DEMOCRACY AND OPPOSITION IN TURKEY:
LOCATING THE FREEDOM PARTY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

BURAK ÖZÇETİN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

SEPTEMBER 2004

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

                                                    ————————————
                                          Prof. Dr. Sencer AYATA
                                                 Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

                                                    ————————————
                                          Prof. Dr. Feride ACAR
                                          Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

                                                    ————————————
                                          Prof. Dr. Feride ACAR
                                          Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Feride ACAR   ————————————

Prof. Dr. Ayşe AYATA   ————————————

Assist. Prof. Dr. Simten COŞAR   ————————————

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Burak Özçetin

Signature   :

ABSTRACT

DEMOCRACY AND OPPOSITION IN TURKEY:
LOCATING THE FREEDOM PARTY

Özçetin, Burak

M. Sc., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Feride Acar

September 2004, 132 pages

The main objective of this thesis is to examine the specific place of the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*) in Turkish political history. Founded by a group of Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*) members who were expelled from the party in December 1956, the Freedom Party (1956-1958) is crucial for a proper understanding of evolution of the idea and practice of democracy in Turkey. Although mostly neglected by students of Turkish politics and labeled as an insignificant political party, this thesis argues that the Freedom Party is critical for understanding the 1950s and socioeconomic and legal-constitutional developments of the following decade. The thesis also pays a considerable attention to the *Forum* journal, which began to be published in 1954 by a group of liberal intellectuals and which guided the Freedom Party in ideological and political terms. It is the main argument of this thesis that the Freedom Party and *Forum* journal introduced a new understanding of politics and this understanding had profound effects in the following decades. The ideological transformation of the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) after the second half of the 1950s and the role of HP in this process is another topic of the thesis.

Keywords: Freedom Party, Democratic Party, *Forum* Journal, Turkish Liberalism, Right of Proof

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE DEMOKRASİ VE MUHALEFET: HÜRRİYET PARTİSİ'Nİ ANLAMAK

Özçetin, Burak

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Feride Acar

Eylül 2004, 132 sayfa

Bu tezin temel amacı Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk siyasal hayatındaki özgül konumunu incelemektir. 1956 Ekim'inde partilerinden tasfiye edilen bir grup Demokrat Parti üyesi tarafından kurulan Hürriyet Partisi (1956-1958) Türkiye'de demokrasi fikrinin ve pratiğinin evrimini anlayabilmemiz açısından önemli bir yerde durmaktadır. Bu tez, Hürriyet Partisi'nin –her ne kadar bu parti Türk siyasal hayatı üzerine çalışan siyaset bilimciler tarafından çoğunlukla görmezden gelinmiş ve önemsiz bir siyasal parti olarak adlandırılmışsa da– 1950'li yılları ve ona müteakip onyılda meydana gelen sosyoekonomik ve hukuki-anayasal gelişmeleri anlayabilmemiz açısından oldukça önemli olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Tez aynı zamanda 1954 yılında bir grup liberal aydın tarafından yayımlanmaya başlayan ve Hürriyet Partisi'nin düşünsel ve siyasi kılavuzluğunu üstlenen *Forum* dergisine de kayda değer ölçüde eğilmektedir. Tezin temel iddiası Hürriyet Partisi ve *Forum* dergisinin yeni bir siyaset anlayışını sundukları ve bu anlayışın sonraki onyıllarda etkisini derinden hissettirdiğidir. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin 1950'lerin ikinci yarısından sonra geçirdiği düşünsel dönüşüm ve Hürriyet Partisi'nin bu dönüşümdeki rolü de tezin değindiği diğer bir konudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Hürriyet Partisi, Demokrat Parti, *Forum* Dergisi, Türk Liberalizmi, İspat Hakkı

To the memory of my father
SAVAŞ ÖZÇETİN

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The main subject of this thesis is a political party in Turkish history, the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Partisi*). The Freedom Party (HP) was founded in December 1955 by a group of Democratic Party (DP) deputies (known as 'the Nineteens'), who publicly announced their discontent with their own government's policies. In fact, the party can be considered as an outcome of the ongoing tension between the founders of the DP and the dissidents. The tension reached its peak when a group of DP deputies brought to the Turkish General Assembly a Bill for providing the newspapermen with the 'right of proof' (*ispat hakkı*) on 2 May 1955. By this, the deputies demanded that journalists who were taken to court under the existing restrictive press law should have the right to prove the truth about what they had written and this should be admitted as evidence in the courts.

In fact, the 'right of proof' was the final straw that broke the camel's back. Many signatories of the 'right of proof' Bill had already raised their voices against the party's leadership. The opposition movement of the 'Sixty-one' (*61'ler Hareketi*) in 1950 was the most striking example of such earlier dissent. Intra-party democracy was the motto of the dissidents, and they criticized the "Menderes circle" for downplaying the role of the party's General Assembly Group in overall decision-making processes.

The landslide electoral victory of DP in 1954 elections and the allegedly "anti-democratic" turn of the party in the succeeding period rendered the ongoing struggle within the party tangible. Also, the economic crisis in the second half of the 1950s played a crucial role in the crystallization of intra-party opposition. Also, so far as the dissidents were concerned, the economic miracle of the first years of the DP rule was not backed by a comprehensive economic plan.

At the end of the summer of 1955 the 'right of proof' became one of the most important topics of the political agenda inn Turkey. Before the Fourth General Congress of the Democratic Party, the signatories of the Bill were expelled from the party.[1] One month later 'The Nineteen' founded the Freedom Party.

The Freedom Party was welcomed by almost all fractions of opposition movements. The liberal intelligentsia saw the Freedom Party as an alternative to both the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) and the Democratic Party. Especially the *Forum* journal, which began to be published in April 1954, supported the HP in both ideological and tactical terms.

Cooperation among the opposition political parties characterized the political climate throughout the period between the birth of the HP and 1957 elections. During this process the HP organized an affective opposition strategy. It can be said that the sound formulations of the Freedom Party and *Forum* journal set the main parameters of anti-DP politics in the second half of the 1950s. The Freedom Party-*Forum* circle presented a new understanding of politics and an alternative way of economic development, which found its reflections in next decades. Here lies the importance of the HP, and the main objective of this thesis is to present a comprehensive analysis of this new stance in Turkish politics in the second half of the 1950s.

As a party almost without an organization, the HP won only four seats in the Assembly in the 1957 elections. On 24 November 1958 the party dissolved itself in its Extraordinary Congress and decided to join the CHP.

The experience of the Freedom Party cannot be taken as isolated from overall development of democratic government in Turkey. Therefore the second chapter of this thesis will try to present a critical evaluation of the analyses on "consolidation" of democracy in Turkey. After a selective reading of the literature on consolidation of non-Western democracies (what I call the "consolidation paradigm") I will try to show the points of intersection between the consolidation paradigm and dominant paradigm among the students of Turkish politics.

