According to Belinda Cooper and Taner Akçam, there was a deliberate and premeditated act of annihilation inflicted by the Ottoman authorities. Cooper and Akçam state that Armenian Ottomans benefited from preferential trade agreements between Ottoman Empire and Western powers and Western merchants tended to trade with non Muslims like Armenians. According to Cooper and Akçam this, on the one hand made Armenian Ottomans rich and on the other hand resented and later attacked by the Muslims.⁹ They assert that in the First World War, Russians encouraged Armenians to rebel, which

⁵ Robert F. Zeidner, "Britain and the Launching of the Armenian Question", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.7, No.4, October 1976, p. 465.

⁶ James J. Reid, ‘Total War, the Annihilation and the Armenian Genocide, 1870-1918’, in Richard Hovannisian (ed.), *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*, (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1992), p.21.

⁷ Stephan H. Astourian, ‘Genocidal Process: Reflections on the Armeno-Turkish Polarization’, in *ibid.*, p.72.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.73.

⁹ Belinda Cooper and Taner Akçam, "Turks, Armenians and the "G-Word"", *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 22 Issue 3, Fall 2005, p.82.

exacerbated the negative sentiments for them in Anatolia. Accordingly, in their view, Armenians were attacked and massacred by Ottomans and they fled to Van district where with the help of Russians they rebelled. According to Cooper and Akçam, this triggered the deportation of them which gave Turks a chance to annihilate Armenians. Hence, Cooper and Akçam claim, due to the deliberate act of the Ottoman government, from 800.000 to 1.5 million Armenians were killed.¹⁰ Cooper and Akçam also claim Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic, *admitted* the "genocide" and deemed accountability necessary.¹¹ They also assert that trials were held under the auspices of the occupying forces in 1919, in order to try the ones responsible for the "genocide". In this respect, they claim that sound evidences were grasped in these trials.¹²

To sum up, those who support the "genocide" view believe that Ottoman administration deliberately slaughtered the Ottoman Armenians. The main reason behind their hypothesis is the rising Turkism sentiment coupled with the resentment against the economic superiority of the Armenians. The "genocide" view is strongly supported and spearheaded by the Armenian Diaspora all over the world and by Armenia.

On the other hand, the *relocation* view is that there was neither premeditation nor a will for annihilation but relocation due to military necessity. According to Bernard Lewis, Armenians in the Ottoman Empire were the *Millet-i Sadıka*, the loyal community.¹³ What changed this position in his view was first, the establishment of Russian Armenia on the eastern border of Turkey. This state, Lewis asserts, had a cultural and political influence on the Ottoman Armenians. Secondly, the liberal and national ideas encouraged Armenian nationalist movements. Lewis claims that it was to some extent tolerable for the Ottomans, though reluctantly abandon distant lands to other communities such as Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars. However, according to Lewis, to withdraw from the lands that Armenians strived for would mean the dissolution of the Empire,

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid., p.83.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (New York: Oxford University Press, second edition, 1968), p.356.

since these lands were located in the nexus of the Ottoman homeland. According to Salahi Sonyel's analysis, Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, with the stimulus for establishing free Armenian state in Anatolia served outside powers to weaken the Ottomans.¹⁴ He points out that during the Russian-Ottoman war in 1877-78 Armenians fought against Ottomans joining the ranks of Russia.¹⁵ What is more, Sonyel states that two terrorist organizations, namely Hintchak and Dashnaktsutiun, were established in order to pursue the Armenian cause through assassinations, rebellion, sabotage etc...¹⁶ Hence, according to Sonyel, because of the violent acts of the organizations, Anatolia faced with a civil war.¹⁷ In Sonyel's analysis, during 1894-1896 due to the civil war, 10.000 or 20.000 Armenians perished unlike the Armenian sources raising the number as many as to 400.000.¹⁸ Sonyel asserts that also 5.000 to 10.000 Muslims were killed.¹⁹ Moreover, according to Sonyel, Armenians joined the ranks of Russia in order to fight against Turks in the First World War. He gives the instance of the joint-invasion of the city of Van by Russo-Armenian forces massacring Turks and establishing the state of Armenia there.²⁰ Furthermore, Sonyel asserts that behind the Turkish front against Russian aggression, Armenians attacked Turkish villages burning them down.²¹ Faced with multi frontal war couple with Armenian rebellion by all means, Sonyel states that Ottomans decided to relocate the community on April 24, 1915. Hence according to Sonyel, it was a vital military necessity that Armenians were relocated outside the war zone.²² For the losses, Esat Uras asserts that many people died from malnutrition,

¹⁴ Salahi R. Sonyel, *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1993), p. 281-282.

¹⁵ Ibid., p.283.

¹⁶ Ibid., p.289.

¹⁷ Ibid., p.292.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., p.403-404.

²¹ Ibid., p.405.

²² Ibid., p.408.

climate change and epidemics like typhus, typhoid fever, cholera and smallpox which were widespread in Turkey. Moreover, according to his analysis, many more died because of gang attacks and illegal actions of certain officials. In his view, also large numbers died while fighting against Turkish army as volunteers within the ranks of Russian forces.²³ He also gives the example of French evacuation of Maraş in the independence war along with 5000 Armenians. He asserts that during the four days march, 2-3000 Armenians out of 5000 died along with 200 French, one of whom was a major.²⁴ Accordingly, he maintains that these were the losses under the similar conditions which did not culminate in “genocide”.²⁵ Concerning the numbers, he asserts that total number of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire was 1.300.000. He also claims that the number of the dead could be no more than 300.000 as against 1.5 - 2 Millions which scholars having the “genocide” view maintain.²⁶ To sum up, scholars defending the relocation view claim that it was the Armenian nationalism to establish free Armenian state in Anatolia. With this motive, they fought together with outside powers against Turkey especially during the First World War. According to the scholars, this hardened the position of Turks fighting in many fronts. Due to this military necessity Armenian people were relocated. The *relocation* view is maintained and strongly sponsored by the Turkish Republic.

5.2 The Armenian Issue as a Means of Propaganda, Terror and Political Struggle

Despite all the attempts of Armenians sponsored by the allied powers to provide a homeland in Anatolia right after the Turkish independence war, Turkey did not even let them discuss the issue on the peace talks. Consequently, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923

²³ Esat Uras, *The Armenians in the History and the Armenian Question*, translated from 2nd edition by Süheyla Artemel, (Ankara: Documentary Publications, 1988), p.130.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.132.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.133-135.

ended the dreams of Armenians for an Armenian state in Anatolia.²⁷ This demoralization caused Armenians to be poised until 1965. From that date on, Armenians all over the world started a political campaign calling the 1915 incidents as “the first genocide of the twentieth century”.²⁸ The Armenian Diaspora was instrumental to raise statues of “genocide memorial” all over the world. The first statue outside Armenia for commemorating the “Armenian Genocide” was constructed in Montebello, California, in 1967. Numerous memorial statues were raised in numerous countries. Only in France, the number of statues, squares and etc for the memorial of “Armenian Genocide” now amount to thirty four.²⁹

From early 70s to early 80s, terror incidents took place against Turkish diplomats abroad. An Armenian underground organization called ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) conducted series of murders so as to take vengeance for the Armenians massacred in 1915. The organization members demanded the recognition of the “genocide” by Turkey immediately and return of the “Armenian territories” occupied by Turkey to Armenians.³⁰ ASALA conducted 28 terrorist attacks in 12 states, notably; France, Greece, Austria, Switzerland, Portugal, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Bulgaria and Denmark.³¹ In these attacks, 37 Turkish diplomats were killed and 78 were wounded.³² ASALA also bombed the houses of American historians, who rejected the “genocide” and executed members of Dashnak organization who were arguably working against the Armenian cause.³³

²⁷ See Ömer Turan, ‘The Armenian Question at the Lausanne Peace Talks’ in *The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period*, edited by Türkkaya Ataöv, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 2001), p. 207-238.

²⁸ Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2005), p. 258.

²⁹ Bilal Şimşir, *Ermeni Meselesi: 1774-2005*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, third edition, 2006), p.230.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.234.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Lewy, *op.cit.*, p. 259.

The murderous attacks ceased in time. However, this time, political attacks dominated the agenda. Armenian lobbies all over the world were successful to make the parliaments of different nations adopt laws recognizing the incidents of 1915 as “genocide”. Stretching from Argentina to Russia; France to Canada, numerous states acknowledged the “genocide”.³⁴ Tough not recognizing the “genocide”, the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution in 1975 declaring April 24 as a “National Day of Remembrance of Man’s Inhumanity to Man”.³⁵ The US House of Representatives issued numerous proposals for recognizing the "Armenian genocide". However, all of them were hampered due to the Turkish reaction warning that this would end the close partnership. One of the most recent examples happened in 2000. A republican representative from California James E. Rogan proposed the recognition of the 1915 events as "genocide", in order to get Armenian American votes for getting reelected. If adopted, the resolution would make the US President add “genocide” to his annual commemorating speech. However, due to Turkey's strong reaction, President Bill Clinton recommended the House of Representatives to withdraw the proposal. Consequently, the resolution was withdrawn and Rogan failed to get reelected.³⁶

5.3 Current Developments Concerning the Existing Taboos on the Armenian Question

Especially in Europe, the “Armenian genocide” gradually became a taboo about which no questions could be raised. European countries searched for punishing the ones who refused to name the issue as “genocide”. In 1994, an eminent American historian, Bernard Lewis was imposed a token fine by the French authorities because his views on the issue made him lose his objectivity.³⁷ Lewis had spoken to French journal *Le Monde*

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ “Defeat of House Resolution on ‘Armenian Genocide’ ”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol.95, No.2, April 2001, p.396-7.

³⁷ Lewy, p. 266.

that there was no tangible evidence for Ottomans to commit genocide on Armenians.³⁸ In 2004 Prof. Dr. Yusuf Halaçođlu, the president of Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) stated in a conference in Zurich that “Armenian genocide” allegations were far from being real. Respectively, he was charged by the Swiss court to be jailed for 5 months.³⁹ In 2005, this time Dođu Perinçek, leader of the Turkish Proletarian Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) again in Switzerland, declared that the “Armenian genocide” was a lie.⁴⁰ He was detained by the Swiss legal authorities and later on was sued by the Swiss court. In Turkey, Switzerland was condemned for acting against its democratic values.⁴¹

In Turkey, comparably there were also some instances that could be labeled as a taboo for accepting the “Armenian genocide”. The first development was the controversial conference planned to be undertaken at Bođaziçi University, Istanbul. In the conference, events in the late period of Ottoman Empire touching upon the Armenian question would be discussed. However, the interesting thing was that only the speakers accepting the “Genocide” were invited to make presentations. It was remarkable to see the reactions both from the government party and the main opposition. The CHP Deputy Şükrü Elekdađ asserted the lack of scientific base in the conference in which only one line of thinking would be permitted to speak. He also claimed that under the pretext of being scientific people would serve the cause of the Armenians.⁴² Most probably, the most striking point came from Minister of Justice, Cemil Çiçek. According to his view, organizing this conference would mean a backstabbing of Turkey.⁴³ Upon these statements, The University decided to postpone the conference. After strong criticism from the EU officials, the said conference was decided to be undertaken two months later in the same place. However, a court decision to cancel the conference

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Gündüz Aktan, “Legal Battles”, *Turkish Daily News*, May 11, 2006.

