

RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF CIVIL INITIATIVES IN  
THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF TURKEY

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF CIVIL INITIATIVES IN THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OF TURKEY**

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The 1999 earthquakes revealed serious gaps in the Turkish disaster management system. The lack of coordination and cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organizations, limits in the legal framework and the lack of policies and plans about disaster preparedness and mitigation are basic. It is highly relevant therefore to expose these deficiencies and find which changes are necessary for capacity building in civil initiatives and which policies can be put into practice to form a strong and a sustainable organizational structure between governmental organizations and civil initiatives. This required reconsidering the events of 1999 Marmara earthquakes and civil initiatives' activities. The analyses have been made among civil initiatives to expose their objectives, their response to earthquakes and future plans. Futher, this required discussion of the current state of disaster management system and legal structure.

Findings are that a number of creative activities of civil initiatives can be observed after the Marmara earthquakes. However, the existing level of collaboration with governmental organizations is inadequate, considering the magnitude of disasters taking place in Turkey and the degree of the people's vulnerability. Efforts such as new draft of law of Turgey Emergency Management General Directorate (TEMGD) seem to provide means to meet the requirements. This draft law could provide the tools to accommodate civil initiatives

The law could be revised so as to maintain a legal basis for civil initiatives' activities as part of disaster management system indicating that governmental organizations should work together in coordination with civil initiatives. Secondly, to encourage voluntary activities, a number of provisions should be available such as life insurance against accidents for the accredited volunteers. Thirdly, TEGMD should also act to find partners for supporting civil initiatives in their financial, personnel training and management needs. With increasing conviction in the need for participatory approaches and people-oriented developments, civil initiatives are committed to face challenges in mitigating and preparing for the variety of disasters facing Turkey.

Keywords: Civil initiatives, disaster management, risk management, earthquakes, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs).

## ÖZ

### AFET YÖNETİMİNDE SİVİL İNİSİYATİFLERİN ROLÜ: TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

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1999 depremleri, Türkiye’de afet yönetim sisteminde, önemli boşlukları ortaya çıkarmıştır. Merkezi yönetim, yerel yönetim ve sivil inisiyatifler arasında, koordinasyonsuzluk ve işbirliği eksikliği; yasal düzenlemelerdeki sınırlar; afet zararlarını en aza indirme ve önleme adına politika ve plan eksikliği başlıcalarıdır. Bu nedenle yetersizliklerin ortaya koyulması, sistemde sivil inisiyatifler için var olan kapasitelerin neler olduğunun bulunması ve etkili bir afet yönetim sistemi için gerekli politikaların neler olabileceğinin belirlenmesi konu ile çok ilgilidir. Bu durumda 1999 depremleri ve sivil inisiyatiflerin yeniden ele alınmasını gerektirmektedir. Amaçları, depremlere tepkileri ve gelecek planlarının ortaya konulması amacı ile analizler yapılmıştır. Bu çalışma ayrıca mevcut afet yönetim sistemi ve yasal yapısının tartışılmasını gerektirmiştir.

Bulgular, Marmara depreminde sivil inisiyatiflerin birçok aktivite ile etkin oldukları şeklinde ortaya konulmuştur. Ancak bundan sonra olabilecek depremlerin şiddeti ve

bundan etkilenebilecek kesim düşünülduğünde, merkezi yönetim, yerel yönetim ve sivil inisiyatiflerin işbirliğine yönelik çalışmaların yeterli düzeyde olmadığı sonucuna varılmıştır. Türkiye Acil Durum Genel Müdürlüğü kuruluş ve görevleri hakkında hazırlanan yasa taslağı bu gereklilikleri karşılayabilecek araçları sağlayabilecek gibi gözükmektedir.

Bu yasa gözden geçirilip yeniden ele alındığında afet yönetim sisteminin bir parçası olarak sivil inisiyatlara merkezi yönetim ve yerel yönetimlerle birlikte çalışabileceklerini gösteren yasal bir temel sağlayabilir. İkinci olarak gönüllü hareketlerini desteklemek için hayat sigortası gibi düzenlemeler hayata geçirilebilir. Son olarak Türkiye Acil Durum Genel Müdürlüğü, sivil inisiyatifleri finansal, personel eğitimi ve yönetim ihtiyaçları anlamında destekleyebilmek için başka yardımcı ortaklar bulmak adına harekete geçebilir. Kesin bir kanı olarak, çalışmanın sonunda, katılımcı planlama yaklaşımına ve insan odaklı gelişmeye olan ihtiyaç nedeniyle sivil inisiyatiflerin afet zararlarını en aza indirme ve hazırlıklı olma konusunda sorumlu kılınmaları gerekliliğı ortaya konmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil inisiyatifler, afet yönetimi, risk yönetimi, depremler, sivil toplum kuruluşları, mahalle örgütleri.

To My Family



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- CBOs** : Community-Based Organizations
- CCAD** : Civic Coordination Against Disaster-A civil initiative worked active during and after the Marmara Earthquakes.
- CENDIM** : Center for Disaster Management- CENDIM was recently established in January 2001 as an interdisciplinary research center under the jurisdiction of the Rector and affiliated with the Bogaziçi University's four faculties and two graduate institutes.
- DEPDER** : Depremzede Dernekleri- Community based civil initiatives worked active after the Marmara Earthquakes
- EMPI** : Earthquake Master Plan of Istanbul
- GDDA** : General Directorate of Disaster Affairs
- ICA** : Izmit City Assembly- A civil initiative worked active before during and after the Marmara Earthquakes
- IEMS** : International Emergency Management Symposium
- JICA** : Japan International Cooperation Agency- As an independent administrative institution established under legal provisions of 2002, it contributes to economic and social advancement in developing countries.
- PMCMC** : Prime Ministry Crises Management Center

- SAR** : Search and Rescue Activities
- TEMGD** : Turkey Emergency Management General Directorate
- UNDP** : United Nations Development Program
- WALD** : World Academy for Local Government and Democracy- A Civil Initiative- Implementing various projects is one of the major means through which WALD seeks to achieve its goals of enhancing local government, democracy and human rights



## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Turkey is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, affected especially by earthquakes. Until the destructive Marmara earthquakes pointed out that our country is very vulnerable to natural disasters, methods of coping with a disaster were not received in the attention. This situation could be clearly observed in the media covering the years following earthquakes, and corroborated by subsequent readings as in used in this thesis. Most sources reported widespread criticisms blaming the institutions. In particular, building contractors and the state disaster management system were accused of being incapable to the cope of the disaster. Furthermore, some comments especially in media (Milliyet, 10.12.2000) claimed that the earthquake was transforming the political landscape in Turkey, as a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which I named in this thesis as civil initiatives because of their volunteering objectives, filled the gap left open by the state system's shortcomings.

Aside from the assistance of state and international organizations, hundreds of civil initiatives arrived at the disaster area offering help from 'search and rescue' to 'debris removal', from food and clothing assistance to health and housing support, from psychological support to children in their education to support to women. This extraordinary outpouring of material and moral support represented both sacrifice and solidarity. In short, it is not an exaggeration to say that in the weeks following the August 17th earthquake, civilians have written a solidarity legend of the 20th century. In this thesis, they are called as civil initiatives because their volunteering structure is not only described as non-governmental only because they are different from governmental organizations but also described as civil contribution.

These civil initiatives continue their efforts now largely concentrating in mitigation works, concerning harm and pain caused by likely natural disasters. Clearly, contributions of civil initiatives have a big share in emergency and recovery period projects. Even if optimism of substantial changes in the political climate has waned today, some commentators like (Kasapoğlu and Ecevit, 2001) still view the earthquake and the emergence of disaster-oriented civil initiatives highly relevant for the process of democratization in Turkey. Many claim (Akşit and Karancı, 2000) that the Marmara earthquakes have shifted the balance between the state and the civil society. In this course, civil initiatives gained importance as political actors.

This thesis is a study of the role of civil initiatives, which has influenced the organizational landscape in disaster management in Turkey after the devastating Marmara earthquakes in 1999 and their likely contribution in the management of urban environment.

After 1999, an expanding awareness for the need for disaster mitigation and preparedness in reducing the hazardous effects of disasters took place among the institutions of society, people and civil initiatives. This is also evident from a number of projects undertaken by governmental and civil initiative organizations after the Marmara earthquakes.

In particular, civil initiatives played significant roles during the emergency and recovery period in 1999. They participated in search and rescue activities, distributed relief materials, interviewed people in the region, built temporary shelters, implemented projects which actively involved women in production and restructuring, supported local networking, built community centers, and arranged conferences and workshops on the subject of the disasters (Selek and Petal, 2001). In short, civil initiatives extensively and successfully contributed to the reduction of pains of survivors.

This thesis aims to clarify how the great civil energy, formed after the earthquakes, has functioned as a catalyst for the revitalization of civil society in urban Turkey. Another aim of the thesis is to demonstrate that Turkey does not have a well-

established institutional and legal framework for disaster management to exploit the massive volunteering capacities. This includes built-in mechanisms for participation of the local people and civil initiatives in decision-making and program implementation. However, some agencies in Turkey work well with local governments and there is an increasing trend for collaborative work in disaster mitigation and preparedness. If the civil potential is put to good use, we could set up an effective disaster management system.

### **1.1 Research Questions and Methodology**

The thesis is not an attempt to fill in gaps in any of the sociological theories. Instead, the main objective is to study the Marmara earthquake as a particular incident. Accordingly, the main intention is to develop new policies for collaboration between central and local governments and non-governmental organizations participating in the disaster management process.

Specifically, the discussion of three questions gains foreground:

- Which changes have taken place about civil initiatives in Turkish disaster management system?
- How did the earthquake marked a turning point for the role of civil society in Turkey?
- Which policies can be put into practice to form a strong and a sustainable organizational structure between central government, local governments and civil initiatives?

It was not easy to find models for this kind of study. Although there is a tendency in the sociology of disasters to regard natural disasters as equally natural and social events, literature in disaster studies about urban civil society is limited including environmental sociology. A comprehensive literature survey was made prior to obtaining information efforts directly from each civil initiative organization involved in the Marmara earthquakes.

The dominant method in the thesis is semi-structured interviews, but other kinds of data have also been used. The interviews have been supplemented by documents from the interviewed organizations. The sample of organizations is selected among the rather few organizations that define their objectives broadly. Apart from İzmit City Assembly, all the organizations intend to be regional, more than local. (And İzmit City Assembly also attempts to redefine what it means to be “local”.) And none of the organizations are working towards one specific social group, such as women or children.

The number of civil initiatives in the sample is too small to be statistically significant. Still, I believe that the selection does reflect something about this particular social discourse in at least urban Turkey. The main reason for this is that the number of disaster-oriented organizations working on the fairly general level that have chosen is rather limited.

A further source of information has been the websites of civil initiatives.

Furthermore, all of the civil initiatives in Turkey are important in this thesis. Some of them intend to be regional, more than ‘local’ such as Local Agenda 21. Some of them are working towards one specific social group such as women or child.

Additionally, civil initiatives that are not disaster-specific organizations, but have a broader perspective in their disaster-related activities such as the community-based organizations, are also included in the analysis.

## **1.2 Some Theoretical Concepts**

The sociology of disaster provides the first analytical perspective of the thesis. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck’s risk society concept provided me a different perspective that helps to challenge the risk management process and the role of civil initiatives in this process. According to Beck (1992), a set of risk and hazards, the likes of which we have never previously faced can no longer be limited both in time and in space. Related with the threatening forces of modernization, natural disasters are hazards and insecurities of our century. Because of this today’s crises, foresighted and innovative forms of approaches should be required (Balamir, 1999).

In other words, a systematic way of dealing these hazards and insecurities is required that is the concept of risk (Beck, 1992).

Modernization and its institutions, failed in the new globally effective threats and hazards because they were designed for closed homogeneous industrial societies and were not ready for 'worst imaginable accidents' of threats and hazards. According to Beck (1992), transformations in threats and hazards is required a new kind of modernization, 'reflexive modernization', and its new institutions. Furthermore, everybody has started to think about and take actions on behalf of their planet. The Marmara earthquakes are the best examples that witnessed civil initiatives' influence to decision-making processes. This theory also shows that risks require new kind of organizational structure to manage successfully. In addition to that, traditional methods of disaster management methods failed as we experienced at Marmara earthquakes.

Second theoretical perspective that is used in this thesis is the revitalization of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the past two decades (Somuncu, 1995). As the twentieth century draws to a close, the stages of international political, economic and social relations as well as humanitarian actions have become crowded with hundreds of actors in contrast to a smaller number in the past. Besides the states and the international organizations, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly come into play actively in tackling the major issues of contemporary society (UNDP, 1995).

In the past few decades, various non-governmental networks have had an important influence on the thinking of certain governments and international organizations. Indeed, they have forced governments and international organizations alike to examine issues, which would otherwise have been ignored or accorded a lower priority (Ural, 1995). These organizations, through which citizens are enabled to participate actively in common issues, have become an important element in a strong pluralist democracy (Baloğlu, 1995). Because of their ability to work at grass-roots level and to establish direct contact with the most vulnerable, they can make

significant contributions to the overall development of a country as in Turkey at Marmara earthquakes.

It is within this context that the NGOs have acquired increasing importance and proved themselves to be an important element in contributing to a strong structure like risk management issues by collaborating with their other governmental partners. Further, by collaboration of all actors-NGOs, governmental organizations, private sector and individuals in the society, one of the most important components of urban planning/management that is called participatory planning could be come into existence.

During the process of urbanization throughout the history, without considering occurrences of natural events and environmental values vulnerable settlements come into existence in an unprecedented amount. However, these human developments that disregard environmental values and natural events were hit by return of a boomerang<sup>1</sup> that is called natural disasters. In other words, the decisions that are taken far from the effects of natural events may probably come up against the high destructions that are resulted from natural events.

Traditional disaster management methods failed due to focusing on works after the disasters; namely response, recovery and reconstruction phases. Because of that, disaster management, which is known and implemented to eliminate damages caused by disasters, may gain new, essential features that cover required works of before and after the disaster and aim to decrease levels of losses to acceptable ones by help of Risk Management Methods (IEMS, 2002). But these require a variety of specializations such as coordination of national, regional and municipal governments, non-governmental organizations, communities and individuals that is called participatory planning.

To sum up, it is obviously clear that non-governmental organizations are important actors in contributing to a strong pluralistic and participatory democracy. They must be in urban management and planning issues. Moreover, they should take part every

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<sup>1</sup> “Risks sooner or later also strike those who produce and profit from them. They contain a boomerang effect, which breaks up the pattern of class and national society” (Beck, 1992,3)

steps of disaster management; namely mitigation, preparedness, emergency response and recovery-reconstruction that are the consecutive steps before and after the disasters.

### **1.3 Organization of the Thesis Study**

This study is an attempt to document and show how civil initiatives were active in Marmara earthquakes and how they could become one of the actors of disaster management processes in the future. For this reasons, at second Chapter, a brief introduction to the Marmara earthquake was given. In addition to that, aim of the second chapter is to create a picture of the civic energy that flowed into the earthquake region. Moreover, civil initiatives and their activities during and after the Marmara earthquakes are pointed out. Problems and lessons learned from earthquakes are discussed. To find out the place of the civil initiatives and to show their probable contributions in disaster management, at the third chapter, the current state of disaster management system in Turkey and capacities for the civil initiatives in this system have been discussed. The chapter documents the current state of disaster management of Turkey and some of the consequences in disaster management in Turkey.

To form an opinion about the place of civil initiatives in disaster management in Turkey, and to expose the basis for this kind of thesis, at the fourth chapter, different theoretical concepts about civil society in particular civil initiatives, natural disasters and their sociology are reviewed. Ulrich Beck's understanding of environmental risks, and powerful actors of Globalization what he called as non-governmental organizations and his new concept individualization can be discussed and pointed out.

In chapter four, the role of the non-governmental organizations in risk society and risk reduction is further examined. By reconsidering their new roles, civil initiatives participation in governmental activities is discussed in the changing context of governmental authority. By comparing their positions in Turkey with that of the developed countries such as India, USA and Japan, their impact on the concept of

disaster policy and on the political sphere are discussed, in order to approach to the main research questions' answers.

According to definition of new roles of civil initiatives that exposed at chapter four, strategies for specific problem areas connected with the role of civil initiatives in disaster management system and the legal framework in Turkey are suggested at chapter five that gives a brief summary of the thesis' conclusions.



## CHAPTER 2

### THE EVENTS OF 1999 MARMARA EARTHQUAKES AND RECOGNITION OF CIVIL INITIATIVES' ACTIVITIES

The earthquake hit the Eastern Marmara region in Western Turkey at 3.02 a.m. on the 17<sup>th</sup> of August 1999, and lasted for 45 seconds. The reading of the shock was 7.4 on the Richter scale (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000). It caused heavy damage in the provinces of İstanbul, Kocaeli, and Adapazarı, with the cities of İzmit, Gölcük, Yalova, Sakarya, Avcılar, Düzce, Sapanca, and Körfez, Akyazı, and Gölyaka suffering severe destruction and collapsed buildings. According to the Government of Turkey, Crisis Management Center, there were 17.480 dead and 43.953 injured people at 17<sup>th</sup> of August 1999.



Figure 2.1. Gölcük-After the August 17th Earthquake ([www.basbakanlik.gov.tr](http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr): 1999)

The earthquake struck the most heavily industrialized region of Turkey, inhabited by 45 million people, or nearly two-thirds of the population of the country (Dünya Newspaper: 25.09.1999). Overall 244.383 houses and offices were reported destroyed or heavily damaged (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000). The region is the center of economic production for the country, and the damage caused by the earthquake heavily impaired economic production (Hürriyet: 25.08.1999).

Again on November 12th of the same year, the second earthquake occurred further to the east and centered in Düzce, a town of approximately 80.000 persons in the Bolu Province. The earthquake took place along the Düzce Fault Zone and caused damage and loss to be felt in the areas of Düzce, Kaynaşlı, Bolu, Akçakoca, Gölyaka, Sakarya, Kocaeli, Yalova (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000). According to Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center Report (2000), there were 763 dead and 4.948 injured people at 12<sup>th</sup> of November 1999. Total number of destroyed or heavily damaged houses and offices were 133.496 at 12<sup>th</sup> November earthquake. As a result of the 1999 earthquakes, 18.243 persons are officially known to have perished, 48.901 were injured. Overall 112.861 buildings were completely destroyed, and 124.146 were damaged, 140.872 were less damaged (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000).



Figure 2.2. Değirmendere-After the August 17<sup>th</sup> Earthquake (www.basbakanlik.gov.tr: 1999)

The earthquakes caused major damage to industries, brought about a shortage of medicine, and had a traumatic effect on individual lives (Radikal: 05.10.1999). The areas hit from both earthquakes are in Turkey's industrial heartland and the most densely populated area outside of İstanbul. Hundreds of thousands of people, many of who lost their immediate family members and relatives, found themselves in a situation with a severe lack of shelter, food, health care and education. The destructive 1999 Marmara earthquakes revealed that Turkey is highly vulnerable to natural disasters once again, and that we know little in how to cope with them. The 1999 Marmara earthquakes are considered by many authors a turning point in Turkish social attitudes and behaviors.

### **2.1. Civil Initiatives And Their Activities During and After the Marmara Earthquakes**

Unlike similar events in history, the August 17<sup>th</sup> and November 12<sup>th</sup> 1999 earthquakes which caused tens of thousands of deaths and injuries, damaged hundred of thousands of buildings, and enormous economic, social and psychological suffering will be remembered as the event that mobilized tremendous civic energy for solidarity (Selek and Petal, 2001). This large mobilization of assistance is indication of the development of civil society in Turkey should be considered a milestone. After the devastating Marmara earthquakes in 1999, there has been an increased awareness among the institutions of society, people and NGOs about the need for disaster mitigation and preparedness in reducing the hazardous effects of disasters. This is also evident from a number of projects undertaken by governmental and non-governmental organizations after the Marmara earthquakes (See section 2.1.1).

To sum up, the objective of this section is to reveal this strong solidarity among civil initiatives including their activities during and after the Marmara earthquakes. Further, the section deals with problems and lessons learned from earthquakes.

### 2.1.1 Emergency and Recovery Period Activities

After the 1999 Marmara earthquakes, Turkey experienced two consecutive processes; namely the emergency period and the recovery period (International Emergency Management Symposium, 2002). The period beginning from the first hours of the earthquake to the construction of the prefabricated houses ought to be described as the emergency period. In a few hours after the 17<sup>th</sup> August quake, individuals rushed into the disaster area, followed by state organizations, and civil initiatives arriving from Turkey, and around the world immediately began to work in emergency activities. These activities aimed to save life, protect property and deal with immediate damage, search and rescue, and provide emergency food, shelter, and medical assistance. After this emergency period, starting with the construction of the prefabricated houses, recovery period began (See Figure: 2.3).




Figure 2.3. Active Organizations at Emergency and Recovery Periods

During the recovery phase following the emergency phase, the physical and psychological rehabilitation of individual and group of survivors were carried out (International Emergency Management Symposium, 2002). Efforts were given to assist communities to return to normal levels of functioning with restoration and rehabilitation works. During the emergency and recovery periods, many organization such as state organizations, civil initiatives; namely search and rescue groups, international relief organizations, associations, foundations, community organizations, professional organizations, and individuals worked together. To sum up, at this section, to expose the whole story of 1999 Marmara earthquakes, the collaboration among civil initiatives and the two periods after the quakes are explained in detail.

#### **2.1.1.1 The Emergency Period**

The emergency period activities at 1999 Marmara earthquakes were carried out by the General Directorate of Civil Defense, Turkish Armed Forces, miners, various governmental organizations, search and rescue associations, volunteers and international teams (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000). A large number of existing organizations, most often with objectives unrelated to disasters, participated in such activities in some way. These responses covered:

- Participation in search and rescue activities
- Organization of essential supplies (food, clothing, medical materials etc.)
- Handling telecommunication and radio communication operations.
- Coordinating emergency activities;
  - Transfer and distribution of relief materials
  - Provision of financial aid
  - Establishment of tent cities and their organization
  - Setting up of prefabricated houses

Several non-governmental groups (NGOs) arrived in the disaster area earlier than others. The total volume of the civil initiatives was, however, difficult to determine.

