

NIETZSCHE'S CONCEPT OF PAIN

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ABDULLAH ONUR AKTAŞ

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Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam  
Head Of the Philosophy Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam (METU,PHIL) \_\_\_\_\_

Doç.Dr. Halil Turan (METU,PHIL) \_\_\_\_\_

Yar. Doç. Dr. Ertuğrul Rufayi Turan (AÜ, DTCF) \_\_\_\_\_

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## **ABSTRACT**

### NIETZSCHE'S CONCEPT OF PAIN

Aktaş, Abdullah Onur

M.S., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam

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This thesis analyzes pain with respect to Nietzsche's Dionysus-Crucified distinction. This distinction, which Nietzsche underlies, reveals his philosophical project. The meaning of pain is at the core point of this distinction. These two deities symbolizes attitudes towards life and pain in it. Dionysus represents the affirmation of becoming and tragic wisdom; and Crucified (Christ) represents despise and escape from life or ascetic ideals. In this sense, the dissertation will first trace Nietzsche's world view. Then the following discussions will present a detailed analysis of ascetic ideals (and their genealogical roots), and tragic wisdom from the perspective of Nietzsche for consideration.

Keywords: Dionysus (tragic wisdom), Crucified (ascetic ideals), Pain, Life

## ÖZ

### NIETZSCHE'NİN ACI KAVRAMI

Aktaş, Abdullah Onur

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu çalışma Nietzsche'nin acı kavramını, onun Dionisos-İsa ayrımına dayanarak incelemiştir. Nietzsche'nin altını çizdiği bu ayrım, aynı zamanda onun felsefi projesini de açığa vurur. Bu ayrımın merkezinde “acı” ya yüklenen anlamlar vardır. Bu iki ilah hayata ve onun getirdiği acılara karşı tutumu sembolize ederler. Dionisos hayatın sürekli değişen doğasının onaylanmasını ve trajik bilgeliği ifade eder; İsa ise bu dünyanın hor görülmesini, öte dünyalardan medet umulmasını ve çileci idealleri temsil eder. Tüm bu söylenenlerin ışığında, tez, öncelikle Nietzsche'nin dünya görüşünü sunacak. Sonraki bölümlerde çileci ideal (bunların kaynakları) ve trajik bilgelik ayrımları sırasıyla tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Dionisos (trajik bilgelik), İsa (çileci idealler), Acı, Hayat

To My Mother

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION: QUESTIONS CONCERNING MEANING OF PAIN FOR NIETZSCHE

“- Have I been understood? - *Dionysus versus the Crucified...*”<sup>1</sup> asked Nietzsche in his last book as last words. His last words provide a key to penetrate his whole philosophy.

This contains two deities that were subject to terrible pain. The first one is torn into pieces and the other died on the cross. But, their difference has nothing to do with their martyrdom as Nietzsche says.<sup>2</sup> The essential point lies in the meaning of their pains. They symbolize different life views: these can be named as *tragic wisdom* and the *ascetic ideals*. One represents existence as becoming without any goal but affirms it and the other represents an innocent on the cross which is an objection to life. He asks whether a Christian meaning or a Dionysian?<sup>3</sup>

The Dionysus and Crucified distinction, which Nietzsche underlies, reveals his philosophical project. *The meaning of pain* is at the core point of this distinction. the “Crucified” symbolizes the denial of the world of becoming and sensations. The world of becoming is evil for a Christian meaning, therefore it fingers to a reality beyond this world of becoming. Dionysus symbolizes the affirmation of such an existence. Existence is becoming and becoming necessitates pain for Nietzsche.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> EH XIV:9 (Abbreviations to Nietzsche's work are given at page 69)

<sup>2</sup> “Dionysus versus the “Crucified”: there you have the antithesis. It is *not* a difference in regard to their martyrdom-it is a difference in the meaning of it. Life itself, its eternal fruitfulness and recurrence, creates torment, destruction, the will to annihilation. In other case, suffering – the “Crucified as the innocent one”- counts as an objection to life, as a formula for its condemnation.” WP 1052

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> This will be discussed in the second part of the dissertation

A highest state of affirmation of existence is conceived from which the highest degree of pain cannot be excluded: the *tragic-Dionysian state*.<sup>5</sup>

Or in another passage he says:

The psychology of the orgiastic as an overflowing feeling of life and strength, where even pain still has the effect of a stimulus, gave me the key to the concept of *tragic feeling*<sup>6</sup>

In the *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche gives further insights for the investigation of the place of pain in his philosophy. He shows pain as a necessary part of future, becoming, growth and resembles it to a woman's pains of pregnancy.

All the details about the acts of procreation, pregnancy, and birth inspired the highest and most solemn feelings. In the doctrines of the mysteries, *pain* is pronounced holy: the 'woes of a woman in labour' sanctify pain in general, - all becoming and growth, everything that guarantees the future involves pain...<sup>7</sup>

In this passage that I quoted above, Nietzsche gives the essential features of his philosophy. All of this is called *Dionysus*.<sup>8</sup> Nietzsche sees procreation and growth as the holy path to life and Christianity as throwing filth to life's origin with its *ressentiment*.

The word 'Dionysus' means all of this: I do not know any higher symbolism than this *Greek* symbolism of the Dionysian. It gives religious expression to the most profound instinct of life, directed towards the future of life, the eternity

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<sup>5</sup> WP 853

<sup>6</sup> TI X:5

<sup>7</sup> TI X: 4

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

of life, - the pathway to life, procreation, as the *holy* path. . . It was Christianity, with its fundamental *ressentiment against* life that first made sexuality into something unclean, it threw *filth* on the origin, on the presupposition of our life.<sup>9</sup>

It is now relative clear that the tragic wisdom and ascetic ideal distinction -in other words, Dionysus and Crucified difference- are different attitudes towards pain. But “what is pain” or “why there must be pain” for Nietzsche are the questions that one has to confront before one discusses these different attitudes.

So what is pain? A person, who is a little bit acquainted with Nietzsche’s philosophy, knows that he never says “this is what I meant with ...” So, it is necessary to see the general context of his philosophy and man as a whole. Not only pain but almost every fact is subject to interpretation for him. Pain does not have a single meaning but this does not mean that it is impossible to find the features of this experience. Pain or painful experience for human beings is the reaction to the disturbance of the equilibrium.

The really specific thing in pain is always the protracted shock, the lingering vibrations of a terrifying *choc* in the cerebral center of the nervous system:- one does not really suffer from the cause of pain (any sort of injury, for example), but from the protracted disturbance of equilibrium that occurs as a result of the *choc*.<sup>10</sup>

In this context, we have to answer the questions: what are human beings? Why is there no equilibrium? Is equilibrium (or stability) not possible in order to avoid pain? These questions find their answers if one confronts with Nietzsche’s world view. Here at least some understanding of

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> WP 699

his ontology is necessary.<sup>11</sup>

Nietzsche's world, *the Dionysian world*, is nothing but "will to power."<sup>12</sup> With his words: the world viewed from inside, the world defined and described by its "intelligible character"—it would be simply "will to power" and nothing else. —<sup>13</sup> What we have is a monstrous -though finite- sea of forces that struggle with each other for more power and give birth to new formations and deformations continuously.

And do you know what "the world" is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; . . . a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms<sup>14</sup>

There is this eternal movement of the totality of forces and there is no equilibrium in the whole universe. This leads to the fact that everything has to change, lose its form. So, there is a perpetual motion and formations in this world. Neither universe nor the formations in it reach to a stable dead point. The universe has no end, no final state.

Human beings are not free from this changing nature of the world. Man is also a tremendous constellation of forces that react to the changes. In this sense, pain is a necessary part of human life that changes and flows.<sup>15</sup> *The problem is an attitude problem:* attitude towards pain in existence shapes the life attitudes. One can affirm pain for the sake of change and growth and

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<sup>11</sup> This will be the question of concern for the next chapter.

<sup>12</sup> WP 1067

<sup>13</sup> BGE 36

<sup>14</sup> WP 1067

<sup>15</sup> If change and becoming is inevitable, it is also inevitable to be subject to pain at some point in our lives.

affirm life as it is or one can try to deny it and save his/her comfort.

At this point, one may ask: is the body or soul subject to pain? Pain is generally thought in terms of an experience that living organisms are subject to and it is separated into two forms for human beings: physical pain or psychological pain. This leads to the differentiation of body and mind: one may say “it is my body that feels pain” or “it is my soul that feels pain.” But, in a philosophical context, it is of course not that easy to answer this question with such a separation; because, the following classical problems of body-mind arise, like: How to draw the borders between the physical and psychological? Shall we separate these two? Does mind exist as a real feature of the world? etc. Nietzsche would answer to such questions saying that all mental processes are actually organic and then relate this question with body.

Your little intelligence, my brother, which you call ‘spirit’, is also an instrument of your body, a little instrument and toy of your great intelligence. You say ‘I’ and you are proud of this word. But greater than this- although you will not believe in it – is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say ‘I’ but performs ‘I’.<sup>16</sup>

According to Nietzsche the whole body thinks, and interprets. As it is said, the title “pain” may lead the reader to the questions of philosophy of mind at first sight. Yet, if we just try to discuss Nietzsche’s concept of pain reducing the problem to the body-mind problem level, I claim that this may lead to miss some essential points of his philosophy. Nietzsche does not simply accept that things, enduring things, body-mind, subject-object, organic-inorganic, doer-deed distinctions exist.<sup>17</sup> First of all, the question,

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<sup>16</sup> Z I:4

<sup>17</sup> WP 634, WP474, GS110

what feels pain, is an ontological question. To gain an insight about this question, it is vital to understand “what is that” or “what is there” for Nietzsche. In this sense, Nietzsche’s world view or his ontology is also important. In his ontology, he introduces the term “*pathos*” as a world principle. The term has several translations like suffering, experience, emotion, the scene of suffering etc. but the meaning of the word is essentially painful action or destruction that is the essential part of the tragedies.<sup>18</sup> What creates tension in the tragedies is this painful action. The pains of Prometheus whose liver is eaten by an eagle, or Oedipus who takes her mother as wife, kills his father and makes his eyes blind with a knife are just some examples of the brutal pains that happen in tragedies. As the most elemental fact of the world, Nietzsche chooses this word. It is in a sense very meaningful because the world is actually a *tragic world* for him.<sup>19</sup>

The will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos* --the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge—<sup>20</sup>

In this respect, the second chapter of the dissertation will deal with Nietzsche’s ontology to represent what human beings are and why pain an inevitable part of this world is. The real nature of the world for Nietzsche is becoming where destruction and creation is for every thing valid. There are no enduring forms, everything (or formation) is subject to deformation and life is a flowing structure. Pain forces to put aside the trust that things will stay as they are. The pained descends to his depths, because he does not have a relation with what is mild and average anymore. *Pain reveals us the*

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<sup>18</sup> The word "pathos" is used by Aristotle in his *Poetics* as an essential part of tragedies (52b9-13)

<sup>19</sup> WP 635, WP 853, WP 1029, WP 1052

<sup>20</sup> WP 635

*flowing nature of life.*

“What is the meaning of pain? The meaning of existence is completely dependent on it: existence is meaningful only to the extent that the pain of existence has a meaning.” So formulates Deleuze the problem of pain from his Nietzsche readings.<sup>21</sup> This will also be my starting point for the other two chapters of the dissertation: *the meaning of pain*. The two different attitudes will be question of concern for these chapters: third chapter will deal with ascetic ideals and the fourth chapter with tragic wisdom.

The third part of the dissertation can be summarized as the genealogy of ascetic ideals. I will try to represent Nietzsche’s critique of any kind of absolutes. He can be thought as a psychologist of absolutes.

