IS THERE ANY SECURITY PREFERENCE FOR TURKEY
BETWEEN THE EU AND THE U.S.?

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ABSTRACT

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The recent global security challenges such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction etc. have altered the security perceptions of the countries. For opposing those new security threats the U.S. and the EU generated their own security discourses. Accordingly, they tackle the issues with diverging perceptions. This diversion paves the way for a debate between two sides. In the mean time, Turkey has established her security architecture in accordance with the Western international community. Nevertheless, the ongoing debate between the EU and the U.S. leaves Turkey in an uncomfortable situation. On the grounds that, the future tendency of Turkey will be dependent on the policies of the U.S. and the EU as well as Turkey's own progress. On the one hand the U.S. can present multilateral or unilateral solutions to the problems. On the other hand the EU can show an inward-looking or an outward-looking policy in international relations. The results of those policy options will be the answer of Turkey's probable security preference between the U.S. and the EU.

Key Words: Transatlantic Relations, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish-EU relations, Turkish-U.S. relations.

ÖZ

TURKİYE'NİN AB VE ABD ARASINDA
BİR GÜVENLİK TERCİHİ VAR MIDIR?

Ünal, Kemal
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Terörizm, kitle imha silahlarının yayılması gibi tüm dünyayı etkileyen güvenlik kaygıları ülkelerin güvenlik algılamalarını değiştirmiştir. Yeni güvenlik tercihlerine karşı koymak için ABD ve Avrupa Birliği kendilerine has güvenlik yapılanmalarını ortaya koymaktadırlar. Bu kapsamda, meydana gelen olayları değişen güvenlik algılamalarıyla ele almaktadırlar. İki taraf arasındaki farklı yaklaşımlar iki taraf arasında çatışmaya sebep olmaktadır. Türkiye'nin güvenlik yapılanması Batı toplumu ile uyum içersinde gelişmiş bulunmaktadır. Ancak, AB ve ABD arasındaki ayrılık Türkiye'yi rahatsız edici bir ortama sokmaktadır. AB ve ABD'nin güvenlik konularındaki değişen algılamaları Türkiye'yi ikisi arasında bir seçim yapmaya zorlamakta olduğu izlenimini yaratmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, Türkiye'nin gelecekteki eğilimi AB ve ABD'nin politikaları aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin kendi başarısı ile ilgili olacaktır. Bir tarafta ABD problemlerin çözümünde tek taraflı veya çok taraflı politikalar sergileyebilir. Diğer taraftan AB uluslar arası ilişkilerde içe yönelik veya dışa yönelik politikalar ortaya koyabilir. Tarafların seçecekleri politikalar Türkiye'nin AB ve ABD arasındaki muhtemel güvenlik tercihine cevap olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Transatlantik İlişkileri, Türk Dış Politikası, Türkiye-AB ilişkileri, Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The security environment of the world has been affected by various dynamics since the end of the Cold War. The new global imbalance on power and its affect on nations' strategic importance become part of those dynamics. Moreover, the innovations in technology have transformed the unattainable conditions to achievable positions. Finally, the attitude of the Western communities on the usage of military power has changed. In view of those dynamics, the possibility of technology transfer to illegal formations has increased. The option still remains that the technology captured by dreadful intentions has potential to cause catastrophic events. Meanwhile, the gap between the wealthy and impoverished states is getting higher on each year. Accordingly, the instability in failed states paves the way for serious security problems.

During the Cold War years the term "national security" was synonymous with the defense. And the security could be maintained by military power. But today security is considered beyond military power and threats to security are not military means. The general exception for assigning security to the ministry of foreign affairs and ministry of defense is no more valid. Indeed, the horizon of security has extended many areas beyond its military meaning. To illustrate, failed governments, unlawfulness, organized crime, insecure borders, smuggling (weapons, drugs, and/or human), illegal immigration, ethnic and religious conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), scarcity in natural resources and terrorism are associated with the security concept. Regarding those topics, developed nations are taking the precedence for being subject of those security threats.

Nevertheless, unlike the years of the Cold War while almost receiving the similar threats, the influences of those threats are varying today. In the new security understanding states are assuming different sets of security tasks to perform and the priorities among them have changed. International security has subordinated the

national security. By the affects of globalization, security is detached from territories of the states and it is entangled in global networks. This in turn diminished the capacity of the state to provide security for its citizens.[1]

Correspondingly, the organizations built for a different age are no longer able to response to those security needs of today. Rationally, each member highlights its individual security considerations that eventually cause disagreement. The security arrangements require a different kind of armed forces organization. That is to say, the current threats cannot be repelled by conventional means like passive defense or preventive precautions. The armed forces might need to be deployed as police forces and require more mobility. They would need to have the capability to operate in different countries. Instead of deterrent activities, the armed forces should accept that the possibility of combat is higher at present. Besides, as in case of war against terrorism, the condition for being in war or not is not distinguishable. That's why a straightforward distinction between the police forces and military is not available any more.

In view of those aforementioned security trends, the Western international community has been trying to confront those security challenges either by performing unilateral solutions or by gathering on multilateral platforms. Their way of handling the security challenges creates problems in international relations. The United States on the one side and European powers on the other side present different reactions against the security challenges. Some of the reasons for the diversions on the way of solutions are hidden in threat perceptions, priorities and global power positions.

Together with the security perceptions of the U.S. and European powers, Turkey presents a unique position during her actorness in the world. Considering the contemporary security challenges and the formed responses to them Turkey, rises as

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[1] Christopher Coker, *Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the management of Risk*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 8.; Richard L Kugler "National Security in a Globalizing World of Chaos: The United States and European Responses" in *Western Unity and the Transatlantic Security Challenge.* Edited by Peter van Ham and Richard L Kugler, Marshall Center Papers No:4 (June 2002) p. 40

a significant power in her neighborhood. Since, her neighboring regions are source of many security vulnerabilities and have the potential for being the origin of future crisis. In that respect, not surprisingly, the U.S. and European powers have an increasing attention in Turkey and her surrounding regions. Therefore, the "triangular"[2] relationship between Turkey, the U.S. and European powers has potential to deteriorate the security problems or provide the key for their solutions.[3]

The future of the relationship between the three is possibly to affect a great portion of Turkish foreign and security policy. As a matter of fact, Turkey's relationship with Europe and with the U.S. is the most significant component of her security and foreign policy due to her strategic ties with them on differing areas. By the same token, European powers and the U.S. are also very much linked to Turkey in their relations not only with Turkey but also with her surrounding regions. However, from the point of view of Turkey, the position she holds between Europe and the U.S. has a fragile nature. Because of their diverging security perceptions Turkey is getting trouble while synchronizing her policies to them. Therefore, the main objective of this thesis is to analyze whether a security preference is ahead Turkey between the U.S. and Europe.

In order to find a substantial answer to the subject under question the other corners and sides of the triangular relationship gains importance. Here, at the corners the U.S., Europe and Turkey persist. Furthermore, each has relationship with the other two while forming the sides of the triangular relationship. The U.S., on the one corner, has been the leader of the unipolar world since the end of the Cold War. The predominance of the U.S. power and globalization became the phenomena of the present age. The power that the U.S. possesses enabled it to engage in the world affairs alone. The cosmopolitan nature of ruling elite in the U.S. has altered the definition of the state's identity. The U.S. no longer identified itself by its European

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[2] The word "triangular" is chosen to show the link between each party and their interaction. Each party has significant connection with the other two in international relations.

[3] Zalmay Khalilzad, "A strategic Plan for Western-Turkish Relations," in *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan*, eds. Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee (Pittsburgh: RAND, 2000), pp. 82-95.

origin.[4] The focus of American policy shifted away from Europe. The inclination of the U.S. policy-making turned out to be more unilateral to the global issues. Nevertheless, the unilateral actions of the U.S. have been creating problems both in the country and in international relations. Therefore, it is important that to what extent can the U.S. go alone in international affairs?

On the other side of the Atlantic, forming another corner of the triangular relationship, Europeans have undertaken many tasks to achieve after the Second World War. They have volunteered to build the peace in the continent under the leadership of the western European powers. That is to say, they have been trying to incorporate European countries under the EC/EU during the Cold War and after. Having been an economic and social union by enlarging and deepening the EU has been striving to be a more prominent actor in the international relations. Nevertheless, due to the inability of acting single minded, strategic vision has lacked in European concept. Europeans favor globalist foreign policy which relies on international cooperation. They prefer to deal with problems through economic integration, foreign aid, and multilateral institutions. The current challenges to the world security are perceived less pressing by the Europeans. However, those challenges require an extended horizon from the Europeans beyond the continent. Thus, it is getting important that whether Europeans will decide on a worldwide actorness or continue their integration process especially on deepening?

Not surprisingly, the relations between the U.S. and the EU are not getting better due to their diverging security perceptions. During the Cold War the transatlantic relations, gathered around the same ideals, succeeded in arranging common attitude against the Soviet bloc. The cohesion of the transatlantic affairs had taken the precedence in American strategy. Besides, transatlantic relationship was also pivotal to the Western Europe. The presence of a common enemy concealed the distinctions between the U.S. and Europe. In view of that, they managed to finish the Cold War with victory. After the Cold War, the mindset of the partnership was reshaped and the assumed monolithic structure of West was challenged. The

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[4] Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Transatlantik Çatlağı: Değişen Kimlikler" *Doğu-Batı*, no: 23 (May, Haz, Tem 2003) 179

incidents of post-Cold War era have revealed the incompatibilities of both sides. The diplomatic ineptness and growing asymmetry in power have become some of the causes of transatlantic gap. The U.S. turned out to be the sole superpower and the EU devoted itself to represent the continent Europe. Accordingly, the U.S. and Europe no longer shared a common view of the world. The historical and economic relationships and political and military alliances have become in danger.

In this connection, the question rises in world community that, will those partners manage to repair their relationship especially on security affairs? The answers for the question are varying today. The studies on transatlantic affairs have generally gathered around case studies. The researches have been contemplated in historical process and the positions of Europe and America on global occasions. Moreover, analysts comment on future transatlantic arrangements. Suffice to say that, all analysts agree on that the differing views of each side have more echoed in the post-Cold War period. As regards, some researchers comment that there is an unbridgeable gap between the U.S. and Europe and it is an irreversible situation. Quite the opposite, some believe that the divergence is not so deep and it is manageable. In other words, those differing analysts can be classified simply as pessimists and optimists. The former anticipate that everything will be worse, so in the future the U.S. and Europe should act according to this situation. The latter believe that this is an unwanted situation for both sides, those circumstances are not permanent and in time the relationship will succeed again.

Having been decided her security pattern alongside with the West and its institutions, Turkey cannot stay away from the affects of transatlantic gap. The widening gap between the U.S. and the EU leaves Turkey confused on her corner. Nevertheless, in pursue of a more admirable place in the world, the future expectations of Turkey lie in the institutions of the West. Considering the awkward position of Turkey between the EU and the U.S., it is an open question whether a security preference has loomed ahead of Turkey between the EU and the U.S.?

The asserted question can be answered in two ways. The positive stance will possess the view that the current *status quo* of the world is coercing Turkey to make

an irreversible choice between diverging allies. Therefore, it will hold that Turkey should pursue an isolated pro-American security policy or delegate her powers to the EU and get bound to the common strategies.

In this strategy, adopting the EU policies and eventual full membership to the EU is one alternative for Turkey. Today the largest part of the EU motivation and propaganda is based on economic matters. It is thought that a much more welfare will be taken for granted by the EU membership. However, the full membership will force Turkey to quit her policies differing from the European views.

Away from Europe, further U.S.-Turkey partnership is another alternative for Turkey in her future arrangements of foreign policy. But the current relationship is mainly based on geopolitical and security matters. The remaining demands of Turkey are mostly in the air in relations with the United States.

A negative type of answer to the question will bring the idea that Turkey is not in the condition of making a choice between the U.S. and the EU in security matters. This kind of answer will assume that the current connections of Turkey with the U.S. and the EU on different platforms are providing a substantial security environment for Turkey. From time to time the foreign and security policies of Turkey may have more similarities with the policies of the U.S. or the EU. However, this will not mean that Turkey should adhere to one of these two choices permanently.

In a parallel manner, the position of Turkey in the EU's and the U.S.' strategic thinking is also important. That is to say, American discussions on Turkey are concentrated on strategic questions. Apart from Americans, Europeans tend to perceive Turkey in the light of domestic political considerations.[5] In strategic view of the U.S. and the EU, "stable and democratic Turkey or democratic and stable Turkey"[6] is another reality for Turkey to decide her future policies. Just then, will it

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[5] Ludger Kühnhardt, speaking in, "At the Crossroads of Geo-politics —Turkey in a Changing Political Environment", *Körber-Stiftung Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis*, (No.109, Hamburg 1997). p.41

[6] Heinz Kramer and Friedman Müller, "Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries", in *Allies Divided – Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East* ed. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (London: CISA studies in International Security, 1997), p. 183

be beneficial for Turkey to make a choice between the EU and the U.S. or will the balance-seeking role be more advantageous for Turkey?

The studies about the Turkey's security preference between the U.S. and the EU have been generally researched under the subject of Turkish foreign policy. The publications have split the Turkish foreign policy into domestic and external affairs. With regard to diverging political views, military, economics, ethnic structure and NGOs, —in a case like Turkey— domestic incidents have been gaining importance for conducting foreign policy. Furthermore, previous studies have dealt with the external matters on regional basis such as Europe, Balkans, Asia, Middle East and USA.

The analysts who have been discussing about the Turkish foreign policy can be categorized under six major tendencies. However, each does not perfectly fit the existing trends. *Pro-Europeans;* support the EU to obtain a leverage against Americans, *pro-Americans;* believe the EU membership is not achievable and Turkish interests are overlapping with the U.S., *pro-Western analysts*; say no need to make a choice between the EU and the U.S. *skeptics about the West;* favor the West, but support resistant foreign policy to the demanding policies of it, *anti-Western analysts;* alternative policy seekers in the east, and finally *balance seekers;* claiming that Turkey has equal opportunities both in West and East.[7]

The current study requires some assumptions in order to explicate some terms and comments. The first assumption of the study is that the transatlantic relations are affairs between the U.S. and Europe. Second, the individual actorness of European countries and their bilateral relations with Turkey is mostly subordinated. Third, it is a fact that, the pursuit of an active foreign policy is constrained by domestic economic performance. However, the economic aspects are excluded from the current study.

In order to analyze the area under discussion, it is necessary to reveal some facts and background directly related with Turkey's security preference. To start with

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[7] Şanlı Bahadır Koç, retrieved from: http://www.avsam.org/gunlukbulten/arsiv/2003/1006.htm

for being the main reason creating the question for Turkey, the gap between the U.S. and the EU is explored in the first chapter. To elaborate, the backdrop of the relationship, contemporary security environment and the rationale for the divergence are provided. Moreover the recent Iraqi crisis that has been in the agenda of the world since 2002 is mentioned for being a useful tool revealing the transatlantic gap. Apart from the diverging policies, the individual dynamics of each counterpart gains importance in searching for an answer to the question of why they prefer conflicting policies in their relations. Therefore, the motives of the United States for conducting its foreign and security policy and European efforts for balancing the transatlantic affairs are discovered. Meanwhile, having been the sole security organization linking the Europe and the North America, the activities and the transformation of NATO after the Cold War have been mentioned. Finally, for obtaining some clues, the ways of compromise between two are questioned.

In the second chapter the general characteristics of Turkish foreign and security policy are presented. After granting the fundamentals of Turkish security perception, the new horizons loomed ahead Turkey after the Cold War are explored. The relationship between the NATO and Turkey is also provided generally for demonstrating how Turkey is affected by the incompatibilities originating from transatlantic divergence. Additionally, the relations between Turkey and the EU, and Turkey and the U.S. are investigated for catching what kind of future policies can be executed. Not only the Turkish perspective is given in the study but also the consciousness of the EU and the U.S. about Turkey is given mainly because of applying an objective comment.

After two explanatory chapters, the third chapter tries to find an answer to the subject under question. First, it evaluates that Turkey is an important country in transatlantic relations. Then, the preference for Turkey is analyzed in accordance with the probable future maneuvers of the U.S. and the EU.

CHAPTER II

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

The Western international community had enjoyed the security umbrella created during the Cold War years under the U.S. leadership. However, the disappearance of the common enemy created doubts about the necessity of such a security guarantee. Subsequently, the security needs of the states as well as individuals have altered in this new era. The definitions, responses and priorities of the new challenges have been differing in the U.S. and Europe. That is to say, their differing security perceptions are leaving Turkey in an awkward position. Therefore, the essences of their perceptions are provided for a sound analysis considering Turkey's future alignments. Moreover, Iraq affairs since 2002 are included because of its importance for verifying the transatlantic gap. Further analyses on the EU, the U.S. and NATO are also incorporated in this chapter.

