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POP PHILOSOPHY VERSUS THE FACE:  
FACIALITY IN DERMOCOSMETIC ADVERTISEMENTS

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POP PHILOSOPHY VERSUS THE FACE:  
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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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## ABSTRACT

### POP PHILOSOPHY VERSUS THE FACE: FACIALITY IN DERMOCOSMETIC ADVERTISEMENTS

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This thesis analyzes Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's "faciality", which is not handled in a Deleuzian sense. The opposition between pop philosophy and the face has been studied in order to draw Deleuzian as well as non Deleuzian connections between pop philosophy, literature, theater, painting and advertising. Since Deleuze calls philosophy as the "art of surfaces", each concept has been taken as a surface to walk on. Not only the author of this thesis but also the face itself takes a walk on "a thousand plateaus", breaks into pop philosophy and reverses Deleuzian concepts such as "difference" and "repetition". Deleuzian concepts and non Deleuzian concepts face each other "in/on" faciality. Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Lewis Carroll, Herman Melville, Antonin Artaud, Francis Bacon, Nikolai Gogol, Edmond Rostand, Carlo Collodi, Franz Kafka, Oscar Wilde, Giuseppe Arcimboldi and *Commedia dell'Arte* shed light on this thesis in order to reveal the faciality in "faciality".

Keywords: Inhuman face, faciality, surface, Deleuze, pop philosophy.

## ÖZ

### POP FELSEFE YÜZE KARŞI: DERMOKOZMETİK REKLAMLARINDA FACIALITY

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Bu çalışma, Gilles Deleuze ve Felix Guattari'nin "faciality" kavramını Deleuzeyen olmayan bir biçimde incelemiştir. Pop Felsefe ve yüz karşıtlığı, pop felsefe, edebiyat, tiyatro, resim ve reklamcılık arasında Deleuzeyen ve Deleuzeyen olmayan bağlantıları kurmak için kullanılmıştır. Deleuze felsefeyi "yüzeylerin sanatı" olarak tanımladığı için, bu tezdeki her kavram üzerinde yürünebilen bir yüzey olarak ele alınmıştır. Sadece bu tezin yazarı değil, yüzün kendisi de "bin yayla" üzerinde yürüyüşe çıkmış, pop felsefeye zorla girmiş ve Deleuze'ün "farklılık" ve "tekrar" gibi kavramlarını tersine çevirmiştir. Deleuzeyen kavramlar ve Deleuzeyen olmayan kavramlar birbirleriyle faciality'nin "içinde/üzerinde" yüzleşmişlerdir. Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Lewis Carroll, Herman Melville, Antonin Artaud, Francis Bacon, Nikolai Gogol, Edmond Rostand, Carlo Collodi, Franz Kafka, Oscar Wilde, Guiseppe Arcimbolde ve *Commedia dell'Arte* "faciality"nin içindeki faciality'i açığa çıkarmada bu teze ışık tutmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsansız yüz, faciality, yüzey, Deleuze, pop felsefe.

To  
My Mother Necla Canar,  
My Father Münir Canar  
and  
My Little Wise Sister  
Burçin Canar

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AO	Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, <i>Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia</i> , trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).
ATP	Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, <i>A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia</i> , trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
DLOT	Gilles Deleuze, <i>Desert Islands and Other Texts (1953-1974)</i> , ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Micheal Taormina (Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2004).
DR	Gilles Deleuze, <i>Difference and Repetition</i> , trans. Paul Patton (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994).
ECC	Gilles Deleuze, <i>Essays Critical and Clinical</i> , trans. Daniel W. Smith and Micheal A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).
FB	Gilles Deleuze, <i>Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation</i> , trans. Daniel W. Smith (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
LS	Gilles Deleuze, <i>The Logic of Sense</i> , ed. C. V. Boundas trans. Mark Lester with C. Stivale (New York: Colombia University Press, 1990).
K	Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, <i>Kafka: Toward A Minor Literature</i> , trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
M	<i>Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty</i> by Gilles Deleuze and <i>Venus in Furs</i> by Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (New York: Zone Books, 1999).
N	Gilles Deleuze, <i>Negotiations (1972-1990)</i> , trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Colombia University Press, 1995).
WP	Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, <i>What is Philosophy?</i> , trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill (London, New York: Verso, 1995).



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The face. That is what we write on. Faciality. A concept to work on. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. They are the ones who provoke us to consider the face and their faciality differently. We make use of an opposition between Deleuze and Guattari and the face. To put it differently, pop philosophy<sup>1</sup> versus the face.

One can choose to “explain” what Deleuze and Guattari mean by faciality. That is what we do not do. This study cannot be considered as a “guide” in order to understand what pop philosophy brings to the concept of the face. In *Ulysses Gramophone*, Jacques Derrida asks a severe question: “For a long time, I have thought (...) that I would never be ready to give a talk on Joyce to an audience of Joyce experts. But when it comes to Joyce, what is an expert? that’s my question”<sup>2</sup>. When it comes to writing on Deleuze we believe, Derrida’s question should be kept in mind. Above all, we are not an “expert” on Deleuze. We attempt to live on the surfaces of pop philosophy as a “nonphilosopher”. Deleuze encourages our intention.

Philosophy requires nonphilosophical understanding just as much as it requires philosophical understanding. That’s why philosophy has an essential relation to nonphilosophers, and addresses them too. They may even sometimes have a direct understanding of philosophy that doesn’t depend on philosophical understanding. Style in philosophy strains toward three different poles: concepts, or new ways of thinking; percepts, or new ways of seeing and hearing; and

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<sup>1</sup> Although Deleuze clearly stated in *Negotiations* that “[Anti-Oedipus] is not the Pop Philosophy or Pop Analysis we dreamed of” (see N, 7), we call Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy as “pop philosophy” in this thesis. It is also crucial to note that “pop philosophy” is used in a broader sense than Deleuze. In other words, the term does not only indicate his works with Guattari; but also the Deleuzian way of thinking.

<sup>2</sup> Jacques Derrida, “Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes In Joyce”, in *Acts of Literature*, ed. Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992), 265.

affects, or new ways of feeling. They're the philosophical trinity, philosophy as opera: you need all three to *get things moving* (N, 164-165).

Fundamentally, we do not try to understand Deleuze and Guattari in terms of faciality. We are interested in finding a faciality in faciality. Our "style" –if we ever have one- does not "depend on philosophical understanding". We rather choose to be a stranger (nonphilosopher) and see how the philosophical trinity *moves* on the surface. We clash Deleuzian concepts with our concepts. We write on the face which reverses the Deleuzian way of thinking in pop philosophy. In a sense, we attempt to reveal *the face* in faciality, which is not handled in a Deleuzian sense. The question is, how we can do what we want to do. Deleuze gives us an inspiration on this issue.

Philosophy's like a novel: you have to ask "What's going to happen?," "What's happened?" Except the characters are concepts, and the settings, the scenes, are space-times. One's always writing to bring something to life, to free life from where it's trapped, to trace lines of flight (N, 140-141).

The novel. The good idea. We ask questions to the face. The characters are either Deleuzian or anti-Deleuzian. We take the setting –pop philosophy- as a character. Our clock strikes "anti-aging". The scenes are gone already. We immediately "crack" to write, not in a Deleuzian sense (cf. Deleuzian "crack in the surface" LS, 165). That is how we find out *the face* in faciality. The concepts we create such as the three-noses-tree break into Deleuzian concepts. In a broad sense, the face takes a walk in pop philosophy (cf. "schizophrenic out for a walk" in AO, 2). We make use of literature, paintings, theater and advertising in this context.

Why is it important to write on the face and Deleuze? The face seems to answer why the body is not able to turn into "becoming-animal". Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the fact that we can "dismantle the face" (ATP, 188). For this reason, it is not surprising at least in terms of art to become "faceless" (see ATP, 187). The face, on the other hand, presents us a man without a face whose difference we will see from Deleuzian "faceless". According to pop philosophy, face is "the *white wall/black hole* system" (ATP, 167). The face has questions on this definition

to Deleuze and Guattari. In brief, the face highlights its opposition to pop philosophy since it is the “faceache”<sup>3</sup> of Deleuze and Guattari.

Rajchman emphasizes how Deleuze’s philosophy provokes us to find out “connections”<sup>4</sup>. Strictly speaking, “to make connections one needs not knowledge, certainty, or even ontology, but rather a trust that something may come out, though one is not yet completely sure what.”<sup>5</sup> With regard to Rajchman’s point, we also think something may come out from the face. What is striking is that the face comes out from the face. We prefer to make connections between pop philosophy and the face with the help of Deleuzian Antonin Artaud, Deleuzian Francis Bacon, Carrollian Deleuze, Moby Dick (not Herman Melville), Lewis Carroll, Nikolay T. Gogol, Edmond Rostand, C. Collodi, Oscar Wilde and Guiseppe Arcimbolde.

The theater. We make use of Artaud’s “theater of cruelty” and *Commedia dell’Arte*. However, we take Artaud’s “cruelty” in order to make gory changes. We take out Pedrolino, one of the Masks of *Commedia dell’Arte*, from the stage in order to place him on the face. In brief, we somehow ruin the theater for the face.

The advertising. The word advertising is the advertising itself in this study. It is actually a setting in the setting. It highlights the basic opposition of this study. By the time advertising announces dermocosmetic advertisements, it will retire. Since advertising is a “rival” of pop philosophy (see WP, 5), even to utter its name will be enough to reach the climax.

Dermocosmetic advertisements. The face in dermocosmetic advertisements reverses Deleuze and Guattari’s “inhuman face”. It constructs a new form of expression which is called “anti-wrinkles” in this study. The face also breaks into Deleuzian repetition and difference in order to create its own difference and repetition. In other words, dermocosmetic advertisements are worthy of note in terms of their opposition to the “general dermatology”, in a word, pop philosophy (N, 87).

We basically take three faces into consideration. These are “human face”, Deleuze and Guattari’s “inhuman face” and the in/human face or the unmasked

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<sup>3</sup> By saying “faceache”, we play with the word “headache”.

<sup>4</sup> See John Rajchman, *The Deleuze Connections* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000), 4-13.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 7.

metaphor or *the face*. These three faces help us to consider the face in dermocosmetic advertisements in a different way. It is of great importance that they all are taken into consideration on the surfaces of pop philosophy. The more we consider the face the more it becomes something else as if it is there to surprise Deleuze and Guattari.

Deleuze once said

philosophy has absolutely nothing to do with discussing things, it's difficult enough just understanding the problem someone's framing and how they're framing it, all you should ever do is to explore it, play around with the terms, add something, relate it to something else, never discuss it (N, 139).

So does the face. When it comes to “add something” not only the face; but we also follow Deleuze. The face gives us a subject to “explore”. At first, nothing comes to mind. That is how we started. When we figure out how we write what we write, it is the face's turn to stay where it is. What we have done to the face is actually revealed in the end.

Deleuze and Guattari say “make a map, not a tracing” (ATP, 12). We keep their suggestion in mind, we are particularly far away from their “rhizome”, though. Pop philosophy is our map in a Deleuzian sense. What is not too Deleuzian is how we make this map. We both repeat and create and recreate Deleuze and Guattari's rivals on the surface. If we summarize what we do, we will say that the face, *the face*, “what happened?”, the face. That is what this thesis is all about.

## CHAPTER 2

### DEEP END OF THE SURFACE: FACIALITY

We need to dive in Deleuzian surface, in order to write on faciality, because Deleuze and Guattari take the face as a “surface” (ATP, 170). However, it is not easy to write on surface since we all are fascinated with depth. What does the depth remind? Whatever the answer is, depth is thought-provoking.

If we consider different meanings of depth and deep, dictionaries will be such a worthy of note:

Depth: n. deepness || an extent of deepness downwards or inwards || the representation of deepness in perspective || the innermost part || the most intense point, *the depth of winter* || the quality of being profound, *depth of feeling* || (of color) intensity || (pl., rhet.) a low moral condition, *what made him sink to such depths?* (...) <sup>6</sup>

In addition, deep also means “(...) completely absorbed, *deep in thought* || heartfelt, *deep sorrow* || well concealed, *a deep secret* || thorough *deep learning* (...)”<sup>7</sup>. Finally, it is better to consider such idioms of deep: For instance, “**deep down** in what you really think or feel.”<sup>8</sup>

What is more, harmonious with its vocabular meaning, depth also implies thought itself. In this case, Artaud can be given as an example. Nevertheless, he is the one who “is alone in having been an absolute depth (...)” (LS, 93). In short, the connection between thought and depth is worthy of note.

Besides, Gilles Deleuze indicates us the surface instead of praising the depth. In other words, there will not be any reason to dive in depthness if we realise “the

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<sup>6</sup> *Larousse Illustrated International Encyclopedia and Dictionary* (USA: McGraw-Hill International Book Company, 1972), 220.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 214.

<sup>8</sup> *Oxford Wordpower Dictionary*, ed. Sally Wehmeier (GB: Oxford University Press, 1993), 166.

strangest things are on the surface.”<sup>9</sup> More importantly, Artaud’s saying will give us the crucial insight of the surface: “One can wonder, in other words, whether it [language of the *mise en scène*] has the power, not to define thoughts but to *cause thinking*.”<sup>10</sup>

Doubtless, Artaud’s saying is not on depth and surface, but on the language of the *mise en scène*. On the other hand, his saying serves our purpose to emphasize the difference between depth and Deleuze’s surface. If depth has the power to *define* thoughts (such as meditation: *deep*, serious *thought* [italics added]<sup>11</sup>) surface will *cause thinking*.

In *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze draws a map of surface with the help of Lewis Carroll’s famous tales on Alice. Artaud is another main reference in this case.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, we take Melville’s *Moby Dick* into consideration. In case of Melville, an interesting finding was that *Moby Dick* is much more thought provoking than Carroll’s surface tales on Alice. Contrary to common thoughts, *Moby Dick* is our key to open Alice’s “small door” of surface. Therefore, we walk on *Pequod*’s deck rather than follow the rabbit.

What do Deleuze and Guattari find in *Moby Dick*? Definitely not the ocean/depth but simply a surface. They take *Moby Dick* as an example of their concept of the “white wall”. That is why, pop philosophy repeats Ahab’s words: “`To me, the white whale is that wall, shoved near to me.` *The white wall*. [italics added] `Sometimes I think there is naught beyond. But `tis enough` ” (Melville, as cited in ATP, 245). Since “the white wall/black hole system” is what the face is (ATP, 167), this is the most crucial reference to *Moby Dick* (not Melville) in terms of

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<sup>9</sup> Gilles Deleuze, “The Schizophrenic and Language: Surface and Depth in Lewis Carroll and Antonin Artaud,” in *Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism*, ed. Josue V. Harari (London: Methuen, 1979), 281.

<sup>10</sup> Antonin Artaud, *The Theater and Its Double*, trans. Mary Caroline Richards (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1958), 69.

<sup>11</sup> *Larousse*, op.cit., 1972, 545.

<sup>12</sup> See LS, 82-93 for the differences and resemblances between Artaud and Carroll. See also Deleuze, op. cit., 1979, 277-295.

faciality, that Deleuze and Guattari make in the “book of concepts.”<sup>13</sup>

The point is, we need to go further than Deleuze in order to read the novel differently. White wall (*Moby Dick*) draws our attention to the face. We keep Foucault’s praise on Deleuze, “one day, perhaps, the century will be seen as Deleuzian” (N, 88), in mind and read the novel Deleuzian not to oppose the century.

It is worth noting that Melville also speaks of monstrosity, it is not alike with Deleuze, though. The difference is, Melville sees *Moby Dick* -the white whale- as monstrous, while Deleuze is taking the human face as a monster in the case of faciality. Faces are, in Deleuze’s words, “surface-monsters” (DIOT, 281).

It is time to give a further information on Deleuzian monstrosity in parenthesis: Monstrosity seems to be a two-sided concept. On the one hand, Deleuze and Guattari speak of “a demonic reality of the becoming-animal” (ATP, 253). To put it differently, the monster is visible in becoming. On the other hand, they face their face’s “monstrous hood” (ATP, 190) in the case of faciality. The point is, what the monster is depends on where you stand on pop philosophy. In the case of Deleuzian monstrosity, Massumi emphasizes “a dog with shoes: neither a molar dog nor a molar man, but a monster, a freak”.<sup>14</sup> At this point, one might consider that “a dog with shoes” is weird. The question is, in the eyes of whom does “becoming-animal” imply a monster?

Becoming-other goes from the general to the singular, returning thought to the body grasped from the point of view of its transformational potential –monstrosity. Becoming-the-same moves to avoid that same potential, going from the typical to the general, from the individual grasped from the point of view of its predictability to the Standard of that normality.<sup>15</sup>

Concerning pop philosophy, although we are not certain whether Massumi’s emphasis on “becoming-the-same” comprises the face or not, “becoming-the-same”

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<sup>13</sup> According to Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus* “is a book of concepts” (See N, 25).

<sup>14</sup> Brian Massumi, *A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 93.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 107.

indicates us only the face. Deleuze and Guattari speak of “specific faciality traits” of human beings (ATP, 168). It seems because of these specific facial expressions, becoming-the-same is inevitable. In addition, the face itself is the refusal of becoming. Nonetheless, “becoming is bodily thought, beyond the realm of possibility, in the world of the virtual”<sup>16</sup>; faciality places itself in the world of visual. After all, we are aware of the fact that “the face [is there] with its visual correlates (eyes)” (ATP, 302).

Pop philosophy points out that “fluid becoming is opposed to static being in various contexts” (N, 186 *n*8). Deleuze chooses becoming, which is “intrinsically transformative, creative, and marginal” (N, 186 *n*8). When it comes to faciality, it is not enough to reveal what is “to be” in a Deleuzian sense for the sake of “becoming”. Deleuze and Guattari or their “schizophrenic” as “the universal producer” (AO, 7) should clash with subfaciality / a faciality which is not yet their “faciality” at first. As long as pop philosophy asserts that it knows the face, even thinking of “becoming-animal” is impossible.

To sum up, while “a dog with shoes” is showing us “the monster”, the face with its “normality” also implies a monster. Pop philosophy seems to point out that “a dog with shoes” is content with its monstrosity. So does the face. The difference is that the face is inwardly content to “be” a monster when it thrusts “normality” into our eyes. It is certain that face cannot announce itself as a monster. It is better to give dermocosmetic advertisements as an example on this issue. Which one of them dare to say that you are a “freak” to your face?

In our opinion, faciality as a “normality [does not only imply] the degree zero of monstrosity”<sup>17</sup> openly; but also it implies the other –rather a dark- side of the monstrosity in all secrecy. In this way, monstrosity is rather a locket which contains faciality in its small case as a bad surprise. At least, for a while, it is our choice -our own free will- whether to open it or not.

It is time to return to Deleuze and Melville. Doubtless, following a trace of inhumanity in “human” face is more interesting than calling a huge mammal a

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., 93.



monster. But, what if the white whale is a huge white wall as Deleuze and Guattari say?

In the first place, take *Pequod* -the ship- as a surface. In terms of *Moby Dick*, each chapter can be taken as “series” which reminds us of series of *The Logic of Sense*. What is more, *Pequod* is the island of real(ly)-imaginary oceans in *Moby Dick*. What do we mean by real(ly)-imaginary? *Pequod*’s journey was written on papers (another surface) and each ocean appears on paper. The ship’s course might be realistic, but writing is rather imaginary. Nevertheless, imaginary has its own reality. Therefore, we call each ocean real(ly)-imaginary. Deleuze indicates “the imaginary isn’t the unreal; it’s the indiscernibility of real and unreal” (N, 66). In terms of “imaginary”, contrary to what we think, Deleuze does “not attach much importance to the notion of the imaginary” (N, 66).<sup>18</sup>

There is also a reason to take *Pequod* as an island rather than a ship. According to Deleuze, “It [the island] is like an egg. An egg of the sea, it is round. [One might consider, but *Pequod* is not round as an island or Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty! We only ask this question as a response: Who has ever seen *Pequod* really? ] It is as though the island had pushed its desert outside. What is deserted is the ocean around it” (DIOT, 11). Besides, Deleuze indicates not the island but “the deserted island”, because “the deserted island is imaginary and not actual, mythological and not geographical” (DIOT, 12).

The fact is, *Pequod*’s course is not geographical either. If we consider Ahab’s mood, *Moby Dick* designates the route. In addition, Ishmael, who is one of the *Pequod*’s crew, has already known, true places are never down in any map.<sup>19</sup>

Secondly, we take Ishmael –the narrator-, the most admirer of the ocean into consideration. Ishmael said once, “Yes, as every one knows, meditation and water are wedded for ever.”<sup>20</sup> Essentially, both water and thought imply the depth. Since Ishmael finds a connection between thought and the ocean, he is the one who is not

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<sup>18</sup> See also ATP, 4-5. In Deleuze and Guattari’s view, “a book itself is a little machine” (ATP, 4) and “writing has nothing to do with signifying” (ATP, 4-5).

<sup>19</sup> Herman Melville, *Moby Dick* (Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga, 1966), 66.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 5.

keen on investigating surfaces.

Despite their differences on depth and surface, the only thing that Deleuze and Ishmael are able to agree with is: How the philosopher should be(come). What is the popular image of the philosopher? Deleuze answers this question: “with his head in the clouds” (LS, 127). Another way of saying this is that he disregards the depth. There is no such difference between the head in the clouds and the head in the blue.

On the other hand, we believe, Ishmael has a similar sense with Deleuze on a philosopher. Therefore, he believes his friend Queequeg (the cannibal) is able to be a philosopher of his own life:

(...) [Queequeg] content with his own companionship, always equal to himself. Surely this was a touch of fine philosophy though no doubt he had never heard there was such a thing as that. But, perhaps, to be true philosophers, we mortals should not be conscious of so living or so striving. So soon as I hear that such or such a man gives himself out for a philosopher, I conclude that, like the dyspeptic old woman, he must have “broken his digester”.<sup>21</sup>

Essentially, Deleuze as a philosopher prefers to become “a tick or louse which is on a level with the surface” (LS, 133). On the other hand, we think it is rather risky to change the “image of the philosopher”. For a while, we all are assumed that, each philosopher chooses to become an animal (a louse) or a cannibal (Queequeg) on the strange surface, what if ticks also become a thing with their heads in the clouds? As far as we are concerned, Deleuze does not guarantee anything in the name of ticks.

If we go back to *Pequod*, we will easily say *Pequod*'s deck is the deepest. Valéry said once that “there is nothing deeper than skin” and Deleuze totally appreciated his “wonderful saying.”<sup>22</sup> The point is, Valéry's saying will take into an account on each surface. In addition, *Pequod* is not an exception on this issue.

We know “the strangest things” such as Fedallah or Ahab's leg is on deck. More important, no matter dead or alive, whale's face has been seen on surface for a

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 61.

<sup>22</sup> See Valéry's maxim and Deleuze's comment on it in N, 87.

while. Besides, sailors' cabin, Ahab's cabin, the hatches, the "blubber-room" are deep, out of sight, in short useless. On the other hand, we consider the struggle between men and whales on the surface. In terms of *Pequod*, not only "the strangest things" but also everything happened on the surface.

In addition to *Pequod* and Ishmael, thirdly, we take *Pequod*'s carpenter into consideration. Not only his face; but also his body can be taken as a surface. The carpenter's features is not narrated (we only know he is an old man) in the novel. The truth is, his body became his craft. It is of a great importance that "he was a stripped abstract (...); living without premeditated reference to this world or the next."<sup>23</sup>

It is worth noting that the carpenter is an archetype of making himself a Deleuzian "body without organs" (BwO). "He was a pure manipulator; his brain, if he had ever had one, must have early oozed along into the muscles of his fingers."<sup>24</sup> Deleuze implies at once: "Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly: the simple Thing, the Entity, the full Body, the stationary Voyage, Anorexia, cutaneous Vision, Yoga, Krishna, Love, Experimentation" (ATP, 151). At last, craftsman is able to become a thing since he thinks with his fingers. However, there is still a lot to do in order to make himself a body without organs. Although the carpenter's fingers become his brain, he has not seen through his skin yet. Therefore, we call him as an archetype.

In addition, the carpenter had not got a "soul" either, instead, "he had a subtle something that somehow anomalously did its duty. What that was, whether essence of quick silver, or a few drops of hartshorn, there is no telling."<sup>25</sup> In this way, Melville depicts such an interesting character. However, we think, Melville cannot possibly aware of the fact that his carpenter's weirdness sounds Deleuzian. Fundamentally, the carpenter is an abstract instance of dismantling the "three great strata (...) the ones that most directly bind us: the organism, signifi-ance, and subjectification" (ATP, 159). The question is, how did he do that?

Firstly, the signifi-ance should be taken into consideration. Deleuze and

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<sup>23</sup> Melville, op. cit., 546.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 547.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

Guattari point out the fact that “signifiante clings to the soul just as the organism clings to the body, and it is not easy to get rid of either” (ATP, 160). An interesting finding was that the carpenter already gets rid of them. So to speak, signifiante is drown in the carpenter’s surface because it does not find a soul to cling. On the other hand, “if his superiors wanted to use the carpenter for a screw-driver, all they had to do was to open that part of him, and the screw was fast: or if for tweezers, take him up by the legs, and there they were”<sup>26</sup>. The fact is, the “screwdriver” carpenter plays a trick on the organism. At the end, organism cannot find a “human” body to cling. Sarcastically speaking, if organism wants this craftsman’s body, the carpenter will only open a part of him in order to wave goodbye to the organism. In other words, he breaks the link – if there is a link- between body and organism. Therefore, the carpenter is hardly an organism.

It is better to give further detail on the carpenter’s unchained body. There is also an irony in Ishmael’s view here about the carpenter, because the carpenter is not a tool (simply a screwdriver); but a “man-maker”<sup>27</sup> in the eyes of Ahab. In our opinion, it is better to call the dialogue between Ahab and the Carpenter <sup>28</sup>, as Shakespearean versus Deleuzian dialogue in order to emphasize Melville’s and Deleuze’s differences. As we mentioned above, the carpenter sounds Deleuzian. In other words, he has a Deleuzian vein: he is choking Ahab’s dark mood with his sneeze (See also how Deleuze uses “choking” differently in N, 136). In our opinion, the carpenter’s sneeze is cruel, because it interrupts Ahab. The captain says to the carpenter: “Take the hint, then; and when thou art dead, never bury thyself under living people’s noses.”<sup>29</sup> The truth is, Ahab’s hint is sarcastic and the carpenter does not even smile.

Deleuze calls machine at once “as a *system of interruptions* or breaks” (AO, 36). The carpenter with his sneeze is definitely a machine. In our opinion it is crucial

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 547.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., 549.

<sup>28</sup> See Ibid., chap. CVIII, 548-553.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., 550.

to ask: what remains of Ahab if the carpenter cuts into his speech with his sneeze? We think, whether symbolically or not, neither Moby Dick nor Ahab himself killed the captain of *Pequod*. Contrary to common belief, the sneeze kills Ahab at once. There is nothing left from Ahab when the carpenter interrupted him. As far as we are concerned, the craftsman has already buried himself under Ahab's nose.

The carpenter is anti-Ahab. Since the captain of *Pequod* is too much Hamlet—nearly insane because of his tragedy—, there is no need to communicate. Although the carpenter listens Ahab, he is not the one who obeys. Actually, Ahab is the one who has to obey the leg which the carpenter made.

On the other hand, the carpenter does not only become a screw driver, but his touch on everything is also in process of becoming. We need to consider Ahab's leg once again in this case. The leg is a leg and it is completely the carpenter's talent. Besides, the leg becomes Ahab. To put it differently, Ahab becomes a leg. We think, the leg on a deck is a refrain. However, this is rather different from Deleuzian "refrain".

