

STATE TRADITION AND BUSINESS IN TURKEY:
THE CASE OF TÜSİAD

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

GÖKTEN DOĞANGÜN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT
OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

DECEMBER 2005

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof.Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science/ Arts/ Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof.Dr. Feride Acar
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science/Arts/Doctor of Philosophy.

Assist.Prof. Galip L. Yalman
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assist.Prof. Galip L. Yalman

(METU, ADM)

Assoc.Prof. Simten Coşar

(Başkent U, PSIR)

Dr. Mustafa Şen

(METU, SOC)

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Gökten Dođangün
Signature :

ABSTRACT

STATE TRADITION AND BUSINESS IN TURKEY: THE CASE OF TÜSİAD

Doğangün, Gökten

M.Sc., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Assist.Prof. Galip L. Yalman

December 2005, 119 pages

This thesis attempts to make an analysis of the state tradition perspective by particularly focusing on the relations between the state and big bourgeoisie represented by TÜSİAD in the post-1980 period. As this perspective has been hegemonic in discourse in examining state-society relations in Turkey in recent decades, thereby dominating the political, academic, and business circles, it becomes very important for Turkish politics students to understand what is implied by this phrase in order to conceive the political developments in Turkey. This thesis aims to explore the adequacy of this perspective in accounting for the state-society relations. The focus on TÜSİAD is derived from the fact that its organizational evolution allows us to evaluate the adequacy of theoretical premises and main arguments of the state tradition perspective.

In this study, it is concluded that the state tradition perspective offers a reductionist framework in favor of the state; neglects the impact of the social dynamics and international institutions and actors; and reproduces the strong state at any historical moment. Depending on these findings, it is claimed that the state tradition perspective does not provide an appropriate methodological and conceptual framework especially in examining the state-big business relations within the context of the changing domestic and international contexts.

Key words: The strong state tradition, statist-institutionalism, big bourgeoisie, TÜSİAD.

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE DEVLET GELENEĞİ VE İŞADAMLARI: TÜSİAD ÖRNEĞİ

Doğangün, Gökten

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Danışmanı: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Galip L. Yalman

Aralık 2005, 119 sayfa

Bu tez, devlet geleneği perspektifinin, özellikle 1980 sonrasında devlet ile TÜSİAD tarafından temsil edilen büyük burjuvazi arasındaki ilişkileri temelinde, analizini yapmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu perspektif, özellikle son yıllarda, Türkiye'de devlet-toplum ilişkilerini analiz ederken benimsenen söylem üzerinde hegemonik işleve sahip olduğu ve dolayısıyla politik, akademik, ve iş çevrelerini derinden etkilediği için, Türk siyasal hayatı öğrencilerinin Türkiye'deki politik gelişmeleri anlayabilmeleri için, devlet geleneği ile neyin anlatıldığını anlamaları önem kazanmaktadır. Bu tez, devlet geleneği perspektifinin devlet-toplum ilişkilerini açıklarken ne kadar uygun ve yeterli bir çerçeve sunduğu üzerinde odaklanmıştır. TÜSİAD'ın örgütsel evrimi böyle bir analizi mümkün kılmaktadır.

Bu çalışmada, devlet geleneği perspektifinin devlet lehine indirgemeci bir yaklaşım sunduğu, sosyal dinamikleri ve uluslararası kurum ve aktörlerin ulusal sınırlar içindeki etkisini göz ardı ettiği ve güçlü devleti her tarihsel momentte yeniden ürettiği sonucuna varılmıştır. Bu bulgulara dayanarak, devlet geleneği perspektifinin sunduğu yöntemsel ve kavramsal çerçevenin, özellikle devlet ve büyük burjuvazi arasındaki ilişkileri değişen toplumsal ve uluslararası koşullar çerçevesinde açıklarken, uygun ve yeterli olmadığı ifade edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güçlü Devlet geleneği, devletçi-kurumsalcılık, büyük burjuvazi, TÜSİAD.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assist. Prof. Galip L. Yalman for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research. I have to acknowledge my debt to my supervisor for the academic inspiration that he provided during my graduate education. His courses and academic tutorial have always been very enlightening for me.

I would like to show my gratefulness to Assoc. Prof. Simten Coşar who kindly agreed to participate in my jury and shared her valuable comments on my thesis which have been very helpful for me. I would also like to express thanks to Dr. Mustafa Şen for his suggestions and comments.

I would also like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Feride Acar who has believed in my efforts during my graduate education and has supported me to pursue my further academic work. I also show my thankfulness to Assoc. Prof. Aylin Özman who inspired me to start the academic journey and who has continuously appreciated my efforts. Her intellectual and morale support are so very important for me.

I am also deeply indebted to my family. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my mother Müjgan Doğangün, my father Asım Doğangün and my brother Bahadır Doğangün who have always believed in and unconditionally supported my efforts during my whole education life. Without their patience and most valuably never-ending care and encouragement they blended with love, this study could hardly be realized.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1. 1. Purpose and Importance of the Thesis	1
1. 2. Methodology and Outline of Thesis	3
2. THE STATE TRADITION IN TURKEY AS A VARIANT OF STATE- CENTERED ANALYSIS	6
2. 1. “Bringing the State Back in” Historical Analysis	6
2. 1. 1. Why Statist-Institutionalism emerged?	6
2. 1. 2. The Methodology of Statist-Institutionalism	10
2. 1. 3. The Concept of the State in Statist-Institutionalism	16
2. 2. The State Tradition Perspective	22
2. 2. 1. The Concept of Patrimonialism	24
2. 2. 2. The Dichotomy of Center-Periphery	25
2. 2. 3. Interest Group Politics in the Turkish State Tradition	26
3. THE STRONG STATE IN TURKISH POLITICS	29
3. 1. Reading Ottoman Empire with reference to the Concept of Patrimonialism	29
3. 1. 1. The Institutional Origins of the Strong State	29
3. 1. 2. The Historical Origins of the Strong State	38
3. 2. Reading Turkish Politics from the State Tradition Perspective	47
3. 2. 1. Turkish Modernization: the Discontinuity with the Ottoman Heritage	47

3. 2. 2. The Strong State <i>vis-à-vis</i> the Turkish Bourgeoisie	52
3. 2. 3. The Interaction between the State Elite and the Political Elite	60
3. 2. 4. The Recovery of the Strong State in the 1980s	66
4. ACCUSING THE STATE: THE STATE-TÜSİAD RELATIONS IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD	72
4. 1. TÜSİAD: Its Origins and Evolution	72
4. 2. The Recovery of the Strong State <i>vis-à-vis</i> TÜSİAD	74
4. 3. The Changing Nature and Pattern of the state-TÜSİAD Relations	84
4. 4. A Critical Evaluation of the State Tradition Perspective	91
5. CONCLUSION	99
 REFERENCES	 106

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. 1. Purpose and importance of the Thesis

From the 1980s, Turkey experienced a profound transformation concerning the pattern of the relationship between the state, market and civil society. The concepts such as ‘shrinking the state, expanding the society’, ‘free market economy’, ‘opening up’ and ‘export-oriented growth’ have become the key phrases of the political and intellectual discourse in that period. At the core of this transformation lies the idea that free market economy is the only proper mechanism for enhancing productivity and efficiency. Thus, reducing the state intervention, limiting the public sector and de-regulation of the market became the major policy objectives in the 1980s.

This transformation has been at least partly attempted to be grounded on a reading of the Turkish political life from a specific viewpoint, that is, the strong state tradition. This tradition is identified as the historical cause of economic backwardness and political instability of the Turkish society. What is implied by the strong state tradition is that the Ottoman-Turkish historical development has been influenced by a state which is characterized by its autonomy from the society. The state has been depicted as an agent establishing socio-economic order from above and when and if necessary initiating reforms. It has determined the socio-economic structure, dynamics and relations in a way that the social forces could not access to power without the consent of the state. Additionally, and more importantly, the strong state is thought to (re)emerge at different historical periods in this perspective. In this framework, the strong state *vis-à-vis* market and civil society has still been preserved in the 1980s although the relations between the government and the societal forces have become more internalized in the 1980s (Heper and Keyman: 1998a: 267). As a

result, there have emerged failures in liberalization and democratization starting in the early 1980s.

This thesis will attempt to explore the state tradition perspective, mainly because it has constituted the “hegemonic discourse” (Yalman, 2002a: 315-6) in examining state-society relations in Turkey in recent years. All disappointing consequences in social, economic and political system are explained by the strong state tradition in both domestic and international contexts. The phrase of strong state tradition comes into sight in books, articles, newspapers, journals, periodicals, interviews and reports published by civil societal organizations. It becomes essential to understand what is implied by this phrase in order to understand and discuss the political developments in Turkey.

In that context, the particular focus of the thesis will be placed on the business class insofar as the nature and pattern of state-business relations constitute the core of the state tradition perspective in exploring why Turkey has not been able to undergo a development process that the Western countries have. While doing that, this study will in particular examine the post-1980 period. The analysis of this period will also be enriched by elaborating on the policies and attitudes of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (*Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği*, TÜSİAD). The basic reason for selecting TÜSİAD, the representative of big business in Turkey, is the fact that TÜSİAD is one of the most important carriers of the state tradition perspective. The Association has been the keenest advocate of transformation in Turkey’s political and economic conditions through endorsing the process of liberalization and democratization.

While doing that, the thesis will point out the need for evaluating the adequacy of the methodological and conceptual framework proposed by state tradition perspective. It will attempt to explore the extent to which the state tradition is a sufficient explanan to account for the state-society relations. It will also provide an analysis of the state-business relations since the 1980s in order to think about this question.

1. 2. Methodology and Outline of Thesis

The literature concerning the state tradition perspective will be examined in terms of the following questions: What is the methodological and conceptual framework of this perspective? Why does this perspective conceptualize the state tradition as a proper framework to conceive the Turkish political life? What are the institutional origins of the strong state tradition in Ottoman-Turkish polity pointed out by this perspective? Where does this perspective find out the historical origins of the strong state in Turkish politics? What is the meaning and function of the state in Turkey? What is the impact of a strong state upon the society, in general, and interest group politics, in particular?

Although there is a vast array of scholars sharing the premises of the state tradition perspective, this thesis will focus upon the works of Metin Heper, Şerif Mardin, Halil İnalçık, Kemal Karpat, Çağlar Keyder, Ayşe Buğra and Ziya Öniş. The state tradition perspective is neither a movement uniting scholars in the field of Ottoman-Turkish development nor an explicitly defined conceptual framework. Consequently, all these scholars employ this perspective in studying a variety of topics related to the different historical periods in the Ottoman-Turkish polity. Metin Heper reads Ottoman-Turkish polity from a statist-institutionalist standpoint; Şerif Mardin employs the center-periphery cleavage in analyzing Ottoman-Turkish polity. Halil İnalçık employs the concept of patrimonialism in describing the Ottoman state structure. Kemal Karpat, sharing the premise of the strong state and its determinacy on the society, points out the change in the social structure and the power, status, roles and occupations of social classes which are considerably influenced by political developments. Also, Çağlar Keyder defines the bureaucracy as a class in examining the state-society relations in Ottoman-Turkish polity. Ayşe Buğra is particularly interested in the state-business relations in Turkish politics. Similarly, Ziya Öniş refers to the state tradition while dealing with the state and market in the 1980s as well as the state and big business in recent decade. In that context, each of these scholars will be touched upon in analyzing the different historical periods in Ottoman-Turkish polity.

Additionally, this study will be making use of TÜSİAD's own publications,

periodicals, reports and brochures, the public pronouncements of its leaders and the newspaper articles. It is because the adequacy of the state tradition as an explanation will be discussed in the light of the organizational evolution of TÜSİAD. The change in the discourse of TÜSİAD, its priorities and its demands will be observed in these documents. While doing that, the questions to guide us are as follows: What is the meaning and function of the state for TÜSİAD? Do its members rely on the state in achieving industrialization, development and democratization? Do they depend on the benefits and privileges given by the state; if they do, what is the degree and pattern of this dependency relationship? What are the subjects of TÜSİAD's publications? What are the demands, expectations, problems, priorities of the bourgeoisie represented by TÜSİAD? What are the activities carried out by TÜSİAD?

In this thesis, the initial step will be to present and discuss the theoretical background of the state tradition perspective. This perspective uses a framework called as statist-institutionalism in reading Ottoman-Turkish polity with regard to the determinacy of the state. The second chapter will mainly be introducing the basic features of statist-institutionalism so as to locate the state tradition perspective. In particular, the reasons for its emergence, its main premises, its methodological and conceptual framework as well as its understanding of the state will be assessed. Then, the conceptual tools of the state tradition perspective in describing the unique implications of the determinacy of the state in Turkish polity will be touched upon. These tools are the concept of patrimonialism, the dichotomy of center-periphery and the reading of interest group politics.

The third chapter will elaborate on the reading of Ottoman-Turkish polity through the above mentioned conceptual tools. This chapter will consist of two main subsections. In the first subsection, the state-society relations in the Ottoman Empire will be reviewed. As the state tradition perspective assumes that the strong state is inherited from the Empire, it will be necessary to examine this historical period. In the second subsection, the reading of Turkish politics from the standpoint of this perspective will be presented and discussed. This subsection will focus on certain themes such as the Turkish modernization, the state-business relations, the relationship between the state elite including the bureaucratic-military elite and the

political elite as well as the recovery of the strong state in the 1980s, which are generally pointed out by this perspective to signify the strong state tradition.

The fourth chapter will scrutinize the relations between the state and TÜSİAD. For, the emergence of TÜSİAD as a political actor pronouncing democracy requires the evaluation of the explanatory potential of the state tradition perspective. It should be asked whether TÜSİAD's increasing interest in democracy in socio-political issues can be explained by this perspective. While doing so, TÜSİAD's establishment, its member profile and its organizational strategy will be introduced. In the second subsection, the reading of the state-business relations under the circumstances of political and economic transformation in the 1980s will be examined from the standpoint of the state tradition perspective. In the third subsection, the rise of TÜSİAD as a political actor and its discourse of democracy will be presented. In the final subsection, the critical evaluation of the state tradition perspective in analyzing the transformation in TÜSİAD will be examined.

Finally, concluding remarks will constitute the last chapter.

CHAPTER 2

THE STATE TRADITION IN TURKEY AS A VARIANT OF STATE-CENTERED ANALYSIS

The state tradition perspective attempts to read Turkish politics from a state-centered perspective. This attempt is founded on a theoretical framework which aims at “bringing the state back in” historical analysis. The “bringing the state back in” perspective is well-known for its argument of the determinacy of the state in empirical reality. The state tradition perspective creates the phrase of strong state tradition with reference to that argument. Before presenting and discussing the reading of Turkish politics with regard to the strong state tradition, it will be appropriate to elaborate on what the “bringing the state back in” perspective offers in grasping empirical reality. Particular attention will be put on the reasons for the emergence of this framework, its methodology and its conceptualization of the state. While doing that, the main objective is to discuss whether the state-centered analysis offers an adequate framework. Then, the general features of reading Turkish politics in terms of the determinacy of the state will be touched upon. At the same time, the theoretical premises, the main arguments, and the conceptual tools of the state tradition perspective will be highlighted.

2. 1. “Bringing the State back in” Historical Analysis

2. 1. 1. Why Statist-Institutionalism emerged?

In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, a state-oriented framework came to receive great amount of attention. The new theoretical framework which aims at “bringing the state back in” historical analysis is defined as statist-institutionalism in

the political science literature. The “bringing the state back in” perspective is broadly characterized by a change in the prevalent methodological position on the state from a by-product of socio-economic context to its determinant (Özman & Coşar, 2001: 82). This framework underlines that the state is to be methodologically (re)discovered due to its central position in social formations. In other words, it is suggested that the state acts as a powerful actor in the real world and thus it comes to be assumed as an explanatory tool in grasping and producing the knowledge of social phenomena.

In that regard, the “bringing the state back in” perspective is an attempt to present a methodological/ conceptual alternative to liberal-pluralist and Marxist approaches. These approaches are thought to create a methodological gap between theory and empirical reality due to their tendency for society-centered reductionism. Thus, they are suggested to be inappropriate to come to terms with the changing circumstances and relations in the post-war era.¹ According to the statist-institutionalists, their inappropriateness is because both perceive political institutions and outcomes as simple reflections of socio-economic structures, and thus treat the state as a dependent component of the whole system. This culminates in the negligence of the concept of state which actually influences various issue areas, i.e. political development, revolution, socio-economic agenda, interest group politics, women question, ethnicity, religion, etc. not only in the developing countries but also in the industrialized countries.

In liberal-pluralist approach, there is a mechanistic approach to agents and

¹ It is generally claimed that socio-economic development in Third World countries have not led automatically to political development and that this context shattered the credibility of modernization theory. In the real world, Cuba faced with a revolution, American government continued to humiliate Vietnam, revolutionary instability and reaction grew in Latin America and South Asia (Leys, 1996: 65). In addition, the fact that in most Third World countries not the entrepreneur class but the state appeared as the main agent to promote socio-economic development (Kohli and Shue, 1994: 300) and empirical evidence from the late 1970s and 1980s, such as the democratic movements in East and Central Europe despite the lack of market economy and in Latin America despite economic crises reinforced the tendency against the structural premises of modernization theory (Grugel, 1999: 5). In that context, Marxist line of critique which opposed the American way of development and addressed on a kind of dependency relation in favor of capitalist countries emerged in explaining the emergence of different patterns of development in the Third World countries. Yet, for the statist-institutionalists, this line of thought seemed to be inappropriate as well (Kohli and Shue, *ibid*). For, the methodological and conceptual framework offered by both of them was based on a relationship of causality between socio-economic factors and political development in favor of the former. Thus, neither of them could provide the social analyst with an appropriate methodology to grasp and examine social reality.

politics which are conceived as epiphenomenal and completely reducible to material or structural conditions because of the belief that “economic conditions create the superstructure of political epiphenomena and that democratization would follow in an automatic fashion from economic growth” (Schmitz and Sell, 1999: 27). Thus, the state is conceived as a passive arena as to be directly shaped by interest group politics (Skocpol, 1985: 4). Researches based on this approach focus on societal inputs to the policy-making process. In these views, the state is not considered to be able to act independently, and thus is not regarded as an independent variable.

In Marxism, the state acts as an instrument the activities, policies and goals of which is formed by the interests of dominant class and the relations and struggles between the dominant and subordinated classes (Evans *et al.*, 1985: 350). Although relative autonomy of the state is proposed by some neo-Marxists to break this determinist framework, this feature of the state is not given considerable attention by “bringing the state back in” because this autonomy in neo-Marxist circles is only resulted from the balance of forces. Being capitalist, the state will not function against the dominance of capitalist mode of production in social formation, although at times it acts against the will of the dominant class or formulates and pursues different goals from the dominant class. Put differently, although the state can sometimes act autonomously from social classes, its capitalist nature which is determined by social struggle among social classes is not denied by neo-Marxists.

Another point that the “bringing the state back in” perspective indicates in liberal-pluralist and Marxist approaches and presents a reason for rejecting them is their tendency to put a grand theory which produces a universal framework in understanding social reality. Thus, for this perspective, the specific picture of processes and relations in a particular social setting cannot be acquired by these societally reductionist approaches.

In that regard, Nettl’s article constituted a major breaking point in political science literature (cited in Almond, 1988: 856). This publication would become the major reference of state-centered works in the coming decade. Nettl asserts that the salience of the state has not been distinguished over many years due to its phenomenal “weakness” in the U. S. He defines four features of the state: the state a) is a collectivity “summing a set of functions and structures in order to generalize

their applicability”, b) is a part of interstate relations, c) is an autonomous actor, and d) is a socio-cultural phenomenon which creates a general cognition and insight in the minds of civil servants (ibid).

In the late 1970s, the analysis of social revolutions in the modern period by Skocpol and Trimberger insistently suggested that a theoretical framework rely on the explanatory potential of states would probably be a more adequate one. For, states are discovered to have been transformative actors determining together with class relations the conditions and process of the revolutions in industrial as well as developing countries. Skocpol and Trimberger (1994) underline a necessity to revise Marx’s theory of revolutions with regard to the changing conditions of capitalism. The authors believe that states should not be completely reduced to class interests and struggles although certainly influenced by them. Revolutions have influenced and shaped state structures and functions more than class structures and relations. States are observed to have become more centralized and bureaucratic organizations at the end of revolutions. It is argued that an analysis of revolutions should commit to a) a non-reductionist understanding of states, b) a focus on social-structural conditions of peasantry before and after revolution, and c) a focus on interstate relations in world capitalism (ibid: 124-5).

Elsewhere, Trimberger (1978) assesses certain historical cases of revolutions in Japan, Turkey, Egypt and Peru and states her dissatisfaction with the general attempt to explain the historical realities of revolutions with a general and ahistorical theory of revolution and with a comparative perspective concentrating exclusively on Western revolutions. According to this, the “normal” form of revolution is revolution from below. Therefore, the existing theory of revolution cannot explore the “unusual” revolutions in the non-Western world. The revolutions in question are qualified as revolution from above which implies the autonomy of the state apparatus including bureaucracy and military (ibid: vii). This type of revolution cannot be independent of historical as well structural circumstances. So, all general theories of revolution attempting to be “applicable to all societies at all times” cannot be useful (ibid: 1).

Skocpol (1994) affirms that Barrington Moore’s approach is a major fruitful Marxist work on the sociology of modernization even if he acknowledges the

different routes of modernization and its different forms among industrialized societies.² Yet, Moore still evaluates the different political outcomes of the ongoing modernization with regard to social structure which is shaped by class struggles. For Skocpol, while doing so, Moore overemphasized the societal factors on the road to the modern world and neglected the world-historical context of the modernization process.

Elsewhere, Skocpol (1979) is interested in the social revolutions in France, Russia and China in the modern era. Skocpol observes that social revolutions arose from the contradictions in the state-structure of the old regime and, in turn, would affect the foundation of the new state (ibid: 29). Therefore, an analysis without taking political factors into account does not provide a complete understanding of social revolutions. Actually, historical cases reveal that the successful social revolutions were the product of the mutual reinforcement of structural and historical contexts. Accordingly, the works on social revolutions that we look briefly claim that the state was the locus of socio-political actions, conditions, and outcomes of revolutions.

Finally, Skocpol *et al.*, (1985) clarifies the basic principles of comparative political development with regard to the state as an explanan of a social inquiry. In this volume Skocpol scrutinizes certain works focusing from a more state-centered approach on a set of various issues, i.e. the revolutions, social politics, foreign policy, interest group politics, trade unions, etc. in industrialized as well as developing countries.

2. 1. 2. The Methodology of Statist-Institutionalism

As Skocpol (1985) one of the editors of *Bringing the State Back In*, and thus one of the outstanding activists of the perspective puts,

Politics in all of its dimensions is grounded not only in ‘society’ or in ‘the economy’ or in a culture- if any or all of these are considered separately from the

² Moore defines three routes to modern world- the Bourgeois route (Western democracy), the Communist route, the Capitalist Reactionary route (Fascist) (Skocpol, 1994: 28).

organizational arrangements and activities of states. The meaning of public life and the collective forms through which groups become aware of political goals and work to attain them arise, not from societies alone, but at the meeting points of states and societies. Consequently, the formation, let alone the political capacities, of such apparently purely socio-economic phenomena as interest groups and classes depends in significant measure on the structures and activities of the very states the social, in turn, seek to influence (p.27).

This means, the state is termed as an “autonomous and sovereign organizational configuration” which is able to shape social, political and economic dynamics (Özman & Coşar, 2001: 84) and which has neither to be an aspect of a mode of production nor to necessarily represent a wide range of interests of social classes. That is, the main focal point of the “bringing the state back in” perspective is to discover neither the socio-economic bases of the state nor the bases for its legitimate actions (Skocpol, 1979: 31-2).

In that context, the statist-institutionalists go back to Max Weber and entirely use his definition of the state. Badie and Birnbaum (1983) maintain that Weber was the first to regard that political phenomena including the state, possess a logic and history of their own (p.17). This means that politics and political changes were no more explained with regard to the relations of production, or means of production, by Weber; instead, social history was thought to be based on the “means of administration” in his understanding. For him, political phenomena had their own determinants usually shaped by political and military considerations (ibid). Weber (1964) writes as follows,

It (the state) possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized corporate activity of the administrative staff, which is also regulated by legislation, is oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state ... but also to a very large extent, over-all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory association with a territorial basis ... The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is as essential to it as its character of

compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous organization (p.156 cited in Waterbury, 1989: 2).

In this definition, Weber highlights that the institutional differentiation of the state from the society represented the coming of modern era (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 21). His, his main focus is to understand why capitalism and modern state originated in the West but not in the East. Since Weber indicates that cultural and religious systems are to be one of the causes in the rise of modern spirit of capitalism, no matter modern or pre-modern, the formation of states is shaped by their cultural systems in his view (Ritzer, 1983: 106).

Weber's culturally related account of state formation in the modern era is derived from a certain methodological position. Weber advocates an interpretative or 'understanding' methodology which regards the individual and his action as the basic unit (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 55). He contends that "such concepts as 'state,' 'association,' 'feudalism,' 'patrimonialism' and the like designate certain categories of human interaction. It is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to 'understandable' action, that is, without exception, to the actions of participating individual men" (cited in *ibid*). The sociologist producing the knowledge of social phenomena (epistemology) has to try to 'understand' the object of his inquiry rather than depending solely on observation (Johnson *et al.*, 1990). In other words, Weber (1949) is concerned with the "empirical science of concrete reality" and attempts to understand the uniqueness of the social reality by concentrating on the cultural significance of individual events in their own contexts, on the one hand, and their historical causes, on the other (p.72). But he precisely stands against absolute empiricism which presupposes the analysis of culture, independent of values and viewpoints. Weber prefers that the inquiry should exclusively not be limited with the observable world and the unique needs, purposes, conditions, dynamics, etc. behind the legal or concrete norms and systems ordering the social life should be searched for.³

³ As a pioneer of subjectivism, Weber (1949) claims that the history or reality is so very infinite or limitless that human beings with finite capacity could not conceive its aspects totally. Human beings are interested only in what comes meaningful to and important for them, that is a certain portion of the reality which is "worthy of being known" (*ibid*: 72). In other words, this action is determined by his subjective-evaluative meaning world. Thus, social scientists cannot act in a value-free way but a

Weber (1949) is committed to the study of causality between the social events (p.73). This is, every individual, namely characteristically unique, event is preceded by another individual event and thus “the *degree* to which a certain effect is ‘favored’ by certain ‘conditions’” is to be estimated by the analyst (Weber, 1949: 183). However, by establishing causal relationships between social events, Weber (1949) adopts an idea of “objective possibility” by which he was thinking about producing not “the end”, namely a universal law, but “the means” of acquiring the knowledge of social phenomena (p.80). In other words, to calculate causality between social phenomena approximately is not the same as producing causal knowledge in the natural sciences. It is more about making probabilistic assumptions between social events (Ritzer, 1983: 105-7). Weber (1949) emphasizes the importance of finding the multiple causality relationship rather than the one-way causality among the different aspects of social reality such as politics, economy, religion, social stratification, etc. (p.106). For example, establishing a relationship of causality between the rise of the modern spirit of capitalism and the Protestant ethic, Weber identifies the latter as not the single cause but one of the causes that is the sufficient condition (Gerth and Mills, 1958: 61). Although Weber points out that hypothetical laws are necessary in order to explain any unique configuration causally in the historical comparative platform, these laws are insufficient for him to understand cultural uniqueness. Thus, they should be conceived not as a resource from which the empirical reality is deduced but used as a means of the analysis of social phenomena.

In that regard, Weber (1949) develops a kind of conceptual tool that is known as ideal type (pp.90-5).