It is suffering that inspires these conclusions: fundamentally they are desires that such a world should exist; in the same way, to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative.<sup>22</sup>

Nietzsche shows the roots of ideals of absolute truths in suffering from this world of becoming. He severely attacks that the idea that there exists an objective knowledge independent of different perspectives. Nietzsche was opposed to truth when it represents a universal, stable being. Traditional Platonic - Christian search for any objective reality is such a position. He separates two kind of sufferings: Suffering from impoverishment of life and suffering from the overfullness of life.<sup>23</sup> The first type is related with being unable to cope with the changing nature of life

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<sup>21</sup> Deleuze 1962, p. 129

<sup>22</sup> WP 579

<sup>23</sup> GS 370



that pain and destruction are inevitable. The second types of people are those who can welcome pain as a part of the world and life (In this part, one has to keep in mind the Dionysus-Crucified distinction).

At this point, it is also necessary to mention “suffering” and “pain” difference. At first glance, one can reply that one is spiritual and the second is physical. A closer look will give us the answer that pain is the objectification of suffering.<sup>24</sup> Suffering is a (emotional) response to pain. In this sense, even though suffering will be mentioned in the following parts of the thesis, “pain” is the kernel of this dissertation as the source of all kinds of sufferings, or in other words as the object or reason of sufferings.

In short, first, I will try to represent the world for Nietzsche and the inevitability of disequilibrium which is the cause of pain: a world of continuous destruction and creation without any ultimate goal. In this world every process is reduced to perpetual struggle of the forces. In the following section, I will pass to human beings and try to represent the reactive interpretations of the world: the interpretations of the world that need stability or any comforting being. As examples of these attitudes, the concepts of language, logic, science and god will be mentioned. It is like creating a kind of spiritual mother womb or a comforting sphere, and holding it tightly. One needs security against the pains of existence therefore creates a sphere that s/he feels comfort in it. And then, after discussing the nature of the world and optimistic interpretations of it, it will be a question of concern to show how he uses his hammer to *construct*. In this part, I will try to represent the tragic view of the world. This world is different than the

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<sup>24</sup> A discussion about the meanings of terms and their etymology can be found in Roselyne Rey's *The History of Pain*. There she gives an example of doctor-patience experience, "When a doctor questions a patient, he is more likely to ask, 'where does it hurt?' or 'Are you suffering?' . . . rather than to ask him directly what types of pains he feels; however, he transcribes in his patience file 'abdominal pain' or 'lower back pain.' " Rey 1995, p. 3,

world of being in the sense that it welcomes pain: *the world of sensations not ideations*.

Instead of some transcendental optimism, Nietzsche chooses and shows Dionysian pessimism. This means to welcome the most difficult; it is, without trying to cling on any beyond, affirming becoming and pains that it brings.

This path that I will follow is not independent of difficulties and paradoxes. For example, Nietzsche says that will to power is an interpretive process. Every thing (Nietzsche uses the term center of force, which will be discussed in the second part of the dissertation) perceives the existence from its own point of view. Therefore theory of will to power that I will try to represent in the first part of the dissertation has primal problem (Nietzsche does not call it a theory): it is also nothing but an interpretation. One may ask what makes his Dionysian interpretation of the world better than the Christian interpretation. Or, one may ask "how can one express becoming with words that stabilize?" He also says that there is no truth.

These difficulties are mostly related with his different usages of these terms. These will be discussed, in the course of the dissertation. And I will try to show that such kinds of difficulties are also essential to his philosophy. He welcomes all these difficulties. He wills the things more problematic than they were.

It is like the love for a woman who gives us doubts. But the attraction of everything problematic, the delight in an X, is so great in highly spiritual, spiritualized people such as these that this delight flares up like bright embers again and again over all the distress of what is problematic, over all the danger of uncertainty, and even over the jealousy of the lover. We know a new happiness.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> GS P:3

Or in another passage he represents his position against optimistic and conformist attitudes with the following words:

*I assess the power of a will by how much resistance, pain, torture it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage; I do not account the evil and painful character of existence a reproach to it, but hope rather that it will one day be more evil and painful than hitherto.*<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> WP 382 (Italics supplied by W. Kaufmann.)

## CHAPTER 2

### THE WORLD FROM THE MIRROR OF NIETZSCHE

Pain, as it is said, is the result of nothing but the protracted disturbance of equilibrium that occurs as a result of the *choc*.<sup>27</sup> Yet, for Nietzsche the world will never reach to equilibrium. Therefore pain or harm should be a necessary part of human life. In this part of the dissertation, I will try to show why the world for Nietzsche will not reach to such an end.

The world from the mirror of Nietzsche, *the Dionysian world*, is nothing but will to power with a perpetual ebb and flut of its forms.

do you want a *name* for this world? A *solution* for all its riddles? A *light* for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men?- *This world is the will to power--and nothing besides!* And you yourselves are also this will to power--and nothing besides!<sup>28</sup>

The world is will to power, including human beings in it; yet, I claim that its engine is nothing but *pathos*; painful action or destruction. This is meaningful, because the key to understand Nietzsche's ontology is becoming and everything that announces future and every procreation necessitates pain:

The will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos* --the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge--<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> WP 699

<sup>28</sup> WP 1067

<sup>29</sup> WP 635

all becoming and growth, everything that guarantees the future involves pain<sup>30</sup>

But now, before discussing the nature of the world for Nietzsche, it is necessary to make it clear if he made an apparent-real world distinction.

Nietzsche's will to power, points to a real world and apparent world distinction. It is an important issue that first one has to confront with before proceeding with the details of his world view. Therefore, I will first proceed with a small discussion if he has an apparent-real world distinction mostly relying on the basis of his posthumously published notes, claiming that Nietzsche made such a distinction.

## **2.1. Setting the Stage: The Distinction of Apparent World and a Real World**

Even though Nietzsche did not publish any systematic theory of ontology, his ontology is being discussed under different names such as "perspectivist ontology,"<sup>31</sup> "flux ontology,"<sup>32</sup> or "process ontology."<sup>33</sup> Friedrich Ulfers and Mark Daniel Cohen even argue that he was indeed an ontologist, "a philosopher of the real, a delver and discloser of the hidden truth of the cosmos."<sup>34</sup> Yet, the distinction between apparent world and a real world in Nietzsche's philosophy is somewhat confusing; because,

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<sup>30</sup> TIX: 4

<sup>31</sup> Hales and Welshon 2000, p.62

<sup>32</sup> Grimm 1977, pp.1-16

<sup>33</sup> Ulfers, Friedrich and Cohen, Mark Daniel "Friedrich Nietzsche as a Bridge from 19th Century Atomistic Science to the Process Philosophy of 20th Century Physics, Literature, and Ethics" 06.2006  
<http://homepage.mac.com/cohenmd1/.Public/Philosophy/Nietzsche%20as%20a%20Bridge.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

Nietzsche refuses such a distinction at some passages,<sup>35</sup> and explains a real world at some others.<sup>36</sup>

There are also different comments on the world view of Nietzsche: R. Schacht sees Nietzsche's position about the world as "trying to abandon all forms of 'thing-ontology' (and to develop an altogether different way of thinking about the world)."<sup>37</sup> Another comment is stated by Peter Bornedal that the difference between traditional metaphysics and Nietzsche's position is that he does not separate a true world and an apparent world; but, an apparent world and chaos.<sup>38</sup>

R. Grimm opposes to Heidegger's view that he was a metaphysician since Heidegger defines metaphysic as the distinction of real and apparent worlds.<sup>39</sup> Christine Daigle's also confronts with Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche and argues that he does not produce any metaphysics but what he has is a new ontology without metaphysics (meaning that he did not escape to a beyond or transcendental indeed he showed the world from his mirror).<sup>40</sup> On the other hand, R. Pfeffer agrees with Heidegger about his views.<sup>41</sup>

The details of these discussions belong to a very interesting field of Nietzsche studies; but, for the aim of this dissertation, I will simply claim that Nietzsche has real- apparent world distinction (especially in his unpublished works) and try to present his position, naming this as ontology. I agree to call this ontology because he is concerned with how beings

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<sup>35</sup> TI III:2 WP 488 WP 461

<sup>36</sup> The best example can be found in WP 1067

<sup>37</sup> Schacht 1983, p.141

<sup>38</sup> Bornedal, Peter "A Silent World Nietzsche's Radical Realism: World, Sensation, Language" in Nietzsche-Studien vol 34 (2005): p. 23

<sup>39</sup> Grimm 1977, p. 40

<sup>40</sup> Daigle, Christine "Ontology, Metaphysics, Ethics and Nihilism. Essay on Nietzsche and Heidegger" in Kriterion vol. 16 (2002), p. 7

<sup>41</sup> Pfeffer 1972, p. 146

perceive the world. He does not say that it is the stable, transcendental foundation of the world independent of the perceivers. But Nietzsche's position about real-apparent world distinction is not so clear. This is, actually, related with his usage of the language, or his philosophizing style.

Nietzsche asserted that the apparent world is the only one: the real world is merely added by a lie.<sup>42</sup> He claimed that "the 'real world', however one has hitherto conceived it – it has always been the apparent world *once again*."<sup>43</sup>

For someone who is just a little bit acquainted with Nietzsche's works is familiar to such passages that assert that there is only one world and that is the apparent world. But the crucial point in his philosophy is that, from Nietzsche's perspectivist point of view *appearance depends on the perceiver*. There is no single appearance world.

The apparent world, i.e., a world viewed according to values; ordered, selected according to values, i.e., in this case according to the viewpoint of utility in regard to the preservation and enhancement of the power of a certain species of animal.

The perspective therefore decides the character of the "appearance"! As if a world would still remain over after one deducted the perspective! By doing that one would deduct relativity!<sup>44</sup>

Or again:

how could we know that things exist? "Thingness" was first created by us. The question is whether there could not be many other ways of creating such an apparent world and whether this creating, logicizing, adapting, falsifying, is not itself the best guaranteed reality.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> TI III:2

<sup>43</sup> WP 566

<sup>44</sup> WP 567

<sup>45</sup> WP 569

The world has lots of qualities according to perceivers. Yet, if we try to see it as it is, we have to strip it from its qualities. What remains is, then, just quantities. Nietzsche uses the word quantum of forces (or quantum of power). For him, there are just forces and they are combining together or trying to assimilate the rest. In this struggle they are constellating new formations, which we know as things. There is no place for atoms, or things in his philosophy. According to Nietzsche every center of force, including human beings, perceive the world in a different way. So, he explains the "apparent world" *as action, emanating from a center of force.*

Every center of force adopts a perspective toward the entire remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of resistance. The "apparent world," therefore, is reduced to a specific mode of action on the world, emanating from a center. Now there is no other mode of action whatever; and the "world" is only a word for the totality of these actions. Reality consists precisely in this particular action and reaction of every individual part toward the whole—<sup>46</sup>

In this sense, our "apparent world," is a part of a chaotic reality and this reality consists of the totality of actions and reactions. In this world view, there is no place for things or things-in-themselves that exist independently of every other thing. The world is a "sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, a play of forces and waves of forces, with ebb and a flood of its forms,"<sup>47</sup> there is nothing stable and everything depends on the perspective of the perceiver. So, it is this point that Nietzsche criticizes traditional metaphysics while they try to stabilize and find a so-called universal reality independent of the perceiver.

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<sup>46</sup> WP 567

<sup>47</sup> WP1067



The question "what is that?" is an imposition of meaning from some other viewpoint. "Essence," the "essential nature," is something perspective and already presupposes a multiplicity. At the bottom of it there always lies "what is that for me?" (for us, for all that lives, etc.)

A thing would be defined once all creatures had asked "what is that?" and had answered their question. Supposing one single creature, with its own relationships and perspectives for all things, were missing, then the thing would not yet be "defined".