According to Deleuze and Guattari, "the refrain is rhythm and melody that have been territorialized because they have become expressive—and have become expressive because they are territorializing" (ATP, 317). There might be rhythm in the case of the leg on a deck. However, it is a rhythm without a "regular repeat". It is crucial to note that it is more like an irregular repeat. Sometimes he walks, sometimes he does not. Unlike Deleuzian refrain, the leg's refrain does not become expressive. The fact is, the leg is resentful. It only reminds the captain Ahab's loss to Ahab. The loss implies memories, not meanings. If "*becoming is an antimemory*" (ATP, 294), how can "Captain Ahab has an irresistible becoming-whale" (ATP, 243) with that leg? We know, Ahab takes his leg to the voyage on a deck. The opposite of this is also possible: The leg takes Ahab to the voyage on a deck. The question is, whether we can call irregular repeat as rhythm or not. Besides, because of the carpenter and his cruel sneeze, Ahab has already lost his melody, he is out of tune.

The last thing about the carpenter is related with his opposition to the three great strata. As we have mentioned above, he has already got rid of organism and signifi-  
cance. Additionally, there is not a trace of his subjectification. Deleuze and Guattari state that, "subjectification is never without a black hole in which it lodges

its consciousness, passion, and redundancies” (ATP, 167). As we have mentioned above, the carpenter’s features is not narrated. In addition to this issue, we might say that the carpenter is out of “the white wall/black hole system”. The question is, whether it is enough to stamp the carpenter as a man without a face because Melville did not say a word on his face. The truth is, whether his face exists or not, this is not necessary for the carpenter, as long as, his hands are not on his face. Above all, he has a “cunning life-principle.”<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, “his body [is] a sentry-box and the soliloquiser on guard there, and talking all the time to keep himself awake.”<sup>31</sup> Consequently, the carpenter tries to fill the gaps of three strata with the help of his “sentry-box”.

The carpenter’s “sentry-box” seems rather reachable than the BwO project. It is crucial to take notice of Deleuze and Guattari’s saying: “You never reach the Body without Organs, you can’t reach it, you are forever attaining it, it is a limit” (ATP, 150). According to Ishmael, the carpenter will be such an odd old man. On the contrary, the man who thinks with his fingers crafts his own “line of flight”. Needless to say, a “man-maker” will be able to somehow find some way to make himself a body without organs. After *Pequod*’s deep end, who can be sure that the carpenter is also gone?

We nearly come into the end of our *Moby Dick* voyage. In addition to the *Pequod*, Ishmael and the carpenter, we finally take the whale’s face into consideration. *Moby Dick* is such a worthy of note, since Deleuze and Guattari imply the monster as a white wall. In terms of faciality, “black holes” and “white wall” are ceaselessly repeating. According to Melville, the white whale indicates a “nameless horror”.<sup>32</sup>

*Moby Dick* gives pop philosophy an opportunity, a huge metaphor in order to emphasize the monstrosity. However, we think, Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on the connection between Ahab and the white whale still sounds old-fashioned:

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<sup>30</sup> Ibid., 547.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 220.

Captain Ahab is engaged in an irresistible becoming-whale with Moby-Dick; but the animal, Moby-Dick, must simultaneously become an unbearable pure whiteness, a shimmering pure white wall, a silver thread that stretches out and supplies up “like” a girl, or twists like a whip, or stands like a rampart (ATP, 304).

It is crucial to note that to think on either Ahab is *Moby Dick* or *Moby Dick* is Ahab seems to us unnecessary, although Deleuzian approach, which indicates “Captain-Ahab has an irresistible becoming-whale (...)” (ATP, 243), can be considered in this context. We focus on white whale’s surface rather than Ahab’s tragedy. On the other hand, to speak of white whale can be deceptive if we disregard Deleuzian intention. The point is, Moby Dick’s colour is crucial not only for Melville but also for Deleuze. Moby Dick’s “whiteness” is not only significant in terms of faciality but also becoming: “Moby-Dick’s whiteness is the special index of his becoming-solitary” (ATP, 306). In brief, we need to consider white wall’s whiteness before inscribing the human face.

White. “(...) in many natural objects, whiteness refiningly enhances beauty, as if imparting some special virtue of its own, as in marbles, japoniacs, and pearls; and though various nations have in some way recognised a certain royal pre-eminence in this hue”<sup>33</sup> and also

The Holy One that sitteth there white like wool; yet for all these accumulated associations, with whatever is sweet, and honourable, and sublime, there yet lurks an elusive something in the innermost idea of this hue, which strikes more of panic to the soul than that redness which affrights in blood.<sup>34</sup>

In other words, white is a horror, just like “*the face what a horror*” (ATP, 190). In our opinion, Deleuze does not randomly give his wall a colour of white. Besides, Melville’s *Moby Dick* is such a dictionary of white. Does not the dictionary tell us what the words mean? The fact is, Melville is willing to give each meaning of white in different cultures.<sup>35</sup> In short, *Moby Dick* whether a whale/wall or not, is a

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 221.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 222.

<sup>35</sup> See Ibid., chap. XLII “The Whiteness of the Whale”, 220-231.

book of white. Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari precisely follow the trace of the peculiar monstrous white.

(...) is it, that as in essence whiteness is not so much a colour as the visible absence of colour, and at the same time the concrete of all colours; is it for these reasons that there is such a dumb blankness; full of meaning, in a wide landscape of snows— a colourless, all-colour of the atheism from which we shrink? (...) and when we proceed further, and consider that *the mystical cosmetic* [italics added] which produces every one of her hues, the great principle of light, for ever remains white or colourless in itself, and if operating without medium upon matter, would touch all objects, even tulips and roses, with its own blank tinge—pondering all this, the palsied universe lies before us a leper (...) <sup>36</sup>

There is still a slight crucial difference between Deleuze and Guattari, and Melville, we may regard their resemblance of scary white, though. Melville or Ishmael speaks of “white depths”<sup>37</sup> while pop philosophy is following the white surface. That is why Melville sees a white whale when Deleuze and Guattari see “the white wall” in case of *Moby Dick*.

Is it possible to say, “phantasm of the surface have replaced the hallucination of depth” (LS, 24) in terms of *Moby Dick*? In our opinion, the surface wins, *Pequod* sinks at the end, though. Ironically, the “surface body” carpenter passes away. Because he has nothing more to tell. The “deep admirer” Ishmael survives. Because he has something to narrate us: *Pequod* –the surface- as an “empty square”. Above all, “what is in excess in the signifying series is literally an empty square and an always displaced place without an occupant” (LS, 50). In addition, Ishmael does not only “literally”; but also worldly belongs anywhere.

In order to be more concrete, we want to emphasize the significance of *Moby Dick* for us once again. First of all, *Moby Dick* gives us an opportunity to reveal Deleuzian surface. In order to write on faciality, we need to designate what the surface is. Secondly, it is crucial to note that we draw a different map from Deleuze

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 230.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.



and Guattari in the context of reading *Moby Dick*. Pop philosophy does not emphasize *Pequod* or the carpenter. Neither does it say much concerning Ishmael.<sup>38</sup> What is crucial for Deleuze and Guattari is crucial for common belief: Ahab and the white whale, that is what *Moby Dick* is. However, according to our analysis, *Pequod* is the “deepest” while we are taking Ishmael and the carpenter as depth and surface. In sum, all of these details reveal why we read *Moby Dick*: We not only emphasize the difference of the surface in a Deleuzian sense; but also find a Deleuzian vein, not in a Deleuzian sense in *Moby Dick* (not Melville).

Since we have designated white wall’s “horror whiteness”, with the help of *Moby Dick*, black holes are rather noticeable on a white wall. Besides, Deleuze and Guattari indicate that “the face has a great future, but only if it is destroyed, dismantled” (ATP, 171). In order to dismantle the face, we designate what faciality is.

It is time to remove the face. It seems, pop philosophy firstly skins the physiognomy from the face, it does not mention physiognomy, though. We want to emphasize the distinct opposition between physiognomy’s discourse and Deleuze and Guattari’s thoughts on the face. According to Chinese physiognomists, “person’s personality can be read from the signs on his face.”<sup>39</sup> Moreover, “everyone is built differently.”<sup>40</sup> According to physiognomy, a face simply indicates an “individual”. However, Deleuze and Guattari point out that “faces are not basically individual; they define zones of frequency or probability, delimit a field that neutralizes in advance any expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations” (ATP, 168).

Pop philosophy also indicates that “the inhuman in human beings: that is what the face is from the start” (ATP, 170). Although, “the ancient Chinese

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<sup>38</sup> Ishmael is not the focus, he is not in the forefront “in/on” pop philosophy. Deleuze takes Ishmael and Queequeg “as a married couple”, “protective big brothers” in terms of “line of alliance or proximity” (see ECC, 78, 80-82) whereas we take Ishmael, who is against the carpenter, all alone a deep admirer into consideration.

<sup>39</sup> Timothy T. Mar, *Face Reading: The Chinese Art of Physiognomy* (New York: New American Library Inc., 1975), 7.

<sup>40</sup> Robert L. Whiteside, *Face Language* (New York: Pocket Books, 1975), 9.

physiognomists classified thirty-nine different human eye shapes as relating to a specific animal”<sup>41</sup>, which can be considered as a slight trace of inhumanity, physiognomists are sure enough of the fact that they are reading human face at the end. It seems in order to see the face in a Deleuzian sense, we need to throw the physiognomy’s “knowledge” into waste bin.

Physiognomy does not only read *a* face; but also creates *the* face. In addition, “the face is, what gives the signifier substance: it is what fuels interpretation, and it is what changes, changes traits, when interpretation reimparts signifier to its substance. Look, his expression changed. The signifier is always facialized” (ATP, 115). In short, physiognomy can be considered in terms of faciality. Whenever we try to read a face, not only the subject; but also the reader is “facialized”.

On the other hand, “the first principle of face reading, then, is an understanding of balance and proportion. A nose should be neither too large nor too small when compared to the other features of the face. If it is not in good proportion to other facial features, it is considered in that light”.<sup>42</sup>

The skinny and bony nose is a sign the individual lacks the power of concentration. If the nose is too high in proportion to the face as a whole, the person is likely to be proud, haughty, and difficult to get along with. Such a person, in authority, invariably has problems with subordinates. This individual is lonely and is only on tolerable terms with his spouse.<sup>43</sup>

In other words, you will probably “lack” from the beginning, if you have a “skinny and bonny” nose. We face physiognomy’s fascism. It is obvious that the shape of the nose is “significant” for face reading. However, we think that the matter seems not “lack of proportion”; but to have a nose on the face in terms of faciality.

We need to become anti-physiognomists. Lewis Carroll’s Humpty Dumpty who is the most famous anti-physiognomists ever for us, is such a worthy of note in this context. Humpty Dumpty complains about human face which is too ordinary:

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<sup>41</sup> Mar, op. cit., 50.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 10-11.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 59-60.

“your face is the same as everybody has –the two eyes, so—” (marking their places in the air with his thumb) `a nose in the middle, mouth under. It’s always the same. Now if you had the two eyes on the same side of the nose, for instance— or the mouth at the top—that would be *some* help”<sup>44</sup> Doubtless, a man who has two eyes on the same side of the nose will probably stamps as out of proportion in terms of physiognomy.

According to Deleuze, “Humpty Dumpty (whose waist and neck, tie and belt, are indiscernible) lacks common sense as much as he lacks differentiated organs; he is uniquely made of shifting and `disconcerting` singularities” (LS, 80). Alice said to Humpty Dumpty “the face is what one goes by, generally”<sup>45</sup> and her saying simply implies the assertion of physiognomy: “Wherever you go in the world, the average person accepts the face as primary evidence of identity.”<sup>46</sup> Although Alice is a child who is able to take a journey to the surface, she sometimes thinks as an average person. In other words, she also makes mistakes. The point is, Deleuze rejects “the average person” who is likely to be signified. In brief, unlike Hamlet: to think (become) or not to think (become) like Humpty Dumpty, that is the question.

It is time to recapitulate how to remove the face. Pop philosophy opposes physiognomy, which shows us how to read faces of individuals. “A book of concepts” knows what the face is. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari disregard taking the face as an indicator of identity. Face is the last thing that belongs to us. It is not only “inhuman” but also “if human beings have a destiny, it is rather to escape the face, to dismantle the face and facializations” (ATP, 171). The thing that we have to escape cannot possibly imply us. In this sense, personality, which is written on each face according to physiognomy, only seems a “signifying subjectivity” (ATP, 171).

Deleuze and Guattari think that “faces have to be made, not all societies make faces, but some need to” (N, 26). The point is, we do not only “make faces” but physiognomy teaches us how to read it in order not to forget what faciality is, as

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<sup>44</sup> Lewis Carroll, *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Through the Looking-Glass and The Hunting of the Snark* (New York: The Modern Library, 192-), 255.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., 254.

<sup>46</sup> Mar, op.cit., 3.

well. Physiognomy shows us how to “enter and enjoy the world of Individuals!”<sup>47</sup> If the face is inhuman, there is no doubt that deception of individuality will be excusable.

## 2.1. The Unmasked Metaphor:

It is important to note that Deleuze owes a lot to literature. “Minor literature” lives in Kafka. The “surface” wins in Carroll and Moby Dick becomes a “white wall” (See ECC and N, 142-143). Literal references play a crucial role for Deleuze. For the sake of his concepts’ acceptability, Deleuze not only uses these writers as a reference but also recreates literature. As far as we are concerned, what Deleuze does, is only an interpretation especially with regard to his literal references.

According to Mattison, “the entire work” of Deleuze and Guattari’s *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature* “is a creation of a new Kafka”.<sup>48</sup> To put it differently, when they create “minor” Kafka from Kafka, it is no more Kafka. Precisely, Deleuze and Guattari’s book on Kafka is not an exception on this issue. In order to be more concrete, we should take Carroll’s Alice into consideration.

What do we know about Alice? Everybody knows Alice. Carroll’s tales on Alice are famous. Carroll gives Deleuze an opportunity in order to built his *Logic of Sense* and Deleuze appreciates Carroll in that “on these surfaces, nonetheless, the entire logic of sense is located” (LS, 93). The fact is, Deleuze’s *Logic of Sense* only reads Alice differently.

We think, interpretation cannot only be taken as “[a disease] of the earth or the skin, in other words, humankind’s fundamental neurosis” (ATP, 114). Although Deleuze is against interpretation, he usually makes interpretation, especially when he refers to literature. In other words, Deleuze is weak to persuade us. Therefore, especially his readings on literature cannot be considered as an example of anti-interpretation. At this point, it is also crucial to remember how we are more devoted

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<sup>47</sup> Whiteside, op.cit., 222.

<sup>48</sup> Andrew Mattison, “The Necessity of Metaphor in Deleuze and Guattari’s *Kafka*” in <http://projects.vassar.edu/~lucetia/Mattison.html> (accessed December 6, 2003).

to find out Deleuzian vein in *Moby Dick* than Deleuze is. Although it seems anything can become Deleuzian as well as non Deleuzian, one must never keep asking whether Melville's *Moby Dick* becomes Deleuzian or not because Deleuze or we -in a different way- say so.

In our opinion, Deleuze has a grotesque sense of humour. We take Meyerhold's saying into consideration:

grotesque usually implies something hideous and strange, a humorous work which with no apparent logic combines the most dissimilar elements by ignoring their details and relying on its own originality, borrowing from every source anything which satisfies its joie de vivre and its capricious, mocking attitude to life.<sup>49</sup>

The question is how does Deleuze become grotesque? So to speak, to praise *a dog with shoes*: "Slepian gets the idea of using shoes to solve this problem, the artifice of the shoes" (ATP, 258)<sup>50</sup>, to offer "schizophrenic out for a walk" (AO, 2), cut out a becoming from masochism, to speak of BwO or how "the BwO howls: They made me an organism! They've wrongfully folded me! They've stolen my body!" (ATP, 159). Therefore, it is not surprising to say that Deleuze and in a way Guattari become grotesque. Especially in terms of their references to literature, they oddly exaggerate resemblances and neglect the differences. Thus, they are not willing to see the fact that Carroll becomes Deleuzian in *The Logic of Sense* just like Kafka in *Toward a Minor Literature*. In other words, Deleuze makes each author whom he cited Deleuzian. When Richard III appears on a thousand plateaus, we are aware of the fact that he is no more "pure" Shakespeare. At the end, each reference on literature can be considered as an instance of pure becoming. In our opinion, only Rimbaud can be taken as an exception on this issue. Since "I is an *other*"<sup>51</sup>, there is no need to exaggerate!

In this section, we designate faciality with the help of literature. In other

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<sup>49</sup> Cited in John Rudlin, *Commedia Dell'Arte: An Actor's Handbook* (London: Routledge, 1994), 172.

<sup>50</sup> See also Massumi's emphasis on "a dog with shoes" in Massumi, op.cit., 1992, 93-94.

<sup>51</sup> Rimbaud to Georges Izambard, "Letter of May 13, 1871" in Arthur Rimbaud, *Complete Works*, trans. Paul Schmidt (New York: HarperPerennial, 2000), 113.

words, we write on literal faciality. As far as we are concerned, literal references of Deleuze is the best way to reveal the monstrosity of the face. According to Deleuze “in the act of writing there’s an attempt to make life something more than personal, to free life from what imprisons it (...) Creating isn’t communicating but resisting” (N, 143). Therefore, in order to resist faciality, we not only need Deleuze’s philosophy, but we also need Deleuzian literature.

On the other hand, if we take Melville’s *Moby Dick* as an exception, Deleuze hardly follows the trace of faciality in the works of his most cited authors. At first, trying to read faciality in literature seems problematic, because Deleuze mostly cited these authors to give examples with regard to “bring bodies to the surface” (LS, 24). In our opinion, it is better to consider Sacher-Masoch’s “the hammer or the anvil” (M, 271) or again “Alice’s telescope-body” (LS, 92) as an example on this issue.

However, the face is rather forgotten. Fundamentally, we draw a different path in the case of literal faciality. We think, Deleuze has already said everything on his Kafka, Proust, Masoch, Carroll, and so on. Therefore, we choose different authors. Additionally, we are not interested in taking the face as a whole in this section, because we want to analyse each part of the face in detail. For instance, we call Gogol’s Kovaliov’s nose, Rostand’s Cyrano’s nose and Collodi’s Pinocchio’s nose as the three-noses-tree. In other words, the face which appears on this thesis has three noses: what a monster! On the other hand, Wilde’s Dorian Gray -the eye- appears as a specter of physiognomy. Essentially, Dorian Gray also implies the calling of dermocosmetics which we are going to analyse in the next chapter.

We think, theater can be another main reference on faciality. Artaud’s “theater of cruelty” and *Commedia dell’Arte* are given as examples on this issue. As we all know, masks firstly appear on actors’ face. Deleuze and Guattari think “the mask does not hide the face, it *is* the face” (ATP, 115). In other words, the face does not need any mask since the mask is the face. The fact is, the mask can be considered as the unique metaphor of the face.

In terms of faciality, we do not only speak of Artaud’s “theater of cruelty”, but also his drawings. It seems that Artaud is the most crucial common reference between pop philosophy and this study in order to designate the monstrosity of the face.

Not only the face itself; but also the metaphors on face may deserve a special interest. However, we do not want to study associations of the face. We rather choose to equate face with metaphor. This time, the metaphor is completely unmasked. Before we write on the unmasked metaphor, it is better to mention what Deleuze thinks about metaphors at once. According to Descamps, although Deleuze emphatically rejects metaphors and analogies; his thoughts might be seen as full of metaphors because some of Deleuze's concepts link with contemporary science such as fuzzy sets and black holes (N, 29). However, Deleuze indicates the difference between two scientific notions as an answer:

There are two sorts of scientific notions, even though they get mixed up in particular cases. There are notions that are exact in nature, quantitative, defined by equations, and whose very meaning lies in their exactness: a philosopher or writer can use these only metaphorically, and that's quite wrong, because they belong to exact science. But there are also essentially inexact yet completely rigorous notions that scientists can't do without, which belong equally to scientists, philosophers and artists. (...) someone's own work can lead to unexpected convergences, and new implications, new directions, in other people's work. And no special status should be assigned to any particular field, whether philosophy, science, art, or literature (N, 29-30).

In terms of faciality, we should keep Deleuze's "inexact notions" in mind. However, what if the face itself is a metaphor? The suspense. What if the face has never existed? The paranoia. What if someday people see themselves as without having faces in the mirror and what if it has nothing to do with Deleuzian "faceless" (ATP, 187)? A new kind of Dracula and this might cause trouble: Is it a sort of self-destruction? It is time to call Deleuzian Kafka: "There is something of Dracula in Kafka, a Dracula who works by letters, letters that are like bats. They prowl by night and, by day, are locked in his coffin-desk" (K, 29-30). At this point, one might consider how pleasant is to say "thought is like the Vampire; it has no image (..)" (ATP, 377). Dracula –the new kind- stares at all Deleuzian vampires and maybe it smiles.

Why do not we do something in order to destroy the face in a Deleuzian

sense? As far as we are concerned, the reason of this incompetence is not because it is difficult to dismantle the face; but human beings are not ready to get rid of it. The truth is we may not use metaphors on face. As we see in Deleuze, it is easy to get rid of them: “[mask] is the face” (ATP, 115). However, we still need a face as an unmasked metaphor in order to read its monstrosity. In brief, the face itself is the only metaphor of faciality in this study.

### 2.1.1. The Three - Noses -Tree:

Everything begins when Artaud discovers “the human face / is an empty force, a / field of death.”<sup>52</sup> Artaud’s portraits are scary and dark. They are speechless. In Artaud’s words, “for thousands and thousands of years indeed, / the human face has talked / and breathed / and one is under the impression still/ that it has not begun to/ say what it is and what it knows.”<sup>53</sup>

In our opinion, the portrait of Collete Allendy, which is one of Artaud’s portraits, is the finest visionary of the mute face. Artaud draws thick lips of his Collete and then he erases the mouth. He has already known the fact that the “empty force” does not make any attempt to speak with human beings. We think that Collete is the first unique example of a face which abandons its mouth.

In *Le Visage Humain*, Artaud also states that “have I avoided above all / forgetting the nose the mouth / the eyes the ears (...)”.<sup>54</sup> The point is, he cannot possibly forget a thing on the face. Besides, he always “strived / to make the / face that spoke to [him]”<sup>55</sup>. Precisely, he is not able to “forget” the mouth that has already forgotten not Collete but Artaud. On this issue, a mute face of the woman can only show us a (not) vanished mouth.

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<sup>52</sup> Antonin Artaud, “Le Visage Humain...” June 1947, Text for the catalogue of the exhibition *Portraits et dessins par Antonin Artaud*, cited in *Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper*, ed. Margit Rowell, trans. Roger McKeon (New York: Museum Of Modern Art, 1996), 94.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 95.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.



On the other hand, we are not interested in learning who Artaud's Collete is. In other words, we totally want to become ignorant of Collete. After we read *Le Visage Humain*, we are certain that Collete will not say anything to us. This is not surprising since "not a single painter in / the history of art (...) / has succeeded in making it talk, / this face of man".<sup>56</sup>

The time when we first saw Collete's portrait was rather an experience of investigating Artaud himself as an artist. We learn what "le visage humain" is in the eyes of Artaud not Collete. As long as Collete's eyes are willing to serve Artaud's purpose, he does not need to erase her eyes.

Additionally, Collete's mute face does not indicate Collete herself. The portrait shows us not her face but the face as an "empty force". It is time to remember Deleuze and Guattari's words: "faces are not basically individual" (ATP, 168). Besides, we are not able to speak of *our* faces; but only *the faces*.

Deleuze told us when the mouth opens, the surface speaks (LS, 23). However, Artaud does not want to let the face speak, because the face is not willing to introduce itself to us. What a rude behavior, one might say. At least, Artaud finds an interesting way in order to communicate with the face. Artaud's portrait of Alain Gheerbrant is crucial on this issue. Artaud's method is easy: just punch on the face's nose. At least, when we look at the portrait, we feel as if Artaud punched Alain hard on his nose. Our opinion seems weird, but we only remind the fact that we narrate what we see in Artaud's portrait. As far as we are concerned, Artaud's visuality not only in theater but also in his portraits is seeking cruelty. It almost sounds desperate. The cruelty begins when he asks what the face is to the face. Artaud does not understand, so he furiously hits.

Since the face is tightlipped, the nose deserves a special interest. In this section, we analyse three famous noses in literature: 1) Gogol's Kovaliov's nose; 2) Rostand's Cyrano's nose; 3) Collodi's Pinocchio's nose. We call these noses as the three-noses-tree. As a matter of fact, this concept will be an enigma unless we write how we created it:

To begin with, the three-noses-tree implies the crucial opposition between

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 95.

“arborescent schema / the tree” and “rhizome”. In other words, Deleuzian opposition to the concept of the tree is the unique source of inspiration to us. Deleuze and Guattari once said “Many people have a tree growing in their heads” (ATP, 15). In our opinion, the tree is growing not only in their heads; but also on their faces.

Secondly, we search the examples of “willing to be rooted” noses for our nose-tree. Literature is once again our main source on this issue. We choose the nose which makes us obey: Kovaliov; the nose which is the reason of our tirade: Cyrano and finally the nose which tortures us: Pinocchio. As a result, our nose-tree is named the three-noses-tree. The reason of our choice is simple: all of these noses appear as a master in these books. Deleuze said at once “ it is faces that choose their subjects” (ATP, 180). In our opinion, the three-noses-tree implies a break because these noses are the ones who choose their subjects (faces). To put it differently, faces become noses’ subjects.

It is also important to note that “Arborescent systems are hierarchical systems with centers of signifiante and subjectification, central automata like organized memories (...) The arborescent system preexists the individual, who is integrated into it at an allotted place (signifiante and subjectification)”(ATP, 16). We think, the three-noses-tree belongs to the highest hierarchy on the face, so their places are in the arborescent schema.

What has the face done to us? It definitely deceives supposed individuals. Additionally, “trees, or rather arborescent processes, being temporary limits that block rhizomes and their transformations for a while” (N, 146). We think that we are blocked by the nose before by the face and the three-noses-tree is actually created in order to emphasize our view. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari are right to be “tired of trees. We should stop believing in trees, roots, and radicles. They’ve made us suffer too much” (ATP, 15). The fact is that the nose follows the trace of the tree. Although it sounds like a prediction, one of the causes of rhizome’s death will be the nose itself.

When we think of these roots, the things that are deeply rooted in/on us, tree-heads and tree-faces, especially the three-noses-tree, one might consider there is no way out, in other words Deleuze’s “line of flight” is unreachable. However, Deleuze believes “each freed faciality trait forms a rhizome with a freed trait of landscapity,

picturality, or musicality” (ATP, 190). Besides, Deleuze gives an example of the tree which becomes a rhizome. For instance, “Buddha’s tree itself becomes a rhizome” (ATP, 20). In short, there is still hope.

However, the three-noses-tree does not only imply our rooted reasoning on the face, but it also implies the process of dismantling the face. Our approach on dismantling the face is not based on Deleuzian assertion that human beings “finally elude the organization of the face” (ATP, 171) but, the nose itself eludes the organization of this surface. In other words, if one day we are able to free ourselves from faciality, it is not because our schizophrenic surface are able to wake up in a Deleuzian sense but because of the nose’s selfishness.