An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct... In its conceptual purity, this mental construct ... can

value-relevant one in selecting as well as analyzing the social phenomena. In that regard, a kind of objectivity reached in the natural sciences is not acquired in the social sciences, and additionally not sought by Weber. In his view, objectivity in social sciences does not necessarily require moral indifference on the side of the analyst (Weber, 1949: 60).

not be found empirically anywhere in reality (ibid: 90).

Ideal type is neither the description of reality which can be found in the real world nor an average of a reality which can be common to same or like events because a typical or representative of a social phenomenon is not sought for by Weber (1949: 80-1). Rather, the construction of ideal type is a matter of establishing relations which, by relying on the real world, can be logically imagined as plausible and objectively possible. The ideal type provides the analyst with a conceptual framework for identifying the absence or presence of the principal elements of a social phenomenon comparatively. Through ideal type the analyst explores what extent the empirical reality approximates to or diverges from the ideal type and thus can find the causes of the occurrence of a social phenomenon, such as capitalism, in a particular social setting and of its absence in others in a comparative way.⁴

Despite their reference to Weber's definition of the state, the statist-institutionalists are not said to follow Weber at the epistemological level. In direct contrast to the subjectivist starting point of Weber, Skocpol (1979) maintains that a suitable explanation of social phenomena is founded on that "the analyst's 'rising above' the viewpoints of participants to find important regularities across given historical instances..." (p.18). But at the same time the statist-institutionalists stress that their method is no substitute for theory as, like Weber, they claim that they do aim at neither presenting a complete theory of a social phenomenon, namely the state, nor generating a set of hypotheses (Evans *et al.*; 1985; Skocpol, 1979: 39). Evans *et al.*, (1985) assert that all the studies in that volume reject deductive theoretical framework and propose, individually and collectively, the method of analytical induction (p.348). Their preference for analytical induction is derived from that this perspective disagrees with the appropriateness of a general and abstract theory of the state which claims encompassing all, and thus draws a one-dimensional process for all societies (Evans *et al.*, 1985: 348; Skocpol, 1985: 28). Apart from this, the statist-institutionalists point out the suitability of analytical induction in carrying

⁴ For example, a military battle as an ideal type is characterized by such principal elements as opposing armies, opposing strategies, materials, a disputed land, supply and support forces, command centers, leadership qualities. The military battles in the real world may not have all these elements but some of them (Ritzer, 1983: 107).

out comparative historical research which is required for considering the socio-historical context in which a social phenomenon takes place. As Evans (1985) puts:

Comparisons across countries and time periods and an emphasis on historical depth, the tracing out of processes over time, are optimal strategies for research on states. Obviously, without cross-national comparisons, investigations of states, even those with grand theoretical pretensions, become mere case descriptions. Along with other macro-social phenomena that do not repeat themselves (at the same time) in each nation, states require cross-country or cross-time comparisons if they are to be studied analytically (p.348).

By means of comparative historical analysis, the statist-institutionalists aim at reaching the explanation of the causes and results of any social phenomenon which are to be “generalizable across cases and historically sensitive” or valid (Skocpol, 1979: 35). Unlike the natural history approach, comparative historical approach attempts to neither set up a typical cycle of a social event depending on strict causality nor produce universal law.⁵ Rather, Skocpol (1979) underlines that at the core of this analysis is situated an effort to consider many variables in examining a social phenomenon and to seek for basic patterns of its regularities (pp.36-7). Such an analysis makes comparisons among positive historical cases of a social phenomenon to evince similar causal patterns despite many differences under a specific set of social-structural and international circumstances. In addition, this analysis applies to negative historical cases of the same social event in order to validate certain parts of causal arguments deduced from the analysis of positive cases (ibid: 37-9). Despite offering a method of multivariate analysis, Skocpol (1979) maintains that all relevant variables which shape any social event in a particular historical setting can not exactly be considered in comparative historical analysis (ibid).

⁵ Skocpol (1979) argues that the goal of the natural history approach is to express the causes and results of any social phenomenon with regard to a characteristic cycle or a sequence of stages which is expected to fit in the occurrence of that social event anywhere (p.37).

2. 1. 3. The Concept of the State in Statist-Institutionalism

The “bringing the state back in” perspective does not propose a new and coherent definition of the state. Rather, two basic forms that most states take are identified by Skocpol (1985). State is qualified as an actor consisting of a set of organizations plus an institution. “As an actor in its own right”, the state does not simply reflect socio-economic demands and interests (Krasner cited in Almond, 1988: 871). On the contrary, civil servants in the name of the state may distinctively formulate and conduct policies and goals. As an institution, the state shapes socio-economic structures unintentionally within a constitutional framework “... because their organizational configurations, along overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions ..., and make possible the raising of certain official issues...” (Skocpol, 1985: 21)

The state properly conceived is no mere arena in which socio-economic struggles are fought out. It is, rather, a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations. Of course, these basic state organizations are built up and must operate within the context of national and international economic dynamics. Moreover, coercive and administrative organizations are only parts of overall political systems. These systems also may contain institutions through which social interests are represented in state policymaking as well as institutions through which nonstate actors are mobilized to participate in policy implementation. Nevertheless, the administrative and coercive organizations are the basis of state power as such (Skocpol, 1979: 29).

Skocpol identifies this perspective in which the state is taken for granted to be an organizational configuration, characterized by its autonomy and capacity, as “Tocquevillian” (Özman & Coşar, 2001: 84). Autonomy implies that states can formulate and pursue certain goals independent of or *vis-à-vis* the different interests

of dominant classes, subordinate classes, or any social group (Barkey and Parekh, 1991: 525). International relations, development process, socio-economic and political crises, the maintenance of control and order are main determinants of state autonomy (Skocpol, 1985: 9). Capacity signifies the ability of the state to implement the goals derived from the autonomous state actions (Skocpol, 1985: 16). The effective implementation of independently formulated goals depends on a stable administrative and military organization, enough financial resources, talented civil servants, etc. (ibid).

If the state as such pursues certain goals independent of, different from, and even against, societal interests, then what kind of policies are produced by autonomous state actions, or what is attempted by these policies? Skocpol (1985) affirms that autonomous state activities cannot be without prejudice, thereby undeniably profiting certain groups in society and annoying the others (p.15). That is, autonomous state activities frequently aim at strengthening the authority and continuity of the state organizations and thus the group being advantageous and privileged as a result of these activities is state officials acting in the name of the state (ibid).

As mentioned above, the statist-institutionalists agree with Weber that an institutional differentiation between the state and society is the distinctive feature of modern era. Due to their positivism, the state is postulated to be potentially autonomous over dominant classes or any social group (Skocpol, 1979: 27). In other words, state autonomy and capacity are considered as the structural features of the state, and thus, the statist-institutionalists are not interested in probing why the state has a degree of autonomy or how the state can acquire the necessary organizational structures to achieve a set of tasks. Rather, comparative researchers favor investigating the circumstances under which the state may formulate and follow autonomous goals and can pursue them (Evans *et al.*, 1985: 350). The “bringing the state back in” perspective elaborates on the process of formulating the distinctive goals and policies through autonomous state actions (Skocpol, 1985: 15) and highlights the organizational structures the presence or absence of which is key to reach states’ goals or to implement their policies (Evans *et al.*, 1985: 351).

Not unexpectedly, the studies aiming at “bringing the state back in” tend to

classify states in regard to the concept of state autonomy. Assuming autonomy and sovereignty as structural features of the state, Nettl (1968) categorizes the phenomenon of the state in particular social settings with regard to the criterion of the 'stateness' which is determined by these features (cited in Özman & Coşar, 2001: 84-5).⁶ In this regard, Nettl raises three questions: 1) Is there a tradition for the existence, primacy, autonomy and sovereignty of the state? 2) To what extent have individuals generalized the concept and cognition of the state in their perceptions and actions, and to what extent are such cognitions salient? 3) Do the political ideas and theories of the society past and present incorporate a notion of the state and what role do they assign it? (cited in Heper, 1985: 18). Taking those questions into consideration, Nettl mentions about the social settings 'high in stateness' and 'low in stateness' (cited in Özman & Coşar, *ibid*).

Another study by Dyson (1980) in the statist-institutionalist literature suggests classifying societies into 'state societies' and 'stateless societies' (p. viii, cited in *ibid*). Due to the general emphasis on historical dimension in the study of states in this literature, Dyson prefers to examine the former in regard to the concept of state tradition which is assumed to have persisted for a long time. This means, the state has a leading role, namely the determinant of, not only in the political discourse but also in the field of the law in 'state societies'.

In the sociological framework presented by Badie and Birnbaum (1983), the phenomenon of the state in explaining and generalizing a wide variety of social patterns comes to be employed through the formation of the 'state' and of a political 'center' (pp.103-4). The authors define four type of the political systems where there is "a state and a center (France), a state but no center (Italy), a center but no true state (Great Britain and the United States) and neither a state nor a center (Switzerland)" (p.103). The first two cases are characterized by the state controlling and organizing civil society while in the others there is neither a state nor a 'true state' and thus civil society can organize itself, thereby preventing the state from acquiring a right to dominate.

⁶ In Nettl's view, the concept of sovereignty emphasizes the institutional aspect of the state, thereby implying the formulation and implementation of certain tasks on behalf of society by the state (cited in Özman & Coşar, 2001: 84).

To the extent that the concepts of state, stateness, and state tradition, which can be said to be used as determining variables in almost all studies in the statist-institutionalist literature, are employed to distinguish political systems and examine them in a particular set of social-structural and historical conditions, these studies generate a reductionist understanding of the state-society relations, on the one hand, and a classification of Western and Eastern polities by universal categories, on the other. Put differently, strong states and weak states come to be conceptualized according to the degree of stateness although the statist-institutionalists maintain to avoid establishing an abstract correlation among state strength (strong state *vis-à-vis* weak state), state capacity and state autonomy (Evans *et al.*, 1985: 351-355; Skocpol, 1985: 14). It is assumed that the more the state gets autonomy, the more the degree of stateness is high and the less civil society has a leading role in the processes of policy formulation and implementation.

Actually, the advocates of the “bringing the state back in” perspective never claim to attempt to substitute society-centered approaches with a strict state-centered one and to construct a dichotomous or a zero-sum understanding of the relations between the state and society; they always call into attention examining the state in relation to its society (Evans *et al.*, 1985; Skocpol, 1985: 20). They always maintain that the organizations of the state depend on two dimensions, that is, class-divided society and the historical circumstances (Skocpol and Trimberger, 1994: 124-5; Evans *et al.*, 1985; Skocpol, 1985; Skocpol, 1979: 30). Additionally, Skocpol (1985) asserts that autonomy is not a “fixed structural feature”; rather it is sensitive to social and historical circumstances and subject to change over time and across region (p.14). But this does not change the suggestion that the state should not be used as a dependent variable. As a result of this overemphasis on the state, this perspective comes to ignore the significance of social dynamics. Under these circumstances, statist-institutionalism comes to be repeatedly read as dichotomizing the literature into state-centered and society-centered perspective (Barkey and Parekh, 1991: 524).

In this thesis, the reductionist reading and universal categorization generated by the “bringing the state back in” perspective is thought to be related to its methodological difference from Weber. Steinmezt (1993) states that the identification of society-centered approaches as inappropriate leads the statist-institutionalists to

underestimate the cultural dimension of Weber's analysis, that is, his accent on the interactive relations among culture, religion, and social structures and the forms of the state (p.17). For the statist-institutionalists, Weber's description of the state, that is, compulsory association, which has "the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the state's claimed territory and the people within it" (cited in Migdal, 1994: 11) implies that the state is not a voluntary or contract based association which comes to exist as a result of human experience but a thing or an entity independent of the constituencies of the society.⁷ In other words, as a result of their positivism, the statist-institutionalists read the differentiation among the institutions of modern society as if it was not a methodological but an ontological one and attribute the state an ontological status, that is, a subject in-its-own distinct from the society. Nettl's definition of the state as a socio-cultural phenomenon which creates a cognition or perception on behalf of state officials (Nettl cited in Almond, 1988: 856) or Krasner's assumption that state officials are bounded by institutional "imperatives and restraints" (cited in *ibid*: 859) are generated around the understanding of the state in that way.

This thesis tries to point out that although statist-institutionalism goes back to Weber; its aim is different from Weber in selecting the state as an object of inquiry. Unlike Weber who tries to find the unique, and hidden reality behind the observable world that is specifically modern state, this view attempts to examine the impact and implications of the state as a socio-cultural phenomenon on the social reality. To the extent that the statist-institutionalists limit the social analyses with the phenomenal world, they cannot grasp the multiple causality relationship among the politics, economy, society, culture, religion, etc. and solely focus on state autonomy and strength in finding out the origins and relations leading to modernization or its absence. Under these circumstances, comparative historical analyses turn out to describe the Eastern politics through, in terms of Bromley (1994), "the theory of absences", that is, the absence of certain institutions and relations which generally

⁷ That is why statist-institutionalism goes back not to the social contract theories which saw the state essential to establish and maintain social order but to Weber. In social contract theories, the individual constitutes the ontological reality and then the state comes to be an artifice generated by human act. Probably, as these theories aim at finding an ideal form of the state, statist-institutionalism does not take them into account.

characterize the development pattern in the West towards capitalism. Within this frame, patrimonialism the ideal type of Weber is conceived as if it was the description of the social reality and turns into a means of reading the Eastern polities as deviant cases.

Due to the general tendency to characterize states with regard to state autonomy, the “bringing the state back in” perspective meets some critiques within statist-institutionalism (Migdal *et al.*, 1994; Mann, 1984). These critiques emphasize that this perspective which considers the state as that much autonomous from society leads to grant the state an ontological status (Migdal, 1994). Mann (1984) contends that state autonomy is not to be conceived as a function of state's capacity to disconnect itself from societal interests but is to be associated with its territorially-centralized organizational structure which provides the state with a capability to meet certain functions which cannot be performed by other societal forces due to their limited socio-spatial organizational structure.⁸ It is also maintained that states and societies are mutually transforming each other (Kohli and Shue, 1994: 319), and that a state-in-society approach which provides a more balanced treatment of the state and society in understanding social phenomena is quite appropriate (Migdal *et al.*, 1994: 1). Additionally, this approach stresses on that the “bringing the state back in” perspective drifts into producing universal patterns about social phenomena. Its advocates claim that the state-in-society approach provides a more helpful framework in carrying out country-specific and broadly comparative researches than the “bringing the state back in” perspective (Kohli and Shue, 1994: 322).

This revisionist approach, offered in the volume edited by Migdal *et al.*, (1994), primarily elaborates on the issue of state strength. In this approach, strength or weakness of any state is not linked to the degree of centralization or the autonomy from society; rather, powerlessness is a simultaneous tendency to occur alongside with centralization and the autonomy may be source of strength as well as weakness

⁸ Mann (1984) associates state autonomy with three stages: a) the state as a product of modern era has been exactly necessary for the preservation of property rights, b) as result of its multiple functions, the state has had relations with cross-cutting groups and the conflicts among these groups have provided the state with relative autonomy, and c) the state is a territorially-centralized organizational structure (pp. 339-44).

(Kohli and Shue, 1994: 309).⁹ In the “bringing the state back in” perspective, state autonomy receives such a meaning that the disconnectedness of the state from society makes the state so very strong as to drive all society according to its own agenda (Migdal, 1994: 20). It is argued that the direct correspondence between an autonomous and strong state and a degree of effectiveness, that is, the success of the state in influencing into society to bring about transformations (Kohli and Shue, 1994: 322) depends on understanding the state as a coherent and homogenous actor (Migdal, 1994: 11-18). The analyses “bringing the state back in” focus on the top levels of state organization and their relations with the society; thus, they cannot notice the incoherent character of state organization.¹⁰ Migdal (1994) states that the interplay with societal forces is different at highest echelons and local levels which are more open to direct influence of social interests and demands and it is very difficult to assume that states are effective to formulate and implement a set of policies in a coherent manner (ibid). Yet, it cannot be said that the revisionist approach breaks the reductionist understanding completely because Migdal (1994) is committed to the idea that the society is a product of state formation in the modern world (p.18). Its aim is to eliminate the perception of non-state arena to be static and its contribution is limited to take into consideration the dynamics, relations, struggles, oppositions, conflicts, etc. in this arena.

2. 2. The State Tradition Perspective

In political science literature in Turkey, “bringing the state back in” historical analysis is explicitly observed in Metin Heper’s studies. In his studies either in the field of public administration or in the field of political science, Heper applies statist-institutionalism to the Ottoman-Turkish case. For Heper (1985), the fact that the state has remained as a fact of life since the Ottoman days requires taking into

⁹ The state-in-society approach is founded on empirical analyses about India, Brazil, China, Africa, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt. For these analyses, see the volume edited by Migdal *et al.*, 1994.

¹⁰ Metin Heper carries out his studies in the field of public administration with the highest echelons of bureaucracy. See Heper 1971, 1974a, 1975, 1976a, 1977.

consideration the phenomenon of the state (pp.1-20). The modernization theory overestimates “the potentially dominant role of the state elites, as self-defined guardians of the public interest”, in relation to the stability of democracy (Heper, 1992a: 142-7). Nor structural-functionalist and neo-Marxist approaches which overlooks that the state is able to undermine the political influence of social groups provide an appropriate framework for Heper (ibid). In Heper’s words (1985), the understanding of the state in the new framework is as follow,

In the sense that the ‘state’ taken here, it may conjure up in one’s mind the notion of the ‘state as an organism’, i.e., ‘a society organized as a sovereign political body’. In fact, here the state is viewed as distinct from society. It is not, however, conceived of as a ‘machine’ or tool, at the disposal of the political elites. It is because insofar as one come across the phenomenon of the state, the agents who ‘act’ in the name of the state (the state elites) do not reconcile sectional interests in terms of procedural norms; rather, they filter the beliefs and demands coming from society through the substantive (state) norms that they themselves formulate (p.4).

Like the statist-institutionalists, Heper depends on the definition of the state by Weber. But, at the same time, he rejects Weberian and also Hegelian and Marxist approaches because he puts that he aims at defining “the origins ... and outcomes of an empirical reality” in its specific set of social and historical circumstances (cited in Özman & Coşar, 2001: 83). In other words, as a function of his positivist stance, to produce the knowledge of empirical reality rather than that of its ideal version constitutes the starting point in his studies (ibid). For Heper (1992a), the presence as well as the nature of the state is essential to the understanding of a polity in a contextual framework. It can be said that, in Heper’s understanding, the State exists in almost all polities in the modern era but “in empirical reality, there are states (in the plural) not *the* state” and the unique features of a state, its origins and consequences can be explained by considering the nature of the state (Heper, 1987: 5).

In that regard, like the statist-institutionalists who accentuate the degree of

stateness in analyzing empirical reality in a comparative historical platform, Heper (1985) indicates the degree of state autonomy from other societal forces as a starting point in grasping the unique origins and implications of empirical reality (p.5). He (1985) says that “the capacity of civil society to create consensus, not by imposition from above, not arrived at once and for all, but progressively as a resolution of conflicts about fundamental claims, is closely related to the ‘fortunes’ of the state to the extent that if such a consensus is not reached there emerges, or re-emerges, a state that is sovereign and autonomous *vis-à-vis* civil society” (p.19). To the extent that the Ottoman-Turkish state is perceived to be autonomous by Heper, he comes to create an imagery of strong state *vis-à-vis* weak civil society or that of vice versa. Under these circumstances, the perspective of state tradition, in general, and Heper, in particular, generate a reductionist understanding of the state and society and universalized classification of Western and Eastern polities. In explaining why modernization has not realized its potential in Turkish polity, this perspective generally highlights the lack of certain institutions which leads to the Western modernization and identifies the strong state to be the reason of this absence.

2. 2. 1. The Concept of Patrimonialism

In order to find out the implications which would be derived from the distinctive nature of the Ottoman-Turkish state, Heper creates the phrase of strong state tradition. This phrase means that the Ottoman-Turkish state, to a considerable degree, has been autonomous from the society or that the Ottoman-Turkish polity has been high in stateness. The conceptual tool, which is used by Heper and the others referring to this phrase, is patrimonialism, the ideal type of Weber. In contrast to feudalism, patrimonialism means a distinctive traditional kind of authority which always keeps under control any sources of power to appear outside the boundaries of legitimate power structure (Mardin, 1969: 259).

In the Ottoman case, this concept is used to distinguish the unique features derived from the location of the state in the social hierarchy (İnalçık, 1995; Heper, 1985; Mardin, 1980; Trimberger, 1978). In this approach, the Ottoman state was autonomous and strong so as to shape the whole system without the need to negotiate

with the societal forces, and thus civil society was not a significant determinant of political process. Unlike the feudal state in Western polities, the Ottoman state had always engaged in power from above when (re)organizing the society, leading to the lack of multiple confrontations between the state and the societal forces.

2. 2. 2. The Dichotomy of Center-Periphery

In establishing his conceptual framework, Heper (1985) interprets the dichotomy of center-periphery, which is created by Mardin in investigating the cultural differences between the Palace and the people, from a statist-institutionalist framework (Özman & Coşar, 2001: 86-7). This conceptual tool is used by Heper to differentiate the state-society relations, which are shaped by the patrimonial state in Ottoman polity from those in Western polities. By center, what is generally meant is the ruling class who attempts to encourage state autonomy, and thus its domination in the polity while the periphery represents the ruled (Heper, 1980: 85; Mardin, 1973: 36-7).¹¹ Particularly in Heper's studies, the center is a substitute for the state, or vice versa, due to the characterization of the polity with state tradition or high in stateness (Özman & Coşar, 2001: 86-7). The center simply signifies not an area where state officials representing the state are but also a realm in which the norms and centers of political activity, through which the essential conflicts about fundamental social issues are resolved, defined and thus alternative ways for political activity are not pre-empted by the state (ibid: 37).

In the state tradition perspective, the center-periphery cleavage implies a dichotomy rather than a settlement between the state and society in the Ottoman-Turkish polity. Heper (1985) argues that as a function of a sovereign and autonomous state, the Ottoman state had a one-sided confrontation with the periphery (p.19). The Ottoman state, or the center, intended to superimpose its central rule upon the periphery whereas the centralization process in the West depended on reconciling with the feudal forces (Mardin, 1973: 36). Thus, not consultation, coordination, and

¹¹ Findley (2000) argues that the center was consisted of the *askeri*, the *kalemiyye* and the *ulema*; there was always a struggle for assuming the control of the state among them, and thus, the balance of power always changed from time to time (p.39).

consociation but control, cooptation, and regulation emerged as the basic marks of the Ottoman state's relation to the periphery (Sunar and Sayarı, 1986: 167). This state had always attempted to preserve its privileged position, and thus its autonomy and domination on the society. In that regard, for the advocates of this perspective, the Ottoman sultans and those who represented the state, for example *askeriyye*, *kalemiyye* and *ulema* created such an administrative and social structure as to reinforce the degree of stateness and control on any field of activity in the society, thereby preventing any opposition against this order.

Additionally, the center-periphery cleavage is underlined to be the source of continuity between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic by the state tradition perspective. It can be suggested that for those advocating this perspective, the center-periphery cleavage constitutes the structural dimension of comparative historical analyses. The assumption that this dichotomy is an element of continuity in Ottoman-Turkish polity constitutes the historical dimension of the analyses. Focusing on the historical depth of social phenomena, what is attempted is to discover the persistence of certain basic patterns of state organization and of the state's relations with societal forces despite a considerable amount of reorganization in the state institutions.

2. 2. 3. Interest Group Politics in the Turkish State Tradition

Not unexpectedly, the interest group politics in the Turkish politics is read with special reference to the strong state. Interest groups are generally regarded as the representative of individual interests, and through the mediation by them, the distance between the state and individuals is decreased. For Heper (1991a), the appropriate framework to study the political development process and interest group politics in this process is to be constructed with regard the type of the State; in other words, there is a one-to-one correspondence between the degree of stateness and the pattern of interest group politics (p.8). That's why main studies of interest group politics, namely pluralism and corporatism, seem inadequate for the perspective of state tradition.

Pluralist and corporatist viewpoints are society-centered approaches and

neither of them necessarily put a significant emphasis on the existence of the state (ibid: 3). Pluralism is defined as “a system in which political power is divided among the branches of government and shared by the state and a number of private groups and individuals. (...) In a pluralist model, the state is not a constituent part of interests but external to those interests, setting boundaries, rules, and incentives” (cited in İrem, 1990: 17). Corporatist approach similarly takes no notice of the theory of the state although it is generally regarded as rival to pluralism. Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the state is a passive arena for interest groups compete but a constituent organizing, regulating, licensing, encouraging, controlling, etc. interest group associations and their activities (ibid: 22). Yet, corporatist studies are deprived of a specific account of the State in regard to its social and historical conditions (Heper, 1991a: 4-6). Thus, the Turkish case matches neither of them because the Turkish state tradition does allow pluralist or corporatist form of interest representation to flourish. As Heper (1991a) puts,

... depending upon the State or governmental tradition a polity has had in the past, interest group politics would tend to evidence, during the later historical periods, not a mix of different patterns of interest group politics but one dominant pattern. That dominant pattern of interest group politics, I would like to suggest, would depend upon the particular configuration of the State-civil society relationship that has been established in the past, and which still lingers on. This is because each pattern of interest group politics has a particular logic behind it which closely fits one type of State, or government, and not others. Pluralism requires a government basically responsive to civil society; neo-corporatism necessitates a harmonious relationship between the State and civil society. Neither pattern of interest group politics would be encountered in a polity dominated by a strong State (p.6).

Accordingly, the state tradition perspective is based on that “bringing the state back in” social analysis about the Ottoman-Turkish historical development is the most appropriate way in understanding the reasons for the lack of modernization in Turkish society. Its main theoretical premise is the determinacy of the state. The above mentioned conceptual tools are formulated to point out the unique implications

of the determinacy of Turkish state. This conceptual framework is founded on a direct correspondence between state autonomy and state strength. The reasons for the failures in Turkish modernization lie in the fact that Turkish state has been considerably autonomous from the societal forces, according to the state tradition perspective. Thus, this framework imagines dichotomous relations between the state and society, which is shaped by state autonomy. It is followed that the society has rarely a considerable role and place in political processes insofar as the polity is high in stateness. As to be seen in the next chapter, the state tradition perspective reads the state-society as well as state-business relations in Turkish politics from that standpoint.

CHAPTER 3

THE STRONG STATE IN TURKISH POLITICS

This chapter will deal with presenting and discussing the evaluation of Turkish politics from the state-centered standpoint. Its main purpose is to indicate how the historical dynamics in Ottoman-Turkish polity are read with regard to the methodological and conceptual framework mentioned in the previous chapter. It will be argued that the problems of the state-centered analysis discussed earlier become clear in this reading. This chapter will be consisted of two main subsections. In order to identify where the state tradition perspective finds out the institutional and historical origins of the strong state, the Ottoman state structure and the Ottoman modernization will be initially examined. In the second subsection, the explanation of Turkish politics with reference to the strong state tradition will be given. The particular attention will be placed on certain topics such as the Turkish modernization, the state-business relations, the relationship between the state and political elite as well as the profound transformation in the 1980s. It is because the state tradition perspective particularly mentions these themes while maintaining that the Turkish state has always been strong. Moreover, the alternative questions, which are thought to point out the insufficiency of the state tradition perspective, will be put forward in this subsection.

