INTERPRETIVE SCHEMES AND OTTOMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

DENİZ TANER KILINÇOĞLU

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
ECONOMICS

JUNE 2005

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Prof. Dr. Erol Çakmak
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Prof. Dr. Eyüp Özveren
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Eyüp Özveren (METU, ECON) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Onur Yıldırım (METU, ECON) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Kürşad Ertuğrul (METU, ADM) _____

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ABSTRACT

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M.S., Department of Economics
Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Eyüp Özveren

June 2005, 79 pages

This thesis analyzes the influences of three eminent social scientists on Ottoman historiography. Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein and Michael Mann are three important scholars, who challenged the paradigms of world historiography in the twentieth century. Nevertheless, whereas the studies of Braudel and Wallerstein made more strong impacts on the area, the influences of Mann remain limited. The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the influences of the former two scholars on Ottoman historiography and then to discuss the reasons of relative omission of Mann's perspective in the area. Moreover, it was aimed to make a very brief introduction to a new perspective on Ottoman history according to Mann's original model.

Keywords: Braudel, Wallerstein, Mann, Ottoman Empire, historiography

ÖZ

OSMANLI TARİHYAZIMI ÜZERİNDE ÜÇ ETKİ:
BRAUDEL, WALLERSTEIN VE MANN

Kılınçoğlu, Deniz Taner
Yüksek Lisans, İktisat Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Eyüp Özveren

Haziran 2005, 79 sayfa

Bu çalışma, yirminci yüzyılın üç önemli sosyal bilimcisinin Osmanlı tarihyazımı üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektedir. Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein ve Michael Mann tarihyazımı ve daha genel olarak sosyal bilimlerin geçerli paradigmalarını sorgulamış ve bu bağlamda önemli etkiler yaratmış üç isimdir. Braudel ve Wallerstein'in Osmanlı tarihyazımının biçimlenmesinde çok önemli etkileri olduğu gözlemlense de Mann'ın etkilerinin sınırlı kaldığı açıktır. Bu tezin ana amacı, bu üç yazarın tarih anlayışlarını ortaya koymak, özellikle ilk ikisinin Osmanlı tarihyazımı üzerindeki etkilerini incelemek ve Mann'ın etkilerinin neden sınırlı kaldığını belirtip, onun modeline göre Osmanlı tarihini yeniden değerlendirmeye, sınırlı da olsa, bir giriş yapmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Braudel, Wallerstein, Mann, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu

ACKOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank his advisor Prof. Dr. Eyüp Özveren and Assist. Prof. Dr. Onur Yıldırım for their guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research.

The author also thanks his family for their endless support and patience throughout his academic studies.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Historiography in the Ottoman Empire, with some exceptions, consisted of the writings of the palace chroniclers, who narrated important political and military events from the perspective of the Imperial Palace. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic on the ruins of the old Empire, the situation changed significantly, particularly after the 1930s. Many students, including historians, were sent to European countries, especially France, in order to create a well-educated generation of scientists and technicians, who were urgently needed by the new state. Although this trend had already started in the nineteenth century, and many important thinkers of the late Ottoman era rose through this process, it became more systematic in the Republican period.

The new generation of historians of the young Republic attempted to rewrite history in Turkey according to the Western norms that they came to know during their education, especially in France. This paved the way for the impact of Western schools of thought on Turkish historiography. The first influential school in this respect was the *Annales*. From early 1930s up until now, Turkish historians have been influenced by many important scientific methods and paradigms. According to Suraiya Faroqhi, "Ottoman history down to the present day has remained a net importer of paradigms." (Faroqhi, 1991: 212)

This thesis deals with the evaluation of three important paradigm-creating scholars, namely Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein and Michael Mann, and their influences on Ottoman historiography.

Fernand Braudel was a follower of the *Annales* tradition, which was very influential in Ottoman historiography from the beginning especially through the studies of a leading scholar, M. Fuad Köprülü. The publication of Braudel's *La*

Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II (1949) strenghtened the influences of the *Annales* perspective in the field. Many eminent scholars of Ottoman history adopted the methodology and perspective of the book in their studies, and moreover they derived important research questions from this study. The main concern of Chapter 2 is to discuss Braudel's contributions to the field, to capture his image of the Ottoman Empire and to judge his influences on Ottoman historiography. Braudel's reflections on the Ottoman Empire between fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, covered in Chapter 2, provide an introduction to Ottoman history that is used as a base for further discussion throughout the thesis.

Chapter 3 of this thesis deals with another scholar related with the *Annales* tradition and a follower of Fernand Braudel, that is, Immanuel Wallerstein, who has been a very eminent social scientist in last thirty years in many respects. Wallerstein's world-system approach brought a new perspective to Ottoman history, as well as to world history in general. According to Wallerstein, world history after the eighteenth century was the history of the expanding European world-economy and the incorporation of other parts of the world, including the Ottoman world-empire, into the European capitalist world-economy. Just as Braudel's studies did, Wallerstein's arguments influenced the leading scholars of the field and paved the way for many important studies that reshaped the area. World-system scholars of the Ottoman Empire attempted to 'reread and rewrite' Ottoman history from within this alternative paradigm. Chapter 3 evaluates Wallerstein's methodology, his writings on the Ottoman Empire and his influences.

Michael Mann, who is a follower of a different school of thought, is studied in Chapter 4. Mann is a very important sociologist, who concentrated on historical sociology and proposed an alternative view of world history. In his three-volume *The Sources of Social Power*, he adopted the Weberian methodology to reevaluate social change from a historical perspective. He rejected all widely accepted 'monocausal' models, which attempted to explain social change by focusing on the priority of some relations within society, i.e. Marxism that emphasizes the priority of the economic relations. Instead, Mann proposed to utilize four 'ideal types', in Weberian sense, which are ideological, economic, military and political (IEMP)

sources of power, to understand the promiscuity of social phenomena. Although Mann's IEMP model has not yet significantly influenced Ottoman historiography, it has an important potential to 'reread and rewrite' Ottoman history. In Chapter 4, Mann's approach and the relative omission of his model in the field is evaluated. Moreover, this particular chapter of the thesis makes a limited attempt to reconsider Ottoman history from the perspective of Mann's IEMP model.

Chapter 5 provides an overview of the discussions of the thesis and a reevaluation of the basic conclusions of each chapter in relation with one another and in the light of the general overview of the arguments.

CHAPTER 2

FERNAND BRAUDEL

SECTION 2.1

Fernand Braudel and the Ottoman Empire

Part 2.1.1: Braudel and His Pyramidal Schema

Fernand Braudel (1902-1985), one of the most important historians of twentieth century, discussed and stressed the importance of the Ottoman Empire in his meticulous studies, and significantly influenced Ottoman historiography just as he influenced the discipline of history in general. Especially in his two-volume book, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (first published in 1949), he gave an important place to this 'superpower' of the sixteenth century. In this detailed study, Braudel argued that the Mediterranean region was the center of the world before the rise of the Atlantic region.

In the sixteenth century, the time period he discussed in *The Mediterranean*, the Ottoman Empire was at her prime and was one of the two great powers of the Mediterranean region (where her western counterpart was the Habsburg Empire). The Mediterranean, according to Braudel was a single coherent unit living under the same cycles; all parts of it breathed with the same rhythm and shared the same destiny; and the Ottoman part, which covered a half of the region, was not an exception. Although the Ottoman Empire was an 'anti-European' phenomenon, in fact she was a part of the same system, and shared the same destiny with her rival, Europe.

Braudel published his other major study, the three-volume *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th – 18th Century* in 1979. These volumes contained a detailed explanation of the economic history of the pre-industrial Europe. He discussed the

economic phenomena from the grassroots level to the top, in relation with cultural, social and political realities of the era. In these three volumes, the Ottoman Empire was not discussed in as great detail as it was in *The Mediterranean*, but the Empire was used rather as a comparison unit for the European economy. Nevertheless, Braudel discussed many important features of the Ottoman Empire and proposed original arguments about her. In *Civilization and Capitalism*, he added many important details to the description of the Ottoman Empire he had made some thirty years before in *The Mediterranean*.

This section provides an introduction to Ottoman history in the time period between fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, according to Braudel's point of view. Naturally, our emphasis will be on economic realities, of course in relation to the social, cultural and political phenomena.

The pyramidal structure Braudel developed in order to study the economic reality will supply the skeleton of this section. According to this model, the economic realities in world history must be divided into three separate segments, instead of being addressed as a single totality. There have always been markets, or 'the market economy', which could be characterized by free competition and transparency. The language of the science of economics was founded on the relationships within these structures. Underneath the market economy, there is a vast shadowy zone, 'the material life' or 'material civilization', which consists of basic subsistence activity of the people and the pre-determined relations of the people with each other and also with nature in this context. Contrary to this pre-destined and static life, at the top of the pyramid there exists the narrowest but the most dynamic zone, 'capitalism'. This is the opaque zone, which escapes the ordinary people. In this zone, the privileged actors determine the destiny of the other two lower zones with their circuits and calculations. (Braudel, 1985: 23-24)

We will use this tripartite pyramidal scheme to analyze Braudel's writings on the Ottoman Empire. In the next part, the material conditions and realities that shaped the destiny of Ottoman Empire will be discussed. In Part 2.1.3, we will explore the Ottoman economic system. In the last part, the top of the pyramid, the

'Ottoman capitalism' in relation to the existent political system will be analyzed. In the end, the main features of the resulting picture will be emphasized.

Part 2.1.2: Material Life

The glorious destiny of the Ottoman Empire was mostly shaped by the magnificent legacy she inherited. The Empire appeared within the Mediterranean region, which was the center of the world before it was superseded by the Atlantic region after the sixteenth century. The most important trade routes and centers, and an extremely dynamic economic network had already been established, especially by the Islamic civilization. In addition to the militaristic tradition of the Turks, the imperial bureaucratic and political experiences of the Byzantines and the Seljuks provided the Ottoman leaders with extraordinary political abilities. Briefly, the Ottoman Empire was a deliberately constructed historical 'wonder' depending on a very strong base, which was a combination of structures inherited from various sources.

In the fifteenth century, especially after the conquest of Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire became an economic and political great power of the eastern Mediterranean region. Ottomans governed this indispensable part of the world in a great rivalry with their Western counterpart, the Habsburgs. The huge and coherent area she covered was the most important source of her power:

> The sultan reigned over thirty kingdoms, over the Black Sea and 'the White Sea' (the Aegean), the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Habsburg Empire in its prime was even larger but that was an empire dispersed worldwide and broken up by great oceans. The Osmanli Empire was in one piece: a jigsaw of interlocking landmasses in which potentially divisive stretches of water were held prisoner. (Braudel, 1992b: 467)

On this vast territory, the great obstacle against humanity, the distance, had been overcome in a relative success. The roads were indispensable for the Ottoman Empire, as they had been for the Roman Empire. They were the means of both central authority and a dynamic economic life. The maintained ancient roads of the Roman Empire within the territory and the newly built ones in the conquered areas created a good transportation and communication network which was admired by the Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On those narrow paved

tracks, the mules were the dominant transport 'vehicles', whereas little wheeled traffic was existent. Camels were the other essential pack animals introduced by the Turks in the region. (Braudel, 1972: 284)

The people under the Ottoman rule were the people of rhythms, like all other peoples of the world. Their destinies were bound by the rhythms of the Mediterranean region, such as climate, famines, epidemics, and wars. Moreover, their daily lives had been stagnant for hundreds of years. In addition to these rhythms, there are two main cultural determinants of daily life in Ottoman society. These were the civilization of Islam from the Middle East and Asiatic (i.e. *yürük*) culture. In fact, the urbanized Islamic civilization itself had many features from nomadic culture of the Middle East; Asiatic Turks had had urban experiences in the Central Asia. So the Ottoman civilization, as an urban phenomenon on the whole, carried the seals of both the urban and the nomadic cultures of the Asia and the Middle East.

As Braudel reminded, depending on the study of Gordon Hewes, the Ottoman Empire or the civilization within the Ottoman Empire (defined as 'Settled Muslims', (Braudel, 1985: 59)) carried the characteristics of densely populated civilizations. These civilizations possessed "multiple assets and advantages: domestic animals, swing-ploughs, ploughs, carts and above all towns" (Braudel, 1985: 57).

The primary economic sector in the Empire was naturally agriculture. Land was extremely abundant and sufficient for both farming and grazing. There was traditional craftsmanship in both European and Asian parts of the Empire. In Anatolia, the artisans had an ancient guild organization (*ahi*s), which had a culture of its own. On the European part, i.e. in Salonica and Istanbul, non-Muslims dominated the crafts industry.

The Ottoman Empire, according to Braudel, was a feudal regime. Especially after the seventeenth century, new self-sufficient estates (*çiftlik*s) appeared, in different magnitudes according to the owner's rank in the state organization. Landlords were the absolute rulers within this unit, although they were the servants of the Sultan. They governed their estates in the name of the Sultan, fed the Sultan's

professional soldiers under their control, improved his estates (*mülk*s) (all the *mülk*s were the Sultan's) with urban and rural infrastructural investments and directly contributed to the imperial treasury with tributes and taxes.

The Empire had the advantage of being established on the accumulated heritage of many civilizations. On this base, Ottomans carefully installed nomad colonies originating from Asia ('Turcomans'). Ottoman rulers disciplined those nomads (*yürük*s) and forced them to settle in the conquered areas (i.e. Balkans, as well as Anatolia). By this way, the Turkish rulers made a new settled Turkish culture rooted in the Empire, and this created a major transformation especially in Asia Minor and the Balkans. This policy not only took both local people and the nomads under control, but also strengthened the defense along the imperial borders. So, the invasion of Islam before and after the Ottoman Empire, and the settlement of the *yürük*s determined the socio-cultural peculiarities of the geography under the rule of the Empire.

The population of the Ottoman Empire had continuously increased in this period due to the conquests, emigration (i.e. flow of *yürük*s), as well as the 'biological revolution' of the sixteenth century. Braudel summarized the substantial increase in this century: "A population that in the time of Suleiman (about 1520-1530) numbered 12-13 million, had risen to 17-18 million by 1580, and possibly to 30-35 million by 1600." (Braudel, 1972: 410) Although Braudel did not give figures for the following centuries, he argues an overall increase in world population, observed also in the Empire, in the time period between fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, despite many massive short term declines due to economic crises (i.e. famines, epidemics, disasters, wars).

The majority of the enormous population of this wealthy empire was poor, like in all other contemporary societies. Frugality created by the poverty surprised even the European observers of the era, although their people were also suffering from destitute living conditions. Braudel discussed the testimony of a Fleming observer in Anatolia in 1555:

> 'I dare to say that a man of our country spends more on food in one day than a Turk in twelve… The Turks are so frugal and think so little of the pleasure of eating that if they have bread, salt, and some garlic or an onion

> and a kind of sour milk, which they call *yoghoort*, they ask for nothing more…' (Braudel, 1972: 241)

Ironically, this poor life created many advantages for the Ottoman Empire. For example, the sobriety of the ordinary people provided the Turkish army with an additional strength, against their European enemies. Because in the campaigns, the provision of the Turkish soldier, who "would be content with a little rice, ground meat dried in the sun, and bread coarsely cooked in the ashes of the camp fire" (Braudel, 1972: 242), could be handled more easily than their European counterparts. A second advantage of the frugal life of the people appeared in the economic life; it provided the necessary production of surplus for commerce, as we will see later.

As being a part of the Mediterranean region, wheat was an important source of calories, especially in the form of bread. Interestingly, the Turkish people have used the common name of the bread in the region: '*pide*' (originated from the Greek word '*pita*', which means baked dough; various versions of the same word were used in many Mediterranean languages like '*pizza*' in Italian, '*pita*' in Greek). Milk and derivatives were the main foodstuffs of the masses as well as of the rich.

> In Turkey, milk products were almost the sole food of the poor: sour milk (yoghourt) accompanied, according to the season, by cucumbers or melons, an onion, a leek, or stewed dried fruit. Along with yoghourt, mention must also be made of *kaymak*, a slightly salted boiled cream, and the cheeses preserved in leather bottles (*tulum*), in wheels (*tekerlek*), or in balls, like the famous *cascaval* which the Wallachian mountain dwellers exported to Istanbul and even to Italy. (Braudel, 1985: 211, original emphasis)

Meat consumption was very moderate as in all other non-European civilizations.

