ENLARGEMENT, FOREIGN POLICY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: ASSESSING THE EU IMPACT ON THE TURCO-HELLENIC CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

ENLARGEMENT, FOREIGN POLICY AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: ASSESSING THE EU IMPACT ON THE TURCO-HELLENIC CONFLICT

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This thesis analyzes the impact of the European Union (EU) on the Turco-Hellenic conflict. The theoretical foundation of this thesis is the link between EU enlargement, policies of conditionality and the process of ‘Europeanization’. The thesis makes the point that, apart from visible capabilities such as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), enlargement is a more significant channel through which the EU interacts with the conflicts in its periphery. With this in mind, the thesis makes a survey of EU involvement in the Turkish-Greek conflict starting from the 1960s, emergence of the Cyprus issue between Greece and Turkey and the changing nature of Turkey-Europe relations with Greece’s membership in 1981.

Keywords: EU, conflict management, Turkish-Greek relations, Cyprus issue
ÖZ

GENİŞLEME, DİŞ POLITİKA VE ANLAŞMAZLIK YÖNETİMİ: TÜRK-YUNAN ANLAŞMAZLIĞINDA AB'İN ROLÜNÜN DEĞERLENDİRILMESİ

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On 23 February 1999, the Turkish newspaper Milliyet ran the headline “Ultimatum: Demirel: If Greece, the collaborator of PKK’s bloody murders, continues to lend its support to terror, Turkey will retain its right of self-defence”\(^1\). About six months later, another Turkish newspaper Hurriyat’s headline was “Bravo: Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs”\(^2\). The mutual empathy expressed in the Greek and Turkish media following the earthquake in Turkey were the first signs of emerging common bonds between the two peoples. A Greek newspaper read, “We are all Turks”\(^3\) in its issue following the earthquake in Turkey and a Turkish newspaper responded in Greek: “Etharisto Poli, File’7 ‘Thank You, Neighbour’”\(^4\).

One of the central arguments on the Greek-Turkish rapprochement has been that it was a product of what is usually called “civic diplomacy,” “people’s diplomacy,” or “seismic diplomacy” initiated after the earthquakes by the peoples of both countries. According to this argument, the peoples of two countries showed their preference for friendship and peace, and the political leaders just followed after the “public’s wish” in their diplomatic initiatives that gained pace in the post-quake period.

\(^{1}\) Milliyet, 23 February 1999

\(^{2}\) Hurriyat, 28 July 1999


\(^{4}\) Hurriyat, August 21, 1999.
The statements of the foreign ministers themselves reflect the arguments of "people's diplomacy". For example, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou wrote: “Through their moving expressions of solidarity, the citizens of Greece and Turkey effectively coined a new political term: 'seismic diplomacy'... They taught us that mutual interests can and must outweigh tired animosities." A similar statement was made by the Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in his speech at a ceremony honouring him and Papandreou for their contributions to improving Greek-Turkish relations: "As representatives of Turkey and Greece, George and I are standing before you today for one simple reason: We have faithfully translated the feelings of the Turkish and Greek peoples into policies and acts." 

Indeed, it is widely believed that the earthquakes that occurred in 1999 are the main reasons for the change in Greek-Turkish relations, which is also referred to as 'seismic diplomacy' in the literature. Greece was one of the first countries to send disaster-relief aid to Turkey and Turkey reciprocated a month later, after the earthquakes in Greece. These events were followed by amicable press releases and declarations at the official level and numerous civil society initiatives aimed at 'conflict-resolution' between two countries. Couple of years later also in Cyprus, the Green Line, which was kept closed for about 30 years, was opened.


Ismail Cem has previously argued that actual cooperation started two months before the earthquake: "Back in June 1999, we had already initiated, as two Ministers, a process of consultation and joint work on our bilateral issues, which was later expedited by the immense solidarity between our two peoples during the tragic earthquakes of last summer".

Papandreou on the other hand, traced the cooperation back to the Kosovo operation in which both countries were involved as NATO allies: "For the first time, Turkish military planes flew over Greece carrying humanitarian aid to Kosovo". He stated that after the war, Greek and Turkish foreign ministers decided to cooperate in many areas such as tourism, environment, culture and education. He has also added that the earthquakes and the Helsinki Summit improved this cooperative process.

However if it is the earthquakes that brought about such a change in relations, why did not any previous earthquake (keeping in mind the overall seismic instability in the region) have the same effect?

Relations with Greece have always been a crucial part of Turkey’s foreign and defence policy, since the 1950s. On the part of the United States and European countries, this rivalry has often been a conflict ‘to be contained’, rather than ‘solved’ within NATO’s institutional structure. Aegean has remained as a dangerous sea throughout (and even after) the Cold War where Turkish-Greek conflict has, on numerous occasions, came close to an armed confrontation. The Cyprus issue, since 1960s, has also added strains on the already

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1 Ibid
2 Interview with George Papandreou, "Resolving Old Enemies". Newsweek, Newsweek International, February 21, 2000
tense relations between the two countries and lead to the militarization of the island and until very recently, the contacts between two sides have been minimal, reinforcing the identity problem and aggravating the perceived ‘otherness’ in both sides.

The identity dimension and ‘otherness’ play primary roles in the Turco-Hellenic conflict, in the sense that both Greece and Turkey had gained independence by fighting each other (Clogg, 1992: 13). The Republic of Greece was created (with European help) against the Ottoman rule and following the 80 years after the Greek independence in 1832, the Greek territory had expanded at the expense of the Ottoman territory. The Megali Idee, the ideology behind Greek nationalist movement, which asserted the unification of all Greeks in a common Greek state, has survived into the considerable part of the 20th century, affecting Greek policy making and relations with Turkey (Gündoğdu, 2001: 112). Likewise the establishment of the modern Republic of Turkey was closely related to the War of Independence and the defense of Asia Minor against Greek invasion. The war was followed by the expulsion of Greek forces and the exchange of populations, which served to reinforce a sense of mutual mistrust between the two nations.

In fact, the period following the Turkish War of Independence had been subject to relative normalization of relations under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Eleftherios Venizelos. A Friendship and Cooperation Treaty was signed in 1933, which brought together a period of détente and even cooperation that lasted into the early postwar period. The division of the world system into a bi-polar structure after the Second World War, the Cold War was in fact
a strong incentive for Greece and Turkey to cooperate against a common enemy, putting aside their differences (Lesser, 1999: 74-76). However, bi-lateral relations were strained by the attempted coup against the then Greek-Cypriot president Makarios by the Greek junta and Turkish intervention in 1974 has marked an important turning point in the relations and the relations remained very tense throughout the following decades.

There have been several attempts to work on the difficulties and improve relations in the past decades until 1999. Arguably the most important of these initiatives was the ‘Davos Process’, named after the meeting between Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal and Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in Davos in January in 1988. However, the ‘spirit’ fell rather short of expectations, because the attempts for dialogue lacked domestic support. In the words of Lesser (1999: 78) “Both leaders found it difficult to ‘sell’ the thaw to a sceptical domestic audience at home, especially as their own internal positions weakened”.

The conflict has taken on a much sharper perspective by the emergence of new regional alliance geometries emerging after the collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, whereas Turkey has expanded its relations in the Balkans, specifically with Bulgaria, Greece has sought alliances in the Middle East and the Caucasus. Greece’s emphasis to foster a wider cooperation with Armenia has alarmed Turkish ruling elites. Fuelling these fears in 1996, Greece signed a defence agreement with Armenia, which Turkish elites read as an agreement against Turkey (Kirisci and Çarkoğlu, 2003: 105-121). Turkish elites were further concerned with Greece’s efforts to forge an active cooperation with Syria because of
Syria’s support of the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan (the close relations between high-ranking Greek military officials and Abdullah Öcalan will be dealt in details further in the thesis).

Turkey’s suspicions were reinforced by revelations that Öcalan had been smuggled into Greece and was given sanctuary at the Greek embassy in Nairobi. With the help of American intelligence, Turkish authorities managed to capture Öcalan as he was being taken to the Nairobi airport. The whole affair was a major embarrassment for the Greek government and led to a sharp deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations as well as the dismissal of several high-ranking Greek officials, including then Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos. Such a disaster can be put forward as a major reason for a tone-down on the part of Greek policy makers, facing a severe domestic pressure for taking an unnecessary risk.

Yet, there were also more implicit factors influencing the change in the Turco-Hellenic conflict. The end of the Cold War brought together a new structural context, which pushed Greece and Turkey to redefine their roles and identities. Both in Greek and Turkish perspectives, the identity constructions are based on the notion that the ‘nation’ is encircled by enemies. In Turkish collective identity, this was the Sevres syndrome; the notion that Turkey is encircled by enemies attempting to divide and destroy Turkish state (Jung, 2003). A similar feeling was rife in Greece where the Greeks had a siege mentality, fuelling mistrust in foreign policy making and negatively influenced its relations with Turkey. The
end of the Cold War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia left Turkey and Greece with two options: They would either stay committed to an identity, based on a sense of encirclement and try to survive the post-Cold War turbulence on their own, or they would cooperate to establish a security regime (within NATO and with the aid of the EU) inconceivable without their mutual collaboration. Without a change in foreign policymaking in both countries, alongside a reconceptualization of national identity, the second option would not be feasible. Complementing these events, significant changes in the international arena showed it would be harder to survive with the old conceptions of foreign policymaking. The Kosovo crisis was critical in pushing the leaders of two countries toward regional cooperation and clearly marked a shift away from traditional patterns of foreign policy, especially in Greece. NATO’s Kosovo operation had a tremendous influence on Greek-Turkish relations, providing the two countries with a common goal.

Just before the earthquakes, in May-June 1999, Cem and Papandreou exchanged a series of letters that included proposals for improving bilateral relations by co-operating in various fields. These letters showed that a key element in the change was a revision in the Greek perception of Turkey. Papandreou wrote, “Both Greece and Turkey have rich cultural traditions. Building a multicultural Europe means that we need to enhance our cultural identities and understand each other’s specificity”. This type of statement is in sharp contrast with the view of his predecessor, Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, in 1997:

"We have nothing to do with Turkey. A man cannot discuss things with murderers, rapists and thieves".10

Developments before the earthquakes also indicated the changing atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations: the 1997 Madrid Declaration to establish mutual respect for sovereignty rights, the decision to create a South-Eastern European Brigade (SEEBRG) for peacekeeping operations in the Balkans in 1998, and military cooperation during NATO’s Kosovo operation in May-June 1999. Clearly, then, a deeper process was at work pushing the two countries and their relationship in a new direction. The sources of this change lay in the wider changes transforming European and global politics: the end of the Cold War and the need to respond to the new political realities that emerged as a result.

This thesis discusses the EU involvement in the transformation of the Turco-Hellenic dispute and lays down the areas where it can be argued that the EU has had a positive contribution and the policy areas where EU has been insufficient in bringing about such a change. To what extent, if any, can we speak of the EU as having a positive effect on the Turco-Hellenic conflict? Can we take it for granted that the EU has always assumed the role of an impartial, equal and just mediator? What are the limitations/drawbacks of EU influence on the conflict?

In the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2), I have lay down different but relevant conceptual frameworks that can be useful for understanding the EU enlargement as a foreign policy tool and EU’s involvement in conflicts in its periphery. Such a chapter is important in my opinion, since the hard security capability of the EU, ESDP is not the main tool of EU involvement in the Turco-Hellenic conflict. European enlargement and association and their impact on the transformation of conflicts are dealt in the Chapter. I make an exposition, definition and discussion of concepts like ‘enlargement as foreign policy’, different types of conflict management and conditionality and how they are related to the Turco-Hellenic dispute.

In the next chapter (Chapter 3) I make a historical survey of relations between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus within the context of association/accession to the EU. The reason for such a chapter is to lay down the key events in the history of the conflict and show where and how the conflict has come to be associated with the EU enlargement. Since the Turco-Hellenic dispute, at its core, a conflict of identities, it is vital to present a survey of how the perceptions of ‘otherness’ were created on both sides and in turn, how these constructed identifications has led to further escalation of crises. Further in Chapter 3, I present how Greeks and Turks view the conflict over the Aegean and Cyprus, how both elite-level distrust and social-level identifications of ‘self’ and ‘other’ have been constructed. Later in the chapter I survey Turkey’s, Greece’s and Cyprus’ relations with the EU in a historical perspective and explore how and where the EU enters the picture.
In Chapter 4, I analyse the EU involvement (through the policy of conditionality) on the conflict with its emphasis on the effect of the ruling elites of both sides of the conflict. I try to analyze how the EU (both directly and indirectly) has been involved in the ‘Davos spirit’ of the 1980s, how have Greece’s and Turkey’s membership and association processes with the Union affected the tension in the relations and how the Turkish-Greek-EU triangle has been affected after Greek membership in 1981 and Turkey’s exclusion and isolation from the process. Later, I seek to explain the change in the self-definition of the EU and its attitude towards the conflicts surrounding it. Further, I explain two processes of ‘Europeanization’ in Greek domestic and foreign policies, first of which became explicit after the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 and the second one, towards the end of 1990s. Furthermore I present in what ways the issue of PKK and Öcalan crisis has affected the conflict between Greece and Turkey. Later in the chapter, I have surveyed how the EU became involved with the conflict in Cyprus, how the Luxembourg Summit of 1997, Helsinki Summit in 1999 and Copenhagen Summit in 2002, and the changing approach of the EU towards Turkish-Greek relations have influenced the conflict on the island.

In the conclusion, I make a final assessment and lay down some arguments regarding the impact of the conflict to Turkey’s EU accession process. To what extend can it be argued that it is the EU influence which improved Greek-Turkish relations? What are the external and domestic factors which led to the alleviation of tensions in both countries?
CHAPTER 2:

ENLARGEMENT, EUROPEANIZATION AND CONFLICT

RESOLUTION: AN OVERVIEW

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War has brought together the necessity for a more independent and politically able Europe. Because of such a necessity, the process of European integration – both in terms of enlargement and in terms of deepening – has become more important and challenging than it had been during the Cold War. Since the demise of the ‘Soviet threat’ was imminent, the necessity of continued American involvement in European security via NATO has come under increased scrutiny and there emerged a necessity for Europe to tailor its own defence and security capabilities independent from NATO and American influence. Within this context, European enlargement has assumed an increasing importance for the stability of the former Soviet (and/or communist) territories and European enlargement became a foreign policy tool for the EU to achieve this task.

1. **Enlargement as foreign policy**

Generally speaking, the impact of EU enlargement on the neighbouring states is identified with the EU’s ‘power of shaping’, which is an act of the influencing and
transforming the politics, economics and civil society of the states surrounding it. The principle means to undertake such a 'power of sharing' is the policy of conditionality and the change experienced as a result of EU involvement is referred as 'Europeanization'. This transformative capability of EU – apart from the military and civilian capabilities being developed under the CFSP framework – can be regarded as another method for EU involvement in the prevention, management and transformation of conflicts.

Previous attempts to assess the conflict management potential of the EU have been focused on the developments on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The construction of the capabilities to be used by CFSP and ESDP have been undertaken in 1993 Maastricht Treaty and materialized with the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force. However, a newly emerging school of thought in EU involvement on conflict settlement offers a different perspective.

Christou (2004: 1) has argued that focusing on the CFSP/ESDP aspect of the EU has been misleading in terms of assessing the EU 'actorness' and its foreign and security capabilities. Holland (1991: 2) has made the same point, maintaining that the focus on the second pillar of the EU has led to inadequate theorisation and conceptualisation of how the EU can act on the global stage. In contrast, the new literature presents a different viewpoint which regards EU enlargement as a tool of foreign policy. This theoretical perspective rests on several previous works.
Hill (2001: 330-332) has argued that EU involvement in conflicts has so far been successful in the ‘longer term’ prevention of conflicts. He has further maintained that the comparative advantage of the EU lies not in the shorter-term involvement in conflicts, but in the medium term conflict resolution and longer term conflict prevention. By that he has implied that EU has guided the conflicting parties with a common forum for discussion and socialisation. Further, he has argued that although the EU’s ‘power of attraction’ has provided a distinct enlargement policy by which states could be directed towards a settlement, such an approach would also alienate and frustrate those that are not offered the prospect of membership. This ‘power of attraction’ has also been put by Munster: “the lure of membership can help to prevent conflicts outside the EU’s borders by suggesting the advantages of good behaviour to eager candidates and by giving the EU leverage where they do not take the hint” (cited by Hill 2001: 323).

Adding to the theoretical foundations of the ‘power of attraction, Christou (2002: 4) maintains that:

“The philosophical underpinning of the success of the power of attraction’ (soft security) approach, whereby states are drawn in and socialized into a ‘civilizing constitution’ derives from two variants of liberalism; the most relevant of which in the post-Cold War era, is the “democratic peace” variant. The democratic peace hypothesis at a basic level is based on the assumption that nations that are democratic do not want to fight each other. Thus by promoting the emergence of groupings of democratic states within an EU setting, this will create peace and a spillover effect to other non-member states”.