⁴⁰ Nermin Aydemir, “Losing Freedom Of Speech”, *Turkish Weekly*, May 5, 2006.

⁴¹ Oktay Ekşi, “Onlardaki de Bu... ”, *Hürriyet*, May 3, 2006.

⁴² “Çiçek: Keşke Dava Açma Yetkimi Devretmeseydim”, *Milliyet*, May 24, 2005.

⁴³ Ibid.

spoiled the plans. This time, Prime Minister Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Gül reacted to the cancellation and criticize the court decision as being undemocratic.⁴⁴ At the end of the day, few days later the debated conference was held in Bilgi University, Istanbul. While the conference was underway, demonstrations mostly led by nationalist groups took place outside the conference hall. Eggs were thrown to people coming to listen to the speakers and Erdal İnönü, son of İsmet İnönü and one of the most prominent figures in Turkish Social Democracy was one of them. The CHP leader, Baykal stated to be glad that the conference was realized. Never the less he asserted that the conference was one sided which supported the Armenian cause.⁴⁵

Another conference concerning the Armenian issue was held in Istanbul University, several months later. Different from the previous one, this conference included both lines of thinking on the issue, though those sharing the Turkish stance were dominant.⁴⁶ The views of CHP were reflected at the conference by the retired ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ who was present as a speaker. All in all, the conference was deemed to be more scientific since both views could be stated freely and it was stated to be a good start for Turkey.⁴⁷

The conference issue was not over though. After the court decision to cancel the conference some columnists criticized the decision in their articles. Correspondingly, a law suit was opened against five journalists, notably Hasan Cemal, İsmet Berkan, Murat Belge, Haluk Şahin and Erol Katırcıoğlu with pretext that their articles amounted to a criminal act of influencing the fair trial principle.⁴⁸ The law suit issue was not over. Another law suit was opened against Hrant Dink, Turkish journalist of Armenian origin

⁴⁴ “Ermeni Konferansı Durduruldu”, *BBC Turkish*, September 22, 2005, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2005/09/050922_armenians.shtml, accessed on June 21, 2006.

⁴⁵ Hadi Özışık, “Baykal Neden Fikir Değiştirdi?”, *Star*, September 26, 2005.

⁴⁶ Sedat Laçiner, “Alternatif Ermeni Konferansı”, *USAK Stratejik Gündem*, March 17, 2006.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ “5 Gazeteci Hakkında Dava Açıldı”, *Sabah*, December 3, 2005.

and editor of *Agos* journal, Turkey, because of his words amounting to an insult against Turkish identity.⁴⁹

The most popular law suit issue on the Armenian issue however, was against Orhan Pamuk, the novelist, because of his speech abroad accepting the “Armenian Genocide”. In an interview on a TV channel, Pamuk asserted that “one million Armenians and thirty thousand Kurds had been killed in 1915.” He further claimed that nobody but he dared to talk about it.⁵⁰ While criticized in Turkey by many, Pamuk was strongly supported abroad and even nominated for a Nobel Prize. Turkish court sued him for *insulting Turkishness*⁵¹ according to the Article 301 of the New Penal Code.⁵² This trial too made Turkey face with strong criticism especially from the EU of which Turkey worked for becoming a member.⁵³ The EU officials threatened Turkey that it was going to be Turkey not Pamuk who would be tried.⁵⁴ Moreover, World’s prominent authors Jose Saramago, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Günter Grass, Umberto Eco, Carlos Fuentes, Juan Goytisolo, John Updike and Mario Vargas Llosa strongly condemned the law suit as a violation of human rights.⁵⁵ Under foreign pressure, the law suit was dropped.⁵⁶

The CHP chose to remain reticent about the trials, most probably because these were the duty of the judiciary branch and it would mean an interference to speculate

⁴⁹ Erdal Güven, “Bazı Haberler ve Türkiye’nin Hali”, *Radikal*, June 11, 2006.

⁵⁰ “Turk Writer’s Insult Trial Halted”, *BBC News*, December 16, 2005.

⁵¹ Sarah Rainsford, “Author’s Trial Set to Test Turkey”, *BBC News*, December 14, 2005.

⁵² Article 301 states, "A person who explicitly insults being a Turk, the Republic or Turkish Grand National Assembly, shall be imposed to a penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to three years."

⁵³ Jonny Dymond, “EU Blasts Turkish Author’s Trial”, *BBC News*, September 13, 2005.

⁵⁴ “Turk Writer’s Insult Trial Halted”, *BBC News*, December 16, 2005.

⁵⁵ “Literary World Backs Pamuk”, NTV Channel, December 13, 2005. <http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/353692.asp>, accessed on June 21, 2006.

⁵⁶ “Orhan Pamuk Davası Düştü”, *BBC Turkish*, January 23, 2006. http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkish/europe/story/2006/01/060123_orhanpamuk.shtml, accessed on June 21, 2006.

about them. Nonetheless, CHP deputy Mustafa Özyürek issued a question to the Minister of Justice, Cemil Çiçek about the events during Pamuk's trial. He asked why they could not or did not take necessary security measures to prevent any act of violence against Pamuk at the court hall, due to which Turkey would face with strong criticisms from outside.⁵⁷

The existing taboos concerning the issue are replete. They reflect the similar determinism of both views. The ones claiming genocide take it for granted and refuse even to discuss its validity. Especially the Armenian lobbies all over the world and Armenia could be counted as an example. Similarly, the ones refusing "genocide" too take their view for granted and refuse even to discuss it. Especially the official stance of Turkey is an example for this. Hence both parties though having conflicting views choose to take a similar deterministic way for establishing their arguments against each other.⁵⁸ It is this determinism which revives taboos and inhibits chances for solution. In any case the Armenian issue is still a puzzle which becomes even harder to solve because of the ongoing antagonisms and resentments of both sides instead of searching for an objective solution to the problem. In Turkey, the official stance continues to prevail. Nonetheless, new initiatives are currently undertaken on behalf of finding an objective solution in spite of continuing opposition of Armenia. The main opposition party, CHP seems to play an active and a determining role, probably for the first time since the elections, on the Armenian issue in collaboration with the AKP government.

5.4 The CHP's Stance on the Armenian Issue

Adopting a hard-line stance on foreign policy, it is not surprising to see that the CHP adopts and sponsors the official view of Turkey. Onur Öymen is the number one official determining the CHP's stance on Armenian issue, as on other foreign policy issues.

⁵⁷ For the question issued by Mustafa Özyürek, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/yazili_soru_sd.onerge_bilgileri?kanunlar_sira_no=37734, (accessed on June 26, 2006)

⁵⁸ See, Necati Polat, "Strateji, Tarih, Soykırım: Türkiye'nin Ermeni Sorunu", *Birikim*, No: 199, November 2005, p.52.

Accordingly, he claims that while Russia invaded Eastern Anatolia in the First World War, Armenian militias attacked Turkish villages and killed numerous Turkish people. That's why Ottoman administration decided to send Armenians to south, away from the war zone. Öymen states that there was no decision by the Ottomans to inflict genocide upon an ethnic group like Armenians. Because, he says, thousands of Armenians lived comfortably on the other parts of the country. Öymen claims that neither Turkish nor foreign researchers could find any evidence proving that Turks massacred Armenians.⁵⁹ He points out even British officials who invaded Istanbul during the First World War could not find any evidence in favor of "genocide". That's why, he states, Britain had to release Turkish officers in Malta where they were kept as the perpetrators of "genocide".⁶⁰

Öymen asserts that during Atatürk and İnönü periods nobody could dare to raise these issues against Turkey since there was a strong government in Turkey. In his view, then these allegations could be raised. In his opinion, Turkey is like a boxer who is always on defense without thinking to hit but thinking not to get hit. According to Öymen, this position should change. For example, he argues that concerning the allegations that France inflicted genocide upon Algeria; French officials could say that the issue should be left to historians. However, he states arguably that nobody criticizes Armenia when it rejects to leave the issue to historians.⁶¹ He also argues that the world does not tend to talk about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the ASALA terror. Instead, he states, numerous states tend to adopt legislations recognizing the 1915 incident as a "genocide perpetrated by the Ottomans". He also asserts that some EU officials even threaten not to accept Turkey as a member if the "Armenian Genocide" is not recognized. Öymen explains that the CHP wants the government, opposition, the NGOs and the media to work together to stand against these allegations. In his view, also the Turkish citizens of Armenian origin are uncomfortable with the issue. Hence he calls

⁵⁹ Remarks by vice chairman of the CHP, Onur Öymen in an interview, TRT Türkiye'nin Sesi Radyosu (Radio Voice of Turkey), February 11, 2005.

⁶⁰ Remarks by Öymen in a conference, TUSAM, Ankara, September 21, 2005.

⁶¹ Ibid.

them to support the idea of opening the historical records so as to reveal what actually happened.⁶² In this respect, according to the CHP, the only solution is to provide historians with all the historical records available in all countries. In order to do this, the CHP is in favor of forming a commission under the aegis of the UN or UNESCO composed of historians all over the world.⁶³

5.5 The AKP – CHP Alliance Concerning the Armenian Question

With a motive to reinforce the official stand of Turkey, the CHP officials sought to conduct an active policy concerning the Armenian issue in conformity with the government. Accordingly, they invited Justin McCarthy, an American historian of Louisville University, to give a conference in the Turkish parliament. Giving a speech totally supportive of the Turkish arguments, McCarthy played a role for bringing various Turkish political figures together at the conference. The important thing was that both the government officials and the CHP officials were present at the program and seemed to stand together about this controversial subject.

The harmony between the governing and the opposition parties was crystallized when they accepted a CHP-sponsored plan, which foresaw a joint action concerning the Armenian issue. This was maybe the first and the foremost joint action on a foreign policy issue by the two main political bodies in Turkey throughout 2003-2005. The parties agreed that the European Union (EU) was in favor of putting the recognition of the “so-called Armenian Genocide” as an obligation for Turkey to become an EU member. This was unacceptable to both parties. The Turkish political elites also agreed that the search for the truth behind the Armenian allegations would have to left to historians not to politicians. In this respect, it was accepted that an international commission composed of Turkish, Armenian historians and historians from other states would be established under the aegis of the United Nations (UN) or UNESCO. It was

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Remarks by CHP Leader Deniz Baykal in an interview, CNN Turk TV Channel, March 21, 2005.

stated that the commission would work not only on the Turkish and Armenian historical records but also those of other states like Russia, Britain etc... Agreed on these views, the Turkish Parliament decided to pursue an active policy in terms of tackling the Armenian issue. In this respect, a letter to the two legislative cameras of Britain was singed and sent by the Turkish parliamentarians, led by Erdoğan and Baykal.⁶⁴ According to the letter, Turkey wanted to reveal the facts about the famous “Blue Book”. Written by British historians, James Bryce and Arnold Toynbee in 1916, it was published by the “Wellington House”⁶⁵, the main propaganda organ of Britain in the World War One. Re-edited by the Armenians in 2000, the book consists of details on the “Armenian Genocide” by the Ottoman Empire in 1915. Asserting that even Toynbee himself later confessed that it was full of lies, Turkey demanded the British parliamentarians to announce, as they had done for the very same book written against Germany, that the book had been written only for a propaganda tool and not foreseeing the reality. Although rejected by the British parliamentarians⁶⁶, the letter symbolized the harmony in the Turkish parliament concerning the Armenian question. Furthermore, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan wrote a letter to Koçaryan, the President of Armenia to accept their offer for establishing a committee of historians to reveal facts about the issue. Erdoğan stated that this initiative could trigger a normalization of the relations.⁶⁷ However, Koçaryan’s reply was negative and determined that there should be no condition for the normalization of the relations. Furthermore, Koçaryan stated that it should be the politicians not the historians to develop bilateral relations.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ See the Annex; “TBMM Üyeleri Tarafından Büyük Britanya Avam Kamarası ile Lordlar Kamarasına Gönderilen Mektup” in Şimşir, op.cit.

