

**IS THE METAPHYSICAL STATUS OF
“LANGUAGE GAME” IN LATER WITTGENSTEINIAN
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
REVOLUTIONARY OR NOT?**

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this study is to present the metaphysical status of “language game” in later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language and to deal with the revolutionary role of “language-game” by means of Hintikka’s interpretation of later Wittgenstein. It is usual to divide Wittgenstein’s work into the early and the later period. The early period is based upon the picture theory of meaning, according to which a sentence represents a state of affairs. On the other hand, the later period gives special emphasis on the actions of people and the role their linguistic activities.

The early period ignored factual or cognitive meaning since it relied on mirroring the structure of state of affairs by sentences. So, early period

of Wittgenstein was concluded that “whereof we can’t speak, thereof we must be silent.” This idea gives clues about metaphysics of early Wittgenstein. In this sense, language is treated in abstraction from activities of human beings.

In the later work, Wittgenstein emphasizes everyday usage of language in “language-game” as social activities of ordering, advising, measuring, and counting and so on. These different “language-games” make up “form of life”. “Language game” with other vital notions of later Wittgenstein, as “form of life”, “agreement” establishes language matrix. So, later period of Wittgenstein is a rejection of his early period. Actually, his treatment of philosophy and philosopher is different from his early period. In addition to this, later Wittgenstein mainly focuses on the principle of “meaning=use” which is called contextual theory of meaning. In his later period, Wittgenstein aims to bring back words from metaphysics to everyday usage. On the other hand, metaphysics still plays a role in his later period as his early period, although he altered his early philosophy of language. To sum up, the notion of “language-game” is conceptually/ ontologically prior to its rules. In this sense, Wittgenstein forms “language-game” as a model for the other social activities of human beings. Furthermore, “language-game” is regarded as a bridge between language and reality and it shows “language-game” s revolutionary role in later Wittgenstein.

Key Words: Wittgenstein, Jaakko Hintikka, language game, conceptual revolution, philosophy of language.

ÖZ

İKİNCİ DÖNEM WITTGENSTEIN DİL
FELSEFESİNDEKİ “DİL OYUNU” KAVRAMINININ
METAFİZİK STATÜSÜ
YENİLİKÇİ (DEVİRİMSEL) MİDİR?

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Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu çalışmanın amacı Hintikka'nın ikinci dönem Wittgenstein dil felsefesi yorumundan yararlanarak ikinci dönem Wittgenstein dil felsefesindeki “dil oyunu” kavramının metafizik statüsünü ve “dil oyunu”nun yenilikçi (devrimsel) rolü olup olmadığını açıklamaktır. Wittgenstein'in felsefesi iki dönemde incelenmektedir. Birinci dönem resim anlam teorisini temel almaktadır. Buna göre, cümle, hal/durumları sunmakta/yansıtmaktadır. Öte yandan, ikinci dönem, insanların sosyal ve dilsel eylemlerine önem vermektedir.

Birinci dönem, olaylara dayanan ve bilişsel olan anlamı yok saymakta ve hal/durumların cümlelerle yansıtılmasından hareket etmektedir. Bu

yüzden, Wittgenstein'in birinci dönemi, "konuşamadığımız yerde, susmalıyız." ifadesiyle özetlenebilmektedir. Bu düşünce, birinci dönem Wittgenstein'in metafizik düşüncesi hakkında ipuçları vermektedir. Böylece dil, insan eylemlerinden soyutlanarak incelenmiştir.

Wittgenstein ikinci döneminde, emir verme, tavsiye verme, ölçme ve sayma vb. nin sosyal eylemleri olarak nitelendirdiği "dil oyunu"nda dilin günlük kullanımını esas almaktadır. Farklı şekildeki dil oyunları çeşitli "yaşam formları" oluşturmaktadır. Bunun yanında, "dil oyunu", Wittgenstein'in diğer önemli kavramları, "yaşam formu" ve "görüş birliği", ile birlikte dil matrisini oluşturmaktadır. Bu yüzden Wittgenstein, ikinci döneminde, kendisinin birinci dönemine karşı çıkmaktadır. İkinci dönemde Wittgenstein "anlam kullanımıdır." prensibine odaklanmaktadır. Bu düşünce bağlamsal anlam teorisi olarak adlandırılır. İkinci dönemde Wittgenstein'in amacı kelimeleri metafizikten, günlük kullanımlarına getirmektir. Ancak, Wittgenstein'in bu düşüncesini değiştirmesine rağmen, metafiziğin, ikinci dönem Wittgenstein'da, birinci dönemde olduğu gibi, bir rolü vardır. Aslında, "dil oyunu" kavramı, dil oyunu kurallarından kavramsal ve ontolojik önceliğe sahiptir. Bu durumda, Wittgenstein "dil-oyunu" nu insanların eylemlerine model olacak şekilde biçimlendirmiştir. Wittgenstein'in "dil-oyunu" nu dil ve gerçek arasında bir köprü olarak görmesi, "dil-oyunu" kavramının devrimsel rolünü ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Wittgenstein, Jaakko Hintikka dil oyunu, kavramsal devrim, dil felsefesi.

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My interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy of language began during high school after reading the sentence of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, which said: "Whereof we can't speak, thereof we must be silent." At university, Akin Ergüden's, PhD. Professor, lectures led me to deal with later Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*. Therefore, I'm thankful to him as well. In this thesis, I benefited from otherside of Wittgenstein which manifests itself in his *Nachlass*.

I owe special thanks to my friend, Sibel Kibar for her coaching and psychological support. My thanks also go to Feride Güven, Nilgün Karabey and Öznur Hizmetli who believed and encouraged me to complete this work. Last but not least, I extend my heartfelt thanks to my family, specially to Nanic, who exerted special effort on my education.

*Grau, teurer Freund, is alle Theorie
Und grün des Lebens goldner Baum*

(Goethe, Faust, Part I)

To Otherside

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	viii
DEDICATION.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	xi
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	xiv
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EARLY AND LATER METAPHYSICS OF WITTGENSTEIN	
2.1 The Notion of Metaphysics in Early Philosophy of Wittgenstein.....	3
2.2 The Notion of Metaphysics in Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein.....	9
2.3 Later Wittgenstein’s Treatment of Philosophy.....	18

2.4 Later Wittgenstein’s Treatment of Philosopher.....	21
2.5 Does Later Wittgenstein’s view of Metaphysics support Popperian Thesis of Metaphysics: “Many metaphysical theories are meaningful.”?.....	24
3 THE NOTION OF LANGUAGE GAME	
3.1 What does Wittgenstein mean by “language game, form of life, grammar, family resemblance”?.....	31
3.2 Contextual Theory of Meaning in Later Wittgenstein: “The name ‘Moses’ can be defined by means of various descriptions...”.....	36
3.3 What is the connection between human agreement and truth?.....	40
3.4 Is language game a “conceptual revolution”?	43
3.5 Hintikka’s interpretation of language-game as conceptual revolution.....	44
4. CONCLUSION	48
REFERENCES.....	54

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

Figure 1- The Notion of Practice..... 30

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- TLP* *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. by D.F. Pears and McGuinness (London: Routledge, 1961).
- PG* *Philosophical Grammar*, edit. By R. Rhees, trans. by A. Kenny(Oxford: Blackwell, 1974).
- BB* *The Blue and Brown Books*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1958).
- N* *Notebooks*, trans. by Anscombe G.E.M, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969.
- PI* *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. R.Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd edition (New York:Blackwell, 1958).
- Z* *Zettel*, edit by G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, (Berkeley: University of California, 1970).

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Ludwig Wittgenstein is regarded as the most controversial philosopher of the twentieth century since his philosophy indicates zig zag improvisations, as called Tractarian Wittgenstein and later Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*. On the other hand, apart from his writings, it is vital that how many people he influenced, yet his early work was taken up by some of the pioneers of analytical philosophy and his later work led to another movement, that of ordinary language. Meanwhile, he is also considered as a key to bridge the gap between analytical and so-called continental philosophy. Thus, all these points indicate the importance of dealing with Wittgensteinian philosophy of language. However, it is vital to pay careful attention to which Wittgenstein is being taken into consideration. In fact, I deal with the metaphysical status of “language game” in later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language whether “conceptual revolution” or not.