> Apart from the enormous consumption of mutton in Seraglio, the average in Istanbul from the sixteenth to eighteenth century was about one sheep or a third of a sheep per person per year. And Istanbul was well off… The meals, even of the richest, are composed of bad bread, garlic, onion and sour cheese; when they add boiled mutton it is a great feast for them. They never eat chicken or other fowl, although they are cheap in that country. (Braudel, 1985: 201)

Although wine producing is an old tradition in the Mediterranean and also in Anatolia, Persia and the Middle East, water had been the primary drink of the Turks.

> [A]s a result of the religious requirements to wash frequently every day under running water. The water drunk there was probably purer than everywhere else; which may be why Turks today still pride themselves on being able to recognize the taste of the water from different springs" (Braudel, 1985: 230).

So, water had a central role in the everyday life of the Turks. Relative abundance and the monumental characteristics of the fountains and public baths (inherited from the ancient Roman civilization), which were built in all towns and cities, were the clearest signs of this importance. Concerning the dominance of milk and milk products in Turkish diet, we should also remember milk and diluted yoghurt as other two major drinks of the Turks. On the other hand, alcoholic beverages like wine and spirits had also widespread consumption, especially within the upper classes. The two important drinks of human history, tea and coffee were greatly accepted by the Turks and created their own places within the Turkish culture after sixteenth century. (Braudel, 1985, pp. 255-256)

A continuous change in fashion was not observed in the Ottoman Empire. Although different social groups (Jews, Muslims etc.) carried different clothing, even upper classes continued to wear more or less the same clothes for several hundred years. Braudel explained this fact with the stability of the society:

> If a society remained more or less stable, fashion was less likely to change—and this could be true at all levels, even the highest in established hierarchies[…] As a general rule no changes took place in these societies except as a result of political upheavals which affected the whole social order. (Braudel, 1985: 312)

As examples for those political phenomena, Braudel told that wherever the influence of the Ottoman Empire was felt, the upper classes adopted their costume according to this new -Turkish- fashion (i.e. in Algeria, Poland). Similarly, after the European cultural influence invaded the Ottoman capital, French fashion appeared among the Ottoman upper classes in the eighteenth century. (Braudel, 1985: 312) This overall static fashion in the Ottoman Empire was not originally observed by Braudel himself, the quotation from Jean-Baptiste Say shows that Europeans had noticed this reality in early nineteenth century, and argued different reasons for that: "I confess that the unchanging fashions of the Turks and the other Eastern peoples do not

attract me. It seems that their fashions tend to preserve their stupid despotism." (Quoted in Braudel, 1985: 314)

Urban settlements (i.e. towns and cities) have been the centers of economic life according to Braudel. They are system builders both within themselves and in the rural areas nearby. They transform all forms of activities; create hierarchies and division of labor within the entire area that they can reach out. "Towns are like electric transformers. They increase tension, accelerate the rhythm of exchange and constantly recharge human life." (Braudel, 1985: 479)

In the time period we are concerned with, the vast majority of the world population was still living in rural areas. On the other hand, in the Mediterranean region, and also in the Ottoman Empire, the urban dominance on economic life was an unquestionable fact:

> The Mediterranean is an urban region […] The prevailing human order in the Mediterranean has been one dictated primarily by towns and communications, subordinating everything else to their needs. Agriculture, even on a very modest scale, is dictated by and directed towards the town; all the more so when it is on a large scale. (Braudel, 1972: 278)

It is again a great fortune of the Empire that she inherited, both economically and socially, marvelous cities from both Islam (i.e. Cairo, Baghdad, Aleppo) and the Byzantine Empire (i.e. Constantinople and Salonica). Those cities had provided the lifeblood of the Empire throughout her entire life span:

> The Turkish Empire had also inherited the towns and great conurbations of Islam: it was scattered with merchant cities with their craft and trades. Indeed almost every eastern city surprised the western visitor by its noise and bustle […] (Braudel, 1992b: 468)

According to Braudel, towns and cities were created by their civilizations. All towns in the same civilization share similar features and there is always a prototype for them. This is certainly true for Islam civilization too:

> Islamic towns were very large as a rule, and distant from each other. Their low houses were clustered together like pomegranate seeds. Islam prohibited high houses, deeming them a mark of odious pride (there were certain exceptions: in Mecca, Jedda, its port and Cairo). Since the houses could not grow upwards, they encroached upon the public way which was poorly protected by Muslim law. The streets were lanes which became blocked if two asses with their packed saddles happened to meet. (Braudel, 1985: 507)

Istanbul, although once a Byzantine city, was not an exception to this definition, based on the observation of a foreign observer traveled the city in 1766:

> [In Istanbul] the streets are narrow, as in old towns [said a French traveler (1776)]; they are generally dirty and would be very inconvenient in bad weather without the pavements running along either side. When two people come face to face, they have to step off the pavement or get out of the way into a doorway. You are sheltered from the rain there. The majority of houses have only one storey which projects over the ground floor; they are almost all painted in oil. This decoration makes the walls less dark and sombre but is usually pretty grim…. All these houses, including even those belonging to nobles and the richest Turks, are built of wood and bricks and whitewashed, which is why fire can do so much damage there in so short time. (Braudel, 1985: 507, notes are Braudel's)

Braudel added that the situation was not so much different in distant cities like Cairo, and even in Ispahan in Iran. Despite all this mentioned mess, they were not in complete lack of plan and order. For example, the most commonly observed city plan of an Islam city was like this: around the Great Mosque which stood at the center, shops and warehouses were established. Then the workshops of craftsmen were placed in concentric circles according to traditional order based on the canonic notions (i.e. according to the level of 'cleanliness' of the work), starting from incense merchants (deemed to be sacred) all the way to the butchers. The placement of Christian or Jewish districts was also carefully considered. Briefly, as in all other civilizations, Islamic civilization and its follower, the Ottoman civilization established or organized cities according to the rules and plans based on social and cultural concerns.

House interiors in the Ottoman Empire, like many other cultural features, carried both nomadic and Islamic characteristics. There was a 'squatting life' both in public and private places, so there was no need for much furniture:

> In Islam, there were a few chests made of precious cedar-wood, used to store clothing, materials and the household valuables. Low tables were occasionally in use, and sometimes large copper trays balanced on wooden frames. In Turkish and Persian houses, at least, recesses in the walls of the rooms could be used as cupboards. But 'they have no beds or chairs as we do; no mirrors, tables, washstands, cupboards or pictures'. There was nothing but the mattresses which were laid out at night and put away in the morning, plenty of cushions and the beautiful woolen carpets of many

> colours, sometimes piled one on top of another […] These were the belongings of a race of nomads. (Braudel, 1985: 287)

The luxury of house interiors was not determined by sophisticated furniture, as it was in Europe. Nevertheless, the elements of the squatting life created its own luxury, i.e. embroidered pillows and cushions from precious fabrics.

> Istanbul museums contain little furniture: their treasures are of different kind: precious fabrics, often embroidered with stylized tulips; spiral glasses (known as nightingales' eyes); […] magnificent jewellery […] (Braudel, 1985: 287)

Naturally, the houses of the poor did not contain all these precious stuff. Their homes contain only the poorest versions of those textile goods and basic tools like coarse copper pots and pans.

In short, the material life in the Ottoman Empire was not significantly different from the rest of the world during the pre-industrial era. The same struggles against the material limitations of the world were observed here too. Poverty, epidemics, distance etc. were the unchanging destiny of each generation of the Ottoman people. The destitute living conditions of the poor were not so much different from their Western and Far Eastern counterparts, despite some peculiar cultural characteristics, i.e. in nourishment. The more important differences in daily life were observed in the life styles of the upper class. Naturally, they had more chance to reveal their cultural features in their relatively sophisticated life. Even so, they also had a more or less stagnant life style over the centuries until the European impact was felt.

Part 2.1.3: Economic Life

The Ottoman Empire was a world-economy of its own according to Braudel.[1] It had clear-cut boundaries, a center with a dominant type of capitalism, and a hierarchy between different economic zones:

> [T]he empire was also unquestionably from the very beginning a world-economy, one which had inherited the ancient ties between Islam and

[1] We covered the 'world-system approach', on which Braudel's arguments in this context depended, in Chapter 3.

> Byzantium and was firmly controlled by the effective state authority. (Braudel, 1992b: 467)

Braudel argued that the world-economies had their own rules, and they did not necessarily obey the economic rules set by the political powers, i.e. the world-empires. Likewise, the economic center of the Ottoman world-economy was not necessarily the capital city. The world-economy set its own rules, and determined its own center. The dynamism of this world-economy can be detected by the continuous shifts of the economic center. In the fifteenth century, the economic center was Bursa. The city was a center of many transit routes and commerce. Then after the conquest of Syria and Egypt in the sixteenth century, the center of this world-economy shifted to two ancient trade centers, Aleppo and Alexandria. Smyrna superseded those cities in the seventeenth century and finally in the eighteenth century Istanbul captured the central position within the Ottoman world-economy.

> The heart of Constantinople was its 'bazestan' with its four gates, its great brick arches, its everyday foods and its precious merchandise, its slave market […] (Braudel, 1972: 312)

The Ottoman capital became the center of all economic transactions. It was the major market for two most profitable sectors, luxury consumption and slave trade; there was a vigorous export trade; moreover it was also a currency exchange market and the financial center of the Empire.

The covered geographical area was a great fortune for the Ottoman economy. First of all, not only was it extraordinarily large, but also it was in one piece, not a scattered structure. Secondly, although the trade routes passing through were not in their prime, they were nevertheless very important and dynamic. Thirdly, besides these dynamic trade routes, the Empire contained vigorous trade centers (i.e. big cities). Fourthly, the Empire controlled many indispensable waterways, such as the Aegean, the Black Sea, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. And lastly, there was a good transport infrastructure (i.e. roads) inherited from the Roman Empire.

In addition to the geographical fortunes, the Empire had a cultural advantage in economic life: Islam. Islam was from the start a trade promoting religion, and in fact the Prophet himself was a big merchant:

> Even before it came into existence Islam was already, by dint of its inheritance, a trading civilization. Muslim merchants enjoyed from earliest times the consideration, at least from their political rulers, which was rarely forthcoming in Europe. The Prophet himself is said to have said: 'The merchant enjoys the felicity both of this world and the next'; 'He who makes money pleases God.' This is almost sufficient in itself to indicate the climate of respectability attaching to commercial life […] (Braudel, 1992a: 558)

The economic life of the Ottoman Empire was based on a 'trading civilization'; moreover other 'sources' of successful merchants, i.e. Jews and Armenians, were readily in hand. Briefly, the Empire had everything for a dynamic economic life, and the rest was up to the rulers, who showed a great success to use this 'capital' and to create a huge wealth.

The Islamic heritage of the Ottoman Empire was far beyond being only a kind of mentality. Islam had constituted an ancient economic network from India to Atlantic. The ancient crossroads of trade, the Middle East, had been the center of the world and under the rule of the Islamic civilization. Lively trade routes with big caravans carrying the most valuable commodities like spice, pepper and silk to the West through Levant, and densely populated cities (i.e. Cairo, Aleppo, Baghdad, Tabriz) created this extraordinary market. But the rise of the Atlantic trade had dethroned the Middle East just before the Ottomans captured this marvelous treasure. Nevertheless, according to Braudel, the conquests of two important centers of this region, Syria in 1516 and Egypt in 1517, were far more important then the capture of Constantinople for the rise of the Empire. Braudel insisted that this victory "was the first glimpse of the future greatness of the Ottoman state" (Braudel, 1973: 667) and "marked the arrival of the Ottomans as a world power" (Braudel, 1973: 668).

> So the Middle East as a crossroads of trade had declined in value, but it was far from being reduced to insignificance. The precious Levant trade, so long unparalleled, was not suspended when the Turks occupied Syria in 1516 and Egypt in 1517, nor were the trade routes through the nearby Mediterranean by any means abandoned. The Red Sea and the Black Sea (the latter as important to Istanbul as the 'Indies' to Spain) continued to offer their services. After 1630, pepper and spices bound for Europe seem to have been permanently diverted to Atlantic route but their place was taken by silk, long before by coffee and drugs, eventually by cotton and cotton textiles, both printed and plain. (Braudel, 1992b: 468)

The Ottomans ruled this market zone with a great success. They maintained and strengthened the trading infrastructure by constructing and maintaining 'caravanserais', 'khans' and roads, and by providing security along these roads. By this way they significantly lowered the costs of long-distance trade and created very suitable conditions for the merchants. The best example of this trade promoting mentality was revealed in the traditional advice, which Braudel related with Islamic trade mentality, given to the Ottoman princes:

> Look with favour on the merchants in the land; always care for them; let no one harass them; let no one order them about; for through their trading, the land becomes prosperous and by their wares, cheapness abounds the world. (Braudel, 1992a: 558)

The only prosperous market within the Ottoman Empire was not the Middle East. The Black Sea and the towns on it; Asia Minor with various towns and cities in various magnitudes; and the Balkans were also economically very dynamic. Briefly, the whole region that the Ottoman Empire ruled had different important niches in world trade. The Balkan region is an important example to understand the economic success of the Ottoman rulers. "The Balkan Peninsula was far from poor, indeed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it was comparatively wealthy." (Braudel, 1973: 663) But it was divided among different powers; moreover there were serious religious conflicts involved. In other words, "socially the Balkan world was extremely fragile—a mere house of cards" (Braudel, 1973: 663). This fragile social structure was a great advantage for Turkish advance in the region in late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. By the way, we should not forget the role of Turkish cavalry in worsening the situation by disturbing the economic life by ruining the crops and cutting the roads. The *pax turcica* was the solution in the eyes of the people; it was a new order against this whole mess. So, the situation in the Balkans paved the way for the Turkish army and then the Ottoman rule advanced very rapidly.

> Military victory was followed by another, more leisurely conquest: the construction of roads, the organization of camel trains, the setting in motion of all supply and transport convoys (often handled by Bulgarian carriers) and finally, most important of all, the conquest which operated through those towns which the Turks had subdued, fortified or built. These

> now became major centres of diffusion of Turkish civilization: they calmed, domesticated and tamed at least the conquered regions, where it must not be imagined that an atmosphere of constant violence reigned. (Braudel, 1973: 665)

Although the subjugated people suffered from the calamities of the war, after the order was established they shared the benefits of the new order, *pax turcica*, with the conquerors. The patterns of Byzantine Empire were re-created and the necessary calm and safety was established for a vigorous market to be established. "In the Balkans, according to Iorgo Tadic, the *pax turcica* and the demand of Istanbul created a genuine national market, or at the very least stimulated trade." (Braudel, 1992b: 469)

Istanbul certainly was a marvelous important economic unit of the Empire, as it was the most important political center. It was a great market because of its huge population and the extreme luxury consumption of the Serail, moreover it was the financial center of the Empire:

> Istanbul was cast in the image of the immense Turkish empire which was so rapidly created. It numbered perhaps 80,000 inhabitants after the conquest in 1478; 400,000 between 1520 and 1535; 700,000 according to westerners at the end of the century; it foreshadowed the development of London and Paris in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries […] (Braudel, 1972: 348)

The demand of this 'urban monster' for various essential commodities (especially grain), huge luxury consumption, slave market, export trade and financial activities created an economic center with a subjugated periphery.

The Ottoman economy was dominated by a kind of market economy, with a strict state control on economic life:

> It was at grassroots level that the real economy of the Turkish Empire, an elementary but a vigorous one, was to be found. Traian Stoyanovich has invented a picturesque name for it, 'the bazaar economy', that is a market economy articulated around the cities and regional fairs where exchange continued to obey traditional rules and was still, he argues, characterize by transparency and good faith. (Braudel, 1992b: 472)

Contrary to Europe, credit and financial mechanisms were not sophisticated in the Ottoman economy, but nevertheless not completely absent. Usury was ubiquitous; some forms of bills of exchange, inherited from Islam merchants were used in

commerce; but there was no developed financial system. The economy, in general, was in an archaic form and prices were very low. But Braudel did not think that these archaic forms led to the decline of the economy, as long as the domestic market remained lively. (Braudel, 1992b: 473) Barter was still the dominant form of payment in many places, but cash was indispensable in all kinds of trade. There was a great circulation of precious metals in the Turkish economy.

