

IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND IR

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND IR**

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Today, especially after various critical evaluations of mainstream theories of International Relations (IR), it is common place to observe that IR discipline is Eurocentric. Natural outcome of this Eurocentric character of IR discipline has been the privileging of modern identity (and thus, modernity) and the marginalization of different cultures and identities as "others". This thesis analyzes the relationship between the concepts of modern identity, national interest and difference within the framework of IR theory. The thesis asserts that IR discipline should solve the problem of exclusion of the "other" or suppression of differences since International Relations means first and foremost interaction with the "Other". In order to solve this contradiction, I argue that IR theory should be deconstructed on the basis of a treatment of differences and heterogeneity. However, criticizing the creation of the "others" necessitates also the critique of modern identity since "heterophobia" is the result of the homogenizing character of European identity. Therefore, a deconstruction of the hegemony of modern identity in IR is the main concern of this thesis. The thesis finally argues that "other worlds" which leave room for different identities and other "truths" are also possible.

Keywords: Identity, difference, otherness, normalization, IR theory, modernity.

## ÖZ

### KİMLİK, FARKLILIK VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER

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Bugün, özellikle Uluslararası İlişkilerin temel kuramlarına yöneltilen eleştirilerden sonra Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininin Avrupa-merkezci yapısını gözlemlemek daha kolay hale gelmiştir. Uluslararası İlişkiler'in bu Avrupa-merkezci yapısının doğal sonucu modern kimliğin(ve modernitenin) ayrıcalıklı olarak; farklı kültür ve kimliklerin ise “öteki” olarak konumlandırılmasına yol açmıştır. Bu tez, Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisi kapsamında modern kimlik, ulusal çıkar ve farklılık kavramları arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Tezde, Uluslararası İlişkiler'in “öteki” ile etkileşim demek olmasından ötürü, Uluslararası İlişkiler'in ötekini dışlama veya farklılıkları bastırma problemini çözmesi gerektiğini öne sürüyorum. Ve ayrıca Uluslararası İlişkiler kuramının, bu çelişkiyi çözmek için farklılık ve heterojenlik temelinde yapıbozuma uğratılması gerektiğini savunuyorum. Heterofobi, Avrupalı kimliğin homojenleştirici özelliğinin bir sonucu olduğu için, “öteki” ‘lerin yaratılması aynı zamanda modern kimliğin eleştirisini de gerektirmektedir. Dolayısıyla modern kimliğin yapısökümü bu tezin başlıca ilgi alanıdır. Ayrıca bu tez, farklı kimlik ve öteki “doğru”lara yaşam alanı tanıyan başka dünyaların da olduğunu göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kimlik, farklılık, ötekilik, normalleştirme, Uluslararası İlişkiler kuramı, modernite.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Today, it is generally accepted that International Relations (IR) is Euro-centric. The natural outcome of this Euro-centric character of IR has been the privileging of identity represented in the modern state—that is, the European sovereign state—over other possible identities, largely peripheral.<sup>1</sup> This has in turn led to the suppressing and marginalizing of differences, which are non-European cultures, ethnicity and gender. However, in a conjecture in which democracy and human rights have become the key values, IR has to revise itself in order to leave space for alterity. This owes much to that late-modernity witnesses proliferation of particularisms. In this age, as Maurice Blanchot puts it for the nihilist age, “for the first time the horizon is infinitely opened to knowledge— ‘all is permitted’”.<sup>2</sup> Henceforth, it necessary to open the field of IR to such nihilisms in order to save it from closure by a single theory. It has been suggested, therefore, that IR theory should be deconstructed on the basis of heterogeneity and differences for a more pluralistic world in which everyone finds room to represent himself/herself.<sup>3</sup> In this thesis, I will focus on the need to deconstruct IR theory in this regard.

Linda Alcoff once said: “identity is the price we pay for subjectivity”.<sup>4</sup> Today, IR seems to prove it by tilting the balance towards the nation-states vis-à-vis people on whom the nationalistic discourse relies. However, nationalistic discourse does not benefit people. Conversely, it even turns against people

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<sup>1</sup> Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 2.

<sup>2</sup> Maurice Blanchot, “The Limits of Nihilism,” in *The New Nietzsche*, ed. D. Allison (Boston: MIT Press, 1985), 122, quoted in James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 2.

<sup>3</sup> E. Fuat Keyman, *Globalization, State, Identity/Difference* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1997), 160.

<sup>4</sup> Linda Martin Alcoff, “Who’s Afraid of Identity Politics?” in *Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism*, ed. Paula M. L. Moya and Michael R. Hames-Garcia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 322.



since it reduces people to objects that somehow maintain the continuation of the system. People's demands are ignored and people are mobilized for the survival of the nation-state. As a result, the gap between people's wills and state's representative mechanisms widens. Democracy becomes instrumentalized for the approval of the system. Nevertheless, a system in which the demands of the people are ignored can not continue since it undermines the legitimacy of the state. Hence, it appears that IR can not have a claim of objectivity especially when it privileges modern identity over differences. Therefore, this thesis aims to question the modern character of IR. However, I should mention that this is not to defend traditionalism within the field but rather, to expose the continuity between them although modernity declares itself superior to traditionality.

The first chapter "Identity" is concerned with the prevailing notion of identity, namely nation-state in IR. It examines the relationship between nation-state and the concept of national interest. In this sense, IR theory that legitimizes the nutrition of the modern identity by national interest is questioned. Objectification of people through the privileging of national interest and the concept of bio-power which facilitates this objectification is examined with critical lenses. In addition, the tendencies of hegemonic identity which have been towards the normalization of difference and attributing otherness to difference are revealed. In this respect, teleological development in identity/difference dilemma highlights IR in its modern character. Therefore, replacement of religious community with nation-state in terms of claims to universality is an important moment to show that the modern state only inherited the logic of the Middle Ages in suppression and creating enemies. Moreover, the contribution of the anarchy-sovereignty dualism to the construction of modern identity in IR is emphasized. This helps to expose the Cartesian logic of identity in IR theory. Also, I will touch upon the lack of legitimacy inherent in identities. I will establish a link between violation of the space of difference and the politics of desire. Last but not least, power-

knowledge nexus in IR will be examined which—I think— is important in terms of problematizing IR theory that helps to privilege the “powerful”.

The second chapter, “Difference”, aims to give a definition of difference which will constitute a basic assumption in the demarcation of difference from otherness in the next chapter. Then, differences in IR which were tried to be either eradicated by the hegemonic identity or stamped as “others” will be exemplified. In this regard, I found necessary to classify difference under three strands namely, gender, ethnicity and East. Gender is included in the category as difference since women are treated as “different” in IR. IR theory which legitimizes security discourses throughout empirical realist theories and draws women out of public sphere and locates men at a privileged status by including them is put under criticism. Therefore, this will constitute the basic premise around which the questioning will take place regarding the gender issues in IR. This will later bring us to the need to question patriarchal IR theory which appears to me necessary given the aspect of exploitation. Ethnicity as difference is also examined in this chapter and the imposition of the hegemonic order into ethnicities is stressed. East as a difference has been related with the East’s “inferiority” in the eyes of the West according to which IR theory is constructed. In short, the chapter enables a suitable ground to argue (later in the last chapter) that differences should be freed from dominant order considering that they “have the right to speak for themselves” without needing any representation.

“Otherness and Normalization” as the third chapter implies that normalization and otherness are complementary in the sense that both deal with the unfinished work of the other. The state, in order to differentiate itself creates “enemies” and these are subjugated to normalization procedures. In the same vein, untamed difference by the state is marked as “other”. Hence, both processes nourish each other. Here, it is important to remind that discipline is what multiplies difference. The chapter also argues that national interests

draw people out of “reality” by making people believe into simulations like demonized “enemies”. Hence realist theories of IR, while pressuring for taking into account “reality”, shift the focus of people to imagined “enemies”. This brings us to the paradox of identity and exposes the need to create “enemies”. Because “anarchy outside” is both the tool to keep the survival of the nation-state and is what people are sheltered against by the state. In taking people in the service of the state, “bio-power” enters the discipline. This contributes to the objectification of both “included” and “excluded” people. Thus, the need to question modern state which reifies people comes under light with the entrance of the concept of bio-power into IR.

The fourth chapter, “Reproduction of Otherness in International Politics” is in order to argue that actors that fit into the roles of identity and difference could change despite the fact that the role of hegemonic identity has been occupied by the West up to date. This chapter exemplifies the reproduction of otherness in the history of international politics. Since one of the basic arguments of this thesis is that the modern state has inherited the logic of the Church in terms of marking people arbitrarily to keep its “existence”, the Church is a good starting point that conforms to that argument. Furthermore, discovery of America is handled in order to examine European vesting of the feeling of superiority. The violation of the space of Ireland by the English is also a good point in order to illustrate the creation of internal “enemies” to strengthen the dominant (European) identity. Colonization period is another important era in history that enabled Europeans to dominate the world by homogenizing the “different”. Nazi Germany might be the most extreme form of how radical nationalism could not tolerate minorities that do not “comply” with the dominant order. The Cold War is used as an example in order to show the inscription of American identity by using the “communist threat”. Last but not least, the post-September 11 era aims to highlight today’s “clash of civilizations” that facilitates the power struggle between nation-states. In

short, the chapter asserts that international politics has a teleological development although it questions such “reality”.

The following two chapters, “Saving IR from State-Orientation” and “Imagining An-other IR”, are complementary in the sense that the latter can not be actualized without starting with the former when contemporary IR is considered. Hence, they stand like two sides of the same coin. The fifth chapter “Saving IR from State-Orientation” aims to problematize the state-centric nature of IR theory. It starts with the globalization process that leads to challenging the nation-state and continues that in an era in which dichotomies of inside/outside are blurred, insisting on the clear-cut boundaries is meaningless. This blurring process leaves self/other dualities in question. Moreover, this chapter questions the “international” which was crystallized for privileging the nation-state. Hence, saving state and international arena from reification is the main concern of this chapter. Furthermore, integrating society into IR theory constitutes another premise of this chapter which I think will open state into interaction. Finally, the concept “democracy” saved from its European monopoly needs to be integrated into IR. The paradox of democracy is also touched upon in the sense that recognizing it and keeping it alive will prevent the dogmatization of the state over people.

Knowing that each deconstruction leads also to a construction, I devoted the sixth chapter to this construction. Hence, “Imagining An-Other IR” is concerned with the establishment of a “different” IR. However, such an establishment differs from the mainstream IR in which modern identity prevails in the sense that it is open to criticism from the very beginning. It starts with the proposal of constructing empathy with the “other”. Thus, understanding the other—which was grounded on that self and other mutually construct each other—is a prerequisite for imagining a different IR. Questioning the Oriental character is also vital in terms of creating a dialogue with Eastern states which were left aside by Euro-centric IR theories. In

proving this Euro-centricism, the teleological development of international politics plays an important role. Bearing in mind the relativity of identity and difference roles that might change in time, understanding the other might seem easier. In this sense, universal claims of the hegemonic identity come also under attack. In terms of methodology, sticking into empiricism drifts the discipline to reductionism. Thus, methodology of IR theories should also be problematized. Moreover, given the power-knowledge nexus, the claim to “objectivity” is questioned. Thus, ripping away the mask of objectivity is called in order to allow room for new “subjectivities”.

## CHAPTER 2

### IDENTITY

The prevailing notion of identity is nation-state in IR since other parameters in the discipline “are defined in terms of it or depend on it”.<sup>1</sup> Westphalian state-system which legitimized sovereign-states system resembled the substitution of the Church’s authority by sovereign-states’ authority.<sup>2</sup> Before Westphalia Treaty in 1648 the Church claimed universal authority and negated differences. However, since 1648 the modern identity came out to represent the ‘self’ and held the authority to define, represent and normalize differences.<sup>3</sup> In this respect, Westphalian Treaty constitutes a milestone in identity/difference dilemma for the purposes of this study of IR although it does not point out to a break with the teleological character of IR. Henceforth, it appears that state’s role had been to “replicate the achievement of Christendom in securing identity against difference”.<sup>4</sup> To put it differently, sovereign state burdened the same function with religion and appointed new ‘infidels’ to reconstruct its identity in theoretical terms. However, the actors that represent identity and difference have changed.

With the emergence of nationalism as a discourse whose origin is in dispute, sovereign states started to appear as nation-states.<sup>5</sup> By the end of the nineteenth century, “every nation began to feel the need to define itself as an *ethnie*, as a self-sufficient, organic entity with its own principles of development, its own “soul”.<sup>6</sup> According to the discourse of nationalism — as

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<sup>1</sup> Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 13.

<sup>2</sup> David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 43.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 47.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 48.

<sup>5</sup> Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” *American Review of Sociology* 19 (1993): 212.

<sup>6</sup> Krishan Kumar, “Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective”, *Theory and Society* 29:5 (2000) : 591, emphasis in original.

Elie Kedourie put it — “humanity is naturally divided into nations, nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and the only legitimate type of government is national self-government”.<sup>7</sup> This led to acceptance of nation-states as ‘natural’ and unquestionably ‘true’ in modern times. Nation state “refers to a national and territorial totality based on the assumption of ethnic homogeneity and political representivity”.<sup>8</sup> That was what made problems harder to solve by ignoring difference for the sake of homogeneity.

Taking nation-states as ‘given’ would also necessitate adapting everything according to state’s needs. Subsequently, people would be evaluated by their efforts to contribute to state power. The concept of “bio-power” would reduce people’s bodies and lives into objects that maintain state’s survival. State’s control of people regarding their contribution to national interests will be observed in IR after the concept of ‘bio-power’ entered the scene.<sup>9</sup> If the hegemony of realism in the field is taken into consideration, it can be easily observed that “bio-power” exposes itself mostly in military service in IR. People are held responsible to join the army when national interests are threatened or if national interests are considered to be in peril. Thus, national interests seem to manipulate people’s lives. In this respect, realist paradigm which attributes a lot of weight to military power for power struggle proves itself to contribute to the objectification of people. Therefore, it can be drawn that IR in which realist paradigm prevails privileges state over people by regarding them as the sources of bio-power.

In IR, seeking national interests through war is internal to the construction of identity. Actually, by creating a ‘ “society of security” in which practices of *national security* and practices of *social security* structure intensive and

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<sup>7</sup> Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (New York: Praeger, 1960) , 9, quoted in Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity,” *American Review of Sociology* 19 (1993): 213.

<sup>8</sup> Keyman, 65.

<sup>9</sup> Michel Foucault, “Right of Death and Power Over Life,” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 265.

extensive power relations, and constitute the ethical boundaries and territorial borders of inside/outside, normal/pathological, civilized/barbaric, and so on', state integrates masses to the system via relying on their fear from death.<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, "evangelism of fear" is maintained by the state, in particular by the nation in order to manipulate people to pursue national interests.<sup>11</sup> Hence, people's fears are used as leverages in order to appreciate national interests. By triggering the anxiety about death, the state gains the legitimate ground for war. Actually, it holds a monopoly over people's bodies and lives. However, it pays back by guaranteeing people's lives and providing them security. To put it bluntly, people's lives are arranged according to states' needs. "The will to survival" becomes the common link that constructs a mutual relationship between state and the people. Therefore, modern state becomes a mechanism that transforms its anxiety into the anxiety of people over existence. This generates a sense of belonging for the people. People are guaranteed not to perish because of external "threats" and thus, they are appeased by "security" while losing their actual freedom day by day. Security discourses are nourished by this anxiety to exist. In this sense, "discourse of security which is concretized through the practice of foreign policy [becomes] integral to state identity".<sup>12</sup> Therefore, state by guaranteeing security and relieving people's anxieties about death steals from people's individuality. In other words, "[the] foreknowledge of death that encourages the self to assert its individuality also becomes an instrument enabling power to restrict, domesticate, and regularize the self".<sup>13</sup> Thus, in modern state people seem to war to guarantee the life of the population. In other words, "[w]ars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity".<sup>14</sup> Hence, life appears to be both a tool

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<sup>10</sup> Campbell, 202, emphasis in original.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 49.

<sup>12</sup> Keyman, 75.

<sup>13</sup> William E. Connolly, *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 18.

