THE GLORIFICATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY: INTERNATIONAL DEBATES AND TURKISH REFLECTIONS

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to problematize the assumptions behind the glorification of civil society as a new and progressive actor in politics along with their political and ideological implications. It is argued that the assumptions behind the glorification of civil society are conceptually misleading and politically disabling. The portrayal of "civil society" or "global civil society" as a homogenous as well as inherently democratic and peaceful sphere that is opposed to an equally homogenous power-seeking state has emerged as a necessity for attributing emancipatory meanings to the concept. One of the most important implications of this conceptualization has been the taming of politics since the state, which is conventionally understood as the main site for political struggle, has apparently been devalued as a respectable political target to be fought over. Interestingly, the taming of politics through a glorified civil society has become a popular discourse shared and reproduced by both the New Right and certain sections of the Left. The thesis sheds light to the development of such a discourse at the global level as well as in Turkey within the context of the rise and spread of neoliberal globalization.

Key Words: Neoliberalism, Globalization, Global Civil Society, Civil Society

ÖZ

SİVİL TOPLUMUN YÜCELTİLMESİ:
ULUSLARARASI TARTIŞMALAR VE TÜRKİYE'DEKİ YANSIMALARI

Arıner, Hakkı Onur

Yüksek Lisans, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu çalışmanın amacı sivil toplumun siyasette yeni ve ilerici bir özne olarak yüceltilmesinin arkasında yatan varsayımları sorunsallaştırmak ve bu varsayımların siyasi ve ideolojik sonuçlarını analiz etmektir. Tezin başlıca argümanı bu varsayımların kavramsal olarak yanıltıcı ve siyasi olarak etkisizleştirici olduğudur. Sivil toplum alanının homojen ve tabiatı gereği demokratik ve barışçıl bir alan olarak yansıtılması ve bu alanın aynı şekilde homojen ancak güç ilişkilerine saplanmış bir devletin karşısında duracağı düşüncesi sivil toplum kavramına normatif bir değer atfedilmesinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Bu tür bir kavramsallaştırmanın en önemli sonuçlarından biri siyasetin evcilleştirilmesidir. Bunun nedeni, geleneksel olarak siyasi mücadelenin başat alanı olarak görünen devletin artık saygın bir siyasi hedef olarak değerinin düşürülmesidir. İlginçtir ki siyasetin yüceltilmiş bir sivil toplum kavramsallaştırılması üzerinden evcilleştirilmesi Yeni Sağ ve bazı Sol kesimlerin her ikisinin de paylaştığı ve yeniden ürettiği popüler bir söylem haline gelmiştir. Bu çalışma neoliberal küreselleşmenin yükselişi ve yayılışı bağlamında bu söylemin hem küresel seviyede hem de Türkiye'de gelişimine ışık tutmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Neoliberalizm, Küreselleşme, Küresel Sivil Toplum, Sivil Toplum

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADD	Atatürk Thought Association (*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği*)
AKUT	Search and Rescue Association (*Arama Kurtarma Derneği*)
ANAP	The Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)
AP	Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*)
CHP	The Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)
CSO	Civil Society Organization
ÇHD	Modern Lawyers Association (*Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği*)
ÇYDD	Association in Support of Modern Life (*Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği*)
DEP	Party of Democracy (*Demokrasi Partisi*)
DİSK	Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)
DP	Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*)
DPT	State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*)
EU	European Union
EMU	European Monetary Union
GCS	Global Civil Society
HD	Lawyers Association (*Hukukçular Derneği*)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
İHD	Human Rights Association (*İnsan Hakları Derneği*)
IMF	International Monetary Fund

INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IWMA	International Working Men's Association
MAI	Multilateral Agreement on Investment
MAZLUM-DER	Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (*İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği*)
MGK	National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*)
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NAFTA	North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OD	Operational Directive
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SOGEV	Social Security and Education Foundation (*Sosyal Güvenlik ve Eğitim Vakfı*)
TAL	Transnational Associational Life
TAYAD	Solidarity Association for Prisoner Families (*Tutuklu Hükümlü Aileleri Dayanışma Derneği*)
TİP	Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*)
TİSK	Confederation of Employers' Unions of Turkey (*Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)
TÜRK-İŞ	Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*)
UN	United Nations

Introduction

1.1 The Purpose of the Thesis

This thesis is mainly concerned about the neoliberal restructuring of state-society relations following the end of the Cold War and the paradoxical rapprochement between the "New Right" and the advocates of civil society in the Left on the crucial topic of how democracy and politics have come to be viewed. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, neoliberalism became the triumphalist expression of the expansion of capitalism. Briefly, "neoliberalism" can be evaluated as a more aggressive form taken by the expansion of capitalist social relations (especially in the absence of an ideological counter-example such as the Soviet Union). It has meant a return to the basic principles of "laissez-faire" with no tolerance to state intervention in the functioning of the market-economy. In practice the neoliberal principles of deregulation of finance, privatization and liberalization have been implemented together with anti-inflationist policies under the close watch of international economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and World Trade Organization (WTO). The neoliberal assumption that the market is the epitome of a perfect functioning mechanism has therefore been promoted by shifting economic management to an unaccountable "transnational" sphere. On the other hand, the promotion of a discourse based on dichotomies such as state-civil society, economy-politics, and national/territorial-global has aided the process by portraying the expansion of capitalism as inevitable and ultimately beneficial. This has had a detrimental affect on how democracy and politics have been interpreted, as the so-defined internationalization process left the state with little room to maneuver in economic matters, while the discourse of inevitability branded those who tried to do so as interfering with the forces of

progress. According to the neoliberal ideologues, the liberal market economy, which has been in fact imposed through conditional debts or by military force when necessary, would promote democracy, human rights and freedom. As the markets get liberalized however, the programs of political parties at the domestic level have started to become less easily differentiated, while the "left-right distinction" has started to blur as well. This has represented in fact a regression from the liberal-democratic state due to the fact that representative institutions started to lose their influence on political-economic decisions. The state has been demonized, and "good governance" principles have been advanced in order to downsize and privatize the state.

The question that arises following this account is: "How has this undemocratic state of affairs been legitimised?" This problem of legitimation has been resolved through a problematic "civil society" discourse, which has paradoxically been promoted and strengthened even by certain sections of the Left. Indeed such a tendency could be observed on the Left starting at the end of the 1960s as the baby boom generation began to organize what have been called "new social movements" that were based on a non-hierarchical organizational form (as opposed to the hierarchical "old social movements") and that saw the labor-capital dispute as only one dispute among others, such as women's rights, gay and lesbian rights, and the environment to name a few. The alleged authoritarian structure of the Soviet Union pushed these groups into rejecting the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the main political strategy against capitalism, and encouraged the search for ways that would prevent the imposition of a certain view of "the good life" on others in order to prevent authoritarianism while at the same time opposing the excesses of capitalist exploitation. This led to the glorification of "civil society" as a field separate from the state and economy, and soon civil society in its reinvented form was advanced as the new stage of politics and democracy at the regional, national and local levels as well as at the global level in the form of "global civil society" (GCS).

This thesis aims to problematize the assumptions behind the glorification of civil society as a new and progressive actor in politics along with the implications of these assumptions. It will be argued that the assumptions behind the glorification of civil society are conceptually misleading and politically disabling. The portrayal of "civil society" or "global civil society" as a homogenous as well as inherently

democratic and peaceful sphere that is opposed to an equally homogenous power-seeking state is misleading yet necessary in order to present it as an emancipatory project to be realized. In contrast with this conceptualization, one of the pivotal arguments of the thesis, also put forward by Alejandro Colas, is that civil society should be understood "as a specifically modern site of socio-political struggle which contains very diverse, often incompatible ideological projects" (Colas, 2005: 17).

GCS has been understood as the agency of the dethronement of the sovereignty of the state and the reconstruction of world politics through the democratization of the institutions of global governance, the spread of human rights and the emergence of a global citizenry (Baker & Chandler, 2005: 1). Generally speaking, it is argued that such an instrumentalist view cannot be plausibly applied to such a broad, ambiguous and unclear concept as that of "civil society", or indeed any conceptualization of "GCS", whose plethora of actors have such variegated views of, and solutions to, the problems of the world today. Civil society, as well as "GCS", therefore, will be analyzed in this thesis as socio-economic and political domains structurally linked to the historical unfolding of modernity as understood by the rise of capitalism and to the particularities and areas of contention this expansion has generated and continues to generate in each country, with a specific focus on Turkey. We cannot, in other words, define the concept of civil society or that of "GCS" without situating its development in the historical development of modernity through the expansion of capitalist relations of production and the international states system (Colas 2005: 21). Therefore, one must exercise caution before reproducing, through the concept of "GCS", "core liberal values including pluralism, non-violent contestation, dialogue and debate", something, for instance, the Global Civil Society Yearbook is guilty of according to Colas "despite the editors' protestations of open-ended impartiality" (Ibid.: p.19). The assertion by Mary Kaldor, for instance, that the concept of civil society has always been linked to the notion of minimizing violence in social relations (Kaldor, 2003: 3) is one such generalization that rests on a liberal rendering of the concept as a "new form of politics" that emerged in the wake of the Cold War (Ibid.: 2), "reinvented" against the "paternalistic and militaristic state" to defend the rights of "personal autonomy, self-organization and private space" (Ibid.: 4).

Analyzing civil society historically and sociologically is indeed a crucial starting point if we are to understand the development of the modern concept of civil society, and thereby evade the ahistorical interpretation of it as a new phenomenon with inherently democratic and peaceful characteristics. Civil society, whether national, international, or global, is a contested sphere of ideological struggle which is constituted by and reflective of the specific forms taken by the nation-state (and the system of states at the international level) and the capitalist world economy. Civil society has not only been constituted by these structures, but has also helped constitute these structures throughout history. Such a view allows one to explain different historical forms of state-society relationships and the fact that civil society both reinforces and undermines the state. The simplification and generalization involved in the assumed dichotomy between the state and civil society is actually an ahistorical fabrication of a normative project revolving around "new" conceptualizations of civil society.

The view that "the more the concept is detached from any necessary association to 'civility', 'plurality' or 'democracy', the closer we will be to identifying both its full explanatory potential and its political/ethical limitations" (Colas, 2005: 20) is therefore essential to prevent a clouding of the real situation on the ground, which may well be non-conducive to civility and plurality. The path is then opened to pointing out the implications of the portrayal of civil society as a "project to be realized", which can briefly be listed as the narrowing of the political sphere to fit the arbitrary conceptualization of "civility", the overlooking of power relations which have favored certain civil society organizations (CSOs) in place of others, and the deradicalization of politics that has resulted from a divided, static and therefore ineffective view of political action. Unsurprisingly, such an account of civil society has been embraced by the neoliberal ideology, and CSOs have been incorporated into neoliberal projects of "good governance" and the restructuring of the state.

1.2 The Theoretical Skeleton of the Thesis: The Legacy of Gramsci

The thesis will utilize a Gramscian approach in order to highlight the historical unity of the state and civil society in the sense that civil society has always been a sphere of hegemonic struggle in which certain state policies and strategies have been legitimized. Due to the fact that Gramsci's political thought has been interpreted in many different ways (in fact, in ways that are inimical to the thesis at hand), it is necessary to clarify the view espoused here.

Speaking against instrumentalization and instrumentalism of the civil society discourse would enable one to look beyond legitimating factors of existing social relations of production on the one hand and the normative perception of the dangers in abandoning the sphere of civil society into the hands of a neoliberal restructuring of state-society relationships on the other. Saying that a political, social or cultural formation is a mere appendage to the economic interests of a dominant group gives us little to explain the consensus generated among the people to the rules to which they adhere. Whether it is the feeling of participation generated by parliamentary processes, political apathy, or organizations and associations within civil society that aid in the ideological justification of existing social relations of production, one must realize the crucial implications of hegemonic processes, one of the most important of which is the production of consent of the dominated.

Gramsci's struggle against an economistic reading of Marx's work following the unexpected resilience of capitalism to the spread of the Russian revolution to more industrialized European countries in the conditions of the post-World War I Europe and towards the end of the inter-war era following the Wall Street Crash of 1929 which kicked off a world economic depression, has been inspirational to many scholars who have tried to formulate a strategy of struggle in advanced industrialized countries. Gramsci provided a key to a richer understanding of Marx's work, one which questioned the plausibility of the claims to "scientific" socialism propagated by Bukharin and "orthodox Marxist" literature, the basic characteristics of which can briefly be listed as a positivist epistemology; a dialectical variant of metaphysical naturalism; rigid economic determinism; and a quasi-Darwinian evolutionary history (Femia, 1987: 67). Gramsci's thinking on the topics of the superstructure paved the

way for Marxist analysis to consider a much broader range of issues from art to identity, unleashing the true potential of the explanatory power of a dialectical perception of history and opening the way for a deeper consideration of the different ways in which capitalism spread and maintained its dominance throughout the world. This had been prevented up to that point by accounts that gave certain primacy to the structure over agency, thereby relegating human agency to the background in relation to prognostications of the inevitable fall of the capitalist mode of production as a result of its inherent economic contradictions: "The claim (presented as an essential postulate of historical materialism) that every fluctuation of politics and ideology can be presented and expounded as an immediate expression of the structure, must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism" (Gramsci, 2000: 190).

The essential idea embodied in Gramsci's notion of hegemony was that he "saw in a way that no previous Marxist had done that the rule of one class or group over the rest of society does not depend on material power alone; in modern times, at least, the dominant class must establish its own moral, political and cultural values as conventional norms of practical behavior" (Femia, 1987: 3). In other words, Gramsci analyzed the ways in which the rule of the dominant class overcame the historical obstacles on its way, especially in the forms of deep economic crises, through the creation of a "historic bloc", a term which signified the interdependency of the structure and the superstructure in the form of the consent given to the capitalist mode of production by the proletariat despite the extant (yet not fully perceived in the fragmented consciousness of the exploited classes) reality of a relationship of exploitation in the economic sphere. He observed, within the confines of a fascist administration's prison, that workers wore their chains willingly, and that therefore this situation had to be derived from a condition of general "consent" in society. From this point forward, Gramsci articulated his thought in the form of a dichotomy, one which has been the center of much dispute. He asserted that there were two forms of social control, and two separate areas in which these were exercised: "whereas 'domination' is realized, essentially, through the coercive machinery of the state, 'intellectual and moral leadership' is objectified in, and mainly exercised through, 'civil society'" (Ibid.: 24). What Gramsci meant by "civil society" is crucial here, as his interpretation broke with Marx's equation of civil society with the material substructure, that is, the structure of economic relations, and although it

seemingly reverted to a Hegelian notion of civil society which encompassed a more expansive set of economic instruments and relations alongside the institutions that were needed to maintain the order necessary to continue these relations, Gramsci in essence equated civil society with the ideological superstructure, which can be described as those institutions and technical instruments that create and diffuse modes of thought (i.e. schools, religious institutions, etc.) (Ibid.: 26). It is possible, therefore, to talk of a unique theorization of the superstructure, one which attempted to reconcile historical materialism with human agency and the ways in which agency was triggered against, or made to conform with, the prevalent cultural norms and values.

One of the most important questions that deserves attention when attempting a study of one or more aspects of civil society with explicit reference to Gramsci is how the Italian thinker conceptualized the relationship between the state and civil society. A short review of the literature on Gramsci will show that the answer given to this fundamental question is one of the most important dividing points among theorists. It can be said that Gramsci conceptualized the state in two different senses throughout his writings. The first (narrow sense) entails the identification of the state with the sphere of "domination". Gramsci, in his Prison Notebooks, points to "two major superstructural 'levels'" of 'civil society' constituted by an 'ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'" and 'political society', to which he equates the state:

> These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of 'hegemony' which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of 'direct domination' or command exercised through the state and 'juridical' government (Gramsci, 2000: 306).

The second sense in which the state is used by Gramsci is in the form of the "integral state", which basically denotes the inclusion of the state in the aforementioned narrow sense together with civil society, containing "both the apparatuses of government and the judiciary and the various voluntary and private associations and para-political institutions which make up civil society" thereby possessing "educative" and "ethical" functions as well (Forgacs, 2000: 429-430). For our purposes, the important point is that Gramsci's distinction between state and civil

society serves an analytical purpose, and was "designed to aid understanding" since he "recognized an interpenetration between the two spheres", exemplified in the efforts of the state to create a suitable public opinion and organize certain elements of civil society when it plans to initiate an unpopular action or policy, while an overlapping of the two moments of the superstructure is seen in the way "the elaborate structure of liberal democracy (e.g. parliaments, courts, elections, etc.), by creating a façade of freedom and popular control, and by educating men in the ways of bourgeois politics, conditions them to accept the status quo willingly", and finally in the way that "certain hegemonic institutions of civil society, such as political parties and organized religion, are transmuted, in specific historical situations and periods, into constituent components of the state apparatus" (Femia, 1987: 27-28). Having drawn the link between the state and civil society, it is important to emphasize that the establishment and maintenance of hegemony is a continuous and dynamic process in which the dominant class attempts to build cultural, moral and intellectual leadership over other social groups in society through both the state and civil society. Understanding hegemony as exercised both through the state and civil society as a non-ending process prevents us from drawing an ahistorical dichotomy between the state and civil society as two homogenous entities categorically opposed to each other through history. Speaking against the free trade movement, for instance, Gramsci places emphasis on the need to understand that this movement is "based on a theoretical error whose practical origin is not hard to identify: namely the distinction between political society and civil society, which is made into and presented as an organic one, whereas in fact it is methodological" (2000: 210).

A perspective which explains the historical relationship between the state and civil society also needs to take into consideration that the state-civil society relationship is not acted out in a vacuum. In other words, the specific historical conditions in which the state and civil society are targeted as spheres of ideological struggle for the establishment of hegemony must be outlined. For instance, Jacques Texier states that

> the conception of the relations between infrastructure and superstructures enable Gramsci to form a concrete idea of historical dialectics through an analysis of the origin and development of superstructural activities in given

> infrastructural conditions up to the decisive moment of the 'overthrow of praxis' or revolution in social relations (Texier, 1979: 48).

This view will be the heuristic model of the thesis, as it will be shown that it confers intelligibility to the notion of civil society (or "GCS") as constitutive of and constituted by the "infrastructural conditions" of modernity defined in terms of the states system and capitalist relations of production, while simultaneously reinforcing and undermining these structures.

1.3 Limits and Scope of the thesis

It is important to note that the thesis at hand is not based on an effort to formulate a definition for civil society. The best it will do towards creating a semblance of a definition will be suggesting that civil society should be viewed in light of its historical dialectical relationship with the structures of modernity, which is identified as the international system of states and capitalist relations of production. Indeed, it will be argued that the concept has been glorified by both the advocates of GCS and civil society within the New Right and the Left based on virtues that have been attributed to the concept through an ahistorical, arbitrary and false definition. In other words, both the New Right and certain sections of the Left have tried to promote a normative definition of civil society based on their mutual assumption of the dichotomy between the state and civil society and their respective visualizations for a more progressive world. In this sense it is possible to argue that a normative definition of civil society attempts to conceptualize the world in terms of the definition espoused. There is nothing wrong with promoting a normative definition of a concept as long as the definition is accepted as arbitrary. The problem arises when such a normative vision of civil society is promoted as a "reality", and therefore "what should be" is mixed up with "what is". This is especially a problem for advocates of civil society in the Left, who have argued for a more tolerant, pluralistic and non-violent sphere of political deliberation. Yet their insistence on attributing "civility", "plurality" and "democracy" as inherent virtues of civil society has led to serious contradictions. This is because it is simply not possible to escape from the fact that organizations that do not share the liberal renditions of "civility",

"plurality" and "democracy" exist in civil society. Some of these organizations have ties to the state and the market, while others have no political perspectives whatsoever.

It should also be noted that this thesis does not further engage debates surrounding Gramsci's conceptualization of state-civil society relationship. It is understood that Gramsci's views have been inspirational to advocates of "radical democracy" and "multiculturalism", which have interpreted Gramsci's writings in such a way as to legitimize civil society as a project to be realized. However, as noted above the thesis prefers to base its theoretical arguments on an interpretation of Gramsci which does not separate the state from civil society. Although the thesis does not directly engage with the contrary interpretations of Gramsci, it does provide arguments which refute the glorification of civil society as opposed to the state, an assumption which defines the former as a sphere of coercion and the latter as a sphere of consent.

1.4 The Structure of the Thesis

In order to clarify and substantiate the arguments above, the thesis has been divided into three chapters.

The first chapter explains the rise of neoliberalism throughout the world as a practical and discursive process. The rise in the structural power of capital against that of the national-state and labor is explained through an account of the way in which this has affected the neoliberal transformation of states, classes and the concept of democracy. The incorporation of the concept of "globalization" by neoliberalism and the way in which this has empowered neoliberal discourse is explained with reference to the way in which democracy is undermined through the "inevitability" thesis, the assumptions of which are consolidated at the supranational level through attempts at "new constitutionalism". The chapter thus analyses the historical background for the rise of neoliberalism, and argues against the portrayal of neoliberal globalization as a mystified and metaphysical phenomenon. This is done by pointing out the fact that neoliberal globalization is the latest stage of the uneven and hierarchical expansion of capitalist social relations of production, implying therefore that globalization is not a finalized process but a tendency with

past precedents. Far from being a natural process, it is argued that neoliberal globalization is a political process managed by identifiable political actors (such as a transnational capitalist class working with sections of national bourgeoisie and state officials).

The second chapter deals with crux of the thesis, the central discussion around which the first and third chapters actually revolve. It problematizes the way in which GCS is glorified by the New Right and certain sections of the Left, with a particular focus on the arguments of the latter. The reasons for the glorification of GCS by the Left is explained as a result of the state-civil society distinction upheld by GCS advocates and the emancipatory role attributed to what has in fact been a field of ideological struggle. The dangers of the assumptions resulting from the glorification of civil society are identified as the deradicalization of politics, as well as an affirmative association with the New Right as seen by the way in which GCS discourse has been accepted by neoliberalism with few modifications.

The final chapter connects the arguments made in the first two chapters with the developments in Turkey. As with GCS discourse, it is argued that debates on civil society in Turkey have exercised a similar process of glorification in the hands of some representatives of the Turkish Left, who were disillusioned with the oppression of the 1980 military coup and abandoned their pre-coup ambitions of obtaining state power in the name of the proletariat. The specificity of the glorification of civil society in Turkey has been that insofar as the Turkish state is understood to be a uniquely oppressive entity defying explanation via Euro-centric analyses, the development of civil society in Turkey is argued to be a completely state-led phenomenon. Certain sections of the Turkish Left have created an acutely normative conceptualization of civil society through its description of the situation of civil society in Turkey as a sphere that has always been and continues to be dominated by the state. This view has served to reinforce the assumed state-civil society dichotomy. The glorification of civil society in Turkey has therefore generated the attribution of an even greater role to civil society as an emancipatory (democratizing) actor by the specific discourse in Turkey, in which civil society is portrayed as victimized by the state. It is argued that this identification of civil society in Turkey as a democratic sphere outside the state has led those scholars and advocates promoting civil society as a new and progressive actor in politics, despite

all warnings made by civil society advocates themselves, into an indirect affirmation of the New Right in Turkey, exemplified in the way in which both have espoused a post-political discourse and the concept of "good governance". Moreover, the chapter illustrates the reality of civil society in Turkey through some historical examples affirming the argument that the state-civil society distinction leads to a gross simplification of the way in which civil society has consistently been a sphere of ideological struggle, in which state and market forces have also played important roles.

Chapter II

The Practice and Discourse of Neoliberalism

2.1 Introduction

Since the late 1970s, state-market relations have been transformed throughout the world in line with neoliberal restructuring processes that have included the restructuring of production through the uneven and hierarchical expansion of global capitalism as well as the devaluation of democracy within a new rhetoric of market democracy. It must be noted that the pressures emanating from these practices are not uniform throughout the globe. The implementation of neoliberalism takes on specific guises in each country, and therefore an all-encompassing model of homogenization cannot be plausibly sought, nor is the development of neoliberalism easily explained through a linear development model. Having said this, certain general characteristics of neoliberalism can still be identified, not only in the way neoliberal policies have been proposed, but also in the consequences these policies have had on the socio-economic and political structures of the countries they are implemented in. This similarity appears to rest on a uniform recipe of "structural adjustment" put forward by multilateral international institutions of "global governance" such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO, and their role of overseeing the implementation of these programs, collecting debt services and keeping up the anti-inflationist neoliberal economic order, all for the purpose of creating a favorable environment for transnational capital. Moreover, neoliberal policies have long been proposed through a discourse, the maintenance of which rests on a "there is no alternative" (TINA) desperation and a feeling of inevitability. The main assumption of this discourse can be summarized as the primacy of market efficiency once left alone to its "natural" evolution and therefore the separation of the state from the market; the sanctification of global economic processes through the rhetoric of the inexorable advance of "globalization"; the necessity to downsize the state which is assumed to be the hotbed of corruption and therefore the primary obstacle in front of

development; and the connection established between what has been proposed as "universal" values such as human rights and democracy, and the free market.

The implementation of neoliberal policies, however, has not been able to justify these assumptions or support the claims based on these assumptions. The spread of neoliberalism has led to growing inequality both within states and between states throughout the process of the internationalization of production. This process has also revealed that the state is an indispensable actor in that it guarantees the smooth operation of the market and advances deregulation and privatization. Rather than contract, the state has transformed and even expanded in order to apply and maintain neoliberal policy prescriptions in the face of growing social disparities and conflict caused by the same prescriptions. The "post-Washington consensus" and the concomitant adoption of the doctrine of "new institutionalist economics" by international institutions such as the World Bank, signify a formal recognition of the importance of the state in the implementation of neoliberal policies. However, this has not translated into a wholehearted denial of the traditional anti-statist stance of neoliberalism, as the good governance discourse continues to invade domestic political debates and transform perceptions on issues such as "corruption", as part and parcel of the transformation of the state into a more neoliberal-friendly form.

The mystification of globalization has been instrumental for the spread of neoliberalism, as state officials could easily point to a process occurring beyond their control in order to exempt themselves from accountability. To the extent that neoliberal policies such as "flexible labor" and anti-inflation has come to be seen as normal economic parlence, the view of "economic globalization" as an inexorable process has helped the political project of neoliberalism. Although the uneven and hierarchical spread of capitalism and the shifting balance of social forces in favor of big business and strong states has ensured that the spread of neoliberalism in the guise of a "neoliberal globalization" would not be left uncontested (through transnational social movements such as Anti-MAI-Multilateral Agreement on Investment), "democracy" in its traditional "liberal-democratic" sense has undergone transformation for the worse due to these occurrences, exemplified by the relative decrease in the state's autonomy vis-à-vis multinational corporations (MNCs) and inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) (implying that representatives accountable to the people who chose them to office would have little to say over globally

implemented neoliberal-economic policies) and the increase in the state's monitoring and law enforcement capabilities (usually manifested in "anti-terror" measures impinging on individual rights).

The concept of globalization has been discussed from various viewpoints depending on how much autonomy is accorded to the state. Once the relationship between neoliberalism and the concept of globalization is viewed from a historical and sociological light, however, the way in which the latter is instrumentalized by the former can be seen. In turn, this leads to a clarification of neoliberalism as a "political project" born out of historical circumstances and a process which therefore can be turned around. For neoliberalism dodges questions of legitimacy and accountability through its emphasis on "globalization" as an unstoppable force, and weaves its anti-statist rhetoric on the grounds that this force needs to be unstoppable if the good deeds that are to come from leaving the market alone are to run its natural course. Contesting this claim one finds that it is possible to point out neoliberalism as a political project with historical precedents for the uneven and unequal expansion of capitalist social relations. The contradictions harbored by the neoliberal discourse (such as the role of the state) are precisely the result of a political project trying to be portrayed as a natural event through the separation of the state and market, politics and economics, thereby separating them as fields of study.

The first part of this chapter will discuss the rationale and the political context of the rise of neoliberalism. The basic assumptions of the neoliberal economic doctrine will be outlined along with the political implications of these assumptions. Basically it can be said that the assumptions of market efficiency and capital mobility have translated into a political attack on the state. The general policy prescriptions of the neoliberal doctrine on the nation-state will be summarized along with its implications for the state-market balance, namely the rising structural power of capital and the internationalization of production, evidenced by the expansion of trade, finance and speculation, and the rise of MNCs in the international scene as against the relative autonomy known to the nation-state during the Fordist era. This will be followed by an account of the dynamics involved in the spread of neoliberalism through the world, championed as an alternative to a welfare-capitalism in crisis, propagated by transnational class interests, encouraged by the decline of the Left throughout the world, and implemented by "structural adjustment

programs (SAP) of IGOs. It is hoped that this account will point to the political process of the spread of neoliberalism and dispel the view that this process was the result of the natural evolution of the market.

The next section will delineate the implications of the spread of neoliberalism as regards the transformation of the state, classes, and democracy. The transformation of the functions of the state is an important point to emphasize. It can be said that rather than being weakened or strengthened, the state has transformed into a more neoliberal-friendly form. The topic of "corruption" is given here as an example to this transformation. The consequence of neoliberal policies on the lives of people is outlined, together with implications with regard to the makeup of classes and the meaning attributed to democracy. The issue of the autonomy of the state vis-à-vis "globalization" has been a central concern for the above-mentioned issues, which necessitates the clarification of the globalization debate. Therefore this section is followed by a brief account of the globalization debate, in order to make sense of the way in which the concept of "globalization" is made an instrument of neoliberal policies, and the way this conceptualization is reproduced unless the "aura of objectivity" of globalization is torn apart and revealed as a political discourse of the spread of capitalist social relations. In order to do this a brief discussion will follow on the concept of "discourse" and the main points of the neoliberal globalization discourse. Thus it is hoped that the way in which globalization is incorporated into the neoliberal discourse to make the latter stronger will be explained, together with the necessity to view the neoliberal globalization discourse as integral to the practice of neoliberal policies.

The concluding section consists of a critical view towards the neoliberal doctrine and its discourse, which is powered by the instrumentalization of "globalization". The resulting "neoliberal globalization", contrary to the discourse it reproduces it will be argued, is unnatural (as opposed to "naturally evolving"), uneven and hierarchical (as opposed to mutually beneficial to all actors) and not unprecedented. The corollary of this argument is that neoliberalism is a political project that has had detrimental effects on the welfare of the masses, a regressive effect as regards the liberal-democratic state, and pacifying effects as regards political action.

2.2 The Rationale and the Political Context of the Rise of Neoliberalism

What has been come to known as the "Washington Consensus" is in fact the practical development strategy of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is premised on certain assumptions of modern neoclassical theory which are crucial to an understanding of the anti-statist discourse on which neoliberalism is based. First, at the microeconomic level, the assumption is that the market is efficient and the state is inefficient, which leads to the conclusion that the market and not the state should deal with economic problems such as industrial growth, international competitiveness and employment creation (Saad-Filho, 2005: 113). Indeed for neoliberalism, "the market symbolizes rationality in terms of an efficient distribution of resources" while government intervention impinges on that rationality and "conspires against both efficiency and liberty" (Munck 2005: 61). The assumption at the macroeconomic level on the other hand is that the world economy is characterized by capital mobility and the unstoppable advance of globalization, which in turn means that domestic policies must conform to the short-term interests of markets, especially financial markets in order to attract investment (Saad-Filho, 2005: 113). Both these assumptions imply that the reason why poor countries cannot develop is due to misconceived state intervention, corruption, inefficiency and misguided economic incentives, and that international trade and finance, and not domestic consumption, should become the engines of development (Ibid.: 114). The assumptions concerning the "natural" evolution and efficiency of the market therefore serve to demonize the state, and to mask the very political nature of the creation of the market through a history of contestation and struggle. This is how neoliberalism is said to have "established a new socio political matrix that frames the conditions for political transformation across the globe" (Munck 2005: 61).

Accordingly, fiscal and monetary discipline is to be imposed, says neoliberalism, in order to eliminate government budget deficit, control inflation and limit the scope for state intervention. Furthermore, neoliberalism opts for the liberalization of foreign trade in order to increase the competitiveness of domestic firms, the devaluation of the exchange rate in order to stimulate exports and promote specialization in tune with the country's comparative advantage, liberalization of the

capital account balance of payment in order to facilitate foreign investment inflows and the liberalization of the domestic financial system. Another policy prescription of the Washington Consensus is the flexible labor market with the supposed aim of increasing employment and labor productivity, including such policies as the simplification of hiring-firing regulations, the decentralization of labor relations, the curtailment of trade union rights, the elimination of collective agreements and protective regulation and the reduction of social security benefits. (Saad-Filho, 2005: 114).

These neoliberal policies have been the order of the day at a period corresponding to the rising structural power of capital, that is, power which is associated with material and normative dimensions in society as in market structures and ideology, exemplified in the increasing importance given to economic growth relative to other goals and the acceptance of certain "assumptions and claims made about the conditions for the achievement of growth, for example, that is fundamentally dependent on investment and innovation by private enterprise" (Gill, 2003: 98). The acceptance of these assumptions, it is argued, would lead to an increasing concern with the cultivation of an appropriate "business climate" lest investment is scared away (Ibid.). This structural power of capital grew against that of the workers and the unions, as business placed the blame on this section of society for the world economic recession experienced in the 1970s:

> Business blamed unions for raising wages and governments for a cycle of excessive spending, borrowing and taxing. Governments were made to understand that a revival of economic growth depended on business confidence to invest, and that this confidence depended on 'discipline' directed at trade unions and government fiscal management (Cox, 2002: 81).

The structural power of capital, exerted over governments throughout the world in the wake of the recession, led to an increase in the mobility of capital and a growing internationalization of production. Trade, for instance, has undergone a quantitative expansion: the proportion of trade to gross domestic product surpassed the pre-1914 era for the first time by the early 1970s; advances in technology made many goods that were not traded earlier tradeable; and the intensity of trade expanded not only within regions but between them, enmeshing national economies "in a pattern of increasingly dense, competitive international trade" (Held, 1998: 15).

An even greater level of expansion, reached in financial flows, has shadowed the expansion of trade. Statistics show that for every 55 dollars turned over in the foreign exchange markets, today 1 dollar is turned over in real trade, with most of this activity being speculative, or in other words generating "values in excess of those which can be accounted for by changes in the underlying fundamentals of asset value" (Ibid.: 16). This implied, in turn, a shift away from industrialization, as in the words of Bonefeld, money was dissociated from production (1994: 38). This basically meant that the increase in the dominance of money capital over relations of production has not been substantiated with an increase in the investment in industrial productivity. This dissociation was pushed on by the deregulation of the financial market: "The market, helped by the deregulation of credit controls, took the freedom to liberate money from labor and toil" (Ibid.: 38). Speculative pressure on national currencies (allowing for the flight of capital in case domestic accumulation was not integrated with global accumulation) implied a shorter leash around the neck of the state, whose area of maneuver was seriously limited. Thus the "orgy of speculation" as Bonefeld calls it, marked by "the breeding of profits by speculative capital through the unproductive investment in money markets" was an outcome of the deregulation of credit controls and the global liberalization of financial markets (Ibid.: 53). Making use of these conditions is another actor in the international scene that cannot be left out in any account of neoliberal globalization, namely the MNCs, which have been another element in the shifting of the balance of power in favor of capital against national governments and national labor movements. Today they account for a quarter to a third of world output, 70 percent of world trade and 80 percent of direct national investment, and have the power to respond to variations in interest rates by moving their production to sites more favorable to their profit motive, which is made possible by the expansion of exit options (Gill, 2003: 17-18). The rise in the power of finance and MNCs has led to worried calls concerning the autonomy of democratically elected governments, stressing that this autonomy is increasingly constrained by sources of unelected and unrepresentative economic power (Ibid: 18) and that "finance has become decoupled from production to become an independent power, an autocrat over the real economy" (Cox, 2002: 82).

