INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL POLITICS: THE CASE OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

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ABSTRACT

INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN LOCAL POLITICS: THE CASE OF MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

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It is widely argued that in liberal democracies, demands and interests of different social groups are defended by their representatives in the decision making bodies. The municipal councils can be seen one such channel at the local level. The aim of this thesis is to explore the municipal councils with reference to their power, representation channels, and the weight of different groups in it. The profiles of the local councilors in reference to their education, ethnicity, sex, and class properties are investigated. In order to explore the above concepts a case study in Denizli Municipality is carried out. Questionnaires and deep interviews with municipal council members and municipal stuff are made.

Keywords: Local Democracy, Municipal Councils, Representation

YEREL POLİTİK SÜREÇLERDE ÇIKARLARIN TEMSİLİ: BELEDİYE MECLİSLERİ ÖRNEĞİ

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Temsili demokratik sistemlerde, farklı toplumsal kesimlerin talep ve çıkarlarının karar alma organlarındaki temsilcileri aracılığıyla savunulduğu düşünülmektedir. Bu yapı, yerel yönetimler düzeyindeki karşılığını belediye meclislerinde bulmaktadır. Bu tezin amacı belediye meclislerinin çalışma prensiplerini ortaya koymak, farklı çıkar ve ilgi gruplarının temsiline ne derece olanak tanıdıklarını araştırmak, belediye meclislerini oluşturan üyelerin eğitim düzeyi, etnik köken, cinsiyet ve sınıfsal nitelikleri ile bağlı oldukları siyasi partiler itibariyle sergiledikleri yapıyı ve bu yapının meclislerce alınan kararların niteliklerine olan etkilerini incelemektir. Yukarıda belirtilen kapsamda bu tez çalışmasında Denizli Belediyesi'nde alan araştırmasına yer verilmistir.

Anahtar kelimeler : Yerel Demokrasi, Belediye Meclisleri, Temsiliyet

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To my family...

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LIST OF ABBREVATIONS

The True Path Party (TPP): Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP)

Republican People's Party (RPP): Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)

Democratic Left Party (DLP): Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP)

Motherland Party (MLP): Anavatan Partisi (ANAP)

National Action Party (NAP): Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP)

Young Party (YP): Genç Parti (GP)

Justice and Development Party (JDP): Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)

Independents: Bağımsız

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Aim

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the question of representation in local politics by concentrating on municipal councils. To this aim, the case of Denizli Municipal Council is taken as a case study.

There are three main arguments to be discussed in this study with reference to the case study. The first one is the representation of the citizens as a whole. The key question is that if the citizens, who vote for and elect the councilors and the mayor, are really represented in the municipal councils? Are the municipal councils really pluralistic representative bodies in local politics? Another question to be asked is that if the municipal councils do not represent the citizens as a whole; whose interests do they in fact represent?

The second argument is related to the belief that the municipal councils and local authorities are schools for politicians where they learn politics. The question is going to be on the common belief that the municipal councils are seen as stepping stones for politicians who want to take part in national politics. Do the councilors really think that way and are the local authorities schools for them in learning politics? Do their memberships affect them in their political future in some ways?

The third argument is about the powers of the municipal councils. Key question is whether the municipal councils are really powerful and influential in local politics. Are the municipal councils strong enough to manipulate decision-making processes? The municipal council's autonomy is also going to be evaluated. If they are not really influential in local decisions and policies, then, who are the most effective and influential groups or persons in these important processes?

These are the main important key questions upon which the thesis concludes.

1.2. Scope

Local governments are largely creations of the state and are sustained by it although they may also have a major influence on central decision-making. The interrelationship between local and central authorities frames the local system of government which cannot be considered as an isolated political structure.

In representational democracies the local governments are systems which cannot be forsaken for any other type of government. They have the main roles in local service provision. By their roles in service provision and participatory democracy, even in the under-developed countries other than Western European countries and North America, they become the main elements of governing and political structures.

The different ideologies' expectations are different from the local governments, however, in the last decade of 20^{th} century, the importance of local authorities for the comfort, happiness and welfare of the masses of people are underlined by two important conferences HABITAT I – II (Keleş and Toprak, 2000)

The right wing ideologies support the free market economy where the role of the public is diminished to a minimum in order to put forward the individuals' creative abilities and entrepreneurships. The central and local state's main role is preparing the necessary conditions for this free competition.

The radical left which is influenced by neo-Marxist thoughts has a different understanding of local governments. Their main stress is upon the class conflicts and struggles between the parts of the society. Another important point that they argue is the autonomy of the local governments from the central governments and the interests of the capital. Other than these theories there are approaches which see the local governments as the main elements that shape up the pluralist societies. These pluralist thoughts offer arrangements in the financial and political structures of the local authorities in order to sustain healthy local service provision. Some theories argue that there are local political elites (provincial elites) which are dominant in the decision making processes, and this is an inevitable phenomenon for the local governmental systems. The class position or organizational positions are not major criterion in their understandings.

These views evaluate the local governmental systems with their relationships with capitalism. They all have doubts about the bureaucracy and all stress on the participation and representation as concepts of main importance. No matter different ideologies or views are inherent in any approach, the importance of the local governments, the local autonomy, and the local democracy cannot be underestimated.

In liberal democracies, these above concepts are tried to be achieved by elections which are made regularly, both at national and local system of government. The members of the parliaments try to represent the nation as a whole. The municipal councils are, in a way, the reflections of these parliaments at the local level; thus, they are the most important representational bodies.

At the local level in representative democracies, the municipal councils (or local councils) are elected directly. Generally, the mayor is also an elected official which is elected by citizens with some exceptions where he/she is elected by the councilors within the council. There are specialized committees within the municipalities for the decision making processes other than these bodies which may be committees on education, housing, health, etc. these bodies are elected in some countries and appointed in others.

The councils and the mayor are given many different names in different countries. Beside the differences in their names, their duties and responsibilities are also differentiated among liberal countries. According to the needs of the local citizens and the governmental system's inner working structure, the duties and responsibilities are given to these mainly elected political institutions.

Despite these many differences in the local political systems, the officials that constitute these political decision-making bodies have very similar properties and characteristics. Many studies made in Western European countries and the United States of America suggest that these elected officials can be described as predominantly male, middle aged, middle class and usually well educated (Saunders, 1979; Cockburn, 1977; Dahl, 1961; Allum, 1995, Miller and Dickson, 1995). The most "democratic" societies' claim is generally that the elected members are chosen from differentiated parts of the society and represent the society as a whole. However, this is not a really valid expression as claimed by the above stated writers. The electorate usually faces the fact that the members that they will choose are from the higher social status in the society

The number of studies made in our country is very few in this aspect. Even in these few studies it is pointed out that the central pressures are affecting the local authorities in negative ways. The local councils and committees are very powerless against the mayors and political parties do not have preparations and regulations for the relations of the local bodies (Keleş and Toprak, 2000).

It is stated in these studies that the elected members are not seen as the real representatives of the citizens and they do not have interest in the future of the urban areas; rather, they try to reflect their own interests as the will of the constituents and have the political future expectations in their minds.

As a common practice in local authorities, the mayors try to assign councilors who have the same ideology (or not –in the case of Denizli) to the municipal companies in order to avoid being controlled strictly by the municipal council. These members of the councils are assigned as presidents or management members of these companies and cannot maintain their real duty, the representation of the citizens and controlling and checking the executive of the municipality.

Another point in our country about the local representation problem is that the ideological, philosophical and theoretical differences between political parties are not valid in local politics. The choices of the constituents are not on the ideologies of the political parties, but on the local candidates' character, statue, and interests. It is a very common fact that the local politicians change their political parties whether in election time or not. In Denizli, where the case study of this thesis is carried out, the mayor which was elected in 1991 changed his political party after the elections. In the 1994 elections, the mayor's party won only 2.3 per cent of the total municipalities in Turkey, and one of them was Denizli. In the 1999 elections, the mayor's party won only three provincial municipalities all over Turkey, and one of them was Denizli. These are proofs for the voting preferences of the constituents which are on the character, statue, and interests of the candidates, rather than its political party's ideas or ideology.

As the municipal councils are the main important representative, executive, decisive and control mechanisms in municipalities, it is very important to study and examine them in detail.

1.3. Methodology

In order to provide a theoretical background to the discussion of the municipal councils and local politics the following chapter examines the main theories of the local states and local councils. It will be shown that there are important differences among the theories and each theory conclude on particular aspects of the local governments and representation. It is important to understand their points of views as there is non single that is capable of explaining the local political processes.

In addition to the discussion of theoretical perspectives, the concept of local autonomy is explained. In addition to the autonomy of the local authorities via a vis central government, the autonomy of the local authorities via a vis local population is examined. This latter dimension is quite central to a satisfactory understanding of the representation question.

In Chapter III, the foreign country experiences on local governmental systems are investigated. The local governmental systems of England, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden and United States of America with reference to their differences and similarities in local elections, local councils, councilor's profiles, etc. are evaluated

In Chapter IV, the local governmental history of Turkey is briefly explained. The municipalities in Turkey are examined according to their establishments, responsibilities, and structures. In addition to these evaluations, a case study about Municipal Councils of Keçiören Municipality is evaluated.

In Chapter V, the case study on the Denizli Municipal Council is presented. The first part provides the evaluation of the questionnaires given to the Councilors in Denizli municipality. The second part deals with the legislative questionnaire given to the same councilors. The third part consists of the evaluation of the questionnaires and deep interviews conducted the municipal staff.

In the final chapter, the findings of the case study are discussed.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Theoretical views

2.1.1. Pluralist (Representational) views

Pluralism is the philosophy which argued that reality cannot be explained or understood by only one substance or principal. Likewise, political pluralism has the view that there are diversities in social, institutional, and ideological practices. Pluralists share the conviction that power is dispersed between multiple actors, and the state is less influential in its ability to assert control on civil society (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

As a theory it argues that a multitude of groups, not the people as a whole, govern the states. Government is dominated not by a single elite but rather by a multiplicity of relatively small groups, some of which are well organized and funded, some of which are not. These groups influence the making and administration of laws and policy. The local democracy consists of the expression and conflict among diverse views and values held by contending groups attempting to shape local government decisions to meet their ends, with all important groups having the ability to gain access to and exercise some degree of influence over decision makers (Wolman, 1995). Local government's role is concerned with the authoritative allocation of values and local democracy is a free flow of group political conflict and local government is its arena.

In the pluralist view, the idea which is created as an opposition to the centralism makes the local authorities important figures. The main point underlined in this context is the role of the local authorities in the allocation of the political power equally in the society. The important properties of the local governments are, according to this view, the ones which increase the democracy and the participation possibilities rather than their effectiveness in local service providing. The local authorities are seen as bodies which create new paths for the interest groups to raise their voices, make it possible to control the local politicians' activities, and for participation. As their closeness to the area of services, and its response to the needs of citizens are rapid, they are given this importance (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

In the local decision making processes the leaders may be both very influential on the citizens and also may be influenced by their constituents. The relationship between the leaders and the constituents is not a governor-governed kind. The local political leaders may shelter to political rituals in order to hide their some of their activities; they may have indirect influences on local policies; and they have a mutual relationship with citizens. These all make it hard to analyze the relation between the political leaders and constituents (Dahl, 1961).

Dahl does not worry about the political passiveness of the citizens. He believes that in representative democracies, the representatives are sensitive to the interests of their voters. The main reason of this belief is that the people who are in active political arena should gain their justification, in a way (Dahl, 1961).

Dahl takes on the relationship between the leaders and the citizens and examines the power to influence the political decisions and how it spreads over different parts of the society. In the analysis of three issue areas he found out that although only a small number of people are involved in local political issues, many people were involved in single issues. Among these people the mayor is the prime example (Saunders, 1979). With this finding he argues that the elected leaders keep in mind that the preferences of the constituents when deciding or rejecting a policy. He adds that "…leaders do not merely respond to preferences of the constituents; leaders also shape preferences" (Dahl, 1961).

According to Dahl, there are shifting alliances between groups which constituted around different political bases according to the issue at hand. By this view Dahl accept the concept that minorities rule rather than the majority rule (Dahl, 1961).

Together with the outcomes stated above, he came up with other assumptions like; Sub-leaders have a great role in the policy making processes, Leaders chose and are influenced by sub-leaders who are more communicative with society and who transmit the wants and needs of a larger part of the stratum. Leaders promote who support them for the continuation of this support and keep their promises; this makes citizens to have a direct influence on the decisions made. Leaders tend to solve conflicts between overt and covert policies in favor of their supporters.

2.1.2. Neo-liberal (new right) views

The new right is a political philosophy that influenced right wing politics of Thatcher with the Conservative Government in the UK and Reagan with the Republican Party in the USA, in the 1980's. It is mainly occurred as a result of the reactions for the Keynesian welfare state politics which are used in Western countries after the Second World War. The economical crises in the beginning of the 1970's increased the supporters of this thought. The characteristic devices of the welfare state like; state participation supporting the private, profit-making economy, much larger public sector, controlled economic growth, consultation with economic interest, social insurance against misfortune, were rejected as they were seen as problem originating phenomenon instead of problem solving phenomenon. (www.surrey.ac.uk).

In the new-right thinking there is a suspicious view of the representative democracy. As the new-right thinkers argue that the market mechanisms are valid in the administration bodies, they started to put forward new concepts for local governments. Local democracy and governance are the main significant concepts in the new-right ideology.

Unlike the main stresses that pluralism made on democracy and participation, in the new right approaches, concepts like the increase of efficiency in the service provision of the local governments and the replies to the new demands of the changing structure of capital gained importance. The new right's understanding of local government got some precautions in the increase of the economic effectiveness in service provision and used the convergence of the urban theories in order to stress the local autonomy (Şengül, 2001). It also introduced the local governments as units which maximizes the possibilities of participation.

After the state pulls its hand off some areas, some other mechanisms tried to fill the vacuum. In the 1980's when this transformation was in its fastest period, the local governments started to leave their positions in the local arena to private sector with privatization and some similar ways. However the deficiency in the state-market separation began to increase and a third party, in other words a third sector, was taken into consideration in the local governments. This concept existed in the newright thinking but it did not gained importance before. It was now used to meet some the reactions that were increasing (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987).

This third sectored model in the city's management included the local state, the local based capital, and non-governmental organizations. This new formation was not fully supported by the local governmental organizations and it was given a new etiquette 'governance'. This concept is argued in many level including international relations, the institutional structuring of the state, regional development, restructuring of the local governments. It is a concept where multiple actors and mutual interaction in place of hierarchy take part in the governing processes. The state serves as a regulator and it prepares the circumstances where these multiple actors can be in interaction without suppressing each other (Şengül, 2001). The governance concept denies a hierarchy between the local and the central governments. By claiming this, it is suggested that there should exist a similar governance models in the local level. The local politics is said to be moving towards multiple actor model.

Local governance is defended for its role in bringing together key organizations and actors, from the three spheres of state, market, and civil society, to identify public priorities and needs, and work with local people to provide them. This is consistent with the widely-shared perception in the policy community of the advantages of partnership and cooperation working as the way of achieving effective outcomes, and solutions to problematic issues, by building trust, sharing knowledge and resources, and working collaboratively across boundaries.

2.1.3. Elitist views

Elitism is the belief that government by a small ruling group is normatively desirable. The classical elite theorists all made strong claims to have established a scientific theory proving that government by small elite over the rest of society is inevitable (Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). First, classical elitists claimed that Marxist theory was a flawed and limited explanation of the persistence of domination in human societies. Secondly, they argued that the transition to an industrialized society with a system of representative democracy could not fundamentally alter the stratification of society into a ruling elite and a mass.

Theoretically, elites can be defined as "those people who hold institutionalized power, control the social resources (include not only the wealth, prestige and status but also the personal resources of charisma, time, motivation and energy) and have a serious influence on the decision-making process". They can realize their own will in spite of opposition (Arslan, 2004).

According to this theoretical definition, the term elite do not necessarily involve only the occupier of the top strata. It may comprise both those people who are at the top, bottom or outside the organizations. It may include the people in the capitalist, middle or working class. Power, control, and influence are major words in this definition. If the people have power actively or potentially, they have a direct or indirect effect on the decision-making process and are controlling the social resources they can be identified as the elite. Their class positions or organizational positions are not a major criterion in this description. In his study of Atlanta (1953), Hunter tried to find the most influential and most powerful persons in the society. Hunter found out that the most influential figures in the community formed themselves into some 'crowds' depending on their main interests (cited in Harding, 1995). These were all senior executives in the business life of Atlanta. The mayor of Atlanta was the only government figure seen as belonging to the policy making group. The policy making process where the needs and desires of the constituents are translated into local policies was not seen as realistic. The institutions and the formal associations play an important role in the execution of these local policies. The main formulation of the local policies was done outside of these formal institutions.

Hunter realized that in these policy-making groups the economic interests were dominant. It can be said that nothing in the local governance of Atlanta came into life without the permission or the approval of the business-dominated elite. The representative democracy in United States of America is thus seen as a smokescreen for dominant business or economic interests (Harding, 1995).

There were critics of this study in some ways. The pluralists criticized Hunter's findings and also his methodology. The pluralists claimed that the results they have found refuted the notion that urban politics was dominated by single coherent elite. The pluralists found out that the people who are the most influential over decision-making processes are different in each policy area. This means that they have found a plurality of local elites. An important outcome of their study is that no one group of decision makers dominated all the others as Hunter's business or economic elite had (Harding, 1995). This proves that the urban political power is not in the hands of the elected or assigned officials or it is dispersed.

The mini elite groups, which may be seen as weaker than Hunter claimed, can be decisive in disputes over issues on the local political agenda but this agenda can be neutralized in order to be unthreatening to the real elite group. The most powerful have mobilized bias to keep those issues they did not want to be debated in the local political agenda.

The urban elite theorists operated within the defined geographical boundaries and the outside of these boundaries was not in their concern. The communities they study were the citizens within these boundaries. The most influential members in the determination of the local political decisions were tried to be found inside these areas. This caused problems for analysis of power. They imputed a high degree of local autonomy. The most powerful figures were assumed to reside within relevant boundaries and the most significant expressions of power were to be seen in an ability to shape local government policies and agenda.

2.1.4. Instrumentalist views

According to instrumentalists, the state is an 'instrument' used in the interests of the dominant classes and thus has little autonomy. In parallel with this understanding, urban political institutions that are integral parts of the state have no or little autonomy from the higher level state institutions (Pickvance, 1995).

O'Connor claims that both state and local governments make considerable spending like highway construction and education expenditures in order to support capital. According to him, local governments are dominated by competitive capital whereas state and big cities are more far away from the direct control of capital. This is because of the O'Connor's argument that there is a tendency in big cities to constitute supra-municipal non-elected bodies for avoiding working-class majorities (Pickvance, 1995).

Lojkine like O'Connor is influenced from the theory of state monopoly capitalism. Thus, he states that there is interdependence between state and monopoly capital and that it is the monopoly capital, not the other fractions of capital, having a leading dominant role. On the other side, however, local state is the haven of small capital and the working class and it is not a mechanism simply trying to meet the needs of capital according to Lojkine. Interdependent to monopoly capital, state tries to impose its intentions directly on local governments but for the most cases it has to compromise with locally dominant interests. It follows from these arguments that, according to Lojkine, urban policies stem from class interests and class struggles, not directly from the interests of monopoly capital. Since the control of the state by monopoly capital interests are mediated by class struggles, state is obliged to respond to interests of other classes as well from time to time, i.e., the notion of the 'relative autonomy of the state' (Pickvance, 1995; Saunders, 1979).

Cynthia Cockburn with her study in Lambeth-London is another name from instrumentalist view of urban politics. Following the basic notion of instrumentalist view, she argues that state preserves a unity and that local state cannot be thought of independently from the central government. She evaluates local authorities as aspects of national state which shares their works and this presents that almost no autonomy is attributed to local authorities. In this respect, local elected bodies such as local councils are parts within the structure of the state and they co-ordinate the interests of a dominant class. Through the local management of families and institutions local governments play their parts and they differ institutionally but not socially from the nation state. Local governments do not perform a given function or have certain set of institutions but rather contradictory processes reflecting the changes in class relations take place within them (Cockburn, 1977).

According to Cockburn the local councils do not spring from ancient rights of selfgovernment but are aspects of national government which is a part of the state. She concludes from the findings of the case study that the local council of Lambeth does not work for fulfilling the interests of a locally dominant class since the dominant class in the town is not made up of local residents. Rather, the local dominant class includes property developers, building firms, and related professions. Since this is the case, Cockburn states that main function of Lambeth's local council is the reproduction of local labor power through the provision of housing, social services and etc. (Cockburn, 1977).

In relation with this, Cockburn emphasizes the concept of community development and neighborhood councils which are the means that local state reproduces the local labor force. Neighborhood councils operate in order to improve communications, provide information, support local councilors, and maintain the council's authority. According to Cockburn, these neighborhood councils defuse conflicts between council and residents (Cockburn, 1977).

2.1.5. Structuralist views

Castells, an essential name in structuralist view, argues that the urban system is inseparable from the total system but rather is one aspect of it. In other words, urban system is the specific expression of the total system within a spatial unit of collective consumption. In consistent with this definition, Castells (1977) identifies three levels which constitutes the urban system: the economic, the political, and the ideological. The economic level is further divided into three elements as production, consumption, and exchange. The political level corresponds to urban administration and other locally based agencies of the state. These political units, for Castells, have a dominant function as the regulation of the relations between different levels for the maintenance of the cohesion of the system. Lastly, the ideological level implies the urban symbolic, i.e., the meanings emitted by socially produced spatial forms (Saunders, 1981; Castells, 1977).

Unlike the instrumentalist view, structuralist view to urban politics gives some autonomy to both state and local institutions while performing accumulation and legitimating functions. In this sense, local political institutions have some autonomy in relation to local class interests for creating a social order through intervening to emergent conflicts. In parallel with this structuralist notion, Castells rejects the theory of state monopoly capitalism and rather than attributing a passive role to state in relation to interests of capital he views state as having a key position in regulating capitalist system's contradictions (Pickvance, 1995). Castells sees growing state intervention as an inevitable aspect of advanced capitalism and defines urban politics as referring to the struggles over state's intervention. It means that state, with its roles of regulation, financing and provision of consumption facilities, becomes the object of political demands. In the articulation of such demands, rather than political parties, Castells emphasize the role of social movements including also the concepts like participation, protest and urban social movements (Pickvance, 1995).

According to Castells (1977 cited in Saunders, 1981) city's specific function within the total system must be economic. More precisely, the function of the urban system should lie in the process of consumption. An essential function of consumption is that it enables the work force to reproduce its capacity for labor. Following this, it appears that the specific function of the urban system is the reproduction of labor power through collective consumption (Saunders, 1981).

According to Castells state intervention at the local level in the provision of consumption facilities results in the politicization of economic contradiction and the emergence of collective response. In other words, state intervention and action at the local level is influenced by class struggle that is expressed in the form of 'urban social movements'. Besides, he adds that this politicization is not necessarily a source of conflict but it can also be a tool for integration and participation. It follows that political response is not predetermined but rather it depends on the level of the political practice. Political practices should be examined with reference to the structural contradictions that give rise to them and the study of urban political responses since structures only exist in practices. In conclusion, the political responses of those who are subjected to urban crisis, the lower class groups, are essential factors in determining political outcomes (Saunders, 1981).

Pickvance who finds Castells analysis of urban social movements inadequate asserts that it is equally important to study the structure of social relations at the base besides the study of the issue and the organizational activity in order to understand how a social base becomes a social force. This study includes the value orientations of individual members which affect the willingness to participate in local political action and the mode of participation, the alternative sources of identification and consciousness, and the costs of participation in terms of money, time, and personal loyalties etc. (Pickvance, 1995).

2.1.6. Uneven development theory views

In this theory Duncan and Goodwin's arguments are based upon Miliband's statement that 'local state is both agent of and obstacle to the central state' (cited in Pickvance, 1995) and one of their basic assumption is that society develops unevenly especially under the system of capitalism. In parallel, they claim that due to economic differentiation stemming from the spatial division of labor, i.e. local economic factors, there are important local differences in the civil society and policy variations and different levels of service provision exist among local governments. Following this, every local area is a specific pattern of social relations among which gender, kinship and household relations are essential. Local governments have their own internal dynamics, structures, and personnel which affect local policies to a considerable extent. Besides, local state should reflect local needs and interests. In other words, rather than merely reflecting the consequences of the uneven development of capital, states (including the central and the local state) are in a mediating position between capital, civil society and nature (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988; Pickvance, 1995).

In terms of the autonomy attributed to local governments, Duncan and Goodwin are close to structuralist view since they argue that although they are restrained by central government through imposed legal statues, local governments have a certain degree of choice in their actions. This also represents the continuing tension between local and central governments. This tension stems from central government's efforts in the way to control the activities of local governments and it is impossible to understand local government action without reference to its relation with the central government (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988).

Following Stewart's writings about local governments, they claim that local governments are not directly subordinated to central government. Although local governments use the power that is conferred on them by national government, they have the right to vary in their use of this power. What causes this variation is the exercise of local choice marking local government off from local administration and

this shows the importance of local authorities in the government of communities (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988).

The notion of local choice includes the conscious political choices made at the local level, the existing pattern of need, or the existing decisions on service type, delivery mode and spending and etc. As mentioned before, this local authority variation is closely linked with the process of uneven development and what concerns Duncan and Goodwin is the identification of where this local choice comes from, how it is shaped and the reaction it gets from the central government. They state that while doing such an analysis it is equally important to consider local factors relating them with wider scales on the one side and the links between economic and political processes (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988).

Although held before Duncan and Goodwin's book, Mark-Lawson's comparative study about three cities, Nelson, Preston, and Lancaster reflected their notions well. The expenditures made for public services differed in three cities and this was caused by the divergences between cities' local social relations including the labor movement strength, the political involvement of women and employment level of women. These divergences also considerably affected council policies (Pickvance, 1995).

2.1.7. Corporatist views

In this view the state is seen as autonomous and the main relations of the state with the interest groups are put in the center. The interest groups are under the control of the state. In the election of the leaders to these groups there is relatively less control. According to Schmitter, beside this phenomenon, the leaders manipulate the members of the interest groups (UPL, 2004).

The main stress is on the political institutions rather than the policy making processes. There is no competition and institutional openness in this view, unlike pluralist views. The organized producers, entrepreneurs, and representatives of the NGO's, etc., which are few in number, are important figures in decision making.

In local political arena, in the decisions for the allocation of the goods and services, the bureaucrats are seen as important figures. The elected politicians in local politics are put aside in these views and the bureaucrats gained more importance. Thus, the center- periphery conflicts are not considered. The local bureaucrats make decision with autonomy from the central state (or relatively autonomous decisions) and the service provision is done according to these decisions.

Saunders, in order to achieve a steady state and local state theory, put forward the dual-state thesis, where the state is corporatist and independent in production, and highly influenced by powerful groups in the consumption arena. According to this idea, close relationships will be made between the local authorities and private sectors in the production functions, where the local authorities are dominant (these may include physical planning, road construction, housing provision) (Saunders, 1979). This may result in division between the powerful bureaucrats which have key positions in local authority and the local council members which are excluded from corporate decision making processes. In the consumption area, the local state may answer to the political pressures coming from localities. Again the main apparatus of these pressures may be the bureaucratically defined terms that define the possibility of decisions and the political composition in the local councils.

The services are restricted by the properties of the local revenue base, the need for supporting the capital accumulation and the control of the central state on local expenditures. The location inequalities and ecological powers may be also restrictive on allocation policies of the local authorities (Saunders, 1979).

After his book, the social theory and urban question, his idea of corporatism evolved and became somewhat a theory which claims that some specific functional interests may have privileges for taking the power from the interests groups' hands. Moreover, in operating some policies where there is a settlement with the state, these interests may have responsibilities. According to him, these kinds of representation ways are still valid in countries like United Kingdom. He gives the examples of water authorities and urban development corporations which are not elected bodies. These organizations may have close relationships with business sectors and interest groups whilst excluding the local citizen and trade unions. He admits that not all of the local services are managed in this way and gives the example of health authorities which are under central managerialist and professional control. The local elected authorities are still under the influence of local residents, trade unions, and other voluntary organizations (Saunders, 1981).

2.1.8. Managerialist views

The urban managerialist thesis claims that the inequalities in the urban system may be explained as the product of a socio-ecological system in which spatial inequalities are reinforced or mediated by actions of strategic urban gatekeepers (Saunders, 1979). The economic and social inequalities are explained through the analysis of the values and actions of those who manage the urban system. These may be local authority bureaucrats, local council members, social workers, or groups which controlled access to the urban facilities like housing.

Pahl states that the urban resources are scarce and the allocation of these resources is unequal. Thus, the conflicts that may occur in the allocation of them are inevitable. Some groups may be advantageous in reaching some resources while some other may not be. So the conflicts may increase in time, but according to Pahl these may not turn into class conflicts (Pahl, 1975 cited in Saunders, 1979).

In his later studies, Pahl insisted that it is useful to study the ideologies and motivations of the urban managers but he suggested that this kind of analysis should define the urban managers as local state bureaucrats rather than elected council members or important gatekeepers (Saunders, 1979). In addition to this, he claimed that the relations between the central state and the local state should have an explicit account. It may be said that the main argument in this theory is that the local state bureaucrats perform a crucial role in mediating between the private and public sectors and between the central state and the local citizens.

The main importance of bureaucrats at the local level is that they determine how a given surplus will be distributed. As the state intervention in the provision of various urban resources is increasing, local managers' allocation decisions are of increasing significance in mediating the effects of market inequalities.

The local state is given importance as being a source of state spending, it is important that it should be under central control if a rational economic strategy is to be followed by the central government. The implication of this for the study of local government is that the growing corporatism has reduced rather than increased the autonomy of urban managers (Saunders, 1979).

An important point in this perspective is that it provides an explicit theory of the autonomy of the state in advanced capitalism (Saunders, 1979). In seeking the answers to the question of the independent operation of the local state from the interests of capital, it focuses attention on the internal operation of the state apparatus. This focus regards the constraints imposed by the central-local relation, also the relationship between the local state and capital expressed in the form of institutionalized pluralism.

According to Saunders, the implications of Offe's work on local governments are that the local governments and private business enterprises have close relationships where the former one is dominant (1979). In addition to this, the local state is seen to be responding to the political pressures from the locality, although this process will be subject to certain important qualifications. External political pressures will be mediated by bureaucratic definitions of what is possible and by the political composition of the local councils. The facilities which are available for the distribution are limited by local revenue base, by the need to support capital accumulation and by central government controls on local authority spending. In addition to these, the effects of local state allocative policies will be mediated by existing spatial inequalities and by the operation of ecological forces. The managerialist perspective theorizes the autonomy of the state and focuses on the inner working of the local and central state while paying attention to restrictions which are brought by the center-local relations and local state-capital relations.

2.2. The concept of autonomy

2.2.1. General explanations of autonomy

It is known that national states and local governments both have their own interests. The interests of the national state can be summarized as maintaining public order and authority, securing public revenues, managing exterior affairs. The local authorities have interest different than their national precedents. As being different in size and function, the local authority tries to govern the city population, exercises jurisdiction over people and activities in a geographically determined area (Gurr and King, 1987). The local state has the institutional and political resources to pursue its interests with some degree of relative autonomy.

The national governments' powers and resources are argued for increasing in a great amount in the last sixty years. Also, the general character of the advanced industrialized societies have changed and conflicts in the quality of urban life between growing and declining cities are being affected by both the national and local decisions (Gurr and King, 1987).

It can be asked, here, that if the local government should be understood as a partner who is sharing the heavy load of the central government in provision of the services? Or is the local government only the arm or an agent of central government at the local level? (Allum, 1995)

When we think about the first question, we may come up with the concentration of power into few hands where it may be dangerous situation from the view of pluralists. Allum points out that it implies a margin of political and administrative autonomy on the part of local government in deciding its policies locally (Allum, 1995). It is known fact that the local administrative bodies, surely, know the

problems of the local people and local areas better, and in addition to this, their feelings are generally better than the central government. As stated above central governments are usually in a situation to decide general policies which may be abstract and flexible (Allum, 1995).