The Civic Organization Guide (Selek and Petal, 2001) mentioned 130 Turkish NGOs and 77 foreign organizations. Both categories include a large array of different organizations, from internationally established groups like the Red Crescent and the Red Cross to small community-based organizations and local professional associations.

The organizations varied significantly also with respect to the kinds of activities they have conducted, and the volume of aid they have provided. Most typical are search and rescue activities, medical assistance and provision of goods like tents, clothes or quite simply money. A few groups offered services that are less related to the emergency response, such as organizing Kindergartens in the tent cities or vocational training for women (Selek and Petal, 2001).

#### **2.1.1.1.1. Search and Rescue Activities**

Chaos prevailed during the first hours of the 17 August quake. Although most electricity plants were not severely damaged, electricity went out in the whole country because power lines were disconnected (Hürriyet: 18.08.1999). The telephone network broke down in the disaster area. Many emergency centers such as hospitals and fire departments, were damaged (Milliyet: 19.08.1999). A fire at the petroleum refinery in Derince threatened to lead to explosions (Star Newspaper: 21.08.1999).

Ten thousands were injured or caught in the debris of collapsed houses. Millions of those who were not killed or trapped escaped out to the streets.



Figure 2.4. People escaped out to the streets after the 17th August earthquake (www.basbakanlik.gov.tr: 1999)

Beginning from the first hours of the 17<sup>th</sup> August earthquake, individuals rushed into the disaster area. Emergency work in the form of search and rescue (SAR) activities was started immediately. SAR activities were enforced by the General Directorate of Civil Defense, Turkish Armed Forces, miners, various governmental organizations, search and rescue groups, associations, foundations, professional organizations, community organizations, volunteers and international SAR groups (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000).

The independent SAR group AKUT was the first search and rescue group that arrived to the disaster area. After an hour and twenty-five minutes from the earthquake, with dogs and doctors, AKUT (Search Rescue Team) organized and began to work with its skilled personnel at Yalova, İzmit, Çınarcık and İstanbul-Avcılar (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000). First team was sent to İstanbul-Avcılar where a main office of AKUT already existed. Other teams began to work at Yalova, İzmit, and Çınarcık where additional offices of AKUT did also. Civil Defense search and rescue teams arrived to the disaster area at seven thirty, that is to say, after nearly four hours from the earthquake (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000).

Civil Defense, AKUT, other SAR teams and armed forces worked together to rescue survivors. Individuals and institutions donated equipment and generators for SAR activities that contributed to rescue activities gain momentum. At the same time, Crises Management Centers were established at all provinces affected by the earthquake. Equipment for survivors were collected and distributed by the Crises Management Centers, the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkish Red Crescent together (Radikal: 20.08.1999). Furthermore, some of this equipment came from abroad. For damage recording works and necessities determination, experts and volunteers came to Değirmendere camping region and established centers for the coordination of emergency activities (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000).

Voluntary doctors were oriented to affected areas and the Ministry of Health sent medical aid to clinics and hospitals. According to the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center (2000), 2000 persons joined the task of providing logistic support and participated in SAR activities.

After 8 days, the necessity of SAR works diminished and AKUT drew back its teams (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000). Medical equipments and other aid equipments were transferred to the Turkish Armed Forces attending to help people. In the same way, after the 12<sup>th</sup> November earthquake, firstly AKUT sent a small rescue team to the disaster area. Then a main AKUT team including 250 members arrived to the disaster area after three hours from the quake. At the end of the 8<sup>th</sup> day, the need for SAR works terminated, and SAR teams with fewer staff remained at work. During emergency works, SAR teams worked in collaboration with Crisis Management Centers.

To sum up, in both earthquakes, the independent SAR group AKUT received great attention (Radikal: 29.09.1999). After the first 8 days, mobile teams began to control the disaster region for 20 days. Moreover, almost 2000 volunteers were organized in the disaster area by the Turkish and international SAR groups. In both earthquakes, the Turkish Armed Forces worked well with its skilled soldiers (See Table 2.1.).



Table 2.1. The Total Number Of Staff Participated In SAR Works At The 1999 Marmara Earthquakes (Selek and Petal, 2001)

STAFF PARTICIPATED IN SAR WORKS	17 <sup>TH</sup> of AUGUST	12 <sup>TH</sup> of NOVEMBER	TOTAL NUMBER
SAR Groups Associations Foundations Professional Organizations Community-Based Organizations Individuals	1750 person	1250 person	3000 person (33 organization)
International SAR Groups	3622 person (55 country)	1673 person (33 country)	5295 person (83 country)
Civil Defense	110 person	108 person	218 person
The Turkish Armed Forces	64.000 person	7037 person	71.037 person

Additionally, the total number of personnel from international SAR groups that worked hard was more than the total number of personnel from other organizations such as foundations, professional organizations, community organizations and Civil Defense (See Table 2.2).

Table 2.2. The Distribution Of Total Personnel Active In 1999 Marmara Earthquakes (Selek and Petal, 2001)

CIVIL INITIATIVES	TOTAL NUMBER OF STAFF
SAR Groups	1450
International SAR Groups	5295
Associations and Foundations	990
Professional Organizations	480
Community-Based Organizations	80

Furthermore, also the rescue teams of local governments have already had their shares in the earthquake. Only three hours after the occurrence of the disaster, the

fire extinguishers and rescue teams, which formed a convoy of 20 vehicles, were at the site, which caused great among the Gölcük citizens (Hürriyet, 17.11.1999).

#### **2.1.1.1.2. Organization of Essential Supplies**

Civil initiatives also supplied relief materials such as food, clothes, hygiene, shelter, showers, toilets, kitchen, laundry and etc. Immediately after the event, most of the civil initiatives have begun to emergency aid works. First of all, there was a great need for shelter. The Prime Ministry Crises Management Center provided 23.288 tents and distributed to those in need of shelter (PMCMC, 2000). During establishment of the tent cities, distribution of supply aids to survivors began. For example Humanitarian Aid Foundation established a coordination center in Adapazarı and worked for organizing supply aids for victims (Selek and Petal, 2001). From the international initiatives, supply aids in quantities came to the disaster area. Some of the International Civil Initiatives that provided supplies are given in the list below: (Selek and Petal, 2001).

- American Friends Service Committee sent hot water showers, toilet units, 6 containers hats, gloves and scarves.
- Australian Red Cross sent medical equipment to 17 damaged hospitals.
- French Red Cross distributed 800 tents, heaters and shelter materials.
- International Aid sent 6 containers full of medical materials to Adapazarı.
- International Blue Crescent distributed hot meals for 2 months to 2000 people in Yalova, Kocaeli and Sakarya.

#### **2.1.1.1.3 Coordination Activities**

After 24 hours from the earthquake, a civil initiative was established for the purposes of coordinating response and crises management activities. This civil initiative originated by 23 civil initiatives such as Citizen Initiative for Light, Helsinki Watch Association, Bee movement and etc., which came together at the beginning of the emergency period. They were called the organization Civic Coordination Against Disaster (The Voice of Istanbul, 1999, Vol: 31).

Among all other civil initiatives, this initiative is the only one that helps to provide support and coordination amongst civil associations, state foundations, regional directorates and professional associations (Sabah, 10.11.2000). It started up the flow of data, information and documents between civilians, civil efforts and foundations in order to make sure that before, during and after the disaster needs and resources met in the right place and time (Selek and Petal, 2001). They all worked with governorates, local governments and The Ministry of Internal Affairs, Red Crescent, UNICEF, AKUT. Additionally, Civic Organization Against Disaster worked for bringing together regional and International NGOs with those in need of financial support.

#### **2.1.1.1.4 Telecommunication and Radio Operations**

Communication is the key component of the emergency period. Especially in the Marmara earthquakes, need was revealed clearly. Disasters like earthquakes that include plenty of indeterminacies and unknowns such as time, place, intensity of events requires a professional mobile infrastructure but this is both technically and monetary different to set up (Şasa, the Minister of Foundation of Wireless and Radio Amateurs, 2000). At Marmara earthquakes, all communication networks including GSM collapsed.

Foundation of Wireless and Radio Amateurs (TRAC) handled the emergency radio telecommunication operations during the earthquakes of 17th August and 12th November in 1999. An infrastructure for emergency communications was established (Selek and Petal, 2001). They made a protocol with the Civil Defense in 1993 and with AKUT in 1998 (Ertür and Yum, 2000). So they worked in cooperation with AKUT and Civil defense during the quake. Furthermore, all activities undertaken were realized by TRAC with the efforts and contributions of its members. The value of the service rendered by 13 TRAC branch offices who directly took part in the activities and by 160 members is expressed as 2 million \$ (Review Conference of Marmara Region Earthquake, 2000).

TRAC is a very good example for civil initiatives that has difficulties with governmental organizations. At every step after the Marmara earthquakes, it collaborated with governmental organizations.

### 2.1.1.2 Recovery Period

After the first shocks of the earthquakes were over and relief days ended, tent settlements began to establish by the help of Prime Ministry, Red Crescent, Turkish Armed Forces, Civil Initiatives and International Civil Initiatives (Selek and Petal, 2001). 113.924 tents were sent to the disaster area from the stocks of Prime Ministry and Ministry of External Affairs, by donation and received from Civil Initiatives (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000). Additionally, to provide shelter for survivors for hard winter days, 42.161 prefabricated houses were set up before the 30<sup>th</sup> of September (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000). Moreover, donations were organized by civil initiatives for disaster victims (See Table 2.3)

Table 2.3. Donations and Temporary Housing from Civil Initiatives (Selek and Petal, 2001)

Civil Initiatives	Number Of Initiatives	Number Of Tents	Number Of Prefabricated Houses	Donations
Associations and Foundations	14	78.700	1.800	2.5 Trillion TL.
Professional Organizations	6	-	50	63 Billion TL.
Community Organizations	2	-	-	4 Billion TL.
International Relief Organizations	40	10.900	3.350	1Billion 652Million USD
Total	62	89.600	5.200	535 Trillion TL.

The other activities of civil initiatives in recovery period are mentioned below (Selek and Petal, 2001).

- To provide rehabilitation services (solidarity and help tents, trauma therapy centers).
- Woman's center, youth center and day care centers for children.
- First aid, search and rescue training and activities for people.
- Scholarships for students.
- To repair high schools, lower schools and hospitals.
- To construct new schools and small clinics for people.
- Voluntary family projects.
- Conferences and workshops arranged on the subject of disaster management.
- To point out on the plans the areas which are suitable in terms of settlement.
- Web sites and local information systems.
- Local newspapers and magazines.
- Preparation of building, structure and residents inventory.

### **2.1.2. The Main Civil Initiatives of 1999 the Marmara Earthquakes**

The most complete catalogue of NGOs was the list compiled by Civic Coordination Against Disaster and the American Friends Service Committee (Selek and Petal, 2001), but the publishers admitted that the book was undoubtedly incomplete. Besides, several of the listed organizations have never been particularly active, and may today consist of only one or two members.

Of the 209 Turkish NGOs listed, 35 that have specifically disaster-related objectives were started in 1999 – most of which are search and rescue (SAR) groups and groups aiming at preparing the public for disaster through behavioral training. They are, in other words, basically directed towards preparedness and response phases, not mitigation and rehabilitation.

All civil initiatives made their best in Marmara earthquakes but some of them performed better among the others because of their expertise, coordination and confidence in Society (Aota and Muroskai, 2004). Additionally, some of them were only community-based. In this section, according to their special characteristics, a selection has been made among 209 civil initiatives that were active in the Marmara earthquakes. As a result of this research, it could be understood that they have different relationships among each other and with state organizations.

Further, this research displayed essential requirements for participatory disaster management process. There revealed 4 type of relationship those are listed below;

- Cooperation between civil initiatives and another civil initiatives
- Cooperation between civil initiatives and international organizations
- Cooperation between civil initiatives and state organizations
- Cooperation between civil initiatives and community

When necessary there have been used some analysis made according to 8 main titles:

- Emergency and Recovery Period Activities
- Objectives
- Response
- Risk awareness
- Perception of cause
- Knowledge Based
- Future plans
- Changes after the earthquake

Additionally, some of the information about the main civil initiatives mentioned in the next sections was received from the interviews conducted at the disaster region in 2001 during the must course-Planning Studio Studies, which was held by Middle East Technical University.

### 2.1.2.1. Cooperation Between A Civil Initiative And Another Civil Initiative

There are some civil initiatives that were established immediately after the earthquake. Further one of the important characteristics of these kinds of civil initiatives is that they intended to provide communication between other civil initiatives and state organizations during the earthquake (Selek and Petal, 2001) (See Figure 2.4). Civic Coordination Against Disaster Initiative and Human Settlement Association are analyzed for this kind of civil initiatives.




Figure 2.5. Cooperation Between a Civil Initiative And Another Civil Initiatives

#### **Civic Coordination Against Disaster**

Civic Coordination Against Disaster (CCAD) was established on the 18<sup>th</sup> of August 1999. The organization consists of volunteers, and has about 20 active members, whereof a few are working full-time. Further, Coordination has a number of volunteers with specific competencies that are ready to help when needed. Finally, an advisory board of professionals in subjects such as seismology and earthquake engineering participate in the production of training programs etc., and gives public lectures. Whereas the organization was initially active in the regions most severely affected by the earthquake, Istanbul has later become the focus area (Civic Coordination Against Disaster website).

**Emergency and Recovery Period Activities:** When CCAD was founded during the chaotic days right after the earthquake, the immediate objective was to gather and distribute emergency aid packages from civilians. At the moment, the main activities

are the establishment and maintenance of a database over civil society resources for future disasters, in order to improve especially the co-ordination of disaster response. For this reason, CCAD has been in contact with a large number of both Turkish and foreign state and civil society organizations for the purpose of coordinating disaster response. This network is, however, active only in emergency cases. CCAD's network basically consists of different state and civil society organizations in Istanbul and the 1999 disaster area (Selek and Petal, 2001).

**Objectives:** To prevent the destruction, harm, and pain caused by natural, social, and technological disasters; to supply coordination among the actors of the society; to help in the development and application of emergency management structure are the objectives of this organization.

Although the scope includes environmental hazards and risk awareness in general, the field of activity is explicitly limited to disasters and emergency situations. According to Girit's (2001), the public relation contact of CCAD, explanation, it is merely because of the members' competence.

Main methods of improving risk awareness are training programs, public lectures and other forums. By this way the public can meet experts within the field. At the moment, these encounters are all dominated by a one-way flow of information. Girit and Talu (2001) states that the aim is to, eventually, transform these encounters into a dialogue, where the public may also question professional decisions and make own proposals. But at the time being, they say, the public is not sufficiently knowledgeable to participate in decisions on risks.

**Risk Awareness:** The earthquake revealed a general lack of preparedness, according to Girit and Talu (2001), among the public as well as the state. Both the Civil Defense and also the GDDA were clearly inefficient, which especially made co-ordination of the emergency activities difficult. In 1999, there existed no systematic disaster management in Turkey. This is slowly changing. The state is developing a management, partly pushed by foreign actors such as the World Bank and ECHO, the European union's aid organization. Much of the state support is, however, limited in



both thematic and geographic scope. CCAD and similar organization may contribute in broadening the improvement of preparedness.

**Perception of Cause:** Girit and Talu (2001) point to relationship between the generally low risk awareness and the irresponsible construction and settlement practices in Turkey. They emphasize that blaming any specific actors for the disaster is less interesting than learning from it to improve the preparedness.

**Future Plans:** After the earthquake, one of the future plans of CCAD was the GAEM project that is the distribution of “...knowledge about what is the true action...” to perform in disasters (CCAD website), since the public’s preparedness is inhibited by contradictory claims about what to do. They have realized this project to standardize a set of knowledge about disaster risk. The affiliated professionals of CCAD, mainly members of the advisory board, do this standardization, which is meant with the phrase “true action”. The project arranges different programs aiming at improving disaster preparedness and awareness of all kinds of environmental hazards among the public. A main issue at the moment is fund-raising for the GAEM project; a mobile training center for disaster preparedness especially intended to reach people from lower income-classes, who are less mobile themselves (CCAD website).

**Changes after the Earthquake:** Finally, Girit and Talu states that the earthquake had the social consequence that some claim; “it was not like in Mexico City”. There were some demonstrations and some well-founded criticisms of the state’s immediate response, they admit, but claim that this remained within a rather small elite. The disaster management system, they assume, may have improved slightly, as several systematic agencies are now being developed, but disaster mitigation is a long-term process. This is the main reason that CCAD deliberately limits its ambitions to public awareness and co-ordination of civil society’s response.

### **Human Settlement Association**

As ICA, Human settlement association was established before the earthquake. The group was established in 1996 as a rather loose association of academics, journalists and employees in municipalities, who shared the view that there are severe

shortcomings to Turkish urban planning and housing policy. In the mid-1990s, Esen says (06.11.01), critical voices to the way that settlement politics were guided only by quantitative criteria began to emerge in Turkey. These politics have their origin in the 1950s, when urbanization started for real in Turkey. Settlement politics were, according to Esen, from the very beginning highly liberal: Gecekondus were formally not encouraged, but in general tolerated by the government and the municipalities of the metropolises. Consequently, the immigrants had few housing expenses (only the materials), and wages could be kept low in the beginning industrialization of the country. Whereas the gecekondu initially were mostly traditional one- or two-storey houses, high inflation and a tight labor market in the 1960s changed the character of the gecekondu.

Ground became a major asset, and maximization of land value through constructions in the height became an important source of income. Quality, both in terms of tangible aspects such as security and infrastructure and intangible aspects such as aesthetics and life quality, was not an issue; environmental and cultural preservation was set aside in this process. This situation is the background for the establishment of Human Settlements.

**Objectives:** The objective of the association is to support the transition from a quantitatively oriented, centralized to a qualitatively oriented settlement politics where locally based entities such as neighborhood associations are main actors.

**Activities and knowledge based:** A main activity of Human Settlements is to act as a mediator between neighborhood groups and the relevant authorities and professional experts, and to co-ordinate different neighborhood's communication with actors on a higher level. It also initiates some projects on its own, such as the current campaign to preserve the few remaining original buildings in Zeytinburnu, Istanbul's first gecekondu. A main activity in the first time after the two earthquakes in 1999 was to improve disaster management in neighborhoods through training and co-ordination. This is no longer central to the organization because several other groups, such as CCAD and Istanbul Community Impact Project, are focusing on projects on this level. Human Settlements is, however, preparing an "Istanbul agenda

on disaster”, a permanent forum for disaster management on all levels, but according to Esen, neither the state nor the civil society is ready to work together yet.

The organization does not have a general information policy. The members make publications and presentations related to Human Settlements’s philosophy, particularly Orhan Esen, on an individual basis.

Human Settlements co-operated with other NGOs immediately after the Marmara earthquake, and CCAD in particular, but the network is now containing only neighborhood associations. Esen does not want to comment on the relationship between CCAD and Human Settlements today.

**Perception of cause:** Although Esen recognizes construction and land-use practices as important traits of the Marmara region’s vulnerability, he most of all attributes the disastrous consequences of the earthquake to how scientists have participated – or rather: omitted to participate – in society. Geo-physicians and engineers neglected their social responsibility, he says, by alarming the official disaster management system locally and centrally, but not the public.

**Risk awareness:** Partly due to the lack of warnings in public forums, Esen means, the public risk awareness was low. And even after the Marmara earthquake, people in Turkey, especially Istanbul, did not perceive themselves as at risk. The earthquake aroused sympathy with the victims; the initial support from NGOs and individuals should be seen as actions of sympathy.

**Response:** The state was unprepared for a disaster of this scope, which left the affected with a feeling of being alone. Also the recovery process left much to be desired. The rebuilding of Adapazarı is characterized by a thoroughly quantitative way of thinking. The houses are probably fairly earthquake-resistant, but they completely lack aesthetic quality. Also NGOs can be criticized. Most of them continued externalizing the risk, by giving monetary contributions without any long-term plans.

**Changes after the earthquake:** As we have seen, Esen (2001) perceives the social impact of the Marmara earthquake quite differently than the other interviewed NGOs. This is also evident in the way he assesses the social changes after the quake.

In terms of disaster management, he believes that there have been certain changes for the better. The governments is, however, still reluctant to admit the value of bottom-up initiatives. This includes the scientists in addition to the central governments, their negligence to inform the public of the risk before the earthquake. Engineers should be trained about the obligation to inform the public, Esen asserts.

Finally, although Esen does recognize the earthquakes as important for the civil society, he regards it as related to a change in attitudes that had manifested it several years earlier.

### **2.1.2.2. Cooperation Between A Civil Initiative and An International Organization**

Some of entrepreneur projects achieved to work with international organizations. Through this cooperation civil initiatives have accelerated their activities by getting public creditworthiness and funds from international organizations (See Figure 2.6). Istanbul Community Impact Project is one of them.




Figure 2.6. Cooperation between Civil Initiative and International Organization

## **Istanbul Community Impact Project**

This project is really hardly a non-governmental organization, as it is affiliated with the state-owned Boğaziçi University's disaster management research center CENDIM (Center for Disaster Management), and sponsored by the United States International Development Agency's Office of foreign disaster assistance (CENDIM website). However, it is aimed at the public in Istanbul, and it is explicitly less academically oriented than other branches of CENDIM and the one other university disaster research center in Turkey (the Disaster management implementation and research centre at the Middle East technical university). It also encounters the same problems with organizing public arrangements as other non-governmental organizations (Petal 06.05.01).

**Objectives:** The objectives are to increase community disaster awareness and local preparedness, with an emphasis on non-structural mitigation skills, such as securing furniture, stocking water and food and having a flashlight in private houses. A series of different programs are building to achieve these goals (Petal 06.05.01). The project is a trainer's trainer project for non-structural mitigation skills and development of educational materials (CENDIM website). Main co-operation partners are CENDIM, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and different NGOs, especially community-based organizations (CBOs).