As Gramsci once argued, writing history of a political party is more than writing the history of that political party. The third chapter of this thesis will try to

---

[1] In fact, 10 signatories were expelled and remaining 9 signatories immediately resigned.

locate the birth and evolution of the Freedom Party within a broader historical context, for the specific place of the HP in Turkish political history cannot be understood without an overall account of Turkey's transition to democracy. A study on the HP hardly makes sense unless it gives an account of the CHP and DP respectively.

Chapter 3 starts with some preliminary remarks on the nature of the Kemalist regime. The nature of the single-party era and two crucial experiences of the period (the Free Republican Party and Independent Group) were dealt for a broader understanding of the relationship between political power and opposition in the early Republican era. After briefly presenting the war-time arrangements and elaborating the dynamics and main characteristics of Turkey's transition to multi-party politics following the Second World War, the Democratic Party will be one of the focal points of this chapter. That is to say, the thesis tries to give a comprehensive account of the DP; its historical evolution and political discourse in the second half of the 1940s in order to present Democrats' understanding of democracy and representation. The chapter continues with an examination of the electoral victory of the DP in 1950 and implications of this electoral victory for Turkish political history. The period between the 1950 elections and 1954 elections is called the 'golden years' of the DP rule. These 'golden years' also witnessed a persistent tension between the "Menderes circle" and the DP's General Assembly Group. The roots of the Freedom Party can be sought within this period. In this chapter, after touching on the main developments of this period, I will focus on the so-called "anti-democratic" turn of the DP after the 1954 elections. The dynamics of this turn and its effects on the balances within the party will be examined.

Three crucial topics of 1955 challenged the position of DP's leadership and caused the dissidents to raise their voices. These were the 'right of proof' issue, the '6/7 September Events' and the economic crisis. Chapter 3 on Freedom Party will evaluate these topics and their contribution to formation of the HP. After giving a brief account of the developments of the period the section will focus on the nature of the party. The party program and social composition of the HP is examined in this part. While the corner stones of the HP's opposition are introduced and discussed

briefly in this section, a more detailed analysis of the party's ideological coordinates are presented in the ensuing Chapter on the *Forum* journal.

The fourth chapter of this thesis is devoted to *Forum* journal, because the ideological disposition of the HP and its founders was largely shaped by *Forum*. As Coşar states, the group provided the party with an intellectual framework. "In other words, the group found an opportunity for the realization of their long-aspired intellectually-framed game of politics." The way that the *Forum* writers grasp politics in general and the problem of democracy in particular, therefore constitute the main subject of this Chapter. *Forum's* alternative economic development strategy also finds a considerable place within this chapter owing to the journal's significant impact on HP.

Finally, the Conclusion tries to show the effects of this peculiar political movement on the course of Turkish political history, in addition to presenting a general evaluation of the HP-*Forum* circle.

CHAPTER 2

CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY

"Democracy" is a word that we more than frequently come across in our daily life. For people living in Turkey, the word "democracy" connotes something mostly ambiguous, and mostly associated with problematic nature of the notion itself. This fact caused many students of Turkish politics to debate on characteristics and main dynamics of crisis of Turkish democracy. Interrupted for four times by military interventions and still being interrupted persistently by the institutional weight of Turkish military in political scene, Turkish experiment in democracy is worth of examination. Not only the problem of the existence of military in political sphere, but also the anti-democratic "culture" in general should be examined closely; first, for a better understanding of the contemporary features of Turkish politics, and second, for grounding the basis of a more democratic society.

The experience of the HP cannot be taken as isolated from general patterns of development of democratic government in Turkey. Being a splinter party, the HP has emerged as a response to the anti-democratic (and even authoritarian) turn of the DP. Thus, for a better understanding of that specific political movement, one might briefly discuss and critically evaluate main arguments on problems of development of democracy in Turkey. In this part, I will briefly introduce the debates over successes and failures of democracies in developing countries. I will briefly present theories of prominent scholars (like Philippe Schmitter, Guillermo O'Donnell, Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Arturo Valenzuela and Seymour Martin Lipset) on possibilities and main characteristics of democratic government and consolidation of democracy in developing societies. After touching on this literature it will be seen that majority of students of Turkish politics are in a dynamic dialogue (both implicitly and explicitly) with it. In other words, certain phrases of the "consolidation paradigm" (like existence of a civic political discourse, vigorous and autonomous

civil society, belief in the legitimacy of democracy, trust in the political environment, tolerance towards opposition movements; a level of political institutionalization, etc.) become main criterions in evaluating the degree and problems of democratic government in Turkey. The second part of this section will deal with Ottoman-Turkish case in particular. I will also try to discuss the relevance of these debates with the main subject of my thesis; to put the question in another way, "Does the consolidation paradigm tell anything about the development of democracy in Turkey in general, and the anti-democratic turn of the DP in the second half of the 1950s in particular?" Since presenting an alternative reading is beyond the purposes of this thesis, I will only review some criticisms directed towards the consolidation paradigm.

2.1 Politics in Developing Countries: How to Consolidate Democracy?

What makes a political and socioeconomic system *democratic*? The answers may vary. In this part, I will briefly introduce main arguments of a group of scholars who are trying to explore the development and problems of democratic experiences of developing countries. How will the problems of democratic rule in non-Western world be examined and located? What kind of factors lead to breakdowns and failures in the democratic experiences of these countries? And, what are the preconditions for consolidation of democracies in these countries? These are the main questions, for which the "consolidation paradigm"[2] tries to find appropriate answers.

---

[2] The purpose of labelling the literature on consolidation of democracy as "consolidation paradigm" is entirely practical, for one cannot see a homogenous theoretical stand. There are many differences –both theoretical and ideological– and crucial disagreements among writers who are dealing with the problem of consolidation of democracy in non-Western world. But, for the purposes of this work, I will briefly present common assumptions of the consolidation paradigm. For an excellent review, see, Timothy Power and Nancy Powers, "Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe in Comperative Perspective –A Rapporteurs' Report–", The Helen Kellog Institute for International Studies (October 1998). This is a report of a meeting held in October 1998. Among the participants of the meeting were: Philippe Schmitter (co-chair), Guillermo

It should be noted that it is not possible to find clear definitions for the terms "democracy" and "consolidation". Mostly, the researchers who deal with consolidation process have different standards in determining the level of democratic development. As formulated by Power and Powers, the main concern is not to find the exact definition of 'consolidation', but rather to discuss the factors that encourage or discourage it; "similarly, the endpoint of consolidation –that is, the condition of being consolidated– may not be defined universally and it is very difficult to identify prospectively."[3] Like Power and Powers, Philippe Schmitter opposes the "essentialist" definitions of the term, "which suggest that particular institutions or procedures are necessary and sufficient to consolidate democracy."[4] Perspectives on definition and problems of democratic consolidation are mostly influenced by the countries under study.[5]