The possible answer to the second question lies in the management and efficiency of the services. From Allum's point of view, in the second conception, sub-central government's margin of autonomy is reduced to a minimum and the claim is that local autonomy would have no other effect than that of dispersing and also fragmenting the political power (Allum, 1995).

When we look at Pahl's earlier works, it is seen that he generally placed very great amount of emphasis on vertical constraints which are upon the local managers. These constraints are coming from central government (Pahl, 1975). In his later works, Pahl stated that the local managers are not autonomous actors who determine which resources to be allocated to which group, the individual acts of volition, etc. According to him there are three major sets of constraints which can be summarized as; ecological, political and economical.

Allum's stress was on political and administrative constraints where Pahl adds the ecological part to this context. Pahl argues that different locations may be always having different advantages and disadvantages in many ways. One city may have advantages in time-cost distance, while the other may be advantageous in externality effects coming from another area. He claims that the distribution in space can never be entirely equal or egalitarian and this view seems to affirm Harvey's claim on the peculiarity of space that no two users can occupy the same time (Harvey, 1973).

Ecological constraints are considered as a main limitation on the autonomy of the local state. Local councils have some degree of control over specific key public resources. These may be education, housing, etc. The way in which these are deployed may significantly affect the distribution of indirect incomes (Saunders, 1979).

The political constraints may have two sides. First one is internal; where the internal organization of the local political structure is limited. The second one is the internal limits again, but this time, limits imposed through vertical integration into central government (Saunders, 1979). This kind of relationship makes us think about the possible conflicts between the elected officials and the local bureaucrats which are appointed. The elected members in UK, for example, see themselves as the true representatives of the citizen as they are elected by their votes. Departing from this idea, some of the leading figures in the council in England have more power than it is generally thought. The leading members' power is strengthened by the recent changes and bureaucracy is now seen as an ally rather than an enemy or conflict.

There are other examples on the political constraint phenomenon. Saunders claims that local authorities are constrained in their policies by national legislation, by government circulars and planning programs and financial controls (Saunders, 1979). He gives the example of the local councilors in Derbyshire, England, who refused to implement the government fair rents legislation and were threatened with both dismissal from the office and a sub-charge for the subsequent areas (Saunders, 1979).

The third type of constraint is the economical one, namely the market. The necessity of maintaining the conditions of existence for the private production is the first question that arises. Second question concerns the fact that the size of the revenue base and the ability of local authorities to generate additional funds to support spending on items not directly to the support of production (Saunders, 1979).

According to Friedland, there are some important points which may be summarized as business political participation, local organizational structure of business and level and type of local business activity, which are all related with economical structure of the city. The business political participation is an important concept because it is the necessary tool for business to have political power in the city's socio-economic life (Friedland, power and crisis in the city). Dahl states that business elite was not predominant participants and businessmen had specialized patterns of participation (Dahl, 1961). The political participation of the individual businessmen is not primary attribute which accounts for their influence. Rather the local organizational structure of business is the primary determinant of business power. It is also argued that an organizational attribute of the local economy to affect the city's power structure is relative number of coordinative economic functions located in the city (Friedland, power and crisis in the city).

The cities vary in the number of individuals which participate in policy issues, decision making processes. Here, organization is necessary for political access and political conflicts are mainly between organizational elites. The business organizations compete for political influence (Friedland, power and crisis in the city). All these competitions of business in the cities and their big influence on decisions may be considered as a type of constrain on the local autonomy. The city may not be able to make decision with a free will as the big business puts pressure upon it.

It is a common argument that if the central government is trying to keep up a steady economy or a successful economical strategy, the local authority expenditure must be strictly controlled or leveled down by the central government. In addition to this, in order to sustain enough feedback into the planning arena, there should be responsiveness to the local political pressures and social and economic needs of the local. This may be the very tension which ensures that local managers, in Pahl's terms, will continue to retain considerable autonomy from central control.

American city governments and city managers have a measure of autonomy from the perspective of Gurr and King. It is in both senses, which means by their subordination to higher authorities in institutional and political areas (Gurr and King, 1987). The centralized British and French states suggest that the municipal authorities they have got are significantly autonomous in interest and action in some spheres. The local authorities have interests significantly different from the national authorities as stated above. The important point is that they have institutional and political resources to pursue those interests with some degree of autonomy.

The federal state, in Allum's terms, is characterized by local governments that exercise a set of significant constitutional powers in full autonomy of the central government (1995). In this kind of state institutions both levels of government have their own legitimacy and their own administration capable of implementing their policies in the areas of their powers (Allum, 1995).

The unitary state is characterized by a central government and a central administration. These exercise power over the whole country. There are elected subcentral governments in these countries with their own administrations. The main point here is that their powers are limited and exercise at the pleasure of the central government (Allum, 1995)

Smith makes a separation between hierarchal systems (Smith, 1972, as cited in Allum, 1995). He claims that there are two types of hierarchies, first one being fused hierarchies, and the second one being the dual hierarchies. In the first type of hierarchy, the central administration field services and local government field services work in tandem. This process is usually supervised by the central authority. In the second one, local self-administration is separated from the central administration's field services and this gives a system of detached or dual hierarchies (Smith, 1972, as cited in Allum, 1995). Here, the central government is responsible for policy making and formulation but sub-central government and its own administration implements it. The local authorities are relied to deliver effective services by the central government. This last point allows local authority an element of relative autonomy in the face of central one (Allum, 1995).

The concept of relative autonomy is generally associated with the Marxist analysis. But the assumption that officials in advanced industrialist societies have the will and means to pursue state interests is independent of Marxist analysis (Gurr and King, 1987). There are many conceptions of the nature of political and social order. Gurr and King explain that private sector imposes constraints upon the central governments and especially on the private capital. Despite these constraints, state has a greater potential autonomy than the locality (1987). In addition to the types of constraint explained above, Gurr and King adds some other types to this phenomenon which may be useful for considering. They add technical, institutional, and incoherence constraints to the other two, political and economical. These are all constraints on the sate autonomy (1987). First one is the limitations of available knowledge and information on specific matters. The second one is limitations on the capacities of complex organizations to get weak people to act. The third addition is the expansion of state powers and functions into what was once private domain. The incoherence term is Sharkansky's term (cited in Gurr and King, 1987), for the extraordinary problems of administrative complexity, lack of effective political oversight and economic inefficiencies.

European social democrats are said to try to expand the scope of autonomy of the state, most conservatives to restrain the state's scope, not necessarily autonomy. As a result the degree of autonomy varies greatly in capitalist societies (Gurr and King, 1987).

In the concept of local autonomy, we see that the contemporary urban analysis do not give the local officials enough weight as autonomous actors. These actors generally pursue self-interested end in order to shape the city. For example, the officials responsible from housing in the local level act with an ideology of professionalism but without much reference to how this potential manifestation for state autonomy at the local level relates to other state interests to larger structural constraints (Gurr and King, 1987).

In modern states, the city officials are generally concerned with increasing their power and resources via-a-vis the claims of other localities and the national state (1987). They may often use their local political resources in order to achieve their goals; the political influence of national legislator from urban constituencies. One point of importance is the financial aspect to the extent which the regional economy provides sufficient revenues through taxation to support local state. If the dependence of the local state on local revenues is relatively higher than its dependence on national grants, than according to Gurr and King, it is more cooperative with local commercial and entrepreneurial interests. This standing is against the view of Cockburn and Saunders who claim that the local state became an instrument of the local capital (Cockburn, 1977, Saunders, 1979). Local officials' interests in private economic activity are functionally limited to what is necessary to ensure a steady and sufficient flow of revenues (Gurr, King, 1987).

The capital cities and administrative centers – usually they are the same urban centers – are generally seem to have more importance than other cities as the national officials would want to live and work at suitable urban environments. Another distinctive mark of a city's importance might be the ideological and political orientation to the ruling party or coalition. Besides these determinants, the key factor may be the economic activity of the urbanized areas for national concern (1987).

All above concerns of national state are important, but the economic activity needs to be evaluated more deeply. The changing relationship between the cities and the national state pushed the states to have some more responsibility in the provision of services and promoting private economy. Certain goods can not be provided by market place. These are some services which are crucial for the city to survive which include health, water supply, refuse collection etc. The public education, mass transit and recreational services are provided by local and national offices and they have programmatic commitments (1987). As state continues to provide these services, it achieves, in a way, to legitimate its integrity. Whenever there is problem in the provision of the services, there may be some challenges, especially political, to its right to rule (1987).

According to some human ecologists, some specific activities and the units that execute them control the conditions under which other activities must o perate (Friedland, power and crisis in the city). For example, large industrial units are dominant in urban areas because they control the income generation and employment in that local community. In addition to this, they also have a control over the flow of resources across city boundaries. Because of their control over these important economic processes they shape the material conditions necessary to the legitimacy and effectiveness of city government (Friedland, power and crisis in the city).

The location decisions, production and investment policies of the big industrial corporations generally affect the problems of a local government. Beside this, it has an important effect on the capacity of the local government in dealing with the problems. Business political participation becomes a consequence of the political power it has got, rather than the main cause of it (Friedland, power and crisis in the city).

As long as the local governments depend on taxes like central governments, and they do not have the authority or ability to control the corporate location decisions, they should avoid policies which may undermine profitable investment. This has become a rule as the control of the economic activity in cities is in the hands of big business corporations.

In relation with the above phenomenon Saunders states that some municipal councils encourage actively the private profitability through policies which appear almost totally subordinate to the demands of the local business sector while some others seem to be less anxious (Saunders, 1987). Some local councils prefer to keep nonproductive expenditures to a minimum in order to reduce the rate burden on local businesses while others pursue a relatively high spending budgetary policy financed to a large extent out of taxation on local industry and commerce (1987). Interesting information came out from a local engineering firm's manager who said: "...*the chamber of commerce is the unofficial arm of the local government in its relations with business corporations. It can negotiate more openly with prospective corporate residents than could the city officials*" (Friedland, power and crisis in the city).

Stone showed how business groups may have taken major compromises in the enactment stage of policy processes and reassert themselves in the implementation stages (Stone, 1976, cited in Jones, 1995). Two different thoughts have been developed on the concept of business power. According to instrumentalists, the business is powerful because of the business interests that possess the political resources to get governmental officials to do their bidding (Jones, 1995). The structuralists argue that the democratic politics are for the use of capitalist

accumulation. The governments are, in their perception, responsive to the business interests as they are dependent on capitalism (Jones, 1995).

According to Jones it is not easy to develop a model of interest influences in local and central governments which is valid for all times and at all places. This is with no further argument true but there are certain claims about these concepts. Saunders, for example, suggested the dual state thesis. He argued that with the national government developing a tendency towards promoting investment and local councils emphasizing collective consumption policies such as housing and public works, the dual state had emerged (Saunders, 1979, 1981).

It is necessary for the national state to pursue development policies in any city or region. At the local level the need to promote development may be more constraining than the central state depending on the mix of local and national revenues (Gurr and King, 1987). For the mayors, councils, or appointed officials of the cities which are heavily dependent on locally derived revenues, the most important aim of development is to maintain and also strengthen the municipal economy whose resources they need to pursue public purposes (1987). The viability of the municipality helps to reinforce the legitimacy of the official's positions. This maneuver puts the city in competition with other cities in a race for attracting the new investments and in increasing their share of extra-local revenues (1987).

The analysis of national state's interests on the local governments and urban processes is generally influenced by Castell's application of Marxist structuralism. This approach has an emphasis mainly on the impact of economic dynamics on urban processes. It is sometimes criticized for neglecting the national state and for emphasizing economic factors to the neglect of political ones as determinants of urban forms and forces (Gurr and King, 1987).

Without doubt the local state can be seen as the responsible party for the implementation of many programs formulated by the central government and for the arbitrary duties between public and private interests. The private interests may be hostile to public interests and these interests focus on the local state which is a kind

of a mediator. It is also clear the local states are semi-autonomous, in a way, which can be used for many kinds of interests. As they have a variety of powers, functions, variable discretion on how they mat be carry out these functions and most importantly headed by elected officials.

According to Gurr and King, there are four key elements in the conception of the local state. First one is that the local state has the primary, formally constituted authority for the governance of the city population (1987). Secondly, the local state exercises jurisdiction overall people and activities within a geographically bounded space. Thirdly, its structure consists of both bureaucratic and governmental offices. Fourthly, the local state has the legal authority to collect some revenues from citizens within its jurisdiction and to make allocative decisions about the use of these and other resources (1987).

The fact that these powers are limited should not question the existence of the local state; the degree to which they are administratively constrained is one dimension of local state autonomy (Gurr and King, 1987). Some writers of political science neglect the state's autonomy and do not see it as a semi-autonomous body. They generally view as an arm of the central state which makes it easier to reach the far points from where it stood. Of course, being the arm of the state means, doing what the central state wants to do.

The local state, in Cockburn's terms, is conceptualized as a component of the national state system. Cockburn argues that the local state is not something that is distinct from the national state nor it is represents the state locally (Cockburn, 1977). The local state is a part of a whole and it pursues policies distinct from those of the national state. According to Cockburn, in each case these all derive from the needs of capital.

Pahl's theory was that the urban mangers had the autonomy in the allocation of scarce urban services to constitute and independent influence upon urban patterns of social and economic inequality. Professional officers or urban managers were deemed capable of pursuing policies relatively independent of electoral constraints

and economic interests (Pahl, 1975). Some critics challenged the independency of urban mangers from the national state as well as local elected officials and also from the dynamics of capital.

Saunders argues that there is fundamental duality between national and urban politics derived from the distinctive functional activities of each level (Saunders, 1979). The national and regional states are responsible for production policies and activities while local or urban level administers consumption policies. Production policies are carried out at the national level; the local level formulates social consumption spending policies responsive to localized popular pressures exerted on and through representative state agencies (Saunders, 1979).

The autonomy of the local state in advanced capitalist societies at any given historical juncture, for Gurr and King, is a function first of its relationship with local economic and social groups and second of its relationship with the national central state (1987). The restrictions on its autonomy is inherent in; limited economic resources; political control by other elements of the state, whether vertically or horizontally located.

2.2.2. Types of autonomy

For Gurr and King, there are two main types of local autonomy. The first type concerns the local state's autonomy from the local economic and social forces. The second type concerns the local state's autonomy from the national state.

2.2.3. The first type of autonomy

It is about being independent from local pressures or forces. As the writers claim, the local state is autonomous to the extent that it can pursue its interests without being substantially constrained by local economic and social conditions (Gurr and King, 1987).

They explain the conditions which may constrain the local autonomy as; *Limits on the revenues which can be extracted from the local economy*, Resistance of dominant local interests to the policies of the local state, The activities of locally based political organizations and social movements which aim at reshaping the content of local public policy.

The local economy has been the principle revenue base for the local state. It provided the local state with a certain financial autonomy. A city should formulate a development strategy, which assumes that it already has a potential or capacity, in order to avoid being dependent. This may include financial resources, organizational skills, land resources and the resources to retain the labor force (Hill, 1984 cited in Gurr and King. 1987).

In the example of England, it is stated that local state's autonomy with respect to decisions to grant or deny planning permission is considerably diminished by powerful economic interests (Kirk, 1980, cited in Gurr and King, 1987). The locally based of organized through national state do not make a difference in Kirk's terms. He claims that in the land use planning matter, this is exemplified by the limited control local councils have over the commercial development process and the location of the firms.

Saunders argue that local councils have been increasingly obliged to borrow to finance their capital expenditures and this has progressively reduced their room to maneuver since the future revenue has increasingly come to be committed to paying interest charges incurred on the past borrowing (Saunders, 1979)

According to Bailey, the local councils have generally little control over what they can and cannot do (Bailey, 1973). He claims that the local councils put rents up whenever the interest rates tell them to do so. The housing types or estates they can afford to build are governed more by the money they can borrow (1973).

2.2.4. The second type of autonomy

This type concerns the autonomy of the local state from the national state. The main concern is how much the local state is independent from the central government (Gurr and King, 1987). It can be said that the local state is autonomous from the national state to the extent that it is able to pursue its interests without substantial interference by the national state. It is obvious that there were and still are national constraints on local policies. These interventions may be in areas in which the local state has exclusive responsibility and absolute authority. The constraints may differ from constitutional limitations to more recondite guidelines accompanying grants, national pressures and judicial decisions aimed at altering specific policies of particular municipal administration.

Jones states that in USA, the local governments are always heavily reliant on the local tax base for raising their revenue, but in UK the central government has provided much revenue to the local governments through grants. This made the local councils less dependent on local revenue (1995). The main important point is that policies will shift from consumption to investment where governments are small and not affected by intergovernmental grants. Where grants from one level of government to another are much, the priorities of local dependency on the tax base can be modified (Jones, 1995).

As the officials of the local state sought to increase their relative economic autonomy, they have sought autonomy in their relations with the national state. Elliot and McCrone argue that (1982, cited in Gurr and King, 1987), despite the differences between nations, a common characteristic of the development of nation-municipality relations in Europe was the quest for the political autonomy by the local state. Municipalities were forced by the dynamics of state centralization and industrialization to become jurisdictional subunits of national state.

The constraints laid upon the local governments by the national state can be characterized in two main forms; the first type is constitutional and legal constraints. These are formally state embodied in explicit institutional arrangements. Again, there are also differences between countries in this concept. The primary difference with respect to government's effect on local autonomy is that, in United Kingdom, local governments may undertake no activity not explicitly authorized by central government but in United States of America local government is not prevented by the federal government from undertaking any activity not contrary to the United State's constitutional of federal legislation (Gurr and King, 1987).

The autonomy of the municipalities in USA is critically dependent upon the powers granted by the state to which it belongs. In recent decades many states have passed legislations which give the local authorities discretionary authority to initiate a diverse range of activities in USA. The local governments have responsibility for providing a range of services and policies as well as having some autonomy to act as initiators of policy (Gurr and King, 1987).

The second type of constraints from the national state is the administrative constraints which emerge from the political nature of the national-local state relationship. For example, the British pattern of national-local relations consistently stressed rule making in London and rule-application by local authorities. Unlike the British model, the French model stressed overlapping and shared control over individual projects among a mix of central and local agencies which are enjoying legal, financial and technical grounds for insisting upon details of design and implementation (Allum, 1995)

An important point in the local and national authority relationship is described by the increasing mobility of the capital. At national, regional and urban levels the capital and investments became mobile and made the formulation of effective public policies more difficult and complex. One major consequence of these movements has been a decline in many big cities. These declines may be summarized as population loss, social stress and decrease in productivity (Gurr and King, 1987). Some municipalities are affected very badly and they are no longer able to generate sufficient revenues from declining local economies. Following these events, the control of urban economic change is getting away from the local governments and are less subject to manipulations by them.

They therefore, are more reliant on the national state. These economic shifts, increasing flow of funds to the local state from the central government can be understood as a diminution of its autonomy. As local authorities are less and less

able to rely upon their own resources they become less and less able to determine how much money they will raise and how. The economic stability, the high productivity means less dependence on national state funding and brings autonomy with it. Despite the big differences among the countries, one main task that dose not change among them is this concept of autonomy depending on local economy.

Another important factor about the state funding is that it is not only dependent on the economical declines of the city. As the local state's activity expands, the flow of fund from the national state also increases in order to sustain a steady local governmental management. These higher levels of central state funding carry a minimum of new restrictions (Gurr and King, 1987).

The worst possible situation that can happen in a local state may be the attempt to maintain existing activities of the declining cities that may find the increasing aid is increased dictation of policy. Retrenchment is one of the main actions which the local authorities are forced to do by the national states.

A well-known example for this is the situation in the 70's in Liverpool and Sheffield. The Labor controlled municipal councils seek to maintain social services even it means an unbalanced budget. The local states in these cities had too little autonomy as they were declining centers. First type of autonomy (*being independent from local pressures or forces*) was restricted by both shrinking revenue-generating capacity and Labor's political commitment to constituencies which resist cuts. Second type of autonomy (*how much the local state is independent from the central government*) was restricted by national government's fiscal policies. These local states were operating with both reduced urban economic base and tighter central control. The local state, thus, is increasingly dependent fiscally on the national state because its municipal economy is declining and key economic decisions are taken outside its jurisdiction (Saunders, 1979; Gurr and King, 1987)

An example for increased autonomy is from Sweden where a substantial growth in programs during 1972-1982 decade with increasing locally-derived revenues is financed by local governments. The national grants, proportionally, decreased. This

means that both two types of local state autonomy increased with the qualification that changes in second type of autonomy should be assessed directly by examining the extent to which national directives delimit the local state's uses of new resources (Jones, 1993; Gurr and King, 1987). These two types of local state autonomy are closely related to each other. It falls to the local state to formulate an effective set of public policies within the constraint each imposes.

The conflict between the central state and the municipal authorities converges on local autonomy and the different program objectives of the central versus local state. Some metropolitan authorities like the Labor controlled metropolitan counties against the Thatcher government in UK, use policy strategies which are offensive to the central state. When the municipalities and the central governments ideologies converge, this affects the autonomy of the local state in a negative way.

The efforts of local authorities to increase their autonomy by improving the urban economy necessarily interact with the second type of autonomy which is their autonomy from the central state. Local authorities have interests and programs to promote which require a sound financial base. Improving the local economy does not automatically imply increased local state autonomy from economic interests but it has that potential. Economic interests can exercise powerful constraints upon local autonomy just as they can upon the national state economy. The local state is a political institution concerned to maximize its autonomous status both from the local conditions and central state constraints. Local autonomy does not follow automatically from the latter but economic vitality is a necessary condition for the first type of local autonomy which is independence from local conditions.

	Restrictions imposed by the national/regional state on increased grants to localities	
Cause of increased fiscal dependence	Low	High
Expanding scope of	Type I Autonomy +	Type I Autonomy +
local state activities	Type II Autonomy 0	Type II Autonomy -
Contraction of local	Type I Autonomy -	Type I Autonomy -
economy	Type II Autonomy 0	Type II Autonomy -

Table A: The implications of growing fiscal dependence on the autonomy of the local state

(Gurr and King, 1987)

2.3. An evaluation of the local councils and the major profiles of the local councilors

It is usually thought that the democratic government consists of the elected officials who represent the people by reflecting the will of them in their policies, and hiring and appointing bureaucrats to implement these policies (Jones, 1995). It may be understood from this suggestion that the main and maybe the core aspect of democracy is the control of bureaucrats by the representatives elected by people. This is said to be a simple model of government and often criticized as misleading.

The critics are both from right and left wing; from the right wing, it is argued that the bureaucrats tend to maximize their budgets and use their information, which is mostly in their hands, about the requirements of implementation; from the left wing it claimed that bureaucracies are responsive to the needs of the business and namely capital, and these businesses are driven by the necessity of increasing taxes, etc. as capital runs away from the statutory city (Jones, 1995).

The model where the citizens elect the representatives who are responsible for policy making and public agencies for implementing these policies is known as the overhead democracy model (Redford, 1969, cited in Jones, 1995). In this model, the citizens control the elected official which is electoral accountability and the elected officials control the bureaucrats which is called bureaucratic control (Jones, 1995). Here, the electoral accountability may be seen as difficult because of the relationship between the elected officials and the citizen is very a complex one.

In order to understand this phenomenon, it is crucial to look at the profiles of the local elected officials. These are the members of the municipal councils, local councils or county councils as they are called in different countries, and the mayor, presidents or prefects.

One of the most important facts about the local elected politicians is that in the Western European countries the number of them differs overwhelmingly from nation to nation. This means that in the countries where the number of the councilors is big, some of the groups should be more important in respect to others (Allum, 1995). Like this premise, the mayors of communes with populations over 30000 may be more important in relation to the mayors of the small communes which have populations around 300.

Beside these differences in numbers, it can be understood that the smaller the population of the local authority, the more representative of the population are the councilors (Allum, 1995). Allum also claims that when the population of the commune gets larger, the middle class and up per class domination on the councils become greater (1995).

In addition to councilors, there are appointed board members which are important figures in the local political system. In a survey carried out by Miller and Dickson, the appointed members of the boards were more conservative, less labor and less liberal than the elected council members in UK (Miller and Dickson, 1995). They add that the appointed members were far more right wing than the elected councilors.

Their main idea is that the increase in the use of appointed boards and private companies in Britain, the role of the elected councilors and so the role of local democracy is diminished (Miller and Dickson, 1995). They claim that the appointed members see themselves as the way of future (1995).

Saunders suggests that most of us generally know very little about the identity, profile, and activities of the councilors that we elect (Saunders, 1979). He adds that

most of the elected councilors are aware of this phenomenon. The most democratic societies usually claim that the elected members are chosen from differentiated parts of the society but this is not a really valid expression. The electorate usually faces the fact that the members that they will choose are from the higher social status in the society (Saunders, 1979). It should not be understood that this means some kind of a concentration of power in the same hands. This is a reshuffling, as Saunders puts it, and this shift is from up per class and big business domination to middle class and smaller business domination (Dahl, 1961).

The local council members in Britain are said to be sure of the fact that they are the only representatives of the citizen in the local arena and by this fact they have the right to exclusive control of the public policy (Newton, 1970, cited in Saunders, 1979). In accordance with this, in Britain the local authorities are large and heterogeneous enough to provide every kid of major local interest with a voice in the policy making processes, and so the electorate do not organize politically outside the local council for their interest to be taken into account (Bell and Newby, 1971, cited in Saunders 1979).

However, this is not the case in all countries. In many countries the councils are not large enough in size to represent the electorate successfully and equally. The size alone itself cannot be, of course, enough for a right representation. Even the districts, which the council candidates are from, have an importance in representation. For example, the size of the council may be enough for the whole population -usually it is determined by the population- but all the elected members may be from the same district so this may not be an equal representation that is desired. An ex-mayor of the greater Ankara municipality stated that there are about 450 districts in Ankara and there are 55 members in the council. The candidates are generally drawn from certain districts where middle and up per class residents live because the political parties see the chance of being elected from these districts as higher. This brings the problem of under-representation with it under the mask of democratic elections.

In addition to the problem of size, there is the problem of function. The functions of the elected council may not be enough to stand for all social parts of the community. There may be people who are in need of education or there may be old people who should be taken care and the council may not have the authority to act in these specific concepts.

Despite the differences stated above (the differences in the number of the councilors, the differences in the size of the councils, and the differences in the functions of them) the sociological profiles of the local councilors are interestingly similar in Western European countries. They can all be describes as, according to Allum, predominantly male, middle aged, middle class and usually well educated (Allum, 1995).

Another point referring the under-representation phenomenon is that the manual workers and people with lower white-collar jobs are underrepresented in the local councils. This is independent of the size of the local authority. To participate in the councils is very difficult for people who work full-time (Allum, 1995). By this fact, we are able to understand the relatively high number of pensioners in the local councils, both in Europe and in Turkey.

In time, there have been other changes in the representation. Saunders claim that, in his study in Croydon, UK, the big businessmen and local gentry who were dominant in the nineteenth century had disappeared from the council altogether (1979). He points out that there had been a large increase in the representation of professional workers on the council. He explains this by increasing number of Labor members whose jobs are teaching, journalism, social works, etc.

A similar approach comes from Allum who states that in the long period there has been a progressive replacement of local notables with professional politician (landowners and local manufacturers with lower and middle class). In the shorter period, there has been a decline in the representation of agriculture and their replacement by the new tertiary professionals (public servants, social workers and teachers) (Allum, 1995). An important aspect is that the councilors are distinct among themselves. Generally, the leading members in the local councils – these may be the chairman of the council or the departments, or the important figure who are usually followed in the policy making processes- are older than the average councilor with greater administrative and council experience (Allum, 1995). They are also better educated, come from more professional jobs and exclusively male. The ordinary councilors are motivated with concern to represent their ward from which they are elected and solve the problems of their constituents. The main policy decisions are left to the leaders. These leaders are mainly concerned with the development of their authority's policies and some of them see their role on the council as stepping stone to a career in national politics (Allum, 1995).

In his study, Saunders found out that the councilors are kept too busy to keep well informed and the information is in the hands of the chief officers and the leading members (Saunders, 1995). This may well grow out of the apolitical positions of the councilors who are not interested in the decision-making processes. As they seem to be apolitical, the leading figures may not be in the mood to share the important knowledge or information with them. Another point comes from the mouth of a chief officer who claimed that the committees in the councils talk for hours about where to locate a bicycle shed and then accept an important proposal involving council expenditure in minutes (Saunders, 1995). This confession is also related with the issue above. As the members become more apolitical, the more important subjects like budgeting, charges, taxation which is the concern of the whole community loose the importance in their eyes, and they become more related with subjects of their ward or district problems.

In addition to the subject which is about the old aged leading figures, Saunders calls the position in Croydon in 1971 elections, as traumatic (1979). The young Labor members who had 22 chairs out of 29 in the council had no prior local government experience. This brought to them almost total exclusion from the real decision making processes. As an opposition they tried to use publicly open council meetings and they made critics about the chief officer group with blaming it to be found in totalitarian regimes (Saunders, 1979). But this did not change anything else than a little ache in the heads of the conservatives.

It is an interesting argument that is going on in Britain which is about the declining numbers of high quality candidates, for example big industrialists, as they do not prepare to stand for the local offices any more. It is said that the local government no longer attracts these kinds of people (Allum, 1995). As a response to this, the central government reduced the size and the number of the elected councils; by doing so increased their political importance. This was done in order to attract this kind of candidate.

When it is asked to the appointed board members about the motivation of the qualified members of the councils, board members held positive attitudes. More than 90 per cent of the board member told that these councilors were motivated by a sense of duty towards their fellow citizens (Miller and Dickson, 1995). 30 per cent of the board members told that the councilors are motivated by a desire for prestige, personal gain, and a higher career in national politics rather than serving to the public as a whole.

From the elected members of the local councils, the positions in the council which has the greatest potential power are the ones on the policy subcommittees (Saunders, 1995). Beside these the chairmanship of the major service committees like education, housing, and social services are also considered as important and usually occupied the leading figures or most senior members of the group (Saunders, 1995).

As stated above, there are differences and similarities about the local councils between countries which representative democracies. Sizes, functions, profiles of the members, popularity of the councils are the main important points. In order to understand these differences and similarities, we should look into the local government and local council experiences in different countries. In the next part, following this context, the local government and local council structures of England, France, Italy, Germany, Sweden and USA will be analyzed and evaluated.

CHAPTER 3

FOREIGN COUNTRY EX PERIENCES ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND LOCAL COUNCILS

3.1. England and Wales

The local authorities' powers, in England, seem more like transferred powers rather than been originally created rights. The local governments are bound by the principles of prohibitions and rely heavily on the central government in some fields, especially finance (Chandler, 1993).

All local authorities consist of a council which is elected on the single member, oneballot majority system (Allum, 1995). These councils are corporate bodies. The decisions are taken by the whole council and the officers serve the council as a whole. As the decisions are being made by the whole council, these decisions rest upon the authority of the council. In the local political system of England, there are specialist committees beside the general body of the council. These committees are important committees like education committee which controls the education department (Chandler, 1993). These committees consist of not only elected councilors and but also local government officers.

The officers usually prepare the decisions and the councilors take these in the determination of the policies. Local council members in England are sure of the fact that they are elected representatives of the people and therefore that have the right to exclusive control of public policy (Newton, 1970, cited in Saunders, 1979). The councilors of the major service committees may be defined as the council's political elite. These positions are generally held by members of the majority party group and

they are filled by the leading and generally most senior members of the group (Saunders, 1979). According to Allum, the most important councilor is the group leader of the majority party in the council (1995)

Chandler states that England's local political system has had some changes in the last decades. These include a decrease in the number of departments. Senior committees were established and chief administrators were appointed for replacing the legalistic town clerk. It is argued that before the 1970's, the local council's control was in the hands of elected councilors, but after this period, it got into the hands of officers (Saunders, 1979). It might not be incorrect to express that the councilors are jealous of this situation and are unwilling to give up their roles in the determination of broad policy and subjects which are in more detail.

It is normal to suppose that local councilors may be largely involved in the decisionmaking processes rather than implementation part. According to Chandler: "...division of labor varies from one authority to another; in some cases there is a tradition of councilor domination, in others officers have established a firm hold, leaving councilors to concern themselves with the unimportant details of administration, and in yet others there is something of a mix" (Chandler, 1993). Sherman also adds that the group is more powerful and demanding than the party in the councils and the party caucus has become a central element in the decision making process (Sherman, 1973, cited in Saunders, 1979). No decision can be taken by a local authority without it eventually being referred to a decision taking committee or the council, where there will be full public access to the meetings and the documentation.