We think that the nose itself is such a worthy of note, because it is basically self-seeker by nature. The nose is what is despotic on the face. In this case, we take Gogol’s most ironic story, *The Nose* as an example. Gogol’s story is about major Kovaliov’s nose who sees itself as “an independent individual”<sup>57</sup>. It is crucial to note that Gogol does not choose an eye or a mouth but a nose:

Kovaliov the collegiate assessor woke up early next morning (...) stretched and asked for a little mirror that was standing on the table. He wanted to look at a pimple which had appeared on his nose the previous evening, but to his great astonishment there was a completely flat space where his nose should have been. Frightened, Kovaliov asked for some water and a towel to rub his eyes; there really was no nose.<sup>58</sup>

Kovaliov’s situation is more terrific than Gregor Samsa’s metamorphosis. To be(come) an insect probably will not need an explanation. On the other hand, if we consider Kovaliov’s loss: to be(come) a man without a nose definitely deserves a logical explanation. “How can I manage without such a conspicuous part of my person? (...) I can’t possibly show myself now”<sup>59</sup>. Kovaliov is right. The disappearance of the nose is unacceptable. It is also worth noting that the nose

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<sup>57</sup> Nikolai V. Gogol, “The Nose” in *The Complete Tales of Nikolai Gogol*, vol.2, ed. Leonard J. Kent (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 223.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 219.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 227.

implies Kovaliov himself. In other words, the nose is what Kovaliov is: “my own nose; that is almost the same as about myself.”<sup>60</sup>

Despite the fact that Gogol’s story is such a unique absurdity, the nose’s possession of Kovaliov cannot be called as absurd. The situation is rather tragic. Since we are unable to see a face in the case of Kovaliov, the nose has right to make “his” own way and be(come) “a civil councillor”<sup>61</sup>. It is time to take physiognomy into consideration once again: “the nose (...) has special importance in face reading since it serves as a fulcrum in balancing the face”<sup>62</sup>. In our opinion, Kovaliov’s nose is rather impudent, therefore it is not ashamed of destroying such a face balance. It is not wrong to say that the “individual” nose is the first one “who” is willing to “dismantle” the face. At last, Deleuzian wishes come true. On this issue, we take Kovaliov’s nose as the pioneer of Deleuze and Guattari .

What if each part of the face chooses to be(come) as independent as Kovaliov’s nose? Who has the power to cease this anarchy? Humanity without faces, flat surfaces but not Deleuzian “faceless”: Not yet born or shall we say “created” instead of born? Almost flat surfaces: Kovaliov: a man without a nose; Collete: a woman without a mouth. Which one is the worse: to be(come) a Frankenstein or a man without a face (not “faceless”)?

A man without a face will be a brand new “genre” or not. It is time to remember Kovaliov’s situation. He is nearly lost without his nose. He would not probably feel himself as a human without his face. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari do not write on new genres (see e.g. *Doctor Moreau* in ATP, 170), they are not keen on Frankenstein either. Nevertheless, speaking of “a genetic axis or the integration of part-objects” is not something what Deleuze and Guattari do (ATP, 171).

An approach based on part-objects is even worse; it is the approach of a demented experimenter who flays, slices and anatomizes everything in sight, and then proceeds to sew things randomly back together again.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 222.

<sup>62</sup> Mar, op. cit., 57.

You can make any list of part-objects you want: hand, breast, mouth, eyes... It is still Frankenstein (ATP, 171).

It is crucial to designate the difference between the approach based on part-objects and our study. Although we start from each part of the face before taking the face as a whole into consideration, we do not sew the nose, the mouth, the eyes “randomly back together”. Besides, we are not even the tailor of Frankenstein’s face. What we intend to do is, rather slaughter the parts of the face from the sur(face).

It is of great importance that the nose immediately steals “individuality” from the face. As we have mentioned above, the case of Kovaliov can be given as an example on this issue. However, in terms of individual, there is a slight difference between Deleuze and Guattari, and the three-noses-tree. The point is, contrary to Deleuze and Guattari who assert that the face is not the sign of the individual, “individual” becomes a spot which is called the nose rather than a hole or a whole face in the three-noses-tree.

In our opinion, when Deleuze and Guattari speak of their white wall / black hole system, what is missing is the nose. It is easy to assume the eyes or the mouth as a “black” hole and name the surface as a “white” wall. Nonetheless, “two black holes, four black holes,  $n$  black holes distribute themselves like eyes” (ATP, 182). In short, the eye is the one which is crucial for Deleuze and Guattari’s black hole concept.

Taking a look at Deleuze and Guattari’s figures of faciality (See the figures in ATP, 183, 185) also helps us to emphasize our view on the absence of the nose in terms of faciality. For example, we cannot see the nose in the “four-eye machine” and “simple-machine”. Even, in terms of a “face-machine with multiple bordering effects”, what we see at the center of the face is, not the nose, as the nose becomes two smooth lines, a specimen. “Celebratory Machine” and “Coupled Machine” are also worthy of note in this context (see ATP, 185), since Deleuze and Guattari only draw the nose, the forehead and the chin in order to separate the face from the line.

As a result, the nose becomes only a promontory and we see a head not the face on these examples<sup>63</sup>.

If our assertion on the three-noses-tree implies the figure of the despot-nose on the face, it is better to outline Deleuze and Guattari's "despot" first. Although we are inspired by Deleuze and Guattari's despot who is as "flow" (ATP, 19), there are some differences between their despot and the three-noses-tree despot. The distinctions can thus be presented as follows:

First of all, neither Deleuze nor Guattari grows the figure of despot, which is called the nose, is like a tree on the face. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari's "despot" is not only related with their "apparatus of capture" (ATP, 444); but also the face of the despot shaped within the "the State and its forms" (ATP, 448-460). Deleuze and Guattari's views on "despotic regime" or "the despot" are nourished by the history. For example, they speak of the face of "the despot-god" or "the priest [who] administers the face of the god" (ATP, 115) in order to show "surveillance by the face, as Strindberg said" (ATP, 115). Christ-face is another historic face in this context:

If it is possible to assign the faciality machine a date – the year zero of Christ and the historical development of the White Man— it is because that is when the mixture ceased to be a splicing or an intertwining, becoming a total interpenetration in which each element suffuses the other like drops of red-black wine in white water (ATP, 182).

It is also important to note that not only in terms of faciality but also in terms of their "state apparatus" or "nomodology", Deleuze and Guattari's views take shape within their approach to history. In brief, history is more than simply a frame for Deleuze and Guattari. At this point, we should remember the Deleuzian "war machine" and the contribution of Ibn Khaldūn (See ATP, 366) as an example on this issue. On the other hand, Deleuzian philosophy encourages us to be involved in history without being historian. Besides, according to Deleuze and Guattari specific concepts they create such as "becomings" are much more important than history"

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<sup>63</sup> See also "Deleuze and Guattari's opposition of frontal and profile faces" in Roland Bogue, *Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 95-99.

(N, 30). In sum, they do not believe to follow the historians in order to look through the history. In a broad sense, Deleuze provokes us to think differently by asking “why shouldn’t I invent some way (...) of talking about something, without someone having to ask whether I’m qualified to talk like that?” (N, 12).

In our opinion, only for the sake of comparison, Deleuze and Guattari’s method to re-read history can be compared to the function of the tweezers. What they do is just pulling out their history from the History. Deleuze and Guattari are picking up everything which is necessary, especially unknown, not well known or wrongfully known. In addition, “dismissed” pieces of history also become crucial. For instance, according to pop philosophy, “history has always dismissed the nomads” (ATP, 394). On the other hand, in terms of faciality, Deleuze and Guattari start from pulling out the “Christ-face” with their tweezers. “Year zero: faciality” (see ATP, 167-191) is the clue. In other words, according to Deleuze and Guattari the Christ indicates us when faciality began. If we recapitulate what their priority is on history, we will say that their “pieces” of history is more important than the History as a whole.

According to Didier Eribon, Deleuze and Guattari focus on “geography rather than history” (See N, 32-34). Additionally, Deleuze says “cartography can only map out pathways and moves, along with their coefficients of probability and danger. That’s what we call ‘schizoanalysis,’ this analysis of lines, spaces, becomings. It seems at once very similar, and very different, to problems of history” (N, 34). It is of great importance that Deleuze and Guattari’s assertions on creating such a geography or cartography in pop philosophy can be considered as a result of their approach to history. In the end, “it is not a matter of bringing all sorts of things together under one concept [such as history] but rather relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations” (N, 31). Thus, it can be said that Deleuze and Guattari are able to construct something different with their philosophy in the gaps of history. They know how to mention history without writing something especially on history. The Deleuzian history imply a kind of “mutation” of history. It is better to keep Deleuze and Guattari’s sayings in mind on this issue: “History may try to break its ties to memory” (ATP, 296). “History is made only by those who oppose history (not by those who insert themselves into it, or even reshape it)” (ATP, 295). In brief, inscribe the map of the tribes instead of reading the tribes which are in historical

periods, regions, and so on. Put it differently, “make a map instead of tracing” (ATP, 24).

As we have mentioned above, there is a difference between Deleuze and Guattari’s not so individual (because of his face) despot and our too much individual (because of the three-noses-tree) despot in terms of their publicity. Besides, there is also a connection between these despots: Deleuze and Guattari say, “the despot acts as a river, not as a fountainhead, which is still a point, a tree-point or root: he flows with the current rather than sitting under a tree” (ATP, 19-20). The point is, the three-noses-tree also acts as a river. We speak of a nose which can run and also runaway like Kovaliov’s nose does. It may whether “bleed” or “breathe” in the end. The result of this act definitely depends on how the nose acts. However, it is crucial to designate the difference: The three-noses-tree or the despot-nose as a “flow” is more like “a tree-point or root” on the face. Therefore, we speak of a flow of the tree which indicates a distinct opposition to Deleuze and Guattari on this issue.

It is better to consider Deleuzian “inhuman face” once again. What do we remember about that face? The face as a whole never changes, in Humpty Dumpty’s words, “it’s always the same”<sup>64</sup>. On the other hand, what changes is the nose itself, that is why it is able to grow like a tree on the surface. The nose is not only despot; but it is also a chameleon. However, it is crucial to designate its difference from the chameleon that we have known up to now. The nose does not change its colour of skin, it changes its shape, instead in order to match with the other parts of the human face. In short, the nose becomes the figure of an individual which opposes “non-individual” characteristic of the “inhuman face”. In addition, the nose does not always have to match with other parts of the face. We may take Cyrano’s nose into consideration as an example on this issue. Cyrano’s big nose is well known because it does not match with the sur(face) from the beginning.

If Kovaliov’s nose is the first root of the three-noses-tree, Cyrano’s nose will be the second. But in terms of the nose’s despotic nature, there is a slight difference between these two rooted noses. Although Kovaliov’s nose leaves Kovaliov in order

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<sup>64</sup> Carroll, op.cit., 255.



to be(come) an independent individual, Cyrano's nose does not even think of leaving his face.

On the other hand, although it seems contrary to Deleuze and Guattari, what if the nose –not “the face”- keeps us under “surveillance”? (cf. ATP, 115). As a matter of fact, Cyrano's nose can be considered as a response to this question.

In particular, Cyrano's nose is more famous than Cyrano himself. Cyrano says “Me, with this nose of mine that marches on/ Before me by a quarter of an hour!”<sup>65</sup> In other words, whenever this brave man shows himself in the public, his nose is the one who enters the room first! Cyrano might be totally a stranger to people who do not know him. Besides, his nose is almost known by everyone. It is like a legend, that is why you do not have to see it to believe it. In brief, if anyone has not heard even a word on Cyrano, will probably have heard that nose.

Cyrano might be the “master of the sword”, but the nose is the master of this man. Is it not tragic? Not even his death; but his nose that is actually tragic for Cyrano. On the other hand, this big nose's dominance on Cyrano deserves to be noticed. Thus the specific characteristics of Cyrano's nose can be enumerated as follows:

1) Cyrano's Nose the Great: The nose becomes Cyrano. In other words, contrary to Deleuzian “a dog with shoes”, we speak of a nose with shoes. Once again it is crucial to designate the difference between Kovaliov's nose and Cyrano's nose. At this point, we should remember Kovaliov's situation: Kovaliov's nose is not only with shoes but also with a uniform because he is a civil councillor. However, Cyrano's nose is content with its place. Another way of saying this is that if someone has to leave, it should be Cyrano himself. In other words, the king does not think to leave the place where he reigns.

On the other hand, neither Cyrano's poetic words, nor his skill on sword is of a great importance in the eyes of the public. After all, his words only cause a confusion for “fools” and trouble for his enemies, his rhythm sounds amazing, but his nose... that is what is worthy of note. Therefore, it can be said that Cyrano's nose will easily be the figure of the despot and call itself/himself Cyrano's Nose the Great.

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<sup>65</sup> Edmond Rostand, *Cyrano de Bergerac*, trans. B. Hooker (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 40.

2) Cyrano's Nose Alludes to Cyrano: The nose is cruel. Cyrano is aware of this fact. If Cyrano's nose does not speak like Kovaliov's nose, there is a reason. The truth is, the big nose speaks even it is in big silence. It does not speak directly, because Cyrano's nose is the one that alludes to Cyrano. It is time to remind Artaud's "empty force", Cyrano's nose on the contrary, always implies us what it is. In order to be more concrete, we take a limited example a scene from act one, Cyrano's reply to the Meddler on his nose:

Cyrano

My nose!.. You pug, you knob, you button-head,  
Know that I glory in this nose of mine,  
For a great nose indicates a great man—  
Genial, courteous, intellectual,  
Virile, courageous –as I am- and such  
As you –poor wretch-will never dare to be  
Even in imagination. For that face—  
That blank, inglorious concavity  
Which my right hand finds—<sup>66</sup>

We thus come to this question: who do you think is speaking, Cyrano or his nose? Contrary to common beliefs, the nose is the one that speaks. Cyrano does not believe what he says, "a great nose indicates a great man". He rather tries to hide his deep misery when he retorts. Since his nose alludes to Cyrano and the others what it is and teaches who the Great is, Cyrano is the one whose "laughter born out of his tears"<sup>67</sup> like Henry Miller's clown.

3) Cyrano's Nose The Grim / Cyrano the Joker: Unlike Deleuze and Guattari's "the despot-god" who "makes himself one, or several faces" (ATP, 115) we imply something different: Cyrano makes himself several noses. In the first place, we clearly see a "carefree" nose, Rostand does not say so, though. It seems, Cyrano probably does not care about its ugliness as long as he does not "see the shadow of [his] profile on the wall"<sup>68</sup>. There is no doubt, we point a strange equation between Cyrano and his nose in terms of making several noses. "Carefree" Cyrano knows, he

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 29.

<sup>67</sup> Henry Miller, *Merdivenin Dibiindeki Gülümseyiş*, trans. R. Tomris (İstanbul: De, 1967), 39.

<sup>68</sup> op.cit., 41.

cannot possibly hide his nose. That is what the fact is. In addition, as long as his nose is common knowledge, there is no need to hide. In short, with this first nose, Cyrano and his nose change their roles. Therefore, the nose is willing to obey Cyrano who does not care about its ugliness. As we clearly see, “carefree” nose implies a ruin of the nose’s dominance. In other words, everything seems to become totally upside down with that nose.

The second nose is the one that is grim. This also implies the real characteristic of Cyrano’s nose. Besides, Cyrano is a joker contrary to his grim nose. We want to emphasize the fact in rhyme: the public will not take notice of the big nose anymore, if there is a joker in the hall. In short, Cyrano tricks a play. That is how he hides his misery from the others. When Valvert makes fun of Cyrano and says: “Your nose is...rather large.”<sup>69</sup>, Cyrano starts from teasing Valvert’s shallowness:

You are too simple. Why, you might have said—  
 Oh, a great many things! Mon dieu, why waste  
 Your opportunity ? For example, thus :—  
 AGGRESSIVE : I, sir, if that nose were mine,  
 I’d have it amputated—on the spot!  
 FRIENDLY: How do you drink with such a nose?  
 You ought to have a cup made specially.  
 (...)  
 CAUTIOUS: Take care—  
 A weight like that might make you topheavy.  
 (...)  
 PEDANTIC: Does not Aristophanes  
 Mention a mythological monster called  
 Hippocampelephantocamelos?  
 Surely we have here the original!  
 FAMILIAR: Well, old torchlight! Hang your hat  
 Over the chandelier—it hurts my eyes.  
 (...)  
 DRAMATIC: When it bleeds—  
 The Red Sea! ENTERPRISING: What a sign  
 For some perfumer.  
 (...)  
 SIMPLE: When do they unveil the monument?  
 (...)  
 RUSTIC: Hey? What? Call that a nose? (...)

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 30.

That there' s a blue cucumber! MILITARY:  
Point aganist cavalry! PRACTICAL: Why not  
A lottery with this for the grand prize?  
(...)<sup>70</sup>

The third nose indicates, in Cyrano's words, "[his] poor big devil" which "inhales April."<sup>71</sup> This time, pity is the only thing that Cyrano feels about his nose. Cyrano is weak. On the other hand, "poor devil" is not so merciful. The nose's ugliness becomes Cyrano's ugliness. In other words, because of the devil's force, Cyrano cannot possibly ignore his nose. After all, it is not easy to admit that the nose is only a part of the face.

One might ask, even it is carefree, grim or a "poor devil", does it not point the same nose in the end? Of course, Cyrano does not change his nose's shape in order to make several noses. On the other hand, whether "rustic", "familiar" or "pedantic", comments on that nose indicate one thing: Cyrano's nose is big. Do several noses indicate a kind of illusion? The answer is in one of Cyrano's lines: "With this protuberance! Oh I have no more illusions!"<sup>72</sup> With words, Cyrano might fragment his nose and makes several of it; but the big nose's visuality shows only one "monument" instead of several noses. To sum up, Cyrano's nose implies not only a break in the name of the despot; but also it implies a tree which "breathes", "hurts", "runs" as a "flow". Therefore, we believe the three-noses-tree might cover the face as a mask in a minute especially in case of Cyrano. There is no need to dismantle the face then. The face cannot be seen because of the three-nose-tree. In short, potential threat is the nose which grows like a tree as "a flow" on a face.

In terms of the three-noses-tree last but not least, we take Pinocchio's nose into consideration. As a matter of fact, whether Pinochhio will or not, his nose lead us to think on Deleuzian "coldness and cruelty". As we have mentioned above,

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 30-31.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 41.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 41.

Pinocchio's nose is cruel, so to speak, a torturer. The three-noses-tree grows, in Artaud's words, in "a field of death"<sup>73</sup>.

At this point, we should remember that Deleuze's "coldness and cruelty" is mainly an assertion of masochism, "the art of Sacher-Masoch" (M, 33). Deleuze starts with designating the difference between sadism and masochism with the help of Sade and Sacher-Masoch. Contrary to common beliefs, Deleuze considers that neither sadism nor masochism assumes a "mysterious link between pain and pleasure". He believes both of them take "pain" as "an *effect* only" (M, 120-121).

Above all, according to Deleuze both Sade and Sacher-Masoch should be read without having any prejudice, because "they discovered new forms of expressions, new ways of thinking and feeling and an entirely original language" (M, 16). In short, Deleuze suggests reading Sade especially Sacher-Masoch differently in his "coldness and cruelty".

On the other hand, masochism is so a worthy of note in terms of not only Deleuzian "becoming-animal"; but also BwO: "the masochist uses suffering as a way of constituting a body without organs and bringing forth a plane of consistency of desire" (ATP, 155). Additionally, "something entirely different is going on: a becoming animal essential to masochism. It is a question of forces" (ATP, 155). As can be seen, becoming is masochism or masochism is becoming. As far as we are concerned, masochism is an alternative of "thought-in-becoming"<sup>74</sup> since it stands as if the only way of *showing* "becoming-animal". Above all, according to Deleuze, masochist does not "imitate a horse"; but he becomes a horse (ATP, 155).

Thus, Deleuze seems to study on masochism in order to see whether BwO and "becoming-animal" work in practice or not. Therefore, we keep Deleuze's reasons of reading masochism in mind. In other words, we try to understand what Deleuze sees in masochism rather than how Sacher-Masoch writes on masochism. It is of great importance that body is the focal point in masochism. Deleuze starts with inscribing "the masochist body" (see ATP, 150) in this context. Additionally, "the masochist is looking for a type of BwO that only pain can fill, or travel over due to

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<sup>73</sup> Artaud, op.cit., 1996, 94.

<sup>74</sup> Massumi, op.cit, 100.

the very conditions under which that BwO was constituted” (ATP, 152).

The question is, how we define the “coldness and cruelty” of a face since the face is almost forgotten by masochism or “bodily thought becoming”<sup>75</sup>. As a matter of fact, we make use of masochism in order to reveal Pinocchio’s nose’s cruelty. Another way of saying this is that in order to inscribe the cruelty of becoming-individual, we make use of “becoming-animal”. Doubtless, we see the danger, masochism does not seem suitable for Pinocchio. But still, both Sacher-Masoch and Deleuze are our main sources of what a torturer implies. Pop philosophy does not focus on details (parts of the face) like we try to do in terms of writing faciality.

It is crucial to designate the difference once again: “becoming-animal” appears in/on masochism. On the contrary, the three-noses-tree implies becoming-individual. Besides, Pinocchio’s nose is the third root of the three-noses-tree. Because Pinocchio’s nose is a torturer by nature it is not wrong to call it, in Sacher-Masoch’s words, a “hammer” (see M, 271) on the surface/face. At this point, we should at once emphasize the fact that to take Pinocchio’s nose as a torturer does not mean that we want to make a comparison between Sacher-Masoch and Collodi. To put it differently, we do not go further to assert that the Blue Fairy is actually “Venus in Furs”. Basically, we are interested in designating the difference between “becoming-animal” and becoming-individual. Thus, in order to reveal what becoming-individual is we make use of its opposition (“becoming-animal”).

In terms of the three-noses-tree, there is a need to take masochism apart since Deleuzian masochism only implies “becoming-animal”. The question is, what do we mean by cutting masochism into pieces? Although it is related to the “becoming-animal”, Deleuze’s masochism comes in handy in terms of designating what cruelty is. Artaud says at once “everything that acts is a cruelty”<sup>76</sup>. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “cruelty has nothing to do with some ill-defined or natural violence” (AO, 145). On the other hand, we think violence is the priority in terms of the nose’s cruelty. That is, the nose’s act can be gory. Therefore, wooden nose’s cruelty is a little bit different from Deleuze’s or Artaud’s cruelty. When Pinocchio’s nose moves

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>76</sup> Artaud, op.cit, 1958, 85.

and grows, cruelty begins. At this point, we speak of something figurative: a nose with a whip. Since the nose's whip strikes the face, pain is, in Deleuze's words, "only an *effect*". In brief, a nose with a whip is at once "very similar, and very different to" masochism like Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis which "seems at once very similar, and very different, to problems of history"(N, 34). As far as we are concerned, "very similar, and very different" defines the connection –if there is a connection- between masochism and Pinocchio's nose.

Contrary to common thoughts in order to become a real boy Pinocchio should obey the nose, not the Blue Fairy. The Blue Fairy is just an image, a phantasy, help Collodi to make a "fairy tale" from the marionette's story. Nevertheless, if Pinocchio's nose had been a speaking one, which ordered Pinocchio "obey me or I will grow on your face", this would have been scary and improper. As a matter of fact, the Blue Fairy is just a camouflage. Besides, she does not even help Pinocchio when Pinocchio is in danger. For example, she came very late when Pinocchio has already been hanged on a tree by the fox and the cat<sup>77</sup>.

If the marionette tells a lie, the nose "[grows] two inches longer"<sup>78</sup> in Collodi's story. Therefore, it is important to "follow the nose". In order to follow such a nose, we make use of *Commedia dell'Arte*. Because, this "theater form" firstly teaches us what to "follow your nose" means in mask. The fact is, the mask (face) in *Commedia dell'Arte* already knows the significance of the nose. Rudlin points out how the world is seen in mask: "if the eye-holes are correctly placed for the wearer, a kind of tunnel vision is set up (...) The world ceases to have dimension and the only means of finding your way around it is to 'follow your nose'".<sup>79</sup> Pinocchio's nose is like an independent, an individual "monument" which implies who the marionette obeys. Doubtless, it is difficult for Pinocchio to obey the rules or to "follow the nose".

Collodi also made use of *Commedia dell'Arte* in *Pinocchio*. Nevertheless,

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<sup>77</sup> C. Collodi, *Pinocchio: The Story of a Marionette and Aesop's Fables*, intr. Elizabeth Morton (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1958), 63.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 73.

<sup>79</sup> Rudlin, op.cit., 40.

Pinocchio is the “wooden brother”<sup>80</sup> of Harlequin and Punchinello, who are one of the Mask<sup>81</sup> in *Commedia dell’Arte*. Thus, it can be said that Pinocchio already knows what a long nose means, since “the longer the nose of the mask, the more stupid it is”.<sup>82</sup> However, contrary to Rudlin’s point what if the nose deceives us and does not want us to find our way? In terms of *Pinocchio*, the nose does not belong to the marionette. The nose is the informer, a trace of the Blue Fairy, it acts as if it is pangs of conscience. It is definitely a torturer. Therefore, it is crucial to designate what “follow your nose” means in case of *Pinocchio*. Pinocchio’s nose does not help Pinocchio in order to reach becoming-individual. On the other hand, as we all know, human beings tell lies and sometimes because of guilty conscience they give colour to lies such as “white lies”. Strictly speaking, Pinocchio should do something inhuman in order to become a human.

More importantly, Pinocchio’s wish “to become a real boy” sounds like an anti-Deleuzian, because Deleuze implies “becoming-animal” in order to survive or reach “the line of flight”. If Deleuze’s “becoming-animal” indicates, in Massumi’s words, “bodily thought”, *Commedia dell’Arte* will deserve to be noticed since it makes a direct connection between animals and faces. Each face/Mask of *Commedia dell’Arte* equates with certain animals. “Such animal mimicry is at the source of many, if not all, of the masks of the *commedia dell’arte*”.<sup>83</sup> Although Pinocchio is a marionette not a Mask, he is also involved in animal mimicry. On the contrary, Deleuze opposes imitation since he is fond of becoming.

Pinocchio firstly imitates human in order to become a human. As far as we are concerned, he is very good at imitating. He acts as if he is a little boy. For example, he does not want to go to school, because the school is not much fun. It can be said that Pinocchio already looks like a real boy he becomes a real boy at the end of the story, though.

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<sup>80</sup> Collodi, op.cit, 39.

<sup>81</sup> “In *Commedia*, ‘Mask’ refers to character type and is inclusive of each individual mask”, Rudlin, op.cit, 35.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 40.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 39. See also Ibid., 153 for the exception, namely *Scaramuccia*.



Once again we should remember the Blue Fairy in order to reveal the monstrosity of Pinocchio's nose. Unlike Sacher-Masoch's "extreme form of contract" (M, 93), there is an oral agreement between the image (the Blue Fairy) and the real (Pinocchio). However, the Blue Fairy's rules are similar to Wanda's rules: Collodi's Blue Fairy says: "you must obey me and do everything that I ask you to do"<sup>84</sup> and Sacher-Masoch's Wanda writes: "as the slave of Mrs. von Dunajew, he will (...) undertake to satisfy all the wishes of his mistress, to obey all her orders (...)" (M, 220). Once again, Pinocchio is "very similar and very different to" masochism.

Whenever Pinocchio disobeys the rules or whenever he falls into numerous "trap for Blockheads"<sup>85</sup>, the marionette is punished. The ritual of punishments have such a priority in the story of Pinocchio. For instance, his nose grows when he tells lies. When Pinocchio goes with other children to the "Land of Blockheads" instead of school, each of them becomes a donkey. In short, "the donkey with shoes" is a punishment more than indicating "becoming-animal". The worse thing is, "the more he [Pinocchio] cried, the longer his ears grew".<sup>86</sup> Neither his nose, nor his ears has pity.

Collodi does not seem to show mercy to Pinocchio. The marionette is first stabbed and then hanged on the Big Oak by the fox and the cat. Animals are bad, tree is like gallows. It seems there is nowhere to go. What is more, Pinocchio has to become a watch dog before he becomes a boy. In other words, Collodi follows a different way in terms of "becoming". When the marionette stole the farmer's grapes, he punished Pinocchio, "[the farmer] took a heavy collar covered with brass nails and strapped it around the marionette's neck. It was so tight he could not draw his head out, and a heavy chain held him fast to the wall".<sup>87</sup> As can be seen in this example Collodi tells each punishment in detail. Doubtless, Pinocchio does not want to be stabbed or hanged. Neither does he want to be chained to the wall. The crucial

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<sup>84</sup> Collodi, op.cit, 108.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 144.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 85.

point is, Pinocchio can only rescue himself to act as a real dog. As a result, he barks in order to help the farmer to catch thief vessels. In other words, he “imitates” a dog. As far as we are concerned, “becoming-animal” is like a stepping-stone in order to becoming-individual in the case of *Pinocchio*.

