

GERMAN IDEAS AND EXPECTATIONS
ON EXPANSION IN THE NEAR EAST
(1890-1915)

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyses the peculiarities of German imperialism in the Near East. The economic aspect of German imperialist policy is reflected in the Baghdad Railway Project, and the political aspect in the German support for pan-Islamism. In this thesis, it is argued that both of these policies were dominated by an anti-colonialist discourse, which formed the distinct nature of German imperialism in the Near East. In order to prove this argument, the works of advocates of German expansion in the Near East has been analysed as the main sourced of influence on the German public opinion.

Keywords: German imperialism, Near East, Baghdad Railway, pan-Islamism, Central Europe.

ÖZ

ALMANYA’NIN YAKIN DOĞU’YA YAYILIŞI ÜSTÜNE DÜŞÜNCELER VE BEKLENTİLER (1890-1915)

Deren, Seçil

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu çalışmada Yakın Doğu’yu hedefleyen Alman emperyalizminin nitelikleri incelenmiştir. Almanya’nın Yakın Doğu’ya yönelik emperyalist politikalarının ekonomik yönünü Bağdat Demiryolu Projesi, siyasal yönü ise pan-İslam akımının desteklenmesi oluşturmuştur. Bu çalışmada, her iki siyasette de kolonyalizm karşıtı bir söylemin hakim olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu iddiayı kanıtlamak amacıyla, Alman kamuoyunda en temel etki kaynakları oldukları için Alman emperyalizminin Yakın Doğu’ya yayılmasını destekleyen yazarların eserleri incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Alman emperyalizmi, Yakın Doğu, Bağdat demiryolu, Doğu Sorunu, pan-İslamizm, Orta Avrupa

To My Parents

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study delves in the peculiarities of German imperialist expansion to the Near East. It is based on the assumption that German imperialism was not colonialist. The non-colonialist character of German imperialism is observed in its expansion in the Near East. In order to define the non-colonialist characteristic of German imperialism, this research focuses on the public discourse of its advocates. With this study, I demonstrate that the propaganda on German-Turkish brotherhood was a product of German liberalism, not German colonialist imperialism in disguise.

European overseas expansion had begun in the 15th century. However, the nature of this expansion changed radically in the 19th century as Britain started to establish her colonial empire. At the last quarter of the 19th century, as more European nations achieved industrial development, the manufacturers,

merchants and financiers were forced to expand their activities to the less developed regions in order to dispose their economic resources profitably, and in due course, they were more and more tempted to resort to their governments to secure their overseas interests. This growing demand for foreign markets for manufacturers and for investments entailed the emergence of imperialism (Hobson, 1948; Landes, 1961). In its course of expansion, imperialism transformed and dominated the economy, politics and culture of target countries by integrating their financial and productive structures into international capitalist system.

19th century imperialism is often associated with colonialism. This association is rooted in the example of Great Britain, the leader of colonial expansion. However, as the scholarly discussions of the 1970s showed, it was possible to describe a number of different versions of imperialism. Depending on the economic structure of the imperialist country, different policies and methods of imperialism were pursued with peculiar political outcomes. In this sense, according to a basic classification, formal imperialism referred to territorial control based on mercantilism, that is, colonialism, whereas informal imperialism was based on economic penetration into undeveloped regions. The latter was pursued by export-oriented (including the export of capital) economies of industrialized countries. This version of imperialism preferred the political independence of the target country and the formation of economic region. Briefly, formal and informal imperialism are represented by British and German methods respectively by the end of the 19th century.

In Marxist interpretation of imperialism, these versions do not mean much difference, because both mean the expansion of capitalist relationships through imperialist supremacy. According to Lenin (1917), the rise of monopoly capitalism only added the motives of finance capital to the numerous old motives of colonial policy. The motives of finance capital were the struggle for sources of raw materials, for the export of capital and for spheres of influence, which were manifested in concessions and economic territories.

The Nazi aggression during the Second World War begun is seen as a particularly evil example of European imperialism. Mainstream Marxist literature tended to see German imperialism before the First World War as the antecedent of National Socialism, implying that the imperialist policy of Wilhelmine Germany was characterized by Pan-Germanism. Pan-Germanism, in this sense, was associated with Germany's claims for "place in the sun" and *Drang nach Osten*, that is, drive to the East. Accordingly, Pan-German plans of population export to Slavic lands, Asia Minor and Mesopotamia were brought up as evidence for German intentions of colonisation in the Ottoman lands. Although Pan-German publicists showed Ottoman territory as target to formal German imperialist expansion in the mid-19th century as illustrated in Ludwig Rofs's *Kelinasien und Deutschland* (1850), these claims did not gain ground at the level of government policy under the rule of Chancellor Bismarck, who refrained from meddling with the Eastern Question. Yet, the German settlement in Palestine has been shown as proof to the realisation of Pan-German aims.

The fact that the Palestine settlements were totally religious in nature and was based on the migration of German Jews is rarely mentioned.

Moreover, the opposition of the liberal imperialists to Pan-German settlement plans has usually been ignored. The Pan-German settlement plans on the Ottoman dominions were being severely criticized especially at the end of the century on a number of grounds. First of all, in accordance with List's ideas, critics of Pan-German plans maintained that over population problem in Germany would sort itself out in the course of industrialization. By the end of the century, there have already appeared a shortage of labour in Germany, thus arguments based on the need for population export were already losing ground, adding strength to the arguments of liberals. Secondly, population export in the form of farmer settlements meant colonization, which would cause difficulties in the relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. It was added by the advocates of German-Ottoman rapprochement that since the German settlement will be governed by German laws, it would cause great problems between the local people and the German settlers, and jeopardize the German and Ottoman relations.

The anti-colonialist discourse of German liberals was discarded by German Marxists. Rosa Luxemburg, for example, stated in 1896 that the liberal tone in the discussions on Eastern Question, stressing the need of reform in the Ottoman empire and the protection of Christians, was enabling the European powers to conceal their real interests in plunder. In similar vein, Lothar Rathman, an East German historian, described the Baghdad Railway Project as

the tool of “peaceful expansion”. The ideological discourse around the Project was supporting the independence of the countries along its route. More specifically, it held the slogan “Balkans for the Balkan people” and supported the political integrity of the Ottoman state. According to Rathman, this anti-colonialist propaganda was a sheer deception.

Contrary to the arguments of German Marxists, which maintained that the anti-colonialist discourse of German expansion served to conceal the imperialist aims, I argue that anti-colonialism was intrinsic to informal imperialism, because it was based on the establishment of foreign investment. The method was to engage in grand railway and irrigation projects credited by intensive finance under high government guarantees. The driving force of informal imperialism was high financial power, which saw independent states as the best customers. Consequently, pursuit of a policy in favour of independent states and having business with them was less costly than seeking direct political control over the targeted country.

In the period between the unification in 1870 to the onset of the Great War in 1914, German politics witnessed coexistence and rivalry between the advocates of formal and the informal imperialism. According to the German historian Wolfgang J. Mommsen’s perspective of pluralism in imperialism, different sectors of a capitalist economy do not necessarily display the same stage in the development capitalism and thus do not pursue the same imperialist goals. In deed, the differences are reflected in disparity in imperialist interest within the same national economic system, sometimes producing contradicting

imperialist discourses. Pluralist understanding of imperialism provokes the questioning of mainstream views on German imperialist discourse. Contrary to Marxist views, it brings about the existence of more than one version of imperialism prevailing in Germany from the unification to the beginning of the Great War. The perspective of coexistence of different imperialist interests challenges the claim that Pan-Germanism characterized the ideological discourse of German imperialism.

Woodruff D. Smith's research shows the different political and socioeconomic background of colonialist and liberal discourses of German imperialism. Smith maintains that imperialist discourses were a real source of political controversy due to their connection with domestic German politics. For instance, the Pan-German discourse legitimised its colonialist aims as a solution to the massive migration from Germany. In a conservative manner, it advocated the establishment of German settlement colonies overseas in the Far East, Latin America and Africa in order to protect the core of traditional German culture from the degenerating effects of industrialisation. The colonialist Pan-German discourse was contested with the liberal discourse on imperialism, which supported peaceful economic penetration. Liberal advocates of imperialism were differentiated from the pan-Germans in their trust in industrialisation and acceptance of the need for social reform it entailed. Thus, they opposed to plans of German overseas settlements.

After 1890, the liberal discourse, which advocated the economic penetration into the Near East, gained a solid ground under the leadership of

Kaiser Wilhelm II, which marked a clear change from Bismarckian politics that favoured the Pan-German circles. Economic colonialism became a significant component of official foreign policy only after Bismarck. It rested on the assumption that, to win profits in trade, German industry had to be supported by the German government, which would make political arrangements favourable to German commerce, protect German interests with political force, and prevent the exclusion of German businessmen from trading areas. It also included a desire to increase Germany's economic sphere of influence preferably in cooperation with Great Britain.

Liberal imperialist discourse was the direct descendent of economic perspective of German economist Friedrich List, who expressed the economic perspective of the new German bourgeoisie in mid-19th century. By the end of the century, his ideas appealed to a range of political groups extending from social democrats and left liberals to national liberals and Christian democrats. This renewed appeal of List's ideas was strengthened by the politics under Wilhelm II, who had close connections with the leaders of the new sections of German industry, Hanseatic commercial circles and bankers. This new political orientation crystallised in the informal imperialist policies directed towards the Near East.

German-Ottoman rapprochement at the turn of the century is always reminiscent of the Baghdad Railway Project and German support of pan-Islamism. The rapprochement had begun in the form of German military missions to the Ottoman army by mid-19th century. The most important figures

of the German military mission were Helmuth von Moltke and Colmar van der Goltz, both of which developed interesting suggestions on how to save the Ottoman state and how to secure German infiltration. Both military advisors contributed to the formation of a certain public opinion in Germany on economic potentials of the Near East. Whereas Moltke was the primary character who directed the attentions over Ottoman dominions as potential sphere for German expansion at high level politics, Goltz played a central role in the establishment of German-Ottoman alliance on the road to the Great War.

After the Berlin Treaty of 1878, the fear from Russia and the estrangement with Britain, especially after the acquisition of Egypt, slowly drove Turkey closer to Germany. Meantime, Germany was concerned about the extension of Russian influence in the South Eastern Europe, which she designed as her natural sphere of economic influence. Germany was already in naval rivalry with Britain in the North Sea. In the 1890s, the resignation of Bismarck and the domination of German politics by Kaiser Wilhelm II marked a radical change in the orientation of German imperialism. Under Kaiser's leadership, Germany sought to establish dependable and numerous connections between the Ottoman government and herself so that they would become actual political allies and that the lead in the exploitation of Ottoman resources would be granted to German finance and industry. The core of these connections became the Baghdad Railway Project. In accordance with the informal nature of German imperialism, they supported pan-Islamism as the ideology that would hold the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

In this study, I argue that the Deutsche Bank, as the financier of the Baghdad Railway Project, acted on purely economic motives as can be discerned from the negotiations with the Ottoman government. The economic nature of the bank's motives is strengthened by the continued attempts of its directors to internationalise the enterprise and to establish British collaboration until 1913. The decline of German invitations to partnership in the Baghdad Railway Company by the British and French governments forced the Deutsche Bank to undertake the Project with Austrian and Swiss partnership. Still, the attempts to internationalise the company did not stop the railway from becoming a factor in bringing about the Great War. Because the Baghdad Railway signified the dominance over the mineral and agricultural resources of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, over which the rivalry between Britain and Germany had gradually become severe since 1903.

In her imperial rivalry with Great Britain, Germany developed a peculiar political propaganda parallel to the economic penetration in the Near East, especially after the Morocco crisis in 1905. German propaganda was based on a criticism of colonialism, and thus an opposition to colonial powers like Britain and France. It was composed of two basic lines: one on the support of the idea of a smaller and stronger Turkey as part of Central European economic zone, the second on the pan-Islamic appeal as a unifying ideology within the Ottoman Empire and as the core of opposition in the British colonies. Liberal imperialism preferred to do business with an independent state. German attempts at strengthening Ottoman army, and at breaking the foreign control on

Ottoman finance employed by Public Debt Office were shaped by liberal imperialist perspective. The ideas on the political-military strengthening of the Ottoman state were also reflected in the way the question concerning the Ottoman minorities is handled. Arabs, Armenians and Balkan nationalist movements were seen as tools of British and Russian imperialism, which aimed at territorial partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. In order to prevent intervention of the Great Powers in the Ottoman affairs, German liberals recommended a smaller Turkey on Asia Minor and Mesopotamia.

German Marxist historians argued that Germany first supported Pan-Islamism as the ideology of the despotic rule of Abdülhamid II, and then Pan-Turkism as the ideology of the similarly oppressive rule of the Young Turks. German support of undemocratic governments in the Ottoman Empire was explained with the anti-democratic nature of imperialism. However, my research indicates that Germany supported pan-Islamist movements because she did not possess any colonies with Muslim population and she tried to turn this fact into her advantage by rising Muslim sentiments against British colonialism. Thus, the idea behind the German support was that pan-Islamism was the core of opposition movements against the British domination in the Middle East and India. Contrary to Marxist arguments, German propaganda for pan-Islamism was largely based on claims of national independence.

Briefly, I argue that German expansion in the Ottoman Empire is an example of informal imperialism, supported by the new sectors in German industry and propagated by the liberal publicists. In this sense, it should not be

considered as part of German *Weltpolitik*, but of *Mitteeuropapolitik*. In order to prove my point, I started with an account on German imperialism. In the first chapter of the dissertation, I dealt with the particularities of formal and informal imperialism in the German political context. I outlined the main line of argument that differentiated advocates of pan-German colonialism from advocates of liberal imperialism.

In the following chapter, I looked into the historical background of the change in German official tendency in imperialism. Here, we see two important turning points. First is the Berlin Treaty, through which Germany acquired the position of a respectable and neutral negotiator in the European balance of power. The period following the Berlin Treaty marked the estrangement of Britain from the Ottoman Empire, opening the Porte for German influence. Second point is the radical change in German foreign policy as a result of resignation of Bismarck from office in 1890. After 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm II took the lead in the determination of German imperialist direction. Kaiser's inclination in foreign affairs was marked by his visit to the Near East in 1898, during which he declared friendship with the Muslim world.

After establishing the main characteristics and tendencies of liberal imperialism in Germany, I turn to make analysis of the exemplary discourse of its advocates. I started with introducing the origin, meaning and targets of *Mitteuropa*. I continued with analysing the works of main proponents of *Mitteuropa*. *Mitteuropa* concept was developed by liberals and mainly propagated by liberal organisations and publications. Thus, my research

focused on liberal propaganda for German expansion in the Near East and I examined periodicals, books and pamphlets published between 1890-1915 dealing with German opportunities in the Near East.

I concentrated on publicly available works of German liberals. German military and economic relations with the Ottoman Empire are well documented in various works (Earle, 1966; Trumpener, 1968; Wallach, 1976; Schöllgen, 1984; Özyüksel, 1988; Barth, 1995; Ortaylı, 1998). These works concentrate on memoirs and monographs of high officials and the official archival documents. German press have been consulted only in a too limited manner as a source of quotations to illustrate points already documented. However the German press, in terms of dailies, weeklies, other periodicals together with pamphlets, was the main source of information for the Wilhelmine German public. Unlike the historians, Wilhelmine public had no access to the documents. “For up-to-date information, commentary, or speculation on the activities of their governments, they had to rely on the press, and the controversies in its columns, however uninformed or misinformed, helped shape their attitudes and reactions to current events” (Turk, 1977; 332). These publications were the main means of shaping public opinion. They are a source of information since they provide a means for understanding Turkey in historical perspective through the eyes of German publicists. They are also important in illuminating the context domestic political issues were discussed in Wilhelmine Germany. They are valuable in identifying the connections between important political positions such as the

parallelism between the demands for social reform in Germany and the informal imperialism in the form of economic penetration.

There were there basic groups that actively took part in the propaganda for German expansion in the Near East. The first group was composed of Friedrich Naumann, Paul Rohrbach, and Ernst Jäckh. They were the most committed supporter of informal imperialism. Although they differ in their definition of the characteristics of German-Ottoman relations, they agree on the necessity of it for German imperialism. They all had close and influential political connections and they acted as intermediaries between the German government, the Deutsche Bank and the German public. In this sense, I saw appropriate to add a brief analysis the views of Freiherr Colmar von der Goltz as representative of the official views and Karl Helfferich of the Deutsche Bank to highlight the similarities they had with liberal publicists.

The works of liberal publicists appeared in a number of periodicals. Naumann established *Die Hilfe* in 1894. This journal was popular among diverse sections of German society. Paul Rohrbach and Ernst Jäckh regularly contributed to Naumann's publication. They also collaborated in Hans Delbrück's *Preussische Jahrbücher*, one of the most popular periodicals of Wilhelmine Germany. Rohrbach and Jäckh edited *Größere Deutschland* and *Deutsche Politik*. Jäckh also published a bilingual journal, *Illustrierte Zeitung* in German and Turkish, and edited *Deutsche Orient Bücherei*, to which also Turkish authors contributed. In addition to their periodicals, these publicists

produced books and pamphlets which mostly covered their first hand observations and experiences in the Near East.

Another noteworthy and studious circle was formed by and around Hugo Grothe. Grothe changed from a colonialist to a liberal imperialist at the turn of the century. After this turn, he established the *Deutsche Vorderasienkomitee* in order to provide information and guidance to those who were interested in investment opportunities in Ottoman Empire. In addition to a number of books, Grothe edited *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Orients*. His interest in Asia Minor was not restricted to economy, but also extended to social conditions, education, and minorities. His works provided very detailed descriptions of the peoples and the economic opportunities in Asia Minor. His descriptions tinted with Orientalism in a manner to reflect his late transformation into a liberal publicist.

The third group of publicists were distinguished by their scholarly interest in Islam. Professor Carl Heinrich Becker is the founder of Islamology in Germany. He founded the journal *Der Islam*, which reported the developments in the Middle East. Becker saw pan-Islamism as the enlightenment of the Muslim world and thus supported the pan-Islamist movement. Martin Hartmann was a specialist in Arab language and literature. His hatred of the Turks was replaced by a Turkophile discourse with the onset of the Great War. He started *Die Welt des Islams* and gave detailed information about the engagements of German missionaries and foreign schools, hospitals and associations. Especially Becker contributed to a great deal to the formation

of a public awareness on the political potentials of Islam in breaking the British overseas hegemony.

The publicists of liberal imperialism brought up many ideas in their attempts to protect the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Some of these ideas seem to have been taken over by the Young Turks in their strife to save the Empire. The actuality of the criticism directed to the Ottoman way of managing economic development are exceptionally sharp and the measures suggested to save the political existence of Turks are extremely realistic. I hope their analysis in study contributes to the literature on German-Turkish relation in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.

CHAPTER 2

PECULIARITIES OF GERMAN IMPERIALISM

The Nazi experience has dominated the post-World War II debates and researches on German history. German fascism was seen as the outcome of German ideological and social development followed after the unification in 1870. In this respect, German imperialism is always associated with aggressive and expansionist German nationalism. In the following chapter, I will try to account for this selective perspective in German historiography, in which German imperialism almost exclusively means pan-Germanism. After that, I will try to show the existence of diverse imperialist perspectives in Germany before the Great War, some of which were not necessarily promoting pan-German ideas. Finally, I will try to introduce the distinct nature of peaceful economic penetration into the Near East in German imperialist thinking in its relation with German industrial development.

2.1 German Imperialism

The nineteenth century witnessed unprecedented colonial expansion on the part of the European powers. In Marxist perspective, 19th century imperialism represents just an extension of the previous European expansion. According to Lenin, with the industrial development of Europe and the concentration of capital in fewer hands through the organization of trusts and cartels and through the increasingly important role of the banks in financing industrial and commercial enterprises, it became essential to find new fields of investment and new markets overseas (Joll, 1978: 79). This struggle for new industrial markets and new areas of investment required the protection of economic interests, which in turn entailed either the direct annexation of the territory or war between European powers.

But, the peculiarity of 19th century imperialism lies in the fact that its influence was not confined to the colonial territories that imperial powers owned outright, but it mainly extended to areas, which were economically and militarily weak. These areas, for one reason or another, were not actually annexed. This was the case with the Ottoman Empire and the new Balkan succession states, which experienced the disruptive impact of new imperialism at first hand. "They were subjected to intensive Western economic penetration,

whose principal manifestations were government loans, which caused financial dependency, and railway building, which increased foreign indebtedness and also led directly to an influx of Western machine-made goods" (Stravrianos, 1963; 73-74).

Down to the mid-1890s, the new imperialism has taken the shape of economic imperialism as a slow process in which the risk of war and the costs of annexation could be largely avoided. First, there was the proliferation of financiers and concession-hunters in the capitalist economies of the day. The second development was the increasing number of governments involved in large-scale imperial ventures. The third development was a reinterpretation of international politics in the world as a whole, a world in which imperialism had achieved an astonishing influence (Gillard, 1977: 159).

The changes in the methods of imperialism in the late 19th century was characterised by the tendency to refrain from political responsibility of the colonised lands. In the new imperialist method, the imperial powers did not want to take on the administration of a colony. The prime objective was the establishment international relations with the target independent states that would entail favourable commercial and entrepreneurial agreements for the imperialist power. Thus, this new methods was in contradiction to the imperialist method of Britain and France. However, this change in the imperialist method from formal to informal imperialism is often neglected in the researches on German penetration to the Near East. This neglect on the different nature of German penetration in the Near East can be explained with

reference to the impact of the German responsibility in the Second World War. Significant amount of research has been devoted to find out the causes of the Second World War. In these researches, German responsibility in the Second World War has been usually stretched backwards, as a result of which the German territorial expansion of the Second World War has been evaluated in direct historical continuity with German imperialism of the 19th century. German penetration in the Near East has been seen part of German imperialist zeal and aggression. As a result, the need to look for the details of its true nature has often been ignored.

In similar vein, the roots of German fascism were found in the authoritarianism of 19th century German political system. It is argued that the aggressive imperialist discourse, which incited nationalist excitement, was the means to conceal the authoritarian and repressive political system. In 1960s, German historians put forth that German imperialism after the unification until the beginning of the Great War was an instrument of national politics, a means of legitimating primarily aimed at making an unpopular government popular. According to this historical perspective, the ruling elite was using imperialist policies remedy against the rising tide of socialism: popularisation of colonialist thought with its call for nationalist sentiments, was aiming at a system of priorities from which democratisation, social welfare and redistribution of wealth were effectively excluded in favour of German economic development

This perspective on Wilhelminian Germany is reflected in Eckhard Kehr's *Der Primat der Innenpolitik* (1965), where he focused on the primacy of

domestic affairs over foreign affairs; and in Hans Ulrich Wehler's *Bismarck und der Imperialismus* (1969), where he developed his social imperialism thesis. Hans-Ulrich Wehler described the colonialist thought in Germany as a reaction to the economic depression of 1873, which was caused by overproduction. To compensate for the overproduction Germany had to commence a world-wide export offensive and in this struggle, working classes should support the national cause of imperial expansion for their own welfare.

The basic argument of social imperialism thesis was that the expansionist policies were consciously devised to unite the nation and to defuse tensions at home, while simultaneously avoiding significant domestic reform. It was argued that at the centre of the social-imperialist mentality laid the preoccupation with order, social stability, and political conservatism. Although economic interest groups of many kinds supported the overseas policies of colonial expansion, their own particular profit or even general prosperity were of less importance than the preservation of a social order immune to left wing challenge. Colonial expansion was valuable above all for the stimulus it gave to a sense of national unity and acceptance of the *status quo*, rather than the swelling of company accounts, although that too would be welcome if it happened (Porter, 1994: 36-7). If colonial successes could breed domestic social and political legitimacy, then they were welcome, even if the price by capitalist standards of profit was low and the cost of expansionist policies high.

However, concealment of authoritarianism by imperialist excitement was not specific to German political system. The concerns underlying social

imperialism were clearly present in all European powers by the 1890s. Moreover, the concept of social imperialism has already been used by Marxist analysts around 1914 to account for the support of imperialist policies by the social democrats, of the moderate reforming policies and nationalist sympathy by left-wing and working class circles in general. It was part of the discourse of socialist opposition against the revisionist social democrats as well as the conservatives.

Parallel to Wehler and Kehr, East German historians argued that the position of German imperialism in the pre-war conflicts was marked by a special aggressiveness emanating from its historical lateness. It was claimed that this lateness brought about a compromise between the liberal and reactionary sections of the German elite. This compromise led to the establishment and consolidation of an authoritarian political system and an aggressive imperialism. The reactionary sections were representing the interests of Junkers, i.e. Prussian landed aristocracy, and that of the old heavy industry. Those interests were directed by need for raw materials, pressure of financial and commercial capital and export industries for control of the world market, and the demands of the army for a strategic advantage, which coalesced in annexationist policies (Jarausch, 1972; 85).

Fritz Fischer contributed to this line of thought by his influential book *Griff nach der Weltmacht* (1962), in which he argued that Germany was deliberately preparing for the Great War since 1890, and the German war aims policy in 1914-18 brought about the Second World War (Fischer, 1967).

Fischer grounded his war aims thesis on Germany's indisputable economic growth and the defensive alliance of Junkers and large industry against the socialist tide. According to Fischer, *Sammlungspolitik* provided the social agitation for a world policy heavily tinged with racism, hostility towards Russia, and the idea of German cultural mission. In Fischer's view, the sources of German expansionism were to be found in her social, economic and political situation at home on the eve of the war, rather than her international position. Thus, Fischer's argument was a criticism directed against the apologetic encirclement arguments, which were directed to deny the German responsibility in the Second World War.

However, in his attempt to prove German responsibility in the Great War, Fischer accepted the Prussian dominance in Wilhelminian politics too readily, causing confusion in the representation of interest groups in Germany. According to Fischer's portrayal of German politics, all other interests appear to be united (willingly or under duress) under the Prussian dominance. This perception of German politics denies the existence of any political conflict under *Sammlungspolitik* (policy of agreement amongst the classes). However, the development of the younger sections of the German economy in the second half of the 19th century both empowered bourgeois and working class interests to organise and stand against the interests of Prussian agrarian aristocracy, causing cracks in the *Sammlungspolitik*. It was the cracks in this policy that led to the fall of Bismack in 1890.

The historical perspective on German history, which emphasizes continuity, also deals with German-Ottoman relations. Most scholarly research on German-Ottoman relations is based on the assumption that Germany was trying to create its India. Fischer maintained that German aims in the Near East were not economically driven, but was aiming at colonisation. He claimed that the German economic prospects in the Balkans and in the Ottoman territories were not as promising as they were supposed to be when the commercial relations of the first decade of the twentieth century are investigated (Schubert, 1915). However, the fact in retrospect that German economic enterprises in the Near East were not as rewarding as expected does defy neither the economic motives behind them nor the method of imperialism employed in their pursuit. According to Fischer, the war aims included the creation of a big *Mitteleuropa* under the full military and economic control of the German Empire through annexations in the west and establishment of satellite states in the east (Fischer, 1967).

Another example of this perspective can be seen in F. Bernd Schulte's *Vor dem Kriegeausbruch 1914. Deutschland, die Türkei und der Balkan* (1980) where he maintained that Anatolia and Mesopotamia was the core of the economic interests of Germany and this territory had to be secured to keep Suez Canal and Persian Gulf under control. He claimed that the actual target of the Baghdad Railway Project was to build a transportation system to transfer armaments and armies as fast as possible to a prospective front against England in the Arabian Peninsula. According to Schulte, Germany was planning an

indirect influence since she was not fully prepared for direct political control on south-eastern European states. Thus, for example, German headquarters planned and expected to exert such influence on Turkey through the military mission led by Colmar von der Goltz, and later by Liman von Sanders (Schulte, 1980:7). However, this account ignores two facts: first that Goltz started to serve in the German military in Ottoman Empire mission long before the negotiations for the Baghdad Railway Project was finalized; he was serving in Istanbul in 1883-95 (Hagen, 1990: 9), while the Project was finalized in 1903. Although, most military officers who took part in the Young Turk revolution of 1908 had been Goltz's students, this did not stop Young Turks to search for British and French alliance to replace the German influence in the Porte. Secondly, there was serious conflict between the representatives of the Deutsche Bank and certain military officers, especially between Karl Helfferich and von Sanders. These facts show that a direct link between the military interests and the economic interest cannot be established in German-Ottoman relations. Still, despite all the contrary evidence, the emphasis on the colonialist character of the German interest in the Near East dominates the scholarly research on German history.

Most remarkable in the mainstream scholarly work is the continuous negligence of the existence of various interest groups. This negligence appears as the presentation of German imperialist discourse only in the words of pan-Germans, who call for colonisation and population export. However, German imperialism was not the policy of a single political and economic interest, thus

it acquired different versions in accordance with the major interests behind it. The mainstream scholarly research tends to ignore the conflict between the hard-line imperialist cartel and the liberal imperialists, whose dreams of peaceful colonial expansion and indirect economic hegemony heavily influenced the government (Jarausch, 1972; 81). Especially after 1890, as can be seen in the foreign policy of Bethmann Hollweg, the aim was a rapprochement with England based on a continental policy, and the Foreign Office sympathized more with the liberal-imperialist slogan “world policy without war” and a bid for *Mitteleuropa* (Jarausch, 1972; 79; 87).

German imperialism was a result of industrialisation and therefore, it represented the contradictions within the different sections in the German industry. Mommsen pointed out that it was difficult to account for the developments in German foreign policy, especially after 1909 merely by referring to social imperialism, since it was not only the most reactionary sections of German society that advocated overseas enterprises (Mommsen, 1973; 20-1). Some of the most outspoken supporters of an effective German *Weltpolitik* were the upper middle classes represented by the National Liberal Party, left-liberals and the considerable sections of the liberal intelligentsia. Conservatives that represented the more reactionary groups in German industry displayed distrust to industrialization and its effects on the social order. Thus, conservative attempts for realignment with the upper middle classes on a joint platform were refused by the National Liberals. German liberals preferred to support a reasonable and efficient German imperialism in foreign affairs,

especially if it would be combined with a domestic policy of gradual modernization in social and constitutional matters.

Mommsen pointed to the fact that different sectors of a capitalist economy did not necessarily display the same stage in the development capitalism. Accordingly, they neither held nor pursued the same imperialist goals. Thus, Mommsen came up with the perspective of pluralism in imperialism: the differences of stage in industrial sectors were reflected in disparity in imperialist interest within the same national economic system, sometimes producing contradicting imperialist discourses.

Pluralism in imperialism implies that imperialist discourses are closely associated with wider political trends. In German case, German imperialist ideology was characterized by the dichotomy between emigrationist and economic approaches as two major trends of colonialism between 1840 and 1906 (Smith, 1974; 641). The anti-industrialist agrarian interests in German society were most loudly represented by Pan German League, whereas the advocates of industry-based economic imperialism, which would be based on a policy of government-backed economic penetration into the Near East and the removal of tariff barriers against Austria-Hungary, together with an understanding with Britain, were gathered around the Free Conservatives, National Liberals, left-liberals and revisionist social democrats (Sheehan, 1982: 201).

2.1.1 Colonialist Imperialism and Emigration

One important feature of emigrationist approach that differentiates it from the economic approach was the population growth. Germany's industrialization was accompanied by a continuous increase of population. The problems of population growth and migration were issues of great significance in the Wilhelmian era (Sheehan, 1968; 363). The population growth was enhanced by better hygiene, medical care, and social conditions. German population was 40.9 million in 1870, 45.3 million in 1880, 49,5 million in 1890, 65 million in 1910, and 67.8 million in 1914 (Holborn, 1982, 367; Feis, 1930, 61). The population growth would have been even more rapid if German emigration had not been so great in the years 1885-90, when almost 450,000 people most of which came from rural districts and agricultural sector, immigrated mostly to the United States. The emigration out of Germany, known as *Auswanderung* was so extensive that agriculture of Prussia's eastern provinces even experienced a shortage of labour, when it combined with the ongoing internal migration towards cities and industrial areas. The driving force behind migration and urbanization was obviously industrialization.

The emigrationist approach saw overseas settlement colonies as the solution to the social problems emerged because of rapid industrialization. Emigration was required for the political and economic good of the German states and could not be restricted, because Germany was seen to be overpopulated, and the excess population simply had to leave in order to

maintain social stability and prevent revolution. However, *Auswanderung* became a major concern. Large numbers of Germans, displaced by economic and social changes in Germany, could settle as farmers in the colonies as an alternative to emigration to America.

Therefore, the success criterion of emigrationist colonies, which were to be established in temperate regions, was not economic but based on their anticipated social effects on Germany: the exportation of excess population would also lessen the possibility of political revolution in Germany. Wehler, in his social imperialism perspective explains this tendency as a “means a Machiavellian ‘technique of rule’ involving ‘the diversion outwards of internal tensions and forces of change in order to preserve the social and political status quo’” (Eley, 1976; 265). Especially under Bismarck, nationalist sentiments were deliberately stimulated to cut the ground from the feet of the opposition, to distract people from reformist politics. German Navy League and Pan-Germans were participating in both the popularisation of nationalist feelings among the middle/lower middle classes and supporting the emigrationist approach.

The debates on how to control over-population engendered ideas on German agricultural settlements in Asia Minor. Emigrationist colonialism saw in the Near East a potential area for German agricultural settlements. Emigrationists, who based their arguments on nationalist or religious grounds promoted a settlement policy in Turkey. Through massive German migration German territorial claims could be strengthened. The leader of this propaganda

and the most important mouthpiece of the conservative nationalist interests was *Alldeutscher Verband* (Pan-German League), which was institutionalised in early 1890. In a brochure published by the *Alldeutscher Verband* in 1896, titled “Germany's Claim to the Turkish Inheritance”, wrote as follows in the editorial manifesto:

As soon as events shall have brought about the dissolution of Turkey, no power will make any serious objections if the German Empire claims her share of it. This is her right as a World-Power, and she needs such a share far more than the other Great Powers because of the hundreds of thousands of her subjects, who emigrate, and whose nationality and economic subsistence she must preserve (Mariot, 1940; 406).

However, the idea of German agricultural settlements did not receive popular support and was not carried out except for the experiment of a small community in Palestine mostly composed of German Jews. American and Marxist sources demonstrate the settlements in Palestine as proof for the implementation of pan-German settlement plans. For instance, Marriot maintained that the plan was supported by Kaiser Wilhelm II (1940: 402). East German historian Lothar Rathmann calls the Palestine settlements as “land robbery” of the Germans. However, the migration to Palestine was of a religious nature. Besides, there was nothing interesting for Germany in Palestine, the radical pan-German propaganda institutions such as *Alldeutsche Verband* and *der Flottenverein* were catering for support and protection of imperialist policy, not for religious influence. The only benefit of this expectation was an increase in German economic activities in the region. In a report of German consulate in Jaffa on 23 February 1912, it was stated that the migration of the German speaking Jews were concentrated on Jaffa and this was expected to bring about an expansion

in German economic activities in the region.¹ Thus, although the Palestinian settlements have been shown as proof for German colonialist aims in the Near East, it did not fit into the plans and visions of late 19th century Pan-Germans.

A characteristic feature of emigrationist approach lies in the attitude of its exponents toward economic change. Advocates of emigrationism believed that uncontrolled emigration resulted in a cultural and economic loss to Germany. Although they regarded industrialization as inevitable, they believed that many of its social effects, such as the destruction of peasant farming and the probable loss of social standing of many middle-class status groups were undesirable. Rapid industrialization was threatening the basis of national power, i.e. the traditional agricultural social structure. The settlement colonies would "protect" the emigrants' culture, retain their contributions to German economy, and recreate overseas the traditional peasant society. Emigrationist colonialism represented an attempt to lessen the bad effects of economic change by removing many of its victims, while establishing overseas a society which would maintain desirable pre-industrial values within a wider, culturally defined Germany. Those groups which were "unhappy with the direction of economic and social change, colonialism was one of a range of ideologies that

¹ In 1891 Chancellor Caprivi investigated in the Foreign Office for the potentials of German settlements in the Near East. The Foreign Office gave him a negative answer on the grounds that German settlements could harm German-Turkish relations rather than improving it. Particularly after the Baghdad railway concession in 1903, the propagandist of expansion into the Near East started to present the settlement strategies as dangerous for German foreign policy. Hans Rohde. "Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas", *Süddeutscher Monatshefte* 13:5 (Feb. 1916): 757-67. p. 757.

could be used in politics to mobilise support and attack other groups” (Smith, 1978: 120).

These ideas also received widespread support of the lower-middle-classes, which were disillusioned with industrialization and with liberal economic theories, which were held responsible for the economic depression of 1873. From the mid-1870s on, radical, anti-industrial, anti-liberal political ideologies began to spread among the sections of the middle class threatened by loss of status in an industrial society. Emigrationist colonialism combined an overt distrust of industrialization with German patriotism and pride in German culture. Thus, anti-industrialism became an aspect of German conservatism especially at the end of 19th century (Smith, 1974, 658). Emigrationist colonialism enjoyed significant popular support throughout the 1850s and 1860s, so long as *Auswanderung* continued. The theory received a programmatic statement in the works of Wilhelm Roscher, a distinguished German economist in mid-19th century. Roscher suggested as far back as 1848 that Asia Minor would be the natural share of Germany in any partition of the Ottoman Empire (Mariot, 1940; 404). Colonial imperialist advocacy of German settlements in Ottoman territories aimed at strengthening German territorial claims in case of a possible partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by the great powers.

2.1.2 Informal Imperialism and Economic Regions

The second major trend in colonialism was the economic approach. This approach was often related to the movement for the creation of a Central European economic area dominated by an industrialized Germany. Economic approach viewed colonies as additions to the industrial and commercial segments of the German economy (Smith, 1974, 641). Contrary to the hostility prevalent in the emigrationist approach towards British Empire, the protagonists of economic approach preferred British cooperation in the world market to a Russian friendship.

Economic colonialism originated in 1840s in the thinking of the influential economist Friedrich List. He predicted a world that was divided into large competing economic areas. Thus, List advocated the establishment of a Central European economic area through tariff protection and economic union, under the dominance of German industry (Smith, 1974; 644). Food and raw materials would be provided to the industrial centre by an agricultural periphery in Eastern Europe, and manufactured goods would be returned in trade.