<sup>14</sup> Foucault, "Right of Death and Power Over Life", 259-260.



used by the state and at the same time is the ultimate end for whose continuation people cease from their actual freedom. To put it differently, “the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence”.<sup>15</sup> This is the fragile point that has been used as a basis for maintaining security by the state. Actually, state both creates fear of death by relying on the image of the “enemies” and tries to suppress those enemies which indeed benefits national interests. “Power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population”.<sup>16</sup> This brings into mind Nietzsche’s words, “to die at the right time” in a world in which people’s fears of death become the instruments of nation-state in pursuing national interests.<sup>17</sup> This is because “death is power’s limit”.<sup>18</sup> Because until death people’s bodies are seen as the sources of ‘bio-power’ that can be used on behalf of the state. People do not have the authority on their own lives and bodies. Thus, everything is marked by the national interests that maintain recycling of the modern identity. In short, national interests direct people to defend national identity and national identity is reified by being replaced above everything and can not be questioned. That means it is “absolute”.

Another implication of arranging everything according to state betrays itself in the disfavoring of possible identities other than the state. However, “[t]o possess a true identity is to be false to difference, while to be true to difference is to sacrifice the promise of a true identity”.<sup>19</sup> This reveals the relativity of truth in terms of identity/difference relationship. Moreover, it betrays the fact that IR has been based on a subjective ground by locating itself on the side of modern identity. This also exposes how universalism attributed to nation-state is born out of a particular interest.

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 260.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 260.

<sup>17</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 171.

<sup>18</sup> Foucault, “Right of Death and Power Over Life”, 261.

<sup>19</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 67.

Modernity seems to have inherited the universalism of religion in Middle Ages. Religion was replaced by “universal reason” in modern times. Hence, nothing has changed in theoretical terms but the agents that claim universality have changed over time. Thus, IR carries on the universality of Middle Ages. Universal discourse of nationalism has been maintained by ignoring diversity and particularity. Thus, difference is melted in identity’s pot in order to establish nation-states. As a natural outcome of the logic of modernity, modern state homogenizes and pacifies difference.<sup>20</sup> To put it differently, in the formation of a nation, “the difference of space returns as the Sameness of time, turning Territory into Tradition, turning the People into One. The liminal point of this ideological displacement is the turning of the differentiated spatial boundary, the ‘outside’, into the unified temporal territory of Tradition”.<sup>21</sup> However, there is always an ‘outside’ for the people as ‘one’. Actually, this is how identity is maintained. Because only through exclusionary practices modern identity (or the nation-state) can declare “inside” of its boundaries “safe” and “secure”. In other words, “outside” serves as a leverage for privileging identity. Therefore, paradoxically identity needs an “outside” as well as it needs normalization of the different. As Richard Devetak puts it:

Identity is an effect forged, on the one hand, by disciplinary practices which attempt to normalize a population, giving it a sense of unity, and on the other, by exclusionary practices which attempt to secure the domestic identity through processes of spatial differentiation, and various diplomatic, military, and defense practices. There is a supplementary relationship between containment of domestic and foreign others, which helps to constitute political identity.<sup>22</sup>

Thus, “[n]ational identity is both unifying and divisive. Its power to unify depends reciprocally on its power to divide”.<sup>23</sup> It both creates a sense of

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<sup>20</sup> Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, (Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press,1996)

<sup>21</sup> 16.

<sup>21</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Modern Nation,” in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha, (London:Routledge, 1990), 300.

<sup>22</sup> Richard Devetak, “Postmodernism”, in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1996), 198.

<sup>23</sup> Michael Pickering, *Stereotyping: The Politics of Representation* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 89.

belonging for the community it represents and non-belonging for people other than its nationals. This is, in a sense, its condition of existence.

Consistent with this logic of existence, anarchy becomes the constitutive element of modern identity in IR. It becomes a leverage to strengthen nation-state relying on the fear of “state of nature”. Thomas Hobbes who argues that human beings compete with each other in a “state of nature” is taken as a reference point in contemporary IR. Hobbes’ ideas regarding the competitive nature of human beings are reflected upon international stage as the power-seeking politics of states. Taking Hobbes’ political theory as a reference legitimizes states’ power-struggles as well as it re-emphasizes the need for a sovereign. Just like ‘state of nature’ creates its anti-thesis—that is, sovereign ruler in Hobbes’ theory; anarchy constructs its anti-thesis, namely the sovereign state. In this sovereign state, “self-preservation” becomes the ultimate goal in order to exist.<sup>24</sup> The people’s fear for their lives in both Hobbes’ theory and realist theories of IR, facilitate the absoluteness of the sovereign state. It is therefore, presented that only a central state could avoid a disrupted order.

Given the anarchy problematique in IR, another aspect of the discourse of nationalism other than pacifying difference thus becomes its contribution to the formation of otherness by legitimizing states’ interest seeking behaviors. As nationalism directed states to manipulate their foreign policies according to reaching power, “survival of the fittest” strategies dominated international arena. As a result, there would be ‘haves’ who enjoy the advantages of their power and ‘have-nots’ who suffer from their weaknesses. The prerequisite to increase national power and thus, to protect modern state was pursuing national interests. The problem with that is its conversion of “difference” into otherness to privilege national identity by devaluing what diverges from

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<sup>24</sup> Johann P. Sommerville, *Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas in Historical Context* (New York: St. Martin’s Pres, 1992), 43.

national identity. As Ignatieff puts it, “[t]he moral ideal of nationalism is an ethic of heroic sacrifice justifying the use of violence in the defense of one’s nation against enemies internal or external”<sup>25</sup> In this respect, protecting national identity through satisfying national interests by power-seeking behaviors creates inside-outside dualisms. Pathological character of nationalism triggers the feelings of hatred creates normal/abnormal dichotomies in order to appreciate what is ‘national’. State sovereignty that takes “anarchy outside” in order to define itself reproduces exclusionary practices.<sup>26</sup> In short, otherness contributes to unification of modern identity and an indispensable part of identity formation. For instance, cold war has served to identity formation and definition since it legitimized an enemy and turned it into an ‘other’. As Campbell states, “the cold war needs to be understood as a disciplinary strategy that was global in scope but national in design”.<sup>27</sup> Hence, seeing behind the power struggle shows us the need to define national identity and also, fragility of national identities.

Therefore, the logic of identity necessitates suppression of differences and national-interests constitute a good pretext for this purpose. Relying on the pretext of national-interest, states seem to gain the authority to intervene into people’s specificity in particular, and lives in general. In this sense, national interests become the tools to continue the existence of the unfair modern state system that exploits some in order to appreciate other some. This leads to mobilization of people for the “holy” ideal of protecting national identity. To put it that way, national-interest is the key to survival of modern identity in security-based IR. It contributes to reproduction of modern identity by magnifying the European nation-state image because magnification helps to

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<sup>25</sup> Shehla Burney. “Manufacturing Nationalism: Post-September 11 Discourse in United States Media” in *Studies in Media & Information Literacy Education* 2:2, 2002, <http://www.utpjournals.com/jour.ihtml?lp=simile/issue6/Burneyfulltext.html>

<sup>26</sup> Rob Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 66.

<sup>27</sup> Campbell, 153.

organize international and domestic agenda according to this image and destroys any trace of resistance to modern state. Thus, national interests serve like mirrors that magnify the image of the nation-state. Statesmen and people that comply with national norms, dazzled by this magnified image of modern-state, seek national interests passionately. Ultimately, they get so blinded with this image that they ignore people and ‘other’ states. In other words, national-interests are the instruments that convert passions of people from micro level to the macro level for the sake of “modern identity”. In a “state of nature”, nation-states become the protector of people from the threat of “anarchy” outside. Thus, seeking national interests becomes the prerequisites for protecting people from “threats” outside. Pursuing them is legitimized by using people’s fears from war. Placing national-interests at the core leads to classification of states according to their power and power competition among states. Hence, “survival of the fittest strategies” begin to dominate international arena. In order not to be ‘naturally selected’ states, states take precautions to reinforce their power. ‘The survival of the fittest’ condition maintains them stronger vis-à-vis public while restricting the living space of people for the sake of national identity. Hence security discourses are reinforced by hiding behind the pretext of national interests. In short, national interest is indispensable for modern identity since it nourishes it. At this point the problem for IR lies in that it reflects the “intertwined characteristic of knowledge and interest”<sup>28</sup> by serving to national interests.

For the case of fragility of national identities, putting forward that this vulnerability is inevitable will be useful. Because there will always be deviations from the hegemonic identity, it lacks full-legitimization. To put it differently, since difference is a requirement for identity, identity will not preoccupy all of the space. Therefore, invading the moral space of difference means the end of identity as well. Henceforth, no identity can achieve full-legitimization since it would bring itself to an end. Because life is richer than

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<sup>28</sup> Keyman, 93.

the constructed structures. Therefore, state's policies as if it has full-legitimacy is what seems problematic in IR. Because doing so means neglecting the flow of life and this is like trying to stay static in this current.

However, it is also inevitable that identity violates the cultural space of difference by suppressing and homogenizing it as the logic of identity requires. "For being is always defined as the appropriation of either difference into identity, or of identities into a greater order, be it absolute knowledge, History, or the state".<sup>29</sup> As Michel Foucault argues, without power subjects can not exercise their agency and thus freedom and power are intermingled.<sup>30</sup> This exposes clearly the paradox of identity since freedom enables differences to sprout as well as it paves the way for suppressing them. Because as power exists, some will be confined to subordinate and the rest will enjoy the advantages of "freedom". In other words, "[p]ossession is preeminently the form in which the other becomes the same, by becoming mine".<sup>31</sup> Possession is thus linked with freedom. "For freedom is maintained by a self-possession which extends itself to anything that threatens its identity. In this structure European Philosophy reduplicates Western foreign policy, where democracy at home is maintained through colonial or neocolonial oppression abroad".<sup>32</sup> Hence, the link between freedom and power also appears to finalize in the paradox of identity.

To put it differently, violation of the space of difference by the national identity can be seen as the result of the politics of desire. Identity is tried to be maintained stronger by penetrating into the space of difference and integrating difference into the system after normalization processes. "The reason is that [the subject] desires *being* something he himself lacks and which some other

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<sup>29</sup> Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London: Routledge, 1990), 13.

<sup>30</sup> Campbell, 204.

<sup>31</sup> Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 46, quoted in Young, 14.

<sup>32</sup> Young, 14.

person seems to possess”.<sup>33</sup> As Girard sets forth that “the subject seeks wholeness of being to stem its own uncertainty and incompleteness. Because *nobody* actually possesses wholeness, desire keeps moving”.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, as far as life goes on; the instinct to integrate difference into identity will continue. However, identities are not clear-cut beings. “Since the constitutive outside is present within the inside as its always real possibility, every identity becomes purely contingent”.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, arguably bearing in mind that hegemonic identity also involves difference might relieve the burden upon difference.

Theorizing identity in IR also shows us the “ ‘Cartesian anxiety’ [which] asserts that either we have some sort of ultimate foundation for our knowledge or we are plunged into the void of the relative, the irrational, the arbitrary, the nihilistic” lies behind the exclusionary practices of states.<sup>36</sup> This explains the logic behind the conversion of otherness which constitutes the second approach to difference in IR. Binary oppositions such as inside/outside, identity/difference, normal/abnormal, self/other etc. thus appear to facilitate to degrade the different by demonizing it as an “enemy” while privileging the Western self.

IR also reflects the paradoxical nature of Western concept of democracy. Because democracy necessitates “homogeneity” and “eradication of heterogeneity” while enabling people to be represented.<sup>37</sup> This is because the principle of equality lies at the heart of democracy in theoretical terms.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, “democratic ideal aims at creating an identity based on

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<sup>33</sup> René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press 1972), 144, quoted in William E. Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 52, emphasis in original.

<sup>34</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 53, emphasis in original.

<sup>35</sup> Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000), 21.

<sup>36</sup> Campbell, 193.

<sup>37</sup> Carl Schmitt, *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy*, trans. Ellen Kennedy, Cambridge, MA, 1985, 9, quoted in Chantal Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox* (London: Verso, 2000), 38.

<sup>38</sup> Mouffe, 38.

homogeneity”.<sup>39</sup> Democracy is exclusionary in the sense that it privileges the ones “who belong to the demos”.<sup>40</sup> Henceforth, in a democratic order some are more equal than the others. This is what happens in IR too. Focusing on states’ interests seeking behaviors and leaving aside what diverges from national identity, IR creates its own “demos”. The ones who contribute to the reproduction of national identity are included while the ones who challenge it are excluded from “demos”. As Carl Schmitt puts it, “democracy always entails relations of exclusion-inclusion”.<sup>41</sup> This brings us to the conclusion that IR should be cleansed from Euro-centric conceptualizations of democracy.

It is also vital to attract attention again to power relationships in identity/difference dichotomy. Nation-state which is also nourished and legitimized by the knowledge maintained by IR, contributes to reproduction of knowledge in the field. In other words, “power and knowledge directly imply one another; there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations”.<sup>42</sup> Power/knowledge nexus finds its implication in European nation-state which holds the monopoly of producing myths about Eastern states in IR. Eastern stereotype in the Westerners’ mind “operate through myths because both involve the combined repressions of politics and history”.<sup>43</sup> In return, IR discipline serves to interests of the European nation-state by legitimizing their power-seeking policies in international arena. However, it is important to note that “[one] can not step “outside” of power, because there is no outside of power.”<sup>44</sup> Since power is “capillary”, it is everywhere. Thus, assuming that it is collected in the nation-state is a mistake. Hence, such an attempt to abolish power from the discipline

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 39.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 39.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 43.

<sup>42</sup> Michel Foucault, “The Body of the Condemned” in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 175.

<sup>43</sup> Pickering, 48.

<sup>44</sup> Terry Aladjem, “The Philosopher’s Prism: Foucault, Feminism, and Critique,” *Political Theory* 19:2 (May, 1991): 279.



will exceed the aim of this thesis. However, for the purposes of this thesis that tries to deconstruct Euro-centric IR theory, the focus of criticism inevitably shifts to nation-state.

Since IR locates itself on the side of modern identity, it imposes nation-states system as the only “true” form of international system. “[P]ower is a regime of truth” —as Foucault suggests. Thus, reaching “truth” would be a meaningless enterprise.<sup>45</sup> In this sense, we must be aware of the fact that IR is composed of contesting different “truths” which would lead to disturbing “truth games”.<sup>46</sup> Consequently, international politics should be considered as a “struggle within power” rather than as a struggle for power as mainstream IR theories suggest.<sup>47</sup>

Finally, state identity is not something static. As far as identity exists, there will be differences accompanying it. In fact, differences benefit to the revitalization of hegemonic identity. “[Hegemonic identity is] narcissistically dependent on the Other in order to become [itself]”.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, examining difference which is part of identity will highlight us about modern identity in IR, which will be the concern of the next chapter.

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 280.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 280.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 280.

<sup>48</sup> Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman, “Introduction: Subjectivity and Modernity’s Other” in *Modernity and Identity*, ed. Scott Lash and Jonathan Friedman (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.), 7.

## CHAPTER 3

### DIFFERENCE

Difference is an indispensable part of politics that keeps on politics of desire which maintains the flow of life. That means, “[i]dentity requires difference in order to be”.<sup>1</sup> If identity could exist on its own, there would be no need to continue politics. To put it that way, “the fullness projected into others is nowhere to be realized and because what is figured from one perspective as a *lack* of fullness can also be figured as the *abundance* over identity that keeps desire moving”.<sup>2</sup> In other words, deriving its roots from the politics of desire, identity complements its lack of fullness with difference. Therefore, difference can be defined as ‘abundance of “life”’ that flows over identity in order to carry on politics. In a different vein, it is the object that keeps the protection instinct of identity alive by triggering the action of creating otherness in mainstream theories of IR. In other words; difference is the motive to keep the identity alive. It is both the obstacle in front of the closure of an identity and at the same time condition of identity’s existence. Therefore, focusing on this motive which was tried to be buried by the mainstream theories of IR might enable us to save identities from getting dogmatized.