Michael Smith has previously argued that “the EU has the economic capacity to reward and to punish; it has the technical and administrative capacity to support and
stabilise; and it has the capacity to negotiate in ways unknown to many of the other participants in the European order” (cited by Hill, 2001: 329). According to Pinder (1996: 147-149) such capacity to reward or punish comes from the historical identity of Europe and the ‘European culture’ and success of enlargement is mainly based on socializing the states involved under a framework of institutional structure. Hill (2001: 10-12) has argued that EU enlargement has two theoretical bases, which are the legal variant of liberalism (which maintains that institutions, law and common rules prevent conflict) and democratic peace theory (which maintains that democratic nations do not go to war with each other).

Such a position is indeed idealistic, in the sense that enlargement is expected to spread the ideals and values of the EU to the neighbouring countries, whose success is open to debate. Cecchini et al. (2001: 155-160) have argued that the theory has been materialized by EU’s provision of a framework for encouraging compliance through a series of instruments and incentives for peace and stability. Yet, for enlargement to be successful as a ‘soft’ security instrument, how non-members view those common values are also important. Indeed EU enlargement and ‘EU values’ should elicit a positive reaction from the recipient countries, which is theoretically materialized by the ‘power of attraction’ definition presented by the literature.

The ‘power of attraction’ theory maintains that since the EU develops and proceeds with its internal reforms, outside states will be either directly or indirectly affected without being part of the decision-making bodies that affect them. It is then up to the EU to include
or exclude the neighbouring states. The logic is that “the enlargement has been a catalyst for either the creation of new or reform of existing foreign policy-making procedures, mechanisms and institutions as the EU is forced to adjust to the impact that its larger size and more diverse membership have on its foreign relationships” (Ginsberg, 1997: 16).

Kramer (1993) and McManus (1998) represent the counter-argument which states that enlargement’s indirect effect has not been distinctly successful in the EU’s initial approach to the Central and Eastern European Countries and also in its initial opinions regarding Turkey’s membership. In general terms, EU’s inability to change Turkish foreign policy during the first half of 1990s has been used as an explicit argument against EU’s enlargement capabilities (Allen, 1998: 56). Moreover the EU has also been accused of looking after its own economic interests and reacting to external events rather than having any coherent long-term strategy for enlargement (Peterson, 1998: 11-13 and Hix, 1999: 348-54).

As a counter-response, Sjøen and Smith (2001: 130-134) declare that the last wave of enlargement has been a product of long term calculation to reshape political order in Europe, rather than a mere reaction to promote enlargement and to minimize the risk of importing further instability.

In fact, at this point a key question emerges: “To what extent can we expect EU to transform the conflicts within its periphery via the prospect of membership?” Indeed, within
this process, the reputation of the EU (and its (in)partiality as an actor) in the eyes of Turkish, Greek, Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot elites and public opinion is of utmost importance for the EU involvement to produce desired results. For example, it can be argued that the EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict has been one of a supporting partner to the United Nations, rather than that of a direct facilitator. Hence, when studying the EU involvement, especially on the Cyprus issue, it is misleading to analyse EU involvement as isolated from the historical processes underlying the conflict. In that sense, the EU cannot be deemed as an impartial actor in the eyes of Turks and Turkish-Cypriots.

Thus, the EU’s capacity to transform the conflicts in its periphery and how the states in the periphery perceive EU involvement, produce some limitations, such as the time lag between conditions (sanction/reward) and ultimate rewards and the lack of automatic entitlement to EU membership. This in turn, might produce a gap between the uncertainty of the negotiation process and the effectiveness of the EU impact, as can be witnessed in the Turkish case.

Some contributions to the literature often use the term “Europeanization of conflicts”, referring to EU’s successful settlement/resolution of conflicts. Before moving along, it will be critical to further explore the relationship between EU enlargement and Europeanization on the one hand and between Europeanization and conflict resolution on the other.
2. **Europeanization**

*Europeanization* is a controversial concept, which does not have a common definition agreed upon by the literature. Instead of theorizing on a monolithic definition of Europeanization, contributions to the literature often prefer selective definitions of Europeanization and then apply that definition to a concrete case-study.

Lawton (1999: 92), for example, suggests that Europeanization is the transfer of sovereignty to the EU, rather than sharing of power between national governments and the EU. Börzel (1999: 574) defines Europeanization as a "process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making".

Featherstone and Radaelli (2003: 12) on the other hand, define Europeanization as "adaptation to the Western European norms and practices". Furthermore, they argue that Europeanization goes beyond the scope of integration and is used as a description of EU’s own (re)constitutive processes. Featherstone and Kazimias (2001: 15-16) introduce six key dimensions for the analysis of Europeanization. First of these dimensions is the institutional adaptation to EU norms within the governmental level. Second dimension, is defined as the transformation in the structural power of domestic actors away from the central government towards non-governmental actors. Third is defined as adjustment of the domestic macroeconomic regime. Fourth dimension constitutes the transformation of the domestic
party system. Fifth dimension is defined as the pressure to re-define national identity and the final dimension is the re-definition of foreign policy interests.

The review of literature by Olsen (2002) has identified five different uses of the concept of Europeanization. First one, “Europeanization as changes in external territorial boundaries” (Olsen, 2002: 3), is defined as the ‘territorial reach of a particular system of governance’. The second dimension is defined as “Europeanization as the development of institutions of governance at the European level”, which means establishment of a governmental system with a ‘collective action capacity’ and ‘enforce binding decisions’. Third one is defined as “Europeanization as central penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance”, which means ‘division of responsibilities’ and ‘powers between different levels of governance’. Fourth dimension is “Europeanization as exporting forms of political organization and governance distinct to Europe”. This implies ‘relations with non-European actors and institutions’ and ‘how Europe finds a place in a larger world order’, signifying positive ‘export/import balance’. Fifth dimension is defined as “Europeanization as a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe”.

Other definitions of the term Europeanization include ‘the penetration of the European dimension into the national arena” (Gamble 2001: 1) or “Europeanization (a) as an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech 1994: 69).
Risse et al. (2001: 1) define Europeanization as “the emergence and development of distinct structures of governance at the European level”. Featherstone and Radaelli (2003: 30) define Europeanization as a process of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated into the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.

A relatively untouched part of the literature is the interaction between EU core/periphery, Europeanization and conflict resolution. A more relevant definition to the scope of this thesis, is the concept of “Europeanization of conflicts” as defined by Coppicus et al. (2005: 12) “[…] a process which is activated and encouraged by European institutions, primarily the European Union, by linking the final outcome of the conflict to a certain degree of integration of the parties involved in it into European structures”.

Such a definition of Europeanization is closely linked to the concept of conditionality. In Grabbe’s view (2003: 113) “Europeanization” of a certain policy area is linked to the EU conditionality and has been structured on payoff/cost calculations within which internal transformation becomes a reflex by the candidates to the economic and social

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11 Dealt in detail in page 22
payoffs offered by the EU, like financial and technical assistance, institutional ties, market access and starting accession negotiations.

Christou (2004: 28) argues that the political objectives of the EU are explicitly reflected through conditionality, as well as the economic, political and security benefits that the EU can offer through association and inclusion. Further, he argues that it is through conditionality that the process of enlargement can be related to foreign policy.

Although it is dealt with further in the chapter, it should also be noted, at this point, that the way EU facilitates ‘Europeanization’ in politics depends on its status of player or a ‘framework organization’. Both modes of involvement imply different types of effect on the conflicts, since how countries perceive EU differs according to how EU is involved in the conflict (i.e. as an impartial institution or representing its member(s)). Following this point, one should also keep in mind that such ‘Europeanization’ elicits different reactions from the recipient countries based on whether the EU is exercising a mechanism of direct conditionality and facilitating dialogue via ‘social learning’. Such social learning, as defined by Coppieters et. al. (2005. 13-14) is a long term process which affects the priorities of the players in parties to the conflict: “the constitutive norms of the EU – in terms of both its liberal market principles and its standards of democratic governance – play an important role by offering a point of reference to all external players who seek closer relations with it”. Adding to this, it is also argued that European institutions act as ‘platforms of socialization’
facilitating interaction between elites and ‘promoters of socialization’ by persuasion and argumentation.

3. **Conditionality**

Conditionality, in general can be defined as “linking by a state of perceived benefits such as aid, trade concessions, cooperation agreements, political contacts, or international organization membership to the fulfilment of conditions relating to certain principles” (Gwiazda, 2002: 12) and often considered as “a norm, a standard of behaviour” (Smith, 1998: 46). Positive conditionality is described as promising a reward or benefits for the attainment of certain conditions. Negative conditionality on the other hand, is defined as imposition of sanctions or reducing, suspending or withdrawal of benefits for the attainment of those particular conditions.

Traditional literature defines conditionality within the context of IMF involvement with regard to access to new loans, re-scheduling or debt reduction. (Killick, Gunatilaka and Mutt, 1998) Such measures have also been adopted by the World Bank in forcing national governments to compliance with certain norms and measures (Checkel, 2000; Bienen and Gersovitz, 1985).

EU’s enlargement towards the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) over the last decade, forced the EU to tailor its own conditionality policies in order to
transform the governance, economics and the state of democracy of the candidate countries
(Hughes, Gordon and Sasse, 2003: 15-18). However, the EU enlargement process has
caused an increase in the political usage of the term “conditionality”. The “EU
conditionality”, in general terms, occurs from pressure exerted by EU institutional organs
for the attainment of convergence of a particular government’s policies with the *acquis
communautaire* on a particular policy area (Spendzharova, 2003: 142-147).

The concept of “EU accession conditionality” on the other hand, refers to EU
accession process and technical pre-accession assistance of an applicant country, attempting
to achieve convergence with EU norms. Grabbe’s (1999: 1018) definition of EU accession
conditionality reads “[...] evolving set of conditions for membership. These conditions have
progressively been expanded to cover a wide range of policy outputs, and imply a role for
the EU in policy-making in CEE beyond its mandate in the existing member states”.

The EU requirements are described in the Copenhagen European Council
Conclusions (1993) and these requirements are translated into direct conditionality as rules,
incentives and sanctions. Rules, in broader terms, constitute the political, economic and
criteria laid down in the Copenhagen criteria. In Copenhagen European Council
conclusions, the political criteria is defined as the “stability of institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities”,
whereas the economic criteria are defined as “the existence of a functioning market
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within

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the Union". Finally the legal criteria are defined as "candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union". Incentives, on the other hand include aid, technical assistance such as PHARE, Twinning or SAPARD programmes which predate Copenhagen criteria, or membership to the European Union. Sanctions, finally, are Smith (1997: 6) argues that "international cooperation must focus especially on positive measures providing incentives; the use of sanctions should be considered only if all other means have failed". However as the thesis will argue later, such negative conditionality has been much willingly used against Turkey concerning its position vis-à-vis Greece and Cyprus.

Schmitter (1999) has argued that supranational institutions such as EU employ threats of coercion, rather than applying direct coercion. Elbasani (2001: 26) maintained that negative conditionality has more to do with persuading and tempting, instead of coercion. Schmitter, further argues that, contrary to the definitions of conditionality adopted by international financial institutions, the primary concern for EU-level conditionality is the democratization of a particular country. Peshkopia (2005: 46) calls Schmitter's definition as "neo-conditionality" and challenges the positions of Pridham (2000) and Elbasani (2004) arguing that such "neo-conditionality" is not as "soft" as it seems. Furthermore, Peshkopia (2005: 46) maintains "In the case of the EU’s policy of "sticks and carrots," the EU certainly uses more than persuasion and temptation; it aims to alter the political attitudes of other countries through the use of traditional forms of coercion and seduction."
Schmitter, further argued that the international organizations or supranational institutions are actors of "multi-lateral conditionality", involving actively and directly in the democratization of the countries in question. Fridham, (2002: 960) on the other hand argues that such institutions do not engage in active conditionality with the countries; rather, their involvement create spill-over of democratization from these international democratic institutions to democratizing countries, and it only happens because doing so reasserts the democratic identity of those international democratic institutions.

Fierro, (2003: 98-100) has identified two pairs of conditionality types. *Ex-post* conditionality refers to a situation where conditions appear once the parties have concluded a treaty, agreement of any other contractual relationship. Fierro exemplified ex-post conditionality with human rights clauses found in the body of EU/EC trade-cooperation agreements like Customs Union agreement. *Ex-ante* conditionality, on the other hand, represents conditions and criteria, found in documents which makes "soft law" and are meant to be fulfilled before an agreement is concluded; in turn, representing more of a political condition than legal. Copenhagen criteria for accession to the European Union are an example for this.

It is important to make a distinction between EU involvement in conflicts within its borders and conflicts in its periphery. Within EU institutional context, periphery refers to marginal states of lesser importance to the European core. Furthermore, it implies that the EU has the ability to transform these states into member states (grant EU membership).
Indeed such a definition implies inequality since core/periphery relations are deemed as asymmetrical; and hence it implies that 'Europeanization' mechanisms of conditionality and social learning are used in order to transform states on the basis of such inequality, exercising hegemony over the periphery.

For a positive conditionality to act as a credible lever, it must be perceived by the involved parties as a mutually beneficial arrangement, which means that the cost/payoff structure should serve both the conditionality actor (e.g. the European Union) and the conditionality recipient (e.g. Turkey). In most cases, the payoff for the recipient of conditionality must surpass the domestic political costs of compliance and convergence (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003). In the 'reinforcement by reward' approach, the conditionality actor withholds rewards if and when the government in question fails to comply with its conditions, but “does not intervene either coercively or supportively to change the cost-benefit assessment of the target government by inflicting extra costs (reinforcement by punishment) or offering unconditional assistance (reinforcement by support)” (Schimmelfennig et al., 2003: 502). Moreover, *ex-ante* conditionality is a political tool which relies on an asymmetrical relationship between the parties involved and as such, is prone to the suspicions of double standards and to arbitrary impositions. In another perspective, such conditionality, while exerting pressure on the recipient state to meet certain criteria, also creates pressure on the actor state to become an ‘anchor’ for reform and to maintain its commitment to grant clear incentives and to distribute benefits (or sanctions) on a proportional and impartial basis (Uğur, 2004: 78-80).
In the area of conflict transformation, EU’s direct involvement in neighbouring conflicts constitute the primary testing ground for the power of EU conditionality. Since EU has relative strength vis-à-vis the conflicting parties and also since (if) the EU is seen as a source of attraction by the conflicting sides, EU can either directly coerce sides into a solution or indirectly shift the internal balance of power (in conflicting sides) by giving political support to moderate groups and discouraging hard-liners (Braxis, 2005: 314-316).

In such scenarios, the main “carrot” the EU can bring forth to direct the conflicting parties towards a solution is the prospect of EU membership and the exercise of a policy of conditionality, acting as a player or step-by-step inclusion of the parties in question into EU common policies such as the single market or customs union, without institutional involvement with the EU’s structures, namely EU’s role as a framework organization. Yet, as the distance between the core of the EU and the conflict area increases, EU involvement comes under challenge by other external actors like the US or the UN.

According to Boerzel and Risse (2000: 16) domestic players in conflicting states abide by EU conditionality, because they are goal-oriented and engage in profit maximization. In their interactions with the EU, they operate on a cost/pay-off scheme, which later generates ‘simple learning’ that leads to re-calculation of domestic players’ actions when confronted by institutional constraints. However, according to Checkel (1999: 102-103), such ‘simple learning’ does not change these players’ identities and thus, such conditionality is difficult to sustain on the long run. Hence, while direct effect (by guiding
parties to a solution) of EU conditionality applies a ‘carrot/stick’ scheme, the indirect effect (altering the domestic political structure) of such conditionality affects domestic politics by offering resources and legitimizing certain domestic players (generally moderates), while preventing hard-liners to attain similar goals. However, as Cowles et. al. (2001: 16-20) argue, such implicit involvement in the domestic political structure of the conflicting parties depends largely on the value attached to the EU ‘carrots’ by the society and the determination of domestic players on the way to EU integration. Yet, while conditionality is a short term method of involvement, socialization and social learning is expected to affect domestic players’ identities and belief systems in the long-run. This argument is based on social constructivist theory, which maintains that through participation in common institutional structures, domestic actors can alter their identity and interests. Such methods of socialization are deemed to be crucial for the applicability of conditionality, since the recipient country is likely to regard conditionality more receptively if EU’s institutional norms are internalized and accepted.