List never abandoned free trade as a desirable goal and never favoured agricultural tariff protection. His recommendations on economic regions were designed to remove obstacles that a strict free trade policy put in the path of rapid industrialization. Far from seeking to preserve agriculture, he saw it as a

sector feeding reactionary attitudes, whereas industrialization engendered greater diversity which required higher mental skills (Barkin, 1970; 33). List proposed a scheme of rapid industrialisation supported by the establishment of a Central European economic region. This scheme, he believed, would help Germany to become a great industrial power. Moreover, it would free the Central Europe from the political and economic pressure of the Great Britain.

Utterly convinced that industrialization was a good thing in itself, List thought that it should be fostered through government economic policy. He thought that emigration from Germany was a transitory problem and would sort itself out in the process of economic development. List's ideas were well known and particularly influential in Austria and with the leaders of expanding German heavy industry after 1850.²

The supporters of industrialization were also inspired by economist Lujo Brentano, who was the leading German proponent of free trade after List. After two years of study at the University of London in the 1860s, Brentano returned to Munich as an advocate of free trade. Unlike the more dogmatic English economists, he recognized the necessity of government intervention on behalf

² Another proponent of this set of ideas in the 1860s was Lothar Bucher, a member of the Prussian Foreign Office and a liberal. "Bucher argued that 'free trade' was simply Britain's way of maintaining her economic dominance. He proposed that Prussia drop free trade and concentrate on a political and economic union of the German states and Austria, with formal economic ties with the rest of eastern Europe" (Smith, 1974; 648). The most important result of this union would be the competition of German economy with the British, which would lead to an even more rapid expansion of German industry. In order to further the expansion of foreign trade and to secure Germany's fair share of overseas markets, trading colonies should be established in Africa, the Near East, and Asia. Different from List, Bucher emphasized the importance of overseas colonies and trade to the future development of Germany, and frequently stated that the Germans were, historically, a "colonial people." Bucher did not envision colonies as repositories for emigration but, rather, believed that emigration was one aspect of the same economic trend that led to the expansion of overseas trade.

of the working class. Like List's, Brentano's main idea on the free trade was based on the exchange of agricultural products with industrial goods. Agricultural states were the main markets for industrial nations (Barkin, 1970; 188). In this sense, his ideas fit well to the expectation on economic relations with Turkey: Germany was planning to sell her industrial goods in exchange of agricultural products of Turkey, such as food stuff and more important, cotton.

Brentano, again like List, advocated social reform. Seeing the dark side of early industrialism, he believed that trade unions would constitute a countervailing power to cartels (Barkin, 1970; 187). In the emerging trade union movement, he saw the improvement in the workers' standard of living. In the industrial sectors that unions had formed, there had already been significant progress. Brentano supported public housing to remedy the unsanitary conditions caused by rapid industrialization. He recommended his fellow economists to press for legislation to strengthen unions and deal with the issues arising from early stage of industrialization. But he was sure that industrialism was not a temporary phenomenon, old social structures based on peasantry were on erosion. Not only the majority of the population started to live in towns, but also tax statistics showed that the land ceased to be the centre of German economic life (Barkin, 1970; 190).

Resembling List, both Brentano and Friedrich Naumann did not consider overpopulation as a serious problem. Naumann pointed out the fallacies in Malthus' and Marx's prediction of increased misery when compared with the fact that the standard of ordinary worker had been improving for the

last three decades. Conservative fears of an advance balance of payments were similarly not disturbing to pro-industrial economists.

The groups, which tended to favour economic colonialism, industry-based economic imperialism, and an understanding with Britain, namely the free liberals (progressives) and the social democrats (mostly the revisionists) also tended to favour a policy of government-backed economic penetration into Eastern Europe and the removal of tariff barriers against Austria-Hungary. This was the basis of the eastern policy of Caprivi, the aim of which was to create an informal economic union in Eastern Europe reminiscent of List's concept.

Foreign policy decisions were influenced by the representatives of emigrationist or economic approaches depending on their political strength at the time. Until the late 1870s, economic colonialism had been allied to political ideas of *Grossdeutschland* and economic concept of industrial protectionism as against agrarian tariff protectionism. These ideas were not officially favoured, but they constituted the major acceptable alternative to the policies of Bismarck's government when conditions changed in Germany. Economic colonialism became a significant component of official foreign policy only after Bismarck.

Bismarck's colonial policy was partly shaped by his desire to utilize pro-colonial, emigrationist middle-class opinion in order to push his general economic policy, and outdo left-liberal opposition by achieving a consensus between the conservative and right-liberal parties with wide popular support. The appeal of emigrationist colonialism was recognized by Bismarck, the

conservative parties, and the right-wing National Liberals, as a means to ease the social tension arising due to the implementation of non-liberal economic policies. Thus, the type of colony for which Bismarck was looking was the tropical trading colony. Bismarck, in the drive for overseas empire, proclaimed protectorates in New Guinea, Southwest Africa, Togo, and Cameroon in 1883-85. The demands of organized colonial movement, whose popularity was growing among the middle and lower-middle classes,³ influenced not only Bismarck's direction but also his motives for colonial acquisition. However, Bismarck's expectations that the colonial territories could be profitably run without significant government expense were soon disappointed, since the trading companies had neither the means nor the intention of governing. Under these circumstances, Bismarck was unwilling to expand the government's role, and colonialist sentiment of both types turned against him. The withdrawal of colonialist support against attacks of social democrats and left liberals became one of several reasons behind the fall of Bismarck. Despite this break down in the conservative consensus on formal colonialism, economic imperialism became a significant component of official foreign policy only after the resignation of Bismarck in 1890.

³ The popular support for colonial policies found expression through organizations that also direct propaganda activities. The founding of the *Kolonialverein* in 1882 was the result of joint action by the colonial publicists and the North German merchant interest, and consequently the stated goals of the organization included both emigrationist and economic elements. Because the primary aim of the *Kolonialverein* was to propagandize for colonies among the entire middle class, the position most often taken in publications was emigrationist. The split between emigrationists and economic colonialists soon became explicit within the *Kolonialverein*. The emigrationist view gained a more secure place when the *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft* was formed in 1887 to replace the *Kolonialverein*.

From 1890s on, German liberals experienced a revitalization of intellectual life. This revitalization came up with a redefinition of the liberal attitudes on matters of state intervention, social reform, trade unionism and imperialism. The ‘illiberal’ results of the politics of the liberals started to be handled by left liberal intellectuals among which were Friedrich Naumann and Max Weber (Eley, 1981; 281). Friedrich Naumann showed strong imperialist beliefs combined with a domestic project that emphasized popular participation. “Besides, the new radical nationalists had clear affinities with the liberals -in their anti-clerical, anti-particularistic and anti-aristocratic attitudes, their stress on the free association of citizen-patriots and independence from bureaucratic influence, and their contempt for the “narrow subject-mentality” - and came as often as not from a strong National Liberal background. Recruiting largely from the same social groups as the liberals, the nationalist pressure groups (above all the Pan-Germans, Navy League, and anti-Polish organization) were legitimate heirs to the nationalist tradition in liberal thought” (Eley, 1981; 283). All these organizations drew their support from the Protestant middle strata, the educated elite, the business circles (for whom national power was often linked with personal profit), manufacturers, school teachers and some skilled workers. As a class of capital owners or controllers and their auxiliaries, the bourgeoisie had the ability to influence the character of the liberal movement, especially as a modernizing impulse.

After 1890, liberal economic approach became part of a general concept of economic imperialism based on the assumed interests of German industry in

developing and securing markets abroad. This concept was shared by industrial and commercial interests and significant elements within the German Foreign Office, of which the *Kolonialabteilung*, the central colonial administration, was a branch from 1890. It rested on the assumption that, to win profits in trade, German industry had to be supported by the German government, which would make political arrangements favourable to German commerce, protect German interests with political force, and prevent the exclusion of German businessmen from trading areas. It also included a desire to increase Germany's economic sphere of influence in cooperation with Great Britain. The concentration on the interests of industry and commerce in expanding markets, the aim of cooperation with Britain set the economic imperialists apart from agrarian conservatives, radical nationalists, and emigrationist colonialists. Kaiser Wilhelm II and Marschall von Bieberstein were advocates of economic imperialism and of cooperation with Britain. Under Kaiser Wilhelm II, in accordance with the economic colonial perspective, *Kolonialabteilung's* policy extended to concentrating on developing the colonies as trading areas and sources of raw materials. These policies followed by the *Kolonialabteilung* under Kaiser and by the Caprivi and Hohenlohe governments caused violent opposition of *Kolonialgesellschaft*, emigrationist colonialists, and radical nationalists on several occasions.

The practical outcomes of a liberal economic imperialist policy can best be observed after 1909. The chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, who held the office since June 1909, refused to suppress the Social democrats and other progressive

forces, and thus criticized by the Conservatives and upper bourgeoisie. The Conservatives were also characterized by their anti-British sentiments. However, the Chancellor considered that an understanding with Great Britain was necessary to minimize the danger of a European war. Moreover, the government worked hard to strengthen and expand the German economic involvement in the Ottoman Empire. Bethmann Hollweg assumed that such a policy of moderate expansionism without war might bring about and was absolutely required British support (Mommsen, 1973; 22). But in 1912, German public opinion was divided between a moderate expansionism favoured by the government and a vigorous foreign policy supported by the strong groups within the upper bourgeoisie.

Because of the substantial changes in the Wilhelminian social and political system due to the accelerating process of industrialization, the conservatives were now in the opposition. The social base of traditional conservatism was losing its ground to the reformism of upper middle classes as a result of the shift from a primarily agricultural society towards urban industrialism, although the agrarian and petit-bourgeois sections of German society were still in the majority. The National Liberals had to consider that a great many of their voters were rather traditionalist. Consequently, they were particularly unwilling to join forces with the Left, as this might have resulted in the disintegration of the National Liberal Party (Mommsen, 1973; 26).

Advocates of economic imperialism, as opposed to the pan-Germans, recruited primarily among circles of the newer industries such as the electrical,

chemical and export industries, favoured the expansion and the securing of German economic hegemony in Europe by means of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Their prime representative institution before the First World War was the "*Central European Economic Association*" founded in 1903 for the pursuit a European 'large-area economy' under German dominance, that - as described in many plans, popular brochures and strategy papers - was meanwhile expected to extend from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. The peaceful penetration by means of capital loans and trade agreements designated under *Mitteleuropa* sought as a solution against the colonial dominance of England, France, Russian and the US in the establishment of a "*major Central European economic region*".

In the prospect of an understanding with Great Britain, the government could depend on the liberals. As a result, a consensus between the official policies of expansion to the Near East and the liberal ideas and visions emerged. Big industry also joined in the economic interests in the Near East, preferring it to German Central Africa. Thus, "Bethmann Hollweg did his best to set the state for a continuation of German economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire, though he took care to let the British have a share in this too" (Mommsen, 1973; 32) despite the different visions of conservative circles composed of the military establishment, agrarians, big industry and the *Alldeutscher Verband*. Consequently, under the pressure of war, Bethmann Hollweg joined the camp of the advocates of a European Economic Association under the banner of *Mitteleuropa* as an alternative to old-fashioned territorial

imperialism. This implied that in case of a liquidation of the Ottoman Empire, German Foreign Office was more willing to see a smaller but independent Turkey within the German economic sphere, than being forced to claim territory in Asia Minor and the Near East. As a result, German diplomacy prevented the Austrians from interfering in the conflict of the Balkan states several times in manner favourable to the Ottoman Empire.

One shared opinion by the proponents of industrial development and anti-industrial agrarians was *Weltpolitik*: to a great extent, they all believed that Germany had no choice but to expand into Asia and Africa in order not to be strangled by the British, American and Russian advances. However, the agreement on aims did not mean an agreement on terms and methods. For economist Lujo Brentano and Max Weber, then a young disciple of Brentano, an agrarian society could not support a powerful navy and a commercial fleet to pursue a *Weltpolitik*. Brentano rightfully argued that German military power was based on industrial and urban growth. Similarly, Weber maintained that continued Junker political hegemony was incompatible with the German attainment of world power status. Thus, for liberal thinkers, *Weltpolitik* had to motivate the drive for intensified industrialization.

While economic colonialism with its pro-industrial ideas retained its hold on the central colonial administration and on commercial and industrial opinion in the 1890s and after 1900, emigrationist colonialism continued to be an important force, although massive emigration ended and even a labour shortage appeared. The main reasons for the continued importance of the

emigrationist ideology were its popularity among the middle classes and its association with the basic ideas of anti-industrial agrarianism. It represented the opposition against Caprivi's pro-industrial policy of reducing agricultural tariffs, which was thought to harness a peasant agricultural society regarded as the basis of German strength. Radical nationalist, racist sentiments, to which emigrationist colonialism appealed and which was primarily concerned with the idea of *Lebensraum*, that is occupying areas in eastern Europe which could be used for German farming settlement or for the establishment of racial fiefdoms in which German settlers would be the rulers of a hierarchical agricultural community, remained as a force in nationalist politics and a means of acquiring support for various nationalist policies.

Pro-industrial economists were aware of the arguments of their opponents and their popular appeal. In the triumph of naval program and colonial demands, Brentano warned that the next war was not begin because of the competition for markets, but of German search for guaranteed supplies of raw materials and political domination of markets. Helfferich contributed to that by arguing that the danger arose from domestic conflicts. "At the Verein für Sozialpolitik conference in 1901 he said, 'I see the greatest danger not in an industrial state per se, but in that we pursue an agrarian policy in an industrial state; a policy ... which will destroy industry and the proletariat'" (Barkin, 1970; 192). Max Weber, another disciple of Brentano, in similar vein, predicted the feudalisation of the German middle class, for he observed the great industrialist sacrificing their economic interests to ally themselves with the

sovereign class which resulted in the continuing predominance of the Junkers in German political life. Naumann and Weber took active part in the liberal opposition against Junkerdom and agrarian romanticism by the appeal of national power and the desire for 'a place in the sun' (Barkin, 1970; 206). The strongest unifying idea of the young liberals was the rejection of the patriarchal state and the rigid separation of state and society associated with a belief in man's ability to cope with change.

2.2 The Place of the Near East in German Imperialism

2.2.1 German Industrial Development

Behind German's claim to world power status was her thriving industrialization, which gained its initial momentum from railroad-building in 1840s. The creation of a network of transportation, moving raw materials to the factory and distributing finished goods was the absolute prerequisite of extensive industrial production. Thus, railroads became the dynamic element that commenced large-scale industrialization. "In 1850, Germany possessed 3,638 miles of railroad lines; in 1860, 6,840; in 1870, 11,600; in 1880, 21,165; in 1890, 26,136; in 1900, 31,174; and in 1910, 36,894 miles" (Holborn, 1982:

375). Germany's central location also made her railroads the carriers of many transit goods.

What made the railroads immediately important for the structural transformation of the German economy was their tremendous effect on coal mining as well as the iron and machine industries. The development of the railway network caused an amazing increase in Germany's coal and lignite production creating new industrial districts in the Ruhr and Upper Silesia regions around 1870. By the turn of the century, Germany doubled her steel production and output and surpassed that of Britain. Especially, "[b]y armaments orders and improved transport systems in Germany and Europe, coal production in Germany increased eightfold between 1870 and 1914, while in Britain it merely doubled" (Fischer, 1975: 4-5). The acquisition of Lorraine in 1871 from France contributed further to the development on industries based on steel and iron production. The immense growth of iron and steel industry even necessitated import of iron. The iron and steel industries formed the basis for the development of extensive and many-sided metallurgical industries, which spread over Germany, which also expanded the volume of exports.

Already in 1870s, Germany has started to compete with Britain on international trade. But, the founding of a shipbuilding industry, chiefly in Stettin, Elbing, Kiel and Vegesack added strength to German trade.⁴ The

⁴ In 1871, Germany possessed one million tons of shipping, less than one tenth of which were steamships, and even these not necessarily iron vessels. By 1880, even Spain owned a larger steam tonnage than Germany. In 1900, German steam tonnage amounted to 1.348 million; in 1912 it had increased to 2.5 million; and in 1914 of 3 million, thus outstripping all other nations except Britain with her 11.7 million. See Holborn (1982, 375-9) for more details. At the

accession of Hamburg and Bremen to the German customs union in 1888 was a factor in the expansion of German shipping. Moreover, German Naval Bill of 1900 contributed this development to a great extent. The emergence of strong commercial and industrial companies together with the developments in shipping enhanced German foreign investments and increased the volume of international trade. However, the dependence of German industry on raw materials and foodstuff was reflected in national budget: the combined imports of raw materials and foodstuffs were much greater than the export of finished goods.

Substantial growth in chemical and electrical industries emerged in the 1880's. The derivatives of coal and lignite favoured the development of the chemical industries. The heavy chemical industries produced chemicals in bulk, such as fertilizers for agriculture, and, for industrial purposes. But it was the light chemical industries such as the creation of dyestuffs and pharmacy products that gained for Germany world-wide reputation. In 1867, Werner von Siemens invented the first dynamo, which made the production of any amount of electrical energy possible. In the 1890s, the systematic construction of power stations for whole cities was undertaken, often simultaneously with that of trolley systems, both usually built and owned by the municipalities. After the inventions of Oskar von Müller had made the transmission of electric power over long distances possible, big regional overland stations were developed, as a rule by the electrical companies or the states. In the last decade before the

outbreak of the Great War, Germany's merchant marine was the second largest in the world, after that of Great Britain (Gilbert&Large, 2002: 72).

Great War, the construction of dams and the production of hydroelectric power were started. Within thirty years, the German electrical industries grew to gigantic proportions, producing 50 per cent of the world's electrical equipment. The greatest part of this production was concentrated in two Berlin companies, the AEG (*Allgemeine Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft*, founded in 1883 by Emil Rathenau) and the Siemens.

The high rates of industrialization did not mean stagnation in the agricultural sector. German agriculture was transformed by the widespread use of fertilizers and the adoption of more businesslike and scientific methods, which required communal management. The agricultural chemistry flourished parallel to this development. Even the German steel industry became involved in the production of fertilizers. Growth in agricultural production was targeting self-subsistence for a larger population which was still increasing. But the demand for higher-quality food also necessitated the import of foreign grain especially after 1871.

Parallel to the industrial development, the banking sector improved and strengthened. From the outset, the modern German banks were designed as the powerful engines of industrial development (Fischer, 1975: 5; Schölgen, 1984; Barth, 1995; Blaisdell 1929). German banks were functioning in place of a variety of financial institutions: they were commercial, merchant and investment banks all in one. Different from the British case, where individual proprietorship and partnership were the norm in the process of industrialization, the new German joint-stock banks were commercial and investment banks,

which provided long term loans for the promotion of industrial and commercial enterprises as mining, iron and steel industry, shipbuilding, and electricity that demanded large capital investments (Holborn, 1982: 382). The banks were vitally concerned with the prosperity of the industrial firms in which they had invested. In order to enable them to produce profitably, the banks would assist their growth to the ideal size help them to win control over subsidiary industries. The control of industry through the banks was strong, since they claimed the right to represent their customers at the shareholders' meetings. Moreover, due to the nature of their functioning, main German banks controlled the German stock exchange.

The dominance of great banks in German economy grew considerably between 1890 and 1900 (Fohlin, 1999: 309) and Berlin became a dominant financial capital. The term "finance-capitalism" (*Finanzkapitalismus*) was ascribed to Germany Great Banks with reference to their concentrated capital accumulation (Barth, 1995: 11). By means of participation in foreign companies and providing government loans, Germany turned from a debtor into a creditor country. Becoming a predominantly creditor company determined the Germany's method of imperialism. By means of government loans, Germany tried to attain both further investment opportunities and also political influence. The creation of banks, the establishment of branch factories, the building of railways served the same purpose of developing foreign markets for the German economic system. In this way, expansion of German heavy industries

was going to be sustained, the raw materials necessary for that expansion secured, the rapidly growing working population be kept in employment.

Rapid industrial development was accompanied with a remarkable population increase⁵ and the change in the social structure. The emergence of bourgeoisie and the working class affected German politics. The emergence of a new industrial bourgeoisie was already threatening Bismarck's anti-liberal policies in 1860s and 1870s. However, the new German bourgeoisie was not unified and it was unlikely for it to wrest the power from the old Prussian ruling class as long as it did not make an attempt to represent the interests and aspirations of wider groups in society. Thus, the industrial interests were not strong enough to confront and challenge the agrarian policies pursued by the Junkers, which represented a coalition of landed agrarian aristocracy and Prussian military establishment. This policy was mainly based on the protective tariffs, which were crippling the improvement on industry. The policy of tariffs' protection was supported with an alliance with Russia and Austria-Hungary.

Nevertheless, despite the pre-eminence of the Junkers, the bourgeoisie had increasingly more political weight with the government. The contradiction of interests between the Junkers and the new bourgeoisie was also strengthened by religious differences. Within the German Empire, great political diversity existed between the conservative northern and the liberal southern (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden) states, which was strengthened with differences between Protestantism and Catholicism (Gilbert&Large, 2002: 72).

⁵ German population increased from 40 to 70 millions from 1879 to 1914 (Holborn, 1882: 367).

The political opposition between agricultural and industrial economic interests was the context in which German imperialist policies were shaped. German government was forced to gradually acknowledge its dependence on the economic success of the bourgeoisie and to protect and promote the interests of the industrialists. All of the successors of Bismarck were convinced that their place as a world power depended upon the expansion of German enterprise and capital abroad. Consequently, colonial and naval policies of the governments under Kaiser Wilhelm II were designed to serve particularly for business and industrial circles.

Parallel to the increase in the political weight of bourgeois aspirations, the German popular sentiment underwent a transformation after 1890: a sense of great destiny of a larger goal began to shape national feeling and ideals. National consciousness found expression in concrete efforts and aims, which were supplied in Germany by the commercial, industrial and financial groups and the rulers. "All felt that their future growth depended upon the acquisition of markets, raw materials and business opportunities in foreign regions. Kaiser and those around him sympathised with these ambitions. The desires for commercial and financial expansion fused with the dreams of an extension of German political dominion" (Feis, 1930: 176). The guide for the dreams of expansion became the judgement and initiative of Great Banks (Feis, 1930: 163).

2.2.2 Reflection of Industrial Development on the Near Eastern Policy

The great banks' involvement in the management of industrial firms entailed their engagement in colonial politics. The German foreign investment primarily rested upon the initiative of the German banks and industries, which recognized that Germany had to participate in the financing of certain areas into which German commerce was trying to expand. As a result, capital was available for foreign loans and enterprises whenever a commercial gain, a political hope or purpose seemed at stake (Feis, 1930: 61). The usual method they operated was by the general public offering of syndicates and listings on the stock exchanges. These offerings were the main course of investment within Germany. German financial journals together with other periodicals were the basic means of information on what to invest (Feis, 1930: 67). The investors were seeking higher returns by the securities offered by these banks' investments in Balkan states, Turkey, and Russia, since they were also under government's guarantees. Great Banks controlled large capitals, which they continued to increase, and commanded all needed varieties of expert knowledge and judgement.

After 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm II became the centre of commercial, financial and military interests, maintaining communication and agreement among them. It became customary on the part of the banks to consult the

Foreign Office in regard to foreign loans to which a political interest might attach, or to which serious objection might be entertained, though no formal requirement of the kind was ever made by the government. Feis maintained that “by private, direct, unofficial but steady communication with the directing heads of the important banks that the Kaiser and the Foreign Office assured themselves of the adjustment of capital movements to their judgements and policies” (1930: 166). The Deutsche Banks sustain political relations with the German government in matters concerning the investments in Ottoman Empire, especially the Baghdad railway concessions from 1890 on (Barth, 1995: 106-112).

If the prospective profits were not clearly promising, the banks became more interested in regions their investments would attract governmental support. Thus, they preferred projects that would attract the governments support for strategic reasons. In this context, Ottoman Empire was most convenient for German investments because it could be reached over land. The indications of government interest sometimes came directly, but sometimes they were conveyed deviously through the semi-official press. It was upon these quiet, informal procedures that the German government relied to turn the process of foreign investment to what it conceived to be the greatest national advantage and to regulate its movement (Feis, 1930: 167-8). The press accounts of German investments abroad also influenced the stock exchange.

There was virtually no German capital in Ottoman Empire until 1888, when Berlin capital market opened to Ottoman government securities and the

powerful German banks were pressed to accept risks and burdens before which they sometimes hesitated. Although there was vigorous competition among great banks within Germany, there was a division of labour with respect to the foreign governments and spheres of activity abroad (Feis, 1930: 65). The Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank were behind the development of German corporate interests in the Near East. The Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank, which were established in 1870 and 1872, had the initiative to decide and pursue when the opportunity of a concessions emerged. Dresdner Bank was associated with the Ottoman armament orders to Krupp. But, the Deutsche Bank took the lead in securing financial support for all the German enterprises which combined into a network of power in Turkey. The Deutsche Bank wielded control over the Baghdad and Anatolian Railways in Asiatic Turkey, the Oriental railways in European Turkey, the Port Company at Haydar Paşa, and the Tramways in Istanbul. This capital accumulation entailed other endeavours such as establishment of German schools and hospitals, which were seen as necessary to secure German investments by means of cultural influence. The need to protect German investments also brought about some measure of guardianship of the loan market.

The Deutsche Bank encouraged and sponsored grand irrigation schemes in Asia Minor. The growing strength and diversification of the German industries led to the diminishing import of semi-finished goods, such as yarns in the textile field. Raw cotton and wool were the largest single import items, amounting to about one tenth of the total. However, German textile industry

was still disadvantaged in comparison to its British counterpart. Unlike Britain, which obtained its basic cotton from India, Germany lacked any direct link to areas of cotton and wool production. Thus, there was not much room for Germany to compete with Britain in textile industry. Invasion of Egypt provided Britain with additional cotton resources and this stirred jealousy in Germany. Thus, the potential of cotton production in Adana and Mesopotamia became one of the most significant interests of Germany in the Ottoman Empire. The irrigation plans for Adana and Mesopotamian plains were directed to enhancement of cotton production. Konya plain became the first area of experimentation with irrigation designated for enhanced food production.

Although German political system was not fully democratic in the Wilhelmian era, public opinion had more influence than it had under Bismarck administration. Thus, emigrationist perspective of the Bismarck period has been slowly replaced by economic perspective. By mid-1890s, economic imperialism, through which the risk of war and the costs of annexation could be largely avoided, enjoyed significant popular support (Gillard, 1977: 159). At the same time, Germany with her thriving industry had become a power in the imperialist system with an ever-rising claim to become a world power. In early 1910s, there was clear evidence of the growing insistence on the claim to a "place in the sun", or a larger *Lebensraum*. This claim reflected the German desire to create a self-sufficient economic area in order to ensure access to raw materials and protect her exports at a calculated cost, but not German political control over colonial acquisitions. Still, this desire was enough to raise the

hostility of Russia, Britain and France, and led to the outbreak of the Great War.

German rapprochement to the Ottoman Empire must be assessed within the context of the tendency towards economic imperialism in accord with the German industrial needs. The colonialist arguments behind Germany's *Drang nach Osten* (drive to East) in the mid-19th century were related to the early phase of German industrialisation. The development of light industries following the development of iron, steel and mining industries was one of the elements in the strengthening of economic imperialist demands. Moreover, great German banks with concentrated capital resources emerged alongside the expansion of coal and steel production and their parallel industries, namely the chemical industry and the electro-technical industry. The growth of the German production was enhanced by the development of the German banking system following the establishment of joint-stock banks, which not only controlled credit but also dominated the capital market. These banks had the initiative in German foreign investment in the form of foreign loans and enterprises.

Thus, German rapprochement to the Ottoman Empire was shaped by the reflection of needs and business opportunities of German industry and finance to German imperialist policies. Contrary to the mainstream presentation of German imperialism as being predominantly pan-German and colonialist, Germany did not have a single and consistently colonialist policy on Ottoman Empire. Colonialist and economic imperialist views disagreed on the method of

German expansion in the Near East. The colonial imperialist supported German farmer settlements in the Ottoman territories to strengthen German territorial claim at the moment of a possible partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers. They wanted Germany's share of "the sick man" for their colonialist aspirations. The economic imperialists supported peaceful economic and cultural penetration to the East by way of the Baghdad railway. This policy necessitated maintenance of good relations with the Ottoman government in order to get economic concessions in accordance with their liberal aspirations for a Central European economic region. It entailed protection of the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire to secure the economic region and German investments in the Ottoman domains. As a result, the strengthening of economic imperialist perspective in German politics was reflected the government's support for economic penetration in the Near East after 1890.

CHAPTER 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO GERMAN EXPANSION IN THE NEAR EAST

The change in the dominant German imperialist policy from a basically pan-German and colonialist one to informal economic imperialism based on economic regions must be traced back to the German attitude towards the Eastern Question from 1870 to 1914. The change in German attitude was closely associated with the transition from Bismarckian to Wilhelmian rule in German politics. Germany had relations with the Ottoman Empire since mid-19th century in the form of Prussian military missions. However, these relations were rather loose before the unification of Germany. After the unification, Bismarck deliberately kept Germany from getting involved in the complicated problems of the East. However, in the face of the international developments following the Berlin Treaty, Germany was in a way drawn into the Eastern

Question. The major change in the official German foreign policy was introduced with the ascendancy of Kaiser Wilhelm II to the throne in 1888. Kaiser Wilhelm II's first visit to Istanbul in the same year signalled the reorientation of German foreign policy in response to the pressing needs of German industry. Under Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Deutsche Bank enjoyed government support in its undertakings in the Ottoman Empire and Germany adopted a more effective propaganda activity in the Middle East. In the following chapter, I will try to outline the historical background to German-Ottoman relations in the context of the Eastern Question. I will ensue with a description of the change in foreign policy from Bismarck to Kaiser Wilhelm II. Kaiser's support for the German expansion in the Near East brought about two major schemes: the Baghdad Railway Project and the support for pan-Islamist movements. Both schemes became very sensitive issues in European politics in the decade preceding the Great War.

3.1 The Eastern Question

The Eastern Question became the focus of the European balance of power in the 19th century as the question of the dissolution of Ottoman domination in south-eastern Europe and the liberation of the Balkans. A decisive phase in this

conflict was the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, when the Ottomans were forced to come to terms with Russia (Anderson, 1966; 4-5). As an outcome of this treaty, the focus of the Eastern Question then shifted to the South Slavic lands of Turkey-in-Europe, where the new conflicts generated by nationalism out of the debris of the Ottoman Empire (Silvera, 2000; 182). It was the policies and interests of the major powers that dominated the course of events in the Balkan arena, where the principle of nationalism unleashed by the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars transformed into the retreat of Ottoman Empire. These policies that had started at the end of the eighteenth century accelerated by the end of the nineteenth, reaching its climax in the violence and turmoil of the First and Second Balkan Wars and finally culminating in the outbreak of the Great War.

In the 19th century, the Eastern Question gained significance in Austria's Balkan policy. Anti-Russian and pro-Turkish feelings had been running in Hungary since 1849 (Islamov, 1985). Islamov explained that the basis of Austria's desire to expand into the Balkans was no longer predominantly dynastic, but increasingly bourgeois-capitalistic. The Vienna court was forced to consider the increasing power of the bourgeoisie. The industrial bourgeoisie, still not in direct conduct of foreign policy, was carrying increasingly more weight in the political sphere, and was deeply concerned with the prospects of exploiting the rich forest and mineral resources the neighbouring Ottoman provinces, and was inclined to consider these provinces as a possible internal colony.

Furthermore, the occupation of provinces in the Balkans was not an end in itself, but a means of foreign policy aimed at advancing into the Balkans and gaining an outlet to the Aegean Sea. This design was part of the more extensive project of creating a *Mitteleuropa* that had originated in Germany in the 1840s. The Austrian step into the Balkans was a risky one that would have had far-reaching consequences for the Habsburg Empire itself in pursuit of its own great power aims, and also for realising the establishment of German control over the Danube from Ulm to the Black Sea.

On the other hand, Russia's policy of supporting revolutionary movements in the East against the Ottoman domination could easily result in the involvement of the oppressed peoples of the Dual Monarchy itself. Since Balkan national movements had a seriously threatening aspect, the conservatism of Vienna's Balkan policy, its desire to maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans as long as possible, and its unwillingness to bring nearer the hour of collapse of Ottoman domination in Europe had a reasonable ground. Another feature of Austria's Balkan policy was the exhaustion of possibilities for territorial acquisition in the West and the weakening of Austria's position in Germany, which made south-eastern Europe the main direction of eventual expansion (Islamov, 1985: 32-34).

At the face of the emergence of Balkan nationalism against a background of wider imperial issues, the Ottoman policy was closely affiliated with the international relations in general, but also with the German influence in the Turkish army (Levy, 1979: 325). On the one hand, the international position

of the Empire was bound with the financial constraints which were deepened as a result of the Capitulations. The Balkan territories were the ones with the most productive economic structure. Thus, the loss of European parts of the Empire would mean drastic economic damage. On the other hand, to keep the Balkans, especially Serbia, was closely associated with the Islamic heritage, which presupposed the protection of any sovereignty rights over territories inhabited by Muslims. The Ottoman Sultans regarded their rule of the Balkan provinces as essential for upholding their title as *Gazis*, or warriors of the Faith against the infidel. "This title they had used to lend strength and legitimacy to their demand on the loyalties of their own Muslim subjects as well as to support their claims for supremacy in the Islamic world" (Levy, 1979: 329). Therefore, Balkan independence movements touched upon an area of great Ottoman sensitivity.

Unsurprisingly, their clashing interests in the Balkans caused antagonism between Austria and Russia. However, Chancellor Bismarck, the architect of German unification, was irritated to see Russia and Austria in serious conflict as was the case during the Bosnian Revolt of 1875-76. "To Bismarck it seemed clear that the obvious solution of this problem was a partition of the Ottoman Empire which would assuage Austro-Russian rivalry and give something to all the great powers with Near Eastern interests" (Anderson, 1966: 188). The attempts at building peace in the Balkans failed and culminated in the armed conflict between Russia and Turkey in 1876-78. England had to get involved in the conflict in order to stop Russian advances in

the Balkans and the threat on the Straits. The clash of interests in the Balkans and the Near East brought about the Congress of Berlin.

3.2 Treaty of Berlin

The Eastern Question is most exquisitely revealed in the diplomacy following the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-8 that triggered major territorial losses. The Treaty of San Stefano, which was forced onto Ottomans in the first round of peace negotiations, was allowing for extremely large zone of Russian influence in the Balkans. Such enlarged Russian domination was a threat to European balance of power. So, the German Chancellor Bismarck proclaimed himself as an “honest broker” seeking peace and no territorial advantage for Germany and conveyed the powers in Berlin (Quataert, 2003: 59).

The Treaty of Berlin (1878) is generally regarded as a great landmark in the history of the Eastern Question. The enduring significance of the treaty is rooted in its two significant outcomes: i) the Ottoman Empire returned from the edge of total destruction, ii) the new nation states emerged out with emancipation. However, as a result of the main provisions of the famous Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire became a mere shadow of its previous existence. “The Treaty of Berlin meant the end of 'Turkey in Europe' as the term had been

understood by geographers for the last four hundred years” (Marriot, 1940: 347).

So far as the daily life of the Balkan peoples was concerned, the period from 1878 to 1914 proved to be an equally revolutionary age being the age of new imperialism and capitalism, which had deeper and more far-reaching repercussions than the age of nationalism (Gewehr, 1931; Kohn, 1929). This does not imply that nationalism played no role after 1878. It did so in an even more spectacular fashion than ever before. However, this was simply the continuation and completion of a movement that had begun a century earlier. According to Daniel Chirot and Karen Barkey "The notion that the penetration of a capitalist Western market stimulated Balkan independence movements is seductive," and they explain by saying that "at least in the cases of Greece and Serbia, the elite that led these movements was partly dependent on profits made by trading with the West or with Austria," but the "interests that these elites were trying to protect, not the introduction of ideologies that were foreign to them" (Chirot & Barkey, 1983: 41).

For Stravrianos, "What was new after 1878 was the rapidly increasing activity of the great powers and their all-pervasive impact upon the Balkans" (Stravrianos, 1969: 72-3). This was manifested not only in the usual diplomatic channels, but also, and most dramatically, in the economic realm. During these years, the dynamic and expanding civilisation of Western Europe invaded the Balkan Peninsula and undermined the latter's self-sufficient natural economy. This traditional economy gave way to a money or capitalist economy, which in

turn led to fundamental changes in the social organisation and daily life of the Balkan peoples. These manifold changes can be seen less important with respect to the spectacular diplomatic crises and wars that characterised the period. But for the daily life of the average Balkan peasant, the new imperialism was more relevant and substantive.

Balkans was always important for the Austrian-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, but secondary to Central and Western European powers. Also, Austria-Hungary was a great power with vital interests in the Balkans. However, due to her economic and military weakness, the multi-nationality of her population, and the diversity of views of her policy makers, she was unable to formulate and pursue a consistent foreign policy even in the face of major events that occurred in the region (Sugar, 1985; Sosnosky, 1913).

In Austria-Hungary, advocates of an expansionist Balkan policy started gaining ground as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. That the 'Balkans are our India' was a widespread view around 1850. The Habsburgs occupied the Romanian principalities as early as 1854, but only after their expulsion from the German federation and the events of 1870-71, they began to show a deeper and more active interest in the Balkans. The traditional dynastic expansionist ideology was complemented by economic considerations after the great economic crisis of 1873 as certain branches of Austrian industry had to be protected against competition from cheap British and Belgian goods by safeguarding the Balkan market (Szasz, 1985: 86).

A major outcome of the Berlin Treaty was the Porte's growing distrust and estrangement to England. Under a separate convention, England concluded with Turkey on June 4, 1878, the occupation and administration of the island of Cyprus, so long as Russia retained Kars and Batum (Langer, 1965; 151). Turkey was to receive the surplus revenues of the island to carry out reforms in her Asiatic dominions, and to be protected in the possession of them by Great Britain. The Cyprus Convention seemed in Russia as a real threat to Russian interests, especially as it immediately produced a revival of British schemes for railway building in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. With the opening of the Suez Channel in 1839, Egypt's geopolitical importance has increased. Thus, Britain invaded Egypt in 1882. Egypt was clearly a great loss for the Ottomans. However, it was an uneven advantage for Great Britain in securing the way to India.