Unfortunately, states hold the authority to determine who must suffer regarding their “difference” and which difference will be converted into otherness. Therefore, difference could also be defined as beings which has not been stamped by the state yet and thus, has not been converted into otherness. However, the paradox with difference is to what extent the “difference” is different. Because in order not to be culturally marked as “other”, it has to comply with general norms that imposes itself in the form of national values in IR. Thus, it has to sacrifice from its originality in order to survive since it

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<sup>1</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 64.

<sup>2</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 55, emphasis in original.

will automatically face with normalization processes and will be adopted by the system. To put that another way, “[t]he world is always richer than the systems through which we comprehend and organize it”.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, if it exceeds the limits from the hegemonic identity so much that the national identity can not tolerate this deviance, it is immediately declared as “enemy”. No doubt, this “enemy” definition is not objective and has no relation with the “real” character of “difference”. In this sense, the charge for difference in the form of stamping it as “other” is arbitrary. Thus, difference could only exist within the limits drawn by the nation-state and the system tries to render approval in any way within its boundaries in modern times. Therefore, nothing is pure. That means, neither difference nor otherness is original. They both carry the burden of “original sin” that was committed by the foundation of nation-state centuries ago.<sup>4</sup>

The approach to difference works in both ways in IR. In the first case, homogenization or normalization of difference has been an effective strategy to protect national identity. These stabilizing strategies showed parallelities with Enlightenment’s legacy. As Rudolph Gasché puts it, “Western philosophy is in essence the attempt to domesticate Otherness, since what we understand by thought is nothing but such a project”.<sup>5</sup> It is also possible to observe the impact of science upon territorial divisions which has been assumed central to mainstream IR:

Galileo, Euclid, and Newton’s representation of space as infinite, homogenous, and absolute facilitated the rise of a modern territorial understanding of space as a horizontal order of coexistent places that could be sharply delimited and compartmentalized from each other. This conception of space was eventually recognized and codified in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 32-33.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 125.

<sup>5</sup> Rodolph Gasché, *The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986) : 101, quoted in Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 3.

<sup>6</sup> Tuathail, 3-4.

The logic of IR in terms of suppressing differences also could be well explained by the politics of desire. René Girard who has touched upon the organization of desire, states that “[i]n desiring an object the rival alerts the subject to the desirability of the object”.<sup>7</sup> The rivalry between nation-states in the form of power struggle—in which other-states are objectified vis-à-vis the acting state— triggers the national instinct to discipline difference and establish a more uniform national identity. Because power is equated with survival based on national-interests.

If homogenization and normalization have been one way of tackling with differences, demonization of enemies via reproduction of otherness has been quite the other. Marginalization of difference has been another strategy unless normalization process works successfully. Because socially marginal people play a significant role in identity formation just as self/other dichotomy. “Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty”.<sup>8</sup> This was also bestowed by Cartesian thought that has given way to binary oppositions such as the self and the other. As Rudolph Gasché argues:

Each concept is part of a conceptual binary opposition in which each term is believed to be exterior to the other. Yet the interval that separates each from its opposite and from what it is not also makes each concept what it is. A concept is thus constituted by an interval, by its difference from another concept.<sup>9</sup>

From another angle, distinguishing a differential identity necessitates at the same time a context. Since identities are shaped according to the contexts they live in, it is impossible to draw the lines between differences and identities.

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<sup>7</sup> René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, Md.: John Hopkins University Press 1972), 145, quoted in William E. Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 52.

<sup>8</sup> Connolly, *Inside/Outside*, 64.

<sup>9</sup> Gasché, 128, quoted in Tuathail, 65.

That is to say that identities and differences are intermingled. As Laclau puts it, “[t]here is no clear-cut solution to the paradox of radically negating a system of power while remaining in secret dependency on it”.<sup>10</sup> Because oppression of difference can not be opposed completely as such opposition will refer to the oppressor and this proves that “there is certain conservatism inherent in *all* [emphasis original] opposition”.<sup>11</sup> Henceforth, every identity seems ambiguous.

Difference in IR could be classified into three categories, namely gender, ethnicity and the East. Gender is taken into the category of difference since women are drawn out of an international system that is based on power-struggle. On the other hand, ethnicity is “difference” vis-à-vis the nation-state as it does not conform to the general order of the state. While anarchy constitutes the opposite of state sovereignty (and thus difference) and reason for normalization practices of nation-state; the East and races in non-European origin are perceived as “differences” by the Westerners upon which the roots of IR discipline could be traced.

### **3.1. Gender as Difference**

Since IR is based on the “worship of the modern identity”, it consists of power-seeking behaviors of states. The key IR concepts such as power, sovereignty, security, anarchy etc. that are represented to be masculine, attract males to the international arena while confining women in the domestic sphere as “different”. Women are marked as “different” because they are excluded from a (modern) system which evaluates human beings with bio-power. IR exposes this fact by supporting a system that is based on national interests that was pursued throughout military power. In this respect, men are privileged

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<sup>10</sup> Ernesto Laclau, “Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity” In *The Identity in Question*, ed. John Rachman. (London: Routledge, 1995), 102.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 102.

over women since they hold “biological power” by which they can contribute to military power to defend national interests. Conflict-oriented structure of IR draws women outside international arena as aggressiveness is believed to belong to masculinity. This exclusion of women from the practices of realpolitik in IR makes the discipline patriarchal in character. However, equating statesmanship with masculine identity and “androcentric accounts of the state and the system of states” is merely a social construction.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, anarchy could be renamed as “gendered state of nature” in IR.<sup>13</sup>

The divide between the public and the private set forth by realist paradigm imprisons women into the private sphere making them dependent upon men in terms of economy and security. While women are held responsible for the household, men are responsible to maintain security from the anarchy “outside”.<sup>14</sup> Because men power could be used to protect national interests since power is measured with military capabilities and women are excluded from international arena as well as domestic sphere.

Nationalism and national identities are gendered in so far as they privilege masculine representations of the nation in war/sacrifice/heroism, and legitimize men’s control over women’s bodies on the basis that they are the mothers of the nation and the embodiment of male national honour.<sup>15</sup>

Gender has been state’s instrument which facilitates the reproduction of the state’s integrity.<sup>16</sup> Being complicit with patriarchal system throughout supporting a power-struggle system, IR theory draw women out of politics. Power-struggle system which is believed to maintain state’s existence is based on male power and this seems to privilege men over women in IR. It also contributes to the formation of “sovereign man” by approving sovereign-states

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<sup>12</sup> Jackie True, “Feminism” in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1996), 198.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 232.

<sup>14</sup> J. Ann Tickner, “You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists” *International Studies Quarterly*, 41:4 (1997): 627.

<sup>15</sup> True, 223.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 230.

system.<sup>17</sup> In other words, “[t]he state legitimizes and regulates ‘naturalised’ gender order for its own authority purposes: sovereign relations with other states outside, as well as man’s relation to woman inside, define the internal constitution of sovereign man and sovereign state”.<sup>18</sup> From another angle, women constitute the unity of the family and thus, contribute to “bio-power” which is used on behalf of the state. Because family is responsible to educate children that will be used in the service of the state when necessary and thus, usage of the institution of family as a “source and the ultimate instrument” becomes for the control and mobilization of population.<sup>19</sup> What is more, security-based IR privileges men over women by declaring them as the warriors with the “enemies” in international stage and domesticates women by pushing them aside. “Men and states stand against anarchy ‘outside’, and are distinguished from women and feminised others ‘inside’. Hence, “[m]asculinist domination is integral to the [power-oriented IR theory]”.<sup>20</sup> As far as security discourses dominate IR, women will continue to be exempted from international relations.

Therefore it seems that the traditional divide between identity/difference in IR, is also void for gender since men are taken superior to women in the same way. The patriarchal character of IR serves to identity-formation of men by granting them the privilege of “inclusion” which makes them feel apart from “those”(women) that do not contribute to the circulation of the system. “[T]he ‘difference’ of female embodiment is regarded as deviant excess”.<sup>21</sup> In this respect, women as “difference” are stamped as “others” and state reproduces patriarchal social structure. In IR, masculine identity seems to be maintained by being set as “[superior] to a feminine ‘other’”.<sup>22</sup> “Rational man” defines itself against the external domain of difference namely, anarchy as well as the

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 230.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 230

<sup>19</sup> Foucault, “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century”, in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 284.

<sup>20</sup> True, 230

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 214.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 213.

feminine 'other' in the domestic sphere. The standpoint that argues international arena is naturally anarchic thus, justifies gender hierarchy.<sup>23</sup> Masculinity/femininity bipolarity contributes to privileging patriarchy in IR. In other words, "gender dichotomies of militarized masculinity-domesticated femininity, authorize violence, especially in defense of national boundaries".<sup>24</sup> In this regard arguably, as far as IR theory continues to support security discourses, it will contribute to confinement of women into private sphere. This will lead IR to be complicit with the patriarchal system.

### 3.2. Ethnicity as Difference

Ethnicity is another point that was perceived as "difference" vis-à-vis nation state in IR. As Homi Bhabha puts it, "a national perspective can never achieve "representative" authority' since it is always concerned with the negation of internal differences in order to achieve the desired homogeneity and uniformity".<sup>25</sup> This is perhaps mostly true for ethnic minorities that are accepted to be deviant excesses threatening nation's uniform structure in IR. Because ethnic groups are pushed into the periphery of the system in order to claim universality of the nation-state. Therefore, particularity is dissolved into universality. This melting of particularity within universality undermines state's credibility since some are sacrificed for the unity of the nation. Arguably, behind the universal claim of the state in fact lies the particularity of a certain group because even the ones who conform to the dominant order are deceived not to sacrifice from national interests. State nourishes dominant classes that constitute a minor group in population dressed in the mask of majority. These dominant classes, who know what is best for the majority of the nation, hold the right to decide on behalf of the whole nation. Thus, state

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 228.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 221.

<sup>25</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, "Dissemination" in *The Location of Culture*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (New York: Routledge, 1997), 144, quoted in Valerie Kennedy, *Edward Said: A Critical Introduction* (MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 135.



appears to be not for its citizens but for the powerful that dominates rest of the people under the mask of the nation.

The modern state has the monopoly of determining our identity in the sense that “[it] provide[s] a new theology of truth about who and what “we” are by highlighting who or what “we” are not, and what “we” have to fear”.<sup>26</sup> Ethnic groups are “different” and have to be feared because they do not comply with the general norms imposed by the nation and have different life styles regarding their local culture. That’s why; they constitute the easy target for the system to divert the responsibilities of the functional disorder of the system. Because people fear from what they do not know. This unfamiliarity with the “unknown” turns to the will to exteriorize them for those who are integrated by the dominant identity.

The Western notion of homogeneity is what causes not to recognize ethnic diversity. “[T]he conventional Western political map is a consequence of a way of seeing that treats space as empty, homogenous, and capable of being divided into clear, linear, inscribed parcels”.<sup>27</sup> Actually, nation-states do not consist of “independent integrity and internal homogeneity”.<sup>28</sup> However, the attempt to homogenize a heterogeneous unity eradicates the respect for difference. In addition, this turns ethnic difference into “other” in order to keep the rest of the population “homogenized” and “disinfected”. Thus, strategies of normalization and otherness target ethnicity as well and harm its uniqueness by stealing from its originality.

### **3.1.The East and Race as Differences**

The ‘East’-which refers to non-West- constitutes another source of difference in IR since International Relations is based on modern European identity.

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<sup>26</sup> Campbell, 48.

<sup>27</sup> Tuathail, 177-178.

<sup>28</sup> Walker, 130, quoted in Tuathail, 178.

Actually, the East is an imaginative geography which was created due to its cultural and racial demarcations from the West. “If a human collective wants to represent a “Western” or “European” self, it needs an “Eastern” or “Asiatic” shadow, but that shadow need not necessarily fall to geographical east”.<sup>29</sup> In this sense, Western representation of the “Orient” does not correspond to its reality. In order to privilege itself vis-à-vis Orient, West uses Orientalist discourse through which it establishes itself as a superior self, while placing “Orient” to an inferior status and constituting it as its “other”. The dominant orientalist discourse holds the monopoly of producing myths about the East regardless of its peculiarities and unique facts. In Said's point of view, “representations are always influenced by the systems of power in which they were located”.<sup>30</sup> In addition, there was not a "true representation" since representations were “colored by power”.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, orientalism constitutes an instrument for power in IR which was accepted as “true” by Eurocentric-theories of IR. In other words, “Western textual construction of the Orient [exposes] Western ‘will to power’ over others” which facilitated colonialism and demonized other races as “enemies”.<sup>32</sup>

Colonialism and thus, imperialism were reinforced by the “appropriation of the other as a form of knowledge”.<sup>33</sup> In the post-September 11 era, such knowledge facilitates pursuing national-interests under the mask of democracy and human rights. “Orient” is being homogenized, differences are suppressed and even people are killed during this normalization process. National-interests legitimize even violence. Since nation-states are at the center of international relations, the “theme of Gulliver”, which magnifies the significance of nation-states, shapes IR discipline according to national-

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<sup>29</sup> Neumann, 206.

<sup>30</sup> Kennedy, 25.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 20.

<sup>33</sup> Young, 3.

interests.<sup>34</sup> Post-September 11 era is an era in which Oriental knowledge is used in order to reinforce Western power and domination over the Orient.

Nation-state constitutes the body of *Universal Reason* in IR.<sup>35</sup> However, this representation of the “universal” by the nation-state then turns to cancellation of the distinction between universality and particularity since *transparency* facilitated by *reason* necessitates eradicating the “incommensurability between a universal to be incarnated and the incarnating body”.<sup>36</sup> This leads to bridging the gap between the “rational” and irrational” in favor of the “rational” European identity.<sup>37</sup> Ultimately, it becomes that particular functions is performed by the *Universal European mind* which dominates the particular “body”.<sup>38</sup> In this sense, nation-state has been reified in historical context. With the same token, European universalism owe much to the cancellation of the “logic of incarnation”.<sup>39</sup> In this sense, “European imperialist expansion” can be understood as “universal civilizing function” and “modernization”.<sup>40</sup> While resistances from other cultures to European imperialism expose the struggle between universalisms and particularisms, “people without history” remain unable to represent the universal.<sup>41</sup> All in all, melting of particularity within universality symbolizes the homogenization committed by dominant European state-system in IR.

This homogenization constitutes the first track which constitutes one of the two approaches to “Orient”. On this first track, differences are tried to be suppressed and normalized by integrating the cultural space of the different. Homogenization of differences regarding the East is an attempt to Westernize Oriental societies. Because this helps to appreciate Western norms and values

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<sup>34</sup> Walker, 125.

<sup>35</sup> Laclau, 96.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 96-97.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 97.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 97.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 97.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 97.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 97.

and shape Eastern states according to them regardless of their social structures. In other words, “Europe’s other has been a narcissistic self-image through which [Europe] has constituted itself while never allowing it to achieve a perfect fit”.<sup>42</sup>

Second track involves demonization of the “East” as an enemy relying on binary oppositions. This is the incarnation of the strategy of otherness regarding the approach to difference. Ignoring the Oriental multiplicity and taking Orient as a monolithic entity as well as the Orient/Occident dichotomy are the results of modern thinking. Edward Said put forward orientalism was the product of Enlightenment thought since it enabled the priority of mind over matter by letting European mind control over the Orient. Therefore, “[by] constructing its other as an object of thought, Europe constructed itself as a subject”.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, Orient/Occident dichotomy owes much to Cartesian thought since they are constructed as “binary opposition[s]”.<sup>44</sup> Modern thought instead of attributing its specificity to the “East” treats the “East” as an object that serves to define European identity. In other words, “European bourgeois self relied significantly on the colonized (savage or barbarian) not-self”.<sup>45</sup> This also exposes the homogenizing character of modern identity which does not respect the heterogeneity of the Eastern states.

Arguably, Western imperial and colonial legacy which points out to Western racist tendencies is a good starting point to illustrate the linear development of IR discipline. As was mentioned above, nothing seems to have changed in international relations in terms of European domination. The Euro-centricism of IR which was once betrayed by colonialism is continued by “clash of civilizations” which divides world civilizations between “west” and the “rest”. Formation of international agenda according to democratic West versus

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<sup>42</sup> Young, 17.