Looking at the above definitions, one can argue that ‘Europeanization’ and adaptation to ‘European norms’ are somewhat convergent with the applicability of the policy conditionality. Indeed as Coppettiers et al. (2005: 15) suggest, “while in the initial phases of Europeanization a rational, institutional approach may better capture the mechanisms of change, over the longer term endogenous processes may become the main driving forces behind domestic transformation”. That is to say, by the successful
'Europeanization' of the domestic politics of a recipient country, the conditionality approach is expected to become more credible and yield better results.

As discussed, EU interacts with a conflict by the policy of conditionality, which is a short-term policy and by enabling social learning, which is a longer term effect. In this framework, EU acts both as an 'active player' and 'framework organization', offering rewards and threatening with sanctions in the short term and guiding towards a negotiated settlement through institutional involvement and multi-level governance. In some cases, these two effects can be interrelated; complementing each other. However, such a relation between EU's 'awareness' is deemed to be more successful in its immediate neighbourhood where countries are tied to EU institutions by an association agreement or accession partnership. In the periphery however, the interplay between EU's roles might yield limited results, since EU accession is generally not in the immediate agenda. Yet, the case of Turkey and Cyprus is an exception, since EU has fulfilled both roles; player and framework due to the accession process.

Where short term EU involvement (active player) is expected to affect the strategies of the parties to the conflict and guide them to a conflict settlement by the use of incentives and sanctions. The complementing involvement, 'EU as a framework organization' includes a set of new policy options such as serving as a point of reference with regard to governance practices and standards, indirectly influencing the conflict (Coppier et al., 2005: 8). Coppier et al. (2005: 4-5, 9-10) bring forward the role of the EU as a 'framework
organization’. According to them, EU as a framework organization, contribute to conflicts within several domains.

First, EU is deemed capable to transform conflicts by accepting the sides and separating them within the context of EU. The logic maintains that since the governance is shared within the EU and monolithic state sovereignty is more or less diluted, such a separation (or secession) could be achieved. Second, Coppettiers et al. argue that the EU framework increases the sub-state-level roles and provides greater opportunities for developing sub-state level of governance. Third, it is argued that the EU fosters multiple identities, since EU citizenship becomes an additional identification which can be shared with national identifications. Fourth, EU influence is expected to solve conflicts via liberalization of goods, services and capital, consequently re-drawing territorial borders. An example to the last type of influence can be the role of the EU as a framework organization in the case of Cyprus conflict.

Boerzel and Risse (2000) argued that conditionality and social learning can occur simultaneously, since they are deemed as complementary. However, mostly as experienced within Turkish context, application of conditionality can reduce the likelihood of socialization. As in Turkish-Greek relations or Cyprus case, if conditionality is perceived by domestic players as favouring one side of the conflict, the likelihood of a compromise solution and socialization diminishes. Likewise if the EU has limited institutional relationship with one or more of the conflicting parties, EU involvement may even yield
negative, conflict-escalating effects. As dealt further in the thesis, after Greece became an EU member in 1981, Greece actively sought to influence EU institutions to gain the upper hand in its dealings with Turkey. It numerous occasions Greece used European institutions as a platform through which it could internationalize its disputes with Turkey; often influencing European institutional and public opinion in order to gain strategic, political or economic concessions from Turkey. This on the other hand, has elicited a reaction in Turkey, viewing Europe as 'captured' by Greece. Hence, the EU has lost its credibility in the eyes of Turkish decision-makers and society over the issues relating to Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus conflict.

Coppetiers et al. (2005: 25) have devised three models of conditionality-socialization interaction based on the arguments above. In the first model EU seeks the application of strong conditionality and direct mediation and force both sides to agree on a solution in the short term. By conditionality and mediation, EU is expected to alter the strategic calculations of the sides of the conflict in the short term; later facilitate socialization between them. In this model framework and player identities of the EU are complementary.

In their second model Coppetiers et al. present a role, where the EU favours one side of the conflict explicitly depending on the democratic and reformist credentials of the regimes and 'reasonableness' of leadership. In this model, EU is expected to lend its full support to one of the sides which it perceives as closer to 'EU values' and capable

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12 Since the authors' work is primarily on EU impact on secessionist conflicts, the third model is not relevant to the thesis and is discarded from the chapter.
reforming structures. This model is also expected to isolate the regime with the perceived undemocratic and obstructionist attitude and apply economic and political sanctions.

Here, it will be worth to focus on the definitions on conflict management/resolution/transformation. The literature on EU involvement in conflicts, focuses mainly on three different types of conflict involvement; namely conflict resolution, conflict management and conflict transformation. Conflict resolution implies that conflict is bad; hence something that should be ended (Azar and Burton, 1986; Kriesberg, 1998; Burton and Frank, 1990). It also assumes that conflict is a short term phenomenon that can be "resolved" permanently through mediation or other intervention processes (Buch and Folger, 1994). Conflict management, on the other hand assumes that conflicts are long term processes that often cannot be quickly resolved, but the notion of "management" suggests that people can be directed or controlled as though they were physical objects (Garnham, 2000). In addition, the notion of management suggests that the goal is the reduction or control of physical violence more than dealing with the real source of the problem.

Conflict transformation, as described Lederach (1995: 8-9), does not suggest that we simply eliminate or control conflict, but rather recognize it and work with its "dialectic nature". By this, Lederach means that social conflict is naturally created by humans who are involved in relationships; however, later the nature of conflict changes the perceptions and behavioral codes of these humans. In this sense, conflict transformation is a term that describes a natural phenomenon. Conflicts change relationships and perceptions, changing
patterns of communications and patterns of social organization, changing/creating images of the self and or the other.

Conflict transformation is also a rule-building (prescriptive) concept. (Chupp, 1997: 6-11) It suggests that without any intervention, conflict can have destructive consequences through constant escalation. However, the consequences can be modified or transformed through intervention/involvement of a third party, so that self-images, relationships, and social structures can be saved away from the escalation of conflict communications. Chupp (1997: 6-11) further argues that this can be done by transforming perceptions of issues, actions, and other people or groups. Kreisberg (1993: 210-212) argues that since conflict usually transforms perceptions by exaggerating the differences between people and positions, effective conflict transformation can work to improve mutual understanding. According to this view, even though people’s interests, values, and needs are different, some progress can be made if each group gains a relatively accurate understanding of the other.

Following this reasoning, there is also a distinction between ‘conflict as the incompatibility (antagonism) of subject positions’ (identities/interests) and violent conflict as a particular form of dealing with such incompatibility (Dietz, 2003: 6-10). As analyzed in this thesis, in Turkey’s conflicts with Greece and Cyprus, discourses of identity are normally at the basis of the conflict (Notter, 1994: 6-7). These discourses of identity construct a particular understanding of who a particular group of people is and what its
characteristics are. They operate on the basis of a self/other dichotomy, where the other is the opposite conflict party, which is portrayed as an existential threat to the ‘self’.

Following these theoretical concepts one can argue that two different types of conditionality policies were at work in the Cyprus conflict, within the 1993-99 period and in the post-1999 period. The former type represents more of a ‘player’ role by the EU, where EU directly mediates between sides. Since the Greek-Cypriot government was not given a membership perspective, EU was more or less a player, though more of a passive player. In fact, although the fact that Greece is already an EU member leads to a questioning of such a position. However after 1999, one can see a clearer inequality between Turkey – Turkish/Cypriots and Greece and Greek/Cypriots in the sense that Cyprus’ membership was ascertained in the Helsinki Summit. Thereafter, the EU has been a ‘framework’ in the conflict, representing one member state and two prospective members. The candidacy of Turkey in the same summit, coupled with the ‘common state solution’ prescribed by the Annan Plan has increased the credibility of EU conditionality, emphasizing the ‘framework aspect’ of it.
CHAPTER 3

DEFINING THE TURCO-HELLENIC CONFLICT

The literature on Turkish-Greek relations approaches the conflict from various levels of analysis. The conflict can be regarded as one of an identity conflict (Stavrinides, 1976; Joseph, 1997), one of a security-oriented conflict (Athanassapoutou, 1994; Cofoudakis, 1983), one of a regional conflict (Bahceli, 1980; Isiksal, 2002; Siegl, 2002), or one of a conflict that is largely affected by systemic/structural influences (Tayfur, 2002; Keridis, 1999; Krebs 1999).

1. Issues in Turkish-Hellenic conflict

Scholars of Greek-Turkish relations, which emphasize the identity factor as an important foundation of the Turkish-Greek conflict which fuels other economic, security, etc.) aspects of the dispute, trace the origins of the conflict back to the disintegration period of the Ottoman Empire (Fisher, 2001; Gumdogan, 2001). Bi-lateral relations have never been subject to long term co-operation after both nations declared their independences. As Clogg (1992: 47) argues the Turkish-Greek conflict is a “continuous feud between historic rivals, one that is managed but cannot be transformed.”
In fact, despite the fact that both nations have gained their independence by fighting each other, after Turkish War of Independence, presidents Venizelos and Atatürk negotiated a wide variety of issues ranging from borders to population exchange, which was solidified by the Treaty of Friendship of 1930. This brief period of amelioration of relations went on from the end of World War I to the mid-World War II. During this period, it was even possible for the leaders of both sides to speak of a shared Byzantine-Ottoman identity and bring about ideas of a Greek-Turkish Union (Clogg, 1992: 13). However, a long pattern of deteriorating relations started roughly after the World War II on a number of issues. According to Tayfur (2002: 28), the main reason for this deterioration is the rivalry between two nations in pursuit of the control of the resources and territory in the Eastern Mediterranean and in turn, asserts their importance to the main powers of the world system.

1.1 The conflict over the Aegean:

According to the Turkish position, the principal source of Greek-Turkish disputes over the Aegean sea is that Greece, contrary to the agreement reached in the Lausanne Treaty, claims the Aegean as a “Greek sea”, instead of a common sea between Turkey and Greece. In that regard, as declared in the website of the Turkish Embassy at Washington D.C.: "The fundamental source of tension between Turkey and Greece is the Greek perception to regard the entire Aegean as a Greek sea in total disregard of Turkey's..."
rights and interests as one of the coastal states. Turkish policy is based on respect for
the status quo, whereas Greece appears determined to alter it in its favour. 13

The official Turkish position defines the Aegean dispute as the foundation of the
Turkish-Greek conflict. This position further maintains that:

"The threat of extending Greek territorial waters beyond their present width of 6 miles
(Greece extended by territorial waters from 3 miles to 6 miles in 1936, Turkey
followed suit in 1964), the militarization of the Eastern Aegean Islands placed under
demilitarized status by virtue of the 1974 agreements, ceding them to Greece a 10 mile
"national air space" over territorial waters of 6, allow of the FIR responsibility as if it
covers sovereignty (request of flight plans from state aircraft and allegations of
"violations of" Athens FIR) can be counted among those efforts which are the real
underlying cause of the Turkish-Greek conflict." 14

On the other hand, the Greek argument maintains:

"Based firmly on both conventional and customary international law, Greece insists that the
islands do have a continental shelf and that the delimitation of the continental shelf in the
Aegean Sea cannot but be a boundary line, which should be drawn between the Greek
islands of the eastern Aegean and the Turkish coast. The median line delimitation, every
point of which is equidistant from the coast (or the baselines) of each country, as foreseen
in article 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention, is the best means of achieving an equitable
continental shelf division between Greece and Turkey (the delimitation of the continental
shelf between Greece and Turkey in Thrace - through the extension of the territorial
boundary line - should also be dealt with)." 15

In general terms, Turkey and Greece share the same continental shelf (Krebs, 1999:
375-377), where Greece maintains that the islands on the Aegean have their own shelf,
whereas Turkish position argues that, since a shelf is shared with its mainland, the Aegean
islands should have their own special characteristics. This territorial dispute took the form

13 http://www.turkishembassy.org/governmentpolitics/issues/aegean.htm
14 Ibid.
15 Quoted from the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs website,

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of an economic/military dispute, when oil was discovered in the Aegean in 1973, and coupled with the escalation of the tension in the Cyprus; it took on a form of critical security issue.

From a Turkish point of view, Greece is disregarding Turkey’s interests and rights as one of the coastal states to the Aegean. As Bahçeli, Coulomnbs and Curley (1997: 18-23) discuss, the 6-mile limit of Greek territorial waters, (extended from 3-miles in 1936) when extended further to 12-miles, the international waters would diminish roughly to 20%, which Turkey does not accept. Following this line of thought, based on the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the solution, as Ankara maintains, lies in the realisation of the fact that Aegean is a common sea shared by Turkey and Greece. Furthermore, Turkish position maintains that the high seas and the airspace above should be available to the use of Greece, Turkey and other third parties.

In terms of the FIR (Flight information Region) disputes, Turkish position maintains that Greece’s limitation of Turkish flights within the international space over the Aegean, contravenes the 1944 Chicago Convention (Aygün and Itantsis, 2000: 35), which states that official state aircrafts do not have to submit the flight plans over the international airspace.

From a Greek point of view, Turkey has violated the status quo in the Aegean Sea by claiming the eastern half of the Aegean airspace and seabed in 1973-75. According to this position, Turkey claims that the border between Greece and Turkey lies between the two
mainland coasts. In this regard, the Greek position makes reference to the 1958 UN Convention on the Law of Sea and the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaties, arguing that these international conventions lay down islands’ rights to a continental shelf and give coastal states the right to extend their territorial waters to 12-miles. However, since Greece points to the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of Sea, Turkey did not sign the treaty and hence is not legally bound by the terms of the 1982 convention. Turkey has also declared that unilateral declaration of the 12-mile extension of Greek territorial waters would be *casus belli*. The Kardak dispute, which emerged in 1996 has been a clear illustration regarding the emphasis both countries give to the larger Aegean conflict, which also comprises disputes over the continental shelf, the territorial waters, the air space, the Flight Information Regions (FIR) and the demilitarization of the Aegean islands, all of which help shape the main conflict between Turkey and Greece. In the aftermath of the Kardak crisis, the dispute was also widened to include a larger number of other islets in several parts of the Aegean. Some of them inhabited, which are regarded as indisputably Greek by Greece but as “grey zones” of undetermined sovereignty by Turkey.

Traditional approaches towards the settlement of the Aegean dispute have been one of a battle between existing legal documents. The Helsinki Summit can be regarded as an interruption of this mainstream approach. After noting that “the candidate States are participating in the accession process on an equal footing,” the EU Council declared that:

“They must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties. In this respect the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges
candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the disputes to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004".10

Acer (2005) maintains that the Council has made a particular emphasis on ‘outstanding border and related issues’ as a clear bearing on the Aegean dispute since Greek intention to extent its territorial sea should be considered as a boundary matter. The provision also sets 2004 as the date until which such disputes should be solved. This in turn has reflected on Turkish National Program as the introduction “Turkey will continue to undertake initiatives and efforts towards the settlement of bilateral problems with Greece through dialogue”.11 On 12 April 2005 Greece and Turkey have agreed to establish direct communications between two air bases in an effort to defuse tension over mutual allegations of air space violations over the Aegean Sea, however so far this move did not prove very useful in alleviating the tensions over the airspace.

1.2 The Conflict over Cyprus

The conflict of Cyprus is probably the most critical issue in Turkish-Greek relations. It is because of this importance, most scholars choose to analyze the Cyprus issue relatively independent of the Turkish-Greek conflict, as a system of its own. Cyprus conflict is in a way an extension of the conflict between Turkey and Greece with much more emphasis of

10 Helsinki Summit conclusions can be reached at: www.vm.coe.es/euroseker_prints/2659.htm
11 National Program can be reached at: europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/mp44_full.pdf
identity factor rather than economic or legal perspective. The events starting with the end of British colonial rule in the island (1960), which lead to the Turkish intervention of 1974, underline the difference between how each side defines/identifies itself; therefore it is worth presenting a brief historical survey concerning the developments leading to the partition of the island and the emergence of the Cyprus conflict.

2. The Historical Roots and Evolution of the Conflict

In January 1955, a Cypriot, Colonel George Grivas, founded the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kypros Agonistoi – EOKA) against fighting the British forces in the island and On April 1, 1955, EOKA opened a campaign against British rule in a well-coordinated series of attacks on police, military, and other government installations in Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca, and Limassol. This resulted in the deaths of over 100 British servicemen and personnel, after which Greek Cypriots that were suspected of collaboration has been arrested. As a result of wide range of arrests by the British, many Greek Cypriots began to leave the police forces and were replaced by Turkish Cypriots instead. This served to reinforce the impression that Britain was engaging in a divide-and-rule policy by using Turkish-Cypriots against Greek-Cypriots (Dodd, 1999: 5). Such a replacement led to tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. In 1957, with British support, the Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teskilati – TMT), was formed to fight EOKA.
Disillusioned and frustrated by the wide range arrests, the Greek-Cypriots started to voice over demands of unifying Cyprus with Greece (which is popularly know as ‘enosis’). In response to the growing demand for enosis, a number of Turkish Cypriots became convinced that the only way to protect the interests and identity of the Turkish Cypriot population in the event of enosis would be to divide the island - a policy known as taksim (“partition” in Turkish) - into a Greek sector and a Turkish sector (Markides, 1977: 69-72).