**Perception of Cause:** Although not denying the disastrous consequences of sub-standard constructions and bad land-use, Petal (2001) also emphasized a behavioral factor, i.e. individual actions prior to, during and immediately after the earthquake. She says that data over the exact way that people were killed and injured in the Marmara earthquake are missing (CENDIM compiled these data, and finished), moreover similar data from USA and Japan indicate that both human and economic damages may be mitigated by non-structural, behavioral means.

**Knowledge Based:** As seen, project's focus area is practical preparedness skills and non-structural mitigation. It is based on research from a huge number of disasters in different countries. A core element in the project's programs is, patterned after similar projects especially in California, the message "duck and cover", which is


intended to protect people from falling objects such as furniture, as well as from broken glass. This slogan, however, is in contradiction with what AKUT has proposed as their most important advice. According to AKUT, most of the people that survived in collapsed houses were not hidden beneath, but just next to, large pieces of furniture. Those who had hid themselves underneath tables, doorframes etc., on the other hand, were often crushed as the roof of the building collapsed on whatever they had hidden under. In the adjacent area, there tended to be a small space left open because the solid objects absorb the pressure from the roof. Prof. Karancı (05.29.01) at METU suggests that the controversy between Istanbul Community Impact Project and AKUT may be seen as rooted in a conflict over the universality of knowledge. Because of the differences in construction standards between USA and Turkey, the hazards are not necessarily the same. In response to this point of view, Petal answers that AKUT's advice is based on a few cases, not on a systematic body of research. Although she agrees that solid objects may sometimes absorb pressure, this is hardly always the case, and she emphasizes that the number of houses where people are killed are small compared to houses where people are injured (Petal 06.05.01).

Although Petal emphasized the importance of systematic research, she nonetheless sees strong specialization as problematic, since earthquakes affect a multitude of areas. Therefore, she states that she has attempted to encourage interdisciplinary knowledge production by bringing different disciplines, such as engineers and rescue workers, together.

**Future Plans:** Although it is believed that the preparedness for disasters have improved after 1999, Petal still meant there is much to do. The state, she states (2001), is often positive to Istanbul Community Impact Project's work. However, it is still reluctant to let go of the control with disaster management. Petal experiences both that state organizations try to control joint activities, and also that Istanbul Community Impact Project – although attached to a state-owned research center - may have difficulties getting the necessary permissions to conduct programs on their own (Hürriyet, An interview with Selek Petal, 21.10.2001).

### 2.1.2.3. Cooperation Between A Civil Initiative And State Organizations

Through this cooperation, civil initiatives have accelerated their activities by getting public creditworthiness, while government took advantage of civil initiative's resources (See Figure 2.7). İzmit City Assembly and AKUT are two of them.



**Figure 2.7.** Cooperation Between Civil Initiative And State Organizations

#### **İzmit City Assembly**

Contrary to CCAD and Istanbul Community Impact Project, İzmit City Assembly (ICA) has a history prior to the August 1999 earthquake. The organization was founded in March 1998 as an umbrella organization for citizens' initiatives, professional groups, academics and local municipalities in the city of İzmit (Agas 06.08.01). Also provincial governmental offices are represented in the assembly, but the purpose of the assembly is to enhance the public's (through member organizations and neighborhoods) influence over decisions affecting the city (Agas, İzmit City Assembly no date-b).

The field of activities was defined in twelve sub-divisions shortly after the establishment of ICA. ICA is not an operative organization, but merely coordinating the work in the sub-fields that is done by its member organizations.

**Activities:** Since it was founded prior to the 1999 earthquake, disaster management was initially not included in the activities of ICA (although it, to a certain extent, was an issue within the work fields of urban planning and environment). However, since İzmit was one of the most affected cities, the organization soon found itself forced to devote itself to disaster, which is now one separate work field (Agas, 06.08.01).

Among the main projects initiated by ICA is an assessment of the damages in the earthquake area (see İzmit City Assembly no date-a). Besides, ICA has given several training and trainer's training programs, which will eventually reach several thousand people in the region, and assisted neighborhoods in Izmit to establish local emergency centers. ICA has also arranged a series of workshops, where the earthquake's consequences for different aspects of life in Izmit and for the original working plan of ICA was examined (Agas, 06.08.01).

The earthquake also affected the organization's networking: Whereas the network until the quake took place underneath ICA's umbrella, it now includes co-operation with foreign NGOs.

**Objectives:** ICA's profile was from the beginning holistic and based on participation and long-term development. In relation to the earthquake, this objective has been particularly important in relationship with two things: ICA's plan for rehabilitation proposed to provide winter tents to the homeless in stead of building temporary houses.

The rationale was that this would be more space-efficient than to build two settlements, thus allowing new permanent housing to be raised near the city center. This suggestion was, however, over-ruled by General Directorate of Civil Defense.

A second issue concerns the relationship between disaster management, environment and industry. Izmit is, as noted, in the most industrialized part of Turkey. The city has a large port, and several large industrial plants, including the TÜPRAS refinery, are located near the Izmit bay. However, although İKK is aware of industrial risks and wish to initiate mitigation measures, it lacks the mean to do so. Besides, many of these plants are found in the province of Kocaeli, many of them are outside the city of Izmit. ICA has for some time worked on a model for an integrated management of Izmit bay, but has so far met little support from Ankara, and besides had difficulties getting consent from local municipalities dominated by different parties.

**Perception of cause:** When asked (Interview with Agas, 2001) why the earthquake became the major disaster it did, Agas attributes the damages to the deteriorating quality of housing during the past few decades, the insufficient control of



constructions and lack of land-use planning. He is in other words in accordance with the most common explanations. In particular, he emphasizes the dense industrialization of Izmit, although the city's location, almost on top of the North Anatolian fault, makes it unsuitable for industry. This is maybe the biggest risk in Izmit bay today, but again, ICA has few opportunities to do anything about it.

**Response:** When estimating the state response to the earthquake, Agas is focusing less on immediate response than on rehabilitation. Whereas ICA was proposing ways to integrate the early recovery phase and the rehabilitation phase through its housing plan, he sees the decisions made by the state shortsighted. Besides, in as far as ICA represents the citizens of Izmit, the state evidently failed to take the point of view of the affected community into account (Interview with Agas, 2001).

**Risk awareness:** As the respondents, Agas perceive the risk awareness prior to the earthquake as too low. In Izmit, the main problem raised by this is industrial plants established too near settlements (Interview with Agas, 2001).

**Knowledge based:** ICA's purpose is to provide a platform where different actors participating in the local development can meet and integrate their activities. Science is one of the most important actors in disaster management, Agas asserts, but it should be situated above the local democracy.

**Changes after the earthquake:** In the interview, Agas states that the disaster preparedness is probably better than it was, but that many things still needs to be done. Again, Agas especially mentions the many industrial plants in Izmit. These make up one of the main risks in the area; in connection to earthquakes and as potential hazards in themselves. However, ICA has not got enough means to deal adequately with this hazard. The political situation has not changed enough to give more weight to bottom-up initiatives. In this respect, the political situation, dominated by central decisions, is obstructing the optimization of local disaster management.

## **AKUT**

Also AKUT was founded before the earthquake. Established in 1996 by a circle of mountaineers, the group little by little expanded its competencies within search and rescue. In June 2001, mountain SAR is still the main activity. AKUT first participated in earthquake response after the 1998 Adana-Ceyhan earthquake, which saw considerable damages.

The organization arrived the Marmara disaster area within less than twelve hours, and quickly established an improvised center for the distribution of aid (foreign as well as governmental) in Gölcük in according to SAR operations in several of the most severely hit cities (AKUT Website).

As we saw in the previous chapter, the organization received a lot of attention after the earthquake, from media, academics and the public, and seems to be the NGO that for many represents the importance of the civil society after the Marmara earthquake. The organization is today, as we shall see, conscious not to be a political actor. Still, it is fair to ascribe a role to AKUT as the actor that at a very early stage demonstrated the power of the civil society.

At the moment, AKUT is in the middle of a court process, charged with going to Israel for a training program without applying for the permissions it needed as an association. Tanrısever (2001) claims that the process does not mean much for the relationship between AKUT and the state; the organization did violate a law and should therefore be investigated, but it acted without the intention to break the law.

**Activities:** In June 2001, AKUT has three full-time employees, and a large number of volunteers with a variety of SAR-related competencies. Besides being continuously prepared for disasters and accidents, its main activity is different training programs for disaster preparedness. The programs are partly given to local municipalities and neighborhood groups, and partly also to state organizations, e.g. the army and the Civil defense. According to Tanrısever, the relationship between AKUT and the co-operating state organizations is one of mutual exchange of knowledge and experiences.

**Objectives:** It limits itself to SAR activities, without regard to political and religious questions.

**Perception of cause:** Tanrısever (2001) states about which the reasons for the devastating consequences of the disaster were, like the answer to the previous question, highlights AKUT's avoidance of politics. Whereas all the other NGOs that I interviewed focused on social factors either before or after the earthquake, Tanrısever attributes the social disaster to the geophysical properties of the earthquake. He is, in other words, more in line with state organizations than with the other NGOs.

**Response and risk awareness:** According to Tanrısever (2001), the army and especially the civil defense, as all other actors, were unprepared for a disaster of the Marmara earthquake's magnitude, he states that they did a good job when they arrived the disaster area on day two.

**Knowledge based:** The rationale behind the establishment of AKUT was a lack of systematic SAR competencies in Turkey, evident in mountaineering search operations. The founding members of the organization set forth to improve this situation through studies, book translations and study trips to countries where the competencies were higher – all on a voluntary basis. A great part of the techniques that AKUT use is developed in Scotland (mountain operations) and USA and Japan (earthquake response). Some techniques, Tanrısever (2001) states, are altered in order to be more appropriate for the Turkish context. For instance, it seems to be an advantage to have rescuers of the same sex as the victims. There are also differences that are not directly socio-cultural, such as the above-mentioned experience that people taking cover under solid objects are more often killed or injured than in USA and Japan. AKUT now advises people to have their homes checked by engineering companies. The safest behavior, Tanrısever states, depends on the structural properties of your house.

**Changes after the earthquake:** According to Tanrısever (2001), AKUT was alone as a trained non-governmental SAR group in the Marmara earthquake in August; some 300 groups participated in the response to the November 1999 Düzce

earthquake. Not all of these are serious, but some are. As for the state, i.e. the army and the civil defense, they were revealed as unprepared in 1999, but they have also done efforts to improve their preparedness.

#### **2.1.2.4. Cooperation Between A Civil Initiative And Community**

After the Marmara earthquakes, some neighborhood self-organizations that are called as community based organizations or local civil initiatives were established. They intended to establish strong ties between community and their organization (See Figure 2.8.). At the beginning, their purpose was to make organizations in their neighborhood about search and rescue activities, volunteer consulting, seminars and meetings to support neighborhood residents after the earthquakes. However, they are now more professional, they have training teams and consulting teams. Furthermore, they have centers at their neighborhood for meetings. For instance, Neighborhood Disaster Management Project (MAY) and Altunizade Citizen Enterprise is only two of them. They are now working for training people for disaster awareness and SAR activities. In addition to that, they have plans to stop construction in green areas with local administrators and renewing old buildings in their neighborhoods (Selek and Petal, 2001).




Figure 2.8. Cooperation Between Civil Initiative And Community

#### **Neighborhood Disaster Management Project (MAY)**

Neighborhood Disaster Management Project (MAY) was also begun after the Marmara earthquakes. Gayrettepe local administrator Özden Gönül and architecture

Ahmet Turan Aydın started the project. The projects aim is to work for preparedness against earthquakes in the neighborhoods together with local offices (Hürriyet, 28.06.2000). This project involves some committees such as data responsible committee and search-rescue ommittee. They achieved a Neighborhood Disaster Master Plan in their neighborhood Gayrettepe. After that they intended to extend this Master Plan to other neighborhoods. They are now working for renewing old buildings in their neighborhood.

### **Disaster Victims' Associations (DEPDERS)**

Adapazarı, Avcılar, Düzce, İzmit-Bekirpaşa, İzmit-Gölcük, İzmit Karamürsel and Yalova DEPDERS are some of the successful associations that made known their selves<sup>2</sup>. They supported survivors judicial, psychological and emotional during and after the earthquakes. They made also first aid and search-rescue training. The most important aid to survivors is that they brought awareness and sensitivity<sup>3</sup>. Now they are supported by some civil initiatives' projects for instance World Academy for Local Government and Democracy (WALD) to continue their works<sup>4</sup>. The project name is Institution Building and Capacity Development Through Support for Civic Associations of Earthquake Victims. The sponsor organization for this project is ACT Netherlands.

The overall goal of the project was to enable civil society take action to improve the quality of its own life and to exemplify the fact that collective action is more influential than individual action in mobilising local resources and know-how and on government decisions on local matters. Hence, the project was geared to supporting grassroots civil organisations and strengthening democratic practices in general, and to relieve people of the effects of the earthquake on people in particular.

The project has aimed to provide financial and organisational support to civic associations of earthquake victims, namely DEPDERS, in terms of subsistence of the associations as well as within the context of several tasks containing most important

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<sup>2</sup> Online Available: [www.sivilkoordinasyon.org](http://www.sivilkoordinasyon.org) (26/09/2003)

<sup>3</sup> Available Online: [www.yurttas.org.tr](http://www.yurttas.org.tr) (26/09/2003)

<sup>4</sup> Available Online: [www.waldacademy.org](http://www.waldacademy.org) (26/09/2003)

problems of the victims of the earthquake, assessed by thorough interviews with DEPDER representatives.

In this sense, the objectives of the project were various, extending from financing of office space to DEPDERs, to providing technical support in legal cases.

Their activities are just like following,

- Setting-up and maintenance of DEPDERs offices
- Technical and financial assistance to public court cases and periodical legal consultancy for individual cases
- Training earthquake protection measures and rescue

#### **2.1.2.5. Concluding Remarks**

At this section, a research has been made among the civil initiatives that have different structural characteristics that I mentioned as different relationships with state organizations and other civil initiatives. These determinations could be taken into consideration in a proposed infrastructure as resources for an effective disaster management method in collaboration with civil initiatives.

It is found out that there are some characteristics of civil initiatives.

- They have already had strong relationship with communities at normal times, and extended their activities to support survivors at the event of disaster.
- They have expertise, experiences and cooperate with other civil initiatives when there is a necessity.
- They have worked coordinately with international organizations.

Further, it is found out that there is a great deal of over-lapping facts. The groups fairly much agree in their perception of cause for the social magnitude of the earthquake, in the evaluation of state response and the risk awareness.

In general, all groups give systemic explanations about their *perception of cause*: Badly functioning expert systems, ranging from construction to the legal system, are increasing vulnerability to the physical hazard, the North Anatolian fault. An

inadequate response apparatus increases the vulnerability. The failure of expert systems is sustained by low risk awareness in both state and civil society. The most remarkable answer is AKUT's, that puts just as much or even more emphasis on the physical properties of the quake as on social and socio-material aspects. The organization has been seen as a motor in the revitalization of the civil society. Another conspicuous feature is that Human Settlement Association is explicitly blaming scientists' failure to inform the public of the earthquake risk.

What perception of immediate response concerns, the organizations agree again: the state system did not perform adequately. The one exception is, again, AKUT.

The groups differ more, however, when assessing the strategies and the long-term measures of the state. Several express views that echo Balamir's (1999) attack on the Turkish disaster management system as paternalistic.

In addition, the organizations agree on the question of changes in disaster management and changes in risk awareness: All groups agree that disaster management is probably improving – both in civil society and in the state. Most groups also agree that the risk awareness is increasing in Turkey. On the other hand, several emphasize the need for a continued campaign to further raise the awareness, and a simple and non-contradictory presentation of the hazard.

The civil initiatives' perceptions of the earthquake are fairly similar to each other, and also to the views of the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs and Ministry Of Public Works And Settlements. We notice a certain difference in the answers of İzmit City Assembly and Human Settlements Association, who explicitly emphasize the continuity between disaster management and development. This difference becomes more evident when the questions that concern actions are considered: activities, objectives and knowledge base.

Civic Coordination Against Disaster Organization, İstanbul City Impact Project Organization and AKUT's main activity is training, followed by measures to improve the co-ordination of response. İzmit City Assembly and Human Settlements Association, on the other hand, have also been organizing training programs, but they have later focused more on integrating disaster management in a wider range of

activities, thereby stressing the connection between recovery (or in Human Settlements Association's case: urban development) and mitigation.

A similar tendency is found in the organizations' *objectives*, where the disaster-related ones explicitly are restricting their activities to issues close to the outburst of disasters; preparedness and response. Civic Coordination Against Disaster and AKUT are explicitly apolitical, and İstanbul City Impact Project is implicitly so. İzmit City Assembly and Human Settlements Association, on the other hand, both aim at improving the participation of local actors in long-term decision-making processes.

İstanbul City Impact Project emphasized that their methods are "research-based", with reference to systematic investigations of a large scale. Further, AKUT's courses are based on ad hoc adaptations of a number of different techniques.

As for the perception of *changes in the role of civil society* after the Marmara earthquake, the immediate response of the public was one of opposition to the state, they say, but this atmosphere soon vanished. Significantly, İzmit City Assembly and Human Settlements Association represent ideas or values that were present also before the Marmara earthquake.

Lastly, for community based organizations and DEPDERS, it can be said that they supported communities by giving empowerment and established confidential relationship with them during and after the earthquakes. They tried also to extend their activities at the event of the disaster. To summarize, it is very important to provide their participation to disaster management processes.

### **2.1.3 Problems and Lessons Learned From Earthquakes**

After the quakes, number of problems has been come out. As mentioned at the previous section, it is clear that we were not ready for such an earthquake. Lack of coordination and cooperation between governmental and non-governmental organizations, limits in the legal framework, slow and late intervention to region because of lack of policies and plans about disaster preparedness, problems in communication with other organizations and transportation to the region, insufficient



financial source for these activities are the most important problems in the Marmara earthquakes (Review Conference of Marmara region Earthquake, 2000).

These problems can be examined for the two periods; emergency and recovery. During the emergency period, an efficient job distribution between civil initiatives and governmental organizations is lacked (Kasapoğlu and Ecevit, 2001). Further, communication could not be established between search and rescue teams (AKUT's web site, 2000). According to Selek and Petal (2000) a lack of authority reigned due to the inexperience of the crisis management center so every team was on its own. In addition to that, the unfounded information and improper interventions of irresponsible staff caused loss of time (Milliyet, 12.12.2000).

Certain operations were due to fail for lack of communication between search and rescue teams (Dünya, 12.11.1999). At a given site there was more than one team while there were sites not explored (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000). District maps were nonexistent. A healthy search and rescue operation required such maps and city plans (AKUT's web site, 2000). Emergency calls failed to receive due response because of the impossibility of location descriptions. Teams worked individually. Further, concentration of different teams on the same spot created complications. The logistics system could be established only after a lapse of six days (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000).

State organizations were reported absent from the emergency area, and for providing inadequate support when they first arrived – days after NGOs and foreign teams. A headline in the Sabah read “First the earthquake, then the state” after President Demirel's visit to the disaster area, when the presidential escort blocked the roads for ambulances and other vehicles busy in the emergency work (Sabah 22.08.99). Kızılay was severely criticized, and eventually went through an organizational restructuring and replaced the president in order to regain trust from the public (Hürriyet, 16.09.2000). The army, which is rarely criticized, was also attacked in the media, for arriving too late, and for putting more weight on maintaining public order when it eventually came (Hürriyet 23.08.99). Foreign rescue teams were reported

more diplomatic than the Turkish public, but several did notice that the rescue work was especially difficult due to poor co-ordination of activities.

During recovery period, because of lack of policy and preparedness plans, there existed slow and late intervention. Further, because of unwillingness of local and central governments in collaboration with civil initiatives, an authority gap have come out. One of the most important reasons behind this unwillingness is until the 1999 Marmara earthquakes, civil initiatives did not have any accountability among the actors of the society. In addition to this, there was no legal support for them. But for the participation of civil initiatives to disaster management processes, after the changes at the 2<sup>nd</sup> section, 8<sup>th</sup> paragraph in the Law of Disasters, there is now an expression that opinions of civil initiatives can be taken into account while the ministry prepare disaster plans and determine the strategies at written regulations (2001). This expression is an opportunity for civil initiatives to protect their accountability. At section 2.2, these legal developments can be expressed in a more detailed way.

In addition to all of these problems and developments mentioned above, there were lessons learned from disasters for governments and civil initiatives.

- Civil initiatives achieved working together and constitute new organizations.
- Civil initiatives became organized with civilians and helped affected people in disaster region.
- Governments and civil initiatives changed their policies and took new decisions about disaster preparedness and mitigation.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **CURRENT STATE OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN TURKEY**

At all the sections mentioned, the working of the disaster management system has been subject to several kinds of criticism after the Marmara earthquakes. At this section, first of all, historical information about Turkish disaster management system is mentioned for understanding these criticisms. The first earthquake-specific building code was established in 1944, after the Erzincan quake of 1939, the biggest ever in Turkey, with 39.000 fatalities (Civil Initiatives Symposiums 4-5-6, 2000). The responsibility for the central disaster management was transferred to the newly established Ministry of Public Works and Settlements (MPWS) in 1958. A comprehensive disaster law was developed in 1959 (Ergünay, 1999). This law has later been subject to several changes, latest in 1997, when the building code was modified after the Californian building code (Özerdem, 2000).

A separate General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA) was established within MPWS in 1964, and has since then been the most important central authority in the disaster management system (Civil Initiatives Symposiums 4-5-6, 2000). Its responsibilities include:

- Mitigation; in terms of risk assessment and the development of hazard maps and prescriptions of construction techniques,
- Rehabilitation; in terms of centers for temporary shelters and the responsibility for reconstruction of houses, and
- Response in terms of damage assessment and the distribution of means from the national disaster fund (Ergünay, 1999).