<sup>43</sup> Patrick Wolfe, “History and Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism”, *The American Historical Review*, 102: 2 (1997) : 413.

<sup>44</sup> Kennedy, 17.

<sup>45</sup> Wolfe, 413.

terrorist Islam dichotomy is the clear manifestation of how Oriental discourse still serves to Western interests in IR which must be deconstructed in order to establish a dialogue with non-Western states.

## CHAPTER 4

### OTHERNESS AND NORMALIZATION

In IR national identity needs an “enemy” in order to protect its security. The reason lies in that self and other mutually constitute each other. Untamed difference is converted into otherness because state apparatus is inefficient in suppressing it or tolerating diversity. Therefore, in order to mask its inefficiency and fragility of its identity, it uses people’s fears regarding threats to their identity and marginalizes difference. The system seems to get approval by using both the “included” and “excluded” people. The ‘excluded’ people help the empowerment of state’s identity by constituting its ‘opposite’. At the epistemological level, this reminds us what Bakhtin calls “epistemological consciousness” which means “the reification of a knowing and sovereign self, cut off from the consciousness of the other”.<sup>1</sup> Thus in this sense, the “other” is simply an object that helps the hegemonic identity to define itself and assert its “uniqueness”. In other words, “[w]ithout the other, the subject actually can not know either itself or the world because meaning is created in discourse, where consciousness meet”.<sup>2</sup> Actually, this is how identity is maintained but the imposition of the hegemonic identity as “true” constitutes the problematic point in IR.

In international relations, “anarchy outside” exemplifies how otherness contributes to national identity formation. This also betrays the paradox of hegemonic identity in IR. Anarchy problematic highlights us very well about reproduction of disciplines and difference which is converted into otherness. According to such a problematique which was outlined by Richard Ashley, the absence of an authority in international arena maintains domestic arena

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<sup>1</sup> Mikhail Bakhtin, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity". in *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas, 1990), p. 89, quoted in Neumann, 12-13.

<sup>2</sup> Neumann, 13.

(inside of sovereign state) safe, secure, homogenous, normal and stable while describing outside of nation-state as the realm of difference, disorder, threat and danger.<sup>3</sup> State of nature in world politics creates discourses of danger legitimizing the state and otherness. “[This] strategy of otherness [is] designed to discipline the self”.<sup>4</sup> In this disciplining process, no doubt violence plays a vital role for punishing the “deviated” people. However, it must be noted that there is a paradoxical relationship between violence and the modern state. This is because “violence is both poison and the cure”.<sup>5</sup> It is both the pretext for intervention into people’s lives and is at the same time against what people are protected. To put it that way, “[d]omestically, by virtue of the present sovereignty, there is a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Internationally, by virtue of anarchy, violence is decentralized”.<sup>6</sup> Henceforth, anarchy which was facilitated by inside/outside dichotomy contributes to privileging of modern identity in international relations by reminding states threat and war in the absence of modern state who came to be “protector” of people from such dangers. Such a dichotomy between sovereignty and anarchy locates modern state as the legitimate representative of people and gives it the authority to take decisions “for the sake of” (or at the expense of) its people. As Levinas has stated “[t]he other’s entire being is constituted by its exteriority, or rather its alterity, for exteriority is a property of space and leads the subject back to itself through light”.<sup>7</sup> Levinas also attracts attention to power asymmetry by stressing that the other is “the alter ego” and it is “another myself”, “what I myself am not”.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, the role of otherness in Western identity formation can not be underemphasized since the unity of modern identity is maintained through “exteriority”. This “external” elements arguably contribute to reunification of the modern identity. As Homi Bhabha puts it, “[o]nce the liminality of the nation-space is

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<sup>3</sup> Devetak, 191.

<sup>4</sup> Campbell, 58.

<sup>5</sup> Devetak, 194.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 195.

<sup>7</sup> Emmanuel Lévinas, “Time and the Other”, in *The Levinas Reader*, trans. Richard A. Cohen, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 43, quoted in Neumann, 16.

<sup>8</sup> Lévinas, “Time and the Other”, 47, quoted in Neumann, 17.

established, and its 'difference' is turned from the boundary 'outside' to its finitude 'within', the threat of cultural difference is no longer a problem of 'other' people. It becomes a question of the otherness of the people-as-one".<sup>9</sup>

Protection of national interests sometimes operates through creating "simulations". In a world in which images and representations prevail, manipulating people by relying on these simulations becomes common. The possibility of danger for national interests, take control of people's lives by transforming hallucinations into "reality" to make people believe that there is a common enemy. Hence, a kind of schizophrenia operates for demonizing the "enemy" and the defense of the nation-state. The demonized image of the enemy owes to the need of identity to define its boundaries. "[The] stereotype of the Other is used to control the ambivalent and to create boundaries. Stereotypes are a way of dealing with the instabilities arising from the division between self and non-self by preserving an illusion of control and order".<sup>10</sup> Hence, the image of the "excluded" people serves to hegemonic identity.

Attaining scapegoats maintain moral superiority for those that remain within the boundaries of the nation-state and conform to its norms. Thus, holding "others" responsible for insecurity of state just facilitates to ward off the burden from self's shoulders and is an egoistic attempt to relieve the self.

[I]n the territorial state, the politics of collective identity tends to organize the idealisms and egoisms of its legitimate members into a collective egoism. And the politics of collective egoism becomes most intense whenever the state is faced with internal or external affronts to its self-assurance.<sup>11</sup>

What comes after is the assimilation of the "otherness" for the sake of the identity. This melting of particularity into universality exposes itself in IR in

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<sup>9</sup> Homi K. Bhabha, "DissemiNation" in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 303.

<sup>10</sup> Elisabeth Bronfen, *Over Her Dead Body : Death, Femininity, and the Aesthetic* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) , 182, quoted in Pickering, 47.

<sup>11</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 205.



the form of “[t]ranscendental egoism” which “demands that those whose identity diverges from its own be defeated, excluded, punished, corrected, or converted in order to preserve its own integrity and hopes”.<sup>12</sup> The “other” being marked as “[s]capegoats” are objectified in order to satisfy the desire of the hegemonic identity that is incarnated in the motive to revenge and violence.<sup>13</sup> They are punished because they ‘threaten’ the dogmatized identity of the nation. In other words, they are “the evil[s]” — *second problem of evil* — “that flows from the attempt to establish security of identity for any individual or group by defining the other that exposes sore spots in one’s identity as evil or irrational”.<sup>14</sup> The “evil”s are the mechanisms that bring identities to a closure. These “objects” also trigger the instinct to possess that facilitates to create a “normal” society from those that are not marked as “others” yet. Thus creating an “enemy” works in both ways— these are, the definition of identity on the one hand and creating a pretext for normalization on the other hand.

Serving to nation-state for the empowerment of hegemony is viable for “included” people as well. They differ from the ‘excluded’ in the sense that they are not affected by cultural markings. Yet, they are still objects. Reminiscent of Foucault, the state can be evaluated as “an ensemble of practices that are at one and the same time individualizing and totalizing” in this process of objectification.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, modern state does not need to be perceived not something above the individuals. Conversely, it integrates individuals provided that “[their] individualities [are] shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns”.<sup>16</sup> The state is in a way “a modern matrix of individualization”.<sup>17</sup> By the help of these “included” people who are ready to give psychological support by creating the ground for

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<sup>12</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 135.

<sup>13</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 53.

<sup>14</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 8, emphasis in original.

<sup>15</sup> Campbell, 200.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 200.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 200.

stamping “scapegoats”, it is easier for states to exclude “others”. Moreover, by relying on an economy of fear, there is in fact not much to do for states. Because people believing that these “differences” threaten the very essence of their being, already start cultural markings which will facilitate afterwards the correction process. In this respect, state and people who are instrumentalized for the “survival” of the state’s identity nourish each other. Sometimes, the interests and even the identities of the people and the state are so intermingled that people can not clarify their actual interests. This is how the modern state penetrates into people’s lives and manipulates them for the circulation of the system. Thus, state converts its interests to “people’s interests” in order to integrate masses to the system. In other words, “[a] normalizing society is the historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life”.<sup>18</sup> Normalization appears to be impossible without manipulating life.

Otherness differs from difference in the sense that it is the signal of dogmatization of identities, in other words, leverage for identities to declare their supremacy. Therefore, alterity can be regarded as processed difference. On the other hand, difference is pure and that is why the hegemonic identity tries to penetrate into the space of difference. From another angle, otherness is the very moment of crystallization of identities. In other words, “[c]ontemporary social life requires identity to be, but the dogmatization and universalization of dominant identities translates some of the very intrasubjective and intersubjective differences through which they are organized and regulated into the modes of otherness to be assimilated, punished, or liquidated”.<sup>19</sup> Otherness symbolizes the reduction of the self into possessive being. In other words, this signals the “degradation of *being into having*, in which creative praxis is reduced to the mere possession of an object, rather than its imaginative transformation, and in which the need for

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<sup>18</sup> Foucault, “Right of Death and Power over Life”, 266.

<sup>19</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 89.

the other is reduced to greed of the self”.<sup>20</sup> In IR this exposes itself in identity dilemma in anarchy-oriented theories.

For the practice of marking “difference”, IR seems to inherit the logic of “noso-politics” according to which hygiene is privileged and medicine has become a mechanism of social control.<sup>21</sup> By delegating power to the *social doctors*, state ensures that the ones who deviate from “national” norms and state’s normalizing practices are stamped as “abnormal”.<sup>22</sup> In this system of “scapegoats” that carry the burden of the systemic inefficiencies, of course socio-medical discourses play a vital role. By adopting “normal/pathological” dichotomy, states via their agents reproduce their authority to exclude people who do not comply with national interests. In short, “[a] medico-administrative knowledge” by serving to discrimination between normals/abnormals reinforces national power in IR throughout normalization procedures.<sup>23</sup>

Coming to terms with normalization reflects another paradox regarding identity related with otherness. Repression is supposed to eradicate differences. Instead, the opposite happens to be the case. “The stronger the drive to the unified nation, the integrated community, and/or the normal individual, the more powerful becomes the drive to convert differences into modes of otherness”.<sup>24</sup> This is related with the fragility of national identity and exposes the fact that identity needs to strengthen itself by relying on its “opposite”. Modern identity creates a normalizing society which is ready to ward off the “enemy” and destroy any “potential” that deviates from its uniform character. The outcome of this logic is a “normalizing society” which “treats the small set of identities it endorses as if they were intrinsically

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<sup>20</sup> Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, *The Postmodern Turn* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1997), 85, emphasis in original.

<sup>21</sup> Foucault, “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century”, 279-282.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 282.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 283.

<sup>24</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, xxi.

true”.<sup>25</sup> This claim of truth “puts it under tremendous pressure to treat everything that differs from those intrinsic truths to be fundamental threats, deviations, or failures in need of correction, reform, punishment, silencing, or liquidation”.<sup>26</sup> However, normalization reproduces a paradox in the sense that it multiplies the deviations.

Reproducing otherness and normalization mentioned above are two sides of the same coin. Actually, there is a cyclical tendency between homogenization and demonization practices of the sovereign state. Difference which was previously converted into otherness—as it was too “deviated” to be corrected—is tried to be normalized afterwards. Or difference which can not be integrated into homogenous unity of the nation after being tamed or without being tamed, is turned into “other”. Both attitudes complement each other. “A normalizing society politicizes difference by converting it into neediness or otherness; it then demoralizes and depoliticizes those constituted as abnormal and those who would call this conversion process itself into question”.<sup>27</sup> Because repressing the marginalized is always easier since radicalization triggers the fear among society and mobilizes the feelings of revenge among people. Seeking revenge against the ones who threaten our security is related with the desire to punish.<sup>28</sup> People take revenge because according to the cultural codes that were (also) inscribed by the state to protect national interests, difference seems to be a potential to threaten people’s security. Henceforth, security was equated with uniformity by the dominant national identity in mainstream theories of IR.

Privileging modern identity necessitates mobilizing the population for the sake of national interests in IR. This necessarily puts light onto the concept of

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 89.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 89.

<sup>27</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 91.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, 42.

“bio-power” and “anatomo-politics”. In earlier times, wars were waged in order to protect their sovereign ruler.

The sovereign exercised his right of life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring. The right which was formulated as the “power of life and death” was in reality the right to *take* life or *let* live.<sup>29</sup>

However, regarding the “worship of the state” in modern age, populations are mobilized for the sake of the “nation”.<sup>30</sup> Hence, “[national] power over [people] of life and death” has surpassed.<sup>31</sup> Actually, there is a transition from sovereign power over death to the “administration of bodies” and “management of life”.<sup>32</sup> In that sense, “*anatomo-politics of the human body*” was concerned with the disciplining of the body and “its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls”.<sup>33</sup> This would facilitate disciplining the different. “[B]io-politics of the population” on the other hand, focused on the body which was related with the “mechanics of life”.<sup>34</sup> These signalled “the organization of power over life”.<sup>35</sup>

The era of bio-power has presented the techniques that facilitate “the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations”.<sup>36</sup> “[P]art of [“the fact of living”] passed into knowledge’s field of control and power’s sphere of intervention”.<sup>37</sup> In IR, power-centered realist paradigm used the concept of “bio-power” in order to reinforce the strength of nation-state. Since then, people’s lives were manipulated according to increasing national power. In this respect, bio-politics would contribute to “worship of the state” ideal in modern age. On the other hand, anatomo-politics is incarnated in the

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<sup>29</sup> Foucault, “Right of Death and Power over Life”, 259.

<sup>30</sup> Campbell, 201.

<sup>31</sup> Foucault, “Right of Death and Power over Life”, 258.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 262.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 261-262, emphasis in original.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 262, emphasis in original.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 262.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 262.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 265.

normalization techniques whose target is “difference” to be integrated into the dominant identity in IR.

Henceforth, national interests would enable to access into people’s lives. They would be the key to open the doors that people set between themselves and the state. Arguably, it serves to national control mechanisms which functions like a *panopticon* that facilitates to create a surveillance society. This would of course pave the way for a “normal” society. State reason seems to colonize every corner of society. People’s right to think otherwise is taken away from them because of the penetration of state reason into society. This dissemination of rationality into social life and inter-personal relations makes normalization of society more possible.<sup>38</sup> Since reason tends to grasp everything relying on the principle of opaqueness, state reason remains to be problematized in order to save “difference” from the reach of the state. The need to intervene into the conversion of difference owes much to that “state reason” “*evade[s] or destroy[s] [emphasis original] the other*”.<sup>39</sup>

Maybe it would be useful to mention disciplinary mechanisms which facilitate normalization in terms of understanding the correlation between normalization and this multiplication of differences. As can be predicted, discipline plays a significant role in the process of normalization.

‘Discipline’ may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a “physics” or an “anatomy” of power, a technology.<sup>40</sup>

Arguably, supporting military power and the institution of military throughout realist paradigm in particular and keeping people in service of state power by

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<sup>38</sup> John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 1995), 51.

<sup>39</sup> Der Derian, 4, emphasis in original.

<sup>40</sup> Foucault, “Panopticism”, in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (London: Penguin Books, 1984), 206.

relying on the concept of bio-power in general, IR seems to approve and legitimize the disciplinary practices of the state.

Intensification of disciplines upon difference is also the signal of collapse of the realization of democracy in a society. These fascistic tendencies in modern identity reflect once again that state is not—and actually will never be—strong enough to afford differences. Moreover, this exposes the fragility and lack of legitimacy of the hegemonic identity as well. Thus, from another angle nation-state bears the consequences of its uniform character and homogenizing practices. That's why we observe ramification of differences in late-modern time. Henceforth, social discipline is what compensates for lack of legitimacy of the state. However, this is what nourishes state identity paradoxically. The paradox with identity/difference dilemma is that identity can not exist without difference while trying to suppress it with disciplinary mechanisms.