As result of the Berlin Treaty, independent states, Greece, Rumania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, were established on the provinces of the Ottoman Empire (Anderson, 1966; 212; 217). France sought for authority to occupy Tunisia in the future; Italy hinted at claims upon Albania and Tripoli. Greece claimed the cession of Crete, Thessaly, Epirus, and a part of Macedonia, but for the moment got nothing.

The terms of Berlin Treaty took away most of the Russian gains. "The greater Bulgaria of the San Stefano agreement was reduced, one third becoming independent and the balance remaining under a qualified and precarious Ottoman control" (Quataert, 2003: 59). In Asia, Russia acquired Ardahan,

Batum, and Kars from the Ottomans. However, the outcome of the Berlin Congress had a negative affect on German-Russian relations. Russia was antagonized by Bismarck's handling of the Berlin Conference, thereby damaging the Prussian-Russian mutual understanding.⁶

More important for the purposes of this research is Germany's position at the time of the Berlin Treaty. On June 2, 1876, German Chancellor Bismarck wrote to King Ludwig II that:

“Die Türkischen Angelegenheiten sehn bedrohlich aus und können dringliche Diplomatische Arbeit erfordern; aber unter allen europäischen Mächten wird Deutschland immer in den günstigen Lage bleiben, un sich aus den Wirren, mit welchen eine orientalische Frage den Frieden bedrohn kann, dauernd oder doch länger als andre, fern halten zu können [the affairs of Turkey look very alarming and may require urgent diplomatic intervention; however, Germany will always keep a favourable position amid all European powers and keep away from the turmoils of the Eastern Question as long as she can” (Grothusen, 1979; 79).

Bismarck was strict in his policy to keep a free hand in European affairs without getting entangled in the Eastern question. He was suggesting fostering diplomatic relations but keep away from the Eastern Question as long as possible. In the weeks after the Berlin Congress, Bismarck was anxious to get away from Near Eastern difficulties (Waller, 1974: 57). Bismarck was sympathetic to consider a Russian attempt to take Constantinople as legitimate

⁶ After the unification, Germany had allied itself with Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Three Emperors' League (*Dreikaiserbund*), but Austria-Hungary and Russia were not the best of friends, partly because they were at odds over the Balkans and partly because Russia represented the Pan-Slavic movement, whose program threatened the very existence of Austria-Hungary. The reinsurance treaty with Russia, which had been a chief feature of Bismarck's system of alliance, was not renewed in 1890. This also marked the end of *Dreikaiserbund*. The German support of Russia in East Asia and the friendly relations between Kaiser Wilhelm II and Czar Nicholas II of Russia (as revealed in the "Willy-Nicky" correspondence) were counteracted by the encouragement Kaiser Wilhelm gave to Austria in its Balkan policy.

self-defence in case Turkey was on the point of dissolution. Still, he advised the British not to irritate the Turkish government on minor questions although Germany showed cooperative attitude on humanitarian grounds on Armenian issue (Waller, 1974: 220-2). The Treaty of Berlin harmed the *Dreikeiserbund* to a great extent: Russia gradually distanced from Germany in a feeling of mistreatment during the negotiations in Berlin, causing a further rapprochement between Austria-Hungary and Germany. This change affected the German domestic politics, causing the conservative Prussian interests groups lose support in their agrarian policies in alliance with Russia.

Since the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, Crete had been in a state of unrest. Russo-Turkish War in 1877 had already caused great excitement in Crete as in other Greek provinces that were still subject to the Sultan. The Treaty of Berlin caused the disappointment of the expectation that the island will be united with Greece. However, achieving nothing from the Congress of Berlin, the Cretans resorted to armed rebellion a number of times. Occasional outbreaks of violence against the Muslim minority of the island, which began in 1885, culminated in 1889 in a revolt for autonomy, but the Ottoman government was able to repress it. In 1894, however, a new revolt took place, and this time the demand was not merely for autonomy, but for independence and annexation to Greece (Duggan, 1902, 151). On February 14, 1896, the British Consul at Canea reported the beginning of racial murders on Muslims, the initiative evidently having come from the Christians (Langer, 1965; 317). The events culminated into a violent outbreak on May 24, 1896.

Cretan uprisings are important since they were the first instance where Germany involved in directly in favour of Turkey against Britain. Germany supported that Turkish army should intervene and that Greeks should not pursue their claims any further. The international significance of the unrest in Crete was due to a potential change of status quo in this part of the Ottoman Empire. It could also encourage uprisings in other parts of the Empire, especially the Balkans. In the concert of European powers, German imperialists took the most opposing position against Greece and the rebellious Cretans, and supported the intervention of Turkish army. The expansionist interests of German finance-capital over the Balkans and the Near East was best realised if the supremacy of the Sultan was not harmed (Klein, 1976, 228-229).

However, both the Macedonian and the Cretan problems were still minor issues when compared with the Armenian question. Atrocities against Armenians, mainly in the Eastern provinces, were on the agenda of British press by the late 1880s. But it was the massacre at Sassun in 1894 that had brought the whole Eastern question into a critical state. The rights of the Christian minorities were taken under further guarantee by the Great Powers, enabling them with the capacity of direct military intervention with Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin. The Article actually implied that, from 1878 onwards, the Sultan lived under the perpetual apprehension of intervention, while his Armenian subjects could repose in the comfortable assurance that they were under the special protection of their fellow Christians throughout the world. Sassun incidents led to the formation of the short-lived Armenian Triplice, that

had revealed to the world the fundamental difference of view between England and Russia, which was supported by France. The Russians had uncompromisingly opposed all measures of coercion to guarantee the position of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in order to keep the status quo under Sultan Abdülhamid II.

Still, the threat posed by Article 61 instigated Abdülhamid II. In the British press, the atrocities against the Armenians were seen as “have been designed to Islamize the Armenians” (Duggan, 1902, 150). However, “The primary motive which animated Abdul Hamid was beyond all question not fanaticism but fear” (Marriot, 1940; 397). He was right in his fears: in June and July, 1879, the English ambassador reported to British Foreign Office that the Sultan, unless he took care, would some day have on his hands an Armenian question similar to the Bulgarian question. "The same intrigues are now being carried on in Asia Minor to establish an Armenian nationality and to bring about a state of things which may give rise to a Christian outcry and European interference" (Langer, 1965: 153). Like the rest of the Ottoman society, Armenians were watching how Greeks, Rumanians, Serbians, and Bulgarians had asserted independence one after another, forcing the Ottomans to retreat from their European domains. Together with Article 61, these developments were surely encouraging Armenian nationalist movement. Armenians had the idea that “Bulgaria was freed by the intervention of Russia, why not Armenia with the help of England" (Langer, 1965: 152). Not only irritated but also terrified by the situation, Abdülhamid II ordered the organization of Kurdish

militia known as the Hamidiye Troops.⁷ On August 26, 1896, the Armenians living in Istanbul staged a bombed attack at the Ottoman Bank in Galata. In the following few days, a very precise and discriminating counter attack directed at Gregorian Armenians took place. In Istanbul incident, the Armenians were the aggressors; the Turks were plainly within their rights in suppressing armed insurrection; thus the bombing did not entail the expected worldwide recognition for the Armenian cause. Due to the diplomatic conjuncture, the events bring about any real intervention from neither England nor Russia; however, it hampered the reputation of Sultan Abdülhamid II irretrievably, especially in British public opinion, and caused further isolation on the side of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan found Kaiser Wilhelm II as his only friend under these circumstances.⁸

⁷ Hamidie regiments, modelled on the Russian Cossack brigades, were organized in 1891, and were based on the Kurdish tribes. They were supposedly meant to act as a frontier defence force. Also, it was presented as a program designed for the settlement of nomadic Kurds. The Kurdish nomads, whom were forced to settle, were allowed to extort taxes from the Armenian highlanders. Beginning in 1892, the Hamidie regiments, sometimes supported by regular troops, began to raid the Armenian settlements, burning the houses, destroying the crops and cutting down the inhabitants. The Armenians, occasionally resisting their demands, were subject to brutal attacks by these troops. The symbiosis of settled agriculturalist and nomadic tribesman was a common practice in that region and had existed for many centuries. From the very nature of the case, the nomad preyed upon his more helpless neighbour, there was raiding and plundering and not infrequently massacre. But in the case of the Armenians, the situation was aggravated by the religious difference.

⁸ As the Armenian massacres went on, Abdülhamid was labelled as the “the bloody assassin” and the “red Sultan” (Marriot, 1940; 400; Langer, 1965; 153), this bad reputation did not deter the German Emperor: the more internationally isolated the Sultan, the greater his gratitude for a mark of disinterested friendship became. “On the Sultan's birthday, in 1896, there arrived a present from Berlin. It was carefully selected to demonstrate the intimacy of the relations which subsisted between the two Courts, almost, one might say, the two families; its intrinsic value was small, but the moral consolation which it brought to the recipient must have been inestimable: it consisted of a signed photograph of the emperor and empress surrounded by their sons” (Marriot, 1940; 401).

In the 1880s, several European powers began to promote their political and economic interests in the Ottoman Empire. Between 1875 and 1882, Britain secured 176,000 shares in the Suez Canal and occupied Cyprus and Egypt. Furthermore, Britain had strong commercial links with Mesopotamia, the Persian Gulf and the Shatt-el-Arab. France had well-established trading interests in Egypt and Syria; French officials ran the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, while Russia was showing an increasing interest in the Middle East. As a matter of fact the attitude of the various Powers on the Ottoman question was no longer determined by political conditions in Europe, but by colonial and commercial rivalry in Asia and Africa. Lord Salisbury declared the change in Britain's policy by saying on 19 November 1896 that Istanbul did not interest them any longer, that the door to the East for Britain was now in Egypt, in Suez, and when Russia recognized their possession of Egypt, they saw no obstacle to the Russian settlement in Istanbul.

The possible partitioning of the Ottoman dominions among Great Britain and Russia was bringing the rival of Germany to a highly advantaged position in the European balance of power. Germany surely did not like such easy offering of Istanbul to Russia. Even Bismarck had to readjust his policy of free hand to Russia. Thus, Germany was drawn into the Eastern Question and, convinced that she was fighting for her future existence, forced to "take on the task of renovation of Turkey" (Eucken, 1914: 67).

Still, until his resignation in 1890, Bismarck tried to keep to his famous expression that he would "never take the trouble even to open the mail bag

from Constantinople” and that “the whole of the Balkans is not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier” to the end. However, this policy of deflection turned out to be very beneficial for future German-Ottoman relations. Marriot comments that “Germany asked for nothing, but was more than compensated for her modesty by securing the gratitude and friendship of the Sultan. Never did Bismarck make a better investment” (Marriot, 1940; 343).

3.3 Transition from Bismarckian to Wilhelmian Imperialist Policy

Bismarck was the architect of German unification. The first ten years of Bismarck’s office was devoted to the task of creating a united Germany under the hegemony of Prussia. The next twenty were given to the consolidation of the position he had acquired. For Bismarck, the exposed position of Germany in the centre of Europe made it imperative to conduct German foreign policy without regard to the fluctuations of party opinion. Thus, Bismarck had not hesitated to conduct an unpopular foreign policy at certain times in order not to disturb the European balance of power. Hence, he also effectively controlled German foreign policy until his fall in 1890.

Until the end of his career, Bismarck regarded Balkan politics as outside the immediate sphere of Berlin. The Eastern Question never regularly came to

the agenda of Prussian diplomacy, even when the question became serious. He insisted that Germany had no economic or political interests in the Balkans that required her interference. Bismarck also took little interest, in the future of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. It is said that on the eve of the signature of the Treaty of Berlin, Bismarck sent for the Turkish representatives and said: "Well, gentlemen, you ought to be very much pleased; we have secured you a respite of twenty years; you have got that period of grace in which to put your house in order. It is probably the last chance the Ottoman Empire will get, and of one thing I'm pretty sure -you won't take it" (Marriot, 1940; 392).

Bismarck, in accordance with his general policy of denying any political interest of Germany in the Near East, had told the German bankers that the German government would not be able to protect their venture in politics (Holborn, 1982; 314). Undoubtedly, he would not have let German economic enterprises in Turkey interfere with his general foreign policy. The change in the official attitude from Bismarck to Kaiser Wilhelm II was illustrated in the initial stages of the Deutsche Bank's involvement in Baghdad railway. When the Deutsche Bank undertook to build a railroad from Istanbul to Ankara in 1888, Bismarck refused the bank any political protection from the government in case of a crisis. When, after 1890, the official policy changed towards making the Near East a sphere of German economic penetration, the Deutsche Bank received strong governmental support for its growing enterprises in the Ottoman Empire. It was even forced to undertake the extended plan to Baghdad

on its own contrary to the bank's sensible plan to undertake the Project in alliance with British and French banks (Holborn, 1982, 390).

The colonial rivalry enabled the Ottomans to enjoy temporary space to reorganize the army with the aid of German officers, and re-established financial credit to an extent (Duggan, 1902, 152). The colonial interests in Germany gradually forced a change in the nation's policy on the Near East and caused a great diversion from Bismarck's route. As early as the 1840s, Freiherr von Moltke, who was on a military mission at the Porte, advocated the establishment of German settlements in Palestine, while famous German economist Friedrich List declared that all European states had 'a common interest that neither of the two routes from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and to the Persian Gulf should fall into the exclusive possession of England nor remain impassable owing to Asiatic barbarism' (Henderson, 1993, 97). But it was not until the late 1880s that businessmen and politicians seriously considered the possibility of German expansion in the Near East. But then, those, who were determined at all costs to gain new colonies for Germany, hoped to secure a share of the spoils if the Ottoman Empire disintegrated. If Britain could control Cyprus and Egypt, then Germany was surely entitled to some territory in Palestine, Syria or Mesopotamia. The change in these ideas was to come with the end of Bismarck period in German history.

Bismarck's line of German policy in the Near East changed almost completely after Kaiser Wilhelm II's first visit to Istanbul in 1889. The young Emperor was anxious to initiate a new departure in the Near East and he was by

no means alone in his anxiety. On November 1, 1889, the German imperial yacht arrived at the Bosphorus carrying Kaiser Wilhelm II “as the apostle of peace; as the harbinger of economic penetration; almost, as was observed at the time, in the guise of a commercial traveller” (Marriot, 1940; 387). This attempt evolved into the keystone of German *Weltpolitik* and in that, Ottoman dominions were useful and important links in a chain of political relations. This first visit to Istanbul was the overt intimation to the diplomatic world of the breach between the young emperor and his veteran Chancellor. In the eyes of the younger generation, Bismarck’s mission was already accomplished, past belonged to him, the future to the emperor.

Wilhelm II ascended over the throne as the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia in 1888. Chancellors succeeding Bismarck were much less influential, and Kaiser Wilhelm II was in general the dominating force in his own government. In domestic affairs, he extended social reform, although he detested the socialists. Although sincerely desirous of maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain, the naval program and his commercial aspirations precluded an alliance between the Britain and Germany.

Count Hatzfeld, who served as the German ambassador to the Sublime Porte in the early eighties, was particularly influential in persuading Kaiser Wilhelm II to the commercial opportunities in the Near East. During his residence in Istanbul, Count Hatzfeld perceived the vacancy in terms of foreign influence at Istanbul. From the days of Suleiman the Magnificent to the first Napoleonic Empire, France seemed to occupy a unique position at the Porte.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, that position was overtaken by England. However, England's popularity at the Porte did not long survive the conclusion of the Cyprus Convention of 1878. It was further impaired by Mr. Gladstone's return to power in 1880, which was known not as friend of the Turks, but of the 'subject peoples' (Marriot, 1940; 393). The occupation of Egypt in 1882 was the final blow to a traditional friendship between the Ottomans and the British. Kaiser Wilhelm II was invited to fill the vacancy thus created at Istanbul.

German presence in Istanbul was not going to be initiated from scratch. Von Moltke had been on military mission to Istanbul since 1841. In the early 1880s, another military mission was sent under the command of Baron von der Goltz, a very famous and capable German commanding officer. Goltz devoted twelve years to the reorganization of the Turkish army, and the results of his teaching brought success in the brief but decisive war with Greece in 1897. Marshall von Bieberstein displayed a good deal of independence in securing Turkey's friendship during his long and successful career in Istanbul in 1887-1912. Moreover, Kinderlen-Wächter, who served as the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs since the summer of 1910, was very sympathetic to new diplomatic triumphs in Istanbul.

In the wake of Prussian soldiers, German traders and German financiers have been spreading: a branch of the Deutsche Bank of Berlin was established in Istanbul, German commercial travellers penetrated into every corner of the Ottoman Empire, many Germany maritime companies started business at the

ports of the Near East. There were ongoing missionary projects in the eastern provinces and upper Mesopotamia. However, the grand project was the Baghdad Railway.

By the autumn of 1898 when the matters concerning the railway concession were stuck, the Emperor William embarked upon a second visit to the Near East. The success of von der Goltz's pupils in the Greek War of 1897 provided a natural excuse for a congratulatory visit on the part of Kaiser to Istanbul. The Emperor and Empress started out with a grand entourage. They visited the Sultan at Istanbul from October 18-22, 1898. The second visit of the Kaiser was not confined to Istanbul and went on to the Holy Land. The pilgrimage was extended from Jaffa to Jerusalem and from Jerusalem back to Damascus. The avowed purpose of the emperor's visit to the Holy Land was the inauguration of a Protestant Church at Jerusalem. Of all the emperor's speeches during this journey, one that which he delivered at Damascus, just before leaving the Holy Land, on November 8, 1898, singles out as the most sensational (Holborn, 1982; 314). In this speech he said:

Mögen die dreihundert Millionen Mohammedaner, welche auf der Erde zerstreut leben, dessen versichert sein, daß zu allen Zeiten der deutsche Kaiser ihr Freund sein wird” Militärisch genommen: der Rekrutierungsbezirk der Bekenner des Propheten des ottomanischen Reiches erweitert sich auf alle Bekenner des Islam, aus dem Existenzkampf der Türkei wird der Dschihad, der heilige Krieg des Islam!⁹

He said “His Majesty the Sultan Abdul Hamid, and the three hundred million Mohammedans who reverence him as Caliph, may rest assured that at all times

⁹ George v. Graevenitz. “Die deutsche Militärmission in der Türkei”, *Deutsche Rundschau* 168 (Juli/Aug./Sep. 1916): 414-436.

the German Emperor will be their friend” (Marriot, 1940; 402). This unfortunate utterance, which Bülow says he tried to excise before publication, pleased Abdülhamid immensely, but did the Emperor no end of harm. It was quoted against him and against the Germans almost *ad nauseam* in the years before and during the World War, as evidence of German efforts to raise the Islamic world against England and France and Russia. As a matter of fact it created little stir at the time. It became a matter of concern in the British and French public opinion only after the Moroccan Crisis in 1905.

On the other hand, Kaiser’s speech had more reverberation in German public opinion. The pan-German tended *Welt am Montag* summarized the German program of peaceful penetration on 21.11.1898 as:

Nur die Türkei kann das Indien Deutschlands werden. [...] Der Sultan muß unser Freund bleiben, natürlich mit dem Hintergedanken, daß wir ihn ‘zum Fressen gern’ haben. Zunächst freilich kann unsere Freundschaft völlig selbstlos sein. Wir helfen den Türken, Eisenbahnen bauen und Häfen anlegen. [...] Der ‘kranke Mann’ wird gesund gemacht, so gründlich kuriert, daß er, wenn er aus dem Genesungsschlaf aufwacht, nicht mehr zum Wiedererkennen ist. Man möchte meinen, er sehe ordentlich blond, blauäugig germanisch aus. Durch unsere liebende Umarmung haben wir ihm soviel deutsche Säfte eingefiltriert, daß er kaum noch von einem Deutschen zu unterscheiden ist. So können und wollen wir die Erben der Türkei werden, von ihr selbst dazu eingesetzt. Wir pflegen den Erblasser getreulichst bis zu seinem Tode. [...] Diesem Zukunftsgedanken hat die Kaiserreise kräftig vorgearbeitet. [Only Turkey can be German India. [...] The Sultan must remain to be our friend, of course with the ulterior motives that we would most like to gorge on him. In the beginning, our friendship can be absolutely generous. We help the Turks in building railways and ports. [...] The ‘sick man’ will be made healthy, so efficiently cured that, when he woke up from his convalescence sleep, he will be out of all recognition. This means, he will look blond, blue eyed and Germanic. In our loving embracement we will inject into him so much German juices that he will not be distinguishable from a German. Thus we can and we want to be the self-appointed heirs of Turkey. We will look after the testator

faithfully until his death. [...] These projections prepared the Kaiser's journey.]”

The commercial aspect of the relations with the Sultan had not escaped the shrewd eyes of the emperor in 1889. The second visit paid by the emperor to the Sultan, in 1898, was more productive in this respect. But the promotion of the commercial interests of Germany was not its primary object. The Emperor's pilgrimage had no direct bearing on the Baghdad Railway scheme. However, Siemens, who was at Istanbul at the time of William's visit to Abdülhamid, and he was received by the Sultan in audience. But the Turks were still determined to have the road from Ankara to Diyarbakır and the German bankers had no heart for it. Siemens had little confidence in the future of Turkey so long as Abdülhamid ruled. So for the time being the Germans concentrated their efforts on securing a concession for the construction of harbour works at Haydar Paşa, which was the terminus for the Anatolian line. In the last days of January 1899 they secured what they wanted and at once began work on the new development.

The Haydar Paşa concession proved to be a crucial step in the evolution of the Baghdad Railway policy. Finally, however, the German group was forced to action in order to keep out competition by British and French entrepreneurs. Siemens and his friends regarded it as essential that competitors should be kept out to secure German commercial interests. After Bülow's encouragement to embark upon the project, Siemens finally applied for a concession to extend the line from Konya to Baghdad in May 1899.

Bismarckian attitude changed gradually not only because Wilhelm II saw in the Ottoman Empire a potential political ally of Germany and a field for German economic expansion, but also because of the changing domestic policies and international alliances. By the turn of the century, “the dislike of liberal England and the wish not to lose all contacts with Russia showed that the traditions of the Holy Alliance were not fully dead among Prussian Conservatives” (Holborn, 1982; 317). On the other hand, the chief champions of the German navy were the National Liberals and the Free Conservatives. The Conservatives voted for naval bills in order to get their grain tariffs. But they were still army people and Bismarckians who preferred friendly German-Russian relations. An Anglo-German alliance actually would have required a realignment of the internal forces of Germany as well. Bülow obviously did not feel that an alliance with England could easily be fitted into the policy which German conditions seemed to dictate and which appeared normal to him. The Germans were swelling with pride right then over the tremendous strides they were taking in these years toward industrial and commercial prominence among the nations of the world.

Meantime, German advances in the Ottoman domains were carefully watched by the other powers. Russia viewed this German penetration with grave misgivings. She expected from the German activities a considerable strengthening of the Ottoman Empire first and foremost due to the railway construction. She also distrusted Germany's declarations that her interests were exclusively commercial. Since the Baghdad railroad envisioned a land route

from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf parallel to the seaway to India via Suez, the British also did not like Germany's exclusive control of the enterprise. Yet these differences were later solved by the German concession to leave the last section of the line from Baghdad to Basra in British hands. German bankers had always wished the participation of British capital. However, the tension between Germany and Britain was not restricted to the issue of Near East; German naval building had to be limited for any possible alliance between the two countries. However, German public opinion in general was in full support of the naval project (Holborn, 1982; 315). Thus, by 1907, German naval policy on the one side and commercial policy in Ottoman Empire on the other brought England and Russia together as well as France. Thereafter, Germany and Austria-Hungary were isolated among the great powers (Holborn, 1982; 317). The new European system of alliances was convenient for the popularisation of *Mitteleuropa* policies.

3.4 Economic Scheme of Germany in the Near East: Baghdad Railway

The railways became a critical source of political power in the 18th century due to their economic and strategic importance. Railway networks not only provided inland trade routes but also contributed to the consolidation of

colonial domination for imperialist powers. A British commentator wrote in 1915 that “rail-power” was a “specialised form of military strength.”¹⁰ In this sense, German enterprise of railway construction in the Asiatic Ottoman territories, better known as the Baghdad railways, is always referred to as a symbol of German imperialism. As an example for its perception by the British, Evans wrote in 1925:

In the course of their progress eastward, the Central Powers often utilized what seemed to be perfectly innocent economic weapons. During the 30 years or so of relative peace, which followed the Congress of Berlin, the Eastern question was entering upon a new phase of its long history. The world was being opened up and progress was becoming identified more and more with the multiplication of material needs. It is not uprising, therefore, that the political dream of conquest should masquerade in the apparently peaceful garb of an "economic mission" (Evans, 1925, 6).

Certainly, the railway construction and new tariff policies changed the economic structure of the Danubian region in a manner that connected it to the Central Europe. However, the assumption that it developed deliberately as part of German expansion into the Near East is far from certain. This assumption reflects the retrospective evaluation of events after the World Wars. In this section, I will try to explain the contradiction between economic and strategic aspects of the Baghdad railway.

The idea of a railway to Baghdad goes back to the time just before the Crimean War. The British, deeply interested in the problem of communications with India, sent out Colonel Chesney to explore the Euphrates River and report on its navigability in 1830s. It was the heyday of European railway building,

¹⁰ Vernon Sommerfeld “ Rail-power and Sea-power: a study in strategy,” *The British Review* 9:3 (March 1915): 358-371.

and therefore fantastic schemes cropped up for opening up the whole east to British colonialism and commerce (Langer, 1965; 629). An active campaign was carried on in Britain, stressing the value of the Asiatic territories of Ottoman Empire for developing the formerly rich lands of Mesopotamia, its commercial and strategic value to Britain as a shorter route to India.

Nevertheless, nothing further than exploration and discussion was done with regard to Asiatic railways. After the Franco-Prussian War, British entrepreneurs were granted concessions for lines from İzmir to Aydın and Kasaba in 1856 and in 1863 respectively. Moreover, in 1880, an Anglo-Greek syndicate was granted from the Porte certain rights for railway construction in Asia Minor (Mariot, 1940; 408), although the project had never virtually been taken on due to England's indifference.

Likewise, directing German capital and German emigration towards Asia Minor and Mesopotamia was a long standing idea. In the days of Chesney's explorations, von Moltke, who was then in Ottoman military service, had already called attention to these possibilities. Moltke's views were parallel to Roscher's in its emphasis for German settlements. Meanwhile, the need for railway connection in the Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire became a matter of pressing urgency in the years following the Russian-Turkish War and the Treaty of Berlin. Abdülhamid was convinced of the tremendous value of railways for the transportation of troops, and the need for better communications in order to hold the integrity of the Empire. His enthusiasm

coincided with the German interests in the Near East and its possibilities as a field for economic penetration.

Hence, after 1870, the idea of a German railway crossing the Ottoman territories became more prevalent and more precisely defined. The next grand railway project was developed by a prominent Austrian engineer, Wilhelm von Pressel, who made careful surveys for Abdülaziz between 1872 and 1874. As a result of his surveys, Pressel finally recommended a network of railways totalling 6000 kilometres. The trunk line of this railway was suggested to run from Haydar Paşa through Ankara, Diyarbakır, and Mosul to Baghdad and Basra, with branches to Eskişehir, Kütahya, and Konya. Pressel believed that a line from Syria running through the desert and through the barren area along the middle Euphrates could never be made a paying proposition. A more northerly route through Anatolia would tap richer provinces, which should be colonized by German immigrants. He suggested the settlement of some two million Germans along this northern line in order to accelerate the development in the Ottoman Empire (Langer, 1965; 630).

In the 1880's, there was a considerable body of German writing calling attention to Anatolia as a suitable territory for German colonization. In 1880, a commercial society was founded in Berlin, with a capital of fifty million marks, to promote the “penetration” to Asia Minor, which employed a leading German cartographer, Kiepert, to survey the country systematically. In mid-1880s, German orientalist were calling attention to the favourable opening for German colonization in these regions. However, Bismarck was not prepared to

favour any activity that might estrange Russia and he therefore never went beyond giving consent for the military mission of von der Goltz as instructor for the Ottoman army.

In 1888, the Oriental Railways' Balkan line was completed and the first train from Vienna entered Istanbul. This development made Sultan Abdülhamid II, who was well aware of the need for better transformation for defensive purposes, ever more willing to see the development of the Anatolian network. The Ottoman Empire had very bad transportation system, a situation which seriously impeded the development of organized trade and of productive agriculture. The railway construction in the Ottoman Empire was a vital need not only because of the economic aspect. If the political unity and control was to be preserved and the military power be increased, railway access to distant regions of the Empire had to be established. Thus, the construction of a trunk line through the Asian domains was Abdülhamid's greatest aspiration.

Through Pressel, Abdülhamid tried to attract the interest of German financiers in the construction of railways in Asiatic Turkey in 1885, but without success. In 1886, he approached the British company which ran the Haydar Paşa-İzmit Railway with a proposal that it extend the line to Angora and ultimately to Baghdad. However, the British showed little interest since at the time political relations between the two countries were bad, the British public opinion was very negative towards the Ottomans due to Armenian problem and London bankers had no confidence in Ottoman finances. Additionally, an Anatolian railway did not seem very promising in terms of business returns. On

the other hand, the French bankers and financiers were very much interested in the undertaking of such a project. They felt less threatened with the financial instability of the Ottoman system because they had an enormous investment in Turkey already, and they controlled the Ottoman Bank, on which the Turkish government had to rely for financial aid. Indeed, French financial position was so strong that Abdülhamid did not want to let them get even stronger by granting further concessions (Langer, 1965; 632).

The third party interested in the project was the Germans. A German financier, Alfred Kaulla, who was in Istanbul arranging for a large sale of munitions, managed to win over Georg von Siemens, head of the Deutsche Bank. Thus, on October 4, 1888, the concession went to Kaulla and the Deutsche Bank, which paid six million pounds for rights in the Haydar Paşa line and agreed to build the railway to Ankara, with the understanding that ultimately it should be continued to Baghdad. The government gave a kilometric guarantee to protect the Company against heavy loss. At the same time the German group made the Sultan a much-needed loan of some million and a half pounds.

This concession was not secured without German official aid. The German ambassador Marschall von Bieberstein took the initiative of inducing German capital to seek it. The Deutsche Bank was hesitant in the beginning because the Project needed large capital investment. Bismarck, while setting no objection, made clear that he accepted no responsibility for the protection of the

company, foreseeing the struggle of influence that would be waged by railroads in Asiatic Turkey (Feis, 1930; 343).

Under the auspices of 1888 concession the Ottoman Company of Anatolian Railways was established in 1889. Sir Vincent Caillard was elected to its board so that the support of the Public Debt Organization and of British capital would be assured (Feis, 1930; 343). This so-called Anatolian railroad, which envisioned stretching from Istanbul to Ankara, was seen from the beginning as the first section of a line eventually to run to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. This marked the beginning of German enterprise in Asiatic Turkey. Moreover, under the name of Anatolian Railway Company, the Deutsche Bank and Wiener Bankverein purchased the controlling share in the Balkan railways. In 1890, a Bank for Oriental Railways was established in Zurich to serve as a holding company for both systems. The British were given three seats on the board of directors of the Anatolian Company, and at first subscribed part of the capital. But in 1890, they sold out their shares. In 1899, 40 per cent of the capital was German, 40 French and a 20 per cent was offered to the Turkish investors (Feis, 1930; 345).

For the Germans, the Anatolian Railway was a good opportunity to sell a good deal of construction material and machinery. Their exports to Turkey rose from about three million dollars in 1888 to about ten million in 1893. Additionally, the shipping company *Deutsche Levante Linie*, which was opened in 1889, established direct communication by water and became an important part of the German commercial advance. A large number of German traders

engaged in lively competition with the British and French, and before long captured a considerable part of the market.

The line to Ankara was completed in the autumn of 1892. Right afterwards, Abdülhamid invited the German interests for an extension of the line from Ankara by way of Sivas to Baghdad. However, Siemens and the Deutsche Bank showed little enthusiasm for they lacked the capital and the difficulties of the terrain indicated expensive construction work. They offered to consider a somewhat more southerly route by way of Kayseri and Harput, but they actually preferred a long branch from the Ankara line through Afyon to the rich area around Konya. Since the matter dragged on, Abdülhamid took it to Wilhelm II to support his scheme. Unlike Bismarck, Wilhelm II was profoundly interested in the Near East and its possibilities. But even his approval failed to move the German bankers, who looked upon the whole affair from the business standpoint and saw little profit in a line which, after all, was designed for strategic rather than for economic purposes.

Still, the negotiations of February 15, 1893, concluded a concession providing for the construction of two lines, one from Eskişehir to Konya, which was to be built at once, and another from Ankara to Kayseri. The second line was to be extended from Kayseri to Sivas as soon as the Haydar Paşa-Ankara line showed returns of 15,000 francs per kilometre for three consecutive years. It was to continue to Diyarbakır and Baghdad as soon as the other German lines showed returns large enough to enable them to dispense with the government guarantee. But the Turkish government reserved the right to demand at any time

the prolongation of the line from Kayseri to Baghdad, making the necessary arrangements for guarantee (Langer, 1965; 635). However, only the Eskişehir-Konya line was built and completed in 1896.

Because of the Armenian problems between 1894 and 1898, European public, including the German, generally hated Abdülhamid II was and, far from wishing to strengthen his position, hoped for his deposition and expected the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Despite this fact, Abdülhamid kept trying to attract German entrepreneurs to take on the railway construction. However, Germans had neither the interest nor the capital. With British co-operation they might have been able to do something, but apart from political considerations the British looked upon the Baghdad railway scheme as a thing of the past. British interests concentrated on keeping a firm hold on Egypt and a safe watch on the Suez Canal. Besides, there was already mounting tension between Germany and Britain, which stood on the way of any possibility of cooperation.

The victory of the Ottoman army over the Greeks in 1897 had once again proved the vitality of railways for the defence of the Ottoman Empire. The victory also brought a renewed interest in Anatolia as a field for economic enterprise. The Pan-German League put out a pamphlet expounding extravagant hopes for the future, and a number of other German books emphasized the importance of the question. Likewise, the new German ambassador Marschall von Bieberstein was enthusiastically in favour of pushing German influence almost from the moment of his arrival in Istanbul in 1887. But the German bankers held back, partly because Sultan Abdülhamid II

and his military leaders were still insisting on the Ankara-Kayseri route instead of the northern route. Moreover, understanding with British financial interests was refused by Marschall von Bieberstein. Thus, the Deutsche Bank applied to the German government for a guarantee, which was going to be refused by Bismarck after some delay.

Finally, in 1898-99, right after Kaiser Wilhelm II's second visit to Istanbul, the Deutsche Bank received the concession for the erection of the port of Haydar Paşa, the starting point of the Anatolian and Baghdad railroad on the Bosphorus, and late in 1899 it also received in principle the concession for the construction of the Baghdad-Basra line. Further concessions were obtained between that time and 1902, and in 1903, the convention for the construction of a railway from Istanbul to Baghdad was finally concluded.

For the German government, this railway was thought to connect Berlin to the Persian Gulf by virtually continuous rail. It was going to be a link in a much longer chain stretching from Hamburg to Vienna, and then by way of Budapest, Belgrade, and Nish to Istanbul, with an ultimate extension from Baghdad to Basra. Thus, it represented a land route to India, one more advantage for Germany in her rivalry with Britain. Unlike the German government, the Deutsche Bank under the direction of Siemens stuck to the purely economic nature of the Baghdad railway enterprise. The economic aspect of Baghdad railway implied the opening up of the economically promising parts of Anatolia, and the Deutsche Bank administration cared neither about the Kaiser's nor the Sultan's strategic plans. However, their

activities were under considerable political pressure from the German government and thus underwent a profound change of character in terms of depending on government securities after the 1890's.

On the part of the railway company, the terrain was difficult and it did not promise much profit. This situation tried to be compensated by the terms of the concession, which assigned extensive subsidiary rights. According to the conditions of the concession, the Ottoman government guaranteed to cover operating expenses up to 4,500 francs per kilometre. The materials needed for the railroad construction and development of the road, and the coal used for its operation were going to be free of domestic taxes and customs. The land required for right of way was going to be conveyed free of charge to the company. Timber necessary for the construction and operation of the railway might be cut without compensation from the state forests. The railroad property and revenue were given perpetual tax exemption, the company was given the right to operate tile and brick works along the railway, and to establish hydroelectric plants to generate light and power, and the mining rights within a zone 20 kilometres each side of the line (Feis, 1930; 347). Under these positive conditions provided by the Ottoman state, the possible routes were surveyed and made definitive finally in the winter of 1902.

In March 1903, the Baghdad Railway Company was established by the Deutsche Bank under the Ottoman Law. The charter of the company provided for the subscription of 10 percent of the capital by the Anatolian Railway Company. At least three of the eleven members of the board of directors were

to be appointed by the board of the Anatolian Railway Company, and at least three others were to be Ottoman subjects. These specifications were targeting at an assured German-Turkish control on the company. Still, the Deutsche Bank started the negotiations with French and British financial groups for the disposition of the bonds to be issued in their stock exchanges to finance the first section. The Deutsche Bank needed not only the participation of the British capital, but also the cooperation of the British government. However, both French and British governments discouraged the participation of their citizens. Despite its earlier sympathy with the Project, French government declared that it would refuse official listing to the Baghdad Railway bonds and admonished the bankers not to participate (Feis, 1930; 349).

Germany had a couple of expectations from the British cooperation. First, Germany wanted Britain to join efforts with Germany to get general consent to an increase in customs duties, whereby the Ottoman government could meet the interest guaranties more easily. Second, Britain was expected to send the Indian mails over the new rail route and pay the subsidy for its carriage. However, in the spring of 1903, a press campaign hostile to German imperialistic enterprise swept Britain and influenced the political and financial circles. A general feeling of unfriendliness against the German naval program and African aspirations were spreading among the masses. Additionally, the Baghdad Railway Project was seen as a prelude to a dangerous German-Turkish alliance. In government and official circles, the construction of a Baghdad railway was seen as putting India, the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal in

danger. Thus, “[o]n April 23, 1903, Mr. Balfour declared in the House of Commons that the government would not give support to the Baghdad Railway scheme” (Feis, 1930; 351). As a result, the German attempts, especially those of Arthur Gwinner, as the representative of the Deutsche Bank, at securing the British cooperation came to no avail

The immediate reactions to Baghdad railway undertaking came from Russia claiming that this German scheme would harm the Russian agriculture making Anatolia and Mesopotamia a great rival granary and that Russia should not tolerate any infringement of *status quo* in Asia Minor or Mesopotamia. It has been said by many writers that the northern route was abandoned because of Russian protests. But, arguing that there is no evidence for such particular protest and change, Langer maintained that the Russian opposition seems to have been to the general strengthening of Ottomans by the development of transportations and communications, rather than to any particular line. Therefore, Langer suggested that the Kayseri-Sivas extension was not constructed because the Germans did not see it as a good business opportunity, considering the resources provided by the Ottoman state still not enough for such a burdensome railway undertaking (1965; 340).