Specific emergency situations are, however, not managed by the central authority, but by the state-appointed governor in the affected province. The main task of the governor is to co-ordinate the activities of operational emergency organizations, such as the local departments of GDDA, the civil defense, the Red Crescent and the army, as well as institutions (hospitals, fire department etc.) of the local municipalities. The central disaster management assists the provincial emergency response if necessary (Ergünay, 1999).

In an assessment of the Turkish disaster management system a few months before the August 1999 earthquake, Oktay Ergünay, the then director of GDDA, sees both strengths and weaknesses in the system (Ergünay, 1999, pg. 5-9). The main strengths, he asserts, is the stability of the system and the clear financial obligations of the state.

Ergünay also sees several shortcomings in the system. One main weakness he finds is the existence of holes in the legislation, such as the lack of requirements of micro-zonation plans. Another hole concerns the relationship between supervision of constructions according to the building code and the provision of new housing through the disaster fund. The supervision is done by local municipalities, which are directly subject to pressure from electors and is entrusted with limited means, whereas reconstruction is organized by GDDA centrally (Ergünay, 1999). This aspect is even stronger criticized by Murat Balamir (1999). In addition to the contradiction between local municipalities and central organizations, Balamir claims that this division between disaster management and development of settlements is not only a matter of implementation and enforcement of laws. Rather, it is also found at the core of the disaster legislation, since building codes and other disaster laws are developed by GDDA, while development legislation is under the jurisdiction of the General Directorate of Construction Affairs (GDCA), another department of MPWS. Consequently, the system fails to integrate hazards in the development of settlements in Turkey. The result is a system that repeatedly falls victim to disasters instead of preparing for them.

Yet another weakness noted by Ergünay is that the disaster management system is highly hierarchical. Although it includes a number of institutions on different levels, the responsible organizations – the provincial governor and GDDA - are in every case closely related to the central government. This leads to a paternalistic system, he asserts, which not only makes co-ordination between central and local actors difficult, but also excludes affected inhabitants from decisions in the recovery process (Ergünay 1999). Again, Balamir presents a similar, but stronger criticism. In his view the system produces fatalism by in several ways excluding the public from responsibility. Especially, he attacks the disaster law's guarantee to carry the economic burdens induced by disasters. Instead of applying a pro-active strategy through emphasizing mitigation measures prior to disasters and rewarding pre-disaster attempts to minimize damages, the weight is put on post-disaster reconstruction. The fact that the state assumes all responsibility for rehabilitation, regardless of whether building codes etc. have been followed, enforces this tendency, since it reduces the incentives for individual mitigation efforts (Balamir, 1999).

Ergünay and Balamir's assumption seems to be supported by an empirical study of attitudes towards risk awareness and mitigation in Dinar (Akşit & Karancı, 1999). The town of Dinar experienced an Mw 5.9 earthquake in 1995, in which 90 persons were killed and 200 injured. In a survey conducted 16 months after the quake, subjects living in new houses provided by GDDA as replacement for damaged houses expressed a higher degree of belief in the possibility of mitigating disaster than subjects who had had their houses damaged, but not sufficiently to qualify for new ones – thus indicating trust in the disaster management system. Further, whereas 71% of the total sample believed that mitigation activities could be effective, only 47% believed that they could do anything themselves, and only 14% reported that they had actually done anything to reduce hazards. Similar figures were found in a study of post-earthquake Erzincan (Karancı & Akşit, 1999). In both studies, the majority of respondents reported that they saw the state as the major agent in disaster management, followed by the municipality (Karancı & Akşit, 2000). In other words, it seems that Ergünay and Balamir's concern that the Turkish disaster management system of 1999 is state-centered is reflected in the population.

Ergünay (1999) finally points to another important aspect of the disaster management system: Although it has undergone a number of changes, the main body of the disaster law is from 1959 – while the Turkish society has experienced enormous changes in the same period.

Current state of Turkish Disaster Management system can be examined under three main titles; namely administrative structure and legislative structure.

### **3.1. Administrative Structure**

At administrative structure there are three levels that determine and regulate disaster management system in Turkey. First one is central level, second one provincial level, and the last level includes other institutions that have tasks for an effective disaster management.

#### **3.1.1. Central Level**

Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center is established at the central level in case of a crisis (including disaster). It is responsible for directing all preparations and activities needed to prevent and mitigate all issues that arise in a crisis. In addition, it serves to manage all coordination, cooperation and activity between General Staff and other associated ministries in order to minimize the negative consequences of the crisis.

#### **Turkey Emergency Management General Directorate**

The framework of emergency management in Turkey is determined with the expression below which has been added to the tasks of Prime Ministry with the decree 583:

To take necessary measures in order to provide an effective emergency management through nationwide in case of earthquakes, landslides, rock falls, fires, accidents, meteorological disasters, accidents caused by nuclear and chemical substances and population movements which are in such a scale that threatens national security and to provide coordination between agencies that are parts of emergency management such as the ones that are active either in precaution before emergencies or in search

and rescue operations during emergencies or in recovery and reconstruction activities after emergencies (IEMS: 2002:24).

With respect to the decrees of 583 and 600 TEMAD's responsibilities are:

- To ensure the establishment of emergency management centers at governmental agencies and departments for the purpose of effective emergency management, to determine their working principles and to provide coordination between them.
- To monitor and evaluate the taking of the necessary measures, the preparation of short and long term plans and the establishment of data banks by agencies and departments with a view to prevent events that would require emergency management or mitigating their damage when they occur (www.basbakanlik.gov.tr, 2000).
- To conduct the activities of coordination in the utilization of all types of land, sea and air transport vehicles and rescue and relief equipment and materials owned by public and private sectors in cases where emergency management is introduced (www.basbakanlik.gov.tr, 2000).

There is an expression that is very important for civil initiatives participation. It is:

- To make arrangements that encourage voluntary organizations and individuals providing relief in emergency situations and to coordinate the receipt and protection of relief supplies and their dispatch to locations where such supplies are needed; and
- To carry out other duties which may be assigned by the Prime Minister (www.basbakanlik.gov.tr, 2000).

During the following two months, Turkey Emergency Management General Directorate Secretariat has prepared new changes and adaptations. This progress is due to the new draft of law, which deals with the responsibilities and establishment of Turkey Emergency Management General Directorate.

Aim of this law is to provide establishment of the System of Emergency Management in Turkey (TEMGD Draft of law, 11.02.2005).

Concept of this law is to provide coordination between institutions and organizations that enforce the preparedness, mitigation, recovery and reconstruction activities before after and during the emergency situations; for this reason, to determine and to check standards at national level, to provide and distribute resources; and about all these tasks, to determine the tasks, the responsibilities and the principles of their collaboration and coordination of governmental, non-governmental organizations and citizens. The structure and the tasks units of the organization can be analyzed just like in the following diagram (See Figure 3.1).




Figure 3.1. The structure and the tasks units of the TEMGD (2005)



### **General Directorate of Civil Defense**

There are some given tasks to this organization about providing security of country at every emergency state. These are:

- To ensure the security of people and property at the time of the war, to rescue lives and property if a disaster takes place, to encourage the civil society to support defense activities at the time of the war ([www.ssgm.gov.tr](http://www.ssgm.gov.tr), 2004),
- To organize civil defense services across the country, to maintain and supervise the preparation, implementation and coordination of these services at public and private institutions ([www.icisleri.gov.tr](http://www.icisleri.gov.tr), 2004),
- To plan and implement armless, protective and rescue precautions, emergency rescue and first aid activities, to determine measures against fires and standards for fire bridges, to educate, supervise and coordinate the personnel, to keep civil defense and rescue teams ready and to use them when necessary ([www.ssgm.gov.tr](http://www.ssgm.gov.tr), 2004).

### **General Directorate of Disaster Affairs**

Tasks of this institution are to help implement and coordinate the emergency aid operations in a disaster, to take short and long term precautions needed for after disaster shelter in disaster areas, to have coordination and cooperation with other involved government institutions and organizations, and to designate disaster prone areas and take necessary mitigation measures ([www.basbakanlik.gov.tr](http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr), 2004)

### **General Directorate of Red Crescent**

It organize a rapid response operation to help out those affected by disasters by providing food, cloth, blanket and tent in both disaster areas and central office. It assists in the delivery of international and national assistance including goods and other products, its storage and distribution.

When necessary send health teams, medical equipment, blood and blood products. It also cooperates with the Ministry of Health and related institutions on these issues.

### **3.1.2. Provincial Level**

Response to a disaster is under the responsibility of Governor at the Provincial level and Kaymakam at district level. Governor and Kaymakam are connected to the Ministry of Interior administratively (IEMS, 2002).

The municipalities are responsible for disaster preparedness activities. The fire departments take major role in the disaster response work under the authority of the municipalities.

### **3.1.3. Roles of Some Other Ministries**

#### **Ministry of Defense/General Staff**

Ensures that the task of Turkish Armed Force, as stated by relevant law and regulations, are completed, and that the emergency aid schemes are prepared in coordination with governors.

#### **Ministry of Health**

Ensures that the first aid treatment services are implemented quickly and efficiently. It takes due measures in order to implement protective health services.

#### **Ministry of Transportation**

It takes due measures in order to provide communication between the disaster stricken area and the rest of the country.

#### **Ministry of Foreign Affairs**

If it is determined to ask for help abroad, the Ministry declares the kind and amount of demand through relevant international institutions. Provides coordination on the transportation of these foreign aids.

## **3.2. Legislative Structure**

### **Prime Ministry Crises Management Center Regulation**

This regulation was promulgated on January 09, 1997, to determine the organization, arrangement, working procedures, mission statements and responsibilities of the Prime Ministry Crises Management Center.

## **The Decrees with Power of Law Establishing Turkey Emergency Management General Directorate under the Prime Ministry**

With decree 583 on November 22, 1999 Turkey Emergency Management Agency was established and with the decree 600 on June 14, 2000, the Agency was mulgated to General Directorate. It ensures that the emergency management, regarding the natural and technological disasters, shall be effective cross the country.

### **Civil Defense Law**

Enacted on June 13, 1958. Overtime, it has gone through some modifications based on the needs surfaced, a responsibility regarding its coverage indicated in the law belongs to Ministry of Internal Affairs. The purpose of the law is to minimize the loss of life and property, to protect prominent facilities and ensure their operation and to determine responsibility, power and organization of civil defense.

### **Law Regarding Precautions and Aid Regarding the Disaster Effective Common Life**

It was enacted on May 25, 1959. The issues covered by the law are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Public works and Settlement. In 1968, after the frequent earthquake and flood disasters, substantial modifications were made on the law.

### **Regulation for Structures to be built in Disaster Areas**

The regulation was promulgated on May 13, 2002. In view of both material and workmanship, it requires all structures to be built in disaster prone areas to comply with the “Turkish Standards and Technical Specification of Ministry of Public Works and Settlements”.

### **Regulation Regarding Disaster Emergency Aid Establishment and Planning Fundamentals**

This regulation came on into force on May 1988. It determines the fundamentals of establishing central and local emergency management institutions, and emergency management plans.

## **Regulation of Establishment of Civil Defense Search and Rescue Unions and Teams, their Responsibilities, Working Principles and Fundamentals**

The purpose of this regulation, which was promulgated on July 21, 2000, is to determine the fundamentals and methods regarding the responsibility, coordination, operation, communication and establishment of search and rescue teams affiliated with General Directorate of Civil Defense.

### **3.3. The Capacity of Administrations and Legal Provisions to Accommodate Civil Initiatives in Disaster Management**

As mentioned previous section, on the national level, there is a General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA)<sup>5</sup>, which is under the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, working on the whole procedure of disaster-response plans. It is composed of several departments such as the Departments of Earthquake Research, Communication and Emergency Aid, Planning and Loan Management, Disaster Survey and Damage Assessment, Temporary Housing, Prefabricated Housing Production and Construction, and Disaster Fund Management and Supplies.

Provincial and local administrations also have departments prepare disaster plans. For example, the provincial governorship Crisis Office has devised a regional plan; it also oversees and approves the disaster plans of the Greater Municipality of Istanbul, which in turn supervises local planning. An immediate action plan for the first 72 hours after an event has been prepared for Istanbul and distributed to all public institutions.

Furthermore, rescue and relief operations are the direct responsibilities of the provinces or districts with assistance provided by the central government or external sources. The central government is responsible for reconstruction and rehabilitation. Locally elected governments are responsible for mitigation (Ergünay, 1999).

On local levels, civil initiatives are becoming increasingly active in disaster planning as well. Since 1999, they have kept growing in Turkey. They are usually closer to the

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<sup>5</sup> General Directorate of Disaster Affairs. [On-Line] Available <http://www.deprem.gov.tr/afet/afetisleri2.htm> (03/21/02)

grassroots culture than government bodies, so their plans focus on individual action on a community scale. For instance, the Turkish Red Crescent Society is developing its own response plans and community education curriculum in several locations nationwide.

Planning authorities in Istanbul receive a great deal of help from other institutions and organizations. Many foreign countries with the similar earthquake concerns, like Japan and Germany, are willing to coordinate in disaster-related projects. From assisting earthquake research in Turkey, those countries can gain experience in preparedness and relief as a feedback. On the other hand, Turkey also needs some foreign countries to help them with their advanced experience and techniques, a need that was highlighted by the slow response and recovery following the earthquakes of 1999. Also, due to economic constraints in Turkey, international organizations are critical in disaster response for their financial assistance, as well as help in planning. The United Nations and the World Bank are two major forces in this category. In 1999, the World Bank approved two loans to Turkey, totaling 757.53 million USD, for the recovery and preparedness of earthquakes<sup>6</sup>. Local universities and research centers hold the most professional knowledge, techniques, and equipment in a country. They also can gather the most detailed information by doing direct surveys. Hence, when governments deal with a specified field like seismology and policies responding to earthquakes, the assistance from academic circles is very helpful. Academic institutions are closely coordinated with all levels of governments in seismic research and planning. Several preparedness and response programs and the institutions that helped put them in place are outlined below. The dual (governor/mayor) administrative system in the Greater Municipality is one of overlapping but parallel responsibilities that never officially cross each other in a hierarchical or a collaborative way. This system has been adapted to fit daily governance in Istanbul, but in the event of an emergency it may be safer to have a clear division of accountability instead of two parallel hierarchies.

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<sup>6</sup> World Bank Provides Earthquake Assistance to Turkey [On-Line] Available: <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/094.htm> (03/30/02).

Reports of relief response to the Marmara earthquake focus on both the need for a clear hierarchy of responsibilities in response, and the need to allow for more flexibility through valuation and empowerment of decentralized actors. These are not mutually exclusive goals, as the state government has shown by investing in city level offices of disaster response and civil defense, as well as funding public university research on disaster response and effects and recognizing the increasing value of civil initiatives, both in international recognition and national public opinion. Besides being social and institutional parts of the province, civil initiatives also play their part in the metropolitan organization and disaster response.

### **3.3.1. Disaster Mitigation Efforts**

The Turkish-Japanese Project (Earthquake Disaster Prevention Research Center)<sup>7</sup> was signed between Turkey and Japan on March 18, 1993. The project works at disaster mitigation in all four categories. The General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA), Istanbul Technical University (ITU), and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), involving personnel in many locations, execute it. The Earthquake Data Collection and Vulnerability Evaluation (EDCVE) Sub center in Ankara is responsible for collecting seismological data, immediately estimating the damages in earthquake events, and giving the estimated results to administrative organizations in a very short time. The Earthquake Engineering Research (EER) Sub center in Istanbul is responsible for developing and investigating earthquake resistant structures for various soil conditions and hazard levels. The Education and Training (E&T) Sub centers are responsible for presenting the results of project studies to the appropriate organizations and to the public.

A Disaster Management Program, executed by the GDDA in conjunction with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), is designed to enhance Turkey's disaster management capacity through improvements in the existing institutional and legislative structure and training of government officials at the local and central levels. The UNDP has been an important partner of governments for over 30 years<sup>8</sup>,

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<sup>7</sup> Turkish-Japanese Project. [On-Line] Available: <http://www.deprem.gov.tr/edprc/edprc.html> (03/20/02)

<sup>8</sup> About UNDP Turkey [On-Line] Available: [http://www.un.org.tr/undp/undp\\_turkey.htm](http://www.un.org.tr/undp/undp_turkey.htm) (03/21/02)

participating in the whole procedure from the rescue and relief after events to risk mitigation for future earthquakes. An Emergency Transportation and Disaster Action plan<sup>9</sup> has been executed by the Greater Municipality of Istanbul, aiming to ensure adequate supplies, personnel, and transportation for critical facilities like the Crisis Command Center, large health centers, temporary shelters, and education centers. Transit routes are also planned between the city and its airports, railway stations, bus stations and ports.

The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) executed an Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level (APELL) Program . APELL is a locally “owned” and operated program designed to make local emergency response authorities aware of disaster-related risk within the community, to develop a coordinated response plan, and to teach residents what to do in the event of an emergency.

Following the Marmara earthquake of 1999, a Neighborhood Disaster Support Program was launched as a joint effort between the Civil Defense Directorate of Kocaeli, the Izmit City Assembly, Izmit Fire Brigade, and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. This program promotes the development of Neighborhood Disaster Committees (NDCs) and Neighborhood Disaster Volunteers (NDVs) Also in response to the 1999 earthquakes was a program of Comprehensive Shelters and Sanitation in the earthquake Affected Areas<sup>10</sup> , a large-scale outreach from the UNDP. The aim of this project is to establish buildings for national and municipal response agencies, and to provide assistance to victims of the Marmara and Duzce earthquake regions. Its objectives were (1) the establishment, refurbishment, and operation of social centers for apparent needs of education, childcare, pre-school and social community activities; (2) to improve the sanitary conditions in selected temporary settlements in the earthquake affected provinces. In addition, the World Bank sponsored two efforts in recovery and planning:

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<sup>9</sup> Earthquake Measures in Istanbul [On-Line]  
[http://www.turkishdailynews.com/past\\_probe/03\\_05\\_00/politics.htm](http://www.turkishdailynews.com/past_probe/03_05_00/politics.htm)

<sup>10</sup> Comprehensive Shelters and Sanitation in the earthquake Affected Areas [On-Line] Available:  
<http://www.un.org.tr/undp/disaster4.htm> (03/22/02)

1. An Emergency Earthquake Recovery Loan (EERL)<sup>11</sup>. This is quick-disbursing loan provides financing for incremental private sector import needs resulting from the Marmara earthquake and for budgetary expenditures related to recovery efforts, notably social protection for earthquake victims.
2. Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction Project (MEER)<sup>12</sup>. This project focuses on building a sustainable national emergency management system as a way to reduce the impact of future earthquakes, establishing a disaster insurance scheme, improving land use management and enforcement of building codes, and reestablishing normal living conditions in the affected areas by constructing new permanent housing and supporting a trauma program for adults.

The MEER project is part of a Framework Program prepared by the government of Turkey, the Bank, and other donors as a comprehensive response to the earthquake. This Program also includes components to be financed by other partners: business rehabilitation; construction of permanent housing; repair of housing and healthcare facilities; and rebuilding and repair of roads, power distribution networks, and water supply and treatment systems.

In addition to all of these disaster mitigation efforts, there has been a broad recognition among governmental, non-governmental and academic organizations of the need for extensive response planning based on detailed risk analyses of likely seismic hazards in Istanbul.

In recent decades rapid and uncontrolled urbanization, faulty land-use planning and construction, inadequate infrastructure and services, and environmental degradation caused the increase of earthquake disaster risks in Istanbul. The other important source of the increased risk in Istanbul is the unprecedented increase of the probability of occurrence of a large earthquake (which stands at about 65% during the coming 30 years) (Hürriyet: 12.08.04). The existence of such a high earthquake

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<sup>11</sup> World Bank Provides Earthquake Assistance to Turkey [On-line] Available: <http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/094.htm> (03/20/02)

<sup>12</sup> Marmara Earthquake Emergency Reconstruction Project-Earthquake and Megacities Initiative, 2000, pg.76



risk makes it imperative that certain preparedness and emergency procedures be contrived in the event of and prior to an earthquake disaster.

The Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul aims to reduce future potential losses for the city of Istanbul from a future large earthquake event with a fairly high probability of occurrence within the next several years. It has been motivated by a request by the Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) to a consortium involving four leading Turkish universities: Bogazici, Istanbul Technical, Middle East Technical and Yildiz Technical Universities. These efforts will be pioneering examples of Urban Development Projects and Local Transformation Programs, or total “Action Planning” for Turkey<sup>13</sup>. The four universities, which took part in the project, have set up several working groups consisting of expert faculty members, and approached the project with such a perspective and studied in detail the works to be done for earthquake preparedness of Istanbul.

### **Earthquake Master Plan of Istanbul (EMPI)**

The scope of Earthquake Master Plan for Istanbul comprised of works to be done in the following areas;

- Technical investigation of buildings and retrofitting options
- Organizational structure
- Information and database design
- Public awareness and preparedness
- Disaster management
- Soil and Earthquake Analysis/ Evaluation of Current Situation

The master plan aims at planning of the activities in these fields, preparation of implementation programs, and identification of the responsibilities and responsible authorities for earthquake disaster mitigation activities to be carried out in Istanbul<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> Earthquake Master Plan of Istanbul. [On-Line] Available: [http://www.cendim.boun.edu.tr/project\\_masterplan.html](http://www.cendim.boun.edu.tr/project_masterplan.html) (2005)

<sup>14</sup> Earthquake Master Plan of Istanbul. [On-Line] Available: <http://www.ibb.gov.tr/yayin/index/> (2005)

In addition, plan reviews some basis principles of disaster management and suggests a framework for emergency management for Turkey that provides a role to the provincial and local governments. Effectiveness of disaster management systems strongly depends on the deployment of resources and division of tasks, the set of formal tasks assigned to individuals and departments, the formal reporting relationships, including lines of authority, decision responsibility, and the design of systems to achieve effective coordination of involved parties<sup>15</sup>. EMPI assesses current seismic vulnerability, develops seismic retrofitting methods, proposes legal, social and political measures to implement the methods, and identify the responsibilities and responsible authorities to carry out earthquake mitigation activities in Istanbul. It covers such fields as seismic safety, urban planning, and legal, financial, educational, social and risk management issues (IDMP Report, 2002).