In the end we want to summarize the basic characteristics of the three-noses-tree as follows:

1) Becoming-Individual: It is of great importance that the three-noses-tree implies becoming-individual. However, this individuality cannot ascribe to the face. So to speak, the nose has its own individuality which differs itself from the surface. Kovaliov’s nose can be considered as an extreme example in this context. On the other hand, the “individual” nose opposes not only Deleuzian face; but also “becoming-animal”. In other words, Deleuze and Guattari’s faciality is improper for such a nose. After all, they take the face as a whole and call it “inhuman”. The three-noses-tree expresses itself as a human. Contrary to Deleuze and Guattari’s “faces that choose their subjects” assertion, the nose chooses its own subject which shows us in a word, the face.

Monstrosity of a nose is apart from the face’s monstrosity. Since the face is distinctively “inhuman”, the three-noses-tree becomes its “freak”. Another way of saying this is that individual nose becomes monstrous on the “inhuman” surface. The three-noses-tree definitely does not sound like Deleuzian. Deleuze and Guattari do not focus on the nose. Faciality forgets the nose. Therefore, the “human” nose is unable to settle in faciality.

As far as we are concerned, unlike faciality, the struggle between parts of the face is more important than the surface itself. The “individual” nose acts; therefore, it shows us, in Artaud’s words, “cruelty”. However, with all its violence nose’s cruelty becomes different than Artaud’s cruelty. The nose makes us obey, tortures us for the sake of becoming-individual which we clearly see in *Pinocchio*. In terms of such a cruelty neither Gogol’s *Nose* nor Rostand’s *Cyrano* or the tale of *Pinocchio* can be considered as a coincidence in this context.

According to Maurice Saillet, Artaud’s portraits “which are not works of art, but which attempt to express ‘the ancient human history’ imprisoned in the human

face”.<sup>88</sup> The three-noses-tree is also an attempt to contribute to the face which we see in Artaud’s portraits. Thus, our emphasis is a little bit different: we are imprisoned in the human face by the nose. In other words, the nose is the warder. Cyrano’s nose and Pinocchio’s nose can be considered as an example on this issue. They do not leave the surface/face where they reign. It can be said that becoming-individual rewrites monstrosity apart from faciality.

There is no such difference between “becoming-animal” and imitating-animal in terms of the three-noses-tree. Contrary to Deleuze and Guattari, “becoming-animal” is not worthy of note for becoming-individual. Deleuze and Guattari write about “thought-in-becoming [which] is more abstract than analogical thinking, since it bears primarily on what may or may not come to pass, rather than on what ‘is’ by general consensus”<sup>89</sup>. As long as “becoming-animal” implies “thought-in-becoming”, the-three-noses-tree is the Achilles’ heel of the face. “Becoming-animal” is unreachable with this individuality, which does not even indicate ourselves. Even if we give up the nose, which seems impossible, we are still far away from “becoming”. Therefore, “a dog with shoes” only shows us a man who thinks himself as a dog. In brief, the three-noses-tree, which is ready to call a “dog with shoes” as lunatic, is on the face.

2) The Legacy of the Tree: The three-noses-tree can be considered within “the tree” or “the arborescent system” whereas pop philosophy indicates rhizome instead of the tree (see “Rhizome” in ATP, 3-25). Although they write on face and create faciality, neither Deleuze nor Guattari see the face. As a result, the three-noses-tree is growing on the face where pop philosophy rarely touches. Besides, Deleuze and Guattari assert that “[the despot] flows with the current rather than sitting under a tree” (ATP, 20). On the other hand, the three-noses-tree or the despot nose flows when it sits. This implies another opposition to pop philosophy.

3) The Man Without a Nose: The three-noses-tree is also deceptive. The nose makes people believe, it is just a part of their faces. The despot nose will also easily act as if it is a fundamental part of being a human. Therefore if the nose disappears

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<sup>88</sup> Maurice Saillet, “In Memoriam: Antonin Artaud”, in Artaud, op.cit., 1958, 159.

<sup>89</sup> Massumi, op.cit., 98.

someday, we will hardly call ourselves as a human. The case of Kovaliov confirms this possibility. Gogol shows us how difficult it is for a man to live without a nose. On the other hand, the case of Cyrano shows how difficult it is to live with such a nose. Additionally, the nose might be the stepping-stone like Pinocchio's nose. Pinocchio emphasizes the fact that the nose shows where individuality starts.

On the other hand, it will be lot easier to believe Deleuze and Guattari's assertion on a face, if the three-noses-tree does not grow on each face. It is crucial to return to *Moby Dick* in order to designate the difference of the three-noses-tree. Melville writes, "physiognomically regarded, the Sperm Whale is an anomalous creature. He has no proper nose (...) so no face can be physiognomically in keeping without the elevated open-work belfry of the nose"<sup>90</sup>. Although Melville speaks of the Sperm Whale, his saying is worthy of note in order to emphasize the importance of the nose. So to speak, if we do not see a nose on the face, it will not be a human.

We think, in order to speak of the "inhuman face" Deleuze and Guattari start omitting the nose from the surface, which is of becoming-individual. Besides, faces without noses can easily be seen in the figures of Deleuze and Guattari's "face-machines" which show black holes on a white wall (see ATP, 183, 185). As a matter of fact, black holes can only replace the eyes or the mouth, but not the nose. What about nostrils, can they become black holes? We do not think so. The nostrils have not become the nose yet. They do not indicate black holes either. We may speak of eye holes -which are the reminder of eyes- instead of the eye. We may still speak of the black hole of Collete instead of the mouth. However, the nose is different. It is neither a "black hole" nor the "white wall" –or the "white" nose of Kovaliov which hides in the bread<sup>91</sup> before becoming-individual- or a "smooth space" of nostrils. Nostrils help us in order to breathe and smell; but the three-noses-tree only breathes –if it breathes- for itself. Therefore, we must not forget the fact that, the individual nose is not a part of our face. Thus, becoming-individual does not imply us.

4) Of Trilogy: It is crucial to designate the difference of Kovaliov, Cyrano and Pinocchio in terms of the three-noses-tree. To begin with, they are the extreme

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<sup>90</sup> Melville, op.cit., 405.

<sup>91</sup> Gogol, op.cit, 217.

examples of the nose's individuality. Besides, three and tree are more than an eye rhyme. This tree implies three main "literal" roots which we already know from literature. At this point we need to open a parenthesis here in terms of literature. In this thesis, literature is taken as a fact rather than a fiction. Firstly, Deleuze and Guattari show us how crucial it is to take literature "seriously". It is one of the main references of pop philosophy. Most of Deleuze and Guattari's concepts make use of literature because literature is as creative as philosophy. Thus, we also make use of literature in order to focus on the problems of Deleuzian faciality. As a result, our emphasis is rather "minor". Gogol, Rostand and Collodi give us an opportunity to show how we are "growing a tree" not only "in our heads" as Deleuze and Guattari say; but also on our faces. Although they are not alike, each root has the same origin. At present, the nose either helps us to become a human (e.g. Pinocchio) or helps us to feel human (e.g. *my* nose) or it becomes an individual (e.g. Kovaliov). On the other hand, it usually does not leave the face (e.g. Cyrano). However, it does not mean that the nose will always be on the surface. (e.g. a man without a nose in the future). In brief, the three-noses-tree grows within these alternatives and these alternatives can be multiplied. The roots are inseparable. If one has a Kovaliov's nose, he/she will certainly have Pinocchio's nose and Cyrano's nose. The name of the nose will be different. Nevertheless, we think it is still *our* nose and we hardly give it a different name. Overall, we can say that the three-noses-tree implies a state of continual contradiction. So to speak, the nose leaves the surface while it is staying where it is. The three-noses-tree is able to change the direction of its branches. Therefore, Pinocchio's nose does not grow forward but upward on the three-noses-tree. After all, Collodi does not write on what Pinocchio's nose does when Pinocchio becomes a real boy.

In sum, neither the roots such as Pinocchio's nose nor the three-noses-tree can be destroyed. We cannot even think of giving up the nose yet. Thus, it is useless to prune or uproot this tree. Deleuze and Guattari do not see the nose. Therefore, we assert that the three-noses-tree, which indicates a monstrous becoming-individual on the face, is a major obstacle to "becoming-animal".

### 2.1.2. The Eye: Dorian Gray

It is difficult to name the face as inhuman since the face has got the eyes. Precisely, the eyes indicate the greatest opposition to Deleuze and Guattari's "inhuman face". The eye is nearly what defines the face all on its own. Therefore, it is not odd to say "to see and to be seen. That is what the face is"<sup>92</sup>. On the other hand, the eyes definitely "cling to the soul" according to physiognomy just like Deleuzian signification does. In sum, the eyes have been widely mentioned in order to imply who we are, what we know about ourselves, in a word our *own* face.

Chinese face readers believe that the eyes are the windows of the heart, the eyes bare one's soul. Indeed, the eyes are probably more closely related to a person's inner vitality and personality than all other facial features combined. All the ancient texts agree that the eyes are also the most sensitive barometer of an individual's feelings. Because a person's character and spirit can be read in the eyes with the most astonishing accuracy, the face reader first examines the subject's eyes.<sup>93</sup>

Physiognomy cannot be considered as an exception in order to give such a priority to the eyes. Van Gogh declares "there is something in the eyes that is not in the cathedral... a human soul, be it that of a poor beggar or of a streetwalker, is more interesting to me"<sup>94</sup>. In other words, the eyes indicate the windows of the human soul for Van Gogh. It is also important to note that if the face is really "inhuman", the eyes can be the last trace of humanity on this surface. On the other hand, contrary to the nose which has its own individuality, the eyes are mainly accepted as a distinctive sign of an individual on the surface. Physiognomy's emphasis can be given as an example on this issue. The common saying "the eyes do not tell lies" is also worthy of note. In short, we are willing to believe that the eyes can show who

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<sup>92</sup> Nicole Avril, *Yüzün Romanı*, trans. Sema Rifat (İstanbul : Doğan Kitap, 2005), 17.

<sup>93</sup> Mar, op.cit., 40.

<sup>94</sup> Van Gogh, as cited in Katherine Sachs, "Chronology: The Early Years" in *Van Gogh Face to Face: The Portraits*, contributing authors Roland Dorn et al. (New York: Thames & Hudson; Detroit Institute of Arts, 2000), 59.

we really are. Although it is rather an exaggeration to say that mankind needs to be rescued firstly from the eyes for the sake of becoming, this expression serves our purpose in order to emphasize the “human” eyes’ opposition to Deleuze and Guattari’s “inhuman” face.

On the other hand, even if Deleuze and Guattari succeeded in erasing the last trace of humanity from the surface, “becoming-animal” will still remind us of Massumi’s saying “thought-in-becoming” because of the nose which we have seen in the previous section. But still, to break the link between the human beings and their eyes is worth trying. At least, we may speak of the possibility of “becoming-animal” more easily.

Considering the black hole, it can be said that the eyes come first for Deleuze and Guattari. “When the mouth and nose but first the eyes, become a holely surface, all the other volumes and cavities of the body follow” (ATP, 170). Pop philosophy constructs such a faciality with the help of “holely surface” eyes. Following this line of thought, it is possible to name the eyes as “inhuman”. Above all, whole face is “inhuman” (ATP, 171) according to Deleuze and Guattari. On the other hand, it is also possible to consider the eyes as “human”. Maybe that is why “black hole is never in the eyes (pupil); it is always inside the border, and the eyes are always inside the hole” (ATP, 184). In other words, since the eye is too much “human”, it is better to place black hole somewhere deepest. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari scoop the eyes out in order to settle their black holes *inside the border*.

But still “the white wall/black hole system” reminds us of the face which we think we know. Therefore, even Deleuze and Guattari have not “dismantled” (ATP, 171) the face yet. In particular, “black holes” become the parts of the face. As can be seen, Deleuze and Guattari rarely change the place of the eyes in the figures of faciality. The crucial point is, we are not certain whether the eyes still indicate the human soul on the “inhuman” surface or not. It seems, Deleuze and Guattari should have started from neither the eye holes nor the black holes but the “human” eyes in order to “elude the organization of the face” (ATP, 171).

In this section we attempt to look through the eyes of Oscar Wilde’s *Dorian Gray* in order to designate how eyes become the face and how the picture becomes Deleuzian simulacrum. At this point, we must emphasize the fact that when we say

the eyes become the face of Dorian Gray, this saying does not imply Avril's *Le Roman du Visage*, in which she equates face with the eyes.<sup>95</sup> Because the eye does not define the face; but it attempts to separate itself from the face in *Dorian Gray*. So to speak, the eye is no more a particular organ. If we make use of Deleuzian terminology, it can be said that the face becomes an obstacle since it does not refer to an "organ(ism)" as a whole any more. On the other hand, the eye defines nothing but itself. More importantly, the "human" eyes, which we will see in Dorian Gray, do not like the "inhuman" face. In other words, we attempt to reveal not a connection but a contradiction between the eyes and the face considering "inhuman face". Therefore, our point is totally different from Avril's point.

On the other hand, Dorian's eyes that become the face, do not imply Deleuze and Guattari's face/eyes which corresponds to the white wall/black holes (see ATP, 301) either. In the case of the eye, we think Deleuze and Guattari's black holes neglect the "human" eye. In other words, they write on "black hole eye" instead of the eye. However, we speak of the "human eye" which stands in front of the black hole. Thus, Dorian Gray's eyes do not seem Deleuzian. In the case of Gray, the picture is what Deleuzian is.

The eyes (Dorian Gray) also indicate a distinct opposition to Deleuze and Guattari's "facialized body". Lord Henry Wotton, who is a friend of the eye (Dorian Gray) and the painter (Basil), says, "real beauty, ends where an intellectual expression begins. Intellect is in itself a mode of exaggeration, and destroys the harmony of any face. The moment one sits down to think, one becomes all nose, or all forehead, or something horrid"<sup>96</sup>. Doubtless, Wotton's saying is about how "intellectual expression" change one's face. However, we think there is no need to be an intellect in order to become all nose, all forehead, and so on. Dorian Gray's eyes can be given as an example on this issue. Although Gray does not "sit down to think", he becomes all eye. Besides, his eyes/face cannot possibly indicate "the entire body" which is 'facialized' (ATP, 175) as long as he is not an example of Deleuze

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<sup>95</sup> Avril, op.cit., 17.

<sup>96</sup> Oscar Wilde, "The Picture of Dorian Gray" in *The Works of Oscar Wilde*, 3rd ed. (London: Spring Books, 1965), 378.



and Guattari's "facialized body"; but at most an eye-body.

But still, it is more easy to believe that Wilde's book is actually written in order to emphasize the fact that faces can show who we really are. Mar's reference to *The Picture of Dorian Gray* can be given as an example on this issue. In order to say "your face is your fortune", Mar indicates Wilde's novel: "the successive changes in the painting of Gray accurately reflected his fate, his moral decay, and his descent into a living hell, his ultimate fate"<sup>97</sup>. As far as we are concerned, Mar misses the most crucial point. The picture is not something of a face. Additionally, it is not even Gray's face.

Everything begins when the eyes see the picture. Essentially, the eye is the one which firstly notices "a look of evil"<sup>98</sup> in the portrait. In this way, they are able to create a face which has "the eyes of a devil"<sup>99</sup>. Dorian Gray believes the picture is actually "the face of [his] soul."<sup>100</sup> On the contrary, not even Gray himself; but the eye takes the picture as the picture of its soul. Nonetheless, the soul does not belong to Dorian Gray in the eyes of Dorian Gray. Thus, the eyes' melancholy is worthy of note. The eyes need to make a face for the soul because of the surface's monstrosity. On the other hand, an interesting finding was that not the body not even the face; but the eyes exclude the soul. Thus, one might likely believe that the eyes betray Van Gogh in the picture of Dorian Gray. However, it is crucial to think on what lies beneath the surface. The eyes place the soul outside the body in order to protect its connection with the soul. Needless to say, the "human" eyes do not possibly ruin this link. Therefore, they can never surprise "face readers" or Van Gogh in this context. The eye's mistake is to believe that the soul can live outside the body. It is of great importance that the picture is neither the copy of Dorian Gray nor his soul because "there is something fatal about a portrait. It has a life of its own"<sup>101</sup>.

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<sup>97</sup> Mar, op.cit., 9.

<sup>98</sup> op.cit., 429.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., 465.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., 442.

As far as we are concerned, the picture of Dorian Gray implies one of the unique examples of Deleuzian “simulacrum”. In a sense, Dorian Gray’s portrait correspond to Bacon’s “two simulacra of portraits” (FB, 62) if we take Deleuzian connection between the simulacra and painting into consideration. The difference is, we speak of a simulacrum of a face in Dorian Gray while Deleuze is strictly speaking of the simulacra of the heads (portraits) with regard to Bacon (See FB, 19-24). Thus, if we name the picture as an example of Deleuzian simulacrum, this saying will definitely be an opposition in the eyes of Dorian Gray.

On the other hand, if we agree with the eyes for a while, it will be easily said that Wilde is succeeded in reversing Deleuzian faciality. The soul becomes something to look at, in a word, a picture. The question is, how is it possible to speak of a white wall without a “signifiante” which in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, clings to the soul ? (cf. ATP, 167) or can we speak of a signifiante without the soul? There will be nothing to be facialized when the hollow signifiante or soul places itself on a canvas. Therefore, we need to think differently from the eyes of Dorian Gray for the sake of Deleuzian simulacrum.

As long as the eye equates itself with the human soul, “human” eye ironically becomes the monster of the inhuman face. In this way, we face with a monster which becomes anti-Deleuzian. What if the picture refuses to be taken as the face of Dorian Gray’s soul? Oscar Wilde certainly gives us an opportunity to think differently. To begin with, it is crucial to see the fact that there are two faces and therefore two monsters in Dorian Gray. In other words, Dorian’s young face is a monster because he is “unchanged”<sup>102</sup>. The face on a canvas is a monster because he is “changed”. As we clearly see, the “surface-monsters” can also be varied in this context. The young monster tries to get over the pain of his “human” eyes which grins at the “inhuman face”. The young monster becomes neurotic. The eyes are annoyed to live on an inhuman surface. As a result, they put the soul into the canvas. On the other hand, the monster in the picture tries to get over the pain of Dorian Gray. The picture is neither Dorian Gray nor the image of his beauty. It is worth noting that the picture abandons the eyes in order to “becoming-other”. This leads us to write that the picture is not a

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 454.

copy; but the simulacrum. At this point it is crucial to designate the difference between the copy and the simulacrum as follows:

The copy is an image endowed with resemblance, the simulacrum is an image without resemblance. The catechism, so much inspired by Platonism, has familiarized us with this notion. God made man in his image and resemblance. Through sin, however, man lost the resemblance while maintaining the image. We have become simulacra. We have forsaken moral existence in order to enter into aesthetic existence (*The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy* in LS, 257).

If we take Deleuze's distinction between the copy and the simulacrum into consideration, it can be said that Dorian Gray's picture is a simulacrum because it is "an image without resemblance". In particular, *through* Dorian Gray's *sin* the picture *lost the resemblance* and *become simulacrum*. In other words, the eyes of Dorian Gray are mistaken. The picture has nothing to do with Dorian Gray's soul. It only deceives Dorian Gray and Basil for a while. The picture gives the sins and the age which makes the young man "Dorian Gray" to Dorian Gray in the end. Nonetheless, "the simulacrum is built (...) upon a difference. It internalizes a dissimilarity" (LS, 258). Thus, it can be said that there is a Deleuzian monstrosity in the picture of *Dorian Gray*. This also helps us to reject common commentaries which assert that the soul of Dorian Gray is in the picture. Besides, this novel cannot be considered as a symbolic story on immorality of the soul or the body. Wilde himself also opposes those commentaries which try to take a moral lesson from his book. Therefore, he writes in the preface of his novel: "there is no such thing as a moral or an immoral book"<sup>103</sup>.

In terms of the picture of Dorian Gray there is one thing left which deserves to be noticed. The picture also makes fun of becoming-neurotic. Therefore, the canvas mixes up the sins and the age. That is why the young monster was "wondering sometimes which were the more horrible, the signs of sin or the signs of age"<sup>104</sup>. In the eyes of Dorian Gray, the sin becomes the wrinkles of his old face in

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid, 376.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 449.

the picture. The sin shows no pity, it does not even wait Dorian to get old. Doubtless, to believe that the sin has a “wrinkled” visuality, definitely pathetic. On the contrary, ugliness unites the sin and the age in the eyes of Gray. They do not only come together, but also the eyes make them nearly identical. Thus, we face with a kind of weird twins here.

On the other hand, the worst thing is people like Basil, believes the sin can be read from the face, “if a wretched man has a vice, it shows itself in the lines of his mouth, the droop of his eyelids, the moulding of his hands even”<sup>105</sup>. As a matter of fact, even if the “human” eye succeeded in putting the soul into canvas in order to keep it away from the “inhuman face”, the picture/the simulacrum would easily choke it. In short, the soul cannot breath. The end.

Essentially, Deleuze says “by rising to the surface, the simulacrum makes the Same and the Similar, the model and the copy, fall under the power of the false (phantasm) (LS, 263). The picture of Dorian Gray “become-mad”, not because it is sinful; but “there is in the simulacrum a becoming-mad, or a becoming unlimited (...) a becoming always other, a becoming subversive of the depths, able to evade the equal, the limit, the Same, or the Similar: always more and less at once, but never equal” (LS, 258). In sum, the simulacrum implies becoming-mad and this becoming has nothing to do with Dorian Gray’s “tragic” end. The eyes become neurotic since they lose the soul. It can be said that there is only one way out for the eyes since they are not ready to leave the surface yet: to become something grotesque, the eye with shoes. Nonetheless, only in this way they are able to walk out of the face.

On the other hand, we are still wondering and therefore ask “what happened” to Dorian Gray. Deleuze and Guattari have already emphasized the significance of asking “what happened” (see ATP, 192-207). According to Rajchman, “[Deleuze] envisaged philosophy as a sort of detective story with concepts for characters, intervening to resolve local problems, then themselves changing as fresh questions emerge and new dramas take shape”.<sup>106</sup> We keep Deleuzian method in mind and try to find “what happened” to the eye and the young monster and the simulacrum and

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid., 460.

<sup>106</sup> Rajchman, op.cit., 21.

the “inhuman face”. It is crucial to know the answer to it since we name the picture of Dorian Gray not the face of the soul; but Deleuzian simulacrum.

Overall, we want to summarize what happened to Dorian Gray. This also implies how we read Wilde’s novel:

1) The “Human” Eyes Live On An “Inhuman Face”. There is a need to find a Deleuzian laughter in *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. Wilde says “humanity takes itself too seriously. It is the world’s original sin. If the caveman had known how to laugh, History would have been different”<sup>107</sup>. Artaud also says the same thing: “You are quite unnecessary, young man!”<sup>108</sup> The eye also follows the humanity in this context. “The window of the soul” *takes itself too seriously*. The eyes not only imply our individuality (if we ever have one); but also seem to protect the soul. However, it is difficult to live on such an “inhuman face”. The worst thing is, the eyes lost the sense of humour and tried to find a safety place for the soul.

2) The Picture Chokes The Soul. As we have cited above, Wilde emphasizes the fact that Dorian’s picture “has a life of its own”. In other words, this life does belong neither Dorian Gray (the spectator) nor his soul (superfluous). The picture is “becoming-mad”. Therefore, it cares neither Dorian Gray (the eye) nor the wrinkled s(k)in. The picture of Dorian Gray or “the simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which denies *the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction*” (LS, 262). In this way, the picture also differs itself from the painter Basil. At this point, we should remember what Basil says when Lord Henry first sees the picture of Dorian Gray and suggests him to exhibit it: “But the world might guess it; and I will not bare my soul to their shallow prying eyes. My heart shall never be put under their microscope. There is too much of myself in the thing, Harry—too much of myself!”<sup>109</sup> As a matter of fact, neither the young monster nor Basil “can resist the vertigo of the simulacrum” (LS, 262). They fall down unlike Bacon’s “fall” (see FB, 21) in the end. Besides, the more they try to see themselves in the picture,

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<sup>107</sup> Wilde, op.cit., 399.

<sup>108</sup> Antonin Artaud, “From The Nerve Meter (1925)” in *Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings*, ed. Susan Sonntag, trans. Helen Weaver (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 85.

<sup>109</sup> Wilde, op.cit., 382.

the simulacrum becomes “imperceptible” (LS, 274). As far as we are concerned, Dorian Gray’s picture is what Carroll’s written “impenetrability” is supposed to mean orally. In terms of impenetrability, Humpty Dumpty says, “when I use a word (...) it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less (...) when I make a word do a lot of work like that”<sup>110</sup>. Additionally, Deleuze also competes with Carroll in order to add some other meanings to impenetrability (See LS, 25). On the other hand, “becoming-imperceptible means many things” (ATP, 279). Since each term is suitable to have many meanings, what we have done is to add something imperceptible to the “impenetrability”. On the other hand, some “impenetrability” can also be added to whatever imperceptible is. As a result, the picture of Dorian Gray *means many things* and the picture (not the word) *means what we choose it to mean*. In this way, the picture implies impenetrability, imperceptibility and simulacrum.

3) Deep End of Dorian Gray. Wilde declares “all art is at once surface and symbol. Those who go beneath the surface do so at their peril. Those who read the symbol do so at their peril”<sup>111</sup>. We go beneath the surface and put the symbols into the waste bin in order to write on Deleuzian inhuman surface in the picture of Dorian Gray. In particular, the eyes of Gray give us such an opportunity to point out the contradiction between the eyes and, Deleuze and Guattari’s “inhuman face”. Additionally, Wilde writes “it is the spectator (...) that art really mirrors”<sup>112</sup>. It is also important to note that “The Masks [or *the faces*] live in the eye of the beholder”<sup>113</sup>. In our opinion, this saying indicates what faciality is all on its own. The spectators might be easily take the picture as the picture of Dorian Gray. They have not been acquainted with the inhuman yet. In addition to that, the eyes are also not willing to face with this surface. Therefore, they need to give a specific meaning (soul) to the picture. In other words, the “human” eyes use symbols in order to arrange a place for the soul into the picture. Sarcastically speaking, the eyes become a hotel

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<sup>110</sup> Carroll, op.cit, 247.

<sup>111</sup> Wilde, op.cit., *The Preface*, 376.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Rudlin, op.cit., 42.

receptionist: “Here is the key to your canvas suite.” However, the eyes are unable to be aware of the fact that the picture has already become Deleuzian simulacrum. In other words, the room is not free. The first tragedy: the young monster/master dies. This also implies how the story ends in the eyes of the readers, beholders, and so on. The second tragedy: The eyes lose the soul and they are unable to become inhuman. Once upon a time they were deep and now they are living in exile on the surface. The third tragedy: To ask this question: Are we able to say that we understand what Deleuzian simulacrum or the picture of Dorian Gray really is?

### **2.1.3. The Beast: Pedrolino**

The last thing related to the unmasked metaphor is “the monster” or “the beast” itself. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the fact that the face does not exactly constitute the wall of the signifier or the hole of subjectivity and it is of great importance that “the face, at least the concrete face, vaguely begins to take shape *on* the white wall. It vaguely begins to appear *in* the black hole” (ATP, 168). There is no doubt that Deleuze and Guattari speak of a noticeable togetherness of white wall and black holes in order to inscribe the face. In addition, we focus on the whiteness and blackness of the “face-machine”. As a matter of fact, the wall and the holes make “inhuman face” in a word, typical; pop philosophy is able to add different combinations relevant to the wall/hole, such as “the wall could just as well be black, and the hole white” (ATP, 169), though.