> […] Turkey under the Osmanli dynasty belonged to a gold zone as far back as the fifteenth century (based on bullion from Africa and Egyptian coins). But gold was relatively plentiful in the Mediterranean and Europe before 1550; if it was also abundant in Turkey, because Turkey was merely a transit point for silver coins from Europe on their way east. (Braudel, 1985: 459)

Levant was the major center of this transit trade. The gold coins arrived here in return for precious commodities from the East (i.e. spice, silk) were re-minted or directly injected into the economy. As a result, various European coins circulated within the Turkish Empire. The capital city, Istanbul, was also the financial center of the Empire, due to several reasons. First of all, based on its enormous population and the presence of the state organization it contained, Istanbul was a huge market. Secondly, it was the center of the Ottoman state, so it was the center for the government borrowing, and as a result, a center of financial activities. There were many—especially non-Muslim— bankers and moneylenders, who made great fortunes in return for their services for the Ottoman state; the Galata region in Istanbul was known as the center of these 'businessmen'. Besides, the economy of Istanbul was based on cash:

> In currency at Istanbul were gold *sultanins* also known as *fonduc* or *fonduchi* (whole coins, halves and quarters); silver pieces—the Turkish piastres known as *grouck* or *grouch*; while *para* and the *aspre* became moneys of account. (Braudel, 1985: 459)

The Ottoman Empire was a gold zone and it was seen only a transit area for silver flow from Europe to Far East. The Ottoman economy was once assumed to be neutral against this transit trade, through Egypt and the Red Sea, or Syria to Persia in the sixteenth century and through Smyrna and Anatolia in the seventeenth century. In other words, it had been assumed that the silver flow originating from the trade

between Europe and Far East had no significant effect on the Ottoman Empire. But Braudel wrote that the Ottoman economy was not so much neutral against this transit silver flow. It was influenced by the cycles of silver supply, originating from European economy (i.e. after the discovery of mines in the Americas). In fact, silver had an indispensable role in the everyday transactions and moreover janissaries were paid in silver. As Braudel discussed, Ömer Lütfi Barkan's study showed that silver inflation originating from Europe shook the Ottoman economy as well. Briefly, although the Ottoman Empire belonged to a gold zone, silver was at least as important as gold.

The Empire contained many merchant 'nations' of the area, i.e. Arabs, Jews and Armenians. The economic system, established by Islam from India to Atlantic (although it was not a sophisticated one), consisted of monetary and commercial networks and experiences (bills of exchange, caravan routes etc.). Jews and Armenians were ubiquitous in the entire region, as they were all over the world. The networks of these nations were very old, for example the networks of Jewish merchants had been established in Roman antiquity. (Braudel, 1992a: 157) Benefiting both from those ancient networks and their 'accumulated' experience in trade, these 'nations' dominated many niches in the Ottoman economy. Jews, especially after their exile from Spain, Sicily (1492) and Naples (1541), made "huge fortunes from the sixteenth century in Turkey—in Salonica, Bursa, Istanbul and Adrianople, as businessmen or tax-farmers" (Braudel, 1992a: 157). The same success was observed in the case of the Armenians as well; for example Braudel described a small Armenian colony, which "with its own rules, its printing houses, and its many trading connections, dominated the huge caravan-trade towards the Ottoman Empire" (Braudel, 1992a: 157). The success of these peoples was observed in all sectors from trade to banking. Briefly, the Ottoman Empire, like all other dynamic markets, was a host to successful and big businessmen from various ethnic origins.

Another advantage of the Ottoman market was the combination of the extremely frugal life of ordinary people and the huge geographical size of the Empire. This combination provided the market with an abundant surplus of many

precious commodities for commerce, i.e. grain, many kinds of animals, textiles. (Braudel, 1992b: 468) The ample surplus production and great cities creating demand for these goods, ancient trade routes and networks within the region and with the other parts of the world, competent merchants who were able to carry out even some forms of long-distance trade), and a traditional trade promoting mentality of the state. The Ottoman economic life had all of those fortunes; although it could not compete with European economy in later times, it nevertheless created an important total wealth.

Eventually the success of the system brought its fall, due to a lack of motivation to search for and develop alternatives. Once again, wealth brought inertia, whereas difficulty brought dynamism. The success of the Ottoman model created no motivation to look beyond the 'limits of the possible'; but Europe, deprived of the control of her lifeblood, the Eastern trade, had to struggle to transcend the limits. In later times, as we now from Braudel, the inertia of wealth was bound to be defeated by the dynamism of scarcity.

Part 2.1.4: Capitalism and the State

The strict economic control of the Ottoman state hindered the absolute dominance of 'the great predators' above the market. From the very beginning, one of the first concerns of the rulers was the appropriate working of the market, but this time not according to its own rules, but according to the rules that the government set, especially in Istanbul. For example, the provisioning of Istanbul was handled as a higher priority than the existence of free markets:

> In the enormous capital city during the eighteenth century, price lists fixed the prices of commodities and ad valorem customs duties in national currencies. (Braudel, 1985: 459)

Although there was a 'market economy' within the entire territory, the maintenance of the infrastructure of the economic system was tightly controlled by the state representatives. Nearly all investments were undertaken by the local rulers, some of whom were capitalists in some respects besides being the servants of the

state. In the capital city and distant parts of the Empire, the state officials were an important part of the 'Ottoman capitalist class'. Moreover the state nurtured the local businessmen with many privileges, as in the case of Europe. Briefly in the Ottoman economy, capitalism went hand in hand with the state, just as in the European economies.

The Ottoman army was the most important source of the power of the state. A well-equipped and well-trained sizeable army was complemented by the great naval strength. This military power provided the Ottomans with both the political power to rule over this vast territory and the economic power by maintaining the security of the markets and the trade routes on land or at the sea, besides conquering new markets.

In the Ottoman Empire, like in all other contemporary states, privileges taken from the state authorities provided 'large players' with important sources of income. The most important of these privileges was getting the control of an estate on behalf of the Sultan. There was no private property in land in the Ottoman Empire; all the lands (*mülks*) belonged to the Sultan himself, but only the administration of these lands was granted to some landlords in return for the provision of local soldiers and some taxes tributes collected from the land. As in all other feudal regimes, the landlords fed the army under their responsibility and joined the campaigns whenever the Sultan ordered. In the peace time, those landlords had also some obligations, like training and equipping the soldiers under their control and maintaining local security. Nevertheless, the landlords were not totally deprived of the initiative to use this 'borrowed power' for themselves:

> The Ottoman 'feudal system' so often evoked was in fact only a pre-feudal régime, of life grants: the *timars* and *sipahiniks* were estates concede for a life time only. Not until the end of the sixteenth century was a real Ottoman feudal system beginning to appear, with a capitalist policy of land-improvement and of introducing land crops. (Braudel, 1992a, pp. 595-596)

What happened at the dawn of the seventeenth century was the establishment of a new type of estates: *çiftliks*. "These are large villages, easily recognizable from the hovels clustering around the tall master's house that towers and watches over them." (Braudel, 1972: 69) Land improvements and other investments were

undertaken by the Ottoman landlords, similar to their western counterparts. This new form of landholding created a feudal aristocracy, especially in the Balkans, which held the control of these estates or fiefs for many generations.

But this feudal regime was different from that of the west. First of all, the aristocracy was not completely independent in their actions and confiscation was always above their head like the sword of Democles. Each inappropriate action that led to the fury of the Sultan or other rulers could be at benefit to the rivals to acquire the control of the lands of the family in question. The Ottoman aristocracy found a solution to save their family fortunes by establishing some religious foundations (*vakıf*s), transferring those fortunes to their *vakıf*s, and administering individual fortunes through these institutions. Nevertheless, no particular precaution could serve as an absolute guarantee against the Sultan's will. The Emperor or the Sultan in this feudal regime was not merely *primus inter pares* as usual:

> [W]hile the western nations are divided, 'all supreme authority in the Turkish Empire rests in a single man, all obey the sultan, he alone rules: he receives all revenues, in a word he is master and all other men are his slaves'. (Braudel, 1973: 666)

This strict militaristic organization of the feudal regime was the source of the Turkish strength, against divided Europe. This led to the rapid success especially in the conquest of the Balkan peninsula. The characteristic of the Ottoman system in fact lay between a feudal regime and a territorial state that was prototypical of the modern state.

The Ottoman state recruited a large number of civil servants (especially beginning from the sixteenth century, like other European states) and many of those officials were Christian born renegades (*devşirme*), who succeeded to climb to the top levels of the state organization as well as to take the place of the previous *timarli*s (the holders of the *timar*s and the fiefs). Braudel, using the study of H. Gelzer, reminded that between 1453 and 1623, out of forty eight-grand viziers between 1453 and 1623, only the five of them were from Turkish origin. Braudel added that in this aspect the Ottoman Empire resembled the Byzantine Empire. (Braudel, 1973: 681)

The problem of administration of the vast conquered areas in the eastern provinces as well as in the Balkans was solved by assigned landlords, who were unquestionably the servants of the Sultan. The organization of this large number of civil servants was under strict discipline, each state official having some particular duties against the state, in return for some forms of payment:

> Turkey, now becoming partly against its own will a modern state, appointed to the conquered eastern provinces of Asia, increasing the numbers of half-pay tax farmers, who lived off the revenues they collected but transmitted the bulk of it to Istanbul; she also appointed increasing number of paid civil servants who, in exchange for specific service, preferably in the towns easiest to administer, would receive a salary from the imperial treasury. (Braudel, 1973: 685)

Like in most other contemporary states, the offices were re-saleable. The head of this 'commercial' activity was generally the grand vizier. Offices, in return for cash or incredibly precious gifts, were sold and re-sold to the candidates. Braudel gave the example of huge fortune of the famous grand vizier of the Empire, Sokollu Mehmed Paşa, obtained by this way. (Braudel, 1973: 690)

Some officials turned their wealth, which was accumulated by salaries, tributes, taxes and even bribery, into commercial capital. Having strong ties with the state or directly being a state official provided the 'capitalists' with many economic advantages within a system under strict state control. As a result, direct capitalist activities of the state and military officials (especially *pasha*s) and the partnerships with those civil servants had been very common in the Ottoman Empire. In some of those partnerships, the officials only invested their 'political capital' (political power).

A very profitable sector in sixteenth century, snow trade, was an example of this situation. In major cities, the trade of snow, snow water and pieces of ice, which were transported from high mountains, were important merchant activities, especially in the summer. "The snow trade was so important that the pashas took an interest in the exploitation of the 'ice mines'. It was said in 1578 to have provided Muhammad Pasha [Sokollu Mehmed Paşa] with an income of up to 80,000 sequins a year." (Braudel, 1972: 28) As an interesting example, Braudel told about a rumor circulated in the middle of the sixteenth century that "Turkish pashas participated in

the speculation at Lyons on the Grand Party" (Braudel, 1973, pp.699-701). Moreover, while some pashas were interested in Levant trade, many janissaries held possessions of some enterprises in crafts sector in the capital city.

On the other side of the picture, we can see huge 'private' fortunes gathered by using the state mechanism. For example, in the Galata region in Istanbul, there were many, mostly Greek, non-Muslim bankers, who grew rich by the loans they gave to the Ottoman state. Braudel told the story of such a 'pseudo-Greek' businessman, Michael Cantacuzenus, who made a huge fortune in Istanbul, in return for his 'services' for the Ottoman state:

> For Cantacuzenus had the monopoly of all the saltworks in the Empire, farmed innumerable customs duties, trafficked in offices and like a vizier, could depose Greek patriarchs or metropolitans at his pleasure. In addition to this, he controlled the revenues of entire provinces, Moldovia for instance or Wallachia, and held enough feudal villages to be able to provide crews for twenty or thirty galleys. (Braudel, 1973: 696)

This single man, who was a great 'holding' company on his own, lost his whole fortune and eventually his life because of the source of his wealth, the state authority. He had troubles with the state, even though the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed Paşa supported him. Eventually, his wealth was confiscated and he was hanged at the doors of his own palace. In short, in the Ottoman Empire the economy had its own rules only up to a certain threshold.

Part 2.1.5: The General Overview

The geographical location of the Ottoman Empire determined her destiny. First of all, the Ottoman Empire was a subsystem of a great system, the Mediterranean. She was influenced by all important social, economic and political phenomena and cycles of the region. Being one of the great powers of the region, she nevertheless submitted to the material realities that she could not control. The Empire could not stay neutral against the climatic and geographic conditions, epidemics, social and demographic changes, epidemics etc. within the region. Secondly, the Ottoman Empire was established on the inheritance of various civilizations and empires, such as Islam, Asiatic Turcomans, Seljuk and Byzantine Empires. The seals of those

factors were existent in social, economic and political life of the Empire. The nomadic life style of the *yürük*s amalgamated with the Islamic factors (and in many places with other religions and cultures), and eventually created a Turkish life style. Islamic economic network was maintained and developed by both the Turks and other non-Muslim subjects. The complicated structure of the state was based on the experiences of the Seljuk and Byzantine empires, whereas the addition of some Asiatic and even nomadic features of the Turcomans provided the originality of the system.

The Empire covered a huge territory and controlled indispensable waterways. The territory she controlled provided an extraordinary market in many ways. First of all, some important trade routes and ancient economic networks were contained in it, such as the Middle East, Levant, Balkans and the Black Sea. Secondly, many important trade centers, vigorous ancient cities were under her control (i.e. Cairo, Aleppo, Baghdad, Salonica, Istanbul). Those cities were the centers of the economic system by creating both the economic networks and a huge demand for commodities. The vast territory combined with an extremely frugal life on it created the surplus for trade. In short, its particular geography was very suitable for a dynamic economic life.

The Ottoman state had a strict control on the market economy. The rulers promoted the trade by providing some services to merchants (i.e. establishing caravanserais, khans), putting strict rules to guarantee the appropriate working of the commercial system, maintaining the security of the markets and trade routes and by granting some economic privileges to the businessmen. The rulers gave primacy to the maintenance of security and the establishment of the necessary infrastructure to reactivate the economic system in the conquered areas. Despite this market promoting mentality, an independent and powerful capitalist class was not permitted to develop. Briefly, the economic system of the Empire was a '*dirigisté*' market economy.

The Empire was within the gold region. The gold primarily from Africa was indispensable for the economic system. Ordinary transactions were handled by silver, and the janissaries were also paid in silver. So, silver inflations originating

from Europe influenced also the Ottoman economy. Although barter was still a widespread practice, cash was the dominant means of payment in commercial transactions. Financial system was not sophisticated; nevertheless some archaic forms of financial activities and papers (i.e. bills of exchange) were existent as inheritances from Islam.

The Ottoman Empire had a feudal regime. But all the estates belonged to the Sultan himself, the landlords were his servants and the estates were granted in return for service. Before the seventeenth century the estates were granted for lifetime only and could not been inherited. But once the new type of estates, *çiftlik*s, were established after the seventeenth century, the system was eased, a landed aristocracy appeared and some capitalist practices began to be observed (such as introducing new crops, land improvements). Despite some precautionary measures of the nobles to save their family fortunes (i.e. *vakıf*s), the unquestioned rule of sultan controlled the power and wealth of the aristocracy until the complete disintegration of the system.

The Ottoman state was a 'modern state' in some aspects. It recruited a large number of civil servants; many of them were salaried. The large imperial territory was administered by the central authority by means of those officials, rather than the local independent landlords as in Europe. The security of both the political and economic system was maintained by means of a well-established army and naval force. Centrifugal political forces and 'extremities' (whether economic, social or political) were not permitted to appear which was to shake the absolute authority of the center. This brought stability to society and as well as to the political system.