EMPI provides two different yet parallel approaches with corresponding strategies and new organizational structures. One strategic plan, a Strategic Plan for Disaster Mitigation in Istanbul (SPDMI) suggest a threefold roadmap which applies different strategies, planning instruments and priorities at macro-level, mezzo-level and micro-level. Contingency plans and actions plans are developed on the basis of the definitions of risk sectors in all fields. The other strategic plan, the Earthquake Mitigation Plan for Istanbul (EMPI), is a comprehensive coordination of mitigation measures and risk management methods developed according to the causal structures and spatial distributions of hazards and risks. It is composed of a contingency plan for the entire urban area, a local action plan in high-risk area and a bundle of research and activities programs to sustain the first two sets of actions (IDMP Report, 2002).

EMPI evaluates the current legal structures, institutional responsibilities, disaster management, and financial schemes necessary for the implementation of the above two strategic plans. Then relevant model in each field is developed and recommendations are made. For example, after an assessment of the legal structure, a

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<sup>15</sup> Earthquake Master Plan of Istanbul. [On-Line] Available: [http://www.cendim.boun.edu.tr/project\\_masterplan.html](http://www.cendim.boun.edu.tr/project_masterplan.html) (2005)

system with a long-term and short-term focus is recommended. For the long-term focus, it is recommended that disaster management should be in the hands of one ministry instead of current several ministries. For the short-term focus, it is recommended that the proposed disaster management model can be analyzed at the central, provincial and neighborhood levels.

EMPI stresses that risk management is mostly legal, social and political issues, and its realization requires support and commitment of governmental institutions at all levels as well as active participations of civil society. Four significant outcomes can be achieved through the implementation of the master plan (IDMP Report, 2002):

- Enhanced institutional capacity development of government and civil society;
- Revised policies, legislation and plans to create a foundation for an all-risk approach to disaster management;
- Application of an effective multidisciplinary, multi-sectoral and inter-governmental disaster response and mitigation systems for all-risk disaster risk reduction;
- Building up the municipality capacity to prepare, mitigate and respond to natural and man-made disasters.

Preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery stages of disaster management incorporates a wide array of constituents, including central and local government bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), chambers of professions, private and public organizations, community-based organizations (CBOs), and the citizens. The main objective of this study was to create an organizational structure for disaster management in Turkey that will provide guidance to division of labor into specific departments and jobs, formal lines of authority, and mechanisms for coordinating activities of a wide-array of constituents regarding all stages of disaster management.

According to the Master Plan, to reduce the impact of earthquake disasters as well as respond to and cope with their consequences is central to the work of government wherever natural and human-induced hazards affect the lives and livelihood of its citizens. In this respect, building up the municipality's capacity to prepare, mitigate

and to respond to a multitude of natural and human induced disasters is an important task.

Further, the Zeytinburnu pilot study is an important experiment in terms of verifying the approaches and methodologies suggested in the IEMP and of achieving scientific consensus on a common framework for risk assessment and mitigation strategies implementation (The Zeytinburnu Project, 2004). It is critical that the Zeytinburnu pilot study encompasses, but not be limited to an exercise of seismic evaluation of buildings; it allows to test and verify the innovative contribution of urban planning to risk mitigation; furthermore, it is an attempt to incorporate the urban renovation and urban transformation recommendations suggested in the IEMP.

The general sense from the researchers is that IEMP defines a concrete framework for implementation<sup>16</sup>. The researchers mentioned that the framework requires cooperation from all levels of government, and an active participation of civil society. The IEMP was seen as a “golden opportunity” to change conventional practice, to bring new knowledge and understanding, and to bridge government to civil society.

The same policy was used in The Zeytinburnu Project. Further, this project is not only a physical redevelopment project; it is also a social process. It aims to demonstrate that regeneration could be in physical, economic and social terms. There are two steps of implementation at this project; the macro level and the micro level (The Zeytinburnu Project, 2004). While macro level is including the preparation of Master Plan by the Municipality, revision of Development Plan, preparation of application projects and also adapting to the new organizational structure, micro level is including participation of individuals, participation in project development procedures and also participation in the new management administration and representation processes (The Zeytinburnu Project, 2004).

This project is the most important step that supports the participation of individuals and all actors of society in risk management in urban area. At this project, the

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<sup>16</sup> Earthquake Master Plan of Istanbul. [On-Line] Available: [http://www.cendim.boun.edu.tr/project\\_masterplan.html](http://www.cendim.boun.edu.tr/project_masterplan.html) (2005)

property owners have a big role because they are encouraged for local partnerships in self-financing and redevelopment projects. Through these partnerships, property owners will become shareholders in development corporations (The Zeytinburnu Project, 2004).

To sum up, the most important enterprise and the project is Earthquake Master Plan of Istanbul and the pilot project Zeytinburnu. They are the unique positive steps that support community participation and civil initiatives participation in disaster management issues.

### **3.3.2. Changes Made After the 1999 Earthquakes**

In 1999, there were some serious obstacles to effective relief. No disaster-relief by-laws existed to allow local authority over resources of the central government. No civil defense network was in place, and the national fund for earthquake relief was nearly empty. Local government, citizens, and foreign aid organizations were much faster than the designated national and the national government received a great deal of criticism. Since that time the central government has restructured its disaster response plan, formed Disaster organizations in arriving at the scene to begin rescue and relief efforts, Coordination Centers in major municipalities, and heavily funded disaster research.

After effects following the Marmara earthquakes highlighted the strengths of less centralized organizational structures, such as the local governments, civic organizations, and volunteer search and relief groups. As a result, more planning and structuring is being done on this level, though it is still (mostly) subject to higher approval. Following the (rural) Osmaniye earthquake of 2001, appropriate response actions were taken by all levels of authority within an hour. However, this was a relatively minor event compared with the scenario of a magnitude 7.5 or greater near Istanbul; it remains to be seen how well the new system will work in a larger disaster, but capabilities are promising.

In legal and organizational terms, the Development Law and the Law on Disasters with their respective regulations constitute the fundamental components of a general system of development control and disaster management in Turkey. The

Development Law has almost no reference to natural disasters, whereas the procedures and organs described within the Disaster Law deals with the aftermath of disaster. The main scope of the Law of Disasters and the Regulations (1959) is to provide a public intervention capacity and improve the efficiency of relief operations after disasters (Balamir, 1999). There is also no adequately defined government policy for the provision of eviction and settlement (risk analysis estimations and planning models for pre-disaster monitoring) of people who are settled in disaster zones.




Figure 3.2 Current System of Disaster Response (Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center, 2000)

This system is according to current disaster bylaws; Civil Initiatives found in response groups.

The Ministry of Public Works and Settlement (national) has the responsibility to make immediate assessments about the extent of a disaster and to declare a state of emergency, which activates the Disaster Response Bylaws that furnish the province governor with extra capacity in issuing orders.

The Directorate of the Public Works and Settlement (province/greater municipality) works under the authority of the governor. It has established a regional crisis center, which oversees relief activities and debris removal. It also works after the earthquake to identify the severity of damage and losses, and then reports the results to the governor so that it can arrange the distribution of aid.

Headed by the governor, the Province Committee for Coordination of Rescue and Response (PCCRR) can mobilize all private and public organizations, civil defense groups, fire fighters, police department and acquire help from the neighboring province governorships as well as military troops to face the disaster (see Figure 2.8.). During an emergency, all information will flow into this center, and it will arrange the use of available resources as well. In this Center, 7625 staff that have been trained and fully equipped is ready for SAR (Search and Rescue) efforts, and it has its own radio channel to address the news and orders after disaster<sup>17</sup>.

Military troops that are situated within the province boundaries report directly to the Head of General Staff in Ankara. According to the organization of the Turkish Armed Forces, these troops get their orders directly from the Prime Minister and the Chief of General Staff.

Therefore, the Turkish Armed Forces are beyond the general provincial organization. However, the commanders of these forces works in close coordination with the central governmental administrators of the province. For instance, in case of an emergency, the PCCRR, which includes local commanders of military forces in addition to the representatives of civil institutions and organizations, gets activated.

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<sup>17</sup> Information from the presentation of the Governor's Crisis Office (2000)

In the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, support from the military came after 72 hours of the disaster. The main reason of the delay was the limit of the law, as they had to wait for command from the Central Government.

The Civil Defense Directorate exists on both national and local levels. The main responsibility of the General Directorate of Civil Defense is to provide unarmed, protective and rescue personnel. Its purpose is to minimize civilian casualties and other types of losses during warfare or any natural disaster. The General Directorate of Civil Defense has been carrying out these services under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. At the national level, there is the General Directorate, the Civil Defense College, and Warning and Alarm Centers. In a province, there are Province and Town Civil Defense, Civil Defense Local Forces, and Search and Rescue Unit Directorates.

The Police Force, governed on the provincial level, maintain order in roads/traffic and pedestrian crowds and individuals during a disaster situation. The greater municipality organizes the Fire Brigade, with stations in each of the boroughs. Responsibilities are, as one would expect: fire control, search and rescue, etc.

To summarize, it is clear that the current disaster management system and response system could not include civil initiatives legally and give place them in the organization plans. To find out why civil initiatives have to be in disaster management processes, at the next chapter, some theoretical concepts about civil initiatives activities in disaster and risk management are exposed. Further, some examples about disaster management policies of other disaster-prone countries are taken up.



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **NEW WORLD POLICY: FOCUS ON REDUCING RISKS AND CIVIL INITIATIVES**

Disasters can wipe out years of development in a matter of hours. Big one-off disasters like earthquakes destroy farmland, animals, livelihoods-keeping people poor and hungry, children may lose the chance to be educated if a disaster demolishes their school, or if parents need their help rebuilding sheltered family lives. So reducing the risks posed by disasters is not an optional extra. It is a central issue as mentioned at previous chapters (UNDP, 2000).

The direct effect of a disaster is loss of human life, injuries, homes destroyed, damage to infrastructure and loss of environmental and cultural heritage. It shakes the social and economical development of a city or a region. Whole world has begun to reshape its politics about the grave effects of devastating disasters. 1999 Marmara earthquakes have shown that disaster mitigation and preparedness are must issues for an effective disaster management system. Furthermore, according to Beck (1999), “The modern society is turning into what a risk society and risks are fast becoming the central political issue of our times.” These words belong to a German social theorist Ulrich Beck. In addition to this big transformation, society is turning into a more awakened society that do their best to understand unknown hazardous effects of risk society.

Effects of the risk society become the motor of the change. More importantly, to be able to cope with risks of risk society, new fields have been come out such as risk management. Risk management is an interdisciplinary area where brings together all forms and levels of urban authorities. Among all of these urban authorities, non-

governmental organizations (NGOs), which express needs of society more closely because of their non-governmental structure, have begun to play a major role in bringing concerns related to risk management on to the national agenda and a promoting shift of focus from mere relief response to mitigation and preparedness.

Environmental sociology provides few clues. The German social theorist Ulrich Beck calls for a stronger role of the civil society in his notion of the sub-political level (Ülner, 1999). Sub-politics is being performed everywhere where risk definitions are being produced and distributed, such as research institutions, media and the courts. However, voluntary organizations such as environmental groups have received most attention in the discussions about sub-politics. In other words, the theory of risk society may also be seen as a theory about the importance of a civil society. As a consequence, some key concepts are taken from risk sociology and the sociology of science and technology.

In recent years, argumentations about governance, civil society, collaborative planning have been put on the agenda of all governmental activities among developing countries. These concepts provide a second analytical perspective in addition to the analytical perspective of the sociology of risk society.

#### **4.1. The Risk Society and Sociology of Ulrich Beck**

“Theories of ‘simple’ modernization, from Habermas to Marx to mainstream Parsonian sociology, all share a sort of utopic evolutionism, whether its motor be communicative rationality, the development of the means of production, or structural differentiation and functional integration.”

Beck sees another, darker dimension to such developments and especially in the constitutive role assigned to science and knowledge. Beck claims that the consequences of scientific and industrial development create a set of risks and hazards that we have never previously faced. These dangers can no longer be limited in time as future generations are affected. He claims that we are living in a society in which the central political conflicts are not class struggles over the distribution of money and resources but instead non-class-based struggles over the distribution of risks. Significantly, many of the bads of modern society-disasters, pollution,

technological hazards-are to escape; they affect everyone. We are increasingly subject to a new form of equality, an “equality of risk,” Beck calls it. Therefore risk is fast becoming the central political issue of our times. In Beck’s words, “The driving force in the class society can be summarized in the phrase: I am hungry! The movement set in motion by the risk society, on the other hand, is expressed in the statement: I am afraid!”

Yet Beck sees potential signs of hope. If the public can wrest back control over science, It may lead to a development he terms reflexive modernization-that is, a form of modernism in which we think critically about where technology and science are going and engage in democratic debate over how best to proceed. But if not, we may plunge into a period of escalating fear and conflict over risks.

Indeed, risk is fast becoming global. “Risk society”, says Beck (1999), “means world risk society.” It remains to be seen whether the global dimensions of risk result in new global coalitions or in new global conflict.

#### **4.1.1. The Shift to a Reflexive Modernization**

“A keystone of Beck’s thesis is that Western societies have recently undergone a profound socio-political reconstitution, meaning that the previously dominant social form, ‘industrial modernity’, has been over taken by a new ‘reflexive modernity’.”

Gleeson suggests above that ‘Reflexive modernity’ refers to a set of socio-political structures—‘modernities’—that have emerged in response to a growing sense of critical self-awareness in the state, and also in economic realms. According to Beck, reason for this shift to reflexive modernization is not simply the crisis of capitalism. The successes of industrial capitalist modernity such as technological and scientific advances have also contributed to the new social form (Gleeson, 2000). These successes are marked by Beck as side effects of which escape perception of the modern state and its institutions.

According to Gleeson (2000), “Although simple modernity had always produced dangers in the form of social and environmental side effects for industrial communities, the development and subsequent failure of biochemical and nuclear

technologies in the second half of the 20th century marked the transition to a borderless 'risk society', a social form where hazards were no longer restrained by space."

In risk society, effects become the new motor of change (Beck, 1997): "Side effects devalue capital, destroy trust, make markets collapse, confuse agendas, and split apart staff, management, trade unions, parties, vocational groups and families."

#### **4.1.2. The Social Surge of Individualization**

"In the welfare states of West, reflexive modernization dissolves the traditional parameters of industrial society: class culture and consciousness, gender and family roles. It dissolves these forms of the conscience collective, on which depend and to which refer the social and political organizations and institutions in industrial society. These detraditionalizations happen in social surge of individualization."

Scott Lash and Brian Wynne (1992) claim that: "Modernization involves not just structural change, but a changing relationship between social structures and social agents. When modernization reaches a certain level, agents tend to become more individualized, that is, decreasingly constrained by structures. In effect structural change forces social actors to become progressively much free from structure. And for modernization successfully to advance, these agents must release themselves from structural constraint and actively shape the modernization process."

Correspondingly, individualization is understood here as a historically contradictory process of societalization. It is precisely the growing awareness of contradictions of which can lead to new socio-cultural commonalities. Consequently, new social movements come into existence as a consequence of process of societalization and they react the increasing risks and risks conflicts. Thus, they are expressions of the new risk situations in the risk society. According to Beck, on the one hand, they result from the search for social and personal identities in detraditionalized culture. In Beck's vocabulary (1992), non-governmental organizations depict disasters as reflexes of long series of social actions, and claim that risks should not be handled through technical means alone.

## **4.2. Powerful Actors of The Risk Society-NGOs**

### **4.2.1. NGOs in the Changing Context of Governmental Authority**

A new specter is haunting the developed world at the present time. It is not the specter of the proletariat that Karl Marx called to our attention some 150 years ago. Rather, it is the specter of the lonely bowler, the alienated individual cut off from his or her social roots, operating outside of social space, lacking bonds of trust and reciprocity. This situation has been traced, in at least some accounts, moreover, to the rise of the state and the more formal components of the voluntary sector, which have supposedly crowded out informal voluntary activity and left it without a clear social function (Salamon and Sokolowski, 2000).

A struggle is therefore said to be raging between two epic foes: the organized structures of social existence, chiefly the state and social organizations; and the self-organization of individuals, with the former presumably emerging victorious, at least in the more developed regions of the world and true citizen self-organization holding its own, if at all, mainly in the less developed regions not yet spoiled by modern life.

The past two decades have witnessed changes in provision of social, human, and community services in all over the world. These changes focus on the gradual transfer of traditional governmental authority, powers, and duties to non-governmental organizations, which have increased their share in provision of personal and social services (Schmid, 2001). They are part of a trend described recently as the reinventing government movement, based on axiom that the government should steer and not row (Schmid, 2001). This process is also connected with developments such as government deregulation, attempts to reduce the size of governments, cutbacks in governmental expenditures, and devolution of authority. In the process of devolution, power is delegated from the upper governmental organizations to the lower organizations and peripheral units, as well as from government to NGOs, including voluntary non-profit organizations such as community based organizations, associations, foundations and so on.

There are several motives for this trend some of which are ideological, and some utilitarian. According to Schmid (2001), “The underlying ideology for this trend

derives from the concept of self-reliance, which focuses on redefining the rights and obligations toward citizens. According to this perspective, not only does the state have certain obligations toward citizens, but citizens are obligated to contribute their share to the state.” If a new division of labor is created between the actors of society, the well being of citizens can be improved. In this connection, it has also been argued that delegating some of the government traditional roles to NGOs can increase efficiency and generate more effective utilization of resources. Delegating of responsibility may also bureaucracy and red tape, improve the quality of responses to the needs of citizens of risk society.

All these perspectives support Ulrich Beck’s point of view (1992): “Just as modernization dissolved the structure of feudal society in the nineteenth century and produced the industrial society, modernization today is dissolving industrial society and another modernity is coming to being.” The old institutions of this new modernity have confronted necessity of new institutionalized structures against new risks situations of risk society. According to Beck (1992): “Established and utilized rights limit freedom of action within the political system and bring about new demands for political participation outside the political system in the form of a new political culture (citizens’ initiative groups and social movements).”

#### **4.2.2. Background of NGO Participation In Governmental Activities**

During the 1980s and 1990s, political and public legitimacy for the welfare state has been questioned. The decline in legitimacy can be attributed to economic pressures and crises, as well as to the rise in unemployment rates and demographic changes such as aging of population, which increased the demand for assistance to elderly people. In addition, there has been a growing demand for special services for different ethnic and cultural populations, following the entry of foreign and immigrant workers into the labor markets of Western countries. The declining legitimacy and growing uncertainty about the functions and missions of the welfare state have also led to significant cuts in government budgets that were previously allocated for advancing needy and disadvantaged populations (Schmid, 2001).

In light of these developments, Western countries began systematically delegating some functions traditionally performed by the government to NGOs. Even in Scandinavian countries, which are typically known as welfare states, there have been complaints about the heavy burden that welfare states pose for modern countries.

Some Western countries began to institute a new division of labor between the government and NGOs. The NGOs, which contract with the government, are responsible for direct provision of services. Indeed, groups of the political spectrum have justified the emergence and function of NGOs, and have recognized the contribution of those organizations toward developing a civil society that counterbalances the power of the state.

#### **4.2.3. Reconsidering the New Roles of NGOs**

From a theoretical perspective, the new role of NGOs can be understood as a response to the governments' failure, inability, or willingness to provide essential services needed by citizens. NGOs can be conceived of as an alternative system, which provides government and public services. As mentioned, they fill a vacuum left by the government, which is either unable or unwilling to cover the entire range of services required by citizens (Fisher, 1998). For example, especially voluntary non-governmental organizations are largely viewed as serving disadvantaged populations by the risks of risk society, and arenas characterized by social ambiguity. NGOs are perceived as innovative bodies that are not trapped by government bureaucracies and can therefore offer innovative experiments that the government would have difficulty implementing. In addition, NGOs satisfy the needs of clients who wish to participate in formulating and implementing their ideology and policies. Moreover, these organizations facilitate attainment of social goals by providing citizens with an opportunity to participate in social struggles and conflicts. From this perspective, for instance, community based organizations are a democratic means of promoting values such as equal opportunities, equitable allocations of resources, support for disadvantaged populations, and responses to the needs of specific populations (Schmid, 2001).

### **4.3. NGO Activities In Risk Reduction**

Since the beginning of industrialization, famines, epidemics and natural catastrophes have been affecting all societies. Now, we have to struggle against new risks such as nuclear power, chemical and biotechnical production and the like. Whatever the types of risks that have affected cities, the conventional practice of interventions to current forms of global and local hazards must be shifted to more comprehensive and proactive 'risk management' methods (Balamir, 2003).

Risk management is an interdisciplinary area where brings together all forms and levels of urban authorities (Beck, 1999). In this part, among all urban risks, natural disasters and NGO activities in natural disasters especially will be mentioned. Additionally, this part contains recent examples of how communities are making themselves safer from disasters.

#### **4.3.1. Living with Risks-Natural Disasters**

Balamir states that (2003): "The significant increases in the number of disasters, their intensity and the level of damage they cause are frequently indicated. This is partly explained by increases in population, forms of their spatial concentrations, and by the enhancement of prosperity. Others point to the limits that contemporary society has depleted the world's natural and social resources."

Everyday, there are news reports about cities stricken by natural disasters. This is likely to continue, and become worse-unless we change our policies and actions on environment and development. Why are cities at risks?

- More people are settling in areas vulnerable to hazards.
- Rapid population growth and migration make it difficult for authorities to protect people from disasters.
- Finally, urbanization is upsetting balances in ecosystems, with added disasters as a result.