⁶⁵ See M. L. Sanders, “Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1, March, 1975 , p. 119-146.

⁶⁶ “İngiltere’den Mavi Kitap Mektubuna Cevap Geldi”, *Vatan*, January 30, 2006.

⁶⁷ See the Annex; “Türkiye Başbakanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’dan Ermeni Devlet Başkanı Robert Koçaryan’a Mektup” in Şimşir, op.cit.

⁶⁸ See the Annex; “Ermenistan Devlet Başkanı Robert Koçaryan’dan Türkiye Başbakanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’a Mektup” in ibid.

The joint action was furthered later against France. The French Senate had recognized the “genocide” in 2001. This time another proposal was issued to the Senate by the French Socialist Party members. The proposal was issued so as to make the Senate pass a bill that would criminalize the denial of the “Armenian genocide”.⁶⁹ According to the proposal, any person who denied the “genocide” would be put into jail for up to five years along with 45 000 euros fee.⁷⁰ The proposal was protested remarkably both in Turkey and France. Turkish business elite issued an announcement in the French daily *Le Monde* so as to protest the French proposal.⁷¹ Besides, nine Turkish intellectuals who seemingly acknowledged the “genocide” wrote an article in another French Daily *Liberation*. They warned that if adopted the bill would hamper the free discussions over the issue and thus would cause grave consequences.⁷² In France, there was a strong criticism from French historians. Composed of more than 600 historians, *l'association d'historiens* announced that they were *profoundly chocked* by the proposal which would undermine and hamper both democracy and science of history.⁷³ In official level, Turkey called the Turkish Ambassadors in France and Canada back to Turkey *for consultations*.⁷⁴ The Turkish government threatened that French products could be boycotted in Turkey.⁷⁵ Most importantly, the Turkish parliament sent a committee to France for lobbying composed of four deputies, two from the AKP, and two from the CHP. The AKP members were Mehmet Dülger and Musa Sıvacıoğlu. The

⁶⁹ Peter Ford and Yigal Schleifer, “Missteps Hobble Turkey-EU Waltz” *Christian Science Monitor*, May 17, 2006.

⁷⁰ Didier Billion, “Plutôt Que de Judiciariser le Débat, la France Devrait Aider le Processus de Dialogue en Cours: Réconcilier les Mémoires”, *Libération*, May 18, 2006.

⁷¹ See *Le Monde*, May 6, 2006.

⁷² Murat Belge, Halil Berktaş, Elif Şafak, Hrant Dink, Müge Göcek, Ahmet İnsel, Etyen Mahcupyan, Baskın Oran and Ragıp Zarakolu, “L'adoption de la Loi Pénalisant la Négation du Génocide Arménien Serait Contre-Productive. Le Travail sur L'histoire Sera Bloqué en Turquie”, *Libération*, May 10, 2006.

⁷³ “Génocide Arménien : Une Proposition de Loi PS Irrite les Historiens et Ankara”, *Le Figaro*, May 10, 2006.

⁷⁴ Marc Semo, “Ankara Durcit le Ton contre Paris”, *Libération*, May 9, 2006.

⁷⁵ Jeanne Lhoste, “Les Intérêts Français Menacé en Turquie”, *Le Figaro*, May 10, 2006.

CHP deputies were Onur Öymen and Gülsün Bilgehan. The committee met with the leading political figures in the French senate and worked for convincing the French deputies not to adopt the bill.⁷⁶ The Turkish committee asserted that the bill would be in contravention of the article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.⁷⁷ The said article secures the *freedom of expression* as a human right. At the end of the day, it was possible to see a total harmony not only among the business elite, intellectuals, and civilians but also between the two main political blocks of Turkey. All these efforts culminated in a positive result for Turkey. The French senate, thanks to the votes of the governing party deputies delayed the proposal to next September.⁷⁸ Seemingly, the French parliamentarians had been convinced that relations with Turkey would be more important than the *denial*. Consequently, the comprehensive alliance between the AKP and the CHP was quite successful to show Turkey's persuasiveness concerning Turkish foreign policy. Albeit undertaken in 2006, the joint stance against the French proposal was an important indicator of the alliance between the AKP and the CHP on the Armenian issue.

5.6 Conclusion

The Armenian question is still prone to propaganda for political gains. The Armenian diaspora continues its lobbying activities through which Armenians seek political pressure on Turkey. On the other hand, the Armenian issue is wielded by some European states so as to exert pressure on Turkey on her way to the EU membership. Moreover, in some states, denying the "genocide" constitutes a crime against humanity. Turkey, on the other hand, continues to maintain her resolute tone against the "genocide" claims and works for the prevention of political actions triggered by the diaspora. A stalemate of this kind has been unfortunately deteriorated due to events out

⁷⁶ "TBMM Heyeti Paris'te Lobi Çalışması Yaptı", *Radikal*, May 13, 2006.

⁷⁷ "Tasarı AİHS'ye Aykırı", *Sabah*, May 13, 2006.

⁷⁸ "L'Assemblée Enterre La Loi Sur Le Génocide Arménien Jusqu'à L'automne", *Libération*, May 18, 2006.

of taboos in the concerning parties, as one has witnessed in the Pamuk trial and Perinçek incident.

Nevertheless, the stance adopted by the CHP currently could be viewed as a policy to enable Turkey to conduct an active and instrumental policy on the Armenian question. Adopting the official view of Turkey, the CHP officials sought to improve Turkey's existing stance by suggesting the solution of the question through historical scrutiny. This time, maybe for the first time, Turkish public witnessed a comprehensive alliance between the AKP government and the CHP. Turkey unanimously urged for scientific research rather than political struggle concerning the solution of the Armenian question. Though neglected by Armenian officials, this joint initiative in a sense opened up a new phase for Turkey concerning her stance on the ongoing issue. Moreover, albeit undertaken in 2006, the joint stance against the French proposal for criminalizing the denial of "genocide" was also an important instance to indicate the alliance between the AKP and the CHP. At the end of the day, tired of being always on the defense, Turkey took steps towards the offense in order to solve the issue with a unified voice in the parliament.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this study, foreign policy orientation of the CHP was discussed along with the main developments in Turkish foreign policy during 2003-2005. There were mainly four areas of focus. Accordingly, first the CHP's attitudes towards Turkey's EU membership process and second, the CHP stance on the ongoing Cyprus problem were discussed. Third, the US- Turkey relations regarding the CHP's views and finally Armenian question considering the CHP's initiatives were closely analyzed. Regarding all these issues, it could be said that the CHP seemed concerned with preserving the status quo. During this period, the party officials reacted against some developments outright while remained cautious towards some other. It could even be put that the party officials adopted a hardliner stance especially concerning the EU and the Cyprus issue. Moreover, the CHP leader spelled out his party's growing inclinations with patriotism¹ and nationalism². In order to understand the reasons of these dissenting and cautious tendencies of the CHP, first it will be useful to remember Duverger's analysis. According to him, opposition parties who remain too much in the opposition tend to act more violently and extravagantly.³ It could be true for the CHP, which did not happen to be the governing party since late 1970s. Coupled with this reason, the main motivations behind the CHP's stance seem to differ from one issue to another. For instance, the CHP of today claims that they have always been in favor of Turkish EU membership starting

¹ "Vatansever Solcuyuz", *Hürriyet*, July 14, 2006.

² "Milliyetçilik Oku Öne Çıktı", *Sabah*, July 26, 2006.

³ Duverger, p.457.

from the very signature by İnönü of the association agreement.⁴ The CHP believes that it is the right of Turkey to become a member⁵ and this issue is the concern of Turkey transcending all the political parties.⁶ Moreover, as the results of the survey show, 65 per cent of the CHP deputies believe that Turkey will become an EU member. What's more, 97 per cent are in favor of Turkey's EU membership. However, first, the party officials believe that the EU inflicts a double standard attitude upon Turkey concerning Turkey's membership process. From the speeches of the leading figures of the party it could be understood that the CHP is convinced that the EU is unwilling to accept Turkey's membership. Second, the CHP claims that the AKP government seeks to satisfy its Islamic tendencies linking them to the EU membership process. These terms are not acceptable for the CHP and make the party react aggressively.

In the Cyprus issue, the CHP adopts a more aggressive and hard-line stance in foreign policy most probably because the party tends to preserve the long established policy understanding of the CHP in the past. More importantly, these policies mostly constitute the back bone of the Turkish foreign policy understanding for so long. However, the CHP first believes that these policies begin to change due to policies of the AKP government. Concomitantly, seeing the attitudes of foreign powers towards Turkey, the CHP chooses to react more aggressively. The CHP is greatly concerned with the establishment of a link between Turkey's EU membership process and solution to the Cyprus problem. Seeing the two as separate issues, leading figures of the party harshly criticize the attitudes of the EU. Because they worry that the attitudes of the EU towards the issue will further isolate the island, providing a cover for the Greek Cypriots. Secondly, according to the CHP, the AKP government dares to drift from the long established Turkish policy on the Cyprus issue for the sake of getting the EU membership. In fact, it is the CHP's Cyprus policy which directs Turkey since 1960s. The period starting from the hardship between İnönü and Johnson over Cyprus to the military intervention on the island by the Ecevit government constitutes a reference

⁴ Baykal's speech in the CHP Parliamentary Group reunion, July 1, 2003.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Baykal's speech in the CHP Parliamentary Group reunion, June 3, 2003.

point. From then on, the proceeding Turkish governments adopted their Cyprus policies accordingly. However, with the AKP government this policy standardization on Cyprus began to fade away. The new perspectives that the AKP government formulated for the Cyprus issue raised concerns which further radicalized the CHP's stance.

Concerning the US-Turkey relations, the CHP seems to continue the cautious stance of the CHP in the past. Unlike the pro-US governments like the DP and the ANAP, the CHP governments remained cautious with the US. This cautiousness also created tensions between the two states especially over the Cyprus issue. The cautious stance of the CHP in the past continued in the CHP under Baykal leadership. The CHP deputies voted against the 1st March motion, the rejection of which raised tensions between the two states. Moreover, the CHP officials keep claiming that there is no *strategic partnership* between the two states. The deputies of the party also mostly believe that the *Greater/Broader Middle East initiative* is the project of the US in order to pursue its interests in region. Moreover, the CHP officials worry about the *Moderate Islam* concept through which the US favors Turkey as a model in the region. They believe that the concept is against the secularism of Turkey. Nevertheless, the CHP members of the parliament believe that the US is the most important state for Turkey. What's more, taking this stance towards the US, unlike the previous foreign policy occasions, the CHP succeeded not to get marginalized during this process. Accordingly, the CHP enjoyed the AKP take the critics of the US holding the AKP responsible for the rising tensions. Accordingly, unlike previous CHP administrations the party officials averted becoming the main source of tension between Turkey and the US.