For Schedler, "originally, the term "democratic consolidation" was meant to describe the challenge of making democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy, beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual "reverse waves""; but as the literature on "democratic consolidation" grew, other countless tasks have been added "to this original mission of rendering democracy 'the only game in town'."[6] This fact has created confusion about the terms used; and for Schedler, "different things should have different names,"[7] because "no scientific field can advance far if the participants do not share a common understanding of key terms in the field."[8] Leaving aside confusions, homonymity (one word meaning many things),

O'Donnell (co-chair), J. Samuel Valenzuela, Laurance Whitehead, Juan Rial, Richard Gunther and Scott Mainwright. Also, for an article criticizing the ambiguities of the concepts "consolidation" and "democracy", and ambivalance of the subdiscipline of "consolidology" in general, see, Andreas Schedler, "What is Democratic Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, no. 9, vol.2, (1998); also see O'Donnell, Guillermo, "Illusions about Consolidation", *Journal of Democracy*, v.7, no. 2, April 1996 [reprinted in, O'Donnel, *Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democractization*, (1999, Notre Dame)] and Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, "O'Donnell's 'Illusions': A Rejoinder", *Journal of Democracy*, vol.7, no. 4, (1996).

[3] Power and Powers, "Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy", 2-3.
[4] Schmitter, 1988: 3, cf. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, "Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences With Democracy", (1995: L Rienner), 4-6.
[5] Power and Powers, "Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy", 3.
[6] Andreas Schedler, "What is Democratic Consolidation?", 91.
[7] ibid.. 103.
[8] ibid.. 92.

"conceptual mess" and "strange multiplicity" of meanings within the sub discipline of "consodiliogy",[9] this study will deal with the formulations which have affected the students of Turkish politics.

Democracy, for Diamond, Linz and Lipset, "signifies a political system, separate and apart from the economic and social systems to which it is joined."[10] They detect three essential conditions for a governmental system to be democratic:

> *i.* Meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially for political parties) for all effective positions of governmental power through regular, free, and fair elections that exclude the use of force
> *ii.* A highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, such that no major (adult) social group is prevented from exercising the rights of citizenship
> *iii.* A level of civil and political liberties –freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and demonstration, freedom to form and join organizations, freedom from terror and unjustified imprisonment– secured through political equality under a rule of law, sufficient to ensure that citizens (acting individually and through various associations) can develop and advocate their views and interests and contest policies and offices vigorously and autonomously.[11]

Implicit in this definition are the principles of accountability,[12] mutual trust and tolerance; and especially existence of channels, or networks, which carry the democracies beyond the 'formal' lines,[13] namely existence of a vigorous *civil society*.

Debates over consolidation do not only take the existence of democratic values, principles and institutions into account within a given societal system; but also *persistence* and *stability* of these values and institutions are considered as central. Diamond et. al. make a distinction between stable and unstable regimes by defining the former as "the ones whose institutionalization and level and breadth of popular legitimacy make it highly likely to persist, even in the face of crises and challenges." For these writers "partially stable regimes are neither fully secure nor in

---

[9] ibid. 92.
[10] Diamond et. al., *Politics*, 6.
[11] ibid.. 6-7.
[12] Both horizontal and vertical, see. O'Donnel, *Counterpoints*, 165-166.
[13] Diamond et. al., *Politics,* 7; see O'Donnell's 'maximalist democracy', which refers to a democracy in which most of the citizens internalizes the democratic values and principles, Özbudun, *Çağdaş Türk Politikası: Demokratik Pekişmenin Önündeki Engeller,*10

imminent danger or collapse . . . Unstable regimes are, by definition, highly vulnerable to breakdown or overthrow in periods of acute uncertainty and stress."[14]

According to Diamond et. al., "democratic stability requires a widespread belief among elites and masses in the legitimacy of the democratic system that it is the best (or the "least evil") form of government."[15] Mainwaring also stresses the importance of political and social actors' commitment to democracy as an important prerequisite for establishment and persistence of democratic government. He analyses some countries in the Latin American continent and concludes that Latin American democracy has persisted only when a majority of social and political actors believed in it. For him, most of the literature on democratic transition "downplayed the importance of a normative commitment to democracy."[16] Although O'Donnell gives more importance to relative positions and structures of the political institutions and the level of institutionalization than elite's commitment to democratic values[17], this does not mean that he neglects the role of elite behaviors, attitudes and actions in establishing, stabilizing, and destabilizing democracies. O'Donnell and Schmitter in *Transitions to Democracy* underlined the role of elite dispositions, interests, alliances, and pacts in liberalization of an authoritarian regime.[18] Not only the role of the 'ruling elites' but also the moderate or radical attitudes of the 'opposition elites' are central in consolidation of political regimes. In their work Schmitter and O'Donnell makes a separation between *radical* and *moderate* opposition strategies; and underline the importance of '*moderate*' opposition strategies for democratic transition and consolidation.[19]

---

[14] Diamond et. al., *Politics,* 9.

[15] ibid.. 9. Whereas, Linz in one of his former accounts states that "actions which support democracy are more important than personal democractic conviction" Linz, 1988: 12. "Juan Linz recounted a conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo who, commenting on the Spanish transition, said that independently of their faith in a previous commitment to democracy, Spanish leaders seem to have acted on the advice of Pascal to a friend whose religious faith was in crisis. He told him, 'act as if you had faith and you will have it'" Power and Powers, "Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy". See Schmitter, 1988: 13: "we are concerned with whether or not actors will play by a democractic set of rules, not what they think about the underlying principles."

[16] Mainwaring, 1992: 308-309.

[17] O'Donnel, *Counterpoints*, 161-166

[18] 15-21.

[19] O'donnell, *Counterpoints*; see, Diamond et. al.'s note on "moderation of political positions and partisan identifications", 1995: 19

The absence of these particular points –the commitment of elites and masses to democratic values and their responsible and moderate behaviors– are referred to in many analyses of Turkish politics.[20] In line with the arguments of O'Donnell and Schmitter, Sunar and Sayarı, in their formulations on Turkey's transition to democracy, assert that with no change in elite composition, the old ruling elites experienced great difficulties in adjusting themselves to the new rules of the game. This was one of the factors which led to degeneration of democratic rule in second half of the 1950s.[21]

Together with the arguments on "commitment of elites and masses to democratic values", the *political culture* emerges as a key variable in understanding the level of democratic government in a given country. Diamond et. al. define political culture as "the beliefs and values concerning politics that prevail within both the elite and the mass," namely, "belief in the legitimacy of democracy; tolerance for opposing parties, beliefs and preferences; a willingness to compromise with political opponents and, underlying this, pragmatism and flexibility; trust in the political environment, and cooperation, particularly among political competitors; moderation in political positions and partisan identifications; civility of political discourse; and political efficacy and participation, based on principles of political equality but tempered by the presence of a subject role (which gives allegiance to political authority) and a parochial role (which involves the individual in traditional, nonpolitical pursuits)."[22] Political culture is something about "conflict management"; and "if political freedom and competition are not to descend into extremism, polarization and violence, there must be mechanisms to contain conflict within certain behavioral boundaries,"[23] which political culture can be considered as (one of) these boundaries.