On the other hand, we intend to separate white wall/black hole system roughly in order to write on the beast. Our approach to the beast cannot be surprising, since this is what we do is on the face. In other words, we have already separated white wall from its black holes in the previous sections of the unmasked metaphor. We assert that each black hole implies completely different monstrosities. Strictly speaking, there is not only one monstrosity of a face. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari’s saying, “a horror story, the face is a horror story” (ATP, 168), we think several horror stories (the nose, the eye, the mouth, a flat surface) take place on an inhuman sur(face). Concerning this issue, it is crucial to remember the case of the eye or the

absence of the mouth (the crux is, Collete is not an exception) which we have previously seen in the unmasked metaphor.

Additionally, we have been focusing on what is in front of black holes rather than digging Deleuze and Guattari's black hole once again. Precisely, there is a *human* eye which is in front of "the empty eye or black hole" (ATP, 177). More importantly, there is a nose (not even a black hole), which stands as a despot, precedes Deleuze and Guattari's "facialized body". In sum, we consider the parts of the face, which prior to "black holes", instead of "black holes", since what is on the surface cannot be the answer of what happens in/on the surface.

Deleuze and Guattari insist that "there is no wall without black holes, and no black holes without a wall" (ATP, 184). On the other hand, we think quite different than Deleuze and Guattari on this issue. In brief, the white wall, which is particularly named Pedrolino, is without its black holes in this section. On the other hand, it is vital to designate pop philosophy's approach to the face once again in order to write on the Beast. As a matter of fact, Deleuze and Guattari blur the face for the sake of "inhuman" face. In this way, their attempt corresponds to Bacon's drawings. Deleuze believes Bacon is succeeded in dismantling the face: "As a portraitist, Bacon is a painter of heads, not faces (...) Bacon thus pursues a very peculiar project as a portrait painter: *to dismantle the face*, to rediscover the head or make it emerge from beneath the face" (FB, 19). Unlike Deleuze and Bacon, we assert that Bacon actually draws faces in his portraits. It can be said that faces only seem to vanish in colour in Bacon. Therefore, we must not miss the crucial point: faces do not go anywhere, even if we try to erase or dismantle them. Besides, what Deleuze and Guattari say on dismantling is also worthy of note:

Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity. Here the program, the slogan, of schizoanalysis is: Find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight (ATP, 188).

Since "faces are not basically individual" (ATP, 168), it is difficult to know



“our” faces. As long as “non of them [faces] strictly speaking”<sup>114</sup> even to Artaud, it is not easy to dismantle them. However, schizoanalysis/pop philosophy want to believe that this can be done<sup>115</sup>. In this regard, our contribution to dismantling the face is mainly inspired by Massumi’s saying, “thought-in-becoming” relevant to pop philosophy. It can only be spoken of “thought-in-dismantling”. Thus, Bacon’s paintings are also far away from dismantling a face as long as there is *the face*. The point is, in the case of Bacon’s portraits, there is a need to place the face on a canvas in order to dismantle it. Faces are already stuck on our “human” heads at once. More importantly, contrary to Deleuze we think heads become faces in Bacon since they have a mouth. Moreover, the nose cannot be hidden. Bacon’s self-portraits especially his *Self-Portrait I-II* (1972)<sup>116</sup> can be considered in this context. In the first portrait we see nothing but *a cyrano’s nose* and in the second we see *a cyrano’s nose* with a half-hearted clown’s mouth.

Essentially, no one will see himself/herself in Bacon’s drawings. That is not the point. From the start, we have seen that Deleuze and Guattari, and Artaud have already pointed out the faceless (not individual) face. With respect to this issue, just like Dorian Gray even Bacon’s self-portraits are not Bacon himself. Besides, if monstrosity of a face has nothing to do with us, it will easily be said that there is nothing we can do in order to dismantle it. In brief, this is only an assumption that the face can be dismantled through becoming (Deleuze) or painting (Bacon). Overall, we can say that contrary to Deleuze’s assertion and especially Bacon’s intention, the portraits of Bacon are heads with *the face*. What is more, there is *the face* not only on our heads but also *in* our heads. In other words, as long as there is *the face in* our heads we see nothing but faces on Bacon’s “heads”.

What about the “white wall” without its “black holes”? We actually place the

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<sup>114</sup> Artaud, op.cit., 1996, 96.

<sup>115</sup> Although Deleuze and Guattari suggest dismantling the face and making use of Bacon’s portraits in order to show how one can dismantle the face, they also point out “we will never succeed in making ourselves (...) faceless” (ATP, 188). In the case of faciality, whenever Deleuze and Guattari show us the exit (the Deleuzian way of dismantling the face), they rush into closing it.

<sup>116</sup> See Francis Bacon’s portraits in [http://www.francis-bacon.cx/1972\\_73.html](http://www.francis-bacon.cx/1972_73.html) (accessed July 13, 2005).

Beast on a white wall. Deleuze and Guattari have already emphasized the fact that “the white wall is always expanding, and the black hole functions repeatedly” (ATP, 177). On the other hand, there is a need to speak of black holes which turn into white. The Beast is totally a white wall which does not need its black holes. In other words, the white wall (Pedrolino) has not created its black holes yet. “The white wall is expanding” without stopping. There is no doubt that it will definitely ruin “the white wall/black hole system” which defines the “inhuman face” together as a whole, if we name the “surface-monster” (DIOT, 281) as only a white wall or a flat surface, not in a Deleuzian sense.

Deleuze and Guattari are fascinated with “the great composition of the white canvas and black slash” (ATP, 173). The point is that “black holes” and “the white wall” never contradict with each other in pop philosophy. They rather show us “the greatest composition”. On the other hand, there is only one way to see the beast. Precisely, Pedrolino *appears* on “the snowy white wall of the landscape-face” (ATP, 173).

At this point, we should answer who Pedrolino is. He is one of the Masks of *Commedia dell’Arte*. In this study, we try to cut the Beast off from Pedrolino. Before we create a Deleuzian beast from Pedrolino, there is a need to write down the specific characteristics of this Mask with the help of Rudlin’s book. Nevertheless, it can be asked why we choose not someone else but Pedrolino.

First of all, Pedrolino is a white wall and his “white face, originally floured (Gian-Farina). He thus has a range of emotional expressions denied to other Masks”<sup>117</sup>. Secondly, “although [he is] an animal-lover, he remains intensely human, a human animal, not a hybrid like the other Masks”<sup>118</sup>. Thirdly, “stoicism in the face of misery, survived his oppression by pretending to be simple. Anaesthetised his sensivity by pretending to have no feelings. Gives vent to feelings only when alone. Totally honest”.<sup>119</sup> Rudlin speaks of Pedrolino on the stage. However, the beast Pedrolino is actually on the face, which corresponds to being off the stage of *Commedia dell’Arte* in this study. In other words, there is not any link between

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<sup>117</sup> Rudlin, op.cit., 134.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 136.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

Pedrolino on the stage and Pedrolino on the face; *Commedia dell'Arte* implies Pedrolino's origin, it informs us about where Pedrolino comes, though. In short, we only borrow Pedrolino, not his "duties" in *Commedia dell'Arte*.

Undoubtedly, it is a "theater of cruelty" to place Pedrolino on a face, but this saying must not remind us of Artaud's works on theater. Pedrolino asks Deleuze and Guattari "what is wrong with me /the white wall /the flat face?" The question implies something more than his "stoic misery". The fact is, nothing is as simple as the white wall. Although "the Stoics discovered surface effects" (LS, 7), Pedrolino is far away from his own discovery. More importantly, he is not able to find his "rhizome" yet. The Beast implies a break: even the Stoics sometimes do not know what to do on the surface.

What if the monster separates itself from the surface? That is exactly what Pedrolino "the human beast" tries to do on a Deleuzian face. Is there any way to think of a "surface-monster" without a surface? The point is, Pedrolino gives us that chance in order to think differently. Thus, it is crucial to see a hidden war on a white wall between the inhuman surface (Deleuzian "imperceptible" monster) and the "human" Beast (Pedrolino). It seems, Deleuzian "landscape" needs to rethink what can be done with such a faciality.

Objections might be made to our evaluations on a white wall, at least in terms of placing Pedrolino on the face. So to speak, there is not a white wall named Pedrolino in Deleuze and Guattari's faciality. On the other hand, it seems problematic to inscribe the beast/monster as a human on an "inhuman" surface since Deleuze and Guattari do not separate monstrosity from the surface in terms of faciality. What is more, the face means "naturally inhuman, a monstrous hood" (ATP, 190), "from the start" (ATP, 171). In brief, how can Pedrolino help us in order to write on that faciality?

To begin with, monstrosity is based on oppositions. Therefore, it is crucial to inject "humanity" into inhuman face. The face can only be inhuman if there are a neurotic eyes or a despotic three-noses-tree on the surface. Precisely, the opposition must be sought on the sur(face) not between the face and the body as Deleuze and Guattari do. In terms of faciality, unlike Deleuze and Guattari, we think that the eyes

or the mouth or the nose comes before “significance” and “subjectification” matter. The face as a whole is in dispute long before it was “watching” us (cf. ATP, 175).

Secondly, we face with a “fragmented” face, not in a Deleuzian sense. Therefore, we need Pedrolino’s “white” opposition to the white wall. Deleuze once said, “the becoming-mad of the depths was climbing to the surface, the simulacra in turn were becoming phantasms, the deep break was showing as a crack in the surface” (LS, 165). Deleuze implies the crack as a kind of wake on the surface. What we imply is rather a different crack. A crack to designate the lines of each part of the face. A crack which is a threat. A crack which does not sound like Deleuzian. Therefore, it is better to draw up a line of battle.

As a curious follower of the white wall, we all dive in sur(face), where in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, “strangest things happens”. What we need is a map on that surface. In brief, it is essential to have a Deleuzian sense of cartography/humour. The white wall’s map or the flat surface is where a whole action of faciality takes place. At this point, we need to draw what is on the “inhuman” surface. In order to be more concrete, we enumerate certain situations that we face on the sur(face) as follows:

SITUATION 1. THE FACE WHICH DRAWS ITS LINE OF FLIGHT: It is crucial to note that Deleuze and Guattari suggest “we must invent our lines of flight, if we are able, and the only way we can invent them is by effectively drawing them, in our lives” (ATP, 202). However, it is the body which needs to escape, draws its line of flight in Deleuze and Guattari’s pop philosophy. In addition to that issue,

*This body [BwO] is the only practical object of schizoanalysis: What is your body without organs? What are your lines? What map are you in the process of making rearranging? What abstract line will you draw, and at what price, for yourself and for others? What is your line of flight? What is your BwO, merged with that line? Are you cracking up? Are you going to crack up? Are you deterritorializing? Which lines are you severing, and which are you extending or resuming? (ATP, 203).*

The face is rather an obstacle, a headache. According to Deleuze and Guattari we can only be saved from the face if our body is able to escape (see ATP, 188). As a

matter of fact, the solution to the problem for pop philosophy is, do not let the face to live or stuck on the head. The body without a face can be created as to Deleuze and Guattari (see “faceless” in ATP, 187 and see also n114 of this thesis). A face without a body. That is what pop philosophy does not focus on since there is a “facialized body”. On the other hand, in the case of Pedrolino, we assert that the face also draws its own line of flight which is totally different from the body’s expressive “line of flight”.

Besides, it is of great importance that the face which draws that line does not refer to “the pictorial semiotic system: Put the face and the landscape to flight” (ATP, 301) as long as it depicts the artists’ “success”. Neither Deleuze and Guattari as surface philosophers nor Bacon as an artist or even Artaud who “had been mad all his life”<sup>120</sup> succeeded in drawing a line of flight to the face. As a matter of fact, the face has its own plans. Sarcastically speaking, this line is *face*-centered.

Now that the time seems ripe, several lines of flight can be drawn on a face; but not by anybody else. What is more, the face as a whole can be considered as an escape plan. The fact is, the face is a battle. In accordance with this “battle mood”, positions on the face should be clearly designated on a map for the sake of its own line of flight.

It is also important to note that each part is looking for a different type of escape. The nose, which shows where faciality starts on a face, draws its own line of flight in order to becoming-individual. The eyes, on the other hand, try not to become an eye with shoe. Above all, the worst news is, the mouth has already escaped. The face seems out of our hands but not in a Deleuzian way. In addition, we leave the “inhuman” in the lurch by putting a sketch of it on a white wall. Therefore, we face with in/human sur(face) in terms of “the white wall/black hole system”.

More importantly, the face is in conflict. Not because of Deleuzian “form of expression” but because of its each part. However, it is still not possible to dismantle the face. Taking Deleuze and Guattari into consideration, if the face is able to be dismantled, there will be no need to write on “becoming”. The crucial point is,

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<sup>120</sup> Susan Sontag, “Artaud: An Essay”, in *Antonin Artaud: Selected Writings*, op.cit., 1988, liii.

“becoming-animal”s will form another “pack” which is different from Deleuze and Guattari’s assertions of becoming a pack. According to pop philosophy “every animal is fundamentally a band, a pack” (ATP, 239). More importantly, “pack (...) form a multiplicity” (ATP, 241). However, pack will not form a “multiplicity”; but a distinctive individuality. The crux of the problem is “becoming-animal” implies becoming-individual. In the end, something will light up in each of the becoming-animals’ body. There is no doubt, this is what Deleuze and Guattari do not think of. In this context, what forms a multiplicity is rather not to follow any pack. Monstrosity is no more monstrosity if we all become “a dog with shoe”. Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming will collapse if we all reach that becoming. In short, nothing will change. They are also aware of that fact. Nonetheless, this may explain why BwO is beyond our reach (see ATP, 150)<sup>121</sup>. The truth is, they have to create such a face in order to write on their “becoming-animal”. In other words, the antidote will be useless if there is not any poison.

In the case of Pedrolino, the black holes turn into white. In this way, a face which draws its own line of flight captures the “inhuman face” on the white wall. The parts of the face get rid of black holes since they are unnoticeable on a white wall. This shows us something: the white wall/black hole system becomes a face on a face.

SITUATION II. THE INCOMPETENCE OF THE EYES: It is also of great importance that not every escape from the face is successful. Most of them sentence to be failed. In this context, the “human” eyes deserve a special credit since they can protect neither the soul nor themselves. There is also no place to hide on a white wall for the eyes. The white holes are “watching” the eyes. When Pedrolino appears on a white wall, the eyes remain in deep silence. We must admit this incompetence since it is difficult to live with a deep soul mood on such a surface.

SITUATION III. FIGURE OUT WHAT PEDROLINO’S INTENTION IS: Pedrolino’s characteristics play a crucial role to name him as a white wall. We want to place a bewildered Stoic on an “inhuman surface”. As a matter of fact, the

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<sup>121</sup> We prefer not to take Deleuze and Guattari’s saying into consideration, “What is this BwO? —But you’re already on it, scurrying like a vermin, groping like a blind person, or running like a lunatic (...)” (ATP, 150), if we “can’t reach” (ATP, 150) what we “are already on it”.

“strangest things” have been really messed up on the sur(face). In these circumstances, Pedrolino’s priority in this study comes from his pure whiteness. He is a stranger on the white wall. He does not need black holes at all. Thus, a walking white wall gives us a chance to think Deleuzian inhumanity differently.

When he was on the stage, he did not only “look after the animals”, but also he had to deal with “hybrid Masks”<sup>122</sup>. What is more “he has a special affinity with dogs since he shares their abused, half-starved lives”<sup>123</sup>. On the other hand, when a white wall is on the face, he firstly tries to get used to his new surroundings. It was not easy to live on the stage and nothing has changed in terms of difficulty when Pedrolino is on the face. The white wall/beast was “a loner, an observer of the follies of others”.<sup>124</sup> It is also crucial to note that to change one’s place cannot change him totally. Pedrolino is still an observer when he is on the face. However, he is the observer of not the other masks; but the face’s follies on a white wall (a half of *the face*) .

If Pedrolino is called as an observer of the “inhuman face” or a white wall on “the white wall”, to who he will inform about the “strangest happenings”? The answer is rather predictable. He has to speak to Deleuze and Guattari. Nonetheless, the face is still inhuman, we change the features of “the white wall/black hole system”, though.

Pedrolino: *How can you want me to shut up? I do not get a moment’s rest. The whole day long I have to run after the nose and the eyes. By the way, the nostrils want me to ask you when will the body “breathe with your belly” (ATP, 151). I have no idea what they are talking about. Have you heard the news? The mouth is gone, and where were you? I must warn you this is not my fault. Maybe you should ask Bacon. Nevertheless, he steals those mouths in order to scream. What have*

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<sup>122</sup> See Rudlin, op.cit., 136.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

you said? What do you mean by parts of the face are not very important? Is not it a face we are talking about? What is the white wall/black hole system supposed to mean? When does the face become inhuman? It is inhuman from the beginning?! *Don't make me mad.*<sup>125</sup>

It is crucial to designate what the white wall's intention is when he faces with a Deleuzian face at this point. We call his response as "Blumfeld effect". It is important to note that *Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor* is one of the short stories of Kafka. Deleuze and Guattari also make use of Blumfeld and his "two strange balls" when they write their faciality. "Two little ping-pong balls jumping around by themselves on the 'wall' constituted by the floor. They bounce everywhere and even try to hit him in the face (...) Blumfeld finally manages to lock them up in the black hole of a wardrobe" (ATP, 169).

What should Pedrolino do ? The truth is, there are several options whether to lock the parts of the face into black holes or to lock the black holes into the parts of the face or to turn the black holes into white as we suggest. It is crucial to note that black holes become Pedrolino's annoying balls. Considering Blumfeld's response, Pedrolino does the same thing but he imprisoned not the balls; but the holes. What do we see? On the one hand, Blumfeld "jumps out of it [wardrobe] with an enormous leap such as he has not made for years, slams the door and turns the key, the balls are imprisoned".<sup>126</sup> On the other hand, Pedrolino jumps out of the inhuman surface, turns the key and the holes are imprisoned in white. In this way, he is able to live on an inhuman surface without black holes. The crucial point is, the face is still not dismantled when it loses its black holes. Besides, the face must stay where it is.

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<sup>125</sup> We freely adapt a part from Pedrolino's sample dialogue with Il Dottore (another Mask in *Commedia Dell'Arte*). The words in italics are Pedrolino's own words in the dialogue. See the original dialogue in Rudlin, op.cit., 137-138.

<sup>126</sup> Franz Kafka, "Blumfeld, an Elderly Bachelor" in *Description of a Struggle and Other Stories*, trans. W. and E. Muir et al. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), 63.



Nonetheless, that is what faciality is. We have something which has a different “monstrous hood”: The white wall/hole.

SITUATION IV. NO WAY OUT TO SCREAM: Barber points out that “figures such as Francis Bacon and Edvard Munch, whose ultimate obsession, like Artaud’s, was to make an image of the body alive and screaming (...) [Artaud’s] work radically sealed within his own body, though always ready to explode out”<sup>127</sup>. Deleuze also admires such screaming. “And the scream, Bacon’s scream is the operation through which the entire body escapes through the mouth” (FB, 16).

As to Deleuze’s words on scream, the mouth’s response is rather mocking: —ha! ha! To hope an escape through the face: —ha! ha! What is a face in the end, just a “figurehead” ? (cf. or not cf. “Oedipus / the figurehead” in AO, x) —ha! ha! As far as we are concerned, it is a grave mistake to think that the mouth “is no longer a particular organ, but the hole through which the entire body escapes, and from the flesh descends (...). This is what Bacon calls the Scream, in the immense pity that the meat evokes” (FB, 24). The truth is, Artaud is more cautious to the mouth. At least, in his *Collette* he does not use the mouth in order to escape.

On the other hand, Deleuze believes “Bacon suggests that beyond the scream there is the smile (...) which fulfill the strangest function, namely, that of securing the disappearance of the body. Bacon and Lewis Carroll meet on this single point. the smile of a cat” (FB, 25). Additionally, “Bacon suggests that this smile is ‘hysterical’, and at the end we see “the screaming mouth in the center, the hysterical smile on the left, and finally, the inclined and dissipated head on the right” (FB, 26). It is true that this smile is “hysterical”; but this is neither Deleuze’s nor Bacon’s smile. The smile on a mouth is irritatingly anti-Deleuzian. The mouth’s hysteric smile becomes wider. The question is the scream itself. Artaud already knows “NEITHER MY CRY nor my fever belongs to me”.<sup>128</sup> The face becomes a big mouth and there is no way out to scream since the mouth is tightlipped. It swallows the scream. It chokes the scream. Besides, that open mouth (hole) which Deleuze and Bacon plan to escape has already gone. In the end, the mouth, which speaks its own

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<sup>127</sup>Stephen Barber, *Antonin Artaud: The Screaming Body* (— : Creation Books, 1999), 33.

<sup>128</sup>Artaud, op.cit, 1988, 91.

words, are not ours. If we consider the mouth in this way, it will be easily said that Munch's scream or Bacon's scream indicates nothing but the terrifying awareness of the fact that there is no way out to scream. The mouth is a deceptive hole. Therefore, whenever you try to escape with a scream through the mouth, you will crash to the wall instead of escaping through the hole. What is more, the holes are already locked in the wall (Pedrolino). As a result, it is inevitable to "lose your head" in the end.

## **2.2. The Unmasked Metaphor Falls Down And The White Wall / Black Hole Looks Ahead And The Waste Bin Throws Or And... And... And...**

The unmasked metaphor attempts to depict a faciality in faciality. Hence, it should not be accepted as an analysis of "the white wall/black hole system" which shows us "the wall of the signifier" and "the hole of the subjectivity" (See ATP 167-191). We asked different questions than Deleuze and Guattari concerning with faciality in the previous section. In other words, we dig another hole on the Deleuzian surface. Precisely, the unmasked metaphor is written in order to show what we cannot find in faciality.

However, it is crucial to answer what we find in Deleuze and Guattari's faciality at once. To begin with, faciality has a new sense of face. Strictly speaking, maybe for the first time it is possible to think the face differently because of Deleuze and Guattari's pop philosophy. In this way, for instance, we are able to free ourselves from the rules of physiognomy. Once again thanks to Humpty Dumpty. What is more, we are able to draw a different path from the faces which show supposedly our faces. With the help of Deleuze and Guattari we learnt that we are simply not our faces. This is all by itself enough to indicate the significance of Deleuze and Guattari's contribution to the concept of the face.

Secondly, although Deleuze and Guattari have not dismantled the face yet, they succeeded in inscribing the "inhuman face". It is worth to think on "a face or a factory? (Godard)" (ATP, 172) or realize the fact that "faces are not basically individual" (ATP, 168). From the beginning, we repeat the latter without stopping. Pop philosophy's priority comes from these rivalry assertions. Sarcastically

speaking, *thus spoke* pop philosophy: “you are totally wrong *my friend* to think to have a face of your own”.

The last but not least, it is such a worthy of note to discover “a monstrous hood” (ATP, 190) in the face and on the face. To name the face as inhuman definitely opposes our archaic common knowledge of the face. An interesting finding was that Deleuze and Guattari focus on the visuality of faces rather than written words on the face. Nonetheless, we see “surveillance by the face, as Strindberg said” (ATP, 115) do not we? Hence, Deleuze and Guattari give their attention to this surveillance. They place black holes on a white wall and say what needs to be said of a face to the face. Only for the sake of comparison, if we assume faciality is a surface to meet, Deleuze and Guattari, and the face comes together on opposite sides of this surface. It is difficult to inscribe the face throughout under the circumstances. Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari place themselves somewhere outside the face. Their faces never come up. What about the surface philosopher’s face? There is no doubt, “they have already dismantled the face”, is not an answer.

At this point, here comes the unmasked metaphor. It is time to look at *the face* inside a face. The unmasked metaphor unites and separates itself unlike Bacon’s “uniting-separating technique” (See FB, 88). It does not take itself as a whole when it unites itself. In regards to the unmasked metaphor, what striking is that it is “very different and very similar to” the problems of faciality. In brief, not only the face but also Deleuze and Guattari’s face (the white wall/black hole system) is in front of us. Furthermore, they seem nearer. In this context, the unmasked metaphor or *the face* is nothing more than binoculars.

If the unmasked metaphor simply becomes binoculars, not only each part of the face; but also black holes and the white wall will be more noticeable. Everything can be recognizable no matter how difficult it is -not far-. This method –if it is a method- of writing faciality also implies the fact that the face cannot be taken as a pure combination of a wall and holes. In other words, the face is more than a w(all)hole surface. Deleuze and Guattari write that “the black hole (...) operates by binarization” and “faciality is always a multiplicity” (ATP, 182). On the contrary, we think parts of the face forms a multiplicity not “the white wall/black hole system”.

Deleuze and Guattari's voyage to the surface creates a typical "inhuman face". What we mean by typical is, nothing seems weird in pop philosophy, especially monstrosity. More importantly, they indicate us the monster for showing the result of "becoming". At last, "inhuman face" cannot surprise us. The fact is, whether we call it as inhuman or human, face is the face. Above all, the face is still the same face in "American psychology" (see ATP, 169). That is what deserves to be noticed. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari do not say something new when they declare that "the face is a veritable megaphone" (ATP, 179).

A language is always embedded in the faces that announce its statements and ballast them in relation to the signifiers in progress and subjects concerned. Choices are guided by faces, elements are organized around faces: a common grammar is never separable from a facial education (ATP, 179).

In sum, what is striking is that it is difficult to say something new on the face. Faciality is rooted in/on *the face*. Faciality all by itself explains why Deleuze gives so importance to Carroll and especially his Humpty Dumpty. When the "surface-monsters" show us the face of the face, Deleuze and Guattari imply an answer to Artaud's unasked questions in *Le Visage Humain*. On the other hand, "since all semiotics are mixed and strata come at least in twos, it should come as no surprise that a very special mechanism is situated at their intersection. Oddly enough, it is a face: the *white wall/black hole* system" (ATP, 167). There is no doubt, Deleuze and Guattari always concern with the problem of that special mechanism which is inscribed on our heads, namely the face.

The unmasked metaphor attempts to separate the inhuman surface from Deleuze and Guattari for two reasons. The first of these reasons is, Deleuze and Guattari's pop philosophy / "becoming" is, in Massumi's words, "bodily-thought"<sup>129</sup>. According to Deleuze and Guattari "the head is included in the body, but the face is not (...) The face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body" (ATP, 170). In sum, faciality focuses on this opposition between the face and the body. Thus, Deleuze and Guattari mainly

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<sup>129</sup> Massumi, op.cit., 99.

create such a philosophy for the sake of the survival of the body. Their “line of flight” only shows a way to the body in order to run away.

Besides, the monstrosity of a face is totally different from Deleuzian monstrosity. This implies *the face's* opposition to Deleuzian face and the body. “Inhuman” comes out not because the face clashes with Deleuze's, in Massumi's words, “bodily-thought”; but it cannot be one whole face. If we make use of Deleuzian “multiplicity”, we will easily say that it is possible to speak of multiplicities of different monstrosities on the face and in the face. In brief, the face seems a short-cut for Deleuze and Guattari in order to define what is wrong with us. For us, it is rather a dead-end. It is also important to note that, Deleuze and Guattari write as if they know the face very well, they assert “all faces envelop an unknown, unexplored landscape” (ATP, 172), though. Thus, “to know the unknown” causes trouble. Faciality can only be constructed on multiplicities of not really known. In other words, there is something possibly unknown in what you already know.

Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, “facialized body” cannot be spoken of since the situation is quite the opposite in terms of each part of the face. The nose, the mouth, even the eye are seeking to become faces as well as bodies. At this point, we should remember Kovaliov's nose once again. He has not only a nose-face; but also a body of a civil councillor.

With regard to Wilde's saying, which we have mentioned in the eye section (See 53), we can easily say that Deleuze and Guattari take their white wall/black hole system “too seriously”. It is crucial to note that this does not mean to reject what they have already said of a face to the face. The point is, their black holes, especially those which relates with the eyes, either replace the eye (see, “the empty eye” ATP, 177 ) or hide behind the eye (see ATP, 184). On the other hand, white wall can be all of the flat surfaces since each flat is likely irritable white. As a result, white wall/black holes are here or there. Moby Dick or something else, it does not matter for Deleuze and Guattari as long as there is a “white” surface which they are able to speak of in order to depict the endless lines of their face's surveillance.