The more tight and extensive the disciplines become, the more deep and widely distributed become the deviations to be dealt with. This is the irony: the intensification of social discipline fosters the proliferation of differences defined through multiple categories of subordination, inferiority, incapacity, and de-gradation.<sup>41</sup>

Therefore, reproduction of difference by disciplinary mechanisms is inevitable. Because such mechanisms are used deliberately by the state in order to create a pretext to establish a homogenous society. In this sense, differences become the leverages for intervening into people's lives. Thus, differences are the indispensable parts of identity. In other words, punitive mechanisms also have positive effects—other than suppressing differences—in terms of producing them. These reproduced differences become the guaranteed existence of the identity. In short, discipline is paradoxically what nourishes otherness even though it seems to repress differences.

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<sup>41</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 21.

Disciplinary mechanisms which operate like a “panopticon” also supply information about the different and facilitate to control them. In this sense; schools, hospitals, military etc. become the institutions of discipline which suppress difference. Modern state throughout its disciplinary mechanisms both controls and collects information about people. This arguably creates a “surveillance society” in which every web of relation is related to the interests of the state. Therefore, knowledge once again serves to reinforcing the power of nation-state. This “will to know” exposes also the “will to power”. Supporting the normalization procedures of the state in order to protect national interests, IR locates itself on this web of disciplinary mechanisms, too.

Thus, there is a parasitic relationship between otherness and normalization which nourishes both of them. As Richard Ashley puts it,

“[p]ractices of modern statecraft work not primarily by solving problems and dangers in the name of a domestic population already given, but by inscribing problems and dangers that can be taken to be exterior to sovereign man and whose exteriority serves to enframe the ‘domestic population’ in which the state can be recognized as a center and can secure its claims to legitimacy”.<sup>42</sup>

Simon Dalby argues that “incorporation of the Same” and “exclusion of the other” is complementary in the sense that they serve division and the rule of a territory.<sup>43</sup> Given these circumstances, it gets obvious that both normalization and otherness work in one direction—that is, reproduction of modern identity in IR.

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<sup>42</sup> Richard Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War,” in *International/Intertextual Relations*, ed. Der Derian and Shapiro, 302, quoted in Tuathail, 172.

<sup>43</sup> Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War* (London: Guilford, 1990), 22, quoted in Tuathail, 180.



## CHAPTER 5

### REPRODUCTION OF OTHERNESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Today it can be easily observed that international politics has reproduced otherness in history several times despite the fact that the actors changed in international stage. Even though conditions have changed, it is therefore possible to draw paralallities between certain historical facts. Therefore, “[a]s a grand cliché about modernity, the claim that we live in an era of rapid transformations has even become a form of continuity among diverse currents of contemporary social and political thought”.<sup>1</sup> This is arguably to assert that there is a teleological development of identity/difference dichotomy between medieval and modern times.

In this sense, Middle Ages constitute a good starting point in order to exemplify the continuity of otherness in international politics. During Church’s authority, evangelism of fear was derived from God and identity/difference dichotomy was based on Christian faith. In modern times, nation-state uses economy of fear in order to mobilize nation forgetting its claim to challenge one centered-authority of Church and promise to transfer sovereignty to its people. Modern thought has inherited ecclesiastical logic in a different vein. This means, “reason” has replaced God’s authority in terms of reproducing otherness. Concerning IR, this shows us that “International Relations remains a battlefield of contending representations, where some representations attain hegemony over others”.<sup>2</sup>

On the way to clarify the teleological development in IR between medieval and modern ages; discovery (or re-invention) of America constitutes a

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<sup>1</sup> Walker, 3.  
<sup>2</sup> Devetak, 185.

significant milestone in the logic of identity as well as of the conversion of difference into otherness. The modern identity resembled by the colonizers violated the space of Amerindians who constituted difference after the “discovery” (or in Campbell’s words “invention”) of America.<sup>3</sup>

In the invention of America, the confrontation between the European, Spanish, and Christian “self” and the “other” of the indigenous people is an encounter of lasting significance for the way in which it brings to the New World the orientations toward difference and otherness of the Old World.<sup>4</sup>

Actually, what discoverers found did not correspond to their demands and expectations and they used this “difference” in order to define the Christian self.<sup>5</sup> In the eyes of the Spanish conquistadors, “Indians [were] culturally virgin, a blank page awaiting the Spanish and Christian inscription”.<sup>6</sup> This facilitated the penetration of Western identity in the autonomous sphere of difference. The idea that sets forth that “ideological certainties can always overcome individual contingencies” created the problematic attitude to homelands.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, Amerindian particular identity has been sacrificed for declaration of universalism of Western identity. In other words, “[i]n the encounter of the “self” with the “other”, it was the Christian identity of the self that was privileged”.<sup>8</sup>

When Columbus faced the inhabitants of the new land, he thought that “linguistic diversity [did] not exist because language [was] natural.”<sup>9</sup> This later on turned into the will to teach their language so that “they [might] learn to speak”.<sup>10</sup> Henceforth, speaking as a concept was limited with what Columbus and other conquistadors knew. In short, it was constrained with their world

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<sup>3</sup> Campbell, 97.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 97.

<sup>5</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 38.

<sup>6</sup> Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other* (New York: HarperPerennial, 1982), 35-36.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 29.

<sup>8</sup> Campbell, 98.

<sup>9</sup> Todorov, 29.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 30.

and imagination. In this sense, Columbus had nothing to learn from the Indians. Thus, this was not a dialogic relationship but rather constituted a monologic one. Hence, conquistadors knowing Spanish—as one of European languages—held also the authority to represent them. Since Indians differed from Columbus’ environment in cultural terms, he saw them as *culturally naked*.<sup>11</sup> Here, stamping attitudes also exposed themselves because Columbus drew this conclusion due to lack of their clothes. Here, making judgments about a group of people according to Western civilization again came from the feeling of superiority. The dangerous attitude towards Indians which came out as the tendency to take them “identical” can be read in this way. This is because it led to “assimilationism” that came out as “projection of [one’s] own values on the others”.<sup>12</sup> This exposes the egocentrism of the conquistadors which finds its implication “in the identification of our own values with values in general, of our *I* with the universe—in the conviction that the world is one”.<sup>13</sup> Columbus’ discovery turned into a project of conversion of Indians to faithful Christians.<sup>14</sup> Thus, alterity was not recognized or respected but instead, Spanish tried to impose their values over alterity.<sup>15</sup>

In the same vein, the difference of the Indians was turned into inferiority.<sup>16</sup> Instead of accepting that they were also “humans”, they were accepted “as living objects”.<sup>17</sup> This meant, denial of Indians as equal subjects like Spanish persisted in the minds of the conquistadors. As Tzvetan Todorov correctly pointed out, “Columbus has discovered America but not the Americans”.<sup>18</sup> Treating Amerindians as the land that was mastered was misleading in the sense that it turned them into “objects” that could be controlled. From another

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 35.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 42.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 42-43, emphasis in original.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 43.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 50.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 42.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 48.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 49.

angle, “[t]he entire history of the discovery of America, [was] marked by [the] ambiguity [of rejection and revelation of human alterity]”.<sup>19</sup> Hence the year 1492 marked a “double movement” for Spain which was incarnated in the “[rejection] of its interior Other” and “discover[y] of exterior Other”.<sup>20</sup> “[T]he discovery *self* makes of the *other*”.<sup>21</sup> This signaled the turn of international politics into a “congealed form of power/knowledge”.<sup>22</sup>

The relationship between England and Ireland was another precedent that gave us insights about the exclusionary and normalizing practices of IR. English expansion into Ireland in the 16<sup>th</sup> century was a good account in terms of creating “internal enemies” for maintaining the unity of the modern identity. In the eyes of the English, “Ireland was an incomplete place in need of ‘civility’”.<sup>23</sup> Henceforth, by inscribing Ireland as the “other”, English were able to colonize Irish territories. Because the logic of identity justifies containing the “other” which threatens the very essence of identity. Henceforth, “[t]he decolonization struggle in Ireland was never only a struggle to decolonize physical space and territory but also to decolonize identity, history, and geographical knowledge” regarding the unreal representation of Ireland that serves to English interests.<sup>24</sup> “Internal colonialism” operated in the making of the United Kingdom.<sup>25</sup> Penetration of English into Irish territory could also be seen from the angle of masculine-feminine bipolarity.<sup>26</sup> Masculine English identity in need of self-fulfillment and overcoming its lack of fullness violated the cultural and political space of Irish identity. Here again, politics of desire operated into the space of the

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 49-50.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 50.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>22</sup> Tuathail, 143.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 14.

<sup>25</sup> Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966* (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1975), quoted in Kumar, 589.

<sup>26</sup> Ed Lengel, “A ‘Perverse and Ill-Fated People’: English Perceptions of the Irish, 1845-52” in *Essays in History* 38, 1996  
<http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/journals/EH/EH38/Lengel.html>

“different”. After the marriage of English and Irish identity, the latter burdened the subordinate role as it was more “domesticated”.<sup>27</sup> After the young Ireland rising in 1848, desire turned into fear necessitating stamping attitudes for the “survival” of English identity.<sup>28</sup> Here, the process of otherness entered the scene. Drawn from the above, the case of Ireland thus constituted a good example in terms of gendered practices in IR as well as the processes of normalization and internal otherness. In short, in the eyes of the English, “Britain would forever be the master and Ireland the subject”.<sup>29</sup>

The sense of “European superiority” experienced during the “invention of America” facilitated colonization period as well in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The “colonialist mind” believed that “[t]he rest of the world was ‘available’ for use by Europeans because their history destined them for Greatness”.<sup>30</sup> Actually, under the colonialist “reason” lay a Darwinist approach which defended “the stronger always extirpating the weak”.<sup>31</sup> Such an understanding “naturally” led to the assumption that “(some) Europeans had become masters of [emphasis original] nature as a result of superior ‘fitness’ in a natural process of evolution”.<sup>32</sup> 20<sup>th</sup> century was the time of attribution of the “status of an organism with its own ‘needs’ and ‘demands’” to European territorial state.<sup>33</sup> Since colonialism was justified by a “science” throughout Darwinist discourses, the credibility of the term “science” and the “scientific status” of IR should also be put into question. To put it bluntly, this appears to be the clear manifestation of how knowledge serves to power in IR.

Nazi Germany could also be counted as a prominent example in the history of otherness and normalization. The attempt to enlarge German “lebensraum” was a clear manifestation of the instinct of normalizing the different and

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Agnew and Corbridge, 54.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 57.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 57.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 59.

homogenizing the space. In the external realm, other states were marked as “enemies” that tempted the instinct to possess. Internally, this enmity towards heterogeneity was incarnated in the form of genocide. Nazi aggression was an extreme form of intolerance to difference that turned into extermination of Jews. However, extermination of them brought them to end. Justified violence by the nationalistic discourse left Nazi identity in crises. Nazi Germany exemplified the process of normalization and scapegoating at the same time. In the minds of the Europeans, “Jews were dangerous polluters of national homogeneity”.<sup>34</sup> Nazis presumed that the Jews were the scapegoats that could burden the deficiencies of the system. Gilman’s words clearly expose the image of Jews in Germany: “[W]hile the German in Africa ‘heals’, the Jew in Europe ‘infects’”.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the Jews needed to be eradicated from Europe according to European collective memory.

Germany before the Second World War exposed how radical nationalism would bring an identity into an edge. The hatred towards the different, namely Jews on the way to create a homogenous nation was crystallized in the moment of “Holocaust”. Privileging “national interests” over people in the most extreme form pointed out to the bankruptcy of humanness when nation was taken central. Thus, nation became a fetish in the sense that what was created by the “people” turned out to control people. Nazi Germany was thus a good example in terms of explaining how extreme sensitivity for national interests reproduced paranoid and the perception of “enemy”.

Since the paranoiac perceives the world about him only as it corresponds to his blind purposes, he can only repeat his own self which is denatured into an abstract mania. The naked pattern of power as such, which dominates all around it as well as its own decomposing ego, seizes all that is offered to it and incorporates it, without reference to its specific nature, into its mythic fabric. He makes everything in his own image.<sup>36</sup>

In the same way, national paranoia tried to make everything in its own image trying to legitimize every means to the end of national interests. National

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 58.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 58.

<sup>36</sup> Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming ( New York: Continuum, 1996), 190.

interests are even used for legitimizing violence. “Hitler demands justification for mass murder in the name of the legal principle of sovereign national rights, which tolerates any act of violence in another country”.<sup>37</sup> This betrays how national interests pull IR to an inhumane ground by placing modern nation-state at the core of the discipline. This also approves the superficial nature of contemporary IR that has stuck into nation and national interests.

As Horkheimer and Adorno argue “the Enlightenment’s program of domination is a secularized version of the religious belief that God controlled the world. The human subject confronts the natural object as an inferior, external other”.<sup>38</sup> This is incarnated in the form of mastering the space. More importantly, it was reflected in the objectification of the Jews who needed to be mastered by *reason* which belonged to “superior” Nazis. This reduction of the Jews to objects was internal to construction of Nazi identity. Geopolitical knowledge served to political power namely, Nazi expansion in IR.<sup>39</sup> Henceforth, geopolitics in particular and IR in general as a science was complicit with instrumental reason within modernity that served to genocide of Jews in Germany.<sup>40</sup>

No doubt, the Cold War was another significant milestone in reproduction of otherness in IR. In that era, communism replaced the evangelism of fear. In such an economy of fear, Soviet system which was different from American system was turned into otherness in order to construct American identity.

Danger was being totalized in the external realm in conjunction with its increased individualization in the internal field, with the result being the performative reconstitution of the borders of the state’s identity. In this sense, the cold war needs to be understood as a disciplinary strategy that was global in scope but national in design.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 193.  
<sup>38</sup> Tuathail, 137.  
<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 158.  
<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 158.  
<sup>41</sup> Campbell, 153.

Since then, security-based IR would prevail in international arena in the Cold War era. “The articulation of “security” involved a new writing of the boundaries of American identity”.<sup>42</sup> From another angle, cold war is an era in which security was defined “in terms of spatial exclusions and specification of a threatening other”.<sup>43</sup> In the construction of Western identity as “free”, “democratic” and “individualistic”, the East as “communist”, “totalitarian” and “enslaved” played a crucial role.<sup>44</sup> In the same vein, the East-West dichotomy was socially scripted.<sup>45</sup>

The need to legitimize national security discourses in the Cold War, directed the US to formulate discourses that marked the USSR as an “enemy”.<sup>46</sup> Here what was needed in the political and social domain has been reflected onto the discipline. However, this normalization of the national needs throughout the discipline does not rescue IR from serving to “power”. Because national security was defined in negative terms in the US during Cold War, since it needed “a permanent adversary” who would keep “perpetual vigilance”.<sup>47</sup> Actually, this vigilance was needed in order to keep on power struggle. Henceforth, the threat posed by the “other” became the motivation behind power-seeking practices. Moreover, the story between the “democratic” West and “expansionist” East was scripted in Cold War.<sup>48</sup> This once again brings us to the fact that IR has served to Western interests.

Finally, the Post-September 11 era witnessed the usage of identity/difference dichotomy incarnated in Orient/Occident duality in order to enable states to pursue their national interests and thus, reinforce the realist paradigm. Attacks highly contributed to manufacturing nationalism.<sup>49</sup> In the post-September 11

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 153.

<sup>43</sup> Devetak, 198.

<sup>44</sup> Tuathail, 160.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 160

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 179.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 179.

<sup>48</sup> Agnew and Corbridge, 65.

<sup>49</sup> Burney.



era, terrorism constituted a good pretext in re-constructing nationalistic discourse. In this nationalistic discourse, "xenophobia" was strengthened in order to underline the distinction between "Self" and the "Other". "Us" versus "them" kind of rhetoric found applause from the public more due to increased national sentiments. By demonizing the terrorist "enemy", the US obtained international support and gained the opportunity to manipulate the public opinion in the direction of its needs. Hence, normalization activities have also been played out successfully.

Since nationalism manufactures the dichotomy of self/other and enables the privileging of one, the September 11 served to triggering nationalism by pushing forward national priorities in the same way. "[The] grand narratives of nationalism evoke meanings and ideologies, which produc[ed] an us/them nationalist discourse that demonize[d] and dehumanize[d] the *other* [emphasis original]".<sup>50</sup> As Said has argued Eurocentric discourse relied on the demonized image of the "other" for reproduction, valorization and validation.<sup>51</sup> In this sense, images and icons seemed to imprison the minds of the people for the ideal of national interests. Henceforth, the US especially after the 9/11 constituted a good example of the reproduction of nationalist discourse relying on the pretext of national interests.