As it will be seen in the succeeding parts, absence of a 'democratic political culture' as such, is another reference point for the crisis of Turkish democracy. For

---

[20] Heper, "The strong state as a problem for the consolidation of democracy", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 25, Issue 2, Jul 1992; Ergun Özbudun, *Çağdaş Türk Politikası*; İlkay Sunar, "Populism and Patronage: The Democratic Party and Its Legacy in Turkey", *Il Politico*, anno LV, 4, 1990; Toker, 1992; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy: Patronage versus Governance", *Turkish Studies*, vol.2, no.1, (Spring, 2001).
[21] Sunar ve Sayarı, 1986.
[22] Diamond et. al., *Politics,* 19.
[23] ibid. 9.

Diamond et. al., democratic success in developing countries is not only related with the strength and growth of democratic values, but also with their roots in a country's historical and cultural tradition. Similarly, Boron argues that "cultural and ideological factors are crucial to consolidating a democracy . . . .the negative cultural legacy of authoritarianism is the long lasting result of a complex process of political resocialization in authoritarian values; therefore, democratic consolidation depends upon a new process of resocialization."[24] For Diamond et. al., "ambivalence of a country's political culture is also associated with ambivalence in its experience with democracy", which Turkey is taken as a reference point for validity of their argument:

> Turkey has been torn between a strong consensus on the legitimacy of popular, elective government and the continuing predilection (dating back to Ottoman rule) for organic theories of state, which spawn excessive fear of division, intolerance of political opposition and individual deviation, and a tendency to see politics in absolutist terms.[25]

However, Valenzuela, rejecting "the underlying assumption that there is a direct fit between social values and political institutions," claims that Chilean democracy emerged without strongly held democratic values, but the exercise of democratic practices over a period of time encouraged the development of certain norms of political conduct and reinforced a belief in the legitimacy of the rules of the game.[26] From a different perspective, Heper opposes the *political culture* argument.[27] Although Heper accepts that *political culture* can be a factor intensifying political crises in a given country, the *political culture* argument is inadequate in two respects: first, "political culture does not crystallize in a vacuum. . . [and] . . . any explanation in terms of political culture begs the question of what factors in the first place have led to the cultural pattern in question"; and second, "from a dynamic perspective,

---

[24] Power and Powers, "Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy", 13.

[25] Diamond et. al. *Politics,* 20.

[26] "As early as 1850s, Chilean political elites of different ideological persuasions worked together in Congress to advance of common objectives, thus developing habbits of flexibility and comprimise. The Radicals, who were excluded from decisionmaking in Argentina until after the 1912 Saenz Pena law, were invited to serve in cabinets fifty years earlier in Chile" Arturo Valenzuela, *"The Chilean Miracle: Lessons of South America's Success Story"*, *Harvard International Review*, (19) 4, 1997, 85.

[27] However it should be noted that in some of his later writings Heper comes closer to *political culture* argument, especially see. Heper, 1998.

political culture may be exacerbating rather than an original casual factor."[28] Heper favors historical and structural analysis instead of referring to the *political culture*.

The casual relationship between existence of a civil societal network and development of democratic government is another key theme of the consolidation paradigm. Larry Diamond defines *civil society* as "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared values."[29] Civil society consists of a vast array of organizations, both formal and informal: interest groups, cultural and religious organizations, civic and developmental associations, issue oriented movements, mass media, research and educational institutions.[30] Political society is defined as an arena in which the actors aim at achieving and exercising state power. Whereas, civil society relates to the state, but not to win control over it, it encompasses and respects pluralism and diversity.[31]

The centrality of existence of a strong civil society and various voluntary associations stands as one of the most important analytical tools for exploring a country's democratic account. The weakness or strength of that magical word, the civil society, becomes a central tool for understanding the level of democratic development on the one hand, and a normative ideal to be attained on the other. As it will be seen below, weakness of the civil society and inordinate power of the state are considered to be the basic reasons behind the difficulties of the Turkish experiment in democracy by many students of Turkish politics.

Again to quote from Diamond et. al., civil society helps the constitution and consolidation of democracy in many ways:

> i. it continues to provide the means for monitoring and limiting the exercise of state power and for holding officials accountable to the public between elections

---

[28] Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* : 3-4

[29] Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Towards Democratic Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy 5* (July. 1994), 5.

[30] Diamond et. al., *Politics,* 26 .

[31] ibid.. 27. cf. E. M. Wood, *Democracy Against Capitalism*, (1995, Cambridge), 19-49, 238-264. Wood brilliantly shows the naïveté of this assumption. Identification of the civil society with freedom and the political society with oppression is also widespread among the students of Turkish politics.

ii. a rich associational life supplements the role of political parties in stimulating political participation and increasing citizens' political efficacy and skill

iii. both through the process of participating within organizations and through more deliberate efforts at civic education by organizations and the media, a vigorous civil society can help to inculcate norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, and accommodation that facilitate the peaceful, democratic regulation of cleavage and conflict.

iv. Civil society can enhance the representativeness of democracy by providing additional channels beyond political parties, for the expression of a wide variety of interests, including those of historically marginalized groups, such as women and minorities

v. As a by-product of successful organizational practice, civil society organizations identify and train new leaders who at some point may cross over into the political arena and broaden its pool of leadership talent

vi. By enhancing the accountability, representativeness, inclusiveness, and legitimacy of the political system, civil society also strengthens legitimacy and governability, giving citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it[32]

Closely related with the existence and the strength of civil society, the relative positions and structures of political institutions within given countries and the level of institutionalization are other prominent themes among the theorists of consolidation.