The Ottoman capitalism went hand in hand with the Ottoman state. The privileges granted by the state provided the 'businessmen' with important chances for huge profits. Whether in the form of a trade monopoly or an estate, those privileges had always required well-established relations with the state and state officials. Corruption ruled the bureaucratic system; the offices were sold in return for cash or precious gifts. Besides the 'private sector', the state officials were also interested in capitalist investments, in trade, land or even in financial transactions.

Big enterprises required some forms of political partnerships to support their operations.

The great success of this system brought its fall in the end. The wealth it created hindered the rise of any motivation to look for alternatives. This eventually brought inertia within the economic and political system, relative to Europe, in which hardships led to dynamism. Nevertheless, Braudel separated the political and economic decline of the Empire and argued that the Ottoman Empire did not experience an economic decline until the working of the markets was halted by the invasion of European industrial products in the nineteenth century, whereas the political decline started much earlier.

In short, Braudel brought alternative explanations to many economic phenomena, which had had until then some widely accepted traditional explanations. He presented a more complete picture by taking into account the influences of political, social and economic spheres on each other, and the influences of international dynamics on particular economic and political units. Braudel's theses on the Ottoman Empire were not only original, but also very influential. In the next section, we will discuss his influences on Ottoman historiography.

SECTION 2.2

Braudel's Influences on Ottoman Historiography

Fernand Braudel's influences on Ottoman historiography can be traced through two ways. Firstly, Braudel was a follower of a very influential school of thought, the *Annales* School. Secondly, his studies were certainly the trailblazers of twentieth century historiography. So, we should evaluate his influences concerning these two points separately and starting from the pioneers of the discipline of economic history in Turkey. In this respect, we should mention Ömer Lütfi Barkan and Halil İnalcık as the two leading scholars of Ottoman historiography who laid the foundations of the discipline of economic history in late 1930s.

But before Barkan and İnalcık, we must dwell upon Mehmed Fuad Köprülü, who was the teacher of many eminent historians including Halil İnalcık. İnalcık tells that as one of his students he was greatly indebted to Köprülü for his "orientation towards institutional, social and economic history" (İnalcık, 1978: 70). Köprülü is very important for us not only for his leadership in this era but also for the fact that he was the first historian who transmitted the methodology of the *Annales* School to Turkish historiography. "After 1930, his interest in the work of Lucien Febvre and *Annales* became increasingly evident in both his methodology and his mode of conceptualization." (İnalcık, 1978: 70)

> In his *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire,* which was written under the influence of the Annales School and was first published in France in 1935, whereas it was published in Turkey as late as 1959, Köprülü emphasized the material conditions rather than the *gaza* tradition. Among these material conditions, he especially underlined the demographic factors, Turcoman migrations that were appeared in the eleventh century and then due to the Mongolian oppression in the thirteenth centuries. Moreover, although he was rather accepted as a social and legal historian, Köprülü influenced the studies of Barkan, İnalcık and many others on economic history, with his method, conceptualization and his utilization of other useful disciplines for historical studies. (Çizakça and Pamuk, 1997: 22; our translation)

Besides the influences of Köprülü, Ömer Lütfi Barkan had probably a direct contact with the *Annales* School. When Barkan was a student at the University of Strasbourg, Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre were also teaching at the University of Strasbourg (now a part of it is called as the University of Marc Bloch (*Strasbourg II - Université Marc Bloch*)). In the meantime, Bloch and Febvre founded the journal *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* (1929). So, he probably met the methodology and the works of this important school of thought during those years in Strasbourg until 1931. Barkan returned to Turkey in 1931 and worked as a high-school teacher for two years and then worked for the Institution of Turkish Revolution (*Türk İnkılap Enstitüsü*) until 1937. In 1937, when he was assigned to the Chair of Economic History and Economic Geography at Istanbul University, he started to focus on economic history. (Çizakça and Pamuk, 1997: 22)

The discipline of economic history deals more with the history of ordinary people ('material life' in Braudelian terms) rather than concentrating on the stories

of the political elites. Ömer Lütfi Barkan was the first to introduce this alternative approach to Turkish historiography, in his *Süleymaniye Camii ve İmareti İnşaatı (1550-1557)* (Barkan, 1972) where he discussed the construction sector and the workers in detail.

Both Barkan and İnalcık seem to be committed to or stay closer to the Annales School. They used vast archival materials, focused on economic and social phenomena and pursued comparative studies. While Braudel was still working on *The Mediterranean*, Barkan and İnalcık were laying the foundations of economic history in Turkey in late 1930s. It seems that the intellectual commitment of those historians to the *Annales* School added many similar features in their studies, before they met each other's works. Nevertheless, the publication of *The Mediterranean* established more concrete connections between Braudel and Turkish historians.

> Among European historians, Fernand Braudel was probably the first to propose that on the level of socio-economic structure, there existed a common dimension between the Ottoman world and early modern European states. This idea was taken up by Ömer Lütfi Barkan […] (Faroqhi, 1991: 211)

Barkan wrote a review (1951) on Braudel's masterpiece, *La Méditerranée*, two years after its first publication in 1949. In this review, Barkan introduced this book to the Turkish scholars studying Ottoman history. According to him, it was for sure that those people would consider the publication of this book as a great scientific phenomenon. (Barkan, 1951: 173) In this review, Barkan emphasized the contributions of Braudel's study to Ottoman historiography and to the methodology of history in general, besides giving some basic information about the content of the book.

Barkan's review can be considered in two main points. Firstly, he emphasized the methodology of the book, which was quite astonishing according to him. The methodology, in fact, was not totally brand-new, but the book was an important application or a solid product of the *Annales* methodology, to which Barkan was committed. And secondly, Barkan argued that Braudel's long-lasting and meticulous investigations in the archives presented major new historical data and knowledge, and proposed new problems for research on Ottoman history. In

other words, “not only do his [Braudel’s] works demonstrate to professional historians how to write history but the approach stimulates one to raise further questions and elaborate research on existing themes.” (Chauduri, 1990: 7) Barkan predated this position:

> First of all it should be emphasized that the writer’s style on the history of the Mediterranean countries in the second part of the sixteenth century is not a traditional general history telling, which is the continuation of the backward customs of the classical historiography that we accustomed to see in history classes that lists the history of each country side by side and emphasizes only the staff of each country and each political organization both large and small. The most important contribution of the study we deal with here is the courageous abolition of all political and more importantly religious and cultural borders. (Barkan, 1951: 174; our translation)

Consequently, Braudel’s study was praised as a trendsetter in historiography due to its emphasis on the coherence of the whole Mediterranean region, and its challenge against the traditional historiography. Moreover, Braudel’s broad perspective on historical phenomena, which was a result of both his multidisciplinary methodology and his commitment to the idea of *longue durée*, created a more comprehensive and explanatory history telling. Combining geographical, climatic, social, economic as well as political factors in the analyses provided the study with a great strength to explain events and trends. (Barkan, 1951: 174-176) Moreover, Braudel’s comparative analyses covered the facts of the whole region and the primary relations within the region, rather than dealing with isolated developments:

> It is no doubt that any scientific explanation of even only political and militaristic events depends on a broad view of the historian and also her/his ability to compare, using plentiful resources, and his interest in the histories of the neighbor countries, as well as his interest in the technical, economic, financial… and other areas.
> It is very important that people who study Turkish history have to understand these facts. So, we wish that one of the primary results that is obtained from this work will be the idea that it is impossible to explain Ottoman history in an isolated manner and from within only the logic of its own developments. (Barkan, 1951: 175; our translation)

As we discussed above, Barkan admired also Braudel’s labor in archival investigations, which presented both new findings and new questions for Ottoman historiography:

> Besides the innovations in the methods used to analyze the phenomena of the considered époque and in the understanding of the responsibilities of the science of history, the fact that the material used here were collected by the author from the archives gives the work an additional importance and originality. (Barkan, 1951: 176; our translation)

According to Barkan, the historical phenomena that Braudel concerned himself with were so new for the scholars that it was impossible to collect any information about them from the existing literature. It was very admirable that Braudel spent 20 years to find all those materials in the archives and he dealt with every tiny detail himself. Moreover, the resulting logical synthesis was not drowned under this tiresome effort for material collection. This is a result of Braudel's extraordinary qualities as a historian, according to Barkan. (Barkan, 1951: 177)

Among all those archives of the Mediterranean countries he researched, Braudel could not reach only the Turkish archives. He considered this fact as a weakness of his study, and felt a pity for the fact that Turkish scholars did not study those 'treasuries' to increase their values further and to introduce them to the international scientific community. Barkan stated that it was an interesting and also honorable duty of the Turkish historians, from then on, to investigate the archives to deal with the historical problems discussed in this book by the same spirit and method. (Barkan, 1951: 177)

After considering those general highlights of the book, Barkan went into some comparisons and evaluations of Braudel's findings and theses on Ottoman history. Barkan discussed three main points of the book. The first one was Braudel's arguments on the demographic boom in the sixteenth century Mediterranean world and its consequences. Second point was the result of the precious metal flows, originating from America into the Mediterranean economies. The third main point Barkan considered was the influence of the discovery of the route to Indian Sea, via the south of Africa, on the Ottoman Empire.

Barkan, as a pioneer of demographic studies on the Ottoman Empire, especially compared the results of his earlier works on the demographic facts and developments with the calculations in T*he Mediterranean*, and found interesting consistencies with Braudel's work. Despite the lack of necessary resources for exact

calculations, Braudel offered very reasonable figures for the population and the population growth of the regions ruled by Ottomans. Moreover, Barkan added that they share more or less the same observations about the influences of those demographic conditions on the Ottoman success (see Barkan, 1951: 178-184).

Barkan found Braudel's arguments on the influences of the precious metal flows on Ottoman economy logical, but admitted that there were no sufficient available studies made by Turkish historians to prove those influences. (Barkan, 1951: 185)

According to him, Braudel's explanations on the influences of the route passing below the south of Africa continent to India were very illuminating. Before Braudel, it was surely known that the discovery of that route paralyzed but not completely terminated the major transit trade activities passing through the Empire.

> After reading Braudel, we learnt the phases and the details of the struggle and temporary successes of the East trade routes, which were passing through the Ottoman Empire and were indispensable for the economic history of the Empire, to protect and regain its old advantageous position. (Barkan, 1951: 186; our translation)

Barkan added that the important duty of evaluating all those important theses, using the necessary archival material, stood before the Turkish historians. (Barkan, 1951: 188) As an important example, Barkan discussed the part of *The Mediterranean* on the economic reasons behind major uprisings, and he concluded that Braudel was completely right in his analyses on the generality of and the reasons behind uprisings and banditry; moreover the major uprisings within the Ottoman Empire should be evaluated in the same way by Turkish historians:

> After understanding that the very well known "Celali uprisings", which have been attributed to the political structure and the inability of the politicians of the Ottoman Empire, were some specific continuations of a general crisis observed in all Mediterranean countries, we think that the Turkish historians, who are studying those events, will have to reevaluate the materials at their hand and reinterpreted them according to Braudel's theses after reading this part. (Barkan, 1951: 189; our translation)

Eight years after the publication of this review, another important Turkish historian, Mustafa Akdağ, responded to the call of Barkan. He explained the socio-economic factors behind the major uprisings in the sixteenth century Ottoman

Empire, namely '*Celali isyanları*' (see Akdağ, 1963 and also Akdağ, 1979). In fact, Halil İnalcık stated that Akdağ, as early as 1950 (Akdağ, 1950), posed the question of population pressure in Anatolia without being aware of Braudel's hypothesis (first published in 1949)" (İnalcık, 1978: 81).

> In summary, this great work of Prof. Braudel is a magnificent study book for Turkish historians, which is full of abundant inspirations […] Turkish historians are greatly indebted to Prof. Braudel who with this book suggested the importance and necessity of international cooperation in modern historical researches and both enriched the area of Turkish history and paved the way for future researches by his innovations and arguments. (Barkan, 1951: 192; our translation)

As Barkan suggested, many eminent Turkish historians after Braudel generally worked on the problems posed by Braudel and made comments on his analyses according to their findings as a result of their archival researches. Both methodology and the problems remained more or less the same as Braudel's. In fact, as Faroqhi contended "Ottoman history down to the present day has remained a net importer of paradigms" (Faroqhi, 1991: 212) and Braudel provided a new paradigm for twentieth-century Turkish historians. Besides presenting many original theses, many leading Turkish historians after Braudel spent great effort to reevaluate Ottoman history according to Braudel's method, as Barkan suggested.

The other pioneer of the discipline, Halil İnalcık, who is one of the foremost Turkish historians today and a colleague of Barkan, devoted one of his papers to an evaluation of the impact of the *Annales* School, (İnalcık, 1978). He emphasized especially the impact of Braudel's work on Ottoman studies within the thirty year time period after *The Mediterranean*'s first publication:

> The publication of Fernand Braudel's *La Méditerranée,* which clearly defined the issues and offered suggestions of seminal importance, has been the most significant milestone in this period. One of the major contributions of Braudel's work, not only to Ottoman studies but also to general historiography, was, I believe, his rediscovery of the historical place of the Ottoman Empire. (İnalcık, 1978: 70)

İnalcık argued that the Ottoman Empire, which once had been considered as "an intruder, a constant disruptor of the normal course of European events", (İnalcık, 1978: 70) began to be considered as a major player in the history of the Mediterranean after Braudel's work. According to İnalcık, as Barkan argued, *The*

Mediterranean not only presented new theses for the Ottoman studies, but also gave "a new orientation to those studies" (İnalcık, 1978: 71). In the rest of his paper, he evaluates Braudel's analyses on the population growth and the developments in trade patterns of the Ottoman Empire under the light of his own findings.

Braudel's influence on Ottoman historiography led also many feedbacks for his studies. Braudel utilized the results of the studies of those Turkish historians in the later editions of *The Mediterranean* and his other masterpiece *Civilization and Capitalism*. For example, Barkan's demographic studies on the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire appeared in the 1966 edition of *The Mediterranean*. Likewise, Braudel benefited from İnalcık's arguments (İnalcık, 1969) for the question of the influence of Islamic economic thought on Ottoman economic life (Braudel, 1992a: 558).

In summary, the influences of Braudel (especially of his first major work, *The Mediterranean*) on Turkish historiography can be summarized under three main headings. First, his methodology; second, his repositioning of the Ottoman Empire within the history of the Mediterranean region; and third, his new findings (depending on the material he collected from the archives) and his original hypotheses on the ever-known historical events.

As Barkan suggested, many Turkish historians adopted Braudel's methodology in terms of time, space and his multidisciplinary approach. *Longue durée* (which is in fact a concept of the Annales School) was widely accepted as the accurate time conception to understand the real nature of historical events. Many historians started to look beyond the formal country borders to understand the historical developments and trends, instead of getting caught in relatively narrow geographical spaces. They began to consider social and political movements and events under the light of economic factors (including climatic, geographical and other constraints), instead of telling the stories of dynasties and elites.

Although, it is possible to discuss all of those influences with clear and detailed examples from the studies of Turkish historians, this would go far beyond the limits of this study. But an interested reader can clearly see some Braudelian flavors in most well-known studies of Ottoman historiography.

As a result, we can certainly say that Braudel was the 'ideological' leader of a great revolution in the history of Turkish historiography, which started step by step in the 1960s. Turkish historians are both motivated for further research to reach new findings to be able to test Braudel's important hypotheses and have reevaluated the existing explanations of ever-known historical events. But Braudel not only made a direct impact, but also caused an important indirect impact on Ottoman historiography through the studies of one of his major followers, Immanuel Wallerstein, with whom we will deal in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

Section 3.1

Immanuel Wallerstein and the World-Systems Approach

Immanuel Wallerstein (1930-) has been one of the most influential social scientists in last thirty years. His 'world-system analysis' has influenced various scholars all over the world; moreover his active involvement in a wide range of academic and political debates, from the methodology of social sciences to the discussions on political systems and events, made his name very popular among both academic and non-academic circles. Two schools of thought mostly influenced Wallerstein's analyses: Marxism and the *Annales School*—especially Fernand Braudel.