The September 11 has been a useful ingredient to construct national "mythologies". The socially constructed threat of terrorism nourished by media and several images prevented any form of political dissent.<sup>52</sup> September 11 attacks facilitated the US to use techniques of normalization. People were manipulated for "national unity". "By playing on individuals' natural fear of terror, the state and media ma[d]e puppets of [them] all".<sup>53</sup> Actually, in the construction of the Western identity as superior to Eastern

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

identity laid the idea that asserts capitalistic modernization as the only true form of living. Capitalistic modernization asserts itself as the only true form of living and this understanding perceives Islam as an obstacle in front of globalization.<sup>54</sup> While the West was attained as democratic, Islam was marked as fascistic.<sup>55</sup> “Muslims continue to function as Europe's constitutive Other: the main opposition of today's ideologico-political struggle is the one between the tolerant multicultural liberal Europe and the fundamentalist militant Islam”.<sup>56</sup> However, September 11 signal the melting of the distinction between the domestic and the international.

All these examples converge in same points—these are normalization, exclusion and suppression of the difference by the hegemonic identities. While proving the Euro-centric tradition of IR, it also gives us insights about the protean roles of identity/difference. In different contexts, identity was resembled by different beings even though all were Western in origin. The examples that aim to highlight the Eurocentric character of IR such as the discovery of America, Colonization Period, Cold War, September 11 etc. thus all prove the exploitative character of dominant Western identity. Rest of the examples—Ireland and Nazi Germany— which try to expose the attitude towards internal “others” illustrate the violation of the space of difference by the dominant national identity within its boundaries. Nazi Germany could also be included in the category of reproduction of otherness outside the nation-state. Given the changing roles of identity/difference, “international theory appears as a historical manifestation of a series of conflicting interpretations, whose unity and identity are the product of a victory in this conflict”.<sup>57</sup> This also justifies Mohanty that claims “identity denotes location:

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<sup>54</sup> Slavoj Žižek., “Christians, Jews and Other Criminals: A Critique of Jean-Claude Milner”, 2004.

<http://www.lacan.com/milner.htm>

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Steve Smith, “The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations”, in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Steve Smith and Ken Booth (Cambridge, 1995), 6 quoted in Devetak, 186.

identities are indexical entities and thus only real within a given location". Therefore, identity and difference roles are not permanent. Because "'internal' is conditioned by, even constituted within, the 'external', which is itself mediated by subjective negotiation. Subjectivity is itself located".<sup>58</sup> In this respect, dogmatic postures of identities which reproduce intolerance towards difference needs to be disturbed. Bearing in mind the changing contexts and thus, the actors that play the roles of identity and differences; Euro-centric character could also be put into question in order to save the East from domination. Moreover, arguably, it will not be inconvenient to mention that international politics has a teleological development since Middle Ages. Therefore, when considered internationally, it seems necessary to observe the unchanging "superiority" of the West in occupying the hegemonic identity even though the actors on the international stage change. Such an attitude could only be changed by putting the Euro-centric character of international politics in question.

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<sup>58</sup> Alcoff, 337.

## CHAPTER 6

### SAVING IR FROM STATE-ORIENTATION

Today, it is clear that globalization of contingency threatens the throne of nation-states. “[I]ncreasing preoccupation with speed, temporality, contingency undermines established categories” that have been reified for the protection of national-identity.<sup>1</sup> This temporal acceleration prepares the ground for changing nation-states system that confines people’s interests to territoriality. Since territorial state can not respond to the inclusion problematique of people and reproduces exclusionary practices in IR, it has to be challenged. As a result of the challenge by global and internal forces in the late-modern era, sovereign state remains under attack. Moreover, limiting political community to a “fixed space” seems to be anachronistic in today’s circumstances.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, “decenter[ing] the state” in order not to trap people into the confines of the nation-state can pave the way for another IR.<sup>3</sup> In this context, IR has to revise itself according to the needs of human interests rather than national interests by transcending spatial categories drawn by modern identity. In a conjuncture in which temporal acceleration gained momentum and nation-state’s authority is challenged by globalization of contingency, confining people’s interests into the borders of nation-states is thus, meaningless. Therefore, we must deconstruct IR theory which places modern-state at the center of its analysis in order not to fix temporality within spatial categories. Such an attitude will pave the way for opening a post-national era in IR.

Saving IR from nation-state orientation starts with challenging the prevailing understanding that suggests that the state has “a true essence”.<sup>4</sup> This brings

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<sup>1</sup> Walker, 13.

<sup>2</sup> Keyman, 79.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 79.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 74.

into mind the etymological root of the word “IR” which is problematic in the sense that it presupposes nation-state as the ultimate basis on which the discipline can be grounded. Henceforth, it renders nation-state unproblematic from the very start. This exemplifies the reflection of the prevailing logic in IR onto the language as well. However, opening the state into theoretical inquiry might help us to escape from our dogmatic lenses towards the discipline. Leaving aside determinism and reductionism in methodological terms will also be possible throughout questioning state. State open to criticism will stand firmer to resistances and find the opportunity to evolve in history. Furthermore, regarding state as an entity that is “historically and discursively constructed” sprouts hopes to save us from the dichotomies of state and society.<sup>5</sup> That is to say that essentialist account of the state which takes it as the starting political formation within IR needs to be rejected since this causes a reductionism.<sup>6</sup> Taking the factors into consideration that “constitute the reality of the state” will enable us to leave our dogmatic attitudes towards the state.<sup>7</sup> The understanding in which states are taken as “ontologically-given” entities, leads to shifting of the focus to nation-states from people. In order to keep the balance between states and the people, “deontologiz[ing] the ontologically-given” is thus an essential step to be taken in the discipline.<sup>8</sup>

In order to be able to shift the focus of IR theory from state to other entities, questioning the constructed dichotomies is essential. As was mentioned before, state throughout its boundaries establishes inside/outside dichotomies leading the perception of “foreigner” in the minds of its nationals. Campbell argues that foreign policy is what constitutes states “foreign” and thus he delineates international relations as

a practice of the inscription of the dangerous, the externalization and totalization of dangers, and the mobilization of populations to control these dangers-all in the name of a

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 77.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 55.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 7.

social totality that is never present, that always contains traces of the outside within, and that is never more than an effect of the practices by which total dangers are inscribed.<sup>9</sup>

Unless IR has solved the problems regarding the “other”, it will not have a claim of objective discipline-even if this is not completely possible. Nevertheless, the boundaries actually should not be taken clear-cut as realist theories of IR impose. “The construction of the outsider, of the Other as a radical negation of the Same, is by no means as clear cut as is implied by the principle of state sovereignty”.<sup>10</sup> This is to say that, in a globalizing world, boundaries get blurred which means that “[t]he boundaries between inside and outside do not sharply distinguish between a community within and an anarchy of difference without”.<sup>11</sup> Hence, detecting the “outside” will not be easy as before.

Placing nation-state at the core of the discipline necessitates sticking to national interests in theory-construction. Nevertheless, the obsession with national interests has dangerous implications in people’s lives. The feeling of threat and the “instinct” to protect them cause “social paranoid” and damage mental health in the social body. The disruption of the society in that way, contributes to the formation of “pathological” people which become the leverage for state’s disciplinary mechanisms. On the one hand, it reproduces them by its obsessive practices. On the other hand, state can not tolerate deviant people and tries to suppress them. The truth is that the state needs such “pathologicals”. This is because control of people and their manipulation for national security necessitates cohesion and regulation in society as well. They are objectified more easily when there are social cohesion and some “pathologicals” that will burden the role of “scapegoat” in the system. In this sense, “medico-administrative” knowledge serves to the correction of society

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<sup>9</sup> Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism and War” , 303 quoted in Campbell, 62.

<sup>10</sup> Walker, 66.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 66.

in IR.<sup>12</sup> Because marking some people as “pathological” becomes state’s pretext to take action for homogenizing society. Actually, this is the way that it feels itself alive and that is what maintains the continuation of life. However, what must be problematized here is the way that state provides such feeling. Because it behaves as if it is “ultimate” and there is nothing beyond the state. Hence, what is resisted in this thesis is not its taking action but the “dogmatization” of such action that turns this action into “passivism” after a while. In this respect, a genealogy of state’s protection mechanisms will pave the way for opening the state into the inputs of difference. As Ashley argues, the “genealogical attitude” in IR should avoid a “final truth”, be skeptical of “moral claims” and should not recognize “a homogenous and fixed essence”.<sup>13</sup> Hence, integrating a genealogical approach to IR theory might help to prevent it from imprisonment in subjectivities and open what is theoretically enclosed.

The opening process for the “closed” is also void for the concept of the “international” which has been taken for granted in IR. The reason for this is that deontologizing the “international” which is accepted as anarchic and constitutes the pretext for aggressive behaviors of states is necessary for opening fixations. “International” as a determining factor of the actions of its parts, namely states should be questioned.<sup>14</sup> IR can not tolerate such reifications in order to prove itself as a “science”. Henceforth, crystallization of the structure should be resisted. In this sense, considering “totality as a historically and spatially constructed entity rather than a constituting entity” will lead to changing our perceptions towards “anarchy problematique”.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, handling anarchy problematique that causes deterministic explanations in the field will help to save IR from legitimizing states’ power-seeking behaviors at the expense of the “others”. In handling such a

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<sup>12</sup> Foucault, “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century”, 283.

<sup>13</sup> Richard Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory of International Politics,” *Alternatives* 12 (1987), 411 quoted in Tuathail, 175.

<sup>14</sup> Keyman, 8-9.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 9.

problematic imagining a post-national era in IR, will help to dissolve the international into what is accepted as “national”.

Disturbing the “international” as was conceptualized in IR theory is also significant for opening it into the effects of society. State “constitutes a “dual anchorage” between socioeconomic structures and an international system of states”.<sup>16</sup> Bearing in mind the “dual anchorage thesis”, international system can be regarded as composed of different processes.<sup>17</sup> Thus, regarding international system composed of nation-states constitutes a highly problematic point in IR. With the same token, state can be considered to be embedded in “socio-spatial” networks.<sup>18</sup> This means, it is also open to influence from the inputs of society. Such a standpoint appears to be vital in the sense that it liberates the state from the gaze of IR theory.

Therefore, it is time IR took into account the civil society as a unique entity that has its own history.<sup>19</sup> Taking into account the society will thus save us from reductionist inquiries within the field. Moreover, this will rescue us from dichotomies of state/society.<sup>20</sup> “[T]he Archimedian point from which the whole world can be grasped” does not recognize that every state has its own peculiarities and respect its existence.<sup>21</sup> Hence, integrating society to the analysis of IR will help the states to render their specific characteristics which were taken away from them by theoretical conservatism. Such an attempt will also expose the fact that state is constituted through practices occurring in a society. Therefore, the focus will shift from the state to other factors as well without privileging one over the other. In this respect, the viewpoint that takes international system composed of nation-state units as basic actors “in an *a*

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid, 62.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 67.

<sup>18</sup> Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 2-3, quoted in Keyman, 68.

<sup>19</sup> Keyman, 80.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 55.

<sup>21</sup> Tuathail, 185.



*priori* fashion” can be prevented.<sup>22</sup> To be able to save state from reification and add other components to the analysis in IR theories, a sociological perspective needs to be integrated into IR discipline. Thus, scholars within the field have to pay attention to society which has been left aside by realist discourses. Such an attempt will avoid fixations and prevent crystallization of the nation-state at the expense of society.

As has been argued above, state is taken as the “privileged entry into the history” in IR. However, to be able to challenge state-oriented theories of IR, positivistic impulses must also be disturbed.<sup>23</sup> Taking the state as the primary point of reference, in a sense, has been the implication of natural sciences. Attributing “state” an unquestioned authority derives from positivism which argues that facts speak for themselves and do not need to be questioned.<sup>24</sup> Therefore, taking its roots from positivism, states are accepted unquestionably true in modern times. This positivistic nature of IR should be challenged in order to open the concept of state to criticism. Furthermore, taking state as an ultimate end brings the end of the state since this contradicts with the nature of identity:

States are never finished as entities: the tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox inherent to their being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in process of becoming. For a state to end its practices of representation would be to expose its lack of prediscursive foundations: stasis would be death.<sup>25</sup>

Thus, constitution of the nation-state as “the privileged point of entry into history” in realist discourses of IR needs to be challenged.<sup>26</sup> Since privileging either the agent or the structure over the other means reification of one, IR has to locate its position at the middle. In other words,

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<sup>22</sup> Keyman, 56, emphasis in original.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 61.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 57.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, 54.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 85.

the state should be viewed as both an institutional ensemble with its own spatial and temporal specificity, which requires taking seriously the geopolitical context in which the state acts, and a site where the condensation of political practices take place, which requires going beyond an analytical understanding of the state/civil society distinction.<sup>27</sup>

This would be a good step on the way to tackle with overt subjectivities that is incarnated in privileging the nation-state in IR.

To be able to criticize the nation-state, questioning the sovereignty which was exercised by the nation-state, is necessary since sovereignty is always exercised at the expense of something. Both powerless states and people living under this sovereign authority are sacrificed. Therefore, sovereignty is performed throughout violation. Moreover, sovereign state is what stops time and holds the monopoly of representing the space in this timeless world. Thus, disturbing the hegemony of the sovereign state via deconstruction is a good way to refuse the exclusionary practices of the state. However, there is a possibility that deconstruction might turn to itself. As “death of the subject” can lead to “death of the death of subject”, deconstruction of nation-states could lead to other “state of nature” burst out from the chaos.<sup>28</sup> Therefore in this sense, deconstruction might refute itself. Thus, questioning the hegemonic identity throughout deconstruction also highlights us about the paradoxical nature of identity. There is no way out for solving this paradox but the point is to keep this paradox alive instead of trying to eliminate it by privileging certain identities.

Taking the state as a “theoretical object of inquiry” instead of an “ontological totality” can be a good way of dealing with the problem of reification.<sup>29</sup> Taking the state as one of the components that influence theoretical construction, enables us to include society in the analysis of international relations. However, it is important to note that state’s reification in IR has its

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 85.

<sup>28</sup> Laclau, 94.

<sup>29</sup> Keyman, 54.

roots in the paradox of theoretical inquiry. “Ontology lies at the beginning of any enquiry”.<sup>30</sup> In this sense, denying ontology at the same time by accepting it exposes the paradoxical nature of theoretical inquiry. Such a paradox can be reflected into IR by accepting the “state” while at the same time questioning it. However, accepting the state without questioning it means attributing an ultimate meaning to “ontology”. Although there is no escape from structure at the last resort, attempts to deny it are worth to appreciate since these rescue us from horizons that we were imprisoned. By the way, it should be remembered that such attempts will not exceed postponing it. However, the point should be to continuously re-vitalize the tension between the structure and the flow of life. “Eschewing any claim to secure grounds”, IR must be able to manifest each dissident thought whether it disturbs the image of the “holy state”.<sup>31</sup> Thus, the way to deal with this paradox needs to be problematized.

Liberating IR theory from state will also avoid equating the state with the “nation” which is another point that constitutes problem in IR.<sup>32</sup> This is because the “nation” and the “state” are not fixed but are socially constructed entities. Here, the problem of representation also enters the scene. To what extent the “state” abstracted from the web of social interactions resemble the interests of the people — or in other words the “nation”— is an issue that remains to be solved. Regarding the nation as a monolithic entity leads to its reification as well as ignoring diversity. However, the state can not be crystallized in the name of the nation. Because it is the pulling and hauling between different groups that constitute and reproduce the reality of the state. In this sense, holistic conception of the state as well as its equation with a homogenous nation needs to be deconstructed in order to consider the state formation as an ongoing process. Hence, distinguishing the nation from the

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 91.

<sup>31</sup> Ashley, “The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Towards a Critical Social Theory of International Politics” , 408, quoted in Tuathail, 175.

<sup>32</sup> Keyman, 56.

state is a step to be taken in order to render them their specific and unique meanings.