In Chapter 1, I deal with the notion of metaphysics of early Wittgenstein and later Wittgenstein. On account of displaying the

spirit of later Wittgenstein, I focus on later Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophy and then later Wittgenstein's treatment of philosopher. In this sense, philosophers' treatment of philosophy clarifies the misinterpretations of philosophy of Wittgenstein, actually in his two periods. In addition to this, later Wittgenstein's metaphysics, leads to deal with the Popperian thesis of metaphysics viz., "many metaphysical theories are meaningful" since later Wittgenstein's view of metaphysics has kinship with Popper's view of metaphysics. This case shows that how Wittgenstein brings back words from metaphysics to everyday usage.

In Chapter 2, considering the view of metaphysics later Wittgenstein, I analyze the notion of "language game". Primarily, I explain core notions of later Wittgenstein, "form of life", "grammar", and "family resemblance" with core element of later Wittgenstein: "language game". Then, the later Wittgenstein's theory of meaning, as called contextual theory of meaning, is dealt with in the case of "The name 'Moses' can be defined by means of various descriptions..." in *Philosophical Investigations*. In this sense, what Wittgenstein means "meaning is use" is dealt with. Hence, the notions of "human agreement" and "truth" is explicated on account of displaying the background of later Wittgenstein's leading concepts, "language game", "form of life".

Finally, I focus on whether “language game” is a “conceptual revolution” or not. In this sense, all of these notions which have been explained are considered into a pot in order to investigate revolutionary role of “language game” in way of Hintikka’s philosophy.

In this thesis, my aim is firstly to clarify the role of metaphysics in early and later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language. With regards to his later view of metaphysics, my main aim is to deal with the revolutionary role of “language game” with other vital notions of later Wittgenstein, as “form of life”, “agreement”, all of which establish language matrix of later Wittgenstein.

CHAPTER 2

ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EARLY AND LATER METAPHYSICS OF WITTGENSTEIN

2.1 The Notion of Metaphysics in Early Philosophy of Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein introduces two quite distinct philosophies. What led him to abandon his views in the *Tractatus*? What provided the stimulus to produce the new philosophy to be found in his *Philosophical Investigations*? Von Wright has emphasized that “The Later Wittgenstein did not receive an inspiration from outside like that which the earlier Wittgenstein got from Frege and Russell”¹

To begin with Early Wittgenstein’s Philosophy: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. It indicates the physical sciences, engineering and logic background of Wittgenstein and his views about the nature

¹ Von Wright, G.H. : Biographical Sketch. Printed with *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir* by N.Malcom, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 5.

of language, viz. that consists of elementary propositions which picture reality and which are glued together by logical connectives to form complex propositions.² Meaningful propositions are either logical contradictions or logically valid propositions or empirical propositions of the natural sciences, which is surely the sphere of the empirically discoverable. The best known thesis of the *TLP* is that “metaphysical” statements are non-sensical, and that the only sayable things are propositions of natural science.³

However, what Wittgenstein actually thought when writing the *Tractatus* is much less important than how he was interpreted by Vienna Circle.

Maslow states that there are occasional traces of metaphysical realism in Wittgenstein’s discussion of Logic because of the influence of Platonism of Frege and the recurrent Platonism of Russell.⁴

Logic occasionally seems to be considered by Wittgenstein as some hidden feature of the structure of reality itself:

² Wittgenstein, L. : *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Edited by B. F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg [and] G. H. von Wright, with a translation by D. F. Pears, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1971, 4.21.

³ *Ibid.*, 6.53.

⁴ Maslow, Alexander: *A Study in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961, pp.11-13.

Logic is ... reflexion of the world.
The propositions show the logical form
of reality.
It must show something about the world
that certain combinations of
symbols...are tautologies.⁵

If we consider tautologies to be based on atomic propositions,
and atomic propositions as representing absolute metaphysical
atomic facts, then we have sense of logic which is based on
metaphysical character of reality:

Elementary propositions which consists
of names and that names mean object
are atoms and they are atomic
propositions. On the other hand, Non-
elementary (complex) propositions are
molecular and they are molecu-
lar propositions.⁶

Such passages suggest that there is something hidden or secret
in our world, metaphysical structure which are endeavour to bring
into light⁷. Moreover, Maslow claims that there is ominal
metaphysical tendency in *TLP*.⁸

⁵ Wittgenstein, L. : *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Edited by
B. F. McGuinness, T.Nyberg [and] G. H. von Wright, with a
translation by D. F. Pears, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University
Press, 1971, 6.13, 4.121, 6.124.

⁶ Ibid., 4.22- 3.203.

⁷ Gillies, Donald : *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth
Century*, Part IV: "The Demarcation between Science and
Metaphysics, Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the
Vienna Circle and Popper's Critique" , USA, Blackwell
Publishers,1993, pp.151-189.

⁸ Maslow, Alexander: *A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus*,
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1961, pp.11-13.

Wittgenstein considers all metaphysics non-sensical, but occasionally he succumbs to the temptation of talking metaphysical non-sense. It seems that at times he means by object “the ultimate ontological simple entities out of which the real world in itself”⁹. In this sense, the influence on Wittgenstein is a kind of Platonic Realism of Frege. Thus Wittgenstein says:”Object from substance of the world...what exists independently of what is the case”¹⁰

Therefore, it is suggested that it may be that we have no direct acquaintance with objects. Realism claims that Language/thought can be compared with reality and found to “agree” with it. When Wittgenstein speaks of the logical features of the world, he simply means the “internal” or grammatical properties of the language which “reflect” the world. Therefore, these grammatical properties of the language are applicable to the world. Indeed, “the logical form of reality” is all shown in our propositions. Meanwhile, we know the world by the grammar of our language.

His early philosophy, as is interpreted by the Vienna Circle concentrated more on distinguishing science from metaphysics. Therefore, the demarcation problem is one of the central issues

⁹ Wittgenstein, L. : *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Edited by B. F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg [and] G. H. von Wright, with a translation by D. F. Pears, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1971, 1.213.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.01, 2.024, 4.2211.

in Wittgenstein's first philosophical work. That's clear from what Wittgenstein wrote to Russell:

The main point is the theory of What can be expressed (*gesagt* by propositions- i.e. by language [sic]- and which comes to the same, what can ve thought, my emphasis) and what cannot be expressed by proposition, but only shown (*gezeigt*, my emphasis); which I believe is the cardinal problem of philosophy.¹¹

As is seen, the distinction between what can be expressed and what can only be shown is, within the framework of *TLP*, the distinction between science and metaphysics. "It's certainly not the solution of any problems of natural sciences that is required."¹²

The interpretation of Wittgenstein by Vienna Circle and Carnap's idea is that metaphysics is entirely meaningless— "Metaphysicians as musician without musical ability."¹³ And Wittgenstein's attitude was somewhat different from that of Carnap and most of other members of the Vienna Circle. In *TLP* he developed a theory of mystical.

¹¹ Russell, B.: *Autobiography*, vol. 2., Allen & Unwin, 1968, p.188.

¹² Wittgenstein, L. : *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Edited by B. F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg [and] G. H. von Wright, with a translation by D. F. Pears, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1971, 6.4321.

¹³ Gillies, Donald : *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century*, Part IV: "The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics, Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Popper's Critique" , USA, Blackwell Publishers,1993, pp. 151-189.

The key point here is that, for Wittgenstein in *TLP*, the limits of what can be meaningfully said do not coincide with the limits of what can be thought. On the contrary there are things which cannot be said, but which can nonetheless be shown or thought which make themselves manifest.¹⁴

As Wittgenstein himself put in the preface of the *TLP*:

There only in language that the limit can be set, what lies on the other side of the limit will simply by nonsense.¹⁵

Thus, we might understand the meaning of life in a mystical experience, but we can't communicate this understanding in words. If someone "treats metaphysics as magical" he shows that he misunderstands what being a symbol, having a memory, or being language is. With remarks on metaphysics as a form of magic, Wittgenstein spoke in the *TLP* and elsewhere of "misunderstanding the logic of our language."¹⁶ So, misunderstanding of the logic of language (or of the way language functions) gives rise to metaphysics but it does not mean that metaphysics puts forward a theory of language which is wrong.

¹⁴ Wittgenstein, L. : *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Edited by B. F. McGuinness, T. Nyberg [and] G. H. von Wright, with a translation by D. F. Pears, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1971, 6.522.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.3.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.29.