The events dragged the island towards the verge of civil war. Several attempts to present a compromise settlement had failed. Beginning in December 1958, the representatives of Greece and Turkey opened discussions of the Cyprus issue, where participants, for the first time discussed the concept of an independent Cyprus (i.e., neither enosis nor taksim). Subsequent talks yielded a compromise agreement supporting independence, laying the foundations of the Republic of Cyprus. Talks continued in London, where the Greek and Turkish representatives were joined by representatives of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots (represented by Dr. Fazıl Küçük), and the British. The Zurich-London agreements that became the basis for the Cyprus constitution of 1960 were supplemented with three treaties - the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance.¹⁸

¹⁸ 1960 Cyprus Constitution can be reached at http://www.eure.uchicago.edu/law/cy/cychron.html

Treaty of Establishment can be accessed from http://www.cyprusnet.co.uk/cyprus/history/rev-establishment.html

Treaty of Guarantee can be accessed from http://www.cyprusnet.co.uk/cyprus/history/rev-guarantee.html
Greek Cypriots, especially members of organizations such as EOKA, expressed
disappointment because enosis had not been attained. Turkish Cypriots, however, welcomed
the agreements and set aside their demand for taksim. According to the Treaty of
Establishment, Britain retained sovereignty over 256 square kilometres, which became the
Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, to the northwest of Larnaca, and the Akrotiri Sovereign
Base Area to the southwest of Limassol.

According to constitutional arrangements, Cyprus was to become an independent,
non-aligned republic with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president.
General executive authority was vested in a council of ministers with a ratio of seven
Greeks to three Turks. (The Greek Cypriots represented 78% of the population and the
Turkish Cypriots 18%. The remaining 4% was made up by the three minority communities:
the Latins, Maronites and Armenians.) A House of Representatives of fifty members, also
with a seven-to-three ratio, were to be separately elected by communal balloting on a
universal suffrage basis. In addition, separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
Communal Chambers were provided to exercise control in matters of religion, culture, and
education. Legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the
President and the Vice-President had the same right of veto - absolute on foreign affairs,
defence and internal security, delaying on other matters - as in the Council of Ministers. The
judicial system would be headed by a Supreme Constitutional Court, composed of one

Treaty of Alliance can be accessed from
http://www.cypnet.co.uk/cyprus/history/republi/treaty.alliance.html

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Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot and presided over by a contracted judge from a neutral country.

Within a short period of time the first disputes started to arise between the two communities. These disputes included taxation and the creation of separate municipalities. Because of the legislative veto system, this resulted in a lockdown in communal and state politics in many cases (Kakoulli, 1990: 41-46). On the part of Turkish-Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios was the main reason behind the discontent. In fact, fuelling this belief, the Greek-Cypriot side unilaterally amended the 1960 constitution in the resolution 186 of the UN Security Council of 1964. The resolution, contrary to the 1960 Agreement referred to the Government of Cyprus in a way which clearly implied that the government manned only now by the Greek Cypriots was the legitimate government of Cyprus. It was important of course, a step bringing inequality in the island and alienated Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.

Repeated attempts to solve the disputes failed. Eventually, on November 30, 1963, Archbishop Makarios submitted a thirteen-point proposal to the guarantors, designed - in his view - to eliminate impediments to the functioning of the government. The thirteen points involved constitutional revisions, including the abandonment of the veto power by both the president and the vice president. A few days later, on December 21, 1963 fighting erupted between the communities in Nicosia. In the days that followed, it spread across the rest of the island. At the same time, the power-sharing government collapsed.
The Greek Cypriots argue that the Turkish Cypriots withdrew in order to form their own administration (Foot, 1964; Kyriakides, 1968: 158-159). The Turkish Cypriots argue that they were forced out (Denktas, 1982; Bahceci, 1990). As a balancing argument, some scholars argue that many Turkish Cypriots chose to withdraw from the government. However, in many cases those who wished to stay in their jobs were prevented from doing so by the Greek Cypriots (Oberling, 1982; Serm, 1977). In any event, in the days that followed the fighting, some effort was made to calm tensions. In the end, on December 27, 1963, an interim peacekeeping force, the Joint Truce Force, was put together by Britain, Greece and Turkey. This force was deployed until a United Nations peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, was formed following UN Security Council Resolution 186, passed on March 4, 1964.19

At the same time, the Security Council also recommended that the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties and the Guarantor Powers, designate a mediator to take charge of formal peacemaking efforts. In the turn of events, the then UN Secretary-General, appointed Sakari Tuomioja, a Finnish diplomat. While Tuomioja viewed the problem as essentially international in nature and saw enosis as the most logical course for a settlement, he rejected union on the grounds that it would be inappropriate for a UN official to propose a solution that would lead to the dissolution of a UN member state (Richmond, 1998: 109).

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In early June, following another Turkish warning of intervention, Washington launched an independent initiative under Dean Acheson, a former Secretary of State. In July he presented a plan to unite Cyprus with Greece. In return for accepting this, Turkey would receive a sovereign military base on the island. The Turkish Cypriots would also be given minority rights, which would be overseen by a resident international commissioner (Sözen, 2004: 7). Makarios rejected the proposal, arguing that giving Turkey territory would be a limitation on enosis and would give Ankara too strong a say in the island’s affairs. A second version of the plan was presented that offered Turkey a 50-year lease on a base. This offer was rejected by the Greek Cypriots and by Turkey. After several further attempts to reach an agreement, the United States eventually gave up its effort.

Following the sudden death of Ambassador Tuomioja in August, Galo Plaza was appointed mediator. He viewed the problem in communal terms. In March 1965 he presented a report criticising both sides for their lack of commitment to reaching a settlement.\(^2\) While it is argued that he understood the Greek Cypriot aspiration of enosis, he believed that any attempt at union should be held on voluntary basis (Sözen, 2004: 10-11). Similarly, Turkish Cypriots would refrain from demanding a federal solution to the problem. Although the Greek Cypriots eventually accepted the report, despite its opposition to immediate enosis, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots rejected the plan, calling on Plaza to resign on the grounds that he had exceeded his mandate by advancing specific proposals (Coufloudakis, 1976: 27-49). The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, argued that if Galo

Plaza resigned they would refuse to accept a replacement. Faced with resistance, Plaza was left with no choice but to abandon the mediation effort. Instead he decided to make his Good Offices available to the two sides. The end of mediation effort was effectively confirmed when, at the end of the year, Plaza resigned and was not replaced.

In March 1966, a more modest attempt at peacemaking was initiated under the auspices of Carlos Bernades, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Cyprus. Instead of trying to develop formal proposals for the parties to bargain over, he aimed to encourage the two sides agree to settlement through direct dialogue (Sözen, 2004: 10-11). However, ongoing political chaos in Greece prevented any substantive discussions from developing. On 21 April 1967, a coup d’etat in Greece had brought a military administration to power. In November 1967, a severe inter-communal fighting began. Responding to a major attack on Turkish Cypriot villages in the south of the island, which left 27 dead, Turkey bombed Greek Cypriot forces (Kor-Lindsay, 2005: 7-8). Greece was forced to capitulate. Following international intervention, Greece agreed to recall General George Grivas, the Commander of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and former EOKA leader, and reduce its forces on the island. Capitalising on the weakness of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed their own provisional administration. Makarios immediately declared the new administration illegal. However, the Archbishop, along with most other Greek Cypriots, was beginning to realize that the Turkish Cypriots would have to have some degree of political autonomy. It was also realised that unification of Greece and Cyprus was unachievable under the prevailing circumstances (Mayes, 1981: 90).
In May 1968, inter-communal talks began between the two sides under the auspices of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General. The talks however, were not held between President Makarios and Vice-President Küçük as it had previously been. Instead they were conducted by the presidents of the communal chambers, Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash. During the first round of talks, which lasted until August 1967, the Turkish Cypriots were prepared to make several concessions regarding constitutional matters, but Makarios refused to grant them greater autonomy in return. The second round of talks, which focused on local government, was equally unsuccessful. In December 1969 a third round of discussion started. This time they focused on constitutional issues. Yet again there was little progress and when they ended in September 1970 the Secretary-General blamed both sides for the lack of movement. A fourth and final round of inter-communal talks also focused on constitutional issues, but again failed to make much headway before they were forced to a halt in 1974 (Coufoudakis, 1976: 38-42).

After the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriot representatives from the parliament and other state institutions, the Republic of Cyprus continued to function as a legal entity much like it did before, but the administration of Turkish-Cypriot affairs was now conducted by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in the enclaves. In 1974, following a nationalist coup instigated by the junta regime in Greece at the time, which called for unification of the island with Greece and a change of the Greek-Cypriot leadership, the Turkish military intervened and took control of the northern part of the island.
Following successive failures to reach a commonly agreed solution to the problem (high-level agreements having been signed in 1977 and 1979), the Turkish-Cypriot authorities in northern Cyprus declared the region as the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (TRNC) in 1983. This declaration of independence did not achieve widespread international recognition and as a result the TRNC has become economically dependent on Turkey. The Greek-Cypriot authorities of southern Cyprus have refused to recognise this as a state and have been referring to it as the part of Cyprus 'occupied by the Turkish military', claiming that the southern Cypriot government (since 1974 staffed almost exclusively by Greek-Cypriots) legally represents the whole of the island.

The Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships have subsequently engaged in bi-communal negotiations aiming to break the deadlock since the 1960s, primarily under the auspices of the United Nations, but have failed to reach a comprehensive agreement thus far. In recent years, two comprehensive plans for solution to the problem have been proposed by the UN, one in 1992, which was termed the 'Gali set of Ideas' after the then Secretary General Boutros Boutros Gali, and one in 2002, which has come to be known as 'the Annan Plan' after the current Secretary General Kofi Annan. At the time of writing of this thesis, the latter is still the main reference document used in the negotiations.
The Annan Plan\textsuperscript{21}, in fact, proposed the creation of the United Cyprus Republic, covering the island of Cyprus in its entirety (except for the British Sovereign Base Areas). This new country was to be a loose confederation of two constituent states – the Greek Cypriot State and the Turkish Cypriot State – joined together by a minimal federal government apparatus. This federal level, loosely based on the Swiss confederal model, would have incorporated the following elements:

- A collective Presidential Council, made up of six voting members, allocated according to population (per present levels, four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots), and selected and voted in by parliament. An additional three non-voting members would be assigned 2:1.

- A President and Vice President, chosen by the Presidential Council from among its members, one from each community, to alternate in their functions every 20 months during the council’s five-year term of office.

- A bicameral legislature:

  - A Senate (upper house), with 48 members, divided 24:24 between the two communities.

  - A Chamber of Deputies (lower house), with 48 members, divided in proportion to the two communities’ populations (with no fewer than 12 for the smaller community).

- A Supreme Court composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot judges, plus three foreign judges, to be appointed by the Presidential Council.

\textsuperscript{21} The full text of the plan can be reached at www.annanplan.org
The plan included a federal constitution, constitutions for each constituent state, a string of constitutional and federal laws, and a proposal for a United Cyprus Republic flag and national anthem. It also provided for a Reconciliation Commission to bring the two communities closer together and resolve outstanding disputes from the past.

It would also have established a limited right to return between the territories of the two communities, and it would have allowed both Greece and Turkey to maintain a permanent military presence on the island, albeit with large, phased reductions in troop numbers.

It should be stressed here, that Annan Plan and EU involvement have been mutually reinforcing paradigms in the Cyprus issue. Annan Plan has actually been a constitutional design and a framework over which the EU could directly involve in the Cyprus dispute and better utilize its conditionality policies. In other words, on the one hand, Annan Plan foreboded a settlement within the EU (and hence increased the desirability of the implementation of the plan) and the EU has been able to use a ready framework as a basis for exercising its policies of conditionality on both sides. Hence, the EU became both a player and a framework organization in the Cyprus conflict, by the co-existence of the Annan Plan and Turkey’s EU accession process.

It would be sound to search for the origins of the EU involvement in the Turco-Hellenic conflict starting from the 1960s, since the first Turkish approaches to the then EEC have been very much influenced with Turkey’s rivalry with Greece. The Greek application for associate membership to the EEC is 1959 threatened to isolate Turkey politically and prompted the Turkish government to follow suit less than a month later. It is important to reflect, from the present-day perspective, that partly because of its larger market and cheap labour reserves, Turkey offered a more attractive prospect than did Greece. However from the beginning, the EEC adopted an ambivalent stance towards the membership applications of both rivals.

First, the membership of one of the two rivals would possibly contribute to destabilizing the precarious equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean, and with it, the relations within the NATO alliance (Tsoukalas, 1981: 145). Secondly, both countries had weak and underdeveloped political and economic systems. Politically they were characterized by seriously polarized domestic political and periodic military interventions. Economically, they employed dirigist economic policies and were subject to repeated economic crises (Harrison, 1996). The internal political problems especially undermined economic relations with the EEC that depended upon a stable commercial environment and an ability to fulfil mutual (liberalisation) obligations. In addition, especially in the longer term, the mutual antagonism between Greece and Turkey would itself aggravate the inherent tensions in the EEC’s political attitudes towards them. While the members of the EEC and
the Council of Europe have been regularly criticizing Greece and Turkey for poor functioning of democracy and of the rule of law, they were forced to work closely with their military apparatus under the NATO (Tsoukalis, 1981: 145-147).

The developments in the relationship of both Greece and Turkey with the EEC ran almost in parallel until the beginning of the 1970s. An association agreement with Greece came into force in 1962. The negotiations on the incorporation of the Community's common agricultural policy, however, were unilaterally suspended by the European Community after the Greek military coup of April 1967. One year after the fall of the colonel’s regime in 1974, the Greek government submitted a new application for membership. In Turkey, there was a military seizure of power in 1960, in course of which the premier Adnan Menderes and his minister of foreign affairs and finance were both executed. However, a new civilian government under İnönü, managed to restart the association negotiations and in September 1963 the Treaty of Ankara was signed. Article 28 of the Treaty stipulated that "As soon as the operation of this Agreement has advanced far enough to justify envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out of the Treaty establishing the Community, the Contracting Parties shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the Community."22 The Treaty therefore, quite ambiguously served as an incentive to prepare Turkey for membership at a later date (Brewin, 2000: 113).

22 Full text of the Ankara Agreement, 1963, can be found at: www.dolmar.ecc.eu.int/kitap/e-ankara.rdf
The Treaty anticipated a five-year preparatory phase, (1964-1969) followed immediately by a twelve year transition period during which the customs union would come about and Turkish economic policy would converge towards that of the EEC. During the third phase, further coordination would take place in the economic, fiscal and competition policy. The Treaty also incorporated temporary measures such as the maintenance of import quotas by the EEC on important Turkish export articles as tobacco, raisin, nuts and dried figs. The preparatory phase got off as Turkey benefited of rapidly expanding export opportunities, loans from the European Investment Bank and large foreign exchange earnings from emigrants’ funds following the increase in demand of guest-workers in specifically Germany and the Netherlands (Harrison, 1996).

However, bi-lateral relations cooled down rapidly. This was partly because the Turkish authorities postponed the planned reductions in import tariffs, because of a sharply deteriorating balance of payments and also because of the political pressure exerted by Turkish domestic producers (Harrison, 1996). The deterioration in the internal political climate in Turkey also contributed to the more distant attitude of EEC leaders. Following violent clashes between right and left the Demirel government resigned, after heavy pressure from the military. The appointment of a new civilian government, however, allowed talks on the implementation of tariff reductions for the transition to the customs union quickly to be resumed.
While the EEC had a somewhat negative impact on Turkish economy, the EEC started to emerge as an important actor in Greek economy. Previously, under the Marshall Aid, American entrepreneurs had secured lucrative contracts within Greece and since then US capital was the main driving engine of the Greek economy. Since it was American capital that was shaping Greek economics, the US was also the primary influence in Greek domestic and international politics. However towards 1970s, European capital had started to penetrate Greek economy. As Tayfur (2003: 67) has argued, Switzerland and France was emerging as large investors in Greece, providing an alternative to (if not confronting) US capital. The European capital also started to change the status quo in Greek politics. Since the US capital was complemented by European capital, Greek decision-makers had less reason to stick with the dominant American influence and started to tailor their own independent foreign policies. Such a process, in the long run, would translate into anti-Americanism (Tayfur, 2003: 67).