In short: the essence of a thing is only an opinion about the "thing." Or rather: "it is considered" as the real "it is," the sole "this is."<sup>48</sup>

First, Nietzsche criticizes appearance and reality distinction, if this reality represents some universal, transcendent truth about the nature of existence independent of all perceivers (not necessarily human perceivers). Apparent world is our perspective; some other creature has another apparent world for its survival needs.<sup>49</sup> This reduces every form of apparent world also into a fiction. So, it is possible to say that, instead of appearance-absolute reality distinction what Nietzsche makes is an appearance - chaos distinction. This chaos is independent of human perspective and values. With the words of R. Schacht:

What [Nietzsche] is thereby saying about the world is that it does not have the character of a fixed and immutable order of being, or of a moral order, or of a unified and coordinated organism, or of an orderly development unfolding in accordance with an inner or preordained purpose, or of a complex of processes and events occurring in accordance with a system of natural or rational laws, or of an organization answering to our idea of beauty, or logic and reason, or our needs and desires.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> WP 556

<sup>49</sup> Or every center of force interprets reality from its perspective

<sup>50</sup> Schacht 1983, p.196

The world is a field of force battling to become more, to enhance their power. Every thing, organic or inorganic, is nothing but the formations of quanta of power into power-constellations in a perpetual conflict with others. They try to assimilate, violate and interpret.<sup>51</sup> This conflict of the same (power quanta) and play of forces is mother of the Dionysian World which Nietzsche designates as "Will to Power."

And do you know what "the world" is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, a household without expenses or losses, but likewise without increase or income; enclosed by "nothingness" as by a boundary; not something blurry or wasted, not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a sphere that might be "empty" here or there, but rather as force throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms; out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory, and then again returning home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity of its courses and its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my *Dionysian* world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> The concepts such as force, quantum of power, power constellations, interpretation will be discussed at the second part of this section.

<sup>52</sup> WP 1067

## 2.2. World as Will to Power and Pathos

In the first part of this section, we saw that Nietzsche has indeed ontology, even though it may not be labeled as a systematic theory of ontology. But that reduces his ideas about the world by no means unimportant. Now, it is important to examine carefully his understanding of the world.

Nietzsche did not just argue that the only world is appearance world but there is a world which is devoid of human perspectives, where there are actually no facts, everything is in flux, incomprehensible, elusive.<sup>53</sup> It is our perspective that we interpret the world with things, substances, subjects, objects, cause and effects. It is an interesting question to ask what remains if we eliminate the concepts that our mechanistic world view consist of. For Nietzsche, nothing but dynamic quanta remains. He simply does not accept the mechanistic view that explains natural phenomena with the motion of the things that has constant effects.

The mechanistic world is imagined only as sight and touch imagine a world (as "moved") --so as to be calculable-- thus causal unities are invented, "things" (atoms) whose effect remains constant (--transference of the false concept of subject to the concept of the atom)...If we eliminate these additions, no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their "effect" upon the same. The will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos* --the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge--<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> WP604, At this point, one can ask; if we can understand the world only through our perspective, how can Nietzsche say something beyond this perspective. R. Schacht argues that Nietzsche's chaos is not a complete chaos: "However, he indirectly makes another [point]: that the 'reality' with which we find ourselves confronted is by no means a complete chaos. For if it were operation with such a 'conception of reality' could not have proven conducive to our preservation and development ...". For further discussion see Schacht 1983, p.198

<sup>54</sup> WP 635

This dynamic quanta is nothing but “quanta of power.” Power-quanta can be thought as amount of power, which has the tendency to increase its power through a struggle.<sup>55</sup> This tendency to increase power is the basic drive of quantum of power or in other words, *this basic drive is quantum of power*. Quantum of power is not defined clearly by Nietzsche but it can be designated as the amount of power that tries to dominate other quantum of power.

A quantum of power is designated by the effect it produces and that which it resists. The adiaphorous state is missing, though it is thinkable. It is essentially a will to violate and to defend oneself against violation. Not self-preservation: every atom affects the whole of being-it is thought away if one thinks away this radiation of power-will. That is why I call it a quantum of 'will to power'<sup>56</sup>

According to Nietzsche, as it is said, the world is nothing but will to power. Will to power consists of these power quanta and they are not irreducible entities like atoms or monads.<sup>57</sup> In other words, power-quanta are forces that are just will to power itself. They are their activity, and according to Nietzsche *all activity is will to dominate between quanta of power*. As Nietzsche says their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their "effect" upon the same.<sup>58</sup> This tension of power quanta leads to continuous motion and change. With his words an adiaphorous state, a neutral state, is missing. There is no stability in universe for him. This is also the source of a chaotic world *that does not obey to our fictions of order*.

If something happens thus and not otherwise, that does not imply a “principle,” “law,” “order,” [but the operation of] quanta of force the essence

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<sup>55</sup> WP633

<sup>56</sup> WP 634

<sup>57</sup> WP 715

<sup>58</sup> WP 635

of which consists in exercising power against other quanta of force.<sup>59</sup>

Now the question is: How can one explain all natural phenomena, things, and human beings in terms of power quanta? At this point it is necessary to exceed from the concept of power quanta to power constellations. In Nietzsche's chaotic world model all natural phenomena, and things, including human beings, are viewed as various dynamic configurations of power-quanta struggling for more power.

My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (--its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement ("union") with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on--<sup>60</sup>

As it is discussed, quantum of power is struggle for domination. In this struggle for domination, power quanta forms constellations or power gaining unions.<sup>61</sup> Power quanta is nothing but will to dominate, will to power; so, they continuously interact with one another and the basic drive is *will to accumulate force, strive for power and increase power.*<sup>62</sup> In this process various power quanta (forces) strive to overcome all resistance, accumulate more power and forms constellations of power.

It is a question of a struggle between two elements of unequal power: a new arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of them. The second condition is something fundamentally different from the first

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<sup>59</sup> WP 635.

<sup>60</sup> WP 636

<sup>61</sup> WP 636, WP 689

<sup>62</sup> WP 688, 689

(not its effect): the essential thing is that the factions in struggle emerge with different quanta of power.<sup>63</sup>

These formations interpret, "define limits, determine degrees, variations of power."<sup>64</sup> Every thing, organic or inorganic, *builds its own reality*. The subject is nothing but perspective-setting force.<sup>65</sup> This view reveals infinitely many interpretations of the world from different centers of force.<sup>66</sup>

In Nietzsche's world view qualities are perspectival. Including thinghood for human perspective, every quality is defined from a center of force. Here, we understand Nietzsche's usage of the term power-quanta more plainly. Quantum means amount and a world stripped of its qualities has nothing but quanta. Every center of force interprets and senses different qualities. Qualities are not in-itself.

Qualities are an idiosyncrasy peculiar to man; to demand that our human interpretations and values should be universal and perhaps constitutive values is one of the hereditary madness of human pride.<sup>67</sup>

*There is no absolute center of reference that can define the world as it is.* There is no world as *it is*. The so-called apparent world is just a perspective of any center of force.

Every center of force adopts a perspective toward the entire remainder, i.e., its own particular valuation, mode of action, and mode of resistance. The

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<sup>63</sup> WP 633 "It is a question of a struggle between two elements of unequal power: a new arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of them. The second condition is something fundamentally different from the first (not its effect): the essential thing is that the factions in struggle emerge with different quanta of power."

<sup>64</sup> WP 643

<sup>65</sup> WP 636

<sup>66</sup> GS 374

<sup>67</sup> WP 565

“apparent world,” therefore, is reduced to a specific mode of action on the world, emanating from a center.<sup>68</sup>

Any “thing” in this model is determined by other things or better to say any “quality” is determined by some center of force. There is no thing-in-itself in this model of the world, everything is determined by center of forces and their relation with each other.

The “thing-in-itself” is nonsensical. If I remove all the relationships, all the “properties,” all the “activities” of a thing, the thing does not remain over; because thingness has only been invented by us owing to the requirements of logic, thus with the aim of defining, communication (to bind together the multiplicity of relationships, properties, activities).<sup>69</sup>

Every union of power sees the world and everything in it, in their own perspective. The totality of the perspectives constitutes the world.<sup>70</sup> In the struggle of power gaining, every union of power interprets in order to become master over some other power constellation. And this is not an epistemological view in question. This perspectivism of Nietzsche is not just an epistemological idea, it is indeed an ontological view about the constitution of the world.

Power groups seek the resistant forces in order to overcome and they interpret the world from a certain perspective in order to be master over something. That leads to continuous destruction and formation in the whole universe. Every active group of power seeks resistance in order to overcome it.

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<sup>68</sup> WP 567

<sup>69</sup> WP 558

<sup>70</sup> WP 567

The will to power can manifest itself only against resistances; therefore it seeks that which resists it.<sup>71</sup>

This is the basic principle that lies at the center of Nietzsche's ontological views. The generator of motion or in other words, the source of every creation and destruction, formation and deformation is this.

All events, all motion, all becoming, as a determination of degrees and relations of force, as a *struggle*.<sup>72</sup>

Becoming is something that does not stop. It is at every moment. At this point, it is also necessary, at least shortly, to mention Nietzsche's views about time. Nietzsche had acquaintance with chemistry and physics of his time.<sup>73</sup> Nietzsche accepted the first law of thermodynamics, conservation of energy, but he does not think that the second law of entropy is applicable to the universe because a permanent state or the end of all change is not possible.

That a state of equilibrium is never reached proves that it is not possible. But in an indefinite space it would have to have been reached.<sup>74</sup>

I have come across this idea in earlier thinkers: every time it was determined by other ulterior considerations (--mostly theological, in favor of the *creator spiritus*). If the world could in any way become rigid, dry, dead, *nothing*, or if it could reach a state of equilibrium, or if it had any kind of goal that involved duration, immutability, the once-and-for-all (in short, speaking metaphysically: if becoming *could* resolve itself into being or into nothingness), then this state must have been reached: from which it follows--<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> WP 656

<sup>72</sup> WP552

<sup>73</sup> This will be discussed at the science part of the third section.

<sup>74</sup> WP 1064

<sup>75</sup> WP 1066



Taking granted that the universe has no final end, becoming, change and contradiction is affirmed through eternal recurrence of the same. The world "lives on itself: its excrements are its food."<sup>76</sup> Cyclicity prepares the ground for motion without any stop.<sup>77</sup>

Now, we are coming to the kernel of this dissertation; because in a world where every power quantum or unions of power struggle and interpret to overcome others and seek resistance without any end, being subject to pain, displeasure or resistance is for every power constellation is inevitable.

But all expansion, incorporation, growth means striving against something that resists; motion is essentially tied up with states of displeasure<sup>78</sup>

In every moment, there is becoming. Pathos is the most elemental fact from which a becoming and motion emerges.

The will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos* --the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge--<sup>79</sup>

The essential nature of the world is will to power. Therefore what a power group, including human beings, amoeba, primitive creature and even inorganic materials, search is pain.

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<sup>76</sup> WP 1066

<sup>77</sup> WP 1063

<sup>78</sup> WP 704, Nietzsche uses the term "displeasure." This term is implicitly coextensive and sometimes same with the term "pain." For example, in WP 699, where he discusses about pain-reaction relation he says, "one does *not* react to pain: displeasure is not a 'cause' of action." See also Grimm 1977, p.12

<sup>79</sup> WP 635

But all expansion, incorporation, growth means striving against something that resists; motion is essentially tied up with states of displeasure; that which is here the driving force must in any event desire something else if it desires displeasure in this way and continually looks for it.- For what do the trees in a jungle fight each other? For “happiness”?- *For power!* –

Man, become master over the forces of nature, master over his own savagery and licentiousness (the desires have learned to obey and be useful)-man, in comparison with a pre-man-represents a tremendous quantum of *power-not* an increase in “happiness”! How can one claim that he has *striven* for happiness?<sup>80</sup>

In the world of Becoming, that has its fuel from quantum of power struggling with each other, continuous deformation and formation are inevitable part of the world. If a group of power increases its power, that means they overcome some pain; and if a group of power decreases its power that means that they could not. In nature there is no force that does not face an opposing force.