Since territorial state fails to “confront the *globalization of contingency* that haunts late modernity, people are face to face with the fundamentalism of the state which derives from the gap between state’s efficiency to respond to the demands of the people and its electoral accountability.<sup>33</sup> This gap is what makes democracy ideal emptied of all its content even though it’s impossible to actualize this ideal.<sup>34</sup> The problem in late-modernity is the identity/difference politics’ exceeding the modern state’s boundaries. That is why; territorial state can not answer the needs and demands of people who claim difference. Democracy is contradictory in nature since it both requires a consensus and tries to keep alive the diversities that contest any unified identity.<sup>35</sup> Thus, “a democratic ethos *introduces an active tension between cultural drives to identity and the persistent ethical need to contest the dogmatization of hegemonic, relational identities*”.<sup>36</sup> However, in IR majority and thus, democracy becomes an instrument to get rid of minority groups and approve the system. In order to maintain a more legitimate government in the eyes of the public, states must pay attention to the demands of the “difference” rather than ignoring them. “[C]ritical responsiveness to new drives of pluralization” is necessary to pave the way for respecting difference.<sup>37</sup>

The need to disturb nation-state orientation in IR theory in a vein derives from the lack of “democracy” in the field. Territorial state by creating inside/outside dichotomies is the obstacle in front of achieving the ideal of “democracy” even though it is impossible to reach it. However, ceasing from actualizing this ideal means crystallization of “demos” for the favor of the “nobled”. In

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<sup>33</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 24 & Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 131, emphasis in original.

<sup>34</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 24.

<sup>35</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 93.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 93, emphasis in original.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, 125.

modern times, everything is organized according to the nation's needs and national interests and ethnic groups, women and minorities are left aside for the sake of national interests. Because focusing on the power-struggle of the states draw people out of its concern by placing national interests above people's interests. However, since IR refers to all kinds of relations among all kinds of actors, considering it as the relations between states is merely a reductionism. IR can no more be restricted with inter-state relations but should also include complex relations regarding human and state relations.<sup>38</sup> Instead, human interests must be at the core of the discipline and it should also concern societies for whom the states must be for. Giving priority to historical human practices over structures would enable us to recognize difference.<sup>39</sup> Thus, stress must be made on people rather than the state in contemporary IR.

Therefore, democracy ideal which allows everyone to represent himself/herself is also "colonized by the state" in the sense that the state privileges center at the expense of the periphery.<sup>40</sup> In order to fill democracy and human rights concepts with their original meanings, allowing diversity instead of repressing difference needs to be maintained. A more cosmopolitan form of democracy would abolish constructed spatial boundaries that reproduce inside/outside dichotomies. Henceforth, a democratic understanding that transcends the borders of the nation-state can be brought into the agenda as "[t]erritorial democracy will become a late-modern anachronism unless it is compromised and exceeded by a new pluralization of democratic spaces, energies, and allegiances".<sup>41</sup> Then, ethical concerns should not be limited within the borders of the territorial state since humanity can not be limited to the borders of the nation-state. Henceforth, Western kind of democracy that is limited with the "demos" should also be problematized in order to allow room for everyone to be represented. In this case, bearing in mind that there will

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<sup>38</sup> Keyman, 82.

<sup>39</sup> Walker, 82.

<sup>40</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 201.

<sup>41</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 161.

always be a “democratic deficit”, state authorities should not take their power for granted.<sup>42</sup> Because “the condition of possibility of a pluralist democracy is at the same time the condition of impossibility of its perfect implementation”.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, Western imposition of “democracy” needs to be read with these lenses.

Here, it would be helpful to re-stress that pressuring for the integration of democracy to IR by no means implies that democracy is completely inclusionary. In point of fact, challenging the Western “democracy” derives its roots from here. As Slavoj Žižek argues “the *demos* to which democracy refers “incessantly oscillates between the all and the *nonall* / *pastout*”<sup>44</sup> Therefore, by its very nature democracy is a paradoxical term since it leaves excluded people outside the *demos*.<sup>45</sup> Hence, pressuring for democracy in IR is not to neglect the double-edged character of democracy. Deriving from this double-sidedness, it gets clear that trying to bring democracy to the IR will not melt all inequalities. Conversely, democracy might reproduce new inequalities unless it is complemented with “equality” principle. Thus, even if by the very meaning of the term “democracy” could be integrated to IR, for an unsolved problem of exclusion still remains unless democracy can not be complemented with equality. This owes much to that “Western democracy” is exclusionary by its very nature. This again brings into agenda the need to cleanse IR from Eurocentric conceptualizations. However, the *tension* between equality and “democracy” could pave the way for a more just world in which everyone seeks the right to be included.<sup>46</sup> And this is what IR needs to adopt in order to bridge the gap between people and IR.

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<sup>42</sup> Mouffe, 4.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>44</sup> Žižek, emphasis in original.

<sup>45</sup> Mouffe, 43.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 44, emphasis in original.

## CHAPTER 7

### IMAGINING AN-OTHER IR

Saving IR from state-orientation has been a good step on the way to create an-other IR but still there are things that remain to be solved. Imagining an-other IR is possible only with an understanding of the “other”. Deriving from Foucault, adopting a “dialogical approach over against a polemical one” in which one side tries to abolish the other will give the “other” the right to speak and help understanding the other.<sup>1</sup> “[M]aking the other strange allows making a distinction between subjectivities or, rather, between selves: a recognition not only that I am the center, meaning he is different from me, but also he is the center, making me the different other”.<sup>2</sup>

As has been put forward, globalization process reminds us the ambiguity of the boundaries in all respects. Regarding such globalization of contingency, melting of cultures and norms into each other must be taken into consideration. As Bhabha puts forward “[t]he boundary is Janus-faced and the problem of outside/inside must always itself be a process of hybridity, incorporating new ‘people’ in relation to the body politic”.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, the awareness about the blurring of boundaries of inside/outside might enable us to wear the ‘other’'s lenses and establish empathy with the “other”. This is because as Bhabha argues, “[t]he ‘other’ is never outside or beyond us; it emerges forcefully, within cultural discourse, when we *think* we speak most intimately and indigenously ‘between ourselves’”.<sup>4</sup> Since the “other” has been an indispensable part of identity formation, suppressive tendencies for difference, also threaten the being of identity itself. “The self and the other

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<sup>1</sup> Der Derian, 10.

<sup>2</sup> Z. D. Gurevitch, “The Other Side of Dialogue: On Making the Other Strange and the Experience of Otherness”, *The American Journal of Sociology*, 93:5 (March, 1988): 1189.

<sup>3</sup> Homi K Bhabha, “Introduction: Narrating the Nation” in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London: Routledge, 1990), 4.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 4, emphasis in original.

merge into one another”.<sup>5</sup> Hence, it is difficult to draw lines between them. Recognizing that identity carries inputs integrated from otherness, approach to the “other” can change. In other words, awareness of the interdependency between identity and difference—that is, identity can not exist without relying on difference—could pave the way for “an ethic in which adversaries are respected and maintained in a mode of agonistic mutuality, and ethic in which alter-identities foster agonistic respect for the differences that constitute them, an ethic of care for life”.<sup>6</sup> Such a respect for difference would mean self-respect since identity and difference are intermingled. When considered with those lenses, “break[ing] with the discursive strategies that affirm a logic of same and different, inside and outside, pluralist and universalist, history and structure, theory/purpose and practice and friend and foe” thus seems necessary in IR.<sup>7</sup> Such an attitude will pave the way for “comprehend[ing] the Other in its own specificity and learn[ing] from it”.<sup>8</sup>

Throughout dichotomies, IR imposes “horizons of modern political imagination” and this constitutes another problem in the field.<sup>9</sup> “[M]odernity constitutes the spatial, temporal, and discursive context of international relations theory”.<sup>10</sup> However, “the necessary horizons of the modern political imagination are both spatially and temporally contingent”.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, privileging modernity in IR means pulling the discipline into a conservative unity. Henceforth, modern character of IR should also be problematized in order to challenge binary oppositions that create self/other bipolarities. This is because taking the categories such as idealism and realism for granted and accepting dichotomies as natural in IR cause pacification and cease us from escaping them. “The grand Either/Or” tyranny within IR theory should be

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<sup>5</sup> Neumann, 36.

<sup>6</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 166.

<sup>7</sup> Walker, 73.

<sup>8</sup> Keyman, 160.

<sup>9</sup> Walker, 6.

<sup>10</sup> Keyman, 93.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 91.



disturbed in order to open space for gray areas in the field.<sup>12</sup> The modern theory of sovereignty presumes that “[t]he sovereign is legally supreme”.<sup>13</sup> Such a standpoint automatically leads to inferiority of the people on whom these sovereign rights are exercised. Given all these circumstances, modern character of IR theory should be deconstructed since this forces IR to parochialism. Above, it was mentioned that deconstruction of nation-state might turn to itself. Thus, questioning the hegemonic identity throughout deconstruction also highlights us about the paradoxical nature of identity. There is no way out for solving this paradox but the point is to keep this paradox alive instead of trying to eliminate it by privileging certain identities.

Of course, this is not to deny that identity can not exist without its “other”. It is inevitable that there is a parasitic relationship between identity and difference. Both identity and difference are paradoxical in the sense that they take the ‘other’ as a part of the proof.<sup>14</sup> Thus, nothing is pure and totally free. Partha Chatterjee states,

[n]ationalism... seeks to represent itself in the image of the Enlightenment and fails to do so. For Enlightenment itself, to assert its sovereignty as the universal ideal, needs its Other; if it could ever actualize itself in the real world as the truly universal, it would in fact destroy itself.<sup>15</sup>

Therefore, identity can not exist without the “other” and otherness is the prerequisite of the existence of identity in IR. However, the point must be to disturb settled identities that feel themselves comfortable in excluding “others” and such an attitude will finalize in constantly resetting the hierarchies of identity and difference. Therefore, the challenge must be not to destroy identity but rather, to place identities on a slippery ground. The pressuring attempt must be to show that the roles of the actors who play in

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 145.

<sup>13</sup> Benjamin Handler, “Towards the Sociology of Sovereignty”, *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, 2:3 (Aug. 1936) :426.

<sup>14</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 66.

<sup>15</sup> Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed, 1986) quoted in Homi K. Bhabha, “DissemiNation”, 293.

international relations—which is based on the interplay between identity and difference—can change. “Agonistic democracy” could be a way to prevent the dogmatization of identities that leads to the perception of “enemy” between people as well as states. “Agonism” in Mouffe’s words “which is a different mode of manifestation of antagonism because it involves a relation not between enemies but between ‘adversaries’, adversaries being defined in a paradoxical way as ‘friendly enemies’ that is, persons who are friends because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different way”.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, while recognizing the need for an ‘other’, exploitation of this otherness by the hegemonic identity must be opposed. In this respect, letting history flow instead of staying embedded in a structure is key to resisting colonization of cultural space. Because after all, “anything goes”.

Since it is now obvious that identity and difference are intermingled, predicting that suppression abolishes the very reason of the existence of the identity will not be difficult. “As heterogeneity decreases, so does the rationale for identities that assume that *they* are fundamentally different from *us*”.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, the definition of identity in relation to other identities gets into peril with homogenizing practices of the state. This puts normalization techniques in question since they reproduce paradox. Furthermore, the way national identity exploits difference can be challenged just as Church’s authority in suppressing “infidels” was once challenged by the emergence of the secular state systems. Hence IR has constantly to revise itself in order not to allow identities to impose their dogmas upon differences. Such a revisionary attempt will transform international agenda for the favor of humanity. To put it that way, “if the *modern* ‘problem of identity’ is how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the *postmodern* ‘problem of

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<sup>16</sup> Mouffe, 13.

<sup>17</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization*, 46:2 (Spring, 1992) :39, quoted in Neumann, 34, emphasis in original.

identity' is primarily how to avoid fixation and keep options open".<sup>18</sup> In this sense, postmodern stance vis-à-vis dogmatic identities can be adopted to create a more protean form of IR.

In the case of otherness, "as the logic of identity requires difference, the potential for the transformation of difference into otherness always exists".<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, the effort must be to challenge with that potential. However, as far as the highest political objective of the state remains as "national security", IR will continue reproducing and dogmatizing otherness. Even though otherness is the inevitable outcome of identity-difference dichotomy, the need to change the roles of the hegemonic identity echoes in nowadays. At the moment of crystallization where the otherness begins, it needs to be problematized without letting identities to get dogmatized. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, "difference" is the instrument that triggers the protection instinct of identity that finalizes in otherness. However, it is important to remind that it can also facilitate criticism towards dogmatic identities. While the former is actualized in the practices of the state that are reflected in the mainstream theories of IR, the latter is ignored for the sake of protecting "nation-state". However, politics can not tolerate one-sidedness and IR should be the ground on which the dialectics between this instinct to protection and self-criticism take place. Only by that way, IR can escape from approving the "unjust" behaviors of the states and can direct states as well as states influence the discipline. In this respect, there is a responsibility for the "other" as well. Instead of accepting the role of the "excluded", the "other" could use it to challenge the dogmatic situation of the nation-state. " 'Apartheid' itself would have to play the role of the element keeping the relation to the other, of

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<sup>18</sup> Zygmunt Bauman, "From Pilgrim to Tourist; or, A Short History of Identity". In *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage, 1996), 18, quoted in Neumann, 228, emphasis in original.

<sup>19</sup> Campbell, 70.

serving as watchword against any discourse claiming to be able to create a final unity”.<sup>20</sup>

Therefore, late modernity is unique in the sense that it can not afford paying for the price of penetration into the autonomous space of difference. Because the borders of nation-state are challenged and technology offers the opportunity to transcend borders, “difference” has the power to organize and unite with its counterparts in other territorial states. That means, it can not be trapped into the confines of nation-state any more. National authorities appease some of these “differences” in order to protect their “power” and people are deceived under the mask of ‘inclusion’. However, being included in an unjust system must not satisfy people at all since the relationship will not transcend a patronage relation between people and the state. Moreover, cohesion can not be maintained while some ‘others’ bear the consequences of their deviations from “standard” norms. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that state’s stamping attitudes will not turn towards “included” one day since norms, and cultural codes change as well as the hegemonic order.

No doubt; it is vital to liberate women, the East and ethnic minorities in order to break with the monopoly of hegemonic identity. For the examination of the relations between states, maybe the East has the leading role the East was depended on Western consciousness and imagination in order to be represented. What concerns IR about orientalism is that it relies on data reproduced by the West for evaluation of the East. Ignorance of the uniqueness and specificity of Eastern societies point out to the manipulation of power in international arena. Since Eastern states are powerless in terms of military capabilities and technological advancement they are left aside in political terms too. This hold of power unfortunately gives Western states the authority to reproduce and legitimize myths about Eastern states. Hence, centrality of Western discourses which produce prejudices about the “East”

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<sup>20</sup> Laclau, 103.

needs to be challenged. Since IR theory is nourished by “Western rationalist and universalist” identity, it has a strong tendency to “dissolve the [Eastern] Other into the unitary conception of the modern self”.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, historicizing the IR in order to show the subjective construction of the “modern subject” is obligatory in order to gain the East its history back.<sup>22</sup> Recognizing the “Other” as difference will pave the way for deviating from Euro-centric and patriarchal character of IR.<sup>23</sup>

The development of international politics from the discovery of America to the (constructed) “Clash of Civilizations” between the “West” and the “Rest” legitimizing the developments in the post-September 11 era proves that IR has a teleological development when its legacy is taken into consideration. It still keeps its Euro-centric character and still serves to Western interests by privileging Occident over the Orient. Therefore, IR theory which places nation-state at the core of the discipline should be challenged to imagine another IR which is based on mutual understanding between states—be it Eastern or Western in origin. Constructing “other” theories which do not rely on constructed spatial imaginations such as the East and the West is vital in the sense that “History, with a capital H, can not tolerate otherness or leave it outside its economy of inclusion”.<sup>24</sup>

Identity and difference appearances change from which angle we look at them. For instance, for an African, Anglo-American constitutes “difference” and for an Anglo-American it is vice versa. However, the problem with IR is that it looks through the lenses of the West. In order to break Western hegemony over the East, “epistemic violence” exerted on the colonized countries needs to be problematized.<sup>25</sup> Questioning the hegemony of modern identity by recognizing space for different cultures other than European

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<sup>21</sup> Keyman, 11.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 10.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, 13.