According to an observation made of councilors in Britain it is stated that they do not represent their constituents. The result of this research claims that the councilors are better educated, are older, and contain much more males than any group in the society (Widdecombe Report, 1986 as cited in Saunders, 1979; Allum, 1995; Keleş and Toprak, 2000). In addition to this, Saunders' study in Croydon points out that the big businessmen and local gentry are not represented in the council anymore. He argues that they were the major part of the council before 1970's (Saunders, 1979).

It is a known fact that the new councilor, who is elected to a council for the first time, learns the job in the process. As there is no formal training for councilors to take, this important position may be seen such as an amateur training program where the rookies of the political arena sit quietly in the relatively unimportant committees and in the meetings of the council. This is a process where they are educated and socialized. Because of the hierarchical nature of the councils, the senior positions like heads of departments are held by people with professional qualifications and who are generally older and more experienced in politics. These key positions are largely involved in policy making and management (Chandler, 1993).

Local authorities in England, like some other Western democracies, have some defects in control of councils. If a party wins majority of the seats in the council, then it gets the full control of the council and it rules the policy making processes by giving chairs in the committees to its own members easily.

The access to the local councils is relatively open and they might be succeeded in some ways including personal meetings with members, writing letters to the council, and petitions. Beside these there are consultative councils and ex-officio membership of local organizations by councilors as other formal channels. Another point is that there is full access of the public to the meetings of the local councils and also to the documentation including the records and official reports of the council meetings (Chandler, 1993).

3.2. France

The local government system in France is divided into three parts. This is called a three-tier system which consists of regions, departments and communes. Each of these parts involves an elected council and they are not considered as superior to any other part. The councils elect an executive, which is a mayor or a president. The councils of the regions are elected in a six years term and the half of the departmental councils is elected every three years (Allum, 1995). Before 1983, the political system of France had some differences. It used to give all the seats in the

councils to the winning list so the minority lists and parties were not represented in the council. This caused big representation problems and was changed after 1980's.

In the regions, an elected council has the responsibility of determining the policies. It also elects the president of the region which has a chief executive role in the council and which acts as a mediator between central government and regional governments (Hunt and Chandler, 1993). In addition to the regional council in the regions, there is an economic and social council made up representatives of economic and social organizations like trade union leaders, industrialists and experts, which have an advisory role.

The prefect in the departments is the most important official figure; it had a role balanced by the council and was responsible for centralized services. They prepared the agenda of the council, the annual budget and they enjoyed a high degree of autonomy in their work. By the 1980 reform in France, the executive role is given to the chair of the departmental council and this decreased the formal powers of the prefects. The departmental councils are not very influential because they meet only six times a year and the important functions of them are transferred to departmental councilors is to represent the needs of their area to the prefect (Hunt and Chandler, 1993).

In the communes the council is elected every six years and the size of it varies from 9 to 49 members depending on the population of the commune. This council has the decision-making powers and the political composition of it is very important in deciding the ideological direction of the commune. Generally, rather than being active in the policy making processes, the councilors follow their leaders and do not participate in the administration details. This is a very common phenomenon in western democracies where it is not possible to exercise detailed control over the mayor's administrative decisions. Following the elections of the council, the mayor is elected by the new council. He becomes a representative and an agent of the national state (Hunt and Chandler, 1993).

The reform of 1982 in France changed some important points in the local government system. It removed the powers of the prefect as the chairman of the council. The prefect, in fact, still remains as a representative of the national state but now it depends on the Prime Minister's office, not Interior Ministry. An important point to be underlined is that the mayors often ask the prefects for advice and to act in their behalf where they lack of essential resources and information (Hunt and Chandler, 1993).

The system in France has a background of allocating homogenous blocks of power to every type of authority in the local political arena. These tiers all share some powers like; economical planning, social welfare, town planning. The responsibilities of the regions are vocational training and economic development. In the departments the social services, health, intercity transport, and rural works are the main tasks. The communes are responsible for some fundamental services like hospitals, refuse collection and public libraries and housing (Allum, 1995).

An interesting concept arises from the centralization of the local government system in France. In fact, the local government system in France tends to be centralized. But this creates a conflict with the position of the National Assembly deputies where 80 percent hold a local office in local government. In the other side of the paradox lies the British local government system, where local government is supposed to have greater discretion, but only a few of parliament members are local councilors (Hunt and Chandler, 1993).

The political parties in France have a great importance at the local level. There are struggles over the political position of the local council in some cities, and in other big cities the elections are battled along the party lines. Although the ideological differences and the fights between parties, effective working relationships can be built up. It means that there some important pressures that sometimes competing parties join together to effect the central power for more resources in certain matters (Hunt and Chandler, 1993).

3.3. Italy

In Italy, like France, the local governmental system is three tiered. These tiers are regions, provinces, and communes. The difference between Italy and France in this sub-central government system is that of a hierarchy. In France there is no hierarchy between tiers and none of them is superior to the others, but in Italy, they have a hierarchical relationship between them.

The regions have two types; special and ordinary. The first type is the islands and the frontier zones with special problems and problematic relations with the state. The second type has complementary and integrative powers while the special regions have an exclusive power in addition to these two, all with regard to national laws (Spence, 1993).

In the provinces, there is an elected assembly. They are seen as geographical and field units of local government and their responsibility is controlling the activities of the communes. They have been under the closest supervision of the central government (Spence, 1993).

Three main categories give us the main responsibilities of the communes which are social services, economic services and development, and lad use planning (Spence, 1993).

In 1976, an attempt to decentralize the decision making process was made in Italy. This had some reasons one of which is the difference between the communes all over the nation. There were very large communes who are urbanized with population over one million and there were very small ones with population of less than five hundred. The politicians tried to make the citizens of the urbanized areas closer to the administration and by doing so increasing the participation in policy making processes. Neighborhood councils are the outcomes of this idea and these were elected through direct popular participation in most of the communes. The functions of these councils are consultative (Spence, 1993).

In Italy, the main important parts of the commune political system are the councils, the giunta and the mayor. Unlike the French local political system before 1980's, the Italian local political system may be seen as a more developed and more participatory one. Each party, in the elections, gets a number of seats in the council in proportion to the votes it receives. No party in the smaller communes is allowed to have more than four-fifths of the seats in the council. This is said to ensure that there will be representation on the council for the minority parties. After the elections the council details the policies, approve the budget, perform municipal legislation, and control the other two organs, the giunta and the mayor. The meetings of the council sare two times in a year which can be increased by the mayor, or the council itself (Spence, 1993).

The giunta involved the heads of administrative departments and was elected members from the council, by the council. It was seen as a collective body but the new law changed this responsibility. The mayor, now, appoints and dismisses the councilors and controls the activity. This may include budgeting, policies and projects of the province. He is not bound by the votes of the councilors so he has great powers. The mayor can only resign as a result of a formal vote of no confidence in him. By these new developments the council is now a rubber-stamping body where a decision is taken by bargaining between parties that form governing coalition.

In a study, Giannini has pointed out that the mayor is the main political figure in the small communes. In the middle-sized communes the councils are still very powerful. The larger communes are directed by the giunta or by the heads of departments who make up the giunta (Giannini, 1967, cited in Spence 1993).

There are certain similarities between the Italian and Turkish local government problems. Like the municipalities in Turkey which are very small in size and population, in some communes in Italy, the mayor knows very little about the laws, administration, and the general principles of effective municipality system. In these situations, the communal secretary or the prefect takes care of the situation or the problem. Also small communes are very limited in their ability to take action because they lack certain financial and staff resources. This is a very common problem which is expressed by almost every single small municipality in Turkey.

Another interesting and important similarity of Italian local governmental bureaucracy with our system is that it gets too much repetitive, complex, and frustrating. In a local government department, generally there is always never-ending unnecessary paperwork and form filling. Like our country, the local bureaucrats are more likely to be drawn from the locality in which he works and have a similar background to that of the local politician.

3.4. Germany

The sub-central government in Germany has a three-tier system like France and Italy. The difference is that Germany is not a unitary state like them; it is a federal state so some slight differences occur from one state to another. The three tiers are Länd, district and commune (Allum, 1995).

The basic unit of government is municipality. They are established to fulfill the political ad administrative reconstruction role and they often provide a wide range of services. They also have considerable discretion in the implementation of their responsibilities (Peters, 1993). The affairs of the municipality are carried out by an elected council which is Ländtag. The size of this council, the frequency of elections for them and also power between elected and appointed officials vary between states. These shall be dictated by the state's constitutional laws (Peters, 1993).

The size of the council is generally depending on the size of the community. Elections for the council are made usually in every four years. The mayor who is the head of the council is elected within the council for a certain term. In large areas executive and administrative authority is in the hands of an official, different than mayor, who is appointed by the council. The executive of the Länd is no a large one with members ranging from 8 to 10 and the main responsibilities of the Länd is administration (Allum, 1995). The meetings of the council (Ländtag) are not

frequent so majority parties select members who have administrative skills to the council.

Beside the Länd, there is another area of local governments which is called district. This are has a dual role. It is elected to manage tasks which the small communes are not able to and it is also the lowest level of state administration in Germany (Allum, 1995). The administrators of the districts are selected by its council. He is a supervisor of the communes in his area. These both types of authority are organized around a council which is elected every four years (Allum, 1995).

It can be claimed that in Germany, the lower sub-central units has two types of responsibilities. These are obligatory and voluntary responsibilities. The first type of these tasks is managed by federal and Länd laws and carried out by the districts. The second type is derived from a competence which allows a commune to act in interests of its citizens (Allum, 1995).

The southern Germany has a kind of mayor in which the administrative and political functions come together for a six-year term. The mayor acts as the chief executor, in a way, as he is the chairman of the council. He is the head of administration and the representative of the polity as a whole. He plays an important role in the policy making processes. In the northern Germany, the council is assisted by a full-time administrator which is appointed by the elected body (Peters, 1993).

In the local political system of Germany, there is a key element of personality. It is interesting that the personality of the politicians rather than their party ideologies or affiliations has become an important concept in local elections. This situation is surely known by the major parties and they, in turn, often attempted to select leading figures in the community as a representative (Peters, 1993). This situation has changed but in most of the rural areas it is still valid. In the urban areas the elections are fought between major political parties. Because of this, the mayor who is still a far more powerful of its British precedent is more likely to a member of the ruling political party.

A successful concept in the local governmental system in Germany is the review mechanism. This mechanism is reinforced by the introductions of a local ombudsman. Beside this, the juridical review of the administration is also well established. The Länder has the responsibility for controlling the local government. Either the district administrator or the prefect appointed by the Länd supervises the activities and reviews them (Allum, 1995). As both ways include an appointed officer, this is seen as anti-democratic by most of the politicians in Germany.

An important point concerning finance in local governmental system in Germany is the equalization techniques. When the fiscal receipts are going to be distributed among the areas, these techniques are used in favor of the poorer land. The vertical technique includes pulling up the poorer land to the average by giving a proportion of the collectively collected taxes to it. The horizontal technique is the equalization where the rich land subsidizes the poorer land (Allum, 1995). This may be seen as a useful method but in practice it produces fiscal problems rather than solve them after the unification of West and East Germany. Like the poor cities of East Germany, some large cities in East Germany are also in financial crisis. These financial problems are temporally solved by some aid programs but the eastern part should a sound economy in order to maintain providing services.

3.5. Sweden

The main unit of government in Sweden is the municipality or commune, like Germany. There are 284 municipalities which have a minimum population of 8000. There are 24 regions (counties) that are the secondary unit of local government (Jones, 1993). All of them are governed by an elected council. In addition to these elected councils, there are county administrative boards which usually act as an arm of central government. These boards' main task is the administration of the regionally provided services. There is a county governor how is appointed by the government as the head of this board. The board's members are nominated from the county council. This board is a fusion with responsibilities that are both to central government and to the county (Jones, 1993).

It is not easy for these boards and councils to work very effectively as they are mixed bodies. Certain clarifications should be made in order to not interfere in the latter's area of responsibility. The distinction of services must be also made as the board is responsible to the government for certain services where the council is responsible for administration of other services.

The main tasks of the councils are the provision of health services, medical care, social services like fostering and family counseling. The vocational rehabilitation is the responsibility of both the central government and local government. Besides the responsibilities which are shared with central government, the county councils have some other responsibilities that are shared with municipalities which may include economic development and planning (Jones, 1993).

In the local political system of Sweden, the municipalities are given most of the services which may be seen as the responsibility of the local governments. Some of these are housing, socials services, and education. Of course these services get an important portion of the municipal budget, as they are expensive services to provide. In addition to these services, fire fighting, road building and leisure facilities are also municipal responsibilities (Jones, 1993). After the legislation in 1984, Sweden's local communes were given the right to develop new functions that are subject to central approval. This had broadened the capacity of local governments' functions and was used generally for planning and economic development purposes (Jones, 1993).

There is a rule in Swedish law which says that the number of the councilors should be an odd number. The minimum number for this is 31. all of the councilor have an substitute for them in case any disposal, etc. in a year, the councils are meeting four times, but most of the authorities meet monthly, and some are even more frequent (Jones, 1993). This may suggest that the normal meeting sessions are not enough for a local authority to work steadily and carry out its responsibilities. Moreover, as the preparatory work for the council meetings are done by committees, the councilors which are elected to the committees may see their position as a full-time job in Sweden. In a local authority where the main objective is to govern successfully and sustain the needs of the citizens, it may be useful to use the flexibility of the law and create ways for more productive and steady working of the authority.

The meetings of the council open to the public and generally advertise in the local media. The council decides the major policies, the important ones being the budget, taxation, and charge levels. The main debates in the meetings are on these subjects. The matters of great importance are not delegated to the committees. The chairman in the council is not a mayor in the British or French style but it is sure a very important figure in local governmental system (Jones, 1993).

The committees are usually constituted in proportion to the party political strength as the councilor's demand so. The chairmen of the committees are elected by the council and these are, not surprisingly, going to be from the majority group or party. Like every councilor, the chairmen also have substitutes.

In Sweden, like any other liberal democracy in Europe, it is stated that women and younger people are under-presented on the local councils. In opposition to this, the higher socio-economic groups are over-represented in Sweden. As the communes become larger and more urbanized, the well educated middle class becomes more dominant in the councils (Jones, 1993).

3.6. United States of America

The cities which are municipal corporations may come into existence after the resident of a community request for this status and make a local referendum in USA. After the referendum, the area is given some kind of a charter which makes up the constitution of the city. The large cities in USA have great autonomy through the grants of their home-rule charters. These charters allow the large cities in many states to undertake activities which are not forbidden by the state law (Chandler, 1993).

The states have other local agents outside cities which are called counties. The county governments are subject to an elected council. It generally acts as an agency of the state and administers some services on its behalf (Chandler, 1993).

Beside these cities and counties, the states develop some other special districts that are local administrative organizations governed by an elected board with authority to undertake specific functions. These organizations are also under the control of an elected council (Chandler, 1993).

In most places the mayor is elected by all citizens of the community and councilors are elected from ward divisions within the city. The council of the city talks on the local legislation and accepts the policies. The mayor is in a position where he can veto these proposals like the federal President.

Important aspect of the mayoral system in USA is the difference of the weak and strong mayoral types. In the strong mayoral type, the mayor appoints all the heads of the departments which makes him the most important figure in the local political arena. Of course, his decisions are subject to the council approval but he has certain important powers like initiate or veto legislation. In the weak mayoral system, mayor is able to veto a policy of the council, but he does not select the heads of the departments. These officers are elected and yet be responsible to different boards of commissions. They are not very closely related to the city council but are subject to mayoral veto again (Chandler, 1993).

In USA, the council managerial system is used by more than 40 percent of the cities (Chandler, 1993). In many of the cities councilors are elected by the community at large. There is an appointed city manger who is an employee of the municipality. The decisions which are made by the council are subject to his approval. He is also responsible for the appointment of all other employees in the city, like the mayor in Turkey (Chandler, 1993).

Over 85 percent of the counties are subject to policy decisions made by a committee, a board or a commission. The members of these organizations are, in most cities, directly elected politicians or appointees of the mayor. They are mostly needed in resolving the policy issues affecting their department. They take technical advice from the subordinate officials in their departments (Chandler, 1993).

It is a known fact that unlike Western European countries, in USA, there is absence of deeply rooted ideological conflict. Taking this as a fact, the city politics usually operates in USA in the style of a federal government (Chandler, 1993). The most important figure in the local political arena, the mayor, has the support of party colleagues in the city council, but he does not rely on their vote.

The policy making process is somewhat a trading process between the legislators and executors. The interest groups' demands usually create the background of these processes. As there is no strong ideological party conflicts, the councilors may be influenced by different interest groups pressures even their party colleagues are influenced by another one. They are usually not mandated to follow a certain party program and this may result in being influenced by pressure groups which they associate in their daily lives or from the ones which are able to express and present their cases effectively. These local political events are in favor of the Dahl's thesis about pluralism. The main idea of him was that a group which cannot reach a certain resources may be advantageous to gain access to another resource in different parts of the social life (Dahl, 1961). Voters, individuals, organized interest groups, the elites, the notables, and the political institutions are said to be involved in the decision making processes.

CHAPTER 4

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY

4.1. Introduction

The municipality is the key element in local governmental system in Turkey. In its most basic definition, the municipality is the unit of local government which is responsible for the provision of the local common needs of the local community and which provides services for the community (Ministry of Interior, 1998). In the Turkish constitution it is written that the municipalities are public institutions whose main establishment rules stated in the law and its decision-making bodies are developed by electorate that is also pointed out by law.

The Turkish Republic has inherited 389 municipalities from the Ottoman Empire. These municipalities were very weak in their structure. In 1960, Turkey had 995 municipalities (606 municipalities were established in 40 years). In the period of 1960 – 1980 this number increased to 1727 (732 municipalities in 20 years) (Keles and Toprak, 2000). In the years 1990, 1994, and 1999 the number of municipalities was 2055, 2710 and 3215. Today, in Turkey there are 3215 municipalities (www.yerelnet.org.tr, www.die.gov.tr). The main legal arrangements on municipalities were made in 1930 by the municipality law no.1580. This basic law still draws the main lines of the municipality system. There are some other laws which came to life till 1935 which are on the duties and incomes of the municipalities.

After the constitution of 1961, the division of labor between the local governments and the central governments are not clearly made and the central government had the decisive power in its hands. In the third five year development plan in the beginning of 1970's, 'Provincial Local Governmental Planning Units' were introduced for the purpose of controlling and coordinating the investments of the local governments which meant the increasing central government pressure on localities (Tekeli and Ortaylı, 1978).

During the 1970's in the municipal councils, the dominant groups were the petite capitalists and the tradesmen. Their interests were in conflict with the consumers in the cities. This is still a valid situation in Turkey today. In 1978 the Ministry of Local Governments was established in order to solve the problems of the existing municipalities but it was cancelled at the end of 1979. After the military had taken the authority in 1980, the mayors were assigned by the military regime. The first elections were done in 1984 and these mayor and councils were replaced.

By the law no.3030 in 1984, the metropolitan municipalities were reorganized and the concept of Greater Municipality was born. By the law no.3194 all the authority for making and the approval of the development plans were left to the municipalities (UPL, 2004). The suitable and necessary mechanisms for this left over were not ready so the urban areas became the main point in the accumulation of the rents in cities.

Today Turkey is experiencing some new developments in local governmental system. The local authorities gained more importance in our country and new laws are being introduced. The increasing importance of localities may have many reasons. However, the most striking point is the unbelievable effort of the JDP's (Justice and Development Party) to pass the laws from the Turkish National Assembly with caring very little about the positions and the real needs of the localities. The results may be far away from reaching a healthy and steady working local governmental system and the municipalities could be damaged badly if the steps for development are taken without precautions, enough research, and programmatic goals.

4.2. The establishment, responsibilities and structures of municipalities

The local governmental system in Turkey consists of Provincial local administrations, municipalities and villages which have public administrative identity. Provincial local administrations and villages do not have diversifications but municipalities have a two-character model since 1984. These are metropolitan municipalities and standard municipalities (www.yerelnet.org).

In order to be a municipality in Turkey, the population of the particular community should be over 2000. For the process of becoming a municipality, the aldermen of the village or more than the half of the population should apply to the governor or to the highest level of administration in the area. After this application, a referendum is generally made and according to the result of the referendum, the governor contacts the Ministry of Interior about the subject for the area which wants to be a municipality. The State Council evaluates and examines the situation in the legal aspects and the leave the case for the vote of Minister of Interior, the Prime Minister, and the President.

The main duties of the municipalities in Turkey are creating development and progress in their area of restriction and meeting the needs of the citizens' local common needs. These may include the organization and controlling of public and environmental health; making the development plans and the necessary constructions stated in these plans; building public libraries, stadiums, and theaters; cleaning and the maintenance of the area and creating the necessary means for the economic and trade life in the area. Beside these duties it is stated in the constitution that the municipality is responsible for the welfare of the people and for maintaining order in the area (Ministry of Interior, 1998).

In the internal structure of the municipality there are three bodies: the municipality (local) council, municipal standing committee and the mayor. The municipal council is the most effective decision making body in the municipality. The members of this council are elected by the citizens of its area. They are directly elected to their seats in the council and this is repeated in every five years with the exception of special

cases like the renewal of the elections, etc. Every municipality has a local council. The numbers of its members vary according to the population of the community and in the range from 9 to 55.

The municipal council has some main responsibilities which may include;

Debating and deciding the municipal budget;

To examine and approve the final accounts;

The maintenance of the streets and environment;

The programs for construction and building of necessary infrastructure;

Making changes in the budget, borrowing money;

Duties about the municipal taxes and charges; debating and approval of these taxes and charges;

Debating and making decisions on subjects which are put forward by either the mayor or the members of the municipal council.

The second body of the municipality in Turkey is the municipal standing committee. The municipal standing committee is the decisive, executive, and the consultancy body of the municipalities. The members of these municipal standing committees are elected from the members of the municipal council and it is headed by the mayor. The municipal standing committee also has the heads of the service departments. The mayor is the head of the municipal standing committee. He should bring someone to duty for the meeting that he cannot attend. The heads of the service departments are the natural members of the municipal standing committee. The number of them varies to the organization of the municipality (the larger the municipality, the more departmental heads in the municipal standing committee).

The number of the members of municipal council which are in the municipal standing committee should not exceed the half of the departmental heads and should not be less than two. They are elected for the municipal standing committee for 1-year periods.

The duties of the municipal standing committee are summarized below: The preparation of the first draft of municipal budget; The first meeting and discussion on the municipal budget;

The examination of the municipality's monthly revenues and expenditures, the approval of these if they are suitable;

To inform the local council on the final accounts;

Decisions on the places for expropriation (compulsory purchase);

To decide the charges for public transportation and mandatory needs;

To evaluate and approve the subjects on employment, deployment, assignment and promotion of officers in the municipality which are the decisions of the Mayor; To make decisions on the subjects which are stated in the law in the responsibility of

the council during it is not having meetings.

The mayors are the heads and the executive bodies of the municipalities. They are directly elected in the local elections for five-year terms. Every municipality must have a Mayor which is a Turkish citizen and above the age of twenty-five. In some specific cases the mayor can be assigned. The Council of Ministers in the provinces and the Governor in the other areas can assign the mayor.

The main tasks of the mayors are; the implementation of the decisions taken by the municipal council, municipal standing committee or up per levels of administration; to fulfill the municipal duties which are not subject to the approval of the up per administrative units; to monitor the local health, development, economical and order state of the municipality; to manage the property of municipality and monitor the revenues and claims (receivable accounts) of it as its representative.

The municipalities in Turkey have their own organization and personnel to fulfill the duties stated in the law. These organizations and personnel vary according to the population and economical position of the municipality. There are deputy mayors and departmental heads which are in civil servant (employee of the state) statue.

4.3. Case study on Keçiören Municipal Council

The main theme of Ayça Kurtoğlu's study in Keçiören in 1994 is "citizenry". This study is based on the municipal councilors elected for the 1994-1999 period. Her

study tries to evaluate citizenry and relationship depending on citizenry in a sociological context and with relevance to politics, rather than a comprehensive analysis of these concepts in a particular societal context.

The reason for her to choose politics in an analysis for citizenry depends on not only it is a commonly used relation in politics but also for an effort to understand the intersection points of politics with societal relations and define the society-politics relationships.

She defines the term citizenry as the place where a person is born. As the population of the province defines how much revenue it will get from the national state, before the population census, the people try to travel to their hometowns. She discovers parallel lines with "politics", "participation in political life" and "patronage" with citizenry.

According to Ayça Kurtoğlu, the term urban local politics identifies the management of municipalities in the urban areas. She claims that the politics in the local level and the national level cannot be separated practically. These concepts do not exclude one another. When pointing out the reasons for the individuals' desires to be elected in the municipal councils, she argues that although they are chosen for the same period as the members of the Turkish National Assembly, their retirement is not guaranteed like them. Following this point, it is underlined that the main reasons for the individuals to be elected for the local councils are their effort for the solving of the problems in the areas they live in and a stepping stone for them for higher levels in national politics (Kara and Köksal, 1989 cited in Kurtoğlu).

It is argued that there are specific differences between the local politics and the national politics (structuring, location, mobilized groups for influencing the policies) however there is an interrelation between them. The decisions taken for the localities may affect the urban life and also the state and its policies by the elections, campaigns, and societal movements.

Kurtoğlu claims that in the local politics of large cities the communication between the constituents and the politicians is less anonymous and more face-to-face than the national politics. The result of this close relation is that both the candidates for the local councils and the elected councilors are in more direct relations than the parliamentary candidate or the members of the parliament. Taking this as a fact, she argues that the individual politicians and their societal relation webs may be more important than the political parties at the local level.

Another assumption that she made is that the constituents at the local level think of their daily lives, daily needs (water supply, road construction, street cleaning, etc.) and how far these services will be provided to them when casting their votes. For this reason the expectation in local politics are more strictly defined than national politics. It should be expected that in reaching these expectation the level of the face-to-face contacts and tries for influencing this level of politics could be higher. As a result of this process the interest groups and congregation politics may play a crucial role in local politics.

The agents of the local politics and activities of them in the policy and decisionmaking processes, plus the activities of the people or groups that try to influence these processes and agents establish the two main important parts of local politics (Savage and Warde, 1993 cited in Kurtoğlu). The structures of these two sets of activity differ from country to country. Beside these differences the legislation for the area of their influence and what they are let to do in local political arena also differs greatly among nations.

If we think of political ethnicity context, the elected councilors do not directly participate to the establishment of the congregation or interest groups as they participate only in decision-making processes. They usually are in close interaction with them and by doing so they may be leaders of these groups, may have close relations with the management of these groups or may desire to be the leader of the congregation.

When stating the reasons for selecting Keçiören as a case study, Kurtoğlu claims that in the 1994 local elections Keçiören does not suit some important patterns. First of all, the municipalities in the central districts were all from SHP or RPP, but Keçiören's mayor was from NAP. Also, NAP did not win any important municipalities since 1960 and their victory in Keçiören was an important one. Beside these, the mayor of greater Ankara Municipality was Melih Gökçek who was the previous mayor of Keçiören. After evaluating the results of the local elections made in 1987, 1991 and 1994, Kurtoğlu states that the personal relationship in politics is very important in Keçiören.

In the theoretical framework, Kurtoğlu underlines the pluralist and elitist theories and gives some definitions of these concepts. As her main concept is ethnicity she continues to give explanations about the ethnic political elites and leaders in the following chapter. She uses the definitions of Dahl-1961; Martiniello-1993; Herbstein-1983 about leaders and elite ruling groups.

Kurtoğlu admits that the main ideas in her study are derived from three writers which are Cohen, Werbner, and Lentz. According to her, these writers developed theories about congregation, political ethnicity and the relations which hold the congregation together.

After the theoretical framework she looks at the urban ethnicity studies done in Turkey. She examines studies of Ayata-1994; Erder-1996; and Güneş-Ayata; 1987. She admits that, in explaining the political ethnicity, she did not try to explain the municipal councilor from the perspective of important question "Who governs?" but from the perspective of the studies done on the political ethnicity. She expresses that the study is not concentrated on the urban ethnic congregation relations, their leaders, and a comprehensive understanding of their relations with political ethnicity. Kurtoğlu adds that the main points she paid attention are those two related processes; first, establishment of urban ethnic congregation and the second, the political processes in the city. The first kind of processes are the one which help to build or maintain the ethnic congregation from the inside and outside whereas the second

type of processes draws the limits of relations in which the individuals, interest groups, and political parties' spend efforts.

In the following chapter where she tries to find out the profiles of the councilors, their societal backgrounds, she concludes that the municipal councilors are emigrants. The councilors generally lived an upward societal mobility. The relationships of the councilors with their relatives or their hometowns did not weaken in Ankara, but strengthened. The relations of the councilors with their congregation are not only related by their positions in their congregation but also related with their political parties.

She takes her point further by examining the migration profiles of the councilors, where they had come from, where they belong? They are, in Kurtoğlu's word, both the object and the subject of the socio-cultural and socio-political processes that they are passing through. She argues that there are six types of councilors; first type establishes congregation by developing societal relations. Second type both uses their neighborhood relations and business environment. The third type lived a greater upward societal mobility than the second type and their success in business world is the result of their own efforts, not their fathers or family's effort like the second type. The fourth type of councilors was the ones which are chosen by their congregation to be active in politics. The fifth type was the ones which are mostly excluded as their relations in the congregation are not very widespread. The sixth type of council members excluded the kinship in congregation relations, and this was different from all other types.

She examines the political orientation of the councilors and their political pasts in order to find out the necessary conditions for the council candidates to be elected. There are of course many conditions, but important point is that they have to start their political life somewhere and be active in local politics. Some get in to politics by the help and support of their families, some by the benefits of their political past and background, and some by the largeness of their congregation. The councilors admit that the friendship in political arena has the up most importance in elections.

One of the main things that lead to political success is the one which is symbolic and earned outside the political environment.

In the chapter where the political representation is tried to be identified, Kurtoğlu aims to evaluate the answers of the councilors in the concepts of representation of socio-economic stratum and ethnic categories. She asks, "Who do the councilors represent in the municipal council?" Three main categories were identified by her with the answers of the councilors. In the first category the councilors claimed that they represent the citizens in general. These councilors told that they do not make any discrimination while they service the citizens. Some of these councilors told that they represent the people of Keçiören. The second type of council members claimed that they represent a specific category which is interrelated with their congregation. These councilors were in strong relations with their citizens and relatives, and almost all of them did not change their political party ever. In the third type, the councilors identified themselves with more than one category and said that they represent these groups. The groups that they are said to represent included their business groups, district groups or other cultural groups. The citizenry, occupational groups and ethnical categories were underlined by some of the councilors which are in this type.

Kurtoğlu points out that the understanding of the councilors about their positions in the political life is much related with their understanding of their political parties in the municipal council. In addition to this finding, she argues that their understanding of themselves in their political parties much effect their views about whom they represent in the local council. As a last point in representation, Kurtoğlu states that the councilors see the political representation as whole and objective. However, according to Kurtoğlu, from looking outside, this representation seems to be tendentious or have partisanship.

CHAPTER 5

CASE STUDY: DENİZLİ

5.1. Introduction

The chapter on the case study on Denizli Municipal Council is in the following order. Firstly, the methodology employed in the case study is explained. Then brief information on the Denizli Municipality is provided. Following section concentrates on the case study, which is based on the questionnaires given to the councilors and municipal employees.

5.2. Methodology

In order to substantiate the arguments put forward in the introduction the Municipal Council of Denizli is taken as a case study. The case study consists of questionnaires given to the municipal council members and the municipal staff. The main body of the first questionnaire is prepared by the students of The Urban Policy Planning and Local Government Program. Some unrelated questions that would be misleading in Denizli municipality are taken out of the questionnaire where some important questions about the development of Denizli and the urban processes in Denizli are added. It consists of 89 open and closed end questions.

The first questionnaire was given to councilors in December 2003. Most of the councilors are visited at their work places where some questionnaires were given at the Town Hall. 2 councilors were out of the city and 1 councilor rejected to take part. Eventually 29 total questionnaires were given.