At this point, it is important to outline the ways in which this set of relations expanded throughout the world, especially in order to give the present set of

circumstances a historical background. The political emblem of the "New Right" that emphasized the supremacy of the market in totality and embodied in the governments of Thatcher, Reagan and Pinochet, was brought up as a response to the world economic recession in the 1970s and the breakup of the Bretton Woods agreement, which had to that date "attempted to strike a balance between the liberal world market and the domestic responsibilities of states" by controlling international finance under fixed exchange rates and acting to preserve trade liberalization and exchange rate convertibility, while at the same time granting states time to make adjustments in their economic practices in order not to disturb the welfare of domestic groups (Cox, 2002: 80). The rise of the "New Right" was heralded as the alternative to crisis-ridden welfare capitalism (Colas, 2005: 76).

There were, according to Colas (Ibid.), three international dimensions of this phenomenon, the first being the "transnational" dimensions of neoliberalism in the form of the emergence of an elite of opinion formers on both sides of the Atlantic who advocated the so-called Washington Consensus, involving fiscal discipline, financial and trade liberalization, privatization and the opening up to FDI, characteristics of neoliberal practice outlined above. Transnational historical materialists have argued that during this time, sectors of the bourgeoisie organized transnationally through private and public institutions ranging from the Trilateral Commission to the Group of Seven (now Eight) industrialized economies in order to formulate, promote and coordinate neoliberal policies worldwide. Stephen Gill (2003: 119) for instance talks of the formation of a transnational historical bloc in his sketch of power structures of contemporary politics, the nucleus of which is said to comprise elements of the G7 apparatuses and transnational capital (in manufacturing, finance and services) and associated privileged workers and smaller firms (e.g. small and middle sized businesses linked as contractors or suppliers, import-export businesses, service companies such as stockbrokers, accountants, consultancies, lobbyists, educational entrepreneurs, architects, designers).

The second dimension outlined by Colas (2005: 77) involves the political decline of the Left in the North and the crisis of non-capitalist forms of development in the South. This is yet another important point that displays the political character of the onset of neoliberalism, for in the capitalist core the Left had "either abandoned any pretence at socialist transformation or faced electoral decline," and had failed to

take their chances in power due to domestic and international economic pressure, exemplified in the cases of France under the 1981 Socialist-Communist government or in Spain with the 1986 referendum over NATO membership (Ibid.) or indeed the Carnation Revolution in Portugal. The labor movement in the United Kingdom was left "demoralized and in disarray" following Thatcher's oppression of the miners, and the words "There is No Alternative" (TINA) seeped into the vocabulary of the general public. In the periphery, Third World revolutionary states failed to please the socio-economic and political expectations of generations born after independence, and the counter-revolutionary wars waged in Africa and central America (El Salvador, Nicaragua), along with the rise of fundamentalist rule in Iran struck a blow to the aspirations of a re-kindled socialist internationalism (Ibid.).

The third international dimension was foreign debt, handed out by international financial institutions (IFIs) under SAPs that were implemented as a condition for receiving loans and which emerged as a result of the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s:

> Successive defaults in the early 1980s led to the design by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of programs aimed at 'restabilising' and 'adjusting' the 'macroeconomic fundamentals' of debtor countries in order to secure repayment. Cutbacks in public spending, currency devaluation, export promotion, opening up of both trade and capital accounts, privatization and tax reductions were among the core components of such SAPs. Unsurprisingly, they were vigorously endorsed by the lending institutions – both national and multilateral- run by, or on behalf of, neoliberal governments, and by the 1990s no major IFI would extend credit to countries unwilling to undertake structural adjustment. (Colas, 2005: 78).

It is also necessary to bear in mind that these policies were not necessarily forced on Third World countries, but rather accepted by those who had something to gain from them within these countries. Examples of Mexico, Brazil and India undergoing neoliberal adjustment due to the decisions of their ruling classes can be cited while the example of countries like Zimbabwe who have carried out structural adjustment without the IMF serves to consolidate this point (Ibid). Indeed, the acceptance of these neoliberal policy prescriptions so readily is based on capital accumulation crises that are experienced at the national level due to both economic and political reasons, and the attempt to overcome these crises by the respective

dominant forces of these countries by integrating their respective national economies with the world economy.

Merely by giving an account of the spread of neoliberalism in history, we come face to face with the glaring fact that this was not a natural process at all. Far from it, it was a process advocated by people with transnational links and power, and institutions through which this power could be exerted. Political and economic crises of capital accumulation has, in cases such as Turkey, led to national initiatives at restructuring the state and its relations with the market and society through the interference of state institutions acting on behalf of the ruling classes. Moreover, the spread of neoliberalism was as much the victory for the New Right as it was the result of the defeat and withdrawal of the Left. Although, once again, this retreat of the Left or its transformation into more reformist movements can be viewed in the light of the "natural" punishment for the blasphemy of defying the market, such an explanation would not be able to account for the rise of the Left in Europe (France, Italy) and South America (Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil) today.

2.3 The Implications of Neoliberal Transformations on Classes, State and Democracy

The implications of the implementation of neoliberalism in the 1980's and 1990's can be examined in two respects: those corresponding to concrete and visible changes in the structure of classes and states, and the rise of a new democratic rhetoric corresponding to these concrete changes. These two developments are, however, very much interrelated, and their separation here merely serves an analytical purpose. For it is not possible to overlook the constitutive role of discourses of reality and the fact that discourses emanate from social contradictions.

As noted above, the economic dictums of neoliberalism necessitated a transformation of the state, which naturally meant a transformation of politics itself, consequently leading to the emergence of the "competition state" (Cerny 2000: 301). The competition state was a new form of state that would facilitate the operation of the market on a world scale:

> Today, rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the market-'decommodify' them as the welfare state was organized to do-the competition state has pursued increased marketization to make economic activities located within the national territory, or that otherwise contributed to national wealth, more competitive in international and transnational terms. (Cerny, 2000: 301).

In order to do this the nation-state was transformed from a "decommodifying agent" which traditionally took economic activities out of the market, and was forced to "act more and more as a collective commodifying agent (i.e., putting activities into the market) and even as a market actor itself" (Ibid.: 306).

The competition state has not necessarily decreased in size. While it has pulled away from its traditional role of acting as a provider of social security and a safety net for the poor, in the economic sphere the state has actually been more active in order to promote the neoliberal policies expected by IGOs (such as privatization and deregulation, as listed above). Such a role for the state has been dictated by IGOs such as the World Bank on various issues that are put forward as interrelated, and most of which is tied to the notion of "good governance". One such issue is that of corruption, which, although not easily defined, is being used by the new right discourse and the international institutions, both of which portray this issue as one of the most important obstacles in front of eradicating poverty. The issue is tied to the institutionalization of political and economic reforms, such as the IMF's attempts at uniting the "first and second generation reforms", thereby indicating that macroeconomic security and the fight against corruption is part of the same development strategy (Bedirhanoglu, 2006: 1, 4-5). This reform process, in turn, has been posited as the responsibility of the states implementing them, thereby implying that should the political will to do so exist, the reforms will be successful. In accordance with this view, the World Bank has stated that the reasons for corruption need to be analyzed according to the political, economic and cultural conditions existing in each separate country. However, although a door is opened to original solutions according to specific domestic conditions, the policies proposed by the World Bank and the IMF are uniform in that they consistently emphasize the importance of restructuring and the consolidation of a competitive market structure as the primary instruments with which to bring corruption under control, backed up by a promise to "encourage governments everywhere to pursue these goals" (Ibid.:

5). What is prescribed to states, therefore, is an acceptance and implementation of values and standards associated with the discourse of the new right, which to the extent that it takes the advance of globalization as inevitable, is not able to propose "original" policies to the states to which it offers its "helping hand". The important point here is that the state is given the responsibility of enacting these policies, which are all too easily equated with democracy, as can be seen by the fact that many countries that have taken steps towards democratization have actually seen the phenomenon of corruption rise rather than fall (Ibid.). In response to this criticism, spokespeople for the new right have interestingly pointed to the fact that the reason behind the failure to bring corruption under control has been the greater intervention in the economy by the state in order for the latter to implement new right policies (Bedirhanoglu, 2006b: 7). The World Bank has also admitted that a connection may exist between the imperatives for the development of a free market economy and corruption, yet this situation has been presented as one that is related to a short and medium-term problem characteristic of the reform period, and one which will be brought under control once a competitive market mechanism is firmly established (Ibid.: 8).

Another implication of neoliberal transformations can be perceived in class structures. The class-biased character of neoliberalism is evident in the fact that Washington consensus policies have systematically favored large domestic and foreign capital, especially financial capital at the expense of smaller capitals and the workers while the "ensuing transfer of resources to the rich, and the growth slowdown triggered by the neoliberal obsession with inflation, have led, in virtually every country, to higher unemployment, wage stagnation and concentration of income", while "volatile capital flows to poor countries have frequently triggered severe financial crises (e.g. Mexico in 1994-95, East Asia in 1996-98, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Turkey and Argentina in 2001)" (Saad-Filho, 2005: 116). Neoliberal policies have confronted implementation problems that have worsened the life standards of the laboring classes in countries these policies were applied. For instance, economic deregulation has harmed coordination of economic activity and state policy-making capacity, precluding the use of industrial policy instruments for the implementation of socially determined priorities (Ibid.), as states find themselves negotiating with a number of firms who hold ownership of key areas of social life,

such as transport, health, and education. Other areas of problem include the destruction of jobs and traditional industries that are labeled inefficient, and the failure to compensate for these lost jobs with the rapid development of new industries, leading to structural unemployment, greater poverty and marginalization; the heavy emphasis on an "intangible and elusive" concept of "business confidence"; and the fact that neoliberal policies are not self correcting, but rather lead to "the *extension* of IMF and World Bank intervention beyond economic policy-making, and into governance and the political process, with the excuse of ensuring implementation of Washington's favorite policies (Ibid.: 116-117). Such problems with the implementation of neoliberal policies and the resulting widespread reaction to neoliberal policy prescriptions have ultimately led to a shift in the conduct of neoliberal policies, with New Institutional Economies taking the spot in the forms of a "Post-Washington Consensus" though without really questioning the assumptions and discourse of neoliberalism, a point which will be elaborated below.

The restructuring of production relations in a new way has been at the center of the transformation in class structures. Following the shift from Fordism to post-Fordism (i.e. from economies of scale to economies of flexibility) due to the advent of neoliberalism, a new model of production came into being that was quite different from that of the "integrated plant employing semi-skilled workers for the mass production of standardized goods", as it has been replaced with a "core-periphery structure of production" characterized by the employment of a "relatively small core of permanent employees handling finance, research and development, technological organization and innovation; and a periphery consisting of dependent components of the production process – outsourcing and temporary and part-time workers" (Cox, 2002: 81). The flexibility of the labor market as dictated by neoliberal policy meant that the majority of workers would be employed on a fluid basis, hiring and firing would be facilitated, and unemployment would become a fact of life.

As the internationalization of production allowed capital to look for ways to free itself from the systems of accumulation and regulation which had traditionally focused on the development of internal markets and limited the scope for state intervention in economic-social policies, a reduction of the "capacity of states to regulate social developments in a coherent and coordinated manner" came into being, leading to the development of more heterogeneous national societies with "an

increase in social disparities and division, on the one hand, and in the establishment of economic relations across state borders, on the other hand" (Hirsch, 2003: 243). International disparities among states generated by an increasingly debt-ridden Third World and the industrialized West has created increasingly larger numbers of refugees and migrants, which "in turn contributes to the reorganization of class structures, the transformation of forms of work, and changes in power relationships within society" (Ibid.). What Hirsch has in mind here can be exemplified with the increasing numbers of migrant workers in industrialized countries, being employed, legally or illegally, in jobs that are not preferred by the workers of the host country. Such a division among the ranks of the laboring classes has led to what Hirsch calls an "apparent paradox", namely the fact that this process, called "denationalization" by Hirsch, "goes hand in hand with growing nationalist and racist tendencies" (Ibid.). In turn, this segmentation of the labor force "by ethnicity, gender, nationality, religion or geographical location has the effect of weakening the power of trade unions and strengthening that of capital in the production process" (Cox, 2002: 81).

The internationalization of production and the nation state has had a transformative effect on the understanding of democracy and politics as well. Theorists of "cosmopolitan democracy" such as Held (1998: 21) argue that the globalization of production has had a transformative effect on the nature and prospects of democratic political community, as "effective power is shared and bartered by diverse forces and agencies at national, regional and international levels," while the idea of a political community of fate, according to Held, can no longer be meaningfully located within the boundaries of a single nation-state alone. This is a sweeping statement, however, since the advent of neoliberal globalization has brought with it a rise in nationalist tendencies, as noted above. Neither can the existence of separatist movements that hold onto national identities as the determining identities in their lives, such as the Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey, to name but one example, be denied. While Held's statement may or may not be true for core countries, it has to be qualified specifically for each developing country, as "democracy" in countries mentioned above, for instance, are precarious to say the least. Even in industrialized countries, such as those comprising the EU, immigration has come to be seen as a serious problem, leading to the adoption of strict laws against it, most notably in the Seville Summit of 2002.

There is a salient point, however, in the statement that democracy is being reconfigured, one way or the other. Joachim Hirsch (2003: 244) talks of the decline of institutional decision-making, due to the reduction of the scope of administrative intervention by the state because of deregulation of markets and privatization, in favor of informal negotiating fora, which are almost completely beyond the control of traditional democratic institutions and processes, leading to such notions as the "deliberative" concepts of democracy which "reduce democracy to processes of negotiation within civil society, between extremely unequal actors or simply to participatory mobilization for the international competition of localities," therefore implying, according to Hirsch, the "re-feudalization" of politics.

Furthermore, the "internationalization of the state" also corresponds to the increase in the weight of ministries of finance and of central banks independent of democratic political decision making processes, and a visible decrease in the diversity of the programs of political parties occurs leading to a growing lack of legitimacy of the political system (Hirsch, 2003: 245; Munck, 2005: 66). Although states still remain the main guarantor of the existing social order and of social cohesion and that transnational capital is not as independent and cohesive as is usually portrayed (Hirsch, 2003: 246-247), the implications that the internationalization of the state has for what has come to pass as representative democracy to this day should not be overlooked, as this process is what sets the scene for the increasing importance attached to GCS and non-governmental institutions as new sites for democracy and politics:

> As the democratic institutions and processes within individual states lose their influence over political decisions, liberal-democracy becomes reduced to a system of domination without the freedom and self-determination, however limited-which citizens might enjoy otherwise. When democratic processes become ineffective in this way political systems lose their capacity for social integration and the resolution of conflicting interests. (Hirsch, 2003: 253).

The new right discourse, strengthened by its use of the concept of "globalization" (which will be clarified below), shuns human agency and collective human action. Instead, it is put forward as a natural and beneficent process that involves a homogenization or convergence of worldwide social relations that economically and politically benefit the development of poor states; economically as

footloose capital moves onto the less obstructive territory of tax havens and cheap labor force provided by Third World States toppling over each other to attract this capital, and politically with the universalization of institutions and values throughout the world such as democracy, human rights, a vibrant civil society, etc. More importantly, the two areas are linked; free economy translates into the free individual, a development of democracy, and a better human rights record. A very good example of this type of thinking can be seen in an article by Demet Yalcin Mousseau, titled with the rhetorical question "Democracy, Human Rights and Market Development in Turkey: Are They Related?". Briefly Mousseau (2006: 299-315) argues that there are two main competing arguments for the development of civil and political rights, the institutionalist aspect that emphasizes democratic institutional structures as the key determinants of political rights and which therefore champions the development of these institutions, and the economical perspective which argues that economic development correlates to liberal political values and fosters the political culture that favors civil and political rights. As can be seen, even the framing of the arguments revolving around the development of civil and political rights is based on a separation of the economic and the political. Mousseau goes on to state, with empirical "evidence", that respect for human rights cannot be learned or realized with democratic institutions, as clientalist and patronage networks, as well as nepotism and favoritism that developed in Turkey despite the formal existence of democratic institutions exemplify. The failure of Turkey to "develop" is, according to Mousseau, the result of the failure to completely liberalize the Turkish economy and to fully implement the economic reforms for the creation of a modern market. This failure has been displayed, according to the author, in the state's continued domination of capital markets with public investments and control over financial markets. The answer to the question of "what can be done?", is answered in the following manner as a good example of neoliberal discourse:

> If low market participation and dependence on clientalist networks inhibit the emergence of a political culture that respects individual rights, then to improve human rights the Turkish state must actively promote a market economy by reducing in-group rent-seeking and actively support widespread participation in the market (Mousseau, 2006: 322).

Linking economic liberalization with greater democracy and better human rights, and portraying the obstacles in front of all these goals as corruption, overlooks the fact that corrupt dictatorial regimes have been able to establish free market economies throughout the world, and that in fact the spread of neoliberal policies around the world have led to a falling standard of life for the majority of the world, increasing inequality and social exclusion both in industrialized states and in Third World states, and as noted above, rising corruption!

It is also necessary to take into consideration what neoliberal political discourse understands from "democracy". It must be noted that this discourse was especially successful in discrediting social conquests related to labor rights and fundamental freedoms as backward-looking anachronisms, while: "The complex and empowering vision of citizenship in its classic democratic presentation was reduced, in the era of neoliberalism, to the power of the credit card and the pleasures of the shopping mall, realizable or not according to one's position on a sharply heirarchised class structure between and within nation-states" (Munck, 2005: 65). Munck goes on to state that individual identities began to be reflected with consumption patterns, leading to a cultural restructuring of society. Personal freedoms were highlighted by neoliberalism while democracy as a system of political representation was devalorised. This was essentially done, according to Munck, with the co-option of democratic discourses in order to legitimize neoliberalism in the 1990s. For instance, traditional democratic concepts such as "civil society" were subverted to introduce new conservative concepts such as 'social capital', while civil society was used by neoliberal discourse against "big government" as all non-state actors were encouraged to supplant or rein in the state, from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to the trade unions. Munck also highlights the way in which the World Bank became a champion of depoliticized 'civil society' "for reasons other than a support for democracy" (Ibid.: 66) (this argument will be elaborated in Chapter III).

2.4 The Incorporation of the Concept of "Globalization" into the Neoliberal Discourse

> One of the single triumphs of neoliberalism as a contemporary ideology has been the appropriation of 'globalization' as a process denoting the universal, boundless and irreversible spread of market imperatives in the reproduction

> of states and societies across the world, thereby allowing the naturalization of neoliberal policies from fiscal austerity to anti-labor legislation through the mantra of 'globalization' as the only game in town. (Colas, 2005: 70).

An important point to emphasize here is that studies on globalization have generally not focused on the ways in which neoliberalism as a discourse has been empowered by the concept of "globalization". This is due, in large part, to the fact that studies on "globalization" have either focused too much on where the state stands as regards globalization, or on globalization as a merely discursive phenomenon. By employing a historical materialist view, however, the ways in which the concept of "globalization" has been appropriated by the neoliberal discourse and the connection of this process to the spread of capitalist social relations can be seen. A brief parenthesis is therefore necessary in order to recount the debates over globalization, since the debates revolving around the concept of globalization are essential guidelines to understanding the incorporation of the concept into the discourse of neoliberalism.

Globalization can be simply seen as a process "describing the intensification of socio-economic and political interconnections across national borders", and a "compression of time and space in social relations". It therefore denotes the relative decline of the national states and the expansion of transnational flows in narcotics money, human beings, ideas, musical rhythms or pollutants, while some have added a qualitative dimension by stating that the world increasingly shares common socio-political norms such as universal human rights or cultural forms, for instance, in the entertainment sector (Ibid.: 71)[1].

David Held (1998: 12-13) proposes that there are two largely misleading views about globalization, the first being its definition as an integrated global order with social and economic processes operating predominantly at a global level and national governments inevitably becoming "decision-takers" as opposed to "decision-makers", resulting in a shift in the organization of social life, while the second is the complete opposite view whereby skepticism is voiced about the extent of globalization and the still integrated, robust and powerful national-state. Held

[1] However, this definition is only the tip of the iceberg. Debates are centered on how much power is held by the market vis-à-vis the state, and the extent to which this compression of time and space in social relations is really taking place, in turn engendering questions about the extent of its effects on the shape and content of policy-making, resistance, or questions asking which values are "universal" and how much "relativism" should be taken into consideration, etc.

simply argues that a middle way should be found: “Global processes should not be assumed to represent either a total eclipse of the states system or the simple emergence of a global society”.

Ian Bruff (2005: 263-269) outlines three waves of globalization literature. The first two are as Held puts it, but interestingly enough, Bruff places Held into the first wave, in which “globalists” and “moderate globalists” are placed on account of their prognostication of a smaller room to maneuver for the state, who believe, in other words, that multidimensional processes work to undermine state sovereignty. The second wave consists of those, such as Linda Weiss, who believe that recent developments are neither as extensive nor intensive as the first wave believes and that the state still possesses considerable room to maneuver, etc. What is of interest here is Bruff’s account of a post-structuralist third wave, and their emphasis on the view that globalization is a “narrative”, as well as his response to all three waves with a neo-Gramscian perspective. The “post-structuralist wave” moves beyond what Bruff terms as the empirical flow of the first and second waves by asking how “globalization” is perceived and acted upon across space and time, employing a “multi-scalar, multi-dimensional” approach to the question of globalization and pointing out to the multiple processes of globalization that interact in specific and contingent ways. He points to the usefulness of this last approach as it underlines the complex and often resisted development of these processes, being simultaneously social, cultural, political and economic, thereby involving multiple levels of analysis. What is defining for this approach, then, is the idea that it may matter less that globalization is not taking place, or at least is not weakening the state, than whether people believe the globalization thesis or not, and that therefore we should focus instead on the practices which produce the “reality” of globalization, thereby viewing globalization “as a self-fulfilling prophecy.” In other words, the concept of “globalization” conflates becoming with being by providing a single word for a process and its end-state, thereby literally defining the outcome as inevitable. Thinking along these lines enhances the role played by the subject, and sets the scene for a neo-Gramscian perspective.

Bruff criticizes all three waves for placing, respectively, too much emphasis on state constraint, state capacity and discursive constructions. The first wave is accused of advancing two fallacies, namely that the forces of change are uniquely

powerful and that the state is being transformed in one general direction, and insightfully suggests that "the presentation of globalization as a "thing" independent of our actions – or alternatively, as something that is promoted by actors with no other choice – ignores the deeply political and contingent character of any social conflict, development of change" (Ibid.: 271). His criticisms of the second wave rest on its neglect for the extra-state factors that figure importantly in the social world, and its denial of the fact that political dynamics have been altered by globalization as a concept if nothing else. What really hits the point, however, is his criticisms of the third wave, as this is what provides the stepping stone for a neo-Gramscian analysis. Criticisms to the post-structuralist view revolved around the argument that its epistemological stance makes its application to practical research impossible, and that it smuggles "an object of analysis through the back door: the capitalist system." Therein lies the perspective of the neo-Gramscians, for while they agree with the deconstruction of the term "globalization" they reconstruct it as capitalism, rather than as "narrative." This is essentially done via the proposal that although the world is complex, contingent and variable, there is a "decisive nucleus of economic activity" lying at its core, and there are social groups that either gain or lose from the way in which this decisive nucleus of economic activity is built upon in terms of a historically specific mode of production. Through this perspective, what is done is that the view that "no social practice or set of relations floats free of the determinate effects of the concrete relations in which they are located is emphasized." This decisive nucleus of economic activity, then, is restricted to "setting limits for defining the terrain of operations, establishing the 'raw materials' of thought" (Ibid.: 274). Such a view gives the neo-Gramscian perspective an historical edge, which is critical in order to place the rise of capitalism into context and thereby be enabled to speak of a continuing historical struggle over the modalities of power and knowledge (Gill, 2003: 121). In order to deconstruct the discourse through which neoliberalism instrumentalizes "globalization", one must take into consideration the view that capitalism is constructed by humans and therefore can also be terminated by them, a view that can also be applied to the state. This becomes impossible, however, once capitalism is covered in an aura of objectivity: "the operation of the neo-liberal myth of progress in modernist capitalism is intended implicitly to engender a fatalism that

denies the construction of alternatives to the prevailing order, and thus, negates the idea that history is made by collective human action" (Ibid.: 139).

At this point, it is necessary to turn to the concept of discourse, and specifically to the way in which the concept of "globalization" is incorportated into the discourse of neoliberalism. The discourse set by the particular forces that stand to gain from the mode of production that exists at that certain period of history is an essential element of the ways in which the supremacy of social groups is manifested, namely "intellectual and moral leadership" besides that of "domination" (Gramsci, 2000: 249). Indeed, such leadership, Gramsci argues, is a precondition for winning governmental power, and the necessity to "lead" does not disappear once power is firmly held in the grasp of the social group (Ibid.). Different concepts can be used to illustrate this point about "intellectual and moral leadership". Stephen Gill mentions, for instance, Foucault's "discursive formation" as a useful concept denoting a set of ideas and practices with particular conditions of existence more or less institutionalized but which may be partially understood by those that they encompass. Another example given is that of "commodity fetishism" by Marx as a concept that can be related to the prevailing cultural discourse in that it outlines "the ways that the exchange of commodities in the form of money masks the conditions and struggles associated with their production" and can therefore reveal the "way in which capitalist commercialization shapes outlooks, identities, time-horizons and conceptions of social space" (Gill, 2003: 120). All three concepts are of great use when trying to understand the way in which neoliberalism draws these boundaries of cognition through its instrumentalization of globalization and of GCS, the former being the subject of this section. The concept of discourse used here, therefore, denotes the institutionalization of a certain form of knowledge-power relation, without questioning, and indeed by reproducing, the assumptions that actually relate to a historically specific set of social relations.

A particular discourse was needed to generate consent and confer legitimacy on the very political attempt at reverting to basic market principles and give meaning to the retreat of the state from its traditional role of shielding the population within its "sovereign" borders from the ill effects of the market. This discourse took the form, in the words of Stephen Gill, of the emergence of a "market civilization", which was "a contradictory movement or set of transformative practices that entail, on the one

hand, cultural, ideological and mythic forms understood broadly as an ideology or myth of capitalist progress" (Ibid.: 117). Cox (2002: 83) calls this phenomenon a "nebuleuse", or the notion of "governance without government" effect underlining "a transnational process of consensus seeking among the official caretakers of the global economy" for want of an overarching political structure capable of exerting authority over increasingly complex and multi-dimensional processes within the rubric of "globalization". A "transnational capitalist class", together with affiliates in developing countries in state bureaucracies, business elites, or usually both, and with the above mentioned governance institutions, perpetuate the discourse of "neoliberal globalization" and thereby conveniently externalize the process by placing the adoption and implementation of related policies on the "seemingly alien and elusive forces of the 'global market'" (Colas, 2005: 70). This is done in a context, as noted above, of the restructuring of the relationship between states and markets on a global scale:

> On this reading, neoliberalism emerges as a thoroughly *political* project which not only privileges the private, economic power of market over the public, political authority of states, but does so, paradoxically, through the state-led, multilateral *re-regulation* of markets in favor of dominant classes (Colas, 2005: 70).

This is a crucial point. The discourse of neoliberalism has been particularly anti-statist, placing due emphasis on the "self-regulating" market with the help of the presentation of "globalization" as a colossal force to the feet of which the outmoded state must throw down its arms, thereby stripping itself of its traditional weapons such as exchange rate manipulation and social security provision, which had kept up its appearance as a welfare state, but had eventually led to its discrediting as a cumbersome and inflexible brute. While the neoliberal discourse consistently emphasizes the "rolling back" of the state in order to make way for the market to operate unhindered, which in turn allows for a language that separates the state from the market and civil society, the anti-statist stance of neoliberalism contradicts neoliberalism's use of the state to establish the domination of the market in increasingly diverse aspects of our lives. This discrepancy between what is said and what is done is essentially the result of the fact that neoliberalism is a class project, and one which ideologically separates the market from the state. Thus taking a

critical approach to the issue, one can point to the view that neoliberal globalization is a process coordinated by identifiable institutions and social groups, and driven by socio-economic and political antagonisms between (and often within) classes (Ibid.: 74). In this case the "identifiable institutions and social groups" consist of a transnationalist capitalist class and their counterparts in developing countries, as well as the institutions of governance.

2.5 New Constitutionalism as an Effort to Codify the Discourse of Neoliberal Globalization

The TINA discourse reigned supreme in the 1990's, given an uncanny boost with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the shift of policies towards the center of the ideological spectrum by former communist parties. Some countries, for instance those in Central Asia and the former Yugoslavia, swung 180 degrees and reverted to an openly nationalist ideology. However, the situation changed in the mid 1990s. Dissatisfaction

> centered on the inability of the Washington consensus to explain the economic success of East Asian countries, the incapacity of neoliberal policies to deliver significant improvements in economic performance, and the unnecessarily harsh measures included in the adjustment programs, which have highly negative consequences for the poor (Saad-Filho, 2005: 117).

A shift away from neoliberal orthodoxy then took place, especially through the advent of the "new institutional economics" (NIE) which shifted the focus away from the neoclassical emphasis on competition and markets and towards the implications of market failure, the institutional setting of economic activity and the potential outcomes of differences or changes in institutions (Ibid.). Development became a process including changes in the distribution of property rights, work patterns, urbanization, family structures, etc. and this sensitivity brought NIE the possibility of offering guidelines for state intervention, such as

> detailed recommendations for legal and judicial changes (primarily in order to protect property rights and secure the profitability of enterprise), the development of market-friendly civil society institutions, financial reforms

> beyond the privatization of state-owned banks, anti-corruption programs, democratic political reforms… (Ibid.).

This translated to an acknowledgement of the importance of the state, as NIE placed emphasis on the importance of the state in correcting market failures. The argument stated that in places where the state possessed the power to enforce the necessary pressures to the actors in the market, operational costs fell and the market became more efficient (Bayramoglu, 2002: 105).

The world was baring witness, therefore, to the "second phase of global neoliberalism" that began in the 1990s and saw a shift in the neoliberal project "into more socially interventionist and ameliorative forms by the Third Way contortions of the Clinton and Blair administrations", defending the idea that it was no longer sufficient to drive back the state but that it was necessary to push the neoliberal agenda onto previously uncharted territory such as among migrants, single-parent families, prisoners and the socially excluded members of society in order to regulate these groups in the interests of the neoliberal political agenda (Munck, 2005: 63).

This shift in politics, however, has only very vaguely helped the consolidation of the neoliberal discourse. At the end of the day, both the Washington Consensus and the Post-Washington Consensus shared the same methodological foundation, which can be listed as reductionism, methodological individualism, utilitarianism, the presumption that exchange is part of human nature rather than an aspect of society, and that the market is a "natural" rather than a socially created institution, making it unchallengeable. Both recommended the same sort of policies to developing countries (conservative fiscal and monetary policy, free trade, privatization, liberalization and deregulation). In fact, the only difference between the two was the speed, depth and method of reform, due to the fact that NIE accepted the potential usefulness of state intervention in order to correct market failures (Saad-Filho: 118).

One attempt at expanding the discourse of neoliberal globalization has been through what Stephen Gill has called "disciplinary neoliberalism," whereby the concept of discipline denotes both "macro- and micro- dimensions of power: the structural power of capital (including the broad capacity to shape expectations, material constraints and incentives); an ability to promote uniformity and obedience within parties, cadres and organizations, especially in class formations associated

with transnational capital and particular instances of disciplinary practice in a Foucauldian sense (i.e. "both a modernist framework of understanding that underpins a terrain of knowledge and a system of social and individual control"), and its institutionalization at the macro-level of power in the quasi-legal restructuring of state and international political forms, which Gill calls "the new constitutionalism" (Gill, 2003: 131). This discourse of global economic governance is reflected in the policies of the Bretton Woods organizations (e.g. IMF and WB conditionality that mandates changes in the form of state and economic policy) and quasi-constitutional regional arrangements such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the European Union (EU) and the multilateral regulatory framework of the WTO. It is reflected in the global trend towards independent central banks, with macroeconomic policy prioritizing the 'fight against inflation' (Ibid.).

New constitutionalist proposals emphasize market efficiency, discipline and confidence; economic policy credibility and consistency; and limitation on democratic decision-making processes: "Proposals imply or mandate the insulation of key aspects of the economy from the influence of politicians or the mass of citizens by imposing, internally and externally, 'binding constraints' on the conduct of fiscal, monetary and trade and investment policies." Central to new constitutionalism is the imposition of discipline on public institutions, partly to prevent national interference with the property rights and entry and exit option of holders of mobile capital with regard to particular political jurisdictions, linked to efforts to define appropriate policy by strengthening surveillance mechanisms of international organizations and private agencies such as the bond-raters. Governments in need of external financing are forced to provide data, in order to make domestic economic and political agents and trends more transparent to global supervisors in the IMF or Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (Gill, 2003: 131-132).

It can therefore be said that new constitutionalism implies the consolidation of the practice and discourse of neoliberalism, and signifies a regression from the liberal-democratic state in terms of the opportunities presented to the citizenry for democratic accountability and political choice. Attempts at a passive and constrained idea of politics with a "no-tolerance" policy towards "subversive" ideologies that may threaten the shift in the balance of social forces towards capital have been

visible in the attempts to consolidate regional networks through "new constitutionalism".

A good example of this marriage of discourse and non-democratic attempts to carve it in stone is the forced imposition of neoliberalism through the no-alternative/inevitability discourse in the EU. In the case of the EU, this angle has been used to make the acceptance of neoliberal policies a sine qua non of European unification: "By identifying it with European unification, the leading political and economic forces in Europe present neoliberalism as a taboo that cannot be violated" (Milios, 2005: 209). In order to legitimize neoliberalism as a means towards European integration, three major agreements have been employed. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1992 formulated a "convergence criteria" presented as a precondition to complete the European Monetary Union (EMU), which proposed low inflation and interest rates, exchange rate stability and a policy of keeping public deficits and government debt no higher that 3 percent and 60 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) respectively (Ibid.: 210). In order to conserve price stability and anti-inflationist macroeconomic policies, a politically autonomous European Central Bank was also established with the view that short term obstructions such as anti-IMF propaganda by politicians would not endanger long term stability. Immediately, therefore, it is possible to see how the creation of an autonomous central bank serves to homogenize politics throughout the Union in favor of neoliberalism, and fixes the unification agenda to the neoliberal program, all the while employing the discourse of the separation of politics from economics. The second agreement mentioned by Milios is the 1996-1997 Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) signed in Dublin which perpetuated the restrictive deflationist policy following the circulation of the Euro and reasserted that budgetary restriction would remain the keystone of economic policy with punitive measures for those exceeding the 3 percent rule. Finally, the third agreement legitimizing neoliberal policies for unification was that of the Draft Constitution, which although ratified by all the governments in the EU, was rejected by the French public. This "Constitution" essentially ascribed the character of "constitutional order" to two major pillars of neoliberalism, namely that of deregulated markets and the priority of state security and military capacity over human and social rights, while disinflation was acclaimed as a major "constitutional end" (Ibid.: 212).

2.6 Concluding Remarks

The discourse of neoliberal globalization revolves around three main points, which need to be analyzed historically and theoretically in order to liberate the term "globalization" from its role as an empowering mechanism for the neoliberal project of capital accumulation. First, it must be emphasized that globalization is not a natural condition, but the latest chain in the expansion and reproduction of the capitalist mode of production, a process that can only be realized with the aid of political agents and force. It is a political project by the representatives of transnational capital working across and within states in order to increase the structural power of capital. This is done through a very political means, namely through the state, as capitalism requires the military power of the state, its domestic role of social cohesion and international role within a system of states to fragment opposition and reproduce inequality at the international level. The internationalization of the state has not caused the disappearance of these functions of the state. Secondly, globalization is not a benign universalization of economic prosperity and universal values, but rather an uneven and hierarchical process that reproduces the contradictions of capitalism and the inequalities it generates in places neoliberal policies are implemented. Finally, neoliberal globalization is not a finalized process, but rather a project to be promoted as well as contested.

