THE RISE OF HIZB UT-TAHRIR
IN POST SOVIET UZBEKISTAN

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ABSTRACT

THE RISE OF HIZB UT-TAHRIR IN
POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN

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This thesis analyzes the conditions that gave rise to Hizb ut-Tahrir, a secretive and international radical Islamic movement, in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. For this purpose, Uzbekistan's political, economic, socio-cultural conditions and the general characteristics of Hizb ut-Tahrir is examined by the help of historical background and content analysis. It is argued that the emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in post-Soviet Uzbekistan as a result of interaction of political, economic and socio-cultural conditions in this country.

Keywords: Hizb ut-Tahrir, radical Islam, Uzbekistan.

ÖZ

ÖZBEKISTAN'DA HİZB UT-TAHRİR'İN YÜKSELİŞİ

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Bu çalışma, gizli ve uluslararası radikal İslam örgütü olan Hizb ut-Tahrir'in Sovyet sonrası Özbekistan'da yükselişinin koşullarını incelemektedir. Bu nedenle, Özbekistan'ın siyasal, ekonomik, sosyo-kültürel koşulları ve Hizb ut-Tahrir'in genel özellikleri, tarihsel ve içerik analizlerinin yardımıyla incelenmiştir. Tezde, Hizb ut-Tahrir'in Özbekistan'da ortaya çıkışının ve yükselişinin nedeni bu ülkenin siyasal, ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel özelliklerinin birbirini etkilemesi olduğu öne sürülmüştür.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hizb ut-Tahrir, radikal Islam, Özbekistan

To My Family

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims to analyze the emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (the Party of Islamic Liberation), which is a secretive and international radical Islamic movement in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The thesis also aims to answer the following questions: why did Hizb ut-Tahrir choose Uzbekistan as a center for its activities in Central Asia? And also, what were the conditions (economic, political, socio-cultural conditions of Uzbekistan and general characteristics of Hizb ut-Tahrir) that resulted in the emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in this country? It will be argued that the rise of radical Islam in post-Soviet Uzbekistan emerged as a result of the interaction of economic, socio-cultural and political conditions after the unexpected dissolution of the Soviet Union. Without the assistance of the Soviet central government, post-Soviet Uzbekistan had to deal with the declining economy, and rising political and socio-cultural problems on its own. Declining living standards, rising unemployment, and poverty made citizens dissatisfied with the Uzbek government.[1] Additionally, President Islam Karimov wanted to solve these problems by using authoritarianism, which also intensified the rise of political and social problems.[2] My argument in this thesis, therefore is the following: in the rise of radical Islam in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, dissatisfaction of the Uzbek people with the political, economic and socio-cultural conditions played an active role. According to some experts, these conditions will make groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir more alluring.[3]

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[1] Hooman Peimani, *Failed Transition Bleak Future? War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Preger Publishers, 2002. 133.

[2] Ibid. 2.

[3] Ariel Cohen, "Have the American Officials Identified a new Threat in Central Asia?" A EurasiaNet Commentary, 06/24/2003, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav062403.shtml, (accessed November 10, 2004)

Post-Soviet Uzbekistan is chosen for the purpose of this thesis because it is geographically, strategically, culturally and economically the heartland of Central Asia. The country's strategic and geographical potential and its population, which is the highest in the region, make Uzbekistan a potential candidate of regional power. The developments in Uzbekistan, therefore, not only affect only this country but also the neighboring republics. Furthermore, Uzbekistan had always been the center of Islam in Central Asia. The thousand-year-old long history of sedentary Islamic culture in Uzbekistan differentiates it from other Central Asian states, with the possible exclusion of Tajikistan.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world witnessed the resurgence of Islam in the Central Asian republics, especially in Uzbekistan. After seven decades of anti-religious Soviet policy, the knowledge of Islam was minimal and religion became an important part of the new search for Uzbek identity. As Tazmini declares, "After independence, the government's leadership appeared to view official Islam as a useful tool in building national identity and solidifying and legitimating its monopoly on power." [4] But similar to the Soviet period, Islam continues to be state-regulated. Uzbek President Islam Karimov has tried to formulate a state-directed Islam by adopting secularism as a constitutional principle and establishing Muslim Board of Uzbekistan. Furthermore, being aware the potential of radical Islamic threat, he adopted several tactics to get over the problem.[5] He banned all of the other opposition parties, such as the moderate Islamic Party, *Birlik* (Unity), the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), and the *Erk* (Freedom) Party.[6] By prohibiting all opposition, he forced religious and non-religious political opposition to go underground. [7]

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[4] G. Tazmini, "The Islamic Revival in Central Asia: a potent force or a misconception?", *Central Asian Survey,* Vol.20, no.1 (2001):72.

[5] Robert O. Freedman, "Radical Islam and the Struggle for Influence in Central Asia," in *Religious Radicalism in the Greater Middle East*, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar, (Portland, Or. : Cass, 1996), 220.

[6] Jeff Haynes, *Religion in Politics*, (London: Longman, 1998), 161-162.

[7] Robert O. Freedman, 1996, 220.

Within this general picture, Hizb ut-Tahrir is also an underground opposition group in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, and the dissatisfaction with the Uzbek government increased the sympathy for the organization, giving them a crucial role in resisting against the repressive government. According to a web-site, Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political party (not Islamic group) whose aim is to re-establish the Caliphate (Islamic State) that was lost by the Muslims in 1924 when the Ottoman Caliphate was demolished.[8] Although Hizb ut-Tahrir is a non-violent organization, all the Central Asian governments have banned it.[9]

In this thesis, it is argued that Hizb ut-Tahrir is a distinct radical Islamic movement among other Islamic groups in the post-Soviet Uzbekistan and also it is more dangerous than any Islamic group.[10] Although Hizb ut-Tahrir's main attempt, that is changing the region's secular governments, is similar to other extremist groups, the party's uniqueness lies in its ideology, strategy, party structure, methods and membership profile.

First of all, the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir is one of its distinctive characteristics because the party calls for the peaceful replacement of the region's secular governments with a multinational Islamic Caliphate. According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report, peaceful replacement means that the party rejects violence and terrorism as a method of political struggle.[11] The members consider killing innocent people to be against Islamic Law.[12] Although they do not use violence and terror; by using persuasive methods they spread their views very quickly and fast. Although they want to change the regime in a peaceful manner,

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[8] The Reality of the Sect, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, http://www.htexposed.com/htexpose.doc, (accessed November 9, 2004)

[9] Richard Weitz, "Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, no.27, Taylor & Francis Inc. (2004), 507.

[10] There are also other Islamic groups in Uzbekistan Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Wahhabist groups. They are detailly explained between the pages 68-72.

[11] International Crisis Group (ICG), "Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizbut Tahrir", *ICG Asia Report* No:58, Osh/ Brussels, (30 June 2003), i, http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?id=1441&l=1, (accessed November 13, 2004)

[12] Ibid.

several authors mentioned that they produce terrorists by creating and provacating their own Islamic ideology. For example according to Baran; [13]

> International experts and law-enforcement agencies agreed that Hizb ut-Tahrir is a "conveyor belt" for producing terrorists. Not all groups have to be directly involved in the terrorist act itself; Hizb ut-Tahrir produces thousand of manipulated brains, which then "graduate" from Hizb ut-Tahrir and become members of groups like al Qaeda.

Rabbimov also claims "Hizb ut-Tahrir is a sort of factory that turns young Muslims into terrorists with the help of ideology and gradual inculcation of the ideas of radical extremism."[14]

Although Hizb ut-Tahrir leaders declare that their ideology rejects violence and terror, the Hizb ut-Tahrir members in the southern Kazakhstan called for a jihad against the United States and Britain when American and British troops attacked Iraq.[15] Soon after, similar leaflets were found in the southern Kyrgyztan.[16]

Secondly, the strategy of Hizb ut-Tahrir is another difference that distinguishes the party from the other Islamist groups. In their own website, Hizb ut- Tahrir explains its strategy in three stages.[17] The first stage is the stage of "culturing to produce people who believe in the idea and the method of the Party." With their ideology they invite people to Islam and they form the party group. The second stage is the stage of "interaction with the Ummah who embrace and carry Islam." The Ummah is encouraged to establish an Islamic state. The third stage is the stage of "establishing government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively." By carrying Hizb-ut Tahrir's message to the world they want to unite the whole Muslim countries under one Caliphate.

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[13] Zeyno Baran, "The Road from Taskent to the Taliban Islamist terror group is undermining a U.S. ally." 2004. http:www.nationalreview.org, (accessed November 15, 2004)

[14] K. Rabbimov, "Hizb ut-Tahrir-Leader of the Islamist antidemocratic campaign", *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, 3:27, (2004):16.

[15] Richard Weitz, 2004, 508.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Hizb ut-Tahrir official web-site, http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/english.html, (accessed November 8, 2004)

The third distinctive characteristic of Hizb-ut Tahrir is its party structure, which is very secretive, organized in cells composed of five people.[18] And the cell leader, *mushrif*, is the only person who knows the other cell members.[19] With this hierrarchial or pryramid-like structure members reveal little information about the organization.[20]

Another distinctive characteristics, which differs Hizb ut-Tahrir from other radical Islamic groups is its method. Hizb ut-Tahrir spread its views by using leaflets, books, technological devices like VCR's, computer CDs, e-mails, websites, and face-to-face meetings. Unlike other movements, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not oppose modern technology. By using all kinds of information-based technology the organization produces videocassettes, tape recordings, and CDs of leaders' speeches and sermons.[21] For extending its message through the world, Hizb ut-Tahrir also uses the internet. They have their own websites such as; www.1924.org, www.Khilafah.com, www.hizbuttahrir.org.

Furthermore, the last distinctive characteristic of Hizb ut-Tahrir is the membership profile. The membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir differs according to the countries around the world. In Britain, which is thought to be the center of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Europe, the membership profile includes educated people. But in Central Asia especially in Uzbekistan except the leaders the members are basically "young people between the ages of 25 - 35 years, and often hail from more traditional areas and families." [22] They believe that Islamic economic order would be more righteous and equitable. It is pointed out that most of these new members are introduced to Islam for the first time through Hizb ut-Tahrir.[23]

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[18] International Crisis Group (ICG). 30 June 2003, 20.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid. 22.

[22] Evgenii Novikov, 2004.

[23] Ibid.

Another researcher, Baran, explains that Hizb ut-Tahrir employs different strategies in different countries. She declares; "In the US and Europe, it appeals to educated Muslims who want to become politically active. Thus, the value added per Hizb ut-Tahrir member is much higher than that brought by the usual foot soldier in other organizations." [24]

Review of the Literature

The sources on the topic of the dissertation can be classified into two groups; the first group includes Hizb ut-Tahrir's own web sites, books and leaflets. The second group includes books, journal articles, media reports and internet resources. In general, it is possible to suggest that the relevant studies in the literature deal with the following questions: Is Hizb ut-Tahrir a real threat in the region? What are the social, economic and political conditions in Uzbekistan/Central Asia that can lead the way to radical Islamism?

First of all, I want to classify the views about the first question, that is whether Hizb ut-Tahrir is a real threat to the region or not. The government of Uzbekistan declares Hizb ut-Tahrir as a threat to region's security. After the terrorist attacks on America in September 2001, the Uzbek government requested that the Hizb ut-Tahrir be included on the international blacklist of extremist organizations drawn up by Washington.[25] According to Uzbek foreign affairs representative Bakhtier Islomov, Hizb-ut-Tahrir had spread its extremist activities in most Central Asian countries and is a threat to political order.[26]

Another scholar, Rabbimov, also considers Hizb ut-Tahrir as a threat. By reminding the terrorist acts in Tashkent and Bukhara in late March and early April 2004, he claims that the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir is dangerous. According to investigation results on the terrorist acts in Bukhara and Taskent, the republic's Public

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[24] Zeyno Baran, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.org.

[25] Nargiz Zakirova, "Tashkent Wants Islamic Group Blacklisted", *Institute for War and Peace Reporting,* http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200301_173_2_eng.txt, (accessed November 15, 2004)

[26] Ibid.

Prosecuter-General declared the actions of several groups (jamoats) actions were guided by the ideas of Hizb ut-Tahrir and other radical Islamist groups in the region. [27] The jamoats, the grass-root cell of Hizb ut-Tahrir, were subjected to brainwashing, which planted the ideas of 'jihad' in their minds. So, Rabbimov believes that Hizb ut-Tahrir is a threat in the region. [28]

Furthermore, Bobojonov who is a specialist on Islam at the Tashkent Academy of Sciences, states that after the US-led campaign against terrorism that started in Afghanistan in 2001, the position of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia changed and the group became much more radical. By spreading leaflets and literature, the group started calling for war and martyrdom for the cause of Islam. [29]

Also, another scholar, Cohen declares that Hizb ut-Tahrir represents a growing medium and long-term threat to the geopolitical stability and the secular regimes of Central Asia and poses a potential threat to other regions of the world. Cohen expresses that by breeding violent anti-American attitudes, attempting to overthrow existing regimes, and preparing cadres for more radical Islamist organizations, Hizb ut-Tahrir poses a threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia and elsewhere in the Islamic world where moderate regimes are found. [30]

Furthermore, Zeyno Baran who is the director of international security and energy programs at Nixon Center, thinks that Hizb ut-Tahrir is a threat in the long term. She declares that although the party is not considered to be a terrorist organization, it is like an elementary school for the ideological training of many other groups. [31]

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[27] K. Rabbimov, 2004. 15.

[28] Ibid. 16.

[29] Bruce Pannier, "How Big a threat is Hizb ut-Tahrir? Part 2" http://www.religioscope.com/articles/2002/002_hizb_b.htm, (accessed November 15, 2004)

[30] Ariel Cohen , "Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia", 2003. http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm, (accessed November 20, 2004)

[31] *Guardian article*, "The terrible truth of Islamic Groups" 23 November 2004, http://www.godpigeon.com/content/view/86/

Some international experts and law-enforcement agencies agreed that Hizb ut-Tahrir is a "conveyor belt" for producing terrorists.[32]

Contrary to these views, there are other scholars who believe that Hizb ut-Tahrir is not a threat to region's security. According to some analysts, labeling Hizb ut-Tahrir as a threat is an attempt to excuse Tashkent's suppression of Muslim radicals.[33] For example, Grishin expresses that Hizb ut-Tahrir poses a danger not only because they themselves present a danger, but also they have been used to justify the authoritarian policies of Central Asian regimes.[34]

Schoerberlein also believes that the authorities are exaggerating the security threat posed by Hizb ut-Tahrir as there is no reason to believe that Hizb ut-Tahrir members have been involved in violent acts and aim the violent overthrow of the governments of the region.[35]

Also, Steinberger claims that Uzbek President Islam Karimov is using Islamic threat to justify its authoritarian style of government, and that a takeover by Islamic fundamentalists does not seem to be a real threat.[36] Rather, such a takeover has been used as a justifying argument by the Russian Federation and current Central

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[32] Zeyno Baran, "The Road from Taskent to the Taliban Islamist terror group is undermining a U.S. ally." 2004, http:www.nationalreview.org. However, the Hizb ut-Tahrir leader, Jaluluddin Patel, found this view very disingenuous. He declares; "the founding Fathers of America would probably have been called a conveyor belt for terrorists because they produced the intellectual ideas which led to the American people rising up against colonial rule." Guardian article, "The terrible truth of Islamic Groups" 23 November 2004. http://www.godpigeon.com/content/view/86/
Patel who is the leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the United Kingdom. For more information about Patel see http://www.1924.org/text/1341/0/28/M

[33] Nargiz Zakirova, http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/rca/rca_200301_173_2_eng.txt

[34] Andrey Grishin, "Assessing Religious Extremism in Central Asia", *Conference Report: The challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology.* Nixon Center. (September2004),74.
http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/PB%202004/confrephiztahrir.pdf, (accessed November 24, 2004)

[35] Bruce Pannier, "How Big a threat is Hizb ut-Tahrir? Part 1"
http://www.religioscope.com/articles/2002/001_hizb_a.htm, (accessed November 15, 2004)

[36] Petra Steinberger, "Fundamentalism in Central Asia: Reasons, Reality and Prospects"., in *Central Asia: Aspects of Transition* ed. Tom Everett-Heath (London: RoutledgeCurzon; New York: Routledge, 2003), 228.

Asian leaders as well as by the Russian as well as Ukrainian anti-democratic, radical nationalists. Steinberger further declares that Karimov and other Central Asian leaders receive financial aid and economic support from the West to stabilize the situation in their countries through increasing the fear of Islamic takeover. [37]

Another scholar, Tabyshalieva who is a well-known democratic activist and expert on Central Asia, also argued that Hizb ut-Tahrir is not especially threatening because it is opposed to both violence and overt political activity. [38]

The second question in the literature was about the views about the social, economic and political conditions in Uzbekistan/Central Asia that can lead the way to radical Islam. The common argument among the scholars is that worsening socio-cultural, economic and political conditions should be considered for understanding in the rise of radical Islamic groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir in post-Soviet Uzbekistan.

First of all, Rabbimov talks about the lack of profound religious knowledge, which is one of the socio-cultural gaps in Uzbekistan. Rabbimov expresses that since Uzbekistan is a Muslim country in which traditional Islamic ideology is accepted as a parcel of public consciousness and everyday life, Islamic beliefs are part of self-identity.[39] Because of the repression on legal activities of traditional Islamic schools in the 20th century, these schools were weakened to a large extent. Today's official Islam also lost its intellectual origins and wants to improve its educational system and reform the Islamic ideas. This is considered to be crucial in order to create a sort of intellectual protection against radical Islam promoted by groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir.[40] Hizbut Tahrir made good use of this general lack of profound religious knowledge and the need of spiritual demand in expanding its area of influence.

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[37] Ibid. 229.

[38] Erin Trouth, "Cross-border Issues in Central Asia - Leadership, Islam, and Narcotics" Georgetown University, Center for Euraisan, Russian and East European Studies, http://ceres.georgetown.edu/events/polattabyshalieva.html, (accessed November 17, 2004)

[39] K. Rabbimov, 2004, 19.

[40] Ibid.

Rabbimov expresses the power of Hizb ut-Tahrir on the Muslim people of the region as follows: "After speaking even once to Hizb ut-Tahrir supporters they fall easy prey to the sect and become its ideological prisoners".[41]

Secondly, Rabbimov talks about the political conditions, which is crucial in order to understand the rise to Islamic movements in the region and in Uzbekistan. Rabbimov tells that Hizb ut-Tahrir expanded its activities in post-Soviet Central Asia in which democratic values and institutions were not fully developed and "social shock absorbers" such as free press, elections, parliament, democratic opposition and meetings do not really work.[42]

Thirdly, Rabbimov mentioned economic problems of the region and suggested that a large segment of the society (lower and middle class) had difficulties to adopt the market economy and capitalism and suffer economic problems. As he claims, Hizb ut-Tahrir is against imperialism, has an idealistic and utopic approach and offers standardization against diversity to solve the economic problems prevalent in today's market economy. In short, Hizb ut-Tahrir claims itself to be the authority to find simple and convincing answers to the important and hard questions of the country's economic, religious and social problems. As Rabbimov suggested, Hizb ut-Tahrir presented its ideas and discourse with in the framework of Islam.[43]

According to Apostolou, Central Asia's stability is threatened by the political regimes, not by the radical groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or the Islamic Movement of the Uzbekistan. [44] In one of his articles, Apostolou especially focused on Uzbekistan, which is a key state in the US-led war against terrorism.[45] According to his arguments, there are two broad categories of state failure in Central Asia. One of

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[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44]Andrew Apostolou, "State Failure and Radicalism in Central Asia", *Conference Report: The challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology* Nixon Center. (September2004),64.http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/PB%202004/confrephiztahrir.pdf, (accessed November 24, 2004).

[45] Ibid.

them is political and the other one is economic. By focusing on the political and economic situation in Uzbekistan, he declares that both economic and political failures have contributed to a context that incubates radicalism.[46] However, Apostolou also believes that economic failures are not the direct reason of terrorism. According to him, poverty does not necessarily create terrorism.

> Rather, poverty is often used as a pretext for terrorism. Terrorists, like many radicals, often come from comfortable middle-class backgrounds, and some have extremely wealthy families. If there is any economic factor that in some vague way influences the decision to use terrorism as a political tactic, then it is the loss of privilege and economic decline from a position of relative comfort. [47]

Also one Hizb ut-Tahrir leader says: "The idea that poverty is what drives people to join is a myth. Look how many well-educated Muslims in the West are members."[48]

Another scholar, Mann, also focused on the socio-economic and political conditions of Central Asia. He states that growing dissatisfaction of various population groups with their socio-economic conditions such as unemployment, poverty, and little prospects of social advancement has caused the religious protest and religious extremism.[49] He explained that independence of the Central Asian republics in 1991 brought huge economic problems and that the proponents of the Islamic movements in the region are educated but unemployed young people.[50] Moreover, he states that: "Lacking opportunities and firm social framework leave people susceptible to radical forces." [51]

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[46] Ibid. 65.

[47] Ibid. 68-69.

[48] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 14.

[49] Poonam Mann, "Religious Extremism in Central Asia" Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA, December 2001 Vol. 25 No. 9, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_dec01map01.html, (accessed November 17, 2004)

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid.

Mann's main argument however is related with the political environment of the Central Asian republics. He states that since the Central Asian republics have failed to develop democracy as they concentrated power in the same set of people.[52] He further claims that governments in Central Asia, especially the Karimov government, has adopted very oppressive policies to prevent political oppositions especially the Islamists who are not officially recognized. So, the Islamic movements were forced to radicalization.[53]

Outline of the Thesis and Methodology

This thesis is composed of five chapters. After the Introduction, in the second chapter, Hizb ut-Tahrir's historical perspective and its actions will be analyzed. In this part, the party's historical perspective is divided into two sections, which are the period between the establishment of Hizb ut-Tahrir to an-Nabhani's death (1952-1977) and the period between 1977 to 2005. Also, in the second chapter, Hizb ut-Tahrir actions will be explained by analyzing its ideology, strategy, party structure, methods and membership profile. The third chapter will be Hizb ut-Tahrir in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. In this chapter, history of Islam in Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir's actions in Uzbekistan will be explained. The country's political, economic and social conditions will be given in detail in the fourth chapter. This examination will help to find an answer if these conditions contribute to the rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. And finally, the thesis ends with a concluding chapter.

In this thesis, a two-step methodology will be adopted: the historical analysis and the content analysis. Firstly, with the help of historical analysis, which is a method of increasing the knowledge of the past, I want to bring out how Hizb ut-Tahrir was established developed and became a widespread group in Uzbekistan. In the second step, by utilizing first hand records about Hizb ut-Tahrir such as their own books, leaflets and web sites, I will use the content analysis.

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[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

HIZB UT-TAHRIR'S HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND ITS ACTIONS

In this chapter, Hizb ut-Tahrir is analyzed from a historical perspective. In the first part, the emphasis is on the period between the establishment of Hizb ut-Tahrir until the death of its founder, An-Nabhani. The second part analyzes the aftermath of an-Nabhani's death. This historical perspective is given with the aim of providing a better understanding of Hizb ut-Tahrir's existence in Uzbekistan. Later, I will also focus on the ideology, strategy, party structure, methods and membership profile of the party.

2.1.1. The period between the establishment of Hizb ut-Tahrir to An-Nabhani's death (1953-1979)

In 1952, Taqiud-Din an-Nabhani (1909-1979) established Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party of Liberation), which was a political party, in Jerusalem.[54] An-Nabhani was born in Haifa and received the traditional primary education. In 1928, he was enrolled in Al-Azhar University and Dar ul-Ulum University in Cairo, Egypt.[55] An-Nabhani was also a member of the radical *Al Ihwan al-Muslimeen* (Islamic Brotherhood), which is a secretive international fundamentalist organization founded in Egypt in 1928 with the aim of establishing *Khilafah* (Caliphate) and which has proponents throughout the Islamic world and an-Nabhani joined the Brotherhood while he was studying in Cairo's Al-Azhar University but later left the Brotherhood because he considered it "too soft". [56] Hizb ut-Tahrir was initially

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[54] Hizb ut-Tahrir, http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/English/aboutus.htm, (accessed November 19, 2004)

[55] Mateen Siddiqui, "The Doctrine of Hizb ut-Tahrir" *Conference Report: The challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology.* Nixon Center. 2004. 1.http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/PB%202004/confrephiztahrir.pdf (accessed November 24, 2004)

[56] Ariel Cohen, "Hizb ut-Tahrir: An emerging threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia", 2003, 20.

supported by the Saudi-based radical Islamist Wahhabi movement, but the extent of Wahhabi assistence today is controversial. [57]

In an interview[58] with Ahmed Rashid, the leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir explains the party's philosophy and aims as follows:

> [Hizb ut-Tahrir] was formed in Saudi Arabia in the 1950's and at that time we had a united plan with the Wahhabi movement. But we soon developed differences and split…[Hizb ut-Tahrir] wanted to work with people in each country on a separate basis and bring about [*Shari'ah*] (Islamic law) in a peaceful manner while the Wahhabis were extremists who wanted guerrilla war and the creation of an Islamic army. We want to make a Caliphate that will reunite all the Central Asian states. [59]

In another interview conducted by Mahan Abedin, Hizbut Tahrir's leader in Britain Jalaluddin Patel, Hizb ut-Tahrir is defined as a political party, not as Wahhabism or Salafism.[60] Patel differentiated Hizb ut-Tahrir as a unique model in adopting ideas because it takes into account the views that are based on authentic Islamic sources. So, any view coming from Wahhabism, Salafism, Shafi and Hanefi sects of Islam is scrutinized according to its "base" in authentic Islamic resources.[61]

In 1932, an-Nabhani graduated from university and obtained the Universal Shariah Diploma.[62] At al-Azhar he had attended different political discussion groups organized by famous scholars such as Sheikh al-Akhdar Hussein. On his return to Palestine he worked as a teacher of religion from 1932 to 1938, but because he did

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[57] Ariel Cohen, "Hizb ut-Tahrir: An emerging threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia", 2003, 20.

[58] The interview was carried out on the basis that his name and the location of the interview would not be revealed. Ahmed Rashid, "Interview with the Leader of Hizb-e Tahrir" Central Asia-Caucausus Institute, November 22, 2000. http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=114 (accessed November 20, 2004)

[59] Ibid.

[60] Mahan Abedin, "Inside Hizb ut-Tahrir: An interview with Jalaluddin Patel, leader of the Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK", *Terrorism Monitor*, The Jamestown Foundation, Volume II, Issue 8, (August 11, 2004). http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=3045 (accessed September 2, 2004)

[61] Ibid.

[62] Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqi-ud-deen_an-Nabhani, (accessed July 5, 2005)

not like this professional field, he started to work as a *qadi* in the Islamic court of law in Ramleh.[63] According to him, in Palestine education were laid down by Western nations, and were therefore spoiled. Judiciary, however, was not interfered by Western influence, as it rested in its entirety on Islamic jurisprudence. So, he applied to the high court in Palestine, which, consequently appointed him in different judicial areas in Bissan, Taberrias and later Haifa. He also worked as an assessor between 1940 to 1945. From this date until 1948, an-Nabhani held a very high position at the court of Haifa.[64] In 1948, he moved to Beirut and was assigned to the Court of Appeals in Jerusalem.[65] When he returned to Palestine in 1951, he started to feel the effects of Westernisation of the Islamic ummah by colonial powers such as Britain and France more. The loss of Palestine in 1948 had made him realize that only a structured and intense intellectual work could take Palestine back to its glorious and powerful past. To achieve this, an-Nabhani started preparations to form the basic structure and literature of Hizb ut-Tahrir while he was still a judge at al-Quds in 1949. In his first written work "Saving Palestine" in January 1950, he exhibited how deeply Islam had been rooted in Palestine since the seventh century. He also described and discussed in detail the main reasons for the underdevelopment of Arab societies. According to him, undevelopment was due to the fact that the ummah had given its powers and will to the colonial powers. In August 1950, an-Nabhani sent a long letter, which was published later as a book ("The Message of the Arabs"), to the members of the Culture Summit of the Arab League in Alexandria, Egypt. In the letter, he emphasized the point that the true and real message of the Arab society is Islam, which could alone bring the intellectual and political revival of the Ummah. As Summit members did not give any response to his letter and an-Nabhani decided to establish a political party.[66]

In 1950 an-Nabahani also wrote and published a book that praised the nationalist ideals. The book's name was "The Treatise of the Arab". In this book, an-Nabhani

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[63] Biographies of some Islamic Leaders, http://www.angelfire.com/az/rescon/biography.html, (accessed 23 August, 2005)

[64] Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqi-ud-deen_an-Nabhani

[65] Mateen Siddiqui, 2004, 1.

[66] Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqi-ud-deen_an-Nabhani

declared that the Hizb ut-Tahrir's top priority was to establish the Islamic state in Arab territories and afterwards in non-Arab Islamic territories.[67] He resigned from his job at the judiciary in 1951 and went to Amman, where he gave numerous lectures at the Faculty of Islamic Sciences. By the end of 1952, an-Nabhani announced a declaration to the governor of Jerusalem and the Jordanian government, informing the authorities about the establishment of the Hizb ut-Tahrir.[68] The party initially requested official registration under the Parties Law in Jordan but Ministry of Interior denied permission in March 1953.[69] Furthermore, the Jordanian government issued a decree, which banned Hizb ut-Tahrir and announced its activities as illegal.[70] According to an expert, the applicants of Hizb ut-Tahrir were rejected on the grounds that "the basic tenets of the proposed platform were contrary to not only to the spirit but to the very terms of the Jordanian Constitution." [71] However, the organizers of Hizb ut-Tahrir did not pay attention to this refusal and continued their work in al-Quds, al-Khalil, Nablus and other towns and villages in Jordan. An-Nabhani himself headed the leadership committee and guided the party structurally, politically and intellectually.[72] He published several books, organized meetings, and gave lectures in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.[73]

In the period between 1953-1956, there was a strong competition and conflict between the monarch's supporters and radical nationalist and socialist opposition in Jordan. In this period, Hizb ut-Tahrir remained as a political opposition party and played an active role in Jordanian politics. In October 1954, the party sent one of his members Sheik Ahamad ad-Daur to the parliament, who would be re-elected in

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[67] Mateen Siddiqui, 2004, 1.

[68] Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqi-ud-deen_an-Nabhani

[69] Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Politics in Palestine*, London ; New York : Tauris Academic Studies, (1996), 68.

[70] Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqi-ud-deen_an-Nabhani

[71] Beverley Milton-Edwards, 1996, 68.

[72] Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqi-ud-deen_an-Nabhani

[73] Mateen Siddiqui, 2004, 1.