In conclusion for this part, Wittgenstein claims that philosophical writings are meaningless, yet *TLP* is itself a philosophical writing. The doctrines of the *TLP* “make themselves manifest” are true; but they can’t be meaningfully stated in words.¹⁷ Something had indeed gone wrong, but Wittgenstein said that the whole philosophy is wrong not only his philosophy.¹⁸

2.2 The Notion of Metaphysics in Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein

His later *Denkweise*¹⁹ can be regarded as a battle against his own earlier philosophy and a struggle to the attempts to imitate a scientific way of thinking by offering causal psychological explanations of language.

There is a deep irony in Wittgenstein’s struggle against the scientific intellectual fashions as he defined. In other words, it would seem possible to interpret Wittgenstein’s struggle against the “scientific” intellectual current as an endorsement of metaphysics.

¹⁷ Ibid., 6.54.

¹⁸ Markov, B. : “Language as a Form of Life”, from the world wide web:
http://www.Argumentationspb.ru/2000_1/Sum/1_2000s.htm, 1999.

¹⁹ *Denkweise* means way of thinking, yet especially it implies the later philosophy of Wittgenstein in German.

Wittgenstein's later philosophy is definitely an opposition to metaphysics, but it's an opposition which is wholly consistent with, and indeed fundamental to, his repudiation of a 'scientific way of thinking'. His opposition involved a differentiation between logical concern with the meaning or use of daily language expressions (a concern to clarify the linguistic facts) and scientific concerns about the nature of things— for example, a concern with making discoveries and offering theories (causal) explanations and hypotheses about phenomena.²⁰

This very demarcation between “scientific” or empirical concerns and everyday expressions of language was essential to his view of metaphysics in his later writings.²¹ Wittgenstein identified the tendency to treat philosophical questions as “scientific” issues with the confusion of factual and conceptual concerns— the latter being precisely what he considered to be the essential characteristic of metaphysics.²²

²⁰ Hilmy, S. Stephen : *The Later Wittgenstein. The Emergence of New Philosophical Method*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989.

²¹ There is a somewhat unconventional view of metaphysics in Wittgensteinian philosophy of language. Wittgenstein characterized metaphysics in a such way as to distinguish it from what he considered to be the proper task of philosophy. He regards philosophical investigations as conceptual investigations and the essential thing about metaphysics is that the difference between factual and conceptual investigations is not clear to it, so a metaphysical question is always in appearance a factual one, although the problem is conceptual one in *Remarks on Philosophy of Psychology* (Blackwell, 1980).

²² Ibid.

To this end, it's essential to note that not only that a “scientific way of thinking” is generally identified as the source of metaphysics, but also that there is explicit mention of the sorts of methodological features: namely, the inclination to explain, and the attempt to reduce (or analyze) things into something else, presumably to more simple things, analogous, for example, to the reduction of a substance to its chemical elements.²³

Wittgensteinian “ideal” Tractarian conception of language is regarded as the source of the metaphysical use of several expressions; for example, object, name, propositions.²⁴ It was his complaint that his conception of the essence of language, of the “general form of propositions”, had entailed perceiving ordinary language (meaningful discourse) as reducible to (analyzable in terms of) a purely simple or primary language of real names and real propositions designating the elemental constitution of the world i.e. “objects” and their elemental “complexes”.²⁵

²³ Gillies, Donald : *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century*, Part IV: “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics, Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Popper’s Critique” , USA, Blackwell Publishers,1993, pp. 151-189.

²⁴ Hilmy, S.Stephen : *The Later Wittgenstein. The Emergence of New Philosophical Method*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd.,1989, p.223.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.257.

Furthermore, it was his Tractarian uses of such words that were cited by him as prime examples of expressions in need of “being brought back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.”²⁶

In addition to this, William James regards Wittgensteinian later philosophy of language as “the science of finite individual minds.”²⁷ In this sense, according to James, Wittgenstein discussed almost no scientific questions. Wittgenstein’s movements are merely attempts to extricate himself from the cobwebs of his earlier metaphysics. In order to realize the explanation of language by means of causal associationist laws which are exemplified by some of the “scientific” research in so called psychometrics. Wittgenstein touch upon this point with the case of Mr. Ballard as follows:

William James in order to shew that thought is possible without speech, quotes the recollection of a deaf-mute, Mr. Ballard even before he could speak, he had thoughts about God and the world.²⁸

In this sense, Wittgenstein points the role of the memory phenomenon, and memory reaction is essential or intrinsic rather

²⁶ In *TLP*, he assumed the possibly of a purely simple, ideal (phenomenal) language in terms of which the meaningful propositions of our everyday language could be completely analyzed. In *PI* § 116, name, object, proposition are, of course, among those words “as used by philosophers but in need of being brought back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” (*PI*, §116).

²⁷ Hilmy, S. Stephen : *The Later Wittgenstein. The Emergence of New Philosophical Method*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989, p.258.

²⁸ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 342.

than some such explanations as Mr Ballard's which rely on so-called "scientific" ground. Thus James' explanations becomes pseudo-scientific although he criticized Wittgenstein as asking no scientific questions. Thought and language or speech relation is that "Speech with and without thought is to be compared with the playing of a piece of music with and without thought."²⁹

On the other hand, apart from Wittgenstein's conflicts with William James, in his early philosophy, Wittgenstein's attempt to discover the "general form of a proposition" led to a false 'idealized' conception of language since language in this sense could be reduced to or analyzed in terms of discovered (or, rather discoverable) elemental constituents, which was a 'scientific' way of thinking³⁰. Therefore, the philosophers, constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads to philosopher into complete darkness. "I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is purely descriptive."³¹

The issue of metaphysical also arose earlier, "when Wittgenstein was cited as having charged that William James, his effects of

²⁹ Ibid., § 341.

³⁰ Wittgenstein, Ludwig : *The Blue and Brown Books*,. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, 9.514.

³¹ Ibid., p. 18.

“scientific” mode of reflection notwithstanding, had not freed himself from “the cobwebs of metaphysics in which he is caught.”³² Wittgenstein only wriggles at this point. Wittgenstein considered James’ ‘scientific’ or pseudo-scientific speculations to be prime examples of a misguided attempt to offer explanations. It’s clear from what has been mentioned above that Wittgenstein considered it precisely the tendency to think scientifically, by attempting to offer causal, psychological explanations. This was, to a certain extent, the source of some of the metaphysical cobwebs in which James was caught.³³

In the *BB*, in the general context of a discussion of questions concerning the meaning of signs, Wittgenstein expresses such questions as “What is the meaning of a word?” or “What is the object of a thought?” These questions about special sorts of psychological things or process can be answered by offering psychological (causal) explanations of the meaning of signs.³⁴ Hence, words and sentences in terms of accompanying ‘feelings’ or mental processes are to take questions about language in a metaphysical way. Moreover, it is to take questions about language, questions about signs including, I mean, I think, I

³² Frank, M. : *What’s neo Structuralism?*, Trans. by Sabine Wilke and Richard Gray, Forward by Martin Schwab, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p. 8.

³³ Wittgenstein, Ludwig : *The Blue and Brown Books*,. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, 9.514.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

expect, as analogous to a question of physics like asking: “What are the ultimate constituents of matter”.³⁵

It's to take a question about language in a way that renders it a typically metaphysical question: “The characteristic of a metaphysical question being that it expresses an unclarity about the grammar of words [including the words, I mean, I think, and so on] in the form of a scientific question”³⁶ For Wittgenstein, giving explanations of the meaning of signs in terms of a queer “mechanism of mind” that gives the signs their “life”, a mechanism which “must be of a most peculiar kind to be able to do what the mind does.”³⁷

In his early time, Wittgenstein asserted that our problem was not a scientific one; but a conceptual muddle; for example, about such expressions as ‘I think, I mean, etc.’ results in a scientific problem. Therefore, Wittgenstein, incidentally, did not consider the ‘metaphysical confusion’ of conceptual and factual matters as province of ‘scientific philosophers’. He considered scientist themselves to be often guilty of such confusion.³⁸

³⁵ Ibid., p. 35.

³⁶ Hilmy, S. Stephen : *The Later Wittgenstein. The Emergence of New Philosophical Method*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989, p. 258.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., 1. 518.