In the Armenian issue, the CHP adopted the official view of Turkey. What's more, the CHP officials sought to improve Turkey's existing stance by suggesting the solution of the question through historical scrutiny. The distinct feature of the CHP's view on Armenian issue is that unlike previous issues, the CHP allied with the AKP government raising the voice of Turkey. While criticizing the deeds of the AKP in previous occasions, the CHP collaborated with the government officials in the Armenian question.

As could be seen above, the CHP sought to preserve the policies of the past CHP governments and the official policies of Turkey. Therefore, one can not witness a shift

from the past CHP stance but a continuation of it. Accordingly we can say that the CHP acted as an actor seeking to maintain the status quo. Any drift from these policies perpetrated by outside and inside actors caused the CHP to act more aggressively.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

Ataöv, Türkkaya (ed.), *The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period*, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 2001)

Ayata, Ayşe Güneş, *CHP: Örgüt ve İdeoloji*, (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1992)

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya, *İkinci Adam : 1950-1964*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, Vol.3, 6th edition, 2000)

Bağcı, Hüseyin, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, (Ankara: METU Press, 2001)

Dodd, Clement H., *Storm Clouds over Cyprus: A Briefing*, (Huntingdon : Eothen Press, 2002)

.....(ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992)

Duverger, Maurice, *Les Partis Politiques*, (Paris: Libraire Armand Colin, fifth edition, 1964)

Goulard, Sylvie, *Le Grand Turc et la République de Venise*, (Paris : Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004)

Hale, William, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000)

Hovannisian, Richard (ed.), *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*, (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1992)

Karpat, Kemal (ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975)

Kissinger, Henry, *Diplomasi*, translated into Turkish by Ibrahim Kurt, (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2002)

Lewis, Bernard, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (New York: Oxford University Press, second edition, 1968)

Lewy, Guenter, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2005)

Nezirođlu, İrfan, *Parlamento Terimleri Sözlüğü*, (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2005)

Oran, Baskın (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası : Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Vol. 2, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlar, 2002)

Sonyel, Salahi R., *Minorities and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire*, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 1993)

Soysal, Mümtaz, *Dış Politika ve Parlamento*, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1964)

Şimşir, Bilal, *AB, AKP ve Kıbrıs*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2003)

....., *Ermeni Meselesi: 1774-2005*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, third edition, 2006)

Turan, İlhan, *İsmet İnönü: Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşileri 1961-1965* (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 2004)

Uras, Esat, *The Armenians in the History and the Armenian Question*, translated from 2nd edition by Süheyla Artemel, (Ankara: Documentary Publications, 1988)

Çözüme Doğru Kıbrıs Notları, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 2004)

CHP'nin Irak Günlüğü, (Ankara: TBMM, CHP Grup Başkanlığı, 2003)

Tam Üyeliğe Evet, Özel Statüye Hayır: CHP'nin Türkiye – AB İlişkileri Hakkındaki Görüş, Öneri ve Uyarıları, (Ankara: Yorum Matbaacılık, 2006)

JOURNAL ARTICLES

Abramowitz, Morton I., Bandler, Donald K., Burwell, Frances G., Drozdak, William and Melby, Eric, "Turkey And The United States At The Crossroads: The Impact Of EU Accession Negotiations", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.6, No.4, October-December 2004

Akçakoca, Amanda, "Cyprus – Looking To A Future Beyond The Past", *European Policy Center*, Issue Paper No. 32, May 12, 2005.

Astourian, Stephan H., 'Genocidal Process: Reflections on the Armeno-Turkish Polarization' in Richard Hovannisian (ed.), *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*, (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1992)

Ayata, Ayşe G., "The Republican People's Party", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.3, No.1, 2002.

Aydın, Mustafa, 'Kafkasya ve Orta Asya ile İlişkiler' in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası : Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Vol. 2, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınlar, 2002)

Cooper, Belinda and Akçam, Taner, "Turks, Armenians and the "G-Word"", *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 22 Issue 3, Fall 2005

Efegil, Ertan, "Why Did the Turkish Parliament Reject the Memorandum of March 1?", *Insight Turkey*, Vol.6, No.1, January-March 2004

Güney, Aylin, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From 'Cold War' to 'War on Iraq'", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.6, No.3, September 2005

Jones, Eric, "Debating the Transatlantic Relationship: Rhetoric and Reality", *International Affairs*, Vol.80, No.4, 2004

Harris, George S., 'Turkey and the United States' in Kemal Karpat (ed.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975)

Kay, Sean, "What Went Wrong with NATO?", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.18, No.1, April 2005

Lewis, Jonathan Eric, "Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner?", *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol.13, No.2, Spring 2006

Kirişçi, Kemal, "Between Europe and the Middle East: the Transformation of Turkish Policy", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.8, No.1, March 2004

Parris, Mark R., "Starting over: US-Turkish Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol.2, No.1, Spring 2003

Polat, Necati, "Strateji, Tarih, Soykırım: Türkiye'nin Ermeni Sorunu", *Birikim*, No: 199, November 2005.

Prager, Rachel, "Turkish – American Relations: Historical Context and Current Issues", *TUSIAD Background paper*, 2003

Reid, James J., 'Total War, the Annihilation and the Armenian Genocide, 1870-1918', in Richard Hovannisian (ed.), *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*, (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1992)

Richmond, Oliver P., "Shared Sovereignty and the Politics of Peace: Evaluating the EU's 'Catalytic' Framework in the Eastern Mediterranean", *International Affairs*, Vol.82, No.1, January 2006

Robins, Philip, "Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq", *International Affairs*, Vol.79, No.3, 2003

....., 'Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis' in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, (Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, 1992)

Rubin, Michael, "A Comedy of Errors: American – Turkish Diplomacy and The Iraq War", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Spring 2005

Sanders, M. L., "Wellington House and British Propaganda during the First World War", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 18, No. 1, March, 1975

Sözen, Ahmet, "A Model of Power-Sharing In Cyprus: From The 1959 London-Zurich Agreements To The Annan Plan", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 2004, p.71.

Tocci, Nathalie, "Cyprus and Turkey: Europe's Historic Opportunity – Part I. Cyprus", *Centre for European Policy Studies*, January 2005.

Turan, Ömer, 'The Armenian Question at the Lausanne Peace Talks' in Türkkaya Ataöv (ed.), *The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period*, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Printing House, 2001)

Zeidner, Robert F., "Britain and the Launching of the Armenian Question", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.7, No.4, October 1976

"The AKP Government's Attempts to Move Turkey from Secularism to Islamism (Part II): Defying European Human Rights Court Decision on Headscarf Ban; PM Erdogan: 'Ulema, Not Courts, Have Right to Speak on Headscarf'", Special Dispatch Series - No. 1048, *Middle East Media Research Institute*, December 13, 2005.

"The AKP Government's Attempts to move Turkey from Secularism to Islamism (Part III): PM Erdogan: Islam is Turkey's Supra-Identity", Special Dispatch Series - No. 1086, *Middle East Media Research Institute*, February 7, 2006.

"Defeat of House Resolution on 'Armenian Genocide' ", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol.95, No.2, April 2001

Legislative Reforms: EU Avalanche, Civil-Military Revolution, or Islamist Assertion?", *Strategic Insights*, Volume 2, Issue 9, September 2003.

COLUMNS

Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, "Uniting Cyprus: A Settlement That Needs a Final Push", *International Herald Tribune*, February 3, 2004.

....., "Erdoğan'ın BOP Pazarlığı", *Sabah*, June 8, 2004.

Chris McGreal, "Turkish PM Accuses Israel of Practising State Terrorism", *The Guardian*, June 4, 2004

Dan Bilefsky, "EU Talks on Turkey Threatened by Disputes", *International Herald Tribune*, September 29, 2005.

Didier Billion, "Plutôt Que de Judiciariser le Débat, la France Devrait Aider le Processus de Dialogue en Cours: Réconcilier les Mémoires", *Libération*, May 18, 2006.

Erdal Şafak, "Dicle-Fırat ve AB'nin Talepleri", *Sabah*, October 27, 2005.

Erdal Güven, "Bazı Haberler ve Türkiye'nin Hali", *Radikal*, June 11, 2006.

Fikret Bila, "Erdoğan'ın Kıbrıs'a Bakışı", *Milliyet*, December 18, 2002.

....., "Baykal: Şimdi de Müzakere Basını", *Milliyet*, October 8, 2005.

Frank Carlucci and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Revitalizing U.S.-Turkey Relations", *Washington Times*, June 8, 2005.

Frank J. Gaffney Jr., "No' to Islamist Turkey", *The Washington Times*, September 27, 2005., "Neo-cons Take on Erdoğan", *Turkish Daily News*, May 23, 2005.

Gilbert Achcar, "Greater Middle East: the US Plan", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 2004.

Graham Bowley, "Debate Must Continue, European Leaders Say", *International Herald Tribune*, June 2, 2005,

....., "As EU Debates Turkey's Membership, Assimilation and Identity are at Issue : For Many Turks, Germany is Home", *International Herald Tribune*, October 4, 2004.

....., “EU Turns up Heat on Turkey as Decision Looms”, *International Herald Tribune*, September 18, 2004

....., “Envoy Rejects Criticism by EU Members : Turkey is Advised to Drop Adultery Law”, *International Herald Tribune*, September 14, 2004.

....., “EU Agrees on Key Point for Turkey”, *International Herald Tribune*, September 21, 2005.

....., “A Standoff Threatens EU-Turkey Negotiation”, *International Herald Tribune*, September 30, 2005.

....., “Austria Demands Turkey's Sights be Lowered in Talks on EU Participation”, *International Herald Tribune*, September 29, 2005.

....., “News Analysis: For Turkey, Journey to EU is Just Starting”, *International Herald Tribune*, October 5, 2005.

....., “Membership Talks Get The Green Light After Deal On Tacit Recognition Of Cyprus: A 'Historic Event' For EU And Turkey”, *International Herald Tribune*, December 18, 2004,

....., “EU Warns Turkey That Talks Hinge On Quick Recognition Of Cyprus”, *International Herald Tribune*, March 1, 2005.

Gündüz Aktan, “Legal Battles”, *Turkish Daily News*, May 11, 2006.

Güngör Mengi, “Uçkur Mesaisi”, *Vatan*, August 31, 2004.

Hadi Özışık, “Baykal Neden Fikir Değiştirdi?”, *Star*, September 26, 2005.

Ilan Berman, “Mending US-Turkey Ties”, *Washington Times*, September 19, 2005.

İsmet Berkan, “CHP'nin Çeviri Sorunu”, *Radikal*, December 22, 2005.

Jeanne Lhoste, “Les Intérêts Français Menacé en Turquie”, *Le Figaro*, May 10, 2006.

Jonny Dymond, “EU Blasts Turkish Author's Trial”, *BBC News*, September 13, 2005.

Karl Vick, “Turkey Asks U.N.'s Annan To Restart Cyprus Talks”, *Washington Post*, January 25, 2004.

Lawrence Auster, “The Search for Moderate Islam”, *Front Page Magazine*, January 28, 2005.

Marie Jégo, “Ankara Minimise la Portée du Vote Français”, *Le Monde*, June 1, 2005.