The second questionnaire was prepared for the municipal staff. People working in some specific departments of the municipality attended the questionnaire. These

departments were Planning Department, Technical Department, Real Estate Department, Social Housing Department, Press and Public Relations, and Municipal Police Department. Planning department was given more importance, as the staff of this department is the ones who are in closer contact with the councilors, deputy mayors and the mayor. It consists of 34 open and closed end questions.

This questionnaire was given to 13 people in February 2004. All the interviewers were conducted at the Town Hall. Because of the upcoming local elections, the deputy mayors and 5 of the departmental heads rejected to attend the questionnaire.

Later on an additional questionnaire was prepared for the councilors in order to understand their knowledge and information on specific laws concerning municipal local administration. It consists of 18 questions and given to 21 councilors in June 2004. This questionnaire was given after the local elections; it was not possible to reach some councilors as they were reelected in the new term.

Beside these questionnaires informal talks with both the councilors and municipal staff members were made. During these sessions some notes have been taken.

In the following part history of Denizli municipality is explained. After this part information on the city of Denizli is given. Following the general information given about the city, at the third part, the evaluation part begins.

The first part is about the presentation phenomenon in the evaluation part. In order to evaluate this, personal profiles of the councilors and occupation, income, education, gender and generational differences are tried to be examined. All the deductions are made according to the answers of the councilors.

The second part is on the political commitment, democracy and participation ideas of the councilors. This part is also divided into two parts; in the first part the argument about the local governments being stepping stones for the local politicians for higher levels in politics is evaluated; in the second part the municipal councils powers, influence and efficiency in decision-making processes, the structure and the internal working of the municipality is examined.

The fourth part of the case study is the evaluation of the questionnaires made with the municipal staff members. Similar to the previous part, the profiles of the employees are given at the first part. At the following part the ideas of the employees about local politics, structure and internal working of the municipality, and urban processes are tried to be examined.

5.2. Municipality of Denizli

5.2.1. History

The first municipal organization in Denizli was established in 1876. Until 1988, with the participation of some small towns in the neighborhood, Denizli became "sancak" of Aydın. After the establishment of Turkish republic, Denizli became a province. The population of Denizli in the year 1927 was 15704. According to the last population census in 2000 the population of Denizli is 275.480 (www.die.gov.tr)

Until the 1950's Denizli had a closed economic and social life. By the establishment of new schools for secondary education and new factories for the industry, the city started to attract people from neighboring cities and towns. With the increase in the labor demand, the city center experienced a rapid development, both in size and population. As being unprepared to this growth like many other Anatolian towns, Denizli faced various urban problems involving, developmental problems, infrastructure, housing etc. After the earthquake disaster in 1976, new buildings and new roads were constructed and Denizli became a more developed and modern city (the second largest city in Aegean region after Izmir).

5.2.2. City of Denizli

As is well known, textile industry has played key role in the recent development of Denizli. There are 878 industrial enterprises in Denizli and 493 of them (per cent57) are working in this sector. In addition to industry, the agriculture is also important in

Denizli. Cotton, the main raw material of textile industry constitutes 16.7 per cent of the total agricultural production. Beside this, almost all of the Turkey's roasted chickpeas exportation is made from Denizli (www.denizli.gov.tr).

Denizli had a population around 17000 in 1935. The population of the city reached to 275480 (DIE, State Institute of Statistics, 2000). An overall consideration of the population growth of Denizli shows that the city has had a steady growth trend throughout the Republican history. This shows that the city has a dynamic structure.





Figure A: Denizli Population Census (1960 – 2000)

(DIE, State Institute of Statistics, Results of the general census, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1997, 2000).





(DIE, State Institute of Statistics, Results of the general census, 1960, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1997, 2000).

As a result of the industrial developments in Denizli, the city became sort of an attraction center in its region. The employment possibilities, the location advantages (close to Izmir and to places at Aegean and Mediterranean costs), the low cost of living and similar reasons have made the city attracting for people from its own region as well as other parts of Turkey. As a result Denizli has faced a rapid urbanization in the last decades.

However Denizli has not been ready for this rapid urbanization in terms of social and physical infrastructure. Likewise, the development plan of the city has become out of date in a short space of time. In turn, unplanned developments have taken place in the city. Perhaps it is not as dramatic as in some other large cities, but illegal settlement problem affects Denizli as well.

These findings make the following arguments possible;

Compared to similar cities in the same size, Denizli has a very dynamic economy which is largely dominated by textile industry. It would not be unfair to expect that industrialists one of the main stakeholders in the local political arena.

Rapid development of the city creates an important pressure on urban lan and development plan of the city has failed to lead these pressures. Thus, given this failure, it would be natural to expect that the municipality of Denizli faces an important pressure from landed interests.

5.3. Evaluation of the Municipal Council

5.3.1. Representation

5.3.1.1. Councilors' Profiles

In terms of party control in municipality Denizli is an interesting case. In the last three local elections the municipality fell into different political parties. In 1994 local elections, Republican People's Party came to power in Denizli. In the following elections in 1999, the True Path Party took over the municipal control. In the last elections it was the Justice and Development Party came to power. These results show that in terms of political culture Denizli does not have a stable structure and choice. Perhaps the rapid development and growth of the city is one of the explanations along with other reasons.

At the election in 1994, RPP had the majority in the municipal council (45 per cent) and the mayor was elected from RPP. MLP and TPP had nearly same amount of votes while RP was the fourth party to be in the municipal council. The main difference in the 1999 elections was that DLP, which did not had seats in the council in 1994, had the majority in the council. After resigning of 10 members of DLP, TPP become the party holding the majority in the council with the independent members. There was a significant decrease in the votes of RPP and MLP where DLP and TPP seem to be the parties which benefited from this decrease.

Name of the Party	Councilors	per cent
MLP	6	19,5
RPP	14	45
ТРР	7	22,5
RP (Welfare Party)	4	13
Total	31	100

 Table 1: The distribution of the members of the Denizli Municipal council according to their parties (1994 Local Election)

Denizli municipal council consists of 31 council members and the mayor. 14 of those council members are elected from "Democratic Left Party" (DLP), 9 councilors from the "True Path Party" (TPP), 5 councilors from "Republican People Party" (RPP), 2 councilors from "Motherland Party" (MLP), 2 councilors from the "Nationalist Movement Party" (NAP). 10 members of DLP in the council resigned from their party. 9 of them continued as independent, and 1 of them joined "Young Party" (YP). The distribution of the members of the Denizli Municipal Council according to their parties at the 1999 local election is given below.

 Table 2: The distribution of the members of the Denizli Municipal council according to their parties (1999 Local Election)

Name of the Party	Councilors	per cent
MLP	2	6
RPP	5	16
DLP	4	12
ТРР	9	28,5
YP	1	3
NAP	2	6
INDEPENDENT	9	28,5
Total	32	100

Name of the Party	Councilors	per cent
ТРР	9	31,4
INDEPENDENT	7	24,1
RPP	5	17,2
DLP	3	10,3
MLP	2	6,8
NAP	2	6,8
ҮР	1	3,4
Total	29	100

 Table 3: The distribution of the municipal council members according to their parties

One council member from DLP refused to fill in the questionnaires form. It was not possible to reach to 2 independent council members. Totally, 29 questionnaires have been applied. Councilors who attended the questionnaires are; 9 from TPP, 5 from RPP, 4 from DLP, 2 from MLP, 2 from NAP, and 7 independent. At the table above, the distribution of the municipal council members according to their parties is given. At the evaluation this table will be considered.

 Table 4: The distribution of the municipal council members according to the cities they were born

Town	Councilors	per cent
Burdur	2	7
Denizli	22	79
İzmir	1	3.5
Kayseri	1	3.5
Konya	1	3.5
Tunceli	1	3.5
Total	28	100

Majority of the councilors (79 per cent) were born in Denizli. 10 of those who were born in Denizli are from central sub-province, and the others are from small subprovinces of Denizli. The distribution among the small sub-provinces is homogeneous. The highest ratio to indicate those who were born out of Denizli is at RPP (60 per cent-3 members). 6 councilors (21 per cent) were born out of Denizli but all of them have been living in Denizli for more than ten years.

Sub-provinces	Councilors	per cent
Central Town	10	45,5
Babadağ	1	4,5
Sarayköy	1	4,5
Bekilli	1	4,5
Çal	3	14,0
Tavas	2	9,0
Kale	1	4,5
Çivril	1	4,5
Acıpayam	1	4,5
Güney	1	4,5
Total	22	100.0

 Table 5: The distribution of the municipal council members according to the sub-provinces they were born

82 per cent of the municipal councilors stated their hometowns as Denizli (24 members). This percentage is very important for Denizli which has a dynamic and migrant population. Migration outside Denizli province has gained pace in last decade. Cities like Uşak, Kütahya, and Aydın in the Aegean region are the areas that give migration to Denizli in the first lines (DIE, 2000). Taken this fact as given, it may be argued that the migrants are not fairly represented in the council.

In Turkey, the elected councilors are generally born in the city where they are elected. However, this statement is not valid for the big cities like Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir. In a survey conducted by Keleş and Toprak, it is found that in the cities like Afyon, Van (100 per cent), Konya (96.7 per cent), Kahramanmaraş (95.7 per cent), Hatay (93.7 per cent), Trabzon, Sakarya, Kayseri, more than 90 per cent of the councilors are born in the city where they are elected (Keleş and Toprak, 2000). In Ankara, İzmir and Istanbul these figures are around 25 per cent. As seen from these figures there is an inverse relation with the population size of the city and the number of the elected councilors who were born in the city where they are elected (Kurtoğlu, 2004, Keleş and Toprak, 2000).

		Type of the Relation					
		Cultivating/ Renting the land	Not cultivating	Only the social relations continue	Total		
Maintenance of the	Yes	3	1	15	19		
relations with hometown	No	-	-	-	8		

 Table 6: The maintenance of the relations of the council members with their hometowns and the types of these relations

When we look at those councilors who were born in Denizli, it is seen that 60 per cent of the municipal councilors were born at the villages or sub-provinces. 19 councilors stated that they still keep in touch their hometowns villages. However, their relationships do not have any other dimension than social contact. Those members, who were born out of Denizli, also claim that their relations still continues with their hometowns.

5.3.1.2. Class and Status

5.3.1.2.1. Occupation

Occupation	Councilors	per cent	
Engineer	11	34	
Pensioner	4	12,5	
Businessmen	7	22	
Merchant	5	15,5	
Lawyer	1	3	
Medical Doctor	3	9	
Housewife	1	3	
Total	32	100	

 Table 7: The occupations of the council members (Those elected at the 1994 local elections)

Occupation	Councilors	per cent
Engineer (Mechanical, chemical, civil engineer)	8	27,6
Architect	4	13,8
Retired (civil servant)	4	13,8
Accountant	3	10,3
Businessmen	2	6,8
Merchant	3	10,3
Lawyer	2	6,8
Technician	3	10,3
Total	29	100

 Table 8: The jobs of the council members (those elected at the 1999 local elections)

Table 9: The first jobs and the first working positions of the council members

	First job	Worker	Technician	Civil servant	Employer- small	Employer- medium	For his own	Total
	State	2	3	4	1	-	-	10
Department	Private- service	1	8	-	1	1	7	18
	Total	3	11	4	2	1	7	28

Most of the members declared that their first jobs were in the private sector. 45 per cent of those members who worked in the private sector are technicians.

According to their first jobs, employers (small or medium) and who work for his own sums up to 10 councilors. According to the latest jobs, employers (small or medium) and who work for his own sums up to 19 councilors. Out of these results, we can argue that the members had their own business. The latest jobs of the council members are shown at the table below.

The percentage of the technical people (architect, engineer, and technician) in the council is quite high as 51.7 per cent. When we include other groups such as

lawyers, accountants, it becomes clear that the municipal council is heavily dominated by the professionals.

Another striking finding is that the percentage of self-employees and entrepreneurs (80 per cent) are quite high in the council. This is consistent with the findings of other city councils.

For instance Keleş and Toprak found that in İstanbul per cent80, in İzmir and İzmit 77.8 per cent, in Afyon 81.4 per cent, in Kahramanmaraş 76.6 per cent, in Konya 92.9 per cent, in Sakarya 69.2 per cent, in Trabzon 74.5 per cent, in Van 60 per cent of the councilors are self-employees.

	Engineer	Architect	Retired (civil servant)	Accountant	Lawyer	Businessmen	Merchant	Technician
RPP	2	-	2	1	-	-	-	-
INDEPENDENT	3	-	2	1	-	-	1	-
TPP	2	1	-	-	2	1	2	1
NAP	-	1		1				
MLP	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
DLP	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1
YP	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	8	4	4	3	2	2	3	3

 Table 10: The occupational distribution of the council members according to party membership

Given the fact that economy of Denizli is dominated by the textile industry it would not be unfair to expect the representation of this group in the council. However, there are only two industrialists but only one of them is from the textile sector. Whoever currently the chairman of Denizli Chamber of Industry is a member of the council.

Another result we can draw from the table above is that the number of entrepreneurs (Merchant, businessman, and tradesman) is high in the right wing parties as TPP,

MLP, and NAP. There is no entrepreneur among the left wing councilors. There is no difference in the technician category as far as the party membership is concerned.

When we compound the occupations of the council members of the previous term (1994-1999) with the current one there is a striking difference between them in terms of representation of business circles. In the previous term, 22 per cent of the council members were businessmen whereas in the current council this figure is as low as 6.5 per cent. The difference in between was fulfilled by technical people such as architects, engineers and technicians. The ratio of the technical people in the council increased from 34 per cent to 51 per cent.

Those council members who served between the previous term (1994-1999) went back to their previous job after their council membership was terminated.. None of them took a different job after their memberships ended. So we can argue that in the previous term the council members did not use the council membership as a step in their professions or in their political life.

	Continuatio	n to their jobs	
Party	Yes	No	Total
RPP	3	2	5
INDEPENDENT	5	2	7
TPP	6	3	9
NAP	2	-	2
MLP	2	-	2
DLP	3	-	3
YP	1	-	1
Total	22	7	29

 Table 11: Did the councilors continue their jobs after the election?

The 75 per cent ratio of the members continued their jobs after the election. The reasons of those who did not continue are retirement or compulsory reasons. Those who continued their jobs emphasized that they continued to run their lives. Those who did not continue their jobs after the election are from TPP and RPP and two of them are Independent.

	Councilors	per cent
Manual workers	3	10,7
Technician	5	17,9
Civil servant	2	7,1
Working for his own	17	60,7
Soldier	1	3,6
Total	28	100,0

 Table 12: The occupations of the councilors' fathers

When we examine the fathers' jobs of the council members of the term 1999-2004, we see that 60 per cent of their fathers worked for their own and 35 per cent for state. The majority of them are in agricultural sector.

When we look at the general occupational structure of the municipal council in Denizli, the majority of the councilors are experienced in technical issues. 51 per cent of the council members are engineers, architects or technicians. Beside these, there are other councilors who are lawyers, pensioners, businessmen and accountants. The municipal council can be accepted as having a wide scope in occupation concept; however civil servants and blue-collar workers are not having seats in the council. The manual workers, lower white-collar job owners cannot participate in the political processes as they work full time and cannot find the time, energy and money for this kind of activities. Concerning the time constraint, it may be expected for the pensioners (retired people) to have a greater ratio but this is not the case (13 per cent).

In the questionnaire given to the municipal staff 38 per cent of the workers stated that the municipal council represents mostly the professions of the councilors. They said that councilors are sensitive about subjects concerning their professions. This is an important input to the discussion because it may be concluded that if the councilors mainly represent their professions, then there is an under-representation of manual workers or lower white collar job owners as they are not having seats in the municipal council.

5.3.1.2.2. Income

	Contribution to the family budget			
	Spouse	Children	Mother	Total
RPP	4	-	-	4
INDEPENDENT	6	-	-	6
ТРР	3	1	1	5
NAP	1	-	-	1
MLP	1	-	-	1
DLP	2	-	-	2
Total	17	1	1	19

 Table 13: Are there any members in your families contributing to the family budget?

The 58 per cent of the spouses of the council members contribute the family budget. When we add to this ratio those two members of whose mother and child working, it reaches to the level of 65 per cent. The spouses of the 85 per cent of independent members who are mostly younger then the other members contribute the family budget. RPP has also a similar ratio (80 per cent). Spouses of 14 members working actively and of 3 members are retired.

It is interesting to note that while only 25 per cent of the left wing councilors are the only 'bread winner' in their families, this figure is around 50 per cent for the right wing councilors. It is also interesting that, in the case of councilors who work in technical field, the spouses also usually work, but in the families of those who run industrial enterprises, the spouse working ratio is low.

	Working status	Total	
Educational Levels	Yes	No	
Grammar school	-	2	2
High school	1	3	4
High school equivalent	1	-	1
Pre-license	2	1	3
University	12	4	16
Master degree	1	-	1
Total	14	13	27

 Table 14: The educational levels of the council members and their spouses' working status

There is also a positive correlation between the councilor's educational level and spouses working status. In other words, while the educational level of the councilors increases, the ratio of the contribution of the spouses to the family budget also increases.

	Working status of the spouses		
	Yes	No	Total
RPP	3	1	4
INDEPENDENT	6	1	7
TPP	1	7	8
NAP	1	1	2
MLP	1	1	2
DLP	2	1	3
Total	14	13	27

Table 15: Working status of the spouses

When we evaluate the working status of the spouses according to political parties of the council members together, the non-working spouses are from mainly right-wing parties (76.92 per cent) and working spouses are from mainly left-wing parties (78.57 per cent).

5.3.1.2.3. Education

Education / Party	Grammar School	High School	High school Equivalent	Pre-license	University	Masters Degree	Total
MLP	-	1	-	-	4	-	5
RPP	-	-	-	2	5	-	7
DLP	1	1	-	1	6	-	9
TPP	-	1	-	-	1	-	2
YP	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
NAP	-	1	-		1	1	3
INDEPENDENT	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total	2	4	1	3	18	1	29

Table 16: The distribution of the councilors according to their education

The ratio of university graduates in the council of is quite high (65.5 per cent). This finding is quite consistent with the occupational structure of the council in the sense that the professionals dominate the council. The educational levels of the councilors in Denizli are relatively high when compared with other Anatolian cities or some neighborhood towns (ratio of university graduates; Afyon 13 per cent, Hatay 21 per cent, Isparta 23 per cent, İzmir 56 per cent, Kayseri 20 per cent, K.Maraş per cent30, Konya 24 per cent).

It could be argued that it is an advantage to have a council constituted relatively well-educated members and in various respect this is a reasonable argument. However, taken with the occupational structure, it might point to a problem as well. Such a situation could be considered as an indicator of an exclusionary structure working against those who lack educational credentials.

5.3.1.2.4. Gender

	Councilors	per cent
Male	27	93.1
Female	2	6.9
Total	29	100.0

Table 17: The distribution of the councilors according to their sex

At the 1999 local elections 3 female members were elected to the council (one of them resigned before completing her term). In the current council there are only two female members, and both of them are the members of RPP. The right wing political parties do not have female members in the council. Although these parties put some women candidates on their lists, they were at the bottom of the lists and failed to win seats in the local elections.

The problem of women representation in politics is a huge problem and Denizli is not an exception in this regard with its low level of representation of women (6.2 per cent) in the council.

As Kurtoğlu suggests, the political parties which are in the municipal councils think of the representation of women in the council as an 'example' keeping (Kurtoğlu, 2004). Every political party claims that there should be more representation of women in the councils and the national assembly but in practice, this never occurs. The equality of different sexes cannot be achieved in any level including politics. In the local politics, as it is expected, women are not represented fairly. The local politics are seen, in some ways, as the starting point of political life. The women's representation can be argued as limited in this context. The ratio is 2.3 per cent for Hatay, 3.8 per cent for Isparta, 8.6 per cent for Istanbul, 12.2 per cent for Izmir in Keleş and Toprak's study (Keleş and Toprak, 2000). The overall ratio of women in the municipal councils is 3.5 per cent (Afyon, Hatay, Isparta, İstanbul, İzmir, İzmit, Kayseri, K.Maraş, Konya, Sakarya, Trabzon, and Van).

Beside the symbolic significance given to women in many areas, they can not take important roles in the managerial positions and key decision-making mechanisms, thus, they are not well represented or not represented at all. When we consider that the women got the right to elect and to be elected at the national and local level nearly at the same time with men, no essential steps were taken for them in active political arena. Women are seen as mothers or wives and their presence in the political parties are thought as enough to be active in politics.


In the structure of the political parties, there are women branches. Many women are working in order to sustain more votes for their respective party, but in the candidate list, they cannot find central positions for themselves. They may be argued as left to secondary places in almost all political parties. The left wing parties may be a step ahead in the representation of women than the right wing parties. In Denizli municipal council, a female councilor was elected from DLP and two from RPP. The DLP member resigned later. In theory, every political party claims that there should be more representation of women in the councils and the national assembly but in practice, this is not the case.

5.3.1.2.5. Generation

Age	Councilors	per cent
20-29	-	-
30 - 39	3	11.2
40 - 49	10	37
50 - 59	10	37
60 +	4	14.8
Total	27	100

Table 18: The distribution of the councilors according to their ages

Figure C: Denizli Age Distribution Table



The distribution of the municipal council members according to their ages is shown below. There are 3 councilors at 30–39 age range. The ranges 40–49 and 50–59 share the first line with a percentage of 37 per cent. 60 and above range has a share of 14.8 per cent. 2 council members did not reply the questions concerning their ages. Considering the ages of the council members, we recognize that Denizli municipal council has a discrimination against the relatively young population. Analyzing this, we can say that, as it is the same in many fields in Turkey, the young population is disregarded in the political arena. While the demographical structure of Denizli is examined, it is realized that the young population has a big share. In any

case that ratio is not seen in the structure of the municipal council, and the majority of the members are consisted of 40-60 age group.

It may be concluded that in the municipal council of Denizli there is an underrepresentation of the young population. 88.88 per cent of the councilors are 40 years of age or older. The youngest councilor was 34 years of age. In Denizli, the young population has a big share (56.01 per cent of the population is under the age of 29 and 73 per cent of the population is under the age of 39). There are only three members in the municipal council which are below the age of 39. Considering the national and local political arena, and also decision-making processes, the young population is disregarded or excluded. According to Allum, the sociological profiles of the municipal councilors are similar in Western European countries where they are generally middle-aged and predominantly male (Allum, 1995). The same phenomenon is valid for the Denizli Municipal Council.

This may have several reasons one of which may be that the young people are seen as in experienced because of their age, in politics. They are expected to do other duties before getting a significant duty like being a municipal councilor. The duties they may have in the political parties are given in order to gain experience in their political lives. One reason may be that it is thought that reverent and respectful duties which require charisma should be done by older people as a kind of respect for them. This is valid in local politics as it is the case also in Denizli. In any case, whatever the actual reason is there is overwhelming evidence that there is an exclusion of relatively young population from the municipal council in Denizli.

5.3.1.2.6. Evaluation

While trying to evaluate the representational dynamics of the Denizli Municipal council, occupation, income, education, gender, and generation are taken as independent variables. The answers of the councilors and the municipal staff are the main supports for the conclusions of the study. It is obvious that these indicators are not by themselves enough to judge whose represented in the councils. For instance, it

is not possible to judge from the fact that most of the councilors are professional and for this reason they represent the professional groups.

To overcome this shortcoming, certain questions were directed to the councilors. In this context, main questions were about the representation of people in general, and the representation capacity of the municipal council and councilors. The councilors claim was that the citizens are not equally represented.

	Do you believe that citizens are represented fairly?			Total
Party	Yes	No	Indecisive	
RPP	-	4	1	5
TPP	2	4	1	7
NAP	-	2	-	2
MLP	1	1	-	2
DLP	-	3	-	3
INDEPENDENT	-	6	1	7
YP	-	-	1	1
Total	3	20	4	27

Table 19: The ideas of the council members on the representation of people

An important majority (75 per cent) of the councilors themselves believe that the overall population of Denizli is not represented equally in the council. While all members of left wing parties agree with the lack of pluralism in the council, three members from the right wing parties claim that there is a pluralistic form of representation in the council.

It is interesting that some of the councilors state that they have no clear idea on whether the people is well represented through the council. It means that some councilors do not have a clear idea yet on the representation of the people who vote for them just do not want to state the under-representation phenomenon clearly by thinking it as a fault or mistake arising from them.

52 per cent of those councilors who defend that the people is not enough represented, stated that the people can be represented better if the participation ways will be opened for the people.

According to Marxist theories, the local governments are dominated by the capitalist class and answer the needs of capital. Beside different Marxist approaches the common point that they share is that there is not an equal representation of the working class. Evaluating the answers of the councilors, it may be concluded that this statement is true for Denizli municipality. It does not necessarily mean that the working class can be represented if and only if there are members from these groups in the council; however, the councilors' idea was that these groups are underrepresented or cannot make their voice heard.

Moreover, like the elite theories claim, the local governments are governed by a ruling elite group which may be the case in Denizli. In order to be elected to the municipal council, candidates spend much money, time and effort which can not be spent easily by large proportions of the society. These people are the ones with wealth, and also some are rank-and-file members. The proportion of these groups in the society is low in relation to the lower-middle class groups.

In addition to these, the councilors are put in the candidate list by their respective parties. This makes people choose what the political party chooses. They are restricted with certain names on the candidate list and these names are generally the names which may have potential to gain votes from constituents.

Saunders claim is that most of the constituents know very little about the identity, profile, and activities of the councilors (1979). He points out that the most democratic societies usually suggest that the elected members are chosen from differentiated parts of the society but this is not a really valid expression according to him. His argument is that the electorate usually faces the fact that the members that they will choose are from the higher social status in the society.

There are people in the municipal council in Denizli which are known by the large parts of the society. Some important names of industry, the president of Chamber of Commerce, the chairman of Chamber of Industry, some well-known tradesmen are members of the Denizli municipal council. It should not be essentially concluded that these members are the main important figures in the council and local decision-making processes as there are other councilors which are from middle-class, like lawyers, architects and engineers. However it should be underlined that these groups always have more chance to be elected, to influence decision-making processes and be the ruling group as elite theory suggests.

The municipal councils can be argued as the main bodies of representation at the local level but it seems from the answers and confessions of the councilors that they cannot create effective and fair participation possibilities for every section of the society. This thought is very common among the councilors as they claim overwhelmingly that the councils do not represent people equally. What happens in practice is that, given the fact that there is no interests of large scale interests in the local politics, the small minorities which may constitute middle ranks of a pyramid in the society has some kind of dominance because of their financial and political power compared to the lower income groups. These groups in the society may be conceived as the professional elite group which may have direct effects on the decisions by influencing the financial and economic processes. Departing from the answers of the municipal council members in Denizli, as stated above, these groups which are small in number have greater influence than the ordinary citizens which are very large in number.

As the municipal councils are elected bodies which may reflect the desires and needs of the citizens, they should be the places which the local democracy works perfectly with participation and representation channels wide open. Unlike the pluralist arguments which claim that all parts of the society may take part in decision-making processes and may have direct or indirect influence on the administration at the local level; the members of the municipal council and the municipal staff declared that the society as a whole is not equally represented in these elected bodies.

5.3.2. Political Commitment, Democracy and Participation

5.3.2.1. National Politics

5.3.2.1.1. Political Profiles

Name of the Party	Councilors	per cent
TPP	9	31,4
INDEPENDENT	7	24,1
RPP	5	17,2
DLP	3	10,3
MLP	2	6,8
NAP	2	6,8
YP	1	3,4
Total	29	100

Table 20: The distribution of the municipal council members according to their parties

As can be seen from the table 21 there is no single party domination in the council. There are six different parties represented in the council and there is considerable number of independent candidates who resigned from DLP.

It is well known fact that involvement in politics and in ideological commitments, there is a great deal of role played by the family background. For this reason, certain questions were asked to the councilors about their family background in politics.

8	Councilors	per cent
Party administrator	1	3.4
Party member	5	17.2
Voter	21	72.4
Other	2	6.9
Total	29	100.0

Table 21: The interest degree of the fathers of council members in politics

The interest degrees in politics of the fathers of council members are given in the above chart. Most of the members stated that their fathers were interested in politics

only as voters. It is obvious that the level of fathers' interest in politics is not important for the members to be engaged in politics.

When the parties of fathers are examined it is seen that the members are close to the parties of their fathers. It can be argued that the members were influenced by their fathers ideological commitments in politics. While 75 per cent of the fathers of left wing councilors were supporter of the RPP, in the case of right wing councilors, 78 per cent of the fathers were supporting the DP. Following the political ideology of their fathers, the councilors generally voted for the same ideological wing, but went a step ahead by entering actively to political life.

	Democratic Party (DP) followers	RPP followers	Different Parties	Total
RPP	2	3	-	5
INDEPENDENT	-	5	2	7
TPP	7	2	-	9
NAP	2	-	-	2
MLP	2	-	-	2
DLP	-	3	-	3
ҮР	-	1	-	1
Total	13	14	2	29

Table 22: The political parties that the councilors' fathers voted

At the table above, those who are indicated as RPP followers (according to their ages) voted for RPP till 1980, for SODEP (Social Democrat Peoples Party) or HP (Peoples Party) in between the years 1980-1990, for RPPor DLP after 1990. Those who are indicated as DP (Democratic Party) followers (according to their ages) voted for DP between the years 1950-1960), for AP (Justice Party) between the years 1960-1980, for TPP or MLP after 1980.

Table 23: The interests of the relatives of councilors in politics

MP	3
Headman	3
Province council membership	1
Manager in the Local Party Branch	1
Party headquarter administrator	1
Municipal council membership	2
Total	11

The ratio showing the interest of the relatives of the council members with politics is not high. The fathers of the council members, mostly, are only voters (72 per cent). The relatives of three members were member of parliament and of two members were council members. The father of only one member was active in the local party branch. For that reason it is not correct to assume a tight relationship between the relations of the council members' political interests and their relatives' interests in politics.

Another dimension is the relationship between political involvement of the councilors and their other memberships. It is assumed that membership to other organizations might have an effect on the council membership.

	Councilors	per cent
Yes	27	93.1
No	2	6.9
Total	29	100.0

Table 24: Are the councilors member of an institution?

Almost all of the members of Denizli municipal council have some kind of involvement in other organizations (NGO) at a rate of 93.1 per cent. The professional chambers like chamber of architects is at the first line, because the majority of the councilors are professional people (19 members). The second line is the cooperatives (11 members). The only labor union member is from TPP. Going through the names of those institutions we meet around 20 different names. This means that the councilors are also active out of the municipality at different institutions.

Table 25: Do their membership affect them on becoming a councilor?

	Councilors	per cent
No	15	60.0
Yes	10	40.0
Total	25	100.0

When asked about the effect of their memberships in an institution in becoming a councilor, 40 per cent of the councilors stated that their memberships were effective in the sense that they were encouraged by their organizations to become a councilor.

	Number of terms of the membership in the council			Total
Party	1 term	2 terms	3 terms	
RPP	4	1	-	5
TPP	6	1	2	9
NAP	2	-	-	2
MLP	1	1	-	2
DLP	3	-	-	11
INDEPENDENT	7	-	-	7
YP	1	-	-	1
Total	24	3	2	29

 Table 26: The number of periods of the councilors' memberships

Regarding the duration of serving as a councilor, most of the councilors (82 per cent) stated that they are elected for the first time as a councilor. It is very interesting that in a council where the average age of the members is quite high like Denizli municipal council, the majority of the members became councilor for the first time. Another interesting finding is that considerable number of councilors has not had a long-term involvement in politics. The best proof for this is that 28 per cent (8 members) of the councilors registered to their parties only after 1998.

At this point it is important to ask why councilors are willing to become councilors in the first place. Most councilors answered this question by stating that they wanted to serve to the best interest of local people and Denizli itself. Only 4 of them mentioned their party relations as the reason for being a candidate. Although at the informal discussions most of the councilors stated that they were elected by chance, only 1 member from the independent group declared this honestly and openly in the questionnaire.