Kobe, Los Angeles, Marmara Region in Turkey...What these cities and regions have in common is that they all have been stricken recently by major natural disasters.



Disasters have become part of the image and psyche of these places (Sasayama, 1996).

Additionally, at these cities, governments mainly establish the system for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and provide standard services to majority of victims (Aota and Murosaki, 2004). But NGOs develop their activities different from governments'; by following up variety of minority needs like that each victim has as we experienced at Marmara earthquake in Turkey.

But these places have something else in common: a new awareness and political commitment to protect their communities from future disasters. Society is turning into a more awakened society of which do their best to understand unknown hazardous effects of risk society. Especially, NGOs have played a major role in bringing concerns related to risk management on to the national agenda and a promoting shift of focus from mere relief response to disaster mitigation and preparedness. The most important thing is that they are representatives of these communities' voices (Fisher, 1998).

#### **4.3.2. What Is Being Done For Cities At Risk?**

If cities are more vulnerable to disasters recently, why aren't more people working for this issue? It is a new concept, which has taken root in the last half of this century, that man need not be fatalistic about disasters. As Beck said it will take time until all communities realize these facts, and only then can they take action.

There are also other reasons. Local authorities have limited control over urban expansion. Urban areas are growing so fast that authorities have difficulty in providing basic minimum services. With scarce resources, disaster threats are just one of urgent problems facing authorities. In these situations, partnerships among NGOs, local and governmental authorities and community-based solutions gain an important role. Especially, preference for projects coordinated with different parts or professions in the community, rather than isolated projects is very effective way for risk management processes.

Additionally, community-based solutions such as positive “can-do” approach, led by city residents, with evidence of consensus-building are vital for public awareness (Gonzales, 1996). National or international partners like NGOs are included where their role is an enabling one. There are some case examples in which an evolving field called as NGO participation in risk reduction has been coming into existence.

#### **4.3.2.1. The Changing Emphasis of Disasters in Bangladesh NGOs**

Bangladesh is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world, affected by cyclones and floods. One of the most hazardous earthquakes Gujarat earthquake occurred in the western part of India in January 2001. The earthquake caused the damage with more than 20,000 people dead (Aota and Murosaki, 2004). At this earthquake, civil initiatives implemented a lot of activities especially to put victims’ lives back in order. For example as a model case, Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) is one of the famous NGOs in India and its mission is supporting economical and self-reliance activities of women (Aota and Murosaki, 2004). It is a community-based organization. And just like the same as Marmara earthquakes-civil initiatives relationship with victims- there were strong ties between community and SEWA.

Accordingly, SEWA immediately picked up needs and supported victims. The following activities were implemented by SEWA for establishing strong ties with victims:

- Housing Construction
- Craft works for providing people employment opportunities.
- Provision of modern farm equipments
- Counseling
- Water retention
- Child education, infant care centers, nutrition
- Health centers

- Insurance coverage
- Fundraising for supporting livelihood reconstruction.

These activities that are mentioned above could be done in a mutual trust manner between community and community-based organizations. NGOs have played a major role in bringing concerns related to risk management on to the national agenda and promoting shift of focus from mere relief response to disaster mitigation and preparedness. The government has, after earlier skepticism, now accepted NGOs as major partners in these tasks. Innovative approaches, such as the use of micro finance, have been applied; many of which are related to preserving the gains of ordination with government. Improved structures are now approved (Matin and Taher, 2001).

Despite progress, neither NGOs nor governmental agencies have clearly defined roles in the effort to link disaster management priorities. This will ensure that long-term development efforts build on local capacities and reduce vulnerabilities.

#### **4.3.2.2. Japan-Kobe Earthquake**

The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, which is called the Kobe earthquake was the costliest disaster ever, and the first major earthquake to hit an urban area in postwar Japan. Economic damage was about \$100 billion. Over 436,000 buildings burned. About 6,300 people died and 34,000 were injured. During the quake, NGOs and community volunteers played a key role, for they were flexible in ways that official authorities were not. They launched their relief activities such as delivery of food and necessities in shelters. In addition to these relief activities, NGOs helped victims to live mainly in temporary houses in emergency period. Lastly, at the reconstruction period, they helped victims to move them to the permanent houses. After the reconstruction period, individuals and corporations have participated in preventive plans in the community to avert future disaster risks (Walsh, 1996).

In Japan, just like the attitude in Turkey at the Marmara earthquakes, there has been a traditional idea that governments should mainly implement activities of the public realm. But governments also could not perfectly respond to a variety of needs by too

many victims in such big disaster (Aota and Murosaki, 2004). In this kind of environment, NGOs appeared as a new instrument to help disaster victims.

### **Evaluation of NGO activities in Kobe Earthquake**

At this section, there are four main titles, which are revealed focusing on four major requirements. These requirements are just like the following; the structure of the NGO - if it is community based or not, what the expertise of the NGO is, if there is any coordination with government or not. All of these requirements are also based on previous sections that are mentioned before.

#### **Community Based**

In Kobe earthquake, NGOs provided resources to help victims with know-how, experience or knowledge, regardless of area. Cooperation between the local units of the government, which are called residential or neighborhood organization by Rosuke Aota (2004), and NGOs generated a synergetic effect and strengthened the community empowerment. An example to this cooperation is the NGO called as Machikomi, Community & Communication. It is in cooperation with the neighborhood government organization, in a certain area, which was severely burned, has built one private apartment. Working with local organizations and their relation ship with communities is a big challenge for NGOs to become community-based.

A variety of measures are underway to protect Kobe area from earthquakes and related secondary disasters such as fires, landslides and industrial explosions. These measures are (Sasayama, 1996):

- Firebreak zones along rivers and roadways.
- A new Rokko Mountains Greenbelt to reduce landslide risks.
- Ten-year community reconstruction committee.
- Backup systems for utilities and hospitals.

Community members also need to be better informed through awareness and education programs. They must also work closely with NGOs.

## **Expertise**

After Kobe earthquake, several professional NGOs have appeared. These NGOs consist of several types of experts. One example is Hanshin-Awaji Town Development Support Organization. It consists of lawyers, tax accountants, and architects. These specialists have integrated in a cross-sectoral manner on a voluntary basis (Sasayama 1996).

## **Coordination**

Some networks NGOs have appeared based on their activities, information sharing, financial assistance, and so on (Sasayama, 1996). One example is Citizen towards Overseas Disaster Emergency. This is NGOs' coalition and implements overseas disaster relief activities to reciprocate in the case of Kobe earthquake (Aota, 2004).

It is found that community based, expertise, and coordination is crucial requirements for NGOs to play effective roles in disaster management processes. If they could not achieve these requirements, they cannot take the initiative in the society.

### **4.3.2.3. USA-Northridge Earthquake**

In the Northridge earthquake, in January 1994, Emergency Network of Los Angeles (ENLA) was established as the network organization of community-based organizations (Bolin, 1998). ENLA has also cooperated with governments and nationwide disaster relief NGOs such as American Red Cross. It was established to respond to unmet needs, in cooperation with FEMA also (City of LA Emergency Management Council Joint Meeting, 1997). Other missions are to link needs with resources, to support disaster-affected victims and to contribute for disaster reduction. ENLA also played a role of catalyst and link between community-based organizations. Since CBOs need to enhance capacity building to prepare for disasters, ENLA has formulated its disaster management plan and regulated its role in three stages (Bolin, 1994);

- At normal times; promotes networking between CBOs
- At the event of disasters; assembles subcommittees depending on CBOs specialty such as shelter, food, and mental and physical health.

- After disasters; holds evaluation meeting and delivers evaluation report to CBOs, governments, nation wide disaster relief NGOs and mass media.

According to Northridge experience, it is clear that response by only governments is insufficient at the event of big disasters. It is indispensable for all of the sectors in the society too cooperate and collaborate with each other. The role of ENLA is quite important to connect these sectors.

#### **4.4. Concluding Remarks**

Some different theoretical aspects about the role of NGOs have been discussed here. According to these different perspectives, the emergence of NGOs in the institutional contour of world risk society is not a new phenomenon. Especially in Beck's theory of the risk society, NGOs are the powerful actors of the individualized risk society. They are the voices of vulnerable population affected by catastrophic incidents of risk society. Although they could be more conscious about their role and place in the public discourse, they do certainly fill a void in the risk management system. Besides they very well have a positive long-term affect on civil society, through raising awareness about the environment and decreasing the public's dependency on the state in future risks. According to my point of view that the conflicts between the actors about managing risks are characterized by avoidance more than confrontation. Finally, it is mentioned that the risks such as disasters should not be handled through technical means alone. They should be studied as an image of social significance.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF CIVIL INITIATIVES IN CHANGING THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT CONTEXT OF TURKEY**

A number of changes in the Turkish disaster management system have taken place since the Marmara earthquakes. One of the aims of this study focusing on civil society is to show that a non-governmental disaster management has emerged. A majority of the actors in this system is engaged in search and rescue activities (SAR), or in local awareness raising projects. There are other organizations that have somewhat a broader perspective.

It seems that the state disaster management system is also in a process of legal and institutional reform. The main motivation of the latter is to improve the disaster response. Reforms in the Civil Defense and in Red Crescent are intended to improve especially search and rescue (SAR) activities. The establishment of Turkey Emergency Management General Directorate (TEMGD) is, even if they could not perform their intended tasks that aimed to improve the coordination of the response, by securing the co-ordination of activities within the system and information to the nation respectively. All legal changes that seem to be motivated by an urge to rehabilitate the expert systems in both public and private sector are those perceived as having failed in the earthquake. This is in line with the recommendations of experts (Balamir 1999, Ozerdem et al. 1999, Ural 1999).

A simple listing of manifest changes would not, however, answer the main questions of this thesis. Therefore, first, we still need to consider whether the civil initiatives have had an impact on the prevailing concept of disaster. Second, we have to question whether the organizations from the non-governmental disaster management

system have revitalized the civil society in Turkey or not. Furthermore, the question, whether the state system has significantly changed its perception of disaster is to be answered.

Next, we have to reconsider the role of civil initiatives in changing the context of disaster in Turkey. With increasing conviction in the need for participatory approaches and human-oriented developments, civil initiatives are committed to face the challenges in mitigating and preparing for the variety of disasters. In this final chapter of the thesis different perspectives are suggested for improving the roles of civil initiatives in disaster preparedness and mitigation.

### **5.1. How Civil Initiatives Participation Could Ideally be Coordinated?**

For an effective disaster management system in collaboration with civil initiatives, the consecutive phases of disaster management process; namely mitigation, preparedness, emergency response, recovery and reconstruction, could be taken up and developed (IEMS, 2002).

During an actual emergency, quick and effective action is required, this has been most severely experienced at Marmara earthquakes. If appropriate action is not taken or if the response is delayed, lives will be lost. In the process of formulating and updating specific aims and objectives, the plans should be communicated with and coordinated with government agencies and civil initiatives. This will improve planning, reduce duplication of efforts, make plans more realistic and increase the overall effectiveness of disaster response.

#### **5.1.1. Potentials and Weaknesses of Disaster Management System of Turkey in Collaboration with Civil Initiatives**

In this thesis, the main argument described at every chapter is that for various reasons, Turkey needs a reform for an effective disaster management system. A strategic program that includes detailed guidelines for the development and implementation of an effective, integrated, and well-practiced disaster mitigation and preparedness plan needs to put into practice in which governments and Civil Initiatives could cooperate. In this section, potentials for a collaborative disaster



management system are explored and other weaknesses pointed out which undermines the current disaster management system. For analyzing these potentials and weaknesses of the Turkish Disaster System, some phases are developed at a model diagram (See Figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1. Collaboration Model (FEMA Website, 2002)

These steps are developed from FEMA’s disaster preparedness and mitigation plan (FEMA Website, 2002). These steps are the main steps for an effective disaster management system. Each step could be a tool for exposing potentials and weaknesses of our disaster management system.

### **Organizing For Emergency Management**

Local governments in Turkey legally are the first responders during a disaster because they are closer to the civil initiatives than central governments. But for an organized disaster management, civil initiatives except community-based organizations could be supported by the central government. For instance, one of the

duties of Turkey Emergency Management General Directorate is to evaluate the needs of public, legal mandates, the difference of day to day missions and how they change during disasters and how to foster an understanding that everyone is affected by disasters, and therefore must plan for them (IEMS, 2002). This task has been enabled the Turkey Emergency Management General Directorate to organize disaster works and to work with civil initiatives easily. Emergency managers could share their data or add civil initiatives to their information networks. In addition to that, they could work with civil initiatives with new projects.

Community-based organizations have to be supported and organized by local organizations. Further, after the Marmara earthquakes as mentioned at chapter 2, there have been many community-based organizations established at neighborhoods.

### **Staffing an Organization for Disaster Preparedness**

The most important element of putting together a disaster management program is executive support. The support, financial backing and program implementation should be based on how they gear their budgets, assign personnel and support policies dealing with disaster management. In Turkey, there are number of civil organizations other than government organizations that are established by professionals. For instance, Amateur Radio Operators has their personal facilities enable them to set up an efficient network because of the potential to immediately establish a telecommunication network based on universal standards and regulations (Review Conference of Marmara Region Earthquake, 2000).

We observe the same revival in the same establishment of Disaster Management Centers that play a role of vital importance in emergencies. The ongoing of the implementations in Istanbul and Kocaeli form the factors of future-oriented preparations. It is evident that due priority should be given for the training of qualified specialized staff having experience and know-how. The establishment of the Emergency Management General Directorate under the Prime Ministry is a positive step taken towards this end.

## **Training Staff**

Training and community awareness creation should be an inclusive, cross-sectoral process involving policymakers, government officials, local leaders, NGOs, communities and private sector (White paper web site, 16.03. 2002). In Turkey, these training activities have been implemented among people, to organizations or trainers active in disaster. But it is clear that for an increasing awareness and effective participation of civil initiatives it should be done by the collaboration of all actors of the society. Additionally, existing training and community awareness initiatives should be strengthened. Target groups should be:

- Professionals involved in disaster management and those from related disciplines.
- Civil Initiatives
- The general public
- Educational institutions
- Line function departments at the national, provincial and local levels of government
- Trainers, educators and researchers.

Local governments and civil initiatives should assist each other in institutionalizing disaster management practice by conducting training for local governments in planning, reorganizing and strengthening co-ordination institutions, mobilizing other civil initiatives and private sector for disaster. Some civil initiatives such as Civic Coordination against Disaster and İzmit City Assembly are good examples for capacity building activities.

## **Utilizing Technology**

Organizations can now use advanced technologies to prepare for disasters and communicate during emergencies such as TRAC, Civil Coordination against Disaster. This include simple communication technologies such as cellular and satellite telephones and pagers to more advanced video messaging and Internet

messaging. Organizations are more and more reliant on the Internet to track and report damage and disaster response. This is a big resource for central and local governments to work with civil initiatives.

### **Improving Community Participation**

“Reducing risks posed by natural hazards is a long-term goal, which will only work if communities at risk are part of the process” (UNDP, 2000). Civil initiatives are also part of these communities and depict these communities’ voices successfully. In addition to this, all disasters are first tackled at the local level by local organizations. National and international response is to be built upon those local efforts. So investing in disaster preparedness within communities at risk remains a top priority. However, preparing to respond to disasters is only part of the broader risk reduction agenda where possible, measures to reduce the physical and human impacts of disasters must be taken.

For improving community participation, people-individuals and initiatives especially community-based organizations-must participate in preventive plans just like as in the philosophy of Istanbul Master Plan to avert future disaster risks. Community members need to have basic tools on hand: after the Marmara earthquakes, citizens, who were lacking tools, did most search and rescue activities (Hürriyet, 15.09.1999).

Community members also need to be better informed through awareness and education programs. They must also work closely with NGOs. There are good examples in Turkey such as neighborhood self-management organization (MAY). As we experienced at Marmara earthquakes, civil initiatives and community volunteers played key role, for they were flexible in ways that official authorities were not. If these neighborhood self-management organizations can be improved by expertise and coordination, there will be councils for consensus building. It is a time-consuming process, but it seems to be the only way to get support.

According to Altiner (2000)-Neighborhood disaster management organization (MAY) member:

- Each community has to have its own plan to respond in case of an emergency.

- Wherever you live, city or village, people keep in mind that they must protect themselves first.

In Turkey, this kind of risk awareness and commitment, unfortunately, came after the Marmara earthquakes. It should be improved by positive “can-do” approach, led by city residents, with evidence of consensus building. National and international partners should be included where their role is enabling one.

Furthermore, developing the earthquake damage scenarios can help to raise public awareness. These scenarios are changing community attitudes. The community is in the progress, however, of recognizing its vulnerability to earthquakes. Residents have introduced early warning systems that are prepared by civil initiatives or governmental organizations. After the Marmara earthquakes, we have gained a lot of advantages. People are now learning first aid techniques and forming response groups. They have also identified “safe houses”.

To sum up, if people became well prepared, they could protect themselves and their homes. But for being well prepared, it is a must condition that learning collaboration and participation before, during and after the disasters. For collaboration and participation, shortly for disaster preparedness and mitigation we need to know that how civil initiatives and public participation should be coordinated. Further, we need to find out and how this could be integrated with urban management and planning.

### **Developing Partnerships**

To support civil initiatives and to provide accountability to them, there have to be partnerships. Firstly, this can be undertaken by central government. According to their interests and sectors, with relevant governmental organizations, civil initiatives should take part in various projects (National Earthquake Council, 2002).

By organizing meetings, all sides at same sectors can come together to establish consensus. The Emergency Management General Directorate could undertake this type of coordination work (National Earthquake Council).

In Turkey, one of the best examples of developing partnerships is community-based organizations’ solidarity with public. For instance, neighborhood self-management

organizations are the most successful ones. Avcılar-Gumuspala Solidarity Association is one of them that were established after the Marmara earthquakes to promote the awareness of solidarity and decency, and to mitigate the damage of earthquakes (Selek and Petal, 2000). Further, after the earthquakes, they provided judicial, psychological, emotional support to those in the disaster region. They worked with a lot of civil initiatives and governmental organizations for instance chief of their neighborhood.

It is not an exaggeration to say that community based organizations have gained strength after the Marmara earthquakes. It is important to give priority to their projects by local governments. Further, they have to participate various activities of local governments and have to use their representing rights. This could only be possible by supporting them financially and encouraging. Further, this is an important step to develop a well-prepared community (National Earthquake Council, 2002). Below there are some successful examples that could be used as a model in the future for developing partnerships.

### **Administrative and Legal Regulations**

The establishment of the Emergency Management General Directorate under the Prime Ministry is a positive step taken towards this end. Further the Civil Defense already has an excellent team, they have their own training program (Dünya, 14.09.2002). But they did lack certain pieces of high-tech equipment. Their collaboration with Mercy Corps International Civil Initiative helped to fill in that gap (Review Conference of Marmara Region Earthquake, 2002). They focused on the search and rescue program and the Civil Defense team has been receiving training on how to use this new equipment. In addition to that, the Civil Defense has started to give training to governmental organizations and some civil initiatives about search and rescue activities (Hürriyet, 28.09.2003).

Following the Marmara earthquakes, The American Red Cross (ARC) and Turkish Red Crescent Societies (TRCS) recognized that they face a common set of risks. Parallel to these risks, both organizations believe that there is commonality in the disaster response solutions to these challenges. The American Red Cross and The

Turkish Red Crescent Society signed a new innovative agreement. Ayşe Saltan states that this agreement provides the framework for a long-term partnership dedicated to earthquake research, preparedness, response management, knowledge development and technology transfer.

The partnership agreement between TRCS and ARC will establish international earthquake institutes in California and Turkey dedicated to earthquake research and development and to strengthen mutual capacities (Review Conference of Marmara Region Earthquake, 2002).

The World Bank approach towards disaster management is another different example. The Bank has financed three projects in Turkey. There was 1992 Erzincan Project, in 1998 projects considering floods and earthquakes, and the MEER project that is a framework program called the Marmara Earthquake Emergency Program 2001. (Pusch, 2002). It includes some strategies for Turkey's institutional framework for instance Emergent Management Directorate Governorate, new disaster management capacities, financing schemes and the ability of the constructing industry (Wilczynski, 2002). Furthermore, the World Bank has established disaster management facility for about four years ago. This facility intends to establish a close cooperation with other international organizations, private sector and civil initiatives. The World Bank forms a consortium, focusing on disaster preparedness combining international organizations, civil initiatives, academics and all interested communities. For example, they participated Review Conference of Marmara Region Earthquake for the same reason and they believe that this kind of exchange helps organizations and countries to strengthen themselves (Pusch, 2002).

Another point of equal importance with the number and merits of the above developments is the backstage and the foundations they rest upon. The wide reaching incentives foreseen in the Law of Civil Defense 7126 related to volunteering in effect since 1958 unbeknown to or unheeded by the governor of the time were put into actual effect for the first time by one of the civil initiatives-TRAC.

At the law Regarding Precautions and Aid Regarding the Disaster Effective Common Life, in the article about writing instructions by Ministry for disaster mitigation and

preparedness, there is an expression for civil initiatives that their opinions are taken into consideration. This is a vital step taken for participatory disaster management that includes civil initiatives but this statement could be developed by saying the disaster plans for mitigation and preparedness can be prepared by getting the civil initiatives opinions and with their participation. This change could provide legislative structure to civil initiatives in the future.

To sum up, all the potentials such as projects and weaknesses of the system such as governmental organizations, which could not perform their tasks effectively, are mentioned above will be a guideline for governmental organizations and civil initiatives. Because each step that was taken for collaboration constitutes new capacities for new partnerships. It is clear that organizations working at same sectors could cooperate and develop new strategies for an effective disaster management.

#### **5.1.2. New Policies And Strategies for a Collaborative Disaster Management System**

Although the establishment of the Turkey Emergency Management General Directorate (TEMGD) is a positive development, it still does not fulfill its responsibilities effectively. In practice, coordination between government agencies and non-governmental organizations which are active in either pre-emergencies or in search and rescue operations post-emergencies, or in recovery and reconstruction activities (IEMS: 2002:24) is one of the main contribution of TEMGD.