The United States and Europe have been representing the free world and the "West". It has been their effort that aimed to bring the peace initially in their homelands and if possible, export their values to the regions that suffer from instability and turmoil. They have regarded themselves as natural allies in conducting their objectives. The history of the partnership can be extended to the beginning of the 20th century, when Europeans were practicing realpolitik and Americans were approaching to the international politics from a liberal internationalist perspective.[8]

American isolationalist policy came to an end when the U.S. felt that her national interests were at stake. In the mean time, American security policy was established in association with Europe. For instance, the partnership placed the U.S.

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[8] Osvaldo Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8 (2003) 472.

into an unavoidable involvement in the Second World War. Over time, the partnership evolved into a security community with shared norms.

After the Second World War, common attitude against the Soviet bloc consolidated the relationship between the U.S. and Europe. Making common defense had been the essence of US-European strategic partnership.[9] Preserving the cohesion of the alliance and forming an integrated Europe had been a primary goal of American strategy during the Cold War.[10] On the other hand, transatlantic relationship was also pivotal to the Western Europe. However, it was not surprising that there began a strife between Europe and the United States. But the presence of a common threat did not allow the partnership to fracture. Hence, they managed to finish the Cold War with victory.

This "conditional" partnership has undergone some developments since the end of the Cold War. First, the partnership exposed to the implications of globalization. Globalization, growing networks of worldwide interdependence, has impact on a number of different global systems.[11] That is to say, sharing the benefits of globalization has serious and shared consequences for both the United States and Europe. Helping other nations tap into the global systems developed into a common strategic and humanitarian interest of the U.S. and the EU.[12]

Second, NATO, which is regarded as the most successful military alliance in history, seemed to lose its 'rasion détre' with the disappearance of common threat. However, having been the major security platform between the U.S. and Europe, NATO broadened its commitment beyond the territorial defense of Europe and the United States. "NATO allies approved a strategy to equip the alliance for the security

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[9] James Thompson, "US Interests and the Fate of the Alliance," *Survival* vol 45, no 4 (Winter 2003) 210.; Leslie H. Gelb, Foreword to the *Future of Transatlantic Relations,* by Robert D. Blackwill (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), p. V.

[10] Robert Kagan, *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003) p. 49.; Gerard Baker, "Does the United States Have a European Policy," *The National Interest* (Winter 2003/04) 37.

[11] Coker, *op.cit.,* p. 8.

[12] James B. Steinberg, "An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations," *Survival* vol.45 no.2 (Summer 2003): 131-132.

challenges and opportunities of the 21st century".[13] With the enlargement strategy and its implementation, NATO has managed to pursuit the maintaining of its importance. In this sense, NATO, together with the EU, exerts a gravitational pull from Bosnia and Herzegovina to Tajikistan.[14]

Third, the EU has economically reached to the level of United States. After accomplishing its major economic objectives, Europe has emerged as a world power in economic terms. Nonetheless, the US-EU trade relationship remains the largest 'bilateral' trade relationship in the world. They produce more than fifty per cent of the world's economy.[15]

Finally, the EU and the U.S. have realized that terror is a new and long-term phenomenon to confront. Halting the proliferation of WMD and rogue states supporting terrorist organizations has coupled with the war against terrorism. Those threats to Western interests are mostly seem to ordinary citizens more remote, abstract and complex than the ones witnessed during the Cold War.[16] At the same time, considering the new challenges or old challenges redefined by global events "human security" is now of growing importance for the Western world.[17]

The characteristic of the present era is the asymmetric conflict between great powers and terrorist or insurgent organizations. The crisis occurred after the Cold War made the national security no longer related with the territories. On the contrary, it is now extended to the troubled regions, which may be away from borders. Likewise, the most obvious threats to the Atlantic community are terrorism and the danger of proliferation of WMD. After September 11 attacks, the possibility that terrorists using WMD and causing mass casualties became the inseparable realities of the daily life.

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[13] *NATO Handbook. 2001.* Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, p.42.

[14] Strobe Talbott, "From Prague to Baghdat: NATO at Risk," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 81 no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2002) 51.

[15] For details see 'Bilateral Trade Relations, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/us/intro.

[16] Robert D. Blackwill, *Future of Transatlantic Relations,* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), p. 8.

[17] Coker, *op.cit.,* p. 8.

Terrorism has been on the agenda of Western allies, but the terrorist events of 9/11 were the climax. This undesired event has been received as a turning point on fight against terrorism. Both Europeans and the Americans condemned the events and immediately constructed a common stance against terrorism. On the day after the attacks of September 11 NATO first time in its history invoked Article 5 of the Alliance's Charter. The celebrated French newspaper Le Monde headline on September 13 was proclaiming "Nous sommes tous Americains" ("We are all Americans") and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder's simultaneous pledge of "unconditional solidarity" were encouraging signals of the cohesion in transatlantic alliance.[18] However, this harmony disappeared as soon as the arguments rose on how to deal with this menace, namely terrorism, more specifically "Islamic terrorism" [19]. In retrospect, it was Americans risked their own safety for defending the vital interests of Europe. But this time a threatened United States is trying to protect its own safety which seems to be disregarded by many Europeans. Europe and the U.S. did not accept each others' motives for international activity.[20] Americans proposed to tackle the issue with hard security tools and to curb down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan by intervention. On the other hand, Europeans joined the Americans on war against terrorism, but rather than using military means they highlighted the root causes of it. Europeans immediately looked for legitimate basis for an intervention by United Nations Security Council.

The changing security environment has also altered the important elements of the old transatlantic bargain. Those new elements challenging the U.S. and Europe are more similar than being divergent because they mostly stem from global trends.[21] It is a fact that EU and the US have much more common interests than conflicting

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[18] Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain," *Foreign Affairs* vol: 82 issue: 4 (Jul/Aug 2003) 79.

[19] The general tendency for associating terrorism with Islam is firmly opposed by the Muslim world. Therefore, Turkey, as an Islamic country, highlights the distinction between Islam and terror.

[20] Daniel N. Nelson, "Transatlantic Transmutations," *The Washington Quarterly* 25:4 (Autumn 2002) 58

[21] Philip H. Gordon, "Bridging the Atlantic Divide," *Foreign Affairs* vol.82 issue 1 (Jan/Feb 2003) 72.

goals.[22] Both agree on to halt the spread of WMD; moving steadily toward a Europe that is whole, free, prosperous, and at peace; maintaining the secure supply of imported energy at reasonable prices; further opening up the transatlantic and global economic systems; and preventing the catastrophic collapse of international financial, trade and ecological systems. Those challenges came to an awkward position in which the binding forces of the relationship were weaker and the centrifugal forces were stronger.[23]

Due to the fact that, the uniqueness in the international politics that the relationship possesses has been experiencing some sort of problems. The ones took place during the Cold War were overshadowed by the common objective of defeating the Soviet empire. But, the disagreements occurred after the Cold War have been more harming and verifying the transatlantic gap. Although this gap has much surfaced after the events of September 11 and Iraqi crisis, there had been previous crises initiating the crack. Disagreements on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Land Mines Convention, International Criminal Court, Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming, and National Missile Defense System were the symptoms of the future disagreements. In addition, the trade disputes were all politically sensitive. Europeans have demanded an equal share of continuing affairs and they were dissatisfied with the unilateral temptations of Americans. They resented over the lack of American consultation with Europe. Americans have been regarding themselves as being responsible for protecting Western values and interests. So, from their perspective, the victory can only be gained by the U.S. leadership. As a matter of fact, Americans found European criticism annoying and insufficient, considering their contribution in case of an action.

That is to say, after the Cold War, the mindset of the partnership was reshaped and the assumed monolithic structure of the West was challenged. The global positions of the U.S. and Europe have been the main source of friction and mutual misunderstandings. After the Cold War, the U.S., as a superpower, has increased its

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[22] Ludger Kühnhardt, *Contrasting Transatlantic Interpretations: The EU and the U.S. towards a Common Global Role,* (Stockholm: Sieps, 2003), p. 28.

[23] Ivo H. Daalder, "The End of Atlanticism," *Survival* vol: 45 no. 2 (Summer 2003) 161

global engagement and its focus shifted away from Europe. Whereas, Europeans has been preoccupied with their continent. For enhancing their commitment to eternal peace in the continent, Europeans deal with the EU enlargement, the euro, and a constitutional convention, in other words they have spent their energy on domestic matters.[24]

In security thinking, the U.S. and Europe differ in the magnitude of related areas. Sovereignty is reduced to the regional level in European integration due to its troubled history, while American sovereignty is defended against the demands of globalization.[25] America's hegemonic position provides her global security thinking. Europeans tend to conceive security limited to continent itself and its neighboring areas. Thanks to the U.S. leadership in NATO, Europeans did not need to think international security beyond their borders.

For the shifted security insights, transatlantic relationship has become less pivotal to the foreign policy of both actors.[26] It is mostly because the U.S. has taken the responsibility to protect neighboring areas of Europe. Likewise, on threat perceptions, the U.S. perceives the proliferation of WMD, rogue states and terrorism as major threats against the persistence of the world order. While, Europeans see ethnic conflict and political economic instability in surrounding regions, global underdevelopment and poverty as key challenges in which the immediate developments have much to do with their ongoing process. Consequently, their reaction to those threats and/or challenges has discrepancies. The importance placed on military power determines the American way. Europeans have enlarged in Central and Eastern Europe for guaranteeing political and economic stability in the continent. Regarding Russia and South Mediterranean countries Europeans prefer to ameliorate their

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[24] Gordon, *op.cit.,* p. 82.; Steinberg, *op.cit.,* p. 114.

[25] Kühnhardt,*op.cit.,*in note 24, p. 23.

[26] Daalder, *op.cit.,* p.151.

position by economic assistance for avoiding immigration. As a result, the consequences of 11/9 are more important to Europeans than the attacks of 9/11.[27]

Americans and Europeans disagree on severity of the global threats mostly due to their divergence on the definition of those problems. Inability in finding a shared definition and the common grounds on application of the policies reflects their diverging mindset. These varying approaches make their engagement to the global matters in a different manner. In other words, though the current threats jeopardize their common vital interests, they are at odds on how best to protect them.

Besides the notion of power, its content and implication have much to do with the ongoing antagonism in relations. Growing asymmetry in power is another cause of transatlantic gap. Americans are sending a message to Europe saying that "grow up and join in-or pipe down and let us do it."[28] The might that the U.S. possesses with "can do" optimism causes resentment on European side. In time, this incompatibility can magnify international disagreements. Each side will want to arrange supporters for their position. [29]

For protecting their common interests, the usage of military matters in security policy is another setback in coordinating their abilities. Even if they agree on goals and strategies, gap in capabilities inhibits the cooperation and disables to work together. The U.S. has taken a quantum leap in the Revolution in Military Affairs, leaving their European allies far behind. Disproportion in military affairs is due to the Europe's unenthusiastic defense spending. This in time caused imbalance in technology, mobility and readiness in military affairs even if they agree on the need to use of force.

Although, the global threats are part of the EU foreign policy consideration, the ways of Europeans to cope the security threats are

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[27] Moravcsik, *op.cit.,* pp. 76-77. The author makes an analogy between the dates of fall of Berlin wall (November 9, 1989) and the terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center and Pentagon (September 11, 2001)

[28] Andrew Sullivan, "America won't Listen to Europe's Appeasers," *The American Enterprise* (December 2002) 32

[29] Steinberg, *op.cit.,* p. 135.

inefficient for overcoming them. More serious precautions are expected from Europeans because in some special cases, where an involvement is required, each delay drives up the costs of intervention. Therefore, any intervention volunteered to tackle by the Western world requires more U.S. contribution during the process. Accordingly, the greater portion of the casualties will belong to the U.S. Armed Forces. For this reason, the possibility of expending more money and risk of having casualty increases the validity of U.S. arguments on referring the military force.

American and European incentives are departing due to their engagement to the world affairs. Americans tackle the threats with strong loyalties and they always abide by the use of force if other means are proved to be inadequate. Moreover, the U.S. is very keen on abandoning universal consensus on the role of international law. Americans exercise power with Martian spirit being virile and potent in which international laws and rules are unreliable.[30] After the Cold War "just war" is a variation of the debate about their sovereignism. Whereas, Europeans are representing the Venetian spirit that is weak and feminine. They approach issues with less urgency, claim to be neutral and take the pledge to exhaust all non-military means for solving the problem. That is to say, Europeans support the UN mechanisms of multilateral definitions and applications of international law. For protecting those values, Europeans stick to legalistic or moral arguments to justify the legitimacy of their interventions.

Meanwhile, the multilateralism, although favored by both of them, has different definitions for the U.S. and Europe. They form it according to their domestic political interests and international power positions. "For the U.S. a joint approach would mean less freedom of unilateral action. For the EU it would mean less opportunity for self serving action."[31] The US has become suspicious of the multilateral institutions, while the EU has got used to multilateralism owing to its multinational association.

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[30] Kagan, op.cit., in note 11, pp. 3-4.

[31] Zbigniew Brezinski, "Hegemonic Quicksand," *The National Interest* (Winter 2003/04) 14.

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The image of the U.S. in world scene is that Americans are inclined to by-pass the international institutions. Nonetheless, the multilateralism that the U.S. maintains is a selective one due to its superpower status. Not surprisingly, the U.S. uses multilateralism for putting order the other states into predictable patterns. What is more, in accordance with the crisis regions, the U.S. allocates the UN, NATO or G-8 to legitimize itself. Actually, the policy approach of the U.S. is not unilateral but a selectively designed multilateralism.

In American way of thinking, multilateralism is not "UN-ism" and should not be defined so narrowly.[32] Some of the conclusions of the UNSC have been inefficient for the Americans. As a matter of fact, in a situation where an intervention is required, Americans, even without UNSC authorization, tend to be multilateral. Therefore, the ineffectiveness of the UN decision-making procedure gains importance as a multilateral platform for tackling the security issues. Then again, it is possible to by-pass the UN mechanism in global security challenges. To illustrate, in Kosovo bombing, it was Europeans desired intervention and took place on an important position though not in the military form. Besides, Europeans also bypass the Security Council when the situation suits their purposes.[33]

The ability of multilateral institutions is also determined by the U.S. in case of an operation. For instance, a UN mandate can go further by the American will. However, in the case of Rwanda, albeit the absence of a UN mandate, world community again blamed Americans for their standstill.

The differentiated governing procedures of the U.S. and the EU for foreign policy are also another impediment for cohesion in relations. Americans have an inter-agency decision making process whereas Europeans are taking decisions by intergovernmental institutions. That's why, making and implementing a decision could vary considering their internal dynamics. In a similar way, political leadership

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[32] Richard N. Haas, ed., *Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, Europe and Problem Countries* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), p. 236.

[33] Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* vol:83 issue:2 (Mar/Apr 2004) 74.

has to be put in perspective in transatlantic relations. To illustrate, Secretary of State Mr. Colin Powell and Secretary of Defence Mr. Donald Rumsfeld have more in common with each other rather than Powell and the foreign ministers of France, Germany or Great Britain.[34] Furthermore, American diplomats specialize in unilateral politico-military affairs, whereas their European counterparts focus on civilian multilateral organizations such as the EU.[35] Therefore, conflicting political choices, orientations and experiences could easily translate into transatlantic debates.

When a Republican administration is in power, European anti-American sentiments seem to increase. The instruments they use such as orthodox free-market approach to economic issues and a more hawkish approach to foreign policy are at odds with prevailing European values and practices. For being a republican "[George W.] Bush surrounded himself with advisors who were of a distinctly Euroskeptic hue."[36] In the mean time, Bush administration's priorities were already shifted away from Europe before Iraq crisis and even before the attacks of September 11. In his first trip to Europe, he preferred not to go to France and Germany that those countries would soon be called as main pillars of "old Europe". Instead, he went to Spain, Poland and Slovenia, later they would be called as "new Europe". This lack of sympathy to the united Europe largely stemmed from the absence of an ideological single European political approach. George W. Bush administration brought the rules of "post-Atlanticism" which were driven from hegemony but not leadership.[37]

Together with the differing governing types, socio cultural domain is significant for the transatlantic rift. The societies on both sides seem to emphasize each other's differences. The cosmopolitan nature of ruling elite in U.S. has altered the definition of the state's identity. The Europeanization of socialization, the

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[34] Michael Cox, "Martians and Venutians in the New World Order," *International Affairs* 79, 3 (2003) 530

[35] Moravcsic, *op.cit.*,p. 77.