Murat Belge, Halil Berktaş, Elif Şafak, Hrant Dink, Müge Göcek, Ahmet İnel, Etyen Mahcupyan, Baskın Oran and Ragıp Zarakolu, “L'adoption de la Loi Pénalisant la Négation du Génocide Arménien Serait Contre-Productive. Le Travail sur L'histoire Sera Bloqué en Turquie”, *Libération*, May 10, 2006.

Mustafa Balbay, “CHP Genel Başkan Yardımcısı Öymen, Akp'nin Türkiye'nin Kırılma Noktalarını Zorladığını Söyledi: 'Hükümet Halktan Kaçıyor’”, *Cumhuriyet*, April 27, 2005.

Nermin Aydemir, “Losing Freedom Of Speech”, *Turkish Weekly*, May 5, 2006.

Oktay Ekşi, “Onlardaki de Bu... ”, *Hürriyet*, May 3, 2006.

Peter Ford and Yigal Schleifer, “Missteps Hobble Turkey-EU Waltz” *Christian Science Monitor*, May 17, 2006.

Pierre Rousselin, “L'onde de Choc du 29 Mai”, *Le Figaro*, June 2, 2005.

Sami Kohen, “Kıbrıs İçin Yeni Bir Yaklaşım”, *Milliyet*, January 4, 2003.

Sarah Rainsford, “Author’s Trial Set to Test Turkey”, *BBC News*, December 14, 2005.

Seçkin Barış Gülmez, “Türkiye-ABD İlişkileri = Stratejik Ortaklık?”, *Mücadele* (Local Newspaper), February 12, 2004.

Sedat Laçiner, “Alternatif Ermeni Konferansı”, *USAK Stratejik Gündem*, March 17, 2006.

Simon Freeman, “Exiled Hamas Leader in Turkey for Talks”, *The Times*, February 16, 2006.

Taha Akyol, “Ankara Sonuçlardan Memnun”, *Milliyet*, December 16, 2003.

Thomas Friedman, “Turkey, a Vital Bridge between Two Civilizations”, *Taipei Times*, January 16, 2004.

Zeynep Damla Gürel, “3 Ekim'in Tarihi Önemi”, *Radikal*, October 12, 2005.

DOCUMENTS

The case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, (Application no. 44774/98), November 10, 2005

The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, March 31, 2004

Conclusions of the European Council December (Brussels 16-17, 2004)

French Constitution of October 4, 1958.

Negotiating Framework, (Luxembourg October 3, 2005)

Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, December 10 and 11, 1999.

Regular Report of the EU Commission on Turkey, October 6, 2004

INTERNET SOURCES

AB Haber News Portal: www.abhaber.com

BBC News Portal: www.bbc.co.uk

Central Intelligence Agency: www.cia.gov

Justice and Development Party: www.akparti.org.tr

McGraw-Hill Professional Development: www.glencoe.com

Ministry of Foreign Affairs: www.mfa.gov.tr

Onur Öymen's Personal Web Site: www.onuroymen.com

Republican People's Party: www.chp.org.tr

Turkish Armed Forces: www.tsk.mil.tr

Turkish Parliament: www.tbmm.gov.tr

The US Department of State: <http://usinfo.state.gov>

The US House of Representatives: www.house.gov

The US White House: www.whitehouse.gov

Voice of America News Portal: www.voanews.com

Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia: www.wikipedia.org

NEWSPAPERS, TV CHANNELS AND JOURNALS IN ENGLISH

BBC News in Turkish: www.bbcturkish.com

Christian Science Monitor: www.csmonitor.com

The Guardian: www.guardian.co.uk

International Herald Tribune: www.ihf.com

Journal of Turkish weekly: www.turkishweekly.net

Le Monde Diplomatique in English: www.mondediplo.com

Reuters: www.reuters.com

The Times: www.timesonline.co.uk

Turkish Daily News: www.tdn.com.tr

The Washington Post: www.washingtonpost.com

The Washington Times: www.washtimes.com

NEWSPAPERS IN FRENCH

Le Figaro: www.lefigaro.fr

Le Monde: www.lemonde.fr

Liberation: www.liberation.fr

NEWSPAPERS, TV CHANNELS AND JOURNALS IN TURKISH

Cumhuriyet Gazetesi: www.cumhuriyet.com.tr

Hürriyet Gazetesi: www.hurriyet.com.tr

Milliyet Gazetesi: www.milliyet.com.tr

Radikal Gazetesi: www.radikal.com.tr

Sabah Gazetesi: www.sabah.com.tr

Star Gazetesi: www.stargazete.com

Vatan Gazetesi: www.vatanim.com.tr

Zaman Gazetesi www.zaman.com.tr

NTV News Portal: www.ntvmsnbc.com.tr

USAK Stratejik Gündem: www.usakgundem.com

SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS

Remarks by the US President Bill Clinton in address to the GNAT, November 15, 1999.

Deniz Baykal's speeches in the CHP Parliamentary Group reunion, November 2002 – February 2006.

Deniz Baykal's speeches in the plenary sessions of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), November 2002 – February 2006.

Deniz Baykal's press conference about the progress report, October 8, 2004.

Deniz Baykal's press conference in December 17, 2004.

TV Channel Interview with Baykal, *TRT 1*, October 19, 2004.

Remarks by the US President George W. Bush in Press Conference after G8 Summit, Savannah, Georgia, June 10, 2004.

Remarks by the US President George W. Bush in Galatasaray University, Istanbul, June 29, 2004.

Haluk Koç's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, June 16, 2003.

Haluk Koç's press conference in December 26, 2005.

Strategic Overview On Defense & Security Affairs by General Ilker Basbug, June 6, 2005.

Mark Parris' Speech retired US Ambassador to Ankara, in a conference held by Turkish-American Architects, Engineers and Scientists Association, New York, May 17, 2005

Mir Dengir Fırat's Press Conference, the Vice Chairman of the AKP, June 13, 2005.

Onur Öymen's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, April 6, 2004.

Onur Öymen's speech in the EU seminar by the Union of the Turkish Parliamentarians, Ankara, November 1, 2004.

Onur Öymen's speech in a conference, Zonguldak, March 3, 2003.

Interview with Onur Öymen, *NTV Channel*, June 12, 2005.

Interview with Onur Öymen, *Cumhuriyet*, April 17, 2003.

Onur Öymen's speech in a conference on the Greater/Broader Middle East initiative held by Bilkent University, Ankara, June 6, 2004.

Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, The World Affairs Council and the Commonwealth Club, San Fransisco, December 6, 2002.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's speech in the AKP parliamentary group reunion, February 1, 2006.

Statement by Rep. Robert Wexler to the US House of Representatives in a hearing on the state of US-Turkish relations, May 11, 2005

Şükrü Elekdağ's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, October 7, 2004.

Şükrü Elekdağ's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, July 1, 2003.

Şükrü Elekdağ's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, March 6, 2003.

Yaşar Yakış's speech in the plenary session of the GNAT, November 19, 2002.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Survey on Foreign Policy Orientations of the CHP Deputies

INTRODUCTION

The name of the organization for which the study was conducted and the name of the person conducting it: Middle East Technical University, Department of International Relations, Seçkin Barış Gülmez.

Participant Eligibility: The CHP Deputies

Methodology: Questionnaire

Dates between which the Data Collection was done: From November 2005 to May 2006

102 out of 154 Parliamentarians from the CHP answered the survey designed to elucidate their Party's foreign policy preferences.

Below are the questionnaire and the summary of the results of the survey.

The principle of confidentiality requires protecting from disclosure to third parties--including Clients and members of the Public--the identity of individual Respondents as well as Respondent-identifiable information, unless the Respondent expressly requests or permits such disclosure.

Attention:

1-The graphics with horizontal pillars show the quantity of the votes cast by the deputies. The pie charts show the percentage of the votes cast.

2-In the questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 28, 29, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39 and there are more than 102 answers though the total number of the respondents are 102. It is because the respondents were asked to go for more than one option when necessary.

QUESTIONNAIRE SHEET

1- From which sources do you follow the developments on foreign policy issues?
You may choose more than one options.

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| a- Newspapers | e- Party's parliamentary Group meetings |
| b- Weekly periodicals | f- Academic conferences |
| c- Television | g- All of the above |
| d- Radio | |
| h- Other (Please indicate)..... | |

2-Which newspaper do you read primarily? If you read more than one, would you enumerate them in terms of their significance to you?

- | | |
|--------|--------|
| 1..... | 4..... |
| 2..... | 5..... |
| 3..... | |

3-Which parts of the newspapers do you read primarily? (Columns, sport, television, domestic politics, foreign politics, economics, magazine etc...) Would you enumerate them in terms of their significance to you?

- | | |
|--------|--------|
| 1..... | 4..... |
| 2..... | 5..... |
| 3..... | |

4-If there are columnists you regularly follow, would you enumerate them in terms of their significance to you?

- | | |
|--------|--------|
| 1..... | 4..... |
| 2..... | 5..... |
| 3..... | |

5-If you watch television regularly, which TV channel do you watch primarily? If you watch more than one, would you enumerate them in terms of their significance to you?

- | | |
|--------|--------|
| 1..... | 4..... |
| 2..... | 5..... |
| 3..... | |

6-If you watch TV regularly, which TV programs do you watch primarily?

7-Do you use Internet? YesNo

8-If your answer is "Yes", for what purposes do you use it?.....

9- Which cultural identity, in your view, is Turkey closer to? If you think there is more than one identity, would you enumerate them in terms of their significance to you? Possible cultural identities; (in alphabetical order): Eurasia; Europe; West; Islam; Middle East; Other (please indicate)

- | | |
|--------|--------|
| 1..... | 4..... |
| 2..... | 5..... |
| 3..... | |

10-What was rejected, in your opinion, in the referenda in France and Holland voting the European Constitution? If you think there is more than one, you can give numbers to the left part of the options.

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
|EU' deepening process |EU' economic integration |
|EU's enlargement process | EU' political integration |
|Turkey's EU membership |All |
|Other (please indicate) | |

11-Do you think Turkey will become an EU member?

- | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| a- Definitely will | d- Most probably won't be able to |
| b- Probably will | e- Definitely won't be able to |
| c- Undecided | |

12-Do you think Turkey should become an EU member?

- | | |
|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| a- Definitely should be | d- Shouldn't be |
| b- Should be | e- Definitely shouldn't be |
| c- Undecided | |

13-If your answer is "should be" or "definitely should be", which of the below could be the reason for your answer? If you think there is more than one reason, you can give numbers to the left part of the options.

-The geopolitical interests of Turkey require the EU membership.
 The EU membership will provide Turkey with economic power.
 The EU membership will provide Turkey with political power.
 The EU membership will improve democracy and human rights in Turkey.
 The EU membership will provide Turkey with more foreign policy gains.
All
Other (please indicate)

14- If your answer is "shouldn't be" or "definitely shouldn't be", which of the below could be the reason for your answer? If you think there is more than one reason, you can give numbers to the left part of the options.

- The EU membership will take away the sovereignty rights of Turkey.
 The EU membership will cause internal conflicts in Turkey and divide the country.
 The EU membership will increase Turkey's economic dependency on abroad.
 The EU membership will increase Turkey's political dependency on abroad.

..... The EU membership of Turkey will dissolve the EU.
.....All
..... Other (please indicate)

15- How could the concept of “Honorable EU membership” which recently took place in the media, in your view be explained? You may choose more than one option.