3. 1. Reading Ottoman Empire with reference to the Concept of Patrimonialism

3. 1. 1. The Institutional Origins of the Strong State

According to the state tradition perspective, patrimonialism and the center-periphery dichotomy in the Ottoman era, which is used as an analytical tool for

describing Turkish polity with the strong state tradition, came to materialize in the state apparatuses. The Ottoman rulers are thought to have established a patrimonial state with a secular legal framework, a status order, an executive mechanism consisting of slave-servants and a non-hereditary land system. It is argued that these apparatuses have provided the Ottoman state with autonomy and, in turn, strength *vis-à-vis* the societal forces. So, it will be adequate to take a look into these institutions. A patrimonial polity is characterized by the lack of an institutional of a depersonalized system which makes the rulers to be bounded by a set of rules. Yet, those advocating the state tradition perspective do not mean a pure personal rule (İnalçık, 1995; Heper, 1992b; Mardin, 1968). The founding sultans who were aware of the need for acquiring the support of the ruled-over and for acting just in order to maintain the social order and welfare had to limit their arbitrary power. In such a context, they tried “to identify the state with established values”, thereby going beyond the religious tradition (Findley, 1980: 9). Particularly, Mehmet the Conqueror attempted to create a systematized body of law and thus to achieve a degree of institutionalization and depersonalization but without denying the absolute rule of the sultan. At this juncture, a secular and state-oriented tradition, *adab* (ibid: 11) or *örf-i sultani*, appeared (Heper, 1992b: 174). *Örf-i sultani* implied the will of the Ottoman rulers to make regulations and enact laws utterly on his initiative, not necessarily depending on religion (İnalçık, 1973: 70).¹²

According to the state tradition perspective, *örf-i sultani*, at first glance, may seem to restrict the sultan’s discretionary power but this legislation does not change the basic political principle of the Ottomans. It is argued that by the practice of *örf-i sultani* the determination of the rules of the game, which were essential to the maintenance of a patrimonial order, was aimed. Accordingly, the practice also gave way to the maintenance of “subject’s compliance and economic capacity to support the sultan” (İnalçık, 1995: 60). Thus, for this perspective, this set of rules and norms

¹² According to İnalçık (1973), this body of law, namely *Kanun-i Osmani*, mainly consisted of two *kanunnames* by which Mehmet the Conqueror organized the state apparatuses and the *tumar* system. The former legalized the basic administrative structure, the functions of institutions, the relations among them and the privileged location of the sultan in the institutional hierarchy while the latter authorized the issue of taxation and organized the relations between the state officials and the *reaya* in order to maintain a fair tax-collection. For the author (2000), the organization of state apparatus and the people through the *kanunnames* also indicates the patrimonial character of the Ottoman social order which was consisted of two main classes, namely the ruling class and the ruled-over (pp.35-6).

to meet certain needs and to resolve essential conflicts was produced independently from societal forces. It was the sultan who decided to issue secular rules on his own, thus, this enactment “never committed the sultans legally” (ibid). Nor did this law assume a judicial balance among the sultan, the state officials, the institutions, the feudal forces, the people, etc. (İnalçık, 1973). For Heper (1980), the laws and regulations issued according to *örf-i sultani* were formulated to control the society from the center instead of granting rights (p.84).

The social structure is thought to have embodied the Ottoman concept of the state, which had a considerable degree of autonomy, as well. İnalçık (1964a) states that the society was ordered around the idea of the circle of justice, which means that “a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without justice” (p. 43). In this structure, which was successfully consolidated by Islam, the sultan was granted the absolute power by God (İnalçık, 1973: 68), and thus, the state should keep each man in his appropriate place, which is determined by his ability, for the integrity and well-being of the *ümmet* (Findley, 1980: 7; İnalçık, 1964a: 42). This means, every society must have a sovereign with absolute power to ensure the reproduction of a good order (İnalçık, 1973: 65-9). İnalçık (1964a) describes this social structure as follows:

Ottoman society was divided into two major classes. The first one, called *askeri*, literally the “military,” included those to whom the sultan had delegated religious or executive power through an imperial diploma, namely, officers of the court and the army, civil servants, and *ulema*. The second included the *reaya*, comprising all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who paid taxes but who had no part in the government. It was a fundamental rule of the empire to exclude its subjects from the privileges of the “military.” Only those among them who were actual fighters on the frontiers and those who had entered the *ulema* class after a regular course of study in a religious seminary could obtain the sultan’s diploma and thus become members of the “military” class. It was, in fine, the sultan’s will alone that decided a

man's status in society (p.44).¹³

According to Mardin (1968), this two-class based social structure is a sign of “the Ottoman view of political power as belonging exclusively to the Sultan and his executive machinery led to the creation of a view of strata in the Empire as political and to a conception of the game of politics as zero-sum game” (p.122). This means that there was no alternative other than belonging to either the ruling class or the ruled-over in the Ottoman society. In that regard, this society is generally classified as a status order in which not only political power was the central value but also status was the primary determinant of income (Mardin, 1980; 1968). In other words, wealth was not sufficient to determine one's status, and thus, the exercise of economic power was curtailed to the extent that “wealth alone did not guarantee the right to consume” (Mardin, 1968: 130). In such a context, social relations and mobility did not stipulate economic sources but political power in the Empire.

For the state tradition perspective, the center had always a suspicious view against the periphery due to the fear of disintegration inherited to the Empire from the frontiers *bey*s' attack on the central authority in the early fourteenth century. As a result, the Ottoman rulers were willing neither to depend on the cooperation with the feudal forces nor to share their authority and power with some forces. Rather, the state dominated the centre so entirely as to close the door to all alternative power centers, and thus, organized the social order, which would be deprived of intermediate structures, as to prevent access to any sources of power other than the sultan. For Mardin (1969), the lack of intermediate structures signified the political premise of mobility, that is, the sultan's will rather than the production and distribution of goods came to determine one's status in the hierarchy (p.273).

Those advocating the state tradition perspective argue that the consolidation of patrimonial domination in the Ottoman polity had originated in the creation of a central administrative apparatus (Trimberger, 1978:45; Karpat, 1973a: 30). İnalcık (1995) refers to Weber who says that “patrimonial domination (...) establishes itself

¹³ Mardin (1968) states that the Ottoman society consisting of two social sets is only an ideal type for Ottoman polity to understand the legitimate (patrimonial) and non-legitimate (feudal) features (p.120). The Ottoman society was not as strict as defined. On the contrary, the Empire has some feudal features. Neither the ruling class nor the ruled had a monolithic structure (ibid: 120-5). But it should be the legitimate features which would not give rise to a revolutionary transformation in the last instance.

through an administrative apparatus. (...) Either by virtue of a constellation of interests or by virtue of authority, domination expresses itself and functions through law and administration” (p.63). According to Findley (1980), an extensive development of patrimonial officialdom and a strong aversion and hostility to the social classes or estates on behalf of the state characterized a patrimonial system (p.6). In the Ottoman Empire, the traditional concept of the sultan’s office, in which the sultan was regarded as a patriarch, namely the head of his household, signified the patrimonial character of the system, in which “the sultan was the head of the household, the dynasty was the family proper, the ruling class comprised the slaves who served in the household, the subject classes were the “flocks” (*reaya*) entrusted by God to the care of the family head, and the territory of the state- with theoretically limited exceptions- was the dynastic patrimony” (ibid: 7).

İnalçık (1964a) affirms that in setting up the central administration with regard to the theoretical absolutism, the Ottoman rulers “eliminated all kinds of aristocracies in the conquered lands, entrusted executive functions only to slaves trained in the court (*kuls*), and enlisted the *ulema* in their service” (p.43).¹⁴ Slaves of the sultan were mostly recruited through the *devşirme* system in which the children of non-Muslim families were chosen to be converted to Islam and educated at the Palace and then became candidates for important administrative positions (Karpat, 1973a: 30). They were personally committed to the sultan and had no hereditary rights (İnalçık, 1995) and thus were placed in the legal status of slaves (Findley, 1980: 14).

İnsel (1996) maintains that a principle of externality to society lies at the core of this special recruitment system (p.77). This principle includes an imagination like that: the society comes from the soil while the State is a supernatural or a spiritual being (Berkes cited in İnsel, ibid). In that regard, high government officials were trained with regard to the principle that their power was derived from the sultan and

¹⁴ Eisenstadt (1981) maintains that the administrative status of Islam and religious bureaucracy proved the patrimonial character of the system. That is, although the Ottoman Empire was a religious entity, Islam was not allowed to be an independent source for power. The *ulema* and the *şeyhülislam*, the head of *ulema*, as the absolute representative of the sultan’s religious authority were prevented from concentrating in their hands a degree of state authority. The administration of religious law was not left to the *ulema* and came to be a government function for which state officials were charged (İnalçık, 1970a: 302).

thus, no ties with social groups on behalf of them were either approved or established (Heper, 1976: 509). Rather, the officials serving to the sultan as his slaves “became a status group with honor and privileges *vis-à-vis* the general population, but their prestige remained tied to office, and hence they were personally dependent on the sovereign” (Trimberger, 1978: 45), thereby neither having a corporate autonomy nor developing an independent organization (ibid; Findley, 1980: 14).¹⁵ In that regard, the organization of the administrative system by Mehmet the Conqueror did not allow a transformation from patrimonialism (İnalçık, 1995: 56). On the contrary, to the extent that the loyalty to the sultan was defined as the exclusive measure on the part of the officials, the replacement of a personal body of servants with an impersonal body of servants whose status were determined by a set of rules did not change the patriarchal model of household but only resulted in a change in the degree of dependence in the household (ibid).

According to the state tradition perspective, high state controls and intervention in economic realm should also be associated with theoretical absolutism. Mardin (1980) argues that the Ottoman economic system was based on the principle of “constant pie” for *reaya* because the growth of production beyond the need would support a new emerging class to challenge the state power (pp.24-5). The income distribution was justified through a traditional idea of equity that was achieved by allocating positions as well as share from the economy with regard to the subjects’ ability (ibid). The patrimonial state organized in agriculture by the rule of justice and the *timar* system, in industry by the rule of *hisba* and the guilds (Sunar, 1974: 17). The Ottoman rulers are thought to have attempted to prevent the accumulation of

¹⁵ For the state tradition perspective, a similar set of checks blocking state officials from consolidating power independent of the sultan were necessarily taken when the administrative system was organized. İnalçık (1970a) contends that in order to preserve the sultans’ absolute authority, a separation among the juridical, executive, financial and military realms was taken as an appropriate solution by Mehmet the Conqueror (p.302). The grand *vezir*, the *kadı* who was in charge of juridical issues, the *defterdar* who was responsible for financial topics and the *Yeniçeris* were the representatives of the sultan in their own spheres and directly responsible to the sultan, and thus, the sultan could reserve for himself the right for final decision in these three spheres (ibid). Additionally, Trimberger (1978) points out to certain regulations such as the sultan’s legitimate right to take possession of the wealth of officials in case of death or discharge, Islamic inheritance laws distributing the estates of officials in every generation and the specific nature of religious estates (*vakıf*), to which officials donate to escape confiscation during their life but which in turn did not provide them a large amount of profit to expand their wealth, which prevented the officials to accumulate sufficient property to become an autonomous power (p.55).

wealth or property in the hands of local forces which would give rise to claims and ability for power, thereby threatening the central and undivided system.

In addition to political and administrative intentions, the controls and interventions of the central authority in economic life are thought to have had an ideological dimension. Sunar (1974) asserts that the Ottoman state was successful in intertwining political authority with socio-economic roles (pp.18-9).¹⁶ It is thought that the state designed a patronage system which was based on a task of common goal which benefited not only the state but also the *reaya*. This system provided the former, namely the patron, with resources and services, and, in turn, the patron as a benevolent father protected the client, namely the *reaya*, against the local notables' violation (ibid). In other words, the Ottoman state was regarded by the people as a force for good which is expressed in the phrase "father state" (Findley, 2000: 34). In that regard, the concentration of surplus at the centre had a function of legitimacy on behalf of the state that was the dispensation of justice (*adalet*) and the maintenance of welfare (*hisba*) (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987a: 102; İslamoğlu-İnan and Keyder, 1987; Sunar, 1987; Mardin, 1969).

It is maintained that the *timar* system emerged as the keystone of the basic state policy in the mid-fourteenth and especially the fifteenth century (İnsel, 1996: 61). As Barkan says, "the Ottoman Empire and its social order and the concept of state, which gave birth to this order, had their foundations in the land policy" (cited in Karpas, 1968: 73). The state's political intervention in the agricultural production process principally tried to "preserve the integrity of peasant holdings, prevent accumulation of land, and protect the free status of the peasant" and the *timar* system provided the political-administrative institutions for direct state controls in surplus of agricultural production (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987a: 102). In this system, the title of the land belonged to the sultan and no one claimed any right over it without a certain permission of the sultan, namely the *berat* (İnalçık, 1973: 73) and the *reaya* or the peasant had only the right of usufruct (Karpas, 1968: 74). The *timar* holder neither occupied the household production nor claimed ownership over the land and the

¹⁶ Here, one of the differences among those referring to the strong state is observed. While Sunar (1974) disagrees in accepting the understanding of the Ottoman state as a spiritless or bureaucratic despotism which was completely alien to the society (p.18), Insel (1996) favors.

peasants.¹⁷

İnalçık (1995) says that the *timar* system was designed to ensure the control and monopoly of sultan over the benefice-holders (p.66). Unlike the feudal lords, the position of the *timar* holder was not hereditary but administrative; however, the *timar*, or in some cases a different benefice holding, was generally granted to the son of the *timar* holder when his father passed away (İnsel, 1996: 61). Due to this general tendency, the Ottoman land regime is discussed to have been similar with and even to be more effective than feudal system (Trimberger, 1978; Mardin, 1968: 122). Yet, what is emphasized by the state tradition perspective is that this tendency had no legal validity, thereby providing not a *de jure* but a *de facto* obligation in the name of the central authority. As the land benefices did not take a legal hereditary form by which feudal lords could claim ownership and consolidate control over the land, the *timar* holders could not have a power base for attaining contractual rights from the sultan (Heper, 1980: 84; Trimberger, 1978: 44). For Insel (1996) what is quite remarkable is that this act of confiscation did not require seeking a legitimacy on behalf of the sultan because a contractual relationship which would bound the sultan with a set of commitments did not constitute the acquisition of *timar* (ibid).

Again as a function of its patrimonial character, the land regime is considered to have prevented the development of intermediate structures by the peasants as well. For the peasantry, independent and small peasantry provided the peasants with sufficient land. This did not lead to the appearance of serfdom which was derived from the loss of land and which in turn constituted the source of power of feudal lords' in Western countries (Keyder, 2000; Heper, 1985: 22; 1980: 82). On the contrary, the central authority always preferred to protect the peasants against the *timar* holders as a result of its ideological image as the distributor of justice and thus intentionally prevented the peasants from perceiving the feudal lords as an alternative protector against the possible abuses of the state (İnalçık, 1973). In that context, the

¹⁷ The *timar* holder was only responsible for keeping the land cultivated, collecting taxes, and producing a given number of soldiers and supplies in case of war (Karpas, 1968: 74). He could not sell the land, divide it, quit its cultivation, and leave it (ibid, 1973a: 32). He had to give the land back to the sultan when assigned to another area (Heper, 1985: 23). The *timar* could have been given from the *sipahi* at any time (İnsel, 1996: 63; Karpas, 1973a: 32; Mardin, 1968: 122). Additionally, the *timar* holders were supervised by the sultan's slaves, namely *kadis*, who were sent out from the center to administer the provinces, kept strict control over taxation (İnalçık, 1995; 1973).

activities and tendencies of the peasants were also strictly and directly controlled and determined by the central authority although the economic foundation of the government protected them against the mistreatments of the *tumar* holders (Karpas, 1968: 74).

In industry, the controls of the state was maintained and legitimized by the duty of *hisba* (Mardin, 1969: 260). According to the Islamic *hisba* rules, the central authority had to protect the community from unjust practices in the market. In that regard, a free market system was not allowed in the Empire in order to keep political power and authority in the hands of state officials (Sunar, 1974: 17). By means of the guilds, the *hisba* exactly organized and regulated urban craft production to provide sufficient food and meet the certain necessities of the people at normal prices (Genç, 2000: 181). Otherwise, namely under the conditions of shortage or high prices, the military and the people would oppose the central authority (İnalçık, 1970b: 217).

İnalçık (1995) indicates that the guilds had also a degree of autonomy in the Empire (p.62). What still leads him to examine the Ottoman polity under the rubric of patrimonialism is as follows: the relations of industrial production did not cause a transformation of guilds into self-governing municipal organizations (ibid).¹⁸ As a function of the basic principle of the Ottoman concept of state, the regulations of the guilds were enforced by the *kadıs* and, also, the guilds were subject to the controls of and the supervision by the local *kadıs* (İnalçık, 1970b: 216). Additionally, the guilds were to function to directly connect the economic activity in urban areas to the central authority as the state aimed at concentrating surplus at the centre and thus hindered the excessive accumulation of wealth and the appearance of potential local forces in local areas (Wallerstein *et al*, ibid).

İnalçık (1970b) argues that the state enforced strict controls over domestic and international trade although commercial activities were not subject to the regulations by the idea of *hisba*. The state organized domestic trade by establishing regional and inter-regional markets (İslamoğlu-İnan and Keyder, 1987: 49), by

¹⁸ At this point, İnalçık seems to be holding a similar line of reasoning with Sunar, İslamoğlu-İnan and Keyder. Sunar (1987) and İslamoğlu-İnan and Keyder (1987) mainly criticize the understanding of Ottoman polity from an Oriental view which claims the East to be a static whole. They contend that the socio-economic system was not far from dynamics, conflicts and contradictions but all of them were patrimonial in nature, thereby, in the words of Sunar (1987), not giving rise to a challenge to the relations of “state-administered mode of production” (p.67).

controlling the merchants to take part in specific markets (Wallerstein *et al.*, 1987: 90), by hindering the translation of mercantile capital into agricultural or industrial capital (Mardin, 1980; İnalçık cited in Sunar, 1974: 21). However, for İnalçık, the state's control over trade, especially international trade, was not as close and strict as over agriculture and industry, and thus was privileged in comparison to the agricultural and industrial activities (cited in Sunar, 1974: 21). The merchants were cooperating with the state because the merchants always gave the Ottoman government a loan of money, ensured fixed revenue from custom changes and helped the regime in tax collection, and in turn, the state protected the mercantile activities and gave the merchants monopolies. Additionally, international mercantile activities made luxury goods for the Palace available and supplied the necessary goods and imported certain raw materials for industrial production especially in big cities.

3. 1. 2. The Historical Origins of the Strong State

As mentioned above, in statist-institutionalism, in general, and in Heper's studies, in particular, there is not a one type of the state but states. That is why those analyzing Ottoman-Turkish polity from the standpoint of statist-institutionalism claim not to rely on one of contrasting the "dynamic" West and the "static" East. Yet, Heper (1987) maintains that "while the state is not a fixed phenomenon, once tradition is established it lingers on over different historical periods" (p.5). That is, the social reality shaped by the degree of stateness is not a static system but at the same time the general and fundamental features of the state determined by its nature do not change in different periods.

In that regard, the Ottoman order is conceived as a dynamic order facing a set of changes as a result of domestic and world-historical conditions (Keyder and Öncü, 1994; İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987b). However, this order is considered to have been patrimonial in nature, and thus the conflicts over political and economic system are to have characteristically been patrimonial (Sunar, 1987: 63). Thus, these conflicts are thought to have never attempted to deconstruct the existing order formulated with regard to the privileged location of the state and to establish a new kind of order in which the nature of relations between the state and societal forces would have been

changed by limiting the power of the state or by demanding power in the name of societal forces.

This constitutes the way of looking of this perspective to the modernization attempts followed during the nineteenth century. Those adopting the state tradition perspective contend that the implementation of the administrative reforms should not be conceived as the beginning of modernization (Sunar, 1987; Heper, 1980; Karpat, 1973a; Mardin, 1969; Rustow, 1968; Shaw, 1968; İnalcık, 1964b). Karpat (1968) puts that the Ottoman state shaped the direction of change, which initially began in the society, according to its historical evolution, philosophy, social status and self-image (pp.70-1). He argues that the increasing control of the *ayans* over the land “enabled them to maintain a commanding position in the community, provided them with income, and gave them a status *vis-à-vis* the government bureaucracy”, leading to a change in the relationship among the state, the *sipahi* and the peasants which severely dissolved the relations and structures supporting the traditional system (Karpat, 1968: 77).¹⁹ Its interventions aimed at maintaining the system which would continue to provide “a fiscal basis for the bureaucratic order” and thus preserving its privileged location in the social hierarchy (ibid). Put differently, this perspective indicates that the reconsolidation of strong state without changing the social hierarchy and power relations constituted the way of resolving the political and economic troubles in the nineteenth century. The main argument is that the reformist measures to modernize the bureaucracy were taken within the traditional philosophy and this led eventually to its transformation into a subject, namely the leader of change having its own viewpoint and remaining independent of the society. As a result, a transformation undergone in Western polities which resulted in the emergence of intermediate structures independent of the state power, and then, that of civil society is argued to have not taken place in the Ottoman Empire.

Here, the line of reasoning followed by this perspective is that the state-society relations in Western polities are portrayed as if those were the ideal cases and those in the Empire come to be elucidated through the lack of constitutive features of

¹⁹ The *ayans*, namely notables and the *eşraf*, “the most influential residents of the city whom the government always addressed on matters directly concerning the town population”, were even found as early as in the fourteenth century (İnalcık, 1964a: 46).

the Western modernization such as the rule of law, social contract, intermediary structures, serfdom, progressive bourgeois class, commercial activities, individualism, the rise of towns, etc. As a pioneer of this line of reasoning, Mardin (1995) maintains that the town was the essential condition of the emergence of civil society as well as that of the Western development (pp.280-5). He summarizes the process as follow: the serfs leaving the lord settled down in town and became a merchant; his changed status was finally accepted by the lord. This shows the emergence of the medieval concept of the rule of law which limited the sovereign's will, leading to the legal and legitimate protection for the merchants and their activities. Thus, the merchants could acquire autonomous power to bargain with the central authority to pursue their interests. For Mardin, all these developments in the long run would bring about the emergence of civil society and the liberties derived from this structure in Western polities (ibid). It was the nature of the Ottoman state that impeded the growth of mercantile capital, in the classical age (1300-1600), by protecting the guilds against the monopolistic activities of merchants, and by disapproving a corporate personality or independent local administration, and then avoided the experience of above mentioned process in Ottoman polity (Mardin, 1969: 260-2). Yet, the aforesaid diagnosis becomes tricky if the argument about the English agrarian capitalism is considered. Wood (1991) argues that there is a general evolution path characterized by the above mentioned features. Yet, the English capitalism did not verify this development path although it was the first instance of capitalism. It generated as a result of the involvement of a landed aristocracy into the commerce and in the countryside rather than that of the emergence of a bourgeois class (ibid). Under these circumstances, the state tradition perspective reads the Ottoman modernization with reference to a development path which did not exist even in the West.

In that regard, Heper (1976a) uses the concept of Sugar, namely "induced" development in conceptualizing the Ottoman modernization. Sugar (1964) advocating the modernization theory argues that change in the Empire was motivated by an outside incentive, namely threat or pressure and then the emergence of a leader group, namely new bureaucracy who aimed at restoring the power of the state; this led firstly to a change in the political structure and then to economic change, i.e. the

creation of a middle class, which would also be planned and performed by the central government according to its own interests (p.149).²⁰ Although adopting statist-institutionalism, Heper develops an understanding similar to the approach of Sugar. The advocates of state tradition perspective simply underline the absence of organic relations between the state and societal forces and relate this to the nature of the Ottoman state. In that regard, it can be said that this perspective produces a contrast rather than a comparison between Western and Eastern polities in which the latter is characterized as a deviant case.

In that study, Heper (1976a) elaborates on that the development pattern in Ottoman-Turkish polity was a consequence of the particular interaction of the traditional order with the Westernizing process. The reformist measures to reorganize the bureaucratic mechanism were not accompanied with a parallel transformation in the area of the norms which had dominated the Ottomans since the fourteenth century (Heper, 1974a: 53).²¹ Under these circumstances, the bureaucracy, who was naturally dedicated to the state, appeared as the leading group (Heper, 1976a: 437-40). In other words, the bureaucracy remained to be a political rather than an administrative input to the development process and the Ottoman elites who were politically engaged to a notion of public good did not transform from a statute elite position to functional elite position, thereby playing much more significant role in

²⁰ In regard to the Western development, Sugar (1964) employs the concept of “organic” development in order to characterize the European pattern of development (p.147). The European countries develops organically as a result of, in order of time, a change in the economy which give rise first to the emergence of a new force, namely the bourgeoisie, and then, through the cooperation of the interests of this new force with the ruler, to the establishment of a centralized state and finally the establishment of constitutional government as a function of the bourgeoisie’s intent to expand its power at the expense of the state.

²¹ Heper (1974a) defines the modernization of bureaucracy as the process of structural-functional differentiation (pp.51-3). Structural-functional differentiation which is a characteristic of a rational and efficient bureaucracy is basically a product of the division of labor and specialization in modern era. Structural differentiation is the differentiation of economic, social, political, etc. functions in a social formation and functional differentiation is the performance of each functions by one institution which is expert in its own field. In the European development, that transformation in the superstructure is led by a transformation in the socio-economic structure and the former is to become responsive to the norms and interests of the leading classes in the society. The bureaucracy loses its autonomy, and thus becomes an entity, an instrumental body or a mechanism in the hands of these classes (Heper, 1971: 423-7). This means that the traditional-religious value system on the side of the statesmen is gradually replaced with a dynamic and principal system; the mission of the bureaucratic system is not to shape but just to carry out the principal goals and policies of the policy-makers.

making than executing rules and goals (Heper, 1975: 122-3).²²

Similar to the modernization theory, Trimberger (1978) is in favor of the thesis of revolution from above in describing the particular experience of the late Ottomans as well as Turkish Republic. For her, the administrative reforms in response to the external motivations during the nineteenth century provided the officials, who became on familiar terms with Western development, with a political outlook; they aimed at only reshuffling the state in overcoming the troubles and felt no need in seeking a social base and support. Similarly, Keyder (2000) argues that the bureaucracy aimed at adapting to the new world now ordered by the relations of capitalist mode of production without changing the traditional system which guaranteed its privileged location at the top of social hierarchy; in doing so, the bureaucracy aimed at transforming the society from above and its political concerns shaped up the socio-economic goals.

Kasaba (1994) who favors a more balanced state-in-society approach contends that the non-state area in the Empire was not as static as conceived by the state-centered perspective. However, as mentioned before, this approach, which claims a non-reductionist understanding of state and society, cannot overcome the methodological problems of statist-institutionalism. Not unexpectedly, the author argues that in the changing Empire of the nineteenth century, the organization of trade and production, the mobility of peasants and the nationalist, religious and sectarian movements in the non-state arena confined and formed the Ottomans' authority but were not able to enclose and transform the state. He concludes that in order to avoid the pressure coming from the non-state arena and to articulate and develop their own interests as a distinct group, the Ottoman-Turkish elites intentionally designed their political discourse in a cultured distance from the non-state arena.

Those advocating the state tradition perspective find the historical origins of the strong state during the nineteenth century in the agenda of the reformist sultans and the changing nature and pattern of the relations between the state and the local

²² In the state tradition perspective, the notion of public good manifests itself in the roles of the state as the distributor of *justice* and the administrator of *hisba*. As the carrier of public good, the state had legitimacy on the side of the ruled-over and could control the socio-economic system without considerable opposition at least in the classical period.

forces. İncalcık (1964a) points out that Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) reasoned the reforms with regard to the circle of justice and legitimized his admiration for and his turn to the West with *Şeriat*. (p.49). Like his predecessors, his main aim was to restore the military power of the Empire and he attempted to establish a regular army under his direct control (ibid). Trimberger (1978) maintains that *Sened-i İttifak* (1808) was a result of struggle for power among the *Yeniçeris*, the *ulema* and the *ayans* and did not attempt to dismantle the state authority and to provide the *ayans* with political power and influence although providing respect and security for the authority of provincial dynasties and thus limiting the boundaries of the central authority (pp.56-7). İncalcık (1964b) asserts that the traditional idea, that is, the sovereign authority of the sultan is essential to the survival of the state as well as the *ayans*, did not change (p. 607). In that regard, for Karpat (1968), the confirmation of *Sened-i İttifak* by Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839) should not be conceived as an attempt to create a new social system as “a change in power hierarchy entailed the disappearance of the state ...” (p.82).