In addition, in the earlier months of 2005, TEMGD has prepared a draft law containing new changes and adaptations. This deals with the responsibilities and re-establishment of TEMGD as a coordinating Prime Ministerial Executive Secretariat about ministries. The draft law includes detailed steps concerning disaster mitigation and preparedness.

Before the law is put into effect, it should be reconsidered in relation to the issue of civil initiatives.



## **The Main Tasks Of TEMGD Concerning Civil Initiatives According To New Draft Law**

In the new draft law, the fourth article of section one, there are 3 main tasks are described including statements that pointed out capacities to accommodate civil initiatives in disaster management system (TEMGD Draft of law, 11.02.2005). These are (See Appendix pg. 105):

### **Task 1-Maintaining Coordination and Collaboration**

One of the tasks of TEMGD is to coordinate organizational structure and maintain collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organizations. This statement<sup>18</sup> should be revised as:

One of the tasks of TEMGD to establish organizational structure and maintain collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organizations and for this purpose to enforce the necessary legal provisions<sup>19</sup>.

### **Task 2-Monitoring, Evaluating and Managing Emergency Situations**

Another task of TEMGD described in sub-article '4' is for managing emergencies to establish a strategic resource inventory and to upgrade, monitor and evaluate this inventory. This statement<sup>20</sup> can be revised as:

For managing emergencies, to establish a strategic resource inventory and to upgrade, monitor and evaluate this inventory in collaboration with governmental organizations, private organizations and civil initiatives<sup>21</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> "MADDE 4- Türkiye Acil Durumu Yönetimi Genel Sekreterliğinin görevleri şunlardır:

a) Ülke genelinde acil durum yönetimini gerçekleştirmek, bu konu ile ilgili teşkilatlanmayı yapmak, bakanlıklar, kamu ve özel kurum ve kuruluşlar, mahalli idareler ile sivil toplum kuruluşları arasında koordine ve işbirliğini sağlama (See Appendix pg. 105)."

<sup>19</sup> a) Ülke genelinde acil durum yönetimini gerçekleştirmek, bu konu ile ilgili teşkilatlanmayı bakanlıklar, kamu ve özel kurum ve kuruluşlar, mahalli idareler ile sivil toplum kuruluşları arasında koordine ve işbirliğini sağlayarak gerçekleştirmek ve bunun için gerekli yasal düzenlemeleri yürürlüğe koymak.

<sup>20</sup> "f) Acil durum yönetimi için stratejik kaynak envanteri sisteminin kurulmasını, güncel olarak tutulmasını sağlamak, izlemek ve değerlendirmek (See Appendix pg. 105)."

<sup>21</sup> f) Acil durum yönetimi için stratejik kaynak envanteri sisteminin kurulmasını, güncel olarak tutulmasını sağlamak, izlemek ve değerlendirmek ve bunun için ilgili bakanlıklar, kamu ve özel kurum ve kuruluşlar, mahalli idareler ile sivil toplum kuruluşları ile işbirliği yapmak

### **Task 3-Encouraging Volunteers and Civil Initiatives**

A further task of TEMGD as expressed in sub-article ‘4’ is to maintain and organize incentives and legal provisions for the accreditation of emergency volunteers and civil initiatives. This statement<sup>22</sup> can be revised as:

To maintain and organize incentives and legal provisions for the accreditation of emergency volunteers and civil initiatives in collaboration with considering the civil initiatives<sup>23</sup>.

There are also a number of missing points in this tasks described above. Regulations for each of these tasks are necessary to maintain collaboration and coordination between governmental organizations and civil initiatives. Further, for this kind of law, it is important to determine how they could encourage civil initiatives to participate disaster management processes and provide them legal provisions for approving their new role in disaster preparedness and mitigation processes.

Recommendations for the design of such a regulation are:

- To maintain a legal basis for civil initiatives activities as part of disaster management system, the regulation should indicate that during an emergency situation; governmental organizations should work together in coordination with civil initiatives. The role of civil initiatives is to provide an avenue for citizen participation. Civil initiatives-associations, foundations, professional organizations, international organizations, and community-based organizations, have a special capacity to reach individuals, ordinary people in their homes. They are able to go to tents and acquire information. This gives them an opportunity to identify people and address areas that the governments’ officials could not. They can provide food assistance to people in the tent cities, and they can discover survivors having health problems, or survivors that complain from sanitation. Civil initiatives are able to address

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<sup>22</sup> “j) Acil durum gönüllüleri ve sivil toplum kuruluşları için özendirici düzenlemeleri ve akreditasyon yapmak (See Appendix pg 105).”

<sup>23</sup> j) Acil durum gönüllüleri ve sivil toplum kuruluşları için özendirici düzenlemeleri ve akreditasyon yapmak ve bu konuda sivil toplum kuruluşlarının görüş ve katılımlarını alarak işbirliği yapmak.

these problems because they are out there on site. They are able to address individual needs. They can attend immediate needs and provide short and long term solutions. In short, if they can identify the need, then they can provide assistance very quickly.

For this kind of facilities, regulation should contain and clarify that;

- Organizational Structure should be exposed- which governmental organizations and civil initiatives could be responsible in this structure?
- Responsibilities and Obligations-What are the main tasks for both governmental organizations and civil initiatives?
- Validity and Enforcement- Who is responsible for the validity and timing of enforcemets?
- Conditions to empower civil initiatives for specific taska, location and period.

These department's responsibilities and duties should also be determined with another written regulation.

- There are civil initiatives such as Civic Coordination Against Disasters that collect and share information about civil initiatives that are active in region like Marmara earthquakes. TEMGD should work with this kind of civil initiatives while establishing a new inventory for using this data to prepare strategic action plans for disaster preparedness and mitigation. The Department of Strategic Planning, Evaluation and Information Technologies should be capable of organizing this kind of partnership (See Chapter 2, Section 3.1.1).
- For encouraging voluntary activities, there should be new arrangements such as life insurance against accident, for volunteers that are active in the disaster area. This life insurance should be added to relevant article of the regulation. The Department of Mitigation and Insurance should work on that kind of insurance policy for volunteers (See Chapter 2, Section 3.1.1).

- It is often stated that civil initiatives' capacities are usually limited, especially, in financial and personnel resources as well as professional management. Providing resources from other sectors is indispensable to enhance their sustainability. The Department of Resource Planning and Management should find other partners to support civil initiatives for their financial needs (See Chapter 2, Section 3.1.1).

### **Participation Of Civil Initiatives To Disaster Management Integrated With Urban Management And Planning**

The reasons for transformation of hazards turning into disasters could be abrupt population growth due to urbanization, unpreparedness of local governments to meet demands and necessities of this growth, and in turn, uncontrolled locational decisions of this additional population. Where responsibilities and liabilities are unidentified and unknown after a natural disaster, these developments have been created in an “organized irresponsibility” according to Beck.

The recent development for civil initiatives' accountability is accommodated in Law of Municipality (5216) accepted on the 23rd of July 2004<sup>24</sup>. According to this law, one of the responsibilities of the municipalities is to cooperate with civil initiatives while executing social, cultural and health services for old, young, children, women and with physically obstructed people. In addition to that, they have to cooperate with civil initiatives, establishing social centers such as profession centers and courses.

This law could open up new collaboration areas for civil initiatives and governmental organizations, not only in managing the cities but also in disaster management.

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<sup>24</sup> Available Online: [www.belgenet.com](http://www.belgenet.com) (15.01.2005)

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **CONCLUSION**

Not only people from Marmara area in general, but also people around the world are focusing their lives on reducing the effects of earthquakes. It is known that an earthquake will happen some time and whether it is going to be of magnitude seven or magnitude eight. Further, it is not known that whether 45.000 or a million people will die. But it have to be recognized that the magnitude 7.4 earthquake that affected the Marmara area is ten times less energetic than a magnitude 8 earthquake. If a magnitude 8 earthquakes was to affect an area again, there is no doubt going to an enormous catastrophe.

As mentioned at Chapter 3, what important to know is that there are now real measures such as Earthquake Master Plan of Istanbul that supports participation of community and civil initiatives in disaster management processes. In addition to that, the discussion for the Turkey disaster management system may sum up that there have been changes, both in the Turkish disaster management system. One change is the state's admission of human influence on vulnerability and measures to make individuals accountable for technical failure. Another one is the emergence of a non-governmental disaster management.

If the whole picture of civil society in Turkey after the earthquakes can be analyzed, the role of civil initiatives, is to provide an avenue for citizen participation. Civil initiatives-associations, foundations, professional organizations, international organizations, and community-based organizations, have a special ability to reach individuals, ordinary people in their homes. They were able to go to tent to tent and ask questions, and talk to people after the Marmara earthquakes. This gave them an

opportunity to identify and address areas that are missed by the governments. They were providing some food assistance to the people in the tent cities, and they discovered that survivors were having some health problems. Further, survivors were complaining of sanitation and civil initiatives were able to address that problem because they were there on site. So very small, but they were able to address individual needs. They can attend immediate needs and provide short and long term solutions. In short, if they can identify the need, then they can provide assistance very quickly.

Furthermore, the Marmara earthquake of August 1999 demonstrated that there were significant shortcomings in earthquake mitigation and preparedness measures. Due to the extensive damage and the fact that the quake affected a very large area, the response of the government in the immediate post disaster phase was slow and uncoordinated. However, civil initiatives were very rapid in their responses, and numerous civil initiatives were involved in the rescue phase and thereafter. Unfortunately, the civil initiatives were also not prepared for such a disaster, and thus their efforts were not coordinated. This recent earthquake once again pointed out the necessity of increasing community involvement in disaster management and creating collaborative alliances among local governmental bodies, municipality, the private sector, and the civil initiatives.

The establishment of the Emergency Management General Directorate under the Prime Ministry and the Earthquake Master Plan of Istanbul are positive steps taken towards this end. Further, the new draft of law, which is not in force for the present, could be a tool for creating capacities to accommodate civil initiatives at disaster management system. Moreover, Istanbul Earthquake Master Plan also stresses the involvement and participation of civil society, in its practical recommendations.

Another question is how the actual development of the legal system will proceed. In addition to all of these, the planned reforms strongly depend on reforms also in other sub-systems, such as education.

To sum up, there are three important consequence can be identified at the end of this thesis;

- First of all, a number of creative activities of civil initiatives can be observed after the Marmara earthquakes. These include community-based disaster management; socio-economic projects to reduce the people's vulnerability; capacity building through training, and small-scale infrastructural measures.
- Still, the existing level of work is inadequate in the name of civil initiatives especially in collaboration with governmental organizations, considering the magnitude of disasters taking place in the country and the degree of the people's vulnerability. As suggested at Chapter 5, some changes should be made in legal provisions to create capacity for civil initiatives.
- With increasing conviction in the need for participatory approaches and people-oriented development, civil initiatives are committed to facing the challenges in mitigating and preparing for the variety of disasters facing the Turkey.

The discussion for the Turkey disaster management system may sum up that there have been changes, both in the Turkish disaster management system. One change is the state's admission of human influence on vulnerability and measures to make individuals accountable for technical failure. Another one is the emergence of a non-governmental disaster management.

There is no doubt that the civil initiatives are enriching Turkey's disaster management. They have themselves no ambitions of being political, but aim solely at reducing losses in future disasters. And although they could, in my opinion, be more conscious about their role in the public discourse, they do certainly fill a void in the disaster management system.

To sum up, they may very well have a positive long-term effect on civil society, through raising awareness about the environment and decreasing the public's dependency on the state in future emergencies.

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## APPENDIX

### TÜRKİYE ACIL DURUM YÖNETİMİ GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ'NİN KURULUŞ VE GÖREVLERİ HAKKINDA KANUN TASARISI TASLAĞI

#### BİRİNCİ BÖLÜM

##### Amaç, Kapsam, Tanımlar ve Görevler

###### Amaç:

**MADDE 1-** Bu Kanunun amacı; Türkiye’de Acil Durum Yönetim Sisteminin kurulmasını sağlamaktır.

###### Kapsam:

**MADDE 2-** Bu Kanun; Ülke güvenliğini ve halkın huzurunu etkileyecek ölçekteki doğal ve insan kaynaklı afetler, iltica ve nüfus hareketleri, iç tehdit, dış tehdit, ağır ekonomik bunalım, tehlikeli hastalıklar gibi normal durumdan seferberlik ve savaş hali durumuna kadar olan her türlü olağan dışı olayla ilgili acil durum yönetiminin ülke düzeyinde etkin bir şekilde gerçekleştirilmesi için gerekli önlemleri almak ve acil durum yönetimini gerektiren olayların meydana gelmesinden önce hazırlık ve zarar azaltma, olay sırasında yapılacak müdahale ve olay sonrasında gerçekleştirilecek iyileştirme çalışmalarını yürüten kurum ve kuruluşlar arasında koordinasyonu sağlamak, bu alanda ülke düzeyinde standartların belirlenmesini, denetlenmesini, kaynak temini ve dağıtımını gerçekleştirmek ve itfaiye hizmetlerini düzenlemek, bu konularda ilgili bakanlık kamu ve özel kurum ve kuruluşlarının, mahalli idarelerin, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının ve vatandaşların görev, yetki ve sorumlulukları ile işbirliği ve koordinasyon esaslarını belirlemek, uluslararası ilişkileri, insani yardımları düzenlemek, sivil asker işbirliği esaslarını belirlemek ve uygulamak, bu konularda politikalar üretmek ve uygulanması hususlarını kapsar.



**Tanımlar:**

**MADDE 3 -** Bu Kanunda geçen:

**Genel Sekreterlik:** Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterliğini,

**Genel Sekreter:** Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterini,

**Acil Durum:** Gerçekleşmiş veya gerçekleşmesi muhtemel, belli bir zaman dilimi içinde yoğunlaşmış toplumun genelini veya belli kesimlerinin ciddi anlamda tehlikeye maruz kaldığı, toplumun temel fonksiyonlarının engellendiği ve sosyal yapının bozulduğu, kontrol edilemeyen, normal durumdan seferberlik ve savaş hali durumuna kadar olan her türlü olağan dışı olayları,

**Acil Durum Yönetim Merkezi:** Acil duruma müdahalenin koordine edildiği, çekirdek kadro personel ile haberleşme ve bilgi sisteminin devamlı işler halde tutulduğu merkezi,

**Akreditasyon:** Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterliğinin koordinasyonu altında çalışılabileceğine dair Kabul ve kayıt altına alınması,

**Zarar Azaltma:** Acil durumların verebileceği muhtemel zararların tamamen yok edilmesi veya azaltılmasına yönelik alınan tedbirleri,

**Hazırlık:** Acil durumlara etkin bir müdahale amacıyla önceden yapılan her türlü faaliyeti,

**Müdahale:** Acil durumun meydana gelmesi ile birlikte, acele olarak yapılan, can ve mal kurtarmaya, acil sağlık, acil barınma ve iaşeye yönelik yapılan her türlü çalışmayı,

**İyileştirme:** Acil durum sebebiyle bozulan sosyal hayatın asgari seviyede yeniden tesis edilmesini, ifade eder.

**Görevler:**

**MADDE 4–** Türkiye Acil Durumu Yönetimi Genel Sekreterliğinin görevleri şunlardır:

lke genelinde acil durum ynetimini gerekleřtirmek, bu konu ile ilgili teřkilatlanmayı yapmak, bakanlıklar, kamu ve zel kurum ve kuruluřlar, mahalli idareler ile sivil toplum kuruluřları arasında koordine ve iřbirlięini saęlamak.

Acil durum ynetiminin etkin bir řekilde gerekleřtirilmesi amacıyla Bařbakanlık Acil Durum Ynetim Merkezini kurmak ve iřletmek, lke genelinde acil durum ynetimi merkezlerinin kurulması ve yaygınlařtırılmasını saęlamak, standartlarını belirlemek, bu merkezler arasında koordinasyonu gerekleřtirmek ve denetlemek.

Acil durum ynetimi gerektirecek olayların nlenmesi ve zararlarının azaltılması iin kurum ve kuruluřlarca gerekli nlemlerin alınmasını, kısa ve uzun vadeli planların hazırlanmasını saęlamak, ulusal acil durum ynetimi stratejik planını yapmak. Hazırlık faaliyetlerini koordine etmek.

İyileřtirme faaliyetlerini koordine etmek.

Acil durum ynetimi iin stratejik kaynak envanteri sisteminin kurulmasını, gncel olarak tutulmasını saęlamak, izlemek ve deęerlendirmek.

Acil durumlara mdahale anında ihtiya duyulan, zel ve resmi her trl kaynakların tahsisini ve kullanılmasını saęlamak.

Kaynak temini, daęıtımı ve lke genelinde kullanılan tm kaynakların bilgi envanterini tutmak.

Tehlike ve risk analizlerinin yapılmasını saęlamak.

Acil durum gnllleri ve sivil toplum kuruluřları iin zendirici dzenlemeleri ve akreditasyon yapmak.

Acil durumlara ilgili her trl yardım malzemelerinin teslim alınmasını, korunmasını ve ihtiya noktalarına sevk edilmesinde koordinasyonu saęlamak, gerektięinde ulusal ve uluslararası yardım kampanyaları amak, ulusal ve uluslararası insani yardım faaliyetlerini icra etmek veya ettirmek.

Faaliyet konuları ile ilgili uluslararası iřbirlięi ve koordinasyon yapmak.

Acil durum ile ilgili eęitimleri yapmak veya yaptırmak.

Acil durumlara ilgili kullanılacak kayıt standartlarını belirlemek.

Ülke çapında bina yapım kodları, inşaat malzemeleri ile iş gücü niteliklerini belirleyecek bağımsız kurulların sekreteryasını oluşturmak ve uygulamaları takip etmek

İtfaiyeye ait standartları belirlemek, itfaiye hizmetlerinin desteklenmesi ve denetlenmesi ile ilgili düzenlemeler yapmak.

Acil durum ve itfaiye eğitimi vermek amacıyla eğitim kurumları açmak, işletmek ve bu eğitimi veren diğer kurumların akreditasyonunu sağlamak ve teşvik etmek.

Acil durumlara ilişkin Sivil-Asker işbirliğini düzenlemek ve yürütmek.

Acil durumlara ilişkin olarak bilimsel, teknik ve idari çalışmalarda bulunmak üzere sürekli veya geçici kurullar oluşturmak.

Halkın bilinçlendirilmesi amacıyla gerekli çalışmaları yapmak ve yaptırmak.

Acil durumlarda toplumun bilgilendirilmesi için gerekli tedbirleri almak.

Ulusal boyutta acil durumlara ilişkin sigortacılık hizmetlerini yürütmek.

İyileştirme hizmetleri kapsamında halka ve kamu kuruluşlarına gerekli desteği vermek.

Acil durumlara ilişkin her türlü kamu kaynağının kullanılmasında gerekli koordinasyonu yapmak.

Başbakan tarafından verilecek görevleri yapmak,

## **İKİNCİ BÖLÜM**

### **Genel Sekreterlik Teşkilatı**

#### **Teşkilat:**

**MADDE 5–** Başbakana bağlı, tüzel kişiliğe haiz, müstakil bütçeli, Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterliği kurulmuştur.

Genel Sekreterlik, Merkez ve Bölge Teşkilatları ile Danışma Kurullarından oluşur.

**MADDE 6–** Merkez Teşkilatı: Genel Sekreter, Genel Sekreterlik Bürosu ile Ana Hizmet Birimlerinden oluşur.

**MADDE 7-**Ana Hizmet Birimleri Genel Sekreterin teklifi ve Başbakanın onayı ile kurulup kaldırılabilir.

**MADDE 8-**Ana Hizmet Birimleri dışında gerekli görüldüğünde görevleri ve hizmet süreleri belirtilmek kaydıyla Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterinin teklifi ve Başbakanın onayı ile geçici hizmet birimleri, Genel Sekreterlik Teşkilatı içinde veya dışında özel eğitim, planlama ve uygulama birimleri kurulabilir. Bunların hizmet ve çalışma sürelerinin uzatılması aynı usule bağlıdır. Genel Sekreterlik birimlerinin kuruluş, görev ve yetkileri ile diğer hususlar yönetmelikle düzenlenir.

Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterlik Teşkilatı ek (1) sayılı cetvelde gösterilmiştir.

**Genel Sekreter:**

**MADDE 9-** Genel Sekreter, Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterliğinin en üst amiri olup Genel Sekreterlik hizmetlerini mevzuat hükümlerine, Genel Sekreterliğin amaç ve politikalarına, stratejik planlama, performans ölçütlerine, hizmet kalite ve standartlarına uygun olarak yürütür.

Genel Sekreter, bu Kanunda belirtilen hizmetlerin yürütülmesinden Başbakana karşı sorumludur.

**Genel Sekreterlik Bürosu:**

**MADDE 10-** Genel Sekreterlik Bürosu; Özel Kalem, Hukuk Müşavirliği, İnsan Kaynakları ve Destek Hizmetleri ile Basın ve Halkla İlişkiler birimlerinden oluşur.

**Özel Kalem Müdürlüğü:**

**MADDE 11-** Özel Kalem Müdürlüğünün görevleri şunlardır:

Genel Sekreterliğin resmi ve özel yazışmalarını yürütmek,

Her türlü protokol ve tören işlerini düzenlemek ve yürütmek,

Ziyaret, davet, karşılama, uğurlama ve ağırlama hizmetlerini düzenlemek, yürütmek ve diğer kuruluşlarla koordine etmek.