Democratic consolidation requires that citizens develop an appreciation for the core institutions of a democratic political society –political parties, legislatures, elections, electoral rules, political leadership, and interparty alliances.[33]

O'Donnell defines institutions as *"regularized* patterns of interaction that are known, practiced and regularly accepted by social agents who expect to continue interacting under the rules and norms formally or informally embodied in those patterns."[34] Political institutions are important for consolidation of democracies, firstly for they "structure behavior into stable, predictable and recurrent patterns" and for "institutionalized systems are less volatile and more enduring."[35] Secondly, (democratic) political institutions are essential in maintaining not only political order

---

[32] Diamond et al., *Politics,* 28-29
[33] Linz and Stepan, 1996, 17
[34] O'Donnel, *Counterpoints*, 161, *emphasis* added.
[35] Diamond et. al., *Politics*, 33

but also "a rule of law, thus ensuring civil liberties, checking the abuse of power, and providing meaningful representation, competition, choice, and accountability."[36]

O'Donnell notes that it is not so easy to make the definition of political institutions: "the boundaries between what is and is not a political institution are blurred, and vary across time and countries."[37] Although their definition is elusive, by the way of some approximations, O'Donnell states that democratic institutions are political institutions, and have a "recognizable, direct relationship with the main themes of politics: the making of decision that are mandatory within a given territory, the channels of access to decision-making roles, and the shaping of the interests and the identities that claim such access."[38] Political parties, constitution, congress, the judiciary, election systems, and the military, among others are the main institutions, which are mostly taken into consideration by the consolidation paradigm. O'Donnell suggests that the main question about these institutions is how they work. He defines the characteristics of a functioning institutional setting as follows:

1. *Institutions both incorporate and exclude*

2. *Institutions shape the probability distribution of outcomes*

3. *Institutions tend to aggregate, and to stabilize the aggregation of, the level of action and organization of agents interacting with them*

4. *Institutions induce patterns of representation*

5. *Institutions stabilize agents/representatives and their expectations*

6. *Institutions lengthen the time horizon of actors*[39]

To put it briefly, O'Donnell sees institutions crucial in the performance of complex democratic societies. They "provide a crucial level of mediation and aggregation between, on the one side, structural factors and, on the other, not only individuals but also the diverse groupings under which society organizes its multiple interests and identities."[40] The alternative, for O'Donnell, "submerges social and

---

[36] ibid. 33.
[37] O'Donnel, *Counterpoints*, 161.
[38] ibid.. 164.
[39] ibid.. 161-163.
[40] ibid.. 163.

political life in the hell of a colossal prisoner's dilemma."[41] In contrast to the institutionalized democracies, in non-institutionalized democracies the well-functioning institutions are to be replaced by other informal but "strongly operative" practices, namely clientalism, patrimonialism, and corruption. This is a key point for O'Donnell what makes *representative democracies* different from *delegative democracies*.[42] O'Donnell states that democracy in the developing world (Latin America in particular) experiences difficulties not because of a   lack of institutionalization, but due to the nature of the institutions in these countries. For him, these polyarchies actually have two extremely important institutions: "one is highly formalized, but intermittent –elections. The other is informal, permanent, and pervasive –particularism (or clientalism, broadly defined).[43] What one sees here is the *relativist* (*relativist* when compared to the *universalist* arguments within the rest of the consolidation paradigm) position of O'Donnell in his studies of democratic consolidation. In other words, although many theorists of democratic consolidation identifies the problem of democratic government with absence of political institutionalization, and proposes the replacement of this lack with western type of institutions,[44] O'Donnell doubts that it makes sense to try.[45]

Institutions are key elements in the process of political representation. Consolidation paradigm stresses the importance of political parties and election systems among other institutions. Democracy implies competition, and electoral competition is organized through political parties, "even in countries where they have been weakened by alternative forms of representation or the resurgence of populism and personalism."[46] As O'Donnell states "no political regime is without some kind of political representation, but democratic regimes have the unique characteristic of making elections the primary (though of course not the only)

---

[41] ibid.. 163.
[42] ibid.. 159-163.
[43] ibid. 176.
[44] See. Diamond et. al, Politics,1987.
[45] Paul Cammack, "Globalization and the Death of Liberal Democracy", *European Review*, (6) 2, 252-254.
[46] Sébastien Ardouin, *Parties and the improvement of democracy: A framework for analysis*, paper presented to the Society for Latin American Studies Postgraduates in Latin American Studies (PILAS) 1998 Conference, The University of Newcastle, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England, 1.

channel through which representation is structured."[47] Valenzuela, for whom political parties are central to the definition of democratic consolidation, states that development of strong political parties are essential for a democracy to be consolidated. For him, "a consolidated political regime is one in which "multiple power currencies" are eliminated in favor of the electoral performance currency: free elections must indeed be *the only*, not one of two or more, means of attaining the important state policy-making positions."[48] There will be two consequences of this:

> i. party careers will tend to attract the most able individuals, who will in turn be taken seriously by other elites in the society,
>
> ii.the resultant party system can be termed "complete", meaning that no important social group can afford to ignore the parties.[49]

For Valenzuela, political parties must be at the center of the political recruitment process. Although *transitions* to democracy often require emergence of strong political leaders who are not closely tied to parties, consolidation of democracy will require the recruitment and selection of all subsequent state leaders through party channels. "Otherwise party life will continue to be a back seat to charismatic individuals whose careers have been divorced from the parties."[50]

Ardouin defines two different levels in order to analyze a party's democratic attitude. Both are related with political culture and elites' commitment to democratic values. First one is the external level: "whether a party is ready to play according to the rules of democracy as 'the only game in town'," and whether they will be "good losers."[51] The second level is deepening[52] of democracy, namely the internal democracy.

> Internal democracy should not be limited to the capacity of members to make suggestions to the leadership of the party though. Indeed, "democracy involves debate and discussion, but

---

[47] O'Donnell, "Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy", 20-21.
[48] Valenzuela, 1988, 21.
[49] Power and Powers, "Issues in the Consolidation of Democracy", 21.
[50] ibid.. 22.
[51] *Parties and the improvement of democracy*, 1-3.
[52] "The notion of the improvement of democracy, as understood here, encompasses two dimensions: democracy can be improved in depth and in quality. The deepening of democracy refers to the extension of democractic mechanisms to the different spheres of political and social life. The quality of democracy refers to the citizens' participation and representation –what we call inclusion- at different levels in the polity" Ardouin, *Parties and the Improvement of Democracy*, 1.

these are not enough if they remain inconclusive and ineffective in determining actual policies". A leadership might listen to the grass-root members, but this is not incompatible with a fundamentally authoritarian structure within a party. The same can be said when the leadership consult the base and emphasizes on participation only to look for the ratification of decisions already taken.[53]

The external and internal levels of a party's democratic attitude are indispensable for inclusion of citizens to political decision-making processes.[54] Institutionalization and democratization of party systems will also contribute to the maintenance of the trust of citizens to political parties and politics in general.[55]

The consolidation paradigm debates over many other important aspects of democracies in developing world, from the role of military to the relationship between the socioeconomic development and democracy.[56] In this part I have tried to introduce the main arguments of consolidation paradigm, especially the ones that have affected the students of Turkish politics. To summarize, the main task of consolidation paradigm is to find the sources of the problems of democratic government in the developing world. Mostly, the writers detect the absence of Western type political institutions, values, and processes as the central problem.