The advocates of state tradition perspective point out that the state-oriented nature of the Ottoman polity created a traditional view on behalf of the *ayans* (İslamoğlu-İnan and Keyder, 1987; Sunar, 1987; Heper, 1980; Karpat, 1973a; 1968; Mardin, 1969; Hourani, 1968; İncalcık, 1964a; 1964b). Hourani (1968) explains that as follows; while the provincial notables having an independent power could possess a position of natural leadership depending on a coalition between urban and rural forces in Western polities, the *ayans* did not develop as an independent group but as a result of the action of government in Ottoman polity (p.46). The *ayans* never intended to acquire an independent power of the state, thereby achieving capitalist transformation (Heper, 1974a: 47, fn. 53).

İnsel (1996) contends that the Ottoman state was always the source of wealth. In a similar vein, Mardin (1968) maintains that “... in an economic structure in which the state and the economy are so closely intertwined that profit is dependent on controlling strategic positions in the state rather than on controlling the production process” (p.138). That is why the *ayans* preferred to invest their money in buying the allowance of tax-farming which seemed the most beneficial form of profit-making to them instead of challenging the ruling authority and finding new areas of investment

(Mardin, 1980: 30; Karpat, 1968: 78). For Mardin (1969), as birth or socio-economic power did not provide them with political privileges, the provincial notables in order to access to the sources of power desired to identify themselves with the ruling class (pp.273-4). In that context, they imitated rather than challenging the Palace culture while the local culture was adopted as a basis for their identity by the notables in the Western polities (ibid).

Heper (1980) conceives the rise of the *ayans* as a function of not their effort to transform the patrimonial structure but the weaknesses of the central authority in the provinces (p.87). He asserts that as a result of this, the *ayans* remained uninterested to the power of the state and its policies for centralization unless the latter had threatened their local autonomy (ibid: 91). Sunar (1987) says that their rise beginning particularly in the seventeenth century represented neither the acquisition of autonomous power which feudal lords enjoy in Western Europe nor the success of political influence (pp.72-4). Just as the state relied on the *ayans*' economic power, as the latter needed the state apparatus; however, they did not establish a relationship of confidence, cooperation and support due to their suspicious feelings against each other (ibid). Thus, it can be said that for this perspective the organic modernization a condition of which is the cooperation of the new economic interests with the ruler did not emerge in the Empire due to the effects of the patrimonial nature of the state over the social system, procedures and relations.

The *Tanzimat* (1839-1878) is generally identified as an era in which the transformation of the bureaucrats from object to subject took place. The historical process is summarized as follows; the reorganization of the administrative system under the rule of Sultan Mahmut II brought to a new generation of reformers, namely the modernizing bureaucrats to the fore.²³ The *Tanzimat* men opposed to the arbitrary rule of Sultan Mahmut II and proposed institutionalization vis-à-vis personal rule, and aimed at limiting the sultan's absolute sovereignty (Heper, 1977: 85). In that

²³ The majority of those bureaucrats had been served in the embassies and institutions such as Translation Chamber set up by Sultan Mahmut II (Chambers, 1964: 308). Additionally, a series of regulations concerning the recruitment, training and promotion of the bureaucrats were issued by Sultan Mahmut II in the 1830s (ibid: 305). At the same time, some political events such as the discomfiting success of Muhammed Ali of Egypt and its solution through the diplomatic negotiations with European powers by Reşid Pasha were essential to that rise of the civil bureaucrats and the beginning of the *Tanzimat* era with little opposition (İnalçık, 1964a: 55-6).

regard, the *hat* guaranteed the superiority over *Şeriat* as well as the sovereign authority of the sultan of the rule of law which would serve to the saving of the state for him (İnalçık, 1976:7).²⁴ In relation to this, a “higher bureaucracy” which was intimately familiar with the Western experience due to their education, roles and positions was created through the administrative reforms (Mardin, 2003a: 276-8).

For the state tradition perspective, the men of *Tanzimat* did not tend to reinterpret their traditional norms, particularly regarding the state’s relations with its subjects and left their reforms without a common base and support. According to Shaw (1968), they thought that as long as their reforms were justified, the requests of the Ottoman subjects did not need to be considered (p.36). It is maintained that, as a function of patrimonialism, they had a notion of public good defined by themselves and insisted that their politics be in favor of all (Mardin cited in Heper, 1977: 85). The reformist efforts such as the rule of law changed the traditional Islamic concept of justice and the latter came to imply promulgation of secular legislation outside *Şeriat* (Heper, 1974a: 56). Then, the state as the distributor of justice lost its legitimacy on the side of the Muslim subjects who came to as the ally of non-Muslims as well as European powers (Sunar, 1987). As a result, the subjects preferred to rely on the provincial notable vis-à-vis the central authority and opposed its reforms, and since then, the traditional dichotomy between the ruling class and the ruled-over has continued along the lines of the clash of Islam vis-à-vis secularism (Mardin, 1973; 1971).²⁵

It can be said that for those advocating the state tradition perspective, the assumption of leadership by the bureaucracy in the Ottoman modernization led to a

²⁴ The *Tanzimat* reforms such as secular public education for civil servants and military officials and the administration of justice through the laws based on European models attempted to reduce the monopoly of the *ulema* in the field of education and law (Chambers, 1964: 318; İnalçık, 1964b: 621).

²⁵ The state tradition perspective points at the field of education where the center-periphery cleavage has been perpetuated since the second half of the nineteenth century (Karpas, 1973a: 44-5; Mardin, 1973: 180; 1969; Rustow, 1968: 108, 116; Shaw, 1968: 37). The modern, or secular, educational system for recruiting and training public servants in administration and army appeared as the way for entering the ruling class. At that time, the public servants came to be distinguished with regard to much more their Western-style life and their alienation from their traditional culture than their qualified skills. That is, the socio-economic power neither guaranteed political mobility nor provided the mass with access for any source of power; rather, the sultan’s *berat* was only replaced by the criterion of education which was considered for the Ottoman reformers essential to save the country.

struggle for acquiring the control of the state among the groups constituting the center. The general idea is that as only the state could provide the groups from within as well as outside the center with capacity and ability to reshuffle the whole system, the reformist bureaucrats following the men of *Tanzimat*, that is, the Young Ottomans (1865-1876) and the Young Turks (1908-1918), attempted to dominate the state apparatus for their own reform agenda to be successful (Keyder, 2000; Zürcher, 1999: 186, 191). Consequently, the ideological differences between the men of *Tanzimat*, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks are explained as the different ways proposed by the bureaucratic elite to save the state by this tradition.

Not unexpectedly, Mardin (2003a) says that the very elitist attitude of Reşit, Ali and Fuat Pashas of *Tanzimat* in the statecraft generated new divisions and groupings among civil bureaucracy itself (p.277). The Association of the Young Ottomans was established by the bureaucrats in lower ranks, who were relatively in a disadvantageous position and who became acquainted with new ideas such as nationalism, constitutionalism and representative government as a function of reforms (Payaslıoğlu, 1964: 414). They criticized the government for overemphasizing Western values and for neglecting the traditional value system in the reforms and advocated integration between Western political institutions and the traditional Islamic values (Karpat, 1973a: 45). They aimed at limiting the power of the high bureaucracy by establishing a parliament and a constitution and thus institutionalizing the division of political power between the council and the high bureaucracy (Mardin, 2000: 31-2). Yet, it is argued that the elitism on behalf of the Young Ottomans had lasted and the participation of the masses into the new political system was attempted and the common good which would limit and regulate the state activities was defined by a small group of bureaucrats (Berkes cited in Heper, 1974b: 72).

Similarly, the coming of the Young Turks into the political scene is conceived as a product of intra-elite conflict. That is, in that period, the military, which had been subordinated to civilian authority since the early reforms of Sultan Selim III, acquired the leadership (Sugar, 1964: 316). Despite their attempt to bridge the gap between the ruling class and the ruled-over and to mobilize the societal resources in establishing a modern state, the Young Turks were committed to the idea of the

dominance of the state over civil society (Kazancıgil, 1981: 49). The Young Turks intended not to establish real ties with the local forces and then to react the central authority but to undertake the privileges of higher bureaucracy (Mardin, 1968: 139). Their agenda, that is, nationalism, nation-building and national economy was revolved around the survival of the state (Keyder, 2000: 73; Lewis, 1961: 208). The priority of political pursuit in the Young Turks' outlook shaped their plans and executions in economy (Keyder, 2000; Lewis, 1961: 224, 452). As a part of this, a national class of entrepreneurs to be created had to be completely loyal to the state and thus their interests would not threaten and eliminate the traditional status order. In that regard, the new class of entrepreneurs would have neither represented the interests of a group nor cooperated with non-Muslim entrepreneurs (Keyder, 2000: 78, 87, 93).

For the state tradition perspective, however, the evolution of modernization under the head of the Westernized bureaucrats in the Ottoman polity is sufficient to assume that the idea of saving the state stood at the core of their agenda. In this frame, the differences among their ideologies defined as different ways proposed to save the state. But this line of reasoning does not give us any clue why, for instance, the Young Turks adopted a different plan from that of the Young Ottomans and presented their own plan to be the best. It is not asked whether the changing social conditions or the inter-state relations had affected the differences or if the bureaucrats had been supported by certain societal groups or had represented certain socio-economic interests. It can be said that the methodological problem of the perspective in question is not to answer this kind of questions in a negative way but not to aim at asking them.

3. 2. Reading Turkish Politics from the State Tradition Perspective

3. 2. 1. Turkish Modernization: the Discontinuity with the Ottoman Heritage

According to the state tradition perspective, the political and economic

developments in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire had significant effect on the political philosophy of the Republican statesmen. Looking at the developments in the Republican period, this perspective identifies more the elements of continuity, such as the importance of the state and the elitism, the notion of public good and the understanding of democracy on the side of the statesmen, than those of change in the state-society relations. As the center-periphery cleavage is highlighted to be the source of continuity, this perspective attempts to find out the persistence of certain basic patterns of state organization and of the state's relations with societal forces in the Turkish modernization.

In analyzing the implications of the Ottoman heritage for the Turkish society, Heper (1985) is committed to a classification of polities with regard to transcendentalism and instrumentalism (pp.7-10). This classification of states as well as civil societies is based on a similar line of argument with the concept of patrimonialism. In that regard, it can be said that the reductionist line of thinking, that is, the contrast between strong state-weak civil society and weak state-strong civil society, dominates the analyses regarding the Turkish Republic. That is, this classification is used to distinguish the nature of state-civil society relations in a historical setting with regard to the state autonomy or the degree of stateness.

In a transcendental polity, the individual is a member of a moral community, in which the community has a priority against the individual while in an instrumental polity the individual belongs to an interest community, in which the pursuit of interests by the individual is the general practice. At the side of the state, transcendentalism refers to a polity in which certain goals are put by the state over civil society while they are formulated by civil society in an instrumental polity. According to Heper (1985), the Turkish state has been located on the side of transcendentalism in this classification because there is no societal force to impose itself upon the society (p.8). The concept of transcendentalism is employed to indicate that a new regime has been established but the political philosophy appeared in the patrimonial state structure has lasted to be around in the Turkish political life. The Turkish state has put the community and its interests prior to the individual and regarded these interests more than the collection of individual interests. In that context, the politics is not seen as business to pursue a variety of individual interests

but as a realm in which educated state officials show the way to the individuals, thereby maintaining the achievement of the interests of the community.²⁶

In that regard, the Turkish revolution is argued to have not been characterized as a new phase of development but have signified the end of the developmental period which had began with Sultans Selim III and Mahmut II and continued during the nineteenth century (Kazancıgil, 1981: 48; Mardin, 1980; 1973; 1971; Heper, 1974b: 90; Karpat, 1973a: 48). The new Turkish state is described as definitely modern in intentions and form, but in spirit, attitudes, and particularly philosophy of power that it has preserved much from the traditional ideology standing on the state's supremacy over the social structure (Karpat, 1964: 53). As the Turkish rulers had their roots in the pre-revolutionary period (Eisenstadt, 1981: 138; Özbudun, 1981: 84), some aspects of the traditional ideology of the state affected the founders of the republic and thus modernization could not realize its potential (Mardin, 1971: 202). Karpat (1964) puts that

The state like in the Ottoman Empire was the symbol of, and the means of fulfilling, the highest moral aspirations of the new nation, as decided by its leaders, who knew where its best interests lay and felt morally responsible to guide it by sheer force of intellect toward the supreme goal (...) In the past, the supreme goal had been preservation of the integrity of the Muslim community and its defense against infidel invaders. Now the state's purpose was to preserve its national territorial integrity and to modernize the country. Modernization was supposed to enhance the welfare of the Turks, but in reality the state was far more interested in its own institutional interests than in the people as individuals (p.53).

²⁶ Heper (1985) characterizes the Turkish polity in different time periods with regard to the different forms of transcendentalism which are resulted from the degree of state autonomy in different socio-historical conditions. The period between 1923 and 1938 is described as transient transcendentalism because Mustafa Kemal avoided setting up a closed, static and dogmatic framework and imposing it on the bureaucracy; he wished for setting an institutional and depersonalized system that should remain out of the day-to-day politics. The period between 1938 and 1980 is defined as bureaucratic transcendentalism in which the state elite and their allies, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, CHP), the secular intelligentsia, and the military, had taken the bureaucratized version of Atatürkism as the official state policy. The period after the 1980 military intervention is a case of partial transcendentalism in which the military returned to the perception of Atatürkism as a technique rather than an ideology or a political manifesto.

The Turkish modernization is generally defined as a “revolution from above” (Keyder, 2000; 1994; Kazancıgil and Özbudun, 1981; Trimberger, 1978; Heper, 1976b; Mardin, 1971). That is, this transformation was not mobilized and supported by the masses although their participation was considered by the revolutionary elite crucial for the transformation to be successful (Mardin, 1971: 199). It is argued that Turkish Republic has been the result of a political struggle against the old ruling class, especially the Young Turks, by a new generation of bureaucrats (Mardin, 1971: 199; Özbudun, 1981: 84). As long as it remained as a political struggle among the elites, social groups not integrated into the political structure were not involved into the process of transformation (Karpas, 1973a: 48; Mardin, 1973: 58).

Those advocating the state tradition perspective discover the origins of the strong state tradition in the Republic in the revolutionary paradigm. In this paradigm, the society as the essential source of authority took the place of the state and the Islamic framework as the essential source of norms and values was replaced with nationalism, namely new cultural framework (Eisenstadt, 1981: 135; Özbudun, 1981: 83).²⁷ It is asserted that the national interest, that is modernization/ Westernization, is one and harmonious; thus, a number of parties to represent the interests of one class against the other are not required (Sunar, 1974: 63).²⁸ The new political philosophy was also accompanied by secularism to the extent that the republican regime aimed at destroying the value system of the Ottomans (Keyder, 2000: 122; Heper, 1976a: 512-3; 1971).²⁹

Yet, for the advocates of state tradition perspective, this paradigm in which

²⁷ Karpas (1982) puts that by the principle of nationalism, the Republican state has tried to guarantee its own survival by creating a Turkish national state replacing all religious and regional allegiances with national identity and a political community sharing its ideals that has been the unity of identity, language and culture.

²⁸ This principle is to be thought in relation to populism. In that time, populism means that the community does not constitute of classes with different values and interests; there are social groups classified with regard to the vocational basis. But a disagreement among them derived from the conflict of their interests is not imagined because all of them are dependent on each other; thus, political activity based on class interests is neither necessary nor allowed (Zürcher, 1999: 265).

²⁹ Mardin (2003b) argues that Mustafa Kemal has built his reformist ideology on the superiority of science; for him, the power and civilization of a contemporary nation would be achieved through the guidance of science and thus science should determine the manner in which the society would be reorganized (pp.189-90).

the state and society was reorganized signifies the idea of the strong state. To be exact, the reorganization of Turkish society on the dimensions of modernization/ Westernization and secularism is thought to have been a design of the Westernized bureaucrats uninformed about and indifferent to their society. The Republican elite developed a notion of public good, that is, modernization/ Westernization, as a result of their interface with the Western world rather than with their society (Karpas, 1991: 48; Mardin, 1971: 201) and the CHP identified itself as “the teacher of the people” to guide them on the road of modernity (ibid). Under these circumstances, unlike Western politics, the reformulation was conceived as a matter of laws and administration rather than a matter of politics which is based on multiple confrontations between the state and the societal forces (Eisenstadt, 1981; Kazancıgil, 1981; Heper, 1980: 81-2; 1974b: 89; Mardin, 1973: 63). That is why the bureaucrats attempted to impose their paradigm through a set of modern and secular institutions (Heper, 1980: 81-2).

The Republican elite are thought to have reproduced the center-periphery cleavage. In this reading, for example, a confident popular basis and support for the political struggle is considered to be a need for Mustafa Kemal and his cadre in the making of Republican reforms (Rustow, 1981: 70-74). However, this need is not taken to have led to a change in the relation between the new rising elite and the masses (Karpas, 1973a: 48; Mardin, 1973: 58). The center as the carrier of secularism continued to be detached from the societal interests and needs before and after the establishment of Republic. Mardin (1971) maintains that religion, as a substitute for the intermediate structures, had an institutional and ideological importance and function in the Ottoman society: Islam had been a moral support, a source of relief, a pattern of life, a world view for the population and provided legitimacy for the state (pp.202-6). Yet, the state elite could not grasp these functions of Islam; they believed that the framework of legitimacy founded on nationalism and secularism would substitute the religion without any trouble (Mardin, 1981: 191; 1971: 202-6) and perceived that the emphasis on Islam and traditional values of the political elite was a sign of the defeat of secularism (Mardin, 1973: 70).³⁰

³⁰ In a similar line of reasoning, the Republican regime’s focus on and preference for women is associated with its traditional standpoint against the upward mobility of lower social groups which have been perceived to be capable of challenging the new regime: women from upper class vis-a-vis

3. 2. 2. The Strong State *vis-à-vis* the Turkish Bourgeoisie

In Heper's view, there is a direct correspondence between the type of state which is determined by the degree of stateness and the nature and pattern of the state-businessmen relations (Heper, 1991a). In this perspective, the understanding of the state-businessmen relations in different historical periods never changes; the state appears to be the independent actor while the businessmen to be the dependent one.

In creating a national bourgeoisie, the Turkish state is supposed to have served as an organization, which affects social structure by its interventions and its relations with social groups, and as an institution, which has a tradition and history (Keyder and Öncü, 1994). Keyder (1994) maintains that after the foundation of the Republic, the population consisted of small landowning peasantry, *petit bourgeois*, and provincial merchants; there was neither an oligarchic nor a bourgeois group to take economy in hand without state support. Similarly, Sunar (1974) argues that the state appeared to provide the necessary conditions for the accelerated accumulation of basic capital and its transformation into industrial capital and production (p.71).

Also, the creation of a bourgeois class is assumed to have been influenced by the traditional posture of the state. Mardin (1980) expresses that the Ottoman rule that political power should be kept as a monopoly of the guardians was transmitted into the republic "in the form of willingness and ability of the state to seize the initiative for industrialization" (p.43). He contends that to catch up the level of contemporary civilization, the republican leaders fostered the growth of an entrepreneurial class but at the same time took measures to keep this class within bounds (ibid: 25). Put differently, market economy could have provided social groups with autonomy to challenge the state's intervention into economy; therefore, a national bourgeoisie created by the state was the best way to achieve capitalism but at the same time keeping the traditional order intact (İnsel, 1990: 46; 1983: 419). Therefore, the alliance with a national bourgeoisie did not suggest that it took on the control of economy and the bureaucrats began to have a secondary role (Keyder, 2000: 173).

men from lower class. See Ayşe Öncü, "Turkish Women in Professions: Why So Many?" In *Women in Turkish Society*, edited by Nermin Abadan-Unat. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981, pp. 181-93.

(...) the central societal structuration in the Republic has always been a political structuration, and the leading industrialists and businessmen have been just as easily controllable as were moneylenders in the traditional Ottoman system. The top of capitalistic entrepreneurial iceberg, the few leading industrialists and businessmen of Turkey, is allowed to figure in the system because they are just easily controllable as the moneylenders were in the traditional system (Mardin, 1980: 37).

Heper (1991a) claims that like those in Turkey, interest groups in the West are “licensed” by the state but by this practice, the Turkish state aims at maintaining political control over the leaders of business circle and this is peculiar to Turkish polity (p.16). In that regard, the legal and institutional framework of interest group politics is also thought to have reflected the traditional suspicion for autonomous interest representation (Uğur and Alkan, 2000: 136). The Chambers were arranged to be quasi-governmental organizations and to be in command of the Ministry of Trade by the Act 655 enacted in 1924. By this way, the Turkish state is believed to extend itself into the local areas rather than transforming power to the latter (Öncü, 1983: 1567-9).

However, to the extent that limiting the analyses to the state, this perspective generates a presuppositional framework and, in turn, concentrates on finding out the indicators of strong state. The analyses turn into reproducing the idea of strong state tradition in different historical periods and, in turn, covering or neglecting a set of complex social conditions and relations. Under these circumstances, the consideration of socio-historical conditions shaping this period or that of the legal and economic regulations in favor of the bourgeoisie becomes inconsequential. For instance, the socio-historical conditions from 1908 to 1922 led to the adoption of national capitalism rather than following liberal economy which required an open and dependent economic system, and thus which would not allow the country to achieve industrialization (Boratav, 2003: 24-8; Kuruç, 1987: 46-8). Similarly, we observe certain empirical data such as the authoritarian manner in which the state regulated the rights of working class in favor of the industrial bourgeoisie in the 1930s (Kuruç, 1987), the regulation of tax system in a fashion to support and motivate private enterprise (Kuruç, 1988: LXXXIV), the impact of private sector

over policy-making process, etc. which provides us with the hints for understanding the social interests, demands, struggles, alliances, etc. taking place in the early Republican period.

This line of reasoning is much more apparent in evaluating *étatist* period. It is generally accepted that *étatisme* emerged to achieve industrialization under the leadership of the state at the crossing point of the Great Depression and the loss of faith in the self-generated capabilities of private enterprise due to the speculative tendencies of commercial bourgeoisie, their rent-seeking activities, their avoidance from taking long-term risks, their lack of interest in industrial investments, etc., (Boratav, 2003: 59-81; 1995a; 1983; 1977; Sönmez, 2003: 127-36; Buğra, 1997: 147-74; Birtek, 1995; Tezel, 1986: 398; Kazgan, 1977: 260; Kerwin, 1952). In other words, *étatisme* can be said to have come into view “ as a means of preventing industrial bourgeoisie from collecting the ‘rents’ of protectionism on its own, thereby allowing the state to make use of an accumulation fund for industrialization (Yalman, 2002b: 28). It is argued that *etatisme* served to provide favorable conditions and possibilities for private enterprise (Boratav, 2003: 65; 1995a: 127-30; Sönmez, 2003: 134-6; Kazgan, 1977: 260-5). In that regard, *étatist* policies did not substitute for private enterprise; public sector developed side-by-side private sector (Buğra, 1994: 240; 1997: 75) and the latter did not become completely subordinated by the state (Patton, 1983: 7).

Yet, *étatisme* is not perceived a means for an end, namely industrialization as well as the rise to the level of contemporary civilization, but an end-in-itself by those advocating the state tradition perspective. Insel (1983) indicates that the protection and encouragement of the entrepreneurial class by state-owned enterprises as well as *étatist* policies should be assumed to have been a sign of the state’s control over this class due to the traditional posture of the state in Ottoman-Turkish polity (p.421). Similarly Birtek (1995) argues that *étatisme* was a reaction against the peripheral forces that steadily achieved power through organizational forms so as to challenge the institutional rationality of the political center (p.145). Despite the cooperation between the state and the bourgeoisie during the *étatist* period, the former aimed at achieving its implicit goal, that is, a status above the society, and the latter expected to be protected against the market conflicts under the circumstances of the 1930s

(Keyder, 2000: chapter 5).

In this illustration, however, a causality relationship between the different economic policies could not be established. Put differently, it is not asked why the state postponed carrying out quite strict economic controls until the Great Depression. For instance, Kurmuş (1979) argues that the liberal policy in external trade pursued by the Turkish state is related to the Lausanne Treaty. But he says that the state deliberately decided to support commercial bourgeoisie at the expense of a small group of industrial bourgeoisie and left the latter without protection for raw materials need for industrial production (cited in Sönmez, 2003: 121). Depending on this data, it can be asked why the state did not follow an interventionist policy rather than a liberal one in the early Republican years. If the state aimed at having a status above the society, then why it did not take control in economy at the very beginning? Or, we can think about why the state encouraged the commercial bourgeoisie against the industrial one although industrialization stood at the core of its economic agenda? Did the state benefit from the cooperation with the commercial groups?

Those advocating the state tradition perspective maintain that the emergence of the state to distribute scarce resources and to encourage the bourgeoisie made the latter become a rent-seeking, non risk-taking, non-innovative and an indifferent class (Buğra, 1997; Sunar, 1974; Neyzi, 1973). It is argued that unlike its Western counterparts, the Turkish bourgeoisie was created by the state (Buğra, 1997). To the extent that the state has been the only source for wealth, this dependence has always been welcomed by the bourgeoisie (İnsel, 1996: 140).

If Turkish industrialists are not very familiar with the uncertainty which accompanies risk-taking and innovative activity, this is not only because of their privileged social origins but also because of the unusual protections that they enjoy in the form of state patronage, monopoly opportunities, and concentration of control. For instance, Turkish industrialists are not threatened by, but welcome state 'intervention' in the form of state subsidies and the protection they receive in exploiting a limited market. Protected by enormously high tariffs, their fear is not state 'intervention' but competition in any form, whether public or private. The state in Turkey has not been a threat but an instrument in the

creation and the protection of a national industrial class (Sunar, 1974: 112).

In this illustration, the growth in economic strength of newly rising groups did not shatter the leading role of the state in economy. In the 1950s, although monopolizing power, the bureaucratic elite as the modernizing center began to lose its significance and eventually had to share it with the new entrepreneurial groups (Neyzi, 1973: 125). The Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*, DP) identifying their stance with the aspirations of these groups, claimed to enhance a middle class which would in turn provide a stable basis for democratic regime (Karpas, 1964: 60). In their reign, private sector was “legitimized” so as to contribute to the welfare of the society and private entrepreneurs were claimed to be not second class citizens (Heper, 1976b: 495). Their liberal economic policy intensified economic activities, increased private enterprise, and facilitated the rise of the new middle classes by inflowing income and foreign aid (Ahmad, 1992: 133-6; Karpas, 1964: 59).

Yet, the traditional status of the newly rising groups did not change and this is explained by the unique dependence of the bourgeoisie on the state. It is maintained that, although acquiring power with popular support, these groups were “ideologically almost powerless under the assault of the statist elites” (Karpas, 1973a: 91). After the war, the bourgeois class seriously undertook to challenge the tradition of bureaucratic administration but this struggle just meant free market rule more than political democracy; it gave up its right to set up a civil society and accepted a state-dominated economy as well as a restrictive political system but in turn acquired the privilege of becoming wealthy (Keyder, 2000: 273).