While globalization has been portrayed by most neoliberals as a natural outcome of a market left to its own dynamics, and therefore the unfolding of a smooth process once artificial distortions created by the state, political interests or archaic customs are removed from the path of free and equal exchange, the reality was that since its emergence in the 17th century, the capitalist market had expanded through force and coercion. The fact is that capitalism has been tendentially global since the beginning and is now more globally integrated than ever, however:

> any analysis of global capitalism has to strike a difficult balance between two equally essential facts: on the one hand, every capitalist economy exists only in relation to others; on the other hand, there is no "global economy" abstracted from the particular local, national, and regional economics that constitute it, or from the relations among them (Wood, 1999: 2).

Although the discourse of neoliberalism has emphasized the undermining of the nation-state in its account of globalization, historically the internationalization of capital has gone hand in hand "with the proliferation of capitalism's original political form", that of the nation-state (Ibid: 9). In fact, Wood stresses the point that globalization itself has been the phenomenon of national economies and national states, and that we cannot make any sense of it if we do not take into consideration: competition among national economies; the promotion of international "competitiveness" through state policies; promotion of the free movement of capital while confining labor within national boundaries and subjecting it to disciplines enforced by the state; and national policies deliberately designed to forfeit national sovereignty (Ibid.).

The attack on Keynesianism as the culprit of the world economic recession in the 1970s and the attempts to "disembed" liberalism (using the terminology of Ruggie who coined the term "embedded liberalism" to describe the market-social security mix of the welfare state), however, overlooked the question of "whether market can be 'disembedded' from social relations and the political order without engendering social disintegration and political disorder" (Munck, 2005: 62). Therefore it has not been possible to talk of the disappearance of the state, but rather a transformation of the state to better suit the needs of an unhindered market in the neoliberal era. It is necessary to bear in mind that the advent of neoliberalism, whether in Pinochet's Chile, Thatcher's UK or Reagan's US depended on the employment of a strong state to "roll back" state interference and consolidate the free market mechanism (Ibid: 63). In this scenario, the state was not without its uses, namely in areas such as defense against foreign aggression; the provision of legal and economic infrastructure for the functioning of markets and the mediation between social groups in order to preserve and expand market relations (Saad-Filho, 2005: 114). The way in which the state was brought into the equation in the form of a "post-Washington consensus" has also been noted, a development that can perhaps be interpreted as the acceptance of this contradiction by neoliberals.

Another misconception perpetuated by the neoliberal discourse is the view that neoliberal globalization will lead to economic development throughout the world as the mobility of capital enables investment options to big businesses and states

compete to draw these investments into their borders, as well as political "development" with the spread of "universal values" such as democracy, human rights, and a healthy civil society, enabled in large part by the free market. Yet the "market civilization" involves patterns of social disintegration and exclusionary and hierarchical patterns of social relations. Market civilization generates a perspective on the world that is ahistorical, economistic and materialistic, me-oriented, short-term and ecologically myopic (Gill, 2003: 118). The spread of this "civilization" is, above all, uneven and hierarchical. Defining neoliberal globalization in this way, then, allows us to dismiss any inherently normative meanings attributed to the concept (Colas, 2005: 71). Held (1998: 14) also agrees that the particular form of power of concern to global theory is characterized by hierarchy and unevenness, the former describing an asymmetrical access to global networks and infrastructures while the latter denotes asymmetrical effects of such networks on the life-chances and well-being of peoples, classes, ethnic groupings, and the sexes.

Indeed, the realities of "neoliberal globalization" does not match the discourse of the homogenization and convergence of worldwide social relations, nor the equation of market freedom with individual freedom, as increasingly it is understood that this process has been, as Colas states, an uneven process that reproduces both new and preexisting socio-economic and political hierarchies. For instance, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows has risen over the past 30 years, but have been overwhelmingly concentrated in the core capitalist economies, while the democratization that is said to be spreading throughout the world turned out to be far from irreversible or unlimited, as dictatorships in the world are still widespread and some states have reverted to authoritarian rule (Colas, 2005: 71)[2]. In reality, the neoliberal shift in government policies have led to the subjection of the majority of the population to the power of market forces, the preservation of social protection for the strong, the redistribution, marketization and individualization of the burdens of risk such as illness, old page, pensions, as opposed to these risks being fully socialized through collective and public provision. Empirical evidence points to the polarization of income and of life chances in the post-Second World War era, and the

[2] It is important to note at this point that "dictatorship" is not the only way in which authoritarianism exists. It can also be argued that the detachment of political parties from their constituency and the resulting loss in legitimacy can also be indicative of authoritarianism. Poulantzas' works may be referred to for an elaboration of this argument.

increase of civil wars, the resurgence of epidemics, widespread environmental degradation and pollution, as well as the ubiquitous reduction of public health and education provisions throughout the world due to the pressures exerted by neoliberal SAPs on governments to exercise monetary restraints, cut budgets, repay debts, devalue currencies, remove subsidies as well as trade and investment barriers and restore international credit worthiness (Gill, 2003: 125-127). The hybridization of culture too has progressed in an uneven and hierarchical manner: "As a result of the structural obstacles of poverty, illiteracy and lack of social or geographical mobility, most of the world's population is unable to share in the delights of fusion cooking or the post-colonial novel" (Colas, 2005: 72).

Finally, globalization should be seen as an "unfolding tendency" rather than an "accomplished condition." Viewing neoliberal globalization as a tendency allows us two very important statements. The first is that as a tendency, the inevitable and inexorable advance of globalization is taken out of the metaphysical and placed into the world of contestation and struggle, that is, into the world of the history of humanity. The second statement that can be made by thus portraying globalization, is the acceptance of the fact that similar processes have occurred in the history of capitalism, namely in the last quarter of the 19th century up until the First World War. Globalization should not, therefore, be seen as a historically unprecedented event. Most transnational flows such as finance, telecommunications and migration, as well as supranational institutions such as international organizations, international advocacy groups and pan-nationalist or regionalist movements associated with globalization pre-date World War II. Therefore, it would be more plausible to speak of a process that is not based on qualitative transformation but on quantitative acceleration (Colas, 2005: 73).

For their part, the champions of the discourse of neoliberal globalization failed to account for the inescapable use of the state in advancing, maintaining and the spreading of the practice and discourse of neoliberal globalization, the uneven and hierarchical character of neoliberalism, or the fact that this process is not an accomplished condition but a tendency of capital to expand. For in order to make these statements, one must look at the concepts used and implemented in our daily lives, as well as at the assumptions behind them, in a historical and sociological light. There are people and groups of people with similar interests behind every action,

every type of institutionalization of knowledge, and all types of power. Externalizing the knowledge-power relation and positing a very historically specific set of social relations as inevitable leaves those who adhere to this formulation incapacitated, or misguided at best. Change can only be sought once it is understood that history is in fact the creation of humanity, and struggle is the key to this creation.

Chapter III

The Uses and Abuses of Global Civil Society

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the rise and spread of neoliberalism was discussed with reference to the relationship between the practice and discourse of neoliberalism, both acting to restructure state-society relations, empowered by the incorporation of the concept of "globalization" in order to portray this process as inevitable, beneficial, and unprecedented. It has been argued that neoliberalism is a political project advanced by identifiable actors and institutions (first and foremost by states increasingly dictated to by IGOs), and that it is necessary to deconstruct "neoliberal globalization" as the discourse of the spread of capitalism. Neoliberalism has managed to successfully apply the classic liberal separation of the state from the market, and politics from economics at the global level with this instrumentalization of "globalization", and has thus fabricated the myth of a self-fulfilling world market.

In the wake of the Cold War, the term GCS also started becoming increasingly popular within academic and political circles throughout the world. This popularity has been the result of the importance placed on the concept from two separate anti-statist discourses. The first of these discourses is the one promoted by the New Right. To recap, the term "New Right" is used to denote advocates of neoliberal policies and the neoliberal globalization discourse who clearly differentiate between an efficient market and an obstructive state. It is argued in this chapter that the reason for the increase in the popularity of the concept of GCS among New Right circles has been the fact that liberal-democracy has been seriously undermined through both neoliberal policies and the neoliberal globalization discourse, and a substitute for democracy was sought that would operate at the global level and that would also be able to generate legitimacy for neoliberal global governance. The New Right has found what it was looking for in GCS as a general category and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in particular,

and incorporated GCS discourse (with slight discursive modifications such as the inclusion of the concept of "social capital) into its project of restructuring state-society relationships. INGOs have been touted as the new, inclusive, and democratic actors that can provide social services traditionally provided by the state.

Interestingly enough, however, the increasing popularity of GCS has been enabled by certain sections of the Left. Leftist politicians, intellectuals, scholars and activists who were inspired by the "civil society movements" against authoritarianism in Eastern Europe and Latin America and disillusioned with the Soviet experience also joined the process of the glorification of GCS as a new sphere of democracy and tolerance. Briefly, this segment of the Left has argued that politics should be based on acknowledgment of differences rather than the imposition of a certain "truth" on others; that the labor question has become only one among many different problems and identities in the world today (such as the environment, gender issues, ethnicity) and that class politics should therefore not be prioritized; and that multicultural understanding and tolerance is obstructed by the "territorial mindset" of the nation-state which invariably leads to authoritarianism and the exclusion of the "other". The projection of GCS as a project to be realized is important in this respect because GCS is thus pointed out as a sphere of democratic deliberation and acknowledgment of differences. Moreover, it is portrayed as a vehicle through which new identities can be more effectively presented to the political agenda, global problems can be dealt with in a global manner, and exclusionism associated with the nation-state can be eradicated. Generally, GCS has been imbued with great hopes of emancipation from the "war-making" state and the states-system, which has taken most of the blame for an "exclusivist" understanding of the world throughout the period of tensions emanating from the ideological projections of the two superpowers. INGOs have been presented as representatives of the global polity. The anti-statist discourse of certain Leftists saw the global polity as something that should be created if it already did not exist. Indeed, as Amoore and Langley (2005: 138) point out: "The key contextual assumption that underpins the global civil society discourse" is the growth of a global polity alongside economic globalization and the end of the Cold War, as the transnationalizing and deterritorializing character of contemporary social relations is said to have challenged the international politics of sovereign states both practically and juridically.

This chapter will emphasize that advocates of a politics based on the glorification of GCS as an inherently democratic, plural and civil sphere fall into a two-pronged trap. The first is the theoretical error of assuming an ahistorical separation between the state and civil society. The separation is ahistorical because the state-civil society relationship is portrayed as zero-sum and therefore the way in which these two spheres interact, overlap and change each other throughout history is overlooked. This is the natural result of arbitrarily prescribing inherently civil, democratic and plural characteristics to a historical sphere of ideological struggle that in fact cannot be separated from its existential ties to the modern state and the capitalist mode of production.

The second trap in which those sections of the Left which equate GCS with democracy, pluralism and civility fall into is the creation of a discourse that is politically disabling and one which can easily be incorporated by the New Right. The effort to separate the state from civil society due to what has been perceived as the shortcomings of the states-system has exaggerated the capabilities of GCS, devalued democracy and politics at the state level, and confined politics to lobbying efforts and pressure exercised by INGOs against states and IGOs. The acceptance of a more functional view of democracy as exercised through often undemocratically structured INGOs has been tied to an "as good as it gets" attitude with regard to possibilities for the exercise of democracy in a "globalizing era". Unsurprisingly, the anti-statism of the advocates of GCS as an intrinsically "good" and uncontaminated sphere has converged with the anti-statism of the New Right to produce the common promotion of an indirect form of democracy and politics at the global level, resulting in an ineffective and deradicalized form of politics.

3.2 Reasons for the Increasing Popularity of "Global Civil Society"

According to the John Hopkins Survey of the non-profit sector in 22 countries, for instance, the NGO sector grew to such an extent that it contributed to employment growth in the last two decades, making up 7.1 per cent of total employment in the countries surveyed. Moreover, the numbers of and memberships to NGOs registered as international organizations had also increased by one third in the 1990s. This growth is attributed to the growth in funding, of which 5 per cent of

all official aid was channeled through NGOs, according to OECD figures (Kaldor, 2003: 88-89). There was a striking change in the willingness of international governmental organizations (IGOs) and the Bretton Woods international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO) that were said to be the pillars of the new "global governance," to cooperate with INGOs. Global governance agencies have devised mechanisms to engage with initiatives from CSOs, such as websites and upgraded public communications to address civil society audiences, information sharing in the name of "transparency", arrangements to include civil society groups in their conferences and workshops, briefings specifically targeting CSOs, appointments of civil society liaison officers in touch with civil society activities, civil society advisor bodies. (Scholte, 2004: 215). Examples include the circulation of a quarterly called "Civil Society Newsletter" published by the IMF to over 1000 recipients, the World Bank's "accessible information centers in many of its resident missions across the planet," and the parallel civil society forums that are organized alongside each United Nations (UN) global summit, etc. (Ibid.: 215-216). As will be elaborated, below, IGOs and INGOs have been involved in a symbiotic relationship, with mutual benefits of this relationship providing the basis for what has been called a new "global politics".

Very crudely, it can be said that the concept of GCS and its prominent actors, namely INGOs, have gained popularity in the last two decades, and especially so following the Cold War, within the discourse and practice of the New Right (exemplified by the increased involvement of global governance institutions with GCS organizations) and some Leftist perspectives which opted for a politics divorced from the nation-state and based on tolerance and democratic deliberation. As for the reasons for this popularity, two can be discerned. The first is the legitimacy crisis of "neoliberal globalization" which neoliberal policymakers quickly found that they had fallen into, while the second is the trust placed in bottom-up alternatives by the Left, namely those who were bitterly disappointed by the Soviet experience. It will be argued here that both have, perhaps paradoxically, espoused a view of GCS that requires a strict separation of the state from civil society, which leads its advocates into ahistorical and non-sociological interpretations of the potentialities of GCS, the glorification of which has been detrimental to the functioning of politics within more clearly defined communities. As it stands, this statement is sweeping and inchoate,

but a brief look at the two reasons for the rise in popularity of GCS can serve as a good introduction to the problem at hand.

The detrimental effects of neoliberalism and its advocacy of a reversion to strict market rule throughout the world, exemplified in heightening inequalities within and among states, unemployment, migration and racism, as well as a general drop in social security and state support to name but a few, have painted the background in which GCS has become popular. One of the problems that needs to be specifically underlined with reference to neoliberalism has been the way in which liberal-democracy has been undermined. With "neoliberal globalization" being presented as an inexorable process which should be accommodated by nation-states through deference to global governance organizations increasingly powerful in promoting "global" neoliberal policies of privatization, deregulation and liberalization, states were exempting themselves from the blame, and thus the notion of democracy and holding representatives accountable was undergoing change. The character of contemporary political authority, which was being portrayed as decentered, multilayered and overlapping in accounts of "global governance," needed to establish some semblance of legitimacy at the "global" level (Amoore and Langley, 2005: 139). The revival of the concept of civil society in the form of a "global" civil society came at a convenient time. INGOs were quickly portrayed as the voice of the people in the "global" arena, to new questions and problems which necessitated, due to their "global" character, a broader understanding, expertise and field of cooperation. The "democracy-deficit" of neoliberalism, therefore, was a crucial reason for the New Right to turn towards INGOs within GCS as substitutes for democracy at the "global" level. After all, environmental, human rights, and gender issues were problems which affected people across borders, and they had to be dealt with universally. Liberal-democracy in its traditional parliamentarian and statist form was deemed inadequate and obsolete:

> National political parties have rarely addressed global governance issues with any prominence in election manifestos and debates. A few exceptions aside, national parliaments have exercised only occasional and mild if any oversight over most suprastate regulatory bodies. In addition, many disillusioned citizens have concluded that the very system of parliamentary politics does not offer adequate channels to make their democratic voice heard, as reflected in low voter turnouts and widespread cynicism about professional politicians.

> In any case relationship between national governments and global governance agencies have mainly flowed through unelected technocrats who lack any direct connection with citizens…In short, then, the conventional statist formula of democratic accountability does not suffice in relation to present-day expanded global governance (Scholte, 2004: 212).

It is important to notice how the faith placed in GCS has been portrayed as going hand in hand with the decrease of faith in parliamentary politics. This is yet another implication of an anti-statist orientation. Indeed, while neoliberalism envisages a division of labor globally between unaccountable IGOs and the bearers of the standard of democracy, INGOs, it consistently uses its anti-statist rhetoric and shifts expectations concerning democracy according to its own interests. In other words, democracy is redefined to accommodate a "global" politics, one which cannot be expected to hold democratic credentials as the nation-state once did, but one which instead surpasses the nation-state in that it is not bound by territoriality and the "territorial mindset" and is therefore inclusive of everyone in the "global polity." Accordingly, much praise has been given to GCS by IGOs in the past decade, which has surprised activists that were used to being ignored by these multilateral economic institutions and international elites:

> One can scarcely attend a meeting of international elites of one kind or another at which an international civil servant speaks these days without hearing, no matter what the topic, a sort of adulatorio to NGOs, a hymn of thanksgiving for 'international civil society' and how it is making international bureaucracy more accountable and effective (Anderson, 2000: 112).

In fact, Anderson remarks that no one believes NGOs are irrelevant anymore, and inquires as to the reasons behind this sudden change, and concludes that this is not solely attributable to a realization that governments and public organizations are not very effective at the rapid and efficient provision of a broad range of services. According to Anderson, this is only part of the explanation of the "relevance" of NGOs. A more important point is that the praise offered to NGOs is given within the very specific ideological language of "civil society":

> It is not merely pragmatic praise for non-governmental agencies and their performance; it is praise *of* a theory of politics framed within terms of a

> discourse of politics, taken more or less directly out of the theoretical literature of 'social movements' and 'civil society'. It is scarcely necessary to adopt so wholeheartedly the whole theoretical apparatus of the Third Sector, the 'independent sector', a theory that is fundamentally about the democratic legitimacy of international NGOs, merely in order to praise their good works. But adopt it the international bureaucracy has (Anderson, 2000: 113).

This, in turn, is due to the fact that IGOs themselves are in desperate need of legitimacy, which has grown as an inevitable consequence of their operation above nation-states. NGOs, in this context, are "cast in the role of giving some veneer of democratic legitimacy to an international system that…suffers from a permanently incurable democratic deficit" (Anderson, 2000: 95). The link between the neoliberal form of capital accumulation and the rise of GCS is crucial. Indeed: "The revival of 'civil society' has occurred at the same time as the neoliberal ascendance, and it has been integral to the discourses and apparatuses through which neoliberalism proliferates and makes itself legitimate" (Sinha, 2005: 163). Having explained the failure of development by placing the blame on the Keynesian state model and stressing the failure of governments to adequately provide public goods due to the rent-seeking behavior of governmental agents, all the while emphasizing the inefficiency of state intervention, neoliberals pushed forward a "good-governance" agenda in order to reform the state. This agenda included concepts such as decentralization, participation, accountability and transparency, and argued for the distribution of government's social functions to 'civil society' (Ibid.: 165).

The process of legitimation is "symbiotic", however, due to the fact that INGOs also make use of this "inflation of rhetoric" as it increases their power and authority within international organizations:

> International organizations and international NGOs can be seen as locked in a romance, a passionately mutual embrace, offering each other love tokens of confirmations of legitimacy and eternal fealty, but, as with lovers everywhere, oblivious to the world outside and oblivious as to whether anyone else thinks that such mutual legitimations make either one any more 'legitimate' (Anderson, 2000: 117).

It is necessary, therefore, to understand the rise in the popularity and "relevance" of NGOs and their international counterparts as part of a top-down search for and construction of legitimacy within a context in which the state as well

as its relationship to society, democracy and politics is being transformed under pressure from neoliberalism:

> The stronger presence of NGOs both at the national level and on the international stage can therefore be interpreted as a result of the post-Fordist, neoliberal restructuring of states and the international system of states. This has led to a far-reaching privatization of political processes of decision making and implementation, thus to a fundamental change in the relationship between state and society. The growth in the number of NGOs and in the amount of attention given to them, both by political scientists and in society as a whole, can rightly be regarded as part of the neoliberal paradigm which has now become dominant (Hirsch, 2003: 252).

Yet the popularity of GCS is not only due to neoliberal efforts at finding a legitimate accomplice for its plans and projects. This popularity has also risen from the "bottom-up," and out of a situation in which the Left's alternatives seemed depleted, liberal triumphalism had declared the "end of history," and "neoliberal globalization" was taking back the social-security rights and state support for which the laboring classes had struggled to obtain since the industrial revolution. In fact, the direct "bottom-up" reaction came as a reaction to the negative effects of neoliberal policies and the state's cooperation with these policies. As the state cut expenditure on social welfare, repressed workers' movements (such as the miners' strike of 1984-1985 in the United Kingdom), and handed over more power to international capital by deregulating finance and liberalizing the economy, this led to a reaction from the "vulnerable elements in society", who were "implicitly challenged to organize independently of the state, both to protest the loss of state support and to compensate for this loss by voluntary initiative and self-help" (Cox, 2002: 101). Certain sections of the Left were able to capitalize on this reflexive action in order to promote a different view of left-wing politics divorced from the nation-state. Scholars, politicians and activists who associated themselves with such a conceptualization of left-wing politics were quick to demonize the state and argue for the need to adapt social protest to the needs of the "globalizing" world. One way in which this "adaptation" of the form and content of protest to the "new" environment was realized was through the casting aside of "mass politics" revolving around the demands of the proletariat, who had, in the words of Cox, lost credibility as a

"fundamental" universal class due to the reorganization of state-society relations along neoliberal lines (Ibid.)

GCS was thus "rediscovered", so to speak, by the movements against what was perceived as Soviet authoritarianism in Central Europe and against dictatorships in Latin America and their Left-wing counterparts in the West. The anti-statism so ubiquitous in activist and academic circles following the end of the Cold War is displayed in Mary Kaldor's account of the "reinvention" of civil society in the 1980s. Kaldor (2003: 4) states that "civil society" was reinvented as a result of concern about personal autonomy, self-organization, and private space against the paternalistic and militaristic state. Indeed, part of the disappointment with the Soviet Union was due to the perceived lack of "civil society" in which the individual was empowered in the sense of having "negative rights", that is, those rights that pertain to the individual's freedom "from" intervention in his/her life. Once the Soviet Union dissolved, the way was 'opened' for civil society: "The collapse of 'real socialism' in the late 1980s seemed to herald a possible rebirth of civil society in those countries where civil society had been eradicated by the Party-state" (Cox, 2002: 101). The vocabulary for civil and political rights was undergoing transformation: "The term 'civil society' and related terms such as 'anti-politics' or 'power of the powerless' seemed to offer a discourse within which to frame parallel concerns about the ability to control the circumstances in which individuals live, about substantive empowerment of citizens" (Kaldor, 2003: 4). Ironically, the "substantive empowerment of citizens" involved a demand that individuals should be able to detach themselves from politics at will. This demand was a response to a new situation, according to Kaldor, characterized by an overbearing state increasingly interfering in private life. Social, economic, technological and cultural transformations in lifestyles also called into question institutional loyalties and assumptions about collective or traditional behavior. Plus, growing interconnectedness provided the "boundaries of 'civil engagement'" in Eastern Europe and in Latin America. On the one hand the extension of legal arrangements from above such as the "Helsinki Agreement" provided an instrument for opening up autonomous spaces in these regions, and on the other hand the inheritors of the "new" social movements in the West were able to "link up" with groups and individuals in Eastern Europe and Latin America to provide "support and protection"

(Ibid.: 5). What had hitherto stopped this pluralism from emerging, then, was the "war-making state," which formed into blocs of war-making states throughout the Cold War, stifling an "independent" area of action identified as "civil society".

The definition of civil society was undergoing change through such accounts of its reinvention. In its "global" rendition, civil society was being detached from the state, which was blamed on the one hand for the world economic crisis in the 1970s, and on the other hand for obstructing the convergence of the peoples of the world. While "civil society" had hitherto been understood in some manner of integral relationship with the state, civil society began to be perceived in the contemporary discourse as a "third sector", independent from both the economy and the state:

> The current widely understood usage which excludes dominant power in the state and corporations from the concept of civil society received impetus from the movements of opposition to Stalinist rule in Eastern Europe…Similarly, movements of opposition to authoritarian rule and capitalist dominance in Asian and Latin American countries are commonly perceived as emanations of civil society. So 'civil society' has become the comprehensive term for various ways in which people express collective wills independently of (and often in opposition to) established power, both economic and political (Cox, 2002: 102).

Moreover, in its new formulation as a distinct sphere outside the state and economy, GCS took on an emancipatory role. In general, the road to emancipation shifted from one in which the working class was the focal point and other grievances were voiced through its "historical" role of struggle against capital and its bid for power, to one in which respect for different identities and individualism took center stage with an aversion to any suggestion of taking state power. Transnational associational life (TAL) was heralded as the means of struggle for a global democracy, human rights regime, environmental sensitivity, etc. Although the criteria for defining what exactly GCS was in terms of its composition was unclear and the question of what its institutional representations should be was left in ambiguity, GCS was certified, by activists and academics following the end of the Cold War, as a global actor:

> A medley of boundary eclipsing actors – social movements, interest groups, indigenous peoples, cultural groups, and global citizens – are seen to be constructing networks, knowledges, and practices that entail a reshaping of

> the political architecture of international relations. Following the lead of East European dissidents and certain democratic theorists, together championing the liberatory political role of associational life ("civil society") against the state, GCS is said to capture a postrealist constellation, where transnational associational life (TAL) challenges the conceit of the state system. The state's historical role is increasingly subordinated to a process of global governance, within which the possibility of democratic accountability is secured by the activism of a rather inclusive array of social groups and organizations. Thus, GCS is touted as the antidote for the anarchical structure, inequality, and exclusions of the state system (Pasha & Blaney, 1998: 418).

3.3 The Glorification of "Global Civil Society"

In trying to understand the way in which the concept of "GCS" has been instrumentalized to reflect an anti-statist elite-advocacy field full of professionalized and institutionalized NGOs instead of an arena of ideological struggle that has, from its very inception, been international, it will be necessary to engage the ambiguous, ahistorical and non-sociological definition of civil society. For the normative aspect of the definition of the term "GCS," reached through assumptions lacking historical or sociological substantiation, is that which makes it ripe for presenting it as the solution to all problems, ranging from GCS being portrayed as a vehicle of legitimate accountability to a vehicle for "efficient" development. The glorification of GCS has been managed through a belief in the idea that today we are experiencing a new situation in global politics towards which we must develop new answers. This new situation, which has necessitated new answers, is presented in a language that demonizes the state, drawing clear boundaries between civil society and the state. This in turn glorifies an "inclusive" conceptualization of democracy at a global level (its inclusiveness being yet another assumption derived from the normative meanings placed on GCS), in which a seat is always reserved for INGOs, which act as mediators between global governance institutions and the world polity, effectively expressing the views of the marginalized and oppressed.

Colas (2002: 144-147) separates the literature on civil society and globalization into three. The most important point is that all define GCS as a new phenomenon opposed to and having advantages over, the nation-state. The first is that of grassroots globalization theorists, who argue that the rise of planetary concerns has encouraged activists to organize and conceptualize their struggles on a

global scale. Transnational grassroots activism has been facilitated through technological developments. Accounts of grassroots globalization not only recognize the extension of social movement activity beyond state boundaries but see this as prising open previously sealed arenas in world politics, thereby gradually replacing the nation state as the major locus of political power. A second wave of scholars are concerned with "global governance" structures and argue that as a response to the devolution of the state's legitimate monopoly over political rule onto multilateral institutions, a parallel development of GCS has taken place as an arena which voices grievances. Thus, agents of GCS fulfill a functional role as grass-roots partners of international institutions in the administration of global governance. They therefore play a crucial role in actually defining global governance since in adopting transnational socio-political causes they foster the establishment of multilateral regimes that can manage global governance and they lend popular legitimacy to such regimes by representing a putative "global demos". The third wave, that is the "cosmopolitan democracy" wave, endorses globalization as a process that can potentially extend liberal democracy across the world, based upon the claim that the "Westphalian model of sovereign states severely limits the realization of any democratic impulse that may lie behind civil society". Today, we are required, according to cosmopolitan democrats, to think about democratic politics beyond the system of states. The second claim is that civil society has a role in sustaining any project for cosmopolitan democracy, which does not subsume local, domestic agents of civil society under an overarching GCS, but rather transcends the inside/outside divide and channels the increasing interpenetration between discrete states and societies within an overlapping cosmopolitan legal framework. The new legal framework is to be built upon "a network of regional and international agencies and assemblies that cut across spatially delimited locales" while it is upheld by grassroots movements and international institutions. Therefore cosmopolitan democrats assign transnational social movement an important function as mediators between the institutions of global governance and the corresponding cosmopolitan demos.

As can be seen, the difference between the three "waves" of GCS advocacy is based, on this account, on the relationship between GCS and the state. All assume that the states-system is somehow defunct, however, and that GCS is a necessary field in order to either take the place of the state, cooperate with supranational

organizations to "by-pass" state inefficiencies and incapabilities, or consolidate democracy at the global level through a supranational democratic legal framework. Other assumptions that are frequently utilized by most GCS advocates include the belief that NGOs arrived recently onto the international political arena as a result of the intensification of global economic relations after the Second World War (Ibid.: 4). This assumption is not taken for granted in the literature today, and as seen in the examples taken from Kaldor and Falk, it is possible for scholars to openly admit that GCS is not a novel concept. Yet due to the fact that the concept is imbued with an emancipatory vision, it must be portrayed as having characteristics that are new. The novelty of the term, then, is equated with the context in which it has risen, namely the end of the Cold War and the subsequent "freedom" experienced by GCS due to the separation from the state. Another assumption is the uncontested liberal underpinnings of the term, portraying GCS as a liberal project, echoing pluralist theories of democracy. This is exemplified by Kaldor's conceptualization of GCS, as a privileged role has been accorded to transnational social movements in the promotion of international cooperation and peaceful resolution of conflict (Ibid.: 5-6).

As noted above, the novelty of GCS, whether subjectively in terms of its organizational form, understanding of world problems and its reach, or objectively, through a description of the structures and realities of the world today that necessitates GCS advocacy, has been a crucial assumption in the instrumentalization of GCS. The anti-statism in the accounts of the novelty of the present GCS is noteworthy, as the novelty of GCS is conceptualized in its differentiation from the state, which is in turn the source of all its virtues. Mary Kaldor, for instance, although clearly accepting the fact that the concept of civil society has a long history, maintains that what is new about civil society since 1989 is tied to the phenomenon of globalization, and the resulting detachment of civil society from the borders of the territorial state. What has changed, therefore, is that civil society has escaped the confines of the state and is now serving to help end the differentiation between states: "The end of the Cold War and growing global interconnectedness have undermined the territorial distinction between 'civil' and 'uncivil' societies, between the 'democratic' West and the 'non-democratic' East and South, and have called into question the traditional centralized war-making state" (2003: 2). Thus, civil society is

promoted as a vehicle for transgressing borders, and therefore an arena where tolerance and good-natured debate will be cultivated, with the corollary of GCS having a potential to be an answer to war. Falk (2005: 69), stating at the outset that in a behavioral sense "GCS" is not altogether an innovation, and emphasizing that due weight must also be given to the resilience of Westphalian sovereignty, nevertheless upholds the view that the current period introduces a radically new dimension to our understanding of global governance "consisting of a variety of transnational undertakings by voluntary associations of citizens seeking to influence the *global setting* of politics, rather than to work for changes in particular states". Falk understands the portrayal of GCS as a new global reality from two perspectives. The first is a descriptive view, highlighting therefore "the intensifying long-term trends that are giving greater prominence to transnational actors and activity" while the second "involves prescribing a global future to be constructed through social action that would be far more shaped by civic forces than, as at present, through a collaborative relationship between states and market forces" (Ibid.: 69). While descriptively GCS is associated with transnational social movements such as environmental issues and the status of women etc.;

> Prescriptively, these movements and actors were viewed as vehicles for the realization of liberal values, norm creation and policy formation, as well as providing positive sources of information and pressure that helped offset the widely perceived failure of governments and international institutions to address effectively a range of global challenges (Falk, 2005: 70).

It is my proposition that through a descriptive account of what is, GCS advocates are shaping expectations of what should be. Indeed, the novelty of today's circumstances is a description of that which is said to exist, and the answer to this reality in the form of GCS is that which should be promoted. In other words, the virtues of GCS are glorified in order to create an answer to a situation that is conveniently lacking in the areas in which GCS is strong, and in areas which the state is portrayed as insufficient and indeed, obstructive. The emancipatory role accorded to GCS is a reflection of the type of politics which GCS advocates favor. This makes the "reinvention" of GCS an ahistorical and arbitrary exercise. Through such a definition the state is automatically demonized, civil society is glorified, and the historical relationship between the state and civil society is forgotten. For

instance, while Falk clearly notes that the state still has an important role to play in world politics and places more emphasis on the "resilience of Westphalian sovereignty" than Kaldor, both underline the distinction between the state and civil society by emphasizing the novelty of today's "global setting". In this global setting, GCS is attributed an emancipatory role as a democratizing actor pitted against an obsolete state.

But what have been put forward as the virtues of GCS? First and foremost on the list is the idea that GCS is inclusive of an array of organizations, from "new social movements" to "transnational civil networks" to INGOs:

> Global civil society includes the INGOs and the networks that are the "tamed" successors to the new social movements of the 1970s and 1980s. It also includes the allies of transnational business who promote a market framework at a global level. It includes a new radical anti-capitalist movement which combines both the successors of the new social movements and a new type of labor movement. And to the extent that nationalist and fundamentalist movements are voluntary and participatory, i.e. they provide a mechanism through individuals can gain access to centers of authority, than they have to be included as well (Kaldor, 2003: 107).

Kaldor's inclusive definition is actually one of the few which places nationalist and fundamentalist movements into the fray. However, this is due to the fact that the main criterion of being included in GCS is that they should be voluntary and participatory: "Voluntary associations in the space of GCS are viewed as either *the* legitimate form of politics through which to bring improved accountability to the institutions of global governance, or as *the* principle form of progressive politics capable of challenging and transforming the status quo" (Amoore & Langley, 2005: 141).

Scholte (2004: 214), a scholar that can be placed in the second wave of the categorization of Colas, namely among those who prescribe a functional role to GCS as regards global governance, specifically defines GCS as made up of voluntary associations: "In relation to contemporary world politics, civil society might be conceived as a political space where voluntary associations seek, from outside political parties, to shape the rules that govern one or the other aspect of social life". Interestingly enough, this inclusive definition also includes businesses, or NGOs that are funded by businesses. Describing the ways in which civil society associations

have engaged global governance institutions for instance, Scholte mixes up anti-globalization protests with the milder reforms suggested by business forums and think-tanks (Ibid.). This contradiction is due to the ambiguity of the concept of GCS, and the differences of opinion of which groups *should* be included and according to which criteria. For instance, an important question at this point that is left unanswered is to what extent business organizations or (I)NGOs funded by business can be considered "voluntary" organizations. Furthermore, those prescribing a functional role to GCS as a sphere made up of democratizing actors within global governance seem to accept this ambiguous notion of "voluntary" organizations and include in their conceptualizations of GCS all actors who somehow "engage" with global governance institutions. The problem here is that while scholars such as Scholte accept the fact that GCS is made up of many different kinds of actors, the crucial differences among these actors (geographical, ideological, material) disappear in a conceptualization of GCS as a democratizing actor in its totality. The problem arises once these actors are somehow placed within the same democratizing project of GCS, which in the case of Scholte at least, is the result of trying to attribute a democratizing role to GCS vis-à-vis international governmental organizations.

Yet even the fact that there is no agreed definition of GCS is shown to be an advantage of the concept. Kaldor (2003: 2) maintains this argument by stating that GCS "provides a common platform through which ideas, projects and policy proposals can be worked out. The debate about its meaning is part of what it is about". Inclusiveness, in this sense, allows all voices to be heard, and once again, this argument is advanced as an advantage of GCS over the state: "The array of organizations and groups through which individuals have a voice at global levels of decision-making represents a new form of global politics that parallels and supplements formal democracy at the national level" (Ibid.: 107). In fact, Kaldor, maintaining that GCS is made up of voluntary associations, argues that these new actors should not have a formal role in decision-making due to this very fact, since "they are voluntarily constituted and represent nobody but their own opinions" (Ibid.: 107-108). She therefore places trust on access, openness and debate. The state is portrayed as being too slow to react to the "unintended consequences of change" brought about by "globalization", while civil society, according to Kaldor, "is a way of expressing reflexivity of the contemporary world" (Ibid.: 108). This

conceptualization of GCS as an inclusive sphere made up of voluntary associations that can act quickly and efficiently to the changes of globalization, is precisely the way in which IGOs, holding on to a discourse of "unintended consequences of change" caused by "globalization," conceptualize GCS (a point which will be elaborated below).