The dominant paradigm among the students of Turkish politics locates problems of democratic development in Turkey in the 'unique' characteristics of Turkish political, social and economic structure *vis-à-vis* the western liberal democratic countries:[57] the absence of a civil society in Ottoman-Turkish socio-political structure,[58] which functions as a system of checks and balances *against* the political and bureaucratic authority; the persistence of a "strong state tradition"

---

[53] ibid.. 4.
[54] Suavi Tuncay, *Parti İçi Demokrasi ve Türkiye*, (1996, Ankara)
[55] Hongwu Ouyang, "Political Parties and Consolidation of Democracy: The Case of Russia", *Perspectives*, (6) 1, 1999.
[56] Seymour Martin Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung Seong and John Charles Torres, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisities of Democracy", UNESCO, (1993, Blackwell).
[57] Again to note that, the usage of the term "consolidation paradigm" is mostly arbitrary; it is very difficult to argue that names like Küçükömer, İnsel, Mardin, İnalcık, Kalaycıoğlu, Özbudun and/or Sunar may be melted in the same pot. We use this term just for stressing and underlying the common points among these writers in their analysis of problems of development of democracy in Turkey.
[58] See, İdris Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, (2001, Istanbul) and Şerif Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, no.11, (1969).

throughout the history of the country,[59] which has its roots in patrimonialistic features of the Ottoman state;[60] the inordinate power concentrated in the hands of political elites,[61] irresponsible behaviors and short-term populist motivations of the political elites and emergence and persistence of patronage networks as a response to the "rational democracy"[62] of the strong "center".[63]

2.2 The Spectre of the Turkish State: "Centrality of the State, Stateness of the Center"[64]

The *nature* of the Ottoman-Turkish state has been one of the most important reference points in any attempt for explaining the crisis driven nature of the Turkish democracy. Taking the Western model of political and socioeconomic development

---

[59] See, Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (1985, Walkington); "The strong state as a problem for the consolidation of democracy", *Comparative Political Studies*, v.25, (2) July 1992; "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics", *Journal of International Affairs*, v.54 (1), Fall 2000; "Turkey: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow", *Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies*, v.1, (3), September 2001; "Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 9-10, 1980; Ergun Özbudun, *Çağdaş Türk Politikası: Demokratik Pekişmenin Önündeki Engeller*, trans. A. R. Usul, (2003, İstanbul); Ahmet İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kıskacında* Türkiye, (İstanbul, 1996); *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, (2002, İstanbul); Clement Harris Dodd, "The Revival of Turkish Democracy", *Assian Affairs*, v.3,(23), October 1992.

[60] See, İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma*; Halil İnalcık, "Comments on 'Sultanism' Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity", *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies*, 1992 and "Turkey Between Europe and the Middle East", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, March-May 1998 (web source, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/lll-1/inalc.htm); Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Understand Turkish Politics", *Daedalus*, Winter 1973.

[61] See, Frey, F.V. "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey", in G. Lenczowski (ed.) *Political Elites in the Middle East*, (1975, Washington DC).

[62] Metin Heper, 44-46. Heper borrows the term "rational democracy" from Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, Chatham House Publishers, New Jersey, 1987, pp. 51-55, which implies a total negation of populist democracy. "What the elites that we have mentioned above understood from democracy was "rational democracy". In rational democracies, the political elites must be literate and educated people, not ignorant and uneducated; also these people must reserve all their efforts for long term interests of their country, and must consider the well being of the next generations, not the next elections. Rational democracy is a process of deliberation among rational individuals for reaching the best political decisions" Heper, 1998: 44-45.

[63] İlkay Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", *Il Politico*, anno LV, 4, 1990; Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy"; Özbudun, *Çağdaş Türk Politikası*.

[64] Simten Coşar and Aylin Özman, "Siyasal Tahayyülde Devletin Belirleyiciliği: Metin Heper Çalışmaları Üzerine Bir İnceleme", *Doğu Batı*, 2001, 84.

as their departing point, many students of Turkish politics detect "the weak civil society and the persistence of a strong state tradition" as the main obstacle for the development of democratic government and culture of democracy in Turkey. Failures of Turkish experiment in democracy is mostly associated with the Ottoman legacy, whose "political norms… persist today, affecting numerous aspects of contemporary Turkish politics."[65]

According to the "consolidation paradigm", the Ottoman state differs from the Western type feudal formation with its full autonomy from social forces. The Ottoman state, with its gigantic bureaucratic tool, was capable of defining goals on behalf of the society, and there existed no system of checks and balances. There was no limit to the absolute power of the Ottoman state. The system was characterized by the impossibility of "opposition";[66] "he [the Sultan] had absolute power to determine the place of each man in the social scheme."[67] The state has always constituted an important dimension of the Ottoman political culture.

> In the Ottoman view, the welfare of the society depended upon the well being of the state. Thus, the Ottomans adopted a circular notion of justice according to which in turn provided the state with the resources necessary to maintain power.[68]

Of course it is not only Heper who insists on the centrality and strength of Ottoman-Turkish state in making of Turkish "political culture". Like Heper, Ergun Özbudun, after discussing some main texts and arguments on consolidation of democracy in the third world, asserts that relatively high level of "stateness" and a strong state tradition constituted one of the main impediments to consolidation of democracy in Turkey.[69] For Özbudun, the Turkish Republic has inherited a centralized and highly bureaucratized state tradition from the Ottoman Empire, in which the legal-rational bureaucratic norms were the dominant form.[70]

> Thus, with no feudalism comparable to that of Western Europe, no hereditary aristocracy, no independent church aristocracy, no independent church hierarchy, no strong and independent

---

[65] Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics" 63
[66] Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi*, (2000, İstanbul), 179.
[67] İnalcık, "Sultanism", 43.
[68] Heper, "Ottoman Legacy", 66.
[69] *Çağdaş Türk Politikası*, 11.
[70] ibid. 13.

merchant class, no powerful guilds, no self governing cities, and with a ruling institution (i.e., the administration and the army) staffed with slaves, the Ottoman Empire represented a close approximation of an **Oriental Despotism**. In the West, non-governmental intermediary social structures operated relatively independently of the government and played a cushioning role between the state and the individual. The Christian Churches were the foremost of these corporate structures such as the guilds, free cities, and like. They had no parallels in the Ottoman Empire.[71]

In a similar pattern, Ahmet İnsel considers the "state tradition of ages"[72] as the main barrier to development of democracy and civil society in Turkey. The legitimacy of the Turkish state was not grounded on the society due to the weakness of the ties between the rulers and the ruled (read as 'state' and 'civil society'); the Ottoman-Turkish state 'itself' was the source of legitimacy.[73] Although at first sight this can be seen as analogous to the case of European (especially the French) public bureaucracy, İnsel notes that "this sector did not represent itself as a monopoly of political power and political legitimacy."[74] Any attempt of searching other sources of legitimacy (e.g. social sources or classes) was detected as a threat to the very foundations of law and order.[75] For Şerif Mardin, this fact explains the suspicious attitude of the '*center*' towards the '*periphery*'.[76]

There can be detected, roughly, two main sources of the autonomy of the Ottoman state. First one is, as Özbudun states, the Ottoman recruitment (*devşirme*) system, "which was a periodic levy on the male children of Christian subjects, reducing them to the status of slaves and training them for service to the state." For Özbudun, because of the volatility of their position, the "slaves" had no chance of and interest in challenging the authority of the Sultan; and more important than that "their removal from their former social environments prevented the development of locally entrenched, semiautonomous elements in the provinces." The second source of state's autonomy from the societal forces was the Ottoman land tenure system.