In this illustration, the encouragement of capital accumulation by public enterprise, credit loans, import and export quotas, etc. made the bourgeois approve of the state intervention and prevented them from being to be a homogenous class rather than a mass of keenly competing pressure groups (Heper, 1975: 130). It is claimed that as the state held control in distributing scarce resources essential for the survival of the entrepreneurial groups, the latter tried to hold their control over profits, protections and other facilities offered by the state. Under these circumstances, private sector was less interested in organized pressure on the bureaucracy especially at the stage of policy making, and more oriented toward political influence,

individual manipulation, personal connection, etc. at the implementation phase (Heper, 1976b: 498).

All economic classes are expecting help from the state. Which of our social or economic classes is after freedom? The bourgeois? That is that class which made the revolution for freedom in the West? Forget it ... On the contrary the bourgeois is ogling the government which represents the state. He is after whoever happens to be in power, to influence him, befriend him and do his business. His only complaint is that the politician does not help him in his work, and that economic conditions are against him. That's all (Başar, cited in Heper, 1975: 129).

Yet, as this quotation clearly signifies, at the core of this understanding lays a normative assumption on the social identity of the bourgeois class; the bourgeoisie is the dynamic force for progressive social and political change, or the carrier of progress (Blackbourn and Eley, 1984: 43-4). The bourgeois revolution, which generally implies a shift in the relationship between the state and a growing bourgeoisie in favor of the latter, is supposed to lead to the process of modernization (Aydın, 2001: 12). Under these circumstances, the perspective of state tradition starts with presuppositional questions such as, in Vitalis' terms (1994), "why not" the Turkish bourgeoisie is independent and progressive as much as the Western one is to lead modernization rather than grasping what kind of conditions and relations that give rise to the specific state-businessmen relations. Rather, the absence of such an ideal bourgeoisie is identified to be a deviant feature of Turkish modernization, and this is linked to the strong state tradition in Turkish context.

The state tradition perspective indicates that there is a dominant type of state which emerges and reemerges at any historical period. This perspective explains the reasons behind the lack of modernization with regard to the strong state. Under these circumstances, this perspective does not consider the alternative analyses which claim that the existence of an independent and progressive bourgeois class would not be a necessary prerequisite for social development in Western polities are not necessarily considered. For instance, it is argued that at the end of the eighteenth century, the rising French bourgeoisie had been rent-seeking, acquired wealth

through the rents earning from land, office, etc. and never thought to challenge the authority of the state (Mooers, 1991: 57-61). In a similar fashion, Blackburn and Eley (1984) state that unlike the British history, the German bourgeois class did not challenge the aristocracy and could acquire whatever it needed by means of the state (p.7). Turner (1984) states that Germany and Italy did not achieve capitalist development by an independent and progressive bourgeoisie and that thus it is possible to claim that the debates about capitalism which was believed to require entrepreneurship was either false or tautological to the extent that they problematize the lack of a bourgeois class (cited in Dinler, 2003: 24). Yet, this information does not make so-called perspective to question the sufficiency of its basic premises; rather, this perspective continues to reproduce the existing reality. The emphasis on the nature of the state is quite determinant in this perspective that the deviations emerging in the European experience are not necessarily conceived to be the disappearance of the feudal state. For, it is argued that the provision of privileges to the businessmen by the state in Western polities does not derived from that the state is interested in imposing control over the businessmen (Heper, 1991a: 16).

For this perspective, the state-businessmen relations continued to be traditional in the 1960s onward in which the country implemented import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policies with protectionism and state intervention (Keyder, 2000: chapter 7; 1984; Barkey, 1984; Öncü, 1980). ISI depended on a coalition among the bureaucracy, big business (industrial bourgeoisie) and organized labor and aimed at eradicating inter-class as well as intra-class conflicts in favor of industrial bourgeoisie (Boratav, 2003: 123-5; Keyder, 2000: chapter 7; 1994: 62; 1984: 13; Eralp, 1994: 215; Sunar, 1994: 101). It is accepted that this coalition contributed to the evolution of the bourgeoisie so as to make it much more important in the process of economic development than ever before (Buğra, 1997: 192).

The argument of the state tradition perspective is that the state had to be relatively autonomous to drive industrialization, to distribute scarce resources, especially foreign exchange, rationally and fairly, and to mediate redistributive policies (Keyder, 2000: 200; 1994: 63; 1984: 14; Aktan, 1991-1993: 64). Under these circumstances, although the existence of a sufficiently powerful middle class is acknowledged, the Turkish industrial bourgeoisie is not thought to achieve the

predominant position in the society (Barkey, 1984: 48, 53). That is, the industrial bourgeoisie continued to tolerate the large space the state had in economy, and to be “content to remain out of the political limelight so long as electoral politics could contain distributive conflicts (Keyder and Öncü, 1994: 11).

However, if we consider parliamentary politics from the 1960s onward, it becomes difficult to explain ISI only in relation to the state tradition. Firstly, it is maintained that an autonomous, homogenous and efficient bureaucracy which was exposed to partisan and clientelist pressures began to disappear in this period (Sunar and Öniş, 1992: 74; Heper, 1990a: 305). Additionally, the CHP, the guardian of the secular-democratic state, moved from the center to periphery in the context of the fragmented and polarized Turkish politics (Heper and Güney, 2000: 637). Under these circumstances, we cannot imagine the bureaucratic elite to be able to reproduce the strong state.

Also, in the struggle between the CHP, favoring centralized planning with more emphasis on public sector and the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*, AP), underlining indicative planning and against the excessive reliance on state and authority from the top, (Sunar and Öniş, 1992: 73; Gülfidan, 1993: 47; Karpat, 1964: 64), big business criticized the AP for pursuing populist and pragmatist policies and ignoring planning, and thus supported the CHP in 1974 and 1977 (Buğra, 1997: 338). From the viewpoint of the state tradition perspective, it can not be explained that why the businessmen supported not the AP but the CHP. Buğra (1997) indirectly points to an instrumental view behind this. She says that the economic model TÜSİAD favored aimed at achieving rapid growth and at the same time income equality; otherwise, social crises which would have derived from income inequality would have directly jeopardize the businessmen much more than any other section in the society (p.338). If big business had such an instrumental view, could we not think that the state might attempt to meet the numerous interests in the context of the expansion of capitalism through ISI policies, namely a growing domestic market, high wages, less control over price?

In the perspective of state tradition, the profound shift in economic policymaking in the 1980s represents the recovery of the strong state. In January 1980, Demirel’s minority AP government introduced an economic stabilization

program, 24 January austerity measures, in cooperation with International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although prohibiting Demirel from political scene, the military government followed this program and not only provided for order and stability but also arranged the basis for an alternative growth model that is an export-oriented growth model *vis-à-vis* the import-oriented one (Cizre, 1991: 59) which was discredited by industrial bourgeoisie and the military due to the poor performances of populist coalition governments in the second half of the 1970s. In the 1970s, the business interests came to be differentiated. The different business associations such as TÜSİAD, Turkish Union of Chambers and Stock Exchange (*Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği*, TOBB), Confederation of Turkish Craftsmen and Tradesmen (*Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarları Konfederasyonu*, TESK), and Turkish Confederation of Employers' Association (*Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*, TİSK) did not achieve a unity about the appropriate route of industrial development. Under these circumstances, the new route of industrialization, namely export-oriented growth, should favor a specific business group, namely big business. Indeed, Big business represented by TÜSİAD withdrew its support from the CHP and began to support the AP and then the military elite both of which declared to follow the stabilization program. However, this view cannot let us find out why the pre-1980 elite attempted such a radical turn or why the post-1980 ones favored to follow their agenda although they opposed to the political elite in the pre-1980s. Or, if the transition to export-oriented growth model is thought to have been followed as a result of the guardianship role of the military, then how we can explain the 24 austerity measures from the viewpoint of the perspective of state tradition. How did liberal bureaucrats emerge and decide to follow an export-oriented growth model? This perspective does not answer these questions.

3. 2. 3. The Interaction between the State Elite and the Political Elite

In Heper's view, the state elite's viewpoint *vis-à-vis* the political elite, the formation of political parties, their understanding of democracy and the relations between the state and political elite are shaped by the strong state tradition. In that regard, the Democrats' coming to power assumed by a new alliance forged with the

new political elite against the state elite in 1950 is conceived as a turning point in Turkish politics (Keyder, 2000: 163; İnsel, 1996: 141; Birtek, 1995: 167; Heper, 1975: 126; Sunar, 1974: 65) but not an ultimate victory to change the traditional system (Ahmad, 1992; Heper, 1985; 1975: 129-30; Mardin, 1973).

Karpat (1972) claims that at the core of the transition to the multi-party era has lied the traditional idea, that is, saving the state but now its modern, national and secular form (p.350). The state elite were concerned with that “the reforms were not sufficiently rooted to permit the evolution of politics within the generally accepted principles of a modern republic” (Karpat, 1982: 367). A Kemalist legacy based on preserving the republican regime and the national state, with all loyalties they entail, is thought to have been created and to have defined the boundaries of legitimate and tolerable competitive politics due to this concern (Özbudun, 1987: 341). In that regard, the state elite developed suspicious attitudes, due to their focus on preserving the modern state as well as the elimination of any challenge to its power, and eventually acquired strongly conservative tendencies, and thus opposed to the upward mobility of lower social groups, class differences, and economic interests (Karpat, 1973b 317-9; 1962: 477-88).

The formation of the political parties is thought to be shaped by the strong state tradition which does not allow an aristocracy or an entrepreneurial class with political influence to emerge in the Turkish polity. In the absence of intermediary structures, the channeling is affected by formulating and institutionalizing various norms of political behavior and processes (Eisenstadt, cited in Heper, 1976b: 493). As a result, there emerge hardly strong links between the political parties and social groups in Turkey (Heper, 1985: 98) and, unlike the Western countries, the political parties are differentiated from each other with regard to not economic, namely interest-based conflicts, but politically and culturally oriented conflicts (Heper, 1998b: 47).³¹

Heper (1998b) maintains that this uniqueness has been apparent in the fashion that the political elite, in general, and the DP, in particular, have understood

³¹ The political propaganda of the DP which was based on re-legitimizing and raising Islam and traditional rural values led to the identification of the Democrats with the culture of the periphery who had regarded themselves and their culture as inferior (Mardin, 1973: 70).

democracy (pp.44-5). For Heper (1992), a consolidated democracy has to have two dimensions, that is, horizontal (responsiveness) and vertical (responsibility) (p.170). In other words, individualism and participation (horizontal dimension) as well as the long-term interests of the people (vertical dimension) should be simultaneously given prominence (ibid). In Turkish polity, in which the degree of stateness is high, responsibility is given greater emphasis than responsiveness by the state elite (Heper, 1992: 170). The transition to multi-party politics led the political elite to focus on solely the horizontal dimension. Put differently, while, for the state elite, the political power should be in the hands of not “ordinary politicians” but the elites who are well-educated enough to lead the common people and have to consider the public interest and the well-being of their citizens, the DP opposed it with an idea of modern government by “National Will” and regarded themselves to be the real representatives of the nation and to have absolute power (Heper, 1998b: 45).

To the extent that democracy implies “to rescue the people from coercion by the state” for the political elite, and for particularly the Democrats (ibid), a balance between the two dimensions of democracy cannot be achieved in Turkey.³² The relations of the political elite with the bureaucracy are generally described as a matter of capturing, monopolizing and using for their own all the institutions of the state dominated by the state elite (Ahmad, 1992: 48-9). The political elites aimed at not restructuring the bureaucracy in terms of instrumentalism and efficiency but adjusted it in terms of political effectiveness (Heper, 1977: 100). In order to decrease the lasting predominance of the bureaucracy in the polity the Democrats, and then almost all political elites in the coming decades, tended to politicize the bureaucratic mechanism, made it inefficient by decreasing wages, and established new institutions loyal to the party rather than the state (Heper, 1985: 108-12).

³² Karpat (1964) emphasizes the DP has been short of an essential ideology other than emphasizing the religion and other cultural symbols (p.57). During the years in opposition as well in power, the DP did not appear concerned with a party program defining the route that the party would follow (Karpat cited in Heper, 1985: 105). The Democrats contended with criticizing the government and its day-to-day politics; they could not respond specific questions such as how to bring down the costs of certain basic items, to increase the price of agricultural products, to improve the communication system, to create job opportunities, to provide better nutrition, etc. Rather, they gave a general answer: “let us get freedom first, and the rest will come by itself (ibid). Similarly, Ahmad (1992) points out that the party programs of CHP and DP in the 1950 elections have almost been same (p.128). The Republicans introduced certain economic measures for free market economy which the Democrats would utilize during the 1950s but the latter was introduced as the winner of private entrepreneurship (ibid).

Another problem in the understanding of democracy by the political elite that Heper (1998b) points out is that they usually consider their individual interests rather than the general interest as well as those of certain groups they claim to represent (p.47). Karpaz contends that “many who had enthusiastically backed the one-party regime and searched for spoils there, now turned to support the multi-party system with the same selfish motives as before. They spoke for democracy in the vehement and uncompromising tone of the one-party days, but as though the mere purpose of the struggle was to change the title ‘one-party regime’ to a ‘multi-party’, shift the people at the head and keep the rest intact” (cited in Heper, 1985: 106). The claim of national will did not change the traditional understanding of authority and power in Turkish political history that relied on an appearance of formal legitimacy and popular obedience to the political authority on the part of the people was not transformed (Karpaz, 1964: 62).

In Heper’s view, the fashion in which the political elite interact with the state elite and the people brings into being another particular component of Turkish politics, namely the military interventions, which is shaped by the strong state tradition as well. The general idea is that the military elite, which have been a member of the center since the late eighteenth century, have intervened into politics to safeguard secular state and consolidate democracy (Heper and Güney, 2000: 636). Heper relates the focus of the military elite on saving secular-democratic state to that all military interventions have been followed by the return to democracy and the recovery of electoral politics. For Heper, this focus differentiates the role of the military in Turkey from that of the military in Third World countries in which the military interventions result in the establishment of authoritarian regimes (cited in İrem, 1990: 82).

The pendulum kept between as purely statist solution (military interventions) and a purely political formula (a debilitating democracy), and the civil societal elements virtually watched as spectators. As a result, in Turkey, the transitions to democracy were no more than a passage one type of monism to another: from one in which the center was dominated by the self-appointed guardians of the state to another in which intensely antistatist, populist political elites

controlled the center (Heper, 1994: 19).

In this understanding, the military rule in 1960-1961 was a product of resentment of the state elite against the parliamentary elite; it attempted to maintain their control of state power and to prevent a breakdown in the political machinery (Sayarı, 1992: 26; Harris, 1988: 182; Karpat, 1982: 370; 1962). Heper (1985) argues that the military elite have been concerned with protecting the regime against the absolutism of majority because the Democrats have used the party's government majority to threaten the continuing existence of the CHP and increasingly acted arbitrarily as to undermine the legitimacy of democratic regime (p.106). Karpat (1972) finds the source of this resentment in the statement of the National Unity Committee.

It would be wrong (they stated) to view the situation (military takeover) ... as an ordinary political coup... The political power that should have been the guardian of civil rights, and that should have symbolized the principles of state, law, justice, ethics, public interest, and public service had ... become instead a materialistic power ended up by losing all spiritual bonds with the true sources of state power, which reside in the army, its courts of justice and bar associations, its civil servants desirous of demonstrating attachment to their duties, and its universities ... it descended into apposition of virtual enmity toward Atatürk's reforms ... The situation was the same from the viewpoint of legitimacy. The legitimacy of a government is ... (derived from) its ability to exist as a rule of law. Instead the government and political power had kept formulating new laws totally contrary to the constitution, and then had proceeded to utilize these laws to violate the constitution... (p.358).

It is argued that certain measures undertaken under the military rule have signified that the military elite have assumed "the role of being a guardian of the secular-democratic state" (cited in Heper and Güney, 2000: 637). Put differently, it is maintained that at the root of the institutions created in the second Republic has laid a basic distrust in political structures popularly elected. To give an idea about this, Heper (1985) elaborates on certain principles of the 1960 Constitution (pp.88-9).

That is, public authority was derived not from parliament but from the law, the judiciary was given considerable weight in the exercise of sovereignty and a Constitutional Court was established to test the constitutional validity of law issued by the governments. The state tradition is so very central to Heper's view that the liberal character of the Constitution, that is, the emphasis on human rights and freedoms, has been less related to the increasing differentiation of the social structure by economic development, rural migration, urbanization, etc. than the fear of absolutism of majority (ibid: 90). For him, by extending the scope of rights to all without any exception, the military elite aimed at achieving a balance between social groups to prevent certain groups from seizing power. He asserts that the state elite have not considered that the people would sufficiently benefit from these rights (ibid). In this illustration, the changing nature and pattern of class relations as a result of the changing social structure is not conceived to influence the reason and resolution of the military intervention and the liberal constitutional principles are thought to have been unintentionally formulated.

Similarly, the military elite are said to have intervened into politics in 1971 because it remained as the lone guardian of the secular-democratic state in the context of the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics by the political parties (Heper and Güney, 2000: 637). In this frame, the military elite, the only member of the center which was able to preserve its autonomy and sovereignty, intervened into politics in 1980 to remove the ideological polarization among the political parties and their emphasis on responsiveness to particularistic interests rather than the general interest, which contributed to the emergence of debilitating democracy and to safeguard the well-being of the country (Heper, 1985: 124-30). Yet, within this frame, the military interventions and, in turn, the strong state tradition is justified by Heper. It is because the focus of the political elite on horizontal dimension of democracy (responsiveness) is underlined as the reason of political crises which forces the military to intervene to preserve the secular-democratic state (Özman & Coşar, 2001: 93-4).

3. 2. 4. The Recovery of the Strong State in the 1980s

In the 1980s, Turkey has experienced a profound transformation concerning the pattern of the relationship between the state and society in the light of the neo-liberal policies which have been pursued to solve economic crisis and political instability. This shift has challenged the strong state tradition at the discourse level and aimed at reducing the state intervention into economy at the policy-making level. The main argument of the state tradition perspective about this transformation is as follows: the opposition of the strong state constitutes its main focus but this state, thanks to its strength, has led to the failures in liberalization and democratization. Heper and Keyman (1998a) maintain that a strong state *vis-à-vis* economy and society has been preserved although the relations between the government and the societal forces have become more internalized and more intensive than those in the previous decades (p.267).

What is indicated by the state tradition perspective about this paradoxical end is the nature of the Turkish state. The neo-liberal paradigm initially emerged in the United States and Britain as a function of the dissatisfaction with the Welfare State policies and then came to be widespread in the world during the 1980s. In that regard, the strong state or interventionist bureaucracy was not peculiar only to Turkey in the pre-1980s. In this perspective, however, it is the unique nature of the state which determined the manner of the bureaucratic procedures and the nature of political and economic crises in the 1970s as well as the fashion that the neo-liberal policies were implemented in the 1980s. Thus, the recovery of the strong state implied that this fashion did not allow civil societal forces to become active participants of policy-making and to impose themselves upon the country. Under these circumstances, this perspective gives rise to such a picture that Turkish society will never be able to eliminate the strong state and realize civil society which has been underlined to be the *sine qua non* of the consolidation of democracy in the recent decades.

In Heper's view, this profound shift was motivated by the military elite who were concerned with providing an opportunity for Turkish politics to extricate itself from the vicious circle of a too prudent government and a debilitating democracy

(Heper, 1994: 20). In that regard, unlike the situation in the 1960 and 1970, the military elite did not take Atatürkism as the official ideology and as a definitive source for public policies but as technique (Heper, 1990b: 324). For instance, the military no more insisted on *étatisme* as an economic policy and their interpretation of secularism was now more conciliatory than it was in the past (Heper, 1990a: 308). The preservation of the prerogatives of the state elite did not constitute the core of the intervention (Heper, 1994: 20).

Under these circumstances, a new political regime founded on a tacit division of labor between the state and the government was established (Karpat, 1988: 154; Özbudun, 1988; Heper, 1990a: 306). According to this, the state and politics were two distinct spheres with a compromise between the presidency and the government. Due to the distrust in civil bureaucracy, the 1982 Constitution structured the state in the office of the president of Republic and the president was burdened with maintaining territorial integrity and security of the state, keeping the country together, and preserving democracy (Heper, 1990a: 308; 1990b: 325). In this regime, the sphere of politics *vis-à-vis* the state came also to be much greater than before (Heper, 1990a: 307). The new constitution granted new powers to the prime minister; all matters relating to the economy came under the control of the government (Heper, 1990b: 325). However, Heper does not provide an explanation as to why the political elite, who are accused for their self-seeking nature, are provided with much power in the new regime. Put differently, if the state is interested in saving in its power so much, then why the military elite match the increasing role of the state in law and order with a decrease in economic affairs of state intervention.

Rather, for the state tradition perspective, this division of labor between the state and the government signified the recovery of the strong state. It is because the new regime strengthened the state, and thus produced disapproving outcomes and failures in the process of liberalization. ISI and a dominant and interventionist bureaucracy was declared by Turgut Özal the prime minister to be responsible for economic crisis the country had undergone in the previous decade (Eralp, 1990: 238-9). Yet, this discourse against the strong state has not broken the nature of the Turkish state. Rather, the regulatory character of the Turkish bureaucracy has changed without changing that the state has been autonomous from society (Öniş, 1998b;

1991; Buğra, 1997; Öncü and Gökçe, 1991; Eralp, 1990: 234; Heper, 1990b; 1989). An “executive inner circle” which was consisted of “a faithful group of followers appointed on the basis of personal trust and loyalty” was created by the prime minister (Öncü and Gökçe, 1991: 104). The prime minister in company with this group became the real locus of economic decision making (ibid: 104-5; Öniş, 1991; Heper, 1991b; 1990b; 1989) and acted independently of intra-bureaucratic pressures as well as interest group associations (Öniş, 1991).³³

Put differently, it is argued that the rhetoric of “free market economy”, “shrinking the state and expanding society” and “removing bureaucratic barriers” did not characterize Turkish politics in the 1980s (Öncü and Gökçe, 1991). The economic policies pursued by the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*, ANAP) governments did not aim at strengthening the hand of societal forces in policymaking (Öncü and Gökçe, 1991; Heper, 1990b: 326). Rather, the ANAP solely aimed at weakening the traditional bureaucracy, which would be neither sympathetic to their objectives nor supported enthusiastically their program (ibid). Additionally, Öniş (1991) contends that especially in the late-1980s, due to inflation and worsening income distribution and due to the tensions derived from the non-monolithic structure of the party, the ANAP government deviated much from neo-liberal policies.³⁴ Especially, after the transition to multi-party politics and the local elections in 1989 in which the ANAP government faced a significant reduction in its

³³ Extra-budgetary funds and the attempt for privatization are conceived to indicate the strengthening and consolidating of power in the hands of political executive *vis-à-vis* the legislature and the bureaucracy by Öniş (1991: 32; 1998a: 153). The extra-budegetary funds were created to increase the government’s ability to generate revenues and to provide it with spending the revenues accumulated without the approval of the parliament. Privatization efforts did not result in retreating the state and expanding society, and particularly private sector because this attempt was carried out by a centralized organization, that was, the Board of Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund, directly linked to the prime minister.

³⁴ The ANAP aimed at bringing the conflicting elements of all traditional ideologies, liberals, social democrats, panturkist extensive right elements, and Islamic fundamentalists, under the same umbrella of New Right. As a result of that the government could not realize economic promises until 1987, the attempt for a new ideological system was unsuccessful and then the Party came to be polarized between the remaining elements, that is, the conservatives including the panturkists and fundamentalists, and the liberals (Tünay, 2002). As a result of the disappointing economic conditions in the late 1980s, the government remained between liberal wing, namely managerial elite, which insisted on following the program of liberalization, and conservative wing, with an Islamic orientation, which was in favor of expanding the electoral base by using the redistributive power of the state (Öniş, 1991).

votes, in other words, when the political rationality clashed with economic one, the prime minister preferred the former (Waterburry, 1992; Öniş, 1991).

Yet, in this picture, the actor to be accused for the failures of in liberalization and thus to reproduce the strong state in the 1980s becomes the political elite rather than the state, or bureaucratic, elite. It can be suggested that the bureaucracy that lost its autonomy and uniformity due to the political pressures and influence hardly appeared to be responsible for the lack of close ties with the businessmen in the analyses regarding the 1970s. This creates a conceptual problem; the concept of state comes to be used instead of the government or vice versa, on the one hand. The conceptual tools as well as the main argument of this perspective turn out to be unsatisfactory to explain the changing parameters of Turkish politics in this period, on the other.

The main argument the state tradition perspective based on a direct correlation between state autonomy and state strength, is also questioned by those within the perspective of state tradition. We come across moderate attempts in the works of Buğra and Öniş. Analyzing the neo-liberal experience of Turkey, Buğra (1997) and Öniş (1991) offers to reflect on the different results of recent economic transformation in the polities with a strong state. The scholars in different contexts refer to the work of Andrew Gamble, *The Free Market Economy and the Strong State*, who points out that the neo-liberal policies in the 1980s in Britain were accompanied with a strong state. To grasp why the free market economy was successfully implemented in Britain despite the centralization of the state, Buğra (1997), unlike Heper, suggests focusing on not the degree of stateness but the nature of state intervention (p. 309). She argues that the failures in liberalization should be searched for in the nature of state intervention. In Turkish politics, this nature is shaped by the political and short-term considerations.

Similarly, Öniş (1998b) states that “from the perspective of economic transformation, the most successful states are typically those that are able to work through and in cooperation with autonomous centers of power” (p.24). Here, he refers to the ideas of Mann who opposes to match strong state with despotic power

and weak state with infrastructural power.³⁵ To be exact, in Öniş's view, the above mentioned indicators which are perceived by the perspective of state tradition to reproduce the strong state may not really signify a strong state but a weak and inapt one. This state has not been able to implement economic reforms, to control export-oriented rent-seeking, to generate tax revenues, and to impose fiscal discipline and, for the author, this shows that the highly centralized Turkish state has had certain weaknesses (Öniş, 1998b: 256). In a similar vein, Öncü and Gökçe (1991) maintain that the changing relations and dynamics within the society, the new world conditions, the importance of international and regional actors and institutions in domestic life, and the impact of all these factors on the state-bourgeoisie relations cannot be taken into account if Turkish political life is read in terms of an uninterrupted strong and centralized state. They state that "to the extent that the character, mission, and capacities (nature and strength) of the Turkish state have been, and continue to be, subject to re-definition and re-constitution in interaction with society, the apparent continuities in State tradition may indeed be illusory" (p.117). Yet, both Buğra and Öniş remain committed to the idea of strong state tradition although they do not attribute a completely passive role to civil society, and do focus on the nature of state intervention. Additionally, they associate any weakness on the part of civil societal forces with the fact that the state has still had distributive power. Similarly, Öncü and Gökçe refer to the imagery of the strong state although they highlight that the state is situated at the crossing point of the social and historical conditions.

In this chapter, the reading of Turkish politics with reference to the determinacy of the state has been presented and discussed. It has been tried to understand whether the Turkish state is an entity that does not necessarily reflect socio-economic interests and shapes the whole system on its own. While doing that, the alternative questions, which are to provide guidance for us to think about our major question, have been directed to the state tradition perspective. It has been argued that this perspective underestimates the significance of societal forces over

³⁵ Mann (1984) defines two forms of autonomy which are infrastructural power and despotic power (p.334). Infrastructural power means that the state can be effective in influencing civil society and in achieving its goals whereas despotic power implies the autonomy of the state by which state officials can take on certain goals without negotiating with the civil society.

state policies. The state tradition perspective claims that the strong state (re)emerges at any historical period. Under these circumstances, the determinacy of Turkish politics by the strong state is supposed to never cease to exist. The significance of supplementing our analysis by elaborating on TÜSİAD is found in that context. It is of great consequence to highlight the rise of big business as a political actor *vis-à-vis* the state in analyzing whether the strong state tradition is an adequate explanan in examining Turkish politics. Now, we turn our attention to the case of TÜSİAD.