- a- Not experiencing a process different from other candidate countries.
- b- Becoming an EU member by preserving the unitary structure of the country and without giving concessions from total political freedom.
- c- Becoming an EU member without giving concessions from total economic freedom.
- d- Having equal rights with other EU members.
- Other (please indicate)

16- How do you see the future of the EU? You may choose more than one option.

- a- The EU will become a world power fulfilling its economic and political integration.
- b- The EU will continue as an economic union without political power.
- c- The EU will provide its political integration but lose its economic might.
- d- The EU will enlarge too much and therefore there will be political and economic dissolutions.
- e- The impacts of international terrorism and the Union’s failure in the making of foreign policy will lead to disintegration of the EU.
- Other (please indicate)

17- If Turkey’s EU membership becomes impossible, in your opinion, which of the following may happen? You may choose more than one option.

- a- Turkey will completely go into the orbit of the US.
- b- Turkey will accept the EU’s privilege partnership offer.
- c- Turkey will take part in a political and economic formation led by China, Russia and Iran.
- d- Turkey will approach Arab countries.
- e- Turkey will approach the Caucasus and the Central Asia.
- f- Turkey will continue its external relations as if nothing happened.
- g- Turkey will withdraw from NATO and will pursue an isolationist policy.
- h- Other (please indicate).....

18- What will be, in your opinion, the repercussions of the Greek Cypriot administration’s entry to the European Union in the name of the Cyprus Republic?

- a- The EU will become a party to the problem and will endorse the Greek Cypriot position. Consequently, the Cyprus problem will never be solved and Turkey’s accession to the EU will be barred.
- b- This will lead to de facto recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the problem will have been solved. The Cyprus impediment to Turkey’s accession to the EU will be overcome.

- c- This will lead to the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus but due to the pressures from Greece and Greek Cypriot administration, Turkey's membership to the EU will be hampered.
- d- Turkey will recognize Greek Cypriot administration as the "Republic of Cyprus" in order to adhere to the EU; it will withdraw its recognition of the TRNC, and will acquiesce to qualify Turkish Cypriots as a minority in Cyprus.
- e- Other (please indicate).....

19- How does, in your opinion, the United States perceive the European Union? You may choose more than one option.

- a- a political partner
- b- a political rival
- c- an economic partner
- d- an economic rival
- e- a military ally
- f- a military rival
- g- Other (please indicate).....

20- How does, in your opinion, the European Union perceive the United States? You may choose more than one option.

- g- a political partner
- h- a political rival
- i- an economic partner
- j- an economic rival
- k- a military ally
- l- a military rival
- g- Other (please indicate).....

21- Which defines the best, in your opinion, the "strategic partnership" concept?

- a- Having common economic interests
- b- Maintaining a military alliance
- c- Having common political interests
- d- All of the above
- e- Other (please indicate).....

22- In line with your answer to the previous question, do you think Turkey has a strategic partner?

- a- Yes
- b- No

23- If your answer is "yes", who is/are the strategic partner/s of Turkey? Please indicate.....

24- Do you think Turkey has adversaries?

- a- Yes
- b- No
- c- I don't know

25- If your answer is yes, please enumerate them in terms of their significance to you.

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....
- 4.....
- 5.....
- 6.....
- 7.....

26- Could you enumerate Turkish foreign policy issues in terms of their significance to you?

- Cyprus problem Armenian question
- Turkish-Greek disputes in the Aegean Sea International terrorism
- Northern Iraq issue Global environmental problems

27- Could you enumerate the international actors cited below in terms of the significance of their relations with Turkey?

- the European Union The United States Iran Israel
- Arab countries Russia China Japan
- Central Asian Turkic Republics

28- What would be the long-term implications on the Turkish foreign policy of the Turkish Parliament's rejection of the motion allowing the passage of US soldiers from Turkish territories? You may choose more than one options.

- a – It is a positive development for Turkey because Turkey has not been a party to the war and did not send its troops to the war.
- b- It is positive because it proved the very existence of a healthy democracy in Turkey; however it is also negative since it damaged Turkish-American relations.
- c- It is a negative development since it has reduced Turkey's potential influence on the developments in Iraq.
- d- It is positive since Turkey's decision that has been appreciated by the European Union countries demonstrated that Turkey made a great advance towards the EU membership.
- e– Other (please indicate).....

29-How could the Greater Middle East Project be defined? You may choose more than one options.

- a- It is a project aiming at ending the clash of civilizations through democratization of the Islamic world.
- b- It is the project of the United States aiming at taking the Middle East into its politico-economic sphere of influence.
- c- It is a diplomatic crusade against the Islamic world.
- d- It is a tactical move by the United States to gain dominance in the Middle Eastern region at the expense of other competing actors, namely Europe and Russia.
- e- It is a project of democracy, culture and progress towards the Middle Eastern countries, through which Turkey would gain great prestige as a model.
- f- Other (please indicate).....

30- What kind of Turkey, in your opinion, is preferred according to the US foreign policy mentality?

- a- A democratic, secular and European Turkey is preferred.
- b- A democratic but not secular Turkey is preferred.
- c- A Turkey governed by Sharia law and which is not democratic is pondered as an easier partner for the US.
- d- A Turkey which is not democratic and not secular but pursuing a moderate Islamic line in its foreign policy is preferred.

- e- A democratic and secular Turkey, which is reconciled with Islam in its domestic politics, is considered more stable.
- f- Other (please indicate).....

31- How do you assess Turkey’s NATO membership in the 21st century?

- a- Turkey should maintain the NATO membership since following the end of the Cold War, the NATO defined new tasks in the changing environment.
- b- Turkey should withdraw from the NATO as with the demise of the Cold War, the NATO fulfilled the tasks on which it had been founded.
- c- Turkey should withdraw from the NATO since the NATO will continue its existence as an organization serving the US foreign policy interests.
- d- Turkey should maintain the NATO membership only if the NATO provides international peace in the 21st century.
- e- As long as the US maintains the World hegemony, Turkey should maintain its membership.
- f- Other (please indicate).....

32- How do you see the possibility for the establishment of a “Kurdish state” in northern Iraq?

- a- There is no such possibility so long as Turkey maintains its resolute policy in the region.
- b- If the US supports this formation outright, such a state might be established in spite of Turkey’s rejection.
- c- If the EU presses on Turkey such a precondition for accession negotiations, the Turkish government might acquiesce the establishment of such a state.
- d- The Iraqi state would never let such a possibility happen since it hampers all efforts to undermine its unitary character.
- e- Other (please indicate).....

33- Which answer you give to the question: “Is there a ‘Kurdish problem’ in Turkey?” is closest to the phrases below? You may choose more than one options.

- a- Yes. In Turkey, citizens of Kurdish origin are treated as inferiors. They are deprived of fundamental human rights and freedoms.
- b- No, there is not such a problem because every Turkish citizen is Turk regardless of origin and no Turkish citizen faces a systematic discrimination.
- c- Yes, the PKK terrorism is the Kurdish problem.
- d- No, there isn’t. To say that “there is a Kurdish problem” will legitimize the existence of the PKK as an actor, rather than as a mere terrorist organization.
- e- Yes, there is a Kurdish problem since Turkey does not recognize the Kurdish nation within the country as minority.
- f- Other (please indicate).....

34- Which one(s) of the following, in your opinion, define(s) the secularism correctly? You may choose more than one options.

- a- Secularism is the separation of religious and state affairs from each other.
- b- Secularism means that the state is not under the domination of religion and religious principles.
- c- Secularism means that the religion is not under the domination of the state and state rules.

- d- Secularism is that citizens are not allowed to use religious symbols in the public sphere.
- e- Secularism is an institutional attitude for state to remain impartial and maintain an equal-distance towards all religions and faiths.
- f- Secularism is a mechanism, which generate a culture of pluralism tolerance and impartiality.
- g- Secularism is the guarantee of freedom of faith and religion.
- h- Secularism is a way of peaceful coexistence among different beliefs in a society.
- i- Secularism is that executive cadres do not adopt a religion-based appearance.
- j- Other (please indicate).....

35- What do you think of Turkey's membership to the Organization for Islamic Conference? You may choose more than one options.

- a- It is positive as a foreign policy instrument and provides Turkey a ground for cooperation.
- b- It is positive in terms of developing dialogue with other Muslim countries.
- c- It is positive because it contributes particularly to the stability of Turkey's Middle Eastern policy in spite of Turkey's secular character, and to Turkey's potential role for the resolution of the Middle Eastern problem.
- d- It is absolutely negative that Turkey, which is a secular country is a member of any religion-based organization.
- e- In spite of its secular character, Turkey's historical and cultural legacy and its geopolitical position render its membership positive.
- f- Turkey's membership is admissible provided that Turkey puts reservation on decisions contradictory to the secularism principle.
- g- Other (please indicate).....

36- Do you contribute to the foreign policy-making process of your Party?

- a- Always b- Yes, sometimes c- Undecided d- Generally not e- Never

37- Do you think that the CHP in opposition is influential in the making of the Turkish foreign policy? You may choose more than one options.

- a- It is not influential because the government never takes into consideration of CHP's opinions.
- b- Yes, it is influential on the Government since the policies defended by CHP are endorsed by the public opinion.
- c- Yes, it is influential because CHP and the Government consult each other on foreign policy issues. No, it is not influential since the policies defended by CHP are not endorsed by the public opinion.
- d- As the Government does not inform CHP on foreign policy issues, CHP's influence is very limited.
- e- Other (please indicate).....

38- How do you perceive the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) as an actor in foreign policy?

- a- In my opinion, TSK should be the most important determining actor of Turkish foreign policy.
- b- I think that TSK should only be one of the actors determining Turkish foreign policy.
- c- I believe that TSK should limit itself to a mere counselor to the civilian government in the making of Turkish foreign policy.
- d- Undecided.

39- How do you assess the AKP government's foreign policy? You may choose more than one options.

- a- With the support of CHP, the Government has made a great progress particularly towards the EU membership.
- b- The Government gives irreversible concessions for the sake of the EU membership perspective.
- c- The AKP Government has reached a remarkable degree of stability and enhanced the country's prestige.
- d- The AKP Government greatly damaged Turkey's stability and prestige by making radical changes in all areas of Turkish foreign policy.
- Other (please indicate).....

40- What does the nationalist (ulusalcı) discourse mean primarily to you? You may choose more than one options.

- a- Honorable foreign policy
- b- Common policy that highlights national priorities transcending rightist and leftist discourses.
- c- Realist foreign policy
- d- Anti-globalist foreign policy.
- e- Anti-EU policy
- f- Anti-imperialist policy
- g- Anti-capitalist policy
- h- Nationalist (milliyetçi) policy
- I- The nationalist (ulusalcı) discourse has nothing to do with CHP, which is part of the Socialist International.
- j- The nationalist (ulusalcı) discourse resisting global capitalism is compatible with the principles and objectives of the Socialist International.
- k- The nationalist (ulusalcı) discourse is a pejorative expression invented by liberals against the ones who defend the primacy of national interests in foreign policy.
- l- None of the above.