Moreover, it was not, therefore, out of any love for metaphysics or metaphysical theology. Wittgenstein, in his later time, was in the process of abandoning, or perhaps already abandoned, his own earlier identification of meaningful statements with the empirical propositions of natural science. In this sense, Wittgenstein found the views and scientific attitude of Vienna Circle repugnant or offensive.³⁹ The scope of his conception of metaphysics was such that it encompassed not only traditional metaphysics, but also, and especially, the dominant mode of reflection or view of metaphysics in his century.

Nevertheless, there is deep irony in his view of metaphysics. For Wittgenstein, scientific reflection, instead of being free of metaphysics, is itself a form of metaphysics, as source of the metaphysics of epoch when he postulated his *Denkweise*. For him, “a metaphysician” is defined in terms of the perspective of that Struggle⁴⁰ which was his later philosophy, as it were, a philosopher playing scientist— that is, a philosopher who treats a conceptual matter as if it were a factual one. It would seem that the intellectual tendency toward ‘a scientific way of thinking’, itself

³⁹ Gillies, Donald : *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century*, Part IV: “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics, Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Popper’s Critique” , USA, Blackwell Publishers,1993, pp. 151-189.

⁴⁰ Struggle as *Kampf* in this sense explains Wittgenstein’s turn in his philosophy since “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language”, *PI*, § 109.

is viewed by him as stemming from language, from the misleading expression of language. Thus, Wittgenstein concluded that “ultimate source of metaphysics of during his later time lying into language itself which lures us, tempts us, tricks us into confusing conceptual and factual matters”.⁴¹

In a nutshell, the Denkweise of later time of Wittgenstein seems to be against to scientific intellectual fashion, however, in deep sense, it indicates an irony on the idea of his later view of metaphysics. As he explicitly phrased this broader point in *BB* before *PI*:

Not surprisingly, in the general context of a repudiation of the talk of some philosophers about ‘analyzing’ the meaning of words as if such an effort were a kind of scientific investigation into the word really means.⁴²

In the *PI*, Wittgenstein regards philosophy as a fight against the fascination forms of expression which exert upon human beings. And similarly in the context of his familiar repudiation of a scientific way of thinking, in his later time it is broadly stressed that philosophy is struggle [*Kampf*] against the bewitchment of understanding by means of language as mentioned above. This

⁴¹ Hacker, G.P. & Backer, P.M.S. : *Language Sense & Nonsense, A Critical Investigation into Modern Theories of Language*, New York, USA, Basil Blackwell Inc.,1986, pp.267-307.

⁴² Wittgenstein, Ludwig : *The Blue and Brown Books*,. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, p. 38.

idea of Wittgenstein occurs in his *Nachlass* as “Philosophy is a struggle against the fascination of language”.⁴³

2.3 Later Wittgenstein’s Treatment of Philosophy

“Main cause of philosophical disease one sided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example.”⁴⁴ Here Wittgenstein declares that the referential, correspondence theory of his early time, as the trends of logical positivism, cannot be applicable. Besides, regarding the idea of one to one correspondence (word-object) as the only method in all philosophy even in “one nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind of example” results in tragic cases; that is an actually “philosophical disease” which is another part of a problem that is related to philosopher’s treatment which will be mentioned in next part of this chapter.

The expression “one-sided diet” indicates our way of thinking which is originated on one word corresponds to one single object that continues in science and philosophy. That principle is regarded in theory of truth which is a superficial one.⁴⁵

⁴³ Wittgenstein changes “Philosophy is a struggle against the fascination of language” which is in his *Nachlass* as “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” in *PI*, § 109 .

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, § 593.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

Apart from this way of thinking, Wittgenstein constructs a theory of contextual language. In *PI*, he criticizes the ostensive definition in this sense and he adds the notion of “form of life” and “language game” in his new theory. That idea is the contextuality of language with the notions of “form of life”, “language game” which implies matrix of Wittgensteinian theory of language. Thus, His “philosophical investigations are such conceptual investigations”.⁴⁶ As the case of philosophical disease Wittgenstein says:

When philosophers use a word—“knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name” -- and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is its original home?—What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.⁴⁷

This is a rejection of his Tractarian uses of such words in order to cure such philosophical disease. Hence, his later philosophy is considered as a reaction against “perceived general intellectual scientific trend of our times”.⁴⁸ This is an idea of the explanation of language by means of associationist laws is a pervasive intellectual fashion of the day as which William James points out

⁴⁶ Hilmy, S.Stephen : *The Later Wittgenstein. The Emergence of New Philosophical Method*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd.,1989, pp.190-226.

⁴⁷ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 116.

⁴⁸ Hilmy, S.Stephen : *The Later Wittgenstein. The Emergence of New Philosophical Method*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd.,1989, pp.190-226.

in his psychological investigations as mentioned. In *BB*, Wittgenstein explicates how philosophers see the method of science and he concludes that they consider the method of science before their eyes and this “leads to philosopher into complete darkness.”⁴⁹ This is a result of “reducing anything to anything”, which asserted that “Philosophy is only descriptive.”⁵⁰ Since there is no one essence to which everything refers, contextuality and in some sense relativity are vital notions in his theory. Moreover, “words like ‘language’, ‘experience’, ‘world’, have a use, and must be as humble a one that of the words ‘table’, ‘lamp’, ‘door’”.⁵¹ So, language or world is the same as table or lamp. They are not special metaphysical status. In this sense, philosophy is, for Wittgenstein, an activity not a system of metaphysical doctrines, actually his philosophy based upon the rejection of advocacy of theories which imposes a picture on our life. In other words, philosophy ought to look at the solution of philosophical disease by reconsidering the philosophical problems in terms of their different understandings in use.

He finally concludes: “A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.”

⁴⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig : *The Blue and Brown Books*,. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958, p. 38.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p.18.

⁵¹ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 97.

⁵² Disregarding the criterion of “meaning is use” in different contexts results in philosophical disease. It is prominent that “there is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” ⁵³

In conclusion, philosophy for Wittgenstein, is a fight against the fascination forms of expression which exert upon us. In short, this philosophical disease stems from narrow knowledge of understanding. So it is important to think of the the word in its use.

2.4 Later Wittgenstein’s Treatment of Philosopher

Wittgenstein states that “the philosopher’s treatment of a question, is like the treatment of illness”.⁵⁴ This quotation on the one hand, in general sense, reveals his attitudes to the task of philosopher, and, on the other hand, shows that it is impossible to consider Wittgensteinian theory of language apart from basic concepts, such as “language-game”, “form of life”. The essential principle of *PI* is to consider a word in the framework of a language game. Thinking of a word in isolation from its language game which results in so many problems. A word gains meaning

⁵² Ibid., § 122.

⁵³ Ibid., § 133.

⁵⁴ Ibid., § 255.

contextually. In other words, it is the language-game which determines or orders a meaning to a word in a context. Indeed, Wittgenstein holds his philosophical investigations as “shed[ing] light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away”.⁵⁵ In addition, his attitude towards philosophy is similar to his *TLP* time as he emphasizes the elucidatory side of philosophy; of course the method is so different that in *TLP* he considered philosophy on the ground of logic.⁵⁶ Furthermore later Wittgenstein considers philosophy as therapeutic.⁵⁷

Philosophers’ treatment of philosophy is important in that sense since Wittgenstein rejects all the theories of language which remained in his early time. In addition to this, the reification of all the problems in philosophy is an illness in the account of Wittgenstein and that illness is related to thinking of both the theory of language and theory of truth as same as *TLP*. This is the problem of naming theory in which all words are reduced to names.

Wittgenstein maintains that the illness in question is the bewitchment of intelligence by language. In that sense, he states

⁵⁵ Ibid., § 90.

⁵⁶ Wittgenstein, *TLP*, 4.112.

⁵⁷ Wittgenstein regards philosophical methods as different therapies, actually he rejects only one method as seen in *PI*, § 133.

that scientists, logicians, mathematicians, and philosophers who think in this way, are confused by their approach to the task of language. Hence, “it is difficult to capture the vagueness of natural language with fixed rules.”⁵⁸ Therefore, philosophical elucidation is vital on the basis of his contextual theory of meaning. This kind of work is the explicit and prominent features of philosophy. Another quality of philosophy is that it makes explicit the statement by giving the essence of the condition as it is. Thus, he criticizes idleness of language that stems from using or considering the language in wrong way that is actually illness.⁵⁹

Hence, philosophy reaches us beyond the limits of language, in so doing it bumps itself. “These bumps make us the value of the discovery”.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Gillies, Donald : *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century*, Part IV: “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics, Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Popper’s Critique”, USA, Blackwell Publishers,1993, pp.151-189.