> A number of world-system theorists, most notably Immanuel Wallerstein, explicitly characterize their work as an extension of the concerns of the *Annales* school of French historian thought […] Among these [*Annales*] scholars, the work of Fernand Braudel is of the greatest direct relevance to world-system theorizing. His three-volume book, Civilization and Capitalism, 15^{th} – 18^{th} Century (1981, 1982, 1984), is the fullest statement of his approach and contains a number of ideas that reappear in world-system theory. (Shannon, 1989:13)

In this chapter, we will first discuss Immanuel Wallerstein's main contributions to the social sciences, i.e. 'the world-system analysis', and then we will trace his influences on Ottoman historiography.

> World-system analysis is not a theory about the social world, or about a part of it. It is a protest against the ways in which social scientific inquiry was structured for all of us at its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century. This mode of inquiry has come to be a set of often unquestioned a priori assumptions […] World-systems analysis was born as a moral, and in its broadest sense, political protest […] [It] challenges the prevailing mode of inquiry. (Wallerstein, 2000: 129)

Wallerstein's contributions depend on his critiques of the current situation of the social sciences. According to him, the existing paradigms, which were the inheritances of the nineteenth century, and the separation between the social sciences, or the 'social science' in his terms, have been the major problems of social inquiry. So, he started his inquiry by questioning the existing paradigms and the separation of the disciplines. He later called this attempt as 'unthinking' social sciences. In the introduction of his 1991 book, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth Century Paradigms*, Wallerstein explains this 'unthinking' approach:

> I have entitled this book, "unthinking social science" and not "rethinking social science." It is quite normal for scholars and scientists to rethink issues […] In that sense, much of nineteenth-century social science, in the form of specific hypothesis, is constantly being rethought. But, in addition to rethinking, which is "normal", I believe we need to "unthink" nineteenth century social science, because many of its presumptions – which, in my view, are misleading and constrictive – still have too far strong a hold on our mentalities. These presumptions, once considered liberating of the spirit, serve today as the central intellectual barrier to useful analysis of the world. (Wallerstein, 1991: 1)

Moreover, Wallerstein thinks that social systems are so complex that the individual disciplines within the social sciences are not adequate individually to understand this totality. As Braudel did, he utilizes many disciplines in his studies but he has not called for a 'multidisciplinary' approach:

> When one studies a social system, the classical lines of division within social science are meaningless. Anthropology, economics, political science, sociology—and history—are divisions of the discipline anchored in a certain liberal conception of the state and its relation to functional and geographical sectors of the social order. They make a certain limited sense if the focus of one's study is organizations. They make none at all if the focus is the social system. I am not calling for a multidisciplinary approach to the study of social systems, but for a unidisciplinary approach. (Wallerstein, 1974a: 11)

If we consider his critique of 'unit of analysis' of the nineteenth century social science, we can understand better what he meant by 'unthinking'. Wallerstein argues that the existing units of analysis, which have been the classical 'units' of the

social science since the nineteenth century, i.e. class conflicts, national society, or the modern nation-states, are inadequate for this aim.

According to Wallerstein the historical/social phenomena are too complex to understand using only those units, which have relatively narrow boundaries. Naturally, this idea reminds us of Braudel's approach for the history of the Mediterranean. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the Mediterranean was a complex and single entity that was beyond the boundaries of the existing political structures. In a similar vein, for Wallerstein, what is/are the appropriate unit(s) of analysis for social inquiry? He offers 'world-systems' as an alternative to the existing structures.

Wallerstein argues that there have been various social systems. First of all there are 'mini-systems' and 'world systems'. "A mini system is an entity that has within it a complete division of labor, and a single cultural framework." (Wallerstein, 2000: 75) According to him, mini-systems were found only in primitive societies and they no longer exist. So, the unit of analysis in the modern world must be the 'world-system':

> A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence… It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. (Wallerstein, 1974a: 347)

There are two kinds of world-systems according to him:

> [T]here have only existed two varieties of such world systems: world-empires, in which there is a single political system over most of the area, however attenuated the degree of its effective control; and those systems in which such a single political system does not exist at all, or virtually all, of the space. For convenience and for a better term, we are using the term "world-economy", to describe the latter. (Wallerstein, 1974a: 348)

Interestingly, we can find the clearest definitions and explanations of the world-systems in Braudel's *Civilization and Capitalism*, where he says, "The ideas expressed … [here] have much in common with those of I. Wallerstein" (Braudel, 1992b: 634) Braudel explained his understanding of the divisions of time and space, and discussed the characteristics of the 'world-economies' in detail. According to him, there were some 'ground rules' about the world-economies. First of all, they had boundaries, which generally did not coincide with political borders, and these

boundaries defined their identities; secondly, they each had a center and a dominant type of capitalism; and thirdly, they had a certain hierarchy and division of labor within themselves. (Braudel, 1992b: 25-26)

The hierarchy within the world-economies is an important argument of the world-system analysis. This hierarchy within the system determines all relationships among different units. According to this view, a world-economy, or more generally a world-system, is separated into three sub-parts: 'core', 'periphery' and 'semi-periphery'.

The core is the narrowest section of the system but it directs all economic activity. "The center of the *core* contains everything that is most advanced and diversified." (Braudel, 1992b: 39) It determines the structure of the economic activities and defines the division of labor within the system, and by this way exploits other parts:

> This division is not merely functional—that is, occupational—but geographical. That is to say, the range of economic tasks is not evenly distributed throughout the world-system. In part this is the consequence of ecological considerations, to be sure. But for the most part, it is a function of the social organization of work, one which magnifies and legitimizes the ability of some groups within the system to exploit the labor of others, that is, to receive a larger share of the surplus. (Wallerstein, 1974a: 349)

The core constructs completely different economic structures in each separate part, according to its own necessities. For example, in the core, the coercion on labor is more indirect, the labor is more skilled and the living standards are higher. Production techniques are more intensive and advanced and there is a strong political structure in the core. (Braudel, 1992b: 39) At the other extreme, the periphery is harshly exploited by the core –and somehow by the semi-periphery- and production techniques are archaic, living standards are very low relative to the other parts. (Braudel, 1992b: 40) There is a weak political structure or there is none at all in the periphery. (Wallerstein, 1974a: 349) We can clearly see that world-system analysis brought a different perspective to the 'development' problem. The 'backwardness', according to this theoretical framework, is not a result of inherent characteristics of individual societies, but of international power relationships.

The semi-periphery is the middle section of the world-system, in terms of both being a mediating sector and carrying average qualifications relative to other two parts. It is the communication zone of the core and the periphery; Wallerstein says that the role of these areas is "parallel to that played, *mutatis mutandis*, by middle trading groups in an empire" (Wallerstein, 1974a: 349). The semi-periphery exploits the periphery but the core exploits it. The semi-periphery is essential for stability because, it is like a bumper against upheavals originating from the periphery against the core.

> These middle areas (like middle groups in an empire) partially deflect the political pressures which groups primarily located in the peripheral areas might otherwise direct against core-states and the groups which operate within and through their state machineries. (Wallerstein, 1974a: 350)

Briefly, a world-economy is a single coherent entity with its own center, hierarchy and division of labor. World-economies set their own rules despite all constraints and regulations of the political units. For example, a political center within the world-economy need not to be an economic center of the area; or the existence of some hostilities between political units (i.e. empires or nation-states) does not always mean that all economic relations are suspended between these.

Wallerstein argues that there were world-economies before the modern era. "But they were always transformed into empires: China, Persia, Rome" (Wallerstein, 1974a: 16) and he contends that the world-economy is an invention of the modern world. His thesis is that the European world-economy, which appeared after the sixteenth century, have expanded in time and incorporated all other parts of the globe into itself. Consequently, the whole world became a part of the capitalist world-economy.

The capitalist mode of production, which started to dominate the European economy after the sixteenth century, transformed the decentralized feudal structure of the continent. According to Wallerstein, "[f]eudal Europe was a 'civilization', but not a world-system" (Wallerstein, 1974a:18). Because, it was not a coherent economic entity, but an extremely fragmented socio-economic structure. The capitalist mode of production needed a concrete network of economic activities. One by one, all economic activities were tied to the market structure. Then, this new

economic structure subdued the political phenomena; and consequently a capitalist world-economy was established and incorporated every economic activity in Europe into itself. Besides, there was a geographical incorporation. Starting from the Eastern Europe and the America continent, the entire globe became the peripheries and the sub-peripheries of the European world-economy until the end of the nineteenth century. In Wallerstein's words, "This system was based on two key institutions, a 'world'-wide division of labor and bureaucratic state machineries in certain areas." (Wallerstein, 1974a: 38)

Wallerstein did not make specialized studies on the Ottoman Empire, contrary to Braudel, in fact until 1977 he did not even mention the situation of the Empire within the context of the European world-economy. In 1977, he prepared a paper for a conference in Turkey, where he advanced his thesis on the Ottoman Empire and proposed questions for further research. In the same year, Wallerstein and his colleagues established the Fernand Braudel Center at the State University of New York at Binghamton, where many important contributions would be made to Ottoman history in following years. In the next section, we will summarize Wallerstein's theses on Ottoman history and in the last section we will discuss the very influences of these theses on Ottoman historiography.

Section 3.2
Wallerstein on the Ottoman Empire

> My problem is a simple one. At one point in time, the Ottoman Empire was outside the capitalist world economy. At a later point in time, the Ottoman Empire was incorporated into the capitalist world economy. How do we know that these points in time were? And by what process did the transition from T_1 to T_2 take place? I say immediately that I do not know the answers to these questions. I wish merely to suggest ways we might proceed to answer them. (Wallerstein, 1977: 1)

After 1977, Wallerstein dealt with this particular problem (namely, the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world-economy) in many other articles, especially in those written jointly with his Turkish students (see Wallerstein 1979, Wallerstein and Kasaba 1981 and Wallerstein et al. 1987). Briefly, as Braudel took the Ottoman Empire within the context of the Mediterranean world especially in the

sixteenth century, Wallerstein discussed the history of the Ottoman Empire (in post-sixteenth century period) within the context of the expansion of the European world-economy:

> The history of the world prior to c. 1500 (and since the Neolithic Revolution) is one of the co-existence on the planet of multiple social systems, which took three major forms: world-empires, world-economies, and what may be called mini-systems. The important thing to note is that, in this long stretch of history, world-empires were the 'strong' form. They expanded, and incorporated within them what had been world-economies and mini-systems […]
> What changed c. 1500 is that there grew up in Europe a new world-economy which, for the first time in history, was able to consolidate itself, and develop fully the capitalist mode of production and the interstate system which is the structural correlate of a world-economy.
> This meant that, suddenly, this world-economy had become the 'strong' form. From then on, it would be the capitalist world-economy that would expand by virtue of its internal dynamic. As it expanded, regularly but discontinuously, it incorporated the world-empires and mini-systems it found at its edges, until by the twentieth century it had incorporated the whole globe, and created a historically new situation, the existence of a singular world-system (as opposed to the previous situation of multiple coexisting world-systems). (Wallerstein et al. 1987: 88)

As we discussed above, Braudel thought that the Ottoman Empire was a world-economy from the beginning (Braudel, 1992b: 467). Wallerstein, on the other hand, believes that the Ottoman Empire, prior to the incorporation process, was a classic case of a large, bureaucratized world-empire (Wallerstein, 1977: 2). There had always been trade relations between this world-empire and the emerging European world-economy. But at some point in time, these trade relations were transformed and the Ottoman Empire became incorporated within the boundaries of the latter. The production within the Empire gained a role within the capitalist mode of production and its state structure became a member of the existent inter-state system of the capitalist world-system.

According to Wallerstein, defining the starting point of this process is somehow problematic:

> My own largest area of uncertainty in relation to the Ottoman Empire is whether its peripheralization should be dated from the nineteenth (or late eighteenth century) or from the early seventeenth century. The standard literature offers both kinds of periodization. On the one hand, Halil İnalcık argues that "the 1590s mark the main dividing line in Ottoman history." On the other hand, M.A. Cook says: "There was no radical discontinuity

> in the history of the Ottoman State between the early fifteenth century… and the early nineteenth century…" (Wallerstein, 1977: 4)

But in the end, Wallerstein believes that the period of 1750-1839 can be considered as the unquestionable period, in which the Ottoman Empire experienced peripheralization. It is important to compare and contrast the characteristics of production and the political system both prior and after 1750s to understand the process.

The Ottoman economic system prior to the incorporation process in Wallerstein's writings was not much different than that of Braudel's. Despite some differences in the definitions (i.e. world-economy or world-empire), the main explanations were similar. Alternatively we can say that Wallerstein utilized Braudel's explanations about the pre-incorporation period as a base for his explanations of the incorporation process.

According to Wallerstein, as Braudel stated, the Ottoman state, during the classical age, had a full control in trade, agricultural production and the craft manufacture. The internal trade activities were under strict supervision of the government with the *hisba* regulations, by which prices, quantity, profit margins etc. were defined. Whereas the land system was organized by the *timar* system, in which the "*timar* holders acted as the local representatives of the central state." (Wallerstein and Kasaba, 1981: 544) Artisans and craftsmen were organized under the strict regulations of the guild structure, in which "quality of the products, weights, and measures were specified and controlled; prices and wages were fixed (*narh*) by the central government." (Wallerstein and Kasaba, 1981: 545) Briefly, the central government controlled everything through its agents and let no uncontrolled economic activities and no centrifugal forces to operate.

Until the end of the sixteenth century, this system worked quite well, while at the same time the Empire was expanding its territories and increased her power within the international arena, as a great power of the region. Nevertheless, from the sixteenth century on, many internal and external developments occurred, which changed the realities of the Empire and eventually led to the complete transformation within the system. First of all, the territorial expansion of the Empire

was halted and as a result a very important source of inflow was lost. The major trade routes had also shifted from the Mediterranean to Atlantic, as we discussed above. Ottoman elites tried to compensate the revenue decline by increasing the rate of surplus extraction within the economy. Despite the decrease in the revenue sources, the luxury consumption increased significantly during the discussed time period. State officials demanded extra payments and taxes from the subjects, and the landholders exercised more coercion on the direct producers. (Wallerstein, 1977:6)

Moreover, the European price inflation both encouraged contraband trade and raised the internal prices. Precious metals and the principal foodstuffs were sucked out of the Empire by the dynamic European world-economy, where the prices were higher. The population boom in the same period worsened the situation by creating additional demand for basic foodstuffs, and led to a supply shortage. The standard of living for the ordinary people worsened, and under the leadership of some discontented local notables, major upheavals appeared. In addition to the social grievances, the revenue crisis of the state led to two important transformations: "extension of the tax-farming (*iltizam*) to the collection of the traditional tax on agriculture (*öşr*); and expansion of capitulatory rights to foreign merchants. Both policies led to a strengthening of centrifugal forces in the Empire." (Wallerstein et al. 1987: 90) We will mention below these two policies in detail.

As we told above there had always been trade between the Ottoman Empire (as a world-empire) and the European world-economy. But "trade between systems tends to be a trade in luxuries, that is non-essentials… The trade between systems tends to utilize ongoing productive systems rather than to transform them." (Wallerstein, 1977: 2) Likewise the trade between the Ottoman world-empire and European world-economy was an 'equal' trade between two systems, mostly in luxury goods; and this trade did not cause significant changes in the production structures. But after the sixteenth century, the situation started to change significantly. The European world-economy started to form a strong, rapidly developing coherent unit; the Ottoman economic system had to be subdued to the new 'global' economic structure.

The internal conditions such as the relative autonomy of the tax-farming system, the greed of the Ottoman elites for luxury, and the external ones such as the developing capitalism, high prices in Europe, the shift of the trade routes were the major reasons for the transformation in the Empire.

First of all, the decline of the Mediterranean trade, as we discussed in Chapter 2, was an important reason of the economic deterioration of the Empire. Wallerstein explains this phenomenon within the context of the world-system analysis and summarizes his point of view by A.H. Lybyer's arguments:

> Indeed, A.H. Lybyer precisely attributes the Levant's "decline" not to cultural resistances to modern technology, but to the structural diversion of trade and hence its noninclusion in the expanding European world-economy. (Wallerstein, 1994a: 325)

So, we can say that, according to Wallerstein, the decline in the Levant trade is a result of its exclusion from the emerging world-system, the European world-economy. The only solution for this problem was the incorporation of the Empire into the capitalist world-system.