CHAPTER 4

ACCUSING THE STATE: THE STATE-TÜSİAD RELATIONS IN THE POST-1980 PERIOD

In the state tradition perspective, the strong state is accused for the failures in liberalization and democratization in recent decades. It is argued that the strong state has not attempted to enhance the role of business class in policy making. Within this frame, the latter is thought to be completely dependent on the state. Yet, an analysis of the organizational evolution of TÜSİAD will provide a basis for critically evaluating the picture that this perspective envisages about the state-business relations. Moreover, as TÜSİAD, calling for democratization, has recently developed into a political actor *vis-à-vis* the state, it allows us to discuss the major question of this thesis in this chapter. That is, to what extent the perspective of state tradition is a sufficient explanan in understanding the relations between the state and TÜSİAD in the post-1980 period. Initially, the establishment of TÜSİAD, its mission, its member profile and its organizational strategy will be presented. In the second subsection, the reading of the relations between the state and TÜSİAD in the period of neo-liberalism by the state tradition perspective will be explicated. The third subsection will elaborate on the remarkable transformation in the preferences of TÜSİAD. Finally, it will be argued whether the rise of TÜSİAD as a political actor calling for further democratic opening can be read by the methodological and conceptual framework followed by this perspective.

4. 1. TÜSİAD: Its Origins and Evolution

TÜSİAD was established on April 2, 1971 by leading industrialists, including Vehbi Koç, Nejat Eczacıbaşı, Sakıp Sabancı, Selçuk Yaşar, Ertuğrul Soysal, Şinasi

Ertan, with a memorandum announcing the foundation of the first voluntary business association in the country. The Association expressed its foundation reason as the need for an organization other than TOBB which did not offer a platform for industrial bourgeoisie to express their demands and interests and to influence the Union's decisions (Boratav, 1994; Arat, 1991: 136; Eralp, 1990: 231; Bianchi, 1984: 252-71; Öncü, 1980). Unlike the Anatolian capitalists, big industrialists commonly from Istanbul supported an export-oriented economic model to integrate with Europe in the late-1970s (Eralp, *ibid*; Gülfidan, 1993: 39). However, the industrialists could not achieve effective representation of their interest *vis-à-vis* the merchants under the Union, thereby making a new organization much desirable for big business (Bianchi, 1984: 252-71).

Buğra (1997), on the other hand, argues that this kind of reasoning is not adequate because the reason bringing together the well-known industrialists under the umbrella of TÜSİAD was to consolidate big business community as a social class rather than representing their short-term interests in an environment where the militant labor unrest and socialist ideas came to direct serious threats to the existence of businessmen (p.337). The words of Aldo Kaslowski, a former vice-president, seem to support her argument. He explains the establishment of TÜSİAD as an attempt to defend the *raison d'être* of private sector (cited in Aydın, 2001: 51). In other words, TÜSİAD was established by a group of businessmen who contributed to national development, and who, in turn, wanted to be no more perceived as compradors or thieves and to be recognized by their real value by the state and society (*ibid*). Not unexpectedly, the Association's goals were defined as "serving Turkey's democratic and planned development and her rise to the level of Western civilization". Then, a special director of publicity was assigned to perfect the image of businessmen among the universities, the youth, and progressive reformists and to emphasize its interest in social issues (Bianchi, 1984: 268).

In the recent decade, the mission of TÜSİAD is stated as commitment to the universal principles of democracy and human rights and the freedoms of enterprise, belief, and opinion. The Association adopts Atatürk's principles and reforms, supports a secular state based on the rule of law, and attempts to reinforce the

democratic foundations upon which civil society is based. TÜSİAD aims to establish the legal and institutional framework of a market economy and to guarantee the application of internationally accepted business ethics. The Association encourages more efficient use of human and natural resources through employment of the latest technology and strives to enhance competitiveness by permanently increasing quality and productivity. In other words, TÜSİAD believes in and works for the integration into the international economic system in which it wishes that Turkey should have a well-defined and permanent place. For this endeavor, its members assume a leading role for industrialists and other business people (TÜSİAD Brochure, 1999).

In accordance with its members' socio-economic background and its mission, TÜSİAD has an elitist organizational strategy and has undergone an organizational transformation towards centralization (Alkan, 1998: 46). These features can be observed in such practices of TÜSİAD as giving up the idea about opening branches, restricting the procedure about membership recruitment, implementing strict punishment in case of irregular payment of membership fee. TÜSİAD has a hierarchal organizational structure at the top of which High Advisory Council (HAC) stands. HAC consists of the most influential members of the Association and constitutes the most effective organ of TÜSİAD. Mostly, this council defines the priority areas, evaluates strategies and offers advice on important matters. The Association implements its activities by employing bureaucrats, academicians, professionals, and experts outside the Association; this is a function of the centralized and elitist nature of TÜSİAD (ibid). TÜSİAD has no branches but representations, one in Ankara (2000), one in Washington D. C. (1998), one in Brussels (1996), and one in Berlin (2003) because of the Association's insistence on holding control, developing general and centralized policies, and avoiding pressures that may stem from regional demands (cited in Koyuncu, 2003: 146-147).

4. 2. The Recovery of the Strong State *vis-à-vis* TÜSİAD

For the statist-institutionalism, “the formation, let alone political capacities, of such apparently purely socio-economic phenomena as interest groups and classes

depends in significant measure on the structures and activities of the very states ...” (Skocpol, 1985: 27). As the states are classified with regard to state autonomy or the degree of stateness by this view, it is claimed that there is one-to-one correspondence between the degree of stateness and the nature and pattern of interest group politics. Therefore, the appropriate methodological and conceptual framework to examine the interest group politics is to be based on the premise that the nature of the state, which is determined by the degree of stateness, shapes the characteristic features of interest group politics (Heper, 1991a: 8). Additionally, and more importantly, as the state is thought to preserve its nature over different historical periods in Heper’s view, the main features of interest group politics, despite significant change in discourse and policymaking in favor of the bourgeoisie, linger on. This line of reasoning principally constitutes the way in which the relations between the governments and TÜSİAD and the analyses using this viewpoint focus on finding out the symptoms of the strong state.

The state tradition perspective perceives the relations between the state and TÜSİAD in the 1970s in the same way. It is argued that TÜSİAD was mainly concerned with strengthening the social position of the businessmen in an environment in which labor unrest was steadily increasing. The Association did not adopt hostility towards the working class but supported social democracy, social peace, and equality in income distribution and embraced a mixed economy in which the state interventions were supporting the private sector (Buğra, 1997: 338). Thus, the Association criticized the AP led by Süleyman Demirel for pursuing populist and pragmatist policies and supported the CHP, which gradually adopted a social democratic view under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, in 1974 and 1977 (ibid: 203-6).

... the RPP had achieved a close enough parliamentary representation that could, under certain conditions, allow it to rule without the necessity of seeking coalition partners. The experience of the National Front Coalition had been all too painful for the industrialists because members of the coalition had exhibited a lack of cohesive decision-making ability, especially in economic matters. This was mainly the result of infighting and Erbakan was perceived as the main contributor to

the incoherent nature of the coalition. Because of their dislike for Erbakan and for the policies he represented, the industrialists were eager to see a government which would exclude him. Given the distribution of seats in the National Assembly, the possibility of forming a government without support from the NSP was available only to Ecevit. Secondly, given the fact that DISK, the radical labor union, had decided to support the RPP in the elections, industrialists hoped that Ecevit could fashion a type of “social contract” modeled on the British Labor Party’s experiment with the Trades Union Congress and thus achieve a modicum of social peace in an atmosphere of increasing unrest among working classes. Thirdly, Ecevit seemed to be more committed to the industrial sector and did not owe any support to commercial elites and Western agrarian interests, which had rejoined the JP with the demise of the Democrat Party” (Barkey, 1984: 60).

Neither in 1974 and 1977-1979, however, Ecevit governments did not please the business community. It is argued that the government was reluctant in establishing close relations with the businessmen and overcoming bureaucratic obstacles that businessmen faced (Gülfidan, 1993: 90). Additionally, due to the political considerations, the government did not reach a full agreement with IMF and the measures it wanted, leading to the intensification of economic crisis (Buğra, *ibid*: 205). Then, TÜSİAD turned to the mass media to attain public support for its arguments. In 1978, the Association started a campaign of advertisements against the Ecevit government in Turkey’s three major newspapers and a weekly news magazine. After this, the relations between the government and TÜSİAD became much worse and reached its peak in 1979, when TÜSİAD started another campaign which announced that the economic model based on ISI was in a bottleneck and should be replaced with an export-oriented economic model.

In an environment where the business associations such as TESK, TİSK, TÜSİAD, TOBB, etc. did not have a common view of suitable route of industrial development, the Demirel’s minority government, replacing the Ecevit’s government in 1979, announced in January 1980 to carry out a stabilization program (Sunar and Öniş, 1992). In other words, in the context conditioned by the polarization of the

society by intra-class conflicts between industrialists and traders, export-oriented and import-oriented firms, large-incorporated and small-medium sized firms in terms of the path of industrial development, economic policies, the allocation of import quotas, foreign currency, bank credits, wages, etc. (Buğra, 1997: 191; Arat, 1991: 136; Barkey, 1984; Bianchi, 1984: 252; Öncü, 1980), the political elite decided in favor of big bourgeoisie. Under these circumstances, the reasons behind this decision satisfying particularly the big bourgeoisie can be analyzed. Why did the political elite choose to support big business? If the bourgeoisie is described to be dependent, rent-seeking, non-innovative, non risk-taking bourgeoisie, then how could it influence the political elite and impose their agenda over the new government? The state tradition perspective does not focus on these questions.

In 1980, TÜSİAD supported the military intervention at home and abroad because the restructuration of political and economic system with regard to the model that the Association proposed would be realized under the military rule. In a letter sent to President Kenan Evren on October 3, 1980, Vehbi Koç, one of the founders of TÜSİAD, expressed gratefulness to the military intervention which succeeded in establishing order and security and maintaining political stability in the country and gave his support to the new government headed by Bülent Ulusu, a retired admiral (Gülfidan, 1993: 93).

In the days following the intervention, TÜSİAD established organic links in the military-controlled government (MAG, 2000: 38, cited in Koyuncu, 2003: 136). In his letter, Koç drew the President's attention to the fact that Özal, thanks to his career as a bureaucrat as well as a businessman during the 1970s, was the person to know the problems, needs, and expectations of businessmen best and desired him to be given a role in the phase of the implementation of the austerity measures (ibid). Not unexpectedly, Özal was chosen as the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic affairs by the Ulusu government. Some of the members of TÜSİAD were also chosen as ministers: Şahap Kocatopçu became the Minister of Industry, Fahir İkel the Minister of Power and Natural Resources. The military-controlled government fulfilled most the demands of TÜSİAD (Gülfidan, 1993: 94).

Depending on the support given by the leading industrialists to the military intervention, a journalist maintained that the alliance of TÜSİAD with the military in

1971 as well as in 1980 was motivated by the Association's need for protecting itself against threats coming from the left (Milliyet, 10.04.1997). Boratav (2003) points out that in 1979 the bourgeoisie continuously declared that labor unrest and widespread anarchy had to be taken under control for the successful implementation of the austerity measures (pp.146-8). He characterizes the 1980 military intervention as a counter-attack of big bourgeoisie, leading to the reorganization of the labor market in a fashion that the big bourgeoisie favored.

In such a context, the prohibition of trade union activities, with the exception of Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*, TÜRK-İŞ) which had had no close ties with any political party and not directly involved in politics, the establishment of High Arbitration Council to determine wages, thereby restricting collective bargaining and strike, etc. signify the legal but non-economic and authoritarian manner in which the capital-labor relations were restructured in favor of the former (Sönmez, 2003: 162). Not unexpectedly, Evren the President in his first speech to the public pointed to the high wages as one of the problems the country encountered (Boratav, 2003: 148). Additionally, TÜSİAD was prohibited from acting only for nine days while all interest group activities were banned. At the end of nine days, the Association was defined as an organization working for public interest and its activities were permitted by decree issued by the Council of Ministers (cited in İrem, 1990: 83). In the process of preparing the principal economic policies under the military-controlled government, TÜSİAD along with TİSK and TOBB appeared as active participants (Boratav, 1995b: 75).

The review of the relevant literature showed that the big business, which has been a major policy goal of the state for modernization since the early Republican days, has become the most privileged section in the society especially in the 1980s. The commitment of the military intervention, the military-controlled government and the ANAP governments to market economy made the bourgeois class socially feel safe. The (re)formulation of economic policies was mostly in line with the interests of the big business. Most of the proposals of TÜSİAD were realized by the Özal government such as exchange rate policy, export incentives, value added tax and capital market law, and regulations for the protection of Turkish lira (Gülfidan, 1993: 102). For the state tradition perspective, however, neo-liberal economic policies have

not achieved eliminating but reproduced the nature and pattern of the state-bourgeoisie relations; in other words, the state gets in touch with civil societal forces, in general, and big business, in particular, and, in turn, the latter remains to be dependent on the state. The main point that those advocating this perspective mainly focus on is the relationship between the government and exporters.

Due to the export-oriented growth model, exporters supported through incentives, tax exemptions, cheap credits, etc. were privileged *vis-à-vis* the industrialists during the 1980s. In 1982, business and industrial circles criticized Özal's economic policies which aimed at making the economy to turn away from internal consumption to exports where competition was harsh as being harmful for the domestic market (Ahmad, 1984: 7). "Koç and Sabancı opposed Özal's policy of rapidly changing the economy's orientation away from import substitution, marking the end of protectionism. Describing the man as irresponsible, they wanted to keep him in check and moderate his policies" (ibid: 10).

In the mid-1980s, the dissatisfaction on the side of industrialists increased. Once disciplining the labor market was complete and once the optimism stemming from the pro-business discourse of the ANAP government which started to erode due to the end of the boom in 1985-1987, the pro-rentier course of the stability program came under strong attack, especially by the industrial bourgeoisie who did not have its own banking institutions (Boratav, 1994: 165).³⁶ Not all of the industrialists dependent on domestic market but the big conglomerates, which could find market abroad, were active in trade as well as production and benefited from export incentives, were successfully adapting the new conditions. In short, the definite advantageous segments were the rentiers and financial capital while the productive bourgeoisie did not benefit from this economic model (ibid). Şahap Kocatopçu, the president of TÜSİAD, expressed its dissatisfaction with the export-oriented policies in that time as follow,

³⁶ In her study, Buğra (1997) points out that conglomerate is a social institution which is a product of particular state-business relations in Turkey which can be characterized by a lack of long-term economic strategy (chapter 4). In order to adapt easily sudden changes in economic policy pursued by the government, to benefit from certain measures, to meet its need for credit which is not distributed neutrally, etc. businessmen are interested in productive, commercial, financial functions at the same time and organize these functions within the same entity.

As freedoms of the individual are limited by the freedoms of others, so is liberalization. It is limited by the level of development of our industries, on the one hand, and restrictions put into force by each country, on the other. Some firms which have undertaken investments according to the previous import-substitution industrialization regime are met with difficulties in adapting themselves to the new export-oriented industrialization policies. Like elsewhere in the world, the Turkish industrialists should also be protected and supported stealthily by the government (cited in Gülfidan, 1993: 98).

Yet, for the state tradition perspective, the privileged position of exporters *vis-à-vis* the industrial bourgeoisie did not mean a structural change but rather continuity in the manner of their relations with the state. This argument relies on that the political regime established by the military elite provided the state with autonomy and strength *vis-à-vis* the bourgeoisie, leading to the consolidation of power in the hands of the political elite and the failures in the implementation of neo-liberal policies. The “inner circle” closed and monopolized the decision-making against the influence coming from civil societal forces, in general, and the businessmen, in particular; thus, they were pretty flexible in formulating and implementing economic policies. Öniş (1991) maintains that under these circumstances, a new form of state-engineered autonomy emerged (pp.31-2). As a result, the fortune of commercial bourgeoisie was mostly tied to the government’s preferences and interests which shaped political choices rather than a set of long-term economic goals (İlkin, 1991: 98).³⁷

In this illustration, the businessmen continued to depend on state-provided incentives and thus to be rent-seeking (Öniş, 1991: 31-2). Öniş (1998b) contends that the import-license oriented rent-seeking bourgeoisie in the pre-1980 period was replaced with an export-oriented one in the post-1983 period (p. 254). The encouragement of exporters by trading rights with specific countries and, in turn, the formation of foreign trade companies, which would compete in the international

³⁷ Kalaycıoğlu (1991) elaborates on a new series of radical policy changes in import-export regime in 1989 was an important instance of this kind of governmental action (pp.83-4). For him, this shock decision was personally made by the Prime Minister, without negotiation with technocrats and commercial groups, due to his political considerations, that is, his goal to be president.

arena, is described to perpetuate the dependence and rent-seeking nature of the businessmen.

In this picture, the interface between TÜSİAD including both commercial and industrial interests and the political elites continued to work by clientelistic ties with the latter and increasing particularism among businessmen which defended their own interests against each other and which tried to keep close ties with the relevant center (İrem, 1990: 89). Kalaycıoğlu (1991) says that as “the tone and style of Mr. Özal’s talks, at the occasional meetings with the representatives of major commercial groups, and his public speeches, indicate that he was more inclined to *instruct* the interest group members than *exchange* views with them, (...) being on good terms with the government has been a more effective strategy for commercial groups than setting their autonomous associations to confront it” (pp.82-3). Under these circumstances, an institutionalized pattern of relationship between the governmental elite and the businessmen did not emerge and the latter preferred to influence policies through individual manipulation at the stage of implementation rather than at the stage of policy making (ibid).

Yet, the above mentioned illustration is to a large extent founded on the negligence of the societal forces, in general, and the big business, in particular. In the previous chapter, Heper was criticized for limiting his analysis to define the features of the new regime and for not answering the conditions, needs, motives, relations, etc. bringing about this regime. For instance, this perspective does not focus on why the Turkish bourgeoisie moved in the direction of authoritarian rule. Rather, those advocating the state tradition highlighted certain institutions such as the Central Bank, Undersecretary of Treasury and Foreign Trade, Undersecretary of State Planning Organization, Board of Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund, the directors of which were directly appointed by the prime minister (Öniş, 1991: 33), and certain procedures such as the encouragement of exporters, the extra-budgetary funds, the excessive public sector spending infrastructure such as transportation, power, telecommunications, highways, etc. in order to claim that the state continued to be autonomous and strong from the societal forces in the 1980s.

Yet, it can be suggested that the new political regime by the military elite, which afterward gave rise to the emergence of these institutions and procedures,

coincided with the change in the course of economy. An expression of one of the leading characters of TÜSİAD illustrates that the division of labor between the state and the political elite which enlarged the area of the latter and the consolidation of power in the hands of political executive *vis-à-vis* the Parliament and the bureaucracy were the consequences of the influence of the big bourgeoisie over the new political regime.

The main difference is that before the coup of September 12, we had to do everything democratically. This meant that it would take months to pass a needed law or regulation. That is, every measure was taken through a cumbersome process in which political references and views had to be satisfied. Economic approach always came from behind. Under the military rule, the decisions did not have to be taken through the Parliament, so quick action could be taken and many mistakes could be corrected with no loss of time. Most importantly, political approaches would be discarded since the military rulers did not worry about votes. The main difference is the saving in time by taking the right decisions in time” (cited in Gülfidan, *ibid*).

Within this frame, the big bourgeoisie supported the military as well as the new political regime. It is because the neo-liberal policies would be successfully carried out provided that the government policies did not have to consider the next elections. Thus, the government would not have to adjust stabilization program to eliminate the adverse effects of these policies. However, the state tradition perspective ignores how the big bourgeoisie favored the new political regime. Under these circumstances, all disappointing outcomes in liberalization are attributed to the strong state tradition. The state tradition perspective is not interested in the reasons behind the new political regime. Rather, the new institutions, procedures and rules generated in this regime are described as a sign of the strong state.

If the understanding of liberalism by TÜSİAD, particularly its disposition on the state and individual rights and freedoms is considered, it becomes clear that the new political regime considerably satisfied the big bourgeoisie. Despite its happiness with Özal’s coming to the political and economic scene, TÜSİAD did not completely agree with his policies in the 1980s. TÜSİAD was not against a kind of state

intervention in favor of private sector; its members adopted the idea of strategic planning although that of mixed economy was out in the 1980s (Buğra, 1997: 338). The Association claims that although market economy is the most effective instrument to serve the individual and common good to the greatest advantage and is a prerequisite for industrial democracy, it has some imperfections (TÜSİAD, 1983: VII). When the market is non-existent and/ or too small or inadequate to serve its proper function, it is the state's duty to establish, to enlarge, and to improve it (ibid). Ali Koçman who was elected as the President of TÜSİAD in 1980 notes that "the private sector advocates the removal of the bureaucratic custody that either stops or retards production. This does not however mean adopting the outmoded 'laissez-faire, laissez-passer' view, since it does not coincide with their 'social' state understanding (...) The only political system where the private sector is sovereign is fascism" (cited in Gülfidan, 1993: 59). Under these circumstances, it is not answered why the businessmen demanded the state to intervene into the economy from the standpoint of state tradition perspective. In other words, the argument put by this perspective that there is an ongoing tension between the state and the liberal businessmen seems to be insufficient.

Additionally, the Association did not have a pluralistic view on individual rights and freedoms (Gülfidan, 1993: 54-5). Its members agreed with the statement that the political freedoms and rights of the individual can be sacrificed to the good of the state especially in time of crisis and can be restricted if these liberties threaten social solidarity and public interest (ibid). Although Gülfidan relates this disposition with the Turkish political tradition that has given priority to the national interest; the idea of the supremacy of the state has been prevalent among the businessmen (ibid: 55), this disposition becomes more meaningful if we consider TÜSİAD's view on trade unions. In other words, it should be asked how the disposition of TÜSİAD on individual rights and freedoms benefited the businessmen.

Although TÜSİAD disapproved the intervention of the state in the functioning of the interest groups, its members were not of the same mind when trade unions are to be autonomous especially in the process of collective bargaining (ibid: 62). Yalman (2002a) points out that the bourgeoisie was always concerned about the rights granted to the working class by the 1961 Constitution which prepared the legal

framework for this class to express themselves as a class (pp.327-8). In 1971 as well as in 1980, this concern led big business to buttress the authoritarian rule which would serve their interests much more than democracy under which the state had to follow redistributive policies. The authoritarian military government between 1980 and 1983 and the legal framework of interest group politics by the new constitution in the post-1983 era imposed strict control over trade unions, collective bargaining, the right to strike, wages, etc.³⁸ In other words, the military elite arranged the political context for the successful implementation of stabilization program; this program came to pass in a political environment where the possibility of opposition by the groups who would be adversely affected by this program was eliminated (Boratav, 2003: 145-51; Sayarı, 1992: 28-30; Eralp, 1990: 238). Under these circumstances, there emerges a picture in which the strong state is appreciated in controlling the labor market. Thus, it can be claimed that the state-TÜSİAD relations in the 1980s should not be explained with regard to the strong state. The state tradition perspective generally underlines that as the state continued to have a great role in economy in the 1980s, the businessmen could not challenge the state. But it can be said that TÜSİAD tolerated the strong state because of its power to control the labor market. However, it is not possible to take into consideration the complex set of relations between the bourgeoisie and the other social classes from the state tradition perspective which is founded on the dichotomy between strong state and weak bourgeoisie and limits the analysis to the state-bourgeoisie relations.

4. 3. The Changing Nature and Pattern of the state-TÜSİAD Relations

A gradual worsening in the relations between the businessmen and the political elite began in the second half of the 1980s when the second generation of businessmen began to come into the business scene, that is, the occupation of influential positions in the Association by young, well-educated, and dynamic

³⁸ For the legal structure of interest group politics, see Ergun Özbudun “The Post-1980 Legal Framework for Interest Group Associations, and for the state-labor relations in that period, Ümit Cizre, “Labour: The Battered Community.” In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups. The Post-1980 Turkish Experience*, edited by Metin Heper.

members (Arat, 1991: 146; Heper, 1991b: 172), and a demand for structural change has been increasingly pronounced by these businessmen since then. The change in TÜSİAD's attitude and policies began with the chairmanship of Ömer Dinçök in 1987, especially became visible with that of Cem Boyner (1989-1990) who opposed the unfavorable government policies openly and sharply, and then continued with the chairmanship of Bülent Eczacıbaşı (1991-1992), Halis Komili (1993-1997), Muharrem Kayhan (1997-1998), Erkut Yücaoğlu (1999-2000) (Aydın, 2001: 57), Tuncay Özilhan (2001-2004), Ömer Sabancı (2004-).

The demand of big business for structural change gave rise to a remarkable shift in the preferences of TÜSİAD in the 1990s. The Association, which previously for the most part focused on economic issues, has come to concentrate on necessary steps to be taken for further democratic opening in the last decade (Öniş and Türem, 2001b: 5). The focus of TÜSİAD on democracy is said to be related to its growing maturity (ibid: 13; Öniş, 2002: 17-8). It is argued that big business, developing under the guidance and influence of strong state in the early stages of industrialization, has eventually become mature. It is because big business has come to be composed of internationally competitive firms with an increasingly global orientation in recent decade. Thus, their dependence on the state for its further growth has not ceased but considerably reduced (Öniş, 2002: 17-8; Öniş and Türem, 2001b: 13).

The focus of big business on democracy is also related with its concern of its public image (Öniş, 2002: 18). Koyuncu (2003) argues that the chairmen of TÜSİAD wanted to show that TÜSİAD is a civil society organization. Muharrem Kayhan argues that TÜSİAD is not an interest group but a pressure group which works to promote not the interests of the businessmen but the long-term interests of the country (Sabah, 13.01.1999, cited in Koyuncu, 2003: 141).³⁹ Eczacıbaşı insists that

³⁹ The belief in the compatibility between the public interest and the interests of the Association became most visible by the establishment of political parties by some leading businessmen, one was the New Democracy Movement (*Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi*, YDH) under the leadership of Cem Boyner and the other was the Liberal Democratic Party (*Liberal Demokratik Parti*, LDP) under the leadership of Besim Tibuk. These attempts have been resulted from the inability and/ or reluctance of the political elites to resolve the socio-economic problems of the country and generally suggested a set of reforms for the consolidation of democracy. However, these attempts, which have been a function of a crisis of representation on the side of businessmen, are regarded as important but insufficient to change the relations between the state and the businessmen (Ekşigil, 1998: 41). As Buğra points out that although YDH has been quite successful, it is more beneficial and important for businessmen to institutionalize the channels in which class organizations like TÜSİAD can regularly participate into

TÜSİAD pronounces not the problems of their members at the individual or sectoral level but the social, economic, and political problems of the country (Sabah, 26.12.1998, cited in Koyuncu: *ibid*). Cem Boyner describes the shift beginning in the late 1980s as an obvious sign of “TÜSİAD’s to become a pressure group whose members have the courage and determination to sacrifice their personal interests, when the general interests of Turkey is concerned” (MAG, 2000: 38, cited in Aydın, 2001: 58).⁴⁰

Global influences are also underlined in explaining the interest that TÜSİAD displayed in democracy (Öniş, 2002; Aydın, 2001; Öniş and Türem, 2001a; 2001b). Failure to conform to global norms definitely leads to isolation, insecurity, and inability to capitalize on economic benefits such as large-scale investment on the part of transnational capital and membership of supranational organizations such as European Union (EU) (Öniş and Türem, 2001b). It seems that democracy is highly valued for TÜSİAD because the costs involved in failure to conform to global norms are considerable for big business which will absolutely be the section which gains much from globalization. In addition to this, Turkey is to keep up with the changes in the world economy and politics in order to cope with the risks such as international terrorism, rapid technological transformation stemming from new economy and information technologies, etc. (Görüş, 2003, 55).⁴¹ In the words of Muharrem

policy making and to overcome political bottleneck in this fashion than being candidate for political power. This is another instance for Buğra which indicates that the Turkish businessmen preferred the hard one to the easy one (cited in *ibid*: 40).