[36] Baker, *op.cit.*p. 39.

[37] Justin Vaisse, "From Transatlanticism to Post-Atlanticism," *In the National Interest* (July 9, 2003)

emergence of Europe as a norm leader, and the diverging discourse between Europe and the U.S. are the socio-cultural factors that contribute to the recent divergence.[38]

The leading debates on the transatlantic relations are proofs that they are not getting ever closer to a common global agenda and fundamental cultural and structural basis for a transatlantic partnership is eroding.[39] Those divergences, begun on 9 November 1989, became clearer after September 11 attacks, and the Iraq crisis made them inescapably clear. Both partners are loosing interest in each other and both becoming more and more insular. Suffice to say that, positive rationale for the partnership is lacking between the EU and the United States.[40]

The U.S. and the EU are increasingly heading for competition and rivalry on various areas. Therefore, negotiation is lacking between two sides. In Ronald D. Asmus's words, "Somewhere between Kabul and Baghdad, the U.S. and Europe lost each other".[41] Owing to those discrepancies, a revitalized transatlantic partnership and a common global role are necessary although it is hard to construct.

Necessary precautions are lacking for ameliorating the relations between two sides. There have been limited efforts for slowing down the widening gap. American inclination has been bypassing the EC/EU. However, the Transatlantic Declaration of November 1990 made available that first time an institutionalized channel developed for more intensive political consultations outside the NATO. Still the consultations were unsubstantial, unlinked with each other and had no focus.[42] The declaration was amended for broader US-EU cooperation in 1995 known as New Transatlantic Agenda.[43] Although it has provided close cooperation and concrete results, the

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[38] Alice Ackerman, "The Changing Transatlantic Relationship: A Socio Cultural Approach," *International Politics* 40 (2003): 121.

[39] Kühnhardt,*op.cit.* ,in note 24, p. 14.

[40] Werner Weidenfeld, A*merica and Europe: Is the Break Inevitable*, (Gütersloh: Bertelsman Foundation Publishers, 1996), p 10

[41] Ronald D: Asmus, "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance" *Foreign Affairs* vol:82 number:5 (Sep/Oct 2003): 21

[42] Alberta Sbragia, "The Transatlantic Relationship. A Case of Deepening and Broadining," in *The European Union in the World Community.* Edited by Carolyn Rhodes (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) pp. 157-158.

[43] The New Transatlantic Agenda was signed in Madrid at the US-EU summit on 3 December 1995.

process itself cannot address certain structural deficiencies. Besides EU-US cooperation has sometimes been excessively bureaucratic and cumbersome.[44]

The agreed effective mechanisms are absent for the security cooperation between transatlantic allies. The relations are defined by their limits, each side prefer to employ vetoing power to the scope of action. The U.S. and Europe no longer define the relations by their opportunities and common perspectives.[45] Deeper values or the surface frictions between the U.S. and Europe will prevail and will depend in large part on how the U.S. plays its hands.[46] The expected automatic cooperation is no more applicable as it was during the years of the Cold War.

2.1. Iraq Crisis: Inciting the Transatlantic Partnership

Iraq affairs have heightened the tensions between the EU and the United States since 2002. Former disagreements mentioned above were also effective for endangering the relations but this has been the toughest one.[47] Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein have been in the concern of Western international community since the U.S.-led intervention in 1991. September 11 incidents were a chance for the U.S. for readjusting the Iraq issue. The U.S. abandoned the indecisive policy about containment of Iraq, which has been continuing since the first gulf war of 1991, mostly as a part of the U.S. war against terrorism.

Iraq has also been under consideration of Europe. However, European governments did not perceive a direct threat from Iraq. They have formed their Iraq policy under geopolitical considerations and Europeans were not able to put forth a common Iraq policy over the crisis period. Ironically, minor powers in Europe placed their bets on behalf of the United States. They expected to gain more from partnership with the U.S. than solidarity within Europe.

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[44] Chriss Patten, "Devotion or Divorce?: The Future of Transatlantic Relations," *European Foreign Affairs Review,* 6 (2001): 287-288.

[45] Kühnhardt, *op.cit.,* in note 24, pp.11-12.

[46] Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power-Why the World's Only Superpower can't Go it Alone*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p 35.

[47] Asmus, *op.cit.,* p. 20.

Debate over Iraq was about the functioning of the international system and the roles of major actors. Europeans find the threat less pressing. They worry more about the spillover of Middle East instability. Franco-German moves against the USA also caused an intra-EU crisis as they revealed the absence of a common EU foreign policy. Rather than a common decision on Iraq, in some European governments and large sectors of the European public, anti-Americanism has become a kind of default ideology. A number of European political leaders believed that Bush administration is actively seeking to divide Europe. Especially Germany and France objected the unilateral temptations of the U.S. administration bypassing the UN solutions. The resentment of the EU leaders had reflections also on the U.S. side. The U.S. urged other European nations not to follow the French government forming a coalition linking Paris to Moscow through Berlin and not to act as an alternative pole against the American super power. This caused loyal allies such as Britain and Poland to declare a new strategy of "punishing France and ignoring Germany."[48] That meant that they would not continue to accept the traditional Franco-German dominance over EU foreign policy.

The former disagreements in the partnership were never actively sought to foment them within Europe. The U.S. decision on intervention divided the Europe between anti-interventionists namely Germany and France and interventionist side with the United Kingdom. Iraq debacle demonstrated that, considering the America's national interests, sometimes a divided Europe is better than a united Europe. The former group disliked a direct use of military means and put forth an alternative plan for enhancing the UN inspectors' position in Iraq. While the U.K. with other seven NATO members[49] cooperated with the United States. Due to the anti-American reactions within Europe the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld affirmed Germany and France for representing "old Europe." On the other hand the supporters of the U.S. policies towards Iraq were named as the "new Europe".[50] The U.S. has managed not to realize an anti-American stance in those countries. Besides,

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[48] Baker, *op.cit.,* pp. 37-38.

[49] Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Spain

[50] Donald Rumsfeld, 'Press Briefing at the Foreign Press Center', Washington, 22 January 2003, Also available at: http:// www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2003/ t01232003_t0122sdfpc.html

especially among Central and East European (CEE) countries the U.S. has gained leverage by insisting on the accession of those countries first in the NATO instead of the EU. For that reason, the U.S. motive in supporting the NATO enlargement has managed to prevent the emergence of an anti-American sentiments and stance in those countries. Yet, the U.S. has adjusted a counterweighing policy against France and Germany via CEE countries.

When the coalition force's military action in Iraq had come to an end, the U.S. officials believed that the EU's internal divisions troubled the alliance. Furthermore, for NATO, it is loosing its effectiveness because of the unwilling members blocking the process. [51]

2.2. The Motives of the United States in Conducting Foreign and Security Policy

The phenomena facing the world today are globalization and the predominance of the U.S. power. The foreign policy conduct of the U.S. is emphasized on unilateral tendencies and national sovereignty is incontestable and brought to the global level.[52] The U.S supremacy resembles to a worldwide empire which is based on the acquisition of wealth. In Joseph S. Nye Jr's words "Power is the ability to effect the outcomes you want, and if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen."[53] That is to say, power enables the U.S. to continue a hegemonic foreign policy. Although the power is softened by the web of multilateral institutions, it permits the U.S. to interfere in the world affairs alone if it has to.

For conducting its foreign policy the U.S. considers some vital interests. They are namely; to protect the U.S. territory and people from an external attack that could cause mass casualties; to maintain the security of North America, surrounding waters and the air space; to avoid the dominance of Europe and northeast Asia by a hostile

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[51] Simon Serfaty, "EU-U.S. Relations Beyond Iraq: Setting the Terms of Complementarity," *Euro-Focus* vol.9 no.3 (April 11, 2003) 1

[52] Peter Volten, "Küreselleşmenin Amerika ve Avrupa'nın Güvenlik Stratejilerine Yansıması," in *Küreselleşme ve Uluslar arası Güvenlik*, ed. Reşat Ödün (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2003) pp. 169.

[53] Nye, *op.cit.,* p 4.

power in order not to lose strategic positions on the opposite shores of the oceans that guards the United States; and the last one is to maintain key international systems on which the U.S. depends.[54] With regard to those interests American people demand a foreign policy that makes sure an event like September 11 will never happen again.[55] That is so, attacks of 9/11 made the rouge regimes, terrorism, WMD as a matter of vital national interest to many Americans. Those clarified targets became core subjects of foreign policy as well as of war against terrorism.

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington did little to compromise U.S. hegemony. Indeed, they provided an opportunity for increasing America's global engagement.[56] War on terrorism is simplistic and universal, it clears the uncertainties and complexities of the post-Cold War period, and it has the almost unanimous support of the American people.[57] However the war against terrorism will be a multidecade struggle. U.S. must undertake a much more severe enterprise than it did in Europe. For being the targeted region, blamed for the source of the major catastrophes that the world is facing, Middle East is a region culturally alien, politically turbulent, ethnically complex and without natural allies.[58] Away from military power, diplomacy, legitimacy, allies, intelligence cooperation, and an ability to win hearts and minds throughout the world will be important in order to get a result. [59] Nevertheless, for being a dilemma facing the U.S., terrorist attacks made it clear that the threat to the U.S. was so great that it would be irresponsible to rely on others such as international institutions and international law. This is mostly because of power and dynamism resulting from internal US developments, particularly economic and technological.

The military capability of U.S. is always under consideration in dealing with overseas crisis. Yet, it has always been the ultimate resort. But it is a fact that, without

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[54] The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002)

[55] Colin Powell, "A Strategy of Partnerships," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2004) 22

[56] Charles A. Kupchan, "The End of the West," *The Atlantic Monthly* (November 2002) ?

[57] Pierre Hassner, "The United States: the empire of force or the force of empire," *Chaillot Papers* no. 54 (September 2002): 38.

[58] Brezinski, *op.cit.,* p. 6.

[59] Nye, *op.cit.,* p. XV.

America's willingness to act, the rest of the international community did not seem to act over the past decade.[60] The concept of "American way of war" has the character of forming massive military force and calls for victory; set aside the consequences of the intention.[61]

For deciding the use of force: public opinion, the military hierarchy and the political elites are determinant in policy-making. Besides, for achieving a foreign policy objective U.S. parliament can lead to difficulties. The absence of curiosity about events abroad on the part of the U.S. public causes to emerge special interest groups and one-issue lobbies have more influence over the U.S. foreign policy than ever before.[62]

However, if America wants to turn the 21st century into another "American century" it must combine the hard power and soft power with a smart use of the advantages of the information age and globalization.[63] In that respect, Americans cannot achieve all their international goals by acting alone. The U.S. needs formerly ignored institutions like NATO and UN. If not so, hegemon attitude without partners and followers would in time encourage countervailing alliances causing turbulence and disorder and this would ultimately weaken the United States.[64]

2.3. European Efforts for Balancing the Transatlantic Relationship

After the Second World War Western European countries gathered around for forming an association in order not to experience catastrophic events of a massive war again. Since, the war has led to destruction and suffering in Europe. Europeans intended to heal their wounds under the auspices of the United States. During the Cold War the American security umbrella allowed the Europeans to concentrate on political and economic reconstruction and integration. In the

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[60] Gordon, *op.cit.,* p. 79.

[61] Hassner, *op.cit.,* p.17.

[62] Blackwill, *op.cit.,* p. 15.

[63] Kühnhardt,*op.cit.,*in note 24, p. 46.

[64]Nye, *op.cit.,* p XIII.

meantime, a more coherent Europe was serving best to American interests. Indeed, Europe was no longer the predominant actor of international action.[65] In other words, Europeans became the backseat drivers of history.[66] Their path to the integration has been in the way of an economic and social union. They consider themselves as a regional power, not a global one, and most European states do not consider that they have vital interests outside Europe.[67]

However, after the Cold War, the rising new worldwide threats shifted the focus away from Europe. The failure of Europe's political unity and defense capability decreased the significance of Europe and changed the U.S.' view on Europe as an equal partner. European self-sufficiency and contribution gained importance in this period. For maintaining the welfare of the West, a balanced transatlantic partnership is necessary. In fact, it is mostly the European's responsibility to enhance their capability for guaranteeing their defense.

Considering its past and its so far improvement, European model of society constitutes a new practice of international politics. Europe has emerged as a norm entrepreneur or norm leader on the international stage. They highlight particular problems or issues that require more social aspect.[68] Most Europeans are convinced that dialogue and development are more effective paths to security than military strength. They prefer to deal with problems through economic integration, foreign aid, and multilateral institutions. It is therefore European experience practice multilateralism and multidimensionality on world affairs.[69]

The probability of the U.S. isolationism scared Europe during the Cold War. This has been replaced by the U.S. unilateralism.[70] They worry about America's reinterpretation of the role of international law. In a parallel manner, the German

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[65] Nelson, *op.cit.,* p. 58.

[66] Jonah Goldberg, "Irritating and Irrelevant," *The American Enterprise* (December 2002) 34

[67] Thompson, *op.cit.,* pp. 215-216.

[68] Ackerman, *op.cit.,* pp. 128-129.

[69] Daalder, *op.cit.,* p.152.

[70] Nye, *op.cit.,* p 35.

foreign minister, Joschka Fisher, said that a "world order in which the national interests of the strongest power is the criterion for military action simply cannot work".[71]

The idea of European integration has become "pooling of sovereignties" of each individual member state. The separate national interests of those countries are no longer strong and consistent enough to affect the ongoing developments. However, the EU is having institutional deficiencies even though it has strong global economic role supported by a common currency. Then again, it has weak and inconsistent political union as well as short of political will. This situation is based on Europe's own failure to agree on significant foreign policy issues. Member states are unwilling to resign their sovereignty whether within the EU or relative to the United States.[72] Strategic vision is lacking in European concept and they cannot converge naturally into one European interest.[73] In short, security and defense culture is lacking among European countries. Moreover, in comparison to the U.S., the EU has weaker institutions related to the hard security issues.

It is again dubious that the EU would form a full-fledged foreign policy institution even if the EU Commission devoted as much time and effort to this as it did for promoting EMU and the Euro. Furthermore, rotating EU presidency has been a significant obstacle to a sustained common policy. Each country pursues its own priorities and bureaucrats have their own interest in putting a national stamp on the outcomes.

The EU's aspiration to be a "civilian power"[74] makes it unenthusiastic about defense spending. One of the reasons for that they feel themselves comfortable with American protectorate established by the United States through NATO during the Cold War. What is more, USA spends more on its forces and does not shrink from

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[71] "We're not Children!" *The Economist* (US edition) 17 May 2003 pp. 44-45

[72] Serfaty, *op.cit.,* p. 2.

[73] Karaosmanoğlu, *op.cit.,* in note 3, p.176.

[74] For an analysis of EU's civilian power status see Karen E Smith, "Still 'civilian Power EU?'", *European Foreign Policy unit Working Paper 2005/1,*. Also available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/intrel/pdfs/EFPU%20Working%20Paper%202005-1.pdf

using force even on behalf of its allies. On the other hand, an enlarged Europe without sufficient institutions capable of assuring its own defense from external threats cannot put the European integration beyond a free trade area. Even though, a number of conscious European initiatives have been advancing on figuring a sober approach in security and defense sphere.

The idea of forming a common security/defense and foreign policy was never entirely absent from discussions around the future of the European project. Since 1950s many initiatives have been taken in the direction of a common European arrangement in security/defense and foreign policy issues.

European Defence Community (EDC) failure of 1950s; European Political Cooperation (EPC) of 1969 for consultations on foreign policy issues are some of these examples. In 1981 for enhancing the EPC Europeans included political aspects of security to the process; the Single European Act (SEA) (1986) firstly mentioned EPC in a community legal document.

By the 1990s, with enormous shift in the world policy, the EC had internal developments by Maastricht Treaty (or Treaty on European Union-TEU). By converting the EC into the EU, CFSP involved as second pillar under common roof of Europe. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was designed to "include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense".[75] In 1997, Amsterdam Treaty created the position of High Representative for the CFSP. It also included Petersberg tasks for giving the EU competence for "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making."[76] At 1998 St. Malo French-British summit meeting British Prime Minister Tony Blair, reversed the British position on behalf of forming an autonomous role for the EU in security and defense matters as long as it would be exercised in conformity with NATO obligations. In that respect, the EU decided "the capacity for autonomous action,

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[75] TEU (7 February 1992), Declaration (no 31) on WEU.