Sure enough, we are asked to conceptualize "democracy" in a different light as well. While the advent of globalization gives rise to the possibility of a system of global governance with participation among international organizations, local and regional government and states, it also requires, according to Kaldor, a new sense of thinking about democracy:

> In thinking about what this means for democracy, it is important to take into account, not just the formal procedures of democracy, for example, elections, important though these are, but also the substantive content of democracy, how citizens can directly influence the decisions that affect their lives (Kaldor, 2003: 110).

Democracy is, according to this account, inevitably undermined in a context of globalization, and due to the lack of any formal way of rectifying this situation, we must reconsider our concepts. Indeed, "a framework of global governance and an active global civil society at least offers some openings for participation at other levels" (Ibid.).

From GCS as an inclusive area of activity then, we go on to GCS as the "representative of the people". It is important to note that among the range of organized forces and institutions of civil society, NGOs are regarded as representing the interests of the people to the greatest extent possible:

> In other words, NGOs have come to replace other well-established political organizations and trade associations that traditionally represent the interests of various constituencies of society. In relation to these organizations, it is argued that NGOs represent the interests of the broadest swath of people, the poor and the underprivileged of society, who tend to have no structures of representation in public affairs, except perhaps the right to vote during election time (Kamat, 2004: 159).

Although NGOs are not representative organizations in that their personnel are not elected and are most likely to be self-appointed, they are portrayed as

representing the peoples will. This is due to the fact that they cannot attain successful results without the participation of their specific constituency, which is often, according to Kamat, within a limited geographical region (Ibid.). A good example of this type of legitimacy is that of community based NGOs (CBOs) and their roles in development. CBOs are said to derive their legitimacy from the fact that their work in a local context requires them to develop a membership base which actively participates in the social and economic projects managed by the CBO and requires the CBOs to interact with their membership base on a daily basis and build relations of cooperation and trust with them, to understand their needs and plan projects that respond to those needs (Ibid.).

In this new framework of democracy, or rather, of INGOs acting as substitutes for democracy, it is easy to perceive a change in the roles of state and civil society. This change in roles can be displayed through the example of development, although it encompasses nearly every other aspect as well. Through the 1950s to the 1980s the state was given the task of development as the embodiment of the public interest or general welfare, while civil society was used to refer to "private sectarian interests" represented through religious organizations, business associations, trade unions, etc. (Ibid.: 157). A flip-flop occurred, however, in the universal conceptual frame for development planning, and today the state is represented as fragmented by private interests (Kamat points here to corruption, a term that has also gained popularity following the Cold War and was used to demonize the welfare state-please see Ch.II), while civil society is perceived as the "honest broker" of people's interest. NGOs are viewed as fully cognizant rational actors capable of going beyond sectarian interests and acting upon matters of general welfare (Ibid.: 158).

Such a conceptualization of civil society has played into the hands of neoliberalism. In fact, the assumptions behind bottom-up renditions of the term have been almost completely appropriated, in its full discursive form, by IGOs and international elites. In the neoliberal definition of the term "civil society consists of associational life – a non-profit, voluntary 'third sector' – that not only restrains state power but also actually provides as substitute for many of the functions performed by the state," while "it is viewed as the political or social counterpart to the process of globalization understood as economic globalization, liberalization, privatization,

deregulation and the growing mobility of capital and goods" (Kaldor, 2003: 9). Comparing this definition with that of the activist version, one is hard-pressed to tell the difference: "On this definition, civil society refers to active citizenship, to growing self organization outside formal political circles, and expanded space in which individual citizens can influence the conditions in which they live both directly through self-organization and through political pressure" (Ibid.: 8). There is nothing in the neoliberal definition which cannot accommodate the same views as the "activist version", especially when viewed in light of the definition of GCS as the "political or social counterpart to the process of globalization". "Global civil society, for the activists" contends Kaldor, "is about 'civilizing' or democratizing globalization, about the process through which groups, movements and individuals can demand a global rule of law, global justice and global empowerment" (Ibid.: 12). Both neoliberals and "bottom-up" activists, according to these definitions, place faith in GCS as a result of its role as a "third sector". According to Kaldor, after all, civil society became transnational in the twenty-first century and today "it remains distinct from private organizations unless they provide a medium for public pressure but its focus is public affairs and not the market," and it constitutes an area distinct from the state although this too may has the proviso of including state-funded organizations should they "act in a genuinely autonomous manner" (Ibid.: 48).

The reason why neoliberal policy advocates have felt comfortable with this understanding of GCS is because its non-state, non-economy characteristics as well as its transformation of the content of democracy due to the putative "new" and "inclusive" characteristics of GCS (as opposed to the hierarchical and exclusivist characteristics of the state) has been complementary with their own anti-statist "globalization" discourse. Neoliberal policy-makers quickly supported the idea of a morally progressive and democratically legitimate GCS. This was not necessarily due to, as Kaldor argues, the end of the Cold War: "As the ideological conflict dissolved, governments and international institutions became more responsive to peace and human rights groups" (Ibid.: 88). Although there may be some truth in the above statement, the uses to which INGOs were put to as the premier representatives of GCS, actually points us in the direction of the will to use INGOs as instruments in order to implement the transformation of the state for the benefit of internationally mobile capital. The role of GCS on this reading is two sided. On the one hand GCS

provides the legitimacy so lacking among global governance institutions, while on the other hand they are given the roles traditionally attributed to the state. The "New Policy Agenda" was especially important in this regard: "The 'New Policy' Agenda' combined neoliberal economic strategy with an emphasis on parliamentary democracy. Already in the 1980s, the World Bank had established an NGO – World Bank Committee. Markets plus elections became the ideological formula of the 1990s. NGOs came to be seen as an important mechanism for implementing this agenda." (Ibid.: 88). "Good governance" was another concept with which much use could be made of NGOs:

> Neoliberal advocacy of good governance, which redefines the state and its role, creates an added space for civil society. The ideal state is now decentralized and participatory. It streamlines its bureaucracy, undertakes new public management reforms, and becomes more accountable and transparent. It concentrates on core functions, and opens out increasing space for private (including international) capital and NGOs, in carrying out its production, reproduction and redistribution functions. As well, NGOs are given a role in training, monitoring and evaluating new institutions of governance (Sinha, 2005: 166)

The uses of NGOs were as social safety nets in place of the government, training in democracy and citizenship, checking of the power of states, and their ability to push corporations towards an agenda of social responsibility (Kaldor, 2003: 88). Other uses of CSOs that were becoming obvious to global governance organizations, which were increasingly convinced that relationship with civil society associations can yield important gains, included the making use of CSOs as agents of public education countering widespread ignorance about global governance; using inputs from civil society groups to bring helpful information and insights to policy processes, including data and perspectives missing in official circles; discussing with civil society groups to gage whether or not the policy measures of global governance agencies are viable; and the general enhancement of the democratic legitimacy of global governance arrangements through the increase of public participation and accountability accrued through well-conducted relationships with CSOs (Scholte, 2004: 216-217). Jan Aart Scholte (Ibid.: 218-222) provides an even more specific list of uses for civil society's contributions to accountable governance, namely four main ways in which CSOs have elicited greater accountability: the advocacy for

transparency; policy monitoring and review; pursuit of redress; and promotion of formal accountability mechanisms.

The roles that were given to INGOs and CSOs in general were also helped along by a neoliberal GCS discourse, which incorporated terms such as "social capital" and "trust" into the vocabulary of GCS, aiding this atmosphere of enthusiasm for NGOs (Kaldor, 2003: 88). Sinha (2005: 166) draws the relationship between this discourse and the way in which civil society was identified with the free market. From the early 1990s, neoliberals expanded their notion of civil society to include "social capital" which was shorthand for referring to trust, norms, reciprocity and social networks. Social capital would create civil society, democracy and development. Cooperation was put forward as necessary to achieve selfish ends but difficult to mobilize because of a lack of trust, which would be established through repeated interaction between rational actors. Free markets were said to be the perfect setting for interactions that produce social capital, which would be the key ingredient in creating civil society, democracy and good governance.

This incorporation of GCS into the neoliberal "global governance" project has usually been referred to as a process which saw the "taming" of new social movements by turning them into institutionalized and professionalized NGOs. The "reality" of the context in which NGOs operate will be elaborated below. It should suffice here to underline that in the process of glorifying GCS, the tamed characters of NGOs has also been presented as a virtue of GCS. For instance, the success of social movements according to Kaldor depends on their capacity to mobilize and on the responsiveness of authorities:

> To the extent that authorities permit protest and take seriously the demands of the protestors, then social movements are 'tamed', integrated into the political process and institutionalized. 'Taming' is not just about access; it is about adaptation on both sides. The authorities accept part of the agenda of protest; the movements modify their goals and become respectable (Kaldor, 2003: 83).

It can be deduced, from this line of thinking, that respectability is earned at the price of certain concessions, and that the modification of demands is the road to "civility". Kaldor (2003: 86) argues that while old social movements were tamed through the state, with many becoming ruling parties (the Green parties in Western

Europe are a good example), "new social movements were 'tamed' not within a national framework but within the framework of global governance". However, just as 'taming' in the national context is said to be beneficial to the success of social movements, 'taming' in the framework of global governance is not mentioned in a pejorative sense. Instead, taming is seen as an advantage: "As a consequence of their 'tamed' character, NGOs are able to act as interlocutors on issues with which new social movements are concerned. In addition, many have built up expert knowledge on particular policy areas, which enables them to challenge the official experts" (Ibid: 89). This is why, Kaldor says, she has included think tanks and international commissions in the category of GCS, which once again takes us back to the 'inclusiveness' issue.

GCS has been glorified by the "New Right" and certain Leftist perspectives, both of which have utilized an ahistorical and ambiguous definition of what constitutes GCS. The glorification is evident in the way the ambiguity intrinsic to the "inclusiveness" of the concept, the transformation of what has been traditionally known as representative democracy into a functionalist view of democracy with pressure groups and particularistic demands taking lead roles, and the "taming" of INGOs, are all portrayed as beneficial to the cause of democratizing globalization or globalizing democracy. This rapprochement between advocates of GCS and the New Right on the topic of GCS, however, serves to portray GCS in a misleading light, and holds particularly dangerous implications.

3.4 Placing GCS into Context

The glorification of GCS, it has been argued, has been contrived by taking the concept out of its context by detaching it from the economy or the state, and identifying it with virtuous characteristics:

> In making claims for the superiority of GCS, the impression is often conveyed that the sphere has a monopoly on virtue and is free from the temptations that afflict nation-state politics. A dualism is set up between a virtuous global civil society and a dirty world of national politics (Pupavac, 2005: 56).

There is one other useful aspect to this dualism, which is the fact that it allows NGOs to make a moral claim to democracy and justice that is disconnected from political economic relations of capitalist expansion (Kamat, 2004: 158-159). So the "virtues" of GCS are premised on its separation from the state and economy. This is true both of the New Right and GCS advocacy within certain segments of the Left, both choosing to perceive GCS as a miraculous "third sector" that has come about as an answer to all of our problems.

It will be argued here, however, that GCS reflects and reinforces the inequalities and power relations inherent to the structures of modernity, and at the same time undermines these structures. Associating GCS with the dual pillars of modernity historically, namely the states system and the world capitalist economy, establishes the concept as mutually constitutive of and constituted by these structures. The failure to do this, it will be argued, is the reason for many of the theoretical and practical problems the concept faces today, problems which encourage us to look to the virtues which GCS is said to possess with some suspicion. Pasha and Blaney (1998: 419) note, for instance, how the discourse of GCS takes for granted global capitalism as the infrastructure for recent trends and purifies what they call transnational associational life (TAL) of the unequal and alienated relationship of capitalism. They state how imagining GCS involves establishing TAL as an unambiguous force for the democratization of a global society, by constructing it as a (liberal) global agent free of imbrication with the state system and the entanglements of global capitalism. TAL may be a site of possible challenges to the oligarchical organization of contemporary global political economy. However, it also appears as a basis for sustaining those relations.

In order to dispel misleading views concerning the "monopoly on virtue" GCS is said to hold, it is necessary to underline the fact that GCS has been deeply intertwined with the rise of modernity and the modern structures that organized social, economic and political life. It is necessary, therefore, to ground the idea of international civil society historically and sociologically by associating its origins and development in a dialectic with the twin pillars of the international system, namely capitalism and the sovereign state. This entails treating international civil society "as a domain of social and political activity subsumed under the broader dynamics of capitalist social relations" while viewing the modern-state and the

international system as a necessary component of international civil society (Colas, 2002: 16). Moreover, modern forms of political and social agency should be viewed as a constitutive element of this international domain, with the collective agency of the exploited classes holding a prominent spot in this analysis. (Ibid.: 17). A historical-sociological approach is necessitated, therefore, as this is the way in which the historical interaction between structures and processes can be explained. The idea that the relationship between agency and structure is not an exclusive one, but rather one which is "forged through time" is inspired by the Marxist understanding that structures generated by the global reproduction of capitalism in turn generate modern forms of collective agency organized around antagonistic class interests (Ibid.: 21).

Evidence of this can be seen in history, as well as the problems facing contemporary GCS advocacy and the source of the criticisms leveled at them. A good place to start this argument is by emphasizing that civil society has been international ever since its inception in, and spread through, capitalist social relations. Civil society, in its origin and development, should not be restricted to a particular national setting. GCS theorists have portrayed the present context in which social movements operate as one which posits a "transnational" character, a phenomenon in turn said to be unique to our present age of "globalization": "Civil society was linked to the war-making colonial state, which constituted a limitation on civil society itself as well as a barrier to the development of civil society elsewhere" (Kaldor, 2003: 44). Yet viewing civil society as always having been international brings serious doubt to this view as well as the normative role attributed to this sphere following premature prognostications of a stateless and therefore "free" world: "…civil society has from its inception been molded by a number of international factors which warrant the adoption of the term *international civil society* as a more accurate category of social, political and historical analysis" (Colas, 2002: 49).

Colas raises three points to underline the international dimensions of civil society. The first of these points emphasizes that civil society must be seen as a constituent of the modern system of states and as having emerged in conjunction with the modern sovereign state:

> …whether seen as a product of capitalism or absolutism, the modern state was given actual historical content not only by the ruling classes and their attendant systems of property and law, but also by a populace which increasingly identified this particular territorial entity as the locus of modern politics. One of the most noteworthy paradoxes of modern social and political movements, therefore, is that they operate at an international level while at the same time recognizing the political salience of the sovereign state. It is in this respect that international civil society becomes simultaneously an arena of domestic *and* international politics (Ibid.: 51-52).

Therefore, by defining the political limits of the modern state, modern social movements were able to contribute to the construction of a modern system of states, seen in the instances of the modern period of revolutionary civil wars, the later-eighteenth-century 'age of democratic revolutions' and the nineteenth and twentieth century experience of working-class agitation (Ibid.: 52, 110, 113, 114-120). The legitimacy of the territorial state as a political community was actually reinforced by "the gradual emergence of social movements employing a distinctly modern formulation of rights, constitutionalism and even democratic governance" (Ibid.: 51). It is important to note, in passing, what this means for the agency-structure debate. By understanding social movements as constitutive of the modern system of states, we come face to face with an immediate refutation of arguments emphasizing either structure or agency as the primary determinant of social relations, as well as the domestic and the international as exclusive spheres of politics.

The second point which Colas raises as regards the international characteristic of civil society is that it should be seen as an international phenomenon by virtue of its global expansion, which is possible once civil society is defined as the expression of capitalist market relations. A very important feature of the use of the term "international civil society" is the way in which it enriches the Marxian understanding of "civil society". Talking of international civil society necessitates bringing the expansion of capitalist social relations into perspective. For international civil society is a social and historical space created by capitalist expansion. This has not, however, translated into a homogenous "global" civil society. Rather, capitalist expansion has been a distorted process, the features of which "became refracted through the lens of international phenomena such as sovereignty, war, imperialism or revolution, and were articulated with pre-capitalist structures such as households, kinship networks, caste or indeed pre-existing political communities" (Ibid.: 52-53).

The concept of international civil society, therefore, rather than being simply equated with the global capitalist market, "should represent an approach to the expansion of capitalism which incorporates a host of international dimensions (such as nationalism, ethnic and religious stratification, revolutions or imperialism itself) into the Marxian understanding of civil society as a private sphere of capitalist production and exchange" (Ibid.: 54).

The third international dimension of civil society is that international civil society is an arena of international political agency, or in other words:

> when civil society is viewed as a political and ethical space occupied by modern social movements, the international dimensions of its operation become even more evident in that such movements have arguably always been subject to a host of transnational forces, both ideological and institutional (Colas, 2005: 49).

This argument is established by advancing the idea that historically the forms of modern political agency typical of civil society sprang from the socio-economic transformations brought about by capitalism and that the uneven expansion of world capitalism and the international civil society it generated "produced very specific manifestations of universal forms of social and political agency" instead of "generating homogeneous replicas of an archetypal modern social movement" (Ibid.: 54-55). The sociological space of international civil society, merely opened up by the expansion of capitalism, is given political content through the international activity of social movements, both within and across states.

Bearing these points in mind, it is argued that social movements *from their inception* have been conditioned by international factors in three important respects. The first point is that all modern social movements are premised on some form of universal political agency. Colas points to the working class for socialists, women for feminists and the imagined community of the nation for the nationalists to illustrate his point (Ibid.: 55). Even overtly racist and national-chauvinist movements have been forced to identify international counterparts to their socio-political programs (Ibid: 56). The second point concerns the organizational forms of modern social movements, which indicates, according to Colas, " a clear international, when not overtly internationalist disposition" (Ibid.: 56). The example of the women's movement is used to exemplify what is meant by this, as Colas states that the

organizations formed by women who organized internationally to further their cause since the 19th century "took shape in the form of organizations such as the International congress of Women (established in 1888), the International Women's Suffrage Alliance (1904) or the Socialist Women's International (1907)", with the single common denominator shared being "the explicit attempt at transgressing the existing national political boundaries" (Ibid.: 56). It is interesting to note that Mary Kaldor also admits the fact that social movements were international in origin:

> The old movements were not originally national. The various movements that pressed for the achievement of individual rights were always universalistic in their aspirations…Likewise, the labor movement was always an international movement. The first international of labor was held in 1864; workers traveled to different countries to express solidarity with their fellow workers from the late nineteenth century onwards; the International Federation of Trade Unions was founded in 1901 (Kaldor 2003: 85).

Yet Kaldor argues that the GCS reinvented after 1989 was new: "What was new about the concept, in comparison with earlier concepts of civil society, was both the demand for a radical extension of both political and personal rights – the demand for autonomy, self-organization or control over life – and the global content of the concept (Ibid.: 76) . However, Colas's account of the women's movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century displays how civil society, made international by the efforts of women, was based on "the demand for a radical extension of both political and personal rights" and was "global" in this respect, as it "managed to attract sympathizers in Turkey, Iran, South Africa and Argentina (Colas, 2002: 57). Indeed, the reach of social movements beyond the nation-state was exemplified in the 19th century with the notion of internationalism, which arose in response to the socio-economic and political changes at the time. These changes, brought about by the uneven spread of capitalism, set the scene for a new principle and practice:

> This aspiration to create bonds of solidarity among groups of different national, religious and ethnic backgrounds was expressed first as a *principle* which celebrated the internationalization of the world as a positive process which could facilitate the pursuit of universal political goals such as peace, democracy, equality or freedom. Additionally, internationalism came to reflect a particular *practice* of social and political organization of people across national, ethnic or religious boundaries (Colas, 2002: 57).

Colas goes on to give the example of working-class internationalism, manifested in the form of International Working Men's Association (IWMA) formed in 1864, which later became the Second and Third Internationals formed in 1889 and 1919 respectively, to show how internationalism was created, as well as caused by, international civil society. The final point Colas makes in contribution to his argument that international social movements have been international from their inception, is that social movements can emerge as a response to, and be inspired by, events occurring in other parts of the world (Ibid.: 58). This is one way in which ideas and organizational forms are diffused throughout the world. This diffusion, however, has not only occurred in our age of "globalization". This has been a phenomenon visible in the democratic revolutions of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries.

> Cast in this light, international civil society represents a political space which has been constructed over the past 300 years by the international activity of modern social movements. By espousing and propagating universal ideologies; by providing examples of how collective action can be politically meaningful across the globe; and, most importantly, by organizing internationally, modern social movements have for decades been extending the boundaries of political action beyond the territorial state (Colas, 2002: 58).

Such a view of civil society as being inherently international due to its involvement in the constitution of the modern states system, the reproduction of global capitalism, and as being a social and political space of ideological contestation which both transcends and reinforces territorial boundaries, places the concept of GCS into context and sheds historical and sociological light on the reasons for the problems and criticisms faced by the concept of GCS along with GCS advocacy today.

Understanding international civil society's necessary and historical relationship with capitalist social relations and the states system allows us to put into perspective some of the contradictions that GCS advocacy faces today. Much has been said, for instance, of the dependence of INGOs on states for funding, which has been a very salient criticism since GCS advocates have generally equated GCS with INGOs, most probably because INGOs are the closest organizations in GCS to global governance institutions, at least the most accepted by the latter. The contradiction is that while INGOs are said to be holding states accountable in their roles within the

"third sector" independent of the state and the economy, they are being paid by the governments they claim to be monitoring.

The answer to this question, as is clear from the arguments promoted up until this point, is that INGOs should not be seen as a "third sector" in the first place. States and the private sector are significant components of international social movement activity: "Many international movements have been supported, when not overtly created, by states" (Colas, 2002: 78-79). INGOs have been broken down to GONGOs (government-organized NGOs), DONGOs (donor-organized NGOs), BONGOs (business-organized NGOs), QUANGOs (quasi non-governmental organizations) and GRINGOs (government-run/initiated NGOs), in order to denote who they depend on for funding and the degree to which they depend (Ibid.: 79). NGOs, due to the fact that they require financial resources beyond that which can be obtained through donations alone, become dependent on state, state federations, international organizations and even private companies. This dependency makes it possible for donors to use NGOs to serve their own interests. NGOs may be used by metropolitan states "to circumvent the activities of governments of peripheral countries and sometimes they are mobilized by national governments in opposition to international organizations or vice versa" (Hirsch, 2003: 251).

An example of this type of instrumentalization through the power of funding is given by Tina Wallace in her account of the way in which development NGOs are increasingly dependent on aid donors. These donors today make demands around social policies, budget allocations, democratic structures and systems of accountability. New aims are set for development NGOs: "The roles civil society and NGOs are expected to play have shifted as the dominant paradigms have moved successively from a focus on the state as the key to economic development, to markets, to an understanding of market failures" (Wallace, 2003: 203). This codifies the shifts in the understanding of development from the welfare state to the Washington Consensus and later towards the Post-Washington Consensus (please see Ch. II). Today, the view is that the 'enabling state' must drive development while civil society regulates it. Wallace draws the conclusion that "civil society," therefore, is a confused and ahistorical term deployed to promote this development model: "as Northern NGOs increasingly rely on official donor funding and goodwill, and as the

conditionalities attached to that aid increase, they are inevitably drawn into supporting and even spreading many aspects of the dominant global agenda" (Ibid.).

NGOs are "state-oriented", however, not only because they are financially dependent but also because they depend on the legislative and executive power of the state and/or the goodwill of private companies for the realization of their objectives (Hirsch, 2003: 251). Although international social movements present a challenge to state sovereignty when identifying with other movements across boundaries and indeed by organizing across boundaries, they are forced to pursue their socio-political goals through the different organs of the sovereign state. Colas (2002: 79-80) points to the examples of international environmentalist and feminist movements, and the fact that they have been "forced to accommodate differing national legislation in the formulation of their goals" in order to "engage directly with the relevant departments of particular states. These examples show the continuing relevance of state sovereignty in the analysis of international social movement activity:

> …international social movements which inhabit international civil society reinforce the legitimacy of the sovereign state through their recognition of local particularities in the expression of global problems as much as they weaken it by organizing across state boundaries when addressing such problems (Colas, 2002: 80).

One very important implication of this view is that state sovereignty and the expansion of international civil society should not be seen as a zero sum situation. Organizations and movements within international civil society reproduce the states-system and must formulate their demands taking into consideration the sovereign state. In this sense, an easy analogy cannot be drawn between state and civil society in the domestic sphere and GCS and global governance in the international sphere. Social movements need the mediation of the structure of state sovereignty in order to interact with institutions of global governance (Ibid.: 139).

The issue of the democratic legitimacy of INGOs has also been questioned with reference to both their dependence on states and the private sector for funding and their lack of internal accountability. As Pasha and Blaney (1998: 421-422) so clearly note, the relationship between civil society and democracy, especially the project of extending democracy, is unclear when placed in its social and political

context because civil society cannot eliminate the role of political authority. State institutions will continue to exist alongside civil society, as the latter often calls for the expansion of the state apparatus (due to the state's mediation role as noted above). Also, civil society is only ambiguously a source of democratic activism due to the fact that associational life is highly undemocratic in character. Moreover, civil society is immersed in a social context of general political passivity and depoliticization and social movements are often the province of the middle class with a set of post-industrial sensitivities characteristic of North American and European societies. Yet another very important point is that INGOs do not constitute a homogenous group of actors. Associational life, by definition, is made up of organizations such as NGOs which promote their own agendas and represent their own constituencies. In addition to this, the "realities" of the present context dictate competition between INGO and NGOs for funding, a fact that has privileged northern NGOs with headquarters in metropolitan centers over rural and southern NGOs established in peripheral countries. Once again, therefore, we see the reflection of the power structures of the present world conjuncture clearly expressed in the functioning of GCS.

The contradiction is clear; how can INGOs claim to represent the global "demos" when they themselves are unaccountable and at odds with each other?

The accountability problem within INGOs has been widely criticized:

> At best, the organizations have tended to have no more than lose oversight by a board (often composed largely of friends, who are in some cases paid), periodic elections of officers (with low rates of participation and sometimes dubious procedures), occasional general meetings (with sparse attendance), minimalist reports of activities (that few people read) and summary financial records (which often conceal as much as they reveal) (Scholte, 2004: 230-231).

How can GCS be a new mechanism of "accountability", therefore, when in addition to the fact that their influence vis-à-vis governance organizations and states are uncertain (due to funding conditionalities) there is the problem of their own accountability? (Baker, 2002: 122-123). The confusion arises due to several reasons, mostly because INGOs are promoted as the main representatives of GCS, and because there is an idea that GCS represents a global "demos". Once the argument

that "questions surrounding the political legitimacy of agents in international civil society are intimately connected to the territorial character of modern political rule" (Colas, 2002: 138), is taken into consideration, however, it becomes easier to dispel such assumptions. For although it may be plausible to criticize INGOs for neglecting accountability issues within their own organizations and towards their own constituencies, and indeed for not being "willing to recognize the full implications of participating in a given political community – one of which involves defining the sources and limits of a group's political accountability" (Ibid.: 62), it does not make sense to criticize these organizations for being unrepresentative of a global "demos", just as it makes no sense for GCS advocates to promote these organizations as representatives of such a world citizenry. "Organizations in civil society do not share a common vision of the good, nor need concern themselves with the common good, in any holistic fashion at all if they choose not to. They have particular agendas and particular issues and particular constituencies" (Anderson, 2000: 119). In fact, "INGOs are fundamentally pressure groups which do not contest the overall legitimacy of a specific regime but merely seeks to alter a particular policy – on human rights, environmental law, women's rights and so forth" (Colas, 2002: 62). Due to the fact that the actions of INGOs impinge on "territorially bounded 'communities of fate'" (Ibid.: 139), what is democratic about international civil society is democratic only in relation to these communities. In other words, the equation of transnational social actors with democracy is problematic because it underestimates the need for democracy to be rooted in communities of fate and "in separating out forms of political authority, like the sovereign state, from their broader position in the totality of socio-economic relations, such theories risk reifying civil society (be it local, regional or global) as the exclusive or principle sphere of democratic deliberation." Yet it is conceptually misleading to separate state and civil society and politically disabling "because the sovereign state still represents the sturdiest base on which to build a genuinely democratic polity" (Ibid.: 158).

Democracy can only be attributed to INGOs in a restricted sense, that is, when democracy is equated with functionality and rationality in political processes and decision making. They enable attention to be given to a broader range of interests and they contribute to greater rationality in processes of problem definition and decision making. However, if one understands democracy as a system which

allows every member of society the highest possible degree of freedom and autonomy, then NGOs are explicitly undemocratic (Hirsch, 2003: 256). Hirsch argues that the failure of INGOs in terms of democracy is due to the fact that they are unaccountable, their activities are confined to "soft" issues and not "hard" issues and due to the fact that there is a hierarchy of power among NGOs (Ibid.). The argument that INGOs, and indeed GCS as a whole, reflect the social relations in which they operate is crucial in order to understand these limitations of GCS.

Portraying INGOs as uncontaminated by the states-system and the world capitalist economy is also belied by the fact that there are many different types of INGOs, let alone many different kinds of organizations and social movements with diverse ideological goals and organizational forms. The "hierarchy of power among NGOs" is both a cause and effect of the present shape taken by the modern structures of modernity. NGOs can be differentiated according to whether they are northern or southern (those that are outsiders and closer to the policy-making community and funds, and those rooted in the local environment); advocacy or service provision (although a range of activities exist that can be included under both headings such as monitoring compliance with international treaties, conflict resolution and reconciliation, etc.); solidarity or mutual benefit (those whose members struggle for solidarity with others and those who place the mutual-benefit of their members to the fore); and their organizational forms (formal versus informal, hierarchical versus participatory, networks versus federations, centralized versus decentralized, etc.) (Kaldor, 2003: 90-91). However particular kinds of NGOs have come to dominate the scene:

> NGOs who are northern and therefore close to the centers of power and funding, whose emphasis is service provision, who are solidaristic rather than mutual benefit, and whose organization tends to be more formal and hierarchical, have come to dominate the NGO scene (Kaldor, 2003: 92).

Amoore and Langley (2005: 148) emphasize the necessity to treat GCS as a number of spaces that are "ambiguous, open to contestation and often contradictory". Moreover, they point to the fact that civil society groups do not unambiguously resist, because they are always also intricately involved in the very production of that power. Three aspects of GCS become visible, according to the authors, once the

search for the consolidated agent for "good" ceases, and once we recognize the contradictory nature of what it means to be "civil". First, within a named and assumed civil society grouping, there are tensions surrounding "who" is being empowered and "what" is being resisted. To deny these tensions is to miss the very heart of a politics of transformation (Ibid.: 151). Participation in a voluntary civil society activity cannot be understood, in and of itself, to empower and emancipate. The second point is that "The assumption of GCS as a cohesive and empowered agent masks the contradictions of people's feelings of shared experience, personal well-being and perceptions of risk and reward". The "dark sides of civil society activity" are invisible within discourses of empowerment and resistance in global governance (Ibid.: 152). "Just as some movements organize to challenge the boundaries that confine and restrict the movement of people, images and ideas, for example, others campaign precisely to close them down, to secure their own sense of belonging" (Ibid.: 152-153). Even within a single protest, groups secure their own identity by criminalizing others. The authors give the examples of how in anti-globalization protests some are quick to criminalize anarchists as vandals in order to hold on to their legitimacy (Ibid.: 153). The third point is that the nature of an emergent GCS is unsettled and contested. The conventional theorist of GCS celebrates diversity and difference within settled, defined and clearly delimited boundaries. However, the very mapping and contesting of GCS should receive greater interest in GCS research.

> Whilst the emancipatory potential of GCS is celebrated, the manner in which this assumed transformative capacity is itself open to challenge and contradiction is not explored. In our view, to continue the search for a particular kind of responsible, legitimate and civil global agency is to avert our gaze from the power relations and contestation that lie at the heart of a politicized reading of GCS (Amoore & Langley, 2005: 154).

Examples of these power relations, including the lack of influence of NGOs and the privileging of northern NGOs can be given in relation to UN sponsored world conferences, which have, according to Colas, occasioned the unique convergence of global agents of civil society:

> Yet, on closer inspection, the form, content and eventual outcomes of such gatherings are so heavily circumscribed by the interests of states that it is difficult to see how the agents of global civil society can be said to be genuinely representative of an autonomous and undifferentiated 'global citizenry' (Colas, 2002: 153).

Moreover, Colas notes, as does Kaldor, that the geographical and political origins of NGOs have a considerable influence on whether or not they are granted consultative status by the UN. NGO's originating from liberal OECD states have secured a position to the detriment of Third World NGOs with fewer material resources and more explicitly "political" goals. (Ibid.: 153-154). Examples are given of well-endowed INGOs in this position such as Save the Children Fund, Amnesty International or Médicins sans Fontièrs. Also, unrepresentative NGOs such as Rotary International, are granted consultative status even though Article 71 of the UN Charter requires NGOs to be accountable to attain this position. Yet, as was argued above, NGOs are only representative of their own membership and not of a global "demos" (Ibid.: 155). Furthermore, multilateral economic institutions will only engage with global social movements so long as the latter accept that their operational function as subordinate partners in the administration of global governance, and global social movements are not united in a harmony of interests as they "replicate the diverse social cleavages which characterize global capitalism" (Ibid.: 156). Although Colas concedes that INGOs have had an impact on the "pluralization" of global governance, for instance by providing a forum for transnational 'networking' and attracting media attention to global agendas, he warns about the limits of such influence and the highly selective nature of such plurality (Ibid.: 155).

A very interesting point that has been made in relation to the effects of NGO activity on the power relations existing in the world today is that NGOs actually reproduce these power relations in ways that privilege strong states, and at the same time form the basis for and legitimize the imperialism of these states that embark on moral crusades. Pupavac has argued, with reference to the human rights regime, that while GCS disclaims its own will to sovereignty, in reality it acts as sovereign by determining human rights norms and their application. GCS advocacy legitimizes the demise of sovereign equality between states and the expansion of the sovereignty of the most powerful states designated as enforcer states against the rest: "Effectively,

GCS is conceptualized on the basis of a new moral division between responsible and irresponsible states, and between a global ethical elite of moral agents and the mass of humanity" (2005: 56). According to Pupavac, GCS advocates are eroding the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, thereby extending the unit of the writ of the most powerful states (Ibid.: 57). The basis for this is the emergence of a "new humanitarianism" in the 1990s which corresponded "in key respects with contemporary global civil society advocacy and its championing of human rights and impatience with national sovereignty" (Ibid.: 59). This new humanitarianism was born out of a critique of traditional humanitarian relief as a short-termist and inadequate solution, and conditionalities began to appear alongside the lending out of humanitarian aid: "Moral judgments about the worthiness of recipients, and aid conditionality to improve recipient societies, have crept into humanitarian work where previously moral and political judgments were suspended" (Ibid.). Such conditionalities and moral judgments have led agencies to make distinctions between sides, and be more willing to engage with politics. Yet this has created new ethical dilemmas, such as the human rights victim not being able to hold the self-declared human rights agent accountable for how his/her interests were interpreted, as well as dangerous decisions, such as that of withdrawing aid to Hutu refugees in Rwanda for fear of aiding Hutu genocidaries, "causing up to 200,000 preventable deaths, including an estimated 75,000 infants under five who could in no way be culpable for the massacres in Rwanda (Ibid.: 60). Another example is that of Oxfam's withdrawal from a water project for gender justice in Kabul, leading to many deaths due to waterborne disease (Ibid.).