⁵⁹ His rejection is that “Naming is so far not a move in the language-game- any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. This was what Frege meant too, when he said that a word had meaning only as part of a sentence.” As seen in *PI*, § 49- § 50.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, §119.

2.5 Does Later Wittgenstein's view of Metaphysics support Popperian Thesis of Metaphysics: "Many metaphysical theories are meaningful."?

In *PI*, Wittgenstein introduces a new theory of meaning on new metaphysical background apart from his early time of philosophy of language as mentioned above. This linguistic and metaphysical turn of Wittgenstein can be used to defend Popper's thesis that many metaphysical theories are meaningful.⁶¹ Moreover, Popper's falsificationism and Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language were reactions against logical positivism.⁶²

Popper puts forward two basic criticisms of the Vienna Circle's view on science and metaphysics. First of all, he proposed that verifiability should be replaced by falsifiability, which is not demarcation of meaningful and non-meaningful but rather sense or nonsense, as the criterion of demarcation between science and metaphysics.⁶³ Secondly, he claimed that metaphysics, though different from science, was in general meaningful, and might even be positively helpful to science in some cases. For

⁶¹ Gillies, Donald : *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century*, Part IV: "The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics, Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Popper's Critique", USA, Blackwell Publishers, 1993, pp.151-189.

⁶² Carvi, R. : *An Introduction to The Thought of Karl Popper*, Routledge, London & NY, 1997, pp.20-23.

⁶³ Ibid.

Popper, the demarcation between science and metaphysics is not a demarcation between sense and nonsense.

Popper regarded the problem of meaning as a pseudo- problem, so he never felt any interest in.⁶⁴ He criticized Wittgenstein's *TLP* in a decisive way. Yet, Wittgenstein himself criticized his earlier Tractarian views and developed a quite different approach in his later work, *PI*. In *PI*, the main thesis is that the meaning of a word is given by its use in a language-game.⁶⁵

Wittgenstein introduces the concept of language-game as follows: "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it's woven, the language game".⁶⁶ Here the term "language game" is meant to bring prominence the fact that the speaking of language is a part of an activity, or of a form of life.⁶⁷ Wittgenstein's notions of "language game" and "form of life" are explained by "meeting of metaphysicians" as follows:

Imagine a group of people who meet regularly on Wednesday afternoons to discuss metaphysical questions. They could be Catholic theologians, for example, or Hegelian philosophers. They will certainly use a large number of curious words and expressions, such as 'essence', 'ground of being',

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 23.

⁶⁶ Ibid., § 7.

⁶⁷ Ibid., § 23.

'dialectic' and so on. Yet, this discourse is not arbitrary, but rule-guided. A beginner who uses an expression incorrectly is reprimanded, and may even be ostracized if he or she does not conform. Within the group, it is well-known who are the experts whose pronouncements are listened to with most respect, and so on. Here surely, we have a language-game (the term 'game' is perhaps more appropriate in this instance), a rule-guided activity, or a form of life.⁶⁸

In this case, within this language-game, words and expressions have a use which is circumscribed by rules and conventions. On Wittgenstein's theory of meaning, therefore, these words and expressions have meaning, and that the metaphysical discourse is meaningful. Would Wittgenstein himself have agreed with this use of his Investigations theory of meaning to support his rival Popper? Gillies answered that there is one passage for this question, where the multiplicity of language games is introduced by giving a long list of games.⁶⁹ This list includes praying, which suggests that Wittgenstein would have included religious ceremonies as language games, and so would have been committed to the view that religious discourse in general, and theology in particular, was meaningful.

⁶⁸ Gillies, Donald : *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century*, Part IV: "The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics, Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Popper's Critique", USA, Blackwell Publishers, 1993, pp.151-189.

⁶⁹ In § 23 of *PI*, Wittgenstein lists the kinds of language games which are put in Chapter 2: *The Notion of Language Game*.

However, there are a few indications that Wittgenstein moved, in his later period, towards the view that religious and metaphysical discourse were meaningful. Moreover, Wittgenstein states that “My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent non-sense.”⁷⁰ This passage is very similar to a passage from the *TLP* namely:

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following:.. whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions.⁷¹

At this point, *PI* by and large stuck to *TLP* view that metaphysical statements are meaningless.⁷²

Wittgenstein introduced new theory of meaning, holding his old view of the senselessness of metaphysics, which is actually incompatible with this new account of meaning.⁷³ Thus, nonsensical character of metaphysics could be defended in terms of the Investigations theory of meaning.

⁷⁰ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 464.

⁷¹ Wittgenstein, *TLP*, 6.53.

⁷² Gillies, Donald : *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century*, Part IV: “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics, Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Popper’s Critique”, USA, Blackwell Publishers,1993, pp.151-189.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

In Wittgenstein's famous example, the boss shouts 'Slab' and a worker goes off and brings a-slab in order to build a house. In this case, worker has to bring a-slab to the boss since it is somehow a game and rules reveals during this activity—bringing the slab to the boss. It's called as language-game by Wittgenstein. This rule-guided social activity of boss and worker gives meaning to the word 'slab'. In this sense, to contrast with the Gillies' metaphysical discussion group—as considering whether the essence of the ground of being implies existence and so on—Wittgenstein might say that words acquire meaning in the practical everyday social activities of the building site, but not in the purely theoretical discussions of groups of philosophers.⁷⁴ In later Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, there are hints of such view as follows:

We have under such an illusion that the order existing between the concepts of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order is a super-order between- so to speak – super- concepts. Whereas, of course, if the words 'language', 'experience', 'world', 'have a use', it must be humble a one as that of the words 'table', 'lamp', 'door'.⁷⁵

It looks here as if a genuine use of a word can only be a “humble” one. In addition to this, Wittgenstein asserts that “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 97.

use.”⁷⁶ This later Wittgenstein’s core of new theory of meaning is called as “populist flavour which means words acquire genuine meanings in practical everyday social activities in which workers lift slabs across building sites...”⁷⁷

Now, analyzing another example of Gillies:

A piece of pure mathematics is developed by a grasp of pure mathematics. It’s then taken up by a group of theoretical physicist and used in the creation of a new physical theory. Finally, this theory is used in a practical application perhaps even in house building. Suppose, further, that we adopt the view that a term is meaningful only if it is used in a practical everyday social activity and not when it is used in purely theoretical discourse.⁷⁸

It’s evident that the mathematical theory is meaningless while the theory is being developed by the pure mathematicians. Then, it is still meaningless when it is used to create the new physical theory. However, it becomes meaningful when that theory is applied to house building.⁷⁹ Thus they were meaningful through practice.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Ibid., §116.

⁷⁷ Gillies, Donald : *Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century*, Part IV: “The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics, Is Metaphysics Meaningless? Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Popper’s Critique”, USA, Blackwell Publishers, 1993, pp.151-189.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.




Figure 1- The notion of Practice

Furthermore, Popper criticized Tractarian time of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as the view of logical positivism, in decisive way. That is a mere picturing or mirroring of reality.⁸¹ Moreover, Popper's main objection to ordinary language philosophy stems from later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language is that "all philosophical problems cannot be reduced to questions concerning the use of language or the meaning of terms."⁸² In this sense, analyzing the Popperian thesis that many metaphysical theories are meaningful shows the difference between metaphysics of later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language and his Tractarian time.⁸³

Popper's falsificationism and Wittgensteinian later philosophy are reactions to logical positivism. For Rodnitzky, the differences

⁸¹ Kraft, V. : "Popper and The Vienna Circle", *The Vienna Circle*, the origin of neo-positivism; a chapter in the history of recent philosophy, translated by Arthur Pap, New York, Philosophical Library, 1953. pp.188-201.

⁸² Carvi, R. : *An Introduction to The Thought of Karl Popper*, Routledge, London & NY, 1997, pp.166-169.