Even though Nietzsche mostly refers to organic life when he wants to explain their behavior with will to power, at the very basic level, Nietzsche does not separate organic from inorganic. There is this world which is a sea of forces. In this sea of limited quantum of power an ontological struggle exists. Quanta of powers unite and form more complex forms (so-called organic life is also a part of this process). In this world view, matter, subject, thing, is gone. Play and constellations of forces is what remained.

Now we can turn back to our question at the very beginning: what is that feels pain? It is now relative easier to sense the answer. Since eternal forming and deforming or creation and destruction is inevitable in the whole universe, there are no forces that do not meet the opposing ones and struggle for more power. This includes every modes of processes: physical

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<sup>80</sup> WP 704

or mental, organic or inorganic, chemical, biological, political etc. Therefore being subject to pain is for every form or organization in the world a necessary experience. Everything is subject to destruction because everything is in process of becoming; since every organization of power has the drive to overcome and master over the others. Therefore a perpetual struggle resulting from and resulting in displeasure or pain is inevitable.

As it is said, Nietzsche gives the name “pathos” to this world principle.<sup>81</sup> Turning back to Nietzsche’s usage of the term, he says that the will to power is not a being, not a becoming, but a *pathos* --the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge.—<sup>82</sup>

Now, it is relative clear why the word pathos is a very meaningful choice from Nietzsche as a world principle: just like a painful action or destruction has to be in tragedy as the essential part of it, the world of becoming has pathos as the most elemental fact of it.<sup>83</sup> We can also sense this from his choice of calling this world a tragic (Dionysian) world.<sup>84</sup> *Both - tragic art and nature - has the same pattern for him.*

### 2.3.Conclusion

The world is a chaotic occurrence. It has nothing to do with our values and qualities that we attribute to it. There is just dynamic quanta of forces that struggle and make unions to be more powerful. This creates continuous

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<sup>81</sup> The meaning of the term pathos is discussed by B.R. Rees ("Pathos in the Poetics of Aristotle," Greece and Rome, Vol.19, No.1 (Apr. 1972), 1-11). He claims that the meaning of the term in the frame of tragedies in this way: "*Pathos*, the action bringing pain or destruction, is essential to tragedy, whether it takes place or is avoided, whether it is seen or imagined, whether it is an incident in the plot or one of its antecedents" (p.11). Rees also discusses examples to such painful actions such as deaths 'in the open' and excessive pains and woundings and all such things.

<sup>82</sup> WP 635

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

<sup>84</sup> BT 16, WP 1029

destruction and construction in the universe. Human beings are also a part of this monstrous ebb and flood of the formations.

Man interpreted the world with respect to survival needs. In a brutal world of becoming that changes, destroys and flows, he had to categorize. Categorizing, defining, schematizing was of course not enough to endure life. Man created worlds that suffering and change was abolished (or pain became as a result of guilt that we have to be punished that after dying we could reach to those beyonds): world of ideals, a heaven. In this way the world of flux, chaos, and pain is denied, and man tried to cling on stable, comforting, transcendental, beyond. Under the title of psychology of metaphysics, Nietzsche tried to show the reasons of denial this world of becoming.

Psychology of metaphysics.--This world is apparent: consequently there is a true world;--this world is conditional: consequently there is an unconditioned world;--this world is full of contradiction: consequently there is a world free of contradiction;-- this world is a world of becoming: consequently there is a world of being;--all false conclusions (blind trust in reason: if A exists, then the opposite concept B must also exist). It is suffering that inspires these conclusions: fundamentally they are desires that such a world should exist; in the same way, to imagine another, more valuable world is an expression of hatred for a world that makes one suffer: the *ressentiment* of metaphysicians against actuality is here creative.<sup>85</sup>

In this context, I will try to represent the ways of escaping from the suffering that the changing character of the world presupposes in the following chapter. Science, logic, language and god will be the matter of issue. But, It is important to keep in mind that Nietzsche is not directly against these unless they posit some underlying metaphysical reality that

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<sup>85</sup> WP 579

points to a beyond which is supposed to save us from the chaotic nature of the world.

As it is pointed Nietzsche shows us a world of perpetual change without any goal. But men seek something stable, and an escape from his sufferings (and a goal for his sufferings): a comforting beyond where there is no pain. At this point, this is a decisive question that Nietzsche asks:

How much truth can a spirit *bear*, how much truth can a spirit *dare*? That became for me more and more the measure of value.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> EH F:3

“From the lengthy experience afforded by such a wandering in the *forbidden* I learned to view the origin of moralizing and idealizing very differently from what might be desirable: the *hidden* history of the philosophers, the psychology of their great names came to light for me. How much truth can a spirit *bear*, how much truth can a spirit *dare*? That became for me more and more the measure of value.”

## CHAPTER 3

### ASCETIC IDEALS

The world from the mirror of Nietzsche is becoming and this necessitates destruction and change as it is seen from the discussion in the second chapter and I tried to discuss Nietzsche's ontology. This points to some kind of chaos. The world is chaotic but man needs order and there is a kind of knowledge that serves those needs: knowledge that claims to be the ultimate, absolute, transcendental one. Nietzsche opposes to such knowledge of the world.<sup>87</sup>

Nietzsche criticizes knowledge and truth when they represent a "being", a "God", a "court of appeal."<sup>88</sup> Nietzsche tries to show that the world of *idealization* is nothing but creating some absolutes beyond this world and clinging on them.

But even though he attacked the so called objective truths and even though he didn't have any systematic theory of knowledge some kind of knowledge is still possible for him, which he calls as tragic wisdom or Dionysian pessimism. It is affirming the life of becoming and sensations. In this sense, its opposite is every idealization that tries to posit an underlying reality and despise the world of sensations.

Any belief that declares absoluteness is ascetic. Ascetic ideal is for Nietzsche a weak will: a will for another world other than this world of change and flux. We cling to the ascetic ideal because, it gives a

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<sup>87</sup> Yet, he also has an alternative which can be labeled as tragic wisdom

<sup>88</sup> "truth was posited as being, as God, as the highest court of appeal" GM III:24

psychological comfort. It redeems us from a life of chaos and suffering; yet, this is an escape from life for the sake of another “absolute” world which represents just the “sickness” (decadence) for Nietzsche.

As a tool of deconstruction and construction, Nietzsche uses his hammer -or philosophize- in order to destruct the settled beliefs that posits a *beyond* and in order to construct the value of naturality and life. He did not just criticize the “reactive” attitudes toward life but also gave the hints of an “active” stand before life. In this chapter the question of concerns are the problems of so-called objective (reactive) knowledge, its source or “what we *can not* know?” for Nietzsche. In other words, the problem of truth that stabilizes. In the following chapter, I will discuss “what we *can* know?” or tragic wisdom. These two sections are important in order to understand the psychology of metaphysics and Nietzsche's life affirmative stand. The basic concern is the attitudes towards pain.

Those who stand a Dionysian understanding of the world are those who can find a resonance with the real nature of the world.<sup>89</sup> They are the ones that can welcome pain as a part of the world and life. These are the ones who suffer from the overfullness of life. For those life counted as *holy enough* to justify even a monstrous amount of suffering. Yet, the Platonic – Christian attitude are for those who are suffering from impoverishment of life.<sup>90</sup> The search for any objective reality is related with being unable to cope with the real nature of life where pain and destruction is inevitable.

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<sup>89</sup> Nietzsche says Dionysian attitude is something that individual has to stand. WP 1052

<sup>90</sup> GS 370

### 3.1. Absolute Truth – Underlying Reality

The idea of absolute truth is what Nietzsche rigorously attacks. This so called absolute truth can be best found in the Platonic idea of “being” and the Christian idea of “God.” Trying to find the knowledge of *a stable reality independent of perspectives* is opposed to life or remaining true to life.

Knowledge is opposed to life, but because it expresses a life, a reactive life which finds in knowledge a means of preserving and glorifying its type.<sup>91</sup>

Traditionally a world of change does not fit to the idea of truth; so, in this respect even science offers us a so called “true” world of order just like the Christian-Platonic ascetic ideal:

even we knowers of today, we (modern scientific) godless anti-metaphysicians, still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by the thousand year old faith, the Christian Faith which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth; that truth is divine...<sup>92</sup>

A divine order, regularity or a fixed reality is what Christian-Platonic ascetic ideal presupposes. This static reality constitutes the so called “real” world; therefore, this world of appearances or in other words, the world of ever lasting contradictions, change and flux can not represent any reality. Reality should be fixed. A stable reality is also desirable with respect to a chaotic world of ever lasting contradictions, change and flux.

The chaotic world is undesirable because it reveals a world of change

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<sup>91</sup> Deleuze 1962, p.100

<sup>92</sup> GS 344



and perishing, which is worked up in the second chapter. In this world one can not have a fixed meaning and a static truth any more. In addition, our lives have to end and the experiences of pain are inevitable. To accept this will result in facing a horrible existence or void (no universal meaning, purpose, acceptance of perishing, suffering etc.). This is why ascetic ideals spring: *Escape from life of chaos and fear from the pain of destruction*. Perhaps, these are not in it self bad: what is bad is hatred for this world of becoming and denying it. Yet, for the tragic man the situation is different. S/he affirms this life and do not escape to a beyond. S/he is open to change. Pain, struggle, destruction are not something to be escaped, on the other hand, it is a stimulant of life and they are welcome.

When one considers reality as a world of "being," then, there is no room for "becoming." This attitude assumes that somehow truth exists but it is beyond the world of appearances (it is also claimed that it is somehow possible to have the knowledge of reality with our pure reason).

For Nietzsche, as we saw in the second chapter, the world is devoid of qualities. There is no stable value of things beyond the perceiver of it. So the case of absolute morality trying to fix a meaning for everyone has a reactive and an optimistic attitude towards flowing nature of the world. These are a part of the so-called ascetic ideal. In this part of the dissertation I will try to represent how god, science, language and logic are a part of this ascetic ideal or serve to ascetic ideals. All of these are optimistic, dishonest attitudes that fear pain of existence that arises from a meaningless becoming.

Given these two insights, that becoming has no goal and that underneath all becoming there is no grand unity in which the individual could immerse himself completely as in an element of supreme value, an escape remains: to pass

sentence on this whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a world beyond it, a true world.<sup>93</sup>

Or in an other passage Nietzsche says:

Until the advent of the ascetic ideal, man, the animal man, had no meaning at all on this earth. His existence was aimless; the question, "why is there such a thing as man?" could not have been answered; man willed neither himself nor the world. Behind every great human destiny there rang, like a refrain, an even greater "In vain!" This is precisely what the ascetic ideal means: that something was lacking, that man was surrounded by a fearful void [*Das eben bedeutet das asketische Ideal: dass Etwas fehlte, dass eine ungeheure Lücke den Menschen umstand*]. He did not know how to justify, to explain, to affirm himself. His own meaning was an unsolved problem and made him suffer.<sup>94</sup>

In this sense, I will start with my representation of ascetic ideal examples with God, science, language and logic. Why and how Nietzsche hits with his hammer to these attitudes will be discussed?

### 3.1.1. Science

Science is, of course, far developed than religion in trying to explain and describe the phenomena of life. Grimm states that Nietzsche also admired science in the context that it is -relative- free from human prejudices and foibles.<sup>95</sup> In this sense, he respected science and had also lots of interest for physics and chemie of his time. He read Lange who was a theoretical scientist that investigated forces. Nietzsche read Lange's "History of

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<sup>93</sup> WP 12

<sup>94</sup> GM III:28

<sup>95</sup> Grimm p.99

Materialism," there he came across with several other scientists of his time like Boscovich, Mach or Zöllner.<sup>96</sup>

Nietzsche also respected science that it brings a mental energy and deductive ability which is more important than the results of scientific inquiry.