4. Turkey's conflictual relations with Europe: Emergence of the Cyprus issue as a parameter in Turkey-Greece-EC relations 1974-1981

After the entry of the Supplementary Protocol into force in 1972, mutual relations between the EC and Turkey stagnated throughout the 1970s and 80s. Both internal domestic and external reasons explain the state of affairs. First the Cyprus question now emerged as a serious obstacle to relations with the EC, and one which has persisted right to the present-day. When the Greek Junta declared the whole island and Greek-Cypriots began assaults
and harassments against Turkish-Cypriots, it directly provoked a Turkish military intervention, to protect the Turkish-Cypriot minority on the island (Bahçeli, 1985: 111). Ironically, the Turkish intervention helped reveal the bankruptcy of the colonels’ regime in Greece and thus start the democratisation process that would eventually lead to Greece’s EC membership in 1981 (Woodhouse, 1991: 293). For Turkey, by contrast, the intervention would serve for years to push the country further from membership, partly because of successive Greek vetoes and partly through the reluctance of successive Turkish governments to accept international arbitration aimed at finding a settlement agreeable to all parties.

Second, both Turkey and the EC had to deal with the negative consequences of the two successive oil crises (1973 and 1979) and the world-wide economic recession. The unfavourable general economic climate and the return of international protectionism exposed many weaknesses of the dual nature Turkish economy and the dirigist economic policies pursued (Harrison, 1996). In 1980, a group of large, less profitable and primarily domestically oriented government enterprises accounted for nearly 40% of Turkish industrial production. These had only survived because of state protection, import substitution loans and subsidies. These enterprises operated alongside a sector of small-scale family firms whose development prospects were severely limited by shortage of capital and restricted access to credit. The agricultural sector was similarly characterised by a dual system of, on the one hand, large, mechanised and capital intensive businesses and, on the

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other, millions of almost self-sufficient small holdings (Lewis, 2001: 63). Third, the EEC itself became much more protectionist in the 1970s and 80s, especially in the sectors of textiles and agriculture; two important Turkish export sectors.

Moreover, because of rising unemployment, member states became far more restrictive in opening their labour markets for foreign workers, especially those from outside the Community. In addition, the Community intensified its trade relationship with its Mediterranean trading partners, Greece, Spain and Portugal, which by the mid 1970s, had all applied for full membership (Harrison, 1996). Turkey became increasingly frustrated at what it saw as clear evidence of unfair preferential treatment. It responded by reconsidering its trade liberalisation commitments and demanding from the EC new concessions on the admission of Turkish migrants, more financial support and new arrangements for the free movement of labour (Öniş, 2000: 23-25).

Despite all the public statements to the contrary, the association agreement seemed very difficult to sustain. This held even truer for the fast disappearing perspectives of future full membership.

In Greece, on the other hand, the penetration of European capital enabled Colonels to deviate from American policies. In 1970, Greece signed bilateral trade agreements with the USSR, East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, pushing the involvement with communist states to its zenith. As Tayfur (2003: 63-72) argues, the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system, the struggle in Vietnam and skyrocketing oil prices lead to a gradual deterioration in the prestige of the US, which also had implications in Greece. Tayfur (2003: 63-72) further argues that the Colonels in Greece saw the demise of American control as an opportunity to realize Enosis with Cyprus, so that Greece could gain a strategic advantage vis-à-vis Turkey.

In the 1980s, the EC focused all its attention and energies on bringing its Southern expansion to a successful conclusion, to completing the internal market and to broadening and deepening European cooperation in existing and in new policy areas (Tsoukalas, 1981: 145). Briefly, in 1980 with Turkey, there were negotiations over a possible revision of the Ankara Treaty, but these proved to be fruitless. However the nine EC member-states together decided that Turkey would have the right to apply for membership (Birand, 2004: 279): It must be apparent then, that they all knew that there was no possibility that Turkey could fulfil all the obligations associated with the EC membership (adopting the acquis communautaire) at any time in the near future and the decision to admit Greece as a member appears to have guaranteed a veto against Turkish membership.

In the event, these new promises were never put to test. In September 1980 General Evren led a new military coup against civilian rule and the relations between EC and Turkey, once again, deteriorated. The last years of civilian rule had been marked by an increasing political polarisation in Turkey, with bitter armed struggle going on between right- and left-wing groups that had resulted in serious loss of lives. The re-establishment of
order by the army under Eren’s leadership was accompanied by the dissolution of political parties and trade unions and the arrest of thousands of civilians (Robins, 2003: 84).

In 1983, under the dominance of the military rule, Turkey adopted a new constitution that formally prepared the way for the restoration of democracy but that placed serious restrictions on the political and civil rights. Moreover the new regime introduced a sort of state-Islam (Turkish-Islam synthesis) as an ideological counterweight to radical-left and more radical religious Islamic ideologies (Zürcher, 1993: 72). Meanwhile, the EC and especially the European Parliament, was becoming increasingly active and alert over questions of democracy and human rights partly because of the democratic transitions that had occurred in all three of the new Southern members and because of the influence of the Helsinki Process within the context of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The developments in Turkey therefore, immediately provoked the suspension of financial aid the indefinite postponement of all further talks with Turkey within the parliamentary EC-Turkey Association Council, that was, in the event, to last until 1996 (Birand, 2004: 283-284).

Uğur (2000: 101) stresses the fact that the formal link between Turkey and EU has been structured on the calculations of reducing the probability of Turkey’s deviations from its declared European orientation and make its ‘Europeanization’ less costly. He further maintains that both EU and Turkish policy-makers have continuously ignored the ‘control-reliance’ and ‘muddling-through’ aspects of the Turkish policy-making process, and the haft
in Turkey’s democratization through 1980s, while 3 Mediterranean countries were undergoing rigorous democratization, locked Turkey’s European orientation. Consequently, he argues Turkey’s European orientation lacked credibility, its convergence towards EU standards remained stagnant and Turkey became economically-integrated with but politically from the EU.

Indeed, throughout the 1980s, Turkey had considerable difficulties with its democracy. The military coup in 1980 and the reluctance to transfer sovereignty to civilians have elicited criticism from the EU. Moreover the human rights violations that followed, diminished Turkey’s standing in the eyes of European elites and citizens. On the other hand, towards the collapse of the Soviet Union, and following 1990s the ‘Western values’ such as democracy, human rights and civil society gained an increased importance. However Turkey seemed not quite fitting to this picture. The fight against the PKK and military’s strict handling of the issue has pulled Turkey further away from reaching the level of democratization experienced in Spain, Portugal and Greece.

However, developments of a competitive and export-oriented economy in Turkey during the 1980s has added to the traditional dimension of European orientation of Turkey, which was established by the Kemalist ideology. Robins (2903: 212-213) has argued that by the ever-present threat from the USSR and the Kemalist tradition coming under increasing challenge from a religious counter-elite, there emerged necessity to carry Turkey’s relations with the EU on a more tangible platform of material nature of economic interests. Turkey’s
pursuit of new markets in the 1980s directed Turkish manufacturers to Europe, since European market was quite large and offered complementary opportunities for Turkey. Moreover Turgut Özal, trying to push Turkey closer to the emerging single European market, has applied for EC membership in 1987, solidifying the ambitions of the business elite on a political infrastructure (Ilkin, 1993: 185).

The main form of interaction between Turkey and the New Europe in the 1990s involved the signing of the Customs Union Decision. In 1993 it was already possible to describe Europe as having emerged as a center of economic gravity for Turkey. The Customs Union in the absence of firm prospects for full-membership, however, provided few incentives for the Turkish political elites to undertake reforms designed to satisfy the EU's Copenhagen criteria. Following the Helsinki Decision however, Turkey was confronted with a more carefully designed set of conditions and incentives than the Luxembourg Decision to undertake the kind of reforms demanded by the EU for full-membership. The mix of conditions and incentives provided by the EU continued to be less favorable judged by the standards of Eastern European candidate countries. Financial assistance by the EU for example, was extremely limited.

On the Greek side, the period between the Cyprus intervention of 1974 and Greek membership has been marked by important changes in Greek foreign policy. First of these changes, as discussed earlier was the emerging differences between Europe and the US, after the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system and the oil shocks. The ease of American
control on Greek domestic politics has enabled Greece to tailor a more independent foreign policy. In that respect, between 1974 and 1981, Greece’s main objective has been EU membership and securing democracy (Veremis, 1982: 36). Clogg (1992: 155-158) on the other hand, has argued that Greece’s withdrawal from NATO and instead pursuing its European ambitions had psychological overtones, as within NATO it considered itself inferior, whereas with the EU, it would become an equal partner.

After 1974, the Cyprus dispute has gained an ‘international’ perspective and further deteriorated the relations between Greece and Turkey. After 1974 for example, Aegean problem gained a further negative momentum by Greece’s sharp increase in the militarization of the islands on the Aegean, arguing that Turkey’s creation of an Aegean army, was a direct threat against Greece. Indeed, after Greece’s membership to the EU, Greek-Turkish relations started to take a new dimension. Previously disadvantageous due to military imbalance vis-a-vis Turkey, after EU membership, Greece regarded European platform as a forum over which it sought political support against Turkey; hence gaining the upper hand in the conflict. For example Greece has prevented the realization of several financial protocols towards Turkey and has since been active in preventing Turkish membership to the EU.

According to Tayfur (2003: 86-87), the most important policy change in post-junta regime in Greece has been the shift from ‘Atlanticism’ to pro-European lines. Indeed, the Treaty of Accession Greece signed in 1979 has been viewed as a formal transition of Greece
to EU lines. Tayfur (2003: 87) has maintained that "EC membership was seen as an invaluable step in escaping from American influence and client status and upgrading the position of Greece in the international sphere". Such a shift, of course, has been finalized with Greece's full membership in 1981.

When one looks at Cyprus, the relations between Europe and Cyprus date since the early 1970s. An Association Agreement between the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the EEC was concluded in 1972 and entered into force on 1st July 1973. The agreement dealt almost exclusively with issues of trade, aiming at the gradual establishment of a customs union and was complemented by a Financial Protocol concluded in 1987, providing the framework for EU-Cyprus relations. Customs Union was also agreed and due for completion in 1977, but was then extended first to 1987 and with the commencement of accession negotiations became part of the accession process. These protocols and agreements can be regarded as steps taken towards de-legitimization and isolation of the Turkish administration of Cyprus, as the agreements have been signed with the Greek administration of Cyprus, as the representative of the whole island. The process of accession of Cyprus to the EU has been viewed by the two communal leaderships in two seemingly contradictory ways: as a solution to the Cyprus conflict, that would ensure that the new status of Cyprus as EU member would override the ethnic split,24 and as simply 'illegal'

24 This view is also shared by the European Commission, as written in its opinion dated 30 June 1993: "This opinion has also shown that Cyprus' integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question - a settlement which will make it possible for the two communities to be reconciled, for confidence to be re-established and for their respective leaders to work together. While safeguarding the essential balance between the two communities and the right of each to preserve its fundamental interests, the institutional provisions contained in such a settlement should create the appropriate
because it overwrites the Cypriot constitution of 1950, that requires both communities on the island to agree before the state can join any other state (Ereken, 1997: 16-18). In this second view, though, union with Europe (of what is seen as 'the southern Greek-Cypriot part of Cyprus') would again mean a 'solution' because it would prompt the union of the TRNC with Turkey, after which point there would be no 'Cypriot' problem to solve.

Whatever the supporting or discrediting arguments relating to these two conceptual positions, at the elite level, the accession of Cyprus to EU membership is viewed as essential for the solution of the problem. The Republic of Cyprus argued that since the EU is not a state, there is no issue of contravening the 1960 constitution (Baier-Allen, 1999: 262).

3. Aftermath of the coup: Greece, as a parameter in Turkey-EC relations, 1981 onwards

While Greece became an EU member, Turkey was under military rule. After the transfer of power to civilians, in April 1987 the Önal government submitted a new Turkish membership application on the grounds of Article 237 of the EEC Treaty. This stipulated that "any European country that wished to do so could submit an application whereupon, following normal procedures, the Council would ask the European Commission to issue an advice on the question". When, two years later, the Commission eventually produced that

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conditions for Cyprus to participate normally in the decision-making process of the European Community and of the correct application of Community Law throughout the island," Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership, doc.93/5 - June 30, 1993.

25 For the full text of the Treaty, see: 63
opinion, it became clear that the price for entry had risen considerably; the result of both internal EC and Turkish domestic-political changes. As the Council shortly before had confirmed, the member-states and the Commission had directed all their resources to completing the internal market and increasing EC’s institutional capacity (via the Single European Act). A new expansion to include Turkey would be completely at odds with the realisation of the ambitions of the EC. As Turkey was deemed as an economically unstable country, it was perceived that it would not be capable of implementing the economic and social acquis. Also, Turkish membership would place a disproportionate strain on EC expenditures on agricultural and structural policies that had already increased sharply following the Southern expansion.

Besides these considerations and also despite the involvement of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament to accelerate internal reforms, the improvements in democracy and human rights in Turkey had not advanced beyond a few, largely cosmetic, adjustments. One explanation for the tardy Turkish performance was the fight against the PKK (Robins, 2003: 131). Extreme nationalism that began to permeate ‘official’ Turkish ideology and the widespread abuse of civil rights that accompanied the struggle intensified the already existing humanitarian objections on the EU-side against full Turkish membership. Although neither the Commission nor the Council denied the principle of an eventual Turkish membership, what they could offer under prevailing circumstances was a package of more intensive cooperation, some increase in aid and the revival of the plans for

http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entoc005.htm

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a customs union. During the Association Council of March 1995 this offer received more substance in four specific areas: the completion of the customs union, closer cooperation on other EU policy areas, increased financial help and the opening of a dialogue on questions of democracy and human rights (Birand, 2004: 288).

The customs union agreement was signed on March 6th, 1995. The main target was the creation of a free-tariff area between the EC and Turkey. This goal has been set already in the Ankara Agreement and was seen as the end of the second stage, the transitional phase. However, one could observe some linkage policies between the customs union and the decision to begin accession negotiations with the Greek-Cypriot government. The customs union agreement was accompanied by reservations in the different institutional bodies of the EC. In December 1995 the European Parliament ratified the agreement but the approval of the customs union by the European Parliament was accompanied by a number of conditions to be fulfilled by Turkey, which were the solution of the Kurdish issue, improving human right standards, improvement of democratic standards and the solution of the Cypriot issue.15 Starting with the customs union, by the end of December 1995, Turkey and the EU has abolished all import duties and other barriers with the same effect such as import quotas, on their mutual trade.

A more intensive issue between the EU and Turkey concerned the dialogue on democracy and human rights. In the course of the 1990s, these issues became ever more central in the debate on the possibility and merits of full Turkish membership of the EU.

This tendency was partly attributable to the unification of Germany and the membership application of ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe, Cyprus and Malta, human rights and democracy assumed a more central position in constructing a European identity. This appeared explicitly in the Copenhagen criteria for membership. The first criterion specified that to qualify for membership, countries had possessed stable institutions “guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.” Only then did the other two criteria, on the possession of a competitive market economy and the institutional capacity to absorb and implement the acquis communautaire, take effect.

The political element of the European Project in the 1990s had become more important, with membership status tied to performance in relation to democratization and human rights. Turkey’s democratic deficits severely constrained its relations with Europe in the post-customs union era, resulting in the failure to activate the financial package which was an integral part of the original customs union agreement itself. A turning point arrived with the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997, where Turkey was explicitly excluded from the countries considered for potential full-membership. On Turkey’s part, the Luxembourg decision was met with a strong sense of disillusionment. The disappointments of Luxembourg were coupled with the fact that the Union had taken significant steps, in the course of the 1990s, in terms of incorporating the former communist countries of the Central and Eastern Europe, arguably countries with deeper authoritarian legacies than Turkey, into

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27 Full text of the Copenhagen Council Conclusions, 2002, can be found at europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/european_councils_.pdf
its orbit. Hence in retrospect, the Luxembourg Summit represented yet another low point in the complex and uneasy interaction between Turkey and the EU, characteristic of the post-war period as a whole.

This crisis in Turkish-EU relations was disturbing to many in Europe. There was a quite widespread feeling that a major turning point in Turkish-EU relations had been reached (Buzan and Dier, 1999: 41). In Turkey, it has been argued, "for the first time there was a clear recognition that there was nothing inevitable about Turkey's claim to full EU membership" (Öniş, 1999: 125). Washington too expressed its unhappiness with the EU's treatment of this strategically important NATO member. Thus, in the almost immediate aftermath of Luxembourg, ways were sought to readdress the EU's approach to Turkey's candidacy.