	The reasons to be candidate for the council						
Party	Sensitive for the town	Further carrier in Politics	To serve to the party	By chance	Other	Total	
RPP	4	-	-	-	1	5	
TPP	7	2	-	-	-	9	
NAP	1	-	1	-	-	2	
MLP	2	-	-	-	-	2	
DLP	2	-	-	-	1	3	
INDEPENDENT	4	1	-	1	1	7	
YP	1	-	-	-	-	1	
Total	21	3	1	1	3	29	

Table 27: The reasons of the council members to be a candidate

Regarding the future expectations in politics, 50 per cent of the councilors declared their future ambitions in politics. The other half stated no such expectation. At least this figure gives us a change to state that despite the fact that most of the councilors put the serving to people as their first motive, half of the councilors have their own political ambitions in politics and they would like to use councilors position as a stepping stone.

Table 20. Do you nave		ation in the future	
	Yes	No	Total
RPP	2	3	5
INDEPENDENT	2	5	7
ТРР	3	4	7
NAP	1	1	2
MLP	1	1	2
DLP	2	1	3
YP	1	-	1
Total	12	15	27

Table 28: Do you have any political expectation in the future?

Related to this argument is the opinion of the councilors on whether they would like to serve as councilors in the following term. The amount of those councilors who want to be candidate again and those who do not want is equal (44.8 per cent). 2 councilors were not sure if they would be candidate or not. 20 per cent of those councilors who replied the questionnaire stated that they want to be elected again and their expectation in politics is being a municipal councilor. 6 of the councilors expressed their ambitions for becoming a Member of Parliament. Only 20 per cent of councilors see the council as a step for their future political expectations.

	Idea to be candidate again			
Party	Yes	No	Undecided	Total
RPP	1	3	1	5
INDEPENDENT	2	4	1	7
ТРР	5	4	-	9
NAP	-	1	-	1
MLP	2	-	-	2
DLP	2	1	-	3
YP	1	-	-	1
Total	13	13	2	28

Table 29: Ideas of the council members to be candidate again

The majority of the Denizli municipal council was elected to the council for the first time. As 44.8 per cent of them want to continue their membership in the council, it can be argued for the rest that they were not in the politics for future expectations or for higher levels in politics. This was in fact stated by these councilors directly. The idea of the local governments being a school for the local politicians who aim higher levels in politics may not be valid in the case of Denizli.

5.3.2.1.2. Relations with the Party Organization

	Councilors	per cent
The city chairman of the party	1	3,4
The sub-province chairman of the party	1	3,4
Member in the city administration	4	13,7
Member in the sub-province administration	1	3,4
Membership in the party headquarter administration	2	6,8
No duty in the party	4	13,7
Member of the "women branch"	1	3,4
Secondary chairman in the party	1	3,4
Member of party assembly	1	3,4
No answer	13	44,8
Total	29	100

Table 30: The party duties of the council members

12 of councilors had a duty in their party before election. The most spectacular of those duties is the membership in the party administration. The 44.8 per cent of the councilors did not reply this question.

Relation with the party after the election								
Party	Better	Better Worse Not changed Tota						
RPP	5	-	-	5				
TPP	-	-	9	9				
NAP	-	-	2	2				
MLP	-	-	2	2				
DLP	2	-	1	3				
INDEPENDENT	2	2	1	5				
YP	-	1	-	1				
Total	9	3	14	27				

 Table 31: The relation of the council members with their political parties after the elections

After the election, 12 members of DLP who had 14 seats in the council, resigned from their parties. 2 of them returned after a while. Those who resigned and become independent or joined the YP say that their relation with the party after the election was not good.

Although the representatives of RPP stated that their relations with their party was improving after the election, the right wing party member councilors stated that their relation is the same as it was before the election.

councils				
	Councilors	per cent		
Member of the province council	2	6.9		
Member of the municipal council	3	10.3		
Total	5	17.2		

 Table 32: The duties of the council members before the election in the local councils

None of the Denizli municipal council members were elected as the mayor before. In the council there are 3 councilors who were elected to municipal council before and 2 councilors who were elected to province council before. All of them are from TPP and MLP.

	Responsiveness to	the party organizations	
Party	Priority should be given to the party members at the equal circumstancesActing equal to anybody		Total
RPP	-	5	5
TPP	3	6	9
NAP	-	2	2
MLP	-	2	2
DLP	-	3	3
INDEPENDENT	-	7	7
YP	-	1	1
Total	3	26	29

Table 33: How much responsive should be the council members towards their political party organizations?

90 per cent of the councilors mentioned the importance of the behaving equal to everybody without considering their parties. 76 per cent of the councilors pointed out that the members of the council and the mayor are sensitive to the members of the political party they represent.

5.3.2.1.3. Evaluation

In this part of the study, the idea which sees the municipal councils and local authorities as schools for politicians is taken into consideration. As we discussed earlier, in these bodies they would be able to learn art of politics and political life. The municipal councils are seen as stepping stones for politicians who want to take part in national politics. Is this the case in Denizli municipal council?

When we examine this question in Denizli municipal council, we see that 44 per cent of the councilors have political expectations in the future like being a member of the parliament and 55 per cent of them stated that they do not see their membership in the council as a preparation for the national parliament or any other higher level in politics. In the informal talks made with the councilors other than the questionnaires, very few of them claimed that their membership should be seen as a starting point for political life. If we look at the results about the councilors' candidacy again for the next elections, 13 members were positive whereas 13 were negative. This is not a contradictory point when related with above ratios. Half of the municipal council members in Denizli see their membership as a starter while half of them do not have interests in higher levels of politics. In this argument the reasons of the councilors to be candidate in the elections may be helpful in order to understand their views clearly. The majority of the councilors stated that (72 per cent) they were sensitive to the problems of the town and so they became members of the municipal council. Only four of them stated that they wanted to be in politics and wanted to serve their political parties at the local level.

It should not be underestimated that the local councils are such bodies where the democracy may be sustained successfully. As they are the closest level of government to the citizens, their importance in the participation of local people in the decision-making processes is more than the national level. Most of the members of municipal councils learn these political processes after they are elected and do not have preparations before. Taking this as a fact, we may conclude that the local governments are schools where the councilors learn the political processes.

Denizli may be seen such an example as the majority of councilors is elected to the council for the first time (82 per cent, 24 out of 29 members). These members did not have an experience in municipal authority before and they learned about the processes simultaneously with the meetings of the council, being elected to the commissions, voting to the issues at hand, etc. As being a kind of a school where the fundamentals of democracy is taught, the significance of local governments should not be undervalued. However, beyond the expectations of the councilors themselves, the question that should be answered is that whether councilors position is a stepping stone in political life in reality. When we look at the national parliament in terms of background of member of parliament it is a striking fact that there are only two members who have a background in municipal councils. Therefore, at least with reference to the membership to the Parliament there are limited changes for the councilors to become a member of parliament.

The councilors of Denizli municipality did not have a duty in their political parties before they are elected. Most of them left blank the answers in the related question. 43.4 per cent of the councilors became a member of their political party in the last five years before the election (21.7 per cent of them became a member of their political party at the same year with the election). 82.75 per cent of the councilors had no prior experience in the local political arena. They are elected first time for the council. With the high average of in the age distribution in the council, the above facts make us think about the belief that political experience comes with age rather than activity in political arena. It is commonly believed that the young people are inexperienced in politics, so the older should take the important positions and the younger people should wait their turn.

5.3.2.2. Local Politics

5.3.2.2.1. Democracy and Local Scale

Regarding the relationship between the strengthening of democracy and scale of political affairs, 7 council members defended the importance of local democracy for the development and progress of democracy, and at the same ratio, the democracy in the nation wide is defended. However, the majority defended that both have the same importance. The local democracy concept is not considered a concept of great importance by most of the councilors of Denizli Municipality; it comes after some other concepts like rendering local services and national democracy.

	Table 34: Political Scale and Democracy						
Which is important for the development of democracy							
Party	Democracy in nation wide	Local democracy	Both have the same weight	Other	Total		
RPP	1	-	4		5		
TPP	4	2	2	1	9		
NAP	1	1	-		2		
MLP	-	1	-		1		
DLP	-	2	1	-	3		
INDEPENDENT	2	1	4	-	7		
YP	-	-	1		1		
Total	8	7	12	1	28		

 Table 34: Political Scale and Democracy

Another point to be underlined is that the councilors do not separate the national and local democracy from one another. This idea is, in a way, reflecting the instrumentalist views where local state cannot be thought independently from the national (central) state. Cockburn, one of the main thinkers of this view, states that local authorities are aspects of the national state which shares their works (Cockburn, 1977). She claims that local authorities play their roles while they differ institutionally from the national state. The similarities are stressed as social similarities between local and central states.

Another important dimension is whether councilors see the democratic processes as the most important and distinctive characteristic of local politics.

	Which is important in local administration?					
	The local services	Local autonomy and local democracy	Other	Total		
RPP	3	1	1	5		
INDEPENDENT	4	3	-	7		
ТРР	6	1	2	9		
NAP	1	1	-	2		
MLP	2	-	-	2		
DLP	1	2	-	3		
YP	-	1	-	1		
Total	17 (58.6 per cent)	9 (31.0 per cent)	3 (10.3 per cent)	29 (100 percent)		

 Table 35: Important Issues in the local administration

Majority of the councilors stated that rendering the municipal services effectively and efficiently is more important than achieving local democracy (58.6 per cent). Only 1 councilor out of five from RPP stated the importance of local democracy in its own right. It is found out that success in municipal service provision is a commonly believed objective in the council. This belief is having some important parts of the thought which sees the administration bodies as firms. The local democracy and local autonomy concepts are not as important as the local service provision for the councilors. When stating their main motivations for being elected to the municipal council, their most commonly underlined reason was their sensitivity for the local problems of the city.

After solving the important issues of the city, it is thought typical to talk about democracy, representation, and participation concepts. One of the councilors claimed explicitly in the informal talks that: "...The citizens in general are not after the concept of democracy or participation, they want to pay less for the water service and wait for the gaps in their streets to be closed immediately; they want services...." Considering this idea in the councilors' heads (and their populist declarations) it may be normal to think they are after solutions of the urban problems in the area, while they put the problems of democracy and representation to second place.

In the pluralist thought, as it is argued in the first chapter, the democracy and participation are important concepts. With the new-right thinking new concepts gained importance rather than local autonomy or participation which are; increase in the efficiency in the service provision as well as the responding to the demands of business groups. These findings supports the arguments of new right perspective rather than the pluralist view as the achievement in service provision had far more supporters than local autonomy and local democracy in the municipal council.

	The ideas of the councilors about giving quota to NGO's				
Party	No	No idea	Yes	Total	
RPP	1	-	4	5	
ТРР	6	1	2	9	
NAP	2	-	-	2	
MLP	-	-	2	2	
DLP	-	-	3	3	
INDEPENDENT	3	1	3	7	
YP	-	-	1	1	
Total	12	2	15	29	

Table 36: The ideas of the councilors about giving quota to NGO's

Given the previous find that councilors themselves do not think that the council itself represents the all groups, the question whether there should be some kind of quota for the NGOs in the council. There was no decisive majority in the council on this matter as half of the council members had sympathy to giving some quota to the NGOS, while the other half was against such a measure. The division was not clearly ideological on this matter even if the left wing councilors seem to be more positive than the rest.

Almost all members who defend the idea of reserving some quota for NGOs in the council stated that it is almost a must for democracy. Neighborhood Headmen are the most favored NGO representatives among the councilors. Chamber representatives are second in the row. Councilors said that this is necessary for the improvement of the local democracy. It is also stated that the members from the chambers may be helpful in technical problems which are discussed in the council meetings.

	Councilors	per cent
Good for participation	7	25.9
Good for local services	4	14.8
Good for both	14	51.9
Not good for anything	1	3.7
Other	1	3.7
Total	27	100.0

 Table 37: Support for Precinct Administration

While all the councilors argued that the precinct administrations could be organized as the first step for the local democracy, the left wing members stated that this would be good for both local services and participation. Although they are elected bodies, they do not have a public legal personality and precincts differentiates in this manner from other local governmental bodies. As it is having some important duties and having the possibilities for the participation of the people easily, it may be thought to rearrange its duties in constitution and organize its budget

Most councilors (92.5 per cent) believe that precincts should be organized as a level of local administration because of the above facts. Whether they state the local service provision or participation as a benefit of this, they all agree on the subject of reorganizing.

Party	Yes	No	No idea	Total
RPP	5	-	-	5
TPP	3	6	-	9
NAP	-	2	-	2
MLP	1	1	-	2
DLP	2	1	-	3
INDEPENDENT	2	4	1	7
YP	1	-	-	1
Total	14	14	1	29

Table 38: Dismissal of the mayor and the council members by referendum

An important issue regarding the strength of local democracy is the dismissal of the mayors and dissolution of councils who are elected by popular vote. While answering to the question of ending the duties of mayor and councilors by referendum before their normal duration, half of the councilors agree with such a method to terminate the term of mayor and councils. Interestingly, other half takes a negative stand toward such a method. It is hard to understand why half of the councilors disagree with such a democratic procedure. It is also interesting to note that most of those who objects are from right wing parties whereas majority of left wing councilors agree with such a method.

	Tutelage should be ended	▲	Limited by the financial aid of the center	Judicial Tutelage	Tutelage should be more tight	Total
RPP	-	-	-	4	-	4
TPP	2	2	-	5	-	9
NAP	-	-	-	2	-	2
MLP	-	-	-	-	1	1
DLP	-	-	1	2	-	3
INDEPENDENT	-	-	1	3	-	4
YP	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2	2	2	16	1	
Total	(8.5 per	· -	· •	(66.5 per	· •	23
	cent)	cent)	cent)	cent)	cent)	

 Table 39: The tutelage on the council

The 66.6 per cent of the members of the council stated that there should be some kind of tutelage on the council but it should be judicial one. However there are limited number of councilors who support the current system.

	Councilors	per cent
Positive	16	66.7
Negative	3	12.5
No idea	5	20.8
Total	24	100

Table 40: Support for strengthening the provincial general assembly?

The members of the council, who defend the municipal council to be more powerful, reply in the same direction the question on the power of the provincial general assembly. 66 per cent of the councilors defended that the provincial general assembly has to be more powerful as this would strengthen the local democracy and participation. Interestingly, 35 per cent of the councilors have no idea at all on the existing situation of the provincial general assembly and strengthening it by new administration laws. It is expected from the elected councilors to have a degree of knowledge on the laws concerning the municipality, local administration and on the bodies which create these institutions. More than one third of the councilors do not have an idea on provincial general assembly and considering the fact that councilors are highly educated section of the society and taking part in one of the key organs of the municipality, it is not unfair to conclude that they do not pay attention to wider local political issues such as provincial councils.

It is one of the widely shared criticisms that the standing committees in municipalities are too powerful given the fact that considerable number of members taking part in these assemblies are not elected. In this regard, it is important to learn the councilors own views on this issue as standing committees in fact act in certain issues on behalf of the municipal councils.

	Councilors	per cent
Elected and attended members should be equal	17	58.62
Majority of the members should be elected	5	17.24
All the members should be elected	4	13.79
All the members should be assigned technicians	2	6.89
Other	1	3.44
Total	29	100

 Table 41: How should be the municipal standing committees' structure?

The majority of councilors think that the numbers of elected and attended members of municipal standing committee should be equal. Surprisingly, only 31 per cent of the councilors think that either majority or all the members of the standing committee should be elected members. Perhaps, even more interestingly, 6.89 per cent of the councilors think that all members of the committee should be appointed. Such findings make one wonder how council members value the democracy itself.

In corporatist thoughts the main concern is on the assigned bureaucrats rather than elected members or representatives. These bureaucrats are seen as important actors in the decisions of allocation of resources, and service provision. The municipal standing committee is such a channel where important decisions are made. The councilors of Denizli Municipality do not agree with these kinds of views where the bureaucrats are more important than the elected members and state that the prevailing condition of municipal standing committee should be changed and more elected members should take part in these institutions.

		Councilors
1	Mayor	19
2	Municipal Council	8
3	Municipal standing committee	6
4	Bureaucracy	3
5	Citizens	2
6	Businessmen	2
7	Municipal companies	2

Table 42: Power distribution in the municipal administration

The councilors were asked about the power sharing in the municipality. 45. 23 per cent of the Councilors replied that the most powerful body is the mayor. After the

mayor, municipal councils and municipal standing committees take the second and third places respectively. The three important bodies of the municipal administration (the mayor, the municipal council, and the municipal standing committee) are stated as main answers (78.57 per cent of the total answers). Only four members pointed to the citizens as the most powerful actor in municipal politics. Despite the fact that there are only two councilors see the municipal bureaucracy as the most powerful one, this finding should be interpreted by taking into those views that see the municipal standing committee as the most powerful organ into account, given the fact that there is a strong involvement of the municipal bureaucracy in this committee. Additionally, there are two councilors who see the business groups as the most powerful actors in municipal politics.

		Councilors
1	Municipal Council	15
2	Mayor	9
3	Municipal standing committee	8
4	Citizens	4
5	Businessmen	2
6	Bureaucracy	2

Table 43: Who should be more powerful in the municipal administration?

It is not perhaps surprising that most of the councilors think that the Council should be the most powerful body in the municipality rather than mayors. They are keen on having some degree of control and influence on the mayor's actions. It is interesting also to note that they value the municipal standing committee more than the citizens.

Tuble The powerful external groups at the manerpanties			
		Total	
1	Merchants / small entrepreneurs	21	
2	Businessmen / Industrialists	15	
3	Headmen	12	
4	Party organization	12	
5	Squatter housing owners	12	
6	Citizens	11	
7	Institutions	10	
8	Other	1	

Table 44: The powerful external groups at the municipalities

The most powerful and effective groups in Denizli municipality seem to be the merchants, small entrepreneurs and businessmen on the view of the councilors. According to the answers of the councilors those who live at squatter houses and the other citizens have equal power on the local administrators (12 per cent and 11 per cent).

While evaluating these results, we have to keep in mind that textile industry and its side industries are the main items for the development of Denizli. At the economic and demographic improvements took part in Denizli in the last years, it is easily recognized that textile and its growing side industries are the most important effectives. For that reason it has not to be a sort of surprise that these parts of the society are regarded as having more effects than the others in city life. Again in this question, the headmen of the precincts are underlined by councilors as being powerful in the municipalities as well as political party organizations and squatter house owners. Going back to the representation phenomenon discussed before in this chapter, it is underlined that the most influential and effective groups in the municipalities are entrepreneurs and businessmen. This statement is again underlined by the councilors themselves. 39 per cent of the councilors stated their ideas in this way.

		Councilors	per cent
1	Non governmental organizations (NGO)	6	29
2	Squatter housing owners	5	24
3	Low incomers	3	14
4	Powerless section	3	14
5	Student	2	9,5
6	People in general	2	9,5
Total		21	100

 Table 45: The sections excluded from the municipality

By the councilors, squatter housing owners, low level incomers, and NGOs were pointed as those that are excluded from the municipal administration. Half of the members of TPP group left this answer blank, and the rest pointed as NGO and squatter house owners. The councilors from different parties, generally, agree that low-income groups who live at deprived areas at the periphery of the city are excluded from the municipal processes.

While evaluating this kind of questions and answers, it may give better result if the low level incomers and the people from slum areas be put in the same category. The councilors, while answering that question, using different terminologies or words, actually meant the same. The squatter housing owners, low income families and powerless sections are put together and reach the level of 52 per cent. All of the Left wing councilors agree that the low level income groups living in deprived areas are excluded from municipality and those groups are non-effective or influential in municipal services.

Although the councilors answered easily the question of "which groups are more effective in the municipality", especially right wing councilors were reluctant to answer the question "which groups are excluded in the municipality". 5 from TPP, 2 from MLP, 1 from NAP, 1 from YP did not answer this question while all members of DLP and RPP answered. Considering 31 per cent of the councilors left this question blank, we can reach the conclusion that the councilors do not dare to express the reality.

	Yes	No	Total
RPP	5	-	5
INDEPENDENT	5	2	7
ТРР	4	2	6
NAP	1	1	2
MLP	-	1	1
DLP	3	-	3
Total	18	6	24

Table 46: Influence of powerful groups in decision-making processes.

Consistent with the above findings, the left wing councilors believe that the powerful groups manage to solve their problems easier than any other group in the municipalities. Those who oppose this argument are the members who reject to reply the previous question. While 63 per cent of the councilors answered as "yes" to this question, 20 per cent said "no".

The council members, except 20 per cent of them, stated that they are aware of this kind of activities of powerful groups. Even so, the members of the council do not seem to be interested in this fact, as these kinds of problems are never brought to the municipal council meetings.

5.3.2.2.2. Evaluation

As pluralists argue the local governments may provide wide spread platforms for people to participate in decision making processes. As they are the closest level of government to ordinary citizens, their existence allow the people to take part in decision making which is assumed to be more difficult in higher levels of government. However, the municipal councils' powers are subject to questioning. It should be evaluated if the municipal councils are strong enough by the ideas of the councilors. As they are having duties in the council, in the decision-making processes and in local administration their ideas shall be helpful.

The municipal councils should work properly in the decision-making processes in order to sustain the equal representation of the citizens and the society as a whole. In order to do this, the council should have enough power to monitor and control these processes. About these subjects councilors claim that the mayor is the strongest body in municipal administration and the council's powers are not enough to check and control his activities.

Instrumentalists like O'Connor states that local authorities are dominated by competitive capital. Cockburn claims that municipal councils co-ordinate the interests of a dominant class and concludes in her study that main function local councils is the reproduction of local labor power through the provision of housing, social services and etc.

Like these views corporatists argue that local councils are not influential in decisionmaking processes at the local level. Entrepreneurs and businessmen are said to have greater influence by these theorists. Following these arguments and the answers and ideas of the councilors in Denizli, it may be concluded that the municipal councils are not properly working representative bodies in local policy processes. They are elected bodies which give them very significant responsibilities. But in order to fulfill these responsibilities, their powers should be reorganized.

The powerful mayor phenomenon is valid in the municipal administration in Denizli. In addition to the representation problems that the municipal councils cannot overcome, the problem of powerful mayor-weak council in a structural context also creates more problems for representation. The effects of these structural defects show themselves with the problems in local service provision.

The councilors in Denizli municipality stated that (with a ratio of 37.5 per cent) the municipal council should be more powerful than the mayor in order to control and monitor his/her activities. 66.7 per cent of them stated that the municipal council should be strengthened very quickly because of the rapid social and economic changes in Denizli. If their suggestion is in this manner, it should be understood that there is not enough control or maybe no control on the activities of the mayor. This concept cannot be accepted and justified with any idea of democracy and it underlines the under-representation phenomenon. The democracy in the local political processes becomes arguable with the above stated concepts.

The councilors of Denizli municipality were (in the informal talks mostly) pessimist about the inner working of the municipal councils. They do not think that these important representative bodies are able to deal with the problems in their city in a successful way. Main idea of them was that the council is an organ of the municipality where specific issues are voted, without deeper examination.

These ideas create some doubts in mind related to the meaning which is given to the municipal councils in the name of democratic decision-making. These mechanisms should have the right for exclusive control of public policy as they are elected by the citizens. The determination of the policies should be done by the council if it is, in real meaning, the actual representative body of municipal administration. However, in practice the reflections of the public as a whole cannot be seen in the policies which are made.

Besides the weaknesses of the council in decision-making processes, the councilors' other argument was about the exclusion of some parts of the society from the municipal administration. These parts were low-income families, squatter owners, and powerless sections (as expressed by councilors). 52 per cent of the councilors agreed on this issues which may be understood as they believe in the under-representation of these groups in the municipality and also they believe that these groups are excluded from these processes. Following their own words, it is claimed that the economically and politically powerful groups in the society always get their problems solved in the municipality. 75 per cent of the councilors stated this as fact that is valid for all local governmental systems. These confessions are against the idea of pluralist thoughts which claims that every part of the society has influence on the decisions made by the local governments. The optimistic views of the pluralists on local authorities are that they are bodies which create new paths for the interest groups to raise their voices, make it possible to control the local politicians' activities, and for participation.

Again in these types of subjects, there is a separation between the right wing and left-wing political parties in the council. Left-wing parties totally agree that economically and politically powerful groups can find solutions a lot easier in the municipal processes where some of the councilors from right-wing parties do not answer or give negative answers to this question.

5.3.2.2.3. Inner Working of the Municipality

	Yes, suitable	No, not suitable	No opinion	total
RPP	3	1	1	5
INDEPENDENT	4	1	2	7
TPP	6	2	-	8
NAP	1	-	-	1
MLP	1	-	-	1
DLP	2	-	1	3
YP	1	-	-	1
Total	18	4	4	26
	(69.2 per cent)	(15.4 per cent)	(15.4 per cent)	20

Table 47: Should the Council decide on local taxes?

A high percentage of the councilors (70 per cent) stated that the authority has to be given to the council to issue taxes. Like the answers to the question about the tutelage, some of the councilors stated that they have no idea on this subject or left empty that line. 25 per cent of the council members of Denizli municipality have no interest at all about the taxing power of the municipality and 21 per cent of them do not have idea about the tutelage on local administration. The knowledge of the councilors about the public administration law as well as issues on legislation will be discussed in the next part where the legislative questionnaires are evaluated.

municipantics.				
	Ideas on the necessity to give new tasks to the			
	municipalities			
	Yes No Total			
RPP	3	2	5	
INDEPENDENT	6	-	6	
TPP	3	5	8	
NAP	1	-	1	
MLP	2	-	2	
DLP	1	2	3	
Total	16	9	25	

Table 48: Do you believe that it is necessary to give new tasks to the municipalities?

The majority of the council members agree that the municipality should have more responsibilities. 64 per cent of the council members believe that municipalities should be given new tasks. TPP is the political party of the mayor and the councilors from TPP agree that municipality cannot overcome other responsibilities than it has today. The mayor himself also thinks in that way. The political parties which do not have the majority claimed the necessities of new services and that municipality's responsibilities should be increased to other areas including education, health services etc.

The new tasksCouncilorsTraffic Control7Education Services4Health Services2Social services2Total15

Table 49: What should be the new tasks of the municipalities?

Among these possible new tasks, the traffic control is in the first line, because Denizli has big problems in traffic congestion problem, as its population is concentrated in a very limited area in the center. For that reason 46 per cent the council members state this as very important problem to be solved in the city. Education, health and some social services were also pointed out by some councilors as the services that should be under the responsibility of the municipality.

	All services should be privatized	According to the means of the services	None of the services should be privatized	Total
RPP	-	5	-	5
INDEPENDENT	-	7	-	7
TPP	2	7	-	9
NAP	1	1	-	2
MLP	1	1	-	2
DLP	-	3	-	3
YP	-	1	-	1
Total	4	25	-	29

Table 50: Ideas on the privatization of municipal services

The councilors share the idea that the privatization of some municipal services will be helpful to deliver those services more rapid, easier, and in a better way. They also added that the privatization would be better if it is implemented according to the nature and the quality of the services. About the services to be in privatization program, the cleaning service is marked as the first one. The councilors mentioned that those services that the municipality cannot manage because of lack of finance, staff or equipment have to be privatized immediately.

An important point is that none of the councilors reacted against privatization. There are six different political parties and also independent members in the municipal council in Denizli, and despite the enormous ideological differences in their political party programs, none of them stood against privatization. Almost every councilor stated that the privatization should be used according to the nature of the service and considering its necessity (86.20 per cent) and 4 members of the council belonging to the right wing parties stated that all municipal services must be privatized.

		Councilors
1	Street cleaning and garbage colleting services	13
2	Services that the municipality can not succeed	6
3	Technical department	4
4	Transportation	4
5	All of them	2

Table 51: Which services should be privatized?

The overwhelming supports for privatization in the municipal services in the council are, in a way, a reflection of the neo-liberal thought. The new-right thinkers claim that the market mechanisms should be used extensively in the local administration.

	Are the municipal	Are the municipal companies useful?		
	Yes	No		
RPP	1	4	5	
TPP	5	1	6	
NAP	-	2	2	
MLP	1	1	2	
DLP	3	-	3	
INDEPENDENT	4 2		6	
YP	-	-	-	
Total	14	10	24	

Table 52: Are the municipal companies useful?

The councilors from TPP, DLP and independent group defended that the municipal companies are useful where the other members mentioned that those companies give harm to the municipal administration. 60 per cent of the councilors, while defending that the municipal companies are useful, underlined the importance of faster service provisions and cheaper costs. Related to the harms of the municipal companies, the non-productivity and corruption are pointed out. The councilors who find the municipal companies useless claimed that there are illegal activities going on inside these municipal companies and accountability is a major problem.

There is a municipal company in Denizli municipality called BELTAŞ. The executive committee of that company consists of 2 members of TPP, 2 independent members, 1 of NAP, and 1 of MLP in the council. 1 member from the independent group is the accountant of that company. The executive committee members are

elected by the mayor at the general meeting of the company. The deputy mayor was the chairman of the executive committee of BELTAŞ in between the years 2000-2002. It should not be surprising that those councilors who are executive committee members in the company mention that the municipal companies are useful.

Some of the councilors underlined the fact that the existence of some councilors at the executive committee of the municipal companies may create inspection problems. This is true, in fact, as far as the productivity and legality concepts are concerned, because the people who manage the companies are the ones who investigate and control its activities. Beside this side of legality, the productivity issue is important as the same people are controlling the financial management of these companies.

	Councilors	per cent
Municipalities should not get loans	5	20
Municipalities should not get foreign loans	2	8
Loans should be used in large scale and key	18	72
projects		
Total	25	100

	Table 53:	The ideas on	municipal dept
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The majority of the councilors agree that the municipality has to get loans and borrowings in order to finance the municipal services. They stated that the mayor should not be afraid of getting internal or external dept to accomplish the important municipal duties. 80 per cent of RPP group stated that municipality should not get loans. 71 per cent of the group of TPP agrees that the municipality can be in dept and get loans for important services. This shows that there is an ideological division in the council on this matter in a similar way to the position taken on the privatization.

	Yes	No	No idea	Total
RPP	4	1	-	5
INDEPENDENT	6	-	1	7
TPP	7	1	-	8
NAP	2	-	-	2
MLP	2	-	-	2
DLP	1	-	2	3
Total	22 (75.9 per cent)	2 (6.9 percent)	3 (10.3 per cent)	27

Table 54: Is it necessary for the municipality to use private companies to achieve some duties? (According to political parties)

Another question where the ratios of the answers are close to each other is the question about the obstacles the municipality faces. According to councilors, most of the problems result from the external factors such as legal framework, financial obstacles and tutelage. Regarding the internal dynamics of municipality only problem pointed out by the councilors is the municipal staff which itself may not be considered solely created by the internal dynamics of the municipality.

	Councilors	per cent
Laws	10	34.5
Municipal staff	4	13.8
Financial subjects	10	34.5
Tutelage of state	1	3.4
No answer	4	13.8
Total	29	100.0

Table 55: Main obstacles the Municipality Faces

It is overwhelmingly argued that the most important obstacles are legal framework and the financial difficulties the municipalities face. 6 councilors from TPP, 2 from RPP, and 2 from independent group marked "the laws" as the most problem generating phenomenon.

How often the councilors meet the mayor?							
	Often	Often Occasionally Rarely None Total					
RPP	1	2	1	1	5		
TPP	2	3	2	1	8		
NAP	-	-	2	-	2		
MLP	1	-	1	-	2		
DLP	-	-	2	1	3		
INDEPENDENT	2	-	4	1	7		
YP	1	-	-	-	1		
Total	7	5	12	4	28		

 Table 56: How often the councilors meet the mayor?

When we examine the meetings of the councilors with the mayor, we see that the party differences are not important. Only 25 per cent of the council members meet the mayor frequently for the requests on employment or local services. This ratio is the same in the TPP group which is the group of the mayor. This shows that party membership is not important to meet the mayor frequently. Councilors stated that the friendly relations are more important. 57.14 per cent of the councilors rarely meet the mayor or do not meet him at all. This percentage is very high if we think that another 17.85 per cent of the councilors stated that they occasionally see the mayor and talk with him.

The mayor is at the top level of the decision making body in local administration. The reason of the existence of the council is that the different parts of the citizens have to be represented in the administration and the requests arising from different parts of the society have to be discussed. Another function of the council is that the councilors help the mayor in the municipal activities.

In these administrational activities the mayor and the councilors meet at certain periods of the year, and try to find solutions to the problems. The council meetings are held three times a year, in October, February and June. In the meetings done in June, the annual working report of the mayor is discussed. In February meetings general requests, mainly the planning requests, are discussed. In October meetings in Denizli, mainly the municipal budget is prepared. With the words of a councilor:

"...the budget which is prepared by the mayor is discussed in the council".