---

[71] Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations", in ed. Ergun Özbudun, *Perpectives on Democracy in Turkey*, Ankara, 1988, 4. Emphasis added.
[72] İnsel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, 24
[73] ibid. 23.
[74] ibid.. 24; Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 259
[75] İnsel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, 24.
[76] "Center-Periphery", 293; Metin Heper, "Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 9-10, 1980.

While the original ownership of the lands was in the hands of the state, the fief holders (*sipahi*) were only to collect the taxes and supervise the peasants under their jurisdiction. In return, "the *sipahi* were expected to recruit, train and support a local contingent of soldiers." Also, the largest fiefs (*has*) were the perquisites of office.[77]

The peculiar characteristics of Ottoman land system, and its difference from the Western type feudalism are used as analytical tools for understanding the "inordinate" power of the central authority. "Society has a center. . . there was in the Ottoman Empire, a lasting center supported by a sophisticated network of institutions."[78] And this was mainly due to the unique characteristics of Ottoman relations of production and distribution. It can be said that İdris Küçükömer, early in the 1960s, was the first to systematically analyze the 'unique' characteristics of Ottoman social formation vis-à-vis the western path of capitalist development.[79] And again it can be argued that mostly his questions and answers dominated the debates over crisis of Turkish democracy in the succeeding decades. Mainly departing from Marx's writings on pre-capitalist economic formations and Wittfogel's[80] analysis of 'hydraulic society', Küçükömer concluded that the Ottoman social formation was not able to develop capitalism (and an autonomous civil society) with its own dynamics. The only path for capitalist development in the empire was imperialism. For Küçükömer, the main impediment to the development of capitalism and civil societal-democratic institutions within the country was the westernist-intellectual-bureaucratic class.[81] For him this westernist bloc, who had culminated the development of the forces of production within the country, prevented the emergence of class movements within the Ottoman Empire.[82] He takes the Western capitalist development as his starting point. For him, the de-centralized character of feudal ruling system, existence of autonomous units, rise of mercantilism and capital

---

[77] Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democractic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations", in (ed.) Özbudun, E., *Perpectives on Democracy in Turkey*, (1988, Ankara), 3.
[78] Mardin, "Center Periphery", 291
[79] Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması* and *Sivil Toplum Yazıları*, (2001, İstanbul)
[80] For an analysis of Wittfogel's 'hydraulic hypothesis' see. Bailey, Anne M., and Llobera, Joseph R "Karl A. Wittfogel and the Asiatic Mode of Production: A Reaapraisal", *Sociological Review*, vol. 27, no.3. 1979. Bailey and Llobera eds. *The Asiatic Mode of Production – Science and Politics*, Rotledge &Kegan Paul: London.
[81] Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, 13-15.
[82] ibid.. 15.

accumulation, increasing autonomy of the cities and formation of parliaments (Etats Généraux), role of the independent church, industrial revolution and crystallization of classes (namely the proletariat and the bourgeoisie), and many other highlights of the Western *type* of capitalist development pointed to a sharp contrast with the Ottoman social system.[83]

Many of the themes outlined by Küçükömer set the criterions for evaluating the problems of democratic consolidation in Turkey. As a recent example, Mousseau states that, "Ottoman Turkey failed to develop a market economy due to the centralized despotic character of political and economic power in the state, and thus never acquired the cultural underpinning for liberal democracy."[84] Thus, a further shift towards market economy is considered to bring further democratization in the country.

For Şerif Mardin, the excessive state control over economic life "had deeper roots derived from the basic premises of patrimonial system that the ruler is personally responsible for the welfare of his subjects."[85] This fact was related with the conception of "state power as the collective property of the ruler's household,"[86] and it was mainly this feature of the Ottoman state, which made it entirely different from Western feudalism. Weber's distinction between *status order* and *class* order plays a central role in debates over development of Ottoman-Turkish social and political system. The above formulation by Özbudun mostly relies on this Weberian distinction: "status order refers to stratification in terms of honor and styles of life peculiar to status groups as such";[87] "in status order status groups are stratified according to the principles of their *consumption* of goods as represented by special styles of life", and "honor as social estimation depends on the ruler's distribution of

[83] ibid.. 15-28

[84] Yalçın Mousseau, "Market Development and Development of Democracy in Turkey", unpublished text., 15.

[85] Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 260.

[86] Halil İnalcık, "Comments on 'Sultanism' Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity", *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies*, 1990, pp.49-72 51; Kemal Karpat, "The Stages of Ottoman History", in (eds.) Karpat, *The Ottoman State and its Place in World History*, (1974, E. J. Brill), 101-103, Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 264.

[87] Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich (eds.), (1978, University of California Press), 936 and *Sosyoloji Yazıları*, edited by Gerth and Mills, trans. Taha Parla (2000, İstanbul), 277.

power";[88] whereas class is determined exclusively by the market operations, and economic interests conditioned by market relations.[89] The status order is entirely different from the class order, which has great political, social and cultural implications. There appears a distinction, then, between estate-type patrimonialism and status-type patrimonialism: while in the former, for Weber, "hereditary fiefs and established seigniorial powers that put limitations on the lord's discretion"[90] and there exists a bilateral contractual relationship; however, the latter, mainly due to non-hereditary character of land 'ownership', exclusively depends on the ruler's arbitrariness and discretion as a norm.

Following Weber, for many of the students of Turkish politics, the Ottoman state refers to an extreme case of patrimonialism,[91] which was both the cause and effect of the absence of capitalist development within the empire. Mardin relates the absence of a mercantilist development (which is taken as the prerequisite of capital accumulation in the scheme of Western socio-economic development) in the Ottoman Empire with "the patrimonialistic bureaucrat's belief that their consumption patterns were essential to the perpetuation of their power"; and this, for Mardin, explains the international trade policy of the empire.[92] Also the "desire to support the military structure as by duty of *hisba*", which had resulted in putting pressures only on producers in the interest of consumers and of army supply, was another impediment to mercantilist development in the Empire.[93] While feudal lords and kings had given support to merchants and artisans in the West, the situation was reversed in the Ottoman Empire. Since the Ottoman state was powerful, this strength hindered the growth of mercantile capital in the empire.[94] In the Ottoman Empire,

> not only the state protect the guilds against monopolistic practices
> by merchants, but, more importantly, by denying corporate

---

[88] İnalcık, *Sultanism*, 52.

[89] Weber, *Sosyoloji Yazıları*, 277-278; İnalcık, *Sultanism*, 52; also see Turner and Houlton, "Status Politics in Contemporary Capitalism", in, *Max Weber On Economy and State*, (1989, London)

[90] İnalcık, *Sultanism*, 53

[91] Weber, *Economy and Society*, 231; cf. İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma*; İnalcık, *Sultanism*.