Wallerstein considers the *çiftlik* system, as Braudel did, as an important element of the transformation of the Empire's economic, social and political systems. The *çiftlik* system appeared in the sixteenth century and especially in the regions that had more direct relations with European world-economy—such as Balkans and the western Anatolia—; and the agricultural production was shifted from household production to large-scale production for the markets, and especially for western markets. The cash crops, which were destined to export, were cultivated rather than more traditional foodstuff. For example, "cotton and maize appeared as new commodities…" (Wallerstein et al., 1987: 91) But more important than the cultivated commodities, the production relations significantly changed.

> The çiftliks […] entailed enserfment of labour and share-cropping relations perpetuated essentially by usury. The landlords extended loans to the peasants at high interest rates. Unable to pay the excessive obligations, the producers were continuously overburdened with debts […] In this manner, peasants eventually lost some of their lands, and came to be employed as share-cropping tenants by the landlord. (Wallerstein et al., 1987:91)

Eventually, the local notables (*ayan*) accumulated large amounts of capital and increased their power, whereas the direct producers were enserfed. In some places these local notables organized their own armed forces. According to Wallerstein and his students, "This is often referred as 'feudalization' and seen as part of the normal processes of the contraction of a world-empire." (Wallerstein et al., 1987: 91) We saw before that Braudel defined the Ottoman Empire as feudal, whereas, Wallerstein thinks that it was feudalized through the incorporation process. As a result, the Ottoman agricultural economy became the feudalized supplier of the capitalist world-economy.

The incorporation process did not influence the artisanal production fatally until the nineteenth century. But in the nineteenth century, the cheap and high-quality products of the European factories invaded the Ottoman markets and destroyed the Ottoman craft industry. Consequently, the peripheralization process of the Ottoman Empire was completed. As a member of the periphery, she was exploited harshly by the core and placed within the division of labor determined by the core. From then on, the Ottoman Empire was the raw material supplier and the buyer of manufactured goods in the capitalist world-economy. In Wallerstein's terms, the trade between these two units was transformed from being 'the trade between two systems', which is relatively equal, to 'the trade within the system', which includes some forms of exploitation. By the way, the Ottoman state could not escape from political subordination.

> Concomitant with the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world-economy, pressure was exerted on the Ottoman government to operate within the parameters and according to the rules of the interstate system. (Wallerstein and Kasaba, 1981: 555)

The *çiftlik* system and the capitulations were two important aspects of the political transformation of the Ottoman Empire. The fiscal problems experienced after the sixteenth century weakened the authority of the central government and caused social grievances against the central administration. "Disorganization at the center impaired the central control over both the Ottoman provincial officials and the local notables (*ayan*). Government functionaries and the *ayan* had acquired substantial power through tax-farming." (Wallerstein and Kasaba, 1981: 554) In

time, these centrifugal forces began to threaten the authority of the central government and as a result, an independent elite group, which was generally in clash with the central authority but mostly incorporated into the capitalist world-economy, appeared, against the 'late' absolute authority of the Sultan.

The second class that functioned against the will of the Ottoman state was the foreign merchants, especially starting with the eighteenth century. The capitulations, "based upon a mutual 'pledge of friendship and goodwill' of the parties involved" (Wallerstein and Kasaba, 1981: 556) in pre-eighteenth century period, turned out to be the apparatus of the exploitation of the Ottoman market by the foreign merchants and companies. The extraordinary privileges granted with capitulations provided these agents with unchallenged powers, i.e. many tax-exemptions to which the Ottoman subjects were liable, complete freedom of trade in the Ottoman waters under their own flags:

> An Ottoman subject needed only to obtain a *patente* from an ambassador or a consul to enjoy the privileges accorded by capitulations to foreigners. Consequently, by 1808, the Russians alone had enrolled 120,000 Greeks as 'protected persons. (Wallerstein and Kasaba, 1981: 558)

Eventually the foreign agents obtained an absolute control over the Ottoman economy, and paralyzed all Ottoman activities, both of the state and the businessmen, except for the Ottoman agents of the foreign companies.

In summary, according to Wallerstein, the Ottoman Empire, which was a separate and powerful world-empire in its own right before the end of the seventeenth century, became a part of the European capitalist world-economy like other parts of the world until the first half of the nineteenth century. Wallerstein's such alternative explanations for the 'decline' period of the Ottoman Empire, depending on his world-system perspective, led the Ottoman historians to a 'new reading' of the Empire's history.

Section 3.3
Wallerstein's Influences

Wallerstein's influences on Ottoman historiography can be seen more clearly than those of Braudel. Several Ottoman historians today are his students and colleagues from the Fernand Braudel Center and the State University of New York at Binghamton. These people, in most of their well-known studies, analyzed the realities of the Ottoman Empire in the light of world-system analysis. Discussing the Turkish world-system analysts' detailed explanations on the Ottoman Empire will be a mere repetition of the above discussions, because we already told the theoretical construction from the viewpoint of the world-system analysis. Instead, we will delineate their views on the question of the world-system perspective's 'new reading' of Ottoman history.

The study of İslamoğlu and Keyder (1977) can be considered as the manifest of a school that proposed a 'new paradigm' in Ottoman historiography:

> In this article we propose a new reading (and writing) of Ottoman history. This reading derives from certain concepts and theoretical constructions which form the basis of an emerging paradigm in social sciences. We hope that the proposed reading will provide the conceptual framework in which new research problems may be defined. (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 31)

The 'new reading' necessitated first the clarification and the critique of the existing paradigm in Ottoman historiography. The authors chose three representative works to show the characteristics of this paradigm:

> H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*; Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*; and B. Lewis *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. Each of these books has the status of standard text for one of the two periods which provide the temporal framework in constructing the history of the Empire. The first deal with the "golden age" and the beginnings of decline, while the latter's primary concern is with the age of reform and "Westernization". (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 32)

According to the authors, the common idea in these studies was their emphasis on the 'unintegrated set of institutions'. Each institution had its own inherent 'idea' and when an institution ceased to conform to this idea, it started to degenerate. The 'decline' of the Empire was a story of such degenerations. The real

factors that led to decline were generally external ones, such as the European inflation and population boom. Briefly, the main concerns of the 'older' paradigm is the existence of a 'golden age', the successive decline period and lastly the refashioning the institutions according to Western norms to make them work again. (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 32)

"İnalcık's history is structured on the 'idea' of Near Eastern society as projected through juristic texts." (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 32) According to this 'idea', reading the main ideological texts of a society revealed the facts of society itself. Society was divided into two main groups: the rulers and the ruled. Moreover, social system was defined by certain institutions like palace, central authority, *timar* system, and these institutions embodied the state ideology, transmitted through the 'juristic texts'. Eventually, the evolution of the state ideology was reflected via those institutions. According to the authors, the main concern of İnalcık is to explain this totality.

İslamoğlu and Keyder contended that according to the same view, 'social and economic life' was relatively independent, despite some regulatory institutions (i.e. guild system) of the central government, which mediated the state ideology and these 'independent' structures. "Given this ideological functioning of the society, the decline of the system cannot be sought in its internal dynamic, but is explained in terms of external factors." (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 34) These external factors are the price revolution and the changes in the trade structure. The new external conditions degenerated the functions of the existent institutions and paralyzed their usefulness; eventually the "adaptation to the new conditions required compromising the ideological purity of the institutions, thereby signaling their decline. According to İnalcık, Ottoman history from the seventeenth century on is the history of this decline." (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 34)

Gibb and Bowen's history was similar to that of İnalcık's in many respects, especially in terms of its institutional characteristic. They attributed Islam a significant role within the social structure as the 'cementing' ideology. The 'Oriental despotism' was an explanatory concept of their analyses. According to this idea, society had a rigid division among the rulers and the ruled, and there is some kind of

a static balance or 'a perfect harmony' between these groups. This isolated system, which had an internal balance, could only be transformed by external factors.

Briefly, the then existent paradigm in Ottoman historiography assumed a relatively static internal balance between the rulers and the ruled, which were mediated through some institutions embodying the state ideology; and only external factors could change this 'peaceful' structure of the 'golden age'. External developments changed the conditions, under which those institutions were established, and their usefulness was paralyzed; as a result a general 'decline' condition was observed for the system. The only solution to this decline was the reformation of the old structures in accordance with the new, Western, conditions.

In fact, İslamoğlu and Keyder's 'new reading' had some similar explanations with the existing paradigm but they rejected the idea that the internal developments are so separate from the external ones. They proposed a more interwoven model, considering the external and internal developments as different faces of the same phenomena and offered the 'incorporation' or 'peripheralization' idea instead, as a more appropriate concept to understand the period:

> A hybrid institutionalist functionalism on the one hand, and a crude modernization perspective on the other, provide the framework for most recent research in Ottoman history. Our attempt… will be to advance a totalizing framework, seeking to integrate both the diverse elements of the structure into an intelligible whole, and to bring together two disjointed temporalities of the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries by means of a periodization centered on the concept of peripheralization. (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 37)

Interestingly, the article was published in the year that Wallerstein's first study on the Ottoman Empire was presented (Wallerstein, 1977) and it was the year when the Fernand Braudel Center was founded. And moreover, this 'manifesto' was published in the 'first' issue of the Center's famous periodical *Review*. Given that they shared the same academic environment, we can surmise that the content of the article was the product of extensive debates between these people and probably many others on the subject. We can say for sure that Wallerstein's 'world-system analysis' was the point of origin for this 'new paradigm' in Ottoman historiography. İslamoğlu and Keyder, clarified this problem in their article:

> The ancestry of the new paradigm are diverse: Althusser and Balibar (1972) for the morphology of mode of production, A.G.Frank (1967) for the concepts of core and periphery, I. Wallerstein (1974) for the definition of world-empire and world-economy as proper unites of study. Within this paradigm Ottoman history should describe the transition from world-empire (in which the Asiatic mode of production was dominant) to a peripheral status in the capitalist world-economy. (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 31)

In other words, this 'new reading and writing' of Ottoman history depended on three major conceptualizations: 1) Asiatic mode of production, which was developed by Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar; 2) the analyses of 'core' and 'periphery', which was taken from A.G. Frank; and 3) Wallerstein's world-system analysis. We discussed above the concepts of 'core' and 'periphery', and the world-system perspective. So at this point, we have to explain the first point above, that is, the 'morphology of the mode of production' in the Ottoman Empire according to the new paradigm.

Asiatic mode of production is a Marxist definition of the mode of production in non-European world. Althusser and Balibar developed this concept according to their 'readings' of Karl Marx's Capital. As we discussed above, Braudel defined the Ottoman Empire as a feudal system, Wallerstein argued that the Ottoman Empire was not a feudal structure but it was feudalized in the incorporation process. In fact, the mode of production in the Ottoman Empire was the subject of an important debate in 1970s. Some scholars (i.e. Sencer Divitçioğlu) argued that the mode of production in the Ottoman Empire was Asiatic mode of production; on the contrary some others insisted that the Ottomans had a feudal regime. It is clear that the Turkish world-system analysts were on the former side.

In the Asiatic mode of production, the control of the central authority over the production and appropriation of surplus constituted the crucial mechanisms of reproduction. The articulated whole was reproduced according to the requirements of this mode, but it also incorporated forms of petty commodity production and merchant capital. In its later stages, the social formation contained 'feudalized' areas as well, which, however, remained subordinate to the division of labor imposed by the ruling class, concretized in the state. (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 37)

Again the external developments, in this case the development of the capitalist world-economy, forced the Ottoman system to a complete transformation as we discussed above. In other words, at some point in time, as Wallerstein stated, the Ottoman Empire was incorporated into this new emerging dominant system:

İslamoğlu and Keyder's "Agenda for Ottoman History" played a similar role with Barkan's review on Braudel's *The Mediterranean*. It was a starting point of a new period in Ottoman historiography, which defined the new framework and the new questions for future research. From then on, many Turkish historians reevaluated Ottoman history according to the new paradigm, just like the case after Braudel's *The Mediterranean*. They contributed to the world-system perspective with their findings and analyses; and Ottoman history was re-written as İslamoğlu and Keyder proposed. İslamoğlu-İnan compiled prominent examples of these studies in 1987 (Huricihan İslamoğlu-İnan (ed.) *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press).

Before summarizing Wallerstein's influences and the reasons behind these influences, we will make a brief overview of the 'periperalization' process according to the world-system scholars who studied Ottoman history under Wallerstein's influences.

> As a world empire, the Ottoman Empire is defined as having a social economy (i.e. division of labor) with an overarching political structure. Patrimonialism describes this political structure as having a well-defined center which exercises its authority through a large administrative staff. (Kasaba, 1988: 3)

The peripherilization process led to a complete transformation of both the political and the economic system:

> With the transformation of the state into a colonial state, the Ottoman system lost its specificity. It was now characterized by the dominance of the capitalist mode of production both at the economic and the political levels. Therefore, it was no longer a proper unit of study. Its subsequent history could only be analyzed within the dynamics of the world capitalist system as an integral, albeit functionally-differentiated, component of this system. (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 53)

According to these historians, with the *çiftlik* system, the majority of the agricultural production within the Empire became part of the global capitalist

network and the Empire became a sub-unit of the European world-economy as the producer of raw materials and the market of the manufactured goods of the capitalist world. This was a complete transformation of economic, political and social structures of the Empire, but not only an economic one. Eventually, the Asiatic mode of production was transformed into a feudal structure, which was commanded by the capitalist center.

> [F]rom the 1750s the western provinces of the Ottoman Empire were structurally integrated into the axial division of labor of the capitalist world-economy. But these areas had been among the most important sources of supply for the provisioning of the capital city and other imperial metropoles. Their incorporation deprived the central government of substantial revenues and constituted a major blow to the redistributive system that was at the center of the classical organization of the Ottoman Empire. (Kasaba, 1988: 35)

The transformation of the land system was a significant element of the peripheralization process:

> From the point of view of the political system, the rise of the *çiftlik* was the most disruptive development. Commercialization of production and, more importantly, change in the status of the peasantry, both of which the *çiftlik* entailed, are necessary components in a process of peripheralization. With the *çiftlik* organization, integration of the Ottoman system into the capitalist world-economy attained an irreversible momentum. (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977: 53)

In the end, the capitulations and other developments (i.e. trade agreements and the invasion of European manufactures) in the nineteenth century led to the absolute domination of the foreign agents in the Ottoman economy.

> [T]he main beneficiaries of these expanding commercial relations were no longer the bureaucratic elite of the classical system but the non-Muslim traders in these regions and their private financiers and partners in Istanbul. (Kasaba, 1988: 35)

Wallerstein's influences on Ottoman historiography can be better understood by utilizing some important attributes about his discourse. First of all, Wallerstein was a follower of a very influential school of thought, the *Annales*, and especially Fernand Braudel, who had great impact in the area. This provided Wallerstein with a great advantage to reach to scholars of Ottoman history. Secondly, despite many differences in analyses, "world-system theory incorporates the major elements and

the basic terminology of the Marxist theoretical approach", (Shannon, 1989: 11) which was very influential in academic world in 1970s. This also made world-system theory more interesting for many, especially young, scholars of the era.

Moreover, Wallerstein, just like Braudel, challenged the place of the Ottoman Empire within world history and brought an alternative view. Prior to the world-system analysis, the history of the Ottoman Empire was written under the strong influence of the Western 'Orientalist' view. According to this view, the ideal types of 'the East' and 'the West' had some contradictory characteristics: "dynamic, rational, democratic West versus static, irrational, authoritarian (despotic) East." (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987: 1) According to İslamoğlu-İnan, the Orientalist tradition of thinking and the Asiatic mode of production carried these characteristics. The East as a result, including the Ottoman Empire, was the *ahistorical* domain of the world history due to its 'static' structure, which we discussed above. (İslamoğlu-İnan 1987: 1) But the rewriting of the history of the Ottoman Empire challenged this established idea. İslamoğlu-İnan summarizes how the world-system analysis rewrites the history of the Empire:

> What the world-system perspective does is to challenge the ahistorical and the dichotomous views of the world history and seeks to place the historical development of the Ottoman Empire in a context of a singular transformation process—that of the European world-capitalist system. As such, this perspective rejects the notion of culturally or geo-politically determined ideal-types in explaining the historical development of different world-regions. Instead it explains the differential development of the Ottoman and the western European societies in terms of the 'fluctuating realities' of the world-capitalist system as it expanded to include the Ottoman territories after the sixteenth century. (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987: 2)

Nevertheless an important problem arises here, regarding the world-system perspective on the Ottoman Empire. First of all, İslamoğlu and Keyder employs Asiatic mode of production to explain the social formation of the Empire, whereas İslamoğlu-İnan, in his later study, defines Asiatic mode of production as an example of the 'ahistorical' explanations of the Empire; this seems like a self-contradiction within the perspective.