Finally, the unmasked metaphor falls down and salutes “the importance of the *fall* [*chute*] in Bacon's work” (FB, 21). It falls because it is no more a white surface with black holes. It falls because it is able to neglect “fundamental neurosis” (see

ATP, 114) which Deleuze and Guattari mention. It falls because it is similar to and different from “the white wall/black hole system”. It falls because it nearly completes its own line of flight. At the beginning of the unmasked metaphor, to slaughter the parts of the face is emphasized (see, 29). When we do this, it is important to clarify that we are not following “the butcher painter” Bacon who says, “I’ve always been very moved by pictures about slaughterhouses and meat, and to me they belong very much to the whole thing of the Crucifixion... Of course, we are meat, we are potential carcasses” (cited in FB, 22). In addition, “meat is the common zone of man and the beast, their zone of indiscernibility; it is a “fact”, a state where the painter identifies with the objects of his horror and his compassion” (FB, 21) according to Deleuze’s Bacon and Bacon. On the contrary, we do not give such a priority to the meat. To slaughter the parts of the face has nothing to do with Bacon’s saying, “we are meat” in the end. As a matter of fact, the face is already separated, slaughtered by itself. In this context, the unmasked metaphor reminds us of neither Bacon’s painted meats nor the whalemens of *Pequod*’s utterance “butchers we are, that is true”<sup>130</sup> or even Deleuze and Guattari.

In the end, we see three faces: the archaic “human” face; the “inhuman face” and the unmasked metaphor (or in/human face). They all come together and making a “concrete” one face. Three faces become one and it somehow reminds us of Bacon’s *triptychs*. The unmasked metaphor falls down and the monsters become visible not “imperceptible”, on the surface. The difference lies in what we see, not in what we already know.

From the beginning, “everything is eventually turned into the body”<sup>131</sup>, except the face. An interesting finding was that not only Artaud’s but also Deleuze and Guattari’s thoughts are especially body-centered. Hence, the Christ face is, in particular, a body not the face, not even the “facialized body” as Deleuze and Guattari say. It will not be an exaggeration to say that how to make the body awake is what Deleuze and Guattari are mainly concerned with. In regards to pop philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari cannot stand the body’s “neurotic lying on the

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<sup>130</sup> Melville, op.cit., 126.

<sup>131</sup> Artaud, op.cit., 1988, lii.

analyst's couch" that impedes "a breath of fresh air, a relationship with the outside world" (AO, 2).

The important concern is, the body abundantly becomes everything both in pop philosophy and for Artaud. For instance, the body is a kind of scale for Artaud to measure "the quantity of suffering"<sup>132</sup>. And the body throws a suffering gaze to its schizophrenic successor, who goes for a surface "walk" (AO, 2) on pop philosophy. In the end, the body will be questioned or not questioned in order to find out how to "remake myself."<sup>133</sup> At this point, the face or the "concrete face", with all its opposition also provokes such a desire "TO FIND ONESELF AGAIN"<sup>134</sup>. When the face is in Deleuze and Guattari's hands, the solution hardly lies in finding a man without a face since they create "faceless", instead. The body has to turn itself into BwO in order to escape. If we consider Deleuze and Guattari, we will say "becoming" definitely corresponds to the body. The body has to awake from its "neurotic" sleep. The face, on the other hand, is the cause of our "deep" sleep. As long as there is a face on your head, it seems impossible to draw the line of flight. Artaud says "we will appear when we have something to say".<sup>135</sup> What about the face? *Le Visage Humain* shows that the face appears when it has nothing to say.

It is crucial to note that "the white wall/black hole system" indicates where the starting-point of dismantling should begin, in order to reach that "becoming". Under these circumstances, the face particularly refers to being. If we summarize this process, we will say: to be a face versus to become a body (without organs). That is what Deleuze and Guattari focus on. At this point, thinking that the heads have been painted instead of faces will not mean dismantling the face, unlike Deleuze's Bacon that we have seen in the previous section. We think that only the parts of the face can dismantle *the face* itself. Therefore, to say "I am faceless" does not solve anything unless we visually become so. Strictly speaking, "to disrupt the patterns of faciality

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid., liii.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., 25.

and disengage the forces that are regulated and controlled by the prevailing regime of signs”<sup>136</sup> is not sufficient to become “faceless”. Hence, unlike Deleuze’s assertion, even Bacon did not create the “faceless” man. In brief, to say a word on the “system” of the white wall/black hole system or to paint as Bacon, does not even harm “the white wall/black hole” at all.

At this point, there is a need to state another obstacle, namely the Waste Bin (WB) on the surface of pop philosophy. First of all, it seems at least “odd” to choose to get ourselves into trouble voluntarily by inventing problems for Deleuze and Guattari. However, we believe not only concepts; but also obstacles should be created on the surface. Nonetheless, counter-face(s) and face(s) come together on the sur(face). As a matter of fact, the WB was created as a “helper” of pop philosophy. On the contrary, at present, it is “troublesome”. Before giving details on that transformation, we will first briefly revise what Deleuze and Guattari bring to philosophy.

According to Deleuze and Guattari “philosophy is the art of forming, inventing and fabricating concepts” (WP, 2). Furthermore, to emphasize the significance of creating concepts, Deleuze and Guattari make use of Nietzsche: “philosophers must distrust most those concepts they did not create themselves” (see Nietzsche cited in WP, 6). For this reason, they oppose “given knowledge or representation” (WP, 11). The fact is, “the concept is not given, it is created; it is to be created. It is not formed but posits itself in itself—it is a self positing (...) the most subjective will be the most objective” (WP, 11). Doubtless, “the most subjective” is thought-provoking and Deleuze and Guattari’s point gives us the courage to have the “most subjective” word on pop philosophy. Therefore, we consider what else can be created concerning their faciality. We focus on what happened to “given” thoughts which Deleuze and Guattari are opposed to. The crucial point is, given thoughts which impede “creativity” should really be thrown into a kind of container. To have a container at least in terms of cleaning out all the “given knowledge” may actually correspond to Deleuze and Guattari’s intention. In brief, the WB comes out because of the willingness to find a place for the rejected thoughts.

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<sup>136</sup> Bogue, op.cit., 5.



Naturally, neither Deleuze nor Guattari is concerned with what happens to given thoughts in the end since they give a priority to create concepts. On the other hand, we are particularly concerned with those given thoughts. The most important question is, are they really gone when they are thrown away? In order to answer we give the characteristics of the waste bin. To begin with, each “plateau” has its own waste bin. On the other hand, in this section the WB, which we focus on, is in the service of faciality. In other words, this WB actually belongs to the “year zero” plateau. Strictly speaking, it is placed right beside “the department of faciality” in Deleuze and Guattari’s concept “factory”. We need this WB in faciality on the grounds that Deleuze and Guattari cannot dismantle the face. Fundamentally, the Waste Bin (WB) comes out to keep *the face* away from the body. It is also crucial to note that “given thoughts” become “given faces” (see ATP, 177) in terms of faciality. Thus we are able to throw *the face* into the WB. In a sense, it visually indicates the first step of becoming-faceless in pop philosophy. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the face is one of the “eight aspects or principles” which “defines the signifying regime of the sign” (ATP, 117). Moreover, the face is “the body of the signifier” (ATP, 117). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari’s suggestion of destroying the face actually indicates dismantling the body of the signifier. After all, what Deleuze and Guattari do is to reveal the face of the regime of signs. On the other hand, to throw *the face* itself into the WB indicates not “thought-in-dismantling”; but “act of destroying”. The point is, by throwing the face into WB, we naturally eliminate the space which the signifier settles in.

It is important to perceive that the WB is not a metaphor. It is not “visually” different from any other waste bin. What makes it special is the waste itself, which we have mentioned above. When the WB comes to the border of faciality, its duty is to accept the “given faces”. However, something happens. The WB “cracks” in a Deleuzian sense. But why does the WB want to crack?

If one asks (...) why the crack is desirable, it is perhaps because only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs, that anything that is good and great in humanity enters and exits through it, in people ready to destroy themselves—better death than the health which are given (LS, 160).

Then the WB is full of faces and now it throws us *the face* back. In a sense, we can speak of a kind of circulation in this context. Whenever we throw *the face* into waste bin, the waste bin throws the face back to us. We will say that in terms of the WB, Trasheology -refusal of waste as a waste bin- begins. However, we face a problem that we do not envisage. Although letting the WB throw the face is too Deleuzian, it makes the WB troublesome. In brief, we neither dismantle nor throw the face into waste bin. In addition, we are unable to follow the inspector Deleuze. We draw circles. We go on asking the same Deleuzian question: What happened? In order to find a clue we summarize the situation. There is a besom in our hands, we are confused and will be tired of sweeping the fallen faces. After all, if we cannot find a solution, we will sweep till eternity. We try to find a name for what we are unable to explain. Deleuze asserts that “it is true that the crack is nothing if it does not compromise the body” (LS, 161). On the other hand, the WB cracks without cracking a body. How is it possible? As we have mentioned in the previous section Deleuze and Guattari clashes the face with the BwO. In terms of the waste bin we would like to emphasize the difference between the thrown body and the thrown face. First of all, there is no need to throw the body away, because the body will vanish when it makes itself a BwO. Secondly, Deleuze and Guattari only suggest dismantling the face. It can be said that Deleuze and Guattari suggest freeing ourselves from the face, because the face is unable to “become”. Therefore, the body is hardly thrown away whereas it is somehow possible for the face to be thrown away from the WB. The most important question is, if we only see the face which is thrown away from a bin, what will it really come in handy?

The besom. To sweep the faces that falls on the surface. The WB. To throw the faces up into the air. Once Deleuze had a word on “the head in the clouds” (LS, 127) and now it is time to speak of “the face in the clouds” because of the crack of the WB. As a result of the crack, the faces are not only on the sur(face); but also really on each surface. Moreover, the faces are in the air. This time, we are under “surveillance by the face” (ATP, 115) in a different way.

At this point, cats will be used as a reinforcement. The question is, what cats can do. As we all know, it is normal to see cats around bins. Thus, to place the cats right beside our WB will not be extraordinary. The difference is, these cats are

created. They can be any “already created” cat except Carroll’s “smiling cat” which Deleuze is very fond of (see FB, 25). All in all, the Cheshire cat is the smile all by itself, “grinning from ear to ear”<sup>137</sup>. When Carroll’s cat “vanished (...) the grin (...) remained some time after the rest of it had gone”<sup>138</sup>. As can be seen, there is no such thing to give a duty to the Cheshire Cat. Deleuzian “becoming-imperceptible” is unbearable right now. Although we do not choose the smiling cat, we will make use of another cat in Carroll’s stories. For instance, Alice’s cat is suitable in this context. Our created cat can be either Alice’s cat or the other nameless cat. In particular, we suggest ignoring Alice’s white kitten and black kitten in *Through the Looking Glass* for a while. Nonetheless, what we expect from these cats will be not proper for kittens. It is also crucial to sustain “multiplicity” of the cats. At this point, we should explain what we want from those cats. The truth is that it is not easy to explain. In order to cope with that difficulty we make use of Carroll once again. After all, there is always somehow a way in Carroll to make everything possible. Once Carroll’s Alice asked: “do cats eat bats, I wonder?”<sup>139</sup> while she was falling down the rabbit-hole. Since bats were what she saw in the air. Although Alice cannot get an answer, her question gives us the courage to ask “do cats eat faces?” After the WB’s crack, faces are what we see in the air. As we clearly see, both bats and faces imply the same question. Although there is not a sound to be heard, we somehow get an answer to our question. If our question is the same as Alice’s question in a sense, then the answer will be the same. As a matter of fact, our “created” cats disappear more quickly than they appear. That shows us something. Every cat potentially becomes Carroll’s “Cheshire cat”.

Since we are not able to find even one cat, there is only one thing left to be done. To touch the face. It is obvious that fallen faces thrown in the WB remind us of masks. Since the mask is the face (ATP, 115) as to Deleuze and Guattari, we certainly take Dario Fo’s comment on masks into consideration. Fo says,

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<sup>137</sup> Carroll, op.cit., 81.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid., 28.

For a start, the mask imposes a particular obligation: it cannot be touched. Once you lay a hand on that thing drawn over your face, it vanishes, or appears contaminated or nauseating. Seeing hands on a mask is damaging and unbearable.<sup>140</sup>

There is no doubt, “the white wall/black hole system” looks ahead as long as we are unable to dismantle it. The WB also refuses *the face* as we have seen above. Thus, if the hands can damage *the face*, somehow they will help us to get out of the face. If we are unable to dismantle it, then we will at least harm Deleuzian “form of expression” and “form of content” of *the face*. It is time to cover the face with hands. To touch the face implies a way to clash with the face on the face (cf. *The Eye and The Hand* in FB, 124-129). It seems possible to make headway with the hands.

On the other hand, is there another way in “and...and...and”? There is no doubt, one of the most striking point of pop philosophy is “to establish a logic of the AND” (ATP, 25). It is important to note that “the tree imposes the verb ‘to be’, but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, ‘and...and...and...’ This conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb ‘to be’” (ATP, 25). As can be seen, it is possible to “uproot” the trees according to Deleuze and Guattari. However, even making use of “and...and...and” cannot be sufficient in the case of the “to be” face. Additionally, we have already indicated the fact that there is no way to uproot the “three-noses-tree” in the unmasked metaphor. In terms of faciality, what Deleuze and Guattari are missing is, “to be” also constructs its own “and...and...and...”

As we all know, the face is deceitful since each part of the face creates its own “multiplicities”. After all, “multiplicity is precisely in the ‘and’” (N, 44). It can be said that the face “shamelessly” makes use of Deleuzian concepts. The face and the face and the face is not “creative” in a Deleuzian sense. But, according to Deleuze “‘and...and...and...’ is precisely a creative stammering, a foreign use of language, as opposed to a conformist and dominant use based on the verb ‘to be’” (N, 44). Additionally, “[And] is always in-between, between two things; it’s the borderline, there’s always a border, a line of flight or flow, only we don’t see it, because it’s the least perceptible of things” (N, 45).

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<sup>140</sup> Fo, as cited in Rudlin, op.cit., 42.

In contrast to “And”, there is no such thing as “in-between” in the face’s “logic of And”. So to speak, “And” is rather an accumulation of faces in this context. In addition, the face itself can be “a foreign use” of *the face*. Although Deleuze and Guattari’s “inhuman face” attempts to free ourselves from faciality, we will be drowned in that faciality unless we reveal the face’s “And”. To sum up, to touch the face might be the key. However, we are searching for a Deleuzian solution, because the face is still walking in/on faciality of pop philosophy. That is why we keep asking, is there a hope in the e(a)nd?

### **2.3. How The Scapegoat Looks**

If one wants to “crack” immediately, one of the best thing to do is, to take a break “on several regimes of signs” (ATP, 111-148). In that part, Deleuze and Guattari focus on how the “regimes of signs” order one’s life. Although they depict such a “bleak” atmosphere, something lights up in the dark: The scapegoat.

The scapegoat is, in particular, magical, pop philosophy does not say so, though. Even to utter its name will be enough to put the “regimes of signs” into trouble. At first glance, to be stamped as a scapegoat indicates a severe punishment. Additionally, “in the signifying regime, the scapegoat represents a new form of increasing entropy in the system of signs: it is charged with everything that was ‘bad’ in a given period” (ATP, 116). However, Deleuze and Guattari’s term causes pain instead of suffering. There is no doubt that to follow the “bad” implies a “flight” in a Deleuzian sense.

Deleuze and Guattari’s two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* present two challenging figures. These are the scapegoat and the schizophrenic. If we consider what they particularly struggle with, we will make use of Deleuze and Guattari’s *lines*. On the one hand, “the schizophrenic is the universal producer” (AO, 7) and it is opposed to “being oedipalized”. The word “schizophrenic” seems especially chosen in order to emphasize anti-Freudian perspective by Deleuze and Guattari. Nonetheless, “Freud doesn’t like schizophrenics. He doesn’t like their resistance to being oedipalized (...) They mistake words for things, he says. They are

apathetic, narcissistic, cut off from reality, incapable of achieving transference; they resemble philosophers— ‘an undesirable resemblance’” (AO, 23).

The scapegoat, on the other hand, implies “everything that resisted signifying signs, everything that eluded the referral from sign to sign through the different circles” (ATP, 116). In a sense, the scapegoat is the name of the schizo “on several regimes of signs” (see ATP, 116-117). However, there is a slight difference between the two. The scapegoat rebels in silence whereas the schizophrenic starts with “walking” (see AO, 2). In other words, the scapegoat, “the goat’s anus stands opposite the face of the despot or god” (ATP, 116) and the schizophrenic walks for “the line of flight”. In brief, they refer to acting in a different way since “everything that acts is a cruelty”<sup>141</sup>.

To be called as a threat, the scapegoat does not have to do many things as long as it is clearly seen. The question is, how the scapegoat looks. Deleuze and Guattari clearly state that “the faceless, depressive scapegoat emanating from the center, chosen, treated and adorned by the priests, cutting across the circles in its headlong flight into the desert” (ATP, 116). What is striking is that the scapegoat probably becomes a scapegoat because it is “faceless”. Thus, the scapegoat’s looks directly indicates an opposition to the face.

The face is so worthy of note in the “regimes of signs” since “in every society, discursive and nondiscursive power relations are organized according to a ‘regime of signs’, within which the face functions as an active visual component”<sup>142</sup>. Additionally, Deleuze and Guattari consider the face as one of “the aspects in the signifying regime of signs” (see ATP, 117). Therefore, to be contrasted with the face means to be opposed to the touchstone of the system. We have already answered what the scapegoat does. The question is, what will the “regimes of signs” do to the scapegoat? Deleuze and Guattari also declare the fact that “anything that threatens to put the system to flight will be killed or put to flight itself. Anything that exceeds the excess of the signifier or passes beneath it will be marked with a negative value” (ATP, 116).

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<sup>141</sup> Artaud, op.cit., 1958, 85.

<sup>142</sup> Bogue, op.cit., 5.

In this section, we especially focus on the opposition between the scapegoat and the face. As a matter of fact, we make severe changes on Deleuze and Guattari's scapegoat. Thus, we are also unable to say "we will be our own scapegoat" (ATP, 122). In the first place, we change the scapegoat's position. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari, the scapegoat does not face the "inhuman face"; but it is on the face. Secondly, the scapegoat is different not because it is a "faceless body"; but because it is neither the body nor the face in a Deleuzian sense. We assert that it can be spoken of multiplicities on the appearance of the scapegoat. In other words, how the scapegoat looks has no answer because what the scapegoat is depends on where it stands on the face. There is no doubt, it can be spoken of a lot of options if we take the three faces of the face into consideration.

At this point, concerning the three faces of the face, we should once again emphasize the difference between Deleuze and Guattari's thought and this study in terms of faciality. First of all, we do not particularly follow the "models" of Deleuze and Guattari to analyse the face. Ronald Bogue points out "Deleuze and Guattari suggest (...) that an analysis of the face may be reduced to three basic models; 'primitive heads', 'the Christ-face system' and 'probe heads'".<sup>143</sup> Unlike Deleuze and Guattari's "three faces"; the human face, the "inhuman face" and the unmasked metaphor, which we have mentioned in the previous sections, are hardly a model. Besides, those three which imply one face attempt to consider Deleuze and Guattari's faciality differently. For this reason, we only focus on *the face*.

Concerning this main difference, each challenge to the face is on the face in this study. For this reason, the counter figure, namely the scapegoat should be placed right on the face. At this point, we should emphasize the fact that although we change the scapegoat's position and the appearance "a little bit multiple", we do not change its Deleuzian intention. After all, we also emphasize why the face is opposed to the baddy: to see a walking scapegoat on the face; that is, what the "inhuman face" cannot stand. At this point, *the face*, which we have focused on, is particularly "in-between" whether to become Deleuzian "inhuman face" or not.

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<sup>143</sup> Ibid., 109.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, the scapegoat “incarnates that line of flight the signifying regime cannot tolerate, in other words, an absolute deterritorialization; the regime must block a line of this kind or define it in an entirely negative fashion precisely” (ATP, 116). There is no doubt, it is essential to draw the line of flight on the face. The scapegoat can stand by the face and can sarcastically say: “this way goes to the exit”.

On the other hand, the scapegoat on the face does not have to be a real scapegoat. If it has been chosen as one, no proof will be required. According to Deleuze and Guattari the scapegoat is “under a curse” (ATP, 116). For this reason, it indicates a “line of flight”. In addition, the face’s purpose is always clear on the scapegoat; if the “curse” is contagious, the scapegoat should be excluded. On the other hand, there is no way to keep the scapegoat away from the face. As the scapegoat continuously changes, the despot’s method in the signifying regime becomes, in a word, useless on the face.

However, there is a risk to become a scapegoat on the sur(face). The point is, the scapegoat will turn into the face’s “puppet” when it is on the face. So to speak, it may come in handy for the face. For instance, the scapegoat will be used to imply what the face is not. What is more, when the scapegoat is able to draw its line of flight, it will not be called as “disaster” for the face as long as there is not any follower. It is time to ask one more question to confuse the “heads”: are there enough space in Deleuze and Guattari’s “puppet theater” (see ATP, 47) for the face’s potential puppet?

What makes the scapegoat a scapegoat is actually its resistance not only to leave the face; but also to be used by the face. On the other hand, the face is unable to “kill” the scapegoat. As we have mentioned above, the scapegoat is not suffering. The point is, the face will “kill” itself while it is preparing its “fatal traps” to kill the scapegoat. The face’s enemy is on the face. For a while, if we assume there is actually a way to “kill” the scapegoat, the plan will fail since the face has to find the scapegoat first.

At this point, there is a need to answer where the scapegoats exactly are on the face. Each scapegoat’s line of flight violates the face’s several lines of flight.



Most of them are what we have already mentioned in the previous sections. In order to be more concrete, it is time to show the scapegoats and their adversaries:

Table 2.3.1 **The Scapegoat Versus The Adversary**

The Three-Noses-Tree	The Inhuman Face
The Eyes	The Three-Noses-Tree
The Mouth	The Body
The Face	The Mouth
The Unmasked Metaphor	The Inhuman Face
The Inhuman Face	The Human Face
The Human Face	The Unmasked Metaphor
The Hands	The Face (Fo's remark)
The Smile	Deleuze's smile
The Nostrils	Deleuze
Pedrolino (W3)	The White Wall
The Black Holes	Pedrolino
The Scapegoat on <i>the face</i>	The Scapegoat faces the face

What does this table imply? To begin with, there is not only one scapegoat on the face. Secondly, the three faces of the face clash with one another in the presence of the scapegoat. Thirdly, the face itself becomes the scapegoat of the mouth. Finally, considering the white wall and black holes the unmasked metaphor and Deleuze stamps each other as a scapegoat. The table shows us the fact that the term scapegoat is not only Deleuzian; but also anti-Deleuzian. After all, the scapegoat on *the face* versus the scapegoat faces the face. The first refers both to “become” Deleuzian and “to be” anti-Deleuzian while the latter refers absolutely to Deleuzian “becoming” in terms of faciality.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE CALLING OF DERMOCOSMETICS

From the beginning, we make use of the opposition between the face and Deleuze and Guattari's pop philosophy. What is striking is that the faciality inscribes us an unchanged "inhuman face". In the previous chapter, we have firstly emphasized the difference between depth and surface with regard to faciality. Secondly, we have mainly made use of assertions of the physiognomy on a face to indicate the difference of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the "inhuman face". Thirdly, we have focused on the parts of the face and asserted their importance in terms of understanding *the face*. In brief, we have not only emphasized the difference of Deleuze and Guattari's faciality; but have also attempted to think differently in faciality.

In this chapter, we no more study *the face* in faciality. On the other hand, it is important to perceive that all faces, which are taken into consideration in this study, oppose Deleuzian "becoming". The fact is, how they oppose "becoming" is different from one another. These oppositions give us a chance to emphasize the difference of pop philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari firstly answer what philosophy is not in order to "create" their own philosophy. At this point, in order to emphasize the significance of "creating concepts", they attract our attention to be aware of philosophy's rivals (see WP, 2-12). This chapter comes out from the idea that the face can also be the focal-point of the struggle between Deleuze and Guattari and their rivals in general. In this way, we have a chance to see how "the face is produced in humanity" (ATP,170). We make use of another opposition with regard to faciality in this chapter. So to speak, we attempt to reveal the opposition between Deleuze and Guattari and one of the "shameless and inane rivals" of pop philosophy: advertising (see WP, 10-11).

Ladies and Gentlemen, the advertising is on the stage. Since advertising

*creates*<sup>144</sup> those “given faces”, there is no need for cats to be around the WB. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “all the disciplines of communication, seized hold of the word *concept* itself and said: ‘This is our concern, we are the creative ones, we are the *ideas men*! We are the friends of the concept (...)’ (WP, 10). In other words, to *create* becomes the way of presenting what has already been “given” in advertising. “The concept has become the set of product displays” (WP, 10). That all by itself explains why advertising is totally “unbearable” for Deleuze and Guattari.

In this chapter, we focus on the advertisement itself in the case of advertising. It means we do not consider how the advertisements are produced. Secondly, we only study the advertisements in which we only see the face itself. For this reason, we choose cosmetic advertisements. However, not every cosmetic advertisement will be studied. We only take dermocosmetic advertisements into consideration.

The question is, why we especially choose dermocosmetic advertisements. To begin with, we want to stress on a specific connection between faciality and these advertisements. In other words, the face in dermocosmetic advertisements implies Deleuzian faciality. On the other hand, there are also some differences between the two which deserve to be noticed. For instance, dermocosmetic advertisements also make the face “inhuman” but not in a Deleuzian sense. We rather focus on these differences in detail in the following sections.

Secondly, dermocosmetic advertisements differ from the other cosmetic advertisements in terms of the purpose of *creating*. To put it differently, they promise not to make a new face from your face; but to give your *the [young] face* back. It can be said that, dermocosmetics advertisements *create the face* whereas the other cosmetic advertisements *create for the face*.

At this point, it is time to speak of “the abstract machine” which is also called “the faciality machine (...) because it performs the facialization of the entire body (ATP, 181). Deleuze and Guattari clearly state that “the abstract machine is necessarily ‘much more’ than language” (ATP, 141). It is so note worthy in terms of “producing faciality” (ATP, 170). On the other hand, “the abstract machine in itself is destratified, deterritorialized; it has no form of its own (much less substance) and

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<sup>144</sup> In this chapter, concerning advertising we use the verb *create* in italics to emphasize Deleuze and Guattari’s opposition to the usage of this verb in communication.

makes no distinction within itself between content and expression (...)” (ATP, 141).

It is essential to note that “the black hole/white wall system is (...) not a face but the abstract machine that produces faces according to the changeable combinations of its cogwheels. Do not expect the abstract machine to resemble what it produces, or will produce” (ATP, 168). It is also possible to speak of the abstract machine in terms of dermocosmetic advertisements. The abstract machine of these advertisements also follows its predecessor in order not to make any distinction between “content and expression”. Besides, the face has been studied concerning the “regimes of signs” by Deleuze and Guattari (see ATP, 111-117). A regime of signs indicates “a formalization of expression” (ATP, 140). On the other hand,

Content should be understood not simply as the hand and tools but a technical social machine that preexist them and constitutes state of force or formations of power. Expression should be understood not simply as the face and language, or individual languages, but as a semiotic collective machine that preexist them and constitutes regimes of signs. A formation of power is much more than a tool; a regime of signs is much more than a language (ATP, 63).

However, expression becomes simply a face in terms of dermocosmetic advertisements. Although “the abstract machine is pure Matter-Function—a diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions and contents it will distribute” (ATP, 141), it is hardly possible to separate expression and content from the abstract machine of dermocosmetic advertisements. Thus, it can be spoken of simplicity when we take dermocosmetic advertisements’s “content” and “expression” into consideration. Above all, everything is nothing but the face in these advertisements.