[76] Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union.

backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises".[77]

European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) materialized at the June 1999 Cologne summit. Same year in December at Helsinki summit European Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was included into the European security structure. In year 2000, Nice treaty set up new formulas for facilitating decision making process and suggested the major functions of the WEU be brought into the EU.

The project of CFSP/ESDP is proof that the EU has progressed on forming a common security/defense and foreign policy. Despite the fact that, CFSP/ESDP lacks in operational capabilities and decision-making coherence. In near future ESDP will not be rival to the NATO. The necessary reforms are not done. The EU is lacking in command control structure, intelligence and logistics. The financial dimension is one of the handicaps for realizing aforementioned capabilities. It is the responsibility of member states to spend enough for meeting their current capabilities gap. Furthermore, today the military structure should be deployable and mobile in order to operate in foreign countries. But in most European countries the defense budget is not expended for the necessary military force to deal with today's threats.[78]

Beyond financial problems security and defense coherence is lacking in the EU. NATO evolved to Europe's main security institution.[79] The current formations in security field, in general, require NATO assets in case of an intervention. Lack of coherence within Europe impedes the EU to stand as a security actor in world affairs.

The separate construction of ESDP has misgivings in the United States because unified Europe on security and defense issues would hinder the United States' policies contrasting with European ones. That would increase Europe's influence on global security challenges and diminish the reliance on NATO. However, the EU's inconsistent initiatives on creating a common security and defense policies had

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[77] Article 2 of the St-Malo Declaration.

[78] Chris Donnelly, "Küreselleşme Bağlamında NATO ve Avrupa Birliğinin Gelecekteki Rolleri, " in *Küreselleşme ve Uluslar arası Güvenlik*, ed. Reşat Ödün (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2003) p. 134.

[79] Daalder, *op.cit.,* p. 149.

caused the Clinton administration to summarize the challenges to develop an effective CFSP as the famous three Ds that are to be avoided: "de-coupling" the U.S. from Europe: "duplication" of NATO structures and capabilities: and "discrimination" against non-EU NATO member allies.

As long as the Europeans are not keen on assuming the responsibility for their own security and defense, the transatlantic gap will not seem to disappear. Iraq occasion showed that depending on Europe was disillusionment. But, any attempt to force a common EU position on Iraq would harm the CFSP. The EU has been implementing a common policy in Balkans. In the Middle East, the policies of the EU have resemblance with its former Balkans policy. [80] After September 11, considering the Middle East, the EU is beginning not only to shape its first truly joint and comprehensive strategy but also to challenge America's monopoly in regional arbitration.

2.4. NATO, After the Cold War

After the Cold War, the U.S. led the transformation of NATO from a defense alliance into an enlarging security alliance. In a parallel way, as a result of its transformation, its role converted to be more political than a military one. It has been the preferred platform for consultation among democratic governments on a range of political challenges. By expansion and with the new initiatives, NATO has become a force for democracy and stability and maintains its unique posture as cornerstone of military defense and security in the Atlantic world. The changing security nature and growing importance on military cooperation enhance NATO's significance with its command structures, common operating principles and shared assets.

The end of the Cold War had provided a unique opportunity to enhance security in the Euro-Atlantic zone without dividing lines. Enlargement includes the former Warsaw Pact nations in which they were compulsorily excluded from the West and wanted to be part of it again. According to these countries NATO is the

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[80] Interview with Atilla Eralp, *Stradigma,* No: 1, February 2003. Also available at www.stradigma.com.; Brian Crowe, "A Common Foreign Policy After Iraq," *International Affairs* 79, 3 (2003) 535.

only institution which symbolizes the Transatlantic West.[81] With the inclusion of Russia as a member for future decisions dealing with common threats and also by the initiatives in surrounding regions, NATO includes all the key actors within the institution.

The restructured security environment has enabled NATO to undergo a major internal and external transformation. While retaining the core function of providing for the collective security of its members, it has paid growing emphasis on conflict-prevention and peacekeeping, has made deep cuts in the level of armed forces and has transformed its structures. NATO reformed military command structure and encouraged its European members to build a European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance.

NATO deployed efforts to render its structures' becoming more flexible in order to better respond to new security conditions. The concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), introduced at the 1994 Brussels Summit allowed for the first time the possibility for NATO to engage in military action with other international entities and for the participation of non-NATO partners in joint operations. Furthermore NATO ceased planning the operations against a clearly defined adversary.[82] Instead, it studied potentially destabilizing factors.

Nevertheless, the ongoing situation in NATO has some handicaps for the future of the institution. The affect of NATO was unsubstantial in non-European security issues. The enlarged NATO and the independently evolving European security architecture are at odds with each other. NATO with 26 members tends to undermine European integration in the security realm. In contrast, the EU's attempts are alienating the non-EU NATO members. Furthermore, the involvements of peripheral countries attenuate the core US-European cooperation in the alliance.

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[81] Kagan, *op.cit.,* in note 11, p.80.

[82] Robert Mc.Calla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War", *International Organization*. Vol:50, No:3, Summer 1996, pp.445-75.

In the mean time, the worsening nature of the transatlantic relations marginalized the confidence-building role of NATO. [83]

2.5. For a Better Partnership

The ongoing transatlantic relationship is defined by its limits. American perception of its future relation with Europe is about enduring the U.S.'s continuous hegemony, whereas, the future of Europe more is likely to be defined against or at least without the United States. Besides, the process of European integration is being inherently directed against the United States. Alternatively, the relations delineated by its opportunities would be more prosperous for both sides. A direct comparison between the two constantly brings misunderstandings, disagreements and quarrels. Indeed, it will be realistic that learning from each other will improve the relations. Institutional parity, rather than rivalry, in dealing with common interests would be a cause for evaporating the disagreements. [84]

The American way ignoring Europeans with hard power instruments obviously will be within limits. Peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction processes are lingering facts of an intervention now. Short-term consequences might be manageable for the U.S. but in the long term the U.S. will need the EU's economic resources and the financial means to ameliorate the region's stability. It is generally applicable for the "Global Balkans"[85] where the U.S. needs Europe extremely. [86]

As a matter of fact, a more persuasive foreign policy is expected from the U.S., such as convincing the other states to cooperate with her rather than to convey reluctant acquiescence. On the relations with Europe, Washington should not treat Europe and NATO as a toolbox. NATO is the natural vehicle for helping to prepare

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[83] Simon Serfaty, R*enewing the Transatlantic Partnership*, CSIS [May 2003]

[84] Kühnhardt,*op.cit.,*in note 24, p. 57.

[85] Eurasia between Europe and the Far East

[86] Brezinski, *op.cit.,* p. 10.

Europe's contribution on global security challenges.[87] Policies dividing Europe can be affective in short term. But substantial results can be taken by a unified Europe.

Considering Middle East, three interrelated tasks are awaiting for a solution. First the Arab-Israeli conflict is disruptive to the Middle East. Second, transforming the strategic equation in the oil-producing region from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia is another necessity for the region. Third, the containment of the proliferation of the WMD and the terrorist epidemic. For those tasks America may be preponderant but it is not omnipotent.[88]

For the Greater Middle East, soft power has been necessary to help these countries for transforming themselves. To bring peace, those regions require sustained engagement between US and Europe.

For a better mutual understanding, the EU must take further steps to increase its institutional and constitutional cohesion over foreign policy matters. Europe should transform itself to a partner that U.S. will take seriously. Still, they should not form their integration against Americans. The more they eliminate the ways of using force in some international problems which have to be dealt with by force, the more they contribute the U.S.' way for going alone without consultation. [89]

In security field, Europe has to take more responsibility for its own security. The deficiencies in European forces can be rectified without dramatic increases in European defense budgets. Besides, agreement on defense industrial cooperation, particularly in the area of technology transfer with the U.S., would add much to European capabilities. A competent Europe on the grounds of military capabilities allows European forces to operate effectively with the United States.

Although they have differing instincts about anti-Western ideologies, terrorism and WMD are concrete threats in front of both the U.S. and the EU. However the

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[87] Kugler, *op.cit.,* p. 38

[88] Brezinski, *op.cit.,* pp. 10-11.

[89] Gordon, *op.cit.,* p. 81.

lacking cohesiveness of the West raises a more critical situation than those threats.[90] "The U.S. and Europe are the only conceivable global partners with each other for seeking to shape the international system in positive ways for the next century."[91] Still, intention is required for rebuilding the transatlantic gap in which the solutions may differ.

In order to continue to be the main actors in the 21st century they need to reframe their relationship with a win-win situation. The legitimacy that Americans need, can be provided by Europeans, but Europeans may fail to grant it.[92] A broadened horizon is necessary for revitalizing the Atlantic community. Yet, they need more formal, effective mechanisms for consultation and even decision-making. The conflict will grow not because of the diverging interests but because lacking necessary structures. "A new approach to Atlantic cooperation has become imperative. NATO can no longer serve as the sole institution for Atlantic cooperation."[93]

[90] Ham, *op.cit.,* p. 2.

[91] Blackwill, *op.cit.,* p. 53.

[92] Kagan, *op.cit.,* p. 87.

[93] Henry A. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*, (New York: Simon&Schuster, 2001) p. 57-58.

CHAPTER III

THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TURKISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

Turkish foreign and security policy is shaped by many elements which has historical, geopolitical and ideological dimensions. The relations with the Western bloc are another component of Turkish foreign and security policy. Turkey demands a unified West converging on the same ideals and foreign policy interests. In this way, Turkey's alignment with the West would proceed more smoothly. Nonetheless, the varying security perceptions of the EU and the U.S. have been bringing about dissimilar policies in the world affairs as mentioned in the previous chapter. Together with the assessment on transatlantic gap, the review of general characteristics of Turkish foreign and security policy is essential for providing a healthy analyze about Turkey's probable security preference between the U.S. and the EU. Therefore, it is important to explore the determinants of Turkish foreign and security policy and look at the relations among Turkey, the U.S. and the EU. Turkey's presence in the NATO is also noticeable while gathering them on the same platform.[94]

Her geopolitical location has enabled Turkey to play an important role in world politics.[95] Considering Turkey's sensitive geopolitical position, the national security concerns have always been paramount in foreign policy considerations.[96] Turkey holds the key to the Turkish Straits and controls the roads from Balkans to the Middle East and from Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. Beyond geographical

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[94] Austria, South of Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, Sweden are member of the EU but does not have membership in the NATO. Nevertheless, it is worth to say that key members of the EU are also member of NATO.

[95] See Zbigniew Brezinski, *The Grand Chessboard American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and US Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* (Jan/Feb 1996) pp.35-51.

[96] F. Stephen Larrabee, "Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges," in *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan,* eds. Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee (Santa Monica: 2000), pp. 21-22.

considerations, her presence in various international organizations[97] especially the NATO and associate membership in the EU are leading connections of Turkey in her actorness in the world arena. Thus, Turkey is an important actor, poised to play a leading role across a vast region extending from Eastern Europe to Central Asia and from Black Sea to the Middle East.

In addition to her geographical location and actorness in the world politics Turkey herself is combination of many constituents. Although, great majority of her land mass lies in Asia, Turkey's progressive elite consider their country as part of Europe. While 98 percent of her population is Muslim, Turkey is a democratic and secular state and has a different path from other Muslim countries. The country both has persistency in Middle Eastern and European culture. That is to say, the developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Caspian and Black Sea, and the Mediterranean regions directly affect Turkey. Therefore, any instability in her neighborhood affects Turkey directly and any change in regional political balance increases the security vulnerability. Furthermore, the Ottoman backdrop, her Western culture and Republican history are key elements of Turkey in assessing the country.[98]

The overall political context, powers and traditions of institutions, personalities and priorities of the leading players have been the foremost organs for determining the foreign and security policy.[99] Besides those actors, Turkish foreign and security policy can be analyzed by the amalgamation of two different patterns. First, the composition of the country is indispensable in creating the foreign and security policy. The structural components present a long-term influence over the determination of the interests of the country. The cultural identity, democratization, economic stability and geopolitics would fall into this category. Second, interrelated developments in domestic affairs and

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[97] Turkey has membership to the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). Turkey has candidature to membership in the EU

[98] Eric Rouleau, "The Challenges to Turkey," *Foreign Affairs* Vol.72 Issue:5 (Now/Dec 1993): 110.

[99] Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War*, (London: Hurts & Company, 2003) pp. 52-53.

international relations dynamically affect the foreign and security policy. In this context, to a large extend, Turkish foreign and security policy is formed by her historical experiences, geopolitical location, sensitivities, ideology outlined by Atatürk's principles and developments on domestic, regional and systemic levels.[100]

The legacy of history is essential in assessing Turkey's security and foreign policy. The state of being the successor of the Ottoman Empire both generates advantages and complications in relations with her neighbors as well as her Western allies. The country has benefited from traditions of state governance, importance given on territorial unity, carefully designed and articulated security and foreign policies and above all the experience of long-lasted state governance. Although, born out of the ashes of the multi-national and multi-religious Ottoman Empire, Turkish Republic prioritized to shape a homogenous-national and secular identity and to build a strong and stable nation without imperial aims. On the other hand, the memories of neighboring countries, misleading image presented to the world, the former demands of foreign countries still have reflections on Turkish people.[101]

The experienced bureaucracy inherited from the empire formed the nucleus of Turkey's modernizing elite. These elite played an important role in shaping the country's Western oriented policies. The common idea, which always existed in the agenda of the policymakers, has been complete integration with the West since the last centuries of Ottoman Empire and throughout the Turkish Republic. This integration was not only enhancing the relations with the European countries and later on the U.S. it was also importing and bringing into practice their values and lifestyle. Eventually, Turkey became follower and ally of the West.[102]

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[100] Mustafa Aydın, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy," *The Reviewof International Affairs* Vol.3 No. 2 (Winter 2003) 307-308.

[101] Reşat Kasaba and Sibel Bozdoğan, "Turkey at a Crossroad," *Journal of International Affairs* 54,no.1 (Fall 2000): 12-15

[102] Wolfgang Schauble and David L. Phillips, "Talking Turkey," *Foreign Affairs* Vol.83 Issue:6 (Nov/Dec 2004) 134; David L Phillips, "Turkey's Dreams of Accession," *Foreign Affairs* Vol.83 Issue:5 (Sept/Oct 2004) 86.

Furthermore, Turkish Republic received a realistic and a defensive and/or protective character from the empire due to steady territorial losses for more than a century. The 'balance of power' concept located since the seventeenth century and steady territorial losses appear as fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory in modern Turkey. Although, replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923, the dictated peace Treaty of Sevres to the Ottoman Empire, which allowed Turks only to keep a small part of central Anatolia under various restrictions, has manifestations on security issues such as external world and its collaborators within the country trying to weaken and divide the country. In a parallel manner, the distrust for outsiders, fear of abandonment, the continuation of state sovereignty and fear of losing territory commonly named after "Serves syndrome" are other constituent elements of Turkish foreign and security policy. By the same token, Turkey has generated the tendency to be cautious about her environment and suspicious about other powers' intentions.[103]

The initial decades of the modern Turkey had experienced striking difficulties. Considering her evolution from 1923 to 1945 Turkish foreign and security policy with one party governing and Second World War environment, protected her neutral stance and stayed away from the destructive affects of the Second World War. The policymakers dealt with consolidating the state of Turkey and after 1939 managed the country to stay away from the war. The reluctance of being away from an adventuresome policy was mostly because the founders of the republic were senior officers of the Ottoman Empire and whose memories was so fresh about collapse of an empire.

Besides, the historical experiences Turkish foreign and security policy is, to a great extend, dependent on the country's geopolitical location. The geographical position of Turkey makes her a Balkan, Mediterranean, Caucasian and Middle Eastern country all at the same time. The countries surrounding Turkey have different characteristics, regimes, ideologies and aims. The historical relationships and the current status of the countries are important for Turkey to designate her foreign and

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[103] Pınar Bilgin, *Rethinking Turkey's Security Discourse: The Challenge of Globalization,* paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA) Boston, MA, August 29- September 1, 2002, p. 12.

security policy. That is to say, the unstable and potentially threatening neighborhood pawed the way for a cautious foreign and security policy which has been continuing her traditional position for enduring *status quo* within herself and neighboring areas. Therefore, the geographic location of Turkey increases the sensitivity to the changes in the international as well as regional political balance.[104]

By the same token, the psychical features of the land create a sense of insecurity for the country. To illustrate, Western Turkey is more vulnerable to the attacks in military terms. In particular, the Straits pose one of Turkey's major security concerns. Moreover, the Aegean Islands and Cyprus are critical for controlling the western and southern shores of Turkey. Meanwhile, the land connections on the east pose threats about immigration, smuggling and terrorism.