It is another fact that in the rapidly growing towns like Denizli those meeting periods are not enough to overcome the difficulties. For that reason it is necessary that the councilors, from time to time, have to visit the mayor to report about the requests or other developments in town. It may be useful in solving problems if the councilors meet the mayor in regular terms. In this sense, the lack of communication between the mayor and the councilors may cause many problems, making it harder not only for the solution of the problems but as well for the representation of the citizens in the administration.

When we consider the fact that the people who have different political ideas reach their party representatives in the national parliament for their problems; this fact is valid for the council members in the local administration. In consideration with this question, 68 per cent of the councilors stated that the people visit their offices to present their requests. 66 per cent of the councilors, who are the members of mayor's party, TPP, stated that people tell their requests in the town hall building. It is a fact that in order to find solutions for the requests or for the problems which are coming from the citizens, the discussions should be held between the mayor and the councilors more frequently and regularly.

	Councilors	per cent
Often	6	21.4
Occasionally	9	32.1
Rarely	10	35.7
Lack of Communication	3	10.7
Total	28	100.0

Table 57: Interaction between Councilors and the Municipal Departments

Councilors answered in similar ratios to the question of discussing planning matters with technicians. Those who replied this question negatively also stated that those kinds of problems do not reach them. This is a valid statement as it was discussed before in Table 46b and Table 47. Some of the councilors state that they are not interested in planning subjects or matters. Interestingly, only 2 out of 15 members who are technical people in the council stated that they meet the technical staff

frequently, and one of them stated that he never met with the technical staff in the municipality.

	Often	Sometimes	Seldom	None	Total
Engineer (mechanical,	2	3	2	1	8
chemical, civil)	2	5	2	1	0
Architect	-	2	2	-	4
Retired (civil servant)	2	-	2	-	4
Accountant	-	-	2	1	3
Businessman	1	1	-	-	2
Merchant	-	1	1	-	2
Lawyer	1	-	-	1	2
Technician	-	2	1	-	3
Total	6	9	10	3	28

 Table 58: How often do the councilors discuss with the technical people on planning matters (classified according to professions of the councilors)

The most debated subjects in the council meetings are development plans and technical issues. All of the political party representatives share the same view. The budget issues are the second most debated subjects. The council members who are elected from TPP, which is the political party of the mayor, all rejected that the budget issues are debated widely.

 Table 59: The most debated subjects in the council

	Councilors
Planning – squatter housing –technical department	23
Budget	10
Salaries or payments for services	3
Other	2
Partisanship	2
Municipal tenders	1

When the least debated subjects were asked, the routine municipal services were stated as the first subject. The municipal social services are not included in these services. Cleaning and health related matters, community education etc. are the least discussed topics.

	Councilors	per cent
Routine municipal services	16	51.7
Municipal social services	3	6.9
The situations of the municipal employees	2	6.9
Town planning	2	3.4
Instructions and regulations	1	3.4
Other	1	3.4

Table 60: The least debated subjects at the council

The routine municipal services took the first line by the answers of the councilors for the least debated subjects. The social activities of the municipality are not included in those answers. By the routine municipal services, cleaning, health, public education, municipal security are meant.

 Table 61: The primary subject that has to be debated in the council but not debated

	Councilors
Planning	10
The quality of the municipal services	3
The municipal investments	3
Transportation	2
Environmental subjects	2
Other	3

The councilors stated that the subject must be debated at the council meetings are "city's physical development and planning". After this subject, the quality of municipal services, the municipal investments, and the transportation is stated. Transportation has become a real big problem of city and it was underlined by the councilors that Denizli municipality has to take more responsibilities on this issue. What is interesting is that despite the fact that planning issues are top issues discussed in the council meetings, the councilors seem to be not happy with the level of discussion as they want more detailed discussion in the council meetings.

	Very good	Good	Bad	Very bad
Dianning department	1	6	14	2
Planning department	(4 per cent)	(26 per cent)	(60 per cent)	(8 per cent)
Technical	2	10	8	2
department	(9 per cent	(45 per cent)	(36 per cent)	(9 per cent)
Public relation	4	12	2	3
Fublic Telation	(19 per cent)	(57 per cent)	(9 per cent)	(14 per cent)
Health	1	10	9	3
Ileann	(4 per cent)	(43 per cent)	(39 per cent)	(13 per cent)
Security	1	6	13	2
Security	(4.5 per cent)	(27 per cent)	(59 per cent)	(9 per cent)
Mass transportation	1	13	8	1
Mass transportation	(4 per cent)	(56 per cent)	(34 per cent)	(4 per cent)
Culture and art	7	11	4	1
	(30 per cent)	(47 per cent)	(17 per cent)	(4 per cent)
Public training	1	3	13	5
	(4.5 per cent)	(13.5 per cent)	(59 per cent)	(23 per cent)
Cleaning	1	6	13	3
Citaling	(4 per cent)	(26 per cent)	(56 per cent)	(13 per cent)
Tutelage on health	1	6	11	4
and food	(4.5 per cent)	(27 per cent)	(50 per cent)	(18 per cent)
Recreational areas	1	9	10	3
	(4 per cent)	(39 per cent)	(43 per cent)	(13 per cent)
Fire department	3	17	2	1
rne ucpartment	(13 per cent)	(73 per cent)	(8 per cent)	(4 per cent)

Table 62: The success ratio of the municipality

The majority of councilors state that Denizli municipality is successful on the activities concerning public relation, art and culture, mass transportation, fire department. For the municipal activities on planning, recreational areas, and cleaning councilors argue that the municipality is not successful. It is worth noting that those services such as planning and cleaning are seen as the areas where the municipality is not successful.

It is important to find out the knowledge of the councilors on the financial structure of the municipality as they are one of the main decision making body. It is interesting to note that they are not well informed on this subject.

	Councilors	per cent
Yes	8	27.58
No	16	55.17
No answer	5	17.24
Total	29	100.0

Table 63: Do you know the municipality's external dept

	Councilors	per cent
Yes	8	27.58
No	16	55.17
No answer	5	17.24
Total	29	100.0

Table 64: Do you know the municipality's internal dept

The members of Denizli municipal council are not well aware of the municipal dept. 55.17 per cent of them say that they do not know the external and the internal dept of municipality. Also five councilors did not give any answer to this question. If we take this group into account it is 72.41 per cent of the councilors are not well informed about the financial situation of the municipality.

Those who declared that they have some idea about the debt of the municipality, have considerable different figures on this issue. 3 members from RPP group declared that they know about the external dept and claimed interestingly that the municipality does not have any debt. Those members who declared that Denizli municipality has external dept stated that the dept of municipality as 10-14 billion TL. Some of the members stated that the internal dept is about 5-9 billion TL. It was announced by the mayor in the council meeting in February 2004 that the dept of the municipality is not more than 8 billion TL. The opposition councilors stated that the mayor's argument is not true.

As we see about one of the main difficulty the municipality faces is the legal framework within which the municipalities comply with. Therefore it is important to learn about the councilors' view on the new draft Municipal Bill in the parliament. In the following section we will look at this issue.

	Councilors	per cent
Yes	14	48.3
No	2	6.9
No idea	8	27.6
No answer	5	17.2
Total	29	100.0

Table 65: Is the new local administration law project creating necessary changes?

40 per cent of the councilors had pointed out "the administrative laws" when they were asked about the obstacles in front of the municipalities (Table 60). When they were asked whether the new draft on the local administration law will be sufficient to solve those problems, 48 per cent of the councilors told that they believe so. The sum of those who have no idea and those who do not answer this question is high as 45 per cent. Those councilors who point out that they have no idea on this subject are the ones who gave the same answers in the question about provincial general assemblies (Table 41). These councilors are from RPP, TPP and independent group at both of the questions. The answers for both of the questions are cross-tabbed at the below table.

Table 66: The ideas of the members of the municipal council about the local administration law project and about the strengthening of the provincial general assembly

		What do you think about giving more power to the provincial general assembly			
		Positive Negative No answer total			total
What do you think about the new local	Positive	11	-	-	11
	Negative	1	1	-	2
administration law	No idea	3	1	4	8
Total		15	2	4	21

It is also interesting to find out that considerable number of councilors is not well informed on the current municipal law which provides the legal framework within which councilors themselves have to work and comply with.

Do you know about the law no. 1580? (Municipal law)	Councilors	per cent
I know very well	3	14.28
I know	8	38.09
I know little	10	47.61
I don't know	-	-
Total	21	100

Table 67: Ideas about the municipal law

It is interesting to note that 47 per cent of the councilors admit that they know little about the current law. This is worrying about the councilors' competence on the local government affairs despite the fact that they hold one of the key positions in the municipal decision making processes.

Subjects to be changed in the law	Councilors		
The members of the municipal standing committee	0		
should be elected from the council	9		
The municipal council should control the mayor	8		
The authority of the council should be increased	7		
Representatives of the NGO's should be in the council	4		
The mayor should be elected from the council	1		
The governor should not interfere to the decisions	1		

 Table 68: Which two subjects should be changed in the law no. 1580?

The most popular subject to be changed in the municipal law is the one about the election of the municipal standing committee members. 9 councilors said that they all should be elected from the municipal council. This idea means that they do not find the situation today as democratic. 38.09 per cent of the municipal councilors agreed that the municipal council does not have control on the activities of the mayor. They stated that the council's powers are not enough in order to check and have a strict control over mayor's decisions or activities. Likewise, 7 of the 21 councilors said that the powers of the council should be increased. These answers show that most of the councilors are not happy with the power of the municipal council. They see that the committees are not working healthy, its decisions are not reflecting the will of people in general, the council has not enough strength to control the decision making processes and the mayor is seen as the main actor who is holding the power in his hands.

Do you know about the law on public administration?	Councilors	per cent
I know it very well	2	9.5
I know	5	23.8
I know little	5	23.8
I don't know	9	42.85
Total	21	100

Table 69: Knowledge on the New Draft Bill on the public administration

Another important point is that the councilors know very little about the new draft bill on Public Administration. The majority said that (42.85 per cent) they do not know, and 23.8 per cent added that they just know very few details about it. Together with their little knowledge about municipal law, their little awareness of the public administration shows clearly that the councilors do not have much interest in these subjects. As the councilors, after 4 years of the elections, have little information on the law that concern them most, this creates doubts about how they act on subjects and make decisions that are depending on these laws.

5.3.2.2.5. Evaluation

In order to understand the ideas of the councilors for the internal working of the municipality, questions on tasks of municipality, services to be privatized, private company use in service provision, topics of council meetings, most debated subjects, municipal dept, etc. are asked.

As discussed at the previous section, the councilors are more enthusiastic about rendering services effectively, efficiently and properly than ideas of local democracy. This fact is most obvious in the answers of the councilors on the subjects above.

First of all, the councilors overwhelmingly claimed that the municipal council should be able to establish taxes in a limited frame. In order to strengthen the municipal council economically councilors agree that the council should not settle for the aid coming from the central government. Like many other municipalities, Denizli municipality does not have enough resources to face the rapid growing urban problems in the city.

Secondly, none of the councilors were against privatization of certain local services. They claimed that for some of the local services privatization is a useful tool in the municipality's hands.

Like the concept of privatization 14 councilors stated that municipal companies are useful tools of the municipality. Councilors' claim was that in order to achieve some duties these companies might be beneficial; however, they find the existing situation problematic in terms of accountability. There are some councilors in the management of these companies which make them unable to control both in economic and efficiency areas.

Keleş and Toprak argue that the above concept creates problems about 'occupational ethics' (2000). The properties of the politicians and civil servants are mixed up in these processes. As the councilors are not much informed about the technical subjects in the municipal companies, more problems arise than the ones that are solved.

78 per cent of the councilors agree that private companies should be used in order to achieve proper and effective service provision. There is a consistence on their answers on privatization, municipal company establishments, and private company use in local service provision and relying on these views it may be concluded that municipal councilors in Denizli are passionate for steady, effective pro per local service provision and they believe that these objectives could only be sustained by the use of market forces given the current conditions of the municipality in terms of financial, legal as well as the staff restrictions.

Considering the council meetings the most debated subjects are the planning issues and the budget of the municipality. Councilors agree that the technical issues especially planning, causes much argument in the meetings. Following these discussions, the municipal budget is the subject to create heated arguments in the meetings. This may be accepted normal, as the councilors say, the budget prepared by the mayor is opposed by the other political groups in the municipal council.

Another point which is underlined by the councilors is that they do not know their municipality's dept (both external and internal). Their claim was that the mayor himself organizes the budget; it is voted in the council and accepted. After this stage they do not know what is going on in the financial side of the municipal services. The councilors stated that they are not able to learn the dept of the municipality even when they wanted to.

5.3.2.2.6. Council-Citizens Relations

	Councilors	per cent
Positive	21	72.4
Negative	1	3.4
No answer	7	24.1
Total	29	100.0

Table 70: The behaviors of councilors to the reactions of the people

The majority of the councilors said that their response to the citizens were in a positive way whether the citizens' reactions are positive or negative about their service provision (72.4 per cent). They also added that this is profitable from the view of democracy, democratic culture, and participation.

	Councilors	per cent
I try to help	12	41.4
I can not help	2	6.9
I do not help	7	24.1
No answer	8	27.6
Total	29	100.0

 Table 71: The behaviors of councilors towards job seeking people

One of the main duties of the councilors is to carry the problems of the people to the council and try to solve them. It is open to discuss to what extend they manage it because of the municipal and the local administration laws and councilors' behaviors and also financial obstacles.

	Councilors	per cent
I try to help	19	65.5
I can not help	1	3.4
I do not help	2	6.9
No answer	7	24.1
Total	29	100.0

Table 72: The behaviors of councilors toward demands on planning issues

It is an undesirable behavior from the point of view of democracy that the councilors are not interested in the requests come from the public. In any case those councilors who try to help the people to solve their problems are in the majority.

Those councilors who are sensitive to their voters stated that they inform the people who ask help for getting a job about the absolute authority of the mayor in the employment issues; and for that reason they cannot help them on that occasion. Those councilors who have good relations with the mayor or those who are from the same political party with the mayor have more chance to get solution for the problems of the people.

It may give right result if we consider those who "try to help" and those who "can not help" together. Those councilors 'who can not help' should be regarded as the ones who 'try to help' because they stated that they cannot help as they are not powerful in the council or they constitute the minority in the council. Because of this, their ability to help people by bringing their problems to the council is low. Some of the councilors said that they have no power or influence in the municipality to find solutions for the problems and the mayor is reluctant when they transfer the requests of the people to the mayor.

We can argue for those councilors who say "they do not help" that they are far from the problems of the people and so far from the problems of the town. Another result we can get from this fact is that those councilors are also not so well interested in the decisions made at the council meetings.

25 per cent of the councilors left both questions blank. Those who do not reply these questions are the TPP and independent group members (These two groups act

together in the council and create majority together in the council meetings). The answering rate of those kind questions at the majority group is quite low.

The reason of this may be so that they are not happy to be in this kind of problems such as getting job or solving planning requests. Another reason may be that they meet more requests since they are the members of the majority group.

Do the businessmen have special requests			
Party	Yes	No	Total
RPP	1	4	5
ТРР	5	3	8
NAP	1	1	2
MLP	1	-	1
DLP	2	1	3
INDEPENDENT	2	4	6
YP	-	-	-
Total	12	13	25

 Table 73: Do the businessmen have special requests?

Another point that divides the councilors in two poles is the question asked about the businessmen especially from textile industry, whether they had special private requests from the councilors. Those councilors who had those special requests stated that the requests were on planning generally. Almost all those requests were private and for the increase of construction intensity on their land or the legalization of the factory buildings that they built up illegally.

We should keep in mind that when the businessmen and the citizens are applying to the councilors, they are quite selective on the councilor whether that councilor is effective in the municipality or not. So that, it is a reality that some of the councilors never get any request application during their membership. The requests go intensively to those councilors who have good dialog with the mayor and to those who are believed to solve the problems in the municipality. For that reason it is logical that the numbers of those councilors who say they get request and who say they do not get request are equal. Those councilors who state that they get special request from the businessmen claimed that they take those requests to the party group in the council and get technical support. 27 per cent of the council members give priority to those kind requests. The reason for that they mention is that they try to have solution for unemployment and they try to help the development of Denizli.

According to the councilors, in Turkey, where the unemployment is a big problem, to reject a request of businessmen that may help the solution of that problem or create possibilities for employment is considered as treachery to the national economy or urban economy even if it is illegal. 15 councilors did not reply to the below question and it should be understood that they did not want to give a negative answer because of the above mentioned facts (51.72 per cent). This situation also brings to our minds that when the councilors left blank answers, it means that they approached the question in a reluctant way. 8 councilors stated that these requests should have a priority where 6 of them denied this phenomenon.

	Do these r			
	Yes	No	No answer	Total
RPP	1	-	4	5
INDEPENDENT	2	2	3	7
TPP	2	1	6	9
NAP	1	-	1	2
MLP	1	1	-	2
DLP	1	2	-	3
YP	-	-	1	1
Total	8	6	15	29

Table 74: Do the requests of businessmen and especially requests of textile industry should have priority?

There are many studies which show the domination of economic and business interests in the policy making processes. Hunter's study is one of these where he tries to figure out the economic elites' roles in the policy making processes. The policy formation stages are in the hands of economic elites and the only elected figure as a representative of the citizens was the mayor in the policy making group (Hunter, 1953 cited in Harding, 1995). It can not be said that in a city where its main employment and development is having its power from industry, the industrialist do

not play a crucial role in decision making processes. Hunter gets a step further by emphasizing that nothing in the city of Atlanta could happen without the permission of the business-dominated elite. In Denizli Municipal council only six councilors refused that the requests of the businessmen/industrialist should have priority (20.68 per cent) which can be understood as their requests are carrying some priority in councilor's heads.

	Councilors
Their own offices	19
Town hall building	13
Party building	6
Their own houses	3
Institutions	-

Table 75: Meeting Place of Councilors with Citizens

The councilors were asked for the places they get requests. Most of the councilors replied that their offices or working places are the main places for requests. The councilors from the mayor's party TPP replied that they met the requests mostly at the town hall building. Among the answers, "party building" reply has a very low level. The party buildings are very important places during the elections. After the elections those party places, where many words are given during the election campaign, loose their importance. This questionnaire was given to the councilors 5 months before the election, so there was no activity at the party buildings at that period.

		Councilors	per cent
1	Party building	7	20
2	Town hall building	6	17
3	Offices	6	17
4	Precinct meetings	5	14,5
5	Open bazaars	4	11,5
6	Tea houses	3	8,6
7	Party meetings	2	5,7
8	At the institutions	1	2,85
9	By the Headman	1	2,85
Total		35	100

 Table 76:
 Meeting Place of Councilors with Party Supporters

The councilors who suggested the precinct to be arranged as a step in local administration, and that the headmen should be in the municipal council put the headmen in the last position for the question of place for meeting their constituents. They see the headman as an important figure in local administration but they do not meet or talk to the headmen often according to their explanations. Party buildings, town hall building, and their offices share the first three lines while the precinct meetings are at the fourth line.

	Councilors	per cent
Not participated at all	9	32.1
By giving money, real estate, labor, equipment	9	32,1
By informing the necessities	9	32.1
By reacting against the decisions and the activities	1	3.6
Total	28	100.0

Table 77: The participation of the people in municipal services

The councilors think that the citizens do not react against the council decisions at all, and act easy for municipal activities. Only one council member stated that the people participate in the municipal activities by reacting to the council decisions. It is mentioned that the citizens in Denizli tend to participate by informing the local administration about their needs and problems. 32 per cent of councilors think that people participate by giving money or land or equipment to the municipality as donation.

	Councilors	per cent
Yes	3	10.3
No	20	69.0
No answer	6	20.7
Total	29	100.0

Table 78: Citizens' reactions against the council decisions?

Only three of the councilors claimed that the people living in Denizli react to the council decisions (10.3 per cent). 69 per cent of the councilors believe that citizens do not react against the council decisions in any way. This can be identified with the

thesis of Dahl (1961), where he states that many people are mostly worried about their daily lives rather than what is going on the local political arena or in the municipality. So they are not interested in these processes or they do not take part in any of these processes in any time (Dahl, 1961).

As they are busy in their daily and have little interest in politics, they do not know or try to learn the decisions taken by the municipality unless the decision affects them in some way. In addition to this, Dahl claimed that he does not worry about the political passiveness of the citizens. His main argument was, in representative democracies the elected members –representatives- should be and also are sensitive to the interest of their constituents. He states that the politicians must get their justification in some way.

	Councilors	per cent
Yes	19	65.5
No	4	13.8
No answer	6	20.7
Total	29	100.0

Table 79: Should Denizli municipality be a metropolitan municipality?

82 per cent of the council members agree that Denizli municipality should be accepted as metropolitan municipality. For most of the councilors the law no.3030 for greater municipalities is not sufficient. 51 per cent of the councilors who state that they have no idea about that greater municipality law show how sensitive the councilors' approach is for Denizli to be metropol town. The answers of the councilors to the question on problems which may be solved easily if Denizli be accepted as metropol town are planning activities in town, more pro per and effective municipal service provision.

Administratively there are 20 municipalities connected to the central town. 12 of those municipalities are very close to the downtown of Denizli (Kınıklı, Kayhan, Bağbaşı, Servergazi, Göveçlik, Bereketli, Hallaçlar, Üçler, Göveçlik, Gümüşler, Korucuk, Akkale municipalities). Because of that reason the enlargement of the periphery of Denizli municipality is impossible. All those small municipalities make

their own decisions in cases like city planning. This situation causes many difficulties in integrity of planning and its implementations.

Since those municipalities are very near to the Denizli downtown, the traffic problem at the central town is very visible. The argument of the councilors on Denizli being metropol town can be accepted logical from this aspect. The council members believe that when Denizli becomes metropol town, the integrity in planning can be achieved.

Those councilors who are against Denizli municipality becoming metropolitan municipality argue that those small municipalities should be dismissed and become precincts of Denizli municipality. By this decision Denizli will be integrated town (Bütünşehir). By this decision the town planning will be activated by one hand covering the whole area around the town. This will also help diminishing the planning conflicts among the small municipalities.

Party	Planning issues	Municipal services	Total
RPP	1	3	4
TPP	3	-	3
NAP	-	1	1
MLP	1	-	1
DLP	1	1	2
INDEPENDENT	6	-	6
YP	-	-	-
Total	12	5	17

 Table 80: Benefits of becoming a metropolitan municipality

Table 81:	The main	problem o	f the citv
			,

1	Air pollution	
2	Planning	13
3	Transportation	
4	Lack of technical infrastructure	7
5	Cleaning	2
6	Investments	2
7	Inspections in the services	1

When the main problem of Denizli is asked, the councilors stated mainly the air pollution, transportation, and town planning. The city of Denizli has the worst air pollution in Aegean region and it has the fifth place in Turkey. It is very hard to solve the problem of air pollution because of the use of bad quality coal in industry and in houses for heating. The natural gas and geothermal energy are still not used in the city for both industrial and heating purposes. The traffic is also another big problem in town because of the intensive construction in downtown. Preparing city plans and their applications have great problems in Denizli. The plans are made in delay and those revisions arising during the application stage are far from being useful for the town. Almost all of the councilors (28/29) who are aware of this fact and living in Denizli for more than 20 years give the first line to these three problems.

	Yes	No	Total
RPP	2	3	5
ТРР	4	3	7
NAP	-	1	1
MLP	-	2	2
DLP	2	1	3
INDEPENDENT	2	4	6
ҮР	-	-	-
Total	10	14	24

Table 82: Land Speculation and Squatter Settlement Relation

The illegal constructions or in other words the squatter housing is big problem for those growing towns having rapid urbanization like Denizli. These illegal constructions cause the citizens living at these parts of the town not getting pro per municipal services and also cause problems in the development of the city.

In Denizli, the amount of illegal housing built up on the public land is less when compared with other larger towns. The illegal constructions in the city are on the legal lands of the people but built up without getting legal municipal construction license. These plots are at those areas of town where the 18th clause of developmental law has not been applied yet and for that reason the plots are very

large and divided in many shares. In order to get legal municipal construction license, those lands have to be arranged in small individualized plots appropriate to the town plan.

59 per cent of councilors do not agree with the idea that these kinds of construction cause improper income to the owner. They mentioned that in Denizli, unlikely large towns, these illegally constructed houses are not built up for trade purposes, but used as their own shelters. Only 41 per cent of councilors (10 councilors) believe still that these illegal houses are for improper income reasons.

	Yes	No	Total
RPP	-	5	5
ТРР	3	5	8
NAP	-	2	2
MLP	-	2	2
DLP	-	3	3
INDEPENDENT	-	7	7
ҮР	-	-	-
Total	3	24	27

Table 83: Is the amnesty on illegal housing necessary?

Table 84: The first houses that the council members lived in and the ideas of the council members on amnesty for illegal housing constructions

		Is the amnesty on illegal housing necessary?		Total
		Yes	No	
	Rented-illegal house	1	1	2
The first	Owner-illegal house	-	4	4
house type	Rented-apartment house	1	9	10
that they	Owner-apartment house	-	7	7
lived in	Other	-	3	3
	Total	2	24	26

88 per cent of the councilors agree on the commitment that the amnesty for the illegal housing construction is not necessary. Those councilors argue that these kinds of amnesties always encourage the illegal constructions and degenerate the

laws. They also stated that the amnesty was not accepted since the illegal constructions will increase.

	Councilors	per cent
Yes	20	69.0
No	8	27.6
No Answer	1	3.4
Total	29	100.0

Table 85: Do big stores affect positively the development of Denizli?

Most of the council members believe that the new market understanding having been established in the last years in the central town of Denizli is for the benefit of the development of the town. Those who oppose this idea emphasize that this is not good for the small street grocery stores. Some says that the establishment of the big stores out of the town does not effect the development of the town and so the result is positive.

5.3.2.2.7. Conclusion

This part of the study consists of the information of the municipal councilors on the municipal processes, the working of the municipality and the legislative concepts concerning the municipality. In the first part, questions on municipal law, administrational law, zoning law, and the subjects which should be reorganized or changed in these laws are asked. Moreover, in order to learn the knowledge of the councilors about the duties of municipal councils, municipal standing committees, provincial local administration, similar questions were asked.

In the second part urban processes of the city are tried to be explained briefly by the answers of the councilors. Main problems of the city, places that councilors get requests, requests of businessmen and their priorities, councilors actions towards the requests of the citizens, the situation of Denizli in becoming a metropolitan municipality are the main concepts which are asked to the councilors.

From the answers of the councilors it may be concluded that they are, in general, not fully aware of the working principle of the municipal councils. The municipal law usually becomes some kind of a guide for the councilors. They become informed about the subjects in the law as the degree they are interested. There is no obligation for them to learn the details.

There are no programs for the councilors to learn about the important laws concerning the working principles of the municipality. In the case of Denizli where the majority of the councilors are elected to the municipal council for the first time, this creates problems in the operation of the council and the municipality.

In his study Saunders came across the fact that in Croydon, the members of the Labor Party had 22 chairs out of 29 in the council and they had no prior local government experience. He calls it traumatic and adds that this situation brought these members almost total exclusion from the real decision making processes (1979).

Denizli may be seen as a similar example as the majority of councilors are elected to the council for the first time (82 per cent, 24 out of 29 members). These members did not have an experience in municipal authority before and they learned about the processes simultaneously with the meetings of the council, being elected to the commissions, voting to the issues at hand, etc. The key point is that the councilors learn the necessary laws and regulations if they are really interested in. in the informal talks with some councilors in the town hall; they stated that they do not have time and energy for learning the necessary parts of the related laws. They added that whenever they need some kind of consultation, they refer to the related municipal department for getting information.

Majority of the councilors claimed that they approach positively to the requests of the citizens. Half of the councilors stated that they try to help the citizens in general for the solutions of their problems concerning employment issues. More than half of the councilors (65 per cent) stated that they help people on planning issues. The councilors who stated that they do not help people stated their weakness in the municipality as a councilor. Their argument was that they are not able to solve these kinds of issues as they are the minority in the council and also the mayor has the sole authority in his hands above the weak municipal council.

An important point is that the councilors stated, again in similar ratios (57 per cent) that the requests of the businessmen, especially from the textile industry which is the main development factor of Denizli, should have priority. Their main claim was that rejecting these issues of the textile industrialist, the urban economy of Denizli is damaged. They told that the businessmen's requests are generally employment generating ones (building new factory, building density increase, etc.) and whenever they reject these kinds of requests they are blamed by the society.

The councilors seem to be in some kind of a dilemma. They should give priority to the needs of larger parts of society rather tan special interests of economically powerful groups. However; sometimes there are mutual relationships between these requests where both sides can settle down even the actions are illegal or unethical.

19 out of 23 answers were positive for Denizli municipality becoming a metropolitan municipality. This is a much debated argument in Denizli in the last years and the citizens also seem to have similar thoughts about this issue. The councilors mostly underlined that planning issues will be solved more easily if Denizli municipality becomes a metropolitan municipality. As they stated at many questions, they added that pro per and effective local service provision would be easier if such a development takes place in Denizli.

14 out of 24 answers were against the idea that the squatter houses are built for trade purposes. Councilors believe that the people in need of accommodation are building their houses without taking the necessary permission from the municipality. This does not mean that these houses change hands or rented after they have been built. The councilors' main claim on this subject was that the squatter houses are built on the land which belongs to the same people who are building the houses.

24 of 27 councilors claimed that amnesty on squatter housing is not necessary. In this question almost all of the councilors stated that these kind of reprieves generally encourage people to create more unplanned and disorganized areas in the urban areas.

5.4. Evaluation of the Opinions of the Municipal Staff

5.4.1. Profiles

5.4.1.1. Personal Profiles

The questionnaires were given to 13 municipal personnel who are working in Denizli Municipality at different departments and units, such as Planning, Technical, Human Resources, Real Estate Resources, Social Housing, Municipal Security, Press, Broadcasting and Public Relations.

The aim of these questionnaires is to get the ideas and opinions of those who work at specific departments in the municipality on the structure and working situation of the municipality, the municipal councils.

Some of the unit directors at different departments and the deputy mayors in Denizli Municipality rejected to take part in the interviews by showing the upcoming local election as an excuse. Out of 13 interviews, 7 of them are made with the staff (officials) who works at the Planning Department. The others are chosen from the departments of technical, human resources, real estate resources, social housing, municipal security, and press, broadcasting and public relations.

Department	Employees
Planning Department	7
Technical Department	1
Human Resources Department	1
Real Estate Resources Department	1
Social Housing Department	1
Municipal Security Department	1
Press, Broadcasting and Public Relations Department	1
Total	13

Table 86: The distribution employees according to departments

More questionnaires are given to the staff working in planning department as it is the most crucial department within municipality in terms of council and citizens interests. Those who work at the planning department are the ones who are work

closely with the councilors. In this department, city planning section, architectural design control section and construction license section are the main units which the councilors visit most.

5.4.1.2. Class and Status

Tuble off the distribution of employees decording to their sea				
Sex	Employees	Per cent		
Male	9	69,2		
Female	4	30.8		

Table 87: The distribution of employees according to their sex

Among the interviewed staff, 4 of the municipal workers are female and 9 of them are male. It is important to note that this distribution is consistent with the ratio of male and female staff in the municipality of Denizli. There are 381 officials at the municipality, and 292 of them are males, 89 are females (75 per cent male, 25 per cent female). The ratio in the council can be considered different (male 93.1 per cent, female 6.9 per cent).

Table 88: The distribution employees according to their educational levels

Educational level	Employees	Per cent
University	10	76,9
Pro university	1	7,7
High School	2	15,3

The employees who are interviewed are mostly technical employees. When we examine the educational level, it shows that 76.9 per cent of them are university graduates. However, this does not reflect the overall educational level of the municipal employees, as those interviewed people are technical staff.

Table 89: The distribution employees according to their hometowns

Birth Town	Employees	Per cent
Denizli	11	84,6
İzmir	1	7,7
Ankara	1	7,7

As it is seen easily, those who were born in Denizli are in majority at Denizli municipality (84.6 per cent). We know that Denizli got migration in the last years from neighborhood towns as well from other parts of the country (DİE, 1990, 2000 census). While considering this, it may be argued that the migrations did not affect the municipality employees of the higher rank. If the manual workers of the municipality will be examined totally, it is seen that half of the manual workers working in the Denizli municipality are born outside Denizli.