⁴⁰ The growing interest of TÜSİAD in social and political matters, along with economic ones, during the 1990s can be seen in the projects carried out by academicians and experts under the directive of the Association. *Turkey towards the 21st Century* (1991-1993), *Higher Education, Science and Technology in Turkey and in the World* (1994), *Towards Designing a New Electoral System in Turkey* (1995), *Towards a New Medium-term Stabilization Program for Turkey* (1995), *Towards a New State Model for the 21st Century: Optimal State* (1995), *Sharing Resources between Public and Private Sectors after 1980* (1996), *Public Spending and Public Debt in Turkey* (1996), *Reforming the Turkish Social Security System: Problems and Proposals for Solutions* (1997), *Perpectives on Democratization Report* (1997), *Quality in the Judicial System* (1998), *Political Stability and Electoral Systems* (1998), *The Reform of the Vocational and Technical Education in Turkey* (1999), *Turkey’s Window of Opportunity: Demographic Transition Process and its Consequences* (1999) are main publications of TÜSİAD. For an overview of all publications published during the 1990s, see www.tusiad.com

⁴¹ In a report published by TÜSİAD, that is, *AB Yolunda Bilgi Toplumunu ve e-Türkiye* (2001), this anxiety can clearly be observed. In this report, it is emphasized that the world is steadily changing as a

Kayhan, the former president of TÜSİAD, “Turkey cannot take the risk of being isolated from the rest of the world” and thus “it has to carry out the structural reforms if it wants to benefit from the opportunities that the global conditions have provided” (cited in Aydın, 2001: 84).⁴²

For TÜSİAD, the EU also appears as the structure which would accelerate the process of structural reformulation for further democratization. Koyuncu (2003) argues that the EU constitutes the most important external anchor which forces Turkey to and helps her initiate and complete a set of reforms necessary for Turkey’s engagement with the global economy (p.173) as well as for democratization. Öniş (2002) states that “closer relations with the Europe and desire to become a full-member of the EU has played an instrumental role and contributed a powerful external anchor in the efforts of Turkish business community (notably big business) to consolidate and deepen democratic norms during the 1990s” (p.6). Tuncay Özilhan the former chairman of TÜSİAD states that the EU is the only gate to the global world and it will determine the future destination of Turkey (Görüş, 2002, 51).⁴³ The Association considers the prospect of membership in the EU as a key to

result of globalization and technology and this change includes serious risks such as widening income inequality. To deal with these risks and at the same time to benefit from the positive aspects of this change, the Turkish state and society, and TÜSİAD have already decided to be with the EU. This report is described as an attempt to discuss where we are, what our destination is, and how we get there and to define the necessary steps to be taken towards the EU.

⁴² TÜSİAD has voiced its concerns about being isolated from the rest of the world and remaining out of the new world order especially under the rule of the Welfare-True Path coalition government in the mid-1990s. Since, one of the partners gave signs of deviating from market rule due to populist considerations (Görüş, 1996, 26).

⁴³ In the pursuit of EU membership, TÜSİAD is involved in lobbying as there are frequent visits to different European capitals organized by the Association. It tries to establish links with the business circles and high-rank officials in the member countries to provide more and better information about Turkey and to exchange views with the European business circles, authorities, academic circles, etc. Being a member of Union of Industrial and Employer’s Confederations of Europe (UNICE) since 1988, TÜSİAD has adhered to the European business world’s analysis and initiatives in relation to the European integration process (Private View, 1998, 5). In 1995, the Association opened a representative office in Brussels to represent the private sector at the EU level and to keep the Turkish business community informed about political and economic developments in Europe (TÜSİAD Brochure, 1999). Another office was opened in Washington in order to present its views in international platforms and to communicate directly with the circles which are important for Turkey’s economic and political progress (ibid). In 2003, another representative office was opened in Berlin which has worked to deepen the economic relations between Turkey and Germany and to influence the views and activities regarding Turkey’s membership in that country (Görüş, 2003, 56: 6-7).

sustainable stability and welfare in the country (Private View, 1998, 5; 2002, 11: 5) which, for TÜSİAD, is necessary for the successful implementation of the reform process. In other words, accomplishing the reform process for the EU membership, that is, the acceptance of such universal norms as the rule of law, the freedom of expression, the coexistence of different cultures and thoughts, a transparent state, productive public sector, minimal regional differences, a competitive market economy, helps Turkey to catch up with the developments in the world (cited in Koyuncu, 2003: 174).⁴⁴

In accordance with the change in TÜSİAD's orientation, the main criticism directed to the coalition governments between 1991 and 1999 by the Association was political and economic instability which dominated the mid-1990s, thereby constituting the main obstacle for taking necessary measures for establishing and developing a stable socio-economic system which would provide Turkey with a place among the Western countries.⁴⁵ TÜSİAD has openly criticized some of the governmental measures and warned the governments about the long-term consequences of their actions. As Halis Komili states,

Additionally, the Association published various reports to encourage Turkey's EU membership. Some of these are as follows; *Towards European Union Membership: Political Reforms in Turkey* (2002), *Harmonization of the Legislation on the Free Movement of Goods within the EU: Problems and Solutions*, a brochure entitled *European Union and Turkey: Towards Full Membership* (2002), another one *European Union and Turkey: Towards Economic Integration, Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey and the EU Copenhagen Criteria. Views and Priorities Executive Summary* (2001), *Information Society and e-Turkey towards European Union* (2001), *Turkey's Membership to the EU and its Possible Effects on FDI and Economic Growth* (www.tusiad.org).

⁴⁴ For TÜSİAD, as Tuncay Özilhan the former chairman states, achieving sustainable economic growth must be realized with the possible increase in Foreign Direct Investment (Görüş, 2003, 55: 6-7). In a report requested from Asaf Savaş Akat to be prepared for the Association in 2002, *The Relations of Turkey's EU Membership, Foreign Investment and Economic Growth*, the reporter carries out a comparative research and analyzes the concept of economic growth in relation to foreign direct investment in order to show the importance of the increasing effects of foreign direct investment, especially in relation to the accession process. The study concludes that although foreign direct investment in Turkey would increase in the coming 10 years, a possible membership to the EU would have a considerably better effect on the economy and the cost of de-linking from the EU will be very high in terms of foreign direct investment inflow and economic growth (Newsletter, 2002, 15). For, it would be the progress in the way to the EU membership which would definitely help stabilizing the economy and reformist efforts which, in turn, increase Turkey's international credibility as well as foreign direct investment flow into Turkey (Newsletter, 2001, 9; Görüş, 2003, 55: 6-7).

⁴⁵ Political instability was a major matter of the association's monthly review during the 1990s. See Görüş, Vol. 24, 25, 30, 31, 32, 36

... Economic growth can not be realized unless plural democratic political structure is institutionalized. Political parties which are competing with each other to seize power leads to worsening regulations and the domination of politics over the economy.... Any pro-reformist attempt which would not provide the politicians with voters' support in the short-run has not been undertaken by them.... The government has tried to get economy better with temporary measures. But what is essential is structural change. If this chaos continues, Turkey will be at the lower stages in the new world order than the stage it stands today. Socio-economic reforms are necessary for preventing this and social consensus is entailed to realize these reforms. Social consensus can be accomplished by democracy. The only way to save the country from disorder is democracy. Economic success can not be achieved without democracy (Yeni Yüzyıl, 24.01.1997).⁴⁶

In the 2000s, the relations between the Association and the politicians have been shaped by the conflicts, tensions, dissatisfactions, etc., especially on the side of businessmen, derived from the differences between these two elite groups in terms of the approach and tactics to be followed towards the EU membership. After the Helsinki Summit, TÜSİAD's main focus has been the acceleration of the government in fulfilling political criteria in order to start accession negotiations with the EU as soon as possible. In that regard, TÜSİAD appreciated the coalition government including the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*, DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*, MHP) and the ANAP in 1999 as this government achieved a degree of consensus despite the different political outlooks of the coalition partners and began to carry out a set of reforms (Newsletter, 2001, 9).⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Translation is mine.

⁴⁷ Erkut Yücaoglu the former chairman of the Association stated that the consensus-building coalition government has proved to be very stable in its first ten months by passing the Reform bills regarding a wide array of Penal Code and Civil Code amendments covering those about political parties, practices of torture, personal inviolability, arrest and detention, freedom of association and organization, independence of judiciary, fair trial, and the jurisdiction of the SSC, and the legislation regarding international arbitration, introduction of a new banking law, a very comprehensive monetary and exchange rate program, adoption of new policies aiming to reduce the government deficits and inflation (Private View, 2000, 8: 6-7).

For TÜSİAD, however, the government was slow in fulfilling the reforms and did nothing for Turkey-EU relations in 2000 due to the political and ideological considerations (Newsletter, 2001, 9). The Association points out to the adverse effects of the lack of political consensus among the coalition partners on the reforms crucial for Turkey's membership to the EU (Newsletter, 2002, 15).⁴⁸ In order to warn the government about losing no time in the process of full-membership, TÜSİAD, on May 29, 2002, as it did twenty years ago, gave a full-page advertisement to newspapers such as *Hürriyet* under the title of "What kind of future is waiting for Turkey?"⁴⁹ Koyuncu (2003) argues that this advertisement might have a positive effect on the government as the Parliament enacted a new reform law, that is, a significant step towards starting accession negotiations with the EU (p.82). This reform package, including the abolishment of capital punishment, the elimination of any legal provisions forbidding the use of mother tongue on TV/ Radio broadcasting, the preservation of cultural diversity and cultural rights for all citizens, achieved conformity with the Copenhagen criteria (ibid).

In 2002, TÜSİAD has appreciated the coming of Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, AKP) into political scene as the party has had majority in the Parliament and declared to be committed to Turkey's quest to become a full member of the EU. The AKP has enacted the conformity packages without delay (Görüş, 2003, 56). By the attempts of the Ecevit and Erdoğan governments, a more or less conformity with the Copenhagen criteria voiced by TÜSİAD since the 1990s have been realized on paper. But this process has not been completed yet and the government is expected to keep being firm in the implementation process (Görüş, 2004, 58). Since then, it can be said that, the Association has assumed monitoring

⁴⁸ For the other critical speeches of Özlhan about the government, Koyuncu (2003) refers to some Turkish dailies such as *Sabah*, 13.06.2001, *Milliyet*, 29.09.2001, *Hürriyet*, 27.04.2001 (p.143).

⁴⁹ In that period, TÜSİAD has perceived that forming a public opinion as an instrument to press the government is much more efficient than using extensively the media, as it did in 1979, and thus has set up the Press Office which is responsible for communicating TÜSİAD's view directly to the public. Indeed, this tendency, that is, "to identify the critical issues, and to keep the public informed and aware" is expressed as the Association's main target (TÜSİAD Brochure, 1999). Bülent Eczacıbaşı points out that "TÜSİAD has become aware of the fact that in order to be succesful (in its mission of creating a participatory democratic society and a competitive economy based on free market), it has to be an institution that does not demand from the state but one that adresses the public" (cited in Aydın, 2001: 67).

and checking whether the structural reforms are successfully implemented or not by the government (Newsletter, 2004, 21).

4. 4. A Critical Evaluation of the State Tradition Perspective

After the brief account about the state-business relations in recent decade, it can be asked how the assumption of the rise of big business as a political actor assuming leadership for democratic opening is understood and explained by the perspective of state tradition. As mentioned throughout the thesis, in Heper's view, the nature of the state, which is determined by the degree of stateness, remains more or less unchanged over different historical periods and shapes the interest group politics. In this picture, the societal forces and the world conditions are not assumed to transform the general features of the state and those of interest group politics from top to bottom. Thus, the bourgeoisie is supposed to remain considerably dependent on the paternal state despite a profound shift in political and economic system, even in favor of the bourgeoisie. Put differently, the bourgeoisie is not expected to become strong to challenge the state within the framework of this perspective.

Yet, the columnists of a Turkish daily maintained that the agenda of businessmen in the mid-1990s indicated a significant change in the state-business relations. TÜSİAD called for a new type of state, that is, optimal state which was a small but an efficient one. This demand was taken as "the rebellion of businessmen against the state" (Yeni Yüzyıl, 01.05.1995). Similarly, the escalation of pro-democratic voices in TÜSİAD, which became visible by *Perspectives on Democratization Report* (1997), was generally conceived as the end of coalition maintained between the state and the bourgeoisie for a long time by Ahmet Altan (Yeni Yüzyıl, 22.01.1997). Gülay Gökürk maintains that "big bosses, once supporting the military interventions for the sake of economic stability and remaining disinterested in interruptions in democratic regime as long as the state does not get in the way, now venture political pressures and aim at promoting democracy" (Yeni Yüzyıl, 23.01.1997).⁵⁰ Put differently, Ahmet Altan claims that "as time goes by, the

⁵⁰ Translation is mine.

businessmen have become less dependent on the state and its existing form has turned into an obstacle for the businessmen aiming at integrating with the world (...) To achieve this, they propose a set of reforms in the fields of economy, law, education and democracy that must be fulfilled” (Yeni Yüzyıl, 22.01.1997).

This information leads us to think about the sufficiency of the methodological/ conceptual framework based on the explanatory potential of the strong state tradition argument in examining the state-business relations. It is claimed that the philosophy of the businessmen, that is, “that of been taking the paternal State (‘devlet baba’) as paramount, refraining from challenging it, and of pursuing an economic policy not in spite of, but along with the paternal State” (cited in Heper, 1991a: 16) has changed. Consequently, it becomes essential to ask how the bourgeoisie, which has preferred economic liberalism to political liberalism due to the strong state, have come to challenge this state and demanded a serious restructuration in the state apparatuses in the name of democracy in the recent decades. More importantly, it is necessary to consider whether or not the methodological/ conceptual framework of the state tradition perspective is able to figure out this change.

Öniş, who is particularly interested in the state-businessmen relations in the 1990s, explains the challenge *vis-à-vis* the state by big business and its discourse of democracy in terms of its growing maturity in the domestic context. However, it is not clear how the businessmen have become mature despite the existence of the strong state. Do the businessmen, who supported the authoritarian rule *vis-à-vis* democracy in 1980, unexpectedly come to be mature and aware of that democracy will better serve their long-term interests? Could the neo-liberal policies, which are described to perpetuate the rent-seeking nature of the bourgeoisie, encourage a process of capital accumulation, leading to the emergence of internationally competitive firms with global orientation? Did the economic policies followed by the autonomous and sovereign state arrange the conditions for the bourgeoisie to become a political actor pronouncing democracy? Öniş does not elaborate the conditions and relations leading to an increase in the maturity of big business and a decrease in their dependence on the state. In that regard, a theoretical gap emerges in his analyses about the conditions making the businessmen much stronger and mature.

In examining the state tradition perspective with regard to the state-businessmen relations in the recent decade, another main question to be asked is about the result of the claimed change in the nature and pattern of these relations. Does the rise of big business as a political actor pronouncing democracy mean a rupture or continuity in the state tradition? Put differently, does the challenge of the state by TÜSİAD, its rise as a political actor and its demand for democracy mean that the Turkish state is eventually becoming weaker? Öniş asserts that although this rise signifies a significant change in the state-big business relations, the state tradition has not entirely disappeared, thereby leading certain failures in the process of democratization. It is argued that the state “with a continued ability to distribute certain economic resources and political patronage, prevents the business associations such as TÜSİAD, TOBB, TİSK and The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (*Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*, MÜSİAD) from acting in harmony and unity to be able to push in the direction of democracy because this would tend to undermine the current political system and therefore risk the possible benefits that can be generated from the state” (Öniş and Türem, 2001a: 112). As a result of this, the businessmen have still relied on the state and employed rent-seeking attitudes.

But at the same time Öniş, as an advocate of a more balanced state-in-society approach, highlights certain weaknesses on the side of businessmen, especially their understanding of democracy, which has discouraged the elimination of the state tradition and the process of democratization. In Öniş’s view, TÜSİAD understands democracy as an instrument, that is, a necessary tool for designing a new state structure to better serve their interests or, at least, not to be an obstacle for integrating with European economy (Öniş and Türem, 2001a: 97; 2001b: 13). The idea that “the economic benefits of globalization would be available on a large scale if and only if democratic norms are fully applied in the political sphere” dominates the Association’s discourse of democracy (Öniş and Türem, 2001b: 12). In other words, pronouncing reduction in the size of the state under the rubric of democratization is conceived as a sign of TÜSİAD’s interest to reorganize the state apparatus in a fashion to provide necessary conditions for acquiring new opportunities in the global arena. TÜSİAD perceives democracy as a necessary component for curtailing the

redistributive powers of the state, leading to the preservation of TÜSİAD's position against any challenge coming from other segments of society (Öniş and Türem, 2001b: 13). In other words, the businessmen have wanted a stable and predictable macro environment in which their activities are not restricted by other social groups as well as by the state (Öniş and Türem, 2001a). Gülay Göktürk describes the main motive behind TÜSİAD's focus on democracy as follows: "they (businessmen) understand globalization much better than any other section in the society and needs to adapt to this new process. They know that this can not be achieved with an archaic state structure and society in the globalizing world" (Yeni Yüzyıl, 23.01.1997).

Big business's focus on democracy is often based on self-interest and therefore necessarily fragile and conditional. They want democracy because they feel more secure in terms of property rights, their legitimacy of its dominant status and the weakness of demands for radical redistribution from below in the current international order, compared to the position it occupied two or three decades ago. Furthermore business elites realize that the economic costs of not conforming to global norms of democracy would be quite considerable, a situation which was clearly not the case during the Cold War order. Hence, if we are to understand the recent shift involving business as an active member of the pro-democratization coalition, self-interest ought to be the proper starting place (Öniş and Türem, 2001b: 8).

Muharrem Kayhan expresses that an enduring market economy can be real as long as a plural democratic political structure and social consensus can be achieved (Yeni Yüzyıl, 25.02.1998). Halis Komili states that "for some time political instability constitutes main barrier facing economic development. There is only one way to overcome this: democratization. And not only we but also the whole society wants this... Democratization is essential requirement in international trade (...) The development and improvement of Turkey with all of its dimensions in business circle and in the field of improvement require a modern understanding and high-level

standards just as in the Western countries” (Yeni Yüzyıl, 27.01.1997).⁵¹

It is also argued that although TÜSİAD tries to justify its demand for democracy by claiming to represent the general interests of the country, it is difficult to assume that TÜSİAD’s interests are compatible with the latter. The Association has “an implicit assumption that what is desirable for business interests could also be beneficial for the country as a whole. It tries to project an image towards the promotion of public interest, as opposed to an image of narrowly defined class-based interest association” (Öniş and Türem, 2001a: 99). Yet, it is contended that TÜSİAD presents its own demands as if they were shared by the people at large if it does not receive attention to their interests from the state and the government (Alkan, 1998: 49). Additionally, it is maintained that for an association which is representative of neither private sector at large nor its members, the representation of public interest is pretty problematic (Buğra, 1997: 341-2). It is said that “(...) TÜSİAD, with its members, has remained like a club; it does not represent the private sector as a whole, (...)” (cited in Esmer, 1991: 128). The personal views of the members who are not in the governing body, such as the Board of Directors and the High Advisory Council, are not taken into consideration when decisions are made (Gülfidan, 1993: 53).

Öniş also points out to the elitism which continues with regard to democratization on the side of businessmen (Öniş and Türem, 2001a: 103-4). Cem Boyner points out that the businessmen, who invest in the country’s future, take risk, and generate employment, have more right than any social group to have a claim on politics (Yeni Yüzyıl, 24.01.1997). In the interview with him in the 25th establishment anniversary of TÜSİAD, Rahmi Koç states that the Association has to lead private sector and announce its views to the government but in doing this, it should not give up elitism (Görüş, 1996, 27). As a result of this elitism, they tend to establish weak horizontal links with civil society and other business associations (Öniş and Türem, 2001a: 103-4).

Another point which is thought to shatter the credibility of businessmen’s focus on democracy is their different view on Kurdish issue and Islam both of which have constituted main obstacles before the consolidation of democracy in Turkey

⁵¹ Neşe Düzel’s interview with Halis Komili. Translation is mine.

(Öniş and Türem, 2001a: 105). While accepting a very liberal attitude towards the former, TÜSİAD preferred to ally with the state and the military to end the Welfare-True Path coalition government in 1997. Under the rule of this government, there was an open war between the Association and the coalition government which supported the small-medium-sized enterprises against big business. However, Alkan (2000) claims that there were no organic links between the Welfare Party and MÜSİAD (pp.139-40). He describes the establishment of MÜSİAD as an attempt by a group of businessmen with religious identity which has been neglected since the Republic and which wants to influence the state and to expand their share in economy (ibid). Öniş (2002) argues that TÜSİAD has denied intra-capital conflicts and challenged MÜSİAD with regard to secularism-Islam dichotomy or legitimate-illegitimate business activity. In other words, TÜSİAD has identified MÜSİAD with illegitimate business activity, as if no member in TÜSİAD were involved in illicit wealth creation practices. Thus, the business community at large cannot achieve cooperation and unity among itself and this has negatively affected the attempts for restructuring the state and society in terms of democratization, globalization, and the EU (ibid).

In that framework, TÜSİAD's discourse of democracy is described to have fragile and conditional components, leading to bolster the strong state tradition. But at the same time the rise of TÜSİAD as a political actor demanding democracy and challenging the state in the name of democracy is underlined as a sign of increase in the strength and maturity of big business. This assertion requires deliberating the state tradition perspective. It is likely to maintain that the 'changing' state-business relations represent a methodological/ conceptual inconsistency for this perspective. For, the reductionist reading of the state-society relations by the state tradition perspective does not seem to offer an adequate explanation for the present picture of the state-businessmen relations. This reading that matches strong state with weak society or weak state with strong society would not help us to elucidate the simultaneous existence of the strong state and the businessmen as a political actor increasingly evolving. In other words, the zero-sum understanding of the relations between the state and society, in general, and between the state and interest groups, in particular, is not able to conceptually justify the incessant rise of TÜSİAD despite

the strong state during the recent decade.

Additionally, it is conceptually unconvinced to hold that the state still preserves its strength. The state tradition perspective does not allow us to elucidate the impact of TÜSİAD's rise as a political actor on the state tradition. It is claimed that this rise does not represent a rupture in the state tradition but any details about this determination are not given. For instance, should the rupture of the strong state tradition certainly result in democratic opening? Does the fact that big business assumes a leadership role for democratic opening clearly imply an increase in their participation into policy making? If so, about which subjects the businessmen take much more part than the state? If the distribution of certain economic resources by the state indicates its strength and prevents democratization, then into which areas does the state intervene in the consolidated democracies? Should a decrease in the state intervention into certain areas give rise to a break in the state tradition? Or, if TÜSİAD comes to understand democracy as an end or to be willing to ally with other civil societal forces and to establish a common front, does this mean a decrease in the degree of stateness for the perspective of state tradition? Any suggestion about these questions is not caught in the state tradition perspective.

Under these circumstances, this thesis asserts that the state tradition perspective presents an unsatisfactory explanation to appraise the 'changing' relations between the state and big business. For, the relationship between the state tradition and democracy is not satisfactorily grasped from the standpoint of the state tradition perspective. This is associated to the fact that democracy does not constitute a focal point in this perspective. In its methodological/ conceptual framework, the nature and pattern of interest group politics is claimed to be determined by the degree of stateness. Thus, it should be expected that the change in this nature and pattern is derived from a change in this degree. However, the so-called perspective does not suggest a picture of democracy in which the state is strong and the society is weak or vice versa. Under these circumstances, it does not seem to measure this change by comparing the state-businessmen relations in the previous decades with those in the recent decade with regard to the degree of stateness. As well, certain constituents of democracy characterizing the polity as high or low in stateness are not drawn by this perspective.

In that context, it is concluded that confident clues about the changing social dynamics and relations that appear as a result of TÜSİAD's call for further democratic opening are not found out by using the methodological/conceptual framework of the state tradition perspective.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis aims at presenting and discussing the state tradition perspective, dominating the academic, political, and business circles in Turkey in recent decades. The particular focus is on the relations between the state and big business represented by TÜSİAD in the post-1980 period. It is because TÜSİAD is one of the most important carriers of the discourse offered by the state tradition perspective. It is attempted to explore whether the state tradition perspective is a sufficient explanan in accounting for the state-TÜSİAD relations.

This thesis starts with elaborating on the theoretical background of the state tradition perspective. For the reason that is the state tradition perspective is a variant of state-centered analysis. The state-centered framework which is noticed in the analyses “bringing the state back in” is well-known for its perception of the state as an independent variable. In other words, the “bringing the state back in” perspective proposes that the determinacy of the state in empirical reality is the most appropriate starting point to grasp empirical reality in its socio-historical context. However, this perspective perceives the modern state, which is institutionally differentiated from the society, as potentially autonomous. The state is taken as a subject on-its own that does not necessarily reflect socio-economic demands but rather shapes socio-economic system.

The second chapter continues with presenting and discussing the methodological/ conceptual framework of the state tradition perspective. The impact of the “bringing the state back in” perspective is observed particularly in Heper’s studies in Turkish literature. His main theoretical premise is the determinacy of the state in all social formations. In his view, the specific characteristics of each social formation are distinguished by the nature of the state. The nature of the state, which, more or less, remains same over different historical periods, is recognized by state

autonomy or the degree of stateness. In that context, the Turkish state is characterized by its long lasting tradition by Heper. That is, the state is identified as the constitutive part of the social formation in Ottoman-Turkish polity and as the source of power by the perspective of state tradition (cf. Yalman, 2002b: 24-5). It is described to have an autonomous structure with logic and interests of its own. Its agents in the form of state elites and institutional structures are believed to indicate that the state is a form of entity with its own rationality (ibid).

In the third chapter, the reading of Ottoman-Turkish polity from the standpoint of the state tradition perspective is portrayed. Initially, a review of the Ottoman state structure as well as the Ottoman modernization is pursued. For the reason that this perspective points out that the state tradition originated in the Ottoman Empire. The institutions and procedures which are assumed to symbolize the superiority of the state in the Empire are elaborated on. Then, the modernization efforts pursued during the nineteenth century, which are supposed to constitute the historical origins of the strong state, are touched upon.

After that, the third chapter sketches the general features of accounting the historical dynamics in Turkey by the state tradition perspective. The main arguments are as follow: the Turkish revolution is defined as a revolution from above which is motivated by the Republican elite, representing the state. It is the strong state which creates a national bourgeois class and aims at maintaining political control over the leaders of business. The strong state is also asserted to shape the relations between the state elite and the political elite: while the state elite including the bureaucracy, academia and the military assumes the role of guardianship for secular and democratic Turkish state, the political elite are held responsible for the political crises. The military interventions are legitimized by relying on the metaphor of reestablishing democracy. In that frame, the profound shift in discourse and policy making against the strong state in the 1980s is identified to lead to the recovery of the strong state. Although the country begins to implement neo-liberal policies, the strong state does not retreat during the 1980s.

Throughout the second and third chapters, it is mainly argued that statist-institutionalism, in general, and the state tradition perspective, in particular, has certain methodological problems. These problems are related to understand the state

as an independent variable and, in turn, to underestimate the significance of cultural determinants. As a result, statist-institutionalism as well as the state tradition perspective generates a state-centered reductionism; the dynamics, oppositions, conflicts, struggles, alliances and relations in the arena of society are supposed to influence the state policies in a limited way.