This point is strengthened when Pupavac (2005: 60-61) talks of humanitarian enforcement, as she insightfully points out to the Kosovo war as a case in point of the new humanitarianism. Liberal peace, as an imperative to this new humanitarianism, have led to demands by NGOs for the use of military force in the name of military victims, thereby jeapordising "the very identity of humanitarian organizations as moral actors". The implications of this are grave: "The demand for military enforcement in the absence of an international military force presumes an international division between responsible liberal human rights enforcer states and non-liberal human rights violating states." (Ibid.: 61). Gideon Baker echoes Pupavac's concern when he states that proponents of a role for civil society in global

governance have a blind spot in their analyses, "which is that in celebrating the ability of global civil society to make ethical demands on individual states, they miss the potentially deleterious effects of this on the right of equal sovereignty between states" (Ibid.:125).

Another development that has awakened GCS advocates to the fact that GCS advocacy is impaired as well as enabled by the present context and power relations is the relationship of GCS agencies with the media. Due to the fact that the crucial resource of power in their possession is the ability to mobilize public opinion, the attraction of media attention has become a key objective of NGO policy. However, as a result of the obligation of GCS agencies to adjust to the ways in which the media industry works, NGOs have discovered that unspectacular, long-term and "sustainable" projects fail to attract public attention while dramatized catastrophes attract much sympathy and donations. NGOs tend to exaggerate crises in order to mobilize public support and gain media coverage. A quote by George Alagiah of the BBC is very revealing:

> Relief agencies depend upon us for publicity and we need them to tell us where the stories are. There's an unspoken understanding between us, a sort of code. We try not to ask the question too bluntly: 'Where are the starving babies?' And they never answer explicitly. But we get the pictures all the same (Quoted in Kaldor, 2003: 94).

In turn, this shifts the priorities of NGOs. An example to a media-induced shift in priorities is that of the way in which international emergency aid business has recently expanded (Hirsch, 2003: 250). So once again, we are confronted with the fact that the structures of power both enable and hinder the operation of GCS:

> The example of Greenpeace show that media-oriented "transnational NGOs" can carry considerable weight in opposition to governments and commercial companies, but they do so at the cost of having to set their priorities tactically according to media-oriented criteria (Hirsch, 2003: 250).

The problems and criticisms GCS advocacy faces today are all tied to the portrayal of GCS by its advocates as a "third sector" separated from the states-system and the world economy, and its advancement as a sphere of democracy in the sense of being representative of a global demos. However, upon closer inspection, GCS

can be seen as a sphere of ideological contestation, inevitably tied to and reflective of the inequalities of the international states system and capitalist economy. Once it is seen in this way, that is, in the context in which it operates, the same criticisms lose their edge. However, the way in which GCS is upheld as an emancipatory project today merely validates all criticisms, as GCS is made an instrument of perpetuating and consolidating the inequalities generated by the structures of modernity.

3.5 Global Civil Society as an Instrument of the Status-Quo

Through the analysis hitherto adopted, it is possible to see how GCS becomes a concept that can, directly and indirectly, aid in the reproduction of the practice and discourse of capitalist political economy. The non-sociological and ahistorical presentation of GCS praises GCS as an "emancipatory project" while at the same time tying its effectiveness with the possibility it presents to form an intimate link to official policy-makers, whose positions are secured due to the fact that GCS is presented as inimical to the aim of changing power relations in any substantive sense, indeed as completely averse to the attainment of power. This has meant a running away from politics at home, and the consolidation of existing power relations at the global governance level. In turn, the New Right has found the means, through the value placed on "effectiveness," to marginalize any opposition to neoliberal policies that exist in GCS, and homogenize the constituents of GCS as technical-professional organs of neoliberal hegemony.

Scholte's account of the problems and challenges facing GCS advocacy is a very good example of the way in which the obstacles in front of the concept are described can reproduce the assumptions about GCS that have been argued against throughout this chapter. For instance, Scholte talks about the "territorialist mindset" that looms large as an obstacle in front of GCS as well as emphasizing the necessity of some sort of proximity to ruling authorities, arguing that "the ability of civil society associations to promote democratic accountability in global governance…depends considerably on their relationships with ruling authorities" (2004: 226). It is possible to see here how GCS as a "third sector" is sanctified, and how "emancipation" has lost any type of radical edge it may have had in the past,

and incorporated into a pressure-exerting mechanism whose effectiveness is at the mercy of the ruling authorities.

The dangers of the failure to place GCS into context are nowhere more apparent than the position GCS advocates fall into as regards the type of politics espoused. David Chandler (2004: 316-317) argues that the type of protest espoused by certain Leftists, especially through GCS advocacy, has emerged from a distrust of the people within a given community and has transformed politics into an ineffective, elitist, unaccountable and reformist phenomenon. Chandler argues for a different explanation of the rise of GCS advocacy than the traditional explanation, which states that the post-1989 genesis of GCS rooted in the revival of the concept of civil society by Eastern European and Latin American opposition movements which contested authoritarian rule and that the concept was subsequently taken up by Western radicals who viewed civil society as a bastion against the power and arbitrariness of the state and on the power of unchecked capitalism. This explanation is questioned by Chandler, who argues that other factors were at work in drawing GCS theorists to the experience of East European dissidents, namely a similar experience of social isolation. What David Chandler has in mind here is the "anti-politics" and "parallel polis" conceptualizations mentioned in relation to the glorification of civil society above, and which underline political refusal rather than political participation. For instance, Kaldor mentions that after 1968, a date marked by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the main form of opposition in Eastern Europe became the individual dissident: "The dissidents saw themselves not as precursors of a political movement but as individuals who wanted to retain their personal integrity" (2003: 53). The task of opposition was not, according to these dissidents, to seize power but to change the relationship between state and society. Similar concepts included 'Anti-Politics," "Living in Truth," and the "parallel *polis*" (Ibid.: 55). The "parallel polis' for instance did not aim to compete for power, but rather to create a structure under or besides this power that represents other laws and in which the voice of the ruling power is heard only as an insignificant echo from a world that is organized in an entirely different way. Another example to this line of thinking was Konrad's anti-politics: "Anti-Politics strives to put politics in its place and make sure it stays there, never over-stepping its proper office of defending and refining the rules of the game of civil society" (Ibid.: 56).

Chandler interprets the anti-politics movement as the result of disillusionment with the people rather than as a mere hostility towards the state: "Beneath the surface of post-liberal radicalism, which seems to condemn the state as the site of power and control, stands a more traditional conservative thesis on the limits of popular democracy" (2004: 318). Chandler points to the beginnings of this shift in the shape and content of contestation to "new social movements", which "side-stepped the working class altogether" and chose to reject the existence of collective political interests "rather than dispute the claims of the old left to represent a collective political subject" (Ibid.: 321). Key demands shifted from equal political rights of participation to the recognition of difference and 'autonomy' (Ibid.: 322):

> In effect, the claim for recognition on the basis of existence – rather than the ideas forwarded or numbers of people involved – inverses the traditional 'benchmarks for judging political legitimacy…Political legitimacy is no longer derived from the political process of building support in society but rather from recognition of the movement's social isolation (Chandler, 2004: 323).

This, according to Chandler, is the logical consequence of the rejection of any legitimate collective subject, which has damaged social interaction and led to elitism:

> The argument that the individual should have no higher political allegiance beyond their own moral conscience merely reflects and legitimizes the radical rejection of collective political engagement and its replacement by elite advocacy and personal solipsism (Chandler, 2004: 313).

Such elite advocacy and personal solipsism has negative implications for the effectiveness of these movements. The choice of certain Leftists to create "autonomous counter-publics" instead of challenging governing power has led to the weakening of political contestation, as Chandler scathingly notes:

> It seems that, from anarchist squatters in Italy to the Landless Peasant's Movement in Brazil, the smaller or more marginal the struggle, the more pregnant with possibility it is and the more it transgresses traditional political boundaries, whether conceptual or spatial (Chandler, 2004: 328).

This global interconnectedness, it is argued, is the flip-side of a lack of interconnectedness locally, and is contrasted with the transnational social movements of modernity, which have existed since the 19th century (Ibid.: 329):

> The transnational social movements of modernity had the independence of aim and capacity to effect meaningful political change at both domestic and international levels without either relying on states to act on their behalf or, at the other extreme, avoiding any engagement with formal politics for fear of losing their 'autonomy' (Chandler, 2004: 330).

The "effectiveness" argument is also taken up by Lipschutz (2004: 203), who emphasizes that civic action and social activism has come to focus, in the context of "neoliberal governmentality" (denoting Foucault's explanation of the dominant discourse and practice ensuring the "right disposition of things"- this concept draws close parallels with Gramsci's "hegemony"), on "politics via markets" (which denotes the use of market incentives to impose "social responsibility" on companies). This "politics via markets" has utilized a distributional concept of power, meaning a concept of power that focuses on who gets what, when and how. The most accessible mode of action for social activists is distributive politics through markets due to the fact that constitutional political mechanisms do not really exist in the emerging arrangements of global rule. In a separate article, Lipschutz (2005: 760) gives two examples in order to illustrate his point, namely that of the upsurge in NGO activities after the Asian Tsunami, and "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR) projects in which NGOs and companies compete to protect workers' labor rights. In relation to the Tsunami, although Lipschutz concedes that NGOs play an important role in disaster relief and assistance, he remarks that "these NGOs are for the most part dedicated to complementing the distribution of such social services as are available (or not), and not working to restructure the political economy that leaves people impoverished and at risk in the first place" (Ibid.: 762). A clearer example are the CSR campaigns, which are national and transnational campaigns that utilize lobbying, public pressure, influence and expertise to impose regulation on capital, due to the state's unwillingness to do so. Some of these campaigns try to convince individuals to engage in 'socially conscious consumption' and businesses to adopt 'corporate social responsibility' (Ibid.: 762). CSOs try to use their market-based power to influence consumer and corporate behavior in order to improve labor

conditions in factories. With selective consumption, consumers believe that they can induce a fear of a loss in profits in corporations, who will then internalize social costs in order to protect these profits. Such campaigns have been successful in terms of instrumental goals but, according to Lipschutz, they suffer from political limitations. Those whose rights are being violated are being treated as objects rather than subjects, and therefore they are deprived of structural and productive power (described below). Individual changes in corporate behavior do not affect the life of the worker outside the factory walls. When the question of what these campaigns have changed in terms of constitutive effects or whether corporations or capitalism have been altered in a structural sense is put forward, the answer is little and no. Although certain companies offer better working conditions as a result of these campaigns, "Workers are still unable to influence or change constitutional arrangements on the factory floor or in society at large" (Ibid.: 763).

Lipschutz argues for the necessity to engage with two other forms of power relevant to politics. These do not talk about the division of resources, but rather, constitutive dimensions. These are "structural" and "productive" power. Structural power resides in political structures, such as the state, and their ability to determine the rules of the game and how the agents that play it can score points. Productive power is exercised through discursive means (at the level of language, cognition, social construction, etc.) (Ibid.: 751). As mentioned above, much of what is regarded as political activity by GCS is the exercise of institutional power taking place within the context of the market, the so-called private realm:

> That is, they do not articulate or instantiate those *ethical* limits that movements demand, society expects, and states have agreed to (e.g. labor and other rights, environmental protection, etc.). It is only through changes in the *structural* rules that do articulate such limits that these struggles and demands can be transformed into social ethics, to which agents must adhere and which structurally constrain them (Lipschutz, 2005: 760).

Lipschutz argues that a focus on distributional power alone "accepts the deployment of power as a given and begs for dispensations from the powerful". GCS is therefore less a "problem" for power than a product of power. It accepts the naturalization of the market as 'efficient' and 'effective' (Ibid.: 768).

> I would argue that a sole concern with distributive issues not only leaves the offending discourses and structures intact but also leads to collaboration with those who exercise domination and institutional power. What is more important in my view is finding ways of generating productive political engagement directed toward social transformation through the structural capacities of the state (Lipschutz, 2005: 769).

Chandler places the ineffectiveness of GCS by arguing that the radical advocate lacks the representative's independent legitimacy, and that his or her position depends upon the good favor of governing elites: "This lack of representational accountability leaves control in the hands of the powerful, while offering the appearance of 'openness', 'transparency' and accountability'" (2004: 334). We are then left with what Chandler calls "courtier politics" and "elite lobbying", whereby transnational activists "have sought to latch on to the ready-made agenda of international institutions," (Ibid.: 331) and international institutions therefore have been enthusiastic about including the global activist network as a legitimizing factor in its decision-making process. More importantly, the elitism and personal solipsism that is generated by the rejection of state-based approaches, which force the individual to engage with and account for the views of other members of society, leads to an unwillingness to engage in political contestation: "this rejection of social engagement can only further legitimize the narrowing of the political sphere to a small circle of unaccountable elites." (Ibid.: 339).

Such a "narrowing of the political sphere" has also been a concern of Pasha and Blaney, who argue that the "notions of civility that are increasingly attached to civil society, while enabling a certain form of civil life, also contribute to a narrowing of the political agenda and the exclusion of certain actors and voices" (1998: 423). What the authors mean when talking of "notions of civility" is the care shown by civil society proponents to not describe a vision of the "good life", but rather to support a broad range of lifestyles in the name of pluralism. The norms of behavior demanded are geared to conserve this economic, cultural and ideological "marketplace". They do so by relegating issues of how one should live and who one should be to a private nonpolitical sphere and thus, the inequalities of liberal civil society are depoliticized (Ibid.). The idea of a cultural marketplace prescribes a mode of individuality sometimes described as "modular", that is, the kind of person for whom identities can be adopted, traded or shed. These individuals can ideally

separate their ethnic, religious, etc. identities with the obligations of the market: "A politics of class polarization or of religious, ethnic, or racial divide, where people are mobilized on the basis of such "primordial collectivities," are said to involve attempts to impose conceptions of the good or to fix identities" (Ibid.: 424) and they are looked on with suspicion due to the fear that they will be polarizing or threatening of private freedom and pluralism. The problem is, however, that a politics of civility may be self defeating in that individuals are not as "modular" or independent as suggested. Members of civil society are encumbered in the social context in which they are immersed, and identities, traditions, class positions, etc. are not so easily left at the door when someone enters political life: "Thus, visions of a 'good life' inform political movements and demands, consequently vitiating a fixed distinction between the public and the private, social concerns and individual matter." The connection of civility to civil society appears at once as a means to preserve diversity and as a principle of exclusion (Ibid.).

The narrowing of the political sphere, whether at the individual level or the NGO level, has been one of the aims of New Right politics, and the "good governance" agendas of the institutions favoring such politics as the main ideology through which the international economy is regulated. It has been argued above that these organizations have glorified INGOs as instruments of legitimacy, as substitutes for the roles of states, and as agents of neoliberal development strategies:

> The institutions of global governance…have increasingly and unashamedly promoted this liberal vision of global civil society as a domain that can be utilized or…'operationalized' in the project of universalizing capitalist rationalization and exploitation. In so far as the interventionist institutions of the state are seen to stand in the way of such universalization, global civil society becomes a useful tool of this anti-statist, laissez-faire and ultimately undemocratic project (Colas, 2002: 165).

Yet in order to instrumentalize GCS and advance the economic agenda of their institutions, depoliticization of existing INGOs was very important. Sangeeta Kamat (2004: 157) identifies two strategies by which global policy actors incorporate the role of NGOs in ways that advance the economic agenda of their institutions, namely by pluralizing the public sphere (at an inter-state level) and depoliticizing the private sphere (at the level of local communities understood as civil society). The

first of these involved the melting of profit-seeking corporations and citizens movements representing vulnerable populations in the same pot. Such an all-encompassing definition of civil society has seriously limited the power and influence of advocacy NGOs within global governance forums (Ibid.: 165). The second way in which the public sphere is "pluralized", according to Kamat, is that a differentiation does not exist among NGO groupings. Business and industry associations have therefore become equal parts of "NGO representation" in international policy forums, "making it impossible for progressive NGOs to build a common alliance against corporate interests" due to the fact that business and industry associations (BINGOs) which are technically NGOs but which represent powerful corporate interests are at an advantage since they are part of the ideological consensus on trade and economic reform and they also have greater access to the forums in terms of the financial resources (Ibid: 166):

> The notion of a 'common partnership' constitutes a central discursive device through which the multiple and disparate entities of civil society are integrated into a unified whole in which each representational body has different, albeit complementary responsibilities. Issues of conflict and contestation between different civil society groups are at best marginally referenced as tensions and awkwardness that are a normal aspect of new partnerships. There is little, if any, consideration given to the unequal power relations between different representational bodies or to the fundamentally different interpretations among them about the constitution of public welfare (Kamat, 2004: 166).

Thus, the pro-poor and anti-capitalist agenda of advocacy NGOs is effectively marginalized by such a pluralist and non-discriminatory approach to global governance. (Ibid.: 167). The second way has been through the depoliticization of local development. According to Kamat, the presence of numerous NGOs at the grassroots providing services to underprivileged populations and mobilizing them for their rights also presents a threat to the neoliberal agenda of privatization. "Scholarship on community-based NGOs point to a process of professionalization and depoliticization of NGOs at the grassroots" (Ibid.: 167). CBOs have shifted away from education and empowerment programs that involve structural analysis of power and inequality and instead adopt a technical managerial solution to social issues of poverty and oppression. This has led to a rise in the

number of professionally trained staff in CBOs. The neoliberal policy context is an important cause of this. The decline in state entitlements lead to a greater amount of aid channeled to grassroots NGOs: "Donor monitoring and accounting systems require NGOs to implement social and economic projects in an efficient and effective manner" (Ibid.: 168). The World Bank, for instance, makes it clear that politicization is seen as a weakness for NGOs:

> NGOs are important to the Bank because of the experience and resources they bring to emergency relief and development activities. The bank's 1989 Operational Directive 14.70 (OD) describes the perceived strengths and weaknesses of NGOs and CBOs and encourages Bank staff to involve those organizations in Bank-supported activities within the framework of the borrower government's policies. The OD identifies NGOs' potential strengths as their ability to reach poor communities and remote areas, promote local participation, operate at low cost, identify local needs, build on local resources and introduce new technologies. The directive refers to NGO weaknesses such as their limited replicability, self-sustainabilty, and managerial and technical capacity, a narrow context for programming, and politicization (World Bank, quoted in Kamat, 2004: 169).

Subir Sinha (2005: 166) also emphasizes the efforts of neoliberalism to limit forms of oppositional civil society. This is exemplified, for instance, in the way in which it depoliticizes labor by conceptualizing it as "human capital" therefore portraying it as not an independent factor in the production of goods, but a special type of capital, a combination of physical-genetic attributes and skills acquired as a result of investment. Laborers are seen as autonomous entrepreneurs and collective labor politics become redundant as laborers become agents who negotiate individually. Moreover, neoliberal formulations of civil society neglect the limits imposed by social class and inherited status, which remain key determinants of social power in all societies. Neoliberal policy interventions are structured around depoliticized collectivities such as "stakeholders" and "user groups" as key agents of producing social capital. However, the neoliberal notion of social capital, by using such "ideal types" and not recognizing the power of collectivities (landlords, men, bureaucrats, ethnicities etc.) limits the success of its policy interventions, while "National and regional histories of voluntary association and social movements, often waged against entrenched relations of power, provide further complexity" (Ibid.: 167)

> As neoliberalism has been scrutinized and opposed, its votaries have declared oppositional forms of social capital and civil society illegitimate, as seen in the heavy police repression unleashed on anti-globalizaiton protestors from Seattle to Genoa, as neoliberals retreat to ever more fortified and remote locations for their annual meeting." Other examples are given by Sinha, for instance the police attacking demonstrators in Miami protesting the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Other forms of association declared illegitimate include Islamist networks and the revolutionary left (Sinha, 2005: 168-169).

3.6 Concluding Remarks

By glorifying civil society and demonizing the state, the view of GCS espoused by the New Right and certain sections of the Left have ironically converged into one which has reified the term to symbolize a "third sector" autonomous from the state and the economy, thereby positing GCS as *the* arena of democracy in the current era of globalization, representing a global demos against global challenges and institutions. It has been argued that such reification has overlooked the historical and sociological ties of civil society, in the sense that civil society has been intricately tied to, has been constitutive of and constituted by, as well as undermining the structures of modernity, namely the capitalist world economy and the international system of states. Civil society can thus be said to have been "international" from the very beginning, an analysis which throws a shadow of doubt as to why it has become popular and "reinvented" following the Cold War. The answer to this is the discursive rapprochement of the New Right and the Left that advocates GCS as a new and democratizing actor in the era of "global governance", the former finding comfort in GCS as a sphere separated from a demonized state, while the latter has been more than willing to incorporate this definition for its own purpose of reproducing neoliberal capitalism. We have therefore witnessed a progressive "instrumentalization" of GCS, as the term has been used on both sides to denote a homogenous sphere representative of a world citizenry with the main form of agency being INGOs. In defense of such an instrumentalized concept, the GCS advocates have paradoxically pointed to the "tamed" character of its agencies, the shift in what has traditionally been known to constitute democracy to a less

representative sphere, and the inclusiveness of the concept as virtues of GCS instead of failings.

Such an instrumental view, however, has served attempts to homogenize what actually is and always has been a sphere of ideological contestation, and has marginalized oppositional forms within GCS by defining what should constitute the sphere, namely technical and professionalized INGOs with little accountability. Moreover, the fact that this sphere has been separated from the state and economy at the global and national levels paints a misleading picture of any potentialities that may exist in GCS, as a healthy analysis of the way in which international civil society reflects the inequalities within the capitalist world economy and the system of states is impaired: "As Marx highlighted, the formally equal civil, political and other rights are unequally enjoyed in an unequal society and even used to legitimize and perpetuate it" (Parekh, 2004: 23). Furthermore, the different expressions of civil society within each national context due to the uneven spread of capitalist social formations is overlooked, obstructing an appreciation of the diverse forms in which it is established and can effect change. It is necessary to bear in mind, for instance, that "non-voluntary associations", although having "rigid norms, oppressive practices and structures of authority, limited mutual contacts and encourage frozen social identities and narrow loyalties" are often reflective of "shared collective memories of struggles, achievements and failures", encouraging "a strong sense of social obligation, mutual commitment, and spirit of self-sacrifice", making up for some loss of liberty "by offering a sense of existential security and rootedness" (Ibid.: 21-22). The fact that voluntary associations are also not free from nepotism and narrow partiality must be taken into consideration (Ibid: 22), as well as the fact that such associations have individualizing tendencies built on an aversion to mass politics that can be detrimental to demanding effective change and questioning the structural forms of power that legitimize the inequalities engendered by modernity:

> A vigorous associational life does not preclude that society at large will be populated principally by a combination of relativerly shallow, passive, and/or exploitative selves, oblivious to deeper social purposes and relationships and committed to inequality an domination as aspects of their personalities and "social" commitments (Pasha & Blaney, 1998: 423).

It is necessary, therefore, to understand "international civil society" within its present context in order not to reify and instrumentalize the concept. However, this should not be taken to mean a complete repudiation of a historically constituted and constitutive sphere of activity:

> On the definition offered here, international civil society is considered as an arena of antagonistic class relations where conflicting socio-economic interests and rival political programs contend for power. This political competition between social movements unfolds in a context constrained by the structures of capitalism and state sovereignty, but it does so on an international plane that aims to cut across existing state boundaries. As such, international civil society is a political terrain which radical social movements must seek to understand and occupy for the purposes of genuine democratic transformation on a global scale. In particular, those socialists who still aim to transcend the existing capitalist system and undermine the power of its various political forms must recognize the importance of this contested realm of world politics (Colas, 2002: 167).

Such a "contested realm of world politics" must be engaged due to the fact that

> A strategy for liberating social change would require a fundamental extension of the concept of "politics" to address issues such as production processes, consumption, life style and gender relations and, combined with this, the promotion of social learning and activities aimed at consciousness raising. This requires political orientation and action which are not limited to lobbying within state-dominated negotiating fora (Hirsch, 2003: 257).

Indeed, one need not dispense with optimism altogether. After all, neoliberalism has not completely succeeded in creating a puppet civil society. Sinha, for instance, gives the examples of NGOs such as "War on Want" or "Third World Network", which provide support to social movements that oppose neoliberalism. Plus, alternative politics of accountability exist, not only for governance but also for citizenship rights. In Porto Alegre, for instance, participatory budgets are tied overall to a politics supportive of the Worker's Party and its demand for a new national project and in Kerala decentralization is tied to the rejuvenation of left-wing party politics: "NGOs and social movements extend the politics of accountability to neoliberal formations, such as the World Bank, and transnational corporations, and to neoliberal attempts to expand the domain of capital sovereignty" (Sinha, 2005: 167).

The individuating tendency of neoliberalism faces countermovements from the workers as well, and in some senses in a novel way. New labor organizations challenge capital sovereignty by linking internationally along specific corporation, by sector and by gender. In Argentina, for instance, worker collectivities have operated autonomously from both the state and capital (Ibid.).

In line with a Gramscian way of thinking, Cox has delimited a two track strategy for the Left, which includes first "a continued participation in electoral politics and industrial action as a means of defensive resistance against the onslaught of globalization" and secondly the

> pursuit of the primary goal of resurrecting a spirit of association in civil society, together with a continuing effort by the organic intellectuals of the social forces to think through and act towards an alternative social order at local, regional and global levels (Cox, 2002: 117).

In this formulation, it is necessary not to glorify GCS, much less the INGOs that constitute it. Rather, their roles should be viewed as being complementary to that of radical action:

> They can at best be part of broader movements or networks. If it is a question of overcoming global dominance, exploitation and dependency, then there can be no substitute for radical action – that is, direct action outside institutional structures, which transcends the limits of dominant political agendas, destroys consensus and attacks the extensive and complex system of domination at national and international levels (Hirsch, 2003: 258).

Chapter IV

Debates on Civil Society in Turkey

4.1 Introduction

The argument that civil society constitutes a sphere of ideological contestation made up of diverse groups with differing organizational forms and political aims, constitutive and constituted by the state, simultaneously undermining and reinforcing the status-quo, and reflective of the uneven spread of capitalism can all be exemplified by the way in which the civil society discourse has established itself in Turkey. In Turkey civil society had been an arena through which a top-down effort at intellectual and moral leadership and social engineering was attempted since the Kemalist revolution. After the 1920s, the Jacobin leadership of the revolution had closely tied its modernizing goal with the cultural identity of the public, which had to be created anew for this aim to be realized. Since then, civil society in Turkey has been a sphere open to the intervention and manipulation of the state, and indeed, a sphere in which some form of hegemony is targeted. It has, however, also been an arena in which social movements have struggled against the status-quo by organizing around issues that have been deliberately sidelined by the established state discourse in Turkey. Today, civil society in Turkey stands as a platform for diverse pressure groups with an array of affiliations.

While some Leftist perspectives have been advocating GCS in international debates as a new global actor suitable to a politics of deliberation, tolerance and understanding with not pretenses of acquiring state power, certain sections of the Turkish Left have also turned to a discourse based on the promotion of civil society as the protagonist of progressive politics. However, this process in Turkey was influenced by specific events, especially the 1980 military coup, which has been a turning point for politics in Turkey. Prior to the coup, the Turkish Left in general followed a political strategy which focused on the idea of a socialist revolution through the acquisition of state power and which prioritized the capital-labor dispute

as the main problem of society. However, following the 1980 military oppression, some Leftists turned to a more passive type of politics that did not revolve around the ideal of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As in the GCS advocacy example, civil society took the place of the working class as the protagonist in this new conceptualization of left wing politics, and again in similar fashion with GCS advocacy, civil society in Turkey was promoted as a new and democratizing actor. The authoritarian state loomed large in the minds of those representing this perspective, as they witnessed and often experienced first-hand the brutality of the military coup, as well as the way in which the Left was effectively marginalized through the "law and order" rhetoric of the Turkish New Right following the coup. In a sense, the dark side of what state power could do was seen, and certain Leftists started to question their pre-coup ambitions to acquire state power in the name of a certain "truth". This ambition was abandoned in favor of a discourse of tolerance and multiculturalism, while the state was portrayed as the main obstacle in front of these ideals.

It will be argued here, therefore, that the (mis)conceptualization of "GCS" by both the New Right and certain sections of the Left throughout the world as an inherently democratic sphere has been mirrored in the similar (mis)conceptualization of civil society in Turkey. Just as in the former "global" example, the assumed separation of the state from civil society has led to the attribution of certain innate and liberal qualities to civil society in Turkey, which has thus been advanced as instrumental for the creation of a counter-culture of democracy and deliberation. A certain interpretation of Turkish history and state-society relations in Turkey has aided the attribution of this instrumental role to civil society. Such a view came in the form of the "relativist paradigm" (Yalman, 2002), which formed the basis of the state-society distinction upheld by both the New Right and certain constituents of the Left in Turkey. Briefly, the relativist paradigm argued that the Turkish Republic inherited and continued the tradition of the Ottoman Empire, and that the state structure of both the Turkish Republic and that of the Ottoman Empire could not be explained by Euro-centric social analyses. The tradition said to be the element of continuity was a position of paranoid existence that stifled the creation of an autonomous bourgeoisie, which to this day is put forward by civil society advocates in the Turkish Left and New Right circles as one of the most important reasons for

the failure of Turkey to democratize. The state, through the relativist paradigm, was treated as a living entity with a mind of its own, eternally locked in opposition to the creation of an autonomous sphere of civil society for the sake of its own survival. Such a view, however, fails to explain some key moments in Turkish history due to the fact that it does not provide for the possibility that the state and the bourgeoisie did not hold radically different visions of hegemony. It also forms the basis for the misleading emancipatory role attributed to civil society.

In order to make sense of the relationship between the state, market and society in Turkey, it can be very useful to utilize a Gramscian outlook in place of the relativist paradigm. However, as stated in the introduction to the thesis, this approach should be one which places civil society as an integral part of the state in the sense that both spheres should be seen as mutually constitutive of the processes through which hegemony is established. Gramsci's thought provides us with perfect analytical tools to understand the New Right's attempts to establish a new hegemony in Turkey in the wake of the 1980 military coup, as it attempted to ensure control over the state as well as civil or what Tünay calls "crucial hegemonic fields such as schools, religious behavior, individuality, media, and above all, the restoration of the necessary exploitation relation between capital and labor" (1993: 12). It is necessary, at this point, to distinguish between what Gramsci calls "expansive hegemony" and "passive revolution", as well as elaborate on how Gramsci defines a "hegemonic crisis". The former two can be utilized to understand different forms of hegemony in Turkey, while all three terms point to the inseparable ties between the state and civil society. The concept of expansive hegemony, for instance, describes a situation in which a national consensus is created (or a situation approximating this state) advancing society to a predetermined goal either by creating a new "common sense" or rearticulating the old one. Even this relatively "thorough" type of hegemony confronts obstacles, however, due to the exploitative social relations within capitalism, and is therefore supported by military coercion when necessary (Ibid.: 14), thus drawing attention to the inseparable nature of the state from civil society. This situation of "expansive hegemony" stands in contrast to that of "passive revolution", a term coined by Gramsci to denote "the containment or neutralization of the interests, political struggles and ideological struggles of subordinate classes and groups" (Ibid.: 13). This is done in a situation whereby the dominant class does

not relinquish its corporate-economic short-term interests in favor of a national consensus, but rather is realized in a context in which the dominant class obstructs the political drive of the opposing forces, mobilizing "only the key sections of society under the rubric of its ideological advance" (Ibid.: 13). Tünay gives the example of Thatcherism as a form of passive revolution in the sense that the Conservative government led by Thatcher contained and neutralized the interests of the popular groups under "massive political propaganda" instead of integrating their interests with those of the government (Ibid.: 16). The term "hegemonic crisis", on the other hand, identifies a crisis in hegemony with a crisis of state authority, well exemplified by the situation that developed in Turkey in the 1970s, leading to the 1980 military coup, which drastically changed the balance of social forces in Turkey and aimed at the widespread depoliticization of Turkish society. It will be argued in this section, therefore, that civil society has been regarded as an instrument for the Turkish New Right to create a "passive revolution" by deradicalizing social antagonisms that emerged as a result of hegemonic crises.

The misconceptualization involved with the relativist paradigm has important implications for civil society discourse in Turkey, as it helps the cause of glorifying "civil society" as the agent for democratization against a demonized state, by portraying both the state and civil society as homogenous entities opposed to one another, the former reduced to an arena for the extraction of egoistic benefits and an agency for rent-seeking while the latter is reduced to progressive voluntary organizations rallying around the cause for democratization. The discrepancies and differences within the civil society sphere in Turkey have been discounted as a result, and this has led to an arbitrary definition of civil society, revolving around ambiguous notions such as "progressive" and "civil". It will be argued in this final chapter that the normative meanings placed on civil society as well as its presentation as a "project to be realized" has indirectly led to a rapprochement between those in the Turkish Left that have turned to civil society as a new and progressive actor and New Right circles in Turkey. This rapprochement has been indirect because of the different reasons for the instrumentalization of "civil society" held by the respective discourses. While the New Right in Turkey has seen civil society as an administrative apparatus in order to overcome recurring hegemonic crises, civil society advocates in the Turkish Left leaned on a normative vision of civil society as

an emancipatory field uncontaminated by "obsolete" traditional parliamentarian politics. The advocates of a politics based on civil society in Turkey have shared the view of the advocates of "GCS" that the traditional parliamentarian system of representative democracy based on a nation-state territoriality has become "obsolete", in that it is no longer adequate in dealing with global problems and it is not diverse enough to represent the growing number of identities and interests. As will be seen, advocates of civil society based politics in Turkey, in similar fashion with GCS advocates, argue that the left-right divide has become blurred and that the capital-labor antagonism is just one among multiple other issues of importance that need to be addressed. Moreover, politics based on the perspective of obtaining state power is rejected for fear that the imposition of one "truth" will lead to authoritarianism, while multiculturalism based on understanding the "other" is espoused as the new form of politics.

The Turkish relativist paradigm, on the other hand, has given the advocates of civil society in Turkey specific discursive characteristics. In fact, the relativist paradigm has allowed them to glorify civil society by underlining the especially oppressive character of the Turkish state as an innate attribute carried over from the Ottoman Empire. Understandably, the demonization of the state came as a reaction following the severity of the repression of dissident voices in Turkish society by the 1980 military coup, which to a large extent targeted leftists. Answers were sought to the question of why military and state repression occurred in Turkey. The answer ultimately given by a certain Leftists was that a civil society that could protect the individual against state power did not exist in Turkey. Variations of this argument dominated the literature on civil society in Turkey. Civil society was presented as a project to be realized against the Turkish state, which had hitherto stifled or manipulated civil society. Thus, most arguments that presented civil society as a project to be realized took for granted the separation of civil society from the state. Furthermore, the argument that civil society did not exist before the 1980 military coup or the more refined argument which states that although civil society did exist prior to the coup that it represented something qualitatively different following this date has set the scene for the glorification of civil society in Turkey. A new type of politics was formulated around civil society. The values of this new type of politics were outlined as tolerance, democratic deliberation, and acceptance of differences.

Violent ideological confrontation, which had created a *de facto* civil war in Turkey prior to the military coup was rejected. The glorified but arbitrary and ahistorical definition of civil society as an inherently non-violent and democratic sphere thus fell into place, and found a following especially by those who wanted to voice their demands in the immediate post-coup oppressive environment.

The emancipatory role attributed to an arbitrary conceptualization of civil society, however, overlooked the fact that civil society in Turkey was an outcome of the specific way in which social relations of production have spread to Turkey and the fact that class antagonisms that had been triggered with the forceful inauguration of capitalist social relations of production in the 1960s had set off one of the liveliest moments of civil society the country has experienced. The view that civil society in Turkey only "really" came into existence following the 1980 military coup fails to identify the roots of civil society in Turkey which may not be related to new social movements. Organizations considered "CSOs" today such as employers' organizations or left-leaning trade unions were created before 1980 and played important roles in the politics of the time. Inevitable contradictions such as this arose due to the normative definition placed on civil society as a result of the effort to create a new and less violent type of politics.