Science furthers ability, not knowledge.- The value of having for a time rigorously pursued a *rigorous science* does not drive precisely from the results obtained from it: for in relation to the ocean of things worth knowing, these will be a mere vanishing drop. Let there will eventuate an increase in energy, in reasoning capacity, in toughness of endurance; one will have learned how to *achieve an objective by the appropriate means*. To this extent, it is invaluable, with regard to everything one will afterwards do, once to have been a man of science.<sup>97</sup>

The first sin happened under the tree of knowledge. This is also a clue for Nietzsche's positive attitude towards science. Nietzsche calls science "wisdom of the world" against Christianity.<sup>98</sup> Science does not need the existence of a God, or an afterlife for its inquiries. Therefore, it is a reality that Nietzsche has a positive attitude towards science. Nietzsche admired science for its sharp thinking methods, and that its will to explain phenomena without a God; yet, he criticizes science more severely than he praises it. The problem is the value of scientific truth problem.

There is still the metaphysical faith that scientific knowledge is the

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<sup>96</sup> Williams 2001, p.53

"According to these thinkers there is no substance, there is only force." Williams 2001,p.53

"[Friedrich] Zöllner was one of the first physicist to accept Georg Friedrich Bernhard Riemann's non-Euclidean concept of space." F.Ulfers and Mark Daniel Cohen "Friedrich Nietzsche as a Bridge from 19th Century Atomistic Science to the Process Philosophy of 20th Century Physics, Literature, and Ethics" 06.2006

[http://homepage.mac.com/cohenmd1/.Public/Philosophy/Nietzsche%20as%20a%20Brid  
ge.pdf](http://homepage.mac.com/cohenmd1/.Public/Philosophy/Nietzsche%20as%20a%20Bridge.pdf)

<sup>97</sup> HAH 256

<sup>98</sup> A 47

only way to represent or picture the “real” world. It is a valuable endeavor to set scientific classifications, equalizations, schematizations or it is a valuable endeavor to search for reasons, causes, and effects. Yet, the problem is that to assume that the only absolute knowledge of the world can be supplied by science. *One does not reach to an absolute truth if one attaches to some phenomena a mathematical formula.* Science is also a perspective.

It is with the faith with which so many materialistic natural scientists rest content: the faith in a world that is supposed to have its equivalent and measure in human thought, in human valuations – a ‘world of truth’ that can be grasped entirely with the help of our four-concerned little human reason – What? Do we really want to demote existence in this way to an exercise in arithmetic and an indoor diversion for mathematicians?<sup>99</sup>

In its search to find the *underlying reality*, or a stable truth, science also *posits* an underlying reality and a stable truth. This belief that such a reality exists is also metaphysical and in this sense science is not different from the motivations of ascetic ideals of Christianity and Platonism because they also posit an absolute, an “underlying” reality.

Those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in science presupposes *thereby affirm another world* than that of life, nature and history; and insofar as he affirms this 'other world', must they not by the same token deny its counterpart, this world, *our world*? . . . it is still a *metaphysical faith* upon which our faith in science rests – that even we knowers of today, we godless anti-metaphysicians, still take *our* fire from the flame lit by the thousand-year old faith, the Christian faith which was also Plato’s faith, that God is truth; that truth is divine.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> GS 373

<sup>100</sup> GS 344

In this sense, it is clear that for Nietzsche, science is not an overcoming of ascetic ideals. The scientific will to truth is not something independent from the ascetic ideal. Ascetic ideal works with putting a veil on the chaotic nature of the world. It is like a sphere that one feels him/herself comfortable in it, or in other words one gives some order to the chaos around him/her. Such an order, of course, is good for survival. But one can not reach the conclusion that: it is reality of the world. Therefore, if science serves to absolutist aims it is not apart from any ascetic ideal that seeks a beyond.

Science-this has been hitherto a way of putting an end to the complete confusion in which things exist, by hypotheses that "explain" everything--so it has come from the intellect's dislike of chaos . . . Physics proves to be a boon for the heart: science (as the way to knowledge) acquires a new charm after morality has been eliminated--and because it is here alone that we find consistency, we have to construct our life so as to preserve it. This yields a sort of practical reflection on the conditions of our existence as men of knowledge.<sup>101</sup>

What does Nietzsche criticize exactly? Isn't it good that science makes experimental observations? Does not science serve human needs? The important point to understand is that he has no problem with scientific observations. Nietzsche criticizes mechanistic science that has metaphysical postulates like: "*natural laws*," "*cause and effect*" or "*order in the universe*." These are anthropomorphic assumptions that are practically important for survival. But this does not make them in any sense true.

The most strongly believed a priori "truths" are for me provisional

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<sup>101</sup> WP 594

assumptions; e.g., the law of causality, a very well acquired habit of belief, so much a part of us that not to believe in it would destroy the race. But are they for that reason truths? What a conclusion! As if the preservation of man were a proof of truth!<sup>102</sup>

Science is also nothing but interpretation. Science offers (or can offer) no explanation. What it can do is description and nothing more?

Now it is beginning to dawn on maybe five or six brains that physics too is only an *interpretation* and arrangement of the world (according to ourselves!, if I may say so) and *not* an explanation of the world.<sup>103</sup>

The world is for Nietzsche a tragic world of chaos as I mentioned in the previous chapter of the dissertation. The character of the world does not open itself with detailed classifications, or schematizations. The truth is like a woman that does not want to open its secrets. If truth means a universal law for any phenomena, this is just a metaphysical error that we posit. Perhaps at this point we can make a gay science and decadent science differentiation. One has the delight in unknown and welcomes change and the other wills to stabilize. One is life-affirming active will to power and the other is life negating “will to truth at any price.”<sup>104</sup> There are no universal laws. Everything is perspectival and truth –in Nietzschean sense- means an enhancement of power feeling.<sup>105</sup> Trying to open the veil of truth, and trying to bring light whatever is kept concealed,<sup>106</sup> is bad taste for Nietzsche. The beauty of a musical piece will be lost if one tries to open the veil of music with experimenting the reception of ears and converting the sounds into mathematical formulas.

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<sup>102</sup> WP 497

<sup>103</sup> BGE 14

<sup>104</sup> GS 344

<sup>105</sup> WP 534

<sup>106</sup> GS P:4

The calculability of the world, the expressibility of all events in formulas – is this really “comprehension”? How much of a piece of music has been understood when that in it which is calculable and can be reduced to formulas has been reckoned up? – And “constant causes,” things, substances, something “unconditioned”; *invented* – what has one achieved?<sup>107</sup>

### Or in his Gay Science

Suppose one judge the *value* of a piece of music according to how much of it could be counted, calculated, and expressed in formulas – how absurd such a ‘scientific’ evaluation of music would be! What would one have comprehended, understood, recognized? Nothing, really nothing of what is ‘music’ in it!<sup>108</sup>

If this world is a Dionysian world that has no universal laws, no aim and goal -as I tried to represent in the second chapter- then to affirm such an existence will be the hardest of perspectives.

Here, we find an attitude that opens the way to a new investigation of the nature with negative elements in it. What Nietzsche criticizes is that underlying metaphysical assumptions of mechanistical sciences. We know nothing about the nature if we label a mathematical formula to any phenomena. It is just convenient and comfortable to create a sphere of so called universal truths and live in it. When one starts to get rid of those universal truths, then the trust in life will be gone and life itself will become a problem.<sup>109</sup>

But who wants the things problematic. What one expect from science may be increase of pleasure and decrease of pain. This is impossible for Nietzsche because there is a balance between pleasure and pain: one can not

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<sup>107</sup> WP 624

<sup>108</sup> GS 373

<sup>109</sup> GS P:3

have one without the other. Modern science seems to promote more pleasure, and less pain. This is impossible for him.

With *science* one can actually promote either of these goals! So far it may still be better known for its power to deprive man of his joys and make him colder, more statue-like, more stoic. But it might yet be found to be the *great giver of pain!* – And then its counterforce might at the same time be found: its immense capacity for letting new galaxies of joy flare up!<sup>110</sup>

Those who are the poorest in life suffer because of their weak attitude toward existence. They need peacefulness and “conceptual comprehensibility of existence - for logic soothes, gives confidence – in short, a certain warm, fear repelling narrowness and confinement to optimistic horizons.”<sup>111</sup>

### 3.1.2. Logic

Nietzsche’s attitude towards logic is somewhat similar to his attitude towards science. He does not have a negative attitude if logic does not lead people to an underlying reality. In *Human all too Human* Nietzsche says:

*The art of drawing conclusions.* The greatest progress men have made lies in their learning to *draw correct conclusions.* ... False conclusions are the rule in older times. And all peoples' mythologies, magic, superstition, religious worship, and law-all are the inexhaustible sites of evidence for this thesis.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> GS 12

<sup>111</sup> GS 370

<sup>112</sup> HAH 271



As it is seen he respects the art of drawing conclusions. But it is not so easy to understand Nietzsche's attitude from isolated aphorisms and making a general comment from it. One has to carefully see the context. The critique about logic is not the calculations that it makes; the problem begins if it assumes an underlying reality. From the strong and destructive character of Nietzsche's aphorisms, one may rapidly be led to the conclusion that what Nietzsche attacks and tries to destroy is logic? But, the case is different. Nietzsche's problem is with the so-called metaphysical underlying, stable reality devoid of any perspective. If one keeps this in mind, one will see that his critic about logic is the problem of applicability of it to the world.<sup>113</sup> The world is *made* logical and this is an illusion but this is not a direct critic to logic.<sup>114</sup>

So, we have to consider this question: Does Nietzsche criticize logic itself or the belief that the rules of logic are applicable to the world?

In short, the question remains open: are the axioms of logic adequate to reality or are they a means and measure for us to create reality, the concept "reality," for ourselves?--To affirm the former one would, as already said, have to have a previous knowledge of being--which is certainly not the case. The proposition therefore contains no criterion of truth, but an imperative concerning that which should count as true.<sup>115</sup>

Nietzsche criticizes logic if it tries to *explain the world* in terms of identity through time and constancy that points out an *underlying reality*. The *assumptions* of logic, i.e., identical things, things, and enduring things *do not correspond to any reality*.

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<sup>113</sup> A good discussion about Nietzsche's attitude towards logic can be found Hales and Welshon 2000, pp. 37-57

<sup>114</sup> HAH 11

<sup>115</sup> WP 516

*Logic*, too, rests on assumptions that do not correspond to anything in the real world, e.g., on the assumption of the equality of things, the identity of the same thing at different points of time; but this science arose from the opposite belief (that there were indeed such things in the real world). So it is with *mathematics*, which would certainly not have originated if it had been known from the beginning that there is no exactly straight line in nature, no real circle, no absolute measure.<sup>116</sup>

Another problem that Nietzsche has is a genealogical problem. The question is how we created our “metaphysical reality.”

*Origin of the logical.*— How did logic come into existence in man's head? Certainly out of illogic, whose realm originally must have been immense. Innumerable beings who made inferences in a way different from ours perished: for all that, their ways might have been truer! Those, for example, who did not know how to find often enough what is “equal” as regards both nourishment and hostile animals, who subsumed things too slowly and cautiously, were favored with a lesser probability of survival than those who guessed immediately upon encountering similar instances that they must be equal. The dominant tendency, however, to treat as equal what is merely similar, an illogical tendency—for nothing is really equal—is what first created any basis for logic.<sup>117</sup>

In this sense Nietzsche does not criticize directly logic. This is somehow clear from his respect to rigorous thinking habits. In his *Human, All Too Human* he says that the greatest progress men have made lies in their learning to *draw correct conclusions*.<sup>118</sup> The assumptions of logic may not fit to the world but they are practical for survival needs of the human beings. For Nietzsche, an order out of chaos was necessary in order to survive, but this

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<sup>116</sup> HAH 11

<sup>117</sup> GS 110

<sup>118</sup> HAH 271

is nothing more than an illusion.

illusion that something is known when we possess a mathematical formula for an event: it is only designated, described; nothing more!<sup>119</sup>

The problem of logic is therefore essentially the problem of belief of an underlying reality. Even though, he does not express it explicitly, it is relatively clear.