Until the German and British interests arrived at a final bitter clash in the Moroccan crisis of 1905, Britain preferred German investment in Asia Minor than that of Russian. The British press pointed out that it is better to have the Germans in Anatolia and Mesopotamia than the Russians, who could later become an obstacle to British commerce. But, the German investment was

favoured on the condition of British participation. “It was Germany’s mission to open up Asia Minor and to irrigate Mesopotamia, just as it was England’s mission to develop Africa” (Langer, 1965; 644). However, during Moroccan Crisis, the British public opinion noticed the dangerous anti-colonialist discourse of German economic imperialism.

The diplomacy of the Baghdad railway set the European agenda once again when new Ottoman government after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 insisted that the Deutsche Bank sought British participation once again. The Young Turk regime, regarding Germany as the supporter of the reactionary and oppressive politics of Abdülhamid II, looked to France and Great Britain for sympathetic support in what had been hailed at the time of the revolution as an effort to create a constitutional and enlightened government (Feis, 1930; 322-3). However, on the part of the British cabinet, the same refusal stood. The French government always imposed conditions or sought advantage in giving official loans to Ottomans. Again in 1910 the French government attempted to impose conditions, which caused the Turkish government to borrow in Germany against its original desire. Only the German government presses the banks to arrange a loan and without any conditions attached to it. “The Kaiser issued in his order to the Chancellor ‘We must help Turkey financially without condition, with the aid of Austria, so that she will not come permanently under Anglo-French domination. Speak to Gwinner about this’” (Feis, 1930; 326). The financial aid restored the position of Germany in Istanbul and made the German appear as a dependable ally leading to even stronger relations than with

the old regime. Soon, Germans bank under the leadership of Deutsche Bank provided the financial aid that was denied to the Young Turks in London and Paris, reviving the prestige of Germany at the Porte. Feis maintained that this was the decisive moment when Young Turk movement turned to “aggressive nationalism, of which Germany alone, of the Great Powers, had nothing to fear” (1930; 354).

Germany’s policies for economic expansion in the Near East deeply influenced the building of the nation states in the Balkan Peninsula especially during the years between 1906 and 1913 (Schulte, 1980: 7). The crisis in the Balkans after the revolution in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 became uncontrollable. On the grounds of political disorder, Austria annexed Bosnia and this encouraged and uncovered the already existing irritation towards the Ottomans among the Balkan nations. Developments in the Balkan Peninsula directly concerned Germany particularly in relation to armaments exports to the Ottoman Empire. Both the armaments policy and the balance between the Great Powers were endangered with the unexpected result of the Balkan Wars: in a very short period, Ottoman Empire lost most of its territory in Europe except for Istanbul and a small hinterland, and retreated back to defence line in Çatalca. The defeat of Ottoman army in the Balkan War of 1912 was a big surprise and was very frustrating for Germany. This could not be taken as the success of German military mission in Turkey. Germany for the last quarter of a century had laid all her hopes on Ottoman Empire in case of a confrontation with England. But this defeat and retreat signified a power vacuum in the south-

eastern Europe. However, as we will see in the following chapter, left-liberal defenders of *Mitteleuropa* tried to evaluate the Ottoman retreat as an opportunity than as a disaster.

The final test to the efficiency of German penetration in the Near East became the Great War. In early 1915, it became clear that the Ottoman Empire could not survive a long war unless available resources in material and men were carefully preserved and cautiously managed (Villari, 1905; Wendel, 1918; Heymann, 1938; Weber, 1970; Pavlowitch, 1999). The channels of supply from central Europe had to be kept open though none of the Balkan states had yet sided with the Central Powers. Austria could not be trusted to get German supplies to the Ottoman front, much less to enlarge her own aid. Finally, the Baghdad Railway proved nearly as unserviceable as the Balkan railroads, for it was still incomplete. And the first year of the war showed that it would not be easy for Germany to acquire new allies in the Balkans, on the contrary, there was a clear challenge to her prestige.

The Balkan railroad as the main connection between Germany and Ottoman Empire proved to be a serious problem. Though Germany's military commitment in the Ottoman Empire was far larger than Austria's, its lines of transport were inadequate and were almost completely under the control of the Dual Monarchy and its Balkan neighbours. At the beginning of the war, attempts were made to send supply ships down the Danube, but they were subjected to bombardment by Serbian shore batteries and to the danger of mines in the river. The Bulgarian government claimed that mines were a danger

to peaceful commerce and demanded that Russians sweep the river. But the Russians gave no satisfaction and Sofia was reluctant to press the matter too far for there was already too much suspicion that the Bulgarians, while technically neutral, were serving the interests of the Central Powers.

As a conclusion, it must be noted that German enterprise was of a purely economic nature at first. However, the amount of German investments naturally contributed to the existing political interest in the strengthening and preservation of the Ottoman Empire. The prospects of a great German route from Berlin to Baghdad seized upon the German imagination and conjured up hopes of a great economic influence in the Near East. German investments also provided the German government an excuse to engage in political and military arrangements to secure economic interests. On the other hand, from the start, the Baghdad Railway signified a threat to India for the British public opinion. It became a symbol of the German rivalry against British dominance overseas, which became more severe with the German Naval Bill of 1900. Despite the rising tension between the Germany and Britain, the directors of the Deutsche Bank always preferred to finance the Baghdad railroad on an international basis. Almost until the eve of the Great War, there was still opportunity for German-British collaboration. Moreover, left-liberals in Germany always supported attempts at collaboration with Britain, in a manner which clearly distinguished them from pan-German imperialism, which, on the contrary, preferred the alliance of Russia. Baghdad railway reflected the economic aspect

of German imperialism, although the Entente powers saw and represented it as the scheme of pan-German expansionism.

3.5 Political Scheme of Germany: Pan-Islamism

3.5.1 Pan-Islamism and the Caliphate

One aspect of German-Ottoman relations was the relation of Germany with Islam. An alliance with Islam by via the alliance with Turks was seen as extremely beneficial for Germany in her imperialist rivalry with Britain, France and Russia. Thus, the title of the caliphate and pan-Islamism emerged as important points of disagreement in British-German imperial rivalry. Germany's naval policy on the one side and her policy in the Ottoman Empire on the other have already been sources of tension between the two countries. While the Baghdad Railway Project reflected the economic aspect of Germany's rapprochement to Ottoman Empire, pan-Islamism reflected the political aspect. After the resolution of Morocco crisis in 1905 in favour of Britain and France, German and British imperial interests started colliding blatantly, and the legitimacy of the Ottoman possession of caliphate became a more important and controversial issue (Farah, 1989; Hamad, 1988). The policy

towards the Muslim world was especially solidified only after 1905 when the anti-Turkish front was established solidly, when, in the face of the pressure for reforms in Macedonia, Germany sided with the Ottomans and the Muslim world (Kampen, 1968: 59; 62).

Pan-Islamism referred to two major ideas: first, that the Ottoman sultan-caliph possessed religious authority over all Muslims, and second, that the Ottoman sultan as the legitimate caliph had the right to call Muslims on a holy war against the infidels. Sultan Selim I acquired the role of titular caliph after the conquest of Egypt in 1517, by which the title passed onto him. For almost four hundred years, the title has not been brought out in the conduct of affairs of state or as an instrument of foreign policy by the Ottoman sultans. Also, until the decade preceding the Great War, the possession of the title of caliph by the Ottoman sultans has never been questioned. In the last decade before the Great War, the title acquired a new interpretation (or a misinterpretation) in the context of the rivalry among great European powers.

The origin of the controversy among great powers over the rightful possession of the title of caliph lied in the Kaiser Wilhelm II's visit to Istanbul and Damascus in 1899. As mentioned before, in Damascus he declared himself the protector of all Muslims. According to Earle:

The German Government had no intention of overlooking the political possibilities of this religious penetration. Promotion of missionary activities might be made to serve a twofold purpose: first, to win the support, in domestic politics, of those interested in the propagation of their faith in foreign lands - more particularly to hold the loyalty of the Catholic Centre party; second, to further one other means of

strengthening the bonds between Germany and the Ottoman Empire (1966:133).

However, pan-Islamist politics were cast aside in the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turk revolution. Still, Kaiser Wilhelm II continued to believe in the potential of pan-Islamism and that with the green flag the British colonists would be dislodged (Kampen, 1968: 62). Given that the one of the largest Muslim populations in the world was that of India, which was then under British domination, Kaiser's declaration in Damascus implied a challenge to British colonial authority. Moreover, whereas Britain, France and Russia controlled the Muslims residing outside the Ottoman Empire, Germany had no colonial domination on Muslim lands. Thus, the caliphate's role influenced Anglo-German rivalry especially in 1904-1914 and, Germany deliberately attempted to exploit pan-Islamism in order to weaken British dominance in India and Egypt during the Great War.

The debate attracted public attention in 1906, when Prince Sabahattin wrote an article in the *London Times* defending the legitimacy of the possession of the title by the Ottoman sultans. Those who challenged its legitimacy claimed that Selim I could not have legitimately acquired the title, since the unchanged creed of Islam called for the bearer of the title to be a descendant of Prophet's tribe Quraysh. Reverend Malcolm McColl, an apologist of British dominance over Muslim peoples, alleged that this precept was recognized both by al Azhar, bastion of Islamic approval, and by the Indian Muslims as well. Vàmbery, as a famous scholar and defender of Islam, supported Prince Sabahattin's remarks. Vàmbery added that although the sultan was regarded as

the spiritual leader of Indian Muslims, his title as caliph did not empower him over them since their worldly matters were in the hands of another secular power (Farah, 1989: 265).

Behind the debates over the legitimacy of the possession of the title by the Ottoman sultans was possibility of declaration of a holy war against all Christian rulers. Declaration of holy war (Jihad) by an Ottoman sultan in alliance with Germany was received as a real thread especially on the part of Britain that was not only concerned about the situation in India, but also in Egypt. Freiherr von Oppenheim, the German consular in Egypt, reported to Chancellor von Bülow in 1908 that British policy aimed at weakening the Ottoman state by detaching the title of caliphate from the sultan as well as the Arabian Peninsula by supporting Arab nationalism. Oppenheim wisely observed that in case Canada, Australia and South Africa was to part from the commonwealth, India and Egypt would become much more important for Britain as the only remaining colonies. He predicted that a prospective engagement of Britain against the Ottoman Empire would result in the uprising of Indian and Egyptian Muslims. Thus, Britain was deliberately and persistently trying to weaken the Ottoman Empire and nullify any authority of declaration of Jihad by the Sultan.

Meanwhile, on the British side, the fear of German cultural and economic expansionism was combined with the concerns over Islamic revival and Egyptian nationalism. British press blamed the organized German and Ottoman propaganda for the rise of Islamic movement everywhere in the

Muslim world. It was argued that Abdülhamid II's residence Yıldız palace had become the seat of pan-Islamic propaganda since the British occupation of Egypt in 1881. Allegedly, after the German rapprochement to the Porte, this propaganda had become a tool in German imperial policy. In fact, the British suspicion on Germany's Islamic policy was instigated by the Moroccan and Macedonian crisis: Germany legitimized her intervention in the Moroccan crisis on grounds of defending the rights of Muslims and Kaiser refused coercing the Porte for reforms in Macedonia. British observers believed that Macedonian issue and other actions of Kaiser proved his aspiration to gain the confidence of the Muslims. Fearing the consequences of pan-Islamism on their rule in Tunisia and Algeria, French circulated anti-German pamphlets warning Muslims not to believe that Germany was a friend of Islam.

Germany, on the other hand, rejected all accusation of disseminating pan-Islamism. Kaiser's visits to the Middle East and his relations with the Ottoman sultan were denied to have any responsibility in the rising Islamic sentiments. Moreover, Britain and France were invited to reconsider their administrations as the source of dissidence among the Muslims. Mustafa Kamil, Egyptian nationalist leader, wrote in the *Berliner Tageblatt* (23.10.1905) that England was trying to consolidate her dominance in the Muslim world by stripping the Turks of the caliphate and damaging the Ottoman Empire by using the Armenian crisis (Farah, 1989: 280).

3.5.2 Assessing the Success of pan-Islamist Policy

The success of pan-Islamism as part of Ottoman foreign policy is questionable. Since the seventeenth century, there was a considerable decline in the ability of the Sultans to exercise their authority over large areas of their realm. This decline was reflected in "the weakening of central authority over the provinces, the gradual breakdown of effective administration, and the continued deterioration of public security" (Levy, 1979: 325). Many provinces in the Ottoman Empire broke away in the early nineteenth century as a result of nationalist movements (Chiot & Barkey, 1983: 42). In order to counter the influence of nationalist sentiments and strengthen their claim to absolute authority, Ottoman sultans resorted to stressing their religious role as caliphs, or the divinely inspired leaders of Islam. The Ottoman sultans' claim for the spiritual leadership of Muslim societies received support from the German intelligentsia. Abdülhamid's Islamic policy clearly received support from India, Iraq and Egypt. However, even during the reign of Abdülhamid, the efforts to stress the Islamic features of his office was not uniformly received within the Arab provinces of the Empire due to different local conditions and great confessional diversity. The dominant political trends among the Arabs during and after Abdülhamid's reign gradually became characterised by a growing sense of Arab cultural distinctness.

On the other hand, the Young Turks' original ideal for the empire was based on Ottomanism, as expressed in the name of their party; 'Committee of Union and Progress'. Their program was based on a league of brotherly fusion of all Ottoman elements irrespective of religious and ethnic differences. Ottomanism was an attempt to generate feelings of Ottoman patriotism, which could be embraced by all the subject peoples of the multinational Empire. After the revolution, in a speech delivered at the Liberty Square in Salonica in 1908 Enver declared:

Today arbitrary government has disappeared. We are all brothers. There are no longer in Turkey Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbians, Rumanians, Muslims and Jews. Under the same blue sky, we are all proud to be Ottomans (Werner, 1968: 1301-1308).

The Young Turks, after the revolution in 1908, tried to replace Hamidian pan-Islamism with Ottomanist ideals. Arminius Vàmbery, a Hungarian traveller in the Ottoman Empire, a notable Turkolog and an apologist of Islam, criticized the Young Turks for abandoning Abdülhamid's Islamic policy and regretted the lack of response to the appeals of the Tartar Muslims against their Russian occupiers.

Recurring revolts in the Balkan provinces showed that Ottomanist sentiment could, at best, attract only the predominantly Muslim peoples of the Empire, Arabs and Turks, which would bring it closer to pan-Islamism. During the Balkan Wars, Ottoman caliphate as a vital symbol of the independence of Islam from Europe was promoted to produce Ottomanism patriotism in the Syrian provinces of the Empire (Cleveland, 1985: xvi). The Arab antagonism against the Ottoman rule, which started by the introduction of *Tanzimat*

reforms, was strengthened by the Young Turk attempts at centralization and Turkification. Hence, the uprisings of the Muslim Albanians and rebellions in Yemen did not wait for long to break out. These rebellions proved that pan-Islamism was not a reliable argument for unity in the Empire.

Nevertheless, having adopted pan-Islamism as part of German propaganda long ago, Germany was eager to fully exploit the chance of having the bearer of Caliphate by her ranks. German hopes on provoking a large scale revolution in India were largely based on Oppenheim's reports. The alliance with Ottoman Empire was seen essential to stir pan-Islamism in India and Egypt in order to destroy England (Fischer, 1967: 126) German anti-Russian agitation supported the Turkomans and other Muslim groups in the Caucasus even before the Great War (Fischer, 1967: 134-5). During the War, Kaiser's speech in Damascus acquired a new meaning: it was militarily interpreted as the extension of the recruitment basis from the believers of the Prophet in the Ottoman Empire to all believers of Islam, through which the Turkish war of survival became Jihad, the holy war of Islam.¹¹ Thus, despite their dislike and distrust for pan-Islamic policies, Young Turks were forced to resort to a call for Jihad in 1914. The American ambassador in Istanbul, Henry Morgenthau, reported that:

The Sultan's proclamation [of war] was an official public document, and dealt with the proposed Holy War [*Jihad*] only in a general way, but about this same time a secret pamphlet appeared which gave instructions to the faithful in more specific terms. This paper was not

¹¹ George v. Graevenitz. "Die deutsche Militärmission in der Türkei", *Deutsche Rundschau* 168 (Juli/Aug./Sep. 1916): 414-436.

read in the mosques; it was distributed stealthily in all Mohammedan countries (India, Egypt, Morocco, Syria and many others) and it was significantly printed in Arabic, the language of the Koran. It was a lengthy document full of quotations from the Koran, and its stile was frenzied in its appeal to racial and religious hatred. It described a detailed plan of operations for the assassination and extermination of all Christians except those of German nationality (1918: 106-7).

Furthermore, German propaganda efforts became more tangible after the onset of the war. The Entente powers were well aware of the fact that Germans "spread news favourable to their cause; they buy up some newspapers, and influence others; they leave no stone unturned to damage the position of those who are opposed to them; they bribe and threaten in every way they can devise the people whose support they covet so keenly" (Buxton, 1915: 22). In Istanbul, German ambassador Wangenheim purchased one of the largest Turkish newspapers, *İkdam*, which immediately began to praise Germany and abuse Entente. The *Osmanischer Lloyd*, published in French and German, was already the official organ of the German embassy. Although Turkish constitution guaranteed free press, a censorship was established in the interests of the Central Powers.

Yet, Arab antagonism, which has been strengthened with the abandonment of pan-Islamism by the Young Turk regime, completely shackled the effect of the call for Jihad diminishing any chance of meaningful response to the repeated calls. For the Turkish internal politics, Jihad as an attempt to unite all Muslim elements against the common enemy turned out to be a failure in the face of the Arab insurgence. The hopes of the German leaders that the appeal of the Sultan to Jihad would stop the Muslim soldiers of the Entente to

fight against the Germans remained unfulfilled (Hagen, 1990: 6). As a result, the success of the call for Jihad in the Great War was rather dubious. In a sense, pan-Islamism and the authority of the title of caliphate was unduly exaggerated by the British, who were alarmed by the idea that pan-Islamism could unite the Muslim world against Britain.

In the context of the Eastern question, the Germany first entered in the European balance of power as a negotiator during the Berlin Congress. Bismarck's attitude towards the Eastern question in course of the Congress and its aftermath was characterised by caution: he did not want Germany to involve in the complexities of the Near East and was not interested in the region in any commercial sense. However, the German imperialist policy became subject to a radical change when the dominance of Bismarck was replaced by that of Kaiser Wilhelm. Then, the Near East became the focus of German commercial expansion under the guidance of the Deutsche Bank and according to the needs of younger sections of German industry. Accordingly, protection of the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire became part of the German foreign policy.

German expansion in the Near East had two components: economic aspect is represented by Baghdad Railway Project whereas the political aspect can be observed in support for pan-Islamist movements. Baghdad Railway Project was based on purely economic concerns backed up by the perspective economic imperialism. Support for pan-Islamist movements entailed an opposition to colonialism. Yet, when tested in the course of the Great War, both components

were successful only in a limited way in the establishment of efficient German domination in the Near East.

CHAPTER 4

GERMAN IDEAS ON EXPANSION IN THE NEAR EAST

The processes, through which Baghdad Railway Project and pan-Islamist propaganda has developed, establish that German expansion in the Near East was not planned by pan-German circles, but by liberal circles. The origin of the propaganda for German expansion in the Near East attests to the change in dominant imperialist policy from a colonialism to economic imperialism. This change was most clearly reflected in the publicity of Baghdad railway, new interest in Islam, increasing need of information and research on the Near East. The context of the publication promoting economic imperialism provides the details of the characteristics of German economic imperialism in their attitude towards the Ottoman Empire, Islam, Baghdad Railway, and minorities. This propaganda activity was the product of the scholar and journalistic groups which were sponsored by the younger sectors of German economy. These

groups can be studied in three categories. The first group was united around the idea of *Mitteuropa*. The second group was led by Hugo Grothe, a German orientalist who turned from colonial to economic imperialist propaganda. The third group contributed to pan-Islamist propaganda through the works of Islamologists.

4.1 The Origin and Publicity of *Mitteuropa*

The concept *Mitteuropa* gained more currency after the German unification, which gave way to broader fantasies on unification in a wider geographical, political, economical and military sense. It had various definitions and different protagonists from Kaiser Wilhelm II to Hitler.

In its origin, the concept *Mitteuropa* was first put forth by Friedrich List, who thought that the Prussian Customs Union was too small to exist safely among the British Empire and a growing United States and Russia. He, thus, wanted to see all of Germany and the whole of Habsburg Empire brought into an economic union called the *Mitteuropa* (Holborn, 1982: 21). List argument of "economic struggle for existence" represented by *Mitteuropa* united academic socialists, liberal imperialists, and of a group of pan-German publicists.

List's ideas were influenced by the German national awakening and the liberal theories of Adam Smith. List advocated the customs union between Germany and Austria. He saw a German-Magyar empire as the heir to the soon-to-collapse Ottoman Empire. List believed that when the Ottoman Empire fell, the vacuum in the Balkans would be filled by the Austrians. In a customs union and political alliance with Austria, Germany could secure a sphere of influence on the Balkans. He also suggested the establishment of a free-trade area in close trade relations with the Levant via the Adriatic ports of Austria. He was interested in the planning and construction of railroads while developing his ideas for economic modernization and unification. His major work, *The National System of Political Economy*, attracted great attention when it appeared in 1841.

Briefly, List argued for a national state unified by a community of cultural and political institutions, resting upon an economy balanced between agriculture and industry, and integrated by a modern system of transportation. List also emphasized the free importation of agricultural products and raw materials and moderate tariff protection for manufactures facing foreign competition. Thus, it can be said that List's concept was a faithful reflection of his bourgeois republican constitutional thought. Foreseeing the expansion of population in such a state and acknowledging the limits to German colonization, he concluded that the future of a German state lay on the continent and must seek its 'colonies' there.

Contrary to his contemporaries, List did not see *Auswanderung* as a great problem and thought that the massive emigration from Germany would sort itself out in time. If the government had to do something about the migration, it should direct it to Danubian basin as alternative to United States (Henderson, 1983; 105). In 1842, List investigated the prospects of German emigration into south-eastern Central Europe. He wrote; 'we have our backwoods as well as the Americans: the lands of the Lower Danube and the Black Sea, all of Turkey, the entire Southeast beyond Hungary is our hinterland' (Meyer, 1955; 13). A similar proposition had recently been made by Helmut von Moltke, who was on a military mission to the Porte since the late 1830s but with a significant difference: he advocated the creation of German settlements in the Balkans and Palestine.

The development of industrial thinking gave rise to a new form of imperialism. Instead of possession of colonies, means of protecting markets and sources of raw materials by favourable foreign relations and import tariffs became the dominant perspective in line with List's thinking (Smith, 1978: 13). *Mitteleuropa* thinking gained more significance after the economic crisis of 1873 in the face of the rising prices in crucial raw materials like cotton, coffee and rubber. Thus, it emphasized the development of areas where production of such raw materials could be enhanced by German investment and technological support.

Bismarck adopted a moderate conception of List's *Mitteleuropa* as a military alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary against Russia,

deliberately renouncing the incorporation of the Germans of Austria and any active interest in the Balkans (Jäckh, 1939, 764). The Bismarckian compromise between Prussian agrarianism and bourgeois industrialism could be interpreted as an example of the economic balance and protectionism of List's national system, but it was in contradiction with List's larger mid-European ideas. List believed that the world was getting divided into large economic areas, which would eventually lead to struggle for domination. For Germany not to become a victim of this trend, he urged the German people to organize Middle Europe and Near East into a political federation and an economic entity. List specifically suggested a railroad through Middle Europe and the Near East to the Persian Gulf to insure easy and rapid communication and transportation.

In this sense, the *Mitteleuropa* perspective represented an alternative both in method and direction to the colonialist *Weltpolitik* that was supported by the alliance of big Prussian agriculture and old sectors of the industry. Thus, the diplomatic alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary on Middle European conceptions was not stable due to the protectionist economic policies both Empires were pursuing by 1870s. For many years after 1879, despite the diplomatic ties of the Dual Alliance and efforts by Austrian-Germans particularly to relieve economic tension between Germany and Austria-Hungary, commercial relations were often severely strained by tariff wars. Those who supported free-trade in Danubian region enthusiastically argued for a customs union, but Bismarck's support could not be secured for the project (Holborn, 1969; 240).

Yet, List was not alone in his concerns and solutions about Germany's position in a world market. In the early 1880's, economic journalist, later Pan-German Paul Dehn was writing about mid-European future for Germany. His book *Deutschland und Orient* was based on the views and conclusions of Wilhelm Pressel, the designer of mid-European and Turkish railways. Dehn revealed a strong distaste for the western European powers that were reaching Asia Minor by sea and thus conveniently 'plundering' the area. It was to be the destiny of *Mitteleuropa* to stop this process of Near Eastern disintegration at the hands of Western Europe and to lead south-eastern Europe and Asia Minor to a new era of development. This was going to be achieved by developing rail and water transportation. Land route was clearly disadvantaged to the sea route, but there were 'greater cultural rewards'.

The concept of *Mitteleuropa* inspired the Austro-Prussian alliance of 1879, the eastern voyage of William II in 1897, the Baghdad Railroad concession of 1899. These events became the themes of many *Stammtisch* discussions and numerous cultural lectures, all supported by the scientific evidence of a map, which proved by geometric logic what was already an 'obvious' route from Berlin to Baghdad. From earliest times the Danube was available as a trade route. In 1888, it was supplemented by completion of a rail line from Vienna to Istanbul. It was believed that Germany's road to the Near East lay across the Balkan Peninsula. Germany was pushing towards the Near East and that the Baghdad Railway was the exit for the land-locked Reich along a convenient path, although the Danube flowed in the wrong direction.

These ideas gained official significance under the rule of Kaiser Wilhelm II. German chancellor Caprivi was faced with an economic depression shortly after he came to power in 1890. Because of the rise in Russian import duties and the prospects of a severe increase in French protection, and similar tendencies in some other states, Germany was faced with the necessity of reconsidering her position as a commercial power. Commerce and industry had been expanding rapidly. Thus Caprivi coined the slogan, 'Either we export goods or we export men' (Meyer, 1955; 62).

In accordance with this commercial policy, a number of treaties were concluded starting from 1891. This 'Caprivi system' evoked a tremendous protest in agrarian sector in Germany. The Chancellor was not an economic liberal, but held fast to the protectionist foundations of German economy. He merely attempted to make a few adjustments in the structure, to liberalize it enough to gain certain benefits Germany's young export industry. It is doubtful if Caprivi was actively seeking to create an economic *Mittleuropa*. Still, his treaties marked a transitional stage in Germany's economic development. Writing in 1901, however, Karl Helfferich attributed the phenomenal increase in German commerce since 1894, directly to the Caprivi treaties.

In fact, *Mittleuropa* in the Wilhelmian period grew out of the unanticipated shattering of the web of *Weltpolitik*. *Mittleuropa* reflects the continental orientation of certain forces, interests and major personalities of the Wilhelmian Era. It was an atmosphere of opportunism, rather than full-fledged freedom that gave an optimistic sense of progress, but lacked any

comprehensive view of policy-making. The unprecedented prosperity and expansion produced superb engineers, merchants, and businessmen such as Georg von Siemens, Gwinner, Alfred Ballin, Schwabach, Robert Bosch, and Rathenau. During pre-war imperialism, over-confidence and self-intoxication was produced in all European nations, but The Reich-Germans were affected especially severely. What complicated the situation gravely were the fact of German military power and its great potentialities of growth. The German variety of this European phenomenon was particularly evident because of the combination of national youthfulness, technological proficiency, and extreme public pride in the fact of newly-gained power.

Parallel to this atmosphere of opportunism, there was a tendency to inflate German financial interest in Turkish railroads and the cultivation of the lands along its route. The fantastic nature of most pamphlets was severely criticized by more serious authors, like Goltz, writing for *Deutsche Rundschau*. Popular willingness to jump to exaggerated conclusions was not peculiar to Germans; the British press was in full speed in overstating the dimensions of German aims and accomplishments in the Near East in a spirit of pre-war imperialism. This exaggeration of these schemes was arising popular anxiety and antagonism against Germany in the British and French public opinion.

German public opinion was based on the information provided by newspapers, weekly and monthly journals, pamphlets and books produced by various political groups. A combination of sharply rising interest in national and international affairs, the reading habits of a rather large segment of the

educated classes, and the negligible cost of production encouraged publishers to undertake large-scale ventures in this medium. Broader German public learned of the *Mitteleuropa* ideas through pamphlets, magazines, and newspapers, which represented an impressive array of ideas. Publishers sought contributions from leading politicians, economists, and writers in all fields.

Pamphlets had a relatively minor influence until the Great War. A number of magazines like *Das Deutsche Arbeit*, *Die Tat*, *Deutsche Politik*, and *Stimmen der Zeit*, published supplementary pamphlet series. But, with the outbreak of the war, and with all of the problems and issues it raised, pamphleteering flourished. Since the German government did not have an organized domestic 'propaganda' agency, pamphleteering soon became a favourite medium of official and unofficial pressure groups and assumed great, though temporary, significance. Some pamphlets were privately printed and distributed by individuals or societies, but the great majority were regularly published and sold through stores or book stalls.

Certain private associations contributed to the publication activities in support of the Central European commercial activities. The activities of these associations were mainly continuous and conscientious efforts to work out problems such as simplification of banking procedures and customs formalities between Germany and the Double Monarchy; but propaganda played a very minor role (Meyer, 1955; 63-64).

Several periodicals offered their version of *Mitteleuropa*. The organ of Pan-German League, *Die Alldeutsche Blätter*, had at times advanced superficial

projects for Central European customs Union in its papers. They portrayed Central and South-eastern Europe as the primary field of economic expansion. Pan-German pamphlets of the 1890's and the widespread popular German misconception of '*unser Bagdad*' reflected the general interest in the south-east Europe and the Near East. This propaganda contributed to bringing the Near East to a primary position in economic expansion of German trade after 1890. In the beginning of the Great War, *Die Alldeutsche Blätter* seldom missed an opportunity to crow that the Pan-Germans had been advocating a Central European economic alliance for twenty years.

Close to *Alldeutsche Blätter* in sentiment and interest were the conservative *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* and Gustav Stresemann's national liberal *Deutsche Stimmen*. The conservative, rebellious individualists who wrote for *Die Tat* sounded similar notes of racial vigour, Germanic Christianity:, *Stimmen der Zeit*, speaking for Reich-German Catholics, showed its interest in a larger mid-European Catholic community. The two most widely read monthlies, *Preussische Jahrbücher* (edited by Hans Delbrück) and *Deutsche Rundschau*, reflected the interest in *Mitteleuropa* in a few articles, reviews, and political commentaries. *Deutsche Rundschau* was especially careful in presenting a 'scientific' view on the matters concerning the Near East in general, and pan-Islamism and German enterprises in the region in particular.

On the left were the *Sozialistische Monatshefte* edited by the revisionist Joseph Bloch and *Die Neue Zeit* edited by Karl Kautsky. The former journal was widely read by all left-of-centre readers and was the major Socialist

magazine; the latter spoke for the Socialist left and was quite critical of the 'Socialistic imperialism' it presumed to find in the *Monatshefte*.

It is generally accepted that prior to the outbreak of the Great War, foreign policy was not among the central concerns of the German left-wing publications. German socialist thought of foreign policy as governed by purely economic considerations, thus they treated the subject as a mere by-product of domestic politics and did not develop a coherent socialist foreign policy. The core of the Social Democratic Party was orthodox Marxist, espousing an ideology which was a synthesis of Enlightenment progressivism and Social Darwinism under the label of Marxism (Fletcher, 1979; 238). The official theoretical organ of German social democracy was *Die Neue Zeit*. Before 1914, both *Die Neue Zeit* and *Sozialistische Monatshefte* showed little interest in imperialism as a foreign policy issue, although the actual interest was probably greater than displayed.

Bloch's *Sozialistische Monatshefte* supported tariff protectionism and continental expansion while nurturing Anglophobia and colonial aggression together with the objective of integrating the proletariat into the existing social order. The journal began to support *Mittleuropa* plans after 1905. Revisionist German social democracy was urged to adopt a positive attitude towards such manifestations of imperialism as protectionism. The argument was that if Germany hoped to preserve an independent existence in the future, she had to guarantee domination in continental Europe realized peacefully through customs union.

One representative of German revisionist thought, Eduard Bernstein, was one of the few who commented on imperialism. Bernstein argued that the dynamic behind German imperialism was not strictly a case of capitalist interests, but a capitalism drunk with its own success, marked by “a strong dose of megalomania” alongside the prevailing super-patriotic intellectual atmosphere (Fletcher, 1979; 258). He condemned both official imperialism and Naumann’s bid for populist imperialism. Naumann’s call for an alliance between democracy and monarchy on a program of internal reform and external expansion was not acceptable, because the Kaiser was not a free agent but a representative of reactionary classes and capitalist interests. As for the concrete aims of German imperialism, Bernstein identified two currents of bourgeois opinion: anti-Russian and anti-British. The former saw the future of a Greater Germany as lying in Asia Minor, which naturally brought them into conflict with Russia. The later, anti-British opinion hoped to use Russia as a political counterweight against Britain and as a vast export market for German industry. The community of interests with Russia was characterized by its hostility to social change and anti-Polish sentiments. Although Bernstein, similar to the mainstream social democrats, did not fit neatly to either camp, he was certainly not anti-British. Consequently, he too believed in the desirability of German expansion by continued peaceful commercial penetration of the world market in collaboration with Britain. However, he was not immune to anti-Russian sentiments. After 1912, after Friedrich Naumann declined his support for the Germany navy program, social democrats became closer to national liberals in

their opinions on the direction and methods of German expansion forming the liberal perspective on imperialism. Within this perspective, German expansion was not understood as imperialism based on territorial expansion, permanent settlement and transfer of culture and civilization.¹²

Later, in 1909, Kautsky made an influential analysis of imperialism in his book *Weg zur Macht*. He attributed the origins of imperialism largely to the expansion of railway construction and of trade into the whole world (Fletcher, 1979; 245-6). Imperialism was seen as a mean for the destruction of capitalism by encouraging antagonisms in the capitalist system. Moreover, German capitalist were serving the general interest in challenging the Britain's industrial monopoly and maritime supremacy. Thus, despite the negative meaning attached to imperialism, the centre of the Social Democratic Party espoused a pragmatic acceptance of *status quo* and supported the cause of Wilhelmian expansionism. A European federation of United States of Europe, expressed in non-imperialist form, against the U.S.A., Britain and Russia, received the approval of centrist spokesman of the party.

It was the radicals within the party that confronted the revisionist centre. Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht and Parvus Helphand among others grasped the political roots of imperialism as well as economic considerations, in line with Lenin's views. However, the radical left did not have much of significance since it did not have its own press, connections with trade unions and mass

¹² It must be mentioned that the Social Darwinist aspect of the Wilhelmian thought generally legitimised the transfer of culture by positing a right of civilization. Right of civilization did not only justify colonization, but was also understood as a moral duty.

appeal. Radical leftists usually held *Weltpolitik* and imperialism as synonymous. The major contribution on the issue came from Hilferding with his book *Das Finanzkapital* (1910) and Rosa Luxemburg's *Die Akkumulation des Kapitals* (1913), both of which did not attract much attention at the time (Fletcher, 1979; 243). Luxemburg attacked the economically affirmative tactics of the party centre. She argued that the collapse of the capitalist order would proceed not from an economic crisis but from a political crisis induced by *Weltpolitik*. However, her analysis of imperialism did not offer any specific policy. For her, the principle of national self-determination had no universal validity and could not be applied in the cases of small, economically backward or non-viable nations. She saw the national liberation movements as reactionary claims of indigenous exploiters against foreign capitalist exploiters (Fletcher, 1979; 250-1). Moreover, the ideas of a German-dominated central European free-trade zone were understood as social imperialism by the radical section of the Social Democratic Party.

In the era of Germany's commercial expansion during the pre-war decades, in an atmosphere of naval rivalry, intensifying agrarian competition, and the perception of 'encirclement', the broader mid-European aspects of List were rediscovered by liberals such as Friedrich Naumann and Ernst Jäckh. The revised *Mitteuropa* scheme assigned the Balkans a peculiar importance for the German and Austria-Hungarian domination and penetration to the Near East. Berlin-Baghdad Railway was designed to run through a territory, which was going to be most valuable under either the German and/or Austrian *Kulturwerk*.

As observed in the public opinion, the Baghdad Railway was offering an exit for the land-locked German Reich along the path of least resistance, and accordingly became a symbol of the future highway of a German *Weltpolitik*.

The advocates of German economic penetration in the Near East were united on an agreement on an economic imperialist perspective. The publicists of this group were travelled a lot in the Ottoman territories and observed a number of issues stretching from the state of German enterprises to German cultural activities, available human and natural resources and political conditions. They had close contact with both German and Ottoman government on various levels. Their publication activities were supported by industrialist and financiers who stood behind their propaganda efforts. They voiced the interests of the new sections of the German economy, which had interests in maintaining closer relations with the Ottoman Empire. Most liberals were convinced that a redistribution of the world would lead to a situation, in which Britain was forced to surrender its previous supremacy and in which the German Reich established itself as a world power in a new system of world states. Especially, left liberal circle assigned Germany the role of friend and protector of the threatened independence of the small states.

The main publicity of *Mitteleuropa* developed around liberal journals. Foremost among the pre-war German liberal publishing was Naumann's *Die Hilfe*. This journal is a vital source for the social and intellectual history of the Wilhelminian era. It also became the organ of the major advocates of *Mitteleuropapolitik*. During the war the magazine reached between thirty to

forty thousand subscribers and a newsstand sale of sixty thousand additional copies. Readers of *Die Hilfe* were often well-educated civilians of independent thought, but it did not lack an appreciative audience in the trenches. The editors took unusual pains to have articles written in a clear, straightforward style and consequently could claim readers among the working and peasant classes, an achievement unattained by any other bourgeois publication. Its influence went beyond these immediate readers. Few magazines were as often quoted or had their material as freely reprinted without acknowledgement.