The search for a new and less violent type of politics which centered on the concept of civil society paved the way for the establishment of a common ground between the above-mentioned sections of the Turkish Left and the New Right in Turkey, similar to the common ground which made "GCS" a buzz word used by grassroots advocates of GCS and international financial institutions alike. The common ground in Turkey took the form of a "post-political discourse", the variations of which can be listed as Second Republicanism, an Islamic civil society project and post-liberalism (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 658). These were attempts to map out a strategy of hegemony based respectively on neoliberal, Islamist and Left formulations of peaceful coexistence. All three perspectives of this post-political discourse criticized "obsolete ideological passions" (Ibid.), took for granted the state-civil society dichotomy and therefore reproduced the relativist paradigm. In effect, the post-political discourse based on the state-civil society dichotomy was not only conceptually misleading, but also politically disabling. The dichotomy painted a static view of state-society relations throughout history as one of opposition.

Therefore, post-political discourse, in all its manifestations (neoliberal, Islamic, Left) argued that civil society was a bastion of democracy waiting to be freed from the iron grip of the Turkish state. Such a view was inevitably based on the promotion of civil society as a sphere in which different views could converse in a "civilized" and non-violent manner. Reducing politics to the act of acknowledging and understanding differences and creating islands protected by the principle of non-interference, the post-political discourse misleadingly viewed civil society as a homogenous sphere due to the reliance on its own arbitrary definition of civil society as an inherently democratic sphere. In other words, post-political discourse assumed that organizations within civil society would conform to the non-violent, autonomous sphere of democratic deliberation which was said to be civil society. Although the New Right in Turkey looked to "civil society" as an administrative apparatus to deradicalize social antagonisms and create a discourse equating democracy with the market, the arbitrary and normative definition of civil society espoused by the Left due to its acceptance of the state-civil society dichotomy led to the paradoxical situation in which both met within the post-political discourse. Paradoxically, civil society advocates within the Turkish Left imposed homogeneity to social movements in Turkey while trying to promote a multicultural vision of society by trying to exclude those movements that did not fit into its own perception of "civility". The various debates in post-political discourse have found it fitting to use this notion of civil society in order to defend an ambiguous and morally high-sounding discourse claiming to be exempt from "archaic" ideological power relations. Yet each "historical turning point" in post-1980 Turkey in which civil society seemed to have surged forward as a protagonist in politics in the public eye at first glance, has instead shown that civil society was a far cry from the way in which it was conceptualized by the post-political discourse. In fact, examples in Turkish history show that civil society in Turkey is a field of ideological struggle that cannot be easily separated from manipulation by the state and the market. Neither is it possible to talk of a complete domination of civil society by the state and the market, an error which is frequently committed by the post-political discourse while reproducing the relativist paradigm. Instead, a historically and sociologically informed view of civil society is necessary in order to understand the complex and dynamic historical relationship between civil society, the state and the market.

The last section of the thesis aims to specifically problematize the civil society discourse upheld by certain Left perspectives in Turkey and highlight the contradictions into which such a view falls due to its insistence on portraying civil society as a separate democratic sphere from the state. Many reserves and caveats have been placed by scholars who have advocated civil society as a democratizing sphere in Turkey. These include warnings concerning the variegated composition of the field, the elitism of certain CSOs, and the dangers of transferring social services from the state to CSOs. However, these caveats are forgotten once the state-civil society distinction is held to be true, as this distinction automatically requires the conceptualization of civil society as a homogenous entity (at least of different groups willing to converse in a democratic environment) categorically opposed to the state. An important source of reference that will be used in order to illustrate this point are the proceedings from the "CSO Symposiums", a series of symposiums which have been conducted through the efforts of a group of CSOs alongside the History Foundation (*Tarih Vakfi*) in order to "increase communication and cooperation among CSOs in Turkey, debate the problems faced by these CSOs and research possibilities to solve these problems"[3]. These symposiums have been conducted between the years 1994-2004, on a range of subjects from state-civil society relationships, participation of youth in CSOs to democracy in CSOs and the role of CSOs in the EU accession process to name a few. The proceedings of these symposiums illustrate the clear approval of certain assumptions concerning civil society along with the contradictions which such assumptions generate.

Indeed, such contradictions can best be illustrated by the fact that civil society advocates in Turkey have accepted two very important issues as the *raison d'etre* of civil society, namely the concept of "good governance" to monitor the state, and the accession process to the EU. The way in which the support for EU membership has been considered as a natural characteristic of CSOs by the advocates of civil society in Turkey, and hence the aversion to organizations that have voiced their opposition to EU membership is a good example of the contradictory position in which those who promote civil society as a sphere of pluralism fall into. It is argued that regardless of whether opposition to the EU is reactionary or not, civil society

[3] Available from: http://www.tarihvakfi.org.tr/ayrinti.asp?StrId=6 retrieved on 25 May 2006. More information concerning the CSO Symposiums and the History Association can be found in the website.

advocates fall into the paradoxical situation of rejecting a sizeable section of civil society as "uncivil". This contradictory stance is the result of associating the EU quite arbitrarily as an address for multiculturalism and democracy, a definition which makes CSOs, which are also arbitrarily defined as democratic and multicultural, the natural advocates of EU membership. This positive correlation established between the EU advocacy and CSOs creates serious problems with regard to the question of how one should define the anti-EU organizations if not as CSOs as well as the analytical utility of the conception of civil society.

4.2 A Brief History of the State-Civil Society Relationship in Turkey: Contesting the Relativist Paradigm

A look into the history of Turkey displays a prime example of the ways in which the state and its coercive apparatus can step in and aid market forces in the face of domestic crises of capital accumulation. In fact the military has had to become, on numerous occasions, an actor in the Turkish political scene in order to set the Turkish state onto a firm line of economic integration with the West by, first and foremost, dispelling the fears of the Turkish bourgeoisie via striking a blow to the democratic structure of the country in order to repress the workers movement. Galip Yalman (2002: 24) contends that the early period of "étatisme" in Turkey (1923-1950) fits into the pattern of a "panoply of hegemonic strategies". Insightfully, Yalman elaborates on this point through his criticism of "a relativist paradigm", or rather, accounts portraying the Turkish state as being unique and a "deviant case" defying explanation by Euro-centric, foundationalist social analyses. This argument basically claims that the Turkish state is a continuation of the Ottoman legacy and therefore deserving of treatment as an autonomous structure with a logic and interests of its own, with its differentiation from society being a structural feature of its formation and signifying a form of reality with its own rationality.

Such accounts, however, fall into various problems, one of which is the failure to form a coherent explanation as to the rupture between the Ottoman state and the Republic in the early years of the latter's formation, signified by the 1923 Congress of Economics which aimed to create a national economy as the basic strategy of the new state. Moreover, relativist accounts of the Turkish state blur the

distinction between a state which does not allow an independent economic sphere to exist in order to preserve its supremacy and a state which attempts to "reconstitute a new social order" (Ibid.: 27). Therefore, the relativist paradigm creates a no-win situation for the state in that it cannot escape being authoritarian. What lies behind this attempt to relativize the Turkish state, according to Yalman, is the

> deliberate attempt to shift the principal social contradiction from being between producing and appropriating classes to one of distribution among the appropriating groups; whilst, at the same time, the state is being reduced to an agency for rent-seeking and/or to an arena for the extraction of egoistic benefits, thereby precluding any social attachment to it as a possible focus of collective identity (Yalman, 2002: 27).

Indeed, the centre-periphery (bureaucratic elite-bourgeoisie) formulation is preferred over a class-based approach, and it is stressed that the relationship between the centre and periphery was confrontational in terms of the distributive struggle, rather than consensual (Ibid.: 28). A very good example to this line of thinking is the views put forward by Ali Yaşar Sarıbay on the development of civil society in Turkey. Sarıbay contends that the dominance of the Ottoman state over society was unquestionable, while a mentality morally justifying capital accumulation and private property did not exist either, leading to the failure of the emergence of an economic sphere separate from the political sphere. Sarıbay underlines the point that this "mentality" reflected onto the successor Republican regime, as Kemalists had to create a bourgeoisie through state manipulation, attempting to establish a system which revolved around private property and capital accumulation. Yet paradoxically relations between the bourgeoisie and the state elite have been politically competitive as state elites, for fear of losing their control over society, never wanted the bourgeoisie to become an autonomous sphere (Sarıbay, 1992: 113). Yalman contests this view and points to the fact that relations between public and private sectors during the implementation of étatiste policies were complementary, and that just because decision-makers rejected competition, this by no means implied an anti-capitalist stance:

> Rather than being motivated by any inclination to stem the rise of a bourgeois class, as contended by the critics of étatiste policies, the preference of a strategy which assigned to the state a "leadership" role in the coordination of

> investments had clearly been conditioned by a determination to enhance the prospects for private accumulation (Yalman, 2002: 29).

This is a crucial point, as the way in which Turkish history is analyzed has important implications for the analysis of state-civil society relations today. This point will be elaborated below, but it should suffice to say at this point that the relativist paradigm paves the way towards an ahistorical view of the state as a homogenous entity and the equation of democracy with an independent and autonomous civil society linked to bourgeois emancipation.

Rather, étatiste policies signified a rupture from Ottoman state policies, as the state-led industrialization attempts together with the Turkish state's consensual relationship with the bourgeoisie in creating a national market have displayed. In fact the Kemalist revolution that founded the Turkish Republic in 1923 had acquired an anti-democratic nature in order to consolidate the power of the Turkish bourgeoisie against foreign competition from three fronts: advanced capitalist countries, different ethnic groups that had predominantly made up the commercial bourgeoisie during the Ottoman Empire, and the appeal of Bolshevism from the newly founded Soviet Union in geographical proximity to Turkey (Savran, 2002: 7). Étatisme is therefore seen as a hegemonic project aiming at the creation of an "integral state" that would have, were it successful, created a historic bloc by superseding its economic-corporate phase, because of the fact that members of the embryonic entrepreneurial class are urged to transcend their economic-corporative interests (Yalman, 2002: 32). Such a view, however, is distant to the liberal-individualist and the statist-institutionalist perspectives, due to their zero-sum approach to state-society relations and their portrayal of the cleavage between the dominant class and the office-holders as the main dynamic of social change, thereby being averse to the idea of a social group transcending their economic-corporative interests (Ibid.: 30-31).

The zero-sum state vs. society analysis of Turkish history conceives the first general election on May 14, 1950 as a watershed in Turkish political history, and a date marking the "victory of the periphery over the tyranny of the center, rejecting the tradition of Kemalist reforms from above in favor of the rule of the market" (Ibid.: 32). Yet again we find a good example of this sort of view in literature interpreting the development of civil society in Turkey. Yerasimos (2000), for instance, states that the basis of the Republic was the creation of a nation (as an

extension of Ottoman absolutism) instead of a society which created its own administrative apparatus. This is said to be the result of the paranoia of religious communities and the resulting up-down imposition of rule due to the necessity felt to forfeit democracy. Democracy, according to this view, was imposed in the same top-down fashion as a necessity of westernization, which implies that westernization was the result of the state's strive for survival. Thus the 1950 election was seen as having emancipated the private sector from the state (Yerasimos, 2000: 17). Yalman contends, however, that this is an exaggerated account, as the two main political parties in the elections both upheld a campaign for the liberalization of the economy. The Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP*), holding a monopoly of power during the étatiste period, had already watered down some of the centralized aspects of economic development, while the change in government did not encompass a change in the balance of forces between the Turkish power bloc and the masses, as the authoritarian form of the state remained intact during the reign of the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti - DP*), which had seceded from *CHP* (2002: 33). The *DP* accused *CHP* of not reaching out to the masses predominantly in rural society, which is a claim that is also advanced by the relativist argument. Once again, the relativists contradict themselves, as upholding the argument that the bourgeoisie was freed from the state undermines the view of the state as a "sublime entity". Yalman states that such a view "would indicate the start of a new era when change ceased to become endogenous to the state" (Ibid.). Yet the relativists do not follow through their argument in this fashion, and instead argue that the periphery, after this date, were denied autonomy by populist leaders who saw their interests to lie in perpetuating clientalistic relationships. In order not to fall into such a contradictory position, Yalman suggests that the anti-elitist discourse of the *DP* could be seen as a new hegemonic project, in the sense that it attempted to link particularistic interests under the leadership of an emerging bourgeoisie which never decided to detach itself from the state. In fact, by evading an exaggerated account of the 1950 election as a "turning point" in state-society relations, it can be seen that a continuity existed "between étatiste and anti-statist hegemonic projects in terms of depriving the dominated classes from establishing their own economic and political organizations as well as of the central role assigned to the state in effecting the objectives of these projects" (Ibid.: 34). The transition to the multi-party system therefore comes out as

an attempt to refine the technique of "passive revolution", that is, the promotion of change without changing the balance of class forces (Ibid.). Civil society was stifled during the state-led hegemonic projects, which brought about passive revolution instead of an expansive hegemony. This did not mean, however, that the state was in any way averse to capitalism or the emerging bourgeoisie. However, and ironically, it was the military which stepped in to establish expansive hegemony in 1960, and was "instrumental in paving the ground for a restructuring of the relations between the state and (civil) society" (Ibid.).

In 1960, a military coup occurred due to social unrest caused by the tensions emanating from the needs of a growing industrial bourgeoisie, which had by that time become part of an "urban coalition" made up of the intelligentsia, university students and the bureaucracy. Social unrest and protests were triggered by the anti-democratic measures taken by the *DP*, representing the agrarian bourgeoisie's vested interests. The 1960 coup created a new constitution in 1961 that expanded democratic rights and freedoms as well as creating institutions as part of preventative measures against the monopolization of political power through support received from the rural majority. In fact, the importance of the 1960 coup lies, according to Savran, "in the adaptation of the political and legal superstructure to the needs of the transition from a predominantly agrarian and commercial process of capital accumulation to one based on industrial capital" and the consolidation of state support for import substitution industrialization (2002: 11). While the superstructural conditions were being made more convenient to the industrial bourgeoisie, a legal framework that made it possible for the dominated classes to form their own organizations also came into being (Yalman, 2002: 34). In fact, the working class movement in Turkey unexpectedly experienced a spectacular rise during the 1960s with the establishment of the Workers' Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi – TİP*), and the new and vibrant Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu – DİSK*), while social movements prospered with an increasingly radical student movement as well as the revival of the Kurdish movement, which had started to organize in the East for the first time after having been repressed in the interwar period (Savran, 2002: 12). Furthermore, the 1961 constitution established the State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı - DPT*) in order to initiate development on a planned basis, and therefore inaugurated

planning as a hegemonic apparatus in order to improve the living conditions of the impoverished (Yalman, 2002: 36). Thus the 1961 constitution itself was another attempt to initiate an alternative hegemonic strategy. It was expected that a unified market geared towards "populist" redistributive policies would be instrumental for the emergence of the Turkish bourgeoisie as a hegemonic class (Ibid.: 34-35). This vision soon disappeared. The effects of the advent of capitalism in Turkey caused a mass migration from rural areas to cities due to industrialization, while those migrating suffered extremely low wages and unemployment. Social discontent grew and Islam came to the fore at first as a reaction to rapid social transformation in the 1960s (Tünay, 1993: 18). Scholars such as Tünay have asserted that the failure of the bourgeoisie to establish hegemony under these conditions was the result of the incapability of the bourgeoisie to inject society with values of liberal individualism. The bourgeoisie failed to promote the Western way of life as, according to Tünay, it was incapable of asserting competitive individualism. According to Tünay, the bourgeoisie in Turkey was ideologically feeble, failing to unite the interests of subordinate groups around a national-popular program (Ibid: 19). Yalman, on the other hand, contends that the failure of the bourgeoisie to become a hegemonic class was not due to its dependence on the state (in the sense that it could not establish its own consciousness), but rather a consequence of "its unwillingness to come to terms with the emergence of the working class as an entity prepared to contest its opponent's hegemony" (2002: 35). It was this failure to accept the representation of working class interests which explains the paradox of the country falling into two decades of protracted class conflict during relative economic prosperity and growth (Ibid.: 35).

Class conflict in Turkey soon led to a hegemonic crisis, the main elements of which were:

> The progressive deterioration of income distribution, rapid but inequitable process of growth, rejection of co-optation policies of the government by a number of radical unions, student' protests, social grievances in the countryside, dislike of the new rich, due to their extravagance, and the dramatic juxtaposition of old and new values, as well as the parliamentary struggle carried out by one section of the revolutionary left, all merged into a form of social discontent (Tünay, 1993: 18).

Capitalism in Turkey had triggered class struggle, and the result was an increase in the activity of civil society. In fact, the bourgeoisie's fear of being encircled by the state (due to the economic plans set forth as part of the hegemonic project) on the one hand and the increasingly vibrant working class movement on the other, despite the fact that the economic plans of the state underlined that the public and private sectors were to be considered complementary in order to underline "the importance of social justice for the maintenance of Turkish capitalism", led the bourgeoisie to form a semblance of political consciousness, which manifested itself in the creation of the Confederation of Employers' Unions of Turkey (*Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - TİSK*) (Yalman, 2002: 36-37). In the 1970s, the bourgeoisie also established the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği - TÜSİAD*) in order to have an organized voice in the political scene, a project which has been paying dividends ever since the 1980 military coup. Meanwhile, the state and the bourgeoisie tried to "tame" the workers movement by coopting the more docile wing of the trade unions, namely the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - TÜRK-İŞ*), by granting it a *de facto* monopoly and paralyzing the activity of DİSK through an attempted legislation devised by the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi-AP*) government, the successor to (and continuation of) the *DP* government. This bill also had the participation of *CHP*. The bill was retracted following immense protests of the working class during June 15 and 16, 1970. The ruling classes were furious, martial law was declared, and military intervention on March 12, 1971 followed (Savran, 2002: 12-13):

> That this military intervention was essentially a reaction of the ruling classes in military garb to the upsurge in class struggle is nowhere more graphically demonstrated than in a statement by the first prime minister of the 'interim regime', according to whom 'social awakening [had] surpassed economic development' (Savran, 2002: 13).

The 1971 military coup turned out to be a feeble attempt to end civil strife. The repression that came about with the 1971 coup could not, despite constitutional amendments, set up a stable government, and in retrospect "the best characterization of the 12 March (1971) regime could be summed up by saying that it was a clumsy, if somewhat painful, dress rehearsal for what was to come in 1980" (Ibid.: 13). The

mass movement had erupted once again, while Turkey experienced a crisis of capital accumulation combined with the capitalist crisis of the world capitalist economy in the late 1970s. The import substitution model had reached its limit in the domestic market, while the gains acquired by the working class in the years between 1965-1977 (higher wages, job security based on seniority pay, high levels of organized protest, the shutting down of State Security Courts, etc.) had become a further burden on capital accumulation. The situation in Turkey was shaping up to be what Tünay calls "one of the most illustrative cases of a hegemonic crisis", entailing:

> the collapse of political order, the decay of parliamentary democracy, labor militancy, student revolts, armed struggle between extreme right and extreme left organizations, the unprecedented growth of social democracy, and above all, the incompetence of the right-wing political parties in constituting the political expression of the economic-corporate interests of the dominant class (Tünay, 1993: 19).

Parliament was paralyzed as ideological struggle took on the appearance of a civil war on the streets, and as Gramsci foresaw, the link between the dominant class and its political representation was severed "as the prominent manifestation of the hegemonic crisis", exemplified by the failure of right-wing political parties to stabilize economic and political conditions (Ibid.). A very important point to emphasize at this point, through the concept of "hegemonic crisis", is the historical and inseparable ties between the state and civil society. Gramsci points to the close ties between the two spheres by advancing the idea that a crisis in hegemony translates into a "crisis of authority" or a "general crisis of the state" (Tünay, 1993: 15-16, Yalman, 2002: 40). Yalman explains the situation in relation to Turkey's history by stating that

> the protracted economic crisis of the late 1970s in fact coincided with the intensification of a range of social conflicts which not only exacerbated the Turkish bourgeoisie's chronic anxiety that its survival was at stake, but would also cause a great deal of trepidation that the very existence of the Turkish state was under threat. Indeed, this particular crisis and its aftermath can be considered as an illustration of the validity of the Gramscian analysis that a crisis of hegemony is *ipso facto* a crisis of the state (Yalman, 2002: 39-40).

Attempts at hegemony had failed, and the military intervened, once again, under the pretext of maintaining "law and order". The 1980 coup led to a complete reorganization of the country's political structure, that is, a restructuring of the relations between the state and civil society (Yalman, 2002: 38), in the sense that the dominant classes were favored in every action of the military regime, along with the changes in the constitution it brought with it:

> Combined with the "24 January" measures, which had been promoted by the civilian government the same year before the coup, notoriously laying the basis of the neoliberal economic policies of the next two decades, the historic function of the 12 September regime was to prepare the Turkish economy and polity to the new path of capital accumulation predicated on a deeper integration with the world capitalist economy (Savran, 2002: 15).

Indeed, Turkey since 1980 emerged "as a test case for a rather savage experiment of wholesale economic and political restructuring under the rubric of structural adjustment policies" (Yalman, 2002: 22). It is interesting to note that the military regime was not autonomous from the bourgeoisie, contrary to the statist arguments that the military regimes were autonomous from class forces in society:

> Rather than *subordinating* those interests (that of the bourgeoisie-HOA) to that of the autonomised state, the military regime's top priority was to assure both the foreign financial circles as well as the domestic bourgeoisie that it was going to remain loyal to the structural adjustment program. It is noteworthy in this respect, that one of the first things the military junta did was to ask for the support of TÜSİAD in transmitting this message abroad, while the activities of all other associations were banned (Yalman, 2002: 39).

Accordingly, *DİSK* was closed down, unionists and leftists were imprisoned and tortured, hundreds of people "disappeared" or were killed in cases of extrajudicial execution and 50 people were hanged. The new constitution that was adopted in 1982, revoked the rights and freedoms granted by the 1961 Constitution. The results of these measures were low-wages, the pacification of *DİSK* and the reinstatement of State Security Courts. These occurred with the outright support of all employers' organizations, intellectuals, spokespeople and the politicians of the dominant classes. The Turkish economy was progressively liberalized in line with the structural programs of the IMF and World Bank in the next two decades (Savran,

2002: 16). The ruling forces were conscious of the need to integrate the Turkish economy into the world capitalist economy if it were to overcome its capital accumulation crisis politically and economically, thereby opening up its borders and its low-wage labor to international capital, focusing on exports, and following a "there is no alternative" discourse surprisingly similar to Thatcher's (Yalman, 2002: 42). Both Yalman and Tünay agree that the new hegemonic strategy was based on putting an end to class-based politics. The "law and order" rhetoric was used by the military to gain the "consent" of the masses disenchanted by the pre-coup crises (Ibid.: 41). Surprisingly enough, however, the 1980 coup aided Islam and the far right, despite its purported attachment to the secular Kemalist ideology, as part of its strategy to counterbalance the revolutionary left forces: "Of course, this operation was not overt but carried out insidiously with the idea that a right-wing social force, outside the boundaries of the state, had to be activated to provide security for conservative forces in the long run" (Tünay, 1993: 20).

Once again, therefore, the state stepped into the sphere of civil society, indeed was involved in the creation and manipulation of the covert wing of this sphere, in order to realize its hegemonic project, encompassing a depoliticization of society and liberalization of the economy. Meanwhile, the Islamic fundamentalist movement, allying with the far right, was able to occupy a central position in the new right formation and its ideology (Ibid: 20). The Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi - ANAP*) which came to power undemocratically following the coup carried out, according to Tünay, a new right campaign for expansive hegemony, advancing the rhetoric of "national unity" and "law and order" by placing the blame for past "evils" on the division of the society. Yalman points to the similarity between the rhetoric of the military regime and *ANAP* in Turkey with that of Thatcherite conservatives in the United Kingdom: "For both were keen to consolidate the new order by portraying the previous one as a highly undesirable one characterized by civil strife and disorder on the one hand, and an economic crisis caused by outdated policies on the other" (2002: 41). *ANAP* prided itself, therefore, on having an inclusive structure, being constituted by liberals, the extreme right, Islamic fundamentalists and social democrats. The ideology to which the new right tried rallying social groups was that of "conservative nationalism", which would only discriminate against the revolutionary left (Tünay, 1993: 21). The new right in Turkey was similar in other

respects to Thatcherite discourse besides that of "law and order", namely a non-class discourse and the "inevitability" argument. One very important constituent concept of the former was that of "ortadirek" (central pillar), which encompassed small agricultural producers, workers, government employees, craftsmen and artisans, symbolically constituting the center of Turkish society (Ibid.: 22). As stated above, the bias in favor of nationalism and religion attempted to mobilize different sections of society around a one nation hegemonic project, a turning point in the history of republican Turkey, taking into consideration the fact that state officials had always presented themselves as ultra-sensitive to the maintenance of secularism on the road to Westernization. This discourse was accompanied, again in similar fashion to Thatcherism, by anti-statism. Certain superficial reforms were carried out in order to back this claim, although as with every other neoliberal government, the state was kept intact and even strengthened in order to implement neoliberal economic policies. Indeed, championing economic individualism, appealing to the people as "individuals" and trying to discredit the trade union movement by calling it a vested interest were among some of the ideological discourses of the new right, all the while strengthening the state: "It was in line with New Right thinking that a strong state would be necessary as the political guarantor of economic individualism" (Yalman, 2002: 41).

A new understanding of economy in line with the neoliberal measures also marked the new right's attempt at hegemony, as the field of economy was portrayed as a technical sphere which had its own laws. The failure to abide by these laws would mean that it would be impossible to cope with inflation, unemployment, low productivity, etc., and this was the criticism leveled at previous administrations: "this new approach implied that once the economy was considered as the most important variable with its independent laws, then the recognition of certain inequalities necessary in the functioning and development of capitalism became inevitable" (Tünay, 1003: 22-23).

The "inevitability" card was thus used to great effect. The new right changed to an export promotion model as its accumulation strategy, which required the state to provide financial privileges and encourage tax benefits for export-oriented industries. The export-oriented economy privileged only one section of the bourgeoisie, although the rest were induced to cooperate due to the prospect of

ANAP being a loyal government serving the latter's political interests in the long run. An anti-inflationist policy, in line with IMF policies and standby agreements also helped the project, while also ensuring political support from the impoverished masses. *ANAP* used monetarism and supply-side economics as tools in its anti-inflationist ambitions (Ibid: 23), controlling the money supply while at the same time trying to increase the supply of commodities; contradictory policies which brought the government at loggerheads with the IMF (Ibid.: 24).

The New Right failed to create an expansive hegemony. The export promotion accumulation strategy did not work with "paper exports" taking up most of the volume while industrialization came to a halt with the decline in the manufacturing sector and rising inflation (Ibid.). The New Right in Turkey failed to implement its traditional formula of economic failure but political success. This was due to the failure of the New Right, according to Tünay, to provide benefits to those sections of the society that should have benefited from the neoliberal project, while the subordinated majority was left undivided according to levels of skill and productivity, as was the case in England. Writing in 1993, Tünay remarks that the *ANAP* government changed to a strategy of "passive revolution" in 1987, but failed to produce even that:

> The neutralization or containment of interests without active mobilization in society presupposes the prior existence of a coherent, cementing ideology to secure moral and intellectual leadership of at least one faction of the dominant class. None of the ideological elements, such as nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, or productivism, seem to have sufficient power to succeed (Tünay, 1993: 26).

Yalman, by focusing on the condition of the Turkish working class on the other had, attributes success to the state's passive revolutionary strategy in the 1980s, in line with the passive revolutions which the new right had to fall back on throughout the world "as the regimes which seemed to adopt its basic philosophy were not inclined to recognize the necessity of the exercise of social and democratic rights by the working classes" (Yalman, 2002: 45). Passive revolution in the post-1980 Turkish experience was based on de-politicization, and displayed the possibility of creating a class hegemony under an authoritarian form of the state favorable to the market with the continuing dependence of the bourgeoisie on the state (Ibid: 46).

This state and its coercive apparatus once again, would step in to the political scene (not literally as in earlier examples, but rather through threatening messages directed to the Islamist government) in 1997 to curb the rising power of the Islamist wing of the bourgeoisie, which had grown due to lenient policies towards Islamist factions throughout the phase of "passive revolution", and reorient the political path of Turkey to the West (Savran, 2002: 17-18).

4.3 The Relationship Between the Relativist Paradigm and Civil Society Discourse in Turkey

The relativist paradigm of the state (i.e. as an entity opposed to an autonomous bourgeoisie due to its refusal to release its hold on power) has paved the way for the glorification of civil society in Turkey. Indeed, the roots of the normative meaning placed on civil society can be traced to the conceptualization of the Turkish state (as well as its coercive arm) as the primary generator of oppression as well as the main obstacle against democratization. The New Right employed the relativist paradigm in order to place the blame for the failure to "democratize" on the historical oppressive nature of the Turkish state and the power hungry nature of the state elite. It is thereby argued that the oppression of the bourgeoisie by the state elite led to the failure to form an autonomous market, which in turn led to the failure to form civil society and therefore democracy. The New Right accordingly carried out an attack towards the state in order to restructure it into a more neoliberal friendly form. Certain Leftist perspectives in Turkey, on the other hand, regarded civil society as a newly emerging political arena which held the key to non-violent politics based on democratic deliberation between equal groups. This formulation was also based on a state-civil society dichotomy, which the relativist paradigm had clearly stated existed in Turkey throughout its history. Understandably, the glorification of civil society as a sphere of democracy against a demonized authoritarian state originated following debates after the unprecedented level of repression brought about by the 1980 military coup. Following the 1983 general elections and the return back to civil rule, the relationship of the state and civil society was put under scrutiny and the conclusion was that a civil society which could protect the individual against state power did not exist in Turkey, and civil society was equated with democracy in such

a way that the word "civil" took on the meaning of an opposition to "military" rule, thus becoming a rallying point for left and right-wing activists (Sarıbay, 1992: 112). That the civil society conception gained support due to its automatic identification with "civil" rule as opposed to military rule (in Turkish the word civil is translated as "sivil" meaning also non-military) does not necessarily serve as a basis for exploring what it actually came to denote[4]. In other words, the non-military connotation has been just one important element among many as regards the glorification of civil society in the specific context of Turkish politics.

In the restricted political climate of the 1980s, civil society was indeed seen as a path by the political wings of either side of the ideological spectrum to voice demands. A very good example to this was the creation of human rights organizations in order to protest against prison conditions and torture (especially in support of left and right-wing activists who were imprisoned by the state following the coup). The Human Rights Association (*İnsan Hakları Derneği-İHD*) was formed in 1986 along with the Solidarity Association for Prisoner Families (*Tutuklu Hükümlü Aileleri Dayanışma Derneği-TAYAD*), as well as right wing organizations such as the right wing Social Security and Education Foundation (*Sosyal Güvenlik ve Eğitim Vakfı-SOGEV*) which had hitherto refused to cooperate with pre-1980 human rights initiatives on grounds that they were conducting communist propaganda (Plagemann, 2000: 363-366).

What the relativist paradigm misses, however, was that civil society did in fact exist prior to the 1980 coup. In fact, it has been argued that civil society experienced its heyday prior to this period, in terms of the proliferation of active organizations such as trade unions, student association and *TÜSİAD*, which was formed in 1971 (Balı, 2000: 33). Indeed, NGOs have existed in Turkey before the 1980 military coup in very diverse forms reflective of the different interests held by the respective sides of the class struggle, one example being the left-leaning Peace Association which was shut down by the 1980 military coup. Interestingly enough, right and left-wing organizations had formed organizations even in the ranks of the police, the latter, namely the Police Association (*Polis Derneği - Pol-Der*) (holding

[4] Writing in 1992, Sarıbay reaches the conclusion that civil society in Turkey is not mentioned with reference to any notion of "civility" or "an important historical watershed in Western Europe", but with hindsight we can say today that the form it took towards the end of the 1980s and through such organizations such as the Human Rights Association indeed took on these meanings.

the majority of the police in its ranks), shared a similar fate of oppression and closure as all other left-leaning organizations (Öner, 2003). In fact, *Pol-Der* demarcated its line of thought by branding itself "the people's police".

The view that civil society only "really" came into existence following the coup fails to identify the roots of civil society in Turkey which may not be related with the new left movement. The conceptualization of the state as a repressive and homogenous entity (as inspired by the relativist paradigm) fails to see the attempts at hegemony by the state in favor of a section of civil society organized by the bourgeoisie, as exemplified by *TÜSİAD*'s close relationship with the 1980 military coup. Similarly, the existence of such organizations as *DİSK*, a leftist trade union which spoke for a great number of workers and played a dynamic role in politics before the military coup are surprisingly left out of the analysis which marks the emergence of civil society after the coup. Contradictorily, both organizations are widely accepted as CSOs today. The fact that associations such as *TÜSİAD* survived in the wake of a military coup which shut down nearly every other organization and forced changes in the Associations Law is illustrative of the way military interventions have favored the organizations of the appropriating class. The example given above of *TÜSİAD* being the spokesperson for the military regime is also important in this respect. However, this cannot with any plausibility be taken to mean that *TÜSİAD* is not a civil society organization, just as Kemalist organizations that are "close" to the state today cannot be excluded from this sphere.

The contradiction involved in the dating of the emergence of civil society in Turkey is only one of the many contradictions that arise as a result of the assumed dichotomy between the state and civil society. The relativist paradigm, which identifies the Turkish Republic as the successor to the oppressive Ottoman Empire, has suitably become the theoretical base on which this dichotomy is built. The clear dichotomy drawn serves both civil society advocates in the Turkish Left and New Right conceptualizations of civil society in that it portrays the state, as quoted above by Yalman (2002), as "an agency for rent-seeking" thus "precluding any social attachment to it as a possible focus of collective identity". Moreover, the separation of the state from civil society, and the shunning of class analysis as the principle social analysis by preferring to explain history through a center-periphery distinction due to the "special" circumstances of Turkey, has led to the emergence of a common

ground between the civil society advocates in the Turkish Left and New Right circles.

4.4 Post-Political Discourse as a Common Ground Between Civil Society Advocacy and the New Right in Turkey

The assumptions derived from perceiving the state as a homogenous and oppressive entity and the glorification of civil society have actually paved the way for the development of a post-political discourse which encouraged the projection of civil society as the bastion of democracy. Variations in this discourse existed, yet all claimed to be above the imposition of ideological values. Meanwhile, events in the political scene in Turkey continually presented the sphere of civil society as one of ideological struggle.

Erdoğan and Üstüner (2005) note how debates revolving around "civil society" by leftist intellectuals in the 1980s gained popularity as "liberals" have been introduced to it through the efforts of the New Right in Turkey:

> By the 1990s, a causal relationship started to be created between the development of civil society and democracy, while democracy was liberalized with its incorporation into neoliberal discourse and its association with the free market, the diminished state, individual rights and freedoms, and pluralism (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 658).

Erdoğan and Üstüner point to three waves of post-political discourse that have developed in the 1990s, and all three deserve attention in order to understand the intellectual background to the championing of civil society as a project to be realized, namely "Second Republicanism", civil Islamic discourse (the "Medina Pact") and "postliberalism". Erdoğan and Üstüner explain why these discourses have been called post-political by pointing to their characteristics of reducing politics to the acknowledgement of the other and to compromise, their view of "ideological" and antagonistic politics as illegitimate and because they "restrict the space of the political to a democratic difference game" (Ibid.). As noted above, throughout the 1990s Islam and right-wing ideology were at a rise due to the fact that they were left relatively unscathed by the military coup debacle and were actually involved in the post-military political alliance within *ANAP*, while Kemalism was trying to make a

comeback in civilian clothes. In such an environment of ideological polarization it may be possible to argue that these post-political discourses responded to the need to form some theoretical basis for cooperation. It is possible, however, to criticize these discourses from two aspects, namely on the contradictions within their own parameters, and the actual implications they have for the visualization and conduct of politics.