⁸³ Ibid.

between the two far from negligible. Popper, then, was criticized by Toulmin, Kuhn, Feyerabend, all greatly indebted to the later Wittgenstein.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER 3

THE NOTION OF LANGUAGE GAME

3.1 What does Wittgenstein mean by “language game, form of life, grammar, family resemblance”?

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein abandoned his views in the *TLP* and he constructed a theory of language which is a kind of zigzag improvisation.⁸⁵ In this sense, what the stimulus to produce the new philosophy provides is an essential question in his masterpiece, *PI*. In his later philosophy, he introduces the concepts of “language-game”, “form of life”, “family resemblance”, which are based upon the existence of grammar of language, that are attached each other in his matrix of theory of language.⁸⁶

His famous “Slab” example, in which A calls out the word ‘slab’ and B acts on that call by taking a piece of stone to the builder, is a kind of teaching-learning activity, since it includes the activity of

⁸⁵ Shibbes, W. : *Wittgenstein Language and Philosophy*, The Language Press, USA, 1969, pp. 1-8.

⁸⁶ Knott, H. : “Before Language and After”, *Philosophical Investigations*, 21:1, January 1998, pp.45-54.

repetition. Wittgenstein thinks of this process as resembling the process of language by analogy, and he concludes that it is possible to think this activity of language as a game and he uses the term “language-game” as “the whole [a]ctivity, consisting of the language and the actions into which is woven”.⁸⁷ He indicated that words do not simply name but have meaning as a part of language and they get meaning by their use in language.⁸⁸

In this way, the notion of later Wittgensteinian contextual theory of language reveals: The words have meaning as part of a context or situation. In that sense, Wittgenstein emphasizes the living side of language as an organism, “languages always growing like a town”.⁸⁹ At this point, he introduces another chain of theory of language, that is, form of life.⁹⁰

In addition to this, the criterion of “meaning=use” displays that the words are comprehended in certain situations for certain purposes. Indeed, it is prominent that what is the function of this word in such situations or in such contexts. Hence, Wittgenstein uses the concept language-game as “the speaking of language is a part of an activity, or a form of life”.⁹¹ This results in a definite

⁸⁷Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 7.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, § 43.

⁸⁹ Wittgenstein, Ludwig : *Zettel*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1967.

⁹⁰ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 19.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, § 23.

close connection between language-game and form of life, which is a side of living organism of language, real human activity.

Wittgenstein considers “form of life” as a background of our language which means the roots of language and of agreement in application of linguistic rules lies beneath consensus.⁹² The notion of “form of life” is a pragmatic sign of Wittgensteinian theory of language in this view. He just means the real life itself by this concept instead of giving an emphasis on philosophical point of life. On the other hand, the expression: “to imagine a language is to animate a form of life” shows the realms of others’ form of life.⁹³ In a nutshell, “form of life” reminds that there is no a system without relations independent from our life.

“Grammar” and “family resemblance” are the other core elements of Wittgensteinian theory of language, both of which complete the former notions.⁹⁴ The role of grammar in his philosophy can be considered as a stimulus to change his philosophy. Wittgenstein considers the aim of grammar as “the rules of the grammar may be called ‘arbitrary’, if that is to mean that the aim

⁹² Searle, John : “Background”, *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, P.141-159, USA, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

⁹³ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 19.

⁹⁴ Hintikka J. & M. : *Investigating Wittgenstein*, Basil, Blackwell, 1986, pp. 166-212.

of the grammar is nothing but that of the language”.⁹⁵ In this sense, he does not give an essential role to grammar in his theory, actually he restricted the schema of grammar apart from his early time. Indeed, grammar must have a contextual ground to be represented or to be used by human beings and he explains the concept of pain in the existence of grammar of language.⁹⁶ Besides, he asserts that any explanation of the language is grammar by which he signifies the rules of language. Moreover, he maintains that “[g]rammar tells what kind of object anything is.”⁹⁷

Apart from his early stand, he rejects the “general form of all propositions and of language” which aims to find the common element which covers all the linguistic activities.⁹⁸ Wittgenstein introduces notion of “family resemblance” since there are similarities and relationships in games, also in language-games, by analogy with card games, etc.⁹⁹ In this concept, he means that it is possible to a word is used/comprehended in various sense and he denies ‘fixed meanings’ which put all the things on the linguistic schema.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 497.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, § 257.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, § 373.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, § 65.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, § 66.

¹⁰⁰ Hintikka J. & M. : *Investigating Wittgenstein*, Basil, Blackwell, 1986, pp. 166-212.

In this sense, Wittgenstein emphasizes that “it is enough to be able to give a rough picture” instead of mirroring of reality.¹⁰¹ Wittgenstein explicates the notion of “family resemblance” by analogy with member resemblance. In this sense, there is not exact resemblance between family members but just similarities. This idea briefly gives clues about Wittgensteinian theory of language.¹⁰²

With regards to all of these concepts of Wittgensteinian theory of language, it is pondered that ‘language’ is meaningful if it is considered as a human activity.

3.2 Contextual Theory of Meaning in Later Wittgenstein: “The name ‘Moses’ can be defined by means of various descriptions...”

Later theory of Wittgensteinian philosophy in some sense presents a contextual theory of meaning in which pragmatic sense of that theory of meaning is separated from the theory of truth. So the misinterpretation of the referential theory of meaning in which a word refers to a single object in that world is explicated.¹⁰³ Another important point of *PI* is that “[m]eaning of

¹⁰¹ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 70.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, § 67.

¹⁰³ Rhees, R. : *Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual*, The University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp.72-75.

word is its use in language” so that there is not a single object as the referent of that word, and also meaning is its use in context.¹⁰⁴

With regard to these vital points of later Wittgensteinian way of thinking, the basis of saying various descriptions about the name “Moses” as follows:

If one says “Moses did not exist”, it may mean various things. It may mean: the Israelites did not have a single leader when they withdrew from Egypt—or: their leader was not called Moses—or: there cannot have been anyone who accomplished all that the Bible relates of Moses—or: etc.etc.—He may say following Russell: the name “Moses” can be defined by various descriptions...¹⁰⁵

The name “Moses” reminds that “Moses” is known as a religious leader of Israelites, as the man who led the Israelites through wilderness, a prophet, and the other descriptions of that name related to his religious characteristics, too. In that way, or actually in that context, the name “Moses” can be defined by means of four or five descriptions in the same context as it seen in *PI* §79. However, the important point is that all of these descriptions taught people who live especially in monotheistic societies. Therefore, it is just a kind of knowledge given by definition in a religious context.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, the name “Moses” can

¹⁰⁴ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 43.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, § 79.

¹⁰⁶ Markov, B. : “Language as a Form of Life”, from the World Wide Web:http://www.Argumentationspb.ru/2000_1/Sum/1_2000s.htm, 1999.

remind someone Michelangelo's statue of 'Moses', which is important in art to scalp figure in other context. Indeed, form of life as a background of language is a key factor to think of names in a contextual way.¹⁰⁷

Hence, later Wittgenstein's contextual theory of meaning shows itself explicitly in the difference between contextual definitions and scientific ones as *Merkmale* definition and ostensive definition. (*Merkmale*, which is a German term for scientific definition.) It can be shown by the lemon example as follows:

The concept of lemon includes qualities of all the kinds of lemons in nature. So, it can be formulated as:

Lemon=Lemon1+Lemon2+Lemon3+...
Lemon n.¹⁰⁸

As seen, *Merkmale* definition is based upon the shared qualities of things. On the other hand, ostensive definition, as also Russell claims in his logical atomism, is roughly definition by pointing to something and saying "That is what this means" as Wittgenstein's asserts.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, Hintikka states that language

¹⁰⁷ Searle, John : "Background", *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*, USA, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp.141-159.

¹⁰⁸ Definition₁ in der nur darauf verwiesen wird, welche Merkmale dem gegebenen Gegenstand nicht zukommen, aber nichts darüber verlautet, welche Merkmale für ihn charakteristisch sind: <http://www.phillex.de/defnegat.htm>.

¹⁰⁹ Richter, D. : *Historical Dictionary of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Lanham, Maryland, 2004, pp.135-136.

is connected with the world by calculus-like human activities, “the idea that ostensive definition in Later Wittgenstein is the paradigmatic way of language learning.”¹¹⁰ Thus, Wittgenstein carries out ostensive definition with the idea of “meaning is use” in his later philosophy.¹¹¹

Later Wittgenstein’s contextual theory of meaning postulates language rules occurring during language games itself since *Merkmale* definition can not give such a possible language rule. By *Merkmale* definition, “X means Y” is regarded as a rule, yet there is not any contextual difference and that is just a formulation.¹¹²

On the other hand, “X means Y” in context Z as public, social [form of life] presents a theory of language as contextual.¹¹³ In that sense, “Human beings agree in the language they use. That

¹¹⁰ Hintikka, Jaakko : *Ludwig Wittgenstein Half-truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths* vol.1, Selected Papers, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands,1996, p. 328.