Pop philosophy highlights that “expression then constitutes indexes, icons, or symbols that enter regimes or semiotic systems. Content then constitutes bodies, things, or objects that enter physical systems, organisms, and organizations” (ATP, 143). If we choose “a body” as a content, the “facialized body” of dermocosmetic advertisements will be the one. Concerning “expression”, these advertisements construct a new form of expression on *the face*. That is, in a word, “anti-wrinkles” as we shall see in the next section. Doubtless, “expression” becomes what is not expressive.

It is also crucial to note that “the diagrammatic or the abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” (ATP, 142). The point is, “the abstract machine is interpretation. It is the meaning process, from the point of view of a given expression”<sup>145</sup>. Deleuze and Guattari’s “given face” (ATP, 177) indicates that “given expression”. Furthermore, “content and expression are in a state of what Deleuze and Guattari call ‘reciprocal presupposition’. One does not exist without the other. They are mutually determining. And although they are always mixed in fact, they are distinct in nature.”<sup>146</sup> On the other hand, it is hardly possible to say that content and expression are “distinct in nature” in/on dermocosmetic advertisements. Hence, both “form of content” and “form of expression” are “simply” displayed on the face of dermocosmetic advertisements.

The calling of dermocosmetic advertisements can be considered as the calling of becoming-Dorian Gray. The “Christ-face” of faciality becomes the face of Dorian Gray in/on these advertisements. To put it differently, the “facialized body” of Christ becomes Dorian Gray. In a sense, these advertisements create their own God. In this way, dermocosmetic advertisements suggest us to forget the eye and the picture. The message becomes rather simple: “you deserve to be young whatever it costs”. Sarcastically speaking, at least we do not have to be “bad” to become young: “What a wonderful world!”

“Becoming-young” provokes us to think on the changeable skin of the unchanged face. At first glance, the skin or the sur(face) gives us an opportunity to see not only the difference between Deleuze and Guattari, and dermocosmetics but also the difference of pop philosophy from Deleuzian “media machine” in a broad sense. In other words, it seems the struggle between Deleuze and Guattari, and dermocosmetic advertisements can be considered as a forerunner of the struggle between communication and pop philosophy at first. An interesting finding was that the face is determined not to say a word on that issue.

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<sup>145</sup> Massumi, *op.cit.*, 17.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

There is also a need to focus on “the language of advertisements” in a Deleuzian sense. Deleuze points that “we are dealing instead with a victim in search of a torturer (...) in order to realize the strangest of schemes. This is why advertisements are part of the language of masochism while they have no place in true sadism (...)” (M, 20). We are not dealing with the victims -if they are spectators, consumers, and so on- of dermocosmetic advertisements. However, if we name the victim differently concerning faciality, then Deleuzian way of drawing a parallel between masochism and advertisements will be agreeable. The victim and the torturer is the face itself in dermocosmetic advertisements.

Although the face is not willing to speak of the opposition between philosophy and communication, their difference should be clearly stated. Concerning with the communication, advertising deserves a special credit since it “is not a form of communication but a way of using forms of communication to achieve effects”<sup>147</sup>. The face becomes a space in where Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy and “intentional communication”<sup>148</sup>, namely advertising come together. The face is in silence. For the sake of its unknown “form of content” and “form of expression”, dermocosmetic advertisements not only cut the faciality out from Deleuze and Guattari’s plateaus; but also dismantle Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*.

If we make a recapitulation, we will say that the calling of dermocosmetics deserves to be noticed for such reasons in terms of faciality. To begin with, the faciality *ete kemiğe büründü*, dermocosmetic *diye göründü*<sup>149</sup>. Secondly, the “inhuman face” is thought-provoking since it is totally different in dermocosmetic advertisements. Thirdly, concerning “the language of masochism”, it is able to speak of a different connection between the victim and the torturer in/on these advertisements. In other words, what we see is a victim-torturer face. Finally, anti-

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<sup>147</sup> Graeme Burton, *More Than Meets the Eye: An Introduction to Media Studies* (London: Edward Arnold, 1993), 116.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> We make use of Yunus Emre’s saying, “Ete Kemiğe büründüm, Yunus oluban göründüm” for the face in order to designate the connection between faciality and dermocosmetic advertisements more clearly. There is no doubt, whatever is of “flesh and bone” is dedicated to Bacon. See Yunus Emre’s saying cited in ed. Sabahattin Eyuboğlu, *Yunus Emre* (İstanbul: Cem, 1971), 18.

aging process will be in question. Above all, it is also crucial to answer what happens to pop philosophy when dermocosmetic advertisements are on the stage to have a word on the face.

### **3.1. A New Form Of Expression: Anti-Wrinkles**

The face<sup>150</sup> takes a walk on “a thousand plateaus” in order to reverse Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts. It might be asked what the purpose of the face is. As a matter of fact, the face wants to take the skin back. Deleuze indicates that the skin is the “deepest” surface (LS, 103). More importantly, according to Deleuze “philosophy [is] a general dermatology or art of surfaces (...)” (N, 87). In case of the skin, it can be said that dermocosmetic advertisements are contrary to “general dermatology”.

The face does not consider Deleuzian “form”, “matter”, “substance”, “expression” or “content”. The fact is that the face constructs a matter of the skin. The face does not make any difference between depth and surface since it becomes the skin, not in a Deleuzian sense. Deleuze, on the other hand, always gives priority to the surface without “sinking into the depths”<sup>151</sup> According to Deleuze “this discovery that the strangest things are on the surface or as Valéry would say, that ‘the skin is deepest’ would be unimportant if it did not carry with it an entire organization of language: Carrollian language”.<sup>152</sup> The face has its own concepts and language which directly indicates just the opposite of pop philosophy.

The question is, how does the face change Deleuzian concepts? The face is a collector of concepts on “a thousand plateaus” without attaching much importance to their meaning. So to speak, if it defines Deleuze and Guattari’s “smooth space” differently, the concept will no more indicate pop philosophy’s “nomodology”. As we shall see, the face is fond of the word “smooth” since it directly indicates a new

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<sup>150</sup> The face we speak of in this entire chapter is the face in dermocosmetic advertisements.

<sup>151</sup> Gilles Deleuze, “The Schizophrenic and Language: Surface and Depth in Lewis Carroll and Antonin Artaud” in *Textual Strategies*, op.cit., 280.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid., 281.

form of expression: anti-wrinkles. In brief, the starting-point is “smooth space” for the face.

In order to be more concrete, we go into details of making a smooth face from the “smooth space”. Deleuze and Guattari clearly speak of “the mixture of two spaces” in “certain number of models” (see ATP 474-500). These spaces are, the smooth space (nomad space) and the striated space (sedentary space) (ATP, 474). Additionally, “there are points, lines and surfaces” in both spaces (ATP, 478). On the other hand, we think the most important difference between the two spaces is “all progress is made by and in striated space, but all becoming occurs in smooth space” (ATP, 486).

Movements, speed and slowness, are sometimes enough to reconstruct a smooth space. Of course, smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory. But the struggle is changed or displaced in them, and life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents new paces, switches adversaries. Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us (ATP, 500).

The truth is that the face does not believe Deleuzian “smooth space” will save us, either. It is of great importance that the face’s smooth space does not refer to nomad space. It destroys the mixture of two spaces. The smooth space is not the one that we are acquainted with becomings. That is not surprising since we already know what the face implies on “becoming”. The smooth space refers to “smooth skin-face”. Lines become “expression lines” which must be destroyed with the help of *Vichy*, *Loréal*, *Lancôme*, *Dior*, *Imedeen*, *DDF*, *Biotherm*, and so on.

To smooth the wrinkles on the “deepest surface” is worthy of note, since it refers not only a new form of expression; but also it attempts to give an answer to Deleuze and Guattari’s stress on “the moon-white mime” of the “inhuman face” (ATP, 167). Although Deleuze and Guattari assert that the face is “the form of the signifier in language” (ATP, 167), the signifier becomes to vanish on the face which begins to smooth the surface. This does not mean the face destroys “the signifier”; but we are precisely unable to say that “the face is what gives the signifier substance: it is what fuels interpretation, and it is what changes, changes traits when interpretation reimparts signifier to its substance. Look, his expression changed. The



signifier is always facialized” (ATP, 115). In brief, the face is not the substance of the signifier anymore. The crux is, the expression will not change if the face is succeeded in dismantling wrinkles. Although our purpose is not to find whether anti-aging creams are succeeded in dismantling wrinkles or not, at least in terms of dermocosmetic advertisements we see the face which destroys its expression. Thus, it can be said that face is in the first step of ruining assertions of pop philosophy on the face. In terms of “expression”, the difference between Deleuze and Guattari, and the face can be summarized as follows: In dermocosmetic advertisements the face changes whereas the expression does not change. However, in pop philosophy the face does not change whereas the expression changes. As a result, we totally see a different “inhuman face” on dermocosmetic advertisements.

To dismantle the wrinkles also indicates to change the sur(face) which is contrary to Deleuze and Guattari’s unchanged face assertion which implies to take the face as it is. What the face has done to the face is to create a sort of subfaciality on “a thousand plateaus”. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari have not lost the “inhuman face” yet. At this point, we need to go back to the surface or *Pequod*. Not Deleuze and Guattari; but the captain of *Pequod* reveals the secrecy of expression. Ahab has a word on wrinkles. The secret is, wrinkles are “unsmoothable”. In short, expression can still be changed.

“And I suppose thou canst smooth almost any seams and dents; never mind how hard the metal, blacksmith?”

“Aye, sir, I think I can; all seams and dents but one.”

“Look ye here, then,” cried Ahab, passionately advancing, and leaning with both hands on Perth’s shoulders, “look ye —here— can ye smooth out a seam like this, blacksmith”, sweeping one hand across his ribbed brow; “if thou couldst, blacksmith, glad enough would I lay my head upon thy anvil, and feel thy heaviest hammer between my eyes. Answer! Canst thou smooth this seam?”

“Oh! that is the one, sir! Said I not all seams and dents but one?”

“Aye, blacksmith, it is the one; aye, man, it is unsmoothable; for though thou only see’st it here in my flesh, it has worked down into the bone of my

skull—*that* is all wrinkles!”<sup>153</sup>

Ahab gives the face a matter whereas the blacksmith gives shape to Deleuzian “matter and form”. According to Deleuze and Guattari “smiths are ambulant, itinerant. Particularly important in this respect is the way in which smiths live: their space is neither the striated space of the sedentary nor the smooth space of the nomad” (ATP, 413). Ahab asks not anybody else but Perth -the blacksmith-. Deleuze’s “itinerant” will certainly correspond to Ahab’s smith on this issue. There is no doubt, Perth is wise since he knows what the wrinkles are. One might say that it is certainly understandable to give a response to Ahab as Perth does. Nonetheless, things would be totally different on Deleuzian smooth space. Ahab is at sea and “the sea is the archetype of smooth space” (ATP, 480). Strictly speaking, the face does not take any notice of Ahab’s white whale “wrinkle” or “the furrows that twist from Ahab’s brow to that of the whale” (ECC, intr. xxx). Contrary to common beliefs, by the time Ahab asks his question (wrinkles) to the blacksmith, he becomes “mad” in a Deleuzian sense for the face.

As far as we are concerned, Perth’s hammer which is unable to “smooth out” the wrinkles of Ahab’s “anvil” head/face recalls “the masochistic process of disavowal” (M, 33). The face, on the other hand, does not make use of “hammer” to smooth the wrinkles since it redefines cruelty. It can be said that Deleuzian masochism (“becoming-animal”) also turns upside down on the face. What is left to us? The fact is, the cream comes and “the hammer” disappears. Here comes another question: What will “the anvil” do? For the sake of the cream it is time to keep “the hammer and the anvil” aside. Strictly speaking, there is a need to separate faces of the face at random in order to find certain characteristics of a new form of expression at once.

On Expression Lines: The face only gives wrinkles a way in order to draw their lines of flight. It is of great importance that the face makes “the expression” a line which deserves to be excluded from the surface. The question is, what does pop philosophy say about lines? According to Deleuze and Guattari:

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<sup>153</sup> Melville, op.cit., 568.

We are composed of lines, three kinds of lines. Or rather, of bundles of lines, for each kind is multiple. We may be more interested in a certain line than in the others, and perhaps there is indeed one that is, not determining, but of greater importance... if it is there. For some of these lines are imposed on us from outside, at least in part. Others sprout up somewhat by chance, from a trifle, why we will never know. Others can be invented, drawn, without a model and without chance (...) Aren't lines of flight the most difficult of all? (ATP, 202).

If we are really composed of lines in a Deleuzian sense, the face will “dismantle” us without a moment’s hesitation. The surface without lines. That is what anti-Deleuzian smooth space should be for the face. On the other hand, Deleuze and Guattari clearly state that lines “have nothing to do with a signifier, the determination of a subject by the signifier; instead, the signifier arises at the most rigidified level of one of the lines, and the subject is spawned at the lowest level” (ATP, 203). However, wrinkles on a face imply a signifier. The face without “expression lines” constructs its own form of expression. On this issue, *Imedeen* can be the example since it is there to destroy “signs of mimic-ageing –a term used to describe expression lines and ‘micro-wrinkles’ caused by repeated facial muscle contractions every time we laugh, smile or frown”.<sup>154</sup>

The face is succeeded in dismantling the “involuntary” (FB, xxix) and “hysterical” (FB, 26) smile of Bacon. It is certainly possible to see the face which is smiling in any of the dermocosmetic advertisements. However, we rather choose to call that smile as the other smile in order to emphasize its difference from Deleuzian smile. The other smile indicates a ruin of smiling. The face has already lost its Deleuze’s or Carroll’s or Bacon’s smile which is a rejection of the face. At this point, we should once again remember Carroll’s Cheshire cat’s smile which “remained some time after the rest of it had gone.”<sup>155</sup> Carroll gives the idea of the difference of

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<sup>154</sup> [http:// www.imedeen.com/imedeen/imedeencomcms.nsf/.../dry\\_and\\_dehydrated\\_skin.htm](http://www.imedeen.com/imedeen/imedeencomcms.nsf/.../dry_and_dehydrated_skin.htm) (accessed September 21, 2005).

<sup>155</sup> Carroll, op.cit., 88.

smile at once: the smile itself can erase the face. In contrast, the other smile indicates nothing but the face.

Deleuze and Guattari assert “lines of flight are realities; they are very dangerous for societies” (ATP, 204). When it comes to the face, “lines of flight” ensures the face’s continuity. After all, that inhuman face systematically becomes something different from the “inhuman face” which Deleuze and Guattari criticize. In a sense, it becomes more “horrid” than the face in faciality. Deleuze and Guattari are wrong to believe

When the face is effaced, when the *faciality traits disappear* [italics added], we can be sure that we have entered another regime, other zones infinitely muter and more imperceptible where subterranean “becoming-animal”s occur, becomings-molecular, nocturnal deterritorializations over spilling the limits of the signifying system (ATP, 115).

What does happen to the surface in the end? The “expression line” disappears without a trace on the face. The face does not give “becoming” a chance to occur. The face draws its own triptych which has nothing to do with Bacon (see Figure 3.1) At this point, we attempt to discuss the matter of the triptych of “surface-monsters” (DIOT, 281) in detail.

In *Francis Bacon*, Deleuze points out that “there are nothing but triptychs in Bacon: even the isolated paintings are, more or less visibly, composed like triptychs” (FB, 70). For this reason, triptych all by itself indicates us *The Portrait of an Artist as Bacon*. To draw a triptych without Bacon means to dismantle “the logic of sensation”. After all, the face replaces “communication of colors” (FB, 117) with communication of creams.

The skin loses its Deleuzian sense in the triptych of the face. By the time the sur(face) dismantles the lines, the face is no more Deleuzian surface. “The principle of the triptych is: the maximum unity of light and color for the maximum division of Figures” (FB, 69); however when it comes to the triptych of the “surface-monsters”, the face is unbelievably colorless and dark. In addition, we can only speak of the division of Deleuzian skin and the face. There is not a trace of unity of neither light and color nor something else on that face.

As to Deleuze, Bacon gives the meat to the head, “the meat is itself the head” (FB, 23) whereas the face gets the bone, “the bone belongs to the face, not the head” (FB, 23). As far as we are concerned, Ahab is right to indicate his skull in a Deleuzian sense. On the other hand, what does the triptych of “surface-monsters” imply? “It is no longer *my face*, but I feel myself inside *the face*”.<sup>156</sup> An interesting finding was that the triptych of the “surface-monsters” has one thing in common with Deleuze’s Bacon: The absence of the face.

It is essential to reveal this connection between Bacon and the face or the painting and the photograph. Deleuze declares that the photograph “would not create the kind of deformation that art produces (...) even when the photograph ceases to be merely figurative, it remains figurative as a given, as a “perceived thing”—the opposite of painting” (FB, 75). The triptych of the face creates deformation itself. To dismantle the “expression line” can thus be considered as an example in this context. “Modern painting begins when man no longer experiences himself as an essence, but as an accident” (FB, 101). However, the face shows us an entirely different thing. We are no more an accident, we have already been murdered by the face, not in a Deleuzian sense.

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<sup>156</sup> cf. Sollier on hysteria: “It is no longer *my head*, but I feel myself inside *a head*” cited in FB, 43.



Figure 3.1 The Triptych of “Surface-Monsters”

(Left Panel: *Imedeen Expression Line Control Serum*, *Sabah Cumartesi Eki*, April 16, 2005. Central Panel: *Vichy Myokine*, *Elele Anti-Aging Eki*, November 2004. Right Panel: *Elele*, November 2004)

On the left panel of the triptych of the face, we see *Imedeen* without an expression. “High performance, dual-action anti-ageing Serum visibly reduces appearance of facial expression lines”<sup>157</sup>. The question is, is it possible to compare the left and the right “panel” with one of Bacon’s triptych’s, in which we see “visible attendant on the left and the one on the right” (FB, 64)? We are unable to see the attendant on that surface. What does Deleuze see in Bacon ? Deleuze’s saying on one

<sup>157</sup>[http://www.imedeen.com/imedeen/imedeencomcms.nsf/.../dry\\_and\\_dehydrated\\_skin.htm](http://www.imedeen.com/imedeen/imedeencomcms.nsf/.../dry_and_dehydrated_skin.htm) (accessed September 21, 2005).

of his triptychs, *Three Studies for Figures at the Base of a Crucifixion*, can be given as an example on this issue: “In the 1944 triptych of monsters a descending head whose hair is falling downward, and an inverted head whose screaming mouth is aimed upward, are placed on either side of the head with the horizontal smile” (FB, 65).

What we see in the face’s triptych is actually faces without faces. The face in dermocosmetic advertisements does not need to choke the face in color as Bacon does in his portraits. The colorful “meats” of Bacon indicates “potential carcasses” (FB, 22). The central panel of the face, on the other hand, directly indicates a corpse of the face since it gives us a little information about what the inhuman face looks like when it has its expression lines. In a sense, the triptych of the face can be considered as remains of Deleuzian “inhuman face”.

*Imedeen* and *L’oréal* are placed on the either side of *Vichy*. The face stares at us and promises to give the face without expression in creames because “you are worth it”<sup>158</sup>. “The refrain”. The face is in creams. “The refrain”. The face deforms the skin. “The refrain”. Dermocosmetic advertisements hide the face. The new inhuman face is called as the young face. The face equates to be(come) young with its smooth space. The face has already become a mask which is not in a Deleuzian sense. In the end, the triptych of “surface-monsters” is not-a Deluzian-thing.

The face does not only erase the “inhuman face”, but also simultaneously becomes re-face. It is odd to speak of re-face since the face seems to destroy its predecessors. Re-face gives us a clue on what the face really is. It is better to start from “pure” instances of re-face. So to speak, we make use of L’oréal’s “refinish micro-dermabrasion kit” (See Figure 3.2) and Lancôme’s “Rénergie Morpholift” (See Figure 3.3) on this issue.

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<sup>158</sup> [http:// www.lorealparis.ca.com](http://www.lorealparis.ca.com) (accessed September 24, 2005).



Figure 3.2 **L'oréal ReFinish**  
(*L'oréal ReFinish*, *Sabah Aktüel Pazar Eki*, April 17, 2004)

L'oréal implies that once upon a time you have that face, which is in cream at present. The face (L'oréal) gives percentages, creates a science of “micro-dermabrasion” and shows how to re-face the face step by step. As we clearly see in the figure above, the face rarely looks directly to the spectator in dermocosmetic advertisements. After all, it dives in its own faciality. With its “refinish treatment”, L'oréal “refines skin texture”, “boots skin’s radiance immediately, evens [even] skin tone”. Above all, *Refinish* is a “resurfacing skin renovator” (See Figure 3.2). What we witness is the fact that the surface passes away. Although re-face of L'oreal implies an answer of how you are able to regain your “young” face, the face you get in the end will not be your face at all. Sarcastically speaking, “where is my face” the face keeps asking, L'oréal shows you the way: “in two minutes” you may begin to finish the surface off.

Doubtless, the new inhuman face must think differently from Deleuze and



Guattari in terms of faciality. As a beginning, it ruins Deleuzian sense of the surface. Secondly, contrary to “the abstract machine of faciality” (see ATP, 176), the face dismantles the “abstract machine”. Deleuze and Guattari write that “Concrete faces cannot be assumed to come ready-made. They are engendered by an *abstract machine of faciality* (*visagéité*), which produces them at the same time as it gives the signifier its white wall and subjectivity its black hole” (ATP, 168). The face is beyond the white wall and black holes. The face defines itself as something which does not yet exist. The creams help the face to come out of the face. In a sense, we are unable to speak of a “production” of faces by the abstract machine. The face is simply not the one we think it is. As long as we dive in the face, we are unable to say “faces are distributed and faciality traits organized” (ATP, 169). As a matter of fact, dermocosmetic advertisements can be considered as a farewell to the “faciality traits”.



**Figure 3.3 Lancôme Rénergie Morpholift**  
(Lancôme Paris Rénergie Morpholift, Sabah Yaşam Pazar Eki, September 18, 2005)

Lancôme’s advertisements are worthy of note since they imply the death of the skin in a different way. “Rénergie Morpholift” (Figure 3.3) makes use of “25.000

microlifts". The Lancôme face inscribes "My skin is tighter. Firmer. More Defined"<sup>159</sup>. Lancôme signs. Lancôme (the face) is under the skin (see figure 3.3). Finally, the face does not need to show a face at all (see figure 3.4). Words are enough since "all writing is garbage".<sup>160</sup> With the help of "Rénergie Morpholift" and its "flash lifting", Lancôme ensures that "your face regains its lovely curves and looks lastingly younger."<sup>161</sup> In case of Lancôme, "lift the face" is "the refrain" since we lost that "rhythm": The face is a wall./ The face is a hole. /The face as a w/hole, / is a white wall /black hole system.

**Yüzüm farkedilir şekilde daha GENÇ!**

**3 Boyutlu Lifting** teknolojisi, sarkan, formunu yitiren cildinize yeniden şekil kazandırırken, bölgesel destekler yaparak çökmüş olan kısımlara yeniden dolgunluk kazandırır.

**Lancôme Laboratuvarları'ndan devrim yaratan yepyeni bir lifting teknolojisi: MORPHO-LIFTING**

- > Yüzeyde, toparlama ve sıkıştırma etkisi: 25.000'i aşan mikro-lifting etkisiyle, cildin yüzeyinde her milimetrede toparlama etkisi yapar.
- > Derinde, yoğun yeniden şekillendirme etkisi: Patentli 3 Boyutlu Nanosome Teknolojisi ile yüz hatlarınızı belirginleştirir, cildinizin yeniden doğal kıvrımlarını kazanmasına yardımcı olur.
- > Sonuçlar: Çok daha genç bir görünüm! Çizgilerinizin görünümü azalır, cilt toparlanır, gerginleşir ve yeniden şekillenir.

**Kullanan bayanlar tarafından belirtilen sonuçlar:**

- > Yüzümün hatları daha belirgin: %72\*
- > Cildim daha sıkı: %80\*
- > Cildim toparlanmış ve daha gergin: %80\*

\* 4 hafta boyunca 49 bayan üzerinde yapılan testler sonucu: sabah akşam Rénergie Morpholift Bakım Kremi'ni uygulayan bayanların değerlendirmesi.

Figure 3.4 **Lancôme**  
(Lancôme Rénergie Morpholift Flash Lifting, Rénergie Morpholift Activ Re-defining Treatment, Sabah Yaşam Pazar Eki, September 18, 2005)

<sup>159</sup> [http://www.lancome.ca/\\_en/ca/catalog/subcategory/.../skincare](http://www.lancome.ca/_en/ca/catalog/subcategory/.../skincare) (accessed September 28, 2005).

<sup>160</sup> Antonin Artaud, "From the Nerve Meter (1925)", in Artaud, op.cit, 1988, 85.

<sup>161</sup> op.cit.

Deleuze and Guattari say that “the face holds within its rectangle or circle a whole set of traits, *faciality traits*, which it subsumes and places at the service of signification and subjectification” (ATP, 188). It is crucial to note that not the face but the skin holds “faciality traits” in dermocosmetic advertisements. The skin makes “re-face” and it seems it is difficult “to remake myself”,<sup>162</sup> under these circumstances.

Dermocosmetic advertisements imply we have lost Bacon’s smile and scream. The worst thing is, we will have not even a tic, we become Claudia Schaffer or the right panel of the face instead (see figure 3.1). It is of great importance that the face also suggests “becoming-woman”, it is not in a Deleuzian sense, though.

What is a tic? It is precisely the continually refought battle between a faciality trait that tries to escape the sovereign organization of the face and the face itself, which clamps back down on the trait, takes hold of it again, blocks its line of flight, and reimposes its organization upon it (ATP, 188).

The question is, without a tic on a smooth surface how is it possible to speak of a battle between the face and a faciality trait?

Deleuze and Guattari assert that “if the face is a politics, dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings, an entire becoming-clandestine” (ATP, 188). On the other hand, the face smoothes itself in order to keep its contrary in silence. Pop philosophy “[has] been addressing just two problems exclusively: the relation of the face to the abstract machine that produces it, and the relation of the face to the assemblages of power that require that social production” (ATP, 181). Dermocosmetic advertisements start from destroying a specific concept of the face. In the end, the face becomes not the one we can “escape through the screaming mouth” (FB, 25).

With the help of its new form of expression, the face becomes an outsider to Deleuzian faciality. The face implies a danger through reversing its “borrowed” terms of pop philosophy; the face knows, not us how to “find the line of separation, follow it or create it, to the point of treachery” (ATP, 186-187). Hence, the face is not the anti-thesis of Deleuze; but precisely becomes “a lack” of Deleuze.

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<sup>162</sup> Artaud, op.cit., 1988, 84.



Chronos: The face provokes us to think on chronos since there is a crack on the face's (Dior) hour-glass (see figure 3.5). Berger says that advertising “never speak of the present. Often they refer to the past and always they speak of the future”.<sup>163</sup> When it comes to the face, we will say that the face clips “two readings of time –time as Aion and time as Chronos-” (LS, 162), which Deleuze focuses on, in his *Logic of Sense*.

The advertisement features a close-up of a woman's face with dark hair and blue eyes, looking directly at the camera. A large, transparent hourglass is positioned behind her face, with pink sand flowing through it. The Dior logo is in the top left corner. The product name 'DiorScience' is written vertically on the left. The product name 'CAPTURE' is in large, bold letters, followed by 'Zamana karşı zafer' (Victory against time). Below this, two bullet points list the benefits: '• 1 saat sonra: %60 oranında kırışıklıklarda düzelme\*' (After 1 hour: 60% reduction in wrinkles\*) and '• 1 ay sonra: %80 daha genç görünüm\*\*' (After 1 month: 80% younger appearance\*\*). A small image of the product jar is shown at the bottom left. The website 'www.diorscience.com' is on the left side.