Another important figure, Ernst Jäckh, started his journalistic career in *Neckar Zeitung*. He edited the German and Ottoman bilingual *Illustrierte Zeitung*. He promptly undertook to edit attractive series. A significant series was his *Deutsche Orient Bücherei*. Turkish nationalists Tekin Alp and Halide Edip Hanim contributed to this book series. His *Der deutsche Krieg* ran to ninety-seven issues. He collaborated with the famous publicist Paul Rohrbach. Together, they founded the journal *Das Grössere Deutschland*, which had an impressive list of permanent collaborators including General von der Goltz, Gustav Schmoller, Max Sering, Friedrich Meinecke and two prominent Pan-Germans, Theodor Schiemann and Count von Reventlow. It had been financed initially by a wealthy Dresden businessman, who had taken to Rohrbach's ideas. During 1915, however, the editors and their financial backer parted ways on the question of war aims and Pan-Germanism. Rohrbach and Jäckh broke with the publication, and together with Professor Philipp Stein, founded a new weekly, *Der Deutsche Politik*. *Das Grössere Deutschland* continued under a more

chauvinist editorship. *Deutsche Politik* occasionally presented articles by Schiemann and other Pan-German authors like Arthur Dix, but the dominant tone came from liberal writers as Axel Schmidt, Max Weber, Theodor Heuss, Schulze-Gaevernitz, Meinecke, Delbrück, Charmatz, Brentano, and the editors. The magazine was read by educated persons of the democratic splinter parties and right-of-centre groups. It attained a circulation of about eleven thousand, a rate good for German conditions, but still not enough to relieve it of financial cares.

During the Great War, advocates of economic and liberal imperialism once again turned to Friedrich List as the primary supporter of industrial progress and the attachment of an industrial German to markets and sources of raw materials. Ideas of *Mitteleuropa* gained significance via Hans Delbrück's Wednesday evening sessions which started in the autumn of 1914 at a restaurant in the Kurfurstendamm, and became one of the outstanding Berlin circles. Among its members who spoke for mid-European ideas were Jäckh, Rohrbach, Eugen Schiffer, Max Sering, Freiherr von Lusensky, and Gustav Schmoller. A memorandum from this group answered the several annexationist manifestoes of 1915 with a firm declaration against land grabbing and an affirmation for national independence of peoples and freedom of the seas. More public and corporative in character was that outstanding organization, the *Deutsche Gesellschaft* was the equivalent in Wilhelmian Germany of a British political club. Again one perceives Jäckh's gift of organization, the desire to bring officials and individuals of all shades of political opinion into contact, and

the sensible financial generosity of Robert Bosch, who was known as the “red Bosch” for his leftist tendencies.

The concept of *Mitteleuropa* became the focus of public debates once again in Germany during 1915 with Friedrich Naumann’s book. In a year’s time, it also became known in the public opinion of the Entente Powers due to its immediate translation and wide circulation. It provoked strong reactions since for many it signified the political slogan of German control on the European continent. When the term first gained prominence in the German public opinion during the First World War, it was used by divergent groups ranging from the Pan-Germans to the right-wing Social Democrats of Germany and Austria. In a political-geographic sense, it referred to anything from strengthening the alliance between Vienna and Berlin to establishment of a coalition of states from the North Cape to Baghdad. Other terms such as *Drang nach Osten*, Berlin-Baghdad and Pan-Germanism were usually associated with *Mitteleuropa*. In this context *Mitteleuropa* was equated with German militarism and aggression, Prussianism, Kaiserism, and German imperial aims. First World War was argued to be instigated by Berlin for the express purpose of establishing a vast domain from the North Sea to the Near East under German control. In England, T. G. Masaryk and R. W. Seton-Watson launched their magazine, the *New Europe*, in a counter-offensive against *Mitteleuropa* (Meyer, 1955; 4).

Mitteleuropa appeared to be the crucial clue to an understanding of German policy since 1870. German-Austrian union (*Anschluss*) of 1931 and

Nazi occupations has been viewed in connection with the German policy prior to 1914. Even in the recent mainstream literature on Germany thought *Mitteleuropa* is associated with pan-German aims and actions. However, as mentioned before, the concept had various definitions: what List implied with *Mitteleuropa* cannot be dealt with the same manner as that of Hitler. Henderson argues that List's plans for a central European customs union was the spearhead of German and Austrian expansion in the Balkans and the Near East and was advocated by Pan-German League which proposed Berlin-Baghdad Railway as the symbol of Germany's peaceful penetration into Ottoman Empire. However, the fact is, as will be shown in the following pages, Pan-German publications propagating imperialist and colonialist expansion together with German settlement has been severely criticized by the liberal advocates of *Mitteleuropapolitik*, who defended the community of interests of independent states. Thus, the liberal understanding of *Mitteleuropa* must be clearly differentiated from a nationalist excuse for annexation. Although Hitler abused the concept to legitimize his claims for Eastern European countries, the original advocates of the idea never gave their support to National Socialist regime. For example, Ernst Jäckh actively worked to form a public opinion against Nazism and moved to United States in mid-1930s.

In its liberal sense, it is more appropriate to see the concept of *Mitteleuropa* as the origin of European Customs Union and/or European Economic Community. The trade and power policy of Germany was summed up in 1897 by one of the significant economists of the time, Paul Voigt as such:

“If Germany does not wish to be forced by the rising Great Powers of the twentieth century into the position of a second rate power, she must convince herself that the enlargement of its economic sphere by a customs union with individual neighbouring states and by an increase in its colonial possessions is the most important task of German economic and trade policy” (Paul Voigt, "Deutschland und der Weltmarkt", cit. Fischer, 1975: 33).

In certain ways, *Mitteleuropa* was the first stone on the way to European Union.

“A French free-trader, G. de Molinari, opened the discussion in 1879, suggesting a unified *Europe Centrale* (*Mitteleuropa*) to comprise France, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland. The Customs Union (*Zollverein*) had brought such prosperity to Germany, he argued, that a broader customs union would foster European prosperity, enhance the prospects of peace, and would encourage gradual abolition of trade barriers throughout the world” (Meyer, 1955; 59-60). Arthur Dix was talking about "The United States of Europe" and "Central European Customs Union" in 1910.¹³

4.2 Liberal Protagonists of German Expansion in the Near East

The advocates of the German expansion in the Near East, mainly in Ottoman Empire, were a group of people united around the legacy of Friedrich List and economic and political views of Lujo Brentano. They formed the group known

¹³ Fischer, *War of Illusions*, pp. 10-11.

as free liberals or progressives. The main members of this group were Max Weber, Friedrich Naumann, Ernst Jäckh, and Theodor Heuss among other. Hans Delbrück and Rohrbach stood close to this group, although not directly members of it. In establishing the relation between economic imperialist policies with the expansion in the Near East, Naumann, Rohrbach and Jäckh are the most important publicists. Their works were not only based on their personal experiences in the Near East, but also that of Karl Helfferich and Freiherr von der Goltz.

4.2.1 Friedrich Naumann

Friedrich Naumann, a theologian by education and a devoted Christian, entered the Wilhelmian public scene in 1894 with his periodical, *Die Hilfe*. Naumann successfully stood for office in a Württemberg district in the Reichstag elections of 1907, supported financially by the Weber family, journalistically by Theodor Heuss and Ernst Jäckh, politically by democratic and socialist groups. He was a leading member of the Progressive party and worked to infuse this middle-class liberal party with social reformism. He was elected to the Reichstag (1907–12, 1913–18) and served as party leader. After the overthrow of the monarchy in November 1918, he helped found the German Democratic

Party, which favoured a democratic republic. Except for a brief interruption during 1912-13, he was extremely active politically until his death in 1919.

Naumann was the founder of *Nationalsozialen Verein*, whose left-liberal views were oriented to social reform and *Weltpolitik* through an alliance of democracy and monarchy. In his endeavours, he developed firm friendships with the South German democrats and left-wingers, notably with politicians Conrad Haussman and Friedrich von Payer and with Robert Bosch. Known in those days as 'der rote Bosch' this wealthy industrialist favoured Naumann as representative of a sensible, 'objective' left-wing ideology (as distinguished from the specific economic interests of the Socialists), and he gave considerable financial support to Naumann's 'political pedagogy' and publications. On the other hand, William II hardly understood him, at times expressed his hostility to Naumann's ideas. Conservatives ridiculed his 'preacher's imperialism. Most socialists rejected his approach to social questions because of its close ties with imperialism, power, and nationalism.

The sample issues of Naumann's *Die Hilfe* started to be published in 1894 not simply as a publication attempt, but rather as a medium of group in its formative stages, known as the Young Christian-Socials. Naumann's handwritten notes provide insight to his political thinking. He recognized the importance of the people and that they were allowed to know the existence of various religious directions. Concerning political program, he was against revolution just as much as absolute monarchy. His program was in pursuit of a more democratic legislation of elections. He portrayed social reform as a

cooperation of state socialism, workers movement and private charity organization (Heuss, 1949, 88). Thus, his articles in *Die Hilfe* should not be colourless, but a little aggressive reflecting both his realistic stand and Christian spirit. The publication should not be Sunday magazine although such publications had increasing popularity due to the rise of Evangelical social movement (Heuss, 1949, 89). Naumann chose the name *Die Hilfe* himself. The paper had the subheading “God’ Help, Self-Help, State’s Help, Bothers’ Help” Theodor von Wächter wrote that “the workers found the title a bit repulsive, they don’t want help, they want self-help, fight for their rights, their freedom” (Heuss, 1949, 89).

For the following three years after its first appearance, the journal was not a great success. In the meantime, left-liberal groups were losing ground whereas social democrats were on the rise in German parliamentary politics under Wilhelm II. Naumann began to be charmed by social democratic ideas. His later edition of *Die Hilfe* aroused the dislike of the Central Union of Industrialist known for its conservative position. Naumann was trying to find an answer to the possibility of social-conservative politics in Germany. Finally, by the end of 1890s, Naumann placed his personal conviction on that the military power had to be the national policy against foreign rival, but it had no significance unless accompanied by domestic social reforms (Heuss, 1949, 116). Thus, he declared that he withdrew his support for the naval policy of Admiral von Tirpitz. Naumann also preferred the politics of the people to the

politics of the working class and claimed that social democracy must one day begin to think and act nationally (Heuss, 1949, 120).

He observed the massive shift of workers in the big cities to social democracy. He wrote in *Der Zeit* on 02.04.1897 that peasantry and workers were the basis of society but they were very weakly represented in the political system (Heuss, 1949, 120). In his journal *Die Hilfe* he expressed his conviction that the German working masses were an integral part of society and he strove to convince the middle class of this reality. This way, Naumann tried to pronounce conciliation and understanding on a basis of common national sentiment and interest. These efforts had, as Friedrich Meinecke, has testified, a marked impact upon thinking Germans and especially on the academic youth (Meyer, 1955; 89). Patriotism and optimism characterise his vigorous support of naval construction and colonial development. Although he was an enthusiastic imperialist, he differed from most of his expansionist contemporaries in seeking far-reaching social reform as well. German labour, he argued, owed its growing significance to imperialism; and German business needed the full cooperation of labour. In this social reformist perspective, even Werner Sombart in his Marxism-friendly period stood close to Naumann in addition to orthodox liberals like Carl Jentsch. This gathering of social democrat and liberal intellectuals around Naumann lasted until he picked up the advocacy of Central European Customs Union (Heuss, 1949, 115).

Naumann's political and social endeavours found expression in his *Nationalsozialer Verein* between 1896 and 1903. For him, *Weltpolitik* and

Sozialpolitik were the two poles of the same manifestation of power and social progress in Germany. Still he was not a liberal democrat in Anglo-Saxon sense. In line with his Christian educational background, he hoped to keep human dignity and individual freedom from falling prey to materialism and mechanization. His concept *Mitteleuropa* was to reflect the great effort at synthesis in search for orderly national and personal growth.

Naumann was not settled with any well-grounded foreign political perspective. He was open to influence from his circle of friends. One personality singled out in this respect: Paul Rohrbach. Rohrbach opened Naumann's eyes to the differences in public opinion with regard to an understanding between Germany and England. Thus, during the late 1890's he developed an active interest in foreign affairs that was to mark his entire later career. The journey to the Near East in the fall of 1899 in the company of Kaiser Wilhelm helped Naumann to develop his ideas on international politics. At the same time the naval propaganda was launched in Germany. For Naumann, the age of discovery was over and the naval policy would only entail economic and spiritual loss of strength by bringing out serious conflict with Great Britain (Heuss, 1949, 122).

Naumann wrote his observations of his travels to the Near East in 1898 in *Reisebriefe* in *Die Hilfe*.¹⁴ In these travel letters, he touched upon the Armenian question and described the Armenians as the "worst man of the world" and there comments provoked strong reactions in the German and

¹⁴ Friedrich Naumann "Hinter Konstantinopel", *Die Hilfe* 4: 45 (6.11.1898). p. 7.

French public opinion.¹⁵ Most fierce criticism came from the Christian circles that were alerted to the problem after the incidents in 1890s and under the influence of Lepsius' reports.¹⁶ In fact, Naumann, being a devout Christian, expressed his concern on Armenian question and expected official intervention by Germany to the Porte. Seeing that Germany took no certain attitude, he wrote with sarcasm and bitterness that Bismarck was perhaps right in his Eastern policy (Heuss, 1949, 122). This was one of the reasons behind his journey to the East after which he concluded that the question was not about power politics or ethics but about the difference between power politics and compliance politics. He questioned if German indifference to Armenian question was one or the other. It was a surprise for the readers of *Die Hilfe* to read that "German citizens in their majority are more moral in their majority than their Kaiser who does not wake up from his sleep" (Heuss, 1949; 123) since Naumann undauntedly supported the Kaiser as the leader for a modern people that cannot be dragged by agrarian conservatism and opposed to Max Weber, one of his closest friends, for arguing that Wilhelm II was a threat to Bismarck's legacy.

¹⁵ The definitions of the Armenians in the discourse of the advocates of German expansion into Near East gradually assumed orientalist and racist tones; the Armenians were described with negative racial characters such as "a nation of natural born criminals" or "rootless scoundrels". Hilmar Kaiser shows that for their portrayal of the role of Armenians in Ottoman trade, these authors have uncritically accepted and relied on early-twentieth-century material produced by the propaganda machine set up by the German Foreign Office. Kaiser sees the anti-Armenian propaganda as part of German "Orient propaganda establishment" composed of propagandists such as Alfred Körte, Friedrich Naumann, Hugo Grothe, Paul Geister, Albrecht Wirth, Ewald Banse, Ernst Jäckh, Ernst Marré, Eugen Mittwoch, and Alphons Sussnitzki (Kaiser, 1997).

¹⁶ *Die Hilfe* 4: 48 (27.11.1898). p. 7.

According to Naumann's observations, whoever wanted to destroy the Ottoman Empire was using the Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Syrians and Armenians for this purpose. All great powers except for Germany have taken part in the agitation of upheaval among the peoples living in Turkey. Revolutionary and separatist movements were supported on the ground of human rights, political freedom, and right to self-determinacy. But they were designated to conceal the aspiration of European Great Powers to the partition of the multi-national Ottoman Empire by way of promoting the separatist tendencies of minorities. The promotion of ethnic separatism could never be seen as a harmless enterprise.

The Ottoman Empire is under diplomatic pressure since the Berlin Congress. Once Turkey has a chance to breathe, it will arrange something in line with instinct of self-preservation. Naumann concluded that with present German policy in the Near East as the protestor of the Ottoman Empire, Germany could not follow the British methods of agitating separationist movements and then occupying the territory. He defended his position on the Armenian question by emphasizing that it was an example of imperialist intervention policy. Besides, there was no alternative to the German policy of supporting the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire. As Marschall von Bieberstein rightfully mentioned in 1899 that Bismarck's perspective that "the whole orient is not worth a Pomeranian infantryman" had no historical truth

since the Baghdad railway became the focus of German *Weltpolitik*.¹⁷ The policy of informal imperialism also determined the attitude of the German government towards the Armenian problem.

He journeyed to Palestine and Asia Minor, which he returned with an extended comprehension of modern Near Eastern problems and potentialities, published his observation in his book *Asia*. Under the impact of the Bosnian Crisis, in 1910 Naumann expressed his concern for Central Europe:

With all the necessary respect for the independence of Viennese policy, we are developing a sense of responsibility for *Mitteleuropa* as a whole. The *grossdeutsch* ideology of yesteryear is reawakening in a new form. For long it seemed as though the Danubian lands were of no significance to us, but now we are becoming aware of the interrelationship of the many events occurring between the Baltic and Adriatic Seas. The diplomats will have to work out the technical details of this new *grossdeutsch* policy; the people already feel it and are taking strength from political thought. Let us reject theorizing and seize upon reality, the possibility of a common foreign policy to protect the German people and culture in all Middle Europe (cited in Meyer, 1955; 92).

He urged continued expansion overseas to increase Germany's standard of living and advocated intensive development of her colonies as areas of food production. A powerful fleet remained the necessary insurance for this policy, as important for the exporters as for the masses who needed the imported food and the wages from their work. He opposed those who demanded expansion into south-eastern Europe and suggested conquest and Germanization of the Slavs, on the grounds that it would bring about serious political repercussions.

¹⁷ Marschall von Bieberstein on Hohenlohe Schillingsfürst, 3.1.1899, cited in Schöllgen, 1984: 452.

He argued that despite Germany's growing population, existing territorial frontiers must be maintained.

Naumann's journey to Palestine in 1898 was symptomatic of a broader Reich-German trend. Several works of Paul Dehn in the 1880's may have stimulated some of this interest, but its transformation into a national enthusiasm dates from the end of the decade, when the Deutsche Bank secured its Anatolian railroad concessions and William II went on his first demonstrative cruise to the Eastern Mediterranean. The young Kaiser captured the delighted attention of many Germans as he moved from port to port, and he was dubbed the most successful travelling salesman of the Reich. German liners subsequently made regular pleasure cruises to the Near East so that others might emulate their monarch. During the 1890's the enthusiasm grew. A host of books, pamphlets, and articles about the region appeared and were widely read. They varied in content from appraisals of German opportunities in Asia Minor to fantastic projects for making deserts bloom as sites for German colonization. These evaluations and dreams concentrated German pride in technological advance, enthusiasm for a big navy, and confidence in expanding commerce upon a particular area. And all these objectives were debated and acclaimed in a rising crescendo form many a *Stammtisch* in the Reich.

In the early 1915, Naumann was concerned whether the war would favour Germany in her delayed pursuit of close participation in colonial activity. So, his book *Mitteleuropa* appeared in the fall of 1915. When Naumann started to advocate Central European Union, he was inspired by the

unification of Germany. At the centre of this unification was the common language of the people. There were religious differences between the north and south, namely between protestant Prussia and Catholic Austria. However, the war against France in 1870 played a catalysing role to bring people together urgently against a common threat (Naumann, 1915; 1). Departing from these ideas, he argued for the union of Austria and Germany to form *Mitteleuropa*. This union was now necessitated against the thread of the western union of Britain and France. Although France sided with Britain in that war, Naumann hoped that in the distant future she would join in the central European politics, since he saw France as part of the Germanic tradition. Italy wanted economically to join in Mitteleuropa, but Naumann claimed that Latin people were not in harmony with the traditions of the central European people. Smaller central European states like Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Holland and Switzerland should be left to decide for themselves in the course of time. In the introduction of *Mitteleuropa*, he wrote:

In war, we are standing together with Austria, Hungary and with the Turks. The last are striving for their own, fighting a war of life and death to save the remains of a once powerful state and the political existence of Muslim belief. The magical game of history brought us together with the Turks: their enemies are our enemies. They have no other chance but to support us, and thus Austria-Hungary. We hail them and hope that we continue to see a common history. But turkey does not belong to the core organization of Mitteleuropa. She is not geographically at close range with us, her people and her economic region is of a very different kind, which is southern, oriental and primitive (Naumann, 1915; 2).

Naumann criticized the Bismarckian pursuit of *kleindeutsch* policy towards Austria until 1866, seeing it as representative of the conservative,

military, old Prussian tendencies (Naumann, 1915; 14). He pointed to the rising voice of the capitalist and liberal opposition. This second group wanted the change of dominance of agrarian interests in the national economic policies and an economic customs union with Austria-Hungary to become stronger to compete with British hegemony on world economy (Naumann, 1915; 15). According to Naumann, German capitalist liberal perspective was aware of the advantages of a central European union in enlargement of the markets and increase of the opportunities for capital investment (Naumann, 1915; 16). The core of these interests had to crystallize in Mitteleuropa. Afterwards, Poland, Balkans, Turkey and Mediterranean regions could be integrated by treaties depending on the final decision of the central Europe (Naumann, 1915; 261).

Naumann was aware of the difficulties in his program due to the difference in the rhythm of life and work and the economic methods between Germany and Austria. For example, the northern Germans were better in organizational capacity. Despite all the structural differences, Naumann advocated *Mitteleuropa* and not simply as a customs union: he theorized Central European Union as an act of will based on common history. He wrote that Mitteleuropa was a superstructure not a new structure. According to one of his young associates, Theodor Heuss, all his economic-rational arguments were indeed political-psychological, and had no real economic ground (Heuss, 1949, 339). Naumann must have hoped to portray a war aim for the German popular consciousness. Answering why German people sacrifice their lives, he designed the Central European will to live together.

The book attracted extraordinary attention, not only in the press but also in general public opinion. There were also critics to the views laid in the book. Karl Kautsky wrote an opposing brochure and Rudolf Hilferding analysed the book in an article in his socialist newspaper *Der Kampf* (Heuss, 1949, 341). They both criticized the pessimism and the militarism of the thesis that even after the war, preparedness should continue that the central European system of trenches should be retained. More important was Lujo Brentano's comparison of the book with other world economic perspectives (Heuss, 1949, 341). He questioned the affects of such a union on free trade. The political outcome of such a union, he declared, did not necessarily entail economic rationalism.

Herman Oncken, dealing with *Mitteleuropa* concept in 1917, described Naumann's thought as fantasy since he spoke of a central European supra-state and a new type of European man. Oncken found all these ideas totally unrealistic, since, for him, their particular ways of life were held very precious by every state and nation, and the historical differences could not be handled so lightly. For Oncken, Naumann only expressed the fervour of the alliance and cooperation in war. The sovereignty of the states rested on the natural will of the people to live together and people did not want to be directed to another state or a supra-state (Oncken, 1917; 96-97). *Mitteleuropa* concept, in this sense, had no value either for practical politics or any philosophy of history. Oncken argued that also in economic sense, *Mitteleuropa* had nothing to offer, because an economic community would harm the crucial liberalism necessary to take part in world economy for both Germany and Austria after the end of

the War. He reminded that Central Europe was fighting for its place in the world economy, not to close upon itself, and that there would be no war if it accepted to shrink to central Europe and the Balkans. He claimed that Germany should pursue her colonial targets after the war. For Oncken, Naumann represented the coalition of national economists (the leader of whom is Friedrich List) with military politics (Oncken, 1917; 101).

Another opposition to Naumann's ideas came from the Hungarian Prime Minister Graf Stephan Tisza. Tisza said in February 1915 that since it would be an extended Austria, he did not want it (Heuss, 1949, 376). Naumann called him a thick head and still expected the Hungarian leaders to conclude a lasting alliance with German Empire (Heuss, 1949, 377-8).

Mitteleuropa thought was most welcomed in Vienna. Naumann was invited to and visited Austria a number of times. In the meantime, a nice short question was published in *Die Hilfe*: what would Bismarck do during the war? The answer was that the man who concluded German union during the war with France in 1870 would surely move towards a union with Austria-Hungary at present conditions (Heuss, 1949, 342-3). During the war, Naumann aligned with the war policy of Admiral von Tirpitz, although he argued against his naval policy two decades ago. Naumann started to advocate the need for a big navy on defensive grounds.

By the time Naumann's book *Mitteleuropa* was being popularly read, Bulgaria finally ended her neutrality by the end of 1915, Italy withdrew from the Central Powers, and Turkey won a victory over Entente Powers at the

Dardanelles with German assistance. However, Turkey was in a precarious position due to the difficulties in the transportation of war supplies over land. Even the most optimistic writer admitted the disadvantage of not being able to secure the road to Istanbul. Bulgaria took part in the war not because of sympathy with Germany or Central Europe, but with the prospect to win back the territories she had lost during the Second Balkan War, specifically Dobrudja and Macedonia. The developments were seen in Germany as threatening the position of the Central Powers in case of a peace settlement.

Naumann, thus, wrote a pamphlet *Bulgaria und Mitteleuropa*, and visited Bulgaria twice in 1916. He commented that a political independence that came as a gift on a silver tray was a dangerous thing (Heuss, 1949, 370). He later made the same comment about Poland. Naumann was irritated to see Russian influence in Bulgaria and he defended the idea “Balkans for the Balkan people” and he argued that this can only be achieved through central European power politics.

Naumann’s pamphlet *Bulgarien und Mitteleuropa* shows a slight change in his ideas. Writing after the defeat of Entente Powers at the Dardanelles, and the German victory over Serbia securing the route over Balkans to Istanbul, Naumann seems to have adopted a more extended view for his *Mitteleuropa*. After he visited Bulgaria, he pointed to the territories between the lower Donau and the Aegean as a field of opportunities for agricultural production (Naumann, 1916; 303). The agriculture had already improved since the German activity started to take place, especially after 1897. The development of national

economy of Bulgaria would need schools, streets, railways, ports, local taxation system, prisons, barracks and a modern army, and there were seen by Naumann as potential fields for German crediting or even undertaking. But most important was the establishment of a modern education system to avoid the threat of an uneducated working class. For the establishment of infrastructure and the education system, German finance had already supplied great amounts of credits (Naumann, 1916; 305). The imports to Germany had also dramatically increased from 9.8 million Marks in 1901 to 43.5 million Marks in 1912 (Naumann, 1916; 307). Naumann considered this increase as proof to Bulgaria's place in the world economy: she was part of the central European powers and their political and economic orientation had nothing to do with Russia. He concluded by saying that there was no Balkan question, but a question of central European unity (Naumann, 1916; 308).

According to Naumann, the weakness of the Ottoman Empire originated from its inability to build a unified cultural community out of its multi-national structure. National consciousness was limited to the military class in the Ottoman Empire. Such army-based national consciousness was disparaging for democratisation. For Naumann, democratisation meant to contain national independence movements, which started to gain ground with the spread of general literacy. He maintained that independence of smaller nations from the Ottoman Empire has not been for their advantage either economically or politically, since the political vacuum created by the retreat of the Ottomans was filled by great powers like Russia or Austria-Hungary. Naumann also

mentioned that the new states emerged after the Berlin Treaty were still more progressive than the Hamidian regime. Young Turk revolution at least wiped of the political inertia in the Empire. However, he was doubtful whether the new government was going to succeed in the face of the structural corruption. He wished Turks to be successful as a political ally of Germany, since the breakdown of Ottoman Empire would be great loss for Germany. He thought it was pity that democratisation caused the revival of nationalism and reminded that Germany has faced similar problem in the case of Poland.¹⁸

Naumann was convinced that it was inevitable for Turkey to get smaller in geographical size. The old great Turkey was an empire of conquest, not a unitary state, and its economy was not rationally managed. Each time one piece of its territory broke apart, one with good intentions said that that was a relief to turkey from her problems. But how far this loss of territory is allowed was the central question, which was going to be decided by the results of the present War. This collapsing empire was composed of two nations: the Ottomans and the Arabs. Their relation with each other was decisive in the fate of the Near East. The persistence of this Empire was the basic target of Enver Paşa and the Young Turks, and Germans wanted to help them to strengthen. That was the reason behind Turkish support for the German cause in the War. However, just as Germans supported the Ottomans, British supported the Arabs (Naumann, 1916; 309). It is noteworthy that Naumann prefers Ottoman to Turkish in his writings. The choice between Turkish and Ottoman actually represented the

¹⁸ Friedrich Naumann "Die Demokratisierung der Türkei", *Die Hilfe* 18 (04.01.1912), p. 534-5.

target of interests. Naumann can be said to be more interested in the exploitation of resources in the Arabian Peninsula and more willing to engage in economic rivalry with Britain.

Naumann argued that the national borders were still not clear, and what he put forth by *Mitteleuropa* was a union beyond national borders. He questioned what nationality was. He argued that Bulgarians were originally a Turanic race like their brothers Finns, Magyars and Ottomans, but they spoke ancient Slavic. Due to conquests and migrations, it was senseless to pursue a racial history. One could only talk about national characteristics, and even this consciousness was only a hundred years old. However, this did not change the fact that Balkan centres, namely Serbians, Greeks, Rumanians and Bulgarians, they depended on each other. This interdependence was recognized by Germany long ago and such particularities were deliberately ignored in order not to hinder progress. One should not question if nationality was good or bad, for it can be both, but it was surely important politically and historically. He wrote "We Germans knew since Bismarck that unity and protection determined the fate of peoples" (Naumann, 1916; 310).

The conflicts of the Balkan Wars had to be put behind and an agreement for capitalist markets had to be pursued. The independence of the Balkan states had to be secured and that "Balkans belongs to the Balkan people" had to be recognized. Balkan unity, for Naumann, has been necessary as a guarantee against Istanbul, Vienna and St. Petersburg. However, Bulgaria and Greece should not also pursue their fate any further into Turkish territory (Naumann,

1916; 314). Moreover, Naumann argued that Greece and other Great Powers should pull their hands off from the Aegean Islands and Crete in favour of Turkish rule (Naumann, 1916; 317). He also hoped for an alliance between Bulgaria and Turkey against the other Balkan states (Naumann, 1916; 318), and added that their rapprochement would also contribute to the agreement on Mitteleuropa (Naumann, 1916; 321).

Naumann evaluated the rising German interest in the Muslim world as part of Germany's development into a world power and her accompanied rivalry to Britain. He saw the title of Caliphate in Istanbul as complementary to Germany's anti-British campaign. He claimed that the reason behind Kaiser's visit to Istanbul in 1898 and his speech in Damascus was to launch this campaign (Naumann, 1916; 325-326). He reminds that he had already foreseen a German-Turkish attack at Suez Canal in his book *Asia*. However, Germany could not intervene in every instance of Turkey's loss of territory, thus the only solution was to strengthen Turkey from inside, to enable her to protect herself. This formed the background of Turkey's decision to seal her brother with Germany at the crucial hour. What triggered the change in Bismarckian policy on the East was the English protectorate in Egypt and in Cyprus after Berlin congress. He concluded that after Berlin Congress, the new European war dictum became Germany against Britain. Protection of Turkey especially after 1980 as part of German *Weltpolitik* became an active area of controversy (Naumann, 1916; 332-33).

The clash of interests between Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire on the Balkans was ended with the results of the Balkan Wars, which enabled a German-Austrian-Turkish understanding (Naumann, 1916; 336). Central Powers had common interests in the trade and transportation line over Istanbul. Naumann argued that a Central European military convention that also included Turkey had to be concluded alongside a Balkan Pact to secure the parallel development of railway and postal systems, maritime regulations, unity in commercial laws. To achieve this end, everything national had to be decentralised (Naumann, 1916; 345-6).

Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* was published in French and English in the summer of 1917. His call for the economic union of Allies was immediately labelled as Pan-Germanism. Naumann saw this as ordinary propaganda and said that any thinking mind can tell the difference between the idea of *Mitteleuropa* and Pan-Germanism (Heuss, 1949, 380). This great publicity also brought about criticism against Naumann. After the war, the idea and the book of *Mitteleuropa* remained in the minds of both its supporters and its adversaries as the main reference explaining Germany's war aims.

4.2.2 Paul Rohrbach

The most famous propagandist of Baghdad railway strategy before the Great War was Paul Rohrbach. His pamphlet *Bagdadbahn* (1902) appeared in competition with Grothe's *Die Bagdadbahn*. Rohrbach's pamphlet began with an attack on colonisation. He stressed that the advocates of colonisation were saboteurs of German policy on the Ottoman Empire (Rohrbach, 1902: 7). He extensively described the effects of German capital and technique on the development of German-Turkish economic relations depending on his observation during his journeys in the Near East from October 1900 to March 1901. He argued that, in the Turkish point of view, a German settlement would remain to be "a state within the state" and discredit the popularity of Baghdad Railway Project among the Turkish government and the people. Moreover neither the climate nor the soil conditions would suit the German farmers (Rohrbach, 1902: 7).

Establishing a respectable fame with this book, Rohrbach became the most widely-read colonial publicist of the Wilhelminian era, which is described by Walter Mogk as the German era of "cultural Protestantism" and "ethical imperialism" (Mogk, 1972). With Fritz Fischer's book *Griff nach der Weltmacht*, Rohrbach acquired renewed fame and unexpected topicality as the representative of liberal imperialism in Germany.

Paul Rohrbach originally studied history. In 1892, after he joined the staff of Hans Delbrück's *Preussische Jahrbücher*, he began to study theology. Through Delbrück, he entered into the Naumann circle, participated in *Die Hilfe-Abende*, which met at Naumann's home, and joined the National-social movement. At the turn of the century he, too, began to travel into the Near East. Rapidly he developed a predominant secular interest in geography and *Weltpolitik*. He related the experiences of his travels and his knowledge of remote places with a decided journalistic flair, seasoned them with an anti-Russian flavour, and charmed a growing audience of readers of diverse magazines. He was a member of *Nationalsozialen Verein* just like Friedrich Naumann and Hans Delbrück. This circle contributed regularly to the national-social weekly *Die Zeit*. Rohrbach's articles, from 1895 on, had been published on a regular basis in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* edited by Delbrück and in *Die Hilfe* edited by Naumann. Rohrbach also made contributions to the publications of the newly established *Deutsche Asiatische Gesellschaft*.

His book, *Die Bagdadbahn* (1902), brought him national recognition and gave him international notoriety. Annoyed by visionary descriptions and fantastic hopes raised by most works, he sought to make a more precise and realistic evaluation of the Baghdad Railroad and Germany's Near Eastern interests. "It was my purpose," he recalled in 1948, "to alert educated and politically-minded groups to the fact that we had a vital stake in developing good relations with Turkey, supporting Turkish resistance to foreign threats,

and really developing a railroad that was of such crucial economic and strategic importance.”

Rohrbach scoffed at plans for German settlement in Asia Minor, but underlined a current conviction that the Near East appeared to be the only immediately valuable, undeveloped area open for exploitation to a late-comer in the imperialistic competition. Arthur Gwinner of the Deutsche Bank was considerably amazed at the echoes which Rohrbach aroused, because, as Rohrbach put it, 'the bank had only a financial interest, not a political one. In the same year his book appeared, Rohrbach acted on his views by escorting a group of Germans through Southern Russia and the Near East. Among his company was Hellmut von Gerlach, editor of a Marburg paper, and Hjalmar Schacht, then secretary of *Der Handelsvertragsverein*, an organization fighting for renewal of the Caprivi treaties against the Prussian agrarian interests.

In the foreign press, Rohrbach's writings were seen as representing German plans to absorb the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and establish hegemony from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. Edward Benes spoke in his memoirs of the propaganda of the 'Rohrbach group' around 1908, and claimed that "hundreds of thousands of leaflets, books, and pamphlets popularized the Berlin-Baghdad scheme and demanded not only the development of the fleet, but also a large supply of aircraft" (Meyer, 1955, 98).

In Paul Rohrbach's view, Germany offered the peoples of the world a new and different conception of society, a new freedom to release them from British or French hegemony. These were the qualities of the German challenge

that were expressed in the opportunism of diplomacy and achievements of German industry (Dehio, 1952). However, “The right hand of this nation never knew what its left one was doing. The supporters of the fleet or the Turks, armaments manufacturers and bankers, army and navy, agrarians and industrialists, liberals and clericals: all pursued their own objectives; but at the top a strong guiding hand was absent” (Hallgarten, 1935: 230). Energy, proficiency, and zeal characterized the Second Reich’s over-seas expansion. German imperialism was not a phenomenon of mass enthusiasm, but rather a creation of special groups and interests.

In 1903, Rohrbach became Imperial Commissar for Settlement in German Southwest Africa. For the next decade, his Russian and Near Eastern interests gave way to enthusiastic agitation for colonial expansion and *Weltpolitik*. An ever-growing circle of readers enjoyed his stimulating and imaginative presentation of historical, cultural, and political ideas. Two books, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912) and *Zum Weltvolk hindurch!* (1914) were particularly successful. In those books, Rohrbach elaborated his conception of Germany's world mission, her right to play a decisive, positive role in determining the great changes taking place in the world. Like the other European nationalists of his time, he put heavy emphasis on armaments and power politics.

His strong sense of competition with Britain in every endeavour sometimes gave rise to a belligerence of expression that made it easy for outsiders to consider him a Pan-German. Yet, Rohrbach's fundamental political

attitudes were considerably more moderate and sensible. The warnings he uttered against Pan-Germanism during the war, when many citizens succumbed to the super-patriotic appeals of the reactionary Fatherland Party, attest his real position. With complete straightforwardness, he stated his views as an 'ethical imperialist,' an attitude not much different from other bourgeois Europeans who gave that pre-war generation its particular stamp.

In April 1914, Rohrbach started to publish another weekly, *Das grössere Deutschland*, with his friend Ernst Jäckh. The weekly was devoted to their program of imperialism, independent of party politics. Rohrbach and Jäckh both had good private connections with German state officers from whom they were able to get the newest latest news. Jäckh had the trust of Kinderlen-Wächter and even functioned as the private reporter of the German Foreign Office on cases related to Turkey (Mogk, 1972; 172). Rohrbach, as an advocate of strong German colonial policy, was recognized by the then Secretary of State, Wilhelm Solf, who financed his journeys to New Cameroon and Africa in 1912/13. Due to his relations with Evangelical-Protestant Missionary Union, Rohrbach was also known to German Navy Office. With the help of Jäckh's connections and the influence of Philipp Stein in publication circles, *Das grössere Deutschland* continued to be published until January 1916, and then on under the title *Deutsche Politik* until February 1922. Jäckh had the financial support of Bavarian entrepreneur Robert Bosch and Philipp Stein of the owner of chemicals company in Frankfurt a.M. Fritz Roessler (Mogk, 1972; 173). In January 1918, the periodical *März*, edited by C.