1956. It can be assumed that Ad-Daur's presence and status in the parliament was viewed as an opportunity to have a representative within the system. Political tensions increased in Jordan throughout 1956. Eventually, the government collapsed and a new cabinet was assigned. King Hussein ordered to take new strict precautions against radical political activities and organizations. With these new orders, the presence of ad-Daur became intolerable in the parliament. The Hizb ut-Tahrir members were now under the threat of prosecution, repression, heavy penalties and exile. So, the party was forced to hide in underground. It, however, continued its activities in West Bank.[74] Despite severe repression and imprisonment of its members, Hizb ut-Tahrir in West Bank and Jordan continued to exist, albeit secretly, throughout the 1960s. The organization became more covert, becoming increasingly deeper in thought and no longer openly responding to the political circumstances of the day. [75] At the time of the second Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Hizb ut-Tahrir still continued to propose a radical Islamic agenda. [76] The party's support increased in 1960s and the leader considered that this was sufficient to take power not just in Jordan, but also in Iraq and Syria with the help of the armed forces in each country.[77]

In the 1970s, Hizb ut-Tahrir was enlarged to Egypt, North Africa and especially Tunisia (where it held a great influence in the 1980s). Some elitist cells within the party eventually appeared to have emanated into the ruling circles in the Arab states and attempted to change their regime forcefully trough military coups. [78] These attempts failed in Jordan 1969 and 1971, in southern Iraq in 1972. [79] Moreover, in June 1974, Hizb ut-Tahrir members failed to make an armed attack on the military academy in Cairo, Egypt, in order to capture weapons and then to overthrow the

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[74] Beverley Milton-Edwards, 1996, 69.

[75] Ibid. 71.

[76] Ibid. 72.

[77] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 3.

[78] Micheal Fredholm, 2003, 12.

[79] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 3.

government.[80] These failures and the arrests of the many members decreased both the enthusiastic support and activities of the party. The membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir fell and an ideological confusion emerged because of the failure to create an Islamic state in Prophet Muhammad's time.[81]

An-Nabhani's exact date of death is controversial. While some sources declare it to be in 1977, Hizb ut-Tahrir web site sources declare it as 1979. However, Wikipedia sources[82] and International Crisis Group (ICG) [83] announced it as 20 December 1977. Sheikh Abdul Qadim Zallum, another Palestinian cleric and a former professor at Al-Azhar University headed the Hizb ut-Tahrir after an-Nabhani's death. Zallum's leadership of Hizb ut-Tahrir continued till his death in April 2003.[84] Sheikh 'Ata Abu Rishtah governed the party after Zallum till today. [85]

2.1.2. The period between 1979 to 2005

ICG report states that the reactivation of Hizb ut-Tahrir after an-Nabhani's death began in early 1990s as political Islam made progress through the Muslim world. The report also stated that events such as the Gulf War further radicalized the Islamic societies.[86] According to Ariel Cohen, Hizb ut-Tahrir supported both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991 and the activites of Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria. [87]

Troughout the 1990s, the popularity of the party extended in Jordan, Syria, North Africa, Turkey and South-East Asia. The party also started working in Central Asia

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[80] Micheal Fredholm, 2003, 12.

[81] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 3.

[82] Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqi-ud-deen_an-Nabhani

[83] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 3.

[84] Mateen Siddiqui, 2004, 1.

[85] Taqi-ud-deen an-Nabhani, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taqi-ud-deen_an-Nabhani

[86] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 3.

[87] Ariel Cohen, "Hizb ut-Tahrir: An emerging threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia", 2003, 20.

especially in the second half of the 1990s.[88] In 1993, members of the group were accused of planning a coup against King Hussein of Jordan. As the organization was banned in most parts of the Middle East, its leaders established the organization in Europe, in particular, Germany, Denmark, and Britain.[89] In short, Hizb ut-Tahrir seems to be an international movement, active in various parts of the Islamic world.[90]

However, it must be also be emphasized that Hizb ut-Tahrir is not only active in the Muslim world but also in Europe. Ahmed Rashid expressed that some of the leaders of Hizb ut-Tahrir set up offices in Europe after it was banned in the Middle East. As he declares, London is believed to be the main organizational center in Europe. In London, Hizb ut-Tahrir raises funds and new members especially among the Muslim students studying in British Universities. The party regularly holds conferences in London to debate political issues. In these conferences, several facilities are provided: activities for disabled people and children, fully equipped medical teams, bookstalls, places for prayer and live Web cast on the Internet. [91]

Micheal Whine, who analyzed Hizb ut-Tahrir's presence and activities in Europe, stated that the party mainly expresses itself to the intellectual Muslim circles in the West. [92] In Britain, Omar Bakri Muhammad founded the first Hizb ut-Tahrir branch in 1986. [93] The public in general noticed the party with its call in 1988[94] to hijack

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[88] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 3.

[89] In January 2001, Germany banned HT on the account that it was active in universities with anti-Semitic slogans and causing hatred towards Jewish population and Israel. The German authorities could ban Hizb ut-Tahrir because German legislation allows for the proscription of foreign-based extremist groups. Denmark also banned the HT because of its published document that threatens the Jewish leadership of the country.

[90] Micheal Fredholm, 2003, 12.

[91] Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 118-119.

[92] Micheal Whine, "Hizb ut-Tahrir in open socities", *Conference Report: The challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology.* Nixon Center. 2004. http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/PB%202004/confrephiztahrir.pdf (accessed November 24, 2004)

[93] Micheal Fredholm, 2003, 12.

airplanes containing Israelis and Jews under the leadership of Omar al-Bakri Muhammad (Omar Bakri Fostock) and Farid Kassım. [95] The members of Hizb ut-Tahrir held well-publicized large-scale conferences at Wembley Conference Center and Trafalgar Square at the time. Their aim was to increase membership, especially among the Muslim students. However, these large-scale conferences threatened Sikh, Hindu and Jewish students and brought to the party a notorious notability. Eventually, Hizb ut-Tahrir was banned by the National Union of Students and in universities where it was active. In addition, the Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (the umbrella body for universities in Britain) issued a guidance booklet to universities in which it condemned religious extremism and coercion. [96]

In 1996, Omar Bakri Muhammed announced that he was forced to leave the party after 18 years. The main disagreement between Muhammad and the central leadership was about the extent of activities and objectives of Hizb ut-Tahrir outside the Arab countries. While the central leadership insisted on expanding the ideological views only to Muslim societies, Muhammad argued that the ideals of an-Nabhani should be expressed in non-Muslim locations as well. As the movement expanded in Britain it could also struggle with British government and regime together with other Muslim governments. [97]

When the leader of British branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Omar al-Bakri Muhammad was replaced by Fuad Huseyin in February 1996, the organization changed its expansion strategy. It became more secret and concentrated more on the protests and activities related with Uzbekistan. With many supporters, Muhammad established a new group called "al-Muhajiroun". [98] The strategy of the new group under Muhammad, al-Muhajiroun, was more or less the same with the Hizb ut-

[94] Peter Nesser, "Jihad in Europe: Exploring the sources of motivations for Salafi-Jihadi terrorism in Europe post-Millenium", University of Oslo & Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), 15 January 2004, 39. http://www.fomi.no/nedlasting/JihadInEurope.pdf, (accessed 23 August 2005)

[95] Micheal Whine, 2004, 101.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Suha Taji-Farouki, "Islamists and the Threat of Jihad: Hizb al –Tahrir and the al-Muhajiroun on Israel and the Jews", *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol.36, No.4, (October 2000):31.

[98] Ibid. 30.

Tahrir. But al-Muhajiroun further developed the aggressive methods and highly intensive media profile. The group became the "fastest growing Islamic party in Britain". [99] It started to organize weekly activities across the country such as encompassing discussion circles and classes in Qur'anic interpretation, current affairs and Islamic Jurisprudence. In addition, an impressive website offering a wide range resources was established. [100]

The third phase of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain is with the leader Dr. Abdul Wahid. Under his leadership, the organization tried to increase its support by two methods. The first one is expanding the number of members among students, and organizing street meetings. The second method is using other communition chanells like a web-based journal, *Khilafah*, and its communiqués. [101]

Currently, British law does not allow for the banning of radical or extremist groups unless they have any interest with terrorist activity.[102] After the attacks in July 2005 in London, some of the British politicians are calling on the government to ban the organisation Hizb ut-Tahrir.[103] As one of the Hizb ut-Tahrir website declared, the Prime Minister proposed to ban the Hizb ut-Tahrir on 5th August 2005. [104]

2.2. Hizb ut-Tahrir in Action

In this section, Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology, party structure, strategy, methods, membership profile and activities in Uzbekistan will be explored. The aim is to understand and describe Hizb ut-Tahrir's current aims, organization style and situation in this country.

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[99] Ibid.

[100] Ibid. 30.

[101] Micheal Whine, 2004, 102.

[102] Ibid. 107.

[103] Vanessa Mock, "Hizb ut-Tahrir: Muslim MP leads call for ban in Britain, 25 July 2005, http://www2.rnw.nl/rnw/en/currentaffairs/region/westerneurope/uk050725?view=Standard, (accessed July 30, 2005)

[104] Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, "Press statement from Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain", 6 August 2005 http://www.1924.org/press_releases/index.php?id=2130_0_8_0_M, (accessed August 8, 2005)

2.2.1. The Ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir

From 1950s and 1960s, Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology has changed little and an-Nabhani's writings continued to be the basic source. [105] According to this, the vital issue for the Muslims was "re-establishing Islam in life, state and society and carrying Islam as a message to the world through invitation and Jihad." [106] Hizb ut-Tahrir members believe that only a political party could achieve this aim because they think that "if the thoughts are not conveyed politically by working with them and establishing them then they would remain stagnant."[107] Because of this, in Hizb ut-Tahrir's official web site, the group is defined as a "political party whose ideology is Islam." [108]

However, Hizb ut-Tahrir is not a party functioning in a democratic state. It rejects democracy and refuses to take part in the elections in the context of a democratic system. The members declared that they do not want to go for elections and do not want to be a part of any coalition government.[109] In a Hizb ut-Tahrir book, *The Democracy is a System of Kufr,* democracy is considered as an "imaginary and inapplicable idea"[110] because:

> Democracy is the product of the human mind and not from Allah. It does not rely on the divine revelation, nor has it any connection to any religion revealed by Allah to His Messengers.[111]

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[105] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 3.

[106] *The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change*, Al-Khilafah Publications (London, 1999), 14. http://www.islamic-state.org/books/MethodologyOfHizbUtTahrirForChange.pdf (accessed July 5, 2005)

[107] Ibid. 17.

[108] Hizb ut-Tahrir official web-site, http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/english.html

[109] Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation)
 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizb-ut-tahrir.htm, (accessed March 8, 2005)

[110] *The Democracy is a system of Kufr*, Al-Khilafah Publications (London, 1995), 11. http://www.islamic-state.org/books/DemocracySystemKufr.pdf, (accessed June 11, 2005)

[111] Ibid. 10

While rejecting democratic society, Hizb ut-Tahrir wish and work for an Islamic way of life. In an-Nabhani's book "the Islamic State" it is clearly stated that the party wants to establish one single Islamic state over the entire Muslim world in which Islamic *Aqeedah* (doctrine) is applied to ensure an Islamic way of life. An-Nabhani formulates this idea as such:

> One single state over the entire Muslim World which would resume the Islamic way of life upon the Islamic *Aqeedah*, implement Islam within society after this was deeply rooted in the peoples' hearths and minds, and which would carry the Message of Islam to the whole world. [112]

In all their publications, Hizb ut-Tahrir expressed that their aim is to re-establish the Islamic *Khilafah* and they saw re-establishing the *Khilafah* as the only solution to all problems of the Muslim world. In this sense, the abolishment of *Khilafah* was a big mistake and a disaster for the Muslim world. As Mayer quoted from one of Hizb ut-Tahrir publications: "Seventy-eight years ago, the Jewish criminal Mustafa Kemal committed the mother of all crimes, by eliminating the *Khilafah* (Caliphate) system…."[113]

According to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Caliphate will be re-established by Muslims on the *aqeedah* (doctrine) of the Prophet and his Companions.[114] Aqeedah, which is the "core creedal concepts" that Muslims believe,[115] composes a system that governs all the affairs of the state and the ummah,[116] and finds solutions to all life's problems. [117] Aqeedah is based on the two main sources: the *Qur'an* and the Hadith. [118] According to an-Nabhani's book *The System of Islam*:

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[112] Taquiddin an-Nabahani, *The Islamic State*, (1998), 2. http://www.islamic-state.org/books/TheIslamicState.pdf, (accessed July 16, 2005)

[113] Jean-François Mayer, "Hizb ut-Tahrir-The next Al-Qaida, Really?" *PSIO Occasional Paper,* 4/2004. 15. http://www.1924.org/resources/pdfs/meyeralqaida.pdf, (accessed June 15, 2005)

[114] The reality of the Sect, Hizb ut-Tahrir, http://www.htexposed.com/htexpose.doc, (accessed November 9, 2004)

[115] Mahan Abedin, 2004.

[116] The Arabic term Ummah refers in the Qur'an to the community of believers.

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> The *aqeedah* is the belief in Allah, His Angels, His Books, His Messengers, The Day of Judgment, and *al-Qadaa wal Qadar*, the good and the bad are from Allah. Islam builds the *aqeedah*, which the mind can comprehend, on the mind. This includes the existence of Allah, the Prophethood of Muhammad and the Qur'an.[119]

With the aim of creating an Islamic state, which comprises all Muslims in the world, Hizb ut-Tahrir composed a "proposed constitution" for the future Caliphate who may not be a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir.[120] The "draft constitution" has 186 articles, which finds solutions for all life's political, economic, cultural, and social problems or to any other issue emanates from Islamic *aqeedah*.[121] In the first article of Hizb ut-Tahrir's draft constitution, it is clearly stated that:

> The Islamic creed (*aqeedah*) constitutes the foundation of the state. Nothing is permitted to exist in the government's structure, accountability, or any other aspect connected with the government, that does not take the creed as it source. The creed is also the source of the State's constitution and [*shari'ah*] canons. Nothing connected to the constitution or canons, is permitted to exist unless it emanates from the Islamic *aqeedah*.[122]

Hizb ut-Tahrir's draft constitution is composed of six main headlines, which explain general rules, the ruling system, social system, economic system, education policy, and foreign affairs. All these headlines in their draft constitution will be analyzed in detail. Education policies will be analyzed inside the social system.

2.2.1.a. General Rules

The first headline in Hizb ut-Tahrir draft constitution is the general rules, which consists of 15 articles, some of which define and explain Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology.

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[117] Taquiddin an-Nabahani, *Party Structure,* Hizb ut-Tahrir Publications, 2. http://www.hizbuttahrir.org/English/books/Party_Structure.pdf, (accessed November 24, 2004)

[118] Mateen Siddiqui, 2004, 11.

[119] *The System of Islam (Nidham al-Islam),* Al-Khilafah Publications, (8/28/2002), 92. http://www.khilafat.org/pages/Book/pdf/TheSystemofIslam.pdf, (accessed May 25, 2005)

[120] Mahan Abedin, 2004, 7.

[121] Hizb ut-Tahrir*,* http://www.khilafat.org/newPages/Hizb/htahrir.php, (accessed May 15, 2005)

[122] *The System of Islam (Nidham al-Islam),* 2002, 115.

Firstly, as other sources of Hizb ut-Tahrir, draft constitution mentions the idea of invitation to Islam as a function of state. Article 11 states that: "The primary function of the State is propagation of the invitation (*dawah*) to Islam". Secondly, the draft constitution explains the divine rules of Islamic order in Article 12, which states that: "The only evidences to be considered for the divine rules (*Ahkam Shari'ah*) are: the *Qur'an*, the *Sunnah*, the concensus of Companions (*ijmaa as sahabah*) and anology (*qiyas*). Legislation cannot be taken from any source other than these evidences." Thirdly, Arabic is chosen as the language of state. Article 8 states that: "The Arabic is the language of Islam and the sole language of the State". Finally, article 6 explains the state's ideal relation with its citizens: "All citizens of the State shall be treated equally regardless of religion, race, colour or any other matter. The State is forbidden to discriminate among its citizens in all matters, be it ruling or judicial, or caring of affairs." [123]

2.2.1.b. Ruling System

The second main headline of Hizb ut-Tahrir's draft constitution is the ruling system, which is a unitary one [124], is explained between the articles 16 and 108. According to the Article 23, the state's ruling system is composed of eight institutions which will be explained as subtitles; "the *Khaleefah*, the delegated assistant, the executive assistants, amir of jihad, governors, judges, the state departments, and the council of the ummah."[125] Although there are eight institutions, only four of them rule the state. Article 18 explains the four positions of State's ruling which are "the *Khaleefah*, the delegated assistant, the governor, the mayor. All other officials of the State are employees and not rulers."[126] The principles of the ruling system are explained in article 22. It states that:

> The ruling system is founded upon four principles. They are: 1. Sovereignty belongs to the divine law [*shari'ah*] and not to the people; 2. Authority belongs to the people, i.e., the Ummah; 3. The appointment of one *Khaleefah* into office is an obligation upon all Muslims; 4. Only the

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[123] Ibid.

[124] Ibid. 119.

[125] Ibid. 120.

[126] Ibid. 119.

> *Khaleefah* has the right to adopt the *Ahkam Shari'ah* and thus he [enacts] the constitution and the various canons. [127]

The articles between 24 and 41 further explain the *Khaleefah.* In Article 24 it is stated that "the *Khaleefah* is deputized by the ummah with authority for the enactment of the divine rule."[128] And according to Article 28, "Nobody can become *Khaleefah* without being appointed by the Muslims. Nobody can hold the power of the *Khilafah* unless it is convened to him legitimately." According to Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology, *Khaleefah* can only get the power by the *Khaleefah* elections. In the article 26, it is stated that "every mature male and female Muslim, who is sane, has the right to participate in the election of the *Khaleefah* and giving him the pledge (*ba'iah*)."[129] One other important point in their ideology is explained in Article 34, which states that, "Ummah has no right to dismiss *Khaleefah* after he has legitimately attained the *ba'iah* of contracting." But when other related articles are analyzed, it can be observed that under some circumstances *Khaleefah be* changed. In Article 38, for example, it is expressed that:

> There is no limitation on the *Khaleefah*'s period in office. So long as he abides by the *shari'a*, implements its rules and able to manage the state's affairs, he continues as a *Khaleefah* unless his situation changes in such a way as to discharge him from the office of *Khilafah*. He is to be dismissed immediately, once such situation occurred.[130]

Article 39 explains three situations, which discharges the *Khaleefah* from the office of *Khilafah.* The first situation occurs when one of the *Khilafah*'s descriptive conditions, which is very important for the *Khilafah* permanence becomes void like apostatizing from Islam, insanity or manifest sinfulness (*fisq*). The second condition arises when the *Khaleefah* could not take the responsibility of the *Khilafah* because of any reason. And finally, the third situation takes place if the *Khaleefah* is constrained by any force and could not to perform the affairs of Muslims by himself

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[127] Ibid. 120.

[128] Ibid. 121.

[129] Ibid.

[130] Ibid. 125.

according to the rules of *shari'a*.[131] The Court for the acts of Injustice (*mahkumat ul-madhalim*) has the only authority to remove the *Khaleefah*.[132] The *Khaleefah* and its political powers in the state are explained in detail in Article 35. According to that:

> The *Khaleefah* is the State. He possesses all the powers/function of the state; so he possesses the following powers: a. The *Khaleefah* puts the *Ahkam Shari'ah,* once he adopted them, into law, and as such they become canons that must be obeyed and not violated. b. The *Khaleefah* is responsible for both the internal and external policies of the State. He takes charge of the leadership of the army and has the right to declare war, conclude peace, armistice, and treaties. c. The *Khaleefah* has the authority to accept and reject foreign ambassadors, and to appoint and dismiss Muslim ambassadors. d. The *Khaleefah* appoints and dismisses the assistants (*mâawin*) and the governors (*wulah*). The assistants and governors are responsible to the *Khaleefah* as well as to *Majlis al-Ummah*. e. The *Khaleefah* appoints and dismisses the chief judge, the directors of departments, the heads of the armed forces and the generals; all of whom are responsible to the *Khaleefah* and not to the *Majlis al-Ummah*. f. The *Khaleefah* adopts the *Ahkam Shari'ah* by which the State's budget is set. The *Khaleefah* decides its sections and the funds required for every field, whether they are related to revenue or expenditure.[133]

Between the articles 41 and 48, the position of the delegated assistant is explained. In article 41, why *Khaleefah* appointed a delegated assistant is explained as such: "the *Khaleefah* appoints an assistant delegated with the authority to assist him in undertaking the responsibility of ruling. He deputizes to him to manage affairs with his own point of view and *ijtihad*."[134] The function of the delegated assistant is explained in the Article 44. According to this, the function of the delegated assistant "is to inform the *Khaleefah* of the matters he has managed to and the appointments and delegated duties he has implemented."[135]

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[131] Ibid.

[132] Ibid. 126.

[133] Ibid.123.

[134] Ibid. 127.

[135] Ibid. 127-128.

Another important position that of the executive assistant is explained between the articles 48 and 51 of the draft constitution. Article 51 explains the reasons why the *Khaleefah* appoints an executive assistant and also clarifies the executive assistant' functions: "the *Khaleefah* appoints an executive assistant whose function is administrative and not ruling. His duty is to execute the instructions of the *Khaleefah* in both internal and external affairs of the state and relay to the *Khaleefah* what is received from these areas."[136]

In addition to the executive assistant, the amir of jihad is explained between the article 51 and 56 in the draft constitution. Article 51 states that "the directorate of Amir of jihad consists of four departments, they are: external affairs, the military, the internal security, and industry. The amir of jihad is the supervisor and director of all four departments." The army of the Islamic state is explained in the articles between 56 and 65. According to Article 61, the leader of the army is *Khaleefah*.[137] The Article 56 states that "Jihad is a compulsory duty (*fard*) on all Muslims. Military training is therefore compulsory. Thus, every male Muslim, fifteen years and over, is obliged to undergo military training in readiness for jihad."[138] The only authority to call for jihad is the Caliphate [139] therefore, the main jihad could only be called when the Islamic state is established. Jihad is a method used in "achieving the Islamic state's foreign policy objectives and spreading Islam." [140] According to a Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, "the true and effective jihad which uproots kufr and liberates the land of the Muslims from the Jews and Kuffar cannot take place without the existence of the *Khaleefah* "[141]

According to Jalaluddin Patel, the leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the UK, the concept of material struggle or jihad does not take part in any of its stages for establishing the

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[136] Ibid. 129.

[137] Ibid. 132.

[138] Ibid. 131.

[139] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 8.

[140] Jean-François Mayer, "Hizb ut-Tahrir-The next Al-Qaida, Really?" 2004, 18.

[141] Suha Taji-Farouki, 2000, 29.

Khilafah state. The work required for establishing the *Khilafah* must follow the peaceful method like the Prophet Muhammad's method.[142] Patel stated that "there is a difference between establishing a *Khilafah* state and defending one's land. It is the duty of Muslims to defend their lands from invasion."[143] If a Muslim land is attacked, Muslims could fight against the invaders in defensive wars. Therefore, defensive jihad does not need any authority to sanction it. According to Patel, "Jihad as a defensive enterprise can be undertaken with or without an Amir and with or without an Islamic state."[144] But, in an offensive situation, the only authority that can sanction offensive jihad is an Islamic state that possesses the appropriate political and military capabilities.[145]

In an interview conducted by Ahmed Rashid, one of the leaders of Hizb ut-Tahrir agreed to answer the questions only with the condition that his name and the location of the interview would not be revealed, declared that "[Hizb ut-Tahrir] wants a peaceful jihad that will be spread by explanation and conversion not by war." [146]

As it is explained before, in article 18, the state is ruled by four positions which are the *Khaleefah*, the delegated assistant (*moâawin*), the governor (*wali*), the mayor (*a'mil*). The governors and the mayors are explained in the draft constitution between the articles 86 and 94. Article 86 states that:

> The territories governed by the State are divided into units called provinces (*wilayat*). Each *wilayah* is divided into units called districts (*Imalat*). The person who governs wilayah is called *wali* or Amir, and the person who governs the *Imalah* is called the *aamil*.[147]

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[142] Mahan Abedin, 2004, 2.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Ibid. 3.

[145] Ibid.

[146] Ahmed Rashid, "Interview with the Leader of Hizb-e Tahrir" Central Asia-Caucausus Institute, November 22 2000. http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=114, (accessed November 20, 2004)

[147] Ibid. 138.

According to the Articles 87, the *Khaleefah* assigns the walis and the *aamils*.[148] The authorities of *wali* are explained in the article 88. According to it:

> The *wali* has the authority to govern and supervise the performance of the departments in his province on behalf of the *Khaleefah*. He has the same authority in the province as the delegate assistant has in the *Khilafah* state. He has command over the people of his province and control over all affairs except finance, the judiciary and the army. He has command over the police in respect of execution, but not in administration. [149]

The judiciary in the Islamic state is explained between the articles 66 and 86 in the draft constitution. The chosen articles explain the functions of the *mahkamat ul-madhalim*. In article 78, for example, stated that:

> The judge of the *mahkamat ul-madhalim* is appointed to remove all unjust acts, committed by the *Khaleefah,* governor(s), or any official state, that have been inflicted upon anyone-whether that person is a citizen or not-living in the domain of the state. [150]

According to Article 81, "The *mahkamat ul-madhalim* has the authority to dismiss any ruler, governor and official state, including the *Khaleefah*."

The state departments, which are administrators, directorates and departments, are explained between articles 95 and 100 in the draft constitution. According to Article 95, "the management of the government's affairs and the interests of people" are achieved by these state departments. According to article 98;

> Every administration must have a general manager and every directorate and department must have a special director responsible for them. All directors are responsible the general manager of their administrations, directorates, and departments. In respect to conforming to the laws and public orders, they are responsible to the *Khaleefah, wali* and *aamil*.

The Ummah Assembly (*Majlis al-Ummah*) is explained in the articles between 101 and 108 in the draft constitution. According to the Article 101 and 102, the people

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[148] Ibid.

[149] Ibid.

[150] *The System of Islam (Nidham al-Islam),* 2002, 136.

elect the members of the *Majlis al-Ummah* who informs the *Khaleefah* the views of the Muslims when consulted.[151] Article 101 states that "Non-Muslims are allowed to be members of the *Majlis al-Ummah* so that they can voice their complaints in respect to unjust acts performed by the rulers or the misapplication of the Islamic laws." In order to be a member of the *Majlis al-Ummah*, there are only two requirements for the State citizens, which are being mature and sane. Therefore, every citizen "has the right to become a member of the *Majlis al-Ummah*."[152] According to Article 21, Muslims can establish political parties to question the rulers as long as the parties are based on the creed of Islam and their adopted rules are Ahkam Shari'ah (Islamic ideology).[153]

2.2.1.c. Social Sytem and Education

The social system articles in the draft constitution of Hizb ut-Tahrir only described the rights and the roles of woman. According to this, the primary role of a woman is being a mother and wife. [154] According to Article 115, "men and women must not practice any work that poses danger to the morals or causes corruption in society."[155] Article 110 expresses that women in social life have also the same rights with men except for the determined *shari'ah* evidences. Thus, "she has the right to practice in trading, farming, and industry; to partake in contracts and transactions; to possess all form of property; to invest her funds by herself (or by others); and to conduct all life's affairs by herself." [156] Although women could "take part in *Khaleefah* elections, be a member of the *Majlis al-Ummah* and appointed as

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[151] Ibid. 141-142.

[152] Ibid. 143. Article 103: Every citizen of the State has the right to become a member of the Majlis al-Ummah, provided he or she is both mature and sane. This applies to Muslim and non-Muslim. However, membership to non-Muslims is confined to their voicing of complaints in respect to unjust acts performed by the rulers or the misapplication of Islam upon them

[153] Ibid. 120.

[154] Ibid. 144.

[155] Ibid. 145-146.

[156] Ibid. 144.

an official of the state," they cannot hold a ruling position like *Khaleefah, mu'awin, wali, aamil* or take part in any other ruling actions.[157]

Inside the social system part, the educational policies will also be explained. The aim of Hizb ut-Tahrir's education policy, which is based on the Islamic creed [158] is "to form the Islamic personality in thought and behaviour."[159] According to Article 173, the state provides free primary and secondary level education to every state citizen. The same article also declares that "the state should provide the opportunity for everyone to continue higher education free of charge." [160]

Article 172 explains many rules of education policy. According to it, the only allowed curriculum in education is the state's curriculum. The private schools are allowed by the state if "they adopt the state's curriculum and establish themselves on the State's educational policy and accomplish the goal of education set by the State". Foreign private schools, however, are not allowed. In article 172, it is also specifically stated that students should not be educated in classes in mixed-gender classrooms. Furthermore, teachers or students should not be included in specific certain deen, madhab, race or colour.[161]

2.2.1.d. Economic System

The fourth main headline in the draft constitution is economic system, which is explained between the articles 119-165. In Article 122, the foundation of party's economic policy is explained. According to it:

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[157] Ibid. Article 111: A woman can participate in the election and giving of the bai'ah to the Khaleefah, and elect, and also be a member of the Majlis al-Ummah, and can be appointed as an official of the state in a non-ruling position. Article 112: Women are not allowed to take charge of ruling, thus women cannot hold the positions of Khaleefah mu'awin, wali, aamil, nor to practice any of the actions of ruling. She is not allowed to be a chief judge, a judge in maHkamat ul-maDHalim nor amir of jihad.

[158] Ibid. 158.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Ibid. 160. Article 173: It is an obligation upon the State to teach every individual, male or female, those things, which are necessary for the mainstream of life. This should be obligatory and provided freely in the primary and secondary levels of education. The state should, to the best of its ability, provide the opportunity for everyone to continue higher education free of charge.

[161] Ibid. 159-160.

Allah is the alone owner of property and He has made human beings heirs in it. By this general entrust mankind has acquired the right to possess property. As a consequence of Allah's permission for the individual to possess property, man has the actual possession.[162]

From this article, we can understand that, individuals have only the right of utilizing Allah's property. According to Hizb ut-Tahrir's economic system, there are three types of property: private property, public property and the state property.[163] They are explained in the articles 124, 125 and 126 respectively: The person who has a private property can get benefit from it or receive a return from it.[164] Public property "is the [*shari'ah*] permission for the community to participate in obtaining benefit from the property itself."[165] State property includes all property whose "expenditure is determined solely by the view of the Khaleefah and his ijtihad, such as: the funds of taxes, land tax (*kharaj*) and head tax (*jizya*)".[166]

Jizya and *Kharaj* are explained in the articles 140 and 141. According to them, *jizya* is only collected from mature non-Muslim men, not from woman or children. Also, non-Muslim mature men pay the jizya if he is capable of paying. The *Kharaj* is collected on *al-kharajiah land,* which is a tax land owned by the state according to the lands' potential production.[167]

According to Article 121, all basic needs of the citizens must be provided completely by state and citizens "must be guaranteed to satisfy [their] luxuries (non-basic needs) to the highest possible level".[168]

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[162] Ibid. 147.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Ibid. 147-148.

[165] Ibid. 148.

[166] Ibid.

[167] Ibid. 149-151.

[168] Ibid. 147.

Article 128 lists the "forbidden" economic institutions and activities which are capitalist companies, co-operatives, all illegal transactions, squandering, extravagance, miserliness, usury (*riba*), fraud, monopolies and gambling.[169]

2.2.1.e. Foreign Affairs

The last main headline in the draft constitution is foreign affairs, which is explained the articles between the 176 and 186. According to Article 176, "politics is taking care of the nation's affairs inside and outside the state. It is performed by the state and the nation. The state practices it and the nation questions that practice."[170] Although the ummah could question the state affairs, "it is absolutely forbidden for any individual, party, group or association to have relations with a foreign state. Relations with foreign countries are restricted only to the state, because the state has the sole right to practice taking care of the ummah affairs."[171] However, there are also some restrictions on the state in conducting foreign affairs with international organizations. According to article 186,

> The State is forbidden to belong to any organization which is based on something other than Islam or which applies non-Islamic rules. This includes international organizations like the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and regional organizations like the Arab League.[172]

Hizb ut-Tahrir also bans establishing relations with Israel. Anti-Semitism is a characteristic of the party's ideology. Hizb ut-Tahrir's attitude towards Israel and Jews incites hatred of them. In a Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet published on 17 April 1988, the following declared: "Hizb ut-Tahrir insists that the only legally permissible encounter between Jews and Muslims is on the Jihad battlefield."[173] And also in

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[169] Ibid. 148.

[170] Ibid. 161.

[171] Ibid.

[172] Ibid. 164.

[173] Suha Taji-Farouki, 2000, 28.

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May 1994, one of Hizb ut-Tahrir's official spokesmen explained that "there can be no peaceful relations with the Jews: this is prohibited by the *shari'ah.*"[174]

2.2.2. The Strategy of Hizb ut-Tahrir

The strategy of Hizb ut-Tahrir derives from the times of Prophet Muhammad who established the Caliphate 1,400 years ago. In order to establish the Islamic State, Hizb ut-Tahrir aims to follow three stages, which are believed to be in parallel with the Prophet Muhammad's stages. The first stage is the stage of "culturing to produce people who believe in the idea and the method of the Party." The second stage is the stage of "interaction with the Ummah who embrace and carry Islam." The third stage is the stage of "establishing government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively."[175] In an-Nabhani's book "*the Islamic State*", Prophet Muhammad's two stages of establishing an Islamic state are explained. According to this:

> The first stage was the stage of teaching, culturing and intellectual and spiritual building. The second stage was the spreading of the Message and the struggle. The first stage was to ensure the correct understanding of new concepts and to incorporate them into personalities and to structure them around these concepts. The second stage was to transfer these concepts into a mobilizing force in the society that drives it to implement them in the different walks of life.[176]

Hizb ut- Tahrir's strategy as explained in its website for establishing an Islamic state is exactly the same as the Prophet Muhammad's stages.[177] In order to follow the example of the Prophet, the party has defined three stages of action. The first stage is the stage of "culturing to produce people who believe in the idea and the method of the party." They invite people to Islam with their ideology and they form the party group.[178] Therefore, the goal of this first stage is to establish a community

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[174] Ibid.

[175] Hizb ut-Tahrir official web-site, http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/english.html

[176] Taquiddin an-Nabahani, The Islamic State, 1998, 22.

[177] Hizb ut-Tahrir official web-site, http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/english.html

[178] Ibid.

of Hizb ut-Tahrir members who accept the party ideas as their own. In another book of an-Nabhani's *The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change,* it is expressed that the first stage constitutes a basis for other stages. Because in this stage, the first circle "the nucleus", was formed.[179] This foundation stage can also be called "culturing stage", because "the Party limited itself to the culturing side only, and it focused its attention to build the party's body, to increase its numbers and to deeply culture the individuals in its circles."[180] According to an-Nabhani, the first stage of establishing Islamic state is exactly the same stage as the Prophet's first stage. "He used to call the people to Islam individually, giving them the message that *Allah* sent him with, and whoever accepted this message, he would culture him Islam secretly."[181] Like the Prophet's method Hizb ut-Tahrir also conveyed the message privately in secret cells.

The second stage is the stage of "interaction with the ummah who embrace and carry Islam." In other words, this stage is the Islamization of the ummah who is encouraged to establish an Islamic state. In an-Nabhani's book, *The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change*, the aim of the second stage could be realized through "creating the public awareness about the Islamic thoughts and rules by organizing lessons in the mosques, conferences, lectures, places of public gathering, newspapers, books, and leaflets".[182] In the second stage, Hizb ut-Tahrir also followed the Prophet Muhammad's second stage, which was the "public stage" in which he openly invited people to Islam.[183] For the second stage, Hizb ut-Tahrir added the concept of seeking *nusrah* (help), [184] just like Prophet Muhammad who

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[179] *The methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change*, Al-Khilafah Publications, 1999, 33.
The first stage is considered to be the foundation of the stage, in which the nucleus exists, and the first circle was formed after being guided to the thought and the method. This first circle started through contacting the individuals in the ummah, and presenting them with the thought and the method individually.

[180] Ibid. 33-34.

[181] Ibid. 33

[182] Ibid. 34.

[183] *Selections from the Seerah of Muhammad*, Al-Khilafah Publications, London, 66. http://www.islamic-state.org/books/SelectionsSeerah.pdf, (accessed May 26, 2005)

[184] *The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change*, 1999, 35.

asked for support from the powerful tribe leaders.[185]   Therefore, Hizb ut-Tahrir initiated the search for the *nusrah* from the people who have high positions. In a Hizb ut-Tahrir book titled *The Responsibility of Muslim Sisters in Britain* explains the ways to find support for re-establishing the *Khilafah* are explained as follows:

> We may have family, friends, or contacts abroad who are in the Muslim army, or are politicians, journalists, writers, in the intelligence service, lecturers at university, judges, or community leaders. These are individuals that we have an added responsibility to discuss with, for they may have a lot influence over the people within society towards the need for the *Khilafah* and the removal of the current corrupt regimes, if they themselves accepted the call. Those in the Muslim army could give the *Nusrah* (material support), one of the vital components in the method to establish the *Khilafah* and protect it once achieved.[186]

According to an-Nabhani's book, *The Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change*, there is a pair of objectives in seeking the nusrah**:** "firstly, to get protection for the party so as to enable it carry the dawa safely; secondly, to reach the government, so as to establish the *Khilafah* and bring back the rule of *Allah* in life, the state, and the society."[187]

The third stage is the stage of "establishing government, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively." By carrying Hizb-ut Tahrir's message to the world the members want to unite the whole Muslim world under one *Khilafah*.[188] In other words, "the last stage is the actual revolution, in which the kufr governments are overthrown and the *Khilafah* is established." At present, Hizb ut-Tahrir finds itself at the second stage of its struggle, which is establishing Islam in life, state and society.[189]

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[185] Jean-François Mayer, "Hizb ut-Tahrir-The next Al-Qaida, Really?" 2004, 22.

[186] *The Responsibility of Muslim Sisters in Britain,* London: Al-Khilafah, 2003, 41. http://www.islamic-state.org/books/ResponsibilityOfMuslimSistersInBritain.pdf, (accessed May 26, 2005)

[187] *Selections from the Seerah of Muhammad*, 67.

[188] Hizb ut-Tahrir official web-site, http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/english.html

[189] Jean-François Mayer, "Hizb ut-Tahrir-The next Al-Qaida, Really?" 2004, 17.

2.2.3. The Party Structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir believes that "governance is a function in which humans are subordinate to the primacy of God."[190] They believe God holds true sovereignty and they established a party structure, which follows Prophet Muhammad's path in order to establish an Islamic state. [191] With this party structure, Hizb ut-Tahrir vested authority to people only for a limited time. [192]

According to this party structure, Amir occurs at the highest position of hierarchy. Since May 2003, the Amir is Ata Abu-l Rushta, who is a Palestinian. [193] There are three bodies below the Amir, which are the most secretive parts of the organization. These are: the administrative body, *Mazalim* (enforcement body) and the body that elects the Amir.[194]

Kiedat, which is the highest legislative body, is formed by the most prestigious Hizb ut-Tahrir members, who are chosen by the administrative body and the Amir. [195] By maintaining contacts with the leaders of all national Hizb ut-Tahrir branches, *kiedat* "directs their actions by providing them with funding, education materials and other necessary support." Moreover, *kiedat* has two other important duties: having the right to make changes of the party's constitution and to enforce disciplinary measures on deviant rank-and-file members.[196]

There are two bodies affiliated to the *kiedat*, the political department and Mutamad. The political department of the *kiedat* collects information on world events and

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[190] Zeyno Baran, "Hizb ut-Tahrir Islam's Political Insurgency", Nixon Center, 2004. 23. http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:PmB7DMkSiPAJ:www.nixoncenter.org/Hizbut-ahrirIslam%27sPoliticalInsurgency.pdf+Zeyno+Baran++Hizb+ut-Tahrir++2004&hl=tr,(accessed June 15, 2005)

[191] Jean-François Mayer, "Hizb ut-Tahrir-The next Al-Qaida, Really?" 2004, 16.

[192] Zeyno Baran, "Hizb ut-Tahrir Islam's Political Insurgency", 2004, 23.

[193] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 20.

[194] Zeyno Baran, "Hizb ut-Tahrir Islam's Political Insurgency", 2004, 29.

[195] Ibid.

[196] Ibid.

gives ideological responses to guide the Muslims. [197] The top leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir a region is "*mutamad*" who is responsible for "maintaining and strengthening the national branch of the party according to the unique social, economic and political circumstances" in their province. [198]

Under *mutamad'*s control, there are three separate groups. The first cell, *treasurer,* is responsible for party finances and donations, second cell, *kitab masul,* collects information for publications of the party literature and the last cell is the regional committee. *Mutamads* direct regional committee meetings.[199]

Masul, who holds the next position of the party structure, also has separate *treasurer* and *kitab masul* groups like *Mutamads,* which are responsible for the same functions.[200] Under *masul'*s control, Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflets address relevant issues to that country in which they are produced.[201]

The *masul'*s asistant, *nakib*, is the leader of the various districts in rural as well as urban areas. *Nakib* manages the general party work at a district level he organizes training activities, propaganda work and the distribution of leaflets.[202] Under the *nakib*, there are local committees and study circles that constitutes the foundation of the party. The *nakib* not only manages the local committee but also communicate with the provincial committee.[203] *Nakib*'s assistant, *noyib*, works with the local committees that supervise the indoctrination process of the circles, which consist of four *mushrifs*.[204] A *mushrif* is the cell leader, who trains new members on topics

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[197] Ibid.

[198] Evgenii Novikov, "The recruiting and organizational structure of Hizb ut-Tahrir", The Jamestown Foundation, *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 2, Issue 22, (November 18, 2004) http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400&issue_id=3148&article_id=2368890, (accessed June 11, 2005)

[199] Zeyno Baran, "Hizb ut-Tahrir Islam's Political Insurgency", 2004, 29.

[200] Ibid.

[201] Ibid.

[202] Evgenii Novikov, 2004.

[203] Zeyno Baran, "Hizb ut-Tahrir Islam's Political Insurgency", 2004, 29.

[204] Ibid.

ranging from general religious issues to world affairs in a period of several months. While the regular members only know the other members of the circle, the cell leader, *mushrif*, is the only one who maintains contact with the next higher staged cell.[205]

The nucleus of Hizb ut-Tahrir's party structure is the cell, which consists of a small number of individuals, ranging between three to five people. The cells are study groups for spreading of Islam and Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology. According to an-Nabhani, for building Islamic culture, reshaping people' minds is the most important strategy, which should be performed in very secretive, organized cells composed of five people. He declared that, "taking them through this culturing process requires that each one of them assume the role of a beginner (student), whose mind has to be reshaped anew." [206]

During the education period in the cells, religious subjects constitute only 10-15 percent of the curriculum. In order to preserve the secrecy of the cell activities, cell members meet once a week after work or school in a member's home, a local mosque, or another secure place.[207] There are also women's cells, which are separate from the men's cells. These circles can be supervised either by these women's husbands, or by their relatives whom they cannot marry. Sometimes other women also supervise these cells.[208] In order to complete the necessary training, candidate members take examinations and those who become successful swear an oath on the *Qur'an* for becoming a full member of the party, or a *khizbi*. The oath, which they swear as follows;

> In the name of *Allah*, I swear to protect Islam and to maintain fidelity to it; I swear to accept and follow goals, ideas and principles of [Hizb ut-Tahrir] in words and deeds; I swear to recognize the rightness of the party leadership's actions; I swear to carry out even those decisions of the party

[205] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 20.

[206] Taqiuddin an-Nabahani, *Structuring of a party*, Hizb ut-Tahrir , 21-10-2001, 11.

[207] Zeyno Baran, "Hizb ut-Tahrir Islam's Political Insurgency", 2004, 29.

[208] Hizb ut-Tahrir, http://www.khilafat.org/newPages/Hizb/htahrir.php

leaders that I find objectionable; I swear to direct all my energies for the realization of the party program. *Allah* is the Witness of my words. [209]

Once the new member takes an oath on the *Quran*, and became a full member, he or she is expected to form a new cell. [210] While enrolling candidates, new members use their social networks, such as kinship and clan. [211] Cohen states that Hizb ut-Tahrir has a rigid totalitarian cell structure in which internal dissent is neither encouraged nor tolerated."[212] With this hierarchical or pyramid-like structure members reveal little information about the organization.[213]

2.2.4. The Methods of Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir seems to be different from other radical Islamic groups by its methods. Although its ideology is very similar to such organizations, Hizb ut-Tahrir does not resist modern technology. It disseminates its literature by using leaflets, books, technological processes like VCR's, computer CDs, e-mails, websites, and face-to-face meetings.[214] By using all kinds of information-based technology, the organization produces videocassettes, tape recordings, and CDs of leaders' speeches and sermons.[215]

One of the most favourite propaganda method is leaflets which are usually slipped under the peoples' doors at nights. Party leaflets can also be obtained through the internet. Leaflets usually express three concepts: a statement of the party's mission, a detailed expression of its position on current political issues, and a call for

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[209] Evgenii Novikov, 2004.

[210] Micheal Fredholm, 2003, 12.

[211] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 20.

[212] Ariel Cohen, "Hizb ut-Tahrir: An emerging threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia" 2003.

[213] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 20.

[214] Micheal Whine, 2004, 103.

[215] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 22.

recruitment. [216] Hizb ut-Tahrir also has a large number of books written an-Nabhani and other leaders. These books, also available in the party's web-sites in pdf formation. [217]

Hizb ut-Tahrir also produced professional videocassettes, tape recordings, and CDs in order to disseminate their leaders' speeches and sermons. [218] By using internet, one can easily reach these videocassettes and DVDs. [219] Moreover, some video reports on current events were made available online "in the style of a modern news presentation, with an [Hizb ut-Tahrir] member acting as a reporter." [220]

The internet is Hizb ut-Tahrir's main propaganda method for disseminating its message in multiple languages around the world. They have many websites such as; www.1924.org, www.Khilafah.com, www.hizbuttahrir.org, www.hilafet.com. For party's "virtual citizens", Hizb ut-Tahrir also supplies forums or chat rooms in these web-sites to exchange ideas and a "news room" to provide "education" on current events. [221]

In order to attrack the attention of internet users who visit their web-site, Hizb ut-Tahrir also linked similar web adresses to their sites. They also composed several specific web-sites regarding issues of general interest for the Muslim, such as the Ramadan. [222]

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[216] Zeyno Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir Islam's Political Insurgency, 2004, 34.

[217] From http://www.islamic-state.org/books/ web-site, people can easily reach their thirty books.

[218] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 22.

[219] Jean François Mayer, 2004, 132.

[220] Ibid.

[221] Ibid.

[222] Ibid.

One of the other powerful methods for disseminating Islamic literature is simply to walk around and talk to people. The party prefers this method because informal conversations and face to face meetings present a much lesser risk of arrest. [223]

2.2.5. The Membership Profile of Hizb ut-Tahrir

Hizb ut-Tahrir is not selective in choosing its supporters according to their age, sex or national identity. The only condition, which is necessary to be a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, is being a Muslim. In Hizb ut-Tahrir's web-site, the conditions of being a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir is explained as follows:

> The Party accepts Muslim men and women as its members regardless of whether they are Arab or non-Arab, white or coloured, since it is a party for all Muslims. It invites all Muslims to carry Islam and adopt its systems regardless of their nationalities, colours and *madhahib* (Schools of Thought), as it looks to all of them according to the viewpoint of Islam. [224]

Hizb ut-Tahrir's supporters are primarily from the young urban elite, who are educated but unemployed or skilled factory workers.[225] They believe that Islamic economic order would be more righteous and equitable. Most of the arrested Hizb ut-Tahrir members were young, educated, urban and not necessarily deprived or poor. It is pointed out that most of these new members were introduced to Islam for the first time through Hizb ut-Tahrir.[226]

Hizb ut-Tahrir enlarges its membership through traditional social networks by using the connections of close friends, family members and relatives.[227] Hizb ut-Tahrir also allows women to be members, who in turn recruit other women.[228] In a Hizb

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[223] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 22.

[224] Hizb ut-Tahrir, http://www.khilafat.org/newPages/Hizb/htahrir.php

[225] Micheal Fredholm, 2004, 12.

[226] Ibid.

[227] International Crisis Group (ICG), "The IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir: Implications of the Afghanistan Campaign", *Central Asia Briefing*, Osh/Brussels, (30 January 2002), 7. http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400538_30012002.pdf, (accessed November 13, 2004)

[228] Evgenii Novikov, 2004.

ut-Tahrir book *The Responsibility of Muslim Sisters In Britain*, methods of utilizing some opportunities for spreading the message of Hizb ut-Tahrir are explained as follows:

> Although we may live in Britain, as Muslim sisters we may have many Muslim contacts such as our immediate families, extended families and friends. We will often have gatherings at our houses, in the mosque, or in community centers, which are either social in nature or Islamic discussions. We may visit family, friends or neighbours regularly. As mothers, we may meet other mothers at group meetings or at our children's school. If we are students we may come across other Muslim students, teachers, or lecturers. If we are working, we may come into contact with Muslim colleagues at our job or Muslim clients. Alternatively, we may just meet sisters on the street while performing our daily routines such as shopping, traveling, or picking up our children from school.

Hizb ut-Tahrir's use of every-day language is another characteristics that attracts people and increase the number of its followers. The people can read the leaflets and books ot the party in their own language, so they get the idea that there is no need to learn Arabic or to study deeply many books of religious scholars. [229]

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[229] International Crisis Group (ICG) 30 June 2003, 16-17.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORY OF ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN

3.1.1. Advent of Islam in Uzbekistan

When followers of Prophet Muhammad first arrived in Central Asia in the mid-seventh century, there was no single dominant religion in Central Asia. There were Shamanism, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Judaism.[230]

The Muslims first entered Central Asia in 640 during their conquest of Persia. Although Arab advance faced opposition at Merv in 651, the last Persian emperor was killed there.[231] Arabs could not reach Central Asia easily because of the mountains, but the expansion did not stop. Because of internal several divisions among the Central Asians and the lack of strong indigenous leadership, Arab armies reached Bukhara in 709 and Samarkand in 712. In 715, Arabs captured Tashkent and occupied the Ferghana Valley. But when they occupied the Ferghana Valley, they encountered with strong opposition and this made Arabs retreat from some lands they gained. By repressing the local religions and converting the entire local population to Islam, the Arabs agitated a revolt in 728 in Mavera-an-Nahr, which is

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[230] Michael Kort, Central Asian Republics (New York, N.Y.: Facts On File, 2004):20-21. Shamanism is a religious phenomenon centered on the shaman, an ecstatic figure believed to have power to heal the sick and to communicate with the world beyond. The term applies primarily to the religious systems and phenomena of the northern Asian, Ural-Altaic and Paleo-Asian peoples. Manichaeism is a dualistic religious movement between the realm of God, represented by light and by spiritual enlightenment, and the realm of Satan, symbolized by darkness and by the world of material things founded in Persia, in the third century AD, incorporating elements of Christianity and Iranian and Indian religions. Zoroastrianism is the ancient pre-Islamic religion of Iran, that continues to survive there in isolated areas and, more prosperously, in India, where the descendants of Zoroastrian Iranian (Persian) immigrants are known as Parsis, or Parsees. Buddhism is a religion and philosophy that developed from the teachings of the Buddha Gautama (or Gotama), who lived as early as the 6th century BC. http://www.britannica.com

[231] Neil J. Melvin, *Uzbekistan: transition to authoritarianism on the Silk Road* (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 2000), 3.

the land between Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers. Putting down the revolt took several years of fighting for Arabs who wanted to control Central Asia. [232]

The introduction of Islam in Central Asia was completed with the Caliphate's victory over the Chinese armies in 750 in a battle near the Talas River. The Arabs remained the dominant power in Central Asia for the next 150 years, and the region was brought firmly within the orbit of Islamic civilization. For about 1300 years, the Arabic script was widely used in writing and architectural decoration in Central Asia.[233] For the next three hundred years, Arabic became the language of science and commerce in the region, while the use of Arabic script continued until the Soviet era.[234] The battle of Talas was not only a political and military victory but also had an important technological consequence. Arabs learned how to make paper from Chinese prisoners and this played a crucial role in spreading the Islamic knowledge throughout the Muslim world.[235]

In the middle of the eighth century, the entire territory of Mavera-an-Nahr surrendered to Arabs and became a part of the Abbasid Caliphate. During the most glorious era of the Abbasid Caliphate in the eighth and the ninth centuries, Central Asia and Mavera-an-Nahr experienced a truly golden age. Bukhara became one of the leading centers of learning, culture, and art in the Muslim world. Although the Abbasid Caliphate ruled Central Asia for a short time, the process of cultural development did not stop.[236] After the Abbasid Caliphate, Persian Samanid dynasty encouraged the development of Persian culture and promoted Islam. In the ninth century, the Samanids created the first independent Muslim state in the region.[237] Their capital city, Bukhara, became an important center of Muslim culture, and also

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[232] Michael Kort, 2004, 21-22.

[233] John Lawton, *Samarkand and Bukhara / John Lawton; photographs by Francesco Venturi* (London: Tauris Parke Books, 1991), 27.

[234] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 3.

[235] Michael Kort, 2004, 23.

[236] Ibid.

[237] John Lawton, 1991, 31.

became famous for its seminaries, scholars, scientists, poets, and writers.[238] In the tenth century, the most influential eastern Islamic world library was in Bukhara.[239] Al Khwarezm, Abu Rai Raihan Al Biruni, Abu Ali Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Farabi were among well-known scientists and philosophers who contributed to the world-wide fame of the area. [240]

In 962, Alptigin established the Ghaznavid state, the first Turkic state in the region.[241] The Ghaznavid state ruled the lands south of Amu Darya, Iran, Afghanistan, and northern India but their dominance was curtailed, when two new groups of Turks came in to the region.[242] The first Turkish tribe was Qarakhanids (932-1165) who replaced the Samanid dynasty in 999.[243] Qarakhanids, who were heavily influenced by Muslim culture and settled in today's Uzbekistan, became the first Turkish Muslim state.[244] Under the Qarakhanids' rule, Islam and its culture progressed in Central Asia. A Qarakhanid Khan, Ibrahim-i ibn Nasr Tamghach (1053-1068), constructed the earliest examples of madrassahs and hospitals in Samarkand.[245] The second Turkish tribe was the Seljuqs, who became the new rulers of the eastern Islamic lands by conquering Anatolia and Central Asia in the 11th century.[246] Central Asian and the Persian and Arabic worlds were now united

[238] Michael Kort, 2004, 23.

[239] John Lawton, 1991, 8.

[240] Martha Brill Olcott, "Muslims in Central Asia Expressions of Identity and Change," in *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change*, ed. Jo-Ann Gross (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 28.

[241] Robin Poulton, Ethnic and Inter-state complexity in the Central Asian "Stans", *Asian Affairs 33*, Vol33, No.1, (February 2002):76.

[242] The Turkification of Mawarannahr , http://www.uzbinbkk.org/history2.htm, (accessed March 22, 2005)

[243] Resul Yalcin, *The rebirth of Uzbekistan: politics, economy and society in the post-Soviet era* (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2002), 27-28.

[244] Ibid.

[245] Svat Soucek, *A history of inner Asia*, (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000), 85.

[246] Michael Kort, 2004, 25.

for the first time under "Turkic hegemony" and the Seljuq Turks ruled in the region from the "Pamir mountains and the borders of China to Iraq".[247]

In the thirteenth century, the Mongol chieftain, Cenghiz Khan, united the nomadic tribes of Mongols who lived on the east Asian steppe to the north of China's Great Wall. Central Asia saw the invasion of the Mongols under the leadership of Genghis Khan when caravans of 450 Mongol merchants were murdered by their western neighbour, Khorezmshahs, who were under rule of a Turkic leader in Khorezm,[248] stole their goods. When Cenghiz Khan sent a protest to the Khorezmshahs, his envoy, too, was murdered.[249] From the Mongolian standpoint, the murder of their envoy was the most heinous of crimes, and this campaign against Central Asia was first and foremost an act of revenge. The attack began in 1220 and Genghis Khan captured the great cities of Bukhara and Samarkand in 1225.[250] The cities were ruined, burnt and almost thirty thousand people were killed.[251] Although 'Cenghiz Khan was tolerant in religious matters and had no personal animosity against Islam', the conquest became the symbol of the biggest threat over Islam.[252] Sufism, which originated in Central Asia before the Mongol rule, played an important role in renewing Islam by sustaining Islamic faith and practice alive.[253]

Although the Mongols massacred much of the population and destroyed cities, farms and irrigation works in Central Asia, also some important changes in politics, economics and culture occurred. The great trade road, the Silk Road, became safe

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[247] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 22.

[248] The Turkification of Mawarannahr , http://www.uzbinbkk.org/history2.htm

[249] John Lawton, 1991, 33.

[250] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 4.

[251] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 22.

[252] Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, *The Islamic threat to the Soviet State* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 58.

[253] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 27. Sufism and the Sufi tariqas will be explained below in the section on parallel Islam.

and it was linked to Europe.[254] Under Mongol control Turkic languages became more widely used in Central Asia.

The Mongolian Empire was perhaps the largest empire in human history in terms of its geographical expansion. It extended from Poland to Siberia, from Moscow to the Arabian peninsula, and from Siberia to Vietnam. Before Genghis Khan's death in 1227, his vast empire was divided between four of his sons. Chagatai, his second son, got most of Uzbekistan including Samarkand and Bukhara, which had already been converted to Islam.[255] In 1241, Chagatai Khan died and his descendants ruled almost for a century but the territory was divided into smaller units because of their internal fights.[256]

In 1370, Chingis Khan's most important descendant, Timur the Lame (or Tamerlane) rose to power near Samarkand. Tamerlane's rule began in the Chagatai Khanate, where he was born in 1336. In 1369, he made Samarkand his capital city.

He was a Muslim, but that did not prevent him from attacking other Muslim empires. After conquering Central Asia, he moved towards India, Persia, Arabia, and could get some land from Russia.[257]

Tamerlane forcibly brought thousands of artisans, craftsmen and scholars to the capital city of Samarkand, which he turned into a cultural and intellectual center. Also, Bukhara became a holy city where believers could pray in different mosques everyday of the year.[258] In Tamerlane's time, the Islamic civilization flourished in the region by the scholars brought by him to Central Asia. Also, there was a revival

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[254] Ibid. 22.

[255] Calum MacLeod, *Uzbekistan: the golden road to Samarkand* (Lincolnwood, Illinois.: Odyssey/Passport, 1997), 15.

[256] Resul Yalcin, 2002, 28.

[257] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 22.

[258] John Lawton, 1991, 10.

of Persian art and architecture and for the first time a Turkish dialect (Chagatai) emerged as a literary language.[259]

After Tamerlane, his grandson Ulugh Beg ruled in Samarkand from 1409 to 1449. In his times, cultural renaissance reached its peak. He constructed many beautiful public buildings, including three madrasas in Central Asia. The madrasas not only focused on theology and training clerics, but also emphasized science. The Samarkand madrasa became a famous center for astronomy and mathematics.[260]

In 1506, the Uzbeks tribes under the control of Muhammad Shaibani Khan, moved from the steppe regions to the north.[261] The last independent nomadic empire in Central Asia, the Shaibani dynasty, set up their capital in Bukhara. Muhammed Shaibani seized Khorezm, Samarqand, Bukhara, and Tashkent. As they gained new cities and lands, the previously nomadic life style of the Uzbeks started to change and they settled in the cities and towns of the region. Uzbek language and literature flourished as well as Persian and Arabic. The great poet, Mir Alisher Navai known as the father of Uzbek literature, created the first Turkish script known as the Chagatai language.[262] The Shaibani dynasty reached its peak under Abdullah Khan who ruled Bukhara from 1557 to 1598.[263] It was the times of Shaibani dynasty that Mavera-an-Nahr became steady homeland for the Uzbeks.[264] The discovery of a sea route from Europe to Asia after the 16th century dealt a damaging blow to the Silk Road and the economy declined.[265]

With the decline of the Shaibani dynasty, power passed to the Janid dynasty who ruled Central Asia and Northern Afghanistan between the years 1599 to 1747. After the Janids, Central Asia was governed by two Khanates and an emirate; the Khiva

[259] Michael Kort, 2004, 29.

[260] Ibid.

[261] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 5.

[262] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 23.

[263] Calum MacLeod, 1997, 20.

[264] Resul Yalcin, 2002, 76.

[265] James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: a Soviet Republic's road to soverignty* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 169.

and Kokand Khanates and the Emirate of Bukhara.[266] The Khivan Khanate, which was located in the west by the Amu Darya River, was established by the descendents of the old kingdom of Khorezm. By declaring himself Khan, Inag Iltuzer established a dynasty, which ruled until 1920. The Khanate of Kokand, which came into existence in 1798,[267] controlled large territories, between the Syr Daria River and Muslim China, with its center located in the Ferghana Valley and the Tashkent oasis. Mostly Uzbeks, Kazakhs and Kyrgyz formed the population, which was about three million.[268] Finally, the Emirate of Bukhara was founded in 1753 by the Mangit dynasty.[269] It was centrally located, and included the cities of Bukhara and Samarqand. Its population in the mid-nineteenth century, was about two and a half million and about half was Uzbeks, one third Tajiks, and one tenth Turkmen.

3.1.2. Islam in Uzbekistan under Tsarist Russia

During the eighteenth century the Russian eastward expansion turned to the south, towards the Central Asia steppe regions.[270] Russians took the advantage of the prevailing anarchy in the steppes by gaining control over the Kazakh Hordes. [271] There were three Kazakh Hordes during that time in the region, the Greater Horde, the Middle Horde and the Lesser Horde.[272] Because of their security concerns, the Middle and the Lesser Hordes accepted Russian sovereignty. The Greater Horde did not accept Russian protection until the middle of the nineteenth century unlike the other two.[273]

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[266] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 23.

[267] Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia* (New York, Praeger, 1964), 44.

[268] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 8.

[269] Ibid. 42.

[270] Geoffrey Wheeler, 1964, 35.

[271] Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, 1983, 15.

[272] Geoffrey Wheeler, 1964, 12.

[273] Ibid.

Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Russians moved to Central Asia to conquer the core areas.[274] This expansion had several economic, political and religious reasons. First, with the outbreak of the American civil war (1861-1865), Russia understood that she could no longer buy American cotton for its rapidly expanding textile industry and decided to conquer Central Asia where cotton could be grown.[275] Secondly, from the early eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries, there was a power struggle between Russia and Britain, which was called "the Great Game".[276] Russia feared of a British expansion into Central Asia from India and wanted to block any influential attempt by the British in this region.[277] And finally, Russian settlers on the steppes were sold into slavery by Turkic tribes and sometimes converted to Islam. Because of these reasons, Russians started a vigorous new campaign to complete the occupation of Central Asia.[278] Although the Crimean War delayed the Russian invasion in the region, Tashkent was captured in 1865. In 1867 the Russian created the "Governate-General of Turkestan" as central Russian administration with Tashkent as its capital.[279] In the brief period between 1968 and 1884, Russians completed occupation of Central Asia, by conquering Bukhara in 1867, Samarkand in1868, Khiva in 1873, Kokand in 1876, Göktepe in 1881 and Merv in 1884.[280] The Khanates retained their native rulers as Russian protectorates.[281]

The Tsarist administration divided Central Asia into two main parts: in the north, the Steppe District, which today belongs to Kazakhstan was governed separately; in the south the Governate-General of Turkestan that constituted today's

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[274] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 8.

[275] Michael Kort, 2004, 35-37.

[276] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 24.

[277] Resul Yalcin, 2002, 34.

[278] Michael Kort, 2004, 36-37.

[279] James Critchlow, 1991, 7-8.

[280] Calum MacLeod, 1997, 21.

[281] James Critchlow, 1991, 8.

Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and parts of Kazakhstan.[282] Tsarist Russia captured the territories of Kokand Khanate, which had resisted Russian invasion most fiercely and controlled the best agricultural land, annexing it to the Governate-General of Turkestan.[283]

During the Tsarist period, Islam was treated with several different models at different periods and areas.[284] The Russian General von Kaufman, who was the military governor of Turkestan, did not disrupt the traditional and cultural patterns of the native Muslims. He argued that: "we must introduce Christian civilization in Turkestan but we must not try to propound the Orthodox faith to the native population."[285] He was also opposed to bring Russian missionaries to the region for challenging Islam.[286] After von Kaufman, a more liberal policy over Islam was not promulgated.[287] In 1911, more than 100,000 students were registered in the 6,000 traditional elementary schools (maktabs), and 328 secondary schools (madrassahs) in Turkestan. In order to disseminate their culture, the Russian administration established 89 Russo-native schools where 2.552 Muslim students were enrolled by 1905.[288] Also, pilgrimage to Mecca as well as waqf (endowment) revenues were controlled.[289]

Russian conquest of the region had some positive aspects in economic, technological and cultural life of the region. In order to strengthen economic links between the center and the Central Asian periphery, the Tsarist administration constructed a railway network, which accelerated the economic development.[290]

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[282] Michael Kort, 2004, 38.

[283] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 9-10.

[284] Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, 1983, 17.

[285] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, *Islam and politics in Central Asia*, (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1995), 7.

[286] Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia.* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960), 75.

[287] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 10.

[288] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 8.

[289] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 10.

With the development of cotton production, a few industrial enterprises were built along the railroads. Under the Tsarist rule, the region became more secure.[291] With the Russian economic and technological improvements, the region was opened up to social changes and its links to the outside world were increased.[292] The Tsarist administration's economic policy affected the nature of economic activity in the region and this in turn changed the native population's attitude to the Russian colonial authorities in a negative way. Although there was little opposition from the local population in the early years of the Tsarist rule, in 1880s religious resistances and rebellions began against the Russian rule in various parts of Central Asia, which would soon be taken under control.[293]

In general, it is possible to talk about two types of opposition movements in the region in this era: the conservatives (kadimists) and the modernists (jadids). The conservatives, who were the defenders of the old method, contested against teaching "native, Russian and European languages and any non-religious sciences."[294] The conservatives' education was based on dogmatic style of teaching, which was memorizing Arabic religious texts in madrassahs and maktabs.[295] By the turn of the century, Russians understood that Jadidism, a pan-Turkic movement, had emerged as a greater threat.[296] The Tsarist government was afraid of "awakening of national self-consciousness of the oppressed nations" by spreading Jadidism because of this reason the government supported the conservatives.[297]

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[290] Resul Yalcin, 2002, 36.

[291] Michael Kort, 2004, 40.

[292] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 12.

[293] Michael Kort, 2004, 40.

[294] Zinnur T. Sharafutdinov and Ildar S. Safuanov, "Jadidism as the important stage in the development of Secondary Education of Tatar Nation" Pedagogical Institute of Naberezhnye Chelny, Russia, 1. http://www.inrp.fr/she/ische/abstracts/safuanov_sharafutdinov.pdf, (accessed May 18, 2005)

[295] Ibid.

[296] Micheal Kort, 2004, 40.

[297] Zinnur T. Sharafutdinov and Ildar S. Safuanov, 2005, 1.

Under the Tsarist rule, another opposition movement in the region was the modernist Jadidism. The Jadids were young men from wealthy Central Asian families who believed that the solution for the decline and "degeneration" of their community was to return to "pure Islam" which was synonymous with "progress and civilization".[298] According to Voll, Ismail Gasprinskii (1851-1914), a Crimean Tatar who was the leader of Jadids, 'wanted to create new (jadid) schools and institutions in Muslim society and to provide a synthesis of modern Islamic, and Turkish elements as a way of renewing Turkish Muslim society.'[299] His immediate goal was modernization of education, language and culture.[300] Gasprinskii tried to unify people with his famous slogan; 'Union in language, in thought and in action.'[301] Ismail Gasprinskii published the magazine Terjüman that became "one of the greatest Muslim newspapers."[302] By 1905, an estimated 5,000 reformist schools were established in different parts of Central Asia, which combined modern science and Islamic education.[303]

In general, the basic demands of the Jadid leaders from the Tsarist administration revolved around equal rights in social, political and economic life. After the Russo-Japan War, which resulted with the 1905 Russian Revolution, these demands were met to a certain extend.[304] After the 1905 revolution, Muslims from Turkestan participated to the second Duma elections,[305] which gave democratic rights to the people of the Tsarist Empire. Between the years 1905-1907, a series of Muslims conventions were held in which Gasprinskii played a very crucial role. In these

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[298] Adeeb Khalid, "Reform and contention in Central Asian Islam: a historical perspective," *Eurasia Insight,* August 3, 2000. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav022400.shtml (accessed March 15, 2005)

[299] John O. Voll, "Central Asia as a Part of the Modern Islamic World," in *Central Asia in historical perspective*, ed. Beatrice F. Manz (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 68.

[300] Shah Abdul Hannan, *Islam in Russia and Central Asia*, (1976):12. http://www.islam-bd.org/articles/Islam_central_asia.pdf, (accessed March 12, 2005)

[301] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 78.

[302] John O. Voll, 1994, 69.

[303] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 9.

[304] Shah Abdul Hannan, 1976, 15.

[305] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 13.

conventions not only political organizations were established but also "the idea of manifesting Islamic unity through a large inclusive conference emerged as an important organizing concept."[306] Although the political organizations did not live long, international Muslim congresses regularly took place in the period between the two world wars.[307]

In 1909, Jadids of Turkestan established a political party. This political party wanted to summon the Congress of the Muslims of Turkestan in Tashkent in April 1917, with the aim of forming a Muslim government.[308] Bukharan Jadids began to call themselves Young Bukharans in the summer and autumn of 1917[309] and they formed the Young Bukharan Party inspired by the revolution of Young Turks in Turkey in 1908.[310] The Young Bukharans wanted political liberty from the Bukhara Emir in 1917, they encountered with the Emir's harsh treatments.[311]

3.1.3. Islam in Uzbekistan during the Soviet Era

With the October Revolution in 1917 in Russia, the tsarist administration was overthrown and was replaced by the Soviets.[312] In November 1917, the Bolsheviks had published a declaration of rights regarding the Muslims, which promised their beliefs and customs as well as national and cultural institutions "free and inviolable".[313] However, Muslim leaders attempted to set up the Muslim Provisional Government of Autonomous Turkestan in the city of Kokand in December 1917,

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[306] John O. Voll, 1994, 69-70.

[307] Ibid. 70.

[308] John Glenn, *The Soviet legacy in Central Asia* (Houndmills; New York: Palgrave, 1999): 66.

[309] Adeeb Khalid, "Society and politics in Bukhara, 1868-1920", *Central Asian Survey*, 19(3/4), (2000): 389.

[310] Glenda Fraser, "Basmachi-I", *Central Asian Survey,* Vol.6. No.1. (1987): 45.

[311] Adeeb Khalid, "Nation into History: The origins of National Historiography in Central Asia," in *Devout societies vs. impious states? : transmitting Islamic learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the twentieth century,*ed. Stephane A. Dudoignon (Berlin : Schwarz, 2004): 138.

[312] Akiner Shirin, "Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks" in *The nationalities question in the post-Soviet States,* ed. Graham Smith (London ; New York : Longman, 1996): 335.

[313] Ibid. 337.

they came into a conflict with Soviets.[314] The Tashkent Soviet was quickly crushed in February 1918 and many Muslims were killed.[315]

In April 1918, the Bolsheviks established the Communist Party of Turkestan (KPT) and Jadids joined to the party in large numbers.[316] Before 1917, the Tsarist administrators and the Bukhara Emir Sayyid Alim Khan (r.1910-1920) were in collaboration with each other in order to restrict the influence of Jadids.[317] The Emir's harsh treatments, however, had radicalized the Young Bukharans' cultural and political views and they overthrew the Emir.[318] Later, they captured the city with the help of the Russian Red Army in August 1920.[319] The Bukharan People's Soviet Republic (BPSR) was proclaimed [320] and its first meeting was held on 24 September 1920.[321]

The Sovietization of Central Asia was not easily achieved. In 1918, the Basmachi revolt started.[322] "Basmachi" is a Turkish word that derives from the verb basmaq: "to attack".[323] The Basmachi revolt, which was the "consequence of the Soviet mistreatments of the Muslims", began against the Soviet rule and the reform

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[314] Michael Kort, 2004, 47.

[315] Olivier Roy, *The new Central Asia: the creation of nations* (New York: New York University Press, 2000): 44.

[316] Adeeb Khalid, *The politics of Muslim cultural reform: Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley University of California Press 1998), 288.

[317] Olivier Roy, 2000, 75.

[318] Adeeb Khalid, 2004, 138.

[319] Shoshana Keller, "The Central Asian Bureau, an essential tool in governing Soviet Turkestan." *Central Asian Survey* 22 (2/3), June/September (2003):284.

[320] Ibid.

[321] Adeeb Khalid, 2004, 138.

[322] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 35.

[323] Richard Lorenz, "Economic bases of the Basmachi Movement in the Farghana Valley," in *Muslim Communities reemerge: historical perspectives on Nationality, politics, and Opposition in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*, ed. Edward Allworth, (Durkham and London ; Duke University Press, 1994), 299.

minded-jadids who had joined in the BRP in 1918 and lasted until 1928 in Ferghana Valley. [324]

The Basmachi activities were concentrated in four areas of Turkestan: the Fergana Valley, the Lokay region, Bukhara, and the Turkmen steppes near Khiva.[325] In 1921, Enver Pasha, a former general and political leader from Turkey, joined the Basmachi movement. The movement achieved some unity under the leadership of Enver Pasha, but when he was killed in battle in early 1922, which was an important blow to the Basmachis, the movement lost its strength. [326]

The success of Soviets over Basmachis had a number of reasons. First of all, the Basmachis lacked a unified command structure, and were disorganized. Secondly, because of the heavy casualties of Basmachis in 1923 in the Turkmen steppe and Lokay, their number was heavily reduced in and regrouping of the Basmachi forces became much more difficult. Furthermore, the Soviets broke the fragile unity of Muslims by including them into the Red Army. And finally, because of the deteriorating economic conditions of the peasant population of the region, who had supported them logistically before, Basmachis could not any further get support from them.[327] The Bolsheviks also used nonmilitary measures, which stopped seizing food from farmers, lowering taxes and ending anti-Islamic policies to subvert the activities of Basmachi.[328] By 1924, most Basmachi resistance was broken and the participants escaped to the mountains of Ferghana Valley.[329]

Once the Basmachi threat was eliminated, the Soviet government started a series of attacks against Islam in Central Asia, which lasted well into the 1940s. The Soviet anti-religious policies between 1917-1941 can be divided into two periods: 1917-1928 and 1928-1941. The first period can be divided into three sub-periods:'1917-

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[324] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 17.

[325] Ibid. 18.

[326] Neil J. Melvin, 2000. 16.

[327] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 18.

[328] Neil J. Melvin, 2000. 16.

[329] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 18.

1920, era of War Communism; 1920-1924, pause; 1924-1928, preparation for the next anti-Muslim campaign.'[330] In the period of 1917-1920, Lenin supported a hostile attitude toward religion by pursuing 'a two-pronged religious strategy' which was composed of an extensive atheistic education program and a systematic attack plan on the religious establishments.[331] The churches, mosques, and religious tribunals were closed; religious schools were destroyed; waqf revenues, the basic sources of income for mosques, were distrainted.[332]

Because of the Russian civil war, foreign occupation and local uprisings, the Soviet government could not pursue its anti-religious policies in the years between 1920-1924 and in this period, mosques, religious tribunals and religious schools were opened again. Anti-Islamic propaganda among the population was stopped and the waqfs were re-established. In this period, Sultan Galiev, who was an important political leader in Turk-Tatar national history, played a crucial role in realizing a compromise between the Muslims and the Soviet government.[333] Sultan Galiev proposed a new ideology, Muslim National Communism when Soviets wanted to spread communism to the colonial east.[334] Muslim National Communism was an attempt to combine and synthesize three ideologies: Islamic religion, nationalism and Marxism.[335] In order to create an 'autonomous Muslim Communist Party, a Muslim army and a Muslim territory' Sultan Galiev crusaded actively.[336] But when he maintained that Russian communists should remain in their own territories, and a Soviet Turkic Republic should be established in Turkestan he became a traitor in

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[330] Fanny Bryan, "Anti-Islamic Propaganda:Bezozhnik, 1925-1935", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.5 No.1 (1986):30.

[331] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 14.

[332] Fanny Bryan, 1986, 30.

[333] Ibid.

[334] Beatrice F. Manz, "Historical background" in *Central Asia in historical perspective*, ed. Beatrice F. Manz (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 16.

[335] Alexandre A. Bennigsen and Wimbush S. Enders, *Muslim national communism in the Soviet Union; a revolutionary strategy for the colonial world* (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1979), 123.

[336] Olivier Roy, 2000, 45.

Stalin's eyes.[337] Once the civil war ended with the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1923, Stalin ordered the arrest of Sultan Galiev as well as other Muslim Communists, Jadids, mullahs, clan and tribal leaders, and nationalists.[338] According to Bennigsen, in the era between 1922-1938, 'all the young Bukharians and nearly all the pre-Revolutionary intellectuals were eliminated from the local Communist parties.'[339]

Because of his fear of 'pan-Islamism' and the possibility to emerge any united Muslim force against the ruling Communist Party based in Moscow, Stalin started a process of dividing the region into ethnic units in 1924.[340] The Uzbek and the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics were the two new union republics and Kazakh, Krygyz, and Tajiks groups were given their own autonomous republics.[341] In May 1925, the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, which had the territories of the former three khanates of Turkestan, became a constituent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).[342]

In the Stalinist era, the Islamic policy of the Soviet regime can be analyzed under two sub-periods: 1928-1938 and 1939-1953.[343] In the first phase, the anti-Islamic policy was again strengthened. In this era, like all other parts of the Soviet Union, a harsh anti-Islamic policy was also pursued in Uzbekistan, where Muslim schools and courts were disbanded, mosques were closed, and religious literature was confiscated and destroyed.[344] In 1928, the Latin script replaced the Arabic script. In

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[337] Steven Sabol, "The creation of Soviet Central Asia: the 1924 national delimination." *Central Asian Survey*, 14(2) (1995): 233.

[338] Ibid.

[339] Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, 1983, 85.

[340] Michael Kort, 2004, 50.

[341] Ibid.

[342] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 17.

[343] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 23.

[344] Akiner Shirin, "Uzbekistan and the Uzbeks" in *The nationalities question in the post-Soviet States,* ed. Graham Smith (London ; New York : Longman, 1996), 337.

1940, there was another change; the Cyrillic replaced the Latin script.[345] In 1917, there were twenty thousand mosques in Russia and by 1929 the functioning mosques declined to less than four thousand.[346] There was only 1.312 working mosques in 1942.[347] In 1929, in order to control all the religious activities, Stalin established "The Law of Religious Associations" which required registration of religious groups and authorized church closings, and banned religious teaching remained in force from 1929 to 1990, severely restricting the rights of believers as well as religious practices.[348] Stalin also systematically arrested Muslim leaders in Central Asia; starting in 1928 and lasting through the 1938s. [349]

3.1.3.a. The Emergence of Official Islam

In the period between the outbreak of World War II and 1953, which constituted the second phase of the Stalin's policies, the anti-Islamic attitude policies had eased.[350] In order to get the support of Soviet Muslims during the war, Stalin established four Muslim Spiritual Directorates by which the government also wanted to control religious activities of the Muslims. Located in Tashkent, the Islamic Directorate for Central Asia and Kazakhstan was the most important and the largest Directorate.[351] The others were located in European Russia and Siberia, northern Caucasus and Daghestan, and Transcaucasia.[352] Although there were four Islamic directorates, only two of them were following the Hanafi tradition: one for Central Asia and Kazakhstan and one for the European Russia and Siberia. The northern Caucasus

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[345] Akiner Shirin, "Social and Political Reorganization in Central Asia: Transition from pre-Colonial to post-Colonial society," in *Post-Soviet Central Asia*, ed. Touraj Atabaki and John Okane (London ; New York : Tauris Academic Studies, 1998), 16-17.

[346] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 38.

[347] Alexandre A. Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, 1979, 92.

[348] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 24.

[349] Ibid. 25.

[350] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 23.

[351] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 38.

[352] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 26.

and Daghestan Islamic directorate was Shafi and the last directorate in Transcaucasia, which was located in Ufa, was Shiite of the Jafari tradition.[353] The Islamic directorates kept the record of all of the "working mosques, madrassahs, and religious publications."[354] Carefully chosen pilgrims were allowed to make the annual hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca. Furthermore, a number of mosques, and the two madrassahs, (which were also the only madrassahs until 1989) in Tashkent and Bukhara were allowed to reopen in Uzbekistan.[355] In 1944, the Soviet government established the 'the Council for Affairs of Religious Cults' for controlling all of these religious boards.[356]

When the Soviets overcame the effects of World War II, they started repressing Islam in mid-1950s.[357] During Khrushchev's time (1958-1964) anti-Islamic propaganda escalated, the number of mosques was further reduced to 1.500. Khrushchev's short but violent campaign lasted until 1964 and in early 1960s there were only 500 mosques registered.[358] In this period religious holidays and rituals were also attacked.[359]

In March 1961, the Soviet Council of Ministers issued a decree entitled "On the Strict Observance of the Laws on Religious Cults" which envisaged a strategy threefold:

> First, a direct attack was to be launched against the clergy as well as the external attributes of religion. Second, the existing laws were to be

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[353] Roberta Micallef and Ingvar Svanberg, "Turkic Central Asia", in *Islam outside the Arab World* , ed. David Westerlund and Ingvar Svanberg (Richmond, Surrey : Curzon, 1999), 156.

[354] Ahmed Rashid. 2002, 38.

[355] Akiner Shirin, 1996, 338.

[356] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 39.

[357] Alexei V. Malashenko, "Islam versus Communism," in *Russia's Muslim Frontiers: new directions in cross-cultura analysis*, ed. Dale F. Eickalman (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1993), 65.

[358] John Glenn, 1999, 89-90.

[359] Alexei V. Malashenko, 1993, 65.

thoroughly implemented. Third, the penalties for religious offenses were to be made more severe.[360]

Because of foreign policy considerations, anti-religious campaigns were moderated under the Brezhnev period (1964-1982).[361] In order to get the support of the Muslim world for its foreign policy priorities, the government wanted to show the Muslim world how it was permissive toward Islam in their own country, especially in Central Asia. In order to develop "official Islam", the government opened two "official" madrassahs in Tashkent and Bukhara, in which mullahs would be trained in both Islamic and Soviet studies.[362] In this era, some sociological studies were also published. Sharaf Rashidov, the Uzbek party leader, softened some strict Soviet policies and Islamic lifestyle rituals such as; sunnat, nikah, janaze, fasting and feasting.[363]

In 1979, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Islamic oppositional activities in Central Asia raised.[364] According to Broxup, "the real, extraordinary and powerful religious revival" in the region initiated with the Afghan war.[365] In 1980s, thousands of Muslims living in Central Asia were drafted into Red Army in order to battle the Afghan Mujahadeen. There, a lot of Muslim Central Asian soldiers were highly impressed by "the Islamic dedication of their opponents". Also, the Muslim Central Asian soldiers who were in jail mostly joined the Afghan Mujahadeen. [366] The major religious impact of the Afghan-Soviet war was the rediscovering of the

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[360] Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 1995, 32.

[361] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 21.

[362] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 39.

[363] James Critchlow, "Nationalism and Islamic resurgence in Uzbekistan," in *Central Asia: its strategic importance and future prospects,* ed. Hafeez Malik (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1994), 244.

[364] Ibid. 116.

[365] Marie Broxup, "Political trends in Soviet Islam after the Afghanistan war," in *Muslim communities remerge: historical perspectives on nationality, politics, and opposition in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, ed. Edward Allworth* (Durkham and London ; Duke University Press, 1994), 314.

[366] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 43.

ummah and unification of Soviet Muslims with the whole Muslim world through the Afghans.[367]

In the 1980s, the Soviet government's attitude toward Islam was rather instable.[368] When Mikhail Gorbachev announced his policy of perestroika, Muslims did not feel at ease immediately. By an anti-religious campaign, Gorbachev blamed Islam for "backwardness" of Central Asia in the mid 1980s.[369] In 1986, in his speech in Tashkent, Gorbachev, "fulminated against local Communist party members" who took place in religious services.[370] But in 1989, the first sign of positive change for the Muslims was observed when the Muslim community demanded Shamsuddin Babakhanov's resignation in a public demonstration in Tashkent.[371] The Muslim community's demand was taken into consideration by the policy-makers in Moscow and in March 1989, the head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Shamsuddin Babakhanov, was forced to resign, whose family had been fulfilling this function for three generations. [372] Babakhanov was charged with "excessive pliability to the secular administration, corruption, incapability or unwillingness to defend the interests of believers, and lack of attention to religious education".[373] In his place the Rector of Tashkent madrassah Muhammad Sadyg Mahammed Yusuf Hoja-ogli was installed who was "a sincere believer and well versed in Islamic scholarship".[374] After his appointment more mosques were opened

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[367] Pınar Akçalı, "Islam as a 'common bond' in Central Asia: Islamic Renaissance Party and the Afghan Mujahidin." *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.17, No.2, (1998): 277-278.

[368] Shirin Akiner, 1996, 342.

[369] Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia's political Crisis," in *Russia's Muslim Frontiers: new directions in cross-cultura analysis*, ed. Dale F. Eick**e**lman (Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1993), 53.

[370] James Critchlow, 1991, 244.

[371] Shirin Akiner, 1996, 342.

[372] Ibid.

[373] Alexei V. Malashenko, "Islam and politics in the southern zone of the former USSR," in *Central Asia and Transcaucasia: ethnicity and conflict,* ed. Vitaly V. Naumkin (Westport, Conn. : Greenwood Press, 1994), 114.

[374] Shirin Akiner, 1996, 343.

and 50.000 copies of the Qur'an were printed. The new head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan wanted every home in the region to have a copy of the Qur'an.[375] There was an explosion in printing the Qur'an in local languages.[376] Although there were still some restrictions for Muslims, practicing Islam was easier than ever. Also, in late 1980s, the glasnost policies of Gorbachev created a conducive environment for expressing interest in native languages, customs, and religions.[377] Furthermore, for the Soviet Muslims, Islam also started to become a political factor.[378] For the first time in the history of the USSR, a Muslim political party (the Islamic Revival Party, IRP) emerged in June 1990 in Astrakhan.[379] In January 1992, the Islamic Revival Party of Uzbekistan was established in a disguised location near Tashkent.[380]

3.1.3.b. The Emergence of Parallel Islam

Anti-religious campaign against Islam could not totally succeed in the Soviet Union, as Islam never completely disappeared from social life even under the worst conditions of repression, mostly because of parallel Islam, which refers to the "popular religious practice and non-state, frequently underground, organizations" in Central Asia. [381] Central Asian Muslims continued to perform basic social rites such as religious births, marriages, and death ceremonies. And they sometimes participated in "organizations of devotional piety associated with tombs and other

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[375] Ibid.

[376] Roberta Micallef and Ingvar Svanberg, 1999, 157.

[377] Reef Altoma, "The Influence of Islam in the post-Soviet Kazakhstan," in *Central Asia in Historical Perspective*, ed. Beatrice F. Manz, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 166.

[378] Alexei V. Malashenko, 1994, 109.

[379] Ibid. 118.

[380] Petra Steinberger, "'Fundamentalism' in Central Asia: reasons, reality and prospects," in *Central Asia Aspects of Transition*, ed. Tom Everett-Heath (London: RoutledgeCurzon; New York: Routledge, 2003), 227.

[381] John O. Voll, 1994, 71-72.

holy sites and with the Sufi orders".[382] The success of parallel Islam in Central Asia took its source from the Sufi tariqas.[383]

Sufism which is a "form of Islamic mysticism that preached direct communion with God and tolerance towards all other forms of worship", originated in Central Asia and Persia soon after the Arab invasions. The name Sufi, which means "wool" in Arabic, comes from the "rough woolen cloaks" worn by early Sufi brothers. [384] Sufism became prevalent in Central Asia with the tariqas which are "unofficial Islamic organizations usually founded by particular Islamic saints or their followers".[385] There are four tariqas exists in Central Asia: Qadiriyya, Yasawiyya, Kubrawiyya and Naqshbandiyya. Naqshbandiyya and Yasawiyya tariqas are the most influential ones in Central Asia.[386] In the twelfth century, the Qadiriyya tariqa was founded by Abd al-Kadir al-Ghilani in Baghdad, which was probably the oldest order. In the thirteenth century, it became stronger in Central Asia.[387] The Yasawiyya Sufi order, which was founded by Ahmed Yasawi (d.1166) included "old shamanic rites deriving from the nomadic tribes". It became very popular in the Ferghana Valley and among the southern Turkic tribes.[388] The Kubrawiyya Sufi order was founded by Najm al-Din Kubra (1145-1221) in Central Asia. Although he was originally from Khiva, he moved to the capital city, Khwarazm, where he began his teachings.[389] The teachings of Kubrawiyya Sufi Order expanded to Persia, Afghanistan, India and China.[390] Najm al-Din Kubra was killed while he was

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[382] Ibid. 72.

[383] Shireen Hunter, "Islam in post-Independence Central Asia: Internal and external dimensions," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 7:2 (1996):293.

[384] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 26.

[385] John Glenn, 1999, 64.

[386] Olivier Roy, 2000, 147.

[387] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 27.

[388] Ibid.

[389] Ibid.

[390] Atosa Aria Abedini, Najm al-Din Kubra and the Kubrawiyyah Order, Part 1 http://www.sufismjournal.org/history/historykabrawiyyah.html (accessed   March 23, 2005)

defending Khwarazm in the Mongol massacres in Central Asia in 1221. Finally, Bahauddin Naqshband (1317-1389) established the Naqshbandiyya tariqa in Bukhara in the fourteenth century, which in time expanded to all regions of Central Asia.[391] Bahauddin Naqshband became "the most revered mystic and saint" in Central Asia and his tomb is still an important place of pilgrimage for Central Asians.[392]   Although Sufism is a tolerant version of Islam and Sufis have no political mission[393] the Naqshbandis believed in "active missionary work and political activism against Tsar and the Communists".[394]

3.1.4. Islam in Uzbekistan in the Post-Soviet Era

On 31 August 1991, the Uzbek parliament declared the independence of Uzbekistan [395] and on the same day, Islam Karimov called for the first national elections and to choose the republic's first post-Soviet president.[396] In December of the same year, Islam Karimov was chosen as the President of the country[397] who had been the President of the Uzbek SSR since 24 March 1990.[398] Karimov used "religious affiliation" as part of Uzbek identity in his attempts of state and nation building process.[399] He began his presidential term of office by swearing an oath on both Koran and the local constitution.[400]

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[391] Uwe Halbach, "Holy War against Czarism: The links between Sufism and Jihad in the nineteenth-century anticolonial resistance against Russia," in *Muslim communities remerge: historical perspectives on nationality, politics, and opposition in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia*, ed. Edward Allworth, (Durkham and London; Duke University Press, 1994), 260.

[392] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 27-28.

[393] Olivier Roy, 2000, 149.

[394] Ahmed Rashid, 2002, 28.

[395] Svat Soucek, 2000, 275.

[396] John R. Pottenger, "Civil society, religious freedom, and Islam Karimov: Uzbekistan's struggle for decent society", *Central Asian Survey* 23(1) March (2004): 61.

[397] N.I. Petrov, "Uzbekistan political stability in the conditions of the command-administrative regime," in *Central Asia: political economic challenges in the post-Soviet era*, ed. Alexei Vassiliev (London : Saqi, 2001), 82.

[398] John R. Pottenger, 2004, 61.

[399] Asal Abbosova, "Religion in present day Uzbekistan," *Central Asia and Caucasus*, No.1(7), (2001): 122.

With independence, there was a revival of religious affiliation and an explosion in building new mosques in the country.[401] By early 1992, Uzbekistan built and restored nearly three thousand mosques and opened up nine madrassahs.[402] In 1992, the Qur'an was translated into Uzbek for the first time.[403] Furthermore, all religious holidays became officially celebrated events.[404] Performing Hajj was officially sponsored and Karimov himself also performed this religious rite[405] in 1992, together with the twelve hundred believers form Uzbekistan.[406] Moreover, religious cultural symbols were renovated.[407] As a government policy, Sufism became accepted as an example of humanist traditions of the Uzbek nation.[408]

Similar to the Soviet period, Islam continued to be state-regulated after independence. In order to control Islam officially, the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM), which was established during the Second World War in the Soviet Union era, was replaced by the Muslim Directorate of Uzbekistan.[409]

After the outbreak of the civil war in Tajikistan in May 1992, the Uzbek President Islam Karimov did not want to tolerate neither the political opposition movements nor the religious movements.[410] In this era, although Islam was considered as an important part of the government policy, Islamic rebirth, which is considered to

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[400] Petra Steinberger, 2003, 236.

[401] Roberta Micallef and Ingvar Svanberg, 1999, 157.

[402] Asal Abbosova, 2001, 121.

[403] Adeeb Khalid, "A secular Islam: nation, state and religion in Uzbekistan." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 35 (2003): 584.

[404] Zahid I. Munavvarov, "Uzbekistan," in *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union*, ed. Mohiaddin Meshabi (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 140.

[405] Adeeb Khalid, 2003, 587.

[406] Zahid I. Munavvarov, 1994, 141.

[407] Asal Abbosova, 2001, 122.

[408] Adeeb Khalid, 2003, 587.

[409] Ibid.

[410] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Report on Uzbekistan, May 2002, 2.

derive from "ethnic and religious extremism", was declared as the main enemy of the state by the government.[411] Under the policy of "fighting Islamic extremism" the government has prohibited all the religious and secular groups, which are considered to be independent or antigovernment.[412] Karimov banned all Islamic opposition parties, including the Birlik (Unity) Party, Erk (Freedom) Party, Adolat (Justice) Party, and the Islamic Renaissance Party. The government also banned independent Islamic mosques and radical Islamic organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir and also Wahhabist groups.[413]

The first banned opposition party was the Birlik Party. The party, which also was known as the "Unity Movement for the Preservation of Uzbekistan's Natural, Material, and Spiritual Riches" was created in the Soviet era, under the leadership of Abdurakhim Pulatov.[414] It started out as a movement with the goal of solving the problems resulting from the environmental, social and economic issues.[415] In order to participate to the 1991 elections, the movement decided to transform itself into a party.[416] On 12 November 1991, Birlik was officially recognized but the authorities did not register the political wing of the movement as a party.[417] Although the Birlik Party could not participate to the elections and become an official opposition party, it continued to criticize the government's policies.[418] In mid 1992, the Birlik Party was banned, the party members were arrested and Abdurakhim Pulatov fled the country.[419]

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[411] Resul Yalcin, 2002, 96-97.

[412] Hooman Peimani, *Failed Transition, bleak future?: war and instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus,* (Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2002), 65.

[413] John R. Pottenger, 2004, 68-69.

[414] Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, *New nations rising : the fall of the Soviets and the challenge of independence* (New York : John Wiley and Sons, 1993), 187.

[415] Ibid.

[416] N. I. Petrov, 2001, 84.

[417] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 35.

[418] N. I. Petrov, 2001, 84.

[419] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 36.

The second banned opposition party was the Erk Party. In 1990, Erk Party which was a "moderate opposition" party established by Muhammad Solikh by splitting from Birlik Party.[420] In 1991, the Erk Party participated to the president elections with their leader Muhammad Solikh, who could get only 12.4 percent of the votes against President Karimov.[421] Solikh was the only candidate to run against Karimov and in December 1992 the Erk Party was banned.[422] Outside the country, the Erk and Birlik continued to function and to publish newspapers and magazines. [423]

The third banned opposition party was the Islamic-oriented Adolat Party. In 1990, The Islamic movement Adolat arose in the city of Namangan in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana valley.[424] Tahir Yuldashev was the leader of the movement, which demanded the creation of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. At the time the movement was estimated to be composed of 5000 young Muslims.[425] The cities of Ferghana valley, which had strong Islamic traditions and low living standarts, supported the Adolat movement. In March 1992, Adolat was banned and Tahir Yuldashev fled to Tajikistan, where he joined the Tajik branch of IRP.[426]

The last banned opposition party was the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of Uzbekistan. The Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) of the USSR, which was the only legal party with a religious based in Central Asia, had became active in Uzbekistan in early 1990s.[427] In January 1991, the Uzbek IRP was established but the Uzbek

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[420] N. I. Petrov, 2001, 80-81.

[421] Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, 1993, 186.

[422] U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Uzbekistan," Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs February 2005, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2924.htm, (accessed March 27, 2005)

[423] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 36.

[424] Michael, Fredholm. "Uzbekistan and the threat from Islamic extremism", *Conflict Studies Research Center.* March 2003. 9. http://www.da.mod.uk/ CSRC/documents/CentralAsia/K39-MP.pdf (accessed on 10 November 2004)

[425] Ibid. 3.

[426] Ibid 4.

[427] Vitaly V. Naumkin, "*Militant Islam in Central Asia: The case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*", University of California Berkeley, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies Working Paper Series. 20. http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/publications/2003_06-naum.pdf, (accessed April 15, 2005)

government did not allow the party to be registered, because it was considered as a threat to the secular regimes in Central Asia.[428] The party was declared illegal in all republics except Tajikistan, where it became part of a coalition government in 1992. In December 1992, the leader of the Uzbek IRP, Abdulla Utaev was arrested.[429]

In the post-Soviet era, the Uzbek government also banned radical Islamic organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. As Jihad Watch describes: "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was a self-proclaimed radical Islamic and political group, which was formed around 1997 by two ethnic Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley with the express goal of overthrowing the government of President Islam Karimov and establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. It has two founders; Juma Namangani, (the group's military leader and a former Afghan veteran) and Tahir Yuldashev (its political leader)."[430] The groups that comprised the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had their origin in the public manifestation of the Islamic movement called Adolat that arose in the city of Namangan in the Uzbek part of the Ferghana valley in 1990. The membership of the IMU predominantly consisted of Uzbeks and Tajiks from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.[431] According to some reports, the IMU changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkestan in June 2001.[432]

Another banned radical Islamic group in post-Soviet Uzbekistan was the Hizb ut-Tahrir. The general feeling of a growing dissatisfaction with the Uzbek government increased sympathy for this organization, giving it a crucial role in resisting against the repressive government. According to a web-site text prepared by Hizb ut-Tahrir; this is a political party (not Islamic group) whose aim is to re-establish the Caliphate

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[428] Ibid.

[429] Ibid. 24.

[430] Jihad Watch. "The growth of radical Islam in Central Asia", 2004. http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/001366.php, (accessed April 17, 2005)

[431] Michael Fredholm, 2003, 9.

[432] Richard Weitz. "Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, (no.27, Taylor & Francis Inc. 2004):508.

(Islamic State) that was lost by the Muslims in 1924 when the Ottoman Caliphate was destroyed.[433] Although Hizb ut-Tahrir's main ideology is common with other radical Islamic groups like IMU, it calls for the peaceful replacement of the region's secular governments with a multinational Islamic Caliphate. Although Hizb ut-Tahrir wanted to change the regime in a peaceful manner, its members in the southern Kazakhstan declared jihad against the United States and Britain when they invaded Iraq.[434]

The government of Uzbekistan also banned the Wahhabist groups. Since 1980s in the Soviet Union era, the term Wahhabism has been used for any kind of fundamentalist group coming from abroad, without any real consideration of resemblance with Saudi Wahhabis.[435] The word "Wahhabism" originated in the 18th-19th centuries. Its founder and ideologist was Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab. According to Human Rights Watch Report, "Wahhabism advocates a purification of Islam, rejects Islamic theology and philosophy developed after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, and calls for strict adherence to the letter of the Koran and hadith". [436] Some scholars suggested that Wahhabism and Central Asian Sufism are ideologically incompatible with each other. A Sufi leader, for example, expressed his views about Wahhabis:

> They are not correct in the practice of our faith. They are narrow-minded and do not understand the depth of Islam. Wahhabism is about 200 years old but Islam 14 centuries, so who are they that are intending to teach Islam? Our goal is knowledge- their goal is political power. Where politics starts religion ends! [437]

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[433] The Reality of the Sect, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, http://www.htexposed.com/htexpose.doc

[434] Richard Weitz, 2004, 508.

[435] Kenneth Weisbrode, "Central Eurasia:Prize or Quiksand? Contending views of instability in Karabakh, Ferghana and Afghanistan," *Adelphi Paper 338*. (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press for the International), 48.

[436] Human Rights Watch, (HTW). Creating the Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan: Notes on Wahhabism, 'Wahhabis', and Hizbut-Tahri.r 2004. 1. http://hrw.org/reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/4.htm, (accessed September 24, 2004).

[437] International Crisis Group (ICG). "Is Radical Islam Inevitable in Central Asia? Priorities For Engagement*", ICG Asia Report* No:72, Osh/ Brussels, (December 2003):6.

The systematic eradication of all forms of opposition parties and groups in Uzbekistan is made possible by the constitutional framework of the country. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, President Islam Karimov gained extreme powers with the newly introduced constitution in December 1992.[438] According to Article 76, for example, although the Parliament exercises legislative power,[439] the President may issue decrees, resolutions, and orders.[440] Also with Article 89, the President is declared as the head of the state and of the executive, as the chairman of the cabinet of ministers.[441] Moreover, under this constitution, the President also received the right to appoint and dismiss *khokims* (local administrators). In short; the President is more powerful than the legislative and judicial branches.

Although the new constitution guaranteed freedom of religion to all citizens (Article 31[442]), and separated religion and the state (Article 61[443]), there are other articles in the constitution, which have the potential of limiting religious freedoms. For example, Article 16 states that "None of the provisions of the present Constitution shall be interpreted in a way detrimental to the rights and interests of the Republic of Uzbekistan".[444] Similarly, Article 20 states that "The exercise of rights and

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[438] Michael Kort, 2004, 124.

[439] Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 76: "The highest state representative body is the Oliy Majlis (the Supreme Assembly) of the Republic of Uzbekistan. This body exercises legislative power." http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Constitution/constitution.html, (accessed May 16, 2005)

[440] Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 94: "The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan shall issue decrees, enactments and ordinances binding on the entire territory of the Republic on the basis of and for enforcement of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan."

[441] Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 89: "The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan is head of state and executive authority in the Republic of Uzbekistan. The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan simultaneously serves as Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers."

[442] Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 31: "Freedom of conscience is guaranteed to all. Everyone shall have the right to profess any religion. Any compulsory imposition of religion shall not be permissible."

[443] Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Article 61: "Religious organizations and associations are separate from the state and equal before the law. The state does not interfere in the activities of religious associations."

[444] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Report on Uzbekistan, May 2002, 2.

freedoms by a citizen shall not encroach on the lawful interests, rights and freedoms of other citizens, the state or society."[445] Therefore, although Uzbekistan declares itself as a secular state, the public administrators have also the opportunity to control citizen's religious life.

Despite his systematic repression Karimov could not stop the activities of radical groups. On 2 December 1997, a local government officer was brutally murdered in Namangan.[446] The police questioned hundreds of people and in 17 December 1997, a suspect, Sohib Kholmatov who was a Wahhabi, was detected. During the shoot-out, Sohib Kholmatov was killed and three police officers were murdered.[447] This event was a turning point as it toughened the campaign over the people. In the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent, the police arrested hundreds of people, probably over 1000. [448] 27 people were blamed for this violence and one of them was sentenced to death. [449] On 5 March 1998, Uzbek security forces surrounded the houses of two imams, Obidkhan Nazarov and Yoldash Ergashev, who were charged with "promoting Wahhabism with the goal of overthrowing the government." [450]

In 1998, Karimov asked official intelligence agencies, local administrators, and mahalla committees to keep an eye on the behaviors of religious people and report their "suspicious" religious activities.[451] Same year, hundreds of unregistered mosques were closed down.[452]

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[445] Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan
http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Constitution/constitution.html

[446] Human Rights Watch (HTW), "Crackdown in the Farghona Valley: Arbitrary arrests and religious discrimination", May 1998, http://www.hrw.org/reports98/uzbekistan, (accessed 24 April, 2004)

[447] Bruce Pannier, "Wahhabis-Fundamentalists of the Ferghana Valley" 23 December 1997, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/53/160.html, (accessed May 19, 2005)

[448] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Report on Uzbekistan, May 2002, 4.

[449] Neil J. Melvin, 2000. 55.

[450] Ibid.

On May 1998, the Uzbek parliament enacted two laws, which limited the Uzbek citizen's religious activities. The first one was the "Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations," which maintained freedom of worship, freedom from religious persecution, separation of church and state, and the right to establish schools and train clergy.[453] However, according to the US Department of State's 2002 International Religious Freedom Report, the Uzbekistan citizen's religious activities were severely limited with this law. This law circumscribed religious rights that were inferred to be in conflict with national security, prohibited proselytizing, banned religious subjects in public schools, prohibited private teaching of religious principles, forbidded the wearing of religious clothing in public by anyone other than clerics, and required religious groups to obtain a license for publishing or distributing religious materials.[454]

The second law, which was adopted by the Uzbek Parliament on May 1998, was on Criminal and Civil Code. According to the new articles in the criminal code, anyone who organizes an unregistered religious group could face up to five years in prison. The law punishes private religious teaching or missionary activity with three-year prison terms. All religious groups must be registered, and activities by unregistered religious organizations are illegal.[455]

These new laws, however, could not stop the radical Islamist group's activities in Uzbekistan. On the 16th of February 1999, six car bombs exploded in Tashkent killing sixteen people and wounding more than 100. The bombs missed Islam

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[451] Human Rights Watch (HTW). "Creating the Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan: Notes on Wahhabism, "Wahhabis", and Hizbut-Tahrir" 2004. 3. http://hrw.org/reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/4.htm, (accessed September 24, 2004)

[452] John Bolender, "Uzbekistan and the US: Sometimes it really is a war on Islam," 18 October 2003. http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=40&ItemID=4367
(accessed May 20, 2005)

[453] U.S. Department of State, "Background Note: Uzbekistan," Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs February 2005. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2924.htm

[454] U.S. Department of State, "Uzbekistan International Religious Freedom Report 2002.

[455] Ibid.

Karimov who had been the main target.[456] Karimov blamed the Islamic extremists for attacks and arrested thousands of people.[457] He also announced that: "Virtually all of those arrested have undergone training in sabotage in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. They all belong to various terrorist and extremist religious groups such as Hizbollah and Hezb-e Tahrir or are supporters of the Wahhabi sect."[458]

Despite the government's harsh treatments over Muslim believers, the extremist activities of the radical Islamic groups continued. On 25 August 1999, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) openly declared jihad against the Uzbek government announced that foreign tourists coming to Uzbekistan would be attacked.[459] In August 1999, IMU militants captured several hostages including four Japanese geologists in Kyrgyztan and expressed their demands from the Uzbek government. These were Karimov's resignation, releasing all religious prisoners in Uzbekistan, allowing the people who fled from religious persecution or exiled from the country to return to Uzbekistan and introducing sharia rules.[460] After the Japanese government provided Kyrgyzstan $ 50.000 ransom, IMU released the four hostages.[461]

In 1999, in order to control the growing Islamic opposition movements, the Uzbek government opened the Tashkent Islamic University under the control of Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan for educating Uzbekistan's future imams.

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[456] John Bolender, 2003.

[457] Human Rights Watch (HTW), *Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan:Background,* 2004.

[458] Tom Everett-Heath, "Instability and Identity in a post-Soviet World Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan," in *Central Asia Aspects of Transition*, ed. Tom Everett-Heath (London: RoutledgeCurzon; New York: Routledge, 2003), 196.

[459] Michael Fredholm, 2003, 5.

[460] Human Rights Watch (HTW), *Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan:Background,* 2004.

[461] Kenneth Weisbrode, 50.

Also, nationwide weekly televisions shows started for teaching "tolerance and religion" to the Muslims of Uzbekistan by the Tashkent Islamic University.[462]

In 2000, the IMU launched incursions into Krygyztan and Uzbekistan and initiated major guerrilla attacks, killing many people near 100 km of Tashkent.[463] After these events, the Uzbek government had extensively increased its defense capacities and strengthened its border controls; in some places the government extended the boundary several kilometers inside neighbouring countries.[464]

After 11 September 2001 attacks, the United States started a military operation against Afghanistan to find Osama bin Laden in order to destroy al-Qaeda's terror network.[465] Thus, IMU lost one of its biggest supports. Although it was thought that the IMU's power would decline with death of their leader Namangani during the clashes, they proved to have sufficient power to command terrorist operations.[466] Bukhara and Tashkent witnessed difficult kinds of terrorist acts at the end of March and the beginning of April 2004.[467] The March bombings were the most violent terrorist event, because for the first time the suicide bombers blew themselves at the bazaar. The suicide terrorists were women wearing "shakhid belts" and they were protesting the imprisonment of their husbands who were charged with Islamist extremism.[468] There were more than 19 dead and many people were wounded.[469] The main target of this attack was the police.[470] On 29 March, another explosion

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[462] Eric McGlinchey, "Constructing Militant Opposition: Authoritarian Rule and Political Islam in Central Asia." Iowa State University, 6 April 2004.
http://www.yale.edu/ycias/centralasia/mcglin_yale.pdf, (accessed April 26, 2005)

[463] Micheal Kort, 2004, 128.

[464] Kenneth Weisbrode, 51.

[465] Micheal Kort, 2004, 128.

[466] Ibid.

[467] K. Rabbimov, "Hizb ut-Tahrir-Leader of the Islamist antidemocratic campaign", *Central Asia and the Caucasus* 3:27, (2004):15.

[468] Eric McGlinchey, 2004, 27.

[469] Esmer Islamov, "Bombings and shootings rock Uzbekistan" , Eurasia Insight, 03/29/2004.
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032904a.shtml, (acceessed July 2, 2005)

occurred in an apartment, which terrorists were using as a bomb-making factory, killing 10 and wounding 26 people.[471]

Once again in July 2004, suicide attacks were launched against three specific targets in Tashkent: the U.S. Embassy, the Israeli Embassy, and the Office of the General Prosecutor. Three Uzbek security guards were killed and eight civilians were wounded.[472] Uzbek President Islam Karimov accused the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) for these bombings,[473] although the Jihad Islamic Group (or "Jamoat") and the IMU took responsibility for the July 2004 bombings.[474]

3.2. Activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan

In Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir is an illegal movement because of its radical discourse, which aims overthrowing the government and establishing an Islamic Caliphate in Central Asia. The General Consulate of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Greece considered Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization and accuses the party with the following acts:

> Organization, programming, preparation and realization of terrorists acts; Instigation to terrorist acts, violence over natural persons or the organizations, destruction of material objects in the terrorist purposes; Organization of illegal armed bands, criminal communities and terrorist groupings, and participation in such actions; Recruitment, support in ammunition, terrorists training; Financing of obviously terrorist organizations either terrorist groups or rendering other assistance to them.[475]

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[470] Eric McGlinchey, 2004, 27.

[471] Esmer Islamov, "Uzbek Bombings: In Taskent many are sceptical about official assertions" Muslim Uzbekistan, 30 March 2004, http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2004/03/ennews30032004.html, (acceessed July 2, 2005)

[472] Richard Weitz, 2004, 521.

[473] Ibid. 506.

[474] Ibid.

[475] The General Consulate of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Greece, "Materials on religious-extremist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir with proofs of its participation in terrorist activity", 10. http://www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc, (accessed June 26, 2005)

However, Hizb ut-Tahrir declares that it rejects resorting to violence and terror as a method for changing peoples' minds.[476] Although they want to achieve their goal peacefully, Hizb ut-Tahrir's war "is a war of ideologies, and terrorist acts are the tip of the iceberg".[477] It has been pointed out that the party produces terrorists by creating and provocating its own Islamic ideology. For example, Rabbimov claims that "Hizb ut-Tahrir is a sort of factory that turns young Muslims into terrorists with the help of ideology and gradual inculcation of the ideas of radical extremism."[478]

However, although Hizb ut-Tahrir leaders reject the claims that they have been engaged in terrorist activities, after a series of bombings in Uzbekistan which started in 1999, the Uzbek government suspected Hizb ut-Tahrir's involvement. As was analyzed above, February 1999 bombings in Tashkent targeted Islam Karimov and 16 people were killed and more than 100 people were wounded.[479] The government's campaign against Muslim extremists composed of three groups: Wahabbists, suspected members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and the IMU.[480] The police arrested thousands of people who were mainly claimed to be Hizb ut-Tahrir members.[481] According to some human-rights groups, nearly 7000 people were arrested and about 4000 of them were accused of being Hizb ut-Tahrir members.[482]

The Uzbek officials wrote an article that declared Hizb ut-Tahrir as a religious extremist organization and by presenting evidence of the party's participation in

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[476] Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, 04/11/2002.
http://www.islamic-state.org/leaflets/november0402.htm, (accessed July 2, 2005)

[477] Zeyno Baran, "The Road from Taskent to the Taliban Islamist terror group is undermining a U.S. ally", 2004. www.nationalreview.org

[478] K. Rabbimov, 2004. 16.

[479] John Bolender, 2003.

[480] Ibid.

[481] Muslim Uzbekistan, "No place for Uzbek Muslims" July 2, 2003.
http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2003/07/ennews02072003_g.html, (accessed May 30, 2005)

[482] International Crisis Group (ICG), "Uzbekistan: The Andijan Uprising", *Asia Briefing No. 38*, Bishkek/Brussels, (25 May 2005): 8.
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/central_asia/b038_uzbekistan___the_andijon_upr ising_edited.pdf, (accessed May 30, 2005)

terrorist activities. In this article it was stated that "Hizb ut-Tahrir publications show open support by organization of religious terrorist acts."[483] It was alleged that an article titled "The Mother Stepped into Suicide Bombing Act" was published in a Hizb ut-Tahrir periodical, "Al-Vaya". The article was about a 22 years old Palestianian woman, Riym Solih ar-Rieshiy, who realized a suicide bombing at the Israel industrial districts of Erets in February 2004. Ideologically supported and legitimated suicidal terrorist acts were later performed in Tashkent in March 2004.[484] With this allegation the Uzbek government claimed to prove Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideological support for Islamic terrorist organizations. On 29 March 2004, two suicide bombings and shootouts killed 19 people and wounded many others at the main bazaar again in Tashkent. No organization took responsibility for March 2004 bombings, but Uzbek officials blamed Hizb ut-Tahrir and the IMU[485] and they arrested about 100 people.[486] The suicide terrorists were women wearing "shakhid belts" and they were protesting the imprisonment of their husbands who were charged with Islamist extremism.[487] Their main target at the bazaar was the police.[488]

Similarly for the 30 July 2004 suicide attacks, Uzbek President Islam Karimov accused Hizb-ut-Tahrir and the IMU.[489] These suicide attacks were launched against three specific targets in Tashkent: the U.S. Embassy, the Israeli Embassy, and the Office of the General Prosecutor. Three Uzbek security guards were killed and eight civilians were wounded.[490] Although the Jihad Islamic Group (or *Jamoat*) and the IMU claimed responsibility for the bombings, Karimov continued to charge

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[483] The General Consulate of the Republic of Uzbekistan in Greece, http://www.uzbekistan.gr/hizb.doc

[484] Ibid.

[485] Esmer Islamov, "Bombings and shootings rock Uzbekistan" , 2004.

[486] International Crisis Group (ICG), 2005. 8.

[487] Eric McGlinchey, 2004, 27.

[488] Ibid.

[489] Richard Weitz, 2004, 506.

[490] Ibid. 521.

Hizb ut-Tahrir for this attacks.[491] He said that Hizb ut-Tahrir "infect the minds of young people with dangerous ideas of creating a Caliphate in Pakistan, Afghanistan and five central Asian republics."[492] Hizb ut-Tahrir, however, denied any responsibility for the attacks by making the following statement:

> If we ever decide to include violence in our programme, we shall not blow up now here, now there; we shall go directly to his [Karimov's] palace and liquidate him because we are not afraid of anyone but God Almighty. Karimov himself understands that we can do it. He can find from his security services that it is in our power to clamp or to liquidate him, should our chosen path allow us to act in this manner…However, we are preparing a terrible death for this tyrant under the Caliphate that is approaching nearer every day – with the permission of Allah. Then this tyrant would get his just punishment in this life. The *Allah*'s punishment in the hereafter would be stronger many times more.[493]

The most interesting, complicated and recent example of the conflict between Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Uzbek government was related to the events in Andijan between June 2004 to 13-14 May 2005. International Crisis Group explained the popular uprising in detail and the aftermath of government suppression in Andijan.[494] The uprising had started a year ago with the protests of people, who opposed the arrests of 23 businessmen in Andijan in June 2004 and 20 employees in Tashkent in September 2004. The demonstrations continued during the trials of these arrested people. According to the report of International Crisis Group, between June 2004 to August 2004, Uzbek security forces arrested 23 young men in Andijan with accusations of involvement in Islamic extremism and acts against the state. The men were also accused of belonging to the Akromiya movement and aimed to overthrow the Uzbek government. Akromiya was the core of an organized religious movement in Andijan, which was founded by Akrom Yuldoshev. Some of the

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[491] Ibid.

[492] Oleg Shchedrov, "Uzbekistan Points to Islamists in Suicide Bombings", Reuters, 31-07-2004 http://www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/073004Reuters_Uzb.shtml, (accessed June 15, 2005)

[493] News Central Asia, "Hizb-ut-Tahrir Explains its Position on Tashkent Bombings", 05-08-2004 http://www.newscentralasia.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=775, (accessed June 14, 2005)

[494] International Crisis Group (ICG), 2005. 1-7.

methods and doctrines Akromiya were embraced by Hizb ut-Tahrir.[495] After the arrests in Andijan, 20 employees of the profitable Turan Furniture Production Company, a branch of an Andijan business whose leadership had been caught up in the arrests in Andijan, were being taken to the National Security Service (NSS) headquarters on September 2004. They were forced to sign confessions declaring that they were leaders of the Akromiya movement in Tashkent. On 2 February 2005, nine people were accused of being a member in an extremist group and anti-constitutional activity. The accused employees, however, denied any membership in the Akromiya movement and even declared that they did not have any knowledge about the Akromiya movement till they were arrested. [496]

The International Crisis Group also explained the reactions of common people to these accusations in detail. According to their report, during the investigation of the accusations, a silent large mass of relatives, neighbors, friends and former employees of the above-mentioned 23 men held demonstrations in Andijan. The trials of the first accused 23 men started in February 2005. Their relatives and the acquaintances insisted that they had done nothing illegal. However, it is claimed that their firms had been successful and they were playing an important role in the economic development of the region. [497]

Towards coming to the end of the trial, the tension in demonstrations increased. NSS officials began arresting participants of the demonstrations on the night of 12 May. In response to the arrests, friends and relatives of the accused men decided to use force and took the control of a number of traffic police stations and seized weapons form a military garrison. They attempted to seize NSS headquarters but were driven back. On same night, an armed crowd broke into the Andijan prison and freed 500 prisoners. Early in the morning of 13 May 2005, the crowd seized the provincial government building, *hakimiyat*. Thousands more gathered on the public square in the town. The leaders of the uprising called for negotiations with the government and demanded that Akrom Yuldoshev be brought to Andijan to testify

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[495] Ibid. 2.

[496] Ibid. 4.

[497] Ibid. 3.

at the trial and explain whether or not these men were really his followers. The negotiation process failed. In response, in the evening of 13 May, armored personnel carriers full of troops roared into the center of town. Government forces reportedly fired indiscriminately into the crowd and began to storm the *hakimiyat* building. Altough many of the civilians who ran to the Kyrgyz border were wounded, at least 541 people were housed in a refugee camp on Kyrgyz side. Official Uzbek figures declared that 169 people were killed. But other sources claim that the number of people killed is over 700.[498] The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) estimated that a total of 300-500 people were killed on 13-14 May in Andijan.[499]

Uzbek officials insisted that Islamic militants were responsible for initiating the Andijan events and civil society activists were "knowingly of unknowingly" aiding and abetting the Islamic radical activities. Moreover, as the Uzbek Deputy Prosecutor General Anvar Nabiyev declared, the number of the dead people in Andijan was 176, which was far lower than most international estimates.[500] However, other sources characterized the Andijan events as a "massacre," in which government security forces opened indiscriminate fire on civilian protesters. [501] At the June 16 briefing Deputy Prosecutor-General Anvar Nabiyev stated the official Uzbek version of events. According to his claims, Andijan events "were a well-planned and organized action of international radical forces whose ultimate goal [was] to change [Uzbekistan's] constitutional order by force." It has been suggested that Nabiyev's explanations showed that Uzbek government would not change its current position and not accept an international inquiry into the tragedy. [502] While

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[498] Eurasia Insight, "Uzbekistan: no good political options in side" 18-05-2005 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav051805_pr.shtml, (accessed June 18, 2005)

[499] Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, "Preliminary findings on the events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005", 20 June 2005, http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2005/06/15233_en.pdf, (accessed August 23, 2005)

[500] Eurasianet, "Uzbek Government adds 'so called democrats' to its enemies list" 17-06-2005 http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav061705.shtml, (accessed June 20, 2005)

[501] Ibid.

the government claimed that a branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir called Akromiya was responsible for the death of 169 innocent people, Hizb ut-Tahrir asserted that the killing of innocent 7000 people was planned by Karimov himself with the help of Russia a month before.[503]

As an important remark, it has to be mentioned that although Hizb ut-Tahrir leaders declare that their ideology rejects violence and terror, in some cases they seem to promote violent acts. For example, Hizb ut-Tahrir members in the southern Kazakhstan called for a jihad against the United States and Britain when American and British troops attacked Iraq.[504] Soon after, similar leaflets were found in the southern Kyrgyztan.[505] Moreover, a newspaper in Kyrgyztan called "Vecherny Bishkek" declared that the attacks in Iraq by U.S. military forces have caused segmentation of Hizb ut-Tahrir. As Khamidov explained, some of the leaders of the Hizb ut-Tahrir wanted to take more active and radical steps.[506] Therefore, it is possible to suggest that Hizb ut-Tahrir members give conflictual statements regarding the use of violence. The following statement given by a group of Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Central Asia is a clear indication of this confusion:

> We approve of Muslims who are fighting with guns in their hands against the American aggressors in Afghanistan and Iraq. But, according to our charter, we have to be engaged only in educational activities. This is why the members of our organization cannot participate in military operations. We and the Mujahideen, who are fighting the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq have different tasks even though we are striving towards the same goal.[507]

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[502] Ibid.

[503] Hizb ut-Tahrir, "This is how the butcher of Andian executed his crime" 21-05-2005 http://khilafat.org/newPages/Leaflets/Resources/LT_ENG_050521_Uzbek.pdf, (accessed June 21, 2005)

[504] Richard Weitz, 2004, 508.

[505] Ibid.

[506] Alisher Khamidov, "Hizb ut-Tahrir faces international split in Central Asia" 21-10-2003. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav202103.shtml, (accessed November 22, 2004)

[507] Igor Rotar, "Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia", Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 2, Issue 4, (February 26, 2004)http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400&issue_id=2914&article_id=23567, (accessed June 28, 2005)

It has also been expressed that Hizb ut-Tahrir is opposing to violent acts against the state in Uzbekistan. So, the party disapproves the activities of the IMU in this country such as killing Uzbek Muslim soldiers. Such acts are denounced as being "sinful".[508] Hizb ut-Tahrir members wanted to carry their message of Islam to the whole world by rejecting the use violence and terror as methods for changing peoples' minds.[509] In a leaflet of Hizb ut-Tahrir "Islam prohibits violence and militancy" it is stated that:

> Violence, force and militancy can never change the beliefs, values and sentiments of a people and hence can bring no change to society. It breeds fear and resentment among people, and further alienates society away from Islam. The only way to change people's thinking is to convince them of the falsehood of their current thoughts and replace them with the correct ones by way of discussion and evidence.[510]

In order to "replace the falsehood thoughts" with "the correct ones", Hizb ut-Tahrir also used internet in addition to leaflets and books. Internet would be helpful "to fill the information vacuum by commenting on important global and local events and communicate with members in Uzbekistan, where there is no press."[511] Also, by using internet, the official web-site of Hizb ut-Tahrir in England declares its activities such as conference dates, public meetings and demonstration dates. For example Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain organized a meeting "a call for Muslim unity from

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[508] Ibid.

[509] Hizb ut-Tahrir leaflet, 04/11/2002.
http://www.islamic-state.org/leaflets/november0402.htm

[510] Why War? Analysis: Website of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Bangladesh, 2 February 2004. http://www.why-war.com/news/2004/02/02/websiteo.html, (accessed May 12, 2005)

[511] Zeyno Baran, Hizb ut-Tahrir Islam's Political Insurgency, 2004. 34.

Muslim woman in Britain" and they declared its date time and place on their web-site's "Activities and Events" part.[512]

Hizb ut-Tahrir members in Uzbekistan also chose to organize demonstrations, protests, and conferences as a response to goverment's repressive policies over Muslims in the country where there is no real opposition. According to Sheikh Sadiq Q. Kamal Al-Deen, the director of the Islamic Centre of Islamic Cooperation in Osh and the former Mufti of Kyrgyztan, "the minimal political participation of the population, the growth of distrust of authority and skepticism about the utility of democratic institutions" are the key factors in the growth of the Hizb ut-Tahrir in the region. [513]

Mostly the relatives of prisoned Hizb ut-Tahrir members stage protests in Uzbekistan. For example in July 2002 in Tashkent, Muslim women staged a protest demanding the release or better treatment for their male relatives jailed for religious extremism. More than a dozen women shouted "Allah Akbar" or "God is great" and hold photographs of their husbands and sons convicted for belonging to banned Islamic group Hizb ut-Tahrir. [514] Another similar protest organized by women took place on 10 March 2003. More than 100 Muslim women participated and protested against the torturing of their relatives in Uzbek prisons.[515] Likewise, on 24 January 2004, a group of Muslim women from all parts of the capital came together in another protest meeting in front of the Central Directorate for Imposing Penalty (CDIP) of the Interior Ministry. The women announced that they would gather

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[512] Official web-site of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, "A Call for Muslim Unity from Muslim Women in Britian [Women only]"
http://www.hizb.org.uk/eventsnew/index.php?id=2554_0_18_0_M100, (accessed August 22, 2005)

[513] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 January 2002, 10.

[514] Hizb ut-Tahrir web-site, "Muslim women stage protest in Uzbek capital over jailed relatives" 25 July 2002, www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2002/07/ennews25072002_6.html, (accessed August 23, 2005)

[515] Hizb ut-Tahrir web-site, "In spite of harsh treatment Muslim women continue protests in Tashkent" 12 March 2003, www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2003/03/ennews12032003_1.html, (accessed August 23, 2005)

every Saturday there to demand ending torture and releasing their male relatives imprisoned on religious motives. [516]

The leaders of Hizb ut-Tahrir organize various demonstrations and protests in Britain as well. For example in July 2003, Britain Muslims organized " a week of protest" against the oppressive Uzbek regime. On 7 July, hundreds of Muslim women came together at the Embassy of Uzbekistan for a demonstration against the rape of an Uzbek Muslim woman by law enforcement officials and the continued oppression against Muslim women in Uzbekistan. On 9 July, a protest meeting was held for the tens of thousands of prisoners in Uzbekistan who had been subjected to cruel attitudes. And on 11 July 2003, a protest was made for the children in Uzbekistan who had seen their fathers imprisoned, tortured and killed and their mothers dishonoured.[517] There demonstrations were parts of an "international awareness campaign", which aimed to put Uzbekistan on the world agenda.

On 1 October 2005, a large protest was organized by Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain outside the Uzbek Embassy in Holland Park to protest against the continuing oppression of the Uzbek regime. This protest was a response to the "Andijan massacre" in the country, in which many people died in May 2005.[518]

Several conferences were also organized as a part of the international awareness campaign of Hizb ut-Tahrir. On 10 August 2005, Hizb ut-Tahrir organized "Muslim Unity Conference" which attracted 2.000 people.[519] The reason for the conference was the Britain Prime Minister Tony Blair's announcement on 5 August 2005 of the

[516] Hizb ut-Tahrir web-site, "Muslim women protest against increased torture" 28 January 2004, http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2004/01/ennews28012004_g2.html, (accessed August 23, 2005)

[517] Hizb ut-Tahrir web-site, "UK Muslims to hold week of protest against oppressive Uzbek regime" 7 July 2003, www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2003/07/ennews07072003_1.html, (accessed August 23, 2005)

[518] Official web-site of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, "Comment: Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain protests against the oppression of the Uzbek regime and pictures of the demo" http://www.hizb.org.uk/opinions/index.php?id=P2516_0_50_0_C, (accessed October 10, 2005)

[519] Militant Islam Monitor, "Hizb ut Tahrir Muslim Unity Conference blasts Blair attracts 2,000 at London venue under threat government ban", 5 August 2005, http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/948, (accessed August 24, 2005)

new anti-terror measures after the after the bomb attacks on July 7 and 21 in Britain.[520] The new anti-terror plan includes deporting or debarring foreigners who encourage hatred and a ban on radical Muslim groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun.[521] He also announced the government's plans to amend the civil rights act and deport terrorists.[522] He declared that "The rules of the game are changing."[523]

During the Muslim Unity Conference, Mohammed Shafiq, told that: "We have a right to express ourselves in a peaceful way, but if anybody is inciting hatred then that's wrong and action needs to be taken and proscription would serve only to push extremists underground." Abu Mamdouh Qutaishat, another leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir, told that; "What the British government is doing against us will only make Muslims more fervent in spreading our beliefs since this war is now exposed as one between the West and Islamic civilisation."[524]

After the proposed ban, Hizb ut-Tahrir's Britain spokesman, Imran Waheed, also declared that, "Our members are all for political expression, not for violence. We have been very clear about that and we will fight any ban through the legal system. We will continue our work. Our work is totally non-violent."[525]

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[520] On 7 July 2005, four suicide bombers exploded four bombs three on underground trains and One on bus in London. Fifty-six people were killed in the attacks, including the four suspected bombers, with 700 injured. On 21 July 2005, a second series of four explosions took place on the London Underground and a London bus. However, this time only the detonators of the bombs exploded, and all four bombs remained undetonated.

[521] Militant Islam Monitor, "Hizb ut Tahrir Muslim Unity Conference blasts Blair attracts 2,000 at London venue under threat government ban", 5 August 2005.

[522] Militant Islam Monitor, "Blair bans Hizb ut Tahrir and Al Muhajiroun - announces plans to amend the civil rights act and deport terrorists", 5 August 2005, http://www.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/915, (accessed 24 August 2005)

[523] Fox News, "Blair announces new anti-terror measures", 5 August 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,164830,00.html, (accessed 25 August 2005)

[524] Militant Islam Monitor, "Hizb ut Tahrir Muslim Unity Conference blasts Blair attracts 2,000 at London venue under threat government ban", 5 August 2005.

[525] BBC News, "Blair extremism measures: reaction" http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4748963.stm, (accessed 25 August 2005)

Moreover, on 22 September 2005, over one hundred and twenty participants attended a live debate held at the Foreign Press Association London, jointly organised by Prospect magazine and New Civilisation magazine. Issues debated included the relationship between Western governments and dictators in the Muslim world, Hizb ut-Tahrir's non-violent political struggle to establish the Caliphate in the Muslim world, and the positive contribution Muslims can make to British society. The chairmanship was David Goodhart, Editor of Prospect Magazine, and the panelists included, Dr Imran Waheed, Representative of Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, A.C Grayling, Professor of Philosophy at Birkbeck College, and Ehsan Masood, a journalist and project director of the Gateway Trust. In the debates, far from being a conveyor belt for terrorism, Hizb ut-Tahrir continued to insist that it was engaged only in peaceful political activities. After a vigorous debate, the audience overwhelmingly concluded that Hizb ut-Tahrir should not be banned.[526]

Hizb ut-Tahrir's Britain media represantative, Taji Mustafa, told on 22 October that "he believed the proposed ban was a result of the pressure form governments in the Muslim world. Pakistan and Uzbekistan had been pushing Britain to clump down on the group's activities." [527]

Mustafa said he believed the proposed ban was a result of pressure from governments in Hizb ut-Tahrir had already been banned in many countries and classified as a terrorist group such as; Germany, Russia, Denmark and in all Central Asian countries. In Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir is an illegal movement. The failure of the Uzbek government to distinguish between moderate Islamist forces in Uzbekistan and more radical elements only tends to radicalize larger and larger segments of the religious community. [528] As Dilmurat Orozov, the head of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Jalalabad oblast (in southern Kyrgyzstan), told:

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[526] Official web-site of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Britain, "Debate: An overwhelming no to proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir", 22 September 2005,
http://www.hizb.org.uk/pressnew/index.php?id=2476_0_45_0_M98, (accessed 1 October 2005)

[527] M&C News, "Hizb-ut-Tahrir to fight British ban",
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/uk/article_1056626.php/Hizb-ut-Tahrir_to_fight_British_ban?page=2, (accessed 25 August 2005)

[528] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 January 2002, 11.

"Because of the repressive measures of the Uzbek authorities, the local Hizb ut-Tahrir members became real fanatics, who would much rather die than denounce their views." [529] According to the various international human rights organizations assessments, there are about 7,000 political prisoners being held in Uzbekistan, approximately 5,000 of who are accused of being Hizb ut-Tahrir members. [530]

In order to eliminate this growing sympathy to Hizb ut-Tahrir, some precautions against Hizb ut-Tahrir had taken by not only mufti-chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Board, Abdurashid Kori Bakhromov, but also the Special Commission in Uzbekistan. In June 1999, Bakhromov as the highest officially sanctioned religious authority in the nation, issued a *fatwa* (an Islamic decree), against the Hizb ut-Tahrir. [531] Mufti Bakhromov declared on national television and radio that;

> As the chairman of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in Uzbekistan and mufti, I have issued a fatwa ordering all Muslims to break off all family relations with mercenary-minded people belonging to [Hezb-e Tahrir] sect, with those who have not shunned the sect's goals, words, and oaths and have not repented. All neighbourly relations should be eliminated with them. They should not be spoken to. But extremely strict measures shouls be undertaken against them in order to open their eyes." [532]

Moreover, a few days later the mufti also signed an additional decree announcing that "those who did not recant oaths taken to unregistered Islamic groups would not be given a Muslim burial." [533]

Besides the mufti's fatwas against Hizb ut-Tahrir, the republic had also set up reconciliatory committees, which travel from one city to another to arrange discussions to persuade the young Hizb ut-Tahrir members to return to the Hanafi mosques where open discussions and sermons were performed. The special commissions were composed of ulema-Hanafi, specialists in Islam and Oriental

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[529] Igor Rotar, "Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia", 2004.

[530] Ibid.

[531] Human Rights Watch, (HTW), 2004, http://hrw.org/reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/3.htm

[532] Ibid.

[533] Ibid.

studies. Some of the voluntary repentances said that "the discussions as a means of neutralizing Hizb ut-Tahrir have been successful."[534] The words of the President Islam Karimov "fight against idea with idea, against illiteracy with enlightment" became the popular saying in the media fighting against radical Islam groups.[535]

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[534] Bakhtiar Mırkasymov, "Salafism in Central Asia and the Northern Caucasus", *Central Asia and the Caucasus,* No.3(21), 2003. 39.

[535] Zukhriddin Khusnidnov, "The Uzbek Response", *Conference Report: The challenge of Hizb ut-Tahrir: Deciphering and Combating Radical Islamist Ideology.* Nixon Center. 2004. http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/ PB%202004/confrephiztahrir.pdf (accessed November 24, 2004), 46.

CHAPTER 4

THE CONDITIONS WHICH GAVE RISE OF HIZB UT- TAHRIR IN THE POST-SOVIET UZBEKISTAN

In this part, political, economic and socio-cultural conditions, which contributed to the emergence of Hizb ut-Tahrir in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, are analyzed separately. First of all, the political conditions will be examined. In this part, the country's political life after independence will be mentioned from the perspective of progress towards democracy. Second, the economic conditions will be examined. In order to understand Uzbekistan's current economic conditions more properly, the economic situations will be examined in two parts: before independence and after independence. And finally, the socio-cultural conditions will be analyzed with a specific emphasis on the impact of economy, politics and traditionalism on socio-cultural life.

4.1. Political Conditions

The reforms of glastnost (openness) and perestroika (restructing) introduced in late 1980s had some impact on Central Asia intellectuals, including the Uzbeks and they began to demand radical, political and economic reforms and concessions.[536] With these demands, which were more than what Gorbachev and his allies in the Soviet leadership could afford, Gorbachev understood that there was a need of radical transformation of Soviet Union. [537] On 3 April 1990, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a law on the procedure of republics to secede from the USSR, which was formulated in such a way as to make such secession virtually impossible. In the same month, for the first time in all Soviet Union's history, Russian was officially

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[536] Anatoly M. Khazanov, *After the USSR : ethnicity, nationalism and politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States,* (Madison, Wis. : The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995):23-24.

[537] Ibid. 36.

declared the state language. [538] However, these laws only increased national awakening among the individual republics and resulted in the emergence of several opposition groups. As was analyzed earlier, Birlik and Erk were the two most influential groups of this era.

In June 1989, Islam Karimov was chosen as the first secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Uzbek SRR and on 24 March 1990, he became the president.[539] In August 1991, a coup was organized against Gorbachev in Moscow. It was widely rumored in Uzbekistan that Karimov may have supported the anti-Gorbachev putsch with his connections to the coup plotters. [540] After it became apparent that the coup had failed, Karimov resigned from the Communist Party in 23 August 1991 and started to push for independence for Uzbekistan. [541] On 31 August, Uzbek SSR became independent and the next day the country's name was changed to the Republic of Uzbekistan. [542]

Post-Soviet Uzbekistan experienced the first general elections on 29 December 1991. People had to choose between Islam Karimov, the president, and the other candidate, Muhammad Solikh, leader of the Democratic Party Erk. Karimov won by receiving 86% of the votes and Solikh received only 12.6%.[543] By a referendum on the same day with the presidential election, the issue of Uzbekistan's independence got a 98.2% support from the Uzbek people.[544] Birlik could not participate the 1991 elections under the leadership of its chosen represantative, co-chairman Abdurakhim Pulatov, because authorities did not register the movement as official

[538] Ibid.

[539] John R. Pottenger, 2004, 61.

[540] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 29.

[541] Bess Brown, "Central Asia: Mixed Reactions", 29 August 1991.
 http://www.funet.fi/pub/culture/russian/politics/coup/rlr/91-0829D.RLR, (accessed August 10, 2005)

[542] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 29.

[543] Ibid. 30

[544] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 31.

party on 12 November 1991.[545] Although the Birlik Party could not participate the elections, it continued to criticize government's policies.[546]

After becoming the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Karimov saw "stability" as the first pre-condition for strengthening Uzbekistan's independent position. In order to achieve stability in Uzbekistan, he pursued a four-fold set of policies. First, he wanted to create a single system of power based around the institution of the presidency. Second, a set of initiatives designed to forge a strong centralized state and to assert Tashkent's control over the regions were started. Third, Uzbek nationalism was promoted as a means to unite society. Fourth, the government was careful to suppress the development of all potential sources of opposition, particularly Islamic groups. [547]

After the unexpectedly gained independence, Uzbek Communist Party's organizational structure did not change. The properties, bank accounts and even some of the old member constituted the basis of the newly established Popular Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU) in November 1991. [548] PDPU became the country's largest and most influential party, which held greater share in nearly all-local representative organs. [549] Although the PDPU was a new party, only one-third of the Communist Party's members, which was 800.000, had transferred their allegiance to the PPDP. Two-thirds of the Communist Party's members, who were Russians, resigned from the party. The leaders of the PDPU promptly got rid of the obsolete Communist ideology and they composed their new ideology on state independence and national revival of the Uzbek nation. [550] With the help of this party, Karimov could easily develop his one-man rule system.[551]

[545] Ibid. 35.

[546] N. I. Petrov, 2001, 84.

[547] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 29.

[548] Yuriy Kulchik, Andrey Fadin and Victor Sergeev, Central Asia after the Empire London: Chicago, IL.: Pluto Press; Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 1996, 30.

[549] Annette Bohr, *Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy London: Royal Institute of Internal Affairs,* 1998, 11.

[550] Yuriy Kulchik, Andrey Fadin and Victor Sergeev, 1996, 30.

President Karimov's rule became increasingly authoritarian, especially after the adoption of a new Constitution, which extended the powers of the President on 8 December 1992.[552] Some of the articles gave excessive powers to the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan.[553] For example, according to Article 91, the President shall enjoy personal immunity and protection under law. Also, he can protect the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and implement the decisions regarding its national-state structure according to the Article 93.2.

According to Article 93.8, the President forms the administration and leads it ensuring interaction between the highest bodies of state authority and administration. Moreover, he set ups and dissolves ministries, state committees and other bodies of administration of the Republic of Uzbekistan, with successive affirmation by the Oliy Majlis.

Furthermore, according to Article 93.9 President can appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, his First Deputy, the Deputy Prime Ministers, the members of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Procurator-General of the Republic of Uzbekistan and his Deputies, with subsequent confirmation by the Oliy Majlis.

Article 93.11 explains the judicial power of the President. According to it, the President can "appoint and dismiss judges of regional, district, city and arbitration courts; suspend and repeal any acts passed by the bodies of state administration or khokims." Article 94 explores the legislative acts of the President. According to it, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, have the authority to issue decrees, enactments and ordinances that is valid on the entire territory of the Republic by virtue of and for enforcement of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

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[551] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 33.

[552] Ibid. 32

[553] All the articles mentioned in this part are taken from the following web-site: http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/Constitution/constitution.html#Part%20One

As political power is basically concentrated in the office of the President, opposition groups faced increased repression. [554] Between 1989 and the outbreak of the civil war in Tajikistan in May 1992, Islam Karimov endured only a small measure of democratization and allowed quite a few political opposition movements and independent religious groups to function overtly.[555] However, since the outbreak of civil war in neighboring Tajikistan in 1992, the government of Uzbekistan under Karimov has become one of the most repressive in the world.[556] On 8 January 1992, Karimov's most visible competitor Shakrulla Mirsaidov was dismissed from the office of Vice-President.[557] Mirsaidov was assigned State Secretary, but soon after he left the office. He was later accused of financial improprieties.[558] He was brought to trial on charges of abuse of office and was sentenced to three years in prison but was later amnestied. [559]

Furthermore, under the policy of "fighting Islamic extremism" the government prohibited all the religious and secular groups, which are considered to be independent or antigovernment.[560] In 1993, the government issued a decree requiring all public organizations and political parties to be officially registered (or re-registered) or face suspension. As had been anticipated, the Popular Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU) and the Progress of the Homeland Party, which was founded as a loyal "constructive opposition" party in June 1992, were quickly re-registered; Birlik Party did not submit any application papers, claiming that the decree was unconstitutional. As a result, both Erk and Birlik were stripped of their official status and were permanently banned. [561] Polat and Salih fled the country. Both Erk and Birlik continue to operate from abroad and Birlik publishes the

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[554] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 36.

[555] United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Report on Uzbekistan, May 2002, 2.

[556] Ibid.

[557] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 32.

[558] Ibid.

[559] Annette Bohr, 1998, 13-14.

[560] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 65.

[561] Annette Bohr, 1998, 13.

newspapers *Mustaqil Haftalık* (Independent Weekly), *Birlik* and the magazine *Harakat* (Movement). [562]

Karimov also banned *Adolat* (Justice) Party, and the Islamic Renaissance Party, independent Islamic mosques and radical Islamic organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Hizb ut-Tahrir and also Wahhabist groups, [563] subjecting their leaders to brutal physical attacks. [564]

Other parties and organizations that have either been denied official registration or were not allowed to re-register under the 1993 decree are, the Uzbekistani branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party, the *Adolat-Haq Io'li* (Justice is the True Path) Party, the Samarkant Movement, the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, the Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan and the Foundation for the Support of Political Prisoners. [565]

The first elections to the Oliy Majlis were held on two rounds in December 1994 and January 1995. These elections represented a step forward in implementation of the democratic process at the ballot box. [566] Two parties participated to the 1994 elections; the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU) and the Homeland Progress Party.[567] On the December 1994/January 1995 parliamentary elections, the presence of The Homeland Progress Party endured the appearance of a multiparty system. Altough these elections were technically multiparty, opposition parties were not allowed to participate. During the electoral campaign, parties other than Karimov's were devoid of any means of free speech and press.[568] In 1994 elections, 167 local authorities (*khokims*) were elected as parliaments to the Oliy Majlis.

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[562] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 36.

[563] John R. Pottenger, 2004, 68-69.

[564] Micheal Kort, 2004, 123.

[565] Annette Bohr, 1998, 13.

[566] Uzbekistan Human Rights Practices, 1995, U.S. Department of State, March 1996.
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1995_hrp_report/95hrp_report_eur/Uzbekistan.html,
(accessed 10 August 2005)

[567] Ibid.

[568] Ibid.

PDPU got 69 seats and the Homeland Progress Party got 14 seats. [569] With this election, the Uzbekistan's highest legislative body, the Supreme Soviet was replaced by a new parliament, Oliy Majlis, which was a 250-seat unicameral legislative body.[570]

In 26 March 1995, an undemocratic referendum extended Karimov's presidential powers for five more years till 2000 with 99.6 percent of approval from the citizens.[571] In June 1996, Karimov left the PDPU, justifying his decision with the assertion that only a non-partisan head of state could serve as a guarantor of the constitution. [572] In December 1996, a law was passed "On Political Parties" by the Oliy Majlis. The law was about political parties in Uzbekistan, which gave them the right "freely to disseminate their ideas, hold meetings and conferences, publish newspapers, from parliamentary factions and take part in elections".[573] The Law proscribed the formation of parties on the basis of religion or ethnicity, as well as parties whose aims was to overthrow the government by force or undermine state sovereignty, security or territorial integrity. An Uzbekistani citizen could not be a member of more than one party; judges, public prosecutors, military personnel, employees of the Interior and Security Ministries, and foreign and stateless persons were debarred from party membership altogether. Parties were banned from accepting financial support from state, foreign or religious organizations or anonymous sources. [574]

According to the same law, political parties could only propose candidates to the Oliy Majlis if the Ministry of Justice registered them 6 months before the date of elections and collect fifty thousand votes of supporting electors. However, a

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[569] Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan, 1999,
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/election/uzbekistan/uzelup0300.html, (accessed August 11, 2005)

[570] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 32.

[571] Azhar Kurtov, "Presidential electionsin Central Asia" , *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 6 (18), 2002, 31.

[572] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 33.

[573] Annette Bohr, 1998, 10.

[574] Ibid.

political party may collect no more than 10% of votes from 50 thousand electors in one of the administrative-territorial formations (the Republic of Karakalpakstan, or any province, or in the city of Tashkent). Although each political party has the right to nominate 250 parliamentary candidates, from each electoral district they can only nominate one candidate. [575] But a political party candidate can be registered as a candidate only if he/she collects no less than 50.000 signatures of voters. [576]

Besides the PDPU, there are four other officially registered political parties but none of them describe themselves as opposition party and they all support the President's policies. [577] They were all established on the advice of the president and his government. These legally registered parties are; the Homeland Progress Party, *Adolat* (the Social-Democratic Party of Uzbekistan), *Milliy Tiklanish* (the National Rebirth Democratic Party), and the National Unity Social Movement. [578]

On 5 December 1999, second Parliamentary elections to the Oliy Majlis took place. To this election, four officially registered parties PDPU, *Adolat, Milliy Tiklanish* and *Fidokorlar* (National-Democratic Party) as well as local authorities and initiative groups participated. [579]

These political parties had very similar programmes: each declared its dedication to the development of an "independent, democratic state". The PDPU supported "a gradual, evolutionary development of the economy and the preservation of social peace and interethnic harmony". [580] The *Adolat*, which was formed in February 1995, professed that its main task was "to faciliate the development of a low-based

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[575] Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan, 1999.

[576] Ibid.

[577] Uzbekistan Human Rights Practices, 1995, U.S. Department of State, March 1996.

[578] Ibid.

[579] Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE), "Republic of Uzbekistan Legislative Chamber Elections, OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Mission Report" 20-22 September 2004, http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/10/3723_en.pdf , 4. (accessed August 23, 2005)

[580] Annette Bohr, 1998, 11-12.

state and the strengthening of social justice". [581] The *Milliy Tiklanish* which was established in May 1995, had the goals of revival of Uzbek culture, promoting solidarity with the rest of Central Asia, and supporting the idea of a greater Turkestan homeland. Its members included intelligentsia, artists, and scholars.[582] The *Fidokorlar* was formed less than a year before the 1999 parliamentary elections on 28 December 1998. *Fidokorlar* targeted the young generation and argued for building an open society and market economy, while at the same time supporting national interests. The party's membership included artists, workers, small- and medium-sized businessmen, intellectuals, and young people.[583]

This election was the first election that "initiative groups", or a group of citizens who could also nominate their candidates to Oliy Majlis, participated as parliamentary candidates. This right was given to the initiative groups by the Parliamentary Law, which was accepted on 26 December 1997. These initiative groups could only nominate a candidate if they were created by at least one hundred voters from one electoral district. [584] However, initiative groups' candidates could only be registered if they could collect at least 8% votes of total number of electors in that electoral district. Although political party and initial group candidates had to collect signatures, khokims did not have to collect such signatures. [585] Under this strict election rules, in this elections, 98 initiative group members registered as candidates and 16 of them were elected as member of the parliament.[586] An other strict election rule was the following: elections were considered void if less than 50 percent of all electors voted. Candidates who received more than half of the votes were considered elected. On 19 August 1999 the Law "On Amendments to the Parliamentary Elections Law" waived the 5 percent barrier for political parties.

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[581] Ibid.

[582] Uzbekistan votes 2004, http://www.rferl.org/specials/uzbekelections/parties.asp

[583] Ibid.

[584] Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan, 1999
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/election/uzbekistan/uzelup0300.html

[585] Ibid.

[586] Ibid.

Now a candidate who won in his electoral district shall be registered as an Oliy Majlis member regardless of the total number of votes his party gained. [587]

According to the results of the Parliamentray elections in 5 December 1999, PDPU only got 32 seats in the new parliament. If we compare the results with 1994 parliamentary elections, the PDPU's parliamentaries number reduced from 69 to 32 in 5 December elections. The Homeland Progress Party also lost five seats in the parliament. *Adolat* party faced the biggest decrease in the number of its parlamantaries from 47 to 9. *Fidokorlar* managed to win the second-largest number of seats in parliament in this election. *Milliy Tiklanish* got 6 seats, and 11 independent delegates won seats in the Oliy Majlis. The group of khokims and other executive authority officials who won 167 parliaments in the 1994 elections got 98 seats in this election. [588]

Table 1 The Parliamentary Elections on 5 December 1999

	Were elected in 1994	November 1999	Were elected on 5 December	Were nominated and registered as candidates	% of those who has been elected
PDPU	**69**	**73**	**32**	180	18
% of all seats	28	31	17		
The Homeland Progres Party	**14**	**14**	**9**		
% of all seats	6	6	5		
Adolat		**44**	**9**	119	8
% of all seats		18	5		
Milliy Tiklanish			**6**	93	6
% of all seats			3		
Fidokorlar		**1**	**19**	207	9
% of all seats		0.4	10		
Local authorities	**167**	**107**	**98**	205	48
% of all seats	67	45	53		

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[587] Ibid.

[588] Ibid.

Table 1 continued

Initiative groups			**11**	98	11
% of all seats			6		
Total	**250**	**239**	**184**		
% of all seats	100	100	100		

Source:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/election/uzbekistan/uzelup0300.html

On 19 December 1999, the second round of elections took place and the parties, local authorities and initiative groups won more seats: The PDPU 16, *Fidokorlar* 15, the Homeland Progress Party 11, *Adolat* 2, *Milliy Tiklanish* 4, representatives of local authorities 12, initiative groups 5. According to the final results as shown in the table below, altough Karimov resigned from chairmanship of the PDPU's, the party got the the highest number of seats. [589]

Table 2 The Parliamentary Elections on 19 December 1999

	Were elected in 1994	November 1999	Were elected on December 5 and 19	Were nominated and registered as candidates	% of those who has been elected
PDPU	**69**	**73**	**48**	180	27
% of all seats	28	31	19		
The Homeland Progres Party	**14**	**14**	**20**	108	19
% of all seats	6	6	8		
Adolat		**44**	**11**	119	9
% of all seats		18	4		
Milliy Tiklanish			**10**	93	11
% of all seats			4		
Fidokorlar		**1**	**34**	207	16
% of all seats		0.4	14		
Local authorities	**167**	**107**	**110**	205	54
% of all seats	67	45	44		
Initiative groups			**16**	98	16
% of all seats			6		
Total	**250**	**239**	**249**		
% of all seats	100	100	100		

Source:http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/election/uzbekistan/uzelup0300.html

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[589] Ibid.

After the parliamentary elections, on 9 January 2000, Karimov was reelected as the president with 92 percent of the votes. His only opponent, Abdulhafiz Jalolov, was the chairman of the PDPU's. The OSCE declined to monitor the presidential elections on the grounds that the preconditions did not exist for it to be free and fair. Following a January 2002 referendum, which multilateral organizations and foreign embassies refused to observe, the term of the presidency was extended from 5 to 7 years.[590]

The 26 December 2004 parliamentary elections were the third parliamentary elections since Uzbekistan gained independence in 1991. These were the first elections since the Republic of Uzbekistan adopted a two-chamber parliament (Oliy Majlis) by the 27 January 2002 referendum. The new legislative chamber includes 120 seats elected in single-mandate constituencies, the number is reduced from 250 seats. The new upper chamber includes 100 senators - 84 indirectly elected by regional councils and 16 appointed by the President. Unlike in the past, the new parliament will be a permanent body. [591] In addition to the parliamentary elections, elections to regional councils, district councils and municipal councils were also held on 26 December.[592]

Five political parties were registered and fielded candidates for the legislative chamber: PDPU, *Adolat*, *Milliy Tiklanish, Fidokorlar* and the Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (LDPU), registered on 3 December 2003. Only the PDPU and LDPU ran candidates in all or virtually all 120 electoral districts. [593]

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[590] U.S Department of State, "Uzbekistan: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 25 February 2004. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27873.htm, (accessed August 23, 2005)

[591] Embassy of the United States, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, "Uzbekistan Electoral Process Needs Major Improvements, OSCE says" 27-12-2004, http://www.usembassy.uz/home/index.aspx?&=&mid=448, (accessed August 20, 2005)

[592] Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE), "Republic of Uzbekistan Parliamentary Elections, 26 December 2004, OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Report" 7 March 2005, http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/4355_en.pdf.html, (accessed August 22, 2005)

[593] Ibid.

There are four unregistered political parties in Uzbekistan, which were excluded from the 2004 elections: *Ozod Dehkonlar* (Free Peasants), Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs (both established in 2003), Birlik and Erk , in existence since 1989 and 1991 respectively. Erk did not apply for registration because its 1991 registration was rejected (an act which under law is the prerogative of the Supreme Court alone) by the Ministry of Justice in 1993. The other three parties had attempted to register over 2003 and 2004, with Birlik doing so on three consecutive occasions - a fourth attempt took place on 22 December 2004, four days before the elections. For various reasons, all were unable to attain registration. *Ozod Dehkonlar* informed the Limited Election Observation Mission (LEOM) that it had not received a reply to its application, delivered to the Ministry of Justice on 5 January 2004. The Party of Agrarians and Entrepreneurs were refused registration in October 2003 on dubious legal grounds (the Ministry of Justice demanding addresses for the 5,000 signatories, a provision not within the legislation). Similarly, Birlik failed to be registered on a variety of grounds, including the alleged absence of addresses and workplaces of signatories, something that the law does not require. [594]

There were also several discriminatory registration procedures. The authorities did not register a single political party, or initiative group candidate, which or who had indicated some critical attitude towards the Uzbek authorities. Amendments to the Law on Political Parties raised the requirement for the registration of a political party from 5,000 to 20,000 signatures nationwide. The August 2004 amendments to the Electoral Code increased the requirement to register an initiative group, which intended to field candidates from 100 to 300 individuals. The 8 per cent minimum of signatures from all precincts (*mahalla*) in an electoral district in order to register an initiative group candidate also was demonstrated to be a serious obstacle. Registration-related legislation appeared to be applied in an arbitrary and inconsistent manner, discriminating against candidates critical of government policies.

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[594] Ibid.

4.2. Economic Conditions

In this part, economic conditions of Uzbekistan immediately before and after independence will be briefly analyzed. The basic aim of this analysis is to trace a possible relationship between the economic conditions of the country and Hizb ut-Tahrir. Although worsening economic conditions and economic difficulties may not always be the triggering factor in the rise of radical Islamic movements, they usually contribute to the emergence of a conducive environment for such movements.

4.2.1. The Economic Situation in Uzbekistan just Before Independence

Being a former member of Soviet Union, Uzbekistan has special economic characteristics common with other Soviet republics in Central Asia. Central Asian states were confronted with a variety of economic problems in 1991 when the break-up took place. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there had been an economic crisis for ten years that had negatively affected the economic conditions in all Central Asian republics. The Soviet Union was in crisis because of its state dominated economy, which had let to its collapse."[595]

There was no significant plan and endeavor for the separation from the Soviet Union in the Central Asian states. Although pro-independence movements were arising in other republics of the Union, there was no noteworthy political pressure group working for independence in Central Asia during the last years before independence. The reason of this was the fact that the Central Asian republics were more strongly dependent on Soviet government than the other republics. [596] The dependency of Central Asia was based on the fact that the region was the least industrialized and the poorest in the Soviet Union. Peimani gives some statistics showing that more than 33 percent of the entire Central Asian population lived

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[595] Hooman Peimani, *Failed transition bleak future? : War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 9.

[596] Ibid. 8.

below the poverty line, while only 5 percent of all the population in Russia lived in poverty two years before the collopse of the Soviet Union."[597]

According to Peimani, after independence there were five major difficulties faced by all of the Central Asian states. 1) dependency to other Soviet republics, 2) deficiencies in the industrial sectors, 3) type and amount of imports and exports, 4) general economic problems, 5) the insufficient energy supply for their own resources. As for dependency, the central Soviet regime was planning all economy in one hand and it provided industrial products, spare parts, consumer goods, medicine, food products, fuel and cash for Central Asian countries to meet the needs of their populations. Central Asian countries depended strongly on Russia because of the necessity of all these elements. For that reason, they all needed Russian support for having a normal economic performance. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the sudden removal of this support increased their economic difficulties and paralyzed their fragile economies.

In 1991 Uzbekistan had a very large support from the Soviet budget, which was about 19,5% of its GDP. So, suddenly gained independence drastically worsened the economic situation of Uzbekistan.[598] Moreover, the Soviet regime while planning and organizing all economy in one hand, nominated every republic with special economic and/or sectoral tasks. In accordance with this central planning style, Uzbekistan was mainly responsible for cotton production but it was not able to produce textile by itself. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were main cotton generators, producing over 90% of the Soviet cotton production. They were the major cotton exporters in the Soviet era and could depend on their ongoing exports as a significant source of revenue in foreign currencies. Despite having some disadvantages, the industrial sector of Uzbekistan could compensate its needs partially and create some positive effects in its economic growth. Moreover, Uzbekistan satisfied some of the needs of its neighbors in the region. [599]

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[597] Ibid.13.

[598] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 14.

[599] Ibid. 19.

Partly caused by dependency to the Soviet Union, the second main difficulty, which Peimani mentioned, was about the deficiencies in the industrial sectors of the former Soviet Republics. The industrial sectors were fragile, was not built to satisfy to the instant needs, obsolete, and/or strongly dependent on Russia for backup, reserves and/or market. Although Uzbekistan had advanced industries, such as military equipment, metallurgy, and energy, its economic role in the Soviet Union was mostly restricted to being the producer of non-industrial goods, which did not result in sufficient development of its industry. However, the country lacked light and consumer industries to meet immediate demands, while heavy industrial products were mainly irrelevant to country's needs. Moreover, most of the industries of the Uzbekistan were obsolete and in need of excessive funds for improvement and/or extension. Uzbekistan's oil industry, which required large funds to become autonomous, is an example. Finally, industries were strongly dependent on Russia for spare parts, expertise, funding, and markets. Deficiency in funds and/or spare parts forced many operational economic units to close. [600]

As the result of inadequate functioning of industrial sectors, Uzbekistan exported to the other regions of the Soviet Union non-industrial and untreated products, and imported industrial goods and foodstuffs from those regions. So, the third main difficulty was the type and amount of exports and imports. Uzbekistan's major export item was cotton that amounted 84% of its total exports in 1991.[601]

As a fourth difficulty, all these problems led to a general economic decline with high inflation, unemployment, rising prices, and shortages of various goods for private and commercial consumption. Since 1980s, a significant deterioration in almost all the sectors of the economy (agriculture, industry and services) was observed. With the economic restructuring of the Gorbachev era, the new economic difficulties such as rising unemployment, inflation and closure of factories emerged.[602]

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[600] Ibid. 16-17.

[601] Ibid. 17.

[602] Ibid. 17-18.

Moreover, another economic difficulty in Uzbekistan that derived from the Soviet era was the insufficient energy supply from the republic's own resources. So, Uzbekistan was dependent on other Central Asian countries and/or on Russia for oil, natural gas and coal. This dependency was because of the shortage of adequate energy resources or the underdevelopment of its energy industries. While Uzbekistan held enough resources of oil and natural gas, majority of them were underdeveloped to be self-sufficient. [603]

4.2.2. The Economic Situation After Independence

In the first few years after independence, the economic conditions worsened in all of the Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan. Especially, the stagnation of their economies generated harsh economic difficulties such as high inflation, skyrocketing prices and shortages. Moreover, it created a potential threat of destabilizing the social order more than the pre-independence economic system. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union harshly worsened the already troublesome economy of Uzbekistan, which could not provide the basic needs of its population. Major weaknesses of the economy such as chronic shortages, low-quality products, and inefficient industries and agriculture were the main characteristics of the Soviet economy after Gorbachev's reforms. [604]

After independence, the basic goal of transition to a liberal economy proved to be very difficult to achive. In the transition process, there were two major factors that negatively affected the speed of the shift to a liberal economy in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. First was the absence of necessary resources (labour, raw materials, machinery, equipment and funds), and second was the fear of an abrupt political opposition to the reforms because of the worsening economic conditions (massive unemployment, sudden drop in the living standards and widespread poverty).[605] In the following section, the difficulties faced by the Uzbek government in realizing economic change will be analyzed.

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[603] Ibid. 18.

[604] Ibid. 26.

4.2.2.a The Difficulties of the Uzbek Economy After Independence

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Uzbek economy had to face many problems in the following topics: 1) economic institutions, 2) privatization, 3) lack of infrastructure and the inability to modernize, repair and/or expand the necessary infrastructure, 4) insufficiently developed agricultural and industrial sectors and products, 5) inadequate foreign financial assistance whether in the form of aid packages or direct investments, 6) increasing external debt 7) high inflation rates after the independence from the Soviet Union 8) the shortage of trained human resources. [606]

Regarding the first problem of economic institutions, it was claimed that Uzbekistan did not have the vital institutional infrastructure for the management and successful functioning of a liberal economy. [607] Moreover, the government was willing to control all the economic activities and institutions. As an example, the Ministry of Finance effectuated the state budget, carried out the financial supervision of enterprises, administered all inter-governmental credit agreements and international institutions, and governed foreign currency loans to enterprises, dealt with external debt servicing and managed re-payments. The government also supervised the Central Bank, which was supposedly be subordinate only to Parliament. [608] In 1994, a bank reform was presented in order to prevent the businesses to take credits and increase inflation. Central Bank emasculated this aim with its insufficient management and control of the mercantile sector. Moreover, the process of company privatization was deteriorated by the ongoing access to cheap credit by the businesses. In addition, the commercial banking sector was tied to the state system. The commercial banks were now permitted to allot credit to priority sectors that were determined by the government. In that way, the President freely directed all economy according to his own priorities. This situation avoided the establishment of efficient, autonomous decision-making centers that could be able to design

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[605] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 27.

[606] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 72 and Hooman Peimani, 2002, 30-39.

[607] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 72.

[608] Ibid. 73.

instruments for investment. The state dominance of the all sides of economy was guaranteed by the absence of independent economic institutions. Thus, it became unfeasible for Uzbekistan to have a noteworthy liberal economic system and private enterprises. [609]

The second problem of the Uzbek economy was privatization. Although the government declared its intention to transform its economic structure, the Uzbek state continued to govern all segments of economy through a number of direct and indirect ways. All economic facilities remained in the hands of a small but powerful ruling elite. There was not any legal defense against state intervention into economic activities since the government supervised the local judges and courts. Although in this economic environment it became very difficult to be successful in promoting the construction of autonomous business organizations through the policies of privatization, the government of Uzbekistan made some attempts. Accordingly, the law "On Denationalization and Privatization" was enacted in November 1991 and the Committee for the Management of State Property (GKI) was founded in 1992. [610]

Melvin criticized the state because of its preservation of strategic stakes in most enterprises. Moreover, even private companies functioned in a strongly state-defined framework because of the state's supervision over credit facilities, exchange controls, price formation and the activities of many bureaucratic agencies. In this framework, shareholders had no influence over firms. Privatization process was under the strict control of government and strongly manipulated by the people who had special relations to the government officials. Moreover, privatizations of companies were used as a tool to establish the networks of political patronage. Acquaintances of the government officials and their families were employed at the most profitable companies. Monopolies remained unregulated and functioned as the basic tool to rent seek instead of improving production or efficiency. [611]

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[609] Ibid. 73-74.

[610] Ibid. 74.

[611] Ibid. 75.

The third economic difficulty in Uzbekistan in this period was lack of infrastructure. Although Uzbek government took some steps to repair and expand the necessary infrastructure, they were inadequate. For example, transportation, telecommunication and energy production and distribution systems were not efficient. [612]

The fourth economic difficulty in Uzbekistan was insufficiently developed agricultural and industrial sectors and products. According to Peimani, the low production of industrial and agricultural production in Central Asia had three main reasons. The first reason was the decline of Uzbekistan's economic structure which was designed according to centrally planned and directed economy and lacked subsidies and transfers (cash, equipment, machinery and fuel) coming from the Soviet Union.[613] Heavy dependency on Soviet assistance and on Russia caused serious scarcity of diverse products immediately after independence.[614] The second reason was the harsh financial circumstances as a result of inadequate national resources and collapse in interrepublican trade. Third reason was the unavoidable negative effect of the transition to liberal economy when reforms of privatization, price liberalization and closure of nonviable enterprises took place.[615]

Regarding agricultural and industrial development, Peimani claimed that Uzbekistan could not assess the situation of its industrial and agricultural sectors and specify the vital steps to improve the situation. The author believes that one of the most important factors in Uzbekistan's economy was the reality that agricultural sector needed improvement by some reforms.[616] Uzbekistan had to develop clear policies toward progress of its agricultural sector. The most important problems were land ownership, land reform, privatization of the state-owned farms, and the role of the state in agricultural production. Infrastructural insufficiency, applying

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[612] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 30.

[613] Ibid. 27.

[614] Ibid. 15.

[615] Ibid. 27-28.

[616] Ibid. 31.

ineffective techniques of production and obsolete equipment, and inadequate investment had all led to the crisis of agricultural sectors and food shortages in Uzbekistan.[617] Some problems of agricultural production such as the failure to form private farms, to update the food processing industry in order to produce better quality goods and supply appropriate packaging.[618] Moreover, a dominant patrimonial agro-industrial structure was developed in the republic because of the fact that party-state apparatus make all the economic and political decisions and the production of cotton is dependent on the local elite.[619]

According to David Kotz's study titled "The Record of Economic Transition in Uzbekistan", right after independence, the Uzbek government wanted to develop its oil resources and agricultural production (especially grain) as soon as possible because the authorities believed that "continuing reliance on imported oil and food would threaten the country's independence." As shown in the Table 4 below, Uzbekistan's energy balance during 1993-98, Uzbekistan's oil self-sufficiency program was achieved by 1995 and without any foreign direct investment.[620] Uzbekistan increased its domestic oil extraction by 92 percent and decreased its oil imports percent by 95 percent between the years 1993 and 1995.[621]

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[617] Ibid. 32.

[618] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 78.

[619] Ibid. 69.

[620] David M. Kotz, "Chapter 1: The Record of Economic Transition in Uzbekistan", 8 December 2002,5.http://www.undp.org/poverty/docs-propoor/uzbekistan-report/Ch%201(%20Performance)%20final%20-Oct%202003.doc, (accessed October 10, 2005)

[621] Ibid. 8-9.

Table 3 Energy Balance of Uzbekistan (thousand tons)

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Domestic crude oil extraction	3944	5517	7586	7621	7891	8104
Oil and oil product imports	4762	3153	250	11	0	0
Domestic consumption of oil products	8201	7368	6961	6547	6520	6934
Net oil and oil product imports	4258	2009	-500	-939	-1190	-948

Source: David M. Kotz, "Chapter 1: The Record of Economic Transition in Uzbekistan", 9.

The goverment's program to increase grain production also became successful. With an increase of 69 percent, 1.91 million tons of grain production in 1991 rose to 3.22 million tons in 1995. In 2002, Uzbekistan produced about 90 percent of the foodstuffs consumed in the country. [622]

The proportional importance of agriculture, industry and other sectors can be comprehensible in respect to their percentage in GDP. As seen in Table 6, agricultural sector in Uzbekistan was relatively greater than the industrial sector, although the share of the other sectors in the GDP was greater than both sectors.

Table 4 GDP Growth and its sectoral percentages in the years 1999 and 2003 in Uzbekistan

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003 (p)*
Agriculture (GDP % growth)	5.5	3.2	4.1	6.1	5.9
Industry (GDP % growth)	1.2	1.3	2.7	3.6	2.8
Others (GDP % growth)	4.7	4.9	4.6	3.5	4.1

Source: Country and Portfolio Indicators and Assistance Pipeline, 15.
http://www.adb.org/Documents/CSPs/UZB/2004/appendixes.pdf
*p=preliminary

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[622] Ibid. 9.

The fifth economic difficulty in Uzbekistan was the insufficient foreign financial assistance in the form of aid packages or direct investments. According to Peimani, there was a financial crisis that did not let Central Asian countries to create revenue. [623] The author explained this with the lack of the financial reserves that could attract foreign investors and the region's "high potential for inner-and interstate conflict". [624] However, Peimani stated that Uzbekistan took the delivery of the larger share of the accessible foreign assistance in Central Asia because of its long-term political and economic promises and prospects.[625]

The proportion of aid per capita slightly increased from the years between 1999 to 2003. In 1999, the aid per capita was 6 U.S $ and it increased to 8 U.S $ in 2003. [626] Another form of financial assistance was the foreign direct investment. It is possible to see the amount of foreign direct investment in the Uzbekistan from World Bank databank in Table 5.

Table 5 Foreign Direct Investment in Uzbekistan in Current U.S. $ Millions

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current U.S.$ millions)	85, 000	121, 000	75, 000	83, 000	65, 000	70, 000

Source: The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators Database. http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000, http://www.undp.org/hdr2000/english/HDR2000.html, 212.

Uzbekistan received financial support by large international organizations assisting individual sectors of economy and/or macro economic projects. In one case, the World Bank enlarged a credit worth $160 million to create a stabilization reserve for Uzbekistani national currency (som). In another case, the Economic Bank for

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[623] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 32.

[624] Ibid. 33.

[625] Ibid. 34.

[626] The World Bank group, World Development Indicators database. http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/, (accessed August 14, 2005)

Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) ensured funding to extend the local telecommunications infrastructure. [627]

International institutions such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank lent money to Uzbekistan for infrastructure, environmental and health projects. Furthermore, the U.S. granted credit assistance for foreign trade. Despite all that, Uzbekistan had difficulties in formulating arrangements with the IMF. In early 1998, the credit arrangement with the IMF to formulate a new stabilization package failed because of the unwillingness of the government to make som convertible. Instead of using the system of multiple exchange rates, the government assigned licenses to preferentially treated companies to achieve access to hard currency and enforced the other firms to look for currency in the black market. Moreover, the government also refused to prepare the conditions for trade liberalization.[628]

At this point, it is also worth mentioning that Uzbekistan holds important resources of hydrocarbons. The oil and gas sectors became very attractive to foreign investors. France and Japan decided to supply $ 200 million to sponsor the renewal of the Bukhara refinery, which would be done under the supervision of Technip of France. Another new significant foreign investment was in the area of the manufacture of small trucks and cars, and diesel engine buses. Uzbekistan started to become a regional center of automotive sector with the manufacturing activities of some foreign companies.[629]

The sixth main difficulty that Peimani mentioned was the increasing external debt. The financial problems of the economy increased debt and negatively affected the balance of payments. [630]

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[627] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 80.

[628] Ibid. 80-81.

[629] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 78-79.

[630] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 35.

Table 6 External Debt Problems in Uzbekistan from 1996 to 1998

	1996	1997	1998
Total debt (current U.S.$ millions)	2,319	2,760	3,162
Debt as a percentage of GNP	…	11,2	15,6
Total debt service as % of exports of goods and services	…	12,9	13,2

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000, http://www.undp.org, 220, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 1999, http://www.undp.org, 194.

As seen from Table 6, the debt of Uzbekistan increased between the years 1996 and 1998. Moreover, debt as a percentage of GNP increased showing that the proportion of debts is getting greater in gross national production. According to the Peamani, the debt problem turned out to be a main obstacle for the economic growth of the region and increased the time needed for the changeover to the liberal economy. The refunding of the debts and the related service charge amounted to a significant share of the yearly revenues when their restricted monetary funds were insufficient to compensate the rising needs.[631] In addition to examining the amount of debt between the years 1996 and 1998, it can be useful to examine the debt structure in Uzbekistan between the years 1999 and 2003.

Table 7 Debt Structure of Uzbekistan from 1999 to 2003

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total debt service (% of exports of goods and services)	18	26	27	25	21
Total debt (current U.S.$ Billions)	..	4,199 ,400	4,443, 700	4,347, 900	4,765, 000
Short-term debt outstanding (DOD, current U.S. $ Millions)	626, 300	282, 200	503, 200,	330, 600	221, 000

Source: The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators database

As seen from Table 6 and 7, both the total debt in current U.S. $ and total debt service of exports of goods and services increased since from 1997 to 2003. The decreases in the short-term debt of Uzbekistan with increasing total debt from 1999 to 2003 shows that short-term debt was converted to long-term. As Peimani

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[631] Ibid. 38.

declared, the worsening economic conditions since the dissolution of the Soviet Union negatively affected the trade balance.[632] The total amount of exports and imports of Uzbekistan between 1996 and 1998 can be seen in the next table. [633]

Table 8 Exports and Imports of Uzbekistan from 1996 to 1998 in U.S. $ Millions

	1996	**1997**	**1998**
Exports in U.S. $ Millions	4,161	3,980	3,148
Imports in U.S. $ Millions	5,175	4,417	3,182

Source: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 2000, 246, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report 1999, 252, and Hooman Peimani, 2002, 38.

As seen from the table, the imports of Uzbekistan are greater than exports in all years causing a negative trade balance. However, the difference between the imports and exports seem to decrease from 1996 to 1998 reducing the trade deficit. Together with the amount of exports and imports between 1996 and 1998, it can be explanatory to examine the percentage of GDP as exports and imports of goods and services and trade.

Table 9 Exports and Imports of Goods and Services as % of GDP from 1998 to 2003

	1998	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	22,2	18	25	28	31	37
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	22,5	18	22	28	28	30

Source: The World Bank Group, World Development Indicators database and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2000, 212.

As can be seen from the table 9, the percentage of GDP in exports is greater in all years and it is increasing. It can be said that Uzbekistan's balance of trade was in better conditions in 2003 than 1998.

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[632] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 35.

[633] Ibid. 36.

In Uzbekistan mining, energy and industry also hold an important share for exports, especially for mineral reserves of gold, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten and lithium. These metals constituted the second vital item of export in Uzbekistan after cotton. [634]

Another economic difficulty that is related with trade deficit, debts, financial problems and scarcity of goods is the inflation. Because of the enormous scarcity of vital goods that were provided by the Soviet regime, prices jumped several fold all over the former Soviet republics. The prices were multiplied by six in average in Uzbekistan immediately after the independence. [635] It can be seen that inflation rate was gradually decreased between the years 1992 to 2001 from Table 10.

Table 10 Consumer Price Index (CPI) Inflation rate for Uzbekistan from 1992 to 2001

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001*
CPI Inflation	645	534	1568	305	54	59	18	29	24	26

Source: David M. Kortz, "Chapter: 2 Sources and Features of the 'Uzbek Growth Puzzle'" 7. http://www.undp.org/poverty/docs-propoor/uzbekistan-report/Ch%202%20Macroreconomics%20Final%20Oct%202003.doc
*Data for 2001 are preliminary actuals, mostly official government estimates.

The last main difficulty was the scarcity of qualified labor force. The absence of competent scientists, engineers, managers and technicians, and skilled workers created the main economic obstacle which prevented the transition to market economy."[636]

The situation of the Uzbekistan's economy can also be understood from the GDP annual growth rates. According to these numbers, in the first years after independence until 1996, the GDP annual growth rates were negative as can be observed in Table 11 below. These negative growth rates were very destructive for

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[634] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 78-79.

[635] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 16.

[636] Ibid. 39.

Uzbekistan's economy. If the negative rates were to continue, the heavy damage in the economy could not be cured in the short run.[637] 1996 was the first year that Uzbekistan GDP annual growth rate finally became positive.

Table 11 GDP annual growth rate from 1993 to 1998

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
GDP growth (annual %)	-2,3	-4,2	-0,9	1,6	5,2	4,4

Source: Hooman Peimani, 2002, 29.

Table 12 GDP in Current U.S. $ Billions and GDP Annual Growth Rate from 1999 to 2003

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
GDP (current U.S. $ billions)	17,078,470	13,760,370	11,401,350	9,687,951	9,949,258
GDP growth (annual %)	4	4	4	4	4

Source: The World Bank group, World Development Indicators database

As seen in Table 12, GDP growth rate was stabilized during 1999-2003 period and the negative growth rates did not continue. But still, the growth rate was very low. According to the World Factbook, the 2004 estimation of GDP annual growth was 4.4%.[638]

As we consider GDP annual growth rates, we can see that after 1996, Uzbekistan's economy progressed a little. However, this progress in the economy does not mean that there is no poverty and unemployment problem. Altough the GDP annual growth rate increased between the years 1996-2001, official statistics showed employment growing at the rate of 1.3 percent per year. [639] The Uzbekistan national

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[637] Ibid. 30.

[638] The World Factbook Uzbekistan, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/print/uz.html, (accessed August 22, 2005)

[639] David M. Kotz, "Chapter 1: The record of economic transition in Uzbekistan", 8 December 2002. 13.

sources declared the unemployment rate at an unrealistically low-level of 96.000 in June 2001 which constituted nearly 0.5% of the population. However, according to the "Asia Barometer" project resulted in 2003, 7.9% of the population was unemployed.[640] However, in reality the unemployment is possibly higher because of the hidden unemployment in the countryside.[641]

To sum up, Uzbekistan had faced all the typical economic problems of a developing country (lack of financial assistance, trade deficit, debt, high inflation and unemployment) together with effects of the economic dependency to the former Soviet structure. However, the government worked for improving the economic sitution and gained a partial success. But still, Uzbekistan does not have a growing and stabilized economy. It is mainly because of the reluctance of the state apparatus, mainly the President and his political associates who do not want to give up their enormous power and supervision over economy and its institutions.

4.3. Socio-Cultural Conditions

The social life in Uzbekistan is a mixture of economic and traditional conditions and political attitudes of people. Each condition interacts with other conditions. In this part, in order to analyze the social conditions in Uzbekistan more properly, the impact of the economic situation which was described in the previous part, political attitudes of the Uzbek people and the traditional life in the country will be analyzed. The importance of traditional life of the Uzbeks will be explained by examining their *mahalla* culture, religion (Islam) and clans.[642]

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[640] Timur Dadabaev, "Post-Soviet realities of society in Uzbekistan", *Central Asian Survey* 23(2) (June, 2004): 157.

[641] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 82.

[642] Before explaining the socio-cultural conditions in Uzbekistan, however, it is significant to take a look at the country's demographic structure. Uzbekistan's population was 25.900.000 in 2003. Uzbeks were 71 percent of the total population. Moreover, 4 to 6 million Uzbeks were citizens in other Central Asian republics. 23 percent of the populations in Tajikistan, 13 percent of the population in Turkmenistan and 12.9 percent of the population in Kyrgyzstan are Uzbeks. These percentages were taken from Ahmed Rashid's The resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism book page 80. (Karchi: Oxford University Press, 1994)

4.3.1. The Impact of the Economic Situation over Socio-cultural Life

The first socio-cultural condition that will be examined in this part is the economic situation of the Uzbek people. It can be understood by analyzing Uzbek people's living standards. In the first years after independence, the economic conditions worsened in all of the Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan. Especially, the stagnation of their economies generated harsh economic difficulties, such as high inflation, skyrocketing prices and shortages. There was also a potential threat of further destabilization the social order. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union worsened the already troublesome economy of Uzbekistan, which could not provide the basic needs of its population. [643]

In the transition period, the Uzbek government wanted to lessen the impact of social costs.[644] For this purpose, all citizens were guaranteed to have access to health care services and education. The residents' of the state-owned flats and houses gained their ownership with nominal sums or were handed over these flats free of charge. Plots of lands were given to many families for personal use. Moreover, the government wanted to create job opportunities especially in rural areas and provide various benefits, transfers and allowances from the state budget for low-income families. These allowances included "childbirth lump-sum grant, maternity allowances, child benefits up to 16 years of age to cover part of the expenses of child rearing, and material assistance to low income families". [645] In addition, the government also gave money for childcare for two years, which was increased up to 925 soms per month. However, amounts of social transfers were insufficient to fill the gap for the poor families completely because the maximum allowances available for families with five or six children consisted of 175 percent of the official minimum wage and most poorest families received it only once in 1996. [646]

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[643] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 26.

[644] Resul Yalçın, 2002, 226.

[645] Ibid. 226-227.

[646] Ibid.

Table 13 Social expenditure as percentage of total government expenditure, 1994-2000

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Social insurance, total	8.9	7.9	7.5	7.9	6.6	6.3	5.7
Child allowances	1.1	2.5	5.8	6.5	5.9	5.8	5.4
Social assistance	1.6	1.8	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.3
Consumer subsidies and transfers for social purpose	6.7	4.2	4.0	2.4	…	2.7	2.3
Memo items: General government expenditure/GDP	52.7	38.7	41.6	32.5	34.5	33.2	31.8
GenEral gov. Deficit/GDP	-10.0	-7.3	-2.4	-3.0	-2.8	-1.2	-1.0

Source: Giovanni Andrea Cornia, 2004, 18.

Between 1994-1997 the percentage of "needy families" receiving social assistance from the *mahalla* or the government rose to 56.9 percent due to the sharp fall of household incomes between 1992-1995. [647]

Although health care system was free, this was rarely the case in practice.[648] Many medical health care facilities were located in unsuitable buildings with obsolete hospital equipment and a shortage of medicine. The construction of schools, hospitals, kindergartens and nursery schools was subject to long delays. [649]

Despite the government efforts to improve people's living standards, poverty was still high. A person with an average salary could only obtain the most basic needs of his or her family. [650] The most important factors that affected the rise of poverty was

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[647] Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Giovanni Andrea Cornia, "Macroeconomic Policies, Income Inequality and Poverty: Uzbekistan, 1991-2002", March 2004, 12. http://www.networkideas.org/featart/mar2004/Uzbekistan_1991_2002.pdf, (accessed 25 October 2005)

[648] Country Studies, "Uzbekistan", http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/uzbekistan/SOCIETY.html, (accessed on 5 October 2005)

[649] Resul Yalçın, 2002, 230.

[650] Ibid.

the decrease of wages and social transfers and the rise in the profits, interests, rents entrepreneurial incomes and income from the sale of agricultural products. [651]

Table 14 Percentage structure of the monetary income of the population

	1991	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Wages and salaries	57.0	42.2	43.0	39.4	36.4	32.3	28.3
Social transfers	25.2	16.7	17.5	14.8	15.1	13.8	14.9
Income from the sale of agricultural products	9.7	19.2	25.4	20.4	23.0	25.9	26.1
Other (interests, rents, profits, entrepreneurial incomes)	8.1	19.9	14.1	25.4	27.3	28.0	30.7

Source: Giovanni Andrea Cornia, 2004, 14.

According to the data of the Ministry of Macroeconomics and Statics in Uzbekistan offered in Table 14, between 1991 and 1995, the wages and salaries declined 14.8 point. Although the government wanted to provide essential social transfers, it could not reach the percentage in 1991 and it dropped almost by 10 percentage. [652] In 1999, as an estimation of the Ministry of Labour, 24 percent of the total population was living below the official poverty line, which was the monthly minimum wage of 925 sums or about $6 at the official exchange rate. Independent sources put this figure as high as 35 percent of the country's total population. [653]

Among people in Uzbekistan not only unemployed poor became poorer but also most qualified specialists had to leave their jobs because of low salaries and as such they also became poor.[654] Doctors, teachers, scientists, government officials and employees of enterprises were confronted with low incomes after independence.[655] However, the situation for the unemployed poor was more difficult. Although the national sources in Uzbekistan show the unemployment rate at an unrealistically low-level of 96.000 in June 2001, which constituted nearly 0.5 percent of the

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[651] Giovanni Andrea Cornia, 2004, 14.

[652] Ibid.

[653] Resul Yalçın, 2002, 226-227.

[654] Ibid. 230.

[655] Ibid. 226.

population, according to the "Asia Barometer" project, 7.9 percent of the population was unemployed in 2003.[656] However, in reality the unemployment is possibly higher because of the hidden unemployment in the countryside.[657] According to Melvin, the problems of unemployment and poverty in Uzbekistan, especially in rural areas like the Ferghana Valley, could easily escalate into social unrest unless the government is successful in generating jobs and possibilities for social mobility.[658]

It is also important to analyze poverty according to localities. After independence, regional wage inequality increased because of abolishment of the Soviet policy of wage equliazation among regions. Cities like Namangan, Samarkand and Surkhan Darya where wages had been gained largely from agricultural activities had low wages. Regions like Tashkent and Navoiy got high wages because of the concentration of industrial activities.[659] As a result, in Uzbekistan, poverty is much higher in rural areas and remote regions as compared to urban areas. As seen in the table below, incidence of poverty in the rural areas is 30.5 percent (as opposed to the urban rate of 22.5 percent.)[660] In rural areas, 69.4 percent of the population was poor and 72 percent of them were extremely poor. The reasons of extreme poverty in the rural areas were "low-paying jobs and owning small amounts of land that is not fully used-either for its low quality or because lack of credit and inputs- for market production".[661]

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[656] Ibid. 157.

[657] Neil J. Melvin, 2000, 82.

[658] Ibid. 83.

[659] Ibid. 16-17.

[660] Ibid. 23.

[661] Ibid.

Table 15 Socio-economic Profile of the Poor by Location and Level of Education

Characteristics	Incidence of poverty (%)	Incidence of extreme poverty (%)	Share of population (%)	Share of the poor (%)	Share of extreme poor (%)
1.Location					
Urban	22.5	7.1	37.4	30.6	27.4
Rural	30.5	11.2	62.6	69.4	72.3
National	27.5	9.7	100.0	100.0	100.0
2.Education of Household Head					
0-4 years	34	...	8.4	10.4	...
5-9 years	32.4	...	13.3	15.7	...
Secondary	31.3	...	47.4	53.9	...
Incomplete Technikum	24.6	...	2.8	2.5	...
Complete Technikum	17.6	...	13.4	8.6	...
Higher education	16.6	...	14.7	8.9	...
National	27.5	...	100.0	100.0	...

Source: Giovanni Andrea Cornia, 2004, 22.

It is also interesting that in Uzbekistan the level of education is not correlated with poverty.[662] Only people with upper secondary or higher education experience lower levels of poverty but in rural places there is a large number of working age adults with secondary education.[663] A person who had completed secondary school in Uzbekistan (higher than the national average) "had also a risk of poverty and that does not significantly differ from families where the head has a higher level of education."[664] According to Givanni Andrea Cornia, the problem with the present growth pattern was its inability to generate a sufficient demand for medium skilled workers.[665] According to a research project, Asia Barometer, [666] only 14.8 percent

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[662] Giovanni Andrea Cornia, 2002, 25.

[663] Ibid.

[664] Ibid. 22-23.

[665] Ibid.

of the respondents saw schools and universities as important institutions.[667] The researchers of the project wanted to find out the concerns of the Uzbek people about psychological and economic security. They analyzed the things people want most in their lives. The results showed that the most important wish of the Uzbeks was to have a good health with 83.5 percent. The second most wanted thing in respondent's lives was a high income with 48.4 percent. High income was followed with comfortable housing by 44.6 percent. 44.1 percent of respondents wanted employment in their lives. The other wishes were the following: well-provided diet with 42.6 percent, access to well-provided health care with 35.9 percent, time with family 34 percent and good relations with others got 29 percentages.[668]

Figure 1 Ranking of What People Want the Most

Source: Timur Dadabaev, Post-Soviet realities of society in Uzbekistan, 159.

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[666] Timur Dadabaev, 2004, 142. "Asia Barometer" project was planned and performed by the Nippon Research Center Ltd., at the Institute of Oriental Studies at the University of Tokyo under the leadership of Prof. Inoguchi in the summer of 2003 in Uzbekistan. "Asia Barometer" was realized with 200 samples in Tashkent, and 100 samples each from the cities of Samarkand, Andijan, Urgench, Bukhara, Ferghana and Namangan. The samples had different ethnic groups: which were 464 Uzbeks, 122 Russian, 51 Tatar, 24 Kazakh, 18 Tajik, 11 Karakalpak, 4 Korean and 24 other ethnic groups. Also 82 respondents declared themselves with no national identification.

[667] Ibid. 159.

[668] Ibid.

4.3.2. Political Attitudes of the Uzbek People

As mentioned before, one factor seems to affect most socio-cultural conditions in Uzbekistan: the economic situation. The problem of unemployment, lowering living standards, and poverty caused dissatisfaction with the government in Uzbekistan.[669] Moreover, public trust in the state also decreased because of terrorism, human rights abuses, crime, corruption, and the central government's failure in economic policies. [670] According to the Asia Barometer Questionnaire, only 57.7 percent of the people of Uzbekistan trust and partly trust to the central government. Also, nearly half of the respondents (51.2 percent) did not trust or only partially trust to the local governments. The people of Uzbekistan, however, continue to trust to their army, which was the most powerful army in the region, with the total trust and partly trust rate of 65.4 percent. Another important result was that the respondents thrusted NGOs only at a rate of 5.7 percent and partially trust at 31.20 percent. Also, they do not trust the media (8.10 percent). Also, although the people of Uzbekistan hardly trust on their country's institutions, the total trust and partially trust percentages of international organizations were much higher: the United Nations (79.80 percent), World Trade Organization (69.70 percent), World Bank (75.30 percent) and International Monetary Fund (72.8 percent).

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[669] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 133.

[670] Ibid. 162.

Table 16 Trust to Institutions

Institutions	Trust	Partly Trust	Partly Distrust	Distrust
Central Government (%)	15.00	42.70	26.10	16.10
Local Government (%)	8.50	39.30	31.80	20.30
Army (%)	23.50	41.90	20.50	14.10
Militia (%)	10.40	26.60	31.10	31.90
NGOS (%)	5.70	31.20	37.80	25.30
Legislative System (%)	10.50	36.20	31.70	26.60
Parliament (%)	15.80	38.20	25.40	20.60
Public education system (%)	12.30	43.80	28.00	15.80
Public healthcare system (%)	9.50	35.00	31.90	23.50
Local big business (%)	10.40	41.60	30.30	17.80
International business (%)	20.20	50.20	21.00	8.60
Labor unions (%)	7.20	24.20	28.40	40.20
Mass Media (%)	8.10	29.70	29.30	32.80
Religious organizations (%)	15.20	41.40	19.30	24.20
UN (%)	32.70	47.10	13.20	7.00
WTO (%)	20.80	49.90	20.50	8.80
WB (%)	28.90	47.40	15.20	8.20
IMF (%)	25.70	47.10	16.20	11.00

Source: Timur Dadabaev, 2004, 149.

4.3.3. The Traditional Life

The third socio-cultural factor that will be examined in this part is traditionalism, which also affects the people's way of life in Uzbekistan. Throughout the years of Soviet rule, traditionalism in Uzbekistan was preserved. One example of

traditionalism was the local neighborhood community, "*mahalla*".[671] The mahalla is an urban institution, a close-knit neighborhood centered around a mosque, its members sharing kinship or profession. It serves the function of providing social and economic protection to needy members of the mahalla.[672] A network of more than 10.000 mahallas covers the whole country.[673] The Uzbek government believed that the *mahallas*, which had taken the status of "organs of the local self-government" in the 1992 constitution and 1993 law, could supply an ideal environment for the formation of ethno-religious identity.[674] The traditional mahalla system, which was an efficient information network at the micro level,[675] is controlled by President Karimov with chairmans (aksakals) and their advisers who were elected by the members of the mahallas for two-and-a-half year terms.[676]

The mahalla system's ability to deliver social assistance is the important part in strengthening of the civil society.[677] According to Eric W. Sievers's research, which was conducted among slightly less than 2000 respondents in seven of Uzbekistan's twelve cities, nationally 57 percent of respondent's labelled *mahalla* as essential to their lives.[678] However, this national average statistically changed among regions: in the city of Tashkent, the most Sovietized part of Uzbekistan, only 26 percent of respondents relied heavily on *mahalla*. In Samarkand and Bukhara, there was 76 percent heavy reliance. In Fergana, 89 percent of the respondents, and in Khorezm, 86 percent of the respondents reported heavy reliance. The ratio of heavy reliance was only 51 percent in Kashkadaryo. [679]

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[671] Timur Dadabaev, 2004, 149.

[672] Radnitz, "The Pen is Mightier than the Horde: Why no large-scale conflict in Central Asia?", 7-9-2003, http://www.oei.fu-berlin.de/cscca/resprops/sr_res_prop.doc, 9. (accessed September 15, 2005)

[673] Uzbek Tourism, http://www.uzbektourism.uz/en/section.scm?sectionId=2925&contentId=2980, (accessed 15 September 2005)

[674] Annette Bohr, 1998, 22.

[675] John Glenn, 1999, 122.

[676] Annette Bohr, 1998, 22.

[677] Uzbek Tourism, http://www.uzbektourism.uz/en/section.scm?sectionId=2925&contentId=2980

[678] This research was conducted between the years 1998-2000.

Another research, the Asia Barometer Project, which was conducted in 2003, showed that more than one third of the population of Uzbekistan considers their local mahalla as their identity. [680]

In order to find out "What do people consider important?" the Asia Barometer project researchers asked this research question to the people. The researchers wanted respondents to choose among important social circles and institutions. According to the results, the 98 percent of the respondents chose family and this was followed by relatives by 74.10 percent of the respondents. 53 percent of the respondents chose place of work, and area of one's childhood got 47.10 percent of the results. 38.30 percent of the respondents found neighborhood an important social institutions. Only 26.80 percent of the respondents found religion important. The respondents gave the least importance on the speaking languages, schools and universities, and hobby circles.[681]

Table 17 Important Circles and Institutions

Social circles and institutions	Among important
Family	98%
Relatives	74.10%
Place of work	53%
Childhood area	47.10%
Neighborhood	38.30%
Religion	26.80%
People speaking in the language	19.40%
School/university	14.50%
Hobby circles	8.60

Source: Timur Dadabaev, 2004, 159.

As a second survey question, the researchers asked the people the most important social circles and institutions. The results were impressive. 91 percent of the

[679] Eric W. Sievers, "Uzbekistan's Mahalla: From Soviet to Absolutist Residential Community Associations", *The Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chicago-Kent* , Volume 2, 2002, http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2002/JICL%20Sievers%20Mahalla%20final%20for%20publication.pdf, 123-124. (accessed 15 October 2005)

[680] Timur Dadabaev, 2004, 149.

[681] Ibid. 158-159.

respondents chose family as the most important social circle. The relatives and religion followed family with very low percentages of 2.5 percent. The place of work got only 2 percent of the responses. Moreover, the rest of the responses were less than 1 percentage. [682]

Figure 2 Religious Beliefs of the Uzbekistan's Population

Source: Timur Dadabaev, 2004, 150.

The religious attachment of the Uzbek people never completely disappeared from social life even under the worst conditions of repression of anti-religious campaigns during the Soviet Union. Islam had always has a fundamental function in regulating social relations. [683] According to the Asia Barometer Research results, 69. 1 percent of the respondents believe in Islam and 18.3 percent of the respondents believe in Christianity. There were also atheists, which constitute 12.7 percent of the respondents. Other religions and Buddism composed less than 1 percent.[684]

According to a public opinion survey conducted in 1994, interest in Islam grew rapidly in Uzbekistan, but the people understood Islam in traditional and cultural

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[682] Ibid 158-159.

[683] Ibid. 150.

[684] Ibid.

terms.[685] For example, about half of ethnic Uzbek respondents professed belief in Islam when asked to identify their religious faith. Among Uzbekistan's younger population, Islamic belief was weakest. The knowledge or practice of the main precepts of Islam was also very weak. [686]

According to the Asia Barometer Project, which was conducted in summer of 2003, 37.10 percent of the respondents attended to religious institutions on religious occasions, 9.10 percent of the respondents attended once a month, 6.40 percent once a week, 0.90 twice a week, 10.50 percent once a year. There were also 10.50% of the respondents who said that they "never" attended a religious institution. Furthermore, according to the same project, 26.80 percent of the respondents found religion important among the five most important social institutions and 2.5 percent the most important social institution. [687]

So, it is possible to state that Uzbek people continue to understand and live Islam as a form of traditional and cultural value. However, with these research results, it is hard to suggest that the Uzbek people are very religious. That's the reason why it is also not possible to claim that Uzbeks want to revive Caliphate in their country. However, the young generation who does not know much about Islam could be attracted to the ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir. So, it can be argued that, people's belief in Islam does not play the most determinant role in the rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan.

According to some authors such as Bakhtiyar Babadzhanov; the Islamists do not have an economic strategy for solving the economic crisis in Uzbekistan, but they have a socio-economic programme for supporting the poor and the unemployed.[688] In Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir has been quick to fill the vacuum of opposition to the

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[685] Country Studies, "Uzbekistan", http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/uzbekistan/SOCIETY.html

[686] Ibid.

[687] Timur Dadabaev, 2004, 149-150.

[688] Lena Jonson, "Introduction", *Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies,* Conference Papers 24, 1999. http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/01.jonson.shtml, (accessed June 6, 2004)

government, in a region where most of the Muslims who were desperate about their living conditions and their future. A 37 year-old Hizb ut-Tahrir cell leader, Nasir, expressed back in 2002 that "If you look at history, no vacuum can stay empty forever, there will be always a group ready to fight for its beliefs.[689] One member told that "this party appeared just at the right time. We could have been led in any direction. If it had not been for Hizb ut-Tahrir, we would have joined some other party."[690] Because of the low level of Islamic knowledge and dissatisfaction with their living conditions, poverty and unemployment, it is easy to persuade young people with "Hizb ut-Tahrir's emphasis on social order equality and assistance to the poor." [691] Hizb ut-Tahrir supported a utopian view of political Islam under which "social problems such as corruption and poverty would be banished by the application of Islamic law and government."[692]

Thus, money can be the only reason for 17-25 year youths to join Hizb ut-Tahrir cells. Many members listed their reasons for joining Hizb ut-Tahrir as bad living conditions and failure of government policies. They give more than one reason why they joined the Party but the common reason was to change their society and make a contribution.[693] Also, because of government repression, many moderate Muslims who reject the movement's aims and ideology nevertheless feel sympathy for the party.[694]

Clans, which are the main traditional informal identity networks of individuals linked by kin-based bonds, remained important in both the politics and the social structure of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. [695] The clan-based regional allegiances could

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[689] Raffi Khatchadourian, "Letter from Uzbekistan", 1-21-2002, http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml%3Fi=20020121&s=khatchadourianint, (accessed January 2, 2004)

[690] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 January 2002, 8.

[691] Ibid. 7.

[692] Ibid. 6.

[693] International Crisis Group (ICG) 30 June 2003, 14.

[694] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 January 2002, 7.

[695] Kathleen Collins, "The Logic of Clan Politics Evidence from Asian Trajectories", *World Politics* 56 (January 2004), 224-225.

range from two thousand to twenty thousand individuals.[696] They are not formally registered by the state because of this; state officials can hardly identify or control clans.[697]

According to the Asia Barometer Research recorded in the summer of 2003 in Uzbekistan, it was also understood that people in Uzbekistan still identify themselves with their locality of residence. According to the research results, four main groups were represented: Tashkentis 21.60 percent, Ferghanites 33.60 percent (cities of Ferghana, Andijan and Namangan), Samarkandis and Bukharis 25 percent, and Khorezmis 10 percent. And 8.90 percent of respondents declared that they did not belong to any specific place.[698]

Besides social life, clan-based localism has always been important in the political life of Uzbekistan. The three main clans in the political life of the country originate from the Ferghana Valley, Bukhara and Samarkand, and Tashkent.[699] After independence, President Karimov wanted to leave clans out of politics. At first, he created a parliament similar to the communist style Supreme Soviet that only rubber stamped executive decrees.[700] Secondly, in order to decrease clan representation in the parties, he manipulated electoral and party legislation in 1996, which strengthened parties. Moreover, Karimov, established five pro-government parties, each designed to represent a different social sector.[701]

Although Karimov wanted get clans out of politics, he was also depended on the Samarkand clan[702] whose chairman, Ismail Jurabekov, supported him.[703] It was also

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[696] Ibid. 232.

[697] Ibid. 236.

[698] Timur Dadabaev, 2004, 147-148.

[699] N. I. Petrov, 81.

[700] Kathleen Collins, 2004, 251.

[701] Ibid. 252.

[702] Andrew F. March, "The use and abuse of history: 'national ideology' as transcendental object in Islam Karimov's ideology of national independence", *Central Asian Survey* 21(4), (2002):379.

the most powerful clan in Uzbekistan whose members controlled key government positions. Strong tribal identity contributed to the formation of highly centralized government in Uzbekistan.[704] According to an analyst: "If something happens to Karimov, there is not a mechanism for transfer of power; there could well be interclan war."[705] However, the persistence of clan-based regional allegiances reduce the Republic of Uzbekistan's chance of becoming an integrated nation-state and hamper its successful transition to democracy. [706]

[703] Gulnoza Saidazimova, "Uzbekistan: Islam Karimov Vs. The Clans", RFERL, 22 April 2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/04/51d08217-f03f-4906-9cc7-6224a3cff08b.html, (accessed August 22, 2005)

[704] Ella Akerman, "Power and Wealth in entral Asian Politics: Clan Structures versus Democratisation" Conflict Studies Researc Centre, May 2002, http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/CentralAsia/K30, (accessed September 15, 2005)

[705] Kathleen Collins, 2004, 254.

[706] Kathleen Bailey Carlisle, *Clan and politics in Uzbekistan,* http://escholarship.bc.edu/dissertations/AAI3034803/, (accessed September 15, 2005)

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, Hizb ut-Tahrir's emergence and the conditions that resulted in the rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in post-Soviet Uzbekistan is analyzed. By 2001, Hizb ut-Tahrir had become the largest underground movement not only in Uzbekistan, but also in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.[707] In order to find an answer why Hizb ut-Tahrir became a popular underground movement in Uzbekistan and gained sympathy among Uzbek people, first, Hizb ut-Tahrir's historical perspective and its actions are explained.

In Uzbekistan, where there was no secular political opposition against the repressive government, Hizb ut-Tahrir took advantage of the power vacuum and became a serious underground religious political opposition. By using its distinctive characteristics, (ideology, strategy, party structure, methods and membership profile) Hizb ut-Tahrir attracted thousands of people in Uzbekistan. Today, there are 7.000 Hizb ut-Tahrir members who are in jail only. These people have families who are also attracted to Hizb ut-Tahrir ideologies.[708] As an example, one member explained that after his brother's arrestment of being a member of Hizb ut-Tahrir, he also joined the group.[709]

The disappointment regarding the Uzbek government is economic policies also helped Hizb ut-Tahrir to attract more people. Hizb ut-Tahrir used its ideology, which called for an end to corruption and greed under an Islamic state. Many members believe that Islamic economic order would be more righteous and equitable. A Hizb ut-Tahrir member in Kyrgyzstan claimed:

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[707] Micheal Kort, 2004, 129.

[708] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 16.

[709] Ibid.

> Nobody is allowed to remain hungry under the Caliphate. For example, the caliph, who will sit in Bishkek, will put me in charge to look after the local population here. If I have one hungry family and do not do anything about it, then the caliph will punish me not looking after my people. [710]

Moreover, another member argued, "Even the caliph himself will be subject to punishment if he commits injustice or breaks the law".[711]

In order to reach their ideological goal, which was re-establishing the *Khilafah*, the members of the group spread their views in secret cells according to its first stage of their strategy. By using secret cells in the first stage, they wanted to change the society's existing thoughts and establish a community, which accepted the party ideas as their own. In the second stage, which could also be called the public stage, the members attempted to spread Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology among others, especially members of the government, the military and power centers.[712] A leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan declared that: "There are many people in Karimov's government who are good people so it's [a] good time to break the government inside, as some people are certain to join us." [713] And the last stage was the establishing Islamic state, which has already been launched, it will eventually solve all the problems of Uzbek people.

Furthermore, Hizb ut-Tahrir easily attacked people by using leaflets, books, face-to-face meetings and technological devices like videocassettes, tape recordings, DVD's, e-mails, and websites. By using them they could disseminate their ideology more quickly and fastly in Uzbekistan, where there was no real opposition. When we look at their membership profile, we saw mostly young people, who fulfilled their education and had high expectations. Hizb ut-Tahrir took the advantage of unemployment problem in Uzbekistan and easily attacked those educated urban young men.

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[710] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 January 2002, 10.

[711] Ibid.

[712] Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Party of Liberation), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hizb-ut-tahrir.htm

[713] Evgenii Abdullaev, "The Central Asian Nexus: Islam and Politics", in *Central Asia: A gathering storm?,* ed. Boris Rumer, (Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 260.

In the thesis, the history of Islam in Uzbekistan is also explained for understanding the reasons why the organization chose Uzbekistan as a center for its activities. Uzbekistan, especially the cities Samarkand and Bukhara, became centers of Islamic culture with the introduction of Islam in Central Asia as early as the eighth century. Since then, a powerful sedentary Islamic culture affected all spheres of life in Uzbekistan until the Tsarist and Soviet era. During the Tsarist era, Russians did not disrupt the traditional and cultural patterns of the native Muslims. The Jadids, however, believed that the solution for the decline and "degeneration" of their community was to return to "pure Islam" [714] The Tsarist government was afraid of them and coerced the Jadids. After the revolution in 1917 in Russia, the Bolsheviks had published a declaration of rights regarding the Muslims, which promised their beliefs and customs as well as national and cultural institutions to be "free and inviolable". However, the Soviets also performed anti-religious campaigns in Central Asia, claiming that they established an atheist and secular state. In order to control religious activities in Muslim areas, Stalin established four Muslim Spiritual Directorates during the World War II. It can be said that the repressive communist regime over Islam partly succeeded. But, Islamic culture continued in the form of "parallel Islam", or non-state underground organizations. As a result of the seventy years of Soviet anti-religious campaigns, two different Muslim groups were formed in Uzbekistan. Some people completely became indifferent to Islam and some people became more radicalized as a response to these repressions. In late 1980s, with the policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost*, there was a more conducive environment for expressing interest in native languages, customs, and religions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a revival of Islam: thousands of new mosques were built, madrassahs were opened in the region. There was also partial freedom in religious affiliations. But, similar to the Soviet Union period, Islam continued to be state-regulated after the independence.

By analyzing the historical and political background of Uzbekistan, it can be said that there had been no convenient platform to constitute democracy and democratic

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[714] Adeeb Khalid, "Reform and contention in Central Asian Islam: a historical perspective," Eurasia Insight, August 3, 2000. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav022400.shtml (accessed March 15, 2005)

institutions. Throughout all these years till their independence, Uzbek people have always been governed by powerful authoritarian centralized Khanates, Emirates, and Tsarist and Soviet regime. After independence, many people hoped that independence would lead to a democratic and free society in Uzbekistan. Instead, authoritarianism once again became the dominant form of government in Uzbekistan and President Karimov continued to use communist tactics to suppress political and religious expression.[715] Because of the authorities' failure in transition to democracy, the Karimov regime has been discredited in the eyes of many Uzbek people. Those people who wanted to find solutions to their political, economic and socio-cultural problems turned more to radical Islam. In this thesis, these reasons were analyzed under the titles of political, economic, and socio-cultural conditions of Uzbekistan. When all these conditions interacted, they provided a fertile soil for the rise of radical Islam and Hizb ut-Tahrir.

The first condition that affected the rise of radical Islam and Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan was about the political conditions in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. As it stated above, the political life after independence in Uzbekistan was a continuation of the communist regime. Uzbekistan is ruled by a highly centralized government comprising President Karimov himself and a small inner circle of his advisers and senior government officials. President Karimov's regime became increasingly more authoritarian and repressive against the opposition groups. Although Karimov used "religious affiliation" as a part of Uzbek identity in the nation building process, he did not tolerate neither secular nor religious political movements. The government pursued a policy of zero tolerance toward any radical Islamic groups and introduced them as a major security threat to the country.[716] Under the policy of "fighting Islamic extremism", the government used its strength and excessively prohibited, dissolved, or destroyed all the religious and secular groups, which were considered to be independent or antigovernment.[717] In this environment, Hizb ut-Tahrir presented itself as one of the most viable opposition centers to the ruling elites. This

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[715] Aisha Khan, *Historical Atlases of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East: A historical Atlas of Uzbekistan*, (New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2003), 57.

[716] Hooman Peimani, 2002, 75.

[717] Ibid. 65.

was the one of the most important factors in the quick rise of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan.[718] As such, state repression was highly effective at encouraging the people to disengage from politics.[719] Those who wanted to protest against the repressive government would be attracted to Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideology. Hizb ut-Tahrir members often cited a desire to participate in political and social life as important reasons for joining the group.

Karimov's repressive attitude was also reflected in all of the parliamentarian elections in the country. In the first elections to the Oliy Majlis held in December 1994 and January 1995, there were only two parties that were allowed to participate. One of them was the President's party, the People's Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDPU), and the other one was the Homeland Progress Party. The other opposition parties could not get the permission to participate to the elections. Moreover, they were not allowed to disseminate their ideas, hold meetings and conferences, and publish newspapers. Also, parties were banned from accepting financial support from the state or any other foreign or religious organization. These rules were also enforced in the other parliamentary elections, which were held on December 1999 and December 2004. In these elections five registered political parties could participate. However, none of them described themselves as an opposition party and they all supported the President's policies. So, it is possible to say that in Uzbekistan the election system is not democratic.

Moreover, the Uzbekistan Parliamentary Elections Law was also not democratic and had very strict rules. With these laws, becoming a parliamentarian is a very difficult job. If we make a comparison between *Khokims* (heads of administration) and political parties and/or initiative groups (a group of citizens) it is possible to say that they do not work under the same circumstances.[720] *Khokims* are allowed to

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[718] Svante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector, "Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists", *The Washington Quarterly*, (2002): 200.

[719] Andrew Apostolou, 2004, 67.

[720] Tashkent city Khokimiyat, 26.02.2003
http://www.tashkent.uz/content.htm?short_name=/articles/city_administration/khokimiyat, (accessed 11 August 2005)

serve as parliament members in the Oliy Majlis and they do not have to be discharged from their positions when they became a parliamentarian. However, all the other parliamentary candidates have to be discharged from their previous positions.[721] Although political party and initial group candidates had to collect signatures, *Khokims* did not have to collect such signatures.[722] Furthermore, the *Khokims* constituted the highest percentage of parliamentarians in all the elections until now. Under these circumstances, it is hard to say that Uzbek election system is democratic.

In this thesis, for the purpose of better understanding whether economic conditions as a second factor constituted a fertile environment for the rise of radical Islam and Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan, economic conditions were analyzed. Although poor economic conditions may not always be the triggering factor in the rise of radical Islamic movements in general, people's poor living standards played an active role in this process in Uzbekistan.

The economic difficulties that the government faced immediately after independence led to a general economic decline with high inflation, unemployment, rising prices, and shortages of various goods for private and commercial consumption. As analyzed in the section on economic conditions, although Uzbekistan's economy progressed a little after 1996, this progress in the economy could not improve the Uzbek people's living standards. In the transition period, the Uzbek government wanted to lessen the impact of social costs and improve people's living standards, but its efforts were insufficient to fill the gap for the poor families. The problems of poverty and unemployment continued.

This environment was conducive for Hizb ut-Tahrir to disseminate its ideology to attract people to live under the Islamic state. In other words, the economic problems constituted one of the main sources of social discontent, which manifested itself in support for the radical Islam. A Hizb ut-Tahrir leader identified the factors that

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[721] Ibid.

[722] Ibid.

would bring his party to powers as follows: "There is too much corruption and bad policies. There are no jobs, the economy is very bad". [723]

Corruption and poverty are much higher in rural areas in Uzbekistan. It is possible to say that poverty increased in rural areas after independence because of the regional wage inequality, low-paying jobs and unemployment. One interesting point is that in Uzbekistan the level of education is negatively correlated with poverty.[724] According to Givanni Andrea Cornia, the problem with the present growth pattern was its inability to generate a sufficient demand for medium skilled workers.[725]

The socio-cultural conditions except religion also provided fertile soil for the rise of radical Islam and Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan. The economic situation of the people affected mostly the socio-cultural conditions in the country. Continued or increasing economic problems, coupled with such social issues as high youth unemployment and birth rates, deteriorating medical services, and rising crime rates, corruption and poverty caused a general dissatisfaction with the government in Uzbekistan. Public trust to the state also decreased. As was mentioned earlier, governments repression over political activities also disengaged the people from politics. The people who no longer wanted to live under bad economic conditions and political repression, started to see Hizb ut-Tahrir as a possible and viable opposition to the present ruling elites. These reasons increased the popularity of the group in Uzbekistan.

The traditional life is still an important socio-cultural factor for the distribution of political and social roles in families, clans, tribes and regional groups in Uzbekistan. [726] The first example of traditionalism that was analyzed in this thesis was the "*mahalla*", an important institution to deliver social assistance to the Uzbek people.

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[723] Evgenii Abdullaev, 2002, 261.

[724] Giovanni Andrea Cornia, 2002, 25.

[725] Ibid 22-23.

[726] Aleksei Malashenko, "Islam and Politics in Central Asian States", *Central Asia and the Caucasus Journal of Social and Political Studies,* Conference Papers 24, 1999. http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/02.malash.shtml, 2. (accessed June 6, 2004)

Karimov established *mahalla* networks for realizing an efficient information network at the micro level. In governmental campaigns against extremism, *mahalla* system provided information to the police about the community residents' religious beliefs and practices.[727] According to U.S. State Department Report on Human Rights for 2001, the Uzbek government blacklisted 107.000 Muslims based on the information provided by chairmen of *mahalla* committees.[728] According to the International Crisis Group (ICG) when a Hizb ut-Tahrir member from their *mahalla* was imprisoned, this event stirred sympathy and resentment among people.[729] According to the report:

> The imprisonment of Hizb ut-Tahrir members generates considerable publicity for the organization and has galvanized support in many social strata and age groups. If caught by police, members are expected to admit their association with Hizb ut-Tahrir. This act of admitting membership and the associated open criticism of the government is considered to be the highest level of bravery. [730]

It is noticeable that Islam in Uzbekistan is still the main factor of the traditional identity that affects social life. More than 50 percent of Uzbeks believed that Islam alone is the solution to Uzbekistan's many problems in 1995.[731] However, through Soviet anti-religious campaign years, personal understanding of Islam by Uzbeks remained limited or distorted. Today, people in Uzbekistan are not very religious and they live Islam mainly as a traditional and cultural value. Hizb ut-Tahrir benefited from this situation and disseminated its ideology to the people especially the young generation who does not know much about Islam. So, it is possible to claim that although other factors of the socio-cultural conditions could affect the

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[727] Human Rights Watch, (HTW). *Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan: Background,* 2004. 6.

[728] Muslim Uzbekistan, "True Terror begins in Uzbekistan: Arbitrary arrest of innocent Muslims",1.04.2004,http://www.muslimuzbekistan.com/eng/ennews/2004/04/ennews01042004.htm, (accessed September 14, 2005)

[729] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 January 2002, 10.

[730] Ibid.

[731] Aleksei Malashenko, 1999, 3.

rise of radical Islam in Uzbekistan in general, people's belief in Islam does not play the most determinant role in this rise.

The last socio-cultural factor that was analyzed in the traditional life was the clan politics. The continuing clan, regional, and tribal structures in Uzbekistan is one of the most central problems that challenged the transition to democracy in the country. Although President Karimov wanted to leave clans out of politics, he also depended on the Samarkand clan, which was the most powerful clan in Uzbekistan. There are two other main clans in the political life of Uzbekistan: Bukhara and Tashkent. It could be argued that other clans whose members could not control key government positions in Uzbekistan could come closer to the ideas of radical Islamic groups especially Hizb ut-Tahrir, who want to overthrow the central government in Uzbekistan. Also, Hizb ut-Tahrir took the advantage of extensive kinship ties of the traditional Uzbek families who felt sympathy and involved to the group because of their relatives. Many women were also involved in Hizb ut-Tahrir because of their imprisoned husbands or sons. [732]

To sum up, in the introduction part of the thesis, it was argued that the rise of radical Islam in post-Soviet Uzbekistan emerged as a result of the interaction of economic, socio-cultural and political conditions. After analyzing these conditions and Hizb ut-Tahrir's characteristics, it possible to say that worsening political, economic and socio-cultural conditions interacted with each other and they constituted a conducive environment for the spread of Hizb ut-Tahrir's ideas in post-Uzbekistan.

The director of Kyrgyztan's Islamic Centre of Islamic Cooperation, Sheikh Sadiq Q. Kamal Al-Deen, stressed that "we can hope to dishearten, discourage and dissuade others from joining Hizb ut-Tahrir."[733] Also he claimed that the Uzbek government needed to build an ideological strategy to combat Hizb ut-Tahrir to persuade them to change their behaviour. [734]

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[732] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 June 2003, 16.

[733] Andrew Apostolou, 2004, 73.

[734] International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 January 2002, 11.

The possible solution to "radical Islamic threat" could be rapid and effective development in political, economic and socio-cultural conditions. However, it can be argued that progress in the political life is the most important one. The continuation of democracy and economic progress in a country especially depends on the politicians. In Uzbekistan, where the state was governed by an authoritarian and repressive political system in all spheres of life, there are important obstacles for democracy to flourish. If Uzbeks could get more familiar with democracy and a democratic culture, which was not possible in the post-Soviet era mostly because of the authorities' failure, it is possible to say that they could no longer be attracted to radical Islamic ideas.

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