In contrast, the Helsinki decision represented a change on the part of the European political elites, in the sense that they have effectively shielded themselves from arguments based Turkey's exclusion on purely cultural grounds. After Helsinki, Turkey was challenged to undertake the radical reforms in the domestic sphere both in the areas of democratization and economic policy reforms in order to qualify for full-membership. This was interpreted as the door is open, provided the necessary conditions are satisfied (Öniş, 1999: 126). This approach makes a sharp contrast with the earlier EU position which imposed similar conditions without providing a clear perspective of full-membership.
Indeed, in terms of the conditions imposed, there existed a great deal of continuity between the outcomes of the Luxembourg and Helsinki Summits. It is unambiguously the case that Turkey’s full-membership rests critically upon its ability to fulfill the EU requirements in three specific areas: consolidation of economic reforms, democratization and the rights of the “Kurdish minority” and improvement in relations with Greece which effectively means an internationally acceptable settlement to the Cyprus issue. The economic component of these requirements appear to be less problematic in terms of generating widespread political support and possibly the secondary component associated with these conditions, even though economic considerations still constitute a formidable barrier to Turkey’s full EU membership.

Greece, on the other hand, entered 1980s with an anti-Atlanticist stance and was often engaging in conciliatory moves towards USSR. Yet, Greece’s relations with the EC started to improve towards the late 1980s, due to EC’s Integrated Mediterranean Program, whose financial transfers helped the development of the rural areas. Tayfur (2003: 67) has argued that it is this economic revival and the realization that EC would become the framework for Greece’s modernization that has fostered a process of ‘Europeanization’ in Greek politics. Yet, when the Yugoslav disintegration began, Greece has portrayed some erratic behaviour, acting less of a conflict manager and straining EU’s involvement in the conflict. This stance was amplified during Greece’s disputes with Macedonia. In other words, initial post-accession years were marked by Greece’s tendency towards unilateralism with regard to European Political Cooperation.
Such stance was abandoned towards the late 1990s. Bahçeli et al. (2003) and Triantaphyllou (2001) have argued that it was the Simitis government’s fear of marginalization within the EU that had brought such a change. Nicolaidis (2001: 22) describes this as a ‘move from the politics of veto to the politics of interest in the EU’. Tayfur (2002: 38-48) defines this change within the context of failed Greek diplomatic initiatives in the Balkans and its dealings with the PKK and the disgrace Greece brought to the EU with such clumsy policies. In turn, as Heraclides (2004) has argued it was the ‘will from above’ (EU and American pressures on Greece to tailor a new foreign policy on Turkey) that brought about a ‘Europeanization’ in Greek foreign policy. Such a change in policy orientation was strongly felt in Greece’s relations with Turkey. Greece has lifted its policy of veto against Turkey in 1999 Helsinki Summit and both countries entered a period of detente, which some scholars choose to define as rapprochement.

At this point, it should be stressed that the Greek politics became ‘Europeanized’ in two waves; the first, around mid-1970s and the second in the late-1990s. The first ‘Europeanization’, as discussed above had more to do with ‘de-Americanization’; the retreat from NATO and American-dictated policy priorities. The main reason for this change was the penetration of European capital into Greece, decreasing importance of American capital and the oil shocks which decreased America’s involvement in the region. The second ‘Europeanization’ experienced in Greek politics was a result of the collapse of the USSR and the triumph of ‘European values’ like democracy, liberal policies, primacy of human
rights and good neighbourliness. In that respect Greece's politics of escalation vis-a-vis Turkey (and against other neighbours), which culminated during the 1991-1996 period (what Keridis (1999: 32) refers as 'foreign policy of nationalism') was abandoned after the Ocalan debacle in 1999, signifying European pressures on Greek foreign policy making.

Greek Cypriot government on the other hand, applied for EEC membership in 1990 and in the same year the office of the European Delegation in Nicosia was opened. Since 1991, a Joint Parliamentary Committee of parliamentarians (MEPs) and Southern Cypriot parliamentarians has been meeting twice a year. Discussions regarding Cyprus' suitability for membership began in 1993, after the Commission decided to accept the Republic's application as one made on behalf of the island. This suitability for membership was decided in 1995 (after, in June 1995, the EU abandoned its linkage between Cyprus' accession and the settlement of the Cyprus problem) and negotiations began in 1998. They were concluded in December 2002 and the Accession Treaty signed in April 2003, with the Accession formally coming into effect as of May 2004.

In 1997 the basic parameters of the Cyprus Dispute changed. A decision by the EU to open up accession negotiations with southern Cyprus created a new catalyst for a settlement. Among those who supported the move, the argument was made that Turkey could not have a veto on Cypriot accession and that the negotiations would encourage all sides to be more moderate. However, opponents of the move argued that the decision would remove the incentive of the Greek Cypriots to reach a settlement. They would instead wait
until they became a member and then use this strength to push for a settlement on their terms. In response to the decision, Rauf Denktas announced that he would no longer accept federation as a basis for a settlement. In future he would only be prepared to negotiate on the basis of a confederal solution. In December 1999 tensions between Turkey and the EU eased somewhat after the EU decided to declare Turkey a candidate for EU membership, a decision taken at the Helsinki European Council. At the same time a new round of talks started in New York. These were short lived. By the following summer they had broken down. Tensions started to rise again as a showdown between Turkey and the European Union loomed over the island's accession.

Perhaps realising the seriousness of the situation, and in a move that took observers by surprise, Rauf Denktas wrote to Glafcos Clerides on 8 November 2001 to propose a face-to-face meeting. The offer was accepted. Following several informal meetings between the two men in November and December 2001 a new peace process started under UN auspices on 14 January 2002. At the outset the stated aim of the two leaders was to try to reach an agreement by the start of June that year. However, the talks soon became deadlocked. In an attempt to break the impasse, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General visited the island in May that year. Despite this no deal was reached. After a summer break Annan met with the two leaders again that autumn, first in Paris and then in New York. As a result of the continued failure to reach an agreement, the Security Council agreed that the Secretary-General should present the two sides with a blueprint settlement. This would form the basis of further negotiations. The original version of the UN peace plan was presented to the two
sides by Annan on 11 November 2002. About a month later, and following modifications submitted by the two sides, it was revised. It was hoped that this plan would be agreed by the two sides on the margins of the European Council, which was held in Copenhagen on December 13. However, Rauf Denktas refused to attend. The EU therefore decided to confirm that Cyprus would join the EU on 1 May 2004, along with Malta and eight other states from Central and Eastern Europe.

Although it had been expected that talks would be unable to continue, discussions resumed in early January 2003. Thereafter, a further revision took place in February 2003, when Annan made a second visit to the island. During his stay he also called on the two sides to meet with him again the following month in The Hague, where he would expect their answer on whether they were prepared to put the plan to a referendum. While the Greek Cypriot side, which was now led by Tassos Papadopoulos, agreed to do so, albeit reluctantly, Rauf Denktas refused to allow a popular vote. The peace talks collapsed. A month later, on 16 April 2004, Cyprus formally signed the EU Treaty of Accession at a ceremony in Athens.

Throughout the rest of the year there was no effort to restart talks. Instead, attention turned to the Turkish Cypriot elections, which were widely expected to see a victory by moderate pro-solution parties. A coalition administration was formed that brought together the pro-solution CTP and the Democrat Party, which had traditionally taken the line adopted by Rauf Denktas. This opened the way for Turkey to press for new discussions. After a
meeting between Erdoğan and Kofi Annan in Switzerland, the leaders of the two sides were called to New York. There they agreed to start a new negotiation process based on two phases: phase one, which would just involve the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, being held on the island and phase two, which would also include Greece and Turkey, being held elsewhere. After a month of negotiations in Cyprus, the discussions duly moved to Burgensstock, Switzerland. The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash rejected the plan outright and refused to attend these talks. Instead, his son Serdar Denktash and Mehmet Ali Talat attended in his place. There a fourth version of the plan was presented. This was short-lived. After final adjustments, a fifth and final version of the Plan was presented to the two sides on 31 March 2004.

The 2004 enlargement, within which Cyprus became an EU member, has been the biggest round of enlargement to date, together with CEECs and Malta. The case of Cyprus is interesting in the sense that the EU accession brought a momentum to developments in the politics of the conflict between the Turkish and Greek sides (Rumelihi, 2004). The shift was felt considerably in the referenda which took place on April 2004, in the north and the southern sides of the island, which sought the parties’ approval for the UN-proposed plan to end the division of the island. Even though 65% of the northern part of the island approved the plan, 76% of the population in the south rejected it and thus the plan was not implemented.

From this point onwards, this thesis will try to analyse how the EU has contributed to or constrained the development of the events mentioned here.
CHAPTER 4

THE EU INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT

Although the Turkish-Greek dispute has started since 1960s and the Cyprus issue emerged as a critical conflict after 1970s and especially after Greece’s EU membership in 1981, it would be wrong to make ambitious statements about long-term EU policies which facilitated a transformation of these conflicts.

1. EU impact on Greek-Turkish relations: Pre-1999 period

However, the literature points to several instances before 1999, where the EC/EU has caused a brief episode of de-escalation in Greek-Turkish conflict. For example it is argued that Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis’ way of handling Greek-Turkish relations after the Cyprus intervention (passive and avoiding further escalation) reflects the EC impact on Greek politics, since Greece decided not to escalate the crisis, because it was preparing to apply for EC membership (Cooulombis and Yannis, 1994: 162). Similarly, Tsakaloyannis (1989: 42-44) have argued that Karamanlis chose to handle 1976 Aegean continental shelf crisis by bringing the issue to the United Nations (instead of military means) because Greece was filing its application for membership to EEC. On a different
viewpoint however, such a move can also be interpreted by the bankruptcy of the military prestige in Greece after the defeat in Cyprus and instead choosing to internationalize the event where Greece would seek a stronger leverage against Turkey, which it would otherwise would not possess (Kizilyuruk, 2002: 229-231). Furthermore, according to Pridham (1991: 80) Karamanlis have initiated several attempts to promote dialogue with Turkey between 1975 and 1981, basically to secure its membership to the EEC. For example in 1976, Greece and Turkey have signed the Berne Declaration, where they agreed not to take unilateral action on the Aegean. Similarly in 1978, Karamanlis met with Bülent Ecevit in Montreux and Washington to discuss a non-aggression pact.

The main justification for these attempts was the strong EC messages which threatened Greece that a prolonged conflict would endanger Greek membership. Likewise, after Greek membership in 1981, the Council of Ministers explicitly voiced its concern on the Greek membership, since it would endanger the prospects of a fair relationship between Greece and Turkey within the EC context (Tsakaloyannis, 1988: 42-44). On the other hand, the European Commission have voiced its concern on the Greek membership, arguing that the EC would import conflicts and suggested a pre-accession period for Greece for the settlement of Greek-Turkish disputes (Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991: 221). Yet, after Greece’s EU membership, EU’s policies of negative conditionality became more identifiable with Greek vetoes, rather than EU’s genuine involvement in Turkey’s democratization.
Such a position was also taken against Turkey during its application for EC membership in 1987. Yildiz has argued that Turkey's milder reaction to the 1987 continental shelf crisis was mainly because Turkey was filling its application for membership to the EC. Since Greece was then a member of the Community, Turkey was aware that improved relations with Greece were crucial to prevent Greek vetoes against Turkish membership. With this in mind, Prime Minister Özal defused the crisis and pursued dialogue with Greece. The attempts to establish dialogue were temporarily successful after Özal's meeting with the then Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou at the annual meeting of the World Economic Summit in Davos in January 1988, which initiated a brief chapter of normalization in Greek-Turkish relations (also referred as 'Davos Process'). However, these attempts did not help and Greece openly opposed to Turkey's membership.

In May 1988, the European Parliament's resolution on Cyprus maintained that Turkish military presence on the Northern Cyprus presented a handicap to Turkey's EC membership. Later, the European Commission's opinion on Turkey's application similarly held that Turkey was not ready for membership and pointed out that Turkey's disputes with Greece and also the Cyprus problem constituted negative factors for Turkey's admission.

In the 1990s, Turkey tried to develop its institutional relations with the EU, first through the Customs Union and later through seeking formal candidacy. In all of these attempts, Turkey's disputes with Greece and Cyprus conflict were brought forward.
straining Turkey’s relations with the then EU. Similarly, to illustrate EU’s policy of negative conditionality, the grant of EU’s financial assistance to Turkey (which was a part of the Customs Union agreement) was vetoed after the 1996 Kardak crisis. Hence it would be accurate to argue that after the 1980s, EU positions on Turkey were primarily influenced by Greek lobbying and Greece have used the EU as an international platform through which it could internationalize its disputes with Turkey and influence European decision-making bodies and public opinion.

As became explicit with the customs union, the EU deliberately linked progress on Cypriot membership with the question of a stable framework for relations between the European Union and Turkey. Even though both Turkey and Greece denied that there was linkage between setting a date for opening negotiations with Cyprus and setting a date completing the final stage of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, the customs union has set a number of linkage conditions, among which the Cyprus question was present. At a meeting on March 6, 1995 of the EU Association Council with Turkey the Greek government lifted the veto it had imposed in December 1994. This meant that, subject to the assent of the European Parliament, the final phase of the Customs Union with Turkey could be implemented by the end of 1995. Following the withdrawal of the Greek veto, foreign ministers of the Member States agreed that negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus should

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28 See, for example, the 18 January 1996 European Parliament Resolution on the Situation in Turkey, the 15 July 1996 European Union Statement, the 16 October 1996 Presidency Statement on the Recent Killings in Cyprus, the 30 October 1996 European Commission Report on Developments in Relations with Turkey, the 29 April 1997 EC-Turkey Association Council Conclusions, 12-13 December 1997 Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions.
be opened within six months and they implicitly dropped the condition that the Cyprus question be resolved by agreement between the two communities under UN auspices before accession negotiations could begin. Then onwards, the Council merely hoped that there would be a settlement prior to the opening of negotiations; once negotiations began, they hoped for a settlement before the submission of an accession treaty to the Member States and the European Parliament. The significance of what had been agreed in March 1995 was understood very differently in Brussels, Athens, and Ankara, not to mention by Cypriots themselves.

As it is argued in the theoretical chapter of the thesis, EU involvement in disputes might lead to further securitizing moves if one or more of the sides perceive EU position as biased ( Coppetiers et al., 2004: 29). So was the case with Turkey when it threatened to annex Northern Cyprus if Southern Cyprus becomes an EU member prior to a solution on the island and also threatening to go to war with Greece if it extends its territorial waters to 12 nms. Hence EU’s policy of direct conditionality (offering/withdrawing rewards, applying sanctions) did not prove very successful in the transformation of the Greek-Turkish conflict.

Stephanou and Tsardanides (1991: 229-230) explain this failure by the conservative self-definition of Europe. According to them, EU mostly ignored disputes between member states concerning vital security matters and assuming an impartial role in conflicts was not its priority. Yet EU was careful not to alienate either side too much (balancing strategy) and to anchor both sides to the West and tried to contain the conflict rather than help both sides
work towards a solution. However, the EU started to take a pro-active stance on Greek-Turkish conflict in the early 1990s, Greece was already a member (hence conditionality against Greece was not credible) and Turkey’s membership was not probable (hence conditionality against Turkey was not credible either). Indeed, by accepting Greece into the Union in 1981, the EU has lost its ability to apply pressure on Greece. Greece on the other hand, has used the Union as a diplomatic lever against Turkey to gain advantage and concessions from Turkey (Coulombris and Yannas, 1994: 43). Further deteriorating the situation, Turkey was denied candidacy in the Luxembourg Summit in 1997, this has elicited some strong reactions from Turkey and Turkish-Cypriot side, where the then Turkish government suspended all relations with the EU and Denktas in Northern Cyprus has banned all bi-communal activities.

Sharply contrasting with this picture, positive and negative conditionality policies of the EU gained more credibility in Greek-Turkish relations after 1999 Helsinki Summit, where Turkey was granted candidacy and membership ‘carrot’ gained credibility for Turkey. Moreover, probably as a response to the failed diplomacy EU suffered in its mismanagement of the Kosovo crisis (Duke, 2000; Caplan, 1998; Schmitt 1999), it has changed its stance against handling conflicts and established the ‘peaceful resolution of border disputes’ and ‘good neighbourly relations’ as a community principle. The European Council has also set 2004 as the latest date by which it will review the disputes of the member states, which was also incorporated into Turkey’s Accession Partnership Agreement and National Program in 2001.
It would also be insightful to put forward that Greece’s obsession with joining the then EC has a lot to do with seeking protection against what it calls as ‘Turkish threat’. Hence support for the EC was driven by the belief that European integration would ultimately result in a common foreign and defence policy, which would strengthen and protect Athens against Ankara (Valanakis, 1994: 131; Tayfur, 2003: 67). It is because of this security consideration that EC membership became an existential dimension in Greece (Heraclides, 2004).