Haussmann, merged with *Der Deutsche Politik. März* was financed by Max Waburg, a banker from Hamburg. Rohrbach always tried to get contributions to the journal not only from scholars, but also from officers on foreign duty. By providing fresh and lively insight on the foreign affairs, he sought to build public awareness on Germany's colonial, economic and military position.

Rohrbach wrote: "It [the great Germany] is not a spatially defined, extended power region as the Great Britain, but we understand from it a substantial moral and material contribution Germany to world economy and world culture, and we demand that this claim of contribution, which is legitimized by our economic and spiritual efforts, receives fair treatment" (Mogk, 1972; 179-80). Rohrbach states that he never thought of a German imperialism in the British sense, that is, direct expansion of political power for national interests (Rohrbach, 1953; 39).

Jäckh's *Aufsteigende Halbmond* (first published in 1908) was influential in attracting Rohrbach's attention to the economic potentialities of Mesopotamia as Germany's main supply of raw material and food stuff. But, he recorded that at first hand he chose the Turkish orient as the right field of his research journey to gather information on political and economic conditions of the region for its geographical closeness to Germany (Rohrbach, 1953; 40). Rohrbach was one of the most energetic advocates of the Baghdad Railway. He believed that the Railway would contribute to the weakening of the British Empire in the Middle East and the strengthening of Germany in the Persian area. Mogk claims that the arguments for both political cooperation with

Austria-Hungary and friendship between Germany and Turkey were only pretentious (Mogk, 1972; 180), because according to Rohrbach the present conditions necessitated the strongest possible Turkish state as the most vital interest of Germany. This was behind Germany's involvement in the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire by economic and military contributions.

Rohrbach defended that Germany would not interfere with the world trade by an armed fist, but would reach out the ancient cultures and nations by means of active participation in their process of resurgence in opposition to the British dominance. These "practical principles of German politics" also had to be pursued in China, which was a sphere for German cultural mission. In this sense, Rohrbach's program was far more open to extension compared to Naumann's, which only sought for the establishment of a union on cultural and historical commonalities, whereas Rohrbach wanted to export culture through the process of economic, military, or whatever reform programs and religious missionaries, hospitals, schools, etc. His perspective was different than Naumann's *Mitteleuropa*, as much as Delbrück's *Mittelafrika*, because for him Germany was not a continental, but a world power (Mogk, 1972; 182).

Rohrbach's writings provide detailed accounts of his journeys from the Eastern provinces down to Baghdad on various occasions between 1898 and 1907. His reports of the journeys first appeared in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* and *Die Hilfe*. *Die Hilfe* then edited and republished a collection of his articles under the title *Im vorderen Asien* and in *Preussische Jahrbücher* under the title *Um Bagdad und Babylon* (Rohrbach, 1953; 54). Although Meyer argues that

Rohrbach distanced from the ideas that support an economic expansion to Turkey after the Armenian events, Rohrbach's writings speaks to the contrary. Although Johannes Lepsius, who was the leader of German relief for the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, was a close friend of his, Rohrbach did not change his case for the strengthening of Turkey as part of German foreign policy (Rohrbach, 1953; 46).

His observations of the first journey in 1898 and the second one during the winter of 1900-1901 was published in *Presussische Jahrbücher* in April-November 1901, and then compiled as a book *Die Bagdadbahn* (1902). Here, he mainly reports about the political and geographical conditions in Mediterranean, Pontus (north-eastern Anatolia), upper Persia and the Caspian Sea. Rohrbach claimed objectivity for his observations in comparison to the numerous irresponsible and unrealistic publications on the Baghdad Railway and the land, the people and the resources along its route (Rohrbach, 1902; 6).

Rohrbach reported that Turkey surely got strengthened politically since the last Eastern War, that is, the war against Greece. The main reason he saw for this improvement in Turkey's condition was the help of foreign advisors in the organization of the army, that is, the military mission of Freiherr von der Goltz. Reminding of the thread posed to Turkey from the small Balkan states and from Russia, Rohrbach states that the risk on a grand financial investment like the Baghdad Railway had to be very well calculated. Although the armament of the Turkish army had been considerably modernized, the problem of transporting troops to the eastern provinces of Anatolia, which he names

Armenia, was still unsolved. However, at present, Russia had the similar difficulties in transportation down to Armenia and upper Persia. On the other hand, Russian battle ships were able to arrive at Istanbul from Odessa or Sivastopol in 30-40 hours. This open and clear thread of Russia had been witnessed in the winter of 1877-78. The lack of transportation to Erzurum was forcing the Turkish government to keep troops in Erzincan permanently. However, the fate of a war on the eastern provinces rested mainly on the transportation facilities. This, he claims was one of the reason why Russia opposed to railway construction plans between Ankara and Erzurum, which are 800 km away from each other. This situation, according to Rohrbach, further necessitated the extension of the Baghdad Railway to regions of Turkish-Russian conflict (Rohrbach, 1902; 10).

From a more economic point of view, a southern route via Eskişehir down to Afyon-Karahisar was more convenient since, in the future, it could be connected to Aydın-İzmir line, which was at present under British control. In case of a liquidation of Turkish rule in Asia Minor, Russia would seek to acquire southern ports like Mersin, thus, according to Rohrbach, Germany had to secure these ports to prevent potential Russian advances. Rohrbach also mentioned that German interests lied on southern ports like Mersin and İskenderun (Alexandretta) more than Istanbul or İzmir. In raising the money for Anatolian Railway, Germany should perhaps collaborate with other nations that would want to stop Russian danger. Russia's main concern was to guarantee no passage of hostile ships through the Straits to the Black Sea and to avoid any

potential attack on Russian territory from the Eastern Anatolia and upper Persia. Germany relatively secured her sphere of influence by a rail route to Diyarbakır, in case peace or of war. Same as in Trace, Turkey had great difficulties in military transportation in Asia Minor. Rohrbach, still holding on to the economic colonialism in 1902, claimed that Germany had to avoid involvement in any conflict in defence of her investment, the Baghdad Railway. During the Russian War of 1977/78, it took seven months for the Turkish troops at Mosul to arrive at the battlefield at eastern Anatolia. It would take 5-6 weeks for the troops in Ankara to arrive in Erzurum on foot. Thus, Turkish general staff wanted the construction of a second line from Syria through Aleppo and Antep (Aintab) following the ancient route of Alexander the Great. Only this way, thought Rohrbach, Ottomans could secure their western territory and the key point of Anatolian-Armenian plateau. The line from Ankara was supposed to be stretched to Sivas, and then turn southwards to Diyarbakır, via Mardin and Mosul to Baghdad. This second rail route would undoubtedly strengthen the military position of Turkey against Russia and be the guarantee of the prevalence of the Ottoman State in the future. However, at that date, Rohrbach saw the construction of this second line absolutely impossible to realize due to the financial and political obstacles (Rohrbach, 1902; 13-14).

Rohrbach concluded that the construction of the Baghdad Railway was very important for the defence of Turkey, and the defence of Turkey was itself very important to secure German interests in the Middle East against the predatory advances of the other great powers. Turkey was also more than

willing to improve its military and political power. Besides, Germany could venture hundreds of millions in the railway construction and further more money in the cultivation of the region along the rail route. In a broader perspective, the region between Tigris and Euphrates was valuable for the improvement of German economy and national wealth. Thus, Rohrbach wrote: “Für eine schwache Türkei keinen Pfennig, für eine starke, soviel nur irgent wünscht wird [For a weak Turkey, there is no penny, for a strong one, as many as wished]” (Rohrbach, 1902; 16). Hereby, Rohrbach wanted to emphasize that German economic investment had to go hand in hand with support of Turkish political integrity.

Moreover, Rohrbach warned that if the Germans did not take on certain measures on Turkey, their rivals in the world economy, that is, England, France and Russia, surely would. He added that Germany’s intention was not an economic monopoly on Turkish territory, and that she certainly accepted a division of spheres of influence. But, at present, Russia claimed the eastern Anatolian plateau down to the Taurus Mountains stretching to the northern half of Anatolia, and France claimed Syria. Obviously, in case of partitioning of Turkey, Germany could not claim anywhere. As a result, Germany had to do anything necessary to secure the political integrity of the Empire; first military improvement by means of railway construction. The rivalry existing among the world powers on the issue was already proved by the railway proposal of a French-Russian company. Consequently, the question of Baghdad Railway was

nothing but the colonization of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia (Rohrbach, 1902; 17).

Rohrbach traces the idea of colonization of Asia Minor back to the mid 19th century. As an example, he refers to a Ludwig Ross, a professor from Halle, as the first to express the potential of Asia Minor as a German colony after his visit to Anatolia (Rohrbach, 1902; 17). In this book, Ross argues for a German agricultural settlement on the south-west coast of Anatolia. Germany should do diplomatic interventions to get land for German settlement. He claims that the region is very convenient for agricultural settlement, because it is thinly populated and very fertile. In order to achieve this, Germany should improve her consular work in the Ottoman Empire, because after the settlement, there could be a great field of work for railway construction and electricity and telegraph systems. Moreover, German tradesman should learn French, Turkish or Greek and start business there. Since he could not hope much for an active German diplomacy soon, he invited private initiative; he suggested that Germany could buy some land from the Sultan (Ross, 1850; v-xxxv).

Rohrbach complains that since Ross, many others had written and advocated the idea of colonizing Asia Minor. Many, who had not even visited the country, wrote about its climate, its fertile land which waited for German migration to blossom. However, Rohrbach expresses his concern for the dangers of such ideas. He wrote that letting tens or hundreds of thousands of German peasants to migrate to Asia Minor would endanger Germany's relations with Turkish rulers sitting in Istanbul and would jeopardize German

plans and expectations for the Middle East (Rohrbach, 1902; 17). Moreover, the region from the eastern provinces to the western Anatolia and Mesopotamia had a very complicated structure of races. Racially and linguistically, Turkish element was concentrated in the central Anatolia. Eastern provinces were composed of Armenians and Kurds, while Mesopotamia was an Arabic-speaking region. Rohrbach informs us that Freiherr von der Goltz advised Turks to concentrate their power and attention on Anatolia, as a heartland to retreat at worst case. Rohrbach comments that this discussion raises the interesting idea that Turkish government may actually prefer a self-amputation in case of necessity, that is, when their political existence was fatally threatened. He concludes from this that central Anatolia being the only secure place for the Turks to take refuge meant that any massive German peasant migration was unthinkable (Rohrbach, 1902; 19). It would also create distrust among the people against Germans. Rohrbach reported that the general view of the educated Turks in Anatolia on Germans was already suspicious despite the present friendliness of the relations between the two countries. He argues that the article appearing in German press in advocacy of massive migration and settlement might cause great difficulties for the future of German-Turkish relations.

In the Arabic speaking regions, Rohrbach observes a completely different situation. The local people were more sympathetic for any foreign power that would improve their conditions and distance them from the Turkish rule. Although the Arab people of the region were far from being homogenous,

the Arabic-speaking people in general saw themselves superior to Turks in terms of civilization. Their territory, Rohrbach says, was open to migration, but the difficulty there was the climate. The Schwabian settlers in Palestine were an exception. Thus, in this region, German interests should be limited to the opportunities that would open up with the construction of the Baghdad Railway.

The present war must be recorded in history as the “German War” (Rohrbach, 1914, 5). The generation before us witnessed the unification of Germany. German-hood would be even greater if unification with Austria, with shared spiritual-cultural and economic structure, was achieved (Rohrbach, 1914, 6). In the 1880s started the German colonial movement, which led to the migration of 150 to 230 thousand people every year. Then, German population was 40 millions, today it is 70 million. This means almost 400 thousand more people every year, which necessitated us to allow for emigration from Germany (Rohrbach, 1914, 6). This remarkable development occurred as a result of economic development, Germany’s foreign trade between 1871 and 1880 was about 5 million Marks. In 1912, it was 21 milliards, grown four times. Our industry was growing out of raw materials, so we needed more and at closer places for the continuation of our industrial development (Rohrbach, 1914, 7). What has that got to do with the German War? A great deal. Because against our vital needs stood one nation: England (Rohrbach, 1914, 8). Since the Napoleonic wars, great naval powers, France, Spain and Holland, lost to England. They also failed against England in trade, seafaring and industry.

England acquired dominance in progress, industry, trades, maritime supremacy. The best technique, capital, fleet concentrated under the control of one nation, securing its dominance in the world. The European culture, economy and language have been carried to distant corners of the world, to china, India, South America by the British power at the turn of the 19th century.

But around 1860-1870, Germany made an impressive take off and reached England. The basis of this take off was our education system, our arts, and out methodological work. I remember Trietschke saying that Germans are a people one half which always examines the other. Out disciplined school system brought about the German trade and German industry. By the end of 1890s, our competition capacity on the world market caught England's. An English newspaper, Saturday Review, wrote in 1897 that "if Germany was annihilated today, there is no British person who would not benefit from it" (Rohrbach, 1914, 10). Jealous thousands started this war to annihilate Germany, invited other nations of Europe to take a piece from Germany. The following year, British Marine Minister declared that Germany ask for war if she starts building a fleet.

In 1911, we confronted the French in Morocco. France took sides with British to attack at Germany. They even planned to move troops of 160 thousand soldiers from over Belgium to Germany (Rohrbach, 1914, 12). France has always been our open enemy.

By the end of 19th century, Russia started her expansion towards the Far East. Then she directed her interest in the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor.

This brought her into conflict not only with Austria-Hungary, but also with Germany. Under the old banner of pan-Slavism, she supported uprisings. Most Slavs in the Balkans live under Austrian rule. The same holds true for the Serbs who were also stirred up by Russia. In addition to the conflict between Austria and Russia and the Balkan question came Turkey as a whole into the problem. This marked the German-Russian confrontation.

What serves us is that Turkey remains as independent and as an open space for commercial and economic activity of all nations. Turkey is also a life insurance for Germany in the political-military sense, because after the German built the Baghdad railway for them, the Turkish troops can bring the Germany and Austria to the borders of Egypt. Egypt is the key to Britain's world empire; once Egypt is lost, lost are the British connections to India, Australia, East Africa and the control of the Indian Ocean. England believed that this is the reason why Germany took on the construction of Baghdad railway. But we never had this perspective. On the contrary, we thought that if Turkey continued to exist and strengthened militarily, and British wanted to go to our throats one day, then could we make a bit of a successful move along this way. All these arguments entail that we should retain Turkey and certainly not hand her over to Russia.

The master stroke of British policy was its success in creating this hostility between Germany and Russia. We did not want any territorial enlargement, no "place in the sun" in Istanbul (Rohrbach, 1914, 16). England led the anti-German encirclement policy by winning Russia on her side

(Rohrbach, 1914, 18). Since 1908, when the British king and the Russian Tsar met in Reval to discuss about the latest crisis in Turkey, they agreed that England takes possession of Arabia, Mesopotamia and Palestine, France of Syria, Russia of Armenia and Asia Minor. It was calculated that Germany would not take any risk in case that turkey engages in a war of life and death against France, England and Russia. Germany wants the endurance of Turkey, which entails the prevention of her perspective partition by our opponents, and this is of vital necessity for Germany.

Rohrbach accounted that Turkey won after the Berlin Congress in 1878 its political unity and military power not because it had the power but because the European powers were more indulged in their overseas interests than the partition of the Ottoman inheritance. This also marked the beginning of German *Orientpolitik* (Rohrbach, 1908, 242). Germany was seeking rapprochement with Austria-Hungary, despite the opposition of Hungarian government. Germany was also supporting the Austrian influence in the Balkans against the Russian. Russia engaged in politics of compensation: she wanted Bulgaria and Bosphorus as Russian regions of influence to leave Serbia and Macedonia to Austrian influence. “Für die deutsche politik ist einzig die Erhaltung einer selbständigen und widerstandkräftigen Türkei conditio sine qua non [The existence of an independent and strengthened Turkey is a necessity for German policy]” (Rohrbach, 1908, 255). But in reality, the commercial competition on the Near Eastern markets was standing between Germany and Austria-Hungary

(Rohrbach, 1908, 258). Thus German railway enterprise in Turkey was not welcomed by Austria-Hungary.

Rohrbach stated that Austrian policy on Balkans, German-Austrian relation and many first degree problems of the great international politics depended on the fate of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Asia. "It is well-known that Freiherr von der Goltz advised the Turks to give themselves up their overseas, that is, European, African and South Arabian possessions and rise themselves back from the true stronghold of their national existence, that is, Anatolia, with its natural continuation, Mesopotamia and Syria" (Rohrbach, 1908, 259). Anatolian peninsula is both national and religious sense the true core of the Turkish state. The Turks, for 800 years, since the Seljuks, brought about in Asia Minor something no other resident of the territory did: they developed a belief of solidarity and unity as people. Seljuks and Ottomans do not have the original upper Asian type, the mongoloid faces in Turkey does not belong to the Ottomans but to individuals in whose roots there is a recent mixing with the latter migrated people from Central Asia. Kapadokians, Galatians, Phrygians, Lydians, etc. are all together Turks or Ottomans. That is why the further southern region of Arabic language is completely different. The language border between Turks and Arabs goes along Northern Syria and Mesopotamia (Rohrbach, 1908, 260).

The situation in the region is in relation to the significance of railway question in the international politics. At the point of every political discussion over Turkey there is a new setting: not by supporting but rather by

strengthening both material and professional power of Turkish army is the point of view on which German *Orientpolitik* must be built. Both domestically and internationally Germany and Turkey are very different and the distance of the two countries' peoples mentality. But on Eastern issues, Germany and Turkey suit to each other. The Turks know that they are surrounded by greater and smaller adversaries who want to possess vulnerable or weaker Ottoman territories, and Turks are aware that they will lose if they confront them alone. Thus they know that if they want to regain their power, they need to find a power which does not want their annihilation and partition. "This power is us" wrote Rohrbach (Rohrbach, 1908, 261). England had claims on Mesopotamia, Russia on Armenia and Asia Minor, France on Syria and Italy on Tripoli, but these territories were now worked by Germany and German economy. The Empire, the population and the possession that existed in Asia Minor since ancient times were going to continue to exist by Baghdad and Mecca railways. According to Rohrbach, the railway was going to increase and improve the villages, towns, cities and people and thus the population, tax income, financial and material productivity, in general capacity of resistance of Turkey against its neighbours, and this will serve our interests (Rohrbach, 1908, 262). He wrote "[O]ur political position to Turkey differs from all other European powers in that we do not want any Ottoman territory anywhere, but we have the wish and interest in Turkey, if she wants to shrink itself to its Asiatic territories or not, as a consumer market and a source of raw materials for our industry'. Hence Turkey was expected to be the German door to new markets by means of

Bagdadbahn for further industrialization and better terms of competition in world economy. This was also supposed to bring new economic development in the region.

Thus, Rohrbach claimed that Germans had to secure political and economic strengthening of Turkey (Rohrbach, 1908, 264). “If we leave the Armenians, who from a question of its own, out of account, we see that the coasts of Asia Minor from Bosphorus to Persian Gulf are dominantly Muslim with the exception of Greek people. The Christian element is not insignificant, but is lessening in the city or in isolated villages, when the western and north western territories of the empire that are dominantly Christian ceases to exist, the Turks will have less causes to take drastic measures and resort to oppression, which in turn cause political distrust (Rohrbach, 1908, 263).

The English policy on the Eastern Question resulted in the grouping of England, France, Russia, and Italy on one side, Germany and Austria-Hungary on the other side. After Kaiser’s visit to England in 1907, to settle *Bagdadbahn* controversy, it turned out that England wants the construction of the line between Mosul and Persian Gulf to herself. According to Wilcox plan, British claim not only the construction of this part of the railway, but also the irrigation of the ancient agricultural regions had to be done by British enterprise. On that claim, they depended on their experience in revitalizing the ancient irrigation canals in India and the Assuan dam and irrigation in Egypt. However, India and Egypt are British territory and peasant there are British subjects.

According to Wilcox plan, settlers from India and Egypt will be moved and settled to Baghdad region in case of British irrigation, entailing the moving out of any Turkish settlements. This implies a political protectorate over Baghdad region. Rohrbach first wrote about the details of the Wilcox plan in *Die Presussische Jahrbücher* in 1905 (Rohrbach, 1908, 265). When in 1906 a rise in Turkish customs came to the agenda, England put the conditions of reform in Macedonia in exchange (Rohrbach, 1908, 266). Because they found the Ottoman guarantee will not be necessary when upper Mesopotamia is irrigated and turned into a profitable agricultural production area with great amounts of exports. British intentions on Baghdad surely depended on the agreement between Britain and Russia. According to this, England agreed on Russia to build a railway from Turkistan through eastern Persia to a port on Indian Ocean (Rohrbach, 1908, 266).

Britain also planned a railway from Beluchistan to Ismailiye on Suez Canal, thus linking India and Egypt over land. On the other hand, the political advances of Britain in Arabian Peninsula were well known. In this sense, they were trying to make the Sheikh of Kuwait declare independence from Turkish rule which would entail that he would contract the end point of Baghdad Railway out to Britain. In the beginning of 1870s, Turkish General Governor of Baghdad, Mithad Pasha conquered the region and appointed the Sheikh of Kuwait as Turkish *kaymakam* for the new *kaza* of the *vilayet* of Baghdad. Although from the legal point of view, the *vali* or *kaymakam* have no political power, in fact the authority of the Ottoman government had slipped away in

large regions like the Arabia, Kurdistan, even in Anatolia. That's how the region fell under the British influence. Britain supported the independence movements in Yemen and Mecca against the Turkish government. Such tendencies surely counteracted against the Turkish Hecaz railway. But the Turkish government put the Turkish soldiers in the region under the service of the railway construction, which was thus completed very fast and became a great political success by empowering Turkish control over the Bedouins and the upheavals in Mekka (Rohrbach, 1908, 269-70.)

According to Rohrbach, the plan known as "German" railway construction in Turkey was associated with the very unfortunate idea of "German colonization" of Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, etc. which inhered in a very dangerous misunderstanding of their (that is, German) economic expectations and prospects in Turkish Asia Minor. He pointed out that the idea that Germans should and could intend a German rural or whatever kind colonization had to be refrained from first due to the climatic affects for the emigrants. Even the Swabian emigrants to Transcaucasia and Palestine got accustomed to the climate only at the second generation and many of them migrated back to Germany.

In addition to the climatic problems, there are practical political problems. Turkey would not be willing to let massive European settlements in her territory. There will apparently be a conflict between the interests of the Turkish state and that of the settlers. The problem becomes more solid when one asks the question if the settlers will be Turkish or German citizens. The first

option is unimaginable from the Turkish point of view. Turks also cannot allow for a blossoming German colony over the economic and material advantages of Turkish state and the government in Istanbul had enough of hundreds of thousands of foreign subjects with their own separate law, nationality, religion, culture in its territory. Such a foreign body cause frailty in the total political organism under any circumstances.

Furthermore, German settlers would not want to be Turkish subjects, for then Germany would have no say in their affairs. Besides, every Muslim still looks down on every non-Muslim. He thought that there was no guarantee that the terrible massacres on Armenians in 1895-97 would not be practiced on German settlers in Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Thus Rohrbach saw no convenience for German settlement along Baghdad railway. The voices in Germany supporting mass rural migration and settlement to Turkey are just making it difficult for German capital and investment in Turkey by causing distrust and suspicion on something which is not at all convenient (Rohrbach, 1908, 276-77). What Germans strived for in Turkey and what we can achieve is not a preparation of a settlement region, but development of a great German commercial region connected by railway system (Rohrbach, 1908, 277).

Rohrbach inquired into what kind of expectations Germans could have. He thought that a primary economic principle for the economic life of all peoples: he who has nothing to sell cannot buy. The things to sell can be of various natures: agricultural products, industrial products, labour, intermediate trade commodities, even the production of precious metals. However, these can

be of very little value, or its consumption by foreign countries may not be independent. These are the obstacles against the development of trade relations. This means a certain country or region may be producing too little for export and its export might be restricted. Thus, it comes to finding countries where export-oriented productivity can be improved without much difficulty so that it would improve their imports. This was the case with Baghdad railway. Rohrbach saw in Anatolian peninsula a promising economic region together with Syria, upper Mesopotamia and coastal Cilicia, which corresponded to the Turkish *vilayets* of Adana, Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdad, Basra and Diyarbakır. Now the productivity is low due to the low density of population and the insecurity in the region (Rohrbach, 1908, 278).

The land between the Taurus Mountains to Arabian Desert and Persian Gulf is known for its fertility since the ancient times. The prosperity of the ancient kingdoms depended on the irrigation of this fertile land. In the Baghdad region two things could not be separated from each other: irrigation and improvement of agricultural methods. These would open the regions where the rainfall was not regular enough to provide for productive agricultural production, especially the north Mesopotamia. But first, the railway had to be constructed, since so long as there was no possibility to export; there was no incentive to improve productivity (Rohrbach, 1908, 281). The river transport on Tigris to Baghdad had many difficulties and was not sufficient for the improvement potential of upper Mesopotamia.

Most important of all was the production of cotton (Rohrbach, 1908, 281). The region, especially Adana, Harran and Urfa, was very convenient for cotton production as for the climate and the soil. From Harran and Urfa to Alexandretta, it took more than 7-8 days with caravan. But, the sea route from Alexandretta to Hamburg or Bremen was far shorter than Charleston or New Orleans to Belgian-Dutch or north German ports. Moreover, the production cost in Mesopotamia was lower due to the comparatively more moderate price of life and the life expectations in this part of the world than in South America or along the river Nile. Also, the soil was so fertile that it did not even require fertilizers to produce high quality cotton. The only thing that raised production cost in the region at the time was the lack of railway transportation. Like the Russians did with the cotton production in Turkistan, so should Germany in Mesopotamia. Cleaning and pressing industries had to be established at the place of production and cheaper transformation should be secured. This would develop import/export capacity of the region. In 1906, Germany manufactured imported cotton products of worth 400 million Marks. Rohrbach pointed at the target of getting most of this amount from Baghdad railway region, together with partial manufacturing and export from there.

Rohrbach was aware that the Germans were not alone in engaging in the potentialities of the region. Mesopotamian cotton attracted both British, French, Belgian, perhaps even American, Swiss and Italian capital. This meant that whoever wanted to secure the biggest advantage had to be conscious of its importance for the nation and should take economic initiative. Who lent money

fastest for the investment in the region, was going to win the race (Rohrbach, 1908, 284). The condition of the East, namely Turkey, entailed that those who had the capital was going to pick the fruit. What Germans were trying to do was to win the trust of both the Turkish government and the native people; and they have managed to reserve a certain friendship. It was unknown how long the present condition of German-Turkish relationship was going to last. But so long as it lasted, Germans had to differentiate themselves in our relations with Turkey from other nations in that Germans earnestly did not desire any political concession, they did not want to rip Turks of any land, port, security, naval base or any such thing.

After the cotton, the Mesopotamian wool had to be taken into consideration. The wool produced in Urfa, Aleppo and Alexandretta and exported to Marseille was of exceptional quality. German firms should take on this business and orient it towards import/export trade. The business capacities that came up with the Baghdad railway in fact would require a settlement colony if the native population did not increase (Rohrbach, 1908, 285). Rohrbach ascertained that wherever the smoke of the locomotive reached, the predatory Bedouins and Kurds was going to have to retreat and exchange their spears and riffles with ploughs. As this security was guaranteed, there would be no obstacle to population increase (Rohrbach, 1908, 286).

Baghdad railway, for Rohrbach, was going to tap the world's third richest petroleum reserve after Pennsylvania and Transcaucasia. But in her target of reviving Mesopotamia agriculturally and in terms of population,

Germany had to differentiate herself from British imperialism prevailing in India by not closing on territorial control on the region to other powers. Rohrbach was convinced that Germany had the right to expect compensation to the overseas colonies that lied at the centre of current general political situation, and that German national economic life was going to benefit from the world wide free commerce. He reminded that it must not be forgotten that such an economic result was based on one principle: besides all railway construction, all transportation policy, no political interest group was prepared for more permanent political and moral conquests. Without or against the native people, Germans could not hope to bring about anything in the Baghdad railway region; with them, that is, with their trust and with the recognition of their peculiarities, their internal and external conditions, the Turkish East could be brought to the greatest and most practical performance, which hosted greatest of economic achievements.

When the Baghdad railway was completed, there was going to be lots of French schools along its route, as if they French do not have enough schools in Istanbul and big coastal cities. He who learns French wants to be treated in a French hospital. Another nation which understood the importance of such enterprise is Italians. The number of Italian schools in the Levant was increasing every year. The increase in Italian imports to Turkey in the recent years was not unrelated to this development.

A less known but surprising fact, which also has commercial significance was the philanthropic enterprise of the American missionaries in

Asiatic Turkey (Rohrbach, 1908, 291). Americans were making Christianity propaganda among Turkish-Armenian speaking people and in Syria among Christian Arabs. More remarkable was the American school in Beirut, and the Syrian Protestant Collage, which has a theology and a medicine faculty. The education language was English and Arabic, Muslim students were also admitted. The graduates of the medical school usually went to the United States for further education and when they returned they brought back American culture with them. As a result of this American institute, there developed a migration of traders and workers from Beirut and Lebanon in general to United States and work as secret American agents for trade. Rohrbach had seen the widespread use of American machinery especially in agriculture in the eastern Anatolia. In Syria, one could see American equipment, tools, fabrics, paper, candle, iron wares, furniture and even conserved food in surprising and growing amounts. The total of American exports to Turkey is worth 30 million piaster every year. And the schools lied at the root of this American economic influence (Rohrbach, 1908, 292).

Germany had to follow a similar route: introduction and spread German culture through schools and hospitals would be the guarantee for strong beneficial influence and the strengthening of the economic relations (Rohrbach, 1908, 289). Germans had to focus on the establishment of German schools and hospitals. Rohrbach witnessed the influence of such German hospital himself in Urfa in the small hospital, which originally was established by Dr. Johannes Lepsius to help Armenians as part of German Eastern mission gained extensive

meaning. (Rohrbach, 1908, 290) The orphanage and the relief work for the Armenians hardly raised any suspicion of the Turks. The medical station extended German influence in Urfa and around to nomadic Kurds and Arabs by means of establishing orphanage, trade school, weaving mill and carpet factory during the last decade. The medical help was provided irrespective of religion and nationality. "It can be said without self deception that spread over the faces of Muslim population of Asia Minor, German has an exceptional place and great trust than the British, French, Italian, Russian, etc." (Rohrbach, 1908, 290). German medical station had an economic influence in addition to moral influence. Rohrbach maintained that this kind of preparations for a future when the Mesopotamian and Syrian railroads were finished was secure German position in the East.

In fact, German private initiative with all the courage, money, power, time, intelligence and effort was already in Mesopotamia before the Baghdad railway turned the attentions into the region as a potential German economic sphere. The fate of the Ottoman Empire has become even more important and more at the forefront of the world politics as it had been for a long time. Since the British got Egypt, it paved the way to grouping among the powers on the Ottoman legacy. Thus, Germans did not only have to pursue the railway construction in Asiatic Turkey, but also direct Germany's world economic and world political development along southeast Europe and Asia Minor (Rohrbach, 1908, 294).

Rohrbach, recollecting the pre-war German aims in early 1950s, accounted that the railway from Bosphorus to Baghdad meant for the German perspective first and foremost the military strengthening of Turkey. He used the Bismarck's phrase that the Balkans was not worth one Pomeranian grenadier in a different sense: if Germany does not want to split the blood of one soldier, and that Russia has to be stopped before she runs over Austria, then Turkey must be strengthened. The economic significance of the railway, looking back he argued, was only secondary. He concluded that the perceived threat by the Britain on Egypt due to the Baghdad Railway project was the main reason behind the Great War (Rohrbach, 1953; 40-49).

In his book *Unsere koloniale Zukunftsarbeit* (1915), Rohrbach deals extensively with the Germany's task in the acculturation of Africa. The second task he analysed is the Ottoman East. He stated that contrary to Africa, East had a thousand years old culture and strong cultural relations with the West. Still, "the oriental culture is different from our Germanic Central European culture" (Rohrbach, 1915; 58). The main difference he marked here was the agricultural productivity. When one travels by train through Germany, France, or any other European country, every piece of land was cultivated; either tilled for grain, or was a meadow, regularly used woodland, vineyard, or garden. There was no place for waste land. But in the East, up to Turkistan, to Persia, down to Arabia, even in Asia Minor itself, he saw waste land as the normal state of affairs. Only the coastal regions of Asia Minor, Syria, and north Mesopotamia, Armenia and the Caucasus, where there was a relatively regular rainfall, the land was

cultivated. He concluded that “we should put our technology at the service of the agricultural development in the Orient. We should take on the task of building dams and irrigation canals and introduce modern machinery” (Rohrbach, 1915; 60).

He maintained that the fate of the war was going to be decided mostly in the East, on the Dardanelles and Egypt. He saw the extension of a German style economic colonialism to Egypt as the main target of the war. So long as a British supremacy prevailed in Egypt, the region would be closed to all the other European nations that have economic interests in the region. To secure her overseas activities, Germany had to drive Britain out of Egypt. Rohrbach clearly expresses that this did not mean German governance in Egypt, but “we will be happy when Egypt becomes Turkish again” (Rohrbach, 1915; 61). According to him, Turks had a respectable military power, but they lacked the economic life to benefit from the region. Hence, Turkey was assigned the role of protecting Egypt against foreign invasion and from the economic tyranny of any single power like Britain. This state of affairs was the most convenient for German policy.

Hence, the strengthening of Turkey came out as the main target of Germany. However, Rohrbach emphasized that in her attempts to strengthen Turkey, Germany must be very careful in not to behave as her masters or protectors, but as her friend and teacher. The experience with the Turks was going to be an example for other eastern people, such as the Persians, Afghans, Muslim Indians, Arabs and Egyptians on Germany’s intentions and attitude.

This had to be followed by a flow of German school teachers, technicians and other professionals to the East. Rohrbach lamented for the fact that there were 600-800 French schools scattered around the Ottoman territory. But he hoped that, in a decade, if things developed the way they were planned, hundreds and thousands of people from the East would not go to Paris, Genf or England for academic and technical education, but to Germany (Rohrbach, 1915; 62-63).

4.2.3 Ernst Jäckh

The most insistent pre-war advocate of German-Turkish collaboration was Ernst Jäckh. Because of his insistence, he was called “Turk Jäckh” by the Germans and “Jäckh Pasha” by the Turks. Although he was younger than both Friedrich Naumann and Paul Rohrbach, he attained a much more influential position and greater personal reputation in official circles than either of them by 1914.

Born in 1875, Jäckh grew up in Württemberg, and attended a number of universities. He became a student of Lujo Brentano in Munich University, and developed a broad interest in languages, literature, theology, history, and politics. Rejecting an academic career, he went into journalism. In time he was writing for a number of papers and magazines and editing several Swabian

weeklies together with the daily *Neckarzeitung* in Heilbronn. Jäckh always prided himself as being representative of South-west German democracy, and, in truth, there were qualities of individualism and political liberalism in his words and deeds that stood in marked contrast to the world of Prussian conservatism. As a very young man, he joined Naumann's *Nationalsozialen Verein* and thereafter was in close touch with him.

The year 1908 was a decisive one for Jäckh. His journey to Asia Minor that summer coincided with the Young Turk revolution and eventuated in firm friendships with several Young Turks (notably Enver Pasha) and with Kiderlen-Wächter, who was also momentarily in Istanbul. The German diplomat became Secretary of state for Foreign Affairs in 1910, and through him Jäckh rapidly was introduced into the highest circles of the German government and society. In these circles, he continued his earlier efforts to introduce a more democratic atmosphere into German politics by bringing men of contrasting opinions and differing social position into intimate personal contact. Naumann was one to profit from these good offices.

Jäckh was a man of uncommon tactfulness combined with an affable social ease. But more than that, he was a constant source of ideas and plans, a genius at organization, administration, and conciliation of diverging views. Whether at the Imperial Court, where William II called him 'my plucky little Swabian' or with the Social Democrats (his brother, Gustav Jäckh, was editor of the socialist *Leipziger Volkszeitung*), Jäckh was equally at home and appreciated. As of 1909, he was president of the *Goethebund*, secretary of the

Association for Württemberg Charity, member of the *Goethegesellschaft* and the *Dürerbund*, and among the leaders of the National Association for a Liberal Germany. In short, Jäckh was an able representative of the Wilhelmian era.

Germans heard much about the Near East from Ernst Jäckh after 1908. He publicized the Central European ideas of Friedrich List, introduced his countrymen to “the new Turkey”, and shared his experiences in the Balkan Wars with them. As guest of the Turkish General Staff, he visited Albania, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia in 1909, part of the time in the company of Rohrbach. Later, he conducted groups of prominent Young Turks through Germany. A year before the Great War, he founded one of his most successful organizations, the German-Turkish Union (*Deutsches-Türkisches Gesellschaft*). Naumann welcomed the plans of this Union for German schools, hospitals, and libraries in Asia Minor, and study opportunities for Turks in Germany as an excellent implementation of Rohrbach's plea to spread German ideas in the world.

Jäckh was closely involved in Turkish politics since the Young Turk revolution.¹⁹ Based on his personal observations, he maintained that there was no old Turks, that is, an opposition of absolutists who wish to bring back the despotism of Abdülhamid's regime, because, such opposition would not have any power. For Jäckh, everyone was a Young Turk in the sense that everyone

¹⁹ Ernst Jäckh “Kleine Anatomien in Türkei”, *Die Hilfe* 18 (04.01.1912), p. 550.

supported the reform and the constitutional monarchy. The only differences of opinion emerged on the methods of the reforms.²⁰

In 1913, Jäckh was enthusiastically propagating the idea of re-establishing the old overland route to the Near East, with such slogans as ‘Helgoland-Bagdad’ and ‘mitteleuropaisch-vorderasiatisches Gemeinschaftsgebiet [Central European and Near Eastern commercial region]’. Seeing in Baghdad Railway Project Germany’s opening to the East, Jäckh fantasized about Helgoland-Baghdad connection, which was achieved by *Orientbahn* that connected Vienna and Istanbul, and *Bagdadbahn* that was going to connect Istanbul and Baghdad. This was going to mean a replacement of British sea route to India with a more efficient land route. When the Baghdad Railway was completed, the journey from Berlin to Baghdad would take six days and London to Bombay over Germany a little more than a week, whereas it took almost three weeks by sea route over Suez (Jäckh, 1913; 11).