The modern Turkey is based on Atatürk's principles. It is not easy to change Turkey on this orientation.[105] The ideological framework of the Turkish foreign and security policy can be summarized by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's expression "Peace at Home and Peace in the World" since the establishment of the Republic in 1923. Hence, preservation of the national state with complete independence conditioned by modern Turkish nationalism, promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization, and attachment to a realist approach in foreign policy actions are ideological basis of the foreign and security policy. In the same way, Turkey has aimed to pursue a foreign policy that is a generator of security and stability in her region and beyond.[106]

Regional developments and the systemic changes in international arena has been another constituent of Turkish foreign and security policymaking. Turkish policy planning is subjected to the superpower policies. Developments occurred after the Second World War transformed world into a bipolar structure between the capitalist bloc represented by the U.S. and the Western European powers, and the

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[104] Kemal Kirişçi, "Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy," *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March, 2004): 39-41.

[105] Onur B. Öymen, speaking in 1997, "At the Crossroads of Geo-politics —Turkey in a Changing Political Environment", *Körber-Stiftung Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis*, (No.109, Hamburg). p.23

[106] Phillips, *op.cit.,* pp. 87-88.

communist bloc led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Turkey's critical decision on foreign and security policy principles was designated in favor of Western bloc due to the deliberate demands of Soviet Union about territorial concessions from Turkey and bases on the Bosporus (1945), the rise of Western Europe as an economic center of gravity and the continuity of the secular governing elite dominated by Kemalist ruling elite. The visit of the USS Missouri frigate in Istanbul on April 5, 1946 was symbolic event for confirming Turkey's presence in the Western bloc.[107] Afterwards, Turkey has consolidated her presence in the Western bloc while becoming beneficiary of Truman doctrine of 1947 and Marshall Plan of following year.

In that respect, Turkey demanded to be in the NATO. Since 1952, while being a southern flank with having the largest geographical frontiers with the common enemy, Turkey contributed to the security of the Western block. Turkey became a member of almost every European and Euro-Atlantic institution. That is to say, Turkey decided to suit her foreign and security policy parallel to the strategies of those powers. It was not only Turkey wanted to take place in West but also the U.S. led-West wanted to see Turkey with them. In that respect relations with the Western bloc permanently improved into concrete, legal and organizational level.

3.1. Turkish Foreign and Security Policy after the Cold War

The geopolitical location of Turkey has meant that Turkey has been susceptible to the changes on regional and global levels. The dramatic changes occurred in the late 1980's and early 1990's, inevitably caused Turkey to reconsider her place and standing in the world. Namely, the collapse of totalitarian regimes, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the emergence of new independent states, the reunification of Germany, and the spread of pluralist democracy and free market economies, had enormous impacts on Turkish foreign and security policies. At the outset, Turkey had failed to understand the dynamics of new milieu. It was worried that the weight possessed during the Cold War will eventually erode and Turkey would lose her importance.

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[107] Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar,* (Ankara: METU Press, 2001) p. 3.

After the Cold War three phases were observed in foreign policy making considering the new opportunity areas in front of Turkey: first the events were surprising to the policymakers. Second, subsequently they dreamed about great opportunities in front of the country. Finally, the reflections of this kind of groundless policy created uneasiness in surrounding regions after 1995s. Although Turkey has been sensitive to the changes in her surrounding regions, the developments within the immediate vicinity put pressure on Turkish foreign and security policy on a more interventionist way. But the fact remains that, the new opportunities loomed ahead Turkey, until now, did not cause any major departure from her Western oriented policy. The assertive nature assumed after the Cold War has not compelled Turkey to abandon the multilateral approaches to the foreign and security affairs.[108] Further improvement on the relations with the EC/EU remained the top priority for the Turkish decision makers. Meanwhile, Turkish security policy establishments has continued and improved her bonds with the Western oriented security establishments.

Throughout the Cold War Turkey served as a barrier to Soviet ambitions and a contributor to the security of Europe. Indeed, the strategic position of Turkey was limited to her role in Western periphery. The developments of post-Cold War era confirmed that Turkey lives in a difficult neighborhood. Unlike the usual pattern of the Cold War "multi-directional" security consideration was entrenched in the agenda of Turkey. Sixteen potential crisis points decided by NATO has been around Turkey.[109] Since 1990s wars and crisis in those regions have affected Turkey's foreign and security policy. Nonetheless, Turkey became one of the key countries being in the axis of contradiction and uncertainties.

The geographical position that Turkey possesses puts her to the heart of new global threats as well as performed responses to them. The Gulf wars in the Middle East, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo crises in the Balkans, and the conflicts over

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[108] Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Society and Foreign Policy in Troubled Times*, Report of a Geneva Center for Security Policy/RAND Workshop, April 2001 p.8. Also available at http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF171/CF171.pdf

[109] Hüseyin Bağcı, "Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler", in *21.Yüzyılın Eşiğinde Türk Dış Politikası* ed. İdris Bal (İstanbul: Alfa, 2002), p.596.

Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya and Abkhazia in the Caucasus, were all took place within the immediate vicinity of the country and increased Turkey's importance in the world. Considering the post-Cold War environment, Turkey has not been not in the condition of threatened by her neighbors individually in the short and medium term. Conversely, her neighbors can be seriously get harm individually in case of Turkey's aggressive interferes. In short, militarily and economically weaker neighbors have been around Turkey since the end of the Cold War. Nonetheless, the incidents at the surrounding regions involved Turkey inescapably. Not surprisingly, those developments also bring about new challenges and security problems and complicated Turkish foreign and security policy.

The most prominent constituents of Turkey's security discourses start with the emphasis given to her geopolitical position. Many of the developments characterize the Cold War and post-Cold War era took place in Turkey's neighborhood. Turkey has assumed a new geopolitical and strategic character from Europe to the Central Asia.[110] Together with the Turkey's traditional way of threat perception from Moscow and Greece related with hard security issues, the new definitions of security have been adapted to the Turkish security thinking. Since 1989 the major security challenges for Turkey has been to manage, contain, and resolve the disputes, conflicts and instabilities in neighboring regions. Still, the hard security issues like external military threats and insurgent terrorist activities dominate the Turkey's security agenda.[111]

Turkey herself and her eastern and southeastern neighbors are part of Middle East region. The region is the owner of the most of the known oil resources as well as the source of instability and turmoil since World War I. Middle Eastern oil and economic ties are part of Turkey's political and diplomatic concern in the region. The developments, and the ever-increasing possibility of international involvement, have inevitably created great concern in Turkey.

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[110] İsmail Cem,. *Turkey in the New Century.* (Nicosia: Rüstem Publishing, 2001) p. 64

[111] Robins, *op.cit.,* pp. 164-165.

Relations with Arabs were overshadowed by Ottoman backdrop and NATO membership. For that reason the image of being a bridge between the East and the West was harmed due to this lack of good relations during the years of Cold War.[112] After the Cold War, Turkey's increasing involvement in Middle East starts with 1990 Gulf war. Turkey's crucial questions about the war was first, sending troops to join the coalition forces, second front against Iraq, and allow the coalition powers to use İncirlik base. Afterwards, Turkey's presence in the Middle Eastern affairs has increased by the, the PKK presence in north Iraq, related with that, 1998 Syria affairs and finally Israeli-Turkish alignment. Those developments prove that Turkey explicitly went after her national interests in the region.

Considering the recent developments in the region since 2002 Turkey is significantly affected by the new situation in Iraq. The intervention of the U.S. forces together with the coalition forces[113] for military action against Saddam Hussein served as the harbinger of both internal and external challenges affecting Turkish foreign and security policy. Turkey did not rush to a final decision until an international consensus was reached on the issue. Turkey hopefully waited for cooperation between the U.S. and the EU under the UN based international community. The most unwanted outcome would be that the Kurds of northern Iraq would come out as a separate country in post-Saddam Iraq. For this reason, Turkey insisted on the total elimination of PKK in first priority. Meanwhile, continuation of Iraq's territorial integrity gained importance. Thus, a strong Baghdad would serve to Ankara's both political and economic interests. By the same token, Turkomans was involved in the policy of Turkey for balancing the Kurds in northern Iraq.

In central Asia and Caucasus, Turkey was absent in those regions during the Cold War. However, Turkish policymakers welcomed the new opportunities seemed

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[112] Ian O. Lesser, "Türkiye'nin Batıyla Gelişen Güvenlik İlişkileri," in *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri,* ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2002) p. 279.

[113] 25 non-U.S. military forces have been participating in the coalition forces. and contributing to the ongoing stability operations throughout Iraq. These countries were Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, United Kingdom, Ukraine. as of March 8, 2004. See more details at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm

to provide Turkey to enhance her regional power and new economic and business relations in the region. Moreover for the Caucasus the energy sources were good chance for diversification of Turkey's energy needs.

The Muslim Turkic-speaker states appeared at the north and east of Turkey by the dissolution of the Soviet Union presented unprecedented opportunity, at least potentially, of political, economic and psychological gains.[114] The country was held up as an economic and political model for these new states. Nevertheless, the optimism was gradually replaced by disillusionment. The new situation posed threats to regional security because of the deep tensions between mixed national groups, contested borders, economic difficulties, and competition of outsiders for influence. Furthermore, Turkey's financial and technological means were too limited to meet the immense socio-economic needs of the underdeveloped former Soviet republics. Accordingly Turkey has chosen to exercise caution rather than risk involvement.

Considering the Balkans, until 1990s the ethnic Turkish minorities in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Greece and Romania was leading issue in Turkey's engagement in the region. After the Cold War, while pursuing her interests, Turkey played a mature, rational, and tolerant role in Balkans.[115] Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo increased Turkey's interest and involvement in the Balkans. Besides, the assertive role of Turkey in the Balkans witnessed Greek-Turkish rivalry. By the same token, significant overlap in the policy objectives of the U.S. and Turkey facilitated the Turkish activism. Turkish participation in multilateral UN peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, airpower for sanctions against Belgrade and UN peacekeeping forces in Kosovo shows that Turkey is very keen on supporting stabilizing forces in the region. On the other hand Turkey's presence in the Balkans has consolidated by the economic and the military ties with Albania, Macedonia, Romania, and Bulgaria.

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[114] Kirişçi, *op.cit.,* in note 103, pp. 46-48.

[115] Şule Kut, "Türkiye'nin Balkanlar Politikası," in *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri,* ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2002) p. 121.

Beyond the regional perspective the events of 11 September 2001 made the strategic value of Turkey more visible. Turkey's long lasting struggle against terrorist insurgency has reached the meaning it deserved in the eyes of Western international community in general and Europe in particular. Besides, Turkey's strategic importance has increased in reference to the war against terrorism, which has been associated with Islam, raising Turkey as a model for the Islamic world. Turkey's Western, secular and diversified cultural identity and her ongoing democratic progress stand out even more remarkably in this new era. September 11 attacks and subsequently the operation in Afghanistan drew attention to Turkey's influence in the Central Asian, Caspian and Caucasus regions. [116]

In addition, the events of September 11 have proven Turkey's importance to the Europeans. The necessary international support was absent during the Turkey's fight against the terrorism. This struggle brought the idea into European minds that Turkey was a "security consumer" country. However, the events of September 11 proved the validity of Turkish arguments.

Domestic developments within Turkey also have significant manifestations on the foreign and security policies. The rise of ethnicity and centrifugal forces in World politics has increased the sensitivity about the sovereignty issues within Turkey. At the same time, linkages between domestic and foreign policy have heightened since the end of the Cold War. Internal and external developments hardened the readjustment of the Turkish foreign and security policy to the post-Cold War international system. During the 1990s Turkey has moved towards a more internal focused conceptualization of national security in which domestic issues such as Kurdish sentiments and political Islam addressed as domestic threats which have global dimensions.[117] Therefore, Kurdish issue human rights concerns, rise of political Islam and nationalist sentiments affected Turkish foreign and security policy in its engagement in global affairs.

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[116] Hüseyin Bağcı and Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey's Strategic Future Post-11 September Impact: The Strategic Importance of Turkey Revisited," in *Turkey's Strategic Future,* (European Security Forum Working Paper No 13, May 2003) pp. 19-25

[117] Bilgin, *op.cit.,* pp. 7-12.

The action for advancing in those domestic affairs has been greatly motivated by the EU after the Cold War. Turkey is moving in the direction of accepting the need for reform to meet EU requirements. Today the foreign policy is not only based on security but also democratization and economic development became instruments of it. Prior to the EU Brussels Summit in December 2004, significant legislation has been passed, expanding the freedom of thought and expression, lifting the barriers for the acquisition of properties by the foundation of religious minorities and abolishing the legal restrictions on teaching and broadcasting in local dialects and languages, namely Kurdish.

The fact remains that, Turkey is one of the most important countries in Eurasia and the Middle East. The developments occurred in her neighborhood did not transform Turkey to a more interventionist status.[118] Decisions to use force are derived from external circumstances, not because of the nature of the internal regime. Nevertheless, the EC/EU dedication and commitment to political and economic liberalism preserves its significance in comprehension of ruling elite.[119] Moreover, Turkey has a role as stabilizing regional power[120] and she is embodiment of the surrounding regions.[121] To illustrate, Turkish vision of a more secure peaceful region was manifested clearly and serious efforts that the government of Turkey made to achieve a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus. Furthermore, the outlook for defusing the conflict with the Kurds has never been more promising before. A Turkey, with her solved Kurdish issue once and for all would more easily approach her surrounding regions.

For the regional context, although Ankara favors multilateral policy, unilateral policies might come to the fore if immediate national concerns are involved.[122] The changing power balance between Turkey and her neighbors provided Turkey to pursue pro-active and assertive policies on issues. On the contrary, those power

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[118] Robins, *op.cit.,* p. 8.

[119] William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000,* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000) p. 191.

[120] Hans-Ulrich Klosse speaking in 1997, "At the Crossroads of Geo-politics —Turkey in a Changing Political Environment", *Körber-Stiftung Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis*, (No.109, Hamburg). p.21

[121] Cem, *op.cit.,* p. 64.

[122] Kramer, *op.cit.,* p. 212

projections have been just for to maintain her geopolitical importance in global politics, to ensure regional stability, to prevent ethnic conflicts from spilling over into her territory and to gain new markets to fuel her strategy of export-based economic growth.[123]

3.2. The Importance of NATO in Turkish Foreign and Security Policy

Turkey considers NATO as the strongest link to the Western world that serves as an ideological and institutional bridge between Turkey and the West. In that respect, Turkey's security and defense policy has been in conformity with NATO since its presence in the organization. As a matter of fact, for her relations in the international arena Turkey acts with her NATO identity.

Turkey both contributes and takes advantage of NATO for her security/defense policy. The broader engagement of NATO in Mediterranean region, Eastern Europe and Central Asia is supported by Turkey. Since, NATO's partnership and dialogue programs about fifty countries are mostly around Turkey. Any occasion in those regions has outcomes on Turkey. Nonetheless, NATO's new security understanding and establishments for meeting the contemporary security needs are intersecting with the perceptions of Turkey.[124] That's why; Turkey supports NATO's policies which are centered on Turkey's security environment. Moreover, NATO also continues its security guarantee for article 5 cases and the intergovernmental decision-making process of NATO enables Turkey to veto the decisions against the country's interests.

Furthermore, Turkey considers that the NATO is the remaining primary organization in Euro-Atlantic area. Similarly, NATO is the platform provides Turkey a direct link to the United States. In that respect, together with the U.S. and UK, Turkey maintains the understanding that the NATO should remain its importance and

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[123] Sabri Sayarı, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism," *Journal of International Affairs* 54 No.1 (Fall 2000): 180

[124] Ramazan Gözen, *Report on Turkey's Delicate Position Between NATO and the ESDP in a Broadening Security Architecture in Europe* (Brussels: NATO fellowship programme: [2002]), pp. 17-18 also available at http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/99-01/Gozen.pdf

strengthen its organizational structure. Not surprisingly, Turkey is reluctant about the Europeanization of NATO because that would entail the reduction of the American role in the alliance[125] and would keep Turkey away from the decision-making process due to Turkey's absence in the related European institutions.

As a consequence, the role of Turkey in NATO is beneficial for both Turkey and other member countries. Turkey contributes to NATO's collective defense, cooperative activities and the new European security architecture. Also Turkey helps for transformation of ex-Soviet countries to Western world. That is to say, Turkey is eager to act as a security bridge between NATO and non-NATO countries such as participating in the operations by sending troops and taking part in developing those countries, and taking responsibility on Pfp and Mediterranean Dialogue initiatives. That is to say, NATO's broadened security environment is closely interdependent with Turkey. Therefore, the advantage gained with the NATO membership will always be favored by the Turkish decisionmakers. As regards, Turkey would always support a strong NATO who has the capability to take care of the security issues of the whole Europe and around and also intercept the new kinds of security problems that are categorized as non-Article 5 issues.