2. Towards the crossroads in relations: Europeanization of Greek foreign policy

A wide literature exists on the ‘Europeanization of Greek foreign policy’. Keridis and Triantaphyllou (2001: 117-118) have argued that the EU has changed Greece’s perceptions/policies towards Turkey by the longer term modernization and democratization of Greek political system and culture. Keridis (2001: 12) have further argued that European integration has been a “powerful agent for the ‘domestication’ of foreign policy and for the softening and broadening of national security towards low politics and economics”. However, there are also quite interesting analyses of the ‘Europeanization’ process of Greece. Isakimidis (1994: 33-52) has argued that Greece suffers from the ‘underdog culture’ syndrome (the notion that the West does not accept Greece as equals because of its culture and history) which caused Greece to remain suspicious concerning the Europeans in general. (arguably, a phenomenon which also had implications on Greek foreign policy
during the 1990s) Ioakimidis, has further argued that the fact that Greece has been subject to foreign protection in the past have left a syndrome of protection seeking. Karop (1998) on the other hand, has argued that Greece has been insecure over its Balkan identity, which has fostered a defensive attitude in Greece against what it perceives as being the ‘illegitimate child’ of Europe.

Towards the late-1990s, joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) became the primary goal for Greece. Apart from the expected economic and financial stability it was expected to bring, EMU became more of a matter of prestige and pride. Hence, Greek decision-makers had to abandon any and all kinds of economic excesses, including the arms-race with Turkey (Moschonas, 2001: 23) which, in the medium-term, has led to conflict diminishing measures. The election of Simitis government has been generally viewed as a turning point in the Europeanization of Greek politics (Diamandouros, 1997; Keridis, 2001; Karop, 1998). That is to say, Simitis government advocated that the policy of deterrence against Turkey should be supplemented with the policy of supporting Turkey’s EU membership. Predictably, such a policy stance has elicited severe criticisms both within and outside PASOK. However, it was apparent that Turkey’s relations with Europe were for the Greek national interests, instead of an outlawed and frustrated Turkey neighbouring Greece.

As a product of this policy change, Greece has chosen not to use its veto power against Turkey’s candidacy at the 1999 Helsinki Summit. This was a result of a shift in the
elite level and social level shifts in Greeks' collective perception of Turkey. Two perspectives explain this change in policy. The first perspective maintains that the reason for the de-escalation of the Greek-Turkish conflict was a result of the earthquakes occurred in Greece and Turkey and both countries' rush to disaster-relief against the other. According to this perspective the earthquakes have set the mood for dialogue between Greece and Turkey and complemented the ongoing 'Europeanization' of Greek foreign policy.

Another perspective maintains that Greece was trying to get over the Öcalan controversy (Tayfur, 2001; Yetkin, 2004; Özkan 2005; Armutçu 1999). With the aid of ultra-nationalist members of the Greek parliament, Öcalan was brought through VIP channels to Greece in early 1999, after he was expelled from Syria and went to Italy and Russia beforehand. Öcalan eventually found his way to the Greek island of Corfu, arriving on a jet provided by a retired Greek admiral (Black, 2004-8). It is still unknown that how much knowledge Greek government officials had of Öcalan's arrival, although there was certainly some complicity in arranging his passage to Corfu.24 Afterwards, he was taken to the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, where he was discovered by the American intelligence and was handed to Turkey.

Predictably, Greece had failed in both of its priorities; to protect Öcalan and not to infuriate Turkey. While the Greek contacts in the protection of Öcalan were exposed one by one, Turkey launched an all-out diplomatic offensive through press releases, official

statements and leaking the reports of the capture to the media. Greece became the target of extremely threatening rhetoric. Turkey used this as an opportunity to attack Greece’s support of Öcalan, but it also revived old allegations that Greece had been involved in supporting the PKK more generally. The Greek government, stunned by a furious domestic response, was paralyzed and unable to react effectively (Yetkin, 2004: 93).

For Greece, the domestic reaction was much more severe than the international fallout. Public opinion viewed this episode as one of the most shameful humiliations in the history of Greek foreign policy. Simitis’s ruling PASOK government was confronted with a near-mortal blow. Right after the internationalization of the incident, Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, Interior Minister Alekos Papadopoulos and Public Order Minister Philipppos Petsalnikos resigned.

Outrage in Greece had to do with multiple aspects of the failed diplomacy. First, many Greeks were angry that the government had been unable to prevent Öcalan from coming to Greece in the first place. They saw the Öcalan row as having been preventable if he had never been allowed to land in Greece. Second, the public was outraged that Greece had bungled its efforts to protect Öcalan so badly that he ended up in a Turkish prison. There was also a general distaste for the secret, clandestine actions of the Greek government.
Although it can be argued that Greek-Turkish relations were already at its lowest point, (and hence nothing could be lost) it is generally this humiliation which had lead Greek government to adopt a more conciliatory rhetoric vis-a-vis Turkey after the earthquakes, complementing and benefiting from the social call for rapprochement.

From the Turkish point of view, it would be wrong to argue that the EU had major effects on Turkey’s outlook towards Greece until 1999. In that respect, since Greece was a member of the EU, Turkey viewed the Union as ‘singing the Greek tune’ after 1981 and hence regarded EU opinions and recommendations as biased, which in turn, aggravated the tension. Indeed, Greece’s membership has created the understanding in Turkey that the EU cannot be impartial with respect to Greek-Turkish relations, Grabbe (2004: 3) has argued that the fact that Turkey is not a full member of the EU has enabled Greece to exert pressure on Turkey, taking full advantage of its position as a full member by pursuing its revisionist agenda against Turkey through a different platform. Such a perception caused Turkey to view EU decisions, recommendations and opinions on Turkish-Greek or Cyprus issues as concessions to Greece.

Similar to the ‘underdog culture syndrome’ experienced by Greece, Turkey’s dealings with the EU (partly after Greece became a member) has brought forward the old memories of threat perceptions; namely the ‘Sevres syndrome’ (Jung, 2003; Oran, 2006). Arising from the memories of the Ottoman Empire’s dismemberment by the European powers after the World War I, the Sevres syndrome perception holds that the ‘West’ is
conspiring to weaken, divide and carve up Turkey. Similar to the Greek perceptions, Turkey has also been suspicious of the unequal treatment by the Europeans, believe that Turkey was an unnatural part of Europe and been discriminated against Greece.

There are differing views about the extent to which Turkey’s foreign policy approach towards Greece has changed (or can be expected to change). The Helsinki European Council decision to grant Turkey candidacy status is promoting a growing recognition that a European identity, through adherence to EU’s conditions/norms, will entail for Turkey a different kind of relationship with Greece and has paved the way for the perception of EU norms and procedures as a neutral basis to build a cooperative relationship with Greece. On the other hand, it can be argued that after the declaration of Turkey’s EU candidacy in 1999, which was accompanied and made possible by a noticeable change in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, and the progressing rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, there has not yet been an equivalent fundamental re-thinking of Turkish foreign policy identity. Öniş (2003: 19), for example, has argued that the incentives created by the prospect of full membership in the EU are not going to be adequate to legitimise the adoption of solution proposed by Greek Cypriots or the EU, highlighting the fact that the strong state tradition and dominant security culture in Turkey would resist to yield to such a foreign intervention/dictation. However, Tsakonas’ (2001: 36) prediction that the Helsinki summit will lead Turkey into a difficult and problematic democratisation process, which may easily translate into intransigent, if not, aggressive policies with respect to Greece and
the Cyprus issue has not come true. In other words, the democratisation process has indeed, in reality, facilitated conflict diminishing measures on the part of Turkish side.\(^3\)

3. **EU involvement in the Cyprus conflict**

When one looks towards the Cyprus while these events were going on, it can be argued that Cyprus' official candidacy (or rather exclusion of Turkey from the process), in 1997 Luxembourg Summit, was a blow to Turkey. Southern Cyprus was quite advantageous vis-à-vis Turkish-Cypriots, since Greece was a member of the Union. Although the EU had made several attempts afterwards to incorporate Turkish-Cypriot representatives into the negotiations, (hence trying to exercise a balancing strategy) the representation of the whole island by the Greek-Cypriot government has aggravated the situation in most occasions (Özersay, 2003: 241-248). For example in 1998, when the Greek-Cypriots were starting accession negotiations, they invited Turkish-Cypriots representatives (albeit with EU pressure) to be present during the negotiations. However, by assuring the candidacy of Greek-Cyprus without any solution and recognition, the EU has increased the tensions on the Turkish side, causing Denktas to ban all bi-communal activities and deny passage through the Green Line (Olgun, 1998: 32).

A year later, at the summit held in Helsinki, where Turkey was recognised as a candidate country for membership, with regard to Cyprus, the Council welcomed the

\(^3\) Since the main focus of this thesis is not Turkey's democratisation, the analysis will not go further. However it should be noted that several other works deal with Turkey's democratisation in the post-Helsinki period such as Ogurba (2002), Onig (2000), Soenen (2004), Uğur (2004)
launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York” and crucially, underlined that “a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union”. It further decided that “if no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this, the Council will take account of all relevant factors.” 31. This last reference to ‘relevant factors’ can be interpreted as a precondition that this decision would hold, provided that the failure of negotiations was not due to the stance of the Greek-Cypriot side. In effect, this statement tied Cyprus' EU accession to the negotiation process, for the resolution of the conflict, but disengaged it from absolute requirements that such a resolution be reached (Demetriou, 2003: 32-33). A number of Greek-Cypriot politicians, interpreted this article as a sign of EU, criticising the Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s intransigent stance during negotiations. Moreover Greek-Cypriots interpreted this decision as a message that even if the negotiations were failed, Southern Cyprus would become an EU member nevertheless. In other words, although this statement had been made by the EU to encourage the Greek-Cypriot side to pursue a positive stance in the ensuing negotiations, in the later phases, it contributed more to encouraging the Greek-Cypriot administration to pursue intransigent policies.

In fact, the impact of this decision has been relatively positive over the short-term, since for the next four years, and until the final signing of the Accession Treaty in 2003, the Greek-Cypriot side appeared to be willing to bring negotiations to a final settlement.

31 Helsinki European Council conclusions, 1999, 9 (a) and (b)
http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/10129/1063.htm
Furthermore, the round of negotiations, which lasted from 1999 to 2004, produced the most comprehensive settlement plan brokered by the UN since the commencement of negotiations in the 1960s.

Here, following Coppieters et al. (2004: 11-38) it is instructive to reflect that the EU has shifted its modes of conditionality (dealt in the theoretical chapter) in the Cyprus issue, from an impartial actor12 which favours a common state resolution and granting equal incentives to both conflicting parties, to an actor which favours one of the conflicting entities depending either on its democratic credentials, or reformist credentials of the elites. This shift in EU stance towards the conflict has produced somewhat similar results to what happened after Greek accession and Turkey’s isolation.

A high point in this negotiation process was the European Council meeting of December 2002 that took place in Copenhagen. In its conclusions related to enlargement, the Council confirmed “its strong preference for accession to the European Union by a united Cyprus” and “welcome(d) the commitment of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to continue to negotiate with the objective of concluding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem by 28 February 2003 on the basis of the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG)’s proposals” urging “the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to seize this opportunity”13. In addition, it repeated its

12 Perhaps at this point, it should be reflected that the EU was not an impartial actor since Greece was a EU member.
willingness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty of Accession\textsuperscript{13}. Finally, it decided that “in the absence of a settlement, the application of the acquis to the northern part of the island shall be suspended, until the Council decides unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission”.

Meanwhile, the Council invited the Commission, in consultation with the Government of Cyprus, “to consider ways of promoting economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and bringing it closer to the Union”.\textsuperscript{15} In these conclusions what can be observed is a series of rewards being offered to the opposing sides in the conflict. On the one hand, the Greek-Cypriot side was encouraged to continue negotiating in search of an agreement, in the knowledge that the key concerns it had up to then raised about the fairness of an agreement would be addressed by its prospective European partners. On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriots were encouraged to continue to support Cyprus’ EU membership prospects because that would secure economic benefits for them as well. It is important to remember that this meeting took place at a time when opposition voices were growing strong in the north and when Turkish-Cypriot demonstrators asked for a solution and EU membership (Bertrand et. al, 2004). In this sense, the last article can also be read as a reward towards this section of Turkish-Cypriot civil society. This reading however, also implies acknowledgement of an attempt to bypass the Turkish-Cypriot leadership that had up then appeared disinterested in any offers the EU had to make. This also implies that such bypassing would constitute a warning to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid. 14.11
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. 14.12
The effectiveness of these conclusions in positively impacting the conflict is difficult to assess in isolation. On the one hand, as the continuation of the strategy developed by the Helsinki decisions, these conclusions indeed contributed to keeping up the impetus of the negotiation process. However, when the Turkish and Greek–Cypriot sides met again in the Hague in February 2003, the Turkish-Cypriot leader withdrew and negotiations broke down. Greek-Cypriot ministerial and governmental representatives later maintained that the failure of the Copenhagen meeting to yield an agreement was due to Turkish reluctance to put pressure on Denktash to accept such an agreement (Bertrand et al., 2004).

This drawback led to the adoption of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession, signed in Athens in 16th April 2003, which stated that although Cyprus would join the EU as a whole, the application of the acquis communautaire would be suspended in those areas of the island outside the control of the authorities of the Southern Cypriot government. This finalised the Cypriot entry to the EU, despite the lack of a solution and recognised the Greek-Cypriot presence as representing the whole of the island. On the other hand, it made the accession of the northern part of the island granted upon solution of the problem (Özersay, 2003: 241-248).

Thus, the protocol satisfied completely Greek-Cypriot position with respect to the link between EU membership and the conflict. According to these positions Cyprus conflict’s prospects of solution would be better after its accession because the Greek-
Cypriot side would have more bargaining power once in the EU as representative of the whole island. Yet, at the same time Protocol 10 also offered the ‘carrot’ of membership to the Turkish-Cypriot side as an incentive to cooperate for an agreement. At a time when the Green Line was still closed to traffic, however, this was also an effective ‘stick’, since it denied the actual benefits of membership when making them appear otherwise so reachable (Dikomitis, 2004: 18-19).

It is in order to enable these benefits to reach individual Turkish-Cypriots as citizens of the Republic of Cyprus that, according to official statements, the Turkish leadership in the north proceeded to allow movement across the Green Line as from 23rd April 2003, a week after the signing of the Act of Accession. In this respect the finalisation of membership had a positive impact on the conflict, since it prompted the most radical change up to that point (Demetriou, 2004: 27). The Green Line’s re-opening has initiated a series of serious transformation on the nature of the Cyprus conflict. Bertrand et al. (2004: 144) has argued that this caused the Greek-Cypriot government to engage in more conciliatory policies vis-a-vis Turkish-Cypriots. Furthermore, he has argued that the Turkish-Cypriot opposition gained even more power and in the parliamentary elections of December 14th the left-wing opposition leader Mehmet Ali Talat was voted into office.

Negotiations then resumed and in February the process of reaching an agreement by May was agreed by the two sides. It is in this last phase of negotiations that the disadvantages of the EU’s previous policies of conditionality were made obvious. The
Greek-Cypriot side, led since February 2003 by the intransigent Tassos Papadopoulos, entered negotiations from a position where the threat of the conditionality from the EU had been removed, accession was certain and the rewards to be had were offered to the Turkish-Cypriot side. With the application of nationalist rhetoric in the presentation of the proposed solution to the Greek-Cypriot populace, a public rejection of the solution was fostered and the UN-proposed final plan was rejected at the Greek-Cypriot referendum of April 24th 2004. In this sense, it could be argued that the referendum showed the fall of the conditionality approach when incentives and disincentives are not available for use at all stages of the conflict resolution process. What really needs to be highlighted here, is that the Greek Cypriots were not equal partners in the negotiations, since their EU membership was already ascertained.

This was more or less the factor that has led the EU (in consensus with Southern Cyprus’ leadership) to adopt the Green Line Regulation on April 30th. The Regulation is directly linked to Protocol 10 and is mainly concerned with the movement of persons and goods across the Green Line as well as with the determination of the authorities responsible for supervising such movement. The most important stipulation of the Regulation is that the legitimacy of movement across the Line was not biased in terms of direction; for example non-citizen nationals are allowed to cross both ways, even if they have, in the Republic’s government’s discourse, ‘entered thought and illegal part’.
Secondly, also as Christou (2004: 166-167) has argued, the Regulation allowed for the movement of goods apart from livestock across the Line, which was presumably a measure designed to facilitate trade with the north. Thirdly, the certifying authority for these goods was primarily the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, with the Commission having overseeing powers over the process and the Greek-Cypriot government agreeing. As Christou (2004: 167-169) has further argued, this stipulation effectively set up a relationship between the Commission and the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce which did not officially exist before, and although it provided for the possibility that the Republic raises specific disagreements at any stage; it also implied that such disagreements could create problems in the relations between the Republic and the Commission. From this perspective, the Regulation could be seen another negative conditionality mechanism against the Greek-Cypriot government, should it prove unwilling to cooperate and a positive conditionality for the Turkish-Cypriots, showing that relations with the EU can be established even if the division remains.