SURVEY RESULTS

1)




Figure 1: Sources through which the CHP MPs follow foreign policy news in numbers

Percentage:

Newspapers (68%)

Television (65%)

The CHP group meetings (54%)

All of the information sources cited above (35%)

Weekly periodicals (14%)

Radio (8%)

Other (international conferences, CHP's executive meetings, MPs researches, books written by trustful researchers, Strategic institutions' publications, CHP's papers, speeches given by Mr. Onur Öymen and Mr. Şükrü Elekdağ, internet, European Union Harmonization Commission meetings in the Turkish Parliament, electronic mails from TÜSIAD and news agencies) (21%)

2)




Figure 2.1: Regularly read newspapers in numbers

Percentage:

Cumhuriyet (95%)

Hürriyet (87%)

Milliyet (65%)

Sabah (39%)

Radikal (38%)

Vatan (27%)

Posta (6%)

Other (Posta, Dünya, Olay, Yeniasır, Yerel Burdur Gazeteleri, Gözcü, Akşam, Yenişafak, Le Monde, Turkish Daily News) (15%)




Figure 2.2: Percentage of primarily read newspapers

3)




Figure 3.1: Regularly read parts of newspapers in numbers

Percentage:

- Domestic politics (100%)
- Columnists (92%)
- Economy (64%)
- Foreign politics (57%)
- Sports (21%)
- Headlines (11%)
- All of them equally important (8%)
- Titles (6%)
- First page (3%)
- Health (1%)




Figure 3.2: Percentage of primarily read parts of newspapers

Numbers:

- Domestic politics (43)
- Columnists (35)
- Economy (5)
- Foreign politics (3)
- Headlines (8)
- All of them equally important (1)
- Titles (3)
- First page (3)
- Health (1)

4)




Figure 4.1: Regularly read columnists in numbers

Explanations:

A: İlhan SELÇUK
B: Mustafa BALBAY
C: Bekir ÇOŞKUN
D: Emin ÇÖLAŞAN
E: GÜNGÖR MENGİ
F: Hasan PULUR
G: Fikret BİLA
H: Oktay EKŞİ

I: Ertuğrul ÖZKÖK
J: Cüneyt ARCAYÜREK
K: Necati DOĞRU
L: GÜNGÖR URAS
M: Hikmet ÇETİNKAYA
O: All of them are equally important
P: Murat YETKİN
R: Mustafa MUTLU
S: Mümtaz SOYSAL
T: Other

Percentage:

Mustafa Balbay (Cumhuriyet) (38%)
Bekir Coşkun (Hürriyet) (36%)
Emin Çölaşan (Hürriyet) (36%)
İlhan Selçuk (Cumhuriyet) (30%)
Hasan Pulur (Milliyet) (20%)
All of them are equally important (15%)




Figure 4.2: Percentage of primarily read columnists

5)




Figure 5.1: Regularly watched TV channels in numbers

Percentage:

NTV (74%)

CNN Türk (60%)

Kanaltürk (55%)

ATV (30%)

Kanal D (29%)

TRT 1 (27%)

Habertürk (26%)

Sky Türk (23%)

Show TV (9%)

TRT 3/TBMM TV (8%)

TV8 (6%)




Figure 5.2: Primarily watched TV channels in numbers




Figure 5.3: Percentage of primarily watched TV channels

6)




Figure 6: Regularly watched TV channels in numbers

Percentage:

Discussions/Open Debate Programs (66%)

The News (59%)

No answer (15%)

Politics programs (14%)

Documentaries (12%)

Economy Programs (11%)

Sport programs and Matches (8%)

Serials (5%)

7)




Figure 7.1: Internet use in numbers




Figure 7.2: Percentage of internet use

8)




Figure 8: The areas for internet use in numbers

Percentage:
 Research (53%)
 Following the News (36%)
 Communication (34%)
 No answer (3%)
 Banking Services (1%)
 Sport News (1%)
 Health information services (1%)
 All areas (1%)

9)




Figure 9.1: The cultural identities Turkey is closer to in numbers

Percentage:

Europe (55%)

West (46%)

Eurasia (42%)

Islam (26%)

Middle East (23%)

Sui Generis (9%)

Asia (5%)

Other (Asian, moderate Islamic, Mediterranean, Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian) (11%)




Figure 9.2: Cultural identities shown as the closest to Turkish cultural identity in numbers




Figure 9.3: Percentage of cultural identities shown as the closest to Turkish cultural identity

10)




Figure 10.1: Reasons behind the rejection of the EU Constitution in France and Holland in numbers

Percentage:

- A : EU' deepening process (20%)**
- B : EU' economic integration (30%)**
- C : EU' enlargement process (53%)**
- D : EU' political integration (38%)**
- E : Turkey's EU membership (50%)**
- F : All of them (18%)**
- G : Other (nationalistic approaches, Common Agricultural Policy, non-respect of individual and economic rights, and neo-liberal policies) (6%)**




Figure 10.2: Reasons behind the rejection of the EU Constitution in France and Holland shown in the first place in numbers




Figure 10.3: Percentage of reasons behind the rejection of the EU Constitution in France and Holland shown in the first place

Explanations:

- A : EU' deepening process
- B : EU' economic integration
- C : EU' enlargement process
- D : EU' political integration
- E : Turkey's EU membership
- F :All of them
- G :Other

11)




Figure 11: Views in numbers on the question whether Turkey will become an EU member

Percentage:

- Probably will (52%)
- Probably won't be able to (28%)
- Definitely will (13%)
- Definitely won't be able to (4%)
- Undecided (3%)

12)




Figure 12: Percentage of views on the question whether Turkey should become an EU member

13)




Figure 13.1: Benefits of Turkey's EU Membership in numbers according to the CHP Deputies

Percentage:

A : The geopolitical interests of Turkey require the EU membership (**13%**)

B : The EU membership will provide Turkey with economic power (**24%**)

C : The EU membership will provide Turkey with political power (**19%**)

D : The EU membership will improve democracy and human rights in Turkey (**31%**)

E : The EU membership will provide Turkey with more foreign policy gains (**26%**)

F : All of them (**48%**)

G : Other (The EU will save Turkey from the Sharia danger, the EU membership does not bring short-term advantages) (**9%**)




Figure 13.2: Primarily Important Benefits of Turkey's EU Membership according to the CHP Deputies

Percentage:

- A : The geopolitical interests of Turkey require the EU membership. (12%)
- B : The EU membership will provide Turkey with economic power. (11%)
- C : The EU membership will provide Turkey with political power. (8%)
- D : The EU membership will improve democracy and human rights in Turkey. (17%)
- E : The EU membership will provide Turkey with more foreign policy gains. (3%)
- F : All of them (29%)
- G : Other (5%)

14) Nobody answered the question.

15)




Figure 15: Views on the definition of "Honorable EU Membership" in numbers

Percentage:

- A- Not experiencing a process different from other candidate countries. **(82%)**
- B- Becoming an EU member by preserving the unitary structure of the country and without giving concessions from total political freedom. **(68%)**
- C- Becoming an EU member without giving concessions from total economic freedom. **(17%)**
- D- Having equal rights with other EU members. **(45%)**
- E- Other **(2%)**

16)




Figure 16: Perceptions of the CHP deputies on the future of the EU in numbers

Percentage:

- A- The EU will become a world power fulfilling its economic and political integration. **(35%)**
- B- The EU will continue as an economic union without political power. **(26%)**
- C- The EU will provide its political integration but lose its economic might. **(9%)**
- D- The EU will enlarge too much and therefore there will be political and economic dissolutions. **(42%)**
- E- The impacts of international terrorism and the Union's failure in the making of foreign policy will lead to disintegration of the EU. **(11%)**
- F- Other **(8%)**

17)




Figure 17: Views on possibilities if Turkey's EU membership becomes impossible in numbers

Percentage:

- A- Turkey will completely go into the orbit of the US. **(26%)**
- B- Turkey will accept the EU's privilege partnership offer. **(15%)**
- C- Turkey will take part in a political and economic formation led by China, Russia and Iran. **(9%)**
- D- Turkey will approach Arab countries. **(8%)**
- E- Turkey will approach the Caucasus and the Central Asia. **(21%)**
- F- Turkey will continue its external relations as if nothing happened. **(48%)**
- G- Turkey will withdraw from NATO and will pursue an isolationist policy. **(1%)**
- H- Other (Turkey will decide later considering the conditions of that time, Turkey will approach the EU but will remain autonomous in foreign policy) **(17%)**

18)




Figure 18: Views on repercussions of the Greek Cypriot Administration's entry to the European Union in numbers

Explanations:

A- The EU will become a party to the problem and will endorse the Greek Cypriot position. Consequently, the Cyprus problem will never be solved and Turkey's accession to the EU will be barred.

B- This will lead to de facto recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the problem will have been solved. The Cyprus impediment to Turkey's accession to the EU will be overcome.

C- This will lead to the recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus but due to the pressures from Greece and Greek Cypriot administration, Turkey's membership to the EU will be hampered.

D- Turkey will recognize Greek Cypriot administration as the "Republic of Cyprus" in order to adhere to the EU; it will withdraw its recognition of the TRNC, and will acquiesce to qualify Turkish Cypriots as a minority in Cyprus.

E- Other

19 & 20)




Figure 19&20: Views on mutual perceptions between the US and the EU in numbers

55 % of the respondents think that the United States perceives the EU as a political partner whereas 35 % say that the EU perceives the US as a political partner.

The percentage of respondents answering that the EU perceives the US as a political rival is greater (35% to 23%) than the percentage of those who believe that the US perceives the EU as a political rival.

In the other expressions, the percentages in comparison are more or less the same.

In general, the votes concerning the question how the US perceives the EU are accumulated in “political partner”. On the other hand, votes concerning the question how the EU perceives the US seem to be spread as balanced.

21)




Figure 21: Percentage of views on definition of "Strategic Partnership"

Explanation:

- 1: Having common economic interests
- 2: Maintaining a military alliance
- 3: Having common political interests
- 4: There is nothing as "Strategic partnership"
- 5: Being a partner in all areas
- 6: Acting together in basic issues
- 7: All of the above
- 8: Other

22)




Figure 22: Percentage of Views on whether Turkey has a strategic partner

Explanations:

1: Yes

2: No

3: No answer

23)




Figure 23: Percentage of views on who is/are Turkey's strategic partner/s

Explanations:

- 1 :The United States
- 2 : The European Union
- 3 : NATO
- 4 : Changes from time to time
- 5 : Iraq
- 6 : Iran
- 7 : Russia
- 8 : TRNC
- 9 : Azerbaidjan
- 10: Turkic Republics

24)




Figure 24.1: Views in numbers on whether Turkey has enemies




Figure 24.2: Percentage of views on whether Turkey has enemies

Explanations:

- 1 : Yes
- 2 : No
- 3 : I don't know
- 4 : No answer

25)




Figure 25: Enemy perceptions of the CHP deputies in numbers who gave an affirmative answer to the previous question

Percentage:

- 1 : Greece (30%)**
- 2 : The United States (14,5%)**
- 3 : Armenia (9,5%)**
- 4 : Neighbor countries (5,5%)**
- 5 : France (1,5%)**
- 6 : Iran (1,5%)**
- 7 : Austria (1,5%)**
- 8 : Terrorism (1,5%)**
- 9 : Globalization (1,5%)**
- 10 : Arab countries (1,5%)**
- 11 : Religious fundamentalism (1,5%)**
- 12 : No answer (30%)**

26)

Explanations for the three pie charts below:

- 1 : Northern Iraq issue
- 2 : Cyprus problem
- 3 : Armenian question
- 4 : International terrorism
- 5 : Turkish-Greek disputes in the Aegean Sea
- 6 : Global environmental problems




Figure 26.1: Percentage of Turkish foreign policy issues voted by the CHP deputies in the first place




Figure 26.2: Percentage of Turkish foreign policy issues voted by the CHP deputies in the second place




Figure 26.3: Percentage of Turkish foreign policy issues voted by the CHP deputies in the third place

27)

The respondents were asked to enumerate the international actors below in terms of their significance.