Logic was intended as facilitation; as a means of expression--not as truth--Later it acquired the effect of truth--<sup>120</sup>

Becoming is again the key to understand Nietzsche's critique of the applicability of logic to world: the world as change and continuous flux.

### 3.1.3. *Language*

What things are called is a more important issue than what they are for Nietzsche. The name of a thing and what it counts for is the basic problem. A dress thrown over things wrongly and arbitrarily.

This has given me the greatest trouble and still does: to realize that *what things are called* is incomparably more important than what they are. The reputation, name, and appearance, the usual measure and weight of a thing, what it counts for—originally almost always wrong and arbitrary, thrown over things like a dress and altogether foreign to their nature and even to their skin—all this grows from generation unto generation, merely because people believe in it, until it gradually grows to be part of the thing and turns into its very body: what at first was appearance becomes in the end, almost invariably, the essence

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<sup>119</sup> WP 628

<sup>120</sup> WP 538

and is *effective* as such!<sup>121</sup>

The way we see the world is determined by the grammatical habits and these grammatical habits became so solid that it is also universalized. In language and grammar we find doer-deed distinction, ego as a being, enduring things, substance, body, soul, cause and effect etc. They are just metaphysical functions of the language and grammar.

The separation of the “deed” from the “doer,” of the event from someone who produces events, of the process from a something that is not process but enduring, substance, thing, body, soul, etc.-The attempt to comprehend an event as a sort of shifting and place-changing on the part of a “being,” of something constant: this ancient mythology established the belief in “cause and effect” after it had found a firm form in the functions of language and grammar.<sup>122</sup>

Language also has to schematize, find similarities and classify them find causalities, etc. Language has its own realm, but we think that we find this realm also in the nature. We think that what we express with language corresponds to reality. According to him the words are the metaphors of a metaphor of the original datum:

To begin with, a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image: first metaphor. The image, in turn, is imitated in a sound: second metaphor. And each time there is a complete overlapping of one sphere, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>121</sup> GS 58

<sup>122</sup> WP 631

<sup>123</sup> Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense” The Nietzsche Channel, Fragment, 1873: from the *Nachlass* <<http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tls.htm>>

With language we set metaphors of sense experiences then within this metaphorical world of language we operate functions like defining, classifying etc. Now it is absurd to say that this metaphorical world corresponds to reality. Language which we think *that reveals us some "truth"* about nature actually just works with tautologies. This leads to a funny condition: what we think that we find in nature is actually what we previously defined.

Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported into them: the finding is called science, the importing --art, religion, love, pride. Even if this should be a piece of childishness, one should carry on with both and be well disposed toward both--some should find; others--we others!-- should import!<sup>124</sup>

Nietzsche also tries to point to the formation of concepts. Everything in the universe is unequal. There is no equality. But we equate and classify them. He gives the example of "leaf." The concept of "leaf" is nothing but an *abstraction with forgetting the differences*. It is an overlook of many differences.

Let us still give special consideration to the formation of concepts. Every word immediately becomes a concept, inasmuch as it is not intended to serve as a reminder of the unique and wholly individualized original experience to which it owes its birth, but must at the same time fit innumerable, more or less similar cases—which means, strictly speaking, never equal—in other words, a lot of unequal cases. Every concept originates through our equating what is unequal. No leaf ever wholly equals another, and the concept "leaf" is formed through an arbitrary abstraction from these individual differences, through forgetting the distinctions<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> WP 606

<sup>125</sup> Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense" The Nietzsche Channel, Fragment, 1873: from the *Nachlass* <<http://www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/tls.htm>>

There is no *is* in the realm of things. The realm of the world that we create is imaginary. It is just the metaphor of a metaphor as we saw above. This is a mild way of saying that this world that we created for us is nothing but imaginary (or a lie).

If one is a philosopher as men have always been philosophers, one cannot see what has been and becomes--one sees only what is. But since nothing is, all that was left to the philosopher as his "world" was the imaginary.<sup>126</sup>

Yet, it is also very difficult to see this independence of the language and the world. We create words, grammatical rules and think that they represent the reality. In *Daybreak* Nietzsche even says that it is easier to break a leg than the eternalized words and conventions of language:

Words lie in our way! Whenever the ancients set down a word, they believed they had made a discovery. How different the truth of the matter was! – They had come across a problem; and while they supposed it to have been solved, they actually had obstructed its solution. – Now in all knowledge one stumbles over rock-solid eternalized words and would sooner break a leg than a word in doing so.<sup>127</sup>

So, the basic question that Nietzsche asks is: "Is language the adequate expression of all realities?"<sup>128</sup> and he states that naming any datum that we have does not reveal us any reality: "I fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar..."<sup>129</sup>

It is now clear to see Nietzsche's critique about language, but the

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<sup>126</sup> WP 570

<sup>127</sup> D 47

<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> TI III:5

philosophy of Nietzsche reveals itself if one does not forget to see the constructive aspect of Nietzsche. It is open that he shows the independence of the world and language. He cut the so-called ties that combine these two realms. Indeed there is no reality without any perspective. Language is also a way of seeing the world. So, is language something bad for Nietzsche? Nietzsche would say no to this question. What is bad is just the faith that with defining or through metaphors we reach to the real nature of the world. Language has the potential to create different perspectives. If one does not use language as if it brings objective, universal truths, it can reveal creativeness. Or in other words "lordly right of giving names"

The lordly right of bestowing names is such that one would almost be justified in seeing the origin of language itself as an expression of the ruler's power. They say "This *is* that or that"; they seal off each thing and action with a sound and thereby take symbolic possession of it<sup>130</sup>

This may also be the reason why Nietzsche uses a language with metaphors, aphorisms and contradictions. He is free from trying to show a universal metaphysical truth, he addresses to the senses rather than so-called reasoning in order to reach some absolute. About Nietzsche's usage of language, R.Grimm states:

Far from being evidence of sloppy or inconsistent thinking, the contraries and paradoxes we encounter in Nietzsche's writings are indications of his constant struggle to create a new linguistic paradigm, to open up levels of meaning and intelligibility which lie outside our normal sphere of discourse and thought.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> GM I:2

<sup>131</sup> Grimm 1977, p.92

In short, we can summarize Nietzsche's position in this way: language corresponds to nothing real. But it has, at the same time, potential to open new artistic and creative worlds.

#### 3.1.4. *God*

Nietzsche used his hammer to our so called universal, absolute, transcendental meanings and the *divine order* that we find in nature. Regarding one divine truth or one absolute "universal" meaning Deleuze states: "The Gods are dead but they have died from laughing, on hearing one God claim to be the only one."<sup>132</sup>

God can be understood as the representative of a cosmic order or absolute values themselves. The death of God, for Nietzsche, is the collapse of the belief of "one true world" beyond this apparent world. But Nietzsche is not interested in discussing if there is a God or not. Primal question to be asked is the value problem. This is value of the Christian morality.

The question of the mere "truth" of Christianity-whether in regard to the existence of its God or the historicity of the legend of its origin, not to speak of Christian astronomy and natural science-is a matter of secondary importance as long as the question of the value of Christian *morality* is not considered. Is Christian morality *worth* anything, or is it a shame and disgrace despite all the holiness of its arts of seduction?<sup>133</sup>

The main problem with the Christian God is that it is not godlike, but miserable, absurd, harmful.

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<sup>132</sup> Deleuze 1962, p.100

<sup>133</sup> WP 251



--The thing that sets us apart is not that we are unable to find God, either in history, or in *nature*, or behind nature--but that we regard what has been honoured as God, not as "divine," but as pitiable, as absurd, as injurious; not as a mere error, but as *acrime against life*. . . We deny that God is God . . . If any one were to *show* us this Christian God, we'd be still less inclined to believe in him.-- In a formula: *deus, qualem Paulus creavit, dei negatio* [God as Paul created him, [is] the negation of God]--Such a religion as Christianity, which does not touch reality at a single point and which goes to pieces the moment reality asserts its rights at any point, must be inevitably the deadly enemy of the "wisdom of this world," which is to say, of *science*--and it will give the name of good to whatever means serve to poison, calumniate and *cry down* all intellectual discipline, all lucidity and strictness in matters of intellectual conscience, and all noble coolness and freedom of the mind.<sup>134</sup>

The belief in Christian God has its roots in the escape. Escape from the anxieties of life and death. Christian morality clings on an absolute beyond. This is not just an error and weak interpretation but also a crime against life as stated in the above quotation because they despise this world. There is also a bad reasoning about God. Most people believe in the God of Christians (or any kind of absolutes) while it makes this life more endurable and it helps for preservation. This simple logic is formulated by Nietzsche in this way:

Life would be unbearable if there were no God! . . . . Consequently there must be a God!<sup>135</sup>

The optimism of any ascetic ideals that grant salvation or happiness to soul after death or in some beyond arises from weakness of the soul.

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<sup>134</sup> A 47

<sup>135</sup> D 90

Nietzsche tries to show that the traditional understanding of God contradicts remaining true to earth.

When the centre of gravity of life is placed, *not* in life itself, but in "the beyond"--in *nothingness*--then one has taken away its centre of gravity altogether. The vast lie of personal immortality destroys all reason, all natural instinct--henceforth, everything in the instincts that is beneficial, that fosters life and that safeguards the future is a cause of suspicion. So to live that life no longer has any meaning: *this* is now the "meaning" of life. . . Christianity is a revolt of all creatures that creep on the ground against everything that is lofty: the gospel of the "lowly" *lowers* . . .<sup>136</sup>

It is possible to find more violent aphorisms from Nietzsche's writings against God. But what one has to realize is that Nietzsche criticizes Christian interpretation of this world. Their problem does not exactly lie in their religious spirit, but in their weak interpretation of this world. They treat this world as inferior just because they are not courageous enough to accept the pains of this existence. Therefore they create beyonds.

Yet, one has to be careful about Nietzsche's words. He says "God is dead." This is not an argument for the non-existence of a God. But what he says is this unhealthy interpretation of the world has its time.

The concept of "God" was until now the greatest objection to existence. We deny God, we deny the responsibility that originates from God: and thereby we redeem the world.<sup>137</sup>

Nietzsche does not just want to redeem the world but also show the importance of naturality.

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<sup>136</sup> A 43

<sup>137</sup> T VI:8

But when will we be done with our caution and care? When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to *naturalize* humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature?<sup>138</sup>

As it is said, Nietzsche does not deny this Christian God but he says its time is up. This god is dead. One bonelike interpretation that had its hegemony over two millennia is broken. This opens lots of many possibilities for the free spirits. A sea lies open

Indeed, we philosophers and "free spirits" feel, when we hear the news that the "old god is dead," as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation,—at long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; the sea, *our* sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea." —<sup>139</sup>

So, as a last question, we can ask: is Nietzsche himself distanced from religious spirit? He is distanced from every belief that despises this world. As the old Christian god died, it is perhaps time for new gods. Christian God is a symbol of this world and beyond distinction; but why not seeing divinity or secrets in this nature. Not escaping from this nature or world but accepting and affirming it. He also has a God.

No! come back, With all your torments!  
Oh come back To the last of all solitaries!  
All the streams of my tears Run their course for you!  
And the last flame of my hearth -It burns up to you!  
Oh come back My unknown God! My pain! My last - happiness.<sup>140</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> GS 109

<sup>139</sup> GS 343

<sup>140</sup> Z IV:5:1

### 3.2. Conclusion

With a monstrous energy and powerful aphorisms, Nietzsche tried to destroy all the optimistic idealizations. In the following chapter, I will discuss what he teaches. In other words, Dionysian pessimism or tragic wisdom.

He took such meanings from the hands of human beings. But, he also pointed to affirming this life as it is without an escape into a beyond.

Truly, I have taken a hundred maxims and your virtues' dearest play things away from you; and now you scold me now, as children scold.

They were playing on the sea shore - then came a wave and swept their playthings into the deep: and now they cry.

But the same wave shall bring them new playthings, and pour out new coloured sea-shells before them!