In that context, both perspectives classify the social formations as either weak state-strong society combination or strong state-weak society one. That classification also brings about universal descriptions about the West and the East: the first of which is identified in the weak state-strong society combination while the second is in the other combination. This classification leads to idealize the state-society relations in Western polities and to describe those in Eastern polities as deviant cases. Thus, the analyses from the standpoint of the state tradition perspective are asserted to generate a contradiction rather than making a comparison with Western polities.

Additionally, it is thought that the state tradition perspective has normative presuppositions in elaborating on modernization, despite its basic premise to be value-free. It is likely to encounter the ideas accepting and legitimizing the existing reality or the suggestions for change influenced by the dissatisfaction with the existing reality in the analyses, which are founded on positivism. It is affirmed that, especially in the field of social sciences, acceptance of or dissatisfaction with the existing reality is directly and indirectly related to an ideological stance (Özman & Coşar, 2001: 94). Following this statement, it is maintained that the phrase of the state tradition is a concept-determined argument. For, the Ottoman-Turkish modernization is read and, in turn, its explanation is created with reference to a specific model of state-society relations, taking place in the Western Europe.

Also, this thesis stresses that the state tradition perspective establishes an essential link between modernization and an independent bourgeois class in reading Turkish politics. As the strong state is assumed to (re)emerge over different historical periods, the Turkish bourgeoisie always remains to be dependent and unprogressive. As a result, the efforts followed, or to be followed, for modernization, liberalization and democratization are never to be successful. In that context, the scholars such as Mooers, Blackbourn and Eley as well as Turner are mentioned in the third chapter in order to highlight that the emphasis on the nature of the state is not as adequate as

those advocating state tradition perspective affirm. All these scholars contend that the existence of an independent and progressive bourgeois class should not be conceived as a *sine qua non* of modernization. They indicate how modernization takes place in different parts of Western Europe such as Germany, France and Italy without the contribution of such a bourgeois class.

Yet, the state tradition perspective does not regard the alternative analyses about the characteristics of the bourgeoisie. Nor, these analyses encourage the state tradition perspective to question the sufficiency of its basic premises. Rather, this perspective reiterates the argument of the nature of the state. The political developments such as the rise of the *ayans* and the modernization efforts followed in the nineteenth century are not assumed as reformist as to break the strong state. It is because the *ayans* as well as the bureaucrats are described to be patrimonial in nature; which aim at not acquiring an independent power of the state but preferring to acquire the state apparatuses. In that context, the deviations emerging in the European experience such as the rent-seeking French bourgeoisie and the encouragement of German bourgeois class by the state are not necessarily considered by this perspective. For, the French and German states are not asserted to aim at imposing political control over the bourgeois class.

Another critical point is that the state tradition perspective comes to justify the anti-state call for neo-liberal policies in the Turkish case since the 1980s although emerging as an alternative to pluralist-liberal approach. For that period, as Yalman (2002b) states, this “dissident and hegemonic” discourse draws a picture that confirms the *sui generis* reality of the Turkish state as well as the neo-liberal eulogy of the market as the domain of freedom and choice (p. 24). As the failures in liberalization and democratization in Turkey is explained by the strong state tradition, the diagnosis proposed by those advocating the so-called perspective serves to legitimize the common argument that civil society and market constitute the field of freedom while the state is assumed to be the source of coercion.

The state tradition perspective seems to make an effort to elucidate the political developments in the post-1980 period with regard to the strong state argument. Mainly, the state tradition perspective meets a conceptual problem in analyzing the post-1980 period: the state, or bureaucracy, which is described as the

carrier of the strong state in Turkish politics comes to be substituted for the government in that period. Thus, the main argument that the state elite reproduce the strong state turns out to be blurred. More importantly, even if the assumption of the traditional role of the bureaucracy by the politicians in the 1980s is thought to derive from the strong state, this perspective does not explain how such a change in roles takes place.

Furthermore, it is more evident that to relate the disappointing conditions to the strong state is quite unconvincing. The state tradition perspective concentrates on discovering the indicators of the strong state rather than explains the social dynamics behind the transformation in the early 1980s. For instance, the strengthening of the political executive *vis-à-vis* the Parliament, the bureaucracy, the Party and interest groups is considered as a sign of the strong state. Yet, such a system is knowingly preferred by TÜSİAD. In that system, the political elite are not concerned by votes, and thus, do not have to create trusty clients among the business groups. Under these circumstances, the political elite are exposed to the partisan and clientelist pressures almost not and, hardly take action according to the political considerations. Additionally, the strengthening of the political elite is thought to succeed the control of labor market, which is demanded by TÜSİAD for the successful implementation of the stabilization program since the 1970s.

In the fourth chapter, the particular focus is put on the state-TÜSİAD relations. The aim is to explore the appropriateness of the state tradition perspective in the context of post-1980 period. It is because the analysis of the organizational evolution of TÜSİAD provides a basis for critically assessing the methodological/ conceptual framework of this perspective. Also, the methodological/ conceptual problems mentioned at the beginning of this chapter become quite clear in the context of post-1980 period.

About state-big business relations during the 1980s, the state tradition perspective repeats its argument: the businessmen remain dependent on the state; its members exert pressure on policy making through their personal links with the political executive; they do not have interest group character. Yet, the literature review demonstrates that those advocating the state tradition perspective mainly deal with the state-TÜSİAD relations during the 1980s. The state-big business relations,

principally, in the recent decade do not constitute a field of interest in the state tradition perspective. An attempt to analyze the state-TÜSİAD relations since the 1990s with reference to the state tradition is observed in the works of Öniş. He claims that the nature and pattern of the state-TÜSİAD relations changes recently; TÜSİAD begins to challenge the state by demanding further democratization. For, big business increasingly becomes mature and strong under the circumstances of globalization. In that context, a significant transformation in the focus of TÜSİAD from specific economic issues into a broader framework of socio-political issues such as democracy, education, women's issues and EU membership takes place.

The state-TÜSİAD relations since the 1990s are evaluated with regard to two main points. Firstly, it is maintained that the methodology of the state tradition perspective does not allow us to clarify the rise of TÜSİAD. It is because this framework is based on a dichotomous reading of the state-society relations. The state tradition perspective indicates that the state is always strong to keep the business class dependent on the state. Under these circumstances, TÜSİAD's increasing independence from the state is not expected and, in turn, could be explained. In Öniş's analyses, this development requires to take into account globalization. But this reveals another deficiency of the methodology of the state tradition perspective. That is, this perspective does not necessarily put emphasis on the international context.

Secondly, the effect(s) of TÜSİAD's rise as a political actor demanding further democratic opening on the state tradition are not sufficiently measured. It is not clear whether this rise represents a rupture or continuity in the state tradition. Even the analyses of Öniş do not seem to sufficiently explain the changing relations and dynamics appeared as a result of the rise of TÜSİAD in Turkey. For, democracy does not constitute a core argument of the state tradition perspective. Probably due to its positivism, this perspective does not suggest a model of democracy which is supposed to break the strong state. Nor, a comparative focus on democracies constitutes an analytical unit in the state tradition perspective. Put differently, certain indicators of a democracy in which the state is strong and the society is weak, or vice versa, are not considerably determined by this perspective. This prevents us from evaluating TÜSİAD's understanding of democracy from the standpoint of the state tradition perspective.

Under these circumstances, it has been concluded that the state tradition perspective does not offer a sufficient methodological/ conceptual framework to evaluate the relations between the state society, in general, and the state and big business represented by TÜSİAD, in particular, in the post-1980 period.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahmad, F. *Demokrasi sürecinde Türkiye 1945-1980*. İstanbul:Hil Yayın. 1992.

_____ “The Turkish Elections of 1983.” *Merip Reports* 122 (March-April 1984): 3-11.

_____ “The political economy of Kemalism.” In *Atatürk Founder of a Modern State*, edited by Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1981: 145-64.

Aktan, C. C. “Turkey: From Inward-Oriented Etatism to Outward-Looking Liberal Strategy.” *Turkish Public Administration Annual* 17-19 (1991-1993): 17-9.

Alkan, H. “Türkiye’de işadamları örgütleri ve devlet.” *Birikim*, 114 (Ekim 1998): 43-62.

Almond, G. A. “The Return to the State.” *American Political Science Review* 82, 3 (1988): 853-74.

Arat, Y. “Politics and Big Business: Janus-Faced Link to the State.” In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups. The Post-1980 Turkish Experience*, edited by Metin Heper. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991.

Aydın, T. İ. *TÜSİAD in the 1990s: The Story of A Transformation*, Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2001.

Badie, B. and P. Birnbaum. *The Sociology of the State*. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.

Barkey, H. “Crises of the Turkish Political Economy: 1960-1980.” In *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change*, edited by Ahmet Evin. Opladen: Leske Verlag + Budrich GmbH, 1984.

Barkey, K. and S. Parekh. “Comparative Perspectives on the State.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 17(1991): 532-49.

Bianchi, R. *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Birtek, F. “Devletçiliğin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü 1932-1950. Yarı-periferik Bir Ekonominin Yapılanmasında Belirsiz Yol.” In *Türkiye’de Devletçilik*”, edited by Nevin Coşar, *Türkiye’de Devletçilik*. İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1995.

Blackbourn, D. and G. Eley. *The Peculiarities of German History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

Boratav, K. *Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1908-2002*. Ankara and İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2003.

_____ “Devletçilik ve Kemalist İktisat Politikaları.” In *Türkiye’de Devletçilik*, 1995a.

_____ *Türkiye’de Sosyal Sınıflar ve Bölüşüm*. İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1995b.

_____ “Contradictions of ‘Structural Adjustment’ Capital and the State in post-1980 Turkey.” In *Developmentalism and Beyond. Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, Ayşe Öncü, Çağlar Keyder, and Saad Eddin İbrahim, eds. The American University in Cairo Press, 1994.

_____ “Türkiye’de Devletçilik.” *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* 2 (1983): 412-8.

_____ “1923-1939 Yıllarının İktisat Politikası Açısından Dönemlendirilmesi.” In *Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Sorunları, 1923-1938*. 1977.

Brett, E. A. “Development Theory in a Post-Socialist Era: Competing Capitalisms and Emancipatory Alternatives.” *Journal of International Development* 12 (2000).

Bromley, S. *Rethinking Middle East Politics*. Oxford: Polity Press, 1994.

Buğra, A. *Devlet ve İş Adamları*. Translated by Fikret Adaman. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997.

_____ “Political and Institutional Context of Business Activity in Turkey.” In

Developmentalism and Beyond. 1994.

Chambers, R. L. "The Civil Bureaucracy." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, edited by E. Ward and D. A. Ruston. Princeton & New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Cizre Sakallıođlu, Ü. "Labour: The Battered Community." In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*. 1991.

Dinler, D. "Türkiye'de Güçlü Devlet Geleneđi Tezinin Eleřtirisi." *Praksis* 9 (2003): 17-54.

Eisenstadt, S. N. "The Kemalist revolution in comparative perspective." In *Atatürk Founder of a Modern State*. 1981.

Ekřigil, A. "İřadamlarının Türkiye siyasetinde artan rolü." *Birikim* 114 (Ekim 1998): 38-42.

Eralp, A. "Turkey in the Changing Postwar World Order: Strategies of Development and Westernization." In *Developmentalism and Beyond*. 1994.

_____ "The Politics of Turkish Development Strategies." In *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, edited by A. Finkel and N. Sirman. London and New York: Routledge, 1990.

Esmer, Y. "Manufacturing Industries: Giants with Hesitant Voices." In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*. 1991.

Evans, P. "On the Road towards a More Adequate Understanding of the State." In *Bringing Back the State In*, P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol, eds. Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Findley, C. V. "Continuity, Innovation, Synthesis, and the State." In *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, edited by Kemal Karpat. Leiden, Boston & Köln: Brill, 2000.

_____ *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

- Genç, M. "State and the Economy in the Age of Reforms." In *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, 2000.
- Gerth, H. H. and C. W. Mills. "Methodology of Social Sciences." In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. London: Routledge, 1958.
- Grugel, J. "Contextualizing democratization: the changing significance of transnational factors and non-state actors." In *Democracy without Borders. Transnationalism and conditionality in new democracies*, edited by Jean Grugel. London and New York: Routledge, 1999.
- Gülfidan, Ş. *Big Business and the State in Turkey: The Case of TÜSİAD*, Unpublished PhD Thesis Boğaziçi University, 1993.
- Hagopian, F. "Political Development, revisited." *Comparative Political Studies* 33, 6/7 (August/ September 2000): 880-991.
- Harris, G. "The Role of the Military in Turkey: Guardians or Decision-Makers?" In *State, Democracy and the Military. Turkey in the 1980s*, eds. M. Heper and A. Evin. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998.
- Heper, M. "Transition to Democracy in Turkey: Toward a New Pattern." In *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, eds. M. Heper and A. Evin. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994.
- _____ "The 'Strong State' and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective." In *Democracy and Modernity*, edited by S. N. Eisenstadt. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992a.
- _____ „The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy. Turkey and Germany Compared.“ *Comparative Political Studies* 25, (July 1992b): 169-94.
- _____ "The State and Interest Groups with Special Reference to Turkey." In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*. 1991a.
- _____ "Interest Group Politics in post-1980 Turkey Lingered Monism." In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*. 1991b.

- _____ “The Executive in the Third Turkish Republic, 1982-1989.” *Governance* 3 (1990a): 299-319.
- _____ “The State, Political Party, and Society in the post-1983 Turkey.” *Government and Opposition* 25 (1990b): 321-33.
- _____ “The Motherland Party Governments and Bureaucracy in Turkey, 1983-1988.” *Governance* 2 (1989): 457-68.
- _____ and E. Fuat Keyman, “Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, 4 (October 1998a): 259-77.
- _____ “Türkiye’de Unutulan Halk ve Birey.” In *75 yılda teba’dan yurttaş’a doğru*, edited by A. Ünsal. İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998b.
- _____ “Introduction.” In *The State and Public Bureaucracies. A Comparative Perspective*, edited by M. Helper. New York & London: Greenwood Press, 1987.
- _____ *The State Tradition*. Walkington England: The Eothen Press, 1985.
- _____ “Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century.” *International Political Science Review* 1, 1 (1980): 81-105.
- _____ *Türk Kamu Bürokrasisinde Gelenekçilik ve Modernleşme. Siyaset Sosyolojisi Açısından Bir İnceleme*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1977.
- _____ “Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a Historical Bureaucratic Empire Tradition.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7 (October 1976a): 507-21.
- _____ “The Recalcitrance of the Turkish Public Bureaucracy to ‘Bourgeois Politics’: A Multi-Factor Political Stratification Analysis.” *Middle East Journal* 30 (Fall 1976b): 485-500.
- _____ “Traditional Tendencies in the Upper Reaches of the Bureaucracy in a changing Turkey.” *Turkish Public Administration Annual* 2 (1975): 121-153.

- _____ “The Political Role of Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State: Some Observations from the perspective of Comparative Public Administration Theory.” *Turkish Public Administration Annual* 1 (1974a): 45-60
- _____ *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği*. Ankara: ODTÜ İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Yayın No: 23, 1974b.
- _____ “Some Notes on the Assumptions of the Theory of Administrative Reform in the Ottoman-Turkish State.” *METU Studies in Development* (Fall 1971): 417-46.
- Hourani, A. “Ottoman reform and the Politics of Notables.” In *Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East. The Nineteenth Century*, eds. William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Ilkin, S. “Exporters: Favored Dependency.” In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*, 1991.
- İnalçık, H. *Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk, Adalet*. İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 2000.
- _____ “Comments on ‘Sultanism’: Max Weber’s Typification of the Ottoman Polity.” 1995.
- _____ “Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects.” Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press, 1976.
- _____ *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600*, New Rochelle New York: Orpheus Publishing Inc., 1973.
- _____ “The Rise of the Ottoman Empire.” In *The Cambridge History of Islam. Volume I The Central Islamic Lands*, eds. P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970a.
- _____ “The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy.” In *The Economic History of the Middle East*, eds. M. A. Cook, P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton and Bernard Lewis. London: Oxford University Press, 1970b.
- _____ “The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey.” In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, 1964a.

_____ “Sened-I İttifiak and Gülhane-i Hattı Hümayunu.” 1964b.

İnsel, A. *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kıskaçında Türkiye. Kalkınma Sürecinde Devletin Rolü.* İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1996.

_____ *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı.* İstanbul: Birikim Yayıncılık, 1990.

_____ “Devletçiliğin Anatomisi.” *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* 2, 1983.

İrem, N. *The Interest Groups-State Interface: The Case of TÜSİAD.* Unpublished M. A. Thesis Bilkent University, 1990.

İslamoğlu-İnan, H. “State and peasants in the Ottoman Empire: a study of peasant economy in north-central Anatolia during the sixteenth century.” In *The Ottoman Economy and the World-Economy.* Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1987a.

_____ “Introduction: ‘Oriental Despotism’ in world-system perspective.” In *The Ottoman Economy and the World-Economy*, 1987b.

_____ and Çağlar Keyder, “Agenda for Ottoman history.” In *The Ottoman Economy and the World-Economy*, 1987.

Johnson, T., C. Dandeker, and C. Ashworth *The Structure of Social Theory. Dilemmas and Strategies.* London: MacMillan, 1990.

Kalaycıoğlu, E. “Commercial Groups: Love-Hate Relationship with the State.” In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*, 1991.

Karpat, K. H. “The Republican People’s Party, 1923-1945.” In *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, eds. M. Heper and J. Landau. London & New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 1991.

_____ “Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980.” In *State, Democracy and the Military. Turkey in the 1980s*, 1998.

_____ “Introduction to Political and Social Thought in Turkey.” In *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East*, edited by Kemal H. Karpat. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982.

- _____ “Structural Change and Historical Foundations of Contemporary Turkish Politics.” In *Social Change and Politics in Turkey. A Structural- Historical Analysis*, edited by Kemal Karpat. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973a.
- _____ “Ideology in Turkey after the Revolution of 1960.” In *Social Change and Politics in Turkey*, 1973b.
- _____ “Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-1970.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 8, 5 (October 1972): 349-75.
- _____ “The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization.” In *Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East*, 1968.
- _____ “Society, Economics, and Politics in Contemporary Turkey.” *World Politics* 17, 1 (October 1964): 50-74.
- _____ “Recent Political Developments in Turkey and Their Social Background”, *International Affairs* 38, 3 (July 1962): 474-501.
- Kasaba, R. “A Time and a place for the non-state: social change in the Ottoman Empire during the ‘long nineteenth century’.” In *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World*, eds. Migdal, J., A. Kohli and Vivienne Shue. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Kazancıgil, A. “The Ottoman-Turkish state and Kemalism.” In *Atatürk Founder of a Modern State*, 1981.
- Kazgan, G. “Türk Ekonomisinde 1927-35 Depresyonu, Kapital Birikimi ve Örgütlemeler.” In *Atatürk Döneminin Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Sorunları, 1923-1938*, 1977.
- Kerwin, R. W. “Private Enterprise in Turkish Industrial Development”, *The Middle East Journal* 5, 1 (Winter 1952): 21-38.
- Keyder, Ç. *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.
- _____ and Ayşe Öncü, “Introduction: Comparing Egypt and Turkey.” In *Developmentalism and Beyond*, 1994.

- _____ “The Agrarian Background and the Origins of the Turkish Bourgeoisie.” In *Developmentalism and Beyond*, 1994.
- _____ “İthal İkameci Sanayileşme ve Çelişkileri.” In *Krizin Gelişimi ve Türkiye'nin Alternatif Sorunu*, eds. Korkut Boratav, Çağlar Keyder and Şevket Pamuk. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1984.
- Kohli, A., and V. Shue “State power and social forces: on political contention and accommodation in the Third World.” In *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994.
- Koyuncu, B. (2003) *Globalization and Its Impact on Business Associations in Turkey: TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD in a Comparative Perspective*. Unpublished PhD Thesis Bilkent University.
- Kuruç, B. *Belgelerle Türkiye İktisat Politikası*. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi S. B. F. Yayınları, No. 569, 1988.
- _____ *Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi 1987.
- Leys, C. “Samuel Huntington and the End of Classical Modernization Theory.” In *The Rise & Fall of Development Theory*. Indiana University Press, 1996.
- Lewis, B. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 1961.
- Mann, M. “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results.” *Archives Europeenes de Sociologie* 25, 2 (1984): 331-53.
- Mardin, Ş. “Yeni Osmanlıların Hakiki Hüviyeti.” In *Şerif Mardin Bütün Eserleri 6 Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset Makaleler 1*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003a.
- _____ “Atatürk ve Pozitif Düşünce.” In *Şerif Mardin Bütün Eserleri 6 Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset Makaleler 1*, 2003b.
- _____ *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.

- _____ “Civil Society and Islam.” In *Civil Society*, eds. John Hall *et al.*, 1995.
- _____ “Religion and secularism in Turkey.” In *Atatürk Founder of a Modern State*, 1981.
- _____ “Turkey: The Transformation of an Economic Code.” In *Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey*, eds. Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan, 1980.
- _____ “Türk Siyasasını Açıklayabilecek Bir Anahtar: Merkez- Çevre İlişkileri.” 1973.
- _____ “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2, 3 (July 1971): 197-221.
- _____ “Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire.” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 11, 3 (June 1969): 258-281
- _____ “Historical Determinants of Social Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness in Turkey.” *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 22, 4 (1968): 111-42.
- Martinussen, J. *Society, State, & Market*. Zed Books, 1997.
- Migdal, J. S. “The State in Society: An Approach to Struggles for Domination.” In *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994.
- _____ *et al.*, “Introduction: developing a state-in-society perspective.” In *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994.
- Mooers, C. *The Making of Bourgeois Europe*. London: Verso, 1991.
- Nas, T. F. “The Impact of Turkey’s Stabilization and Structural Adjustment Program: An Introduction.” In *Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization*, eds. Tefik F. Nas and Mehmet Odekon. Bethelam: Lehigh University Press, 1992.
- Neyzi, N. “The Middle Classes in Turkey.” In *Social Change and Politics in Turkey*, 1973.
- Öncü, A. and D. Gökçe. “Macro-Politics of De-Regulation and Micro-Politics of Banks.” In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*, 1991.

- _____ “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Odalar.” *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* Cilt 6, 1983.
- _____ “Chambers of Industry in Turkey.” In *Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey*, 1980.
- Öniş, Z. “Entrepreneurs, Citizenship and the European Union: The Changing Nature of State-Business Relations in Turkey.” www.ku.edu.tr, 2002.
- _____ and U. Türem. “Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations.” *Turkish Studies* 2, 2 (Autumn 2001a): 94-120.
- _____ and U. Türem. “Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey.” www.ku.edu.tr, 2001b.
- _____ “The Evolution of Privatization in Turkey: The Institutional Context of Public Enterprise Reform.” In *State and Market. The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective*. İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 1998a.
- _____ “Redemocratization and Economic Liberalization in Turkey: The Limits of State Autonomy.” In *State and Market*, 1998b.
- _____ “Political Economy of Turkey in the 1980s: An Anatomy of Unorthodox Liberalism.” In *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups*, 1991.
- Özbudun, E. “The Status of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982: Presidentialism or Parliamentarism?” In *State, Democracy and the Military. Turkey in the 1980s*, 1988.
- _____ “Turkey.” In *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries*, eds. M. Weiner and E. Özbudun. Durham N. C: Duke University Press, 1987.
- _____ and Ali Kazancıgil. “Introduction.” In *Atatürk Founder of a Modern State*, 1981.
- _____ “The nature of the Kemalist political regime.” In *Atatürk Founder of a Modern State*, 1981.

- Özman, A. & S. Coşar. "Siyasal Tahayyülde Devletin Belirleyiciliği. Metin Heper Çalışmaları Üzerine Bir İnceleme." *Doğu Batı* 4,16 (August, September, November 2001): 81-96.
- Patton, M. "The Role of the National Bourgeoisie in Turkish Development." Paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Meeting, Bilkent University Halil İnalcık Special Collection, 1983.
- Payaslıoğlu, A. "Political Leadership and Political Parties." In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, 1964.
- Remmer, K. L. "Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Development. The Resurgence of Institutionalism." *World Politics* 50 (September 1997): 34-61.
- Ritzer, G. *Sociological Theory*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983.
- Rustow, D. A. "Atatürk as an institution-builder." In *Atatürk Founder of A Modern State*, 1981.
- _____ "The Modernization of Turkey in Historical and Comparative perspective." In *Social Change and Politics in Turkey*, 1973.
- Sayarı, S. "Politics and Economic Policy-Making in Turkey, 1980-1988." In *Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization*, 1992.
- Schmitz, H. P. & K. Sell. "International Factors in processes of political democratization: towards a theoretical integration." In *Democracy without Borders. Transnationalism and conditionality in new democracies*, 1999.
- Shaw, S. J. "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers." In *Beginning of Modernization in the Middle East*, 1968.
- Skocpol, T. "A critical review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy." In *Social revolutions in the modern world*, edited by T. Skocpol. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- _____ and E. K. Trimberger. "Revolutions and the world-historical development of capitalism." In *Social revolutions in the modern world*, 1994.

- _____ “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research.” In *Bringing Back the State In*, 1985.
- _____ *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
- Sönmez, M. *100 Göstergede Kuruluştan Çöküşe Türkiye Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.
- Steinmetz, G. “Introduction: Culture and the State.” In *State/ Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1993.
- Sugar, P. “Economic and Political Modernization.” In *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, 1964.
- Sunar, İ. “The Politics of State Interventionism in Populist Egypt and Turkey.” In *Developmentalism and Beyond*, 1994.
- _____ and Ziya Öniş, *Sanayileşmede Yönetim ve Toplumsal Uzlaşma*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1992.
- _____ “State and economy in the Ottoman Empire.” In *The Ottoman Economy and the World-Economy*, 1987.
- _____ and Sabri Sayarı. “Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects.” In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Southern Europe*, eds. G. O’Donnell, P. C. Schmitter, and L. Whitehead. Baltimore & London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- _____ *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey’s Development*. Ankara: A.Ü. S. B. F. Yayınları, 1974.
- Uğur, A. and H. Alkan. “Türkiye’de işadımı-devlet ilişkileri perspektifinden MÜSİAD.” *Toplum ve Bilim* 85 (Yaz 2000): 133-55.
- Tezel, Y. *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi*. Ankara: Yurt Yayınevi, 1986.
- Trimberger, E. K. *Revolution from Above*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books Rutgers University, 1978.

Tünay, M. “Türk Sağının Hegemonya Girişimi”, *Praksis* 5 (2002): 177-97.

Vitalis, R. “Business conflict, collaboration, and privilege in interwar Egypt.” in *State Power and Social Forces*, 1994.

Wallerstein, I., H. Decdeli and R. Kasaba. “The Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world-economy.” In *The Ottoman Economy and the World-Economy*, 1987.

Waterbury, J. “Export-Led Growth and the Center-Right Coalition in Turkey.” In *Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization*, 1992.

_____ “State and Society in Contemporary Political Analysis.” *Paper presented to the conference on Dynamics of States and Societies in the Middle East*. Cairo, 1989.

Weber, M. “Objectivity in Social Sciences.” In *Max Weber on the Methodology of Social Sciences*, trans. and eds. Shils E. A. and H. A. Finch. Glencoe: Free Press, 1949.

Wood, E. M. “England, Capitalism and the Bourgeois Paradigm.” In *Pristine Culture of Capitalism*. London: Verso, 1991.

Yalman, G. “Hegemony Projeleri Olarak Devletçilik, Kalkınmacılık ve Piyasa.” In *Liberalizm, Devlet, Hegemonya*, edited by Fuat E. Keyman. İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2002a.

_____ “The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective: A Relativist Paradigm or a Panoply of Hegemonic Strategies?” In *The Politics of Permanent Crisis. Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*, eds. Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002b.

Zürcher, E. J. *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, translated by Yasemin San Gönen. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999.