The "Second Republicanism" discourse came into being in an environment when the *ANAP* coalition was dissolving and the Kurdish problem was escalating. Ozal's (Prime Minister from 1983-1989 then President from 1989-1993) solution to the situation was to diffuse the view of a peaceful coexistence of cultural differences through a neoliberal restructuring of the state-civil society relationship (Ibid.: 658-659). Prominent journalists such as Mehmet Altan and Cengiz Candar took on the task of disseminating this view, which in effect blamed the old order (called the "First Republic") and the power which the military-civil bureaucracy held as well as proposed downsizing the state. Also, the nation state and centralized economy were criticized, while the main obstacle in front of Turkey was deemed to be the military make up of the view that the first republic and its single party regime conceptualization of politics stifled the development of civil society with its imposition of Kemalist ideology, obstructing the representation of different identities in a cultural mosaic. Second Republicanism also understood the free market to be a fundamental precondition of democracy and "productivity", with the state only playing a "technical" role cleansed from ideology. The solution is sought in the "encompassing" characteristics of Second Republicans and the de-radicalization of ideologies through the tolerance shown by the Second Republic. Also, the discourse views, in line with neoliberalism and in opposition to "classic Kemalism", peasantry as a population that needs to be reduced in size and transcended in mentality (Ibid.: 659-660).

It is important to note that the way in which civil society was used in this case was a reflection of the neoliberal ideology sweeping through the world following the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially in its equation of democracy with the free market and capitalist social relations of production. It is also interesting to note the heavy influence of the "relativist paradigm" in the formulation of the discourse. For instance, Altan (1997) specifically points to the patrimonialism of the Turkish

Republic, in the sense that it continued the unique capitalization process of the Ottoman Empire. Stating that the Ottoman Palace directly appropriated the surplus of the small peasantry, Altan states that capital accumulation was a threat to Ottoman land-agriculture policies and that the Republic took on this legacy and protected it. Today, according to Altan the situation continues as before, and that Turkey is an agricultural land with an agricultural mentality in which small production is dominant while the republic continues to hold exclusive power over the economy and politics. The solution, according to Altan, is for the state to hand over economic power to the public: "Otherwise it should not be expected for Turkish society to obtain an environment constituted by a free market economy respectful to human rights. Democracy is an instrument for the individual to seek out his/her monetary and social rights and to expand his/her freedoms in this area" (Ibid.).

Second Republicanism is essentially criticized for being a search for "passive revolution" and for attempting to hegemonize a neoliberal discourse. Moreover, Erdoğan and Üstüner state that "Second Republicanism has aimed to regulate and tame social conflict and antagonism through the diminishing of the state and a framework for order envisaged through an acknowledgement of the 'cultural mosaic'" (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 660). The Second Republicanism discourse is perhaps the clearest example of how neoliberalism has instrumentalized the concept of civil society through reference to specific problems in domestic politics.

The second post-political discourse is that of the Medina Pact as an Islamic civil society project. The idea has been introduced by Ali Bulaç, who has argued that the Medina Pact is an Islamic solution to a political union which does not differentiate between social blocs on the basis of race, language, religion, sect and religious belief (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 660). Bulaç (1992) explains the creation of the Medina Pact in the following way: The Medina Pact was signed following the emigration of the Prophet Mohammed and his followers to Medina from Mecca, due to the oppression in Mecca from established groups which created an unsuitable environment for attracting followers and spreading the teachings of Islam in peace. The condition in Medina was better suited to the creation of a political alliance and the thriving of Islam, due to the fact that the existing Arab and Jewish populations were constantly warring with and among each other. The lack of political authority helped Mohammad settle in Medina with his followers, and soon under the

leadership of the prophet the followers set up a communal system in order to create an economic base of solidarity between the Muslims of Mecca and Medina. This system was not organized around blood ties, but rather around a principle of "brotherhood" in which each Muslim was associated with another to the extent that they shared the produce from agriculture and created inheritance bonds. Later, in order to create peace between the three social groups of the city (the Muslims, the Jewish community and the non-Muslim Arabs), Mohammed devised a formula which was based on religious and legal autonomy for each community. Negotiations between Muslim and non-Muslim communities led to the creation of the Medina Pact, a treaty (later broken up into 47 articles) which became the "constitution" of the new city-state (Bulaç, 1992: 104-106).

As the defining principles of the Pact, Bulaç points to four: that true peace and stability can only be derived from a voluntary and contractual agreement; that participation is the basis of the Pact and not domination; that many different types of legal systems can be simultaneously valid; and that Islam is a religion which only binds Muslims (Ibid: 108-109). Bulaç reaches the conclusion that the Pact can be a guiding light for a pluralistic social project for today:

> Personally I believe that with certain abstractions and generalizations made by taking the Pact's clauses as a guide, we can obtain certain defining principles that can be a reference for today and that these defining principles can be a basis for a pluralist social project in the last instance (Ibid.: 110).

The position of the state, in Bulaç's conceptualization, is that of a referee, and therefore similar to the conceptualization of the role for the state proposed by the Second Republicanism. Bulaç also differentiates between official Islam and civil Islam by defining the former as top-down and totalitarian, and the latter as pluralistic and participatory (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 661). One criticism towards the Medina Pact has been the ambiguity of which transcendental law should be taken into consideration as the common denominator of administration in society in light of the principle of Tevhid in Islam which dictates that Islam is the total of all religions and that Muslims must see it thus (İnsel, 1992: 30-32), as well as the question of where individuals stand in this conceptualizations vis-à-vis (religious) groups (Akçam, 1992: 14; Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 661). Moreover, the Medina Pact (in line with

İnsel's criticism) has been accused of being an effort at the establishment of an Islamic (Gramscian type) hegemony with Islam being the religion portrayed as that which contains all religions, as well as being criticized for being similar to the second Republican discourse in granting legitimacy to social blocs on condition that they do not hold political power ambitions (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 661).

The third discourse is that of the "post-liberal democrats", which also came into Turkish discourse in the 1990s. This view has espoused a multicultural model of society with the main principle being that democracy is a regime which allows different lifestyles to live together by preserving their differences. All ideas and identities are considered equal and the legitimacy of democracy comes from public debate. What constitutes a "democratic actor" is "the action of social understanding", which essentially means forming empathy to the extent that one can understand identity "from within" the "other" group, without sacrificing one's own belief (Ibid.: 662). The post-liberal discourse shares with Second Republicanism the criticism of Kemalism in terms of its military power over the political regime and its role in repressing cultural identities, as well as seeing the state as an "impartial referee" with no ideological views. An important point of difference between the two is that post-liberals do not share the neoliberal equation of the free market economy with democracy (Ibid.: p.661). A very important point to mention about post-liberal democrats is that they accept every demand for or claim to difference as legitimate (Ibid.: 662). In this sense, as well as in the sense of refusing to equate democracy with neoliberalism, their discourse bears a striking resemblance to the discourse which is more commonly used by those in the Turkish Left which advocate civil society as a progressive political actor. This point is substantiated by the fact that the post-liberal discourse has debated the multicultural society model on the basis of Islamic identity and the Islamic movement, claiming that it attributed a potential to the Islamic movement for contributing to the tolerance of differences in society (Ibid.: 663). Akçam, writing in 1992 in response to the debate between İnsel and Bulaç on the Medina Pact, clearly outlines that for him the Pact is an excuse for the creation of a new social project for Turkish society. Moreover, he contributes to the debate by arguing that the first problem that needs to be discussed for this new social project should be the criteria for defining different groups and the relationship between them, to which his suggestion is that every group which claims itself to be

different should be acknowledged, without any conditions attached (Akçam, 1992: 14).

Yet some very salient criticisms have been leveled at post-liberals as well. These criticisms also hit the heart of a normative conception of civil society, because as mentioned above, civil society advocacy in Turkey uses a very similar discourse when it comes to the importance attributed to "tolerance", "empathy" and "deliberation". Just like liberals, post-liberals attribute an automatic value to the preferences of communities and individuals, and in this sense they are said to essentialize and make absolute subjective positions, thus refusing to question these positions by taking for granted these positions and the civil political relationships within which they are formed (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 663). Furthermore, due to the fact that democracy and politics is reduced to the reflection of social demands and preferences on decision making-mechanisms, democracy becomes synonymous with a non-conflict type of politics and becomes a game of democratic differences in which political practice must become reconciliation. Plus, in its rejection of discourse based on "unity", it holds the view that social cohesion can only be created through multiculturalism. Yet in its defense of pluralism it aims to discipline differences, and fails to understand the "other" in its irreducible totality, which paradoxically leads to the demand of society to become depoliticized (Ibid: 664).

All these points have one thing in common, which is that they reflect a change in the conceptualization of politics to a more static and post-modern understanding, in that they espouse a view of complete tolerance to difference, whereas modernity preaches the effort to rally certain groups behind a specific conceptualization of "truth". The fear of central authority in general and the state in particular is a reflection of the fear of modernity due to its potential totalitarian outcomes. In such a conceptualization, the normative meaning placed on civil society is understandable, and perhaps the only way in which a multicultural form of politics can establish itself. İnsel for instance, in expressing his views about the possibility whereby Islam can turn totalitarian due to its insistence that all of humanity "must learn and understand" the call to holy revelation, emphasizes that "Refusing to hear, refusing to learn and refusing to understand are rights which guarantee individual freedoms as much as the rights to hear, learn and understand" (1992: 31). Akçam (1992), by stating that solutions proposed in the history of Anatolia have all been

totalitarian in that all solutions aimed to eradicate differences, understands the claims to representing "truths" by Marxism and Islam on the basis of "science" or "God" as having become invalid, although conceding the point that the prospect of "living without interference" is not an easily acceptable demand for those who believe they have a "mission" in life.

Yet the very real problem this type of conceptualization engenders once again is that it brings us back to the fundamental misconception as to the character and role of civil society. Modernity (as defined by the dual structures of the state and market), is still the framework in which national and international demands for rights takes place:

> Far from experiencing a shift toward modes of domination and contestation that transcend capitalist modernity, the present international conjuncture is characterized precisely by the affirmation of modern claims to state sovereignty, democracy, citizenship rights and civil liberties and by the deployment of modern forms of agency through political parties, trade unions and other comparable organizations (Colas, 2002: 13).

This paves the way for the second and more general criticism directed at the post-liberal argument, namely all three views have been built on a state-civil society dichotomy. In doing so, the fact that civil society is not a homogenous sphere, and that it harbors patriarchal, authoritarian and fascist tendencies are overlooked (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 664). In fairness it must be noted that this misconception is an end result of assuming the separation of state and society, as proponents of civil society in the Turkish Left have shown consistent awareness of this point in the literature devoted to civil society. For instance, Tanil Bora underlines that uncivil organizations, such as those who have in the beginning of the 1990s campaigned for the ousting of Kurdish members of parliament belonging to the "Party of Democracy" (*Demokrasi Partisi – DEP*) are also civil initiatives, and that therefore being "civil" or involved in "civil society" is not a sufficient enough qualification to be part of a "different type of politics" (*Gazetepazar*, 1997, cited in Sancar, 2000: 30-31).

4.5 A "Mutant" Civil Society or a Field of Ideological Struggle?

Despite this meaningful caveat, however, civil society advocates have portrayed civil society in Turkey as a "mutant" formation, due to the alleged domination of the sphere by the Turkish state. Yet civil society is so diverse that it is simply too big a generalization to say that civil society in Turkey is completely state led. Although useful in showing the way in which the state can interfere with the sphere of civil society, the generalizations associated with this view have grave consequences, one of which is the theoretical error of assuming an unchanging nature of the state by overlooking the way in which the state has been seriously affected by civil society. This brings us back to the point about the relativist paradigm. To illustrate, Serdar Tekin's (2000) view of the specific nature of civil society in Turkey can be given. Tekin argues, in line with the relativist paradigm, that civil society in Western Europe developed as a result of the tensions between property owners and the dominant classes, and that such an effort at autonomy could not be made in the Ottoman Empire due to its overbearing nature. The newly founded Republic and the Kemalist elite thus confronted the problem of imposing their ideas of modernization to the society at hand, which inevitably took the shape of a top-down-social engineering. As a consequence, a "mutant" civil society formed in Turkey, the main anomaly being that instead of taking the shape of an autonomous sphere through which public demands could be directed to the state, it became a platform through which the state ideology could be injected into society. Civil society in Turkey thus became a sphere dictating the state's demands to society, legitimizing state actions rather than monitoring them, and helping protect the state against other sections of society instead of protecting society against the state (Tekin, 2000: 44). The problems with this type of conceptualization is clear; the state is being viewed as an unchanging and therefore ahistorical entity, while differences in civil society are being overlooked, in this case by contending that civil society in Turkey have become instruments of the state.

Seçkinelgin (2004) holds a similar view, but arrives at his conclusion in a slightly more sophisticated manner. He upholds that a new type of civil society has emerged in Turkey (due to globalization and the EU process) and the new CSOs

have been able to bring different issues to the political agenda as a result of their less formalized structures:

> In this, several other factors are important – both the impact of the concept's global resurgence and of organizational forms and the Turkish aspiration to become a member of the European Union have brought about a certain change. The number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has increased, and their areas of interest have diversified: from various women's issues to the environment, from gay and lesbian rights to homelessness, from language rights to ethnic groups to prison-reform associations. In other words, the civil society scene is becoming less formalized, and as a result is becoming more diffused than is possible within the more bureaucratic structures characteristic of traditional organizations (Seçkinelgin, 2004: 174).

Seçkinelgin goes on to state that various groups are emerging with political agendas and demands to make of the system and that: "The question here is whether both new and traditional groups have a similar voice in terms of the sociopolitical debate, and the reach of this voice in the system" and that "It is at this juncture of the new and the traditional that the existing traditional tacit understanding between the formal civil society and the state is exposed" (Ibid). In his explanation of this "tacit understanding" between what is classified as "formal civil society" and the state, Seçkinelgin points to the reproduction of a certain Kemalist notion of Turkishness by what he calls traditional, and formal, civil society. Kemalism is identified as the content that is used to substantiate the notion of Turkishness, which is not defined on the basis of race or ethnicity, but which instead points to the merger of the attempt to create a new form of polity with the social construction of a particular identity, linking social life and identities with the political commitments of the Kemalist project, in that democratization was and is still seen as an end that would be established through the anchoring of the political regime by socially engineered cultural change and a "particular mode of being civilized" (Ibid.: 175). The main tenets of the Kemalist project are listed as "its total commitment to a western secular society (most importantly breaking the link between religion and the judicial system), a state feminism that promotes the rights of women in public life, a strong emphasis on economic modernization, and an important commitment to Western civilization in both social and political spheres" (Ibid.). The merger of the political and social agenda, Seçkinelgin argues, has created "a particular understanding of the

civil society space", in which civil society became a defender of a particular form of life in the sociocultural sphere: "In the process, civil society has gained two roles: making sure on the one hand that the state is democratically responsible and on the other hand that society develops within the Kemalist lines" (Ibid.: 175-176).

The main point which Seçkinelgin is emphasizing here is the exclusionary nature of civil society in Turkey due to the state's intervention in the sphere in order to guarantee and reproduce the social identity which is suitable to its modernizing ideals:

> The match between the political identity of the state and the cultural identity of people, particularly a certain social consensus among the educated elite, is used as a reflexive restriction for the space of civil society. In this way, those excluded are constructed as socially irrelevant and politically suspicious (Seçkinelgin, 2004: 177).

Although civil society can disagree with everyday political issues and economic management, once this questioning addresses the core values of the Kemalist project, Seçkinelgin states that the sociocultural reflex, defined as "the specific background conditions that are mobilized by various actors when they are threatened" (Ibid.: 173) contracts, and both the state and civil society react with one voice to defend a particular way of life. The "sociocultural reflex", more concretely, is an amalgamation of political nationalist feelings. Thus, newly emerging groups and demands are made to adopt the ethical outlook shared through Kemalist ideals in order to be included and not be seen as traitors (Ibid.: 176). The examples given by the author concerning those who have been subjected to this reflex are those questioning Turkey's military involvement in the South East, Kurdish language groups, vocal Islamic groups protesting the ban on headscarves in what has been called "public spaces", all seen to be threatening the "integrity of the nation" (Ibid.: 178). This argument has also been applied to international actors funding NGOs in Turkey as well, while organizations funding Kemalist NGOs have not been placed in the spotlight (Ibid). As an example to the way in which the state and the military views civil society, Seçkinelgin also gives the example of the secretary-general of the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi-MGK*) who in April 2003 attempted to create an umbrella organization to bring together all civil society groups

established in Europe by Turkish immigrants for the purpose of coordinating their efforts to support Turkish national interests (Ibid.: 178-179).

The conclusion drawn by Seçkinelgin can lead us towards the predicament of Leftists in Turkey which advocate civil society. Seçkinelgin argues that:

> For democracy to function and to become the organizing principle of society, the basis of the sociocultural reflex needs to be discussed. In this way, it is not only the state but also ordinary people, those who are seen as the proverbial soldiers in the Kemalist project, who need to rethink the sociopolitical limitations that are internalized if they are also aspiring to achieve the main Kemalist aim of becoming a modern democracy (Seçkinelgin, 2004: 179).

Seçkinelgin's account of civil society in Turkey fails to present a model which overcomes the assumed separation between the state and civil society. In effect, Seçkinelgin's views can be seen as a more refined view of the relativist state vs. civil society approach because although he is quick to point out that a newly emerging civil society is spreading over a much more variegated set of issues due to the EU accession process and globalization in general, it follows a pessimistic note in that it understands these new movements as following the Kemalist domination of the state and state ideology in civil society when it comes to criticizing established state policy due to the pervasive socio-cultural nationalist reflex which threatens to brand anyone opposed to it as illegitimate. As noted above, this argument is a useful portrayal of the state's reach into civil society, and also, to the credit of Seçkinelgin, the acceptance of actors within civil society which have ties to state ideology. However, it is inaccurate in its generalization that a clear-cut dichotomy exists between newly emerging CSOs and another "official" brand of CSOs.

A more accurate view is that Kemalist organizations within civil society situate themselves in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis the state. Erdoğan (2000) argues that the need for Kemalist CSOs came about due to the fact that state institutions started to fail in promoting the Kemalist political project against ethnic and religious movements and soon organizations such as the Atatürk Thought Association (*Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği-ADD*) and the Association in Support of Modern Life (*Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği-ÇYDD*) started to conduct a wide range of activities, with financial support from the state budget due to their positions as "associations working for the public good" (Erdoğan, 2000: 236-239). Although at

first glance this situation may seem to substantiate Seçkinelgin's argument, a deeper look into the way in which these organizations conduct politics suggests otherwise. For "civil Kemalizm" is caught in a contradiction due to the fact that on the one hand they can be identified with the state and the official ideology because of their support for the founding ideology of the republic, while on the other hand it conducts a politics based on the "victimization" rhetoric, meaning that they point to the "true" Kemalist ideology as being encircled by a number of traitors, namely "separatists", "religious fundamentalists" and "the implementers of free market laws". The strategy of portraying oneself as a victim in politics in order to attract support has been crucially augmented by a stance against the doctrinaire and oppressive state. For instance, one of the main complaints of civil Kemalists has been the failure of the state to spend the necessary effort to shed light on the murders of several prominent civil Kemalists such as the head of the *ADD* Muammer Aksoy, and researchers/journalists Uğur Mumcu and Ahmet Taner Kışlalı (Ibid.: 247-248). Also, these "civil" or "new" Kemalists attribute great importance to civil society, exemplified in the fact that Kışlalı's brochure stating that hope lies in CSOs and not in the state and political parties has been accepted as the main philosophy behind *ÇYDD* (Ibid.: 250). Seçkinelgin's conceptualization of an "official civil society" is therefore problematic, although not completely inaccurate, as there are examples of these organizations supporting state policies and upholding the authoritarian reflexes of the Kemalist tradition, such as the support given to the post-modern military coup which took place on February 28, 1997 against the rising Islamic wing, the support for the ban on headscarves and its intransigent stance on cooperation with what have been labeled as Islamic groups (Ibid.: 256). However, the equation of civil Kemalism per se with state ideology (a successful strategy by Second Republicanism) overlooks the transformation throughout history of the relationship between state institutions and civil Kemalism or civil society in general (Ibid.: 246). Instead, civil Kemalism should be seen as a side in the ideological struggle to promote its own hegemonic world view. Indeed, differences exist among these organizations. For instance while *ADD* defends Kemalism as an integral and systematic ideology *ÇYDD* understands Kemalism as a guide for modern life which can and should be reformed according to the realities of the day (Ibid.: 259-260).

Neither can civil society be so readily equated with a sphere outside of the free market, or in any way immune to the social relations of production in society. This is essentially a criticism against the post-liberal approach, for while second republicanism specifically vouches for the free market as a guarantor of democracy and the Medina Pact does not really have anything to say about the issue, the post-liberal approach opposes the neoliberal formulation that equates democracy with the free market (and so do the advocates of civil society analyzed below). It has been argued, for instance, that businessmen/women have seen the area of civil society as a public relations campaign field in which they can replenish their tarnished image due to the imposition of neoliberal policies (Balı, 2000: 34). In fact, ever since the early 1990s businessmen have promoted themselves as art-lovers and promoters, as well as trying to create the image of the "socially conscious, respectable and responsible businessman" to which involvement in civil society contributes. However, Balı stresses the point that businessmen cannot take a stance against the state, and that they are therefore not independent of state pressure. Business is reliant on the state for bids, credits, etc., and chooses to keep good relations with the state. The example of high level state attendance in business opening ceremonies is given, and Balı points to the contradictory situation whereby businessmen are reliant on the state to further their business opportunities while at the same time being involved in an field that is supposed to be devoted to democratization and the limiting of the state (Ibid.). Business associations are frequently mobilized by the state in order to lobby in favor of Turkey in Western circles, on topics such as accession to the EU and the Armenian genocide, with *TÜSİAD* being especially vocal on these issues on the side of the Turkish state (Ibid.: 36)[5]. Businessmen present their own foundations and associations as contributor to democracy while at the same time involving retired army officials, university staff and retired bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ibid.: 35) in administrative posts in these organizations. Balı also accuses *TÜSİAD* of being insincere in its support for human rights in Turkey, by giving examples of denials of human rights abuses in Turkey by high ranking *TÜSİAD* members and speeches claiming that democracy is a necessary means to raise the image of the country and sell goods (Ibid.: 37). Aytekin (2000: 70) also gives the

[5] TÜSİAD-EU and TÜSİAD-US have been specially built to deal with the issue of lobbying on behalf of formal Turkish theses. The web pages in which this mission is stated with relative clarity are: www.tusiad.us, and www.tusiad.org.tr/teu.htm.

example of *TÜSİAD* as a CSO in his argument as to the weaknesses of the civil society project, by emphasizing the point that these business organizations will not follow up on non-profitable projects, and indeed will resist them if it hurts their interests, and asks whether it is conceivable for such organizations to agree to a project which aims to move urbanization into less-profitable but stronger and safer land, or to a shift in the location of industry to other parts of the country in order to contribute to a decrease in regional differences. These are salient criticisms, and once again show the ideological differentiation of civil society.

4.6 The Reality of Civil Society in Turkey Following the Military Coup of 1980

Yet is there a practical truth to civil society being a homogenous sphere of democracy and non-violent and constructive debate between different views independent from the state and economy? The best answer that can be given to this is by pointing to the results of certain historical moments in the development of civil society in Turkey. Nearly all important dates have answered this question negatively.

It was mentioned above that following the military coup the resentment of state power led left-wing activists to increasingly adopt the language of civil society. One of the first activities these took part in were for the defense of the rights of political prisoners and protests against the conditions of prisons. *IHD* and *TAYAD*, created in 1986, were one of the first organizations to be founded following the military coup in which left wing activists could pool. Yet differences immediately appeared between the two organizations, as *TAYAD* refused to cooperate with IHD on the latter's call for general amnesty, instead calling for the perpetrators of torture to be punished (Plagemann, 2000: 363). Right-wing organizations also were formed in order to support prisoners and families, but they refused to protest against the state especially alongside leftist organizations due to their aim of treating the political prisoners on "their side" as an isolated affair which needed to be resolved between the state and themselves. The Organization of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (*İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği - Mazlum-Der*) was founded in 1991 as a human rights organization prioritizing state abuses on Islamic actors. Although Plagemann (2000) is at great pains to explain the evolvement of *Mazlum-Der* into a more westernized actor increasingly basing its

argument on human rights on "western" principles instead of exclusively on Islam, he concedes that this organization is still tied to its Muslim surroundings, a fact that has come to the fore in its reaction to the Sivas Massacre. The event called the "Sivas Massacre" occurred when 33 intellectuals were burned alive when the building in which they were attending festivities of an Alaouite association ("Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association") was torched in a religious fundamentalist riot of nearly 20000 people in 1993. Government and state forces did not interfere throughout the process, and only did so when it had become too late. It was later found out that the massacre was pre-planned, and that the mayor of Sivas had incited the crowd. At a time when nearly every existing organization and movement denounced the massacre, *Mazlum-Der* in 1994 stated that the massacre was the result of provocation by Aziz Nesin (a famoust author/satirist) and that it was not pre-planned. *Mazlum-Der* changed its stance in 1997 by focusing on state institutions which failed to prevent the riot, but has never openly criticized the mentality behind the massacre (Ibid.: 392). Plagemann states that cooperation among human rights groups is limited, due to the fact that members of these different organizations actually come from political organizations which have violently fought each other before the 1980 coup, and states that the level of cooperation in the future still remains an open-ended question (2000: 394). What is more, the increase in human rights activities conducted by occupation organizations and universities were also fragmented. For instance, the Lawyers' Associaton (*Hukukçular Derneği - HD*) was founded as an Islamic affiliated association focusing on defendants supporting their views, and was involved in publications and meetings on Islamic law and human rights. On the other hand, the "Modern Lawyers Association (*Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği - ÇHD*) belonged to a left-Kemalist line of thought, and refused to cooperate with what it called "any type of reactionary Islamic organization", in this quote referring to *Mazlum-Der* (Plagemann, 2000: 377).

If the early years following the 1980 military coup can be shown as examples for the diversity of civil society, then certain important political events in the 1990s can be used as examples to show how civil society can both undermine and reinforce the status quo. In 1996, a scandal erupted in Turkey following a car accident. A

police chief, a member of parliament of one of the major parties in Turkey[6] and an ultranationalist gang leader were found to be in the same car. In the court hearings following the car accident, the links between the state and government with the fugitive gang leader killed in the crash (wanted for the murder of 7 students killed in 1978) were brought into daylight, and resulted in the resignation of certain high-ranking officials in the administration. The scandal provoked a wide reaction, and CSOs, in concerted action, conducted the "1 Minute of Darkness for Continuous Light" (*Sürekli Aydınlık İçin 1 Dakika Karanlık*) campaign. The campaign was designed as a call to the state and government to enlighten the Susurluk Scandal and to demand "openness". The campaign involved shutting off lights for one minute at exactly nine o'clock every day in the month of February. Differing views as to the success of the protest have been expressed. Balı argues that this movement, together with the Black Ribbon movement following the August 17, 1999 earthquake shared the characteristic of being an elite movement, which failed to gain mass support (2000: 41). Yet at the time of the action, many CSOs rallied behind the call for "1 minute of darkness" and the protests were widely covered in the media. Kemalist organizations such as *ADD* and *ÇYDD* supported the protests as well (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 239).

A year later, the *MGK* in a report presented to the Council of Ministers in the form of a "notification" (instead of "advice" which was the usual case) noted precautions against religious fundamentalism. This acted as an ultimatum to the Refah government, which in effect acted as a coup that ultimately toppled the government and saw political bans being handed out to several politicians, as well as the banning of the party in question (Seufert, 2000: 32). The role of civil society in this process was striking, as some leading CSOs including leading trade unions rallied to the army's cry against religious fundamentalism (Ibid: 34). This situation has been widely interpreted as illustrating the control exercised over civil society by the state and army (Seufert, 2000: 34; Tekin, 2000: 45). However, an objection can be raised against this point, namely that as mentioned above, this example cannot be shown to represent the complete domination of the sphere of civil society by the state and army. Kemalist organizations which had supported a "1 Minute of Darkness"

[6] The True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi – DYP, which was part of the ruling coalition at the time along with the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP), which was widely accused of religious fundamentalist inclinations)

campaign against the covert relationships between the administration and underground elements now once again joined forces to support the post-modern coup. Interpretations of the 1997 coup as being a move against the strengthening of the Islamic wing of the bourgeoisie should also be taken into consideration, as the military general staff categorized private businesses into two, namely as belonging to either the dangerous "green" (Islamic) capital or to the trustworthy "secular" capital (Seufert, 2000: 32). This approach explains, for instance, the support of some of the largest employers' associations for the military coup. It is difficult to imagine that the prospect of weakening a very significant portion of competition did not figure in the support given to the coup by these major organizations, which normally are quick to talk in favor of democracy and civil society. It can be seen, therefore, that not only does the view that civil society serves merely as a medium for the Turkish state is inaccurate, but it serves as an argument to promote a normative conceptualization of civil society which simply does not exist in reality.

In addition, criticisms of "elitism", "association with business interests" and the glorification of civil society against the state have used the example of the earthquake of August 1999, which had raised expectations dramatically about the future role of civil society in Turkey. With the death of some 27000 people, the lack of preparedness by the government and the state was severely criticized throughout the country, and a civil society campaign against the state was initiated, based on the belief that the state could no longer fulfill the tasks it set itself on, due to its backward and corrupt structure. It was claimed that these tasks should be fulfilled by a modern, dynamic and world-integrated civil society, a conceptualization to which the Search and Rescue Association (*Arama Kurtarma Derneği - AKUT*) fit perfectly, due to its urban and elitist make up (Aytekin, 2000: 66). The elitism involved in the increasing praise given to *AKUT* soon became clearer, as major newspapers portrayed *AKUT* as heroes and "the symbol of social change and solidarity" (Balı, 2000: 40). As an organization made up of "pure and uncontaminated youth", *AKUT* was compared with state organizations in a very elitist manner. An excerpt from the newspaper Sabah dated September 25, 1999, for instance, portrays this elitist image in a stark fashion when in its comparison of *AKUT* and the Civil Defense Organization tied to the Ministry of Interior (derogatorily labeled "the state's *AKUT*"). *AKUT* is said to be made up of voluntary university graduates in the high-

income section of society whereas the Civil Defense Organization is made up of high-school graduate civil servants with a low-income, who do not know any foreign languages, have no women members and have moustaches (cited in Balı, 2000: 40).

Another very salient criticism of the popular attitude adopted towards CSOs following the earthquake is the above-mentioned attempt to designate the civil society sphere as one which should take over social services from the state. Indeed, following the tragedy exaggerated expectations began to be formed immediately in the media, and suddenly CSOs were expected to have the answer to all problems (Türkeş, 2000: 48). Aytekin ties this civil society campaign against the state to the neoliberal current in Turkey, by pointing to the fact that the solution presented by certain organizations in full page declarations printed in newspapers was the concept of "governance", a term placed in public administration literature by the New Right (2000: 66) Aytekin also expresses concern about the way in which this attitude gained acceptance in "left-wing intellectuals albeit in a more sophisticated and reserved manner", giving the example of Ömer Laçiner's claims that it is correct and imperative that public services be taken out of the state structure, while branding those against such an idea as "conservatives" (Aytekin, 2000: 66-67). Aytekin notes that differences exist in wanting certain services to be taken out of being public services and the desire to detach these services from the state on condition that they remain public services. However, in terms of political implications, both arrive at the same point, which is that without an in depth debate and development of concepts such as "public space", the consequences of insisting on the detachment of these areas from the state will aid neoliberal policies (Ibid.).

This final point brings us to the contradictions which advocates of a politics based on civil society in Turkey face while promoting civil society as a project to be realized.

4.7 The Misconceptualization of Civil Society in Turkey

Çulhaoğlu argues that a meaningful debate concerning the relationship between the state, civil society and democratization cannot occur in Turkey's left today, because as with their international counterparts, those in the Turkish Left which advocate politics via civil society hold a superficial view of the relationship

between the state and civil society. According to the author, if we are to ask anyone in the left today, whether Turkish or Kurdish, we will receive the following answer: "The state is bad, while civil society is very good; as for democratization, the concept denotes the expansion and strengthening of this very good civil society, in opposition to the state, which is very bad…" (2001: 19). Çulhaoğlu then ties this to what he calls an irresolvable problem in all conceptualizations of civil society:

> This weakness derives from the assumption that the relationship and difference between civil society and the state has a primacy that dominates all types of relationships, contentions and contradictions within the sphere of civil society, and pushes them into a secondary and insignificant position (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 34).

The assumption, then, is that CSOs will collectively question and organize against the state instead of each other (Ibid.: 34).

A deeper look at the way in which the said section of the Turkish Left has been debating the concept, however, shows that such a statement does not do justice to the depth of the arguments concerning the concept of "civil society". Scholars and activists associated with civil society advocacy have debated the issue of "civil society" from very different angles, and none are complacently superficial. Instead, the superficial definition of civil society is a result of the theoretical assumptions acquired in order to formulate a normative definition of civil society, and therefore a trap to which these civil society advocates fall due to their insistence on according normative values to a sphere that is actually historically conditioned by the structures of modernity and in no way a pool of homogenous values. Indeed, the debates revolving around the civil society concept among these scholars display this tension. On the one hand, certain advocates of a politics based on civil society acknowledge the necessity of the cooperation of the state in implementing policies towards democratization and are fully aware of the diversity of CSOs (exemplified by the consensus achieved on the concept of "civil society organizations"-CSOs-as the correct terminology that reflects this diversity), while on the other hand their attempt to formulate "civil society" in a more normative fashion push them to represent civil society in a way that excludes these different interests and voices, in turn distancing their political practice away from "mass politics".

Civil society in Turkey is generally seen as being constituted by "foundations (vakıflar), whose traditions have existed for centuries; the clubs bringing internal migrants from similar areas together in large cities (Hemşeri dernekleri); sectoral associations or chambers (odalar), bar associations (barolar); universities, journalists and trade unions (sendikalar)" (Seçkinelgin, 2004: 173). This relatively inclusive definition of what constitutes civil society in Turkey has been one of the first contradictions in the new left's struggle to promote the sphere as separate from the state and detach it from social relations of production.

The concept of "civil society organizations" as the correct terminology in the Turkish case was introduced by the "Civil Society Organizations Symposiums", the first of which convened on 16-17 December 1994. Interestingly enough however, it was the Turkish bourgeoisie that was the first to act in producing a coordinated effort bringing together certain NGOs under the organization "Third Sector Foundation", which had been established in early 1994 by leading businessmen, among whom were the heads of the two largest capital groups in Turkey, namely Vehbi Koç and Sakıp Sabancı, as well as such well known names in the Turkish business world such as İhsan Doğramacı and Aydın Bolak. The symposiums, therefore, set out with the aim to bring together various groups and foster relationships between these different groups in an atmosphere of good-natured debate and dialogue. This aim is clearly stated in Silier's opening speech to the first symposium, with the call for any civil society grouping to refrain from claiming to represent the whole of CSOs:

> Without giving ground to these types of differences (political-HOA), I believe that a common analysis of the situation and the debating of the ways in which communication among civil society organizations can be developed will help the process along (Tarih Vakfı, 1998:5).

Thus, just as noted above by Çulhaoğlu, this initiative by civil society advocates set out to bring together different classes in Turkish society in a call to coordinate efforts against a common obstacle in front of democratization, namely the state: "It is also known that the state holds a strong, weighted and pervasive effect in social life while social life outside the state is extremely limited, and its development is slow and frequently interrupted" (Tarih Vakfı, 1998: 4). The state-civil society separation has therefore been immediately assumed at the outset of the initiative,

utilizing a discourse subordinating differences in interest among social classes to common action against the state, validating the point that the state-civil society separation has led to the overshadowing of the differences between CSOs in civil society.