¹¹¹ Wittgenstein considers ostensive definition in his later time as the fact that “the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.” (*PI*, § 43). It’s What Hintikka calls ostensive definition as paradigmatic way of language learning.

¹¹² Grayling, A.C. : *Wittgenstein*, United Kingdom, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 83-90.

¹¹³ Baç, M.: “Wittgenstein ve Anlamın ‘Ortalıkta’ Olması”, *Felsefe Tartışmaları*, vol: 28, B. Ü.Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2001, pp.47-60.

is not agreement in opinions but in form of life”.¹¹⁴ These notions are important to have various descriptions of such case.

In *PI* § 79, Wittgenstein states that whether “Moses got a fixed and unequivocal use for [him] in all *possible* cases.” This is an important question and he thinks of the name “Moses” accordingly in “N is dead” case. He concludes that “Where are the bounds of the incidental?” and “If I had given a definition of the name in such a case, I should now be ready to alter it.”¹¹⁵ The name “N” is used without a fixed meaning since it can be thought of in various descriptions of the name “Moses”, yet the difference feature of the name “Moses” is that it is in a religious context and it can be meaningful for people who have knowledge in that area. May be, it is not meaningful in daily usage for other people; actually, in the account of Wittgensteinian theory of language, the daily usage of language is emphasized.¹¹⁶

In addition to this, the absurd debate between Protestant and Catholic on ‘Wine’ is relevant for the name “Moses” example and the idea of meaning is its use in a context. Catholic community considers ‘Wine’ as blood of Jesus, however, Protestant community rejects that idea as a taboo and “they consider ‘Wine’

¹¹⁴ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 241.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, §79.

¹¹⁶ Rhee, R. : *Wittgenstein on Language and Ritual*, The University of Chicago Press, 1982, pp. 72-75.

as wine we taste (perceive) when we drink in daily life usage rather than the sacred context as religious symbol.”¹¹⁷

3.3 What is the connection between human agreement and truth?

In later Wittgensteinian contextual, in some sense pragmatic, theory of language, “human agreement” plays a vital role. In the traditional view, the meaning does not belong to individuals who share or create the meaning with others. In that sense, it was thought that “sensations are private”.¹¹⁸ Meanwhile, private language implies independent rules from the language that is used in public. For instance, Wittgenstein asserts that “If the lion could talk, we could not understand him.”¹¹⁹ This case indicates that there must be a “form of life” which constitutes background of language and provides communication with others. However, if the lion would have a private “form of life”, which is independent from sharing an actually living “form of life”, “there would be no criterion to say who is right?”¹²⁰ Thus, meaning is around [us].¹²¹

¹¹⁷ Weiss, P., Hortshorne, C. and Wurks, A. (eds) : , “How to make ideas clear”, *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Pierce*, Vol V,Book II, Cambridge,Mass., The Balknop Press,1962, paper 5,§ 401.

¹¹⁸ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 246-248.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.223.

¹²⁰ Rhees, Rush : “Can there be a Private Language”, *Aristotelian Society Supp.*, Vol.28, p.63-94,1954.

¹²¹ Baç, M.: “Wittgenstein ve Anlamın ‘Ortalıkta’ Olması”, *Felsefe Tartışmaları*, vol: 28, B. Ü.Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2001, pp.47-60.

“If language is to be means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also in judgment”.¹²² By this statement, it can be said that in Wittgensteinian theory of language there is a relationship between “human agreement” which is also related with “form of life” and “truth”.¹²³

On the basis of “form of life”, “human agreement” and “truth” also are parts of language-games because they are regarded as bridges or the functions of language in order to provide communication with others in later Wittgensteinian philosophy as he points out:

It is the human agreement deciding what is true and false; and they agree in language they use. As a result that is not an agreement in opinions but in form of life.¹²⁴

Indeed, his philosophy does not impose a theory of truth as in his early time. Wittgenstein rather admits naïve truth that is accord with his pragmatic theory of language.

The reason why there is not a theory of truth or the criterion in

¹²² Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 242.

¹²³ Wittgenstein claims that “human agreement decides what is true and what is false?—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use” (*Ibid.*, § 241).

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

order to distinguish true from false can be explicated in his theory of “meaning = use”. And in general sense language is not uttered to find out ‘metaphysical truth’, the importance of language lies in its daily usage. Accordingly, what is true and what really exists is relative to different circumstances, cultures or form of life.¹²⁵

To conclude this part, “Human Agreement” and “Truth” are considered in later Wittgensteinian philosophy as functions of language which have close connections with his other concepts “language-game” and “form of life”. Therefore, “what engages with the concept of truth (as with a cogwheel) is a proposition.”¹²⁶

3.4 Is language game a “conceptual revolution”?

In Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, learning a language, such as questioning, naming, commanding, is to play “language games”. Wittgenstein regards “language game” as “a whole consistency of language and the actions into which it is woven”.¹²⁷ Such linguistic activities requires ‘training’ in order to obey a command, i.e. ‘which words are interwoven’. In this sense, words are like pieces in chess and “the meaning of a piece is its

¹²⁵ Rorty, R. : *The Linguistic Turn*, Chicago, IL, Chicago University Press, 1967.

¹²⁶ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 136.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, § 7.

role in the game” as “to look at its use and learn from that”, i.e. “the meaning of a word is given by its use in language game”.¹²⁸
 In order to show countless different kinds of use, Wittgenstein gives lists of examples of language games as follows:¹²⁹

- giving its
- Giving orders and obeying them-
 - Describing the appearance of an object- or
 - Measurements-
 - Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)-
 - Reporting an event-
 - Speculating about an event-
 - Forming and testing a hypothesis-
 - Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams-
 - Making up a story; and reading it-
 - Play-acting-
 - Singing catches-
 - Guessing riddles-
 - Making a joke;telling it-
 - Solving a problem in practical arithmetic-
 - Translating from one language into another-
 - Asking, thanking,cursing, greeting, praying.

“Language game” in this sense is not theoretical device or a kind of idealization. So “here the term ‘language game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.”¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Ibid., § 563, § 340, § 43 .

¹²⁹ Ibid., § 23.

¹³⁰ Ibid., § 23.

3.5 Hintikka's interpretation of language-game as conceptual revolution

Hintikka enunciates the primacy of language games in rule following consideration, which means that language games cannot be defined by new rules, because games are primary with respect to their rules. This is vital to Wittgensteinian philosophy of language.¹³¹

Regarding language games as the bridge between language and reality leads to the idea that language games are prior to their rules. So "rules are not kind of independent system by which we infer all the things since these rules can be appreciated only by mastering the underlying game".¹³² Language games as *Spiel* is another form of *calculi* according to Hintikka, of course, they are not arithmetical calculi but become more like "outdoor games played on actual objects of which our language can speak".¹³³ Indeed, language games are rule-governed activities and that is to say "language is tied to the world by certain human activities " by means of language games.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Hintikka, Jaakko : *Ludwig Wittgenstein Half-truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths* vol.1, Selected Papers, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1996, pp.275-335.

¹³² Ibid., p.320.

¹³³ Ibid., p.321.

¹³⁴ Wittgenstein, L.: *Zettel*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1967.

How can we decide whether a rule is being followed correctly and with the proper understanding of what is going on? Hintikka answered that the only criterion that can help us to decide whether a rule is being followed is ultimately the entire language game to which the rule belongs. Thus, “language games are conceptually prior to their rule”.¹³⁵ In other words, rules can only be understood in “the context of the entire game”.¹³⁶

In *PI*, §151, Wittgenstein gives an example of understanding the rule and becoming capable of continuing the sequence. Wittgenstein concludes that the right formulas occurring to B is that “B can continue the series” under certain conditions (language game is for this conditions). In *PI* §156-158, he indicates that being able to read is based on the entire practice of reading, “not in any particular experiences of the reader”.¹³⁷

However, Hintikka criticizes Wittgenstein in that he generalizes the case of reading to all rule following considerations.¹³⁸ In other words, Wittgenstein thinks of playing all language games as his case of reading. However, Wittgenstein refrains in his philosophy of language from generalizations in that sense. Rules

¹³⁵ Hintikka, Jaakko : *Ludwig Wittgenstein Half-truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths* vol.1, Selected Papers, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 1996, p. 320 .