[92] In the Ottoman Empire export duties were 12 %, whereas import duties were 3 %, "The Ottoman rulers were vitally interested in imports but not in exports." Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 262.

[93] ibid.. 262.

[94] Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, 20-21.

personality and independent government to towns it blocked the formation of oligarchies of merchant capitalists.[95]

Within this structure, Ottoman notables "turned their backs on the possibility of developing independent sources of power based on economic enterprise."[96] They have typically searched for a place within the existing domination structures.[97] For Mardin two features of the Ottoman legal system reinforced this diffuseness: *i.* characteristic of patrimonialism, which transforms all problems of law and adjudication into problems of administration, and *ii.* undevelopment of impersonal legal norms: "In short, Ottoman system may be characterized as one of status tempered by diffuseness."[98] Lack of differentiation of '*secondary*' structures and the general diffuseness of Ottoman society is a common feature pointed by many of the students of Turkish politics. The Ottoman society, like the rest of the eastern world lacked those "prolific network of institutions – church, family, club, guild, association and community – lies between the state and the individual, in which simultaneously connects the individual to authority and protects the individual from total political control."[99] On the one hand, there is the bureaucratic uniformity (and uniformed nature) of the state, and a society, which is traditional, heterogeneous and disjointed, on the other.[100] What we see is a huge gap between the state, with its all bureaucratic and mythical instruments, and the society; or to formulate it differently, between the *center* and the *periphery*.[101] Unlike the western way of crystallization of class positions through the development of capitalism in general,[102] in the Ottoman Empire there emerged a center-periphery cleavage along cultural lines: the "Great Culture" of the elite *versus* the "Little Culture" of the people.[103]

> Associated with the *great culture* were such features as war and administration as life-time occupation, the use of language highly permeated with Persian and Arabic words, and Orthodox Islam.

---

[95] Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 261.
[96] ibid.. 268; also see Mardin, "Center Periphery".
[97] Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*; İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma.*
[98] Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 268-9.
[99] B. S. Turner, *Orientalism, Postmodernism, and Globalism*, (1994, London), 23.
[100] "Hence, the power which the bureaucratic elites exercised tsemmed largely from the organized/centralized apparatuses of the state and the unorganized/decentralized nature of society", Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", 747
[101] See, Mardin, "Center Periphery" and Heper, 1980.
[102] Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, 14.
[103] Heper, "Ottoman Legacy", 66 and "Merkez-Kenar", 5; Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 270.

The rural masses and particularly the Turkish tribesman, on the other hand, used Turkish vernacular, engaged in buying and selling and in agriculture, were taxed to gills, had access only to primitive technology and were suffused by heterodox currents.[104]

The advantageous position of the Ottoman elite vis-à-vis the Ottoman society made them to feel superior over the illiterate and traditional unsophisticated/ordinary people. By the *Tanzimat* movement, this gap did not evade. On the contrary, it took a more clearly cultural form as the élites became increasingly familiar with western culture.[105] Mardin states that in the mid-19th century the ideas and practices of the Young Turks were motivated by the project of bridging the gap between the elites and the masses. The criticisms mainly held by the journalists of the time –increase in the importance given to provinces, emergence of a split within the bureaucracy, and breakdown of the traditional system of education– could be considered as expressions of this mentality.[106] They opposed the reformers of their age, namely Fuad and Ali Pashas for their despotic use of power; for creating a new bureaucracy without any limitations upon its executive power; for their naive understanding of modernity and Westernization, and most importantly, for degrading and degenerating traditional and Islamic values without serving or producing an alternative vision of life.[107] However, they finally found a legitimate ground in the idea of "social engineering", which was deeply inspired by Comte's positivism: "Science was the rock they leaned."[108] Again for the Young Turks the main question was the maintenance and welfare of the state; and the salvation of the society was dependent upon the well being of the state. The significance of the social issues had escaped them and they had exacerbated the so-called cultural cleavage.[109]

The rise of the power of military and civil bureaucracy *vis-à-vis* the Sultan, in essence, did not change the main characteristic of the relation between the state and the (civil) society. Even in the Republican era, the balance of forces between these two different power-blocs did not change. Heper states that the overemphasis of Republican cadres on the need for being "one and together" (*birlik ve beraberlik*) and

---

[104] Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 270.
[105] ibid.. 274; Heper, "Ottoman Legacy", 66-67.
[106] Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 275.
[107] Mardin, *Yeni Osmanlı Deüşüncesinin Doğuşu*, (2002, İstanbul), 123-135.
[108] Mardin, "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", 275-276.
[109] Heper, "Ottoman Legacy", 68.

social/political harmony constituted a serious barrier to the emergence of adversarial politics.[110] For many of these writers, the Kemalist cadres were the continuation of the modernist civil and military bureaucratic elites[111] and the Republican People's Party was described as a coalition between the central military-bureaucratic elite and local notables –a coalition in which the former clearly being the dominant element. As Özbudun states, "the CHP represented the old center, i.e. the world of officialdom, with some local allies in the periphery."[112] The Kemalist cadres set the tasks of modernizing and westernizing the country as their main goals. As for many of the theorists of democratic consolidation in Turkey, the main motive behind this westernist attitude was the center's desire to control any peripheral, or to call it centrifugal, movement in the country. *Populism* was one of the six principles of Kemalism, but it never had a mass-mobilizing dimension. Sunar argues that official populism of Kemalism "had been a means for legitimizing a Rousseausque kind of claim to representation: the general (solidary) will of the people had been represented directly by a solitary elite in a regime d'assembleé that had reflected in reality less the general will and more the will of the bureaucratic elites."[113]

As it was the case in the Ottoman Empire, the Kemalist center regarded the development of any autonomous social force, or to enunciate it more precisely, development of civil society as a potential threat to the very foundations of the system. İnsel argues that Kemalist cadres used 'economics' as a tool for enhancing their power: economic activities could become legitimate (in the eye of the center) if and only if they were carried under the tutelage of the state.[114] The Kemalist economic policies were nothing more than attempts for guaranteeing the autonomous power of the state *vis-à-vis* society.[115] For İnsel, the heritage of the Ottoman patrimonialism, as an instinct, sets the norms of the new game under the Kemalist rule.[116] For the consolidation paradigm, another fact, which explains the centrality of the state in the early republican era, is the nature of the relationship between the

---

[110] ibid.. 69.
[111] See, Küçükömer, *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*; Heper, "Ottoman Legacy"; Mardin, "Center Periphery"; Sunar and Sayarı, "Democracy in Turkey"
[112] Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government", 13.
[113] Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", 749.
[114] İnsel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, 47.
[115] İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma*, 47.
[116] İnsel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, 32.

newly rising bourgeoisie and state.[117] In the