Political Expectation	Employees	Per cent
Yes	4	30,8
No	9	69,2

Table 90: The distribution employees according to their political expectations

69.2 per cent of those who are interviewed state that they have no expectation for the future in politics. Among those who have some kind of political expectation, becoming a councilor is the first choice.

5.4.2. Politics, Democracy and Participation

5.4.2.1 Local Politics

When asked about their opinion on the priority given to service provision or local democracy, there is no clear-cut choice among the municipal staff. It is ironic that they value the local democracy more than the councilors do.

	Number of Employees	Per cent
Achievement of the local services	6	46,1
Local autonomy and democracy	5	38,4
Others	2	15,5
Total	13	100

 Table 91: Which is more important in local administration?

Regarding the representative capacity of the council, most of the technical staff (92.4per cent) believes that the council fails to represent the citizens. Only one person was positive regarding the representative capacity of the council.

	Employees	Per cent
Yes	1	7,6
No	12	92,4
Total	13	100

Table 92: Are the people represented enough in the municipal councils?

While the reasons were asked to those who argue that the people are not enough represented in the councils, different answers were given. They stated that the council members are not following the requests of the people after the election and that councilors prefer to go after the wills of their party managers or their own interests instead of the people's interests. Beside these, they also added that the representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and the headmen must take important roles in the decision-making processes. Some of the municipal staff mentioned that the prevailing electoral system do not allow people to be represented in the councils easily, so that the legislation on electoral system should be changed and the inner democracy in the political parties have to be achieved in practice.

It is widely believed that the representatives of NGO's and precincts (headmen) and others should take part in the decision making process. It was stated that those have to be in the councils together with the elected council members. While 61.4per cent of the staff answered in this manner, 23.2per cent stated the importance of electoral system and municipal legislation changes.

Table 95. What are the conditions for the councils to act more effective		
	Employees	per cent
The educational levels of the councilors	4	30,7
have to be increased	•	50,7
The representation of the people in the	3	23
council have to be increased	5	23
The democracy in the council has to be	3	23
sustained	5	23
The electoral system should	ſ	15,6
reorganized	Z	13,0
No answer	1	7,7

Table 93: What are the conditions for the councils to act more effective?

When asked about the proper and effective working of the municipal council, the municipal staff's answers were negative with a ratio of 61.5 per cent. They claimed that the councilors' political interests were put in the first place and there were no agreements on specific subjects concerning the city in general. It is added that the council do not has the opportunity for representation of every part of the society as a whole.

In order to work more proper and to achieve its duties, the employees stated that the councils' average education level should be increased. When we examine the average education level of councilors we see that 65.5 per cent of them are university graduates, and if we add the ones who are pre-licensed, we reach the level of 75 per cent in the council. Almost all of the municipal staff who attended the questionnaire is university graduates and they stated that they cannot communicate with some councilors in technical matters. Another reason for them to state the educational level to be increased is that they want to see higher educated people in the higher levels of decision-making processes.

	Employees	per cent
Yes	10	77
No	1	7,7
No idea	2	15,6

 Table 94: Support for the New Municipal Law

Those workers, who underline the obstacles in the organization and the lack of authority, think that the new municipal law is going to bring more efficiency for the local service provision. Although they admit that they do not know much about the content of the new law, they said the idea of giving more authority to the municipalities is appreciated. It is mentioned that if the municipalities get more power by the new law, the realization of the large investments, like natural gas and geothermal energy in Denizli would be easier. One of the workers answered this question negatively and emphasized that this kind of increases in authority will not help by itself; together with this increase, some other arrangements in the local administration level are needed.

	Employees	per cent
Yes	12	92,3
No	1	7,7
No idea	-	-

Table 95: Do you believe that the municipalities should be strengthened more?

The result of the previous table is almost the same in this question. The workers who perceive this question as the previous one answer in the same way as that by the strengthening of the municipal councils, the decision making process in the municipalities will be more effective, and efficient.

Table 96: What do you think on the strengthening of the provincial general assembly?

	Employees	per cent
Should be strengthened	7	53,8
Should not be strengthened	-	-
No idea	6	46,2

The municipal workers, generally, see the strengthening of provincial general assembly as strengthening of the local democracy. Because they believe that the decentralization of the authority and power from the center to the local will help the development of localities. Some of the workers also stated that this idea will help quite deal to activate the provincial general assembly which are very stagnant now, and will help to create the equal distribution of the investments in the country.

Table 97: Do you share the idea that the municipality is the bedrock of democracy?

	Employees	per cent
Yes	11	84,6
No	2	15,4

The 84.6per cent of the municipal employees state that the municipalities are the fundamentals of democracy, but it is very difficult to see this in reality because of the prevailing conditions in the country. The other important idea pointed out is that the powerful groups in the municipalities follow their own agenda which often contradicts the democratic ideals. It is also added that the mayor is the absolute

authority in the municipalities. It is stated that if the mayor is a democratic-minded figure, then democratic procedures could be applied in the municipality, as he is the most influential figure in the municipalities

5.4.2.1.1. The structure of the Municipality

The answers given to the question on the municipal standing committee is quite interesting. Those who are closely related to the working of municipal standing committee (mainly those working at the planning unit) totally stated that the numbers of elected and attended members in the committee should be equal. This ratio is 53.8 per cent in throughout all municipal workers in the municipality.

	Employees	per cent
All the members should be elected	-	-
All the members should be assigned technical people	3	23,1
Majority of the members should be elected	-	-
Majority of the members should be attended	-	-
Elected and attended members should be equal	7	53,8
No answer	3	23,1

Table 98: How should be the structure of the Municipal standing committee?

Those technical people, such as city planners, architects, and engineers who are working at planning department stated strongly that the professionals should attend the municipal standing committee in order to explain the technical points such as city planning concepts, legislation etc. to those council members elected who do not have sufficient knowledge or information. Thus, proper decisions could be taken. It pointed out that this would be profitable in the name of democracy.

Table 99: Is it necessary to give quota to NGOs in the municipal council

	Employees	per cent
Yes	9	69,2
No	2	15,4
No idea	2	15,4

70 per cent of the municipal workers think that there should be quota for the representative of the NGO's. They also think that this will help better representation of citizens in municipal decision-making processes. This view is consistent with their lack of trust on the councilors capacity to represent the overall population of the city.

Related to the above statements, it is added that professional chambers (chamber of architects, chamber of artisans...) and headmen have to be in the council for better achievement of democracy, and objectivity.

Those who are against those arguments state that there are members from those chambers or NGOs in the council. So that, every group is represented in the council by those members. They add also that if it is seen necessary, the council may invite the necessary professionals to get their ideas on the relevant issues.

	Employees
The director of the related unit	6
Deputy mayor	4
The councilors	3
The mayor	1
Myself	1
No answer	1

Table 100: Who is the most effective body in your department in the decisionmaking processes?

Regarding the most influential figure in their department, the employees pointed firstly to the director of the unit in question. The Deputy Mayor is the second influential figure and then the councilors are seen as the third influential group. Surprisingly, they did not see the mayor himself as the most influential actor regarding their own department. Perhaps this is not because they see the mayor as a weak figure. Rather, they do not directly meet the mayor in those issues in the responsibility of their department. Rather it is the Deputy Mayor who deals with the department, and therefore they point to him as the most influential figure.

	Employees
Legislation	9
Financial matters	7
Personnel	3
Tutelage of the government	1
Other	-

Table 101: Obstacles before the better provision of municipal services?

In relation to the obstacles before the better provision of municipal services, the municipal employees largely agree with the councilors' view on this issue. Legal framework is seen the most important problem along with the financial difficulties.

	Employees	
The most effective;	11	
The Mayor	11	
2 nd effective;	0	
Municipal Council	0	
3 rd effective;	6	
Municipal standing committee	0	
4 th effective;	4	
Municipal Bureaucracy	4	
5 th effective;	4	
Businessmen	4	

Table 102: Which one is the most effective at the municipal administration?

The workers state, almost unanimously, that the most effective body in the municipality is the mayor. The municipal council and the municipal standing committee follow the mayor. The arrangement does not change when they answered to the question of which one should be the most effective. Slight differences in the ratios do not change the main idea in the results. Some of them who prefer the present situation think that the decision making processes will not be effective and the bureaucracy will be more powerful in the municipality, if the mayor will not be the most effective in the municipality.

	Employees
The most effective;	0
The Mayor	2
2 nd effective;	8
Municipal Council	0
3 rd effective;	
Municipal standing committee	0
4 th effective;	5
People	5
5 th effective;	2
Municipal Bureaucracy	2

Table 103: Which should be the most effective at the municipal administration?

In the Table 99, the businessmen can be seen as the fifth most effective part in the society, but this changes in the Table 100 with the people in general. This may be understood as some employees of the municipality, not in high percentages, see that the businessmen are effective and influential in municipalities.

	Employees	per cent
Those who do not have any acquaintance at the municipality	5	38.3
Municipal staff / officials / workers	5	38.3
There is no powerless group	2	15.6
No answer	1	7.8

Table 104: Which group is the most powerless at the municipality?

It is stated by the municipal workers that the powerless groups in the local administration, are those who have no acquaintances at the municipality, and poor people in general. They mentioned that some people can not find anybody in the municipality who will listen to them and try to find solution for the problems. Those who are out of the patronage relations can not solve their problems or can not find somebody to help in solving the problems of them.

5.4.2.1.2. Inner working of the Municipality

	Employees	per cent
To help for their own requests	3	37,5
I do get such request	3	37,5
Request for getting information	2	25
Total	8	100

Table 105: What kind of requests do you get from the mayor and the councilors on planning and alike matters?

The workers in the planning department and technical department are asked whether they get such requests from the mayor or the councilors. The answers are parallel to each other. Some of the workers argued that the councilors are not after the requests of the citizens but after their own interests or after the interests of their party members. And some of the employees said that councilors try to get information on some technical subjects rather than putting forward their own requests.

Table 106: How do you approach to those kinds of requests coming from the mayor and the councilors?

	Employees	per cent
I approach within the legal frame	6	75
I reject those kind of requests	2	25

The majority of the workers agree that those kinds of requests have to be evaluated and resulted within the legal frame. They claim that the requests coming from the mayor and the councilors are not different than those coming from the people out of the municipality. Some of the workers said that they are keen on rejecting the requests which are mainly personal and not for the good of the public in general.

Table 107: Mostly from where you get requests concerning out of the municipality?

	Employees
From the citizens	8
From the official departments	5
From the private institutions	2

Mostly the requests come from the people, while the official and private institutions follow them. People apply for their private problems. From each group of citizens they have applications, so it is not possible to say that the requests are by some specific groups. The official institutions are also applying for their problems, such as the governor office, national education department, electricity department etc. The point which is commonly stated by the staff is that these kinds of public institutions have so many requests, mainly on planning matters.

Table 108: How frequent the mayor talks with you about the planning problems?

	Employees	per cent
Frequently	2	15,3
From time to time	3	23,1
Seldom	3	23,1
Never	2	15,3
No answer	3	23,1

The workers answers on the frequency for talking to the mayor are smoothly shared for each alternative. While 38.4 per cent of them talk to the mayor frequently or from time to time, 38.4 per cent of them talk seldom or never. It can be understood that some departments are more important for the mayor, as he visits them regularly where some are not having that importance as the workers state that they do not see the mayor.

problems.		
	Employees	per cent
Frequently	6	46,2
From time to time	4	30,7
Seldom	-	-
Never	-	-
No answer	3	23,1

Table 109: How frequent should the mayor talk with you about the planning problems?

The workers were asked for the necessity for the mayor to talk to themselves and they argued that mayor should get some specific information from them so there must be meetings with him. The examination of the replies shows that their answers are quite logical. Workers main idea was that if the decision making bodies are in close contact with the technical people in the municipality it would be easier to find solutions to the general problems.

	Employees	per cent
Frequently	2	15,3
From time to time	1	7,6
Seldom	6	46,4
Never	1	7,6
No answer	3	23,1

 Table 110: How frequent the councilors talk with you about the planning problems?

The frequency of talking of the council members to the municipal workers is very rare. 54 per cent says they do not talk with the councilors. It can be felt easily that the representatives of the people do not act in close relation with the municipal workers who take part in the solutions of problems directly. If the communication of the councilors with the municipal workers is a healthy one, it is a fact that this will bring useful feedback to them. This reality may be the reason that the municipalities which has to be the problem solving places, get far away from the solutions and they themselves be the real problem for the people. The council members are also far from the problems of the town. They only meet the problems at the council meetings, and in a very short time they try to be acknowledged or get informed on the subject matters, and vote later.

It is well known that the different parts of the town and different social groups in the town have specific problems of their own. It is necessary that the councilors have to evaluate these problems in order to find the right solutions. Since the council members are interested only in their private lives and problems; do not visit the working body of the municipality; and do not pay enough attention to the citizens' problems, this causes many important obstacles in the processes of problem solving, decision making, and implementing. It is mentioned by many municipal workers that some of the council members come to the town hall only for the council meetings which are only three times a year. They add that those councilors attend the meetings only for voting reason and do not discuss any sort of problems or solutions.

	Employees	per cent
Frequently	5	38,7
From time to time	2	15,3
Seldom	1	7,6
Never	2	15,3
No answer	3	23,1

Table 111: How frequent should the councilors talk with you about the planning problems?

After the municipal workers stated that the councilors do not talk to them, they were asked how frequent they have to talk to them. 54 per cent replied as "frequently" or "from time to time". The "from time to time" choice means a regular time interval of 10-15 days. For that reason in this evaluation the terms of "frequently" and "from time to time" have to be considered together.

It can be accepted as an easier and profitable way for the councilors to visit the necessary departments in the municipality from time to time to discuss the problems and the solutions with those municipal workers who are directly involved in the municipal services.

 Table 112: How the councilors act when their requests are not answered positively? What do they do?

	Employees
They act understandable	4
They vote negative in the council meeting	3
They react negatively	2
Other	2
No answer	2

The municipal workers do not complain about the councilors on their behaviors towards them if the wills of councilors are rejected. According to the workers, they do not act negatively. The councilors accept the rejections as normal. Some workers state that the majority party members act normal because in any case what they want is realized at the end, so they have no need to act negatively. However, few of the workers say that some councilors act negatively when their requests are rejected from the legal aspects. In fact, some of the workers were reluctant to give these kind of answers, but in informal talks they stated that when the ideological differences with the councilors are big, some problems occur from time to time in rejecting their wills.

	Employees
Mostly	
TPP members	4
Independent members	2
RPPmembers	1
DLP members	1
Rare	
MLP members	1
NAP members	2
RPPmembers	1

 Table 113: To which party members do you talk on planning matters?

The members gave the answer of TPP when they are asked for the most talked or visited party members. The reason for that is the mayor is from TPP, and TPP is the majority party in the council with 9 members (31.4 per cent).

Besides the above fact, they also stated that if a councilor takes a role in the planning or in one of council commissions, it becomes a reason for them to talk to the workers from time to time. This means that the party of councilor is not so important for worker to inform the councilor on the subject they want to be informed. Some of the workers also told that they talk to the councilors from the party they have sympathy from time to time and exchange information. They added that those kind of talks are always 'off the record' talks.

	Employees	per cent
Yes	11	84,6
No	1	7,7
No answer	1	7,7

 Table 114: Do you feel comfortable and secure while working in municipality and taking decisions?

Almost all the workers (84.6 per cent of them) expressed that they feel secure and comfortable while working. So we can say that Denizli Municipality workers act free in the decision making process and feel no pressure of the other authorities upon themselves.

	Employees
Financial matters and the budget	7
Planning subjects	4
Items in the agenda	1
No idea	2
No answer	2

Table 115: Which subjects cause more quarrel in the council meetings?

For the workers, the financial matters are the most debated subjects in the council meetings. That means the municipal budget is debated much. The budget is underlined as the most debated and the most difficult voted subject.

The town plans and suggestions on the changes on town plans follow the budget in that sense. It is discussed very widely that, since the developmental plan changing suggestions are too many in number and scope and they are mostly personal subjects, the council does not have much time to survey the matters that are important for the social and economic life of the town.

	Employees
The subjects that are decided in the commissions or that are decided projects	5
Other	2
No idea	2
No answer	4

 Table 116: Which subjects cause fewer quarrels in the council meetings?

The answers given to the question about subjects of the council meetings are the ones decided in the commissions or the decided projects. It is stated that those subjects are voted in the council without ant debate on them. An important argument of the workers is that even different party members with different ideologies come together and vote in the same way to share the possible revenue or profit of the project.

	Employees
Subjects related to the whole town	5
Societal subjects	1
No idea	2
No answer	5

Table 117: Which important subjects are not discussed in the council meetings?

The question on the important subjects to be discussed in the council was answered as the problems of the town and public in general. This means that workers desire the councilors to discuss and decide the future of the town and the main subjects related to the whole town rather than personal interests. They answer without hesitating that in practice this does not happen. The workers explain that since the agenda of council meetings are so full, every time, with the personal requests coming from the citizens, to find time for the council members to discuss the town problems is almost impossible. At the interview with the mayor and the councilors, this point was strongly underlined before. It means this problem is a very fact in the municipalities.

5.4.2.1.3. Urban Processes of the City

	Employees
Increase in the construction intensity (having extra floor)	8
Change in the planning	6
Implementation of "Clause 18th" of law on zoning	3
No answer	3

Table 118: What kind of requests do you get from the people on planning matters?

In the question requests on planning matters, the mostly stated answer is increase in construction intensity (having extra floors). The municipal staff working in planning department and technical department claimed that these kinds of requests come from all parts of the society, and generally all of them are illegal. Beside these requests, requests on changes of the development plans are also common. The main point which is underlined is that the function of the area of the people are generally tried to be changed.

	Employees	per cent
I look for a legal solution	6	46
I look for a solution for the benefit of the people	3	23
I reject	1	12
No answer	3	23

Table 119: What is your approach to such requests of the people?

The municipal workers state that they act in the legal frames towards those requests. They also added that they try to find a solution in favor of the people but in the legal limits. They underlined that in any case they have nothing to do on those kinds of requests, because the authorities which are able to solve those problems are the council and the mayor.

Table 120: What is the biggest problem of your municipality?

	Employees
Lack of authority and organization	4
Lack of finance	3
Low level of education	2
No answer	1

The workers say that the main problem of the town of Denizli is the infrastructure. The workers argue that the social and physical infrastructure deficiency of the town is the basic thing to be handled. Transportation, air pollution, lack of recreational areas are the given examples. To overcome these problems the workers say that the transportation master plan should immediately prepared and natural gas or geothermal energy solutions have to be discussed seriously.

The lack of authority and the disorder in the organization seem as big problems for inner structure and inner working of Denizli Municipality. Most of the workers stated this quite seriously. Parallel to these, financial problems and educational deficiencies in the local service problems are also mentioned, as the same in many governmental organizations. It is underlined by the workers that, at Denizli municipality, many of the workers have to work outside the unit suitable for their professions for political reasons and patronage relationships. This seems another obstacle for municipal productivity in Denizli.

5.4.2.1.4. Conclusion

30 per cent of the municipal staff is female, and 70 per cent of them are male. In fact the sample was originated with only 13 members. According to the annual municipality report, the municipality has 25 per cent female and 75 per cent male officials working in the departments. Only one of the departmental heads was a woman. The ratio of women in the council was even less than this. Some of the departmental heads are the natural member of the municipal standing committee however there is only one woman in the municipal standing committee. The ratio of men/women is always in favor of men in every political level.

The employees who are interviewed are mostly technical persons. When we examine the educational level, it shows that 76.9 per cent of them are university graduates. If we consider the whole of the municipality, it is a very fact that this educational level will decrease, but in any case, at the units where this questionnaire is held, the level was high. The ratio of knowing a second language is low all over the municipal departments. Even very few of the university graduates know a second language which explains that they did not need one; however Denizli municipality has sister cities from foreign countries and there are close relations between these cities. Group visiting for the councilors, mayors and municipal staff are being made annually.

The municipal staff's view about the representation of the people in the council was negative with a ratio of 92.4 per cent. The important point that they underlined was that the councilors were going after their party managers' or their own requests and wills, rather than the society as a whole. With this brave commitment they also added that the NGO's should take part in the municipal council. 70 per cent of them held positive views for the district administrators and members of NGO have to be members of the councils.

The counter argument for this idea was depending on some of the councilors who are members of NGO's (Chamber of commerce, Chamber of industry [resigned to join the parliament]). The argument was insisting that the municipal council is able to invite technicians on technical subjects and have their view on specific concepts rather than making them an integral part of the council. In fact, their main idea was the political process that the council members have passed where time, money and efforts was spent in order to be elected. They do not find it right to give seats to the members of the NGO's who did not pass through the stages that they have passed and some of the councilors have declared this in the informal talks very honestly and directly.

The municipal staff in the planning department was asked about the requests coming from the councilors and the mayor. The answers were important as the closest relations were between the members of this department and councilors in consideration to other departments. They stated that some councilors ask for help for their own interests while some come to take information on planning issues. They all added that they approach within the legal frame to these kinds of matters.

It is understood that the municipal staff is always in communication with the deputy mayor with the related responsibilities. The employees stated that they seldom talk to he mayor or the mayor does not visit their departments frequently. In addition to this, it was stated that the deputy mayor was the most effective person in decision-making processes in their departments. With the deputy mayor the head of the department was also stated. While the workers underlined the departmental heads, the departmental heads underlined the deputy mayor as the most effective person in decision-making. The employees see the nearest higher level of administration as the most effective person.

The councilors in general are blamed for not being in a position of information or knowledge exchange with the municipal staff. More than half of the interviewed employees stated that they do not talk or meet with councilors ever. This may show the disinterest of the councilors on many subjects that may be the concern of the city. In the informal talks with the staff, it is mentioned that most of the councilors do not have idea of the agenda of the council meetings where they just come for voting purposes. They are informed right before the beginning of the meeting, without having any information before on important subjects. The minority party's councilors are said to be in less communication or in no communication at all with the staff. The majority group, which is TPP (political party of the mayor), and left wing party members are said to be in closer relations with the municipal staff. Moreover, the employees claimed that whenever a councilor becomes a member of a commission, like planning commission, it seems to be reason for them to talk or visit the staff working on those subjects. Other than this kind of situations, the councilors are not interested in these issues in no way. Employees also stated in the informal talks that they tend to speak with the councilors which is from the political party they have sympathy.

Considering the whole municipal administration, the employees declared that the mayor is the most powerful person above the municipal council and the committee. They also stated that the municipal bureaucracy plays important role in the municipal administration. Their answers were the same when they were asked about the ideal power diversion in the municipal administration. The percentages of the answers were close to each other but mayor was the figure which should be the most powerful body in the municipality. This may be much related to the time interval when these questionnaires were made. The election was just two weeks after the time of the questionnaires. Some municipal workers were very reluctant to attend this questionnaire.

It is a known fact that as the mayor loses the elections, the new mayor usually changes the team in the municipal standing committee which means the departmental heads and deputy mayors. As Keleş and Toprak suggest, this causes erosion for the officials of the municipality. Another point which is a problem in the municipal administration is that the municipalities are seen as employment generating institutions. As new workers are employed in the municipality and there is not any restriction for this as it is in the hands of the mayor, the necessary public services lose their functionality in an important manner.

As explained above, workers of the specific departments stated that their ideas, visions or thoughts are not considered as important factors by the councilors. Some of these employees took part in the municipal standing committee before. According

to their expressions they were not influential in the committees with some reasons which may be stated as being scared from begin politicized, their reluctance, education defects, the weaknesses of relations in between the level of statues. In fact, when they were asked if they were comfortable and feeling secure when doing their duties in the municipality, their answers were with a ratio of 85per cent, "yes". But in practice, it is understood that this is not the case.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Local governments are argued for being an integral part and the creations of the central state. They are also sustained by it although they may have a certain degree of autonomy and a significant influence on central decision-making. There has always been an interrelation between these two levels of government. The interrelationship between local and central authorities frames the local system of government which cannot be considered as an isolated political structure.

There has been a widely shared argument that local government is important in the first place for the reason that they have been the 'cradle of democracy'. There are different reasons behind this assumption. First of all, as pluralists argued they provide wide spread platforms for people to participate in decision making processes. As they are the closest level of government to ordinary citizens, their existence allow the people to take part in decision making which is assumed to be more difficult in higher levels of government. Secondly, they are a school for politicians. It is argued that they are stepping stones for those who aim to take part in the national politics.

Whether such a conceptual framework would be applied to the reality is another question. It is widely shown that there are considerable problems in local government structures which undermine the validity of pluralist argument. Like national level, there are strongly represented groups in local politics along with under and non-represented groups in local government.

Instrumentalists like O'Connor states that local authorities are dominated by competitive capital (Pickvance, 1995). Cockburn claims that municipal councils co-

ordinate the interests of a dominant class and concludes in her study that main function of Lambeth's local council is the reproduction of local labor power through the provision of housing, social services and etc. (Cockburn, 1977).

Unlike instrumentalists, structuralists argue that local political institutions have some autonomy in relation to local class interests for creating a social order through intervening to emergent conflicts. However; they claim that there is a growing state intervention on local authorities and this is because of the inevitable character of advanced capitalism. We may conclude that these interventions are made in favor of the capitalist class in order to sustain proper conditions. Castells explain local politics with reference to these interventions which are made in the articulation of needs of capital (Castells, 1977).

Uneven development theory followers argue that in local political arena the relations of kinship, gender, and race are important factors which may affect the local policy processes. They argue that the local governments are not reflecting the needs of the citizens as a whole; rather it has a role of mediation between capital and civil society (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988).

The corporatists claim that entrepreneurs, producers, NGO representatives have the main important power in their hands in decision-making processes at the local level. The councilors are not seen as important figures although they are elected by the citizens and represent them. Saunders argues that municipal councilors are excluded from corporate decision-making processes where the local bureaucrats make decisions with autonomy from the central state (Saunders, 1979).

Elitists believe that the national and local government by a small ruling group is normatively desirable. The term elite does not necessarily involve only the occupier of the top strata; it may comprise both those people who are at the top, bottom or outside the organizations. It may include the people in the capitalist, middle or working class. However, it is unavoidable for governments that there should be an elite rule (Harding, 1995). Hunter found out in his study of Atlanta that the urban political power is not in the hands of the elected or assigned officials or it is dispersed. It is in the hands of some local elite groups (Hunter, 1953).

Pahl in his managerialist view underlines the scarcity of resources and the unequal allocation of these resources. Some parts of the society may be advantageous in reaching these resources while others cannot be. Again in his theory, he claims that local bureaucrats rather than elected municipal councilors are important figures in determination of resource allocation (Saunders, 19979). The allocation facilities which are available for the distribution are limited by the need to support capital accumulation and by central government controls on local authority spending.

It may be concluded that despite the differences among different local authorities, with the outcomes of the above studies, there is one common feature that certain economically and politically powerful groups in localities usually dominate the policy making processes at the expense of ordinary citizens who constitute the majority of the local population. Working people, women, elderly, ethnic minorities are those who usually experience considerable exclusion from the local government while business groups, local politicians and bureaucrats are those who are well represented in them despite the level of representation of each group changes in each locality depending on the specific conditions of each locality in hand.

Municipal councils are suitable places to find out the power structure of a local authority. It would not be unfair to expect the councils to be pluralist platforms for the representation of different groups in local politics if the pluralist argument is valid. Again it is natural to expect the councils to be powerful in local government decision making processes as they are assumed to be elected bodies. Test of these two assumptions is quite important to see whether local government is the arena of local politics where the will of people finds reflection in local government.

The reviews of local council experience of different countries have shown that there are differences among them. But there is a common conclusion we could draw out of this review that councils are far from being pluralist platforms. In many cases, there is limited representation of certain groups in them. Further, it is not unusual that the

councils are far from being powerful structures in the local government decisionmaking processes.

The municipal councils can be argued as the main bodies of representation at the local level but it seems from the answers and confessions of the councilors in Denizli that they cannot create effective and fair participation possibilities for every part of the society. This thought is very common among the councilors as they claim in majority that the councils do not represent people equally. What happens in practice is that, the small minorities which may constitute the top of a pyramid in the society has some kind of dominance because of their financial and political power. These groups in the society may be conceived as the elite groups which may have direct effects on the decisions by influencing the financial and economic processes. Departing from the answers of the municipal council members in Denizli, as stated above, these groups which are small in number have greater influence than the ordinary citizens which are very large in number.

According to the answers of the councilors, the most powerful and effective groups in Denizli municipality seem to be the merchants, small entrepreneurs and businessmen. This is a vital confession when we take the fact that in the councils manual workers or blue collar job owners do not have seats in the council. The businessmen and white-collar job owners both have influence on the decisionmaking processes in the municipality (whether they are outside the formal structures or not) and are also represented in the municipal councils.

In a related question, municipal council members stated that the people living in squatter houses, the low income families and the powerless sections are the least represented parts in the councils. These answers were at a ratio of 52per cent. The councilors agree that these parts of the society cannot participate in or influence the decision-making processes in any way. The critical point here is that nine councilors (all of which are from right wing political parties with five of them being from TPP, True Path Party, the political party of the mayor) did not give answers to this question where they all answered the question about the most influential sections of

the society as the business sector. Their reluctance can be seen as avoiding the truth about the under-representation phenomenon of the working class.

As it can be seen from the declarations of the councilors in the chapter where representation phenomenon is evaluated, councilors do not believe that the municipal councils are really representative bodies at the local politics. Although the yare elected bodies, they are not able to fulfill the representation responsibility properly. With their words, Denizli municipal council does not represent the city as a whole.

The candidates which will appear on the candidate list for the municipal councils are chosen by the political parties. This also affects the quality of the candidates and the citizens' freedom to choose in negative ways. In the representational democracies the candidate deciding phenomenon is as important as the choices of the citizens. However, this process is run without the participation or the preferences of the citizens. The freedom of the citizens become, in practice, electing or rejecting the people (candidates) which are chosen by political parties.

The elected people become the decision makers at the local level. This is very much related with the representation and participation concept and it establishes the fundamentals of the local politics. The councilors and workers in Denizli Municipality mentioned that the prevailing electoral system do not allow people to be represented in the councils easily, so that the legislation on electoral system should be changed and the inner democracy in the political parties have to be achieved in practice. Beside these, in order to achieve their duties effectively, the obstacles in front of the freedom to elect and being elected should be terminated.

Following the argument which states that the local authorities and municipal councils are schools for politicians who aim higher levels in politics, the views of the municipal councilors in Denizli were asked. 55per cent of them stated that they do not see their membership in the council as a preparation for the national parliament or any other higher level in politics. In the informal talks made with the councilors other than the questionnaires, very few of them claimed that their membership should be seen as a starting point for political life.

The councilors of Denizli municipality did not have a duty in their political parties before they are elected. 43.4 per cent of the councilors became a member of their political party in the last five years before the election (21.7 per cent of them became a member of their political party at the same year with the election). 82.75 per cent of the councilors had no prior experience in the local political arena. They are elected first time for the council. Most of the members of municipal councils learn these political processes after they are elected and do not have preparations before. As the councilors pointed out, many members learned about the processes simultaneously with the meetings of the council, being elected to the commissions, voting to the issues at hand, etc.

From the views of the municipal councilors it may be concluded that almost none of them see their membership as a stepping stone to national politics. There are some councilors who admitted this exclusively. It may be thought that as the majority of the municipal council was elected for the first time as a councilor, they do not yet have the idea of national politics. It may be added that they might be trying to be experienced in local politics and then they might be going on to national politics. Needless to say while these assumptions are made, the answers of the councilors are used. It is not always the case but sometimes the councilors hide some information or do not want to share some personal information with the public. Their reluctance on claiming their membership as a stepping stone might be generating from these thoughts.

The councilors were also asked about the power diversion in the municipality. They replied that the most powerful body is the mayor (45.23 per cent of the total answers). The powerful mayor phenomenon is valid in the municipal administration in Denizli. In addition to the representation problems that the municipal councils can not overcome, the problem of powerful mayor-weak council in a structural context also creates more problems for representation. The effects of this structural defects show themselves with the problems in local service provision.