**Dior**

www.diorscience.com

**DiorScience**

**R60/80™**  
CİZGİLERE KARŞI  
ULTRA ETKİLİ BAKIM KREMI

DiorScience Bilim Merkezi, anında ve uzun vadeli çift oranın etkili (double patch) özelliği olan R60/80™ teknolojisine dayalı olan ilk kozmetik stratejisini yarattı:

- 1 saat sonra:  
%60 oranında kırışıklıklarda düzelme\*
- 1 ay sonra:  
%80 daha genç görünüm\*\*

Cildiniz fark edilir bir şekilde avrım geçirir: Cildiniz daha pürüzsüz, daha ısıtılı görünüm kazanır. Zamana karşı kazanılan zafer!

**CAPTURE**  
Zamana karşı zafer

- 1 saat sonra:  
%60 oranında kırışıklıklarda düzelme\*
- 1 ay sonra:  
%80 daha genç görünüm\*\*

**CAPTURE**  
R60/80™  
CREAM CORRECTION RIDER  
ULTIMATE WRINKLE CREAM  
Dior

\* Zayıf kırışık gözlemlenen anında ölçülen kırışık. \*\* Zayıf kırışık gözlemlenen 1 ay sonra ölçülen kırışık.

Figure 3.5 Chronos Devouring Expression  
(Dior Science Capture R 60/80, Digiturk, February 2004)

<sup>163</sup> John Berger, *Ways of Seeing*, (London: BBC Penguin, 1982), 130.

Past, present and future were not at all three parts of a single temporality, but that they rather formed two readings of time, each one of which is complete and excludes the other: on one hand, the always limited present, which measures the action of bodies as causes and the state of their mixtures in depth (Chronos); on the other, the essentially unlimited past and future, which gather incorporeal events, at the surface, as effects (Aion) (LS, 61).

Contrary to “Aion” advertising, the face in dermocosmetic advertisements speaks of Chronos since “chronos is the present which alone exists. It makes of the past and the future its two oriented dimensions, so that one goes always from past to the future” (LS, 77). The face of Chronos differs from Stoic thought, which “show[s] at once the necessity of these two readings [Aion and Chronos] and their reciprocal exclusion”(LS, 61), with its own reading of time. Chronos is captured by the face (Dior) and Aion no longer exist.

“The present is everything” or “nothing” (LS, 62). When it comes to the face, the present is something to use. The “lasting” face (Dior) looks for a hole to crawl into time. Time has the colour of pink (see figure 3.5). The past-future is out of sight because of “the Aion, in its difference in nature from the devouring Chronos” (LS,132). In a sense, the face salutes to the “hunger” of Chronos. “Capture” indicates a Chronos of face which is devouring expression without opening a mouth (see figure 3.5). In a sense, Goya’s “Saturn Devouring One of his Sons” fades away on a canvas since the face (Dior) “captures” chronos myth and “depth”.

Chronos has become a deep break. In this sense the adventures of the present manifest themselves in Chronos, in agreement with the two aspects of the chronic present—absolute and relative movement, global and partial present: in relation to itself, in depth, insofar as it bursts asunder and contracts (the movement of schizophrenia); and in relation to its more or less vast extension, in virtue of a delirious future and a delirious past (the movement of manic depression). Chronos wants to die, but has it not already given way to another reading of time? (LS, 164).

Although Dior (face) makes use of “the vast and deep present of Chronos” (LS, 168), Deleuzian reading of Chronos is different from the face. On the other hand, Chronos is out of readings of time in terms of dermocosmetic advertisements. The time fades away together with expression. The time, which is in words, is in/on these advertisements. Deleuze points out that Lewis Carroll shows us “even words are eaten” (ECC, 21). Dermocosmetic advertisements should not be considered different in this context. The face is willing to devour all writing if it is, in Artaud’s words, “garbage”<sup>164</sup>. When we take his saying into consideration, it will not be odd to say the face also becomes a garbage-disposal unit.

### 3.2. Anti-Aging Repetition:

The face clearly distincts itself from advertising since it is definitely in/on pop philosophy. Dermocosmetic advertisements make use of Deleuzian repetition and difference. To start with, we may say that the face takes *the repetition* as a gift *for itself*<sup>165</sup>. To find out what the face has done to the repetition absolutely indicates the purpose of this section.

What is striking is that the repetition is essential not only for Deleuze; but also for advertising. According to Burton, repetition is one of the “devices of persuasion”: “people tend to believe messages which are repeated. They take notice of them. Hence the habit of repeating brand names or catch phrases in advertisements”.<sup>166</sup> Burton shows us why the repetition is significant in advertising. When it comes to dermocosmetic advertisements, the face makes changes about the repetition. At this point, the face gives its turn to speak to Deleuze. We must highlight Deleuze’s thought about the repetition in order to see the changes on the face more clearly.

Repetition itself is similarly unthought, for representationalism considers it as a strictly negative

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<sup>164</sup> Artaud, op.cit, 1988, 85.

<sup>165</sup> “Repetition for itself” is one of the titles of a chapter in Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition*.

<sup>166</sup> Burton, op.cit., 121.

conceptual fault. Representation defines repetition as a form of inadequacy in the identity of the concept, for example as the re-presentation of that which is to be recognized as the same, whereas Deleuze argues that repetition is the productive power of difference<sup>167</sup>.

It is interesting to note that dermocosmetic advertisements are different from “representation” in terms of the repetition. Although it is considered as a general method, the advertisements which we focus on in this study will not be another example of “visual analysis of advertising images”.<sup>168</sup> The face does not relate to the repetition in terms of the repeated “brand names” either. What is essential for the face is precisely Deleuzian difference of the repetition.

Strictly speaking, Deleuze says “repetition (...) appears as a difference, but a difference absolutely without concept; in this sense, an indifferent difference” (DR, 15), the face gives him a nod. The face picks up this saying, “the mask is the true subject of repetition” (DR, 18) as if it is tweezers. Deleuze continues “Because repetition differs in kind from representation, the repeated cannot be represented: rather it must always be signified, masked by what signifies it, itself masking what it signifies” (DR, 18). The face erases whatever is related to “signified” from the previous sentence. Furthermore, the face appreciates the fact that “if repetition makes us ill, it also heals us; if it is enchains and destroys us, it also frees us, testifying in both cases to its ‘demonic’ power” (DR, 19). It is time to face specific instances about the repetition gifted face.

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<sup>167</sup> Patrick Hayden, *Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze* (New York: Peter Lang, 1998), 6.

<sup>168</sup> Burton, op.cit, 122.



Figure 3.6 L'oréal Revitalift New Double Lifting  
(L'oréal Revitalift New Double Lifting, Sabah Cumartesi Eki, September 24, 2005)

At first glance, there is nothing new in the Figure 3.6. L'oréal *Revitalift* advertises its *New Double Lifting*. The face of Andie MacDowell shows how the expression becomes the shooting star of the smooth space. Expression slides along the surface. The light on a face is “the difference without [a] concept” (DR, 15). Since “true repetition takes place in imagination” (DR, 76), the face (Andie) indicates imagination itself. In Figure 3.7, Revitalift is without its *New Double Lifting*. Figure 3.7 helps us to see the fact that “difference lies between two repetitions” (DR, 76). The difference is without the face. The “new” implies both difference and not difference in the case of *Revitalift*. Deleuze says that “repetition occurs when things are distinguished *in numero*, in space and time, while their concept remains the same” (DR, 270). As a matter of fact, L'oréal is the instance of it. Andie's *Revitalift* is distinguished *in numero*, in space and time, while the face remains the same.





Figure 3.7 L'oréal Revitalift  
(L'oréal Revitalift, Milliyet Pazar Eki, November 7, 2004)

The concept in dermocosmetic advertisements is particularly the face. However, it has nothing to do with “Revitalift” in the case of L'oréal. The cream itself can be considered as a “bare repetition” which “concerns accuracy” whereas the formula or Revitalift is a “covered repetition which forms itself in covering itself in masking and disguising itself” (see and cf. DR, 24). Last but not least, there is a face (Andie) which makes use of *repetition for itself*. Essentially, the face walks along the corridor of Deleuze's “image of thought”. What does the face see? A concept to break into.

Deleuze points out “a philosophy of repetition” (DR, 94) whereas the face indicates a face of repetition. Deleuze writes that

The present is the repeater, the past is the repetition itself, but the future is that which is repeated. Furthermore, *the secret of repetition as a whole*[italics added] lies in that which is repeated, in that which is twice signified (DR, 94).

Undoubtedly, the face has a word on that secrecy. Since it excludes the past and the future as we have mentioned in the previous section, it seems that “the

repeater” is only in our hands. In short, the face ruins *the secret of repetition as a whole*.



Figure 3.8 Vichy Thermal Fix  
(Vichy Thermal Fix, Seninle, August 2005)

“The repetition belongs to humour and irony” (DR, 5). Figure 3.8 can be considered in this context. The face (Vichy) has a drop of water. The water, Ishmael’s depth, is kept under the surface by Vichy. The face (Vichy) “heals us”. What the humour and irony of this is actually the connection between the face and Lewis Carroll. Deleuze’s words on Carroll is informative on this issue: “but the world of depths still rumbles under the surface, and threatens to break through it. Even unfolded and laid out flat, the monsters still haunt us” (ECC, 21-2). Vichy also deals with depth and surface. A drop of water smoothes out the surface. What a miracle. The water *rumbles under the face and threatens to break through it*. But Vichy promises us to keep the depth under the sur(face).

*Vichy Thermal Fix* misses the point of anti-aging a little bit. Cream is in the shadow of a drop of water. Precisely, the water replaces the cream. To say that it

shows us a face without an expression might not be new. However, this face has never had wrinkles before. *Thermal Fix* implies “wrinkletight” instead of watertight surface. In a sense, even a drop of water can *break through* the face (Vichy). The other faces erases wrinkles, but Figure 3.8 actually indicates there is no need to erase them since they can never possibly exist.

### 3.3 Anti-Aging Difference:

*At this point, in such a mirror,  
faces are distorted* (DR, 29).

Deleuze believes that “the difference is insurmountable” (DR, 8), so does the face. It is difficult to state a word on the face since it walks in/on Deleuze’s difference. The face has no idea as long as “ideas are multiplicities” (DR, 182). The face changes the feature of advertisement. It keeps away from representation. It encourages misunderstandings. Firstly, the face we focus on, is an advertisement but not in a Deleuzian sense. Secondly, the face is not an advertisement in the eyes of pop philosophy’s rival.

Anti-Aging Difference is not relevant to the difference of anti-aging creams. We consider the face which breaks through Deleuzian difference. Hence, “brand names” on the face vanishes. The smile, the eye and the facialized “bronze” body come up. We are taking them into consideration. Anti-aging difference has just begun. According to Deleuze what is the difference of the difference? The answer lies in the “difference in itself” (See DR, “Difference in Itself”, 28-69). Additionally, “to rescue difference from its maledictory state seems (...) to be the project of the philosophy of difference” (DR, 29).

What can be seen on the sur(face) in terms of the difference? First and foremost, the “difference in itself” becomes the face itself. Inhuman face is not Deleuzian. The expression is gone without a trace on the surface. The face provokes us to point out such a monster and this monster angers Deleuze’s “becoming-animal”. The face underlines the lines. The face speaks of “line peel” (see Biotherm in figure 3.10). In a sense, the face shines in the previous monster (see figure 3. 9).

What is striking is that the other half of the face is in dark. *Vichy LiftActiv* focuses on the difference. Wrinkles are a trace of Deleuzian inhuman face and there is also a need to consider Deleuze’s “lightning” on the face in the circumstances.




Figure 3.9 **Vichy LiftActiv**  
(*Vichy LiftActiv, Elele*, November 2004)

Deleuze says that “instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself-and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it” (DR, 28). At first glance, his saying implies nothing more than a riddle. However, lightning shows us the way. “Lightning, for example, distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail it behind, as though it were distinguishing itself from that which does not distinguish itself from it. It is as if the ground rose to the surface, without ceasing to be ground” (DR, 28).

It is time to focus on Figure 3.9, in the light of Deleuze’s “lightning” example. The face *distinguishes itself from the face but must also trail the wrinkles behind, as though it were distinguishing itself from that which does not distinguish itself from it*. Additionally, the light captures wrinkles on the surface. They were hidden in dark. The smile appears in/on the mouth of Vichy (See Figure 3.9). Deleuze once suggested “it is better to raise up the ground and dissolve the form”

(DR, 28-29). The difference begins when the face creates its own “difference in itself”.

Secondly, the face in dermocosmetic advertisements is a half-faced monster (see figure 3.10). Even the whole face is “more or less visibly composed like” half-faced (cf. Bacon’s triptychs in FB, 70). Fundamentally, a half-faced is dedicated to the “terrified face” (see DR, 260) of Deleuze. When the face all by itself takes the face in itself, it will seem as if we are “faceless” (not in a Deleuzian sense). Precisely, the face becomes “difference-monster”.

What we see in figure 3.10 is definitely another face of the “difference in itself”, not in a Deleuzian sense. Whether they are apart or not, *Biotherm* (face) and *DDF* (face) make a half-faced monst(e)r/osity. The light highlights “the figure of evil” (DR, 29). The half mouth of *DDF* does not match with the “other” half-mouth of *Biotherm*. The nose unites itself by the time it separates from the surface. It can show how the three-noses-tree grows on a face. A half-faced monster implies something different from Humpty Dumpty’s saying, “[the face] is always the same”<sup>153</sup>. Precisely, not the face as a whole; but the other half of the face, which is not shown in the advertisement(s), is always the same.

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<sup>153</sup> Carroll, op.cit, 255.





Figure 3.10 **Half-Faced Monst(e)r/osity**  
 (Left: *Biotherm Line Peel*, *Sabah Cumartesi Eki*, September 10, 2005; Right: *DDF Therapeutic Skincare*, *Elele*, November 2004)

A half-faced monster definitely ruins the “so-called” symmetry of the eyes. The smile of the monster also deserves to be noticed since the face neglects Deleuze and Deleuze’s Bacon once again. The mouth is neither open nor closed. *DDF* reveals the monstrosity of *Biotherm*. *Biotherm* reveals the monstrosity of *DDF*. “Thought must think difference, that absolutely different from thought which nevertheless gives is thought, gives to be thought” (DR, 227). Thought must also consider half-faced monstrosity *that absolutely different from thought which nevertheless gives is thought, gives to be thought*.

Thirdly, the “difference in itself” in terms of the face does not highlight its difference from representation as Deleuze did in his *Difference and Repetition*. The face breaks into the fact that Deleuze himself is different and Deleuze’s concept of the difference; but not his difference from representation. The face loves “the figure of evil” (DR, 29). However, this does not point out its difference. Essentially, “the figure of evil” becomes Deleuze’s “inhuman face” for the face.

On the other hand, that face cannot be called as a “simple otherness” (DR, 30). There is also not a trace of “opposition”. For this reason, it is difficult to consider the face in terms of “the four dimensions (identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance) of the classical world of representation which Foucault has shown” (see DR, 262). In other words, we are unable to say that the “difference” on the face is “mediated” to the extent that it is subjected to the fourfold root of identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance” (DR, 29).

Although, the face takes “the difference” differently from representation, this does not make the face Deleuzian. In the light of this fact, we take dermocosmetic advertisements into consideration. We start from Vichy’s *LiftActiv Pro*. The face comes out of a face. The new face tears the face, which is full of *the face*/the face expression. The surface is behind the depth. The difference is on the face (see figure 3.11). The face makes itself distinct from not only representation but also Deleuze. In terms of representation, Vichy becomes “unreadable”. Vichy (the face/the difference) is (in) Deleuze. As a general method, the face takes specific concepts of pop philosophy without taking their Deleuzian meanings. The face destroys inhuman face; not the human face (see figure 3. 11).



Figure 3.11 **Vichy LiftActiv Pro**  
(*Vichy LiftActiv Pro*, *Sabah Cumartesi Eki*, May 7, 2005)

According to Deleuze, “the difference is made, or makes itself, as in the expression ‘make the difference’” (DR, 28). Contrary to Deleuze, Vichy (the difference) is *not* made, or make itself as in the expression ‘make the difference’. Vichy tears the difference. Deleuze “propose[s] to think difference in itself independently of the forms of representation which reduce it to the Same, and the relation of different to different independently of those forms which make them pass through the negative” (DR, xix). The face does the same; but not in a Deleuzian sense. The difference is/was on the surface whereas the “difference in itself” dives in faciality. One might likely say that Vichy (Figure 3.11) is still an advertisement and “the difference becomes an object of representation” (DR, 138). However, we assert something different. The difference becomes an object of the difference (Vichy).

The face has a word on the eye. At first glance, we may see nothing but the face which wears a mask of capillary in Figure 3.12. There is a need to close in on



the surface. What else we see is the face that cuts the face (mask) with laughter. The question is, whether it is true that the face frees the eyes or not. Vichy's *Oligo 25 Yeux* actually cuts out the face of the eyes from the sur(face). The face tears, the face cuts, the face laughs at Vichy (face). There is a multiplicity not in terms of the expression; but in terms of “no expression”.



Figure 3.12 “It Is There, Staring At Us, But Without Eyes” (DR, 152)  
(Vichy Oligo Yeux, Sabah Aktüel Pazar Eki, June 12, 2005)

We give a “mysterious” caption, a sentence from *Difference and Repetition*, to the Figure 3.12. The face once again does the same in terms of the difference. It takes this saying without paying attention to its meaning. In this way, the face *creates* a sentence from the sentence. At this point, there is a need to mention Deleuzian meaning of that caption in order to reveal how Vichy breaks into it. The first question is, what does this mysterious “it” refer to? The answer lies in “individuation [which] is inseparable from a pure ground that it brings to the surface and trails with it” (DR, 152).

It is difficult to describe this ground, or the terror and attraction it excites. Turning over the ground is the most dangerous occupation, but also the most tempting in the stupefied moments of an obtuse will. For this

ground, along with the individual, rises to the surface yet assumes neither form nor figure. *It is there, staring at us, but without eyes* [italics added]. The individual distinguishes itself from it, but it does not distinguish itself, continuing rather to cohabit with that which divorces itself from it (DR, 152).

When it comes to the face (Vichy), “it” changes. The face creates its own “horror story” from Deleuzian words. The face chooses a name. That is all. What “it” refers to is definitely up to what we see in Figure 3.12. In a sense, we are unable to speak of “the most beautiful human faces: the presentiment of a hideousness peculiar to the human face, of a rising tide of stupidity, an evil deformity or a thought governed by madness” (DR, 152). In case of Vichy, stupidity is up to the scissors’ act in hand. It cuts the mask but the mask does not fall. The face cannot possibly throw off the mask or the mask cannot possibly throw off the face.

What about the eyes? From the begining, we see how the eyes become one of the major obstacles of the obstacle. To be without Dorian’s eyes. That is what *the face* will be. Since “stupidity” is related to capillary, the eye seems never to come up. The Laughter narrows the eyes. The laughter kills the eyes. The face chokes the eyes in the eye hole. The face chokes the eyes with the mask. The eyes are in cream. The color is green. (see the box in Figure 3.12) Vichy stares at faciality. Vichy’s *Oligo Yeux* reveals the face before and after the eyes. The question is, what will remain to stare at us, without eyes.

As we have mentioned above, the face all by itself terrifies “the terrified face” of Deleuze. The point is, Deleuze “consider[s] a terrified face [which] expresses a possible world: the terrifying world” (DR, 260). Additionally,

The terrified face does not resemble what terrifies it, it envelops a state of the terrifying world. In every physic system there is a swarm of possibilities around reality, but our possibles are always Others. The Other cannot be separated from the expressivity which constitutes it. Even when we consider the body of another as an object, its ears and eyes as anatomical pieces, *we do not remove all expressivity from them* [italics added] even though we simplify in the extreme the world they express: the eye is an implicated light or the expression of a possible light, while the ear is that of a possible sound (DR, 260).

The question is, how the face breaks into the terrified face and creates the terrified face of Deleuze. An uprising occurs among “anatomical pieces”. The face in dermocosmetic advertisements *removes all expressivity from them*. Oligo Yeux removes the eyes whereas L’oréal or Dior removes the lines. We do not see something on the face which “expresses the terrifying world” (DR, 260) since the face is busy to make up a terrifying Deleuze.



Figure 3.13 The Facialized “Bronze” Body  
(Dior Bronze, Digiturk, 2004)

The facialized “bronze” body depicts what the face is. The face/difference is the skin. According to Deleuze and Guattari “the face is White Man himself, with his broad white cheeks and the black hole of his eyes. The face is Christ. The face is the typical European (...)” (ATP, 176). When it comes to the face, the face is neither “White Man himself, with broad white cheeks and the black hole of his eyes” nor “Christ” nor even “the typical European”. *Dior Bronze* (the face) bronzes “the white wall/black hole system”. The face acts along the body without facializing it. The

caption of the Figure 3.13 indicates that the face has a sarcastic sense of humour. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “facialized body” or the “Christ-face” indicates “an organization of the face, white wall/black holes, face/eyes or facial profile/sideview of the eyes” (ATP, 301). An interesting finding is that the face (Dior) also shows us the fact that it is not easy to “put the face and the landscape to flight” (ATP, 301).

The facialized “bronze” body or Dior Bronze (the face) breaks through the “white wall” before it “break[s] through the walls of signifiance”; it bronzes “black holes” without “pour[ing] out of the holes of subjectivity”; it grows “trees” instead of “veritable rhizomes”. Contrary to Deleuze and Guattari, since the “faciality machine” does not “produce” the face, we are unable to speak of “perform[ing] a veritable ‘defacialization’” and therefore, the unexisted machine cannot possibly “free something like *probe-heads* (*têtes chercheuses*, guidance devices) that dismantle the strata in their wake” (See and cf. in order to face how the face breaks into Deleuze’s words in ATP, 190).



Figure 3.14 Vichy Myokine  
(Vichy Myokine, Sabah Cumartesi Eki, April 9, 2005)

Deleuze and Guattari believe that

Beyond the face lies an altogether different inhumanity:

no longer that of the primitive head, but of 'probe-heads' here, cutting edges of deterritorialization become operative and lines of deterritorialization positive and absolute, forming strange new becomings, new polyvocalities. Become clandestine, make rhizome everywhere, for the wonder of a nonhuman life to be created. *Face, my love*, you have finally become a probe-head (ATP, 190-191).

The face destroys “probe-heads” before it dismantles Deleuzian “inhuman face”. So to speak, the “inhuman face” all by itself belongs to Deleuze and Guattari which they wish to turn it into probe-heads. At this point, the face transforms that inhuman face in order to hinder the attacks of Deleuze and Guattari. A simple plan, is it not? One might consider that the face without wrinkles particularly resembles a “pure” white wall. As a matter of fact, it is not even a wall.



Figure 3.15 Imedeen Expression Line Control  
(Imedeen Expression Line Control, Sabah Cumartesi Eki, September 10, 2005)

Anti-aging difference shows that the face always starts from the surface. The face is becoming something else not in a Deleuzian sense. The face takes the wrinkles out of itself (see figure 3.14). The face makes faces for the parts of the face. In the end, even the eyes has got the face (see the eye in figure 3.15). The face “bronzes” white wall/black hole system. The face even dares to separate itself from advertising in order to escape from such criticisms of Deleuze and Guattari on this issue.



## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSION



Figure 4. 1 **L'Inverno**  
(Giuseppe Arcimbolde, *L'Inverno*, 1563. 66,6x 50.5 cm, in *Galleria Del Museo Di Belle Arti Di Vienna* (Spain: Codex, 1968))

## 1. Conclusion : A Play on Words

The surface. *Pequod*. The depth. The leg. A sneeze that kills Ahab. The colour is white. Physiognomy. Philosophy. *A tick*. The human face. The inhuman face. The unmasked metaphor. Kovaliov's nose. A man without a nose. Cyrano's nose. Several noses. Pinocchio's nose. A nose with a whip. Becoming-individual. The three-noses-tree. A locket. The monster. Deleuzian *faceless* versus a man without a face. Collete. A face which abandons its mouth. The tweezers. Dorian's eyes. An eye with shoe. The picture. "Here is the key to your canvas suite". *The simulacrum*. The black. *Commedia dell'Arte*. Pedrolino or White Wall Walking. Bewildered Stoic. "Blumfeld effect". The nostrils. Sniff sniff. *Don't make me mad*. Bacon. No way out to scream. Ha!ha!ha! Artaud. *Le Visage Humain?* "Cathedrals" of Van Gogh. Bacon and Deleuze. The heads. "Does anybody see any faces out there?" The (w)hole face. The w(all)hole. The unmasked metaphor falls down. *The white wall/black hole system*. The face is a face on the face. The Waste Bin (WB). The cats. "Do cats eat faces?" The besom. Sweep till eternity. The scapegoat. Fo's hands. *A tick*. The skin. The wrinkled s(k)in. Smooth-skin-face-space. *General Dermatology*. The advertising. The advertisement. The calling of the face. A new form of expression. *Becoming-woman* versus Becoming-Claudia Shaffer. Perth. Ahab's "unsmoothable" skin. The other smile. Re-face. A drop of water. "Lift" the face. Lose the rhythm. Chronos. Pink. *Repetition*. A concept to break into. *Difference*. Humpty Dumpty. *The repetition for the face*. *The difference in the face*. A half-faced monster. The laughter that kills the eyes. The bronze. The facialized "bronze" body. Dismantled *probe-heads*. *Line of flight*. *Line Peel*. The face is a wall. The face is a hole. The face as a whole. No more *white wall/ black hole system*. Parts of the face. *A tick*. The face that breaks the *faciality machine*. The face that breaks into pop philosophy. The face that reverses Deleuzian concepts. The face that bronzes the white wall/black hole system. The sur(face). *The face*. The face. Vichy. L'oréal. Dior. Imedeen. Lancôme. DDF. Biotherm. And. The end. *The tick*.

## 2. Conclusion: Figure 4. 1

Guiseppe Arcimbolde's *L'Inverno* (The Winter) all by itself is the second conclusion of this thesis (see figure 4.1). We take neither Arcimbolde's purpose as an artist nor the name of the picture into consideration. The winter which is on the body / trunk of an old man or the winter which resembles an old-tree-man never comes up in this context. The question is, why we choose this picture.

The picture reveals what the face is. It is an answer to Deleuze and Guattari's faciality. It is a faciality in faciality. The body is not the center of attention. The tree is "becoming" something else by the time it reminds us of Deleuzian faciality. Deleuze and Guattari once said "many people have a tree growing in their heads" (ATP, 15). At present, the tree grows on the face as we see in *L'Inverno*. The face is deeply rooted. The mouth is mockingly noticeable. Twigs come out of the chin. The neck is utmost thick. It indicates us the fact that the face will not leave the body. The neck preserves the body for the face. The face does not look at us. Deleuze and Guattari write "the face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body" (ATP, 170). When it comes to Figure 4.1, the tree-face does not have a head. What if there is not a head? The face dives in its own faciality.

We see not the eye; but the eye holes on a tree. *The face* is the pioneer of the face in dermocosmetic advertisements. It smoothes the surface, not in a Deleuzian sense. Wrinkles disappear. The face draws its own line of flight which is anti-Deleuzian. We are unable to seize the expression on the face. The face is neither human nor inhuman. The face is the face which "has not begun to / say what it is and what it knows"<sup>154</sup>.

The tree gives us more "Deleuzian" inspiration than the unknown "rhizome". Arcimbolde's picture is of faciality. It is the picture of Deleuzian and anti-Deleuzian face. It is the face of Artaud. It is the scream of Bacon. It is the other smile. It is the one that chokes the scream. Are we able to see "a tick (...) which is on a level with the surface" (LS, 133) in the end? Yes, we are. Is it the face or the philosopher? The face itself is a tick on "its" surface.

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<sup>154</sup> Artaud, op.cit., 1996, 95.



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