A few months before the war began; Jäckh and Rohrbach began publishing a magazine on current affairs, *Das grössere Deutschland*.²¹ For

²⁰ Ernst Jäckh “Konstantinopoler Brief”, *Die Hilfe* 18 (04.01.1912), p. 505-6.

²¹ A letter written in 1946 by Mrs. Clara Rohrbach to Ernst Jäckh caught the spirit of their activities in those exciting pre-war days:

As I think of you, my thoughts always wander back to that time when you and my husband co-operated in that fine effort: work for *Das grössere Deutschland*, peaceful expansion and cultural activities in the Near East. Enver Pasha. Vienna the gateway for these policies. Hamburg the portal to the seas and other continents. The German *Werkbund*. Export of our quality products. Mutual exchange with Balkan nations. A peaceful Germany, great, honoured, and respected. ... And in our internal affairs Naumann and his friends were working and we around him I knew his ideas and demands: our people should learn to knead iron as no other ever had. Our methodical thought should be translated into technology and enterprise. Our sense of aesthetics should be revealed in lines, and forms, and colours. Our justice should be the best available. And our social

those Germans who waxed enthusiastic with Ernst Jäckh over Turkish potentialities, it was a logical step to welcome and support *Mitteuropa* plans as soon as it was evident that the war would not be won in a few months. Similarly, statesmen and writers of the nations allied against the Central Powers were convinced, as soon as the *Mitteuropa* literature began to appear, that they had found confirmation for a so-called *Drang nach Osten* as the slogan of the most ferocious German imperialism, which some of them had been suspecting for a decade or more. But, on the contrary, Ernst Jäckh regarded the agrarian Balkan states and the Near East as suitable supplies of important raw materials such as cotton, wool, grain and ores, and a market for German finished goods (Fischer, 1975: 265), not as a potential colony.

Jäckh, in his political and economic thought, was very much influenced by Friedrich List. He called List the “greatest German economist” and the “Bismarck of German economy” (Jäckh, 1913). Although, it cannot be said that they totally agree in their ideas on Turkey, there is a certain lineage between List and Jäckh, the former being the constitutive thinker of the interests of German merchants interests after the unification against the domination of Prussia and Austria. List was voicing the interest of Hanseatic merchants and manufacturers in an economic environment, where tariffs, fiscal policy, coinage, transport, legal matters and education was under Prussian control (Henderson, 1983; 31-33). However, the Anglo-German agreement List

legislation and policies the foremost in the world! Acknowledgement of our nation and of the task of humanizing our masses were but two aspects of one and the same cause. What a magnificent time that was, when all this was planned, worked for; and you and my Paul in the midst of all these things! (Meyer, 1955: 102).

recommended as part of the liberal orientation of his economic program became an unattainable dream in half a century due to the intensified rivalry on sea and land transport, raw materials and consumer markets.

Despite the estrangement in German-British relations, Jäckh did not want to give up on the liberal aspect of List's heritage. As representative of national liberal circle and thought, he argued that German overseas commercial intentions were far more liberal than that of the British. He referred to Sir Johnson, a colonial politician from Great Britain, by saying that if he was a German, his dreams about the future would be a great German-Austrian-Turkish Empire, with at least two major commercial ports, Hamburg and Istanbul, accompanied with ports stretching from North Sea to Aegean Sea, Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Jäckh's argument was that this expression represented the true British imperialist thought, which pursued a territorial imperial unity and that it contradicted with the German intention, which was an economic and political community of interests based on three independent states, namely German, Austrian and Turkish Empire (Jäckh, 1913; 9).

Particularly in his writings after 1908, Jäckh deliberately prefers and uses "Turkish" as the name of the country and the people to "Ottoman". He clearly expresses his favour for a smaller and nationally more homogenous Turkey. Jäckh did not approve of the Austrian recommendation to the Turkish government of "decentralisation" He believed that decentralisation did not suit to the realities of Turkey. Although both Austria and Turkey were composed of

multiple nationalities, what was applicable for Austria was not possible for Turkey, because there was a linguistic and cultural unity in Austria, whereas Turkey was an exceptional mosaic. There were commonalities among nations, for example both Albanians and Arabs were Muslim, but there was nothing more than that.

Recommending Turkey decentralisation, or federation in the sense of becoming “United States of Turkey”, or recognition of autonomy for every national element, would simply lead to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. According to Jäckh, Turkish population was in the majority and thus they had the right to dominate. If cultural decentralisation was pursued, it would also end up with British Arabia. Jäckh emphasized that decentralisation as granting of autonomy was even rejected by the Armenian Ottoman Foreign Minister, Noradunghian. Jäckh agreed Noradunghian, who understood decentralisation as Ottomanisation, that is, proclamation and recognition of the principle that all the races of the Empire were united for the good of the Empire. This meant that Arabs, Turks, Greeks, Armenians were going to be turned into Ottoman patriots, not into Turks.²²

His ideas about the future of Turkey develops parallel to that Goltz’s advise on the self-amputation of Ottoman State and retrieval to the Turkish core. Jäckh wrote in 1912 that, for 20 years, Goltz-Pasha recommended “our Turkish friends” to give their European and African territories up and rise over the stronghold of their national existence in Anatolia, Mesopotamia and Syria.

²² Ernst Jäckh “Kleine Anatomien in Türkei”, *Die Hilfe* 18 (04.01.1912), p. 550-1.

Jäckh added that also Rohrbach, “a determined friend of Turkey and an influential advocate of German-Turkish alliance” expressed for 10 years that once Turkey got free of its separatist European territories, it would start to gain political stability and military strength. Jäckh mentioned the similar advice of Marschall von Bieberstein on giving up on Tripoli at the first opportunity of a peace treaty with the Italians. Jäckh emphasized that even a smaller Turkey was going to be three times larger than Germany. He pointed that Germany had already limited her activities to the core of Turkey, that was, Asia Minor.

Deutschland sucht und braucht nach wie vor die kleinere, aber kräftiger Türkei in Kleinasien: dort reist langsam, aber zuverlässig das grösste Kulturwerk das Deutschland bisher in der Welt draussen geschaffen hat [Germany seeks and needs a smaller but stronger Turkey in Asia Minor, there rises slowly but surely the greatest German *Kulturwerk*]²³

German *Kulturwerk* was mainly concentrated on agricultural development; particularly the cultivation of cotton in Konya and Adana plains and the Baghdad railway was going to be the means of transport for agricultural and semi-manufactured products. Jäckh was firmly convinced that German-Turkish collaboration would form a strong enough economic region to compete with Britain and the United States. The only obstacle he saw was the Russian influence in the Balkans, but it had to overcome to guarantee the success of German *Weltpolitik* and the rise of the Orient.

Although not expressed either by Jäckh or Goltz, the perspective of smaller Turkey was in line with Germany’s Balkan policy in alliance with Austrian Empire. In order to avoid conflict in the Balkans, Germany followed a

²³ Ernst Jäckh “Die kleinere und grössere Türkei”, *Die Hilfe* 18 (1912), p. 728-9.

policy of “Balkans for the Balkan people” since the Treaty of Berlin. This policy was also based on the assumption that smaller independent Balkan states would act as a buffer to any potential clash between Germany’s allies, Austrian and Ottoman Empires, and would give an end to nationalist uprisings that threaten the stability of the region. Another aspect of the argument for smaller Turkish state withdrawn from the Balkans was related to the political integrity of the Ottoman state. According to Jäckh, it would avoid the potential threat of intervention of Great Powers on the grounds of Christian people’s issues (Jäckh, 1913; 46-47).

In Jäckh’s view, another advantage of retreat from the Balkans was the enhancement of migration of Muslim population to Asia Minor. Jäckh refers to Goltz’s observation of the positive influence of *muhadjirs* (Muslim immigrants) on the revival of agricultural production in Anatolia (Jäckh, 1913; 17). Furthermore, Asia Minor could in this way experience a rise in the density of population, which it obviously needed (Jäckh, 1913; 46). Concerning the revival of agriculture, Jäckh agreed with Goltz in the devastating affect Baghdad Railway Project was to have. As the greatest German cultivation work abroad, Baghdad Railway Project was not only consisted of a railway construction with economic and military-political significance, but also included in irrigation projects. Jäckh emphasizes that this cultivation work would continue and progress even better in a smaller Turkey. He supported his view by stating that it is being shared not only by von der Goltz, but also by German ambassador to Istanbul Marschall von Bieberstein and pro-Turkish

publicist Paul Rohrbach. In a manner of genius, the cure to “sick man” was suggested to be the “difficult amputation of his own body”.

“Schon ein geschickter Arzt vollzieht nicht gerne selbst eine schwere Amputation am eigenen Körper; wie viel weniger gar ‘der kranke Mann’ persönlich. Aber dennoch: der operierte kranke Mann mag und kann gesünder und kräftiger werden als der hinsiechende kranke Mann. (...) Geographisch gesprochen: wenn die Türkei europäische Teile aufgibt, so wird sie eine Provinz hergeben, die nur den zehnten Teil ihrer asiatischen Heimat ausmacht [Neither a gifted doctor nor the sick man wants a difficult amputation. But still: the operated man can be healthier and stronger than the sick man. (...) Geographically speaking: when Turkey gives away her European sections, it will be giving away a province, which made only one tenth of its Asiatic motherland]” (Jäckh, 1913; 46).

Jäckh continued by mentioning that the land Turkey would have after giving up only one tenth of her Asian territory would still be three times bigger than Germany with a population three times smaller than German population. Jäckh tries to support his argument also by referring to his contacts with the members of the Turkish government, and especially General Mahmut Muhtar. He quotes Mahmut Muhtar saying on the Balkan battlefield that “we found ourselves on an enemy land on our own land and soil” (Jäckh, 1913; 47-8). Here, it is remarkable that the possibility of intervention on the grounds of Christian population located at the eastern parts of the Ottoman State was never considered as a problem and eastern provinces were never brought up as potential regions of amputation: it is the Balkan lands and the North African territories to be amputated. These ideas also imply a certain degree of consolation for the result of the Balkan Wars. Thus, in 1913, right after the Balkan Wars, Jäckh was convinced that the land Turkey lost during the Balkan

Wars was only enemy territory and that she retreated to her homeland, to her Asian roots.

Moreover, according to Jäckh, alliance with a Turkey stretching to three continents was a big burden on and danger for Germany (Jäckh, 1913; 48). According to German-Austrian eastern policy, Balkan region had been left to Austrian activity and the Anatolian Turkey to German activity. Accordingly, Germany had only a few consulates in the European Turkey and the administration of the railways between Vienna and Istanbul were under Austrian control. German policy was a smaller, but stronger Turkey in Asia Minor, where the tasks and tendencies, aims and interests both for a mounting Germany and Turkey united. He underlined that the argument for a smaller but stronger Turkey did not reflect a turkophile optimism, but had a history. How important it was to leave behind the historical restrictions for Turkey in order to achieve development had been discussed by Goltz almost 15 years ago in *Deutsche Rundschau*.

As the architect of Helgoland-Baghdad connection, Jäckh pointed to Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, who signed the treaty with England for Helgoland as the German Foreign Minister in 1890, and the final concession with the Turkish government on Baghdad Railway in 1910. For Jäckh, both dates were the parts of the same plan and system of the new German *Weltpolitik* (Jäckh, 1913; 10).

Helgoland-Baghdad connection had an exceptional significance for German economy and it had already produced an increase in German long-

distance trade and shipping. Balkans and the Turkish territory, with their growing opportunities for development and their productivity, were the most natural and the nearest neighbouring region that could be opened up for German *Kulturwerk*. The direction of German economy and foreign policy were determined by the concerns of security of existence for a nation which was going to be doubled in two generations (Jäckh, 1913; 12). According to the figures Jäckh provided, German population had risen from 41.1 millions in 1871 to 64.9 in 1910 and was expected to be around 80 millions in 1930 (Jäckh, 1913; 12). Jäckh emphasized that, despite the drastic population increase, Germany had no settlement colonies and did not need any. What German people needed first and foremost were the processing and improving raw materials into manufactured goods and the export of these products to 'created' sales areas (Jäckh, 1913; 13).

Consequently, agrarian Balkan and Near Eastern lands were exceptionally important and necessary for Germany as raw material suppliers. Exports of cotton, lambs wool and grain alone cost Germany millions of Marks every year. Moreover, in case of a war when the North Sea ports would be blockaded, Germany would severely suffer from scarcity of food and raw materials. Baghdad Railway, together with *Orientbahn*, secured Germany's connection with resources and at a lower price. Moreover, since the market and the source of raw materials were geographically nearer, the transportation costs would be lower, and thus the rates of profit higher. Pointing to the rise in the

percentage of trade of Germany and Austria with Turkey,²⁴ Jäckh concluded that the future of German economy was closely linked to the fate of Istanbul.

Hence, the associated aim of Baghdad Railway was the economic development and resurrection of the new Turkey and a simultaneous military security and political stability at even the remotest corners of the Turkish Empire. Such an opportunity of Turkish development was advised by German initiative and research in accordance with a consciousness to German interests (Jäckh, 1913; 16-17). Jäckh tries to convince his public that this scheme was both politically and scientifically correct.

Together with improvement of transportation, Baghdad Railway Project would open up the field of agriculture. Baghdad Railway Company had brought agricultural machinery and financed researches and provided education by experts to introduce rational agricultural techniques to the local people. Jäckh described the Anatolian peasants as clever, hardworking and open minded, since they had easily exchanged ploughshares with machinery that is most required for this poorly populated region (Jäckh, 1913; 18). Baghdad Railway Company was dealt with agriculture also by preparing irrigation canals on dry lands in order to bring the ancient productivity of the plains of Konya, Adana and Mesopotamia back to life. In the *vilayet* of Konya, which Jäckh illustrate as large as Würtemberg and Bavaria together, German, Swiss and Dutch engineers with Kurdish workers built dams and forced Beyşehir Lake, which was 93 km

²⁴ According to the figures of Jäckh, the total trade of Germany and Austria was 18 % of Turkey's total imports in 1887, while it rose to 42 % in 1910 (Jäckh, 1913; 15).

wet of Konya, to water 50 thousand hectares of agricultural land (Jäckh, 1913; 18), increasing the production of grain ten times. What Jäckh omits to mention is the German exports of fertilizers.

The irrigation project was carried out by a totally German company directed by Philipp Holtzmann, an entrepreneur from Frankfurt a.M., with an estimated 20 million Franks budget and aiming at the revival of the wide fallow lands of Turkey into new agricultural areas. If Konya project succeeded, as Jäckh already celebrated, it was going to be followed by an irrigation project of Adana plain on 500 thousand hectares for cotton production. In and around Adana, a German-Levant Company with headquarters in Dresden, with Armenian workers, had already extended and improved the existing cotton cultivation. Thus, cotton production in Adana has increased more than double from 1904/5 to 1910/11 (Jäckh, 1913; 19). The following project would be the irrigation of the gigantic plain between Tigris and Euphrates, opening up 5 million hectares for agriculture. For this grandiose project, Jäckh anticipated the need for British collaboration.

Jäckh complains about certain German politicians and publicist for whom aforementioned economic and political activities of Germany did not suffice. They long yearned for German peasant settlements in Mesopotamia and a German naval base at Alexandrette (Iskenderun). Such propaganda, for Jäckh was old, and had already damaged the German *Kulturwerk* in Asia Minor by arising suspicion about German intensions. In the face of the loss of the European Turkey, such claims were renewed and improved. However, Jäckh

stated that this kind of settlement could only be possible in case Asia Minor was partitioned by Great Powers, and such a partition would not happen without a world war, which no one could dare at that moment. Secondly, he pointed out that Turkish government would not willingly allow for such settlement, because, according to the capitulations, foreigners in Turkey did not acquire Turkish citizenship and were not abide by the Turkish law. A massive settlement would imply the development of a foreign state within Turkey giving the relevant sovereign a free hand to intervene in Turkish politics. With such existing difficulties pertaining to constitutional law, it would entail religious conflicts between the Christian peasants and the local Muslim people. Another obstacle he pointed was the climate. He underlines that Mesopotamia was not Palestine; even there most the German settlers immigrated back to Germany.

Against the claims for a naval base in Alexandrette, he argued that being next to British Cyprus; it should remain a Turkish port built by Baghdad Railway Company for the Turkish government (Jäckh, 1913; 20-21). Jäckh reminded that British politician specialized on Eastern affairs and an engineer Sir Wilcox once asked whether Baghdad Railway would be British or German. Jäckh read here again the British mentality of imperialism, which he has been making an effort to differentiate from German intentions. Thus, Jäckh stressed that Baghdad Railway was a Turkish railway as stated in its name “*la société impériale ottomane des chemins de fer de Baghdad*”, with a 40 % German, 30 % Swiss and 30 % French capital, and with 4 Turks in administration alongside 11 Germans, 1 Austrian, 2 Swiss, 8 French and no British representative. The

initiative, organization, finance and technical guidance was German, but the economic and military-political gain was Turkish. This was the reason why the Young Turkish regime put all its energy to speed up the construction, which was very slow in the old Turkish regime thanks to British diplomacy.

Jäckh recognized the threat perceived by Great Britain due to Baghdad Railway Project. He maintained that they saw an attack of Germany on their connection to India. However, Britain had given up the protection of the Ottomans, leaving the stage for Russia and stirring the Arab people by propagating for a British-backed Caliphate. British policy in the Arabian Peninsula was oriented to the weakening of Turkey, which contradicted with the German aims, namely the overall strengthening of Turkey.²⁵ British railway plans were centrifugal, whereas German plans were centripetal: British rail lines did not allow for the Turks to reach their borders, but were preparing for the break apart of the region as was the case with Maan-Akaba line, or the trans-Arabian project, which would surely cut Arabia from Turkey putting the region under absolute British hegemony (Jäckh, 1913: 37-38). The achievements of 30 years of German eastern policy and *Kulturwerk* in Turkey could not be left at the mercy of British diplomacy (Jäckh, 1913: 32-33).

Jäckh defended the German foreign policy which was under harsh criticism mostly due to the influence of British press. Against the criticism that Germany foreign policy was incapable of achieving anything, Jäckh presented the Baghdad railway, which was being built only with German capital, as an

²⁵ Ernst Jäckh "Deutschlan 5: England 8", *Die Hilfe* 19 (1913), p. 117-8.

example for the success of the laborious work of both *Deutsche Bank* and German diplomacy. He agreed with Rohrbach, who mentioned that the declaration of British protectorate in Kuwait did not mean a failure on the part of Germany, since the extension of the railway further south from Mesopotamia was not profitable. It was also not needed in the defence of a smaller Turkey.²⁶ In the same manner, Jäckh supported the naval program of Tirpitz on the grounds that it was a necessity of German defence. He believed that the naval program served not at the preparation of war between Germany and Britain, but at preventing it.

In a pamphlet he published in 1915, Jäckh wrote in a dreamy romanticism

Over there in Turkey, stretch Anatolia and Mesopotamia: Anatolia, the 'Land of the Sunrise'; Mesopotamia, the region of ancient paradise. May these names be to us a sign: may this World War bring to Germany and Turkey the sunrise and the paradise of a new time; may it confer upon an assured Turkey and a Greater Germany the blessing of a fruitful Turco-Teutonic collaboration in peace after a victorious Turco-Teutonic collaboration in war.²⁷

Ernst Jäckh lived as a liberal all his life and, after 1933 he first immigrated to Britain and then settled in United States, where he died in 1959.

²⁶ Ernst Jäckh "Die neuen Bagdadbahn-Verträge", *Die Hilfe* 19 (1913), p. 324-5.

²⁷ Ernst Jäckh (1915) *Die deutsch-türkische Waffenbruderschaft*. Berlin. p. 30.

4.2.4 Freiherr Colmar van der Goltz

Prussian field marshal Freiherr Colmar, von der Goltz served as part of German military mission in Ottoman Empire 1883 to 1896. He took part in the reorganization of the Ottoman army. He spent twelve years in Ottoman service, the result of which appeared in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, and he was made a pasha and in 1895. He was (1914) governor-general of Belgium in 1914, but was soon transferred to the Turkish front, where he commanded the Turkish 1st Army in Mesopotamia until his death in April 1916. Goltz contributed to publications on German Near Eastern orientation. His pamphlets and essays in various periodicals, especially in *Deutsche Rundschau*, provided an 'expert' view to the bourgeois readers, urging them to make frequent reference 'to any good set of maps'.

In his frequently quoted article "Stärke und Schwäche des türkischen Reiches", which appeared in *Deutsche Rundschau* in 1897, Goltz tried to answer in this article the question he has been frequently asked by his fellow officers, students and friends since the unfortunate conclusion of the Crimean War (1854-55). The question was whether the Ottoman Empire was going to be able to withstand. The decline of the Ottoman military power brought up the phrase "sick man", partition plans of Ottoman territories, even the colonisation of the Near East started to be discussed in the German press. The European

public opinion was loaded with derogatory prejudices against the Turks. For Goltz, espionage on Young Turk activities proved the rottenness of the “palace rule”. However, he agreed with Vàmbéry on the need to differentiate the government from the people.²⁸

In his account for the reasons for Ottoman decline, Goltz described the “Turkish Empire” as Central Asian and based essentially on conquest. Once the conquest arrived at its natural borders, it was expected to arrive at a halt and a decline. Yet, Ottomans had an additional mistake: they left the Turkish population, which was the core element, unattended. Consequently, the Turkish element became one minority among many other foreign ethnicities, whereas it should have been built into majority by active Turkification.²⁹ At present, the future of Turkey depended on the transformation of a conquest-state into a smaller but stronger culture-state. According to Goltz, this was the metamorphose that had to happen in the Orient. He recommended a transformation into nation state on a smaller territorial basis. He added that the Arabian and North African provinces contributed to the Ottoman state neither with tax revenues nor with military support, but only cause more problems on the defence of the country. Besides, in Arabian Peninsula and the North Africa, the Turks were seen as infidels, just like the Christians. They want an Arab caliphate (109). Thus, the (re)turning of the Anatolian Turkish population to the core of Ottoman power had to be the main focus, and this should be achieved

²⁸ Freiherr von der Goltz “Stärke und Schwäche des türkischen Reiches”, *Deutsche Rundschau* 93 (Oct./Nov./Dec. 1897): 95-119, p. 97-8.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

by improving the economic conditions first of all by developing a transportation system that would revive the agriculture.

Goltz was not pessimistic about the survival of the Ottomans, because the unfortunate peace Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774) had the positive outcome of triggering Turkish-Muslim migration into Asia Minor from the former Ottoman territories. The immigrants from Crimea and the Caucasus, i.e. “muhadjirs”, both strengthened the national character and contributed to the development of the economy.³⁰ As a conclusion, he saw the survival of the Ottoman Empire based on the material and intellectual development of core provinces in Anatolia and the resolution of the Arabian question, together with the transformation into a Muslim culture-state.³¹ According to Goltz, the existing pan-Islamist appeal could contribute to the internal political unity only if it brought about an understanding between the Turks and the Arabs, around which other Muslim groups would gather.³²

As Goltz himself mentioned, he thought thousands of Ottoman military students: from 1883 to 1895, the number of military students educated by German officers raised from 400 to 14.000 (95).³³ Goltz’s students took part in the Young Turk revolution (Hagen, 1990: 9). Thus, he returned to his post in Istanbul in 1909.

³⁰ Ibid., 107; Goltz, 1896: 67-73.

³¹ Ibid., p. 118.

³² Ibid., p. 110.

³³ Ibid., p. 95.

However, Goltz, writing after the Young Turk revolution, seemed unconvinced about the appeal of Ottomanism. He maintained that the national and religious differences formed a strong centrifugal force. Neither the established corruption of the system nor the industrial and economic backwardness was a solid ground for building loyalty of the citizens. Moreover, there were heavy political tasks waiting: the Macedonian question was not yet resolved, the Arabian question became more severe since the Christians and Jews were granted equal rights under the constitutional system, the railway construction begged attention.³⁴ Still, Goltz was not pessimistic: a strengthened Turkey could be part of Central European state system, and Germany, above all, would continue to contribute to this end.³⁵

4.2.5 Karl Helfferich

Karl Helfferich started as a talented scholar in economics. He was a disciple of Lujo Brentano and was pro-industrialist like his teacher (Barkin, 1970; 191). His active defense of the new industrial order made it possible for bankers and businessmen accept him as one of their own. His scholarly interest in monetary

³⁴ C. Freiherr von der Goltz "Die innerpolitische Umwälzung in der Türkei", *Deutsche Rundschau* 138 (Jan./Feb./März 1909): 1-17. p.13.

³⁵ Ibid., . p.17.

matters and his formal academic qualifications gave him entry to bureaucratic circles. Therefore, he was ideally qualified to move easily between business and bureaucracy and thus connected them. “Indeed, it is in some ways characteristic that while a civil servant he arranged construction of the only privately financed railways in the German colonies and that while a banker he committed the Deutsche Bank obligations in Turkey that were difficult to justify as business propositions, but were intended to support German Weltpolitik” (Williamson, 1971: 61).

Helffferich’s transformation from scholar to officer began in 1901, when he started to work as an unpaid assistant to the Director of the Colonial Division of the German Foreign Office, Oskar W. Steubel. In the meantime, he continued to lecture at the University of Berlin and at the Seminar for Oriental Languages. But after he started to work for the Deutsche Bank after 1906, he committed himself to the world economy and the Baghdad Railway Project. From early 1906, he started work as the Second Director of the Anatolian Railway. Helffferich's transfer from Foreign Office to Anatolian Railways Company signified a more active Middle East policy. In fact, Gwinner from Deutsche Bank had to request permission from Chancellor Bülow for Helffferich’s transfer. Gwinner stressed that he need a man with both financial and diplomatic talents for a job concerning the railway, which was, as Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein described, “the foundation of German policy in Turkey” (Williamson, 1971: 260). Thus, in a sense, Helffferich parted with the official bureaucracy to better serve the official policy. In another sense, it is

an example which shows how the line between business and government blurred during the late Wilhelmian era.

Helffferich was disheartened by the Young Turk revolution because parliamentarianism recalled the British. But, Marschall von Bieberstein believed that Germany's position was more secure than it appeared since the revolution was made by German-trained officers. He recommended sponsoring the theme that the aims of the new Ottoman regime and Germany were the same: keeping the Ottoman Empire intact. The Deutsche Bank kept the negotiations going with the British on the one hand, and on the other moved to support the German propaganda organization. As early as September 1908, Helffferich asked Gwinner to secure 9,000 marks for the 'expenses' of Paul Weitz, the German correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and a man with extensive contacts in Young Turk circles, to improve German public relations. Gwinner and Helffferich visited Istanbul in November 1908. They hoped to promote Germany at the expense of Britain. During this visit, Gwinner pointed to the Grand Vizier Hilmi Paşa that the British had no interest in a percentage of the Baghdad Railway, but wanted a geographical addition to their spheres of influence. Helffferich reported to Chancellor Bülow that the government should organize more extensive public relations and he asked the permission to contribute up to 100,000 francs to help an 'influential' Turkish group found a newspaper (Williamson, 1971: 89-90).

The Deutsche Bank was troubled when it was learned in early 1910 that Cavid Bey, the minister of finance, was contemplating negotiating a large state

loan in London or Paris. This would mean he was going to promise more public income in return of the state loan, which in turn would mean fewer resources for the railway construction. Cavid Bey came back empty handed since the French demands were unacceptable. They would lead to total financial control of France and Britain, an outcome Germans did not want just as much as Turks. Thus, Kaiser Wilhelm personally offered the state loan in order to force the French to offer the Turks more reasonable terms. But Marschall von Bieberstein maintained that an immediate loan was a political necessity for Germany. Finally, in 1911 and 1912, the Deutsche Bank agreed to provide the Ottoman state up to 11 million pounds and the loan was secured only by the customs duties of Istanbul. Cavid Bey commented later that Helfferich acted with great intelligence and tact, setting no conditions inconsistent with the dignity of the Ottoman Empire (Earle, 1966: 225-6).

Helfferich, with the realism of an economist feared from the weight of the projects on both Germany and the Ottoman state. He wrote that the recklessness with which all the projects were being pursued, without any regard for the financial capacities of the country worried him. In 1911 he wrote to Weitz “what will come of the insane railroad and financial policies down there only the gods know” (Williamson, 1971: 97).

Between 1903 and 1911 the deutsche Bank had always been ahead of the Foreign Office in its readiness to come to terms with the British, the railway’s principle opponents. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the dominant influence in official Near Eastern policy, was less impressed with the financial

difficulties that weighed largely with the bank and refused to consider a settlement with Britain (Williamson, 1971: 106). The Bank gained full control after the death of von Bieberstein and Kinderlen-Wächter in 1912, and having full authority, Helfferich lead the Anglo-German settlement negotiations of which started in 1913 but concluded weeks before the outbreak of the Great War.

In 1915, Helfferich denied the understanding on the partitioning of Turkey. He thought it sufficient to keep the prewar Turkish agreements with Britain and France; “the greater intelligence, industry and honesty of our people will do the rest” (cited in Williamson, 1971: 260). However, he clearly rejected the idea of settling Germans in Turkey after the War as some publicists like Albert Ballin proposed. On the other hand, he found the views of extreme proponents of German-Turkish friendship, especially Ernst Jäckh’s, “rose-colored” (Williamson, 1971: 260).

In his book *Die Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges* (1919), Helfferich presented a central European economic program, which in its departure about simple arrangement on commercial policy compiled with the basic concepts of Naumann (Heuss, 1949, 375). He argued that since 1890 Britain became more and more aware of and threatened by German industrial development. The exceptional economic upswing of Germany in mid-1890s alarmed the commercial and political circles in Britain in an increasing extent. The stigma “made in Germany”, revealing the growing industrial and commercial efficiency of German competitiveness was obviously damaging British

economic interests. British politicians were aware that they were confronting a very productive opponent and that their rival was not France any more, but Germany (Helfferich, 1919; 46-47). The German railway enterprises together with the naval program contributed to the Britain's perception of threat. According to Helfferich, the antagonism arising out of German economic expansion and the present pretentious position of Britain became especially bitter and dangerous when German endeavours put claims on regions that Britain saw as her present or potential spheres of interest. Helfferich added that the most important and characteristic example of this antagonism was the years long resistance of Britain on Baghdad Railway Project (Helfferich, 1919; 49-50).

Helfferich accepted that the Young Turk revolution shook the existing matrix of confrontation once again for a while. The Young Turk cadres holding the Ottoman government, Helfferich observed, were going to put their political efforts in an alliance with Britain and France. The German ambassador to the Porte, Freiherr von Marschall, lost his influence against British, French and even Russian ambassadors and fell into disfavour. Annexation of Bosnia by Austria, as the main German ally, made the situation worse for Germany-Ottoman relations. Helfferich witnessed to the fact that Germany intervened to limit Austria in her actions continuously, since the developments were putting the investments of German capital in Ottoman Empire under great threat. Helfferich went to Istanbul in July 1908, shortly after the outbreak of the revolution as the Director of the Deutsche Bank. He was asked by von

Marschall to explain the situation in Berlin and demand the German mediation in Turkish-Austrian conflict. German diplomacy worked hard to bring out a settlement and succeeded in its efforts finally in February 1909. However, soon, in 1911, came another conflict, this time by the Italian claim on the Turkish Tripoli in North Africa. Germany had no claim on Turkish territories, but her allies did, putting her in a very awkward position. In 1912, the Balkan War broke out. Helfferich wrote that all through these crisis and wars, Germany tried to mediate the conflicts while trying to convince the Young Turks through the advise of von der Goltz that getting rid of territories which constantly cause problems was better for the future integrity of Turkey and pouring amazing amounts of financial help (Helfferich, 1919; 92).

In early 1913, Helfferich and Gwinner, both as representatives of Deutsche Bank, were in Vienna right after the peace settlement of the Balkan War to discuss Austrian collaboration in Baghdad Railway. They were hoping to pull Austria into this investment so that she would not dare to shake the balance temporarily achieved in the Balkans in a way that would revive hostility against the Central Powers. However, Austrian state secretary von Jagow put Austrian supremacy in the Balkans as a condition for such cooperation (Helfferich, 1919; 106-7).

Helfferich commented that the affairs around Baghdad Railway were at the centre of Middle East question and played an important role in German-British relations for over a decade. The Project, he argued, sharpened the difference of opinions in British government, which already had problems in

policies concerning German naval developments. Baghdad Railway interested France and Russia from the beginning and thus became a peculiar problem in world politics. Helfferich stated that after Postdam Agreement of 1910, Russia gave up her interest and let Germany free in her enterprise. Similar agreements were sought for with France and England in order to secure world peace (Helfferich, 1919; 121). The German efforts for understanding and collaboration had a long and detailed story. France was already in control of financial affairs in Ottoman Empire through the Public Debt Office and did not welcome a rival Germany. Russia was waiting for the fall of the Ottoman Empire and any improvement in Ottoman conditions was against her interests. In the face of the German success represented in the opening of the railway service between Haydar Paşa and Ankara in 1896, French ambassador in Istanbul, Mr. Constans approached the German ambassador for recognition of common interests in Turkish independence and financial and economic strengthening. German-French understanding developed as a result of this rapprochement.

In May 1899, Deutsche Bank group, under the supervision of ambassadors of both parties, that is, von Marschall and Constans, agreed on the basics of a united pursuit of interests in the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Baghdad Railway had a strategic significance as a short cut to India, which kept Britain from any possible solution to the difficulties (Helfferich, 1919; 125). In November 1899, Kaiser Wilhelm II with his chancellor visited the King of England to pursue British collaboration in the railway undertakings in Asia

Minor. But despite this show of political good will, securing the collaboration of British financial groups could not be achieved (Helfferich, 1919; 127). After the conclusion of the Baghdad Railway concession in December 1899, Georg von Siemens, as the director of Deutsche Bank's railway undertakings, went to speak with British foreign Office. Siemens asked for British collaboration and approval of a rise in Turkish tariffs to secure Turkish guaranties for the railway. Britain demanded British control of the last section of Baghdad railway in Persian Gulf and approved a rise in tariffs on the condition that the extra income would be used in reform in Macedonia (Helfferich, 1919; 129). Thus, Siemens also returned empty handed.

Helfferich concluded in 1920 that the naval and commercial rivalry between England and Germany and the constant conflict between Austria and Russia over the Balkans drew Germany and Turkey closer to each other. According to Helfferich, Turkey was only a side factor for the politics of the young German Empire in its earlier decades. For Helfferich, Turkey interested Germany in so far as she was a factor in the relations of Great Powers, in the formation of alliances and oppositions.

Bismarck's expression of "not worth even one Pomeranian grenadier" dating 1876 was being cited very often in the discussion on the Eastern Question. Bismarck also said in a parliamentary speech on 11 January 1887 that Eastern question was not a question of war for Germany (Helfferich, 1921; 4). Bismarck wrote in his memoirs that he tried to keep Germany's relations with Russia friendly and tidy even in the face of a Russian settlement in the Straits.

This position of Bismarck was reflected in the German-Russian reinsurance treaty on 1887. Helfferich argued that Bismarck's policy on Turkey should not be concluded only by looking at these thoughts, because his overall approach was quite practical and elastic. Bismarck declared in December 1892 that German attitude was not support of Russia in her aims on Turkey, but only not getting in her way. There was a great difference between these attitudes. On the other hand, bearing in mind the possibility of victory of pan-Slavism and anti-German elements in Russia, Bismarck approved of military missions of Prussian officers in Turkey, which he thought might become useful one day when friendship with Turkey turn out to be for German advantage. His idea was that "one day the enemies of Turkey can be our enemies" (Helfferich, 1921; 5).

It was none of Germany's business to help or to stop Russia in her aims on Turkey, but it was also impossible to ignore the value of Turkey as a stone in the game which Germany could play against a hostile Russia. Bismarck did not want to see German economic interests in Turkey cause difficulties with the Russian friendship. In brief, German policy on Turkey depended on the international situation and the relations with Russia in Bismarck's time.

According to Helfferich, the development of Germany as a whole forced a transgression of Bismarckian continental politics. Helfferich argued that the drastic increase in population in Germany necessitated a development from agrarian to industrial and commercial society. German economy became more and more integrated in the world economy. The need to secure raw materials and food resources and the need to guarantee consumer markets for German

products became stronger. Bismarck had to acknowledge the situation and said that “Yes, this is a new age and a totally new world” (Helfferich, 1921; 7). The development of port facilities in Hamburg yearned for German economic expansion. Bismarck had already engaged in colonial politics in 1880s, but the world was already partitioned and Helfferich wrote “we were already too late”. Bismarck rushed to acquire possessions in south Sea and Africa, but Helfferich stated that these did not satisfy Germany’s the world economic aims and needs for raw materials. Thus it became ever more important for Germany to compensate for the lack of overseas colonies.

In this respect, Helfferich explained that Turkey stood in the forefront on geographical reasons: she was accessible for Germany over land by railways and through waterways on Danube. Moreover, a successful policy towards Turkey would entail a German supremacy in Austria-Hungary and the Balkans. Turkey also allowed for great German economic activity in the field of agriculture, mining and railway construction. Helfferich referred to Friedrich List as a forerunner of pointing towards Turkey for German economic expansion. Thus Helfferich concluded that “it was not a coincidence and chance, but the result of the overall development of our fatherland that Germany gradually began to take an active interest in Turkey” (Helfferich, 1921; 8).

Helfferich accounted that German interest in Turkey was very different from that of the other great powers from the beginning. Germany’s expressed interest was the preservation of Turkish political integrity and sovereignty, and

thus providing Germany equal opportunity with other powers in the economic sphere. The interests of all other powers, namely Russia, Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy, rested more or less with the weakening and partition of Turkey. Helfferich stated that only Germany and France had nothing to gain but a lot to lose in case of a partition of Turkey. Germany did not only have any territorial claims, but also had no wish for war. But she had to prepare for war to protect German investments in the Asiatic Turkey. Helfferich claimed that even if Germany did not take on the protection of Turkey and avoided all political and economic activities such as the navy construction, the war would not be avoided, because German *Weltpolitik* and the German economic aspirations associated with it was going to become a source of conflict anyway. The general development of German economy necessitated an active policy even at regions with a high risk of confrontation with other Great Powers. He argued that this was the case with Turkey, but he claimed that German policy in investments in Turkey was in fact developed very carefully to avoid any occasional clashes and the development of ill-feelings.