3.3. The Relations between Turkey and the EU

The objective of promotion of Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization has been aimed to be realized by Turkey's presence in Europe. However, Turkey's European vacation has experienced varying levels as a result of fluctuating relations with the EC/EU and the developments both in Europe and Turkey. Turkey's existence in Europe has seemed more manageable for Turkey after the cooperation of the Western European powers on economic, social and political union since the end of the Second World War. During the 1960s, together with the security based affairs, Turkey chose to begin close cooperation with the European Economic Community (EEC) for improving the economic perspective in relations. The development of the

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[125] Heinz Kramer,. *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States.* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000) p. 203

EEC for becoming an economic and social union caused Turkey to distinguish her relations with the U.S. and Europe herself. [126]

After the Cold War it was realized that cooperation with the U.S. is not condition of enhancing the relations with the EC/EU. Therefore, Turkey has initiated more sober domestic developments to become eligible for the full membership to the EU. The EU, representing most of European countries, has loomed as the final target for Turkey. On the other hand, the recent trends in the world, growing insecurity on global basis, Turkey's progress on domestic developments and enhanced security role requires Turkey to be in the EU. In other words, in contrast to the Cold War circumstances, where Germany was cornerstone of European security, in the post-Cold War era Turkey has loomed as the keystone of the security of Europe.[127]

Turkey's ambition for full integration to the fabric of Europe has faced several troubles. The relations have followed an uncertain course. Having been considered as the beginning of the formal relations, 1963 Ankara agreement did not function as a platform for overcoming outstanding obstacles. On the European side, by consolidating its integration under the roof of the EU, Europe completed its internal security. Throughout its experience on living together, democracy and social aspects has taken the precedence in relations with the world and candidate countries. It has become one of the cornerstones in relations with Turkey. In the eyes of Turkish citizens, that situation has created the idea that Europe has been in the manner of ignoring Turkey's aspiration, and strives to prolong the aged orient policy.[128] Relations with Turkey are linked with the issue of European identity by the Turkish elite. In fact, besides this kind of ideological excuses, Turkey's domestic political and economic system has come to the fore during the relations. The impact of Turkey's membership on the functioning of EU institutions has led to considerable caution in European countries.[129] Formerly "non-strategic factors", Kurdish and

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[126] Hale, *op.cit.,* p. 218.

[127] Donnelly, *op.cit.,* p. 138.

[128] Halil İnalcık, "Türkiye ve Avrupa : Dün Bugün" *Doğu-Batı* sayı. 2 (1998) p 16

[129] Steinberg, *op.cit.,* p. 124.

human rights questions became "strategic factors" in relations with the EU.[130] Economically, Turkey's membership in the EU would create a heavy drain on the EU budget; additionally free movement of labor would create problems in receiving countries. Being a substantial agricultural producer Turkey would become a large beneficiary of EU funds.

Then again, there has been a dilemma about Western Europe and the EU in the minds of Turkish decision makers. They are eager on Turkey's commitment for being a full member of the institutions and structure of Europe, and still suspicious of Europeans trying to dismantle the Turkish state. The EU's response to the Turkish-Greek debate, Cyprus issue, terrorism and insurgency produces doubts about the EU on the Turkish side. Today, the most of the EU aspiration and the tendency of the public opinion in Turkey are based on economic matters. Considering the welfare of the EU countries, Turkish citizens assume that their income will increase eventually. Suffice to say that, Turkey claims that she will full participate in the EU and its institutions. However, the full membership would force Turkey to suit her social, economic and even political policies to the common EU decisions. Moreover, Turkey will delegate her sovereignty in supranational and quasi-intergovernmental structures of the EU. In that respect, integration with Europe in security and defense affairs, other than NATO, requires much more European approach.

Europe has two meanings for Turkey. One is welfare and prosperity through economic integration and the other is security via NATO.[131] The new opportunities around Turkey changed the focus away from Europeanization during the early 1990s. At the same time, Europe was dealing with the deepening and enlargement that Turkey was less in interest of Europe. Turkey's role of being an indispensable part of European security architecture was more evident during the Cold War years. Turkey was the main strategic ally against the Soviet expansion in three areas of vital importance, namely: the Mediterranean, due to her control of the Straits, in the

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[130] Hüseyin Bağcı, "Changing Security Perspective of Turkey," in *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Global Encounters and /vs. Regional Alternatives,* ed. Mustafa Aydın (Ankara: Grafiker Ltd, 1998) p. 80.

[131] Hikmet Çetin, speaking in 1997, "At the Crossroads of Geo-politics —Turkey in a Changing Political Environment", *Körber-Stiftung Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis*, (No.109, Hamburg). p.91

Middle East, in which Europe had economic and political interests, and in the Black Sea, where she could block the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact. However, according to European policymakers the common strategic culture disappeared in the new security era. Turkey's position in the Western alliance was overshadowed by the EU's improving security structure. Besides, the regional security concerns of Turkey have been disregarded by the Europeans. As to them, Turkey is unnecessarily heightening the security responsibilities of the Union. By Turkey's full membership, the EU's borders will start from Iran, Iraq and Syria which would erode the stability in the union.[132] The recent regional problems that Turkey faced has been more related to the Middle East according to the European policymakers.[133] Nonetheless, the security based importance of Turkey didn't vanish for Europeans due to her presence in various organizations, but its definition became vaguer.

The reason for the declining importance of Turkey in the European minds on security affairs is mostly because of the disappearance of the major menace to the European lives. After the Cold War, strategic conditions transformed Europe more insular. They have accelerated the strengthening of the integration process. Treaty on EU brought the defense vocation as an integral part of the Union. By the same token, while the geopolitical horizon of Europe has become limited with the geographical borders of the EU, the democracy discourses and democratic vision of Europe were intended to go beyond Europe. Whereas, the new strategic conditions forwarded Turkey to a more interventionist inclination in pursue of her national interests. Unlike Europeans, Turkey widened her geopolitical horizon and did not expand her democratic vision.[134]

As a matter of fact, the challenges of the new era have manifestations both on Turkey and Europe. They have shared the same sensitivity about the crisis occurred in the surrounding regions. Any individual EU intervention will be insufficient to

[132] Stephen Larrabee, "U.S. and European Policy toward Turkey and the Caspian Basin," in *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East,* eds. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997) pp. 160-161.

[133] Lesser, *op.cit.,* p. 291.

[134] Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Türkiye Açısından Avrupa Güvenlik kimliği: Jeopolitik ve Demokratik Ufuk," in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik* ed. Şaban H. Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı and Ramazan Gözen (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001) pp. 66-67.

manage without Turkey. Turkey's integration to the EU may be hard to digest but Turkey is also much too important to be neglected and left alone by Europe. This is mostly because; Turkey is one of the pivotal countries in the emerging Eurasian reality. Turkey's pivotal role in the defense of Europe during the Cold War, having the second largest standing army in NATO and considerable experience in peace-keeping operations necessitate Turkey on any further EU initiative on security basis.[135]

However, the evolving security architecture of the EU, which has aimed to eliminate the recent security challenges, has put Turkey in a "delicate position"[136]. Turkey has linked to the Western security design especially to the European security by NATO, the EU/WEU and ESDP. The EU's evolvement on defense and security matters since the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 has been in the aim of to improve the European contribution to NATO-led operations and give Europe a capability to act where NATO as an organization would not be engaged. This new strategy named as the ESDI designated the Western European Union (WEU) as the defense component of the EU. Accordingly, WEU was the link between the EU and NATO. The linkage between the NATO and the WEU was providing Turkey to participate and to contribute the European security architecture.

Turkey's presence in the WEU as an associate member enabled Turkey to take part in decision-making process. Nonetheless, EU Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999 merged the WEU with the EU and cut the institutional connection between the WEU and NATO and a new process has begun within the EU replacing the ESDI with the ESDP. The ESDP has been an autonomous EU initiative aimed to realize EU-led military operations using NATO assets. As a NATO member and non-EU European country Turkey has felt herself excluded from the developing European defense and security matters.[137]

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[135] Esra Çayhan, "Towards a European Security and Defense Policy: With or Without Turkey?," in *Turkey and the European Union: Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics,* eds. Ali Çarkoğlu and Bary Rubin (London: Frank Cass, 2003) p. 46.

[136] Gözen, *op.cit.,* in note 111, p. 2.

[137] Çayhan, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

Turkey supported the ESDI developed within the NATO through WEU. In that case the EU's accession to NATO assets would be provided by case by case basis. Likewise, the EU can initiate an operation when NATO chooses not to do so. In view of the fact that, the stance of Turkey to the ESDI is based on four points: Turkey's national interest; respecting the legal documents of NATO; NATO's position on Europe; strengthening European security.[138]

The current European security architecture forms a certain marginalization of Turkey. Turkey's failure to attend from second pillar issues by ESDP causes considerations in Turkey. Turkey will not have a say in the strategic control and political direction of the operations in case the EU led operations uses NATO assets and capabilities. The projected Petersberg task missions give Turkey a subcontractor role for ESDP. In a case Turkey's assets used the EU could put Turkey away from decision making process and would use the NATO assets in Turkey.[139]

Although the EU's security architecture externalizes Turkey, a tangible amount of contribution has been offered to this initiative by Turkey for being involved in decision-making process. In that respect, the failure of ESDP for considering Turkey's position in the European security and Turkey's interests caused the Turkish veto on letting the EU to use NATO assets and capabilities. In December 2001 this deadlock was solved by a deal between the U.S., Britain and Turkey the so-called Ankara Document. According to this agreement, apart from previously given rights, Turkey was provided with additional assurances and rights, in return that Turkey will remove her veto on the EU-NATO co-operation. It also provides important progress to meet Turkey's fundamental concerns relating Turkey's national interests in the broader European security region.[140]

Turkey also underlines the importance of NATO vis-à-vis the Europeans' standpoint. In that respect, Turkey is against the cutback of NATO's significance by

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[138] Onur Öymen, "Turkey and the New Challenges to European Security," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 6 (2001): 402-403.

[139] Charles Grant, "A European view of ESDP," European Security Forum Working Paper 10 September 2001. Also available at http://www.eusec.org/grant.htm.

[140] Simon Duke, "CESDP and the EU response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link," *European Foreign Affairs Review* (2002): 159-160.

the Europeans. ESDP arrangements concerning the non-EU European NATO members are eroding the inclusiveness principle of NATO. Any effort for degrading the principality of NATO would harm Turkey in which Turkey pursues foreign and security policy by NATO advantages. This would bring the psychology of being excluded from European security architecture which consequently paves the way for hindering reforms which Turkey should bring into action. Therefore, Turkey's inclusion in ESDP would provide a chance to accelerate those reforms. Membership in the EU would be Turkey's strongest possible anchor to the West. Moreover, autonomous structure of the EU's security establishment might permit Greeks use the ESDP as leverage against Turkey. [141]

Turkey from the beginning wants to be in European security order developing under the framework of the EU. An issue handled on European level or NATO level would have different connotations for Turkey. A case undertaken in the NATO agenda will be above European level and Turkey eventually will have right to involve in process. Together with its changing nature towards a political organization NATO, will be the platform for deciding on important political and operational decisions on Europe's security concerns.[142] However, European way of constructing ESDP is not suitable for Turkey.

Consequently, the strategic planning of the EU will have reflections on Turkey. The recent developments within the EU will occupy the continent with domestic affairs in short and middle term. In this sense, the EU, busy with its internal problems such as deepening, digesting the newly member states and struggling for a Europe-wide constitution could easily put Turkey out of the EU design as well as European security architecture. On the other hand, the contemporary challenges necessitate the presence of Europe beyond its borders. That situation necessitates the presence of Turkey within the security developments of Europe. So, Turkey expects a more assertive Europe beyond its geographical limits.

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[141] Nathalie Tocci and Marc Houben,. "Accommodating Turkey in ESDP". *CEPS Policy Brief No.5* (May 2001) pp. 7-8

[142] Kramer, *op.cit.,* p. 216.

During the Cold War Turkey contributed to European security via NATO. Turkey will remain the backbone of European security as long as the transatlantic relations remain the strongest elements of American interests in Europe.[143] The isolation of the EU's security development was a psychological resentment for the Turkey since the critical issues will be settled by the NATO Council.[144] Nevertheless, the EU needs Turkey for forming an effective actorness.[145] In addition, Turkey's full integration into the EU will cause development in the sense of soft security. By the same token, Turkey's significant transformation gains importance considering her decision on being a member of a supranational union vis-à-vis Kemalist rhetoric on national sovereignty.[146] Therefore, Europeans have to do more than simply preach to Turks.[147]

The current global dynamics dictates a concerted European commitment that the EU would turn out to be a significant security actor. This ideal can be managed more easily by including Turkey to the EU's security culture and then full membership in the EU. The goodwill of Turkey on cooperation with the EU on security issues will not be provided if the EU does not change its ambiguous policy towards Turkey. It would not only result in lack of support in near regions but also add domestic challenges such as Cyprus issue to the EU's security challenges.

3.4. Mutual perceptions, Turkey and the U.S.

The conditions of the Cold War consolidated the relations between the U.S. and Turkey within a realist perspective. Turkey became the part of the U.S.' Cold War policy, and in turn, the security of the former became integrated with the Western bloc.

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[143] Kramer, *op.cit.,* p. 213

[144] Hale, *op.cit.,* p. 230.

[145] Lothar Rühl, speaking in 1997, "At the Crossroads of Geo-politics —Turkey in a Changing Political Environment", *Körber-Stiftung Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis*, (No.109, Hamburg). p.34

[146] Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, *Yol Ayrımında Türkiye* [Turkey at the Crossroads] (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), p. 232.

[147] Morton Abramowitz, ed., *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy.* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000) p. 4

In American foreign policy thinking, Turkey's strategic importance has remained as one of the dominant factors. For Washington, the strategic partnership with Turkey means; to obtain the support of Turkey and make use of her geographical location. The critical military base facilities of Turkey were strategically important for the U.S. during the Cold War years. The cooperation on security between them was mainly grounded on the use of Turkey's base facilities and in turn, the provision of economic and military aid to Turkey by the United States. The relationship has been consolidated not only with the U.S. aids but also with solid agreement such as "Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA)" signed in March 1980. Although both partners benefited from each other the partnership did not follow a trouble-free pattern. The U.S.-Turkish partnership has even named after "troubled alliance", "ambivalent ally".[148]

The conformity of Turkish foreign and security policy with both NATO and the policies of the U.S. has been necessary for the relations. The U.S. wants Turkey to be stable, secular, democratic and allied with West.[149] However, apart from siding with Western norms Turkey has not set aside her national interests. Therefore, Turkey's adherence to her national interests prohibits the U.S. to directly conduct its crucial interests via Turkey. Frankly, the current relationship is mainly based on security matters and military cooperation. The demands of Turkey related to the areas, except the security issues, are usually ignored by the USA. In that respect, Turkish elite supports the idea that U.S. should consider Turkey as an equal partner and develop her dialogue within this perspective.[150]

The relationship has undergone some difficulties both during and after the Cold War years. The past of the two countries has witnessed several instances illustrating the facts that Turkey's strategic importance is expendable in favor of the U.S.' global

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[148] Nasuh Uslu, "1947'den Günümüze Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Genel Portresi" [A General Portrait of Turkish-American Relations] *Avrasya Dosyası* 6/2 (Summer 2000) : 208-214

[149] Morton Abramowitz, speaking in 1997, "At the Crossroads of Geo-politics —Turkey in a Changing Political Environment", *Körber-Stiftung Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis*, (No.109, Hamburg). p.17

[150] Soli Özel, speaking in 2004, "Future of Turkish-American Relations", Boğaziçi University and TUSIAD Foreign Policy Forum, p.37. Also available at http://www.tusiad.org/dpolitika/raporlar/3_27nisan.pdf.

interests and the U.S. doesn't remember Turkey unless it needs her.[151] Regarding the Cold War years; the removal of Jupiter missiles, Johnson letter and arms embargo after Cyprus intervention, and for the post-Cold War era; the dual containment of Iran and Libya, U.S. position about the future of Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations, the veto against Turkey's weapon acquisition programs, the assertions about Turkish human rights deficiencies, the U.S. insensitivity about the status of northern Iraq's Kurdish region, and the activities of Armenian Diaspora in the U.S. are some of the examples that have caused tension between the two sides. Moreover, U.S. accusation of Iran and Syria for supporting terrorism has produced uneasiness in relations with Turkey which aims to build good relations with her neighbors. Finally, the decision of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) taken in March 2003, which did not allow the usage of Turkish land for opening a northern front against Iraq by the U.S., caused discomfort between two sides.