<sup>24</sup> Young, 4.

<sup>25</sup> Kennedy, 124.

cultures is a necessary step to be taken in order to imagine a more democratic discipline. Deconstructing the dominant Orientalist discourse in IR which evaluates Orient “ahistorically as a uniform entity incapable of self-definition” is key to establish dialogues between the East and the West.<sup>26</sup> Hence, decentering European thought would relieve the colonization of the space of “difference”. Moreover, leaving aside spatial imaginations such as the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ will save us from dichotomies and free our imagination about an-other IR. IR needs to be concerned with producing alternative accounts of history about the colonized countries instead of fixing itself into a subjective history that privileges the West. Since international relations means interaction with the “other”, West can not keep on acting on behalf of the East any more. That means, it can not suppress the voices of the East. In order to establish a dialogue, rather than a monologue which facilitates Western imposition of meanings and Western speech on behalf of the Orient, IR must hear the voices of Eastern people as well.

Identity/difference perceptions might change over time. Territorial state who challenged the identity of the Christian universalism was difference during medieval times. Therefore, there is no guarantee that modern state can not be challenged by another “difference” and its status of identity could be replaced by an “other”. In other words, “[s]elf/other relationships have to be understood in their historicity; they are aspects of historically contingent ideas of self, which again are rooted in historically contingent ideas about time and space”.<sup>27</sup> This brings the need to question and disturb the dogmatized identities into agenda. Since identity and difference are mutually enforcing and identities change over time by integrating the inputs of difference, sovereign state always lacks full legitimacy since “[s]overeignty always occurs after the moment it claims to occupy”.<sup>28</sup> Seeking for this legitimacy

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 24.

<sup>27</sup> Neumann, 23.

<sup>28</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 139.

without the aim of finding it, will break the chains of the existing system of international relations that imprison people.

Drawing from the discussed above in Chapter 3, arguing that mainstream theories of IR privilege men over women by magnifying the importance of military power would be no meaningless. As Foucault suggests “at the juncture of the “body” and the “population,” sex [is] a crucial target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of death”.<sup>29</sup> This intervention into private sphere or household more specifically can not be accepted any more in a conjuncture in which human rights became the key values. Henceforth, rather than differentiating between sexes, difference could be used as “a force for change”.<sup>30</sup> This change in the approach to females will no doubt enable us to get rid of the understanding that draws women out of politics and pave the way for a more humane and inclusionary IR .

Until recently, the state is taken as a “national territory totality” and this paved the way for its acceptance as an a priori entity. However, evaluating the state from a Weberian point of view which considers it having a “legitimate monopoly of power and coercion in a given territory”, will lead to definition of state power in terms of other states.<sup>31</sup> Since then, it will probably be observed that this is what actually generates struggle for power and “state of nature” in international arena. Realizing this relativity of state power-that is measuring its power after comparison with other states- helps us to break with the absolutist understanding of the state. Moreover, such an approach could pave the way for dealing with the “other” on equal grounds by helping to establish empathy with the “other”.

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<sup>29</sup> Foucault, “ Right of Death and Power over Life”, 268.

<sup>30</sup> Keyman, 108.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 61.

In order to deal empathy with the other universality attributed to modern identity also needs to be put into question. “[U]niversal moment” of the nation-state needs to realize itself in “finite reality”.<sup>32</sup> However, regarding IR as if nation-states are infinite exposes the reification of time. IR seems to continue the universalism of the West in the Middle Ages. Those times, the Church was declaring itself universal representative of all Christians. In modern times, universalism is incarnated in nation-state. Actually, what changed in modernity was only the center of power. The power shifted from God to human reason. But this did not prevent subjugation and exploitation. In particular in IR, nation-states inspired by trust in “human reason” have the authority to dominate other states or the people within their borders. Hence, Enlightenment ideal of “freedom” stays unactualized in nowadays. This brings into mind the necessity to problematize the modern framework as Medieval mind was once problematized by “reason”. Moreover, “contingent succession” of the nation-state must be brought to the fore in order to save IR from medieval Christian tradition of universalism.<sup>33</sup>

So far, IR theory was questioned in epistemological terms. However, imagining an-other IR also necessitates methodological criticism. Methods of dominant IR theory continuously generate, reproduce and simulate unfair reality “further distancing and alienating them from some original, unproblematic meaning”.<sup>34</sup> Realist theories of IR “always dream of fixing, reducing, subjecting [realities] to a single, monological meaning” regardless of “the linguistic interaction of theorist and text”.<sup>35</sup> Empirical study is just one method of grasping the “reality” and privileging it over other methods serves to appreciating the unjust reality. This is because “there is [no] external

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<sup>32</sup> Laclau, 96.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, 96.

<sup>34</sup> Der Derian, 6.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 6.



being, supreme epistemology, ultimate theory that can prove, adjudicate, confirm an existence independent of its representation”.<sup>36</sup>

Imposition of empiricism as “universally true” has disturbing implications for “difference” and “powerless” states. Throughout this universality claim, IR reproduces a “theology of truth” that binds all states. However, this is what generates reductionism in the field. Ignoring diversity in empirical, ontological and methodological terms leads to its dogmatization. Emphasizing particularity would save the discipline from “one truth imposition” and pave the way for new methods. As Connolly sets forth “problematiz[ing] the grounding any theory presupposes while it works out the implications of a particular set of themes” is necessary on the way to break the monopoly of the “empirical”.<sup>37</sup> As far as IR adopts the “ocularcentricism of Western epistemology”, it will be confined to the borders of realist paradigm which measures power in terms of military capabilities.<sup>38</sup> Hence, this is to say that imagining an-other IR can not be achieved without integrating normative aspects to IR theory. If IR is the “science” of the play between states on international stage, then it should cease from the role of a “camera” that reflects what happens on this stage. In other words, IR theory should adopt a more normative approach in order to prevent the exploitation of the hegemonic identity.

IR claims itself to be a positivist discipline by relying on the claims of objectivity. However, taking nation-states as “essentially objective” can not hide its completely subjective character. Actually, this exposes the fact that knowledge serves to power. National power backed up by the discipline that privileges “haves” over “have nots” also serves to reproduction of the realist paradigm in the discipline. Reminiscent of Gramsci, “humanly objective is

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 7.

<sup>37</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference*, 56-57, quoted in Der Derian, 8.

<sup>38</sup> Tuathail, 175.

historically subjective”.<sup>39</sup> The same is true for IR as well. Objective claims to reality by hiding behind empiric data damages IR by shaking the throne of nation-state. Because what is regarded objective is “nation-state” and “national interests” in IR. However, these concepts were accepted as “objective” and “absolutely true” due to a social and political context. That is why, these came to be “universally objective”. According to mainstream theories of IR, “[r]eality” is “out there”, a complex but nevertheless graspable and capturable external world of objects independent of signification”.<sup>40</sup> However, there is no such a reality since “the figure of Man is at once the source and the limit of [investigation]”.<sup>41</sup> Actually “reasoning man” is enmeshed in history and such a division between him and the history is misleading in the sense that subjectivity is inevitable.<sup>42</sup> Therefore, claiming “universality” relying on the Man’s perceptions and creations becomes meaningless.

It is therefore clear that contemporary IR is “subjective” since it reads the discipline through the optics of modern identity and national interests that nourish it. IR’s privileging of nation-state destroys its objectivity claims and makes it a subjective discipline that exists for the sake of national interests. Instrumentalization of law, judicial system and in general, state system by punishing those who challenge nation-state and “damage” national interests exposes the colonization of ethics by the nation-state. Drawing upon Foucault’s knowledge-power analysis, it is useful to set forth that IR serves to the powerful which can not exist without knowledge. Prevailing modern identity—in order to protect itself and reinforce its power— produces knowledge that makes up IR discipline. “[This] knowledge is not objective or neutral, but determined by the prevailing conceptions of what is required in

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<sup>39</sup> Keyman, 92.  
<sup>40</sup> Tuathail, 167.  
<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 171.  
<sup>42</sup> Ibid, 171.

the social domain”.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, there is a mutual relationship between IR discipline and modern identity which nourishes each other. “Without a proper mode of knowledge to render it intelligible, [national identity] can not exist, and loses its power to organize political reality through a demarcation of inside from outside, of Same from Other”.<sup>44</sup> With the same token, “without a proper form of [national identity], knowledge loses its power to organize reality, and to constitute objects and fields of enquiry as well as criteria of validity and truth”.<sup>45</sup>

Another point that constitutes problem in IR is IR theories’ dealing with history. As was mentioned, nation states are accepted as “privileged agents of historical change” in IR.<sup>46</sup> Taking history as a “process with a single subject” is incarnated in nation-states which consider themselves able to master the international system.<sup>47</sup> Nation-states who regard themselves at the centre of decision-making parallelities with the “Subject” of Enlightenment thought. In this sense, realist paradigm which prioritizes nation states, constitute the modern milestone of IR. Hence, nation-state enters the scene of IR as the “*privileged agent of History* [emphasis original]” with the domination of realist paradigm.<sup>48</sup> Letting history flow would prevent colonization of history by the nation-state.

The link between the East and history in IR is also problematical. IR serves to exclusion of lived meaning of the East’s history in international agenda in order to shape it according to its purposes. “History is the realm of violence and war; it constitutes another form by which the other is appropriated into the same”.<sup>49</sup> The East’s right to write its history is taken away from it and it is

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<sup>43</sup> Devetak, 182.

<sup>44</sup> Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty*, (Cambridge, 1995), 83, quoted in Devetak, 183.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 83, quoted in Ibid, 183.

<sup>46</sup> Laclau, 98.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, 94.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid, 96.

<sup>49</sup> Young, 15.

dehistoricized by being reduced to an object isolated from its historical and sociological context. Even its right to speak in order to represent itself is taken away from the East. “[S]ubalterns can not speak: their identities and their choices are thoroughly constructed; they have and can have no voice”.<sup>50</sup> However, “[f]or the other to remain other it must not derive its meaning from History but instead have a separate time which differs from historical time”.<sup>51</sup> Thus, unless Western monopoly over History is prevented, the East can not gain its history back.

To conclude, drawing upon the steps above to establish a more democratic IR, I would like to imagine an-other IR that focuses on “others” that are not included in such an unjust system. Because focusing on them would enable us to throw out the system that reproduces inequalities and pave the way for a more humane, equal and just world. So far, IR has proved that is for states but not for people. But I am dreaming of an IR that represents the voice of differences until they turn into identities. Because it seems to be the only way that we break with the “statist monopoly on human identity” in IR.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Larry M. Preston, “Theorizing Difference: Voices from the Margins”, *The American Political Science Review*, 89: 4 (Dec. 1995), 945.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>52</sup> Walker, 67.

## CHAPTER 8

### CONCLUSION

“Truth” depends on the angle from which we look at it, and IR has chosen to look from the side of modernity so far. However, I preferred to look at it from the point of view of difference without imposing its truth. Actually this thesis was not trying to invert the hierarchy but rather it aimed to show that settled thrones could be disturbed and no being can enjoy the comfort of its position at the top of hierarchy. As Connolly puts it, “[n]othing is fundamental” and we should not take identities as absolute.<sup>1</sup> In order to disturb crystallized identities, we had better start by “speaking the language of the exiles”.<sup>2</sup> This thesis aimed to leave open spaces for differences inspired by the “death of the subject”. Yet, deconstruction of a single center in the making of history does not mean “replacing the transcendental subject by its symmetrical other”.<sup>3</sup> Because this can lead to another totality composed of multi-subjectivities that might turn into another “objectivity”.<sup>4</sup>

Theory does not encompass all the “truth” and neither does this thesis claim so. This thesis rather aimed to highlight a certain aspect of the problematique IR faces nowadays. As Bakhtin notes,

Languages of heteroglossia, like mirrors that face each other, each reflecting in its own way a piece, a tiny corner of the world, force us to guess at and grasp for a world behind their mutually reflecting aspects that is broader, more multi-leveled, containing more and varied horizons than would be available to a single language or a single mirror.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 39.

<sup>2</sup> Richard K. Ashley and R. B. Walker, “Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/ Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 34:3, Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissidence in International Studies (Sep., 1990), taken from the title of the special issue.

<sup>3</sup> Laclau, 93.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 93.

<sup>5</sup> M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogical Imagination: Four Essays by M. Bakhtin*, ed. M. Holquist ( Austin: Texas University Pres, 1981), 414-415, quoted in Keyman, 4.

IR serves to suppression of difference and how difference is demonized or contained was the primary concern of this thesis. Therefore, what I rejected was the violation of the space of difference by the hegemonic identity (the nation-state) in IR instead of destroying identity which is an indispensable part of difference. To put it bluntly, the rift between identity and difference will continue. Because “[f]or fullness [on either side], were it possible to possess, would destroy the *movement* of desire itself. This apparent condition of possibility of desire, then, is marked by the impossibility of its attainment”.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, identity which does not carry the potential to reproduce otherness is not possible. However, the point is not to bring identities in a closure. Only by that way, the dialectic between identity and difference would pave the way for democratic politics in which every identity is left open to criticism. Therefore, the point is to keep alive the tension between identity and difference, not destroying it by killing difference. We need identity to be, however turning identities into straitjackets must be contested.

Hence, changing our approach towards identity is obligatory in a conjuncture in which proliferation of ethnic conflicts take place, minority and women rights are brought into agenda and interdependence constantly increases as a result of globalization. Instead of feeling comfortable under the umbrella of an identity, a postmodern stance “which assumes an ironic stance toward what it is and is not when it affirms itself in its identity” should be adopted in order to be able to establish empathy with differences.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, self-criticism might pave the way for overcoming dogmatisms and reifications. Then, the point must be to avoid “theoretical enclosure”.<sup>8</sup> As Der Derian argues “[u]ntil we learn how to recognize ourselves as the Other, we shall be in danger and we

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<sup>6</sup> Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 55, emphasis in original.

<sup>7</sup> Connolly, *Identity/Difference* 47.

<sup>8</sup> Der Derian, 7.

shall be in need of diplomacy”.<sup>9</sup> Thus, arguably it can be asserted that perception of otherness is in a way paradoxically what constitutes international relations.

Henceforth, despite the fact that international relations means interaction with the “other” and necessitates dealing with the other on an equal basis, it is the paradoxical nature of IR that produces otherness. Since logic of identity leads to devalue “others” while privileging the self, IR will be confined to survive with this paradox. However, this is to suggest that neither should we surrender to this reified identity prevailing in IR nor should we take it for granted. The point is to be aware of this contradiction, avoid bringing an identity into a closure and keeping open the ways difference could challenge identity and take its place. In this respect, there is no guarantee that identity will not be difference one day. I believe bearing in mind that identity is not fixed but contingent and the outcome of several factors coming out in a context would lead us to be more fair and tolerant towards difference. Recognizing that “[e]very image embodies a way of seeing”, might help to perceive identity as a more protean being.<sup>10</sup> But of course this will not help the paradoxical nature of identity. Because after all the dialectic between identity and difference will continue to carry on international relations as far as power exists on Earth.

Drawn from the discussed above in “Otherness and Normalization”, it is now obvious that “Other” is an image constructed to fuel the feelings of patriotism and a representation that was injected into the minds of the people by different channels. Therefore, even if people want to deal with something “reel”, that will not be anything that realist paradigms present in IR. This is because they seem totally subjective and serve to national interests instead of humanity. It is obvious that if “power struggle” is placed at the center of analysis in IR, some states will burden the fate of being subordinated. If IR wants to have a claim

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<sup>9</sup> Der Derian, *On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987): 167, 297, 209, quoted in Neumann, 22.

<sup>10</sup> Shehla Burney.

of science, it should also aim to “emancipate” people. No doubt, this will not be actualized unless IR theory shifts its focus from nation-state to people.

All in all, what I set forth is an awareness about the contingency of identity and dependency of it to difference instead of trying to escape from identity. Therefore, we should all reject dogmatization of identities and continue to seek—but not to find—for the state systems a mode of being in which no exclusion takes place. Because after all, “[t]he state is never constituted once and for all time; it is an ongoing political task”.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Devetak, 200.



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