Thus will they be consoled; and you too, my friends, shall, like them, have your consolations - and new coloured sea – shells!<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Z II:5

## CHAPTER 4

### TRAGIC WISDOM

From the mirror of Nietzsche there is no divine order, no aim or goal of the universe. No real world as it is, which has the properties of regularity and a stability. These are human impositions. This leads to a real-apparent world distinction. Traditional metaphysics despises apparent world because reality should be divine and stable. A “chaotic” world of ever lasting contradictions, change and flux can not be real. But for Nietzsche just the opposite is true. Chaos is the nature of universe and there is no beyond or apart or God that will redeem us from the pains of contradictions, change and flux.

When we get rid of all of these -a world that is beyond, being, god, objective unchangeable truth, etc.- a world of change and perishing will be revealed before us. In other words, we can have no fixed meaning and a static truth any more; in addition to all these, our lives have to end without any divine meaning (our soul will not go to any beyond and be happy eternally). This leads to *facing the anxiety of meaninglessness*. Actually, this anxiety of meaninglessness is the source that creates the ascetic ideals,<sup>142</sup> and Nietzsche tried to point this source with his genealogy. This is his hammer that destroys every belief that is “universally” defined. At this point one can ask the following questions: Did he teach anything beyond showing the spring of ascetic ideal? Did he just destroy any belief in any beyond with his hammer? Was he just a destroyer? Has he nothing to say about life?

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<sup>142</sup> GM III:28

Nietzsche teaches *facing the life of becoming without escaping to a "beyond"* that gives our souls comfort and gives us the answers. Nietzsche wills the things problematic. He wills that trust to life away from life. Life itself should become problematic:<sup>143</sup> this is what he teaches which can be called as "tragic wisdom." About tragic wisdom Babette E. Babich states:

Nietzsche does not seek to eliminate suffering as, very differently, promised by religion (in heaven or the world to come) or science (in the future that is about to become real), but rather to transvalue (this is Nietzsche's word) suffering and every tragic occurrence as such. It should not go unnoted here that such a move elevates suffering to tragic wisdom<sup>144</sup>.

Nietzsche teaches *amor fati*; love of fate or "yes" saying to life. But, this has its roots in pessimism. Pain does not count as an objection to life.

He who knows how to extract any meaning at all from the closing words of the poem ["Hymn to life" by Lou Salome] will divine why I preferred and admired it: they possess greatness. Pain does *not* count as an objection of life: 'Have you no more happiness to give me, well then! *still do you have your pain...*'

A real "yes" to life is arrived with the full realization of the negative elements in life. Here, the connection between pain and life-affirmation becomes clearer because if one can not affirm pain, s/he can not affirm life. A ready-made affirmation without any overcoming is not possible. It is possible for those who accept traditional metaphysics for the price of denying this life. This is not an affirmation of life; it is just resignation of this life. Just through affirmation of pain or welcoming of pain a person may reach to an affirmation of life.

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<sup>143</sup> GS P:3

<sup>144</sup>Babich, Babette E. "Nietzsche's Imperative as a Friend's Encomium: on Becoming the One You are, Ethics, and Blessing" in Nietzsche-Studien vol 33 (2003) p.55

The highest state a philosopher can attain: to stand in a Dionysian relationship to existence –my formula for this is *amor fati*.<sup>145</sup>

The same point is expressed in a different way by Deleuze. He explains that “when anguish and disgust appear in Nietzsche it is always at this point: can everything become an object of affirmation, *that is to say of joy?*” For him the tragic is the aesthetic form of joy, and it is not a medical phrase or a moral solution to pain, fear or pity. *It is joy that is tragic.*<sup>146</sup>

In this sense, The Dionysian relation (or tragic sense) to existence as Nietzsche says is something that the individual should stand<sup>147</sup> because, now, the trust in life is no more with us, all the traditional values are collapsed, we lost the ground and we have to endure a life that we are not allowed to have transcendental truths (“the truth”: A world that is not self-contradictory, not deceptive, does not change, a *true world* – a world in which one does not suffer.<sup>148</sup>). In addition to all these, one must also be prepared for “grief unto death.”<sup>149</sup> It is like saying “yes” to a universe that is indifferent to life on earth. But this is the critical point of Nietzsche’s *amor fati*. Joan Stambaugh comments on Nietzsche’s tragedy as affirmation:

As the man who announced that God is dead and proclaimed nihilism, the uncanny guest at the door, Nietzsche struggled to affirm life in spite of the collapse of the traditional values. He struggled ever since he saw the basic meaning of tragedy as affirmation, not as resignation<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> WP1041

<sup>146</sup> Deleuze 1962, p. 17

<sup>147</sup> W P 1041

<sup>148</sup> WP 585

<sup>149</sup> GS 12

<sup>150</sup> Stambaugh, Joan “All Joy wants Eternity” in Nietzsche-Studien vol.33(2004) eds, p. 340

#### 4.1. Dionysus, Chaos, and Pain

The real nature of the world is a relative difficult issue. Every center of force interprets the world from its perspective. There is no stable truth. Everything interprets, gives values, and qualifies the world from its own perspective in order to increase its power. If we eliminate all the qualities (thinghood included) that we attribute to things, nothing but dynamic quanta remains. This reveals us a monstrous view of a sea of forces eternally changing, eternally flowing.

a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms; out of the simplest forms striving toward the most complex, out of the stillest, most rigid, coldest forms toward the hottest, most turbulent, most self-contradictory, and then again returning home to the simple out of this abundance, out of the play of contradictions back to the joy of concord, still affirming itself in this uniformity of its courses and its years, blessing itself as that which must return eternally, as a becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness<sup>151</sup>

This world is devoid of meaning in itself, this world is continuous becoming or play ground of forces which means perpetual destruction. And centers of forces interpret in order to become master over some others.<sup>152</sup> At this point, one can ask: is not Nietzsche's view also an interpretation then? Very well, it is. It is an interpretation. An interpretation of the world trying to think it without the human impositions of order, qualities and values.

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<sup>151</sup> WP1067

<sup>152</sup> WP 636



The critical point to see is that for Nietzsche there is no truth criterion in the traditional sense. That means it is necessary to understand Nietzsche within his frame of thought. Truth is not something that one can find. It is not there to be found. *It is created and made.* In this sense, truth is also related with his ontology. He says that the criterion of truth is in the increase of power feeling: "The criterion of truth resides in the enhancement of the feeling of power."<sup>153</sup>

Nietzsche's problem is the value of life. He wills to praise this life with every negative elements in it. He uses Dionysus as the symbol for a meaningless becoming (or an illogical dynamism) of the world, but at the same time welcoming of sensations, future, growth and procreation. Repeating his words:

Every single element in the act of procreation, of pregnancy, and of birth aroused the highest and most solemn feelings. In the doctrine of the mysteries, *pain* is pronounced holy: the "labor pains of the woman giving birth" hallow all pain; all becoming and growing—all that guarantees a future—*involves* pain ... That there may be the eternal joy of creating, that the will to life may eternally affirm itself, the "agony of the woman giving birth" *must* also be there eternally ... All this is meant by the word Dionysus: I know no higher symbolism than this *Greek* symbolism of the Dionysian.<sup>154</sup>

Dionysus and Christ, they both experience terrible pains. But the meaning of their pains is important. The two were subject to pain but the important thing is their meaning.

The god on the cross is a curse on life, a signpost to seek redemption from life; Dionysus cut to pieces is a promise of life: it will be eternally reborn and return again from destruction.<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> WP 534

<sup>154</sup> TI X:4

<sup>155</sup> WP 1052

Dionysian world view represents us perpetual transformations in the sea of forces, that has no goal. This is a horrible world view for someone who wants to trust in life, who wants to be optimist, who wants to believe in some divinity that offers salvation from this world. Nietzsche's alternative is a strong pessimism or Dionysian pessimism.

That there still *could* be an altogether different kind of pessimism, a classical type -- this premonition and vision belongs to me as inseparable from me, as my *proprium*[my own] and *ipsissimum*[my ownmost]; only the word "classical" offends my ears, it is far too trite and has become round and indistinct. I call this pessimism of the future -- for it comes! I see it coming! -- *Dionysian* pessimism.<sup>156</sup>

Our pessimism: the world does not have the value we thought it had. Our faith itself has so increased our desire for knowledge that today we have to say this. Initial result: it seems worth less; that is how it is experienced initially. It is only in this sense that we are pessimists; i.e., in our determination to admit this revaluation to ourselves without any reservation, and to stop telling ourselves tales-lies-the old way. That is precisely how we find the pathos that impels us to seek new values. In sum: the world might be far more valuable than we used to believe; we must see through the naivete of our ideals, and while we thought that we accorded it the highest interpretation, we may not even have given our human existence a moderately fair value.<sup>157</sup>

At this point, it is important to understand that Nietzsche does not present his ideas in the traditional sense. He has a totally different criterion of truth of life. Within his frame of understanding of the true nature of universe, the mechanistic search for truth is a weak interpretation. It represents an ascetic ideal that does not want to accept the horror of a world

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<sup>156</sup> GS 370

<sup>157</sup> WP 32

that Nietzsche represents with the name Dionysus. Such a will to truth is a disability of creation and escape from the pains of a world of flux.

Man seeks "the truth": a world that is not self-contradictory, not deceptive, does not change, a true world--a world in which one does not suffer; contradiction, deception, change--causes of suffering! He does not doubt that a world as it ought to be exists; he would like to seek out the road to it.<sup>158</sup>

If one accepts Nietzsche's view about truth that it is an increase of the feeling of power, to be able to affirm and welcome the chaos of terrible and horrifying interpretation of the world becomes the truest of every truth. The question is "How much truth can a spirit *bear*, how much truth can a spirit *dare*?"<sup>159</sup> He shows the world from his mirror as the hardest of the world to dare.

Within this interpretation of the world, one should not criticize Nietzsche simply saying that if every interpretation is a fiction, and there is no truth, theory of will to power is itself a fiction if it is true. But it is a relative wrong stand before this theory (he never says that that is a theory). It does not speak of truth with a logical content. Truth is what a center of force creates. In this sense, I think that Nietzsche does not fall into a paradox.

If this is a world of becoming, he shows this world from his mirror.<sup>160</sup> *Every distinction; body-mind, organic-inorganic, subject-object, doer-deed dissolves and there remains just the continuous destruction and formation of forces without any goal.*

As, it is said, for Nietzsche the world is a sea of forces eternally

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<sup>158</sup> WP 585

<sup>159</sup> EH F:3

<sup>160</sup> indicating becoming with a standard language that fixes everything is in itself also a difficult problem.

changing, eternally flowing and giving birth to new forms. Every formation (formation is better than saying form) causes a deformation and it is subject to deformation. And pain is within this process in the middle point because *pain is a reaction to deformation and pain is a catalyst to new formations.*

All becoming and growing, all that guarantees the future, postulates pain.<sup>161</sup>

Now, we can ask the place of pain in our lives as human beings. We are not apart from will to power. We are not viewing this sea of forces at a distance, we see it within. As Joshua Foa Dienstag says *we are not islands of being in a sea of becoming but are constantly transforming and developing.*<sup>162</sup> We are also a part of this chaotic world of becoming without any meaning or goal. We are also complex formation of power unions.

For him we are not creatures consisting of a body and mind. Body mind problem exists for those who make such a distinction. We saw that all processes are interpretive processes, including mental and physical processes. Mind and body are not distinct features. The whole body actually thinks and brain is just a centralization apparatus in this body.