Figure 27.1 : Views on primarily important actors for Turkey in numbers

Percentage:

- 1 : The European Union (35%)**
- 2 : The United States (58%)**
- 3 : Iran (2%)**
- 4 : Russia (1%)**
- 5 : China (0%)**
- 6 : Japan (0%)**
- 7 : Israel (0%)**
- 8 : Arab countries (0%)**
- 9 : Central Asian Turkic Republics (1%)**
- 10: No answer (3%)**




Figure 27.2: Views on secondarily important actors in numbers

Percentage:

- 1 : The European Union (53%)**
- 2 : The United States (33%)**
- 3 : Iran (3%)**
- 4 : Russia (3%)**
- 5 : China (0%)**
- 6 : Japan (0%)**
- 7 : Israel (2%)**
- 8 : Arab countries (0%)**
- 9 : Central Asian Turkic Republics (3%)**
- 10: No answer (3%)**




Figure 27.3: Views on thirdly important actors in numbers

Percentage:

- 1 : The European Union (8%)**
- 2 : The United States (2%)**
- 3 : Iran (8%)**
- 4 : Israel (10%)**
- 5 : Arab Countries (2%)**
- 6 : Russia (45%)**
- 7 : China (3%)**
- 8 : Japan (2%)**
- 9 : Central Asian Turkic Republics (18%)**
- No answer (2%)**

28)




Figure 28: Views on the 1st March decision of the Turkish Parliament in numbers

Percentage:

1 – It is a positive development for Turkey because Turkey has not been a party to the war and did not send its troops to the war. **(86%)**

2- It is positive because it proved the very existence of a healthy democracy in Turkey; however it is also negative since it damaged Turkish-American relations. **(12%)**

3- It is a negative development since it has reduced Turkey's potential influence on the developments in Iraq. **(9%)**

4- It is positive since Turkey's decision that has been appreciated by the European Union countries demonstrated that Turkey made a great advance towards the EU membership **(26%)**

5- Other. (The principle of peace at home peace in the world was fulfilled, it is negative in the short run but positive in the long run, Turkey got rid of an invasion) **(9%)**

29)




Figure 29: Percentage of views on Greater/Broader Middle East Initiative

Explanations:

- 1- It is the project of the United States aiming at taking the Middle East into its politico-economic sphere of influence.
- 2- It is a tactical move by the United States to gain dominance in the Middle Eastern region at the expense of other competing actors, namely Europe and Russia.
- 3- It is a project of democracy, culture and progress towards the Middle Eastern countries, through which Turkey would gain great prestige as a model.
- 4- Other. (It is a diplomatic crusade against the Islamic world. It is a project aiming at ending the clash of civilizations through democratization of the Islamic world. It is an utopia.)

30)




Figure 30: Views on what kind of Turkey is preferred by the US in numbers

Percentage:

- 1- A democratic, secular and European Turkey is preferred. **(15%)**
- 2- A democratic but not secular Turkey is preferred. **(8%)**
- 3- A Turkey governed by Sharia law and which is not democratic is pondered as an easier partner for the US. **(8%)**
- 4- A Turkey which is not democratic and not secular but pursuing a moderate Islamic line in its foreign policy is preferred. **(15%)**
- 5- A democratic and secular Turkey, which is reconciled with Islam in its domestic politics, is considered more stable. **(38%)**
- 6- Other **(16%)**

31)




Figure 31.1: Views on Turkey's membership in NATO in numbers




Figure 31.2: Percentage of views on Turkey's membership in NATO

Explanations:

- a- Turkey should maintain the NATO membership since following the end of the Cold War, the NATO defined new tasks in the changing environment.
- b- Turkey should maintain the NATO membership only if the NATO provides international peace in the 21st century.
- c- As long as the US maintains the World hegemony, Turkey should maintain its membership.

- d- Turkey's membership to NATO is nothing but a symbolic one. It doesn't have any function for Turkey.
- e- Turkey's membership to NATO should be maintained under every condition.
- f- Other (Turkey should withdraw from the NATO as with the demise of the Cold War, the NATO fulfilled the tasks on which it had been founded (0), Even though NATO has lost its raison d'être, Turkey should remain a member to develop new tasks for NATO (1), Turkey should become a more pro-active member in NATO (1), Turkey should maintain its NATO membership in spite of the United States (1), Turkey should withdraw from the NATO since the NATO will continue its existence as an organization serving the US foreign policy interests (0).

32)




Figure 32: Percentage of views on probability for the establishment of a Kurdish State in Northern Iraq

33)




Figure 33: Views on the question whether there is a Kurdish problem in Turkey in numbers

Percentage:

- a- Yes. In Turkey, citizens of Kurdish origin are treated as inferiors. They are deprived of fundamental human rights and freedoms. **(6%)**
- b- No, there is not such a problem because every Turkish citizen is Turk regardless of origin and no Turkish citizen faces a systematic discrimination. **(60%)**
- c- Yes, the PKK terrorism is the Kurdish problem. **(11%)**
- d- No, there isn't. To say that "there is a Kurdish problem" will legitimize the existence of the PKK as an actor, rather than as a mere terrorist organization. **(24%)**
- e- Yes, there is a Kurdish problem. **(5%)**
- f- Yes there is a Kurdish problem; this is mainly due to socio-economic, cultural, educational gap throughout the country at the expense of the citizens from Kurdish origin. In other words, it is an underdevelopment problem. **(5%)**
- g- Yes there is a Kurdish problem. This is mainly due to non-respect of fundamental human rights. **(5%)**
- h- No there is not a Kurdish problem. There is a problem with non-respect for individual rights. **(5%)**
- i- Other (Yes, there is a Kurdish problem since Turkey does not recognize the Kurdish nation within the country as minority (3), There is an undefined Kurdish problem (4), No there is no such problem but some try to invent it (3), No, there is no such problem in Turkey but there is an external exploitation of the question (3), There is not a Kurdish problem but there is Turkishness problem (1), It is not realistic to limit the problem to Kurdish question (1), No answer because there is need for developing the options further (1).) **(16%)**

34)




Figure 34: Views on definition of secularism in numbers

Percentage:

- A- Secularism is the separation of religious and state affairs from each other. **(75%)**
- B- Secularism means that the state is not under the domination of religion and religious principles. **(41%)**
- C- Secularism means that the religion is not under the domination of the state and state rules. **(5%)**
- D- Secularism is that citizens are not allowed to use religious symbols in the public sphere. **(8%)**
- E- Secularism is an institutional attitude for state to remain impartial and maintain an equal-distance towards all religions and faiths. **(35%)**
- F- Secularism is a mechanism, which generate a culture of pluralism tolerance and impartiality. **(11%)**
- G- Secularism is the guarantee of freedom of faith and religion. **(56%)**
- H- Secularism is a way of peaceful coexistence among different beliefs in a society. **(27%)**
- I- Secularism is that executive cadres do not adopt a religion-based appearance. **(6%)**
- J- Other (Secularism is a principle that justifies the primacy of law (1), All of the above (1), No answer (1), Secularism is that state and society rules are not established in line with religious rules (1).) **(6%)**

35)




Figure 35: Views on Turkey's membership in the OIC in numbers

Percentage:

A-It is positive as a foreign policy instrument and provides Turkey a ground for cooperation. **(57%)**

B-It is positive in terms of developing dialogue with other Muslim countries. **(21%)**

C-It is positive because it contributes particularly to the stability of Turkey's Middle Eastern policy in spite of Turkey's secular character, and to Turkey's potential role for the resolution of the Middle Eastern problem. **(42%)**

D-It is absolutely negative that Turkey, which is a secular country, is a member of any religion-based organization. **(6%)**

E-In spite of its secular character, Turkey's historical and cultural legacy and its geopolitical position render its membership positive. **(24%)**

F-Turkey's membership is admissible provided that Turkey puts reservation on decisions contradictory to the secularism principle. **(21%)**

G-No Answer **(6%)**

H- Other (It is positive unless the principle of secularism is harmed (1), it is positive in terms of economic and cultural interests of Turkey (1)) **(2%)**

36)




Figure 36: Percentage of views on the question whether the CHP deputies contribute to the foreign policy of the Party

37)




Figure 37: Views on the role of the CHP in Turkish foreign policy in numbers

Percentage:

A-It is not influential because the government never takes into consideration of CHP's opinions. **(17%)**

B-Yes, it is influential on the Government since the policies defended by CHP are endorsed by the public opinion. **(65%)**

C-Yes, it is influential because CHP and the Government consult each other on foreign policy issues. **(6%)**

D-No, it is not influential since the policies defended by CHP are not endorsed by the public opinion. **(8%)**

E-As the Government does not inform CHP on foreign policy issues, CHP's influence is very limited. **(18%)**

F-Other (It is very influential (1), It is successful but there is no sufficient public endorsement of its policies (1), it fails because it follows ultranationalist policies (1), it is failing except the rejection of the 1 march bill (1), CHP is successful in spite of AKP (1).) **(5%)**

38)




Figure 38.1: Views on the role of Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish foreign policy in numbers




Figure 38.2: Percentage of views on the role of Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish foreign policy

Explanations:

A-In my opinion, TSK should be the most important determining actor of Turkish foreign policy.

B-I think that TSK should only be one of the actors determining Turkish foreign policy.

C-I believe that TSK should limit itself to a mere counselor to the civilian government in the making of Turkish foreign policy.

D-Undecided

E-Other (No answer (1))

39)




Figure 39: Views on the AKP's foreign policy in numbers

Explanations:

A-With the support of CHP, the Government has made a great progress particularly towards the EU membership. **(19%)**

B-The Government gives irreversible concessions for the sake of the EU membership perspective. **(74%)**

C-The AKP Government greatly damaged Turkey's stability and prestige by making radical changes in all areas of Turkish foreign policy. **(39%)**

D-The AKP Government has a submissive foreign policy **(12%)**

E-Other (The AKP Government has reached a remarkable degree of stability and enhanced the country's prestige (0), AKP fails in foreign policy because it does not have adequate cadres (3), AKP does not have any foreign policy (3), It is the most characterless foreign policy ever (1).) **(8%)**

40)




Figure 40: Views on the meaning of Nationalist (Ulusalcı) discourse in numbers

Explanations:

A- Honorable foreign policy (**75%**)

B- Common policy that highlights national priorities transcending rightist and leftist discourses. (**50%**)

C- Realist foreign policy (**41%**)

D- Anti-globalist foreign policy. (**7%**)

E- Anti-imperialist policy (**30%**)

F- The nationalist (ulusalcı) discourse resisting global capitalism is compatible with the principles and objectives of the Socialist International. (**37%**)

G- Other (anti-EU policy (1), Nationalist (milliyetçi) policy (4), nationalist (ulusalcı) discourse has nothing to do with CHP, which is part of the Socialist International. (1), Anti-capitalist policy (6), The nationalist (ulusalcı) discourse is a pejorative expression invented by liberals against the ones who defend the primacy of national interests in foreign policy. (4), None of the above. (1), No answer (1). (**18%**)