It seems that the world-system perspective attributes a more passive role to the Ottoman Empire within the world history after 1750s. Although many features of the incorporation process were the results of the Ottoman elites against the 'decline', the main determinants of the history of the Empire in post 1750 period were the European capitalists, who expanded the borders of the European capitalist world-economy. The Ottoman subjects, both the rulers and the ruled, could only reform their structures according to the emerging dominant economic system. Moreover, the absence of strong class formations and class conflicts contributed to the passive transformation of the Empire due to external developments. İlkay Sunar provides a mediating explanation for this problem:

> [T]he transformation of this [patrimonial] system was neither the consequence of a dynamic inscribed into the system nor the simple outcome of a direct impulse transmitted from outside; rather, it was the interaction of internal and external forces which determined the process of such transformation. The primary shock to the Ottoman system was provided from outside, but the response to the shock was mediated by the domestic patrimonial structure. (Sunar, 1987: 63)

We discussed above that the world-system analysts formed the 'new paradigm' in Ottoman historiography, by criticizing the paradigm, which served as a basis for also Halil İnalcık's studies. Interestingly, İnalcık later became one of the most important scholars who contributed to the rewriting of Ottoman history according to world-system perspective and introduced the new paradigm into Ottoman historiography:

> Ömer Lütfi Barkan's close ties to Fernand Braudel and the *Annales* ESC, and Halil İnalcık's later involvement with Wallerstein and the Ottoman concerns of the Fernand Braudel Center are not peculiar personal orientations of these two scholars, but indicate a long-term trend. (Faroqhi, 1991: 211)

Lastly, we can conclude surely that the influences of both Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein developed in accordance with the intellectual commitments of the Turkish scholars, besides their important contributions to the area.

Braudel attributed the Ottoman Empire a more active role in the sixteenth century, and defined her as a 'super power' of the era, against the dominant

Orientalist ideas that attributed passiveness to the Eastern world, including the Ottoman Empire. Besides his astonishing contributions and alternative view, this 'praise' of the 'Turkish history' probably influenced the Turkish scholars of strong Republican and nationalist convictions. (Faroqhi, 1991: 211)

Wallerstein adopted more or less a Marxist interpretation of history when Marxism was on the rise among the academic circles and especially among young scholars. Moreover, his perspective also rejects the Orientalist approach, although his approach attributes a relative passiveness to the Empire in its own incorporation process. Nevertheless, Wallerstein used some 'magic words' of the era such as 'core' and 'periphery', which were adopted from the *Dependency* approach (see Shannon, 1989: 11) and he emphasized the exploitative characteristic of the capitalist system. These ideas meant much in late 1960s and 1970s, especially for left-wing young Turkish scholars.

Having considered the strong influences of both Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, in the next part we will discuss why Michael Mann, who also made important contributions to the historiography in general, could not make a commensurate impact on Ottoman historiography. Furthermore, we will attempt to reevaluate Ottoman history briefly to understand how his theses could have influenced the area.

CHAPTER 4

MICHAEL MANN

Section 4.1

Michael Mann and the 'IEMP' Model

Michael Mann (1942-), a well-known professor of sociology, is mostly known for his alternative view of world history, just as Immanuel Wallerstein. But unlike Braudel and Wallerstein, he has no special interest in Ottoman history; so Michael Mann neither contributed to nor influenced Ottoman historiography directly. Nevertheless, his original contributions to the methodology of history can be used to reevaluate Ottoman history from a different point of view. In this chapter, we will explore his perspective and we will attempt to reevaluate Ottoman history according to this perspective.

In his three-volume *The Sources of Social Power*, Mann adopted a Weberian approach and reformulated the processes of world history, from ancient times to the twentieth century, according to his 'IEMP' (ideological, economic, military, political) model. Before discussing this alternative model, one should understand his starting point.

Like Wallerstein, the starting point of Mann is his disbelief in some existing, widely accepted paradigms about 'social change'. In the preface of the first volume of the *Sources of Social Power*, he explained the initial motivation behind his studies.

> In 1972, I wrote a paper called "Economic Determinism and Structural Change," which purported not only to refute Karl Marx and organize Max Weber but also to offer the outlines of a better general theory of social stratification and social change. The paper began to develop into a short book. It would contain a general theory supported by a few case studies,

> including historical ones. Later I decided that the book would set forth a sweeping theory of the world history of power. (Mann, 1986: vii)

There are two pillars of Mann's perspective. First one is his rejection of the notion of a 'unitary society' and the second one is his disbelief in some 'determining' or 'primary' relationships in social change, i.e. the primacy of economic relations within the social sphere.

"Societies are not unitary." (Mann, 1986:1) They are not monolithic entities, which can be fully grasped by using concrete concepts like a definite 'mode of production'. "Because there is no bounded totality, it is not helpful to divide social change or conflict into 'endogenous' or 'exogenous' varieties. Because there is no social system, there is no 'evolutionary' process within it." (Mann, 1986: 1) Mann argues that 'society' is only an 'ideal type' in Weberian sense, which has promiscuous relations and structures within.

Mann's second argument is somehow the result of his first concern. Having accepted the idea of society above, it is obvious that we cannot define this promiscuity of structures and processes with only one singular, 'primary' set of relationships. Against the widely accepted idea of primacy or the determining role of economic relationships, Mann proposed an alternative schema:

> A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I will call the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military and political (IEMP) relationships. (Mann, 1986: 2)

Mann's concern is somehow similar to interdisciplinary or in Wallerstein's terms 'unidisciplinary' approach to history of Braudel and Wallerstein. But Michael Mann proposes a more specific schema by defining four basic relationships, which in fact generally overlap, to explain the social phenomena throughout world history. These four sources are "the overlapping networks of social interaction, not dimensions, levels or factors of a single social totality." (Mann, 1986: 2) And moreover, they are "organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals." (Mann, 1986: 2)

> IEMP model is not one of a social system, divided into four "subsystems," "levels," "dimensions," or any other of the geometric terms favored

> by social theorists. Rather, it forms an analytical point of entry for dealing with mess. (Mann, 1993: 10)

Although Mann rejects the notion of 'unitary society', which was also somehow assumed by Max Weber, he positions himself in the Weberian tradition. According to him, though many leading sociologists like Marx and Durkheim understood that "[s]ocities are much messier than our theories of them" (Mann, 1986:4), Weber, whom Mann salutes as 'the greatest sociologist', "devised a methodology (of 'ideal types') to cope with messiness." (Mann, 1986: 4) The notion of 'society' and the four sources of social power are not pure, concrete structures, but only ideal types to deal with the promiscuity of social phenomena.

According to Mann, although one or more sources obtain primacy among themselves in certain time periods, (i.e. during the eighteenth century, economic and military sources dominated) we cannot talk about any ultimate primacy of any of them, such as Marx and Engels attributed to the economic relations. (Mann, 1993: 1)

Mann asks an important question and as an answer to that he explains the origins of his model:

> What, then, are the main power organizations? The two main approaches in current stratification theory are Marxian and neo-Weberian. I am happy to accept their initial joint premise: Social stratification is the overall creation and distribution of power in society. (Mann 1986: 10)

Mann derives three power organizations from contemporary stratification theory: 'class, status and party'. Although, Mann tells that both Marxian and Weberian traditions have accepted all these three organizations, it is obvious that this is the formulation developed by Max Weber (see Weber, 1948). Mann adopts this schema in his model by making a rough match and defining ideal types, such as economic/class, ideology/status and political/party types. But he argues that there is a fourth element, military power, and this element derives from the 'political/party' type. "The 'political/party' type actually contains two separate forms of power, political and military power: on the one hand, the central polity […] on the other hand, physical or military force." (Mann, 1986: 10-11) As a result, Mann took the tripartite schema from contemporary stratification theory (especially Weber's), added a fourth element and developed his own model.

The origins of these four sources of power, according to Michael Mann, are the human characteristics, or in other words, human nature. Mann describes human beings as "restless, purposive, and rational, striving to increase their enjoyment of the good things of the life and capable of choosing and pursuing appropriate means for doing so." (Mann, 1986: 4) He argues that human beings necessarily cooperate to achieve their goals and this necessity calls for some kinds of social power relations. In other words, these human characteristics are the original sources of power. (Mann, 1986:4) With the development and complication of such relations many forms of social power emerges, i.e. ideological, economic, military and political.

Ideological power derives firstly from the human beings' need for ultimate 'meanings'. Humans need to interpret, understand the relations in their natural and social environment. To achieve these goals we need "concepts and categories of meanings". (Mann, 1986: 22) Social cooperation calls for some shared 'norms', which every individual must share for a sustained harmony. Moreover, social cooperation gives birth to some 'aesthetic/ritual' practices, which are both means and signs of social identity. Ideological power, as a result, derives from the need for some kind of central organizations to fulfill these social tasks.

"Economic power derives from the satisfaction of subsistence means through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of the objects of the nature". (Mann, 1986: 24) It is obvious that economic or more basically subsistence needs of a social group necessitates some forms of division of labor and 'circuits of praxis'. Economic power emerges as a result of the need to organize these circuits, within the context of humans' subsistence activities.

Military power derives from the need for defense and aggression within the context of both internal and external relations of the social cooperation. The goals of the group can be obtained by a cooperated aggression towards other groups; or the achievements must be protected from such activities of other groups. Besides, the harmony within the group can sometimes be sustained by oppression of the individual members. All such activities lead to an organization of concentrated

oppression and violence; as a result, some kind of military power appears within the social cooperation.

"Political power […] derives from the usefulness of centralized, institutionalized, territorialized regulation of many aspects of social relations." (Mann, 1986: 26) The main difference of this type is its emphasis of boundaries; in other words, "political power heightens boundaries, whereas the other power sources may transcend them." (Mann, 1986: 27)

Having thus considered the bases on which Michael Mann established his arguments and before using this perspective for reinterpreting Ottoman history, we need to make a brief summary of his 'IEMP' model.

According to Michael Mann, human beings are purposive creatures and to achieve our purposes we set up many networks of social interaction. Society is not a complex, bounded totality, but a promiscuity of these countless and overlapping interactions. Although many sociologists accepted this mess of social phenomena, they insisted on using some 'monocausal' explanations. Mann believes that Weber's methodology, which utilizes some 'ideal types' that does not formulate exact definitions but some representative approximations, is more useful to deal with such a mess.

The variety of social cooperation leads to the emergence of different social relations, and this necessitates some forms of organizational practices and regulations for a sustained social cooperation. As a result, different types of social power emerge; these are mainly, ideological, economic, military and political powers. Although, social scientists have defined the existence of all, they attributed one of them as the 'defining' or 'primary' social power, which explains, in Marxian terms, 'the motor of human history'. Mann, instead, argues that these are overlapping structures and a more correct approximation can only be made by utilizing all of these ideal types to explain social phenomena. Each power source creates its own separate social organization and manages a definite portion of social phenomena; so omitting one of them will result with an incomplete picture of the so-called 'society' and its development.

In the next part, we will make a brief reevaluation of Ottoman history, between fourteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the light of Michael Mann's IEMP model.

Section 4.2

Four Sources of Social Power in the Ottoman Empire

As we discussed above, although the four sources of power jointly determine social change, in certain time periods, one of them may preponderate in determining social change. In this respect, we can divide Ottoman history into three different periods. In the first two centuries of the Empire, roughly between 1300 and 1450, the military and economic powers were more dominant. Between 1450 and 1700, political and ideological sources of power made more visible changes in the Ottoman Empire. And lastly, after 1700s, the time period that Wallerstein called as the incorporation process, economic phenomena were more effective in the reshaping of the Empire. Nevertheless, we have to remember that according to the IEMP model, this does not mean that each of them was the sole defining factor in each certain period. On the contrary, as Michael Mann argued, the four sources of power "'entwine', that is, their interactions change one another's inner shapes as well as their outer trajectories." (Mann, 1993: 2)

At the beginning, the Ottoman existence was in the form of a loose organization of Turkish tribes (*beylik*). In the chaotic situation in Anatolia after the decline of Byzantine and Seljuk Empires, there were many such organizations in the region, but the Ottomans increased their power continuously and rapidly. The basic motivations behind their strength were the heroic tradition of the Turkish nomads (*gaza*) and economic gains in the form of booties. In fact, the first Ottoman elites were active warriors (*gazi*s) and this tradition lasted until late fifteenth century; even in that period Ottoman sultans led the army on horseback. Moreover, there was also a religious motive to mobilize the Turkish masses against the rich Christian lands. The Ottoman leaders amalgamated the heroic tradition with religious discourses to

motivate people in their wars against the 'infidels' and showed great success, especially in the Christian territories across the Straits. Despite the influence of such an 'ideological' factor, it seems that the main factor behind the military success was again economic. Because, the Ottomans and their initial subjects were Muslims, their military successes (and eventually enormous booties) gathered many Christian leaders and masses under Ottoman flag, in the course of time. But it is important to note that they not only attacked the Christian territories but also other 'Muslim' Turkish *beylik*s.

Political organization had evolved in time according to the needs; the Ottomans behaved pragmatically in this matter. At first, Osman was a tribal chief, who led the council of the leaders as the *primus inter pares*. But as the territories expanded and the population under their rule increased, military and political administration became complicated; eventually a new state began to emerge. As we discussed in Chapter 2, the Ottomans inherited the political traditions of the Byzantine and Seljuk Empires. For example, the Seljuk title *vezir* were given to some of the leaders of the tribe as the executive ministers. Council tradition continued in later periods under the name of *Divan-ı Humayun*, but the state organization became much more complicated as time went by.

The *devşirme* system was an important element of the development of state organization in terms of providing the political structure with well-trained civil servants. Although in the first three centuries, the Muslim Turcoman families dominated in the political elite, the Ottoman state administration acted pragmatically in recruiting qualified personnel:

> Regardless of origin, to be a full member of the Ruling Class, an individual had to (1) accept and practice the religion of Islam and the entire system of thought and action was an integral part of it; (2) be loyal to the sultan and to the state established to carry out his sovereign duties and exploit duties and exploit his revenues; and (3) know and practice the complicated system of customs, behavior, and language forming the Ottoman way. (Shaw, 1976: 113)

It is very obvious that the main concern was not religious but practical. The aim of the *devşirme* system was not converting 'heretics' to Islam, but to establish an effective state organization with institutions and servants that were fully committed

to the Ottoman state ideology. By this way, the Ottoman ruling class would be able to exploit the ideological sources of power; and the success of the central state organization would be secured and improved.

Beside the imperial traditions discussed above, the state tradition of the Middle Eastern Islamic civilization (i.e. Sassanids) was utilized with success. The Ottoman style of social and political administration, 'the circle of justice', which was formulated by the Ottoman chronicler Kınalızade, was a product of this long tradition:

1. There can be no royal authority without the military.
2. There can be no military without wealth.
3. The *reaya* produce the wealth.
4. The sultan keeps the *reaya* by making justice reign.
5. Justice requires harmony in the world.
6. The world is a garden, its walls are the state.
7. The state's prop is the religious law.
8. There is no support for the religious law without royal authority. (Itzkowitz, 1972: 88)

"These statements were usually written around a circumference of a circle, showing how the eight statement led directly to the first." (Itzkowitz, 1972: 88) If we assume that this formulation had always been a part of the Ottoman state ideology, we can clearly see that Ottomans understood that the sources of power were actually entwined and could never be separated.