4.3 Representative of German Orientalism: Hugo Grothe

Hugo Grothe was the secretary general of *Münchner Orientalischen Gesellschaft* in 1900-1912. He was the director of the *Deutsche Vorderasienkomitee* from 1908 on and had close contacts with the Foreign Office and German embassy in Istanbul (Rathmann, 1963: 47; Kampen, 1968: 212). Grothe travelled in the Ottoman Empire on various occasions in 1901/2, 1906/7, and 1912. His accounts of there travels has a taste of Karl May's novels. He emphasized that his observations were based on his genuine experiences during these travels.

His interest in the objective and first hand information in the Near East resulted in the works of *Vorderasienkomitee*, which was specialized in the German cultural and political activity in the Near East since 1908. The activities of the organization focused on assisting German people of all sorts of circles in realization of their projects in the region morally and economically. The organization functioned as an information centre for teachers, doctors, chemists, various other specialists, railway and mine workers, engineers, salesman, industrialists and agricultural advisors in Turkey and in Germany.

The *Deutsche Vorderasienkomitee* saw the need for cultural propaganda to the German people itself to protect the policy of expansion into the Near East. A well-known means of cultural influence is the construction of schools

where native children would get acquainted with the German culture, so that they would develop a special attachment to Germany. Both Rohrbach and Grothe strived for the formation of “[public] awareness of the necessity for German propaganda in the Muslim East”. As advocates of German expansion in the Near East, they were concerned by the fact that other powers have already developed cultural influence in the region.

In this respect, Grothe saw the task of construction of German schools and hospitals very urgent. In his view, improvement of German schooling in Turkey was seen as an undeniable necessity and those schools had to be supported with books, newspapers, cinemas and scholarship opportunities. The money applied for this purpose would soon return as expansion in imports (Kampen, 1968: 201). Both Marschall von Bieberstein and his successor in Istanbul Wangenheim actively supported the cultural propaganda and the building up of German schools. In 1913, there were three high schools in Izmir, Aleppo and Jerusalem, secondary schools in Haydar Paşa, Eskişehir and Baghdad, and a thousand religious and missionary institutions in Palestine, Mesopotamia and Asia minor. German technical school in Eskişehir was very important for Anatolian Railway Company to fight against the French-Catholic cultural influence (Kampen, 1968: 203). Rohrbach was still not satisfied when comparing the German figures with the number of French, American and British schools (1912: 231).

The *Deutsche Vorderasienkomitee* declared itself to be independent of party politics. The contributors to Grothe’s periodical *Beiträge zur Kenntnis des*

Orients and the books edited by the organization were also independent in their ideas except for “their sincere friendship to the Ottomans”. The authors gathered around *Vorderasienkomitee* agreed on the support and preservation of the Ottoman state. Grothe argued that on the grounds of scientific objectivity, they spared some space on the non-Turkish elements in the Ottoman Empire, such as the Arabs, Armenians and Greeks.

The ideas of Hugo Grothe suited to both emigrationist and liberal imperialist approaches. In the beginning of his career, Grothe was a fervent supporter of colonization of the East with German peasants. In his propaganda pamphlet *Die Bagdadbahn und das schwäbische Bauernelement in Transkaukasien und Palästina* (1902), Grothe called for the official proclamation of the region of Anatolian and Baghdad railways as German settlement sphere and for the beginning of colonisation. The German colonists would be a state within a state with their own police, taxation and customs system in the Ottoman Empire. After 1905, Grothe, former advocate of Swabian peasant settlements in the Ottoman Empire, began to display disapproval colonialist plans and became one of the major advocates of peaceful penetration into the Near East. He refused settlement plans on the grounds that they would raise the opposition of the Turkish government and the misgivings of the European powers.

German entrepreneurs were taking part in the German investment in Asiatic Turkey as either establishing intermediary manufacturing companies or as buying bonds at the German stock exchange. They depended on the German

press and publications in directing their enterprises. There were, as mentioned above, great publicity on German business opportunities in the Near East, but not all of them were reliable sources. Most of them were filled with fantasies and dreams. Thus, Hugo Grothe established the *Deutsche Vorderasienkomitee* in 1906, an association that gathered academics and public officers, and observers living in Ottoman domains to support research and provide objective information to the German public in the political, social and economic affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

In his line of thinking, Grothe was an orientalist. He believed that it was the spirit (*Geist*) that made people develop ideas, build roads and canals, cover seas with fleets, fill distant continents with colonies, took on research on every field of science and refresh it with continuous effort without losing touch with the truth, maintain law and order under every condition. This spirit was what made the difference between Europe and Islam. His comments on the Ottoman society reflect his position.

Grothe in his book *Die asiatische Türkei und die deutsche Interessen* (1913) pointed that the idea of reform in Turkey was as old as the Eastern Question. A third generation in Turkey was still engaged with ideas and plans of reform, but without any real results. Balkan Wars had intensified the talks about the rejuvenation of Turks. The political mistakes of the government and the weaknesses in administration made it difficult to believe that a rebirth of Turkey was close. But, he claimed, the existing national core of power, that is, the peasantry of Anatolia, had to be attributed proper consideration, as is done

by Martin Hartman. The new Turkish generation since the time of Midhat Paşa had the education, talent and desire for revolution. After the Revolution in 1908, they began to implement their projects such as the changes in Constitution, reform in education and economic system.

One deficiency of these reformers, according to Grothe, was the failure to realize the reform projects. He gave the example of Agriculture Chambers. The new government planned the creation of Agriculture Chambers in every provincial capital. Those Chambers were going to collaborate with the governors and be connected to the Ministry of Agriculture. The Chambers, designed on the example of German agricultural cooperatives, were planned to engage in the improvement of agriculture. In addition to supervising irrigation, they were going to organize the farmers and supply agricultural credits. They were going to be responsible for anything the name cooperative meant together with mediating purchases and sales. A further task was going to be the purchase of agricultural machinery and equipment, and assisting the farmers in how to use them. Grothe wrote that everything was perfectly thought and planned, that the intelligence and the good will was there, but the hand to put it into action was missing.

Grothe commented that it would be unjust to attribute this failure in action to an exceptional incapability of the Turkish race. He argued that it was the oriental mentality that stood on the way. A look at the decade's long Europeanization efforts of Persia put forth the same picture. Grothe referred to Freiherr von der Goltz who described the geographic and ethnic condition that

caused obstacles in the development of the East in his book *Der jungen Türkei, Niederlage und die Möglichkeit ihrer Wiederhebung* (1913). Grothe wrote that “the lack of eye for the attainable [targets], getting lost in fantasies or purely theoretical speculations in no way an education failure. It appears in the whole disposition of the oriental spirit that can be found not only in the army but also in other spheres of public activity. The obvious and the simple did not enjoy any prestige. The plans are destined so gigantic that they become irrelevant to the practical necessity and blind to a careful consideration of existing conditions. Then the fund expire and what is started stays uncompleted” (Grothe, 1913; 4).

Grothe joined Goltz and complained that all around Asiatic Turkey, there were unfinished buildings, half-completed roads, bridges left to the mercy of nature. Every new government started once again from scratch leaving the previous plans incomplete (Grothe, 1913; 5). This failure in completing the plans to their fullest, Grothe illustrated with an anecdote from a traveller in Turkey, who was a stone on the way to Yedikule on which “a young artist wrote with coal ‘bu kuş kazdır (this bird is a goose)’” (Grothe, 1913; 13).

Grothe also observed that two great social strata existed in the Ottoman society: the civil servants and the army officers, and the towns’ people and the peasantry. He argued that there was not much influx from the latter to the former, and any possible influx was further prevented by the Young Turks since they saw them as the source of conservative and pro-Hamidian reactionary ideas. According to Grothe, another feature of the Turkish population was its

almost total lack of tradesmen and craftsmen, a section of society that formed the basis of a healthy middle class as the source of economic progress.

The peasantry as the core of the Ottomans was no source of economic development and vitality with their ignorance, and their patience to the degree of resignation and passivity. Thus, he argued that the first step for any possible rejuvenation of the Ottomans had to be the widespread education of the Anatolian peasantry. In this respect, the immigrants from Trace and Macedonia, who were called the *Muhadjirs*, caused a great inner colonization in the Ottoman Empire. Those immigrants, who grew up in European soil, brought along European economic methods. Grothe witnessed to the oasis created by the Russian-Caucasian immigrants in Eastern Anatolia. These immigrants, he thought, could be the leaders of an economic recovery in the Ottoman Empire.

Concerning the problems arising out of minorities, Grothe displayed a similar attitude like Rohrbach. He argued that Armenians did not have the geographical integrity that would make it possible to justify their claims for political independence. He saw the geographical nature of the territory defined by high mountains and cut by wild rivers as an obstacle to form a united land. Reminding that the concept of the land of Armenia never acknowledged by the Turks and that administrative regions were defined by the Turkish administration rather arbitrarily, not based on ethnic characteristics.

He argued that Armenians scattered all around Anatolia as a minority. He wrote that only in *sandjaks* of Van and Muş the Armenians overweighed numerically. The Armenian population in five provinces, namely Erzurum,

Van, Bitlis, Mamuret-ul-Aziz and Diyarbakır corresponded to the two thirds of the total Armenian population in Asiatic Turkey, where Armenians made up one fourth to one third of the total population. He emphasized that it was not possible to give exact numbers, but an assumption closest to truth about the Armenian population. Grothe stated that census in European sense was not held in Turkey. Moreover, tax and recruitment records were not reliable. The most reliable source he accounted was the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul, which gave a total of 2 million Armenians in Turkey. Grothe assumed that this number should be less after the blood-bath of Abdülhamid and Kurdish attacks on Armenians in 1895, 1897 and 1910.

4.4 Advocates of pan-Islamism and Islamology

4.4.1 The Origin of the Interest in Islam

German interest in Islam developed alongside the economic interests in the Near East. Publicity of pan-Islamism, which was directed to German public opinion, was active since 1890. Most influential defenders of pan-Islamist policy within Germany were Baron Max von Oppenheim, Arminius Vàmbéry, and C. H. Becker. Another interesting figure taking part in pan-Islamist German

propaganda was Martin Hartmann, who suddenly turned turkophile after the beginning of the War. Pan-Islamism was elaborated and supported mostly by the conservative and anti-British circles in Germany.

Baron Max von Oppenheim was the first to attract the attention to the potentials of pan-Islamist policy for the German *Weltpolitik* (Hagen, 1990: 30-31). Supposedly an archaeologist, he travelled all over the Ottoman Empire and settled in Egypt as German observer after 1896. As early as 1898, Oppenheim's "views on pan-Islamism may have impressed Wilhelm II and contributed to the emperor's *anti-British* speech in Damascus, in which he claimed to be the 'protector' of the world's three hundred million Muslims" (McKale, 1997: 201).³⁶ Oppenheim was an extreme Anglophobe and known to the British as 'the Kaiser's spy' since he was known for manufacturing public opinion against England and France by opening offices everywhere for this propaganda facility. He was behind the rumours that Kaiser Wilhelm II converted to Islam and became "Hacı (Pilgrim) Wilhelm", the great protector of Islam (Hamed, 1988: 13). Oppenheim's reports also convinced Kinderlen-Wächter that friendship with Islam would be great help in case of war (Hagen, 1990: 32).

During the autumn of 1914 and for most of 1915, Oppenheim assisted in organizing pan-Islamic propaganda and other activities in the Middle East and India, aimed principally at inciting Jihad against the British. He did not miss any opportunity of reminding the Egyptian nationalist Press of the syllogism that Islam was threatened with extinction by Europe, that Britain and France

³⁶ Emphasis mine. McKale's reads the speech as peculiarly anti-British.

were at the head of the anti-Islamic movement, that the Sultan was the last hope of the faithful and that Germany was the friend of the Sultan and therefore the only Muslim-minded European Power. He disseminated among the Turkish populace that Moslems of India and Egypt were about to revolt and overthrow their English tyrants. Still, the impact of Oppenheim's propaganda attempts remained limited and rather insignificant.

Oppenheim's activities achieved certain success only in Egypt. In 1914, there had been a wave of anti-British and pro-German feelings among the Egyptians. Turco-Circassians, lawyers, students and nationalist journalists who formed the core of the Egyptian elite had absorbed affectionate and even passionate interests in and expectation of German success. Germany was seen as the only great power that had befriended Islam without acquiring an acre of Muslim territory. Kaiser Wilhelm's visits to the Middle East and his 'noble generosity' in providing two battleships in place of those maliciously and at the last moment withheld by the British when most needed, were cited as evidence of Germany's unanimity to Islam (Hamed, 1988: 17). Pro-German campaign was being sponsored by German capital. But more important than that was the German appropriation of Turkish army and navy. As is well known, Turkey entered the war with the bombardment of Goeben and Breslau Russian coasts on Black Sea, the above-mentioned battleships which were supposedly a sign of good will on the part of Germany.

In this pro-German context, Farid, an Egyptian nationalist leader, appealed to Germany for support. However, he refused contributing to the

German Islamic propaganda when he was approached by the German Foreign Ministry to take part in editing *al-Jihad*, a German organ issued in 1915 that appeared in various Islamic languages including Arabic. He believed that Germany sought to control the Pan-Islamic ideas to serve her own interests. Farid even warned Talat Bey, the Turkish Minister of Interior, that leaving the Pan-Islamic propaganda in the German hands might endanger the Ottoman Empire, unless the latter takes the initiative. Still, he believed that an alliance between the Germanic and Islamic Unions would be the stronghold against the imperialist European powers (Hamed, 1988: 24).

Arminius Vàmbéry was a prominent defender of Islam and is introduced by Gotthard Jäschke as the father of pan-Turkism with his travel book *Reise in Mittelasien* (1873) (1941: 2). Vàmbéry showed to the elite Turks of Istanbul that their racial roots were in Central Asia, where they had to search for their interests, and establish relationships. He said that Turks, under the Ottoman rule, fought for Islam instead of bearing their Turkish consciousness (Jäschke, 1941: 3).

During the decade preceding the Great War, Vàmbéry was more interested in pan-Islam than Turkology. In 1913, commenting on the repercussions of the Balkan Wars, he seemed more concerned on Muslim identity, rather than Turkish one (Vàmbéry, 1913: 1-10). According to Vàmbéry, the news from *Rum* (west) and the Caliphate was keenly watched by all the Muslims. Thus, the Turkish catastrophe required an explanation. He mentioned that "Of course the war is not represented as an assault against

Turkey, but as against Islam as a whole, and not the four Balkan states but the whole Europe, that is the whole Christian world, raised against the peoples of Muhammed's teaching" (Vàmbéry, 1913: 1).³⁷ He added that this perception was made clear by the declaration of the Muslims of India under the title 'Message to the Muslims'. Another message entitled 'Message to the East' showed that the opposition of Muslims against Christians received support even from Brahmans and Buddhists, since it acquired an anti-imperialist tone.

On the other hand, more anger stood with Persia, Syria, Arabia and Egypt in case their national future was threatened by the French, English or Ottoman, or in case the Arabic element (especially in the army) was to fall behind the Turkish element. Islam stood not only as political but also as social, ethnic and moral power on which a resistance could be built upon. According to Vàmbéry, if Turkey insisted on adapting Western education and coming closer to European world, her political future in Asia would never progress, rather she would become a toy in the hands of occidental politicians.

³⁷ See also Kohn (1928; 32-45).

4.4.2 Prof. Carl Heinrich Becker

Carl Heinrich Becker was the founder of modern Islamology (Batunsky, 1981; Essner&Winkelhane, 1988). The journal *Der Islam* was founded by him in 1913. Professor Becker's field of expertise was Islam and the Ottoman Empire. While Ernst Renan professed the disappearance of Islam altogether under "the blows of positivist sciences", Becker saw another alternative for Islam as an emotional and intellectual source. He argued that pan-Islamism was the proof for the present vivacity of Islam. Therefore, Islam was going to be the real foundation of a cultural and historical regeneration of the Muslim Orient (Batunsky, 1981: 293).

Becker maintained that politics of Islam was part of international colonial politics as an important source of political prestige (Becker, 1915: 113-115; 117). According to him the prestige of the Ottomans as the most powerful Muslim state of the time and the bearer of the caliphate was a commonly recognized fact. A colonial power that is in good terms with the Ottomans who hold the title of caliphate had the power to direct the Muslims around the world as had been done by England in the past. Recently, Germany had found herself in the position of protector of Sultan-Caliph's international claims, since her interests corresponded with those of the Ottoman Empire. Becker emphasised that, different from other great powers, Germany had no territorial claim on the

Ottoman dominions. Moreover, Germany had no interest in the weakening of the Ottoman Empire; on the contrary she had her interests in Ottoman strengthening through economic policies.

Responding to a French critique, which argued that pan-Islamism to be a vehicle of Germanism, Becker wrote that this argument clearly was an outcome of jealousy, for in reality, Germany's policy of Islam was not different in the peacetime and that Germany was a real friend of Muslim world.³⁸ England, Russia and France had millions of Muslim subjects. For Becker, a great part of these Muslims felt themselves suppressed by those great powers. So, if Turkey stressed the ideal of solidarity of the whole Islam, she would set free the pro-Turkish sentiments of the subjects of her main adversaries, by which she would hinder the ready wit of the Great European Powers (Becker, 1915: 106). Therefore, the colonial politics of every European power with Muslim subjects had to take into consideration the ideal of Islamic solidarity (Becker, 1915: 107). Becker went on by saying that a caliph is not a Pope, not a spiritual leader, but an actual sovereign. This was valid for the lands once occupied by Turkey, as in the cases of Bosnia, Tripoli, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece. Egypt should also be remembered here.

³⁸ "Französische Kritik hat das Problem mit den Worten formuliert: "Le Panislamisme sert le véhicule au Germanisme." Der Zusammenhang war aber kein künstlicher, sondern ein natürlicher; der Eifersucht unserer Konkurrenten aber war es selbstverständlich, das Deutschland in Friedenszeiten durch Aufhetzung der fanatischen Instinkte der Muhammedaner eine panislamische Propaganda betrieb. In Wirklichkeit ist unsere Islampolitik im Frieden nie etwas anderes gewesen, als eine offene Türkenpolitik, allerdings unter Schonung der Islamischen Empfindlichkeiten und unter häufiger Betonung unserer Freundschafts für die Islamische Welt" (Becker, 1915; 117).

There was an ongoing theoretical discussion on the form and the character of the prospective modern Turkish state. Becker saw three development possibilities: religiously and ethnically neutral Ottoman state, Turkish national state, and Islamic caliphate state. Becker formula corresponded to Yusuf Akçura's *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*. According to Becker, the idea of political solidarity of all Muslims was a slogan of war, under which Islam conquered the world. The aggressive character of pan-Islamism had vanished in time. The new caliphate-state would be different from the absolutist-patriarchal caliphate-state of the past. As part of Ottoman foreign policy, pan-Islamism assumed a defensive character: Ottomans were trying to confront the military threat from England and Russia and the financial threat from France by means of spiritual power (Becker, 1915: 104).

Becker, like many of his contemporaries, was convinced that Islam could play a unifying role among the Muslim Ottomans. He observed that Turks and Arabs formed the core of the Ottoman population and the prevailing contradiction between them could be resolved with recourse to Islam. The centrality of the Turkish and Arabic elements had been proved during the Balkan Wars when the Christian fellow combatants joined with their own ethnic groups: Christian subjects were no more reliable on the battlefield. From another perspective, there is another result of the Balkan wars: numerous Muslims migrated to the provinces in Asiatic Turkey. Becker maintained that this contributed to the strengthening of the Islamic character of the Turkish

state (Becker, 1915: 102). The immediate affect of pan-Islamism would be seen in the army in case of Jihad.

Becker and Dutch orientalist Snouck Hurgronje were the first experts on Islam at a time information on Muslim world became a strategic resource. Becker state himself that he was guided by the interests of German state (Batunsky, 1981: 295-6). The political inference of his writing after the onset of the War brought Becker into controversy with Snouck Hurgronje (Hagen, 1990: 39; Essner&Winkelhane, 1988: 157). Against Becker's support of pan-Islamism and Jihad as political instruments, Snouck Hurgronje claimed the holy war was being fabricated in Germany (Heine, 1984). He questioned the legitimacy of the Sultan's holding of the title and also explained that, even if legitimate, the position of caliph was not similar to that of the pope. Abdülhamid's pan-Islamic policy was based on errors in the understanding of caliphate. The same erroneous assumptions were used occasionally by the British on the Muslims of India through displays of friendship with the Ottoman sultan. "The German tried during the World War to unchain, under the same false banner, Muslim fanaticism against their enemies" (Snouck Hurgronje, 1924: 71).

4.4.3 Prof. Martin Hartmann

Martin Hartmann was an Arabist and until the beginning of the war, he was known for his sympathy for Arab nationalism and anti-Turkish writings. In 1880s, Hartman was residing in Beirut, translating and occasionally substituting for German Consulate. After his return to Germany, he lectured on Arabic language and literature. In 1912, he founded the *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Islamkunde* and exercised considerable influence through its journal *Die Welt des Islams*. He turned turkophile and supported pan-Islamism until his death in 1917. He contributed to the journal *Der Neue Orient*, which played an active role in the propaganda for pan-Islamism in Germany (Hagen, 1990: 42).

Martin Hartman was a peculiar character in German orientalism. Gradually embracing socialist ideas after 1902 and publicizing about the inevitability of change, he was at odds with his more conservative colleagues, particularly C.H. Becker. Becker thought that Hartmann was seeking confirmation of his political opinion in the history of Islam (Hartmann, 1912: 5). He rejected Becker's criticism by arguing that he was committed to sociology and anthropology.

According to Hartmann, Islam was in essence democratic, and leaders of Islam occupied this position not because of who they were, but as expounders of the Islamic ideals. Therefore, Hartmann was championing Arab

nationalism and was known as a passionate Turk-hater. In Hartmann's view, the Muslim world needed unification, but the Ottoman Sultan could be ruled out as the focus of this unity, because he was first a Turk, then a Muslim. Additionally, the methods of Abdülhamid were in obvious contradiction with the ideals of Islam. Thus, the Turkish Empire was detested the same way by both the Christians and the non-Turkish Muslims (Kramer, 1989: 288). He disliked the Young Turk government just the same. For Hartman, the very notion of an Ottoman identity was full of contradictions. In appealing to its Muslim subjects, the regime emphasized religious allegiance to the Caliph; in appealing to non-Muslim subjects, it insisted that they cast aside religious allegiances in favour of a secular loyalty to sultan. For Hartmann, Ottomanization only meant Turkification at the expense of Arabic language and culture.

Hartmann's pro-Arab ideas and his claim that the Ottoman Empire had lost the loyalty of its Arab Muslim subjects aroused controversy in the prevalent turcophile mood in Germany at the turn of the century. In sentimental mood of Kaiser's visit in 1898, most German publicists supported the Wilhelmian policy of professed friendship towards Islam rested on the assumption that Islam's true centre resided in Istanbul (Kramer, 1989: 291). However, with the arrival of the War, Hartmann suddenly developed an enthusiasm for the Turks. This sudden transformation was received as unnatural and suspicious by his colleagues.

The fact was, Hartmann certainly could not have continued to write about the Turks the way he did in the past. No criticism of the ally in print was tolerated by the German government. Hartmann could have sufficed with not writing criticism, but he preferred to write pieces that served Germany's was propaganda. His articles began to resemble Becker's in their themes and purpose. They were mainly attempted to convince German readers that the alliance with the Ottoman Empire served essential German interests and also constituted a moral necessity. They shared the widespread German preoccupation with the conspiracies developed by the Entente powers against the legitimate interests of Germany in the Ottoman lands (Kramer, 1989: 297-8). In 1917, Hartmann pointed out that the Ottoman hegemony was under the influence of Turanism rather than Islamism and the title of caliphate. Turanism became more pronounced after the Arabs' insurgence against the Ottomans.³⁹ In short, he wrote as a true turcophile until his death in 1917.

All three circles' publication activity was serving the purposes of German informal imperialism. Accordingly, by promoting the Baghdad Railway Project together with its agricultural and commercial prospects and by supporting the unity of Muslim peoples, they were forming the German propaganda against British colonial imperialism. This propaganda displayed certain common characteristics. First, as for the promoters of it, they were all liberals; and

³⁹ Martin Hartman "Das Kalifat, Falschwertungen und Wahrheit", *Der Neue Orient* 21.04.1917. pp. 64-5.

therefore this was not a pan-German propaganda. The method of German imperialism was indisputably different than that of in Central Africa, South America and Far East. Secondly, it was based on the vision of Central European commercial union. This union was thought to be based on independent states and the motor force of their industrial development was going to be the German industry and technology. Third common point is a common concern for the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a potential and important member of Central European customs union. This concern brought up a number of suggestions for the protection of the Empire's integrity. Briefly, the advocates of economic imperialism preferred a territorially smaller, demographically more homogenous, i.e. dominantly Muslim, and economically and militarily stronger Turkey.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The World Wars had a remarkable influence on the history writing in the 20th century. The Great War was fought on the heritage of Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire joined the War as a last resort to save the remainders of its imperial power and in alliance with Germany. Ottomans' entry into the War is usually pictured as planned by Germany in accordance with Germany claim to become a world power. It was also maintained that German economic designs in the Near East formed the bulk of German *Weltpolitik* in the late 19th century. In this sense, Germany is said to have been preparing for a great war since 1890.

The peculiar role of Germany as the main source of aggression has been explained by its position as a late-comer in European imperialist competition, and by the emergence of a strong German industrial and financial system,

which shook the balance of power in Europe. The second time Germany devastated Europe was when she pulled herself together under the banner of national socialism in the 1930s. At the end of the Second World War, when the repercussions of national socialist regime, i.e. racism, genocide and holocaust, was exposed, the dimensions of the disaster haunted the humanity, but most of all the Europeans. Since then, European academia, both in the Eastern and Western block, devoted significant amount of research to the explanation of the holocaust. This research extended back to the late 19th century when the examples of German aggression were to be found in its imperialist zeal. In this manner, the roots of Nazism were found in the German expansionist aggression in the 19th century. Similarly, German fascism was seen as the outcome of German ideological and social development followed after the unification in 1870. In this respect, German imperialism is always associated with aggressive and expansionist German nationalism and pan-German cause. German imperialism has been depicted exclusively with reference to pan-German aims, with a deliberate exclusion of the existence of diverse imperialist perspectives in Germany before the Great War, some of which were not necessarily promoting pan-German ideas.

In similar vein, the propaganda for “peaceful economic penetration” in the Near East has been seen as a major deceit of pan-Germans. East German historians like Lothar Rathmann insisted that Baghdad Railway Project was a specific strategy of German dominant classes for the peaceful penetration to the Near East and was an example of indirect colonial policy. The indirect colonial

policy exercised economic, political, military and cultural influence as instruments of imperialism. The economic and political offensive was to prepare the grounds for an export offensive that was most needed by German monopoly-capitalism. The armaments exports of Krupp to the Ottoman Empire were pointed as proof to the Prussian-German militarism. For the final target of export offensive struggling of political supremacy, Germany gradually drove away the British and French influence from the Porte. As part of this struggle, Germany employed pan-Islamist propaganda to against Britain, Russia and France. As a result of all the tension built up by Wilhelmian imperialist policies, the Near East became the central stage of the Great War. German Marxist historians maintained that Central European and Near Eastern military and economic union was going to rise under the auspices of German imperialism. This union was going to be ascertained by the German control of critical power positions in the Turkish state apparatus especially in the Turkish army. It is asserted that for this aim German imperialism cooperated with Zionism in the settlement projects in Ottoman domains. Moreover, Germany built schools and hospitals in support of her cultural and political offensive.

German Marxist historians emphasized that the predacious character of the expansion policy tried to be concealed by the deceitful and mendacious formulation of Germany's friendly mission in the Asia Minor, which aims the resurrection of the devastated culture of the peoples of this land. They argued that, on the contrary, the true objective behind German "peaceful penetration" has always been invasion and annexation. The anti-imperialist and anti-

colonialist discourse that was presented in numerous German pamphlets about the Baghdad Railway Project and German-Turkish cooperation was seen as a myth, a lie, and a deceit by German Marxists. The myth that Germany attempted to protect the Middle Eastern peoples like the Turks and the Arabs from British and French imperialism was fabricated by 'bourgeois historians' by forgery of history, such as Hajo Holborn and by apologists of German imperialism, such as Bekir Sitki, Reinhard Hüber and Heinz Friedrich Bode. American historians such as Edward M. Earle and Paul K. Butterfield were thought to draw to the subject to improve the methods of indirect imperialism for American interests. It is agreed that the myth of anti-colonial character of German imperialism was an instrument of German fascism. The true nature of German imperialism as posed in the economic and commercial penetration in the Near East had been assessed only by Lenin and Luxemburg.

This research demonstrated that, contrary to the mainstream presentation of German imperialism as being predominantly pan-German and colonialist, Germany did not have a single and consistently colonialist and pan-German policy on Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the German imperialism of the Wilhelmian period was an example of modern informal imperialism which characterized the German economic expectations in the Near East. German rapprochement to the Ottoman Empire was shaped by the reflection of needs and business opportunities of German industry and finance to German imperialist policies. Colonialist and economic imperialist views disagreed on the method of German expansion in the Near East. The colonial imperialist

supported German farmer settlements in the Ottoman territories to strengthen German territorial claim at the moment of a possible partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers. They wanted Germany's share of "the sick man" for their colonialist aspirations. The economic imperialists, on the contrary, supported peaceful economic and cultural penetration to the East through commercial agreements and concessions. This policy necessitated maintenance of good relations with the Ottoman government in order to get economic concessions in accordance with their liberal aspirations for a Central European economic region. It entailed protection of the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire to secure the economic region and German investments in the Ottoman domains. As a result, the strengthening of economic imperialist perspective in German politics was reflected the government's support for economic penetration in the Near East after 1890.

In this respect, it is important to note that the nature of German imperialist policy has radically changed under the guidance of Kaiser Wilhelm II, especially after the resignation of Bismarck in 1890. The dominance of colonialist claims of pan-German circles has been replaced by liberals support for informal economic imperialism based on economic regions. At the centre of informal German imperialism is the peaceful penetration to the Near East. The major turning point in German-Ottoman rapprochement was the Kaiser Wilhelm's second visit to Istanbul and Damascus in 1898. After that visit, the development of the Baghdad Railway Project gained an accelerated pace. Enjoying enlarged governmental support, Deutsche Bank became more

confident in its undertakings in the Ottoman territories. Moreover, the German support of Islamist movements entered in the vocabulary of European hegemonic rivalry.

As the Near East became the focus of German commercial expansion in accordance with the needs of younger sections of German industry, the protection of the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire became part of the German foreign policy. Baghdad Railway Project and pan-Islamist propaganda as basic components of German expansion to the Near East was also directly associated with the arguments for the protection of the political integrity of the Ottoman state. The advocates of economic imperialism preferred a territorially smaller, demographically more homogenous, i.e. dominantly Muslim, and economically and militarily stronger Turkey. In fact, Germans imperialists who favoured friendship and economic relations with Turkey stood for anything that would contribute to the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Pan-Islamism in Abdülhamid's time, nationalism in Young Turk regime, or a smaller Turkey as advised by Goltz, to secure German economic expectations in the Near East.

German rapprochement to the Ottoman Empire must be assessed within the context of the tendency towards economic imperialism in accord with the German industrial needs. The development of light industries namely the chemical industry and the electro-technical industry following the development of iron, steel and mining industries together with the development of a strong banking system was one of the elements in the strengthening of economic

imperialist demands in the form of German foreign investment in the form of foreign loans and enterprises.

The change in the nature of German imperialism was most clearly reflected in the publicity of Baghdad railway, new public interest in Islam, increasing need of information and research on the Near East. The social and political network behind the propaganda for German expansion in the Near East attests to the change in dominant imperialist policy from colonialism to economic imperialism. This propaganda activity was the product of the scholar and journalistic groups which were sponsored by the younger sectors of German economy. The three major groups (advocates of *Mitteleuropa*, orientalist, and Islamologists) that have been studied in this research served the purposes of German informal imperialism.

Advocacy the Baghdad Railway Project together with its agricultural and commercial prospects and support for the unity of Muslim peoples under the banner of pan-Islamism became the main elements of anti-colonialist German propaganda. The anti-colonial nature of German imperialist discourse was targeting British colonialism.

This propaganda displayed certain common characteristics. First, as for the promoters of it, they were all liberals; and therefore this was not a pan-German propaganda. The method of German imperialism was indisputably different than that of in Central Africa, South America and Far East. Secondly, it was based on the vision of Central European commercial union. This union was thought to be based on independent states and the motor force of their

industrial development was going to be the German industry and technology. Third common point is a common concern for the political integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a potential and important member of Central European customs union. This concern brought up a number of suggestions for the protection of the Empire's integrity.

The Baghdad Railway Project was certainly the most prestigious project of Wilhelminian Germany with world political significance. The presentation of the motives behind German policy in the Near East in the contemporary German and the position of this policy in public opinion formed the centre of this research. Liberal imperialists like Ernst Jäckh, Paul Rohrbach and Friedrich Naumann, and orient-experts like Hugo Grothe and Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz played the main role in the formation of German public opinion on the economic potentialities of the Near East. The most significant form of contemporary description of German Eastern policy was indeed based on travels and accounts of personal experiences in the Ottoman domains. However, there also appeared a number of reports from correspondents and scholarly articles that provided information, statistics and commercial balances. Although they were mainly targeting at the common people and potential investors, these publications were not negligible for the German Foreign Office either.

In most of these plentiful publications, Turkey was depicted as a market and a source of raw materials for German industry. This was the basic motive portrayed as German penetration to the Near East. A second element was the

fact that Turkey was easily reachable. Germany had the advantage of being able to reach the Ottoman domains over land, and the shipment over Donau was possible (although the river run in the opposite direction).

The economic expectations from the Eastern policy were focused on the modernization of transportation and agriculture in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. The most important of all was the development of intensive cultivation of grain and cotton, agricultural raw materials that German industry severely needed. The import of cotton from the Near East was going to set Germany free from American imports and enable her to compete with British textile industry. In addition to cotton, agricultural products such as tobacco, nuts, raisins, and opium were important items of German export. The coal and oil resources of the Near East were just as attractive for German industry. Baghdad Railway Project was designed to provide transportation to all these resources and was buttressed by parallel irrigation projects on Konya and Adana plains. All this economic activity was going to be consolidated by the establishment of German schools and hospitals along side the establishment of agricultural industry.

Wilhelmian Eastern policy was in accordance with what Friedrich List foresaw: an economic region with German, as the industrialised power at the centre surrounded with the south-eastern Europe and the Near East, the periphery which was rich in agricultural and mineral resources. Only the establishment of such an economic region would enable Germany to compete with Britain in a struggle of life and death. This struggle was very crucial under

the Social Darwinist perspective of the late 19th century. The same Social Darwinist perspective was behind Germany's naval program of 1900, which had a central place in German-British antagonism.

German imperialism in the Wilhelmian period was characterized by the concern of the protection of the political independence of the target markets. This protection was going to be secured by German dominance in the European balance of power. The opening up of new resources and markets for German industry was believed to provide for the German competitiveness in the European political and economic rivalry. German Eastern policy claimed to be independent and different from the colonial policy of Great Britain. The German emphasis on this difference was not lip service, but a genuine attempt at developing a different discourse than her main adversary. Moreover, Germany, as a young nation, compelled to insist on the political independence of nations. The propaganda for national independence was part of German nation's self-assurance. In social Darwinist perspective, the imperial Britain was a threat to land-locked German national existence. Consequently, British attempts at weakening Ottoman political authority have been consistently criticized by the publicists of Germany's Eastern policy.

The accounts on the pan-German nature of German Eastern policy, the central argument of which was the export of population to the Near East is based on false grounds. First, the arguments for German settlement in the Near East lost ground due to the emerging shortage of labour and withdrew from the political arena in the Wilhelmian period. Secondly, all of the citations which are

claimed to prove the pan-German origin and meaning of German economic expansion to the Near East dates either before 1890, or after the outbreak of the War, during which all publications inevitable assumed a more nationalistic character. On the other hand, the change in the arguments of imperialist publicists like Hugo Grothe point to the influence of the general trend towards informal imperialism, which was also anti-colonialist, in the Wilhelmian period. The clear opposition against German settlement and the persistent emphasis on the national independence of the Balkan and Middle Eastern peoples expressed by the advocates of German penetration to the Near East attest to the genuinely anti-colonial nature of German imperialism. Thirdly, the mainstream argument that the pan-Germans cleared out the British and French influence from the Porte contradicts with the historical facts and is ideologically biased. Since the Berlin Treaty of 1878 former diplomatic understandings were falling apart. The fall of the British influence from the Porte especially after British invasion of Egypt in 1882, gave Germany the opportunity to establish firmer and closer political and economic bonds with the Ottoman state.

Arguing that the German imperialists advocating penetration to the Near East were not pan-Germans does imply that German imperialists were saints; but the domestic political and economic conditions of Germany together with her (Social Darwinist) rivalry with England produced the material grounds for anti-colonial character of German imperialism. Moreover, German *Kulturarbeit*, i.e. building schools, hospitals and other cultural institutions, which are characteristics of modern imperialism, is related to the dominance of

informal economic imperialist perspective in Germany. *Kulturarbeit* was also closely associated with establishment of modern consumer and workers out of the natives of the Near East, who were also hoped to become citizens of an independent nation-state.

Briefly, German economic penetration to the Near East was initiated by younger sectors of industry that was locked up in tariff walls. The basic motives behind the destination of this economic expansion were its convenience for overland transportation, which brought about the Baghdad Railway Project at first hand. Secondly, it was believed that the modernization of transportation in the Near East was going to extend the market for German sales in as much as it would stimulate the agricultural production due to the opening up of commercial potential.

In this research, I found out that, contrary to the widespread historical accounts, the German interest in Turkey rather belonged to the liberal circles in Germany rather than the Pan-Germans. The historians who associated German economic penetration to the Near East with pan-German ideology also establish a connection between German nationalism and Turkish nationalism. The need of new German industry to survive in the world market that coincided with the Turkish aim to prevail the political integrity of the empire by reforming of state apparatus via Westernization, and nationalism being the ideological aspect of this aspiration.

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