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 321.

¹³⁷ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 156.

¹³⁸ Hintikka J. & M. : *Investigating Wittgenstein*, Basil, Blackwell, 1986, pp. 166-212.

lie in the entire complex of activities of which an act is a part, i.e. “language game is the ultimate [*arbeiter*] of rule-following”.¹³⁹ Hintikka regards this notion of Wittgensteinian “language game” as the major “conceptual revolution” which Wittgenstein is attempting to carry out in the rule following discussion.¹⁴⁰ Wittgenstein considers the rule following discussion as “mythological description of the use of a rule”.¹⁴¹

In *PI*, §199, Wittgenstein emphasizes the conceptual priority of language games over their rules:

To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique as [rules].

In this sense, he denies that “any one symbolic expression of rule can be essentially connected with rule following”.¹⁴² Furthermore, the act of following the rule does not involve symbolic expression of the rule. Wittgenstein states that a rule is followed “blindly”.¹⁴³ Thus, symbolic expression is not what following a rule consists in. “Being a move” in an entire game, which is the only “criteria” of rule following.¹⁴⁴ Indeed, the entire practice of language game is that decides whether a rule is being followed in Hintikka’s sense.

¹³⁹ Hintikka, Jaakko : *Ludwig Wittgenstein Half-truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths* vol.1, Selected Papers, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands,1996, p. 331.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

¹⁴¹ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 221.

¹⁴² Hintikka, Jaakko : *Ludwig Wittgenstein Half-truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths* vol.1, Selected Papers, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands,1996, p. 331.

¹⁴³ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 219.

¹⁴⁴ Hintikka, Jaakko : *Ludwig Wittgenstein Half-truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths* vol.1, Selected Papers, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands,1996, p. 315.

Language game is rule-governed activity, but it does not mean that it is a rule as is formulated in a sentence. If it is, that rule “hangs in the air”.¹⁴⁵

On the other hand, “blindness” does not mean “tacit knowledge” or “innate ideas” which is, core idea of Plato’s, Chomsky’s, and Humboldt’s philosophy of language all of which are based on an idealized system which implies that there is a hidden structure behind language. But Wittgensteinian view that rules are followed “blindly” in language games makes the language game conceptually/ontologically prior to rule with respect to “form of life” and “agreement” as mentioned.¹⁴⁶ Thus, it is regarded to be a conceptual revolution by Hintikka.

¹⁴⁵ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 198.

¹⁴⁶ Hacker, G.P. & Backer, P.M.S. : *Language Sense & Nonsense, A Critical Investigation into Modern Theories of Language*, New York, USA, Basil Blackwell Inc., 1986, pp. 267-307.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Wittgensteinian philosophy of language is considered in a language matrix which consists of the notions of “language game”, “form of life” and “agreement”. These main notions in Wittgensteinian philosophy of language integrates with each other in terms of grammar and social aspects of language. In this sense, “language game” is the ultimate *arbeiter* in language matrix of later Wittgenstein, since during the “language games”, the rules of language occurs or appears.

Hence, “language games” which are outdoor activities tied to the reality as Hintikka asserts, produce meaning, which is the use. Thus, “language game” is as conceptual revolution since its metaphysical status depends on practicing/using language which is different from early Wittgensteinian philosophy of language. In this sense, Wittgenstein aims to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, there is no fixed schema or set of rules which are independent from language itself, so “something new (spontaneous) is always a language-

¹⁴⁷ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 116.

game”¹⁴⁸ Meanwhile, meaning is actually around us.¹⁴⁹ In this sense, The crucial point is that Wittgenstein does not rationalize/idealize concepts. He just says what they are in our life.

What is life in Wittgenstein’s sense? In his view, “life is life itself”.¹⁵⁰ For instance, adults do not need to prove anything when they teach children to speak language; they either act in an imperative manner as “initiators” or they might say, “do this; when you grow up you will know why this is so?” in different language games with a “form of life”. Wittgenstein has introduced the notion of “form of life” to indicate the roots of language and agreement on it in application of linguistic rules. So “form of life” is the basis / ground of “language games” which plays. Indeed, “language games” occur on the surface of “form of life”. On the other hand, “agreement” can be regarded as the roots of “form of life”.

Indeed, Wittgenstein enunciates that the limits of my language is the limit of my world or form of life. Instead of postulating structure/system, in Wittgensteinian philosophy “form of life” is

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p.224.

¹⁴⁹ Baç, M.: “Wittgenstein ve Anlamın ‘Ortalıkta’ Olması”, *Felsefe Tartışmaları*, vol: 28, B. Ü.Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2001, pp. 47-60.

¹⁵⁰ Wittgenstein, L. : *Nachlass*, The Bergen Electronic Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

intended to emphasize that language has no higher status than a human status. So, human status has an essential role in that sense. In addition, for Wittgenstein, to imagine a language is to animate a “form of life”.¹⁵¹

As Wittgenstein mentions “form of life”, he gives essential role to “language game”. Wittgenstein makes explicit connections among “language games” and “forms of life”, and somehow “culture”, “custom” as well. Indeed, “form of life” contains language games as self-sufficient part. Indeed, the notion of language game is *arbeiter* of Wittgensteinian philosophy of language. Therefore, it's the core element of *PI*.

To sum up, what counts as a “form of life” will depend upon what particular language game one is trying to understand.¹⁵² For Wittgenstein, without language we cannot “see” or “observe” or even “know”.¹⁵³

In later Wittgensteinian contextual, in some sense pragmatic, theory of language, “agreement” plays a vital role since the meaning does not belong to individuals themselves, but rather

¹⁵¹ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 19.

¹⁵² Markov, B. : “Language as a Form of Life”, from the World WideWeb:http://www.Argumentationspb.ru/2000_1/Sum/1_2000s.htm, 1999.

¹⁵³ Grayling, A.C. : *Wittgenstein*, Oxford University Press, UK, 1996, pp.83-90.

emerges due to an agreement in judgements among the individuals: “If language is to be means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also in judgment”.¹⁵⁴ Thus, it can be said that in later Wittgenstein there is a serious relationship between “human agreement”, “form of life” and “truth” on the basis of the notion of “language-game”.

In this sense, “language-games” make communication with others possible. So, I regard later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language as language matrix which consists of “agreement”, “form of life” and “language-game”.

On the other hand, there is an agreement that underlies our concepts; the agreement is on “extremely general facts of nature”.¹⁵⁵ Hence, Wittgenstein does not deny that there are rules and we follow them. He held that the way a rule is applied in particular cases determines the meaning. In this sense, there is an “overwhelming agreement” which gives the meaning of rules and accords them. The content of the rules grows as our practice grows; in other words, “following a rule is practice [praxis] one can not follow a rule ‘privately’”.¹⁵⁶

In *PI* §224, Wittgenstein writes:

¹⁵⁴ Wittgenstein, *PI*, § 242.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, § 202.

The word 'agreement' and the word 'rule' are related to one another, they are cousins. If I teach anyone the sense of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.

This paragraph gives the relation between “agreement” and, “rules” and how it is related to forms of life with respect to “language game”. Following a rule implies doing the same, and what “the same” is can only be defined as applying rules as playing chess in which more than one person participates, as “language- games”.

Wittgenstein regards life as itself. So, there is no other interpretation beyond our life. On that ground, he constructed his language matrix which consists of “language- game”, “form of life” and “agreement”. However, there is a deep irony in later Wittgenstein philosophy of language. Although, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects metaphysics, he claims in his *Nachlass* that there are some concepts/situations which are not sayable. Indeed, they are *mystical* .¹⁵⁷ In part of Popperian thesis that “many metaphysical statements are in general true” in Chapter 1 of this thesis shows that the metaphysicians cases are guaranteed by later Wittgenstein’s notion of “language- game”. In short, later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language indirectly has spirit of metaphysics.

¹⁵⁷ Wittgenstein, L. : *Nachlass*, The Bergen Electronic Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Moreover, I consider Hintikka's point of view to be legitimate, which regards "language games" as "conceptual revolutions", taking into consideration language matrix of later Wittgenstein. In a nutshell, 'life is life itself', 'language is language' and we do not need to have further interpretations as sacred metaphysics which results in ambiguity and vacuous waste of misunderstandings.

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