Briefly, in the first two centuries of the Ottoman existence, the Ottoman elite successfully exploited the four sources of social power. Beside the external factors (i.e. chaos in Anatolia and Balkans, and dispersed and weak rivals), the Ottoman achievement was a result of a successful administration. Military victories, which mostly depended on heroic character of the nomadic Turkish tribes, were supported by economic gains; and the economic gains were used to recruit the leaders and masses from various origins. A pragmatic state ideology, which mostly depended on the symbiosis of Islam with the state traditions of the geography, was established to exploit ideological sources of social power and to form an effective political organization.

In the fifteenth century, the military successes led not only to some quantitative changes but also an important qualitative change. During the reign of

Mehmed II, the Ottoman state started to evolve explicitly into a powerful empire. The conquest of Istanbul was a significant symbol of this great transformation, after which Mehmed II declared himself as the new emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire. “Istanbul, the new capital, became the symbol of Mehmed’s ambition for a universal empire.” (İnalcık, 1994: 18)

In the ‘golden age’ of the Ottoman Empire, that is, roughly between 1450 and 1700, the political and ideological factors preponderated in the Ottoman state, although military and economic advances continued significantly.

Ottoman society consisted of two main groups; the large masses of subjects and a small group of rulers, the latter being an administrative and military class. As we discussed above, the state ideology was essential in administrating this social structure. The religion of Islam was carefully maintained and promoted in order to guide rulers and subjects in carrying out their roles within the Ottoman social system.

The main protector and organizer of this social system was the Ottoman legal system, which was a product of the heritages of traditional law systems of Persian, Turkish and Islam. In this respect, it was a combination of two laws, that is, the customary law of sultan and the religious law. *Ulema*, which consisted of centrally educated servants, were in charge of enforcing the law system, on behalf of the Sultan. *Ulema* were organized to utilize both extensive and intensive forms of ideological power and different subgroups (i.e. *kadi*s, *mufti*s, *kazasker*s) were defined according to their role. For example, *mufti*s were in charge for more intensive forms of ideological power, such as the interpretation and development of Islamic codes and issuing *fetva*s, whereas *kadi*s were in charge for more extensive forms, such as the application of these codes and *fetva*s to individual cases, *kazasker*s served in the military.

The Ottoman social administration was organized according to the *millet* system. *Millet* had a religious character and different *millet*s had to obey different rules and regulations in both law and financial practices. The *Şeriat*, beside providing the principles of public law, covered the personal matters in the Muslim *millet*. While, the religious laws of the non-Muslim *millets* were elaborated and

enforced by their own religious leaders. The tax system was also divided into two parts, that is, the Islamic taxes and the taxed determined by the Sultan himself. Muslim and non-Muslim subjects were subjected to different taxes.

In this time period, the political organization became more elaborate and the significance of the Sultan in this organization gradually decreased. The extensive and intensive forms of political power were utilized by the complex organization of the central and local political institutions, in which the established state ideology was unquestionably inherent. The Palace in İstanbul was both the house of the Sultan and his retinue and the central political organization. On the other side, the *Timar* system, with its political, economic, military and religious functions and together with other institutions established by the local administrators and notables (i.e. pious foundations) formed the foundations of extensive utilization of social power.

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries state officials arrived to the newly conquered areas immediately and made detailed lists (*tahrir* registers) of all taxable resources, lands, households, living stock and the agricultural produce. Then, local administrators were charged to establish and maintain the political, economic and military order in the area in the name of the Sultan. Lands were divided into parts (*timar*s) and distributed to these officials according to their rank. This system had maintained both the central and local administration, because taxes were collected efficiently, security was maintained and also the soldiers of the imperial army were fed and trained by local officials. (Itzkowitz, 1972: 14-15)

Starting from late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the Sultans were no longer on horseback to lead the army and moreover, they did not actively get involved in the details of political administration. The Sultan gradually became only the symbol of the state authority. The actual authority passed into the hands of other elites, i.e. their mothers and retinues. But especially after the second half of the seventeenth century, the prime ministers, *sadrazam*s, were the genuine executives of the administration.

Seventeenth century, especially the latter half, both created the reasons and carried the signs of a complete transformation within military, political and

economic spheres. We discussed in the former chapters that the Mediterranean region and the Ottoman Empire in particular had serious economic and social crises in this period. The population boom, high inflation originating from Europe and the shift of major trade routes from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic created serious economic problems for the Ottoman Empire, which led to a complete transformation. Moreover, the Empire had to deal with other crises in military and political spheres, and as Mann indicated, all these power sources entwined and seriously influenced each other.

The *janissaries* had been the most powerful military force of the Europe until the eighteenth century. The well-trained and well-equipped Ottoman army paved the way for the Ottoman success and expansion in the period in which the military sources of power were relatively more effective. But the precious metal flow, starting from the sixteenth century, provided European powers with an important source of wealth, some part of which was invested in military technology. European states, which gradually gained a more centralized character in the era, equipped themselves with more advanced assault and defense systems and technologies. Eventually, the uncontested success of the Ottoman army was contained by the military revolution in Europe. Although Ottomans tried to cope with these new techniques, the costs were huge and the state revenues were on the decline.

The march of the Ottomans into Europe was hindered in 1683; the imperial army was defeated at the Vienna siege and a new century with many other fatal defeats followed. From then on, not only was the territorial expansion of the Ottomans hindered, but also the eastern European lands in hand were lost gradually. These events led to serious military, economic and political repercussions. The second period of the Ottoman Empire, which was fueled especially by military successes, ended by military defeats. The following century was the transformation age of the Empire, where the economic sources of social power preponderated.

The lack of new military successes cut an important income source of the Ottoman society. Military defeats, together with the disadvantageous economic conditions, which were told above, created serious fiscal problems. As a result, Ottoman elites tried hard to come up with more income from internal sources and

compensate their losses. As a result, the *iltizam* system was extended to obtain more ready cash; the oppression on direct producers increased and eventually social grievances emerged; *çiftlik* system, with its both economic and political consequences, appeared. We have already discussed the transformation in this period in Chapter 3, so we will not go into detail but reiterate the main characteristics of this era.

The *iltizam* system and the *çiftlik*s not only increased the powers of the local notables, *ayan*, and eventually the centrifugal forces against weakened central authority, but they also paved the way for the direct connections between the European markets and the Ottoman production system. Central administration gradually lost its political and economic authority within the Empire and the production mechanisms began to be organized according to the needs of the European markets. Although the economic sources of power were relatively more visible behind this transformation process, *ayan* and state officials utilized all other sources to obtain and secure social power within the Empire.

The ideological power sources, i.e. Islamic traditions, were utilized by the Ottoman elites to adapt to the new period; the role of the pious foundations in this period was an example of this fact. State officials, beside their political revenues, established partnerships with merchants and became capitalist entrepreneurs. The pious foundations, *vakıf*s, were utilized to accumulate and protect family wealth gathered by such capitalist enterprises and other revenues. The *Şeriat* rules, which were unquestionably protected by the *ulema*, strictly forbade confiscating the pious foundations. The means to protect and increase private wealth struck a major blow to the power of the central authority on political and economic system. Although several measures were tried against this trend, eventually in the first decade of the eighteenth century, the Sultan accepted this *de facto* situation and allowed the right to inherit the *timar* holdings.

The rise of the local notables, *ayan*s, transformed the political mechanism. The central state was no longer able to enforce their subjects to obey new rules and regulations without questioning; instead it had to bargain with independent leaders of its subjects, *ayan*s. Some of the *ayan*s, beside their independent economic power,

established their own armed forces and organized independent campaigns against others and sometimes even against external territories. (Quataert, 2002: 89) Some of the most powerful local administrators (i.e. Mehmed Ali Pasa of Egypt) even struggled for independence and was hindered with the help of the European powers. At the down of the nineteenth century, the *ayan* were holding a substantial political, economic and also military power in their hands; the 1808 agreement between *ayan* and the central authority was a regulation of the rights and duties of both parties.

The long nineteenth century itself was the last transformation period of the Ottoman Empire, in which the external agents, i.e. foreign merchants and ambassadors, began to increase their power within the political and economical networks of the Ottoman Empire. Although we could further discuss how the struggle between foreign and local groups to obtain social power proceeded in terms of utilizing four sources, it must remain the subject of a separate and more detailed study.

Briefly, it is very obvious that the four sources of social power were utilized by different groups of elites to change the social system according to their own needs. In this study, we have used the well-known facts about Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the rethinking of Ottoman history according to the IEMP model has provided us with a different perspective to establish more concrete connections between different phenomena from very different origins. It is obvious that with the help of further detailed studies along these lines we may arrive at original interpretations of social phenomena in Ottoman history.

Michael Mann did not study Ottoman history and he was not a follower of an influential school of thought in Ottoman historiography. These facts might be the reasons behind the relative absence of his impact in the area, although he is a very well known scholar. Nevertheless, as we saw in this chapter, his Weberian approach and IEMP model contains important analytical tools to reevaluate Ottoman history. This task has never been taken seriously but it seems that IEMP model still carries an important potential to 'rewrite' Ottoman history; so, the task is standing in front of the scholars of the area who are looking for alternative perspectives.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The publication of the *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch in 1929 was a turning point in world historiography. Their interdisciplinary approach and emphasis on the long-term analysis of social change (*longue durée*) created a new paradigm in the science of history. The methodology of the *Annales* School influenced the Turkish and Ottoman historiography immediately, when this area was reshaped by more scientific approaches of leading Turkish historians in 1930s. M. Fuad Köprülü, who was one of the actors of this reshaping process, published his study on the emergence of the Ottoman Empire in 1935, in France and under the influence of the *Annales* approach. While Köprülü was reshaping the future of Ottoman historiography by both his studies and his students, like Halil İnalcık, the *Annales* School was raising its second generation, who would make further astonishing influences on the area. Fernand Braudel was one of them.

Fernand Braudel published his first monumental book, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, in 1949 and his book was another turning point in historiography. The influences of this *magnum opus* immediately reached Ottoman historiography, thanks to its alternative perspective, rich content and also to the already existent influence of the *Annales* School. Another important Turkish historian, Ömer Lütfi Barkan, who was already committed to the Annales approach before the publication of *The Mediterranean*, published a critique (Barkan, 1951) on this book two years after the first edition of the *Mediterranean* came out. In this article, Barkan not only introduced the book to the field of Ottoman history but he also proposed further research areas and questions based on the theses and

analyses of the book. These proposals would be the major research topics for Barkan and other major scholars in the following years.

The importance of Fernand Braudel's book for Ottoman historiography did not originate only from its methodology and original content. Fernand Braudel rediscovered the place of the Ottoman Empire within the context of world history. Beside its scientific aspects, this rediscovery, which in fact was a revaluation of Ottoman history, motivated the Turkish historians of the era (i.e. Barkan and İnalcık) by appealing to their strong national convictions. In short, Fernand Braudel was a paradigm maker, a leader of a revolution in Ottoman historiography. Nevertheless, he was not the last scholar from the *Annales* tradition who influenced the area.

Thirty five years after the first edition of *The Mediterranean*, another scholar linked with the *Annales* tradition, Immanuel Wallerstein published his *magnum opus*, *The Modern World-System, I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. Although this book did not contain analyses on the Ottoman Empire, the 'world-system approach', which was introduced with this book, would become another tracklayer for further Ottoman historiography.

Three years after the publication of *The Modern World-System*, in 1977, three important events occurred in this respect. Fernand Braudel Center was established, which would be the base also for many important studies on the Ottoman Empire in following years; Wallerstein presented his first study on the Ottoman Empire within the context of the world-system analysis and proposed many important research questions, which paved the way for many path-breaking studies in this area; and the manifesto of the world-system scholars of the Ottoman Empire, "Agenda for Ottoman History" (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1977), was published in the first issue of the *Review*, the famous periodical of the Center.

Wallerstein agreed with Braudel in his analysis on the classical age of the Ottoman Empire, which is roughly between fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, and did not address this time period much. But according to Wallerstein, the world history in the post-sixteenth century period consisted of the processes of one

singular event, that is, the development of the European world-economy. The European world-economy expanded in this period and incorporated all parts of the world into itself by creating a global division of labor. Eventually, Ottoman history of this period should also be considered within this perspective. The studies of the world-system scholars of Ottoman history have thus been concentrated on when and how the Ottoman Empire was incorporated into the capitalist European world-economy.

There are various reasons behind the influences of Wallerstein on Ottoman historiography. First of all, he brought an alternative perspective of world, and particularly Ottoman, history and advanced many important theses on the methodology of social sciences. Secondly, he too was the follower of an already influential school of thought in Ottoman historiography, the *Annales*. And thirdly, he adopted, with some reservations, a reconstructed Marxist approach, and used the terminology of this tradition, which was very influential among young scholars in 1970s. Fourthly, he established a base, the Fernand Braudel Center, in which many young and brilliant scholars of Ottoman studies had obtained the chance to make important contributions to the area.

It is obvious that the majority of the well-known Ottoman historians today, especially the ones who study economic history, have some connections with the *Annales* tradition; and it is mostly thanks to the influences of Braudel and Wallerstein. In other words, the *Annales* School, and most importantly these two followers of it, were among the most important factors that have shaped Ottoman historiography in last 60-70 years.

Beside many other scholars and studies, which influenced the area, there are the ones that could have made such impacts but were relatively ignored. Michael Mann and his 'IEMP' model is an important example of them.

Michael Mann published his award-winning book, *The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760*, in 1986 and brought a different perspective on world history. Mann, just like Wallerstein, began his discussion with asking very basic questions about society and how it changes. According to him, 'society' is not a unique totality of various relations, but a

promiscuous being, which could not be explained by 'monocausal' models. He adopted a Weberian approach and proposed some 'ideal types' to explain the basics of social change.

In Mann's model, there are four main sources of power, that are, ideological, economic, military and political (IEMP). These are not pure and solid beings but only ideal types to understand the power relations within society, which this latter being itself another ideal type. Moreover, the four sources of social power were entwined, so that each of them has shaped the inner structures and outer reflections of the other sources throughout world history. These power sources appeared as a result of the goal-oriented nature of human beings. Human nature is restless, purposive and rational according to Mann and we establish social coordination in order to achieve our goals. Eventually, social coordination and the natural results of it, that is, institutions and organizations, lead to some power relations that secure and improve the working of social organization. Mann argues that the sources of these power relations actually shape social change.

Mann applied his model to world history, but particularly to European history, in order to 'reread and rewrite' it. Nevertheless, he relatively ignored the external relations, but concentrated on internal sources of social change and as a result, he did not see Ottoman history within the context of the development of European history. Eventually, this characteristic of his model may have led to a relative omission of it by the Ottoman scholars. Moreover, in contrast with Braudel and Wallerstein, Mann is a follower of the Weberian tradition, which has strong influences in social theory in general, but not particularly and directly so in Ottoman historiography. This may be another reason behind this evident omission. Nevertheless, Mann's IEMP model can be an important alternative approach to reconsider Ottoman history.

Mann's model presented an interdisciplinary or 'unidisciplinary' approach, similar to those of Braudel and Wallerstein, which took into consideration several different factors in social change. But what Mann did further was that he roughly singled out four main sources that determine the development of any society. Moreover, he applied Weberian approach, especially based on Weber's notion of

'ideal types', to historiography and proposed an alternative approach to deal with the huge mess of social relations. A very brief part of this thesis has been devoted to the reevaluation of the major events and periods of the Ottoman Empire according to this approach and we have seen that Mann's IEMP model has important implications that can lead to new findings and explanations as far as the Ottoman Empire is concerned. Nevertheless, this attempt has remained very limited in this thesis, due to its aim and scope.

In short, this thesis mainly covers the contributions of three important scholars, namely, Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein and Michael Mann, to the historiography and more particularly to Ottoman historiography. Although, Braudel and Wallerstein had strong and obvious impacts on the area, Mann's studies, despite their important potential, have not yet made such an impact. In this thesis, we have discussed both the reasons behind this situation and have attempted to apply Mann's IEMP model to the study of Ottoman history in a very limited way. In order to realize the full potential of Mann's model and to reach a new perspective for Ottoman history, the need for more detailed studies on Mann as well as his model stands on the way of the scholars of the Ottoman Empire.

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