Hier ist die Voraussetzung gemacht, daß der ganze Organismus denkt, daß alle organischen Gebilde Theil haben am Denken Fühlen Wollen — folglich daß das Gehirn nur ein enormer Centralisations-Apparat ist.<sup>163</sup>

What Nietzsche tries to show is that the world of *sensations* is more important than the *ideation*. Life is a becoming but it is possible to create

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<sup>161</sup> TI X:5

<sup>162</sup> Dienstag, Joshua Foa "Nietzsche's Dionysian Pessimism" in The American Political Science Review, vol.95, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), p. 935

<sup>163</sup> Nachgelassene Fragmente 1884-1885, 27[19]

"Here is the prerequisite made that the entire organism thinks, that all of the parts of the organic formation participates at thinking feeling wanting — consequently that the brain is only an enormous centralisations apparatus." (trans. is mine)

ideas and cling on them as if they are absolute facts about the universe. Labeling meanings in a sense that resist to change and flux are reactive attitudes that impose more value on the so-called consciousness. But, for Nietzsche consciousness is just a function of the brain that arranges, simplifies, schematizes, interprets.

everything of which we become conscious is arranged, simplified, schematized, interpreted through and through--the actual process of inner "perception," the causal connection between thoughts, feelings, desires, between subject and object, are absolutely hidden from us--and are perhaps purely imaginary. The "apparent inner world" is governed by just the same forms and procedures as the "outer" world. <sup>164</sup>

It is practical in the sense that it helps us to survive but Ego (consciousness) is a creation of the Self (body-senses). In Zarathustra Nietzsche says:

The body is a great intelligence, a multiplicity with one sense, a war and a peace, a herd and a herdsman.

Your little intelligence, my brother, which you call 'spirit', is also an instrument of your body, a little instrument and toy of your great intelligence.

You say 'I' and you are proud of this word. But greater than this- although you will not believe in it – is your body and its great intelligence, which does not say 'I' but performs 'I'.

What the sense feels, what the spirit perceives, is never an end in itself. But sense and spirit would like to persuade you that they are the end of all things: they are as vain as that.

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The Self is always listening and seeking: it compares, subdues, conquers, destroys. It rules and is also the Ego's ruler.

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<sup>164</sup> WP 477

Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, stands a mighty commander, an unknown sage – he is called Self. He lived in your body, he is your body.<sup>165</sup>

Man separated his reason from his senses. S/he escaped from the chaotic realm of passions, drives and created ascetic ideals, purposes, heavens, goals, to him/herself.<sup>166</sup> Even though man has the tendency to think that his reason separate from his body, it is the body that creates mind. Reason has its roots in the body. Yet, man wants an equilibrium or stability devoid of pain.

#### **4.2.Conclusion**

Nietzsche's world view does not let anyone to speak of absolute truths. These are just *our* truths and they do not have any quality like absoluteness. There is still a human narcissism that human beings have. There is still will to reach to the knowledge of absolute world independent of any perspective. This is, in a sense, a very aggressive, arrogant and reactive attitude. One holds his/her beliefs as absolute truths and do not want to leave them. For sake of these, s/he can ignore every other kinds of perspectives, morals, religions. Nietzsche asks simply the genealogical roots of such beliefs. Answer lies in the fearful void.<sup>167</sup> The man who suffers from his meaning in the world creates such ideals and then despise the life of becoming. A search for a meaning that supplies salvation from all the change and pain in existence. In this case, man does not want life anymore,

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<sup>165</sup> Z I:4

<sup>166</sup> “There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom. And who knows for what purpose your body requires precisely your best wisdom?” Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> GM III:28

but just a metaphysical comfort. Search for a life that is devoid of pain results in losing contact with the value and meaning of life. Nietzsche's Dionysian call is a call to sensations, creation, art and life.

We simply cannot conceal from ourselves what's really expressed by that total will which received its direction from the ascetic ideal: this hate against what is human, and even more against animality, even more against material things—this abhorrence of the senses, even of reason, this fear of happiness and beauty, this longing for the beyond away from all appearance, change, becoming, death, desire, even longing itself—all this means, let's have the courage to understand this, a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a revolt against the most fundamental preconditions of life<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

I entreat you, my brothers, remain true to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of superterrestrial hopes! They are poisoners, whether they know it or not.<sup>169</sup>

It is now important to step a little bit outside of Nietzsche's philosophy and try to see his teaching, modern civilization and individuals from bird's eye view. First, it is a good start to see the aspects of civilization. Very basically, human beings seek pleasure and avoid pain. But the exaggeration of this situation is the reason that we loose contact with life. It is no more possible to experience anything intensively for those who just try to welcome pleasure and eliminate pain. We have medical developments and life comforting technology that tries to eliminate pain from life. We plan our lifes, we have daily routines and we do not want anything unexpected. In this sense, we become more machinelike as Nietzsche says.

we moderns, with our anxious self-solicitude and neighbor-love, with our virtues of work, modesty, legality, and scientism -- accumulating, economic, machinelike -- appear as a *weak* age. Our virtues are conditional on, are *provoked* by, our weaknesses<sup>170</sup>

We create a sphere for us that does not let any pain or surprise in it. We have drugs, medicine, religion, lots of ideals that offers salvation from this life. Therefore, Nietzsche's philosophy is one of the most meaningful

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<sup>169</sup> Z P:3

<sup>170</sup> TII IX: 37



call to life. He does not offer any salvation through an escape in a beyond.

In this respect, ascetic ideals represent the opposite attitude. For them, this world of change and perishing is evil. From their perspective, pain is evil but we are subject to it, therefore we have to have some guilt. The world is a place where we are being tested by some ultimate being. In this case, the world becomes just an unreal, transitory place. It is worth despising because life that changes is not even real. The real world should be stable which makes appearant world unreal. There is a beyond where salvation from this world is possible. Salvation from the pains of this world and find a stable heaven. The ascetic ideals also try to create a comfort giving, selfish sphere for the human soul. They represent an optimism. An optimism that believes in a stable world.

When the emphasis of life is put on the 'beyond' rather than on life itself – when it is put *on nothingness* -, then the emphasis has been completely removed from life. The enormous lie of personal immortality destroys all reason, everything natural in the instincts, - everything beneficial and life-enhancing in the instincts, everything that guarantees the future, now arouses mistrust . . . . That as immortal souls, everyone is on the same level as everyone else, that in the commonality of all beings, the 'salvation' of *each* individual lays claim to an eternal significance, that the small-minded and the half-minded can think well of themselves, that the laws of nature are constantly *broken* for their sake – you cannot heap enough contempt on this, every type of selfishness *shamelessly* to the point of infinity.<sup>171</sup>

As it is seen for Nietzsche all these are sick attitudes towards life. We can see him as a doctor who tries to teach health. His diagnosis for ascetic ideals and modern society finds its expression with the words “nihilistic.” Nihilism can be understood as negating this life. But, for him life is at the

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<sup>171</sup> A 43

core point. This is welcoming pain and transitoriness. This necessitates will to encounter, will to life. In his philosophy one can not find a comforting beyond. If one is able to affirm life as it is without clinging on any beyond, then this is convalescence.

The convalescent has a more delicate taste for what is joyful, and he gets delight in a perspective, or a creation. Universal truths are gone but it is not a problem at all. Such a convalescent will see this search for a so-called universal truth as bad taste.

No, we have grown sick of this bad taste, this will to truth, to 'truth at any price', this youthful madness in the love of truth: we are too experienced, too serious, too jovial, too burned, too deep for that<sup>172</sup>.

And as such, s/he joins in the productive activity of life and art. In this sense, pain may lead to bring new creations, new perspectives, fresh opinions.

At this point, one can ask the following question: if life is a meaningless becoming where everything is subject to destruction, why not resignation or saying no to life? Why should we affirm it if life has so many terrors? That would be, perhaps, the teaching of Schopenhauer or Buddha, for Nietzsche. One can not negate life and find salvation. This is negating what one is. And there is no real salvation in this escape.

Here we encounter with the importance of art. Art resembles the creative activities of nature. Art may reveal us truth from the perspective of Nietzsche. There is not a stable truth as ascetic ideals, or any science that wants to stabilize asserts. In this sense, with the words of Rose Pfeffer "The world becomes an aesthetic phenomenon, a free and purposeless working

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<sup>172</sup> GS P:4

from within. Man becomes the creator-god who in his productive activity experiences a oneness with being itself.”<sup>173</sup> But this art is a different kind of art: an art for the convalescents.

No, if we convalescents still need art, it is *another kind* of art – a mocking, light, fleeting, divinely untroubled, divinely artificial art that, like a bright flame, blazes into an unclouded sky! Above all: an art for artists, only for artists! In addition we will know better what is first and foremost needed *for that*: cheerfulness – any cheerfulness, my friends!<sup>174</sup>

The world is a monstrous amount of forces that does not grow bigger or smaller. They represent will to power. Power constellations seek to become more. They want to grow.<sup>175</sup> The process is independent of human judgments and valuations. The nature of the world is eternally creating and destructing. In this sense, art is finding resonance with life itself. One can affirm life with art. As every power constellation seeks to become more, *beauty signifies strength* or increase in power for human beings: “becoming more beautiful” is a consequence of *enhanced* strength.”<sup>176</sup> This is affirmation of life, not an escape from ugly and evil.

What is essential in art remains its perfection of existence, its production of perfection and plenitude; art is essentially *affirmation, blessing, deification of existence*-. . . . Tragedy does *not* teach “resignation”- To represent terrible and questionable things in itself an instinct for power and magnificence in an artist: he does not fear them-There is no such thing as pessimistic art-Art affirms.<sup>177</sup>

The creations of art are not resulting from any dissatisfaction with

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<sup>173</sup> Pfeffer 1972, p.210

<sup>174</sup> GS P:4

<sup>175</sup> But the sum of forces do not change

<sup>176</sup> WP 800

Nietzsche's will to power is sometimes wrongly understood as Nazism or political ideas in this sense. But it is a wrong interpretation of his works.

<sup>177</sup> WP 821

reality. Art reveals the world of sensations. "Beautiful" actually signifies eroticism.

Eternal life, the eternal return of life, the future promised and hallowed in the past; the triumphant Yes to life beyond all death and change; true life as the continuation of life through procreation, through the mysteries of sex. For the Greeks a sexual symbol was therefore the most sacred symbol, the real profundity in the whole of ancient piety. Every single element in the act of procreation, of pregnancy, and of birth aroused the highest and most solemn feelings.<sup>178</sup>

It is also important to keep in mind that repression of sexuality, means repression of the world of sensations that reveal change and destruction. In this sense, ascetic ideals represent just a wishful thinking that can not tolerate the fears of a world devoid of transcendental meanings and a world that change and perishes. All idealizations are decadent forms of life; but through art a world of creation-destruction and becoming reveals itself: "Our religion, morality, and philosophy are decadence forms of man. The counter movement: art."<sup>179</sup>

Reading Nietzsche's philosophy from the glasses of pain reveals the essential elements of his philosophy. He values life from his mirror which is perhaps the hardest of all perspectives. He teaches Dionysian attitude. This is not a resignation philosophy. This is such a view that welcomes pains of existence and it is very interesting that he, who often suffered from physical pain, finds admiration for this difficult experience.<sup>180</sup> Trying to pursue a life

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<sup>178</sup> TI X:4

<sup>179</sup> WP 794

<sup>180</sup>He suffered from severe headaches and migraine attacks and when he recovered from these migraine attacks, he could never work for more than twenty minutes because his eye problems resulted in headaches. In his book *Ecce Homo* he also tells about the extreme pain that he lived through and their relation with the ideas he developed. EH I:I

without pain is not only impossible, but also takes all the possibilities and meanings of life from it. Eliminating life from pain means eliminating life itself.

**KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS OF NIETZSCHE'S WORKS EMPLOYED IN  
THE DISSERTATION**

			Published
BT	=	The Birth of Tragedy	1872
HAH	=	Human, All-Too-Human	1878-
9			
D	=	Dawn	1881
GS	=	The Gay Science	1882
Z	=	Thus Spoke Zarathustra	1883
BGE	=	Beyond Good and Evil	1886
GM	=	Genealogy of Morals	1887
TI	=	Twilight of the Idols	1889
A	=	Antichrist	1895
EH	=	Ecce Homo	1908
WP	=	Will to Power	(notes from 1883-8)

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