The Copenhagen meeting of December 2002, which was pointed above, has also impacted the leadership of both sides of the Cyprus. Despite having a different purpose, the meeting has been a forum for debating the prospects of a solution of Cyprus among Cypriot, Greek and Turkish delegates. The meeting in effect provided a context which could be used to legitimise internally whatever concessions each side would have been asked to make, had an agreement been reached. In other words, the fact that, at the end of the meeting, both the
Republic of Cyprus and Turkey came out with ‘scores’ on their side, could be used to justify possible concessions for a solution.

The Copenhagen meeting was important in one other respect as well. After the meeting, the Turkish-Cypriot opposition forces organised a highly attended demonstration against the regime and in favour of a solution to the problem and EU accession of the north (Demetriou, 2004: 32). In this sense, the meeting also enabled the organisation of civil society activities that were later proven to be of some importance to the overturning of the political status quo in the northern part of the island.

Another example worth looking is the presence of EU officials in the negotiation process that led to the referenda of April 2004. This presence had been an issue of considerable discussion in the negotiations in New York earlier in the year, when the procedure leading to the referenda was agreed. The Greek-Cypriot side demanded that EU observers be present at the final stage of negotiations, while Turkish-Cypriot leadership opposed such a prospect. Turkish-Cypriot leadership finally agreed, partly because the new representative, Talat, did not share Denktas’s view of the EU as a negative influence, which was completely on the side of Greek-Cypriots. The EU Commissioner for Enlargement did attend the final days of the negotiation process and the presentation of the final version of the agreement plan and his presence was crucial in terms of willingness of both parties to reach an agreement.36

36 Bulletin of the European Union 12-2002
Therefore, it could be said that the aim of EU policies at this stage was to enable the sides to argue in favour of the agreement internally, with reference to EU – Southern Cyprus relations. In parallel, the statements of the European Parliament issued in the period before the referenda, which effectively urged the Turkish and Greek Cypriots to vote in favour of the plan, by stressing the point that the Union would be prepared to accommodate the derogations from the acquis that the implementation of the final agreement would entail could be said to have aimed at enabling concessions to be argued with reference to EU principles. It is exactly on this basis of principles that the EU parliament sought its policies of negative conditionality, when, later, the Greek-Cypriot leadership announced its intention to encourage a negative vote in the south of the island. At that point, the Commissioner for Enlargement made a widely publicised speech where he was accusing the Greek-Cypriot leadership of having “cheated” when appearing willing to see the process of negotiation of a final solution to the end and thus to allow a united Cyprus to join to EU.

In fact, the critical point to be highlighted here is, that the election of Papadopoulos in 2003 elections was much of a surprise for the EU and UN. In fact the success of the Annan Plan, tailored by the UN and endorsed by the EU, depended on the election of Glafkos Clerides (a moderate figure) in the South. The election of the hard-liner Papadopoulos was indeed a major setback, since the Annan Plan was structured more on the


3 See for example Helsinki European Council Conclusions, 1999
beliefs and viewpoints of Klerides than Papadopoulos. Hence it should be noted here, that the rejection of the Annan Plan in the south had more to do with election of Papadopoulos, rather than the plan itself.

Thus, it can be argued that the objective of these statements was to enable the opposition in the south to argue strongly in favour of accepting the plan. This however also allowed the government of the Greek-Cypriots to build into their rhetoric of rejection of the anti-imperialist argument – which has thus far been used in public and academic discourse to depict the Cyprus problem as one based on the disingenuous intentions of high power and to accuse the opposition as 'traitor'.

One other important even in the conflict was the actions of the EU with respect to the opening of the Green Line in April 2003, particularly the adoption of measures in support of the Turkish-Cypriots, which had originally been proposed by the government of the Greek-Cypriot government and later by the EU. The first package of those measures was primarily concerned with citizenship rights, confirming those that Turkish-Cypriots already had under the 1960 constitution. However the rhetoric that surrounded their presentation could be considered as an EU involvement, since it was founded upon a reconciliatory discourse that identified Turkish-Cypriots as 'compatriots', and therefore enabled (or forced) the government of the Greek-Cypriots to articulate a discourse that it had not used until then. At the same time, however, the rhetoric had also enabled the EU to appear

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determined to solve the conflict, while not actually implementing the most radical of these measures in practice (as for example the regulation of the movement of goods across the Line and the setting up of an office dealing exclusively with Turkish-Cypriot concerns).

It is these failures, and especially those related to trade, that Turkish-Cypriot discourse point to, when stating that these measures had minimal impact in the north in general and in facilitating a solution to the political problem in particular. Furthermore, Özşay (2004) has argued that the EU package of measures that focussed more on economic impact had been almost useless, since none of the measures had been implemented. Furthermore, they pointed to the government of the Republic as responsible for the non-implementation of the measures because, they argued, it used legalistic arguments to impede any substantial benefits from the implementation of the measures from reaching the north.

Overall then, it could be said that in the case of Cyprus, the extent to which the pursuit of the conflict mediation has been successful is indicative of the unique and sui generis nature of the Cyprus. As discussed in the theoretical chapter of the thesis, such success rests on the willingness of both sides to cooperate and therefore make use of the possibilities for resolution that are enabled. As the examples above show, however, this can also result in a situation where a certain type of discourse is adopted, but the actual substance of the relation between the conflict parties on the official level remains static. Recent attempts by the government of the Greek-Cypriot government and its partners in
coalition to present at the island’s Greek-speaking media. Mehmet Ali Talat as the new Denktas in order to legitimise the failure to implement these measures by recourse to the argument that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership cannot be trusted, could be said to mark a reversal of the conciliatory rhetoric mentioned above, which did not reflect their political positions from the beginning.

An entirely different point of view regarding the EU influence in the Cyprus conflict would be the Cyprus-related cases presented to the European Court of Human Rights. For example, the case of Ahmet Ayn, who successfully sued Turkey because it impeded his freedom of movement within Cyprus (by keeping the Green line closed) has been cited as one of the considerations that led to the decision to open the Green Line in April 2003.  

Perhaps a clearer example is the case of Tizina Loizidou, who won a suit against Turkey for not allowing her access and enjoyment of her property, which she was forced to abandon in the north during the intervention of 1974. The outcome of this case, which ordered Turkey to pay more than €1.12m in compensation, was a reference point in the way the UN-proposed plan was negotiated and in the debate on refugee property rights that took place before the referendum. Even though the ECHR is an institution of the Council of Europe and not of the EU, its rulings against states are generally considered by the EU as important indicators of the human rights situation in the country. In this sense, Turkey’s convictions in these two cases can be said to have indirectly influenced its stance on

30 For the full text of the judgement see (http://www.cyprusaction.org/humanrights/freedoms/movement/ahmetary abdominaljudgement.html).
particular aspects of the conflict resolution negotiations because of their implications on its
relations with the EU.\footnote{The full text of the judgment can be downloaded from (http://www.braction.org/archives/eu/court1.html).} The convictions against the Greek-Cypriot government in a further
two cases involving Turkish-Cypriots living in the south seem to have functioned in a
similar way as regards the Greek-Cypriot positions.

In the first of these cases, Kemal Selim sued the Republic for not allowing him to
marry because the law permitting civil marriages to take place, which was passed in the
early 1990s, only referred to the Greek-Cypriot community since under the 1960
Constitution marriage law had come under the jurisdiction of the Communal Chambers and
the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber had been disbanded since 1963.\footnote{For the full text of the judgment see (http://www.cypursection.org/humanrights/echr/selimecoh/judgment.html).} The civil marriage law was
made applicable to Turkish-Cypriots and the case was settled through an amicable
agreement.

In the second case, Ibrahim Aziz sued the Greek-Cypriot government for impeding
his right to take part in elections because the government had after 1963 kept the division in
the electoral polls between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot voters but had effectively
cancelled the latter. With the measures proposed by the Government after the opening of the
Green Line, the right to take part in elections has been extended to Turkish-Cypriots and its
implementation came with the EU parliamentary elections of June 2004, when one Turkish-
Cypriot candidate ran as independent and around 500 Turkish-Cypriots were registered to vote.

In this sense, compliance with European principles regarding human rights, which the EU endorses, seems to have been the key concern that caused the Greek-Cypriot side to take legislative steps that restored the rights of Turkish-Cypriots as citizens of the Republic. At the same time however, Turkish-Cypriot politicians, activists and lawyers pointed out that the confirmation of this status of citizenship in the Republic before a final agreement on what the solution to the conflict would look like, entailed potential threats for the prospects of resolution. They argued for example, that the issue of voting could be used by the government of the Republic to retract its acceptance of the communal political rights of Turkish-Cypriots that it had previously agreed to (Olgun, 2002: 38-40).

In a wider sense, as discussed earlier, Helsinki decisions have turned into enlargement acquis for Turkey, in the sense of resolving outstanding border disputes. Coupled with the initially liberal policies of the AKP government and the election of Mehmet Ali Talat in Northern Cyprus, the EU conditionality has lead to a new period in the Cyprus conflict. However, as the EU conditionality became more strict for Turkey after its candidacy in Helsinki Summit, it is quite difficult to speak of a similar tone or vigor in the conditionalties presented to the Greek-Cypriots. As discussed, the ineffectiveness of EU conditionality on Greek-Cypriots has been made explicit during Annan plan negotiations. This fact, counted with the results of the referendums for unification, suggests that the
current balance is in fact a failure of EU involvement in Cyprus. After all the intransigent Greek-side became an EU member, whereas the solution-seeking Turkish side has been left out. Moreover the financial aid which was supposed to ease the isolations on the North has been agreed to be transferred first to the Greek-side, and then to the Turkish-side. Such a diplomatic gesture, in fact, asserts that the EU is contributing to the isolation of the North.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis has discussed the extent of EU involvement in the Turco-Hellenic conflict. The central argument of the thesis can be summarized as follows. First, theoretically, the main argument of the thesis was in line with Christou’s (2004: 11-20) argument, that EU’s CFSP and ESDP are not sufficient policy areas to analyse the full extent of EU involvement in the Turco-Hellenic conflict. Complementing these two is the EU enlargement which, through its ‘power of attraction’, can be argued to influence the conflict in positive, albeit on some occasions, also negative ways. It has primarily been the EU enlargement process and the Association Agreements that on most occasions have led to conflict diminishing measures. Moreover, it would be important to put forward that, it was EU’s ‘power of attraction’ (the importance of the possibility of membership and association) that has enabled the EU to use its policy of conditionality in the conflicts. Hence, it is mainly the importance of EU membership that has enticed the sides involved to a de-escalation of the tension (though, the long-term implications of these effects are yet to be seen).

Secondly (and more empirically) EU involvement in Greek-Turkish (Aegean) conflict, did not yield the desired results up until 1999 where Turkey was given candidate
status by the EU. Prior to that, there was a strong perception of double-standards in Turkey caused by the Greek membership to the EC in early 1981. Another reason why the EU has not played an active mediating role prior to 1999 can be explained by EU’s overall reluctance to engage in conflicts outside of its borders. That mentality has changed after Europe’s inability to deal with the Kosovo crisis and (when looked from a different perspective) the humiliation that followed the American involvement in the conflict. This failure has brought together a series of questions regarding international ‘actorness’ of the EU, where some American officials went so far to argue that Europe was a ‘paper tiger’.\(^\text{42}\) After the Kosovo crisis, the EU had to assume a more proactive stance vis-à-vis the conflicts surrounding it and such a stance was also taken vis-à-vis Greek-Turkish and Cyprus conflicts.

However, European decisiveness was not the determining factor alone. Complementing Europe’s self-definition, thirdly, the Ocalan affair and the political turmoil brought to Greece after his capture, has created a public reaction against the unnecessary adventurism of the Greek elites. In fact, this has coincided with the process of second wave of ‘Europeanization’ of Greek foreign policy (liberalizing and democratizing influences) that was already in progress since the early 1990s. On top of all these incidents, the earthquakes that occurred in Greece and Turkey in 1999 have provided a strong momentum (and in fact a concrete reason) for the rapprochement between the two countries, saving the relations from the ambiguity of the post-Kurdak and post-Ocalan status quo. As a result of

\(^{42}\) See for example NATO Secretary General George Robertson’s speech: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/546367.stm
the improving relations, Greece withdrew its veto for Turkey’s candidacy in the 1999 Helsinki Summit and was still (at the official level at least) a supporter of Turkey’s EU membership during the time this thesis was being written. Actually this policy change was also closely related to Greece’s calculations that an EU-member Turkey is for the Greek interests instead of a rejected, marginalized and frustrated one.

In the case of Cyprus, the EU’s strategy of conditionality did not produce the desired solution as well, yet similar to the Aegean dispute, it can be argued that it has brought some positive momentum which might, in the future, lead to a solution. The opening of the Green Line after 30 years and Turkey’s offer to allow Greek Cypriots to travel to Turkey after 40 years can indeed be seen as improvements. However, these improvements should be viewed as ‘socialization’ rather than a solution, since such movements in themselves are no substitute for a comprehensive settlement. In that sense, it can be argued that the accession process, at least started to change the minds and create a focus for resolving the conflict. However, such a momentum was severely damaged when the Greek-Cypriot side has voted ‘no’ to the Annan Plan. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, such an overwhelming rejection was not as much of a surprise as was the election of Papadopoulos and it can be argued (albeit ambitiously) that a settlement would have been reached had Clerides was elected in the 2003 elections instead of Papadopoulos. On the other hand, one could question to impartiality of the negotiations regarding the future of the island. Since after 1999 Southern Cyprus’ membership was ascertainment and from then onwards, Turkey and TRNC became more disadvantageous vis-à-vis Greece and the Greek-Cypriot government,
Yet, the start of accession negotiations with Turkey in 2005 carried the issue on a different platform. In the foreseeable future, one should expect an increased exposure of Turkey to the conditionality policies of the EU due to the agonizing accession process and looking at the fact these negotiations have been quite difficult for every member state, one can imagine the potential of difficulties expected to arise with Turkey’s process. And given the fact that both Greece and Greek-Cyprus are European members, it is quite possible to get into pessimistic forecasts considering the future of the issues related.

But it is also important that a unified Cyprus as a member of the EU would most probably increase Turkey’s chances for joining the EU and facilitate its integration into European governance structures. This will most probably lead to a fundamental transformation of Turkish domestic politics and political culture in general. On the other hand however, the EU has to prevent the alienation of Turkey by not asking for unnecessary concessions and prove its claim as a ‘soft security’ actor.

In fact, it is also quite arguable that EU has in fact not been an actor of soft power in the conflicts of Turkey in general, (including the Kurdish and Armenian cases) given the fact that the very concept of conditionality (rewarding and sanctioning) is actually regarded as a tool of a typical hard power. Following this logic, it is possible to see the change in the Turco-Hellenic conflict, not as a product of EU soft power, but of an EU hard power, where the hard power relates to granting/suspending/withdrawing membership, association,
candidacy or financial aid. Thus, indeed the EU has been a ‘coercive power’ in terms of its dealings with Turkey. From another point of view, Cyprus’ strategic importance can also give a serious hard power capability for the EU and increase the Union’s involvement in the eastern Mediterranean.

However, if it is the hard power capabilities of Europe that brought about such a change, then why could not the possessor of the largest hard power in the world, United States, could not bring about that change? The literature answers this question by the definition ‘power of attraction’ which (as defined in the theoretical chapter) is basically (and simplistically) the prospect of EU membership. The prestige of being a Union member and the political and economic support it brings together makes EU membership very desirable for countries to show their good intentions, in order to resume their association with the EU. Hence the short-term conditionality policies of the United States have not been as strong as were the EU policies and the rewards proposed by both powers were unequal in importance for Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.

Moreover the ‘open-ended’ nature of the accession negotiations will continue to be the main handicap towards the ultimate settlement of the disputes in question. As discussed, when the ‘carrots’ offered by the EU are vague and unpredictable in some way, the conflicting states lose incentive to work towards a solution. Following that, with open ended negotiations, Turkey could be asked to give more concessions for an uncertain reward.
Therefore, to conclude, the EU (through enlargement) has had a certain degree of effect on the Turco-Hellenic conflict. Although EU had contributed to the conflict both positively and negatively, overall, one can argue that the EU factor has contributed to the 'socialization' of the parties to the conflict. This alone can not bring about a thorough solution to the conflict. However both in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, several taboos appear to be taken out and channels of social communication are widening. When one considers the fact that no government policy can live for long without public support, the new rhetoric embraced by the Greeks and Turks can be expected to translate into further measures of rapprochement. Yet, this picture should be given a clearer membership focus.
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