The councilors in Denizli municipality stated that (with a ratio of 37.5 per cent) the municipal council should be more powerful than the mayor in order to control and

monitor his/her activities. 66.7 per cent of them stated that the municipal council should be strengthened very quickly because of the rapid social and economic changes in Denizli. If their suggestion is in this manner, it should be understood that there is not enough control or maybe no control on the activities of the mayor. This concept can not be accepted and justified with any idea of democracy and it underlines the under-representation phenomenon. The democracy in the local political processes becomes arguable with the above stated concepts.

The elected members' confession about the weakness of the council is not only related with the structural defects of the municipal administration system. It has also relations with councilors themselves. They should be more participative, more interested, and more willing to control the activities going on in and outside the municipality in order to fulfill their duties as the representatives of the public. This can not be sustained by just attending to the meetings of the municipal council which is held three times a year.

Beside the insufficiency of these meetings which are held three times a year, the authority which is preparing the agenda of these meetings is the mayor. When stating the power of the mayor, some councilors underlined the agenda of the meeting and claimed that the subjects they offer for discussion are usually not taken into consideration. As this can be achieved by the majority of the council, the councilors' offers which are against the ideas of the mayor of which are suggested by minority groups can not be discussed and this is usually the case. As the main local policies are decided in these meetings, it can be argued that the local administrative policies are the ideas of the mayor, in most cases.

These above statements may be questioned in the sense that whether the municipal councils are working effectively and correctly in the decision-making and policy-making processes. Moreover, the implementations of these policies are significant concepts and local councils' powers also should be questioned in this manner. The councilors of Denizli municipality were (in the informal talks mainly) pessimist about the inner working of the municipal councils. They do not think that these important representative bodies are able to deal with the problems in their city in a

successful way. They believe that the councils are not strong enough in policy making processes. Main idea of them was that the council is an organ of the municipality where specific issues are voted, without deeper examination.

These ideas create some thoughts in mind related to the meaning which is given to the municipal councils in the name of democratic decision-making. These mechanisms should have the right for exclusive control of public policy as they are elected by the citizens. The determination of the policies should be done by the council if it is, in real meaning, the actual representative body of municipal administration. However, in practice the reflections of the public as a whole can not be seen in the policies which are made.

It may be concluded that there are problems on the representation and the participation of the citizens. It is commonly believed that the municipality and its administration is the bedrock of democracy. If the problems are not solved in this level, they are just simply transferred to higher levels of administration. Specifying the real responsibilities and duties of the people who have the political power in their hands is important. More important than this, is the monitoring and controlling of their activities which is a clear defect in our municipal administration. Other than representation problems, the political culture phenomenon has also imperfections and deficiencies.

The elected members information and knowledge are vital concepts which should be examined before their candidacy by their political parties. The responsibilities of the political parties are very central to these issues as they are the main actors of the political arena. The party programs for local authorities may be seen as not giving the necessary significance to these governments. The competitions between them cover the essential and key elements of their ideologies.

The citizens should be seen far more important than just customers to the municipality. The municipal administration which are generating and improving the democratic ideals must be understood more than merely local service providing "firms" and the institutions. The main idea should be the real participation of the

constituents in the policy and decision-making processes as having the rights and responsibilities for this. The growing significance of the non-governmental organizations should not be underestimated and the corporation with them in local politics should be sustained. The mayor and the municipal council should be strengthened by taking the local society by their side and by this way the local democracy and democratic structures may be strengthened.

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APPENDIX A

ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ KENTSEL POLİTİKA PLANLAMASI ve YEREL YÖNETİMLER ANA BİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI

BELEDİYE BAŞKANLARI VE MECLİS ÜYELERİ ARAŞTIRMASI SORU KAĞIDI

Anket Uygulanan Kişi
1. Belediyenin Adı: Denizli Belediyesi
2. Görevi 1 () Belediye Başkanı 2 () Meclis Üyesi
3. Cinsiyeti 1 () Erkek 2 () Kadın
4. Doğum yılınız?
 5. Öğrenim Durumunuz Nedir? 1 () İlkokul Mezunu 2 () Ortaokul Mezunu 3 () Lise Mezunu 4 () Genel Lise 5 () Dengi 6 () Önlisans/Alanı 7 () Üniversite Mezunu/Alanı 8 () Yüksek Lisans/Alanı 9 () Başka
6. Doğduğunuz yer İliİlçesi Memleketiniz İliİlçesi
7. Denizli'ye geliş tarihiniz?
8 Niçin Denizli'ye geldiniz?
 9. İlk oturduğunuz konut türü? () Kira gecekondu () ev sahibi gecekondu () Kira apartman () Ev sahibi Apartman

() Diğer.....(belirtiniz).

10. Sırasıyla hangi semtlerde oturdunuz.

Semt	Konut Türü
1	
5	
	oturulan semt ve konut türünü yazınız.)

11. Çalışmaya başladığınız tarihten itibaren çalıştığınız işleri en son işten geriye doğru sıralayınız?

	Çalıştığı yer/kurum	
5.		
6.		

12. Seçildikten Sonra, Seçilmeden Önce Yapmakta Olduğunuz İşi Sürdürüyor musunuz?

1 () Evet / Niçin? 2 () Hayır / Niçin?....

13. Babanızın Mesleği Nedir/Neydi?

- a) Mesleği.....
- b) Çalıştığı Yer:
 - 1 () Çalışmıyordu
 - 2 () Kamu Kesimi
 - 3 () Özel Kesim
 - 4 () Kendi Hesabına (Serbest)

14. Babanızın siyasetle ilgilenme derecesi neydi/ nedir ?

a- parti yöneticisi () b- parti üyesi () c- seçmen () d- diğer ()

15. Akrabalarınızdan siyasetle ilgilenen var mı? Kimler? Hangi derecede?

	Evet ()	Hayır ()
1		

16. Köyünüzle ilişkileriniz sürüyor mu?

 () Hayır () Evet, Ne tür bir ilişki () Köyde arazim var işliyorum/icara veriyorumGelir miktarı (yıllık) () Köyde toprağım var işlemiyorum () sadece sosyal ilişkilerim devam ediyor () hiç bir ilişkim yok () diğer
18. Ailenize başka gelir getiren var mı?
() Hayır () EvetKimNe kadar
19. Eşinizin çalışıyor mu?
() Hayır () EvetNe iş yapıyor
20. Çocuklarınıza ait bilgiler
YaşıCinsiyetEğitim DurumuÇalışıyorsa İşiAynı evde mi12345
21. Belediye meclisine/başkanlığına seçildiğiniz dönemleri sırasıyla belirtiniz.
1 () Birinciyıllar 2 () İkinciyıllar 3 () Üçüncüyıllar 4 () Başkayıllar
22. Niçin belediye meclis üyeliğine aday oldunuz?
22a Geleceğe yönelik politik beklentiniz nedir? (milletvekilliği, il genel meclis üyeliği, belediye başkanı vb.)
23. Bugün baktığınızda beklentileriniz gerçekleşti mi?
() Evet () Hayır Niçin
24. Tekrar aday olur musunuz?
 () Evet () HayırNiçin Ne iş yapacaksınız? () bilmiyorum/kararsızım

25. Şimdiye kadar hangi partilere üye oldunuz?

Parti Adı	Üyelik Yılları
1	
2	
3	
(Dikkat en son şu an üye oldu	ığu partiyi yazınız)
26. Seçilmeden Önce Partidek	i Göreviniz Ne İdi?
Görev S	üre (yıl aralığı)
1	
2	
3	
4	
26a seçildikten sonra partiyle	iliskiniz nasıl değisti?
a- daha iyi (sıkı) (mişininin masır azgrişarı
b- daha kötü ()	
c- değişmedi ()	

27. Seçilmeden Hemen Önce Aşağıda Sıralanan Görevlerden Herhangi Birini Yapıyor muydunuz?

- 1 () Milletvekilliği
- 2 () Belediye Başkanlığı
- 3 () İl Genel Meclis Üyeliği
- 4 () Belediye Meclis Üyeliği

28. Aile Üyelerinden, Geçmişte Aşağıdaki Görevlere Gelenler Oldu mu?

j	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	Yakınlık	Devam ediyor mu	Parti
1 () Beled	liye Başkanlığı			
2 () Mille	tvekilliği	••••••		
	nel Meclis Üyeliği			
4 () Beled	liye Meclis Üyeliği			
	İl Başkanlığı			
6 () Parti	İlçe Başkanlığı			
7 () İl Yö	netim Kurulu Üyeliği			
8 () İlçe Y	önetim Kurulu Üyeliği	•••••		
9 () Parti	Meclis Üyeliği			
10 () MK	YK Üyeliği			
	i Disiplin Kurulu Üyeliği			

29. Aşağıda Sıralanan Örgütlerden Üyesi Olduklarınızı Belirtiniz

	Görev	Tarihler		ilişl	ki sıklığı	
			Sık	Arada Bir	Nadiren	Hiç
1 () Dernek						
2 () Spor Kulübü						
3 () Kooperatif						
4 () Meslek Odası						
5 () Sendika						
6 () Başka						
7 () Hiçbirine Üye Değil						

30. Üye olduğunuz örgütlerin belediye meclis üyeliğine seçilmenizde ve siyasal bir partiye katılmanızda ne tür bir etkisi oldu

() olmadı () Oldu. Nasıl

.....

31. Belediye meclisinde önemli konular görüşülmeden önce parti grupları kendi arasında bağlayıcı bir grup kararı alır mı?

() Evet () Hayır

32. Sizce bu tür bir karar alınması iyi midir?

() Evet niçin?.....() Hayır niçin?....

33. Sizce Belediyecilikte, Aşağıda Sıralanan İfadelerden Hangisi Daha Önemlidir?

- 1 () Hizmetlerin Yerine Getirilmesi 2 () Yerel Özerklik ve Yerel Demokrasi
- 3 () Başka

34. Halkın Belediye Meclislerinde yeterince Temsil edildiği Kanısında Mısınız?

1 () Evet 2 () Hayır 3 () Fikrim Yok

35. (Yanıt "Hayır" ise), Daha İyi Bir Temsil İçin Neyi Önerirsiniz?

.....

35a yerel halkın belediye uygulamalarına karşı toplantı, gösteri ve benzeri protesto girişimlerinde bulunmasını nasıl karşılıyorsunuz?

a- olumlu bakıyorum () b- olumsuz bakıyorum () niçin?.....

36. Sizce Belediye Encümeninin Oluşumu Nasıl Olmalıdır?

1 () Üyelerinin Tümü Seçilsin
 2 () Üyelerinin Tümü Atanmış, Teknik Elemanlar Olsun
 3 () Üyelerinin Çoğunluğu Seçilsin
 4 () Üyelerinin Çoğunluğu Atansın

5 () Seçilmiş ve Atanmış Üyeler Eşit Oranda Bulunsun

6 () diger.....

37. Belediye Meclislerinde "Sivil Toplum" Örgütlerinin Temsilcileri İçin Üyelik Kontenjanı Ayrılması Sizce Uygun Mudur?

1 () Hayır. niçin?
2 () Fikrim Yok 3 () Evet . niçin?
Kimler?
() Muhtar temsilcileri
() Dernek temsilcileri
() Sendika temsilcileri
 () Ticaret/Sanayi odaları temsilcileri () Meslek odaları temsilcileri
() Wester oddiair ternsherieri ()
Diğer(belirtiniz).
38 . Sizden kimler, ne tür yardımlar talep ediyorlar?
(mahalle genelinden mi?, ilçe genelinden mi?, il genelinden mi?)
1 Talep türü
2 Talep türü
3
4 Talep türü
85 . Denizlili sanayicilerin ve özellikle tekstil sektöründe çalışanların özel talepleri oluyor mu? Oluyor ise ne tür talepler?
86. Bu tarz talepler karşısında nasıl tavır alıyorsunuz?
87. Sizce bu sektörlerin talepleri bir öncelik taşımalımıdır?
40 . İş bulma yönündeki talepler karşısında ne tür tavırlar takınıyorsunuz?
41 . İmar ve benzeri konularda gelen taleplere nasıl yaklaşıyorsunuz?
42 . Belediye başkanıyla bu tür sorunları çözmeye yönelik olarak ne sıklıkta görüşürsünüz?
() Sık sık () Arada bir () Nadiren () başka
43. Seçmenlerinizin imarla ilgili sorunlarında İmar müdürü ya da diğer yetkililere ne sıklıkta görüşürsünüz?

() Sık sık () Arada bir () Nadiren () başka.....

44. Size gelen talepler nerelerde yapılıyor? (önem sırasına göre sıralayınız)

- () Evime gelirler
- () Parti, il, ilçe binasında
- () Belediye'de
- () Hemşerilik derneğinde
- () Diğer.....(belirtiniz).
- () iş yerimde

45. Belediye Başkanları ve Meclis Üyeleri, Seçilmelerini Sağlamış Olan Siyasal Parti Örgütlerinden Gelen İstemlere Ne Ölçüde Duyarlı Olmalıdır?

- 1 () Partili Üyelere Öncelik Verilmeli
- 2 () Koşullar Eşit Olduğu Takdirde Partililere Öncelik Tanınmalı
- 3 () Herkese Eşit Davranılmalı

46. Belediye Meclis üyeleri/başkanlar sizce seçildikleri partilerinden gelen bu tür isteklere ne derece duyarlılar?

() Oldukça duyarlılar () Duyarlılar () Sınırlı Ölçüde () Duyarsızlar

47. Siz seçmenlerinize hangi yollardan ve nerede ulaşıp, onların sorunlarını, düşüncelerini dinliyorsunuz?

.....

48. Belli koşulların Varlığı Halinde Belediye Meclisi ve Belediye Başkanının Görev Süreleri Dolmadan Görevlerine Halkoylaması Yoluyla Son Verilmesi Yolu Açılmalı Mıdır?

- 1 () Evet
- 2 () Hayır
- 3 () Fikrim Yok

49. İl Halkını İlgilendiren Önemli Kararların Alınmasında Halkoylamasına Gidilmesi Sizce Uygun Mudur?

- 1 () Evet
- 2 () Hayır
- 3 () Fikrim Yok

50. Demokrasinin Gelişmesi Bakımından Aşağıdaki Görüşlerden Sizce Hangisi Geçerlidir?

- 1 () Ülke Çapında Demokrasi Belirleyicidir.
- 2 () Belirleyici Olan Yerel Demokrasidir.
- 3 () İkisinin de Ağırlığı Aynıdır.
- 4 () Başka.....

51. Denizli halkı, Meclis Toplantılarıyla Ne Ölçüde İlgileniyor?

- 1 () İlgili
- 2 () Az İlgili
- 3 () İlgisiz

52. Sizce neden ilgi göstermiyorlar?

.....

53. Sizce belediyelerde en etkili ve güçlü olan toplumsal grup hangisidir? (önem sırasına göre numaralayınız).

() Esnaf/Küçük girişimci

() İşadamları/Sanayici

() Gecekondulular

() Gecekondu dışındaki kent sakinleri

- () Hemşeri ve benzeri dernekler
- () Muhtarlar

() Parti örgütleri

() Diğer.....(belirtiniz)

54. Sizce belediyelere ilişkin en etkisiz ve dışlanan kesim hangisidir.

1..... 2...... 3.....

55. Belediyenizde Yerel halk Belediye Hizmetlerine Hangi Yollarla Katılmaktadır?

- 1 () Hiç Katılmamaktadırlar.
- 2 () Para İle 3 () İşgücü İle
- S () Işgucu ne
- 4 () Taşınmaz Mal Vererek
- 5 () Araç-gereç Vererek
- 6 () Gereksinimlerini ve İstemlerini Bildirerek
- 7 () Tepki Göstererek, Karşı Çıkarak
- 8 () Bilmiyorum
- 9 () Başka.....

56. Belediyenizce Alınmış Kararların Uygulanmasında Halkın Size Güçlük Çıkardığı Oluyor Mu?

- 1 () Evet
- 2 () Hayır

57. (Yanıt "Evet" İse), Hangi Kesimler, Gruplar Ne Tür Konularda ve nasıl Güçlük Çıkarıyor?

kesim	konu	nasıl
kesim		
kesim		
Reomin		

58. Mahallenin Tüzel Kişiliği Olan Yeni Bir Yerel Yönetim Basamağı Olarak Düzenlenmesi, Demokratik Katılım ve Yerel Hizmetler Açısından Yararlı Olur Mu?

- 1 () Katılım İçin Yararlıdır.
- 2 () Yerel Hizmetler Açısından Yararlıdır.
- 3 () Her İkisi İçin de Yararlıdır.
- 4 () Hiçbir Açıdan Yarar Sağlamaz.
- 5 () Başka.....

59. Belediyelerin Üzerindeki Vesayet, onay ve benzeri Denetimlerin Kaldırılması Konusundaki Düşünceniz Nedir?

1	()	Vesayet Tümüyle Kaldırılsın. Neden?
2	()	Bugünkü Durum Korunsun. Neden?
			Merkezin Mali Yardımıyla Sınırlandırılsın. Neden?
4	()	Yargısal Denetimle Yetinilsin. Neden?
5	()	Başka

60. Belediye meclislerinde en çok tartışma çıkartan konular hangileridir?

1	
2	
3	
3	

61. Belediye meclislerinde en az tartışma çıkartan konular hangileridir?

1	
2	••••••
3	

61a belediye meclislerinde tartışılması gereken ancak tartışılmayan konular hangileridir?

1	
2	
3	

62. Anayasa ve Yasalarca Çizilen Sınırlar İçersinde Belediye Meclisine Vergi Koyma Yetkisinin Tanınması Sizce Uygun mudur?

- 1 () Evet
- 2 () Hayır
- 3 () Fikrim Yok

63. Belediye Hizmetlerinin Özelleştirilmesi Konusunda Ne Düşünüyorsunuz?

65a belediye şirketlerinin yarattığı sorunlar var mı?

.....

67. Belediyelerin Borçlanmaları Konusunda Ne Düşünüyorsunuz?

- 1 () Olabildiğince Her Türlü Borçlanmadan Kaçınılmalı.
- 2 () Yurt Dışı Borçlanmadan Kaçınılmalı.
- 3 () Borçlanmadan Kaçınılmayıp, Önemli Hizmetler Gerçekleştirilmeli.

68. Belediyelerin Bugün Yapmakta Olduğu Görevlerin Dışında Yeni Görevler Üstlenmesi Sizce Gerekli Midir?

1 () Gereksiz

2 () Gerekli (Hangi Görevler Belirtiniz).....

69. 3030 Sayılı Büyükşehir Belediyelerinin Kurulmasına Dair Yasa'yla Kurulan Sistem sizce yeterli ve sağlıklı bir sistem midir?

- 1 () Evet
- 2 () Hayır
- 3 () Fikrim Yok

70. (Yanıt "hayır" İse), Sizce Aşağıdaki Önerilerden Hangisi Uygundur? (Birden Fazla İşaretlenebilir)

- 1 () Anakentler nüfusu 250 bini geçen yerlerde kurulsun.
- 2 () Anakentler nüfusu 500 bini geçen yerlerde kurulsun.
- 3 () Anakent Belediye Meclislerini Doğrudan Halk Seçsin.

4 () Görev Paylaşımı Gözden Geçirilsin. İlçe Belediyelerinin Görev ve Yetkileri

Arttırılsın.

- 5 () Anakentlerde Çok Başlılık Kaldırılsın.
- 6 () Belediye Encümenine Seçilmiş Üyeler de Sokulsun.
- 7 () Anakentlerin Gelir Kaynakları Arttırılsın.
- 8 () anakent belediyeleri kaldırılsın

88. Sizce Denizli belediyesi Büyükşehir belediyesi olmalımıdır? Neden ?

.....

89. Denizli Belediyesi Büyükşehir belediyesi olduğunda ne tarz problemlerin daha kolay çözüleceğine inanıyorsunuz?

.....

71. Belediye İşlerinin Daha İyi Yapılması Konusunda Sizce Aşağıdakilerden Hangisi En Çok Engelleyici ya da Bağlayıcıdır?

1 () Mevzuat	
2 () Personel.	
3 () Mali Konular.	
4 () Vesayet.	
5 () Başka	

.....

72. Sizce anakent belediyesi ile ilçe belediyesi arasındaki güç dağılımı adil midir?

() Evet () Hayır.....(Niçin, belirtiniz)

73. Sizce, şu anda belediye yönetiminde aşağıdakilerden hangileri en etkilidir? (etkililik sırasına göre sıralayınız)

- () Belediye Başkanı() Belediye Meclisi
- () Belediye Encümeni
- () Belediye Şirketleri
- () Belediye bürokrasisi
- () Vatandaşlar
- () İş çevreleri
- () Sanayiciler
- () Başka.....(belirtiniz)

73a sizce hangisi etkili olmalıdır?

- () Belediye Başkanı
- () Belediye Meclisi
- () Belediye Encümeni
- () Belediye Şirketleri
- () Belediye bürokrasisi
- () Vatandaşlar
- () İş çevreleri
- () Sanayiciler
- () Başka.....(belirtiniz)

74. Belediyenizin Aşağıdaki Hizmet Alanlarındaki Başarısını Değerlendiriniz.

Basarı Derecesi

		Başarı	Derecesi	
	Çok	Başarılı	Az	Başarısız Neden
1. İmar İşleri	()	()	()	()
2. Fen İşleri	()	()	()	()
3. Basın-Halkla İlişkiler	()	()	()	()
4. Sağlık Hizmeti	()	()	()	()
5. Zabıta	()	()	()	()
6. Toplu Taşımacılık	()	()	()	()
7. Kültür-Sanat	()	()	()	()
8. Halkın Eğitimi	()	()	()	()
9. Çevre Sağ. Ve Temiz	()	()	()	()
10. Sağlık ve Gıda Denet	()	()	()	()
11. Açık ve Yeşil Alanlar	()	()	()	()
12. Yangın Söndürme	()	()	()	()
•••••				

75. Kentin sizce en büyük üç sorunu nedir, sıralayınız?

1
2 3
76. Gecekonduluların rantiye olduğuna dair görüşe katılıyor musunuz?
 () Hayır / neden? () Evet a () belediye sınırları içinde neden? b () il sınırları içinde neden ?
77. Gecekondu afları gereklimidir?
() Hayır () EvetNiçin
78 . Kentteki güçlü kesimlerin belediyelerde dahil bir şekilde işlerini hallettikleri yönünde bir inanç var, katılıyor musunuz?
() Evet () Hayır
79 . Kentlerde yeni çıkmaya başlayan Migros, Tansaş ve benzeri alışveriş merkezleri sizce kentin gelişimine olumlu katkı yapmakta mıdır?
() Evet () HayırNeden
80. Meclis üyesi olduğunuz belediyenin şu an ne kadar dış borcu olduğunu biliyor musunuz?
() Evetdolar () Hayır
80a Meclis üyesi olduğunuz belediyenin şu an ne kadar iç borcu olduğunu biliyor musunuz?
() EvetTL () Hayır
81. Belediyelerin özel firmalara iş yaptırması sizce gerekli mi?
 () gerekli neden? () gereksiz neden? () fikrim yok
83 Yeni belediyeler yasası sizce olumlu mu?
 () evet () hayır niçin? () Fikrim yok
84 İl genel meclislerinin güçlendirilmesi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
 () olumlu neden? () olumsuz neden? () fikrim yok / bilmiyorum

Eklemek istediğiniz herhangi bir not var mı?

APPENDIX B

1. Mevcut 1580 sayılı "Belediyeler Yasası"nı biliyor musunuz?
İyi biliyorum () Biliyorum () Az biliyorum () Bilmiyorum ()
 2. 1580 sayılı "Belediyeler Yasası"nda değiştirilmesini istediğiniz iki konuyu yazar mısınız? 1 2
3. Mevcut kamu yönetimi yasasını biliyor musunuz?
İyi biliyorum () Biliyorum () Az biliyorum () Bilmiyorum ()
 4. Mevcut "<i>kamu yönetimi yasası</i>"<i>nda</i> hatalı bulduğunuz iki konuyu yazar mısınız? 1 2
5. 3194 sayılı İmar yasasını biliyor musunuz?
İyi biliyorum () Biliyorum () Az biliyorum () Bilmiyorum ()
 6. 3194 sayılı İmar Yasasında değiştirilmesini istediğiniz iki konuyu yazar mısınız ? 1 2
7. Belediye encümeninin görevlerinden iki tanesini yazabilir misiniz?1
8. <i>Belediye meclisinin</i> görevlerinden iki tanesini yazabilir misiniz?
 2
 9. <i>İl özel idarelerinin</i> sorumluluk alanına giren iki konuyu belirtebilir misiniz? 1
10. "Stratejik plan" kavramı ile ilgili fikriniz var mı?
Evet, var () Hayır, yok ()
11. <i>Yeni yerel yönetimler yasa tasarısı</i> ile mevcut belediyeler yasası arasında ki farklardan ikisini belirtirmisiniz? 12.
12. <i>Yeni kamu yönetimi yasa tasarısı</i> ile mevcut kamu yönetimi yasası arasında ki farklardan ikisini belirtirmisiniz?
2

13. <i>Îl genel meclislerinin</i> görevlerinden iki tanesini yazabilir misiniz?
2
14. Belediye meclisine Vergi Koyma Yetkisinin tanınması sizce uygun mudur?
Evet () Hayır () Fikrim yok ()
15. Belediyelerin üzerindeki <i>vesayet, onay ve benzeri denetimlerin</i> kaldırılması fikrine katılıyor musunuz?
Evet () Hayır () Fikrim yok ()
 16. "İmar yönetmeliği"ne göre "İnşaat Ruhsatı" ve "Yapı Kullanım İzni" alınması için gerekli olan belgelerden iki tanesini yazar mısınız ? 1
17 . Belediye Meclisi toplantılarında hangi konularda <i>gizli oylama</i> yapılır, iki konu belirtir misiniz?
2
18. Belediye bünyesinde ki birimlerin müdürlerinden hangileri <i>Belediye Encümeni üyesi</i> değildir?
1
2

APPENDIX C

ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ KENTSEL POLİTİKA PLANLAMASI ve YEREL YÖNETİMLER ANA BİLİM DALI BAŞKANLIĞI

BELEDİYE ÇALIŞANLARI SORU KAĞIDI

İsim	:
Görev	:
Belediye'de ça	lıştığı birim;
İmar işleri Fen işleri Zabıta Halka ilişkiler Diğer	
Cinsiyeti: () Erkek	() Kadın
Doğum yılı:	
Doğum yeri:	İliİlçesi
Öğrenim Duru	imu:

Çalışmaya başladığınız tarihten itibaren çalıştığınız işleri en son işten geriye doğru sıralayınız?

Çalıştığı yer/kurum	Görev	Tarih (yıl olarak)
1		
2		
34		
5		
5		••••••••••

Geleceğe yönelik politik beklentileriniz var mı?

(belediye meclisi üyeliği, parti üyeliği vb.)

Sizce belediyecilikte, aşağıda sıralanan ifadelerden hangisi daha önemlidir?

- 1 () Hizmetlerin Yerine Getirilmesi
- 2 () Yerel Özerklik ve Yerel Demokrasi
- 3 () Başka.....

Halkın Belediye Meclislerinde yeterince temsil edildiği kanısında mısınız?

- 1 () Evet 2 () Hayır
- 3 () Fikrim Yok

Halkın Belediye Meclislerinde daha iyi temsil edilmesi için önerileriniz nelerdir?

.....

Belediye Meclisleri görevlerini doğru ve sağlıklı bir şekilde yerine getirebiliyor mu ?

Belediye Meclislerinin görevlerini doğru ve sağlıklı bir şekilde yerine getirebilmeleri için gerekli olan şartlar nelerdir?

Sizce belediye encümeninin oluşumu nasıl olmalıdır?

- () üyelerinin tümü seçilsin
 () üyelerinin tümü atanmış, teknik elemanlar olsun
 () üyelerinin çoğunluğu seçilsin
 4 () üyelerinin çoğunluğu atansın
- 5 () seçilmiş ve atanmış üyeler eşit oranda bulunsun
- 6 () diger.....

Belediye meclislerinde sivil toplum örgütlerinin temsilcileri için üyelik kontenjanı ayrılması sizce uygun mudur?

- 1 () Hayır niçin?....
- 2 () Fikrim Yok
- 3 () Evet niçin?.....

Kimler?

- () Muhtar temsilcileri
- () Dernek temsilcileri
- () Sendika temsilcileri
- () Ticaret/Sanayi odaları temsilcileri
- () Meslek odaları temsilcileri
- () Wester odulut tenishenen

Diğer.....(belirtiniz).

İmar ve benzeri konularda halktan gelen taleplere nasıl yaklaşıyorsunuz?

.....

.....

İmar ve benzeri konularda belediye meclisi üyelerinden ve/veya belediye başkanından gelen taleplere nasıl yaklaşıyorsunuz?

Belediye başkanı imar / fen işleri ile ilgili sorunları çözmeye yönelik olarak ne sıklıkta sizinle görüşür?

() Sık sık () Arada bir () Nadiren () başka.....

Belediye meclisi üyeleri imar / fen işleri ile ilgili sorunları çözmeye yönelik olarak ne sıklıkta sizinle görüşür?

() Sık sık () Arada bir () Nadiren () başka.....

Sizce belediye meclisi üyeleri imar / fen işleri ile ilgili sorunlar için ne sıklıkta sizinle görüşmelidir?

() Sık sık () Arada bir () Nadiren

() başka.....

Sizce belediye başkanı imar / fen işleri ile ilgili sorunlar için ne sıklıkta sizinle görüşmelidir?

() Sık sık () Arada bir () Nadiren () başka.....

İmar ve fen işleri konularında belediye meclisi üyelerinden hangi partiye mensup olanlarla daha fazla görüşüyorsunuz? *Neden? En cok.....*

En az.....

1

Belediye meclisi toplantılarında en çok tartışma çıkartan konular hangileridir? Neden?

]	I
2	2
~	,
))

Belediye meclisi toplantılarında en az tartışma çıkartan konular hangileridir? Neden?

1	
2	
2	
3	
J	

Belediye meclisi toplantılarında tartışılması gereken ancak tartışılmayan konular hangileridir? *Neden*?

	1
	2
1	2
	3

Belediye Hizmetlerinin Daha İyi Yapılması Konusunda Sizce Aşağıdakilerden Hangisi En Çok Engelleyici ya da Bağlayıcıdır? *Sebepleri nelerdir?*

1	()	Mevzuat
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- 2 () Personel.
- 3 () Mali Konular.
- 4 () Vesayet.
- 5 () Başka.....

Sizce, şu anda belediye yönetiminde aşağıdakilerden hangileri en etkilidir? (etkililik sırasına göre sıralayınız)

() Belediye Başkanı	
() Belediye Meclisi	
() Belediye Encümeni	
() Belediye Şirketleri	
() Belediye bürokrasisi	
() Vatandaşlar	
() İş çevreleri	
() Başka(belirtiniz)	

Sizce hangisi etkili olmalıdır?

() Belediye Başkanı
() Belediye Meclisi
() Belediye Encümeni
() Belediye Şirketleri
() Belediye bürokrasisi
() Vatandaşlar
() İş çevreleri
() Başka(belirtiniz)

Belediyenizin Aşağıdaki Hizmet Alanlarındaki Başarısını Değerlendiriniz

Başarı Derecesi

	Ço	k	Başa	rılı	А	Z	Başarısız Neden	
1. İmar İşleri	()	()	()	()	
2. Fen İşleri	()	()	()	()	
 Basın-Halkla İlişkiler 	()	()	()	()	
 Sağlık Hizmeti 	()	()	()	()	
5. Zabıta	()	()	()	()	
Toplu Taşımacılık	()	()	()	()	
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8. Halkın Eğitimi	()	()	()	()	
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10. Sağlık ve Gıda Denet	()	()	()	()	
11. Açık ve Yeşil Alanlar	()	()	()	()	
12. Yangın Söndürme	()	()	()	()	

Yeni belediyeler yasası sizce olumlu mu?

() evet	
() hayır	niçin?
() fikrim	yok / bilmiyorum

İl genel meclislerinin güçlendirilmesi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

() olumlu neden?
() olumsuz neden?
() fikrim yok / bilmiyorum