## **Hukuk Müşavirliği**

**MADDE 12** – Hukuk Müşavirliğinin görevleri şunlardır:

- a) Başbakanlık, bakanlıklar, diğer kamu kurum ve kuruluşları ile Genel Sekreterlik birimlerinden gönderilen kanun, tüzük, ve yönetmelik taslakları ile diğer hukuki konular hakkında görüş bildirmek.
- b) Genel Sekreterliğin menfaatlerini koruyucu, anlaşmazlıkları önleyici hukuki tedbirleri zamanında almak, anlaşma ve sözleşmelerin bu esaslara uygun olarak yapılmasına yardımcı olmak.
- c) 8.1.1943 tarihli ve 4353 sayılı Kanun hükümlerine göre adli ve idari davalarda gerekli bilgileri hazırlamak, taraf olduğu idari davalarda Genel Sekreterliği temsil etmek veya Genel Sekreterlikçe hizmet satın alma yoluyla temsil ettirilen davaları takip ve koordine etmek.
- d) Ülke genelinde acil durum hizmetlerinden eşit olarak faydalanılabilmesi için gerekli tedbirleri almak.
- e) Genel Sekreterin vereceği diğer görevleri yapmak.

## **İnsan Kaynakları ve Destek Hizmetleri Başkanlığı**

**MADDE 13-** İnsan Kaynakları ve Destek Hizmetleri Başkanlığının görevleri şunlardır:

Genel Sekreterliğin insan gücü planlamasını yapmak.

Personelin atama, nakil, sicil, terfi, ücret, sağlık, emeklilik ve benzeri özlük işlemlerini yürütmek.

Genel Sekreterliğin yapım, satın alma, kiralama, bakım ve onarım, arşiv ve benzeri her türlü idari ve mali hizmetleri yürütmek.

Taşınır ve taşınmaz mal kayıtlarını tutmak.

Genel Sekreterliğe ait bina ve tesislerin güvenliğini sağlamak

Genel Sekreterin vereceği diğer görevleri yapmak

### **Danışma Kurulları:**

**MADDE 14-** Genel Sekreterlik, acil durumlara ilişkin olarak bilimsel, teknik ve idari çalışmalarda bulunmak üzere sürekli veya geçici kurullar oluşturabilir. Kurul üyelerine Başbakan onayı ile belirlenecek miktarda huzur hakkı ödenebilir.

### **Ana Hizmet Birimleri:**

**MADDE 15-** Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterliğinin ana hizmet birimleri şunlardır.

Zarar Azaltma ve Sigorta Başkanlığı,

Hazırlık ve İyileştirme Başkanlığı,

Müdahale ve Acil Durum Yönetim Merkezi Başkanlığı,

İtfaiye Hizmetleri Başkanlığı,

Eğitim, Tatbikat Hizmetleri ve Standartlar Başkanlığı,

Uluslararası ve Sivil Toplum İlişkileri Başkanlığı,

Stratejik Planlama, Değerlendirme ve Bilgi Teknolojileri Başkanlığı,

Kaynak Planlaması ve Yönetimi Başkanlığı,

Güvenlik ve Sivil-Asker İşbirliği Başkanlığı,

### **Zarar Azaltma ve Sigorta Başkanlığı**

**MADDE 16-** Zarar Azaltma ve Sigorta Başkanlığının görevleri şunlardır:

Meydana gelebilecek acil durumların zararlarının azaltılması için gerekli tedbirleri tespit etmek ve alınmasını sağlamak.

Acil durumlara yönelik sigorta hizmetlerini yapmak.

Genel Sekreterin vereceği diğer görevleri yapmak.

### **Hazırlık ve İyileştirme Başkanlığı**

**MADDE 17-** Hazırlık ve İyileştirme Başkanlığının görevleri şunlardır:

Meydana gelebilecek acil durumlara müdahale amacıyla gerekli tedbirlerin tespiti ve alınmasını sağlamak.

Meydana gelen acil durumlardan sonra hayatın normale dönmesini sağlamak için gerekli tedbirleri tespit etmek ve alınmasının sağlamak.

Genel Sekreterin vereceği diğer görevleri yapmak.

### **Müdahale ve Acil Durum Yönetim Merkezi Başkanlığı**

**MADDE 18-** Müdahale ve Acil Durum Yönetim Merkezi Başkanlığının görevleri şunlardır:

Meydana gelen acil durum esnasında devlete, özel kişi ve kuruluşlara ait her türlü imkan ve kabiliyetleri kullanarak acil durumun ortadan kalkması için her türlü tedbirin tespiti ve alınmasını sağlamak.

Acil durumun ortadan kaldırılması için ulusal ve uluslararası her türlü kaynağı değerlendirmek.

Acil durum yönetimine müdahale amacıyla merkezde Acil Durum Yönetim Merkezinin 24 saat esasına göre çalışmasını sağlamak.

Bakanlıklarda ve kamu kurum ve kuruluşları ile illerde Valiye bağlı acil durum merkezlerinin açılması ve işletilmesini sağlamak.

Bu merkezler arasında gerekli koordinasyonu sağlamak amacıyla; ortak haberleşme ve bilgi sistemleri alt yapısının kurulması ve işletilmesi için her türlü tedbiri almak.

Genel Sekreterin vereceği diğer görevleri yapmak.

### **İtfaiye Hizmetleri Başkanlığı**

**MADDE 19-** İtfaiye Hizmetleri Başkanlığının görevleri şunlardır:

Ülke genelinde itfaiye hizmetlerinin standartlarını belirlemek, itfaiye hizmetlerinin desteklenmesi ve denetlenmesi ile ilgili düzenlemeler yapmak.

Gönüllü itfaiyeciliğin kurulması ve yürütülmesi konusunda gerekli tedbirleri almak.

c) Genel Sekreterlik adına arama kurtarma hizmeti verecek İtfaiyelerle ilgili il özel idareleri, belediyeler, diğer kurum ve kuruluşlarıyla işbirliği yapmak.

Genel Sekreterin vereceđi diđer görevleri yapmak.

### **Eđitim, Tatbikat Hizmetleri ve Standartlar Bařkanlıđı**

**MADDE 20-** Eđitim, Tatbikat Hizmetleri ve Standartlar Bařkanlıđının görevleri řunlardır:

Acil durum hizmetlerinin ve acil durum yönetim merkezlerinin standartlarını belirlemek.

Acil durum yönetimi ile ilgili merkezde, bakanlıklarda, kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarında, eđitim hizmetlerini planlamak, yapmak veya yaptırmak.

Tařrada; il özel idareleri, belediyeler, özel ve resmi kurum ve kuruluşlarda eđitim hizmetlerinin standartlara göre yapılması için gerekli tedbirleri almak.

Özel kiři ve kuruluşların yeterli eđitim alabilmeleri ve halkın bilinçlendirilmesi için gerekli tedbirleri almak.

Acil durumlara ilgili tatbikat yapmak veya yaptırmak.

Acil durumlara ilgili standartlara uygunluk denetimini yapmak.

Genel Sekreterin vereceđi diđer görevleri yapmak

### **Uluslararası ve Sivil Toplum İliřkileri Bařkanlıđı**

**MADDE 21-**Uluslararası ve Sivil Toplum İliřkileri Bařkanlıđının görevleri řunlardır:

Acil durum yönetimi ile ilgili konularda ikili, bölgesel ve çok taraflı uluslararası işbirliđi ve antlaşmalar yapmak, eđitim ve tatbikatlar düzenlemek, uluslararası insani yardım faaliyetleri ve bađış organizasyonları yapmak.

Sivil toplum kuruluşları ile gönüllü kiřilerin acil durum yönetimi ile ilgili akreditasyonu yapmak.

Genel Sekreterin vereceđi diđer görevleri yapmak.

### **Stratejik Planlama, Deđerlendirme ve Bilgi Teknolojileri Bařkanlıđı**

**MADDE 22-** Stratejik Planlama, Deđerlendirme ve Bilgi Teknolojileri Bařkanlıđının görevleri řunlardır:



Acil durum yönetiminin uygulanmasını ve gelişmesini sağlamak amacıyla strateji geliştirmek.

Ülkede her kademede alınan acil durum yönetimi tedbirlerinin belirlenen stratejiye uygun olarak gelişmesini sağlamak amacıyla her türlü teşvik edici tedbirleri almak ve denetlemek.

Ulusal boyutta acil durumlarda kullanılacak olan bilgi ve haberleşme sistemlerinin standardizasyonunu sağlamak amacıyla gerekli tedbirleri almak.

Genel Sekreterin vereceği diğer görevleri yapmak

### **Kaynak Planlaması ve Yönetimi Başkanlığı**

**MADDE 23-** Kaynak Planlaması ve Yönetimi Başkanlığının görevleri şunlardır:

Acil durumlara ilgili kullanılacak her türlü kaynağın tespiti, temini ve yönetimini yapmak.

Milli kaynakların ekonomik ve etkin kullanımını sağlamak amacıyla; acil durumlara yönelik yapılacak kamu yatırımlarını, personel istihdamını planlamak ve koordine etmek.

Genel Sekreterin vereceği diğer görevleri yapmak.

### **Güvenlik ve Sivil-Asker İşbirliği Başkanlığı**

**MADDE 24-** Güvenlik ve Sivil-Asker İşbirliği Başkanlığının görevleri şunlardır:

Acil durum hizmetlerine yönelik güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınmasını sağlamak.

Acil durum hizmetlerinin yürütülmesi ile ilgili güvenlik kuruluşları ile işbirliği esaslarını belirlemek ve uygulanmasını sağlamak.

Acil durum hizmetlerine yeterli askeri desteği sağlamak amacıyla sivil-asker işbirliği esaslarını belirlemek ve uygulanmasını sağlamak.

Seferberlik ve savaş hazırlıkları çerçevesinde askeri makamlarca ihtiyaç duyulan sivil envanterin tespitini yaparak, güncel halde tutmak.

Genel Sekreterin vereceği diğer görevleri yapmak.

## ÜÇÜNCÜ BÖLÜM

### Sorumluluk ve Yetkiler

#### Yöneticilerin Sorumlulukları:

**MADDE 25-** Acil durum yönetimine ait her türlü tedbirin alınması hakkında merkezde Başbakan ve Bakanlar ile kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarının en üst amirleri; illerde valiler, ilçelerde kaymakamlar, belediyelerde belediye başkanları ile merkezi hükümetin taşra teşkilatında en üst amir şahsen yetkili ve sorumludur. Özel kuruluşlarda bu tedbirleri almaktan, bu kuruluşların sahipleri şahsen yetkili ve sorumludur.

Bu hizmetlerin yürütülmesi ve tedbirlerin alınması için yöneticiler ve kuruluş sahipleri acil durum danışmanı veya danışmanları istihdam edebilirler, bu danışmanlara veya başkalarına bu yetkiler devredilebilir, sorumluluklar devredilemez.

**MADDE 26-** Genel Sekreter, ülke düzeyinde acil durum yönetimi hizmetlerini yürütmekten Başbakana karşı sorumludur.

**MADDE 27-** Genel Sekreter, Genel Sekreterliğin tüm birimleri arasında koordinasyonu sağlamaktan ve Genel Sekreterliğin iyi işlemesinden sorumludur.

Genel Sekreterliğin her kademedeki yöneticileri, yapmakla yükümlü oldukları hizmet ve görevleri, Genel Sekreterin emir ve direktifleri doğrultusunda mevzuat hükümlerine, Genel Sekreterliğin amaçlarına, stratejik planlama, performans ölçütlerine ve hizmet kalite standartlarına uygun olarak yürütmekten bir üst kademeye karşı sorumludur.

#### Koordinasyon ve İşbirliği:

**MADDE 28 –** Genel Sekreterlik; ana hizmet ve görevleriyle ilgili konularda Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, bakanlıklar, kamu kurum ve kuruluşları, üniversiteler, yerel yönetimler, sivil toplum kuruluşları ve özel sektör ile işbirliği ve koordinasyon sağlamakla yetkili ve sorumludur.

### **Yetki Devri:**

**MADDE 29-** Genel Sekreter ve her kademedeki Genel Sekreterlik yöneticileri, sınırlarını yazılı olarak açıkça belirtmek şartıyla yetkilerinden bir kısmını astlarına devredebilir. Yetki devri, yetki devreden amirin sorumluluğunu kaldırmaz.

## **DÖRDÜNCÜ BÖLÜM**

### **Çeşitli Hükümler**

#### **Atama:**

**MADDE 30-** Genel Sekreter Bakanlar Kurulu Kararı ile atanır. Genel Sekreterlik teşkilatında görev alacak personel;

Genel Sekreterlik kadrolarına atanacaklardan,

Sözleşmeli personelden,

Silahlı kuvvetlerden Genel Sekreterlikte görevlendirileceklerden,

160 sayılı Devlet Personel Dairesi Kurulması Hakkında Kanunun 4 üncü maddesi kapsamına giren kurum ve kuruluşların personelinden, Genel Sekreterin teklifi ve Başbakanın onayı ile görevlendirileceklerden, oluşur.

Genel Sekreterlikte birinci derece kadrolara Genel Sekreterin inhası üzerine ortak kararlar, 2-4 üncü derece kadrolara Genel Sekreterin teklifi Başbakanın onayı ile, 5-15 inci derece kadrolara Genel Sekreterin onayı ile atama yapılır.

Genel Sekreterlik kadrolarında görevli personelin diğer kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarına atanmasına ihtiyaç duyulması halinde atamaya ilişkin talep Başbakanlığa bildirilir. Başbakanlık bunların atanacakları kurum ve kuruluşları tespit eder. İlgili kurum ve kuruluşlar atama işlemlerini genel hükümlere göre yaparlar.

### **Özel Hükümler**

**MADDE 31-** Genel Sekreterlik personeli aşağıdaki özel hükümler dışında 657 sayılı Devlet Memurları Kanununa tabidir.

Genel Sekreterliğin kadroları, genel hükümlere uygun olarak tespit edilen ek göstergeleri ile birlikte Genel Sekreterin teklifi ve Başbakanın onayı ile ihdas edilir veya kaldırılır.

657 sayılı Devlet Memurları Kanununa 31/7/1970 tarih ve 1327 sayılı Kanunla eklenen zam ve tazminatlara ilişkin ek madde gereğince, Genel Sekreterlik personelinin görev ve kadro unvanları esas alınarak kimlere ne oranda ödeme yapılacağı; tespit olunan azami miktar ve oranları geçmemek üzere Genel Sekreterin teklifi ve Başbakanın onayı ile belirlenir.

160 sayılı Devlet Personel Dairesi Kurulması Hakkında Kanununun 4 üncü maddesi kapsamına giren kurum ve kuruluşların personelinden çalıştırılmalarına ihtiyaç duyulanlar, esas görevlerine ait bütün hakları saklı kalmak, aylık ve diğer özlük haklarını da bağlı buldukları yerlerden almak ve disiplin, izin ve sicil bakımından Genel Sekreterliğe bağlı bulunmak şartıyla Başbakan tarafından gerekli görüldüğü sürece Genel Sekreterlikte çalıştırılabilir.

Genel Sekreterlikte görevlendirilen personelden, kendi kurumlarından aldıkları zam ve tazminatlar toplamı, Genel Sekreterlikçe yapılan ödemelerden az olduğu takdirde aradaki fark Genel Sekreterlik bütçesinden tazminat olarak ödenir.

Genel Sekreterlikte çalıştırılacak sözleşmeli personelde 657 sayılı Devlet Memurları Kanununun 4 üncü maddesindeki şartlar aranmaz. Bunların istihdam şekli, sözleşme esasları, Bakanlar Kurulunca tespit edilecek tavanı aşmamak üzere alacakları en az ve en çok ücretleri ile sosyal haklarına ait esaslar çıkarılacak yönetmelikle düzenlenir. Sözleşme ile çalıştırılacak personel, istekleri üzerine T.C. Emekli Sandığı ile ilgilendirilir.

Genel Sekreterlik personelinin Genel Sekreterin teklifi ve Başbakanın onayı ile gerekli görülenlere 657 sayılı Devlet Memurları Kanunu gereğince giyecek yardımı yapılır.

### **Yurtdışına Gönderilecek Personel**

**MADDE 32-** Genel Sekreterlik, Genel Sekreterlikte görevli elemanları ile acil durum hizmetlerinde çalıştırılacak diğer kişileri uzmanlık alanlarındaki mesleki bilgi ve

tecrübelerini geliřtirmek ve/veya ihtisas yapmak üzere 657 Sayılı Kanundaki kısıtlamalara tabi olmadan yurt dıřına gönderebilir.

#### **Yönetmelik:**

**MADDE 33** – Bu Kanunun uygulanmasına iliřkin usul ve esaslar ilgili kuruluřların görüşleri alınarak Genel Sekreterlik tarafından çıkarılacak yönetmeliklerle düzenlenir.

#### **Sözleşme ile Arařtırma, Etüt ve Proje Yaptırma:**

**MADDE 34-** Genel Sekreterlik görevleri ile ilgili olarak ihtiyaç duyduđu konularda arařtırma, etüt, projeler ve uluslar arası ikili ve çok taraflı temas ve toplantılar düzenleme ve bunlarla ilgili her türlü mal ve hizmetlerin sağlanması gibi işleri yerli ve yabancı gerçek ve tüzel kişilere sözleşme veya pazarlık sureti ile yaptırabilir ve bu konularla ilgili mal ve hizmet satın alabilir.

Bu hususta 4734 sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu hükümleri uygulanmaz.

#### **Kaynak Yönetimi:**

**MADDE 35-** Genel bütçeli idarelerin acil durum yönetimi ile ilgili genel bütçeden yapacakları her türlü yatırımlar Genel Sekreterlikçe koordine edilir. Özel bütçeli kuruluşlar ile mahalli idareler bütçelerinden her yıl Genel Sekreterlikçe belirlenecek esaslar ve oranlarda acil durum yönetimi hizmetleri ile ilgili pay ayrılır.

Acil Destek Programı, Sivil Savunma Fonu ile Afet Fonuna ait kaynaklar, acil durum yönetimi ile ilgili işler için belirlenecek esaslar çerçevesinde Genel Sekreterlikçe tahsis edilir.

Bu fonlardan ihtiyaç duyulan kısmı zarar azaltma, hazırlık, müdahale, iyileřtirme çalışmaları ile denetim ve koordinasyon faaliyetleri için doğrudan Genel Sekreterlikçe kullanılır. Genel Sekreterliğin uygun göreceđi oranda bütçeye aktarılır.

#### **Görevlendirme:**

**MADDE 36-** Genel Sekreterlik, acil durumlara iliřkin olarak bilimsel, teknik ve idari çalışmalarda bulunmak üzere sürekli veya geçici kurullar oluşturabilir. Kurul Üyelerine Başbakan onayı ile belirlenecek miktarda huzur hakkı ödenir.

Acil durum yönetiminin gerektirdiđi hallerde, kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarına Başbakanlık tarafından verilecek görevlerin gerektirdiđi kaynak Genel Sekreterlikçe karşılanabilir ve Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterliđi ile söz konusu kurum ve kuruluşlar, ücret ve adedi Başbakan onayı ile belirlenecek miktarda geçici işçi ve personel çalıştırabilir ve hizmet satın alabilirler. Kamu kurum ve kuruluşlarının bu kapsamda yapacakları harcamalar 1050 sayılı Muhasebei Umumiye Kanunu, 4734 sayılı Kamu İhale Kanunu ve 832 sayılı Sayıştay Kanunu ile 19/6/1994 tarihli ve 540 sayılı Kanun Hükmünde Kararname hükümlerine tabi değildir.

**Yürürlükten Kaldırılan Hükümler:**

**MADDE 37** – 15/11/1999 tarihli ve 583 sayılı Kanun Hükmünde kararname ile 18/5/2000 tarihli ve 600 sayılı Kanun Hükmünde kararname yürürlükten kaldırılmıştır.

**GEÇİCİ MADDE 1** – Ekli (1) sayılı listede yer alan kadrolar ihdas edilerek 190 sayılı Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamenin eki (I) sayılı cetvele “Türkiye Acil Durum Yönetimi Genel Sekreterliđi” bölümü olarak eklenmiştir.

**GEÇİCİ MADDE 2** - Geçici birinci maddede belirtilen yasal düzenlemeler yapıncaya kadar yürürlükteki mevzuat hükümlerinin uygulanmasına devam olunur.

(Geçici Ek Madde: İl Özel İdareleri ve Belediyelerde Acil Durum Merkezleri kurulur)

**GEÇİCİ MADDE 3** –Bu Kanunun yürürlüđe girmesinden sonra, çıkarılacak acil durum hallerinde uygulanacak esaslara dair kanun yürürlüđe girinceye kadar 2935 sayılı kanun, 7126 sayılı kanun, 7269 sayılı ve diđer kanunlarda acil durum yönetimiyle ilgili ulusal koordinasyona yönelik tüm yetkiler acil durum genel sekreterliđince kullanılır.

## **BEŐİNCİ BÖLÜM**

### **Yürürlük ve Yürütme**

#### **Yürürlük:**

**MADDE 38** - Bu Kanun yayımı ..... Tarihinde yürürlüğe girer.

#### **Yürütme:**

**MADDE 39** - Bu Kanun hükümlerini Bakanlar Kurulu yürütür.

## **EK- (I) SAYILI CETVEL**

### **TÜRKİYE ACİL DURUM YÖNETİMİ GENEL SEKRETERLİĞİ**

#### **TEŞKİLAT YAPISI**

Genel Sekreter	Ana Hizmet Birimleri	Genel Sekreterlik Bürosu
Genel Sekreter	1.Zarar Azaltma ve Sigorta Başkanlığı	1.Hukuk Müşavirliği
	2.Hazırlık ve İyileştirme Başkanlığı	2.İnsan Kaynakları ve Destek Hizmetleri
	3.Müdahale ve Acil Durum Yönetim Merkezi	3.Genel Sekreter Danışmanı
	4.İtfaiye Hizmetleri Başkanlığı	4.Özel Kalem Müdürlüğü
	5.Eğitim Tatbikat Hizmetleri Ve Standartlar Başkanlığı	5.Basın Müşavirliği
	6.Uluslararası ve Sivil Toplum İlişkileri Başkanlığı	
	7.Stratejik Planlama, Değerlendirme Ve Bilgi Teknolojileri Başkanlığı	
	8.Kaynak Planlaması ve Yönetimi Başkanlığı	
	9.Güvenlik ve Sivil-Asker İşbirliği Başkanlığı	