Although the relationship has undergone several divergences, the past cooperation, the ongoing connections and the mutual efforts for future prospects prove the idea that the relationship of the two has the potential to develop a strong partnership. The policies of the U.S. and Turkey converge on many issues and areas of interest. For example; the U.S. buttressed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project which directly serves to Turkish national interests[152]. Moreover, the U.S. bolstered Turkey in Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative, membership in the EU, the endorsement of Turkey in G-20 in 1999, Customs Union Agreement with the EU in 1995, and in relations with Israel. Above and beyond, Turkey and the U.S. both supported the admission of the Eastern European countries to NATO, OSCE, and NATO's PfP and Mediterranean Dialogue program. In the meantime, Turkish government supported UN sanctions and allied military operations against Iraq in 1990s and actively took role in UN and NATO peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia, former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Considering

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[151] Morton Abramowitz, ed., "The Complexities of American Policy Making on Turkey," in *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy.* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000) p. 176

[152] Mark Parris, "Starting Over: U.S.-Turkish Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* Volume.3 No:1 (April 2003). Also available at:
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=191772&attrib_id=7590

the Greater Middle East region, the U.S. and Turkish expectations mostly overlap. Both parties do not want the region dominated by a radical revisionist regime and they are eager to halt proliferation of WMD. In addition, they highlight the strengthening of relations with Jordan and other moderate Arab states. Likewise, on Turkey's war against terrorism Turkey appreciated the U.S. support against the terrorism of PKK.

After the Cold War, the relations with the U.S. underwent a transition from a strategic cooperation conditioned by bipolar world realities to a new form of relationship based on Turkey's enhanced importance on a variety of regional issues.[153] The geopolitical importance of Turkey has been essential for both sides. An important part of the U.S. global strategy on Eurasia is highly related with Turkey. Turkey was considered as an indispensable ally in the region. Therefore, Turkey's role during the Cold War transformed into a pivotal role among the Middle East, Caspian Region and Balkans[154]. For the time being, U.S. policy on Turkey has been affected by the developments in neighboring regions like Russia, Balkans and the Middle East. The U.S. assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke claimed that "Turkey is replacing Germany as the cutting edge of Europe", and described Turkey as the U.S.' "new European front".[155]

New security agenda of the U.S. has overlapped with Turkey's security discourse. Turkey is mainly regarded as an important component of Middle East political arena with regard to possible repercussion for American national interests. Together with her location and willingness to cooperate with the U.S., Turkey is viewed as a front line ally for the U.S. objectives in the Middle East.[156] Similarly the U.S. used Turkey for performing its policies in regions next to Turkey using NATO

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[153] Kemal Kirişçi, "U.S. Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership," in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, eds. Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001) p. 129.

[154] Chase, Hill and Kennedy *op.cit.,* pp.35-51.

[155] Quoted in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000,* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000) p. 194.

[156] Ekavi Athanassopoulou, "American-Turkish Relations since the End of the Cold War," *Middle East Policy* Vol. VIII, No. 3 (September 2001) : 145.

as an instrument. The loneliness that Turkey felt during the 1990s and the uncertainties of the Middle East brought Turkey even closer to the U.S.[157].

Gulf crisis of early 1990s convinced the U.S. about Turkey's enduring strategic importance. The significance of Turkey relatively increased in the U.S. side after the Gulf crisis and its aftermath. Post Iraq war realities generally figured the new relationship. Although former crisis paved the way for dismantling most of its military basis in Turkey, the Persian Gulf crisis in 1991 indicated that the U.S. wants to maintain its presence in Turkey especially at Incirlik air base.

In Central Asia Turkey was believed able to become a facilitator of American interests and counterbalance the influence of Moscow and Tehran. In the post-Soviet region the U.S. pursues three main policy goals in the Caspian region: first, support the independence if the NIS; second, support of its own commercial involvement in the region's oil production and export; and third reduction of future dependence on Persian Gulf oil.[158] Turkey has a significant strategic role for America's policy of reinforcing the NIS.[159]

Aside form the strategic collaboration, the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. has also some social aspects. The American foreign policy thinking has been formed under two tendencies: Idealism for enhancing the world economy and realpolitik for acquiring the interests of the country. The former has overshadowed by the latter in case of a conflict between two. Settling democracy has been included in foreign policy application when it is necessary for the region by the U.S. decisionmakers. Therefore, the rhetoric of democracy has not been completely incorporated in foreign policy.[160] The American way of tackling the humanitarian issues in Turkey includes some discrepancies with the European ones. Republican presidents usually placed a much higher value than the democratic presidents. The

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[157] Çandar, *op.cit* p. 149.

[158] Larrabee, *op.cit.,* p. 163.

[159] Brezinski, *op.cit.,* p. 7.

[160] Ramazan Gözen, "Türk Amerikan İlişkileri ve Türk Demokrasisi: 'Realist' Bağlantı," in *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi Kimlik, Demokrasi, Güvenlik* ed. Şaban H. Çalış, İhsan D. Dağı and Ramazan Gözen (Ankara: Liberte Yayınları, 2001) pp. 75-76

hard security issues have taken the presedence during the republican presidents. On the other hand, the latter have been received with less enthusiasm and a degree of suspicion by the Turkish policymakers.[161] However, the role for being model has different connotations in both countries. Turkey's strategic position has priority over human rights agenda. According to American observers the democratization of Turkey has been necessary for stability and respect for human rights in the country. In the meantime, the priority for Turkey is about her role. The U.S. administrations have been circumspect in its references to the political role of the Turkish military. "Question for Washington is how to balance the geo-strategic and human rights concerns."[162] U.S. only declares its support for democracy. "Washington cares merely about Turkey's pro-Western orientation, but it didn't want democratic procedure disregarded either."[163] Clinton administration put greater emphasis on human rights and democracy in relations with Turkey. Clinton predicted on important constructive role for Turkey. Accordingly, the U.S. didn't interfere with the Kurdish and religion rhetoric. In fact, U.S. encouraged Turkey on her war against terrorism. The U.S. administration highlighted the terrorist provocation behind the scene and employed more sensible process.[164]

The U.S. supported Turkey for the EU membership, even though in the long run integration might take Turkey more European and less pro-American. A situation which keeps Turkey away from the EU Turkey would likely look to the U.S. for even greater support for the EU membership or as an alternative pole for integration to the West. Actually, the relations with the United States have compensated the divergence between Turkey and the EU. NATO is the main instrument for that return. However, Turkey's EU membership is perceived by Washington as a carrot for greater Turkish cooperation on issues of importance to the United States, including Cyprus and the Middle East. Not surprisingly, Washington's advocacy of Turkish membership in the

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[161] Mustafa Kibaroğlu, "turkey: Missing Bill Clinton," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* Vol. 60 Issue 2 (March 1, 2004):

[162] Alan Makovsky, "U.S. policy Toward Turkey: Progress and Problems," ," in *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy.* (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000) p. 251

[163] *ibid.*, p. 225.

[164] George S. Haris, "ABD-Türkiye İlişkileri," in *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri,* ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2002) p. 257.

EU brings the idea that the U.S. is struggling to strengthen the Atlanticist nature of the EU against the Euro-centric view of the EU founders.[165] Respectively, after Turkey's EU membership the analysts anticipate a special relationship with the U.S. like United Kingdom.[166] Besides, the U.S. supported Turkey's presence in the EU for domestic considerations in the country. The stable and politically and economically affective Turkey in the region is important for the Washington.

The continuation of closer strategic relations with the U.S. is one of the dynamics of Turkey's security policy. However, the Iraq issue has shaken the conviction about the predominant U.S. support on Turkish foreign policy interests. Although it was an unwelcomed surprise, that Turkey did not allow the U.S. to send ground troops to Iraq via Turkey, 1 March 2003 incident is a breakpoint in relations not a separation. The Iraq experience showed that neither side can take the other side for granted and they were irresponsive to the needs of the other.[167] Turkey did not feel confident about the U.S. policies in Iraq especially in northern regions. For the Americans, the image of Turkey as "staunch ally" disappeared and they would no longer guarantee the cooperation of Turkey in future occasions. Nevertheless, this would result in an eventual decrease in the U.S. support on Turkey on various issues in which Turkey has firm interests like in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, accession to the EU, issues with Greece and Cyprus. This might have result in reduction of bargaining power of Turkey against the EU. In fact, the quality of relations will likely to change. The US and Turkey will likely to reinvigorate their strategic partnership[168].

The priority for the U.S. in Iraq is in any case to provide the stability in which the cooperation with the groupings, mainly the Kurds, serving the U.S. interests is reasonable for the Americans. For that reason the issue about PKK is inferior to the

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[165] Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities," *The Washington Quarterly* 27:3 (Summer 2004): 57

[166] Abramowitz, *op.cit.*in note 136, p. 183.

[167] Parris, *op.cit.*

[168] Franc Carlucci and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ravitalizing U.S.-Turkey Relations," *The Washington Times* 8 June 2005.

Americans. For Turkey the priority is on the integrity of the Iraq and complete elimination of the terrorist activities in the region.

As a result, Washington has sought to prolong five principles in Turkey. Security is the first one, second sustain for democratization, third enlarging economy with becoming an energy corridor, fourth the continuation of the importance of NATO and fifth the support for the EU membership. Supporting those aforementioned opinions George W. Bush invited Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to the G-8 summit in June 2004 as leader of a "democratic partner" country, to differentiate between Turkey and the Arab states and other Muslim countries, which are the targets of the Broader Middle East initiative.

The upcoming generation is candidate for healing the relations with USA. They have been thought in Anglo-Saxon discipline and favor the ideas of liberalism and globalization. Besides, Turkey is, thanks to the enhanced communication, in pursue of a more honorable place in the world mostly favoring the Western values. Nonetheless, an opportunity for the shift of the U.S. policy from bilateral strategic partnership to multilateral relations would upgrade the U.S.-Turkish relationship. For Turkey, the U.S. has been considered as supporter for various foreign policy interests and assistance in term of military equipment and economy. Respectively, the bond between U.S. and Turkey is a pragmatic response to common security needs and goals.[169]

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[169] Cengiz Çandar, "Some Turkish Perspectives on the United States and American Policy Toward Turkey," in *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy,* ed. Morton Abramowitz (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000) p. 133

CHAPTER IV

A SECURITY CHOICE FOR TURKEY

The new political order set after the Cold War necessitates a permanent attention to the global Balkans, which is also crucial to American and European interests. However, their way of handling the issues with their individual perceptions has been experiencing some differences. In that respect, those differences have paved the way for a rivalry between the U.S. and the EU in the Middle East, Balkans and Caucasus. It appears that The EU-versus-U.S. debate will depend on how sharply U.S. and EU strategic interests diverge in the coming decades. The world would likely witness increasing tactical and even strategic divergence between the United States and Europe regardless of who holds political power in Washington. As a matter of fact the incidents, which have been taking place since the end of the Cold War, reveal that the U.S. and the EU will tackle the issues around Turkey with different kind of perspectives.

It is a fact that the future policies of the EU and the U.S. will be more related with Turkey herself. Both the EU and the U.S. will need Turkey on their engagement to the issues around Turkey. [170] For example, the future of the EU includes a Mediterranean and Middle East policy with growing importance to the countries in the region. And the new strategy document of the U.S. has much to do with Turkey. Then again, the association of Turkey in their policies has discrepancies in essence. However, considering the transatlantic relations and its effects on Turkish foreign and security policy, the future tendencies of each counterpart have much to do with Turkey. The differing interests of the U.S. and the EU in Greater Middle East would result in differing meanings to their relations with Turkey. Thus, to avoid the emergence of new transatlantic differences over Turkey, U.S. and European policies

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[170] Richard Lambert, "Misunderstanding Each Other," *Foreign Affairs* vol: 82 issue: 2 (Mar/Apr 2003) 69

need to be closely coordinated.[171] "Strategic collaboration between the U.S. and the EU would make easier for Turkey to avoid a painful choice between her loyalty as a U.S. ally and her hopes for the EU membership."[172]

Turkey enjoyed the coherent policy and suited herself to the policies of the Western community. However, the unresolved current American-European differences and the absence of a new global transatlantic program for global security are hampering Turkey's democratic society, which is trying to anchor herself more firmly in the Western community. Therefore, from Turkey's standpoint, the U.S.' and the EU's policies being in harmony will be favored.

For years, Turkish foreign and security policy has maintained a fragile balance between the U.S. and Europe. Turkey desires to be pivotal state in Western community, but the uncertainties in transatlantic relations may make the very concept of the "West" unclear as seen from Ankara. In the post-Cold War era, elites understand that the uniformity of the West was no more valid and the collaboration with the U.S. would no more provide enhanced relations with Europe.[173] In that respect Turkey is facing with a West with having two different visions. Rationally, Turkey should pursue her own interests in world affairs. But in which condition Turkey will be able to manage to realize those interests?

A security choice for Turkey between the U.S. and the EU can be analyzed within the triangular relationship between the three. Each partner holds its security perceptions and has different priorities among them. In addition, the bilateral relationships in this formulation have the keystones for Turkey in her future security arrangements. Together with the security perceptions and arrangements of the U.S. and the EU, the relationship between them was assessed in chapter one. On the other hand, Turkish foreign and security policy and Turkey's connections with the U.S. and the EU was analyzed to make known the remaining corner and sides of this

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[171] F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Pittsburgh: RAND, 2003), p 198.

[172] Brezinski, *op.cit.,* p. 15.

[173] Atilla Eralp, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği," in *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri,* ed. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (İstanbul: Alfa Yayınları, 2002) p. 236.

triangular relationship. Accordingly, from Turkey's standpoint, the present policies and future strategy probabilities of each party is likely to expose whether a security preference for Turkey is existing between the U.S. and the EU.

The asserted question can be answered in two ways. The positive stance to the question will assume that a security preference is necessary for Turkey between the U.S. and the EU. Therefore, Turkey should side with the U.S. or the EU for her future security arrangements. Because of the unresolved current American-European differences and the absence of a new global transatlantic program for global security are coercing Turkey to make a choice between the U.S. and the EU. Hence, with regard to the gap in transatlantic relations, it will be rational for Turkey to make a choice between the two. Nevertheless, Turkey's probable solid decision on behalf of the U.S. or the EU will decrease the efficiency of the excluded partner in its relations with Turkey. To illustrate, Turkey's presence in the EU will likely erode the fundamental links with the United States. Conversely, the exclusion of Turkey from the EU will put Turkey closer to the United States. By the same token, Turkey's further cooperation with the U.S. may slow down Turkey's progress on structural reforms since the emphasis of the U.S. is on strategic terms in its relations with Turkey. Alternatively, the worsening relations with the U.S. will cause Turkey to see the EU strategic option against the United States. Therefore, Turkey's further cooperation with one of the two choices will be irreversible in essence.

The negative stance will suppose that there is not a security preference for Turkey. Although the transatlantic partners are having differing views in international relations, Turkey's bilateral relations with the U.S. and the EU are based on different topics. That is to say, the economic and social links are stronger in relations with the EU. On the other hand, geopolitical approaches and security based relations are more apparent in relations with the United States. Therefore, Turkey can continue her relations with the EU and the U.S. on different stages. However, from time to time, the policy divergences between the U.S. and the EU seem to coerce Turkey to make a choice between the two considering Turkey's own interests. In other words, the policies of Turkey may overlap more with the EU or U.S. policies on some cases. Therefore, it will be appropriate to expect rational policies from

Turkey, such as increasing her cooperation with the U.S. or the EU. Nevertheless, a further cooperation with one party will not necessitate a cutback in the level of partnership with the other party, since Turkey's links with the EU and the U.S. have different meanings for Turkey. From the same point of view, considering the Turkish foreign and security policy, the emphasis should be on having a policy simultaneously including both the EU and the U.S. aspects.[174]

As a matter of fact, both answers seem to have their own acceptable basis considering Turkey's unique position in the triangular relationship. Nonetheless, together with the facts of "yes" and "no" answers, there are also some other dynamics which are very much related with the question under discussion. To be precise, there are some circumstances that are not under control of Turkey. So, these circumstances are also creating the reasons for Turkey whether to make a choice or not. The current and the expected policies of the U.S. and the EU are directly linked with Turkey's probable choice between the U.S. and the EU. In this way, it will be useful to analyze the basis of each partner's actorness and their possible future paths.