Efforts at establishing this discourse met its first contradiction in the question of what was to be included in the "CSO" conceptualization. The research report titled "Leading CSO's" by Aydın Gönel (1998) which was the third and final part to a research project in the context of these symposiums in order to provide empirical data about the types, general structure, goals, activities, financial indicators, etc. of leading CSOs in Turkey, describes the use of the concept of "CSOs" in the research as a deliberate one due to the fact that the concept denotes a more expansive organizational field than such concepts as "third sector", "voluntary organizations", "NGOs" and "non-profit organizations", concepts which only cover associations and foundations. Gönel (1998: 1) explicitly states that the reason for a more expansive concept is the desire to view organized civil society in its totality. This more expansive concept denoted an agreement that chambers and bar associations, to which membership is non-voluntary in that it is required by law, are an important part of civil society, so much so as to be indispensable to an empirical research of civil society in Turkey. Such a requirement according to Gönel is the result of the traditional approach of the state towards civil society in that the former has attempted to encircle and intervene in every aspect of the latter (Ibid.). This analysis should be read as a concession that civil society cannot be considered, let alone researched, without taking into account the intervention of the state in the field: "If we understand CSOs as institutions that are out of the reach of the state and/or local administrations, then taking into consideration the present laws and related statutes, we will have restricted organized civil society to a very narrow area" (Ibid). Yet this is exactly the trap into which certain segments of the Turkish Left ultimately fall. In the seventh symposium of the "CSO Symposiums" series titled "CSO-State Relationships in Turkey on the Road to the European Union" held in 2-3 June, 2000, Silier defends the concept of "CSO" by stating that this concept was established in 1994 with a view of the importance of the separation of civil society from political society in Turkey; in order to attract attention to the emancipatory process based on this separation; to monitor, guide, and take on some of the responsibilities of the state

which in Turkey has been authoritarian and despotic in many instances and unable to achieve democratization (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 29). In the opening speech of the first sitting of the same symposium, Şenatalar, for instance, states:

> For CSO's to be autonomous in their relationship with the state is necessary by definition. CSOs are based on voluntary involvement and are not profit-seeking. A characteristic that is as important is that they are autonomous. Therefore when they start losing their autonomy when under pressure they start losing their essence (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 14).

The contradiction is clear therefore once normative and empirical efforts at defining civil society are compared. The former separates civil society from the state and accords democratizing potential to the whole of civil society thereby instrumentalizing the concept, while the latter understands the state's involvement in civil society and although lamenting this fact, conducts research accordingly. The two are paradoxically part of the same civil society discourse, and the contradiction serves to show the arbitrary nature of efforts at according an inherently normative role to the concept of "CSO".

The seventh symposium is extremely informative as regards the view upheld by certain section of the Turkish Left of the civil society-state relationship in Turkey. Examples of the similarity of assumptions between GCS advocacy and advocates of politics based on civil society in Turkey abound. Although certain meaningful caveats are placed on civil society advocacy in Turkey, the demands made on the basis of these symposiums contradictorily revert to the normative assumptions placed on the term.

One of the most important assumptions shared by civil society advocates in Turkey is that today we are faced with new and global threats due to globalization, and that CSOs, in operating internationally, can alleviate these problems (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 7, 85). Moreover, it is generally accepted that CSOs are an invention of the last quarter of the 20th century, and that although CSOs existed earlier, their novelty today lies in their popularity, ubiquity and importance (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 9). Their importance, according to the speakers at the symposium, is based on the assumption that CSOs hold many advantages over traditional politics and democracy. This argument contends that the reason for the strengthening of CSOs is the insufficiency of classic or representative democracy in dealing with a diversification

of issues in social life. The increasing complexity and identities in social life, as well as increasing demands for participation from a more politicized citizenry, could not find an outlet through which these demands could be represented, thus bringing CSOs to the fore, which are assumed to be bottom-up initiatives to voice these demands and therefore strong where classic democracy has seemed to be lacking (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 11). It is argued that the view that politics is the job of political parties and that the rest is the responsibility of CSOs has been transcended throughout the world and is now obsolete (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 34). CSOs actually bring issues sidelined by traditional politics to the political agenda, thus expanding the political sphere and becoming the voice of those excluded (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 11, 34, 146). Another guiding assumption which follows through from, and indeed is the basis of, the above-mentioned assumptions, is that a certain fundamental change has occurred in the manner of conducting politics as political parties throughout the world are experiencing a crisis of representation due to the supplementation of the traditional fault line of relations of production differentiating the ideological stance of political parties as "left-wing" or "right-wing", with a number of new fault lines such as gender, environment, ethnicity, etc. This assertion bears similarity to one of the fundamental assumption of post-political discourse. The "left-right" opposition is therefore watered down as it becomes more difficult to place these concepts with these new fault lines (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 145-146). The transformation in politics, in turn, is assumed to give way to the more peaceful sphere of civil society, based on dialogue, cooperation and reconciliation, rather than the more violent politics of class struggle. The decrease in the area of state and the weakening of the state and the increase in the power of CSOs is said to bring democratization, while the expansion of protest is accompanied by a de-radicalization of protest, with more "pragmatic demands" taking the place of "the demand to change the system" (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 12). Thus, civil society is portrayed as being separate from the state by definition, and inherently democratic to the extent that it should and is replacing traditional representative forms of democracy. It is also inherently peace oriented, and more pragmatic than what is regarded as an "obsolete" mode of politics based on class struggle.

The implications of these assumptions immediately show themselves in terms of the roles accorded to CSOs today. Two interrelated issues are said to be crucial to

the existence of CSOs, as put forward in the eighth CSO symposium titled "The Role of Civil Society Organizations in the Turkey-EU Integration Process", held on 15-16 December, 2000. The first of these is the issue of "good governance", which is seen as directly related to CSO activity, so much so that it is referred to as related to the reason for the existence of CSOs, due to, once again, the assumption that CSOs are organizations that are established "by citizens who have reached the conclusion that somewhere something is not right" (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 149). Thus the concept of "good governance" is reduced to the participation of CSOs based on voluntary membership. Speaking in the same symposium, Çiçekoğlu, the general secretary of Europe-Turkey Association at the time, argues that the concept of "governance" should be brought on to the agenda of Turkey by CSOs. According to Çiçekoğlu, "good governance" is defined as "the realization of public administration with an open, accountable, participatory and egalitarian approach with a view of the principles of human rights and the rule of law" (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 178). Although Çiçekoğlu goes on to argue that one of the sine qua non's of good governance is the implementation of an egalitarian development plan with the coordinated effort of the state and civil society, the above definition of "good governance" is taken for granted, therefore begging the question of how such a plan can be conceived with the same tone denoting the privatization of the state in terms of the retreat from social service provision envisaged by neoliberal discourse utilized by the World Bank and the IMF.

Besides equating "good governance" with active citizenship, proponents of CSO activity in Turkey advance the assumption that the state-civil society relationship is actually "evolving" from instances in which the state manipulates civil society towards governance, defined in this case as a cooperative relationship between the state and civil society, (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 13). There are a few points through which this assumption can be contested. The first is that in Turkey, the associations' law and civil law have inaugurated increasingly more repressive guidelines for the operation of civil society in Turkey. This is, paradoxically, a point made by Şenatalar immediately after his statement that the relationship between state-civil society is "evolving" towards "governance":

> The first community law in Turkey was ratified in 1909, and because the Turkish Civil Law accepted in 1926 was taken from Switzerland, it brought quite a liberal approach towards associations. For instance Article 54 of this civil law stipulates that associations need not register themselves and obtain approval by doing so. In 1938 a very anti-democratic associations law was accepted, which became more restrictive in 1972, and the 1983 associations law is catastrophically anti-democratic (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 15).

This point is seconded by Gönel, who in his research report identifies the restriction placed on each and every type of CSO in Turkey with the 1983 associations law (Tarih Vakfı, 1998: 3-12). The assumption that the relationship between the state and civil society is "evolving" towards governance, therefore, is unsubstantiated. Furthermore, the question of why such an "evolution" should be a good thing is left unanswered, or rather, is made irrelevant by the assumption that "governance" means cooperation between the state and civil society.

The second issue which is seen as the raison d'etre of civil society, and which can therefore be presented as an example to the way in which advocates of civil society in Turkey narrow the political sphere simultaneously arguing for a more "plural" politics, is that of EU membership. Çiçekoğlu argues, for instance, that it is imperative for CSOs to follow the EU process according to their respective fields of expertise, and "conduct activities towards familiarizing the Turkish public with concepts used in the EU" (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 179). Furthermore, Çiçekoğlu argues that CSOs, instead of becoming a party in certain political and high-level diplomatic debates, in which they cannot be effective anyway, should concentrate on coming together according to their respective fields of expertise on more specific issues that will directly affect peoples lives, and try to work in the same conceptual framework (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 178-179). The assumption is very clear, namely that CSOs are, as a whole, supportive of Turkey's bid to join the EU. Moreover CSOs are reduced to instruments of public relations in the process. Speaking for the Helsinki Citizens Assembly (*Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği – HYD*), Nazan Aksoy similarly argues that "The issue in which we, as civil society, can be most effective, is to open a window to a world in which we redefine ourselves as modern individuals and eradicate the "us-them" distinction", and create an environment of dialogue towards this end" (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 158).

4.8 Contradictory Reserves and Demands

An analysis of the reserves and warnings placed on the usage of the term "civil society" display the high level of consciousness of the issue in Turkey. These warnings only pay lip service however, as they do not figure in the demands made for the future of, and roles given to, civil society in Turkey. One such warning is concerned with the role of the state, and displays a fundamental contradiction in civil society discourse. It is possible to find the concern about the replacement of the state by CSOs voiced repeatedly in civil society literature in Turkey, in the sense that frequent warnings are made against the argument about CSOs taking on the role of the state as provider of social services. Şenatalar, for instance, states:

> Neoliberal ideology, which has been inaugurated or strengthened by globalization, aims to reduce the expenses of the state by narrowing its social services. In this framework, neoliberal ideology is oriented towards according CSOs a new function, responsibility and task. In other words the demand is for the state to abandon its tasks related to education, health and social security as much as possible to CSOs. I believe this to be a very dangerous approach in terms of developing countries with vast social inequalities such as Turkey (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 15).

Ahmet İnsel similarly argues that it is wrong and dangerous for CSOs to say "there is no need for the state, we will manage" in the field of social politics.

> This is an extension of a neoliberal project. To say "we do not need the state, we will manage", is the privatization of social policy and is an ultra-liberal project. Such initiatives by CSOs will mean becoming instruments of an ultra-liberal project…For instance, to tell the truth, I strongly disagree with the attitude of certain CSO's in Turkey on education; the opening and complete operation of a school from A to Z. In the end, such efforts end up engendering elite private schools (İnsel, 2005: 17).

In this sense it is argued that the eradication of social inequalities is the job of the state, and that although cooperation can be conducted with CSOs and the sphere of governance can be expanded, the primary actor responsible for this task is the parliament and governments (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 16). This very important reserve has in turn led to the concession that today CSOs cannot take the place of classic politics (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 15; Keyman, 2004: 11). The point conceded here, namely that

classic politics cannot and should not be replaced by CSO politics, contradicts with demands towards the decrease in the size of the state due to the fact that it begs the question of how the state can keep up its traditional role of providing social services when reduced in size, as well as contradicting with the assumption that classic or representative politics (with political parties as protagonists) is insufficient and obsolete. Interestingly enough, the same view is voiced by *ÇYDD*, one of the associations upholding the "Kemalist ideology" seen to be detrimental to pluralism in civil society by authors such as Seçkinelgin quoted above. *ÇYDD* argues that although it criticizes the state when it disagrees with its policies and understands that diminishing public trust towards the state is a result of certain people within the state, it

> does not judge the whole of the state, disregard it, and does not contemplate a society without a state. Because in the end of the day, state organs are used in solving the problems caused by the deficiencies, wrongs and injustices caused by the state. In other words it is again up to state organs to fix injustices and set justice on the right path (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 61).

The fact that advocacy of civil society in Turkey is reluctant to forego the state is thus clearly seen. At the level of service provision and implementation, the civil society advocates clearly concede the necessity of the state, and indeed, view these areas as the "job" of the state. In turn, this leads civil society advocates into arguing that CSOs cannot replace classic politics, which contradicts with the initial presentation of classic politics as obsolete. One final example will be useful in tying this caveat with those placed on cooperation between CSOs. For instance, in opposition to the argument that CSOs should acquire or demand state funds as a "last resort", stated in a report produced by a workshop held at the end of the seventh symposium, Silier argues that state resources should not be seen as the "last resort", due to the fact that they are the resources of the people anyway (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 89). Furthermore, Silier argues that not using these resources for moral reasons would "result in nothing less than gifting a massive group of resources to clientalistic, reactionary and conservative CSOs" (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 90). This reserve speaks volumes. Besides the implication that the state cannot be disregarded due to the fact that it holds the "people's resources", the sphere of CSOs is no longer presented as a group of democratizing actors, but rather as a field of contesting ideas,

or at least a field that is split between "progressive" and "reactionary" actors. In fact, Silier, later on in the symposium, warns against attempts to make use of CSOs as a new field for the strong state and the private sector, and he gives the example of the Third Sector Foundation, which he accuses of being an institution representing the interests of the state and the private sector and for being "an activity based on handing out plackets to state elites at the Opera building in Ankara" (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 109).

Serious warnings have also been voiced by the new left against elitism in CSOs. Sezai Hızır, talking on behalf of Habitat and Agenda 21 Youth Association, argues:

> In many meetings the same people come together and we make many assessments, but we are not organizations that work side by side with society. This is why, I believe, this aspect of civil society should be questioned. Just as we question the "elite state", we should also discuss the concept of "elite civil society" and in its place bring to the agenda a CSO concept with a wider base, more open to the public, shaped by the problems of society and one which acts together with society (Tarih Vakfı, 2001: 21).

Belge also mentions the elitism issue as one of the serious problems which exist within CSOs. One of these problems, according to Belge, is the overwhelmingly middle class make up of these organizations which imply an exclusivist organization, as opposed to political parties: "In other words, the political parties which we shun today, were able to create a much greater amount of communication and deliberation. Most of the NGOs I see today act as though the poor sections of society do not exist" (2003: 22).

4.9 Conclusion: The Dangers of the Misconceptualization

The conceptualization of civil society by certain Leftists in Turkey is based on assumptions, which are arbitrarily defined and then taken for granted when prescribing a normative role for civil society in Turkey. The main fault line which paves the way for these assumptions is the imagined separation between the state and civil society, which has become part of the civil society discourse around the world. The result is the creation of a false dichotomy, which results in the attribution of

certain characteristics to each sphere, and overlooks the transactions between the two spheres:

> As a result of a dichotomy created between two spheres of a social whole, fundamental processes which in actual fact affect both spheres and therefore make the two similar as well as create mutual interaction and transaction are relegated in importance. The envisaged dichotomy, inevitably, results in the attribution of certain absolute characteristics to each sphere. For example, while civil society is characterized on the basis of voluntarism, democracy, conciliation and autonomy, the dynamic of the state is reduced to tying public space to the system and rules in an egalitarian manner (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 38).

A holistic approach may better serve to explain the development of civil society in Turkey. By holistic, what is meant here is the need to take into consideration not only the interrelation between the state and civil society, but also between the expansion of capitalism in Turkey and the specific way this has affected state discourse in Turkey as well as generated specific issues, which have in turn led to a specific relation between the state and civil society. This does not entail, however, the relativization of the Turkish case in terms of the fundamental social relations of production. Just as Yalman warns against the mystification of the Turkish state as a phenomenon with its own rationality in that such a view serves to overlook class struggle and instead creates a misleading state vs. society approach, Çulhaoğlu warns against the emphasis on the uniqueness of Turkey in the framework of an orientalist paradigm (2001: 21). The biggest problem with this perception is, according to Çulhaoğlu:

> its failure to see the primacy of a certain form of production even if it contains specificities, as well as its failure to accord importance to the existence of modern social classes characteristic of this form of production. This being the case, social transformation projects that revolve around one of the modern social classes is, like the concept of class struggle, taken off the agenda, or at least seen as "irrelevant" for the society concerned (Çulhaoğlu, 2001: 22).

However, Turkey has lived through a process of capitalization in full, and although the process has included the specificities of "late modernization", it has engendered a certain form of production and modern classes characteristic of this form. Bearing this point in mind, the specificities of capitalist expansion in "late

modernizing" countries can be evaluated, such as outside interference and dependency on outside forces, state interventionism and "social engineering" (Ibid.: 24). One of the most important advantages of such a holistic view is its acceptance of social relations of production in capitalism as a reality, as well as seeing the specific ways in which this form of production takes in "late modernizing" countries, both points being integral to the analysis of civil society in Turkey. For capitalism in Turkey has developed through the "social engineering" of the state, which has attempted a "panoply of hegemonic strategies", to use Yalman's phrase, in order to maintain the relevant modernizing discourse. Therefore, just as the Turkish state intervened in political processes and democracy with its coercive apparatus, it has also intervened in the sphere of civil society. The Turkish bourgeoisie, with its way opened after the 1980 military coup, was also able to organize in civil society and promote the sphere within the new "globalization/New Left/de-radicalized politics" discourse. Thus, civil society became a sphere of ideological struggle.

Civil society advocacy by sections of the Turkish Left, by creating a dichotomy between the state and civil society, demonizes the former and glorifies the latter, to ill effect. An excellent example of this glorification of civil society can be seen in the internet questionnaire by CYDD[7], which asks: "What do you think is the contribution of CSOs to democratization?" The options are as listed below:

- It reflects the voice of society.
- It regularly monitors the state and government.
- It helps individual development.
- It establishes a balance between the state and the public.

Interestingly enough, none of the answer options have anything negative to say. In fact, it is assumed that CSOs aid democratization, and all the answers can be true. The question is therefore meaningless, and reflective of the CSO discourse in Turkey, which indirectly becomes non-conducive to pluralism. An understanding of civil society as a field of ideological contestation is the first step towards a truly pluralist civil society paradigm.

[7] Internet poll: taken from: http://www.cydd.org.tr, retrieved on 2 June 2006

Here an important point can be made about a serious strategic error into which civil society advocates in the Turkish Left fall into, namely the reconfiguration, or rather, the de-radicalization of politics which has enabled a "passive revolution" to be formed in Turkey, the basis of which has been an indirect rapprochement between the New Right and certain Left wing perspectives in Turkey, reflecting the similar situation in debates over GCS. The roots of this strategic mistake can actually be found in the "post-political discourse", the variants of which have been discussed above. All share the emphasis on the abandoning of "ideological passions" in order to bring an end to the antagonism in relationships between different identities (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 664). In a country plagued by civil strife this indeed seems like a noble effort. Yet as Erdoğan and Üstüner note, this also translates into a "reverse authoritarianism", as it substitutes official intolerance with "repressive tolerance", "exclusive-oppressive strategy" with "encompassing-reconciling" strategy (Ibid.). To better understand what this may mean, it is worth looking at Türkeş's (2000: 50) analogy between CSOs and internet websites. The author's prognostication for the future is based on a depoliticized society in which CSOs form the most rational ordering of public space. The social structure targeted by the new world order is explained through the internet, which is, according to Türkeş, a simulative model, in the sense that it is a virtual world in which social interest is shifted to non-poiltical areas. CSOs have a similar function. They display the same democratic view, but in fact rearrange the type of relationship between people. It becomes possible to represent every difference in society (color, ethnicity, areas of interest) with a separate CSO, independent from each other but rivals, just like websites. These types of CSOs do not reach out to you if you do not reach out to them, and do not see anything other than their field of interest, nor do they want to (Ibid.).

The problem here is that: "The conciliatory politics and state model on which post-political discourse is built rejects the irreducible antagonistic characteristic of political power relations" (Erdoğan & Üstüner, 2005: 665). In other words, politics cannot be based purely on non-antagonistic relationships. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that the state is not necessarily an impartial referee, but rather one of the main areas of struggle among social forces (Ibid.: 665). Aytekin notes the historical role and continuing potential of the state to broaden services of

redistribution, a phenomenon which came about during the time of the "welfare state" due to an organized struggle against the appropriating classes (2000: 68). Categorically rejecting the state as an area of struggle, however, as civil society discourse in Turkey as well as throughout the world is doing today, also brings with it the rejection of the services the state can be made to provide to the majority of the population who require such aid. As Aytekin notes it is contradictory to demand that the state pulls away from the public service area when there is a market willing to fill the void, as well as a serious strategic mistake. Today there is no alternative to the state in the implementation of public services. The example of the state's (Ministry of Health) ability to mobilize the vast number of doctors during the earthquake or exempt earthquake victims from fees in private hospitals is given (Ibid: 69). Although the state may be used as an oppressive apparatus, it can also provide redistributive services such as the minimum wage, which is a lifeline for many during the imposition of neoliberal economic policies. The struggle should aim for a more efficient provision of these services by the state rather than argue for weakening the state (Ibid: 70). The state needs to be understood and analyzed historically, as a sphere of struggle which is constantly redefined changes shape. The state is not an ahistorical structure whose boundaries are definitively drawn, and which possesses its own rationality and aims with unchanging orientations. Rather, it is a form taken by social relations. The main problem with the Turkish state today is not that it is growing too large or that it is a mere instrument to capital, but that it has been formed according to the interests, demands and needs of capital. This is also the reason for why the state is weak on some issues and strong in others (Ibid: 71).

This points to the possibility of conducting a struggle for democratization with the view that placing all hope on a ideologically contested terrain such as civil society, sections of which are instrumentalized by the state and capital, may be the wrong strategy to follow. This struggle for democratization must include the demand for an increase in the scope and efficiency of the social services provided by the state, and grasp the risk in placing hope on conceptions that are yet to be developed through public debate such as the idea of a "public space" which exists outside of the state and economy. Failing to do so will ultimately aid neoliberal "governance" policies which emphasize the privatization of the state.

Conclusion

Throughout history, the relationship between state, market, and civil society has been a dynamic and overlapping one. None of the three spheres are or ever have been immune from the effects of the other spheres, and indeed it is difficult to demarcate where one begins and another ends. Yet in the wake of the Cold War, an effort was made on both sides of the political spectrum to simplify the complex web of relations that have existed within and among these spheres. Doubtless different reasons lay behind this simplification. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, for instance, the New Right capitalized on its victory through its promotion of neoliberal ideology and its elevation of the forces of the free-market to a god-like status. The price to pay for obstructing the forces of the free-market was economic recession, while the alternative to the free-market was authoritarianism. The state was therefore a separate sphere from the market, an alien sphere which could only do harm to the functioning of a perfect mechanism. Once left to its own devices, the market would ensure the democratization of society. With the incorporation of the concept of "globalization" to the neoliberal discourse, market rule was imposed on national-states as a global imperative. Indeed, the state-civil society distinction took on a global character as the state was transformed into a more subservient actor in world politics while the structural power of transnational capital grew. On the other hand certain sections of the Left, disillusioned with the Soviet experience, created a discourse which glorified civil society and demonized the state. "GCS" was championed as the new progressive actor in world politics in place of the working class. This section of the Left thus drew a similar distinction between the state and civil society with that of the New Right. It did not equate the market with inherently progressive tendencies, but rather attributed these tendencies to civil society. The glorification of civil society took the form of assuming that it represented a sphere for democracy, pluralism and civility. A fundamental shift in the way in which politics was visualized formed the basis for such a normative definition of civil

society. Advocates of GCS argued that civil society was a sphere of democratic deliberation between different groups, and that it actually taught these groups to be tolerant and understanding towards different groups and interests, both of which had proliferated with the end of the stifling political atmosphere of the Cold War and national level politics.

It has been argued in this thesis that the state-civil society distinction has led to a conceptually misleading and politically disabling discourse. Naturally, neoliberalism took the opportunity to incorporate civil society in its aim to transform the state, and the Left fell into the trap of indirectly enabling this strategy as a result of its acceptance of the state as an outmoded, war-making and authoritarian entity opposed to democratization and peace. In fact, the assumed state-civil society dichotomy misleadingly portrayed the state-civil society relationship as zero-sum. Such a view implied that both spheres were homogenous entities locked in an ahistorical opposition to one another. The corollary of this was the refusal to acknowledge some civil society organizations, which did not fit in to the "civil", "democratic" and "pluralist" conceptualization of a normatively defined civil society. Yet various organizations have existed in civil society which have not given up their goals of taking over state power (which the said section of the Left had long since rejected in order to create an equal footing among different groups) and their belief in imposing their truths on others. Nor is it possible to deny that certain organizations continue to have close links with the state and the market. Proponents of civil society thus faced the contradiction of denying the legitimacy of such organizations that did not fit their own arbitrary definition of civil society while upholding the principle of pluralism.

The thesis has aimed to show the implications of this normative definition of civil society, the most important of which being the deradicalization of politics, which has in turn become one of the most important basis for the establishment of a common ground between the advocates of a new type of politics based on the civil society discourse and the New Right discourse. This has come about due to the failure of the former to take into consideration the irreducible antagonistic characteristic of power relations in civil society. Once again, this can be seen as a misconceptualization that has originated from the separation of civil society from the state and the market, which has blinded advocates of GCS (or civil society) to the

ways in which civil society has been affected by the structures of modernity with which it has existed in a dialectical relationship, namely the states system and capitalist relations of production. Advocates of GCS, however, have redefined the concept of civil society by attributing it a sense of purity in the sense that it came to be regarded as uncontaminated by the undemocratic ambitions of the state and the market, not to mention groups that have either been tied to these structures or which aim to overthrow the existing political regime. Basically, it can be argued that the failure to view civil society as a sphere of ideological struggle in which attempts at hegemony and counter-hegemony exist side by side has left those relying on the civil society discourse for a new type of politics unguarded against the incorporation of the normative discourse of civil society by neoliberalism, and has precluded the possibility of collective action against neoliberal exploitation through a strategy aiming to democratize the nation-state.

In elaboration of these arguments, the first chapter of the thesis has dealt with the discourse and practice of neoliberalism in order to set a background for the thesis. The rationale and the political context of the rise of neoliberalism is explained with reference to the assumptions held by what has generally been come to known as the "Washington Consensus". Hence, the policy prescriptions of this "consensus" for national-states, the rising structural power of capital which has made it possible for neoliberal policies to expand, and the internationalization of production which has resulted from this rise in structural power (exemplified in the increase in trade, financial flows and speculative pressure, and multinational corporations) were critically examined. Taken together, these developments have meant a shift in the balance of power in favor of capital against national governments and national labor movements. It was argued that the expansion of neoliberalism and the rise of the "New Right" as an alternative to welfare capitalism could in no way be seen as a "natural" process. This was done through indicating specific actors and circumstances that have allowed such an expansion: the efforts of a "transnational" elite of opinion formers; the political decline of the left in the North and of non-capitalist forms of development in the South; and the Structural Adjustment Programs imposed on periphery states by international financial institutions. The implications of neoliberal transformations on states, classes, and democracy has been outlined in order to show the three dimensions through which neoliberalism has

consolidated its strength and weakened that of representative institutions and collective action, and therefore to display the regressive effects of these transformations in all three dimensions. The chapter progressed with an account of the incorporation of the concept of "globalization" into the neoliberal discourse, which was initiated with a brief discussion of the globalization debate with the aim of showing a certain lack of emphasis in these debates on the ways in which neoliberalism as a discourse has been empowered by the concept of globalization. This empowerment has been through the portrayal of globalization in what can almost be called a metaphysical manner, in the sense that it is painted as inevitable and beneficial. The chapter went on to explain the reasons behind the inauguration of what has been called the "second phase of global neoliberalism", with an emphasis on the acceptance of the neoliberal ideology of the usefulness of the state in helping the neoliberal ideology penetrate further into society. The expansion of the resulting "disciplinary neoliberalism" has then been explained through what Stephen Gill has called "new constitutionalism", or rather the attempt to consolidate the discourse of neoliberalism revolving around proposals that emphasize market efficiency, discipline and confidence, economic policy credibility and consistency, as well as a limitation on democratic decision-making processes, in quasi-constitutional regional arrangements such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement or the European Union. The chapter concluded with a call to deconstruct neoliberal globalization by liberating the term "globalization" from its association with neoliberalism through a historically informed view of what it denotes. This is done by viewing globalization as the latest chain in the expansion of capitalism rather than a natural condition, by emphasizing its uneven and hierarchical character rather than seeing it as a benign universalization of economic prosperity and universal values, and by underlining the fact that globalization was not a finalized process but an ongoing tendency.

The second chapter has attempted to identify the increasing popularity of GCS following the Cold War within the ranks of the New Right and some Leftists, as well as to explain the reasons for such popularity with reference to two seemingly opposed dimensions. The first dimension was described as that of the legitimacy crisis of "neoliberal globalization", and the view of GCS as an instrument in glossing over the increasingly blatant democracy deficit due to the restructuring of the state and the internationalization of production. GCS has been characterized as the

representative of a "global polity", as well as a global actor which was suitably shaped to find global solutions to global problems, something which the state and the traditional liberal-democratic parliamentarian system could not possibly accomplish. The state vs. society view which formed the base of the GCS discourse has therefore been an essential key to the compatibility of the concept with anti-statist and anti-democratic neoliberal ideology. The second dimension discussed in this chapter was concerned with the "bottom-up" advocacy of civil society. A certain section of the Left, disappointed with the Soviet experience and watching the expansion of neoliberalism throughout the world, argued for the adaptation of protest to the "new" and "globalized" world. The reinvention of the concept of "civil society" was then described, with an emphasis on the arguments based on the differentiation drawn between the state, the economy and civil society; the attribution of an emancipatory role for GCS based on this differentiation; and the change in the conduct of politics that has emerged in the form of a rejection of the working class as the main actor in the process of emancipation as well as the rejection of a perspective of power, to be substituted by multiple actors and multiculturalism respectively.

The chapter continued with a detailed account of what I have called the "glorification of civil society", which can be summarized as the attribution of innate and progressive characteristics to the arbitrarily and ahistorically defined concept of GCS. It was argued that the literature on GCS was mostly based on the assumption that the state-system was defunct and that GCS as a new actor in the political scene held the answers to the problems of a new era. The glorification of GCS was therefore discussed with reference to the assumed virtues of GCS. The manner in which these virtues were described, it has been argued, was a good example of the glorification of a concept, as well as an example of how, because of the emancipatory role issued to GCS, the concept has come to denote a deradicalized form of politics. The way in which the lack of an agreed definition of GCS as well as the "taming" of INGOs (put forwards as the principle actors within GCS) were argued to be advantages rather than disadvantages were given as examples of how the advocates of GCS as a "project to be realized" have groped for answers to the theoretical and practical deficiencies of such a formulation. It was argued that the refusal to understand GCS as a sphere of ideological struggle fragmented by existing relations of production and power, has allowed neoliberalism to fit the concept into

its restructuring of state-society relations through such formulations as "social capital", denoting the downsizing of the state and the privatization of social services through transfer of these responsibilities to INGOs at the international level and NGOs at the national level.

The chapter then placed GCS into context. In other words it described and explained the growth of "civil society" as an ongoing process taking into consideration its dialectical relationship with the modern states system and capitalist relations of production, in the sense that has been constituted by and constitutive of these structures, as well as simultaneously undermining and reinforcing them. It was argued that attempts to portray the concept as new did not stand up to historical scrutiny. Moreover, it was argued that certain criticisms towards the concept of GCS did not make sense once GCS was placed into historical and sociological context, which was based on the rejection of GCS as an autonomous and homogenous global actor. Instead, an argument was made for conceptualizing GCS as being reflective of today's social relations of power, exemplified by the legitimation of the demise of sovereign equality between states by certain international humanitarian organizations (thus paving the way for the extension of the strength of the most powerful states) along with the media hype to which they needed to conform in order to propagate their views.

The way in which GCS advocacy became the basis of a rapprochement between a section of the Left and the New Right through the instrumentalization and reinvention of GCS from both sides was explained with an emphasis on the strategic mistake to which GCS advocates within the ranks of the Left fell into. Essentially, it was argued that the glorification of civil society has been created through a discourse of the rejection of collective action rather than political participation, exemplified by concepts such as "Anti-Politics" that have been pronounced in order to reject the perspective of attaining state power. The manner in which such discourse was politically disabling has been outlined with special emphasis on the implications of a rejection of the existence of collective political interests, namely ineffectiveness in so far as political legitimacy was no longer based on building support for a certain cause in society but from the sanctity of the movement's social isolation, as well as elite advocacy and personal solipsism that has emerged as a result. Moreover, it was argued that the political sphere has been narrowed down in accordance with the

rejection of conceptualizations of the "good life", a term seen to be inimical to the existence of a broad range of lifestyles and the "modular" individual.

The third chapter picked up from this analysis and weighed it in relation to the Turkish case. A certain relativist paradigm was described as being the basis of anti-statism in certain Leftist circles in Turkey, as well as the basis of the "mutant civil society" conceptualization that was developed in relation to civil society in Turkey. Basically, the view (as defended by the relativist paradigm) that a civil society has not been able to gain an autonomous existence in Turkey due to the belief that an autonomous bourgeois sphere could not be created as in Western industrialized countries was problematized by pointing out the uneven expansion of capitalism and the specific qualities this expansion acquired in the Turkish social formation. Examples that were given to the specific way in which attempts at the consolidation of capitalism in Turkey included the attempts by the military and the state to consolidate capitalism and the position of the bourgeoisie as a hegemonic class vis-à-vis the laboring classes; the perennial fear of the bourgeoisie exemplified by its refusal to forego its short-term economic/corporate interests for the creation of such "expansive hegemony" thus having to do with "passive revolution" instead; and the favoring of CSOs created by the bourgeoisie and the repression of the rest. However, the relativist paradigm has been embraced by advocates of civil society making up a section of the Left in Turkey, who following the brutal repression of dissident voices by the military regime that led a coup in 1980, turned towards civil society as an emancipatory actor, which in turn led to the generalizations and simplifications involved with the state-civil society dichotomy. Once again, assumptions concerning the potentialities and characteristics of civil society and its promotion as a "project to be realized" led to a different conceptualization of politics, which has been exemplified in the post-political discourses that emerged in the 1990s. This discourse has been displayed in such manifestations as Second Republicanism, the Medina Pact and Post-liberalism, all of which have reduced politics to the acknowledgement of the other, rejected "ideological" and antagonistic politics as illegitimate and restricted politics to the acknowledgment of social isolation. The chapter then went on to describe the ways in which the theoretical problems and critical implications of a normative conceptualization of civil society (also clearly seen in conceptualizations of "GCS") was reflected in the Turkish case.

In opposition to such a view, civil society in Turkey was taken into consideration as a field of contesting ideological views that both undermined and reinforced the state. This was illustrated through examples in post-coup Turkish history in which civil society played a prominent role. The narrowing of the political sphere has been a symptom of the way in which civil society advocates within the Turkish Left portrayed civil society, in the sense that "governance" as a administrative truism as well as "EU membership" as a political path were sanctified by certain CSOs claiming to harness the "pluralist" characteristics of civil society in Turkey.

As a conclusion, it can be argued that the theoretical and practical traps into which civil society advocacy has fallen into today have been the result of an arbitrary and ahistorical definition of civil society based on the assumed dichotomy between the state and civil society. In order not to fall into these traps, it is necessary to define civil society historically and sociologically, and to accordingly conceive it as a sphere of ideological struggle in which hegemony is simultaneously exercised (or continuously attempted) and opposed. This will be a crucial first step to prevent the glorification of the concept of civil society. It is important to note that the thesis at hand does not propose the rejection of civil society advocacy altogether, but rather insists on placing civil society and conceptualizations such as "GCS" into context. This basically means promoting a deeper understanding of the way in which civil society is historically intertwined with the states system and capitalist relations of production, as well as the necessity to take into considerations differences among organizations within civil society. For instance, while the activities of CSOs providing humanitarian aid is at first sight commendable, it is necessary both to analyze the elements behind the administering of aid as well as the specific character of the CSO concerned. It may well be the case (and has been the case in history) that a certain CSO is better funded by a neoliberal administration due to its assured support for the conditionalities that are presented to the country (or community) in need for the reception of humanitarian aid. Such conditionalities may call for neoliberal policies which dictate the termination of social provision by the state, in which case the problem may be exacerbated.

By placing civil society into context, therefore, it may be possible to better understand the opportunities for the creation of a counter-hegemonic struggle. A further area of study may be able to formulate a balance (or perhaps a division of

labor) between collective political action and CSOs within this counter-hegemonic struggle. For no matter what the criticisms directed towards the present conceptualization of civil society by the Left, leaving civil society to be manipulated as a hollowed out concept instrumentalized for the covering up of the democracy deficit that has surfaced following neoliberal attempts at transforming the state cannot be the answer.

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