4.1. A multilateral or Unilateral U.S.

The world community has witnessed the dominancy of the U.S. in international affairs since the end of the Cold War. Most of the European countries and Turkey have been under the influence of the U.S. in some ways. It seems that, the policies of the U.S. will continue to dominate the future developments in the international arena. The rest of the world will produce their scenarios in response to the American policymakers' decisions. By the same token, the U.S. will have the opportunity to associate itself with the multilateral organizations. However, the national interests of the U.S. will be at the top of the agenda of the U.S. policymakers. In other words, it appears that, they will refer to the multilateral organizations if those organizations serve their interests. But, Iraq intervention of March 2003 has shown that going around the multilateral platforms has not been useful for the United States. In this parallel, it may be argued that the presence of

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[174] Sami Kohen, "Gene aynı soru: ABD mi, AB mi?," *Milliyet*, 26 September 2003

Americans in the Middle East is requiring dependable cooperation with the local nations as well as EU.

There are two possible conditions for the United States. On the one hand, the U.S. may associate itself with the multilateral organizations. In that respect, Turkey's taking part in these organizations will be easier and thus she will have a greater ability to affect the ongoing developments. In other words a security choice for Turkey will not be persistent if the U.S. prefers multilateral solutions to the global security challenges. On the other hand, the U.S. may decide not to join the multilateral solutions. For maintaining its global hegemony the U.S. has the capability to go alone if it has to do so. That is to say, as it was the case in Iraq, the U.S. may directly move towards a unilateral solution with further allies for its quest, and Turkey may find herself in a situation of making a choice. If Turkey cooperates with a unilateral U.S., this cooperation will be dangerous for Turkey when it is compared to multilateral platform embracing Turkey.

For the U.S., Turkey is an important power in her region and it is not easy to continue a policy ignoring Turkey. Considering Washington's security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, the policies of the United States will continue to be an important influence on Turkish foreign and security policy.[175] Moreover, the U.S. will maintain its interest at the neighboring areas of Turkey for continuing its worldwide hegemony. Turkey will continue to be partner of America as long as Turkey satisfies three conditions in advance. First, Turkey should support the U.S. policy and provide her landmass or facilities even though her military capability. In this context the full uniformity with the policies of the U.S. would limit the independent policies of Turkey that the U.S. might overlook. Second, a limited support from Turkey will also be appreciated by the United States. That is to say Turkey should endorse the future policies of U.S. but might have some reservations considering its own interests. Nonetheless, the outcome might be away from the situation desired by Turkey. Third in a situation that Turkey will not have the approval about the policies of the U.S., Turkey should remain her silence and should not disturb the policies of United States. The overall situation reveals that Turkey

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[175] Makovsky, *op.cit.,* p. 247.

will keep her presence in the agenda of U.S. in deciding its future policies at the neighboring areas of Turkey unless Turkey has the complete contrast with the U.S. policies. Accordingly, considering the stability and democracy in Turkey, the U.S. will always prefer a stable Turkey with a political will in support of U.S. no matter how the country handles the democracy issue.[176] It is therefore, American discussion on Turkey is concentrated on strategic questions. In this kind of partnership the political will and eagerness of Turkey to use her military capability gain importance.

The recent events have also revealed that a unilateral action places more burden than a single country can meet. Within this context, even the U.S. has realized that it can no longer compensate the expenses rising from a unilateral action. In other words, the U.S. needs more domestic and external support for its endeavors. Seeing that, the U.S. will always be in search of a multilateral approach to the global affairs. This kind of consideration will increase the eagerness of its European allies as well as Turkey for burden-sharing as long as U.S. takes into consideration of the demands of its allies. If the U.S. pursues multilateral policies and cooperates with the EU, this will terminate the justifications for Turkey to make a choice between the two.

4.2. An Inward-looking or Outward-looking EU

The EU, relying upon its past successes in economic and political arena, strives to become a global actor. It has been seeking a common foreign and security policy in which the outcome will be cornerstone of its global political actorness. Indeed, the EU is about to decide on its global power status. However, one pillar of being such an actor, namely security architecture, has not been successfully developed within the EU yet. In this respect, it may be argued that EU's global actorness is still questionable. Therefore, it will be the EU's decision to become a significant actor in the world community by deciding on its own strategic outlook, in other words EU has to choose one from two following options. That is to say, two paths appear in front of the union. The EU on the one side will either prefer an inward looking policy or an outward-looking policy.

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[176] Kramer, *op.cit.,*in note 6, p. 183.

The EU's struggle with its domestic issues may subordinate its security architecture and its effort for exerting a common foreign and security policy that will open the door for becoming a global actor. Hence, the EU may possibly fail to put forth a political will for global challenges and turn its eyes on domestic issues. By the same token, due to the EU's diminishing enthusiasm about further enlargement, the relations between the EU and its neighboring areas may deteriorate due to the very fact of its becoming an inward looking actor. The EU will possibly exploit most of its energy for consolidating the union and disregard the requirements of global security developments.

The EU is an important actor affecting Turkey's political and economical transformation. Being a neighbor to Turkey, The EU tends to perceive Turkey in the light of domestic political considerations.[177] The inclusion of Turkey in EU politics will have irreversible outcomes in its outlook. However, since Turkey's dedication for becoming a part of Western Community, Turkish-EC/EU relations have been an area of uncertainty. With respect to the various analyzers revealing opinions from different perspectives a half empty-half full cup situation is observed in Turkey's EU vacation. As regards, Turkey's relations with Europe are oriented towards full integration with the EU. Turkey has taken her proper place in all the relevant European institutions. But the developments on being a full member to the EU have followed a different course giving way to imperfect relations. The vagueness in relations with the EU would coerce Turkey empower relations with the United States. [178] Therefore, an inward-looking EU will possibly marginalize Turkey from the union. Such an attitude of the EU may compel Turkey to loose her eagerness on her voyage to the EU. In this respect, a security choice will appear in front of Turkey and such a choice will possibly be in favor of the United States.

On the other side, the EU could decide on its global actorness and expand its horizon beyond the union. This will result with the evolution on the common foreign

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[177] Ludger Kühnhardt, speaking in 1997, "At the Crossroads of Geo-politics —Turkey in a Changing Political Environment", *Körber-Stiftung Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis*, (No.109, Hamburg). p.41

[178] Ludger Kühnhardt, "On Germany, Turkey, and the United Sates," in *P*arameters of Partnership: The U.S.-Turkey-Europe, eds. Hüseyin Bağcı, Jacson Janes and Ludger Kühnhardt (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999) p. 231.

and security policy. As long as the EU members make progress on moving together the union will be able to react to the political needs of the world. In the meantime, this outcome requires solid security initiatives which require more investment than the current one. At that point, Turkey could contribute to the security requirements of the union. [179] This situation can be promoted by the conformity between two sides or full membership of Turkey to the union. A situation in which Turkey becomes full member to the EU leaves no room for Turkey to make a security choice between the U.S. and EU. Theoretically, Turkey will guarantee her security and enjoy her presence in the union.

4.3. The Assessment of Turkey's Position

Turkey has turned her face to the western international community. In this respect, if the U.S. follows multilateral solutions to the global security needs and the EU exerts its actorness beyond the continent with an outward-looking agenda, Turkey will be immune from making a security choice between the two. The ongoing developments reveal that the U.S. needs more cooperation in its responses to the global challenges. Relying upon this, the U.S. will possibly follow multilateral policies in international relations. Meanwhile, the EU is also vulnerable to the new global security threats. So, an inward-looking EU will not be able to deter those threats. In parallel to these views, Turkey will not be in the condition of making a choice between the U.S. and the EU in the foreseeable future.

Turkey's immunity from making a choice will also be sustained by Turkey's stability and strength in her domestic and international affairs. In other words, the power of Turkey gains importance considering the question under discussion. Turkey's protection from the threats outside her borders has much to do with her domestic policies. It is possible that domestic problems will interrupt Turkey's progress if Turkey does not remedy them. As long as she remains domestically stable Turkey cannot be threatened by an enemy in Turkey's geopolitical environment. As long as the country guarantees a secure and stable environment, the necessity for making a choice diminishes.

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[179] Tocci and Houben, *op.cit.,* pp. 8-10.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Different from the years of Cold War, the contemporary security environment requires a worldwide cooperation. As a matter of fact precautions for the national security could start beyond the borders. Furthermore, the existing security challenges are considered beyond military power and they can be out of military means. In the mean time the, security challenges are not only the subject of external affairs also the internal affairs has much to do with them. In view of the fact that, those threats have the potential for malicious achievements without discrimination. However, the responses for those threats are varying among countries.

Turkey is also subject to the new security challenges or old challenges redefined by global events. Either domestically or externally Turkey has been sensitive to several security threats for her persistence. But, for prolonging her safe heaven Turkey is dependent on the ongoing security alignments of the Western international community. However, the varying security perception of the EU and the U.S. are causing disorientation in transatlantic link. The differences in policies created in response to the global security challenges stall or deteriorate the possible precautions for intimidating the danger. In that respect, the synchronization of Turkey's policies to the EU or U.S. creates troubles in Turkey herself.

Since decades Western Europe and the U.S. regarded themselves as natural allies in conducting their objectives. However, their cooperation exposed to the implications of globalization. In the meantime, NATO broadened its engagement and the continent Europe managed to unify under the EU roof. Nevertheless, both the EU countries and the U.S. are still vulnerable to the risks of terrorism and WMD. And this time all individuals are susceptible to those threats.

The terrible events of September 11 confirmed that necessary precautions should be executed immediately. A worldwide condemnation had prevailed after the

terrorist events. However the harmony among the countries especially between the EU and the U.S. vanished due to their varying intentions about the solution. The U.S. for being the target country experienced the events and demanded an immediate solution with the great public support. On the other hand Europeans disregarded the motives of the Americans and looked for an international solution which will have a long term outcome. In response to the unilateral temptations of the Americans, Europeans have demanded an equal share of continuing affairs and much more consultation. Although the EU and the U.S. have much more common interests than conflicting goals, they are at odds on many areas. Moreover, the contemporary security challenges have appeared at such a time in which the binding forces between the two has begun to erode.

After the Cold War the U.S. increased its global engagement and felt themselves responsible for the occasions against the humanity. With its superpower status the U.S. sovereignty is defended against the demands of globalization. In their response to the world affairs the importance placed on military force is significant and they feel themselves ready to use it. Accordingly they have the ability to by-pass the international consent and act alone for not experiencing an event like September 11 again. In the meantime Europeans exerted their energy domestically for creating a Europe-wide union for guaranteeing political and economic stability in the continent. They highlighted the regional level sovereignty and subordinated the importance of the member states. By the same token, they are having institutional deficiencies and inconsistent political union. In a situation which has global aspects Europeans stick to non-military means and they claim to be neutral. They are convinced that dialogue and development are more effective paths to security than military strength. They prefer to deal with problems through economic integration, foreign aid, and multilateral institutions.

For the shifted policy insights, transatlantic relationship has become less pivotal to the foreign policy of the U.S. and the EU. Growing asymmetry in power between them inhibits the cooperation and disables to work together. For the Americans more serious precautions are expected from Europeans. That is because each delay drives up the costs of any possible intervention. Considering the Iraq

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affairs, which has been lasting for years, heightened the tensions between the EU and the United States. The general consideration of the Europeans has been the spillover of Middle East instability to the continent and they felt the threats originating from the Middle East less pressing. On the other hand Americans understood that considering the America's national interests, sometimes a divided Europe is better than a united Europe.

Considering the contemporary security environment peacekeeping, post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction processes are the major factors associated with an operation. The means that the U.S. uses especially the military responses are short term solutions in its nature. Together with the fiscal hardships of the conflicts in the long term the U.S. will be in search for greater support from its European allies. Simultaneously it is the Europeans' responsibility to transform themselves to a partner that U.S. will take seriously.

In view of those aforementioned security trends and the responses of the EU and the U.S., the position of Turkey in this environment is gaining importance. Since 1989, Turkey has been trying to manage, contain, and resolve the disputes, conflicts and instabilities in her neighboring regions. Moreover, the line between domestic and foreign policy became vaguer. However, in this new era the neighbors surrounding Turkey became weaker and the country herself relatively continued her power status. Yet, Turkey involved many incidents in her neighboring regions. It was not because that Turkey transformed herself to an interventionist country, the external circumstances required Turkey to be part of it. Since the Cold War the main objectives of Turkey have been to maintain her geopolitical importance in global politics, ensure regional stability, prevent ethnic conflicts from spilling over into her territory and gain new markets to fuel her strategy of export-based economic growth. In view of the fact that, NATO, with its broadened security perception, remained to be primary security organization for Turkey in Euro-Atlantic area.

For securing her global interests full membership to the EC/EU has been a national objective to Turkey. Quite the opposite the impact of Turkey's membership on the functioning of EU institutions has led to considerable caution in European

countries. Full inclusion of Turkey to the fabric of Europe has been less in interest of European communities. According to some EU countries, Turkey is unnecessarily heightening the security responsibilities of the Union and Turkey's regional security concerns do not always have a direct interest in EU countries. But Europeans are also aware that Turkey is much too important to be neglected and left alone by Europe. Turkey's inclusion in European security architecture would provide a chance to accelerate the reforms that the EU has been trying to realize. In view of that, Turkey will be able to anchor to the West permanently. Moreover the inclusion of Turkey to the institutions of the union made the decisionmakers to consider Turkey in the light of domestic political considerations. Similarly, Turkey's EU membership process increases the relationship between foreign and domestic policy within Turkey. And either side realized that they are vulnerable to the new security threats.

By the same token, the support of the U.S. maintains its importance for Turkey in conducting her national interests. The bond established between Turkey and the U.S. is a pragmatic response to common security needs and goals. In American foreign policy thinking Turkey's geopolitical importance has remained to be the dominant factor in relations. The U.S. wants Turkey stable, secular, democratic and allied with West. But however, Turkey couldn't easily be discounted or might be taken for granted. The former incidents showed that Turkey's strategic importance is expendable in favor of the U.S. global interests and the U.S. doesn't remember Turkey unless she needs it. The recent Iraq experience demonstrated that neither side can take the other side for granted and they were irresponsive to the needs of the other. As a matter of fact, geopolitical importance of Turkey has been essential for the both sides.

Considering the linkages among Turkey, EU and the U.S., Turkey is a significant actor across the Atlantic. The outcomes of the EU process will have a significant effect on Turkey's future evolution. Besides, Turkey's strong security ties with the United States will continue to be an important influence on Turkish policy. As long as the EU and the US diverge in their policies Turkey needs to continue a fragile balance between them. That is to say Turkey's geopolitical situation still encourages maintaining her strategic ties with the United States and economic ties

will grow stronger with the EU. The ideal condition for Turkey will be securing the U.S. support and to be full member to the EU. However, the ongoing developments in the world will not allow Turkey to secure each side's support. Suffice to say that Turkey's future inclinations will generally depend on how the EU development process unfolds and how the U.S. will tackle the future events.

It will be the European's decision whether to have an outward-looking or inward-looking policy. In the former case, Turkey will eventually take her proper place in the necessary EU institutions. However the latter situation will require that the presence of Turkey in the EU will not mean anything to the EU decisionmakers. From the same point of view two positions can be expected from the U.S. which will have significant outcomes for Turkey. First, the U.S. may continue to subordinate the international law and related international organizations in conducting its national interests. Unilateral temptations of the U.S. will make Turkey less supportive of the policies of it. And any cooperation will be temporary in essence. Second, a multilateral U.S., seeking for greater international support, will be welcomed by Turkey as well as Europeans. But it will not mean a permanent choice for Turkey on behalf of the United States. The abovementioned arguments have also much to do with Turkey's domestic developments. As long as Turkey remains stable and reduces the risks targeting her sovereignty she will continue to be in Western fold but less dependent to the each counterpart.

The probable future tendencies of the EU and the U.S. reveal that they seem not to have a common agenda on global affairs. But it will not mean that they will be divergent on every issue. A harmony between them is likely to remove the justifications for Turkey in making a choice between the two. Moreover, Turkey's bilateral relations with the U.S. and the EU are based on different topics. That is to say, Turkey can continue her relations with the EU and the U.S. on different stages in which a further cooperation with the one will not exclude the other in Turkey's outlook. The ongoing developments reveal that the U.S. needs more cooperation in its responses to the global challenges. Relying upon this, the U.S. will possibly follow multilateral policies in international relations. Meanwhile, the EU is also vulnerable to the new global security threats. Although the domestic policies occupy

most of the EU agenda, the EU will eventually take necessary precautions to deter the global security threats. In parallel to these views, Turkey will not be in the condition of making a choice between the U.S. and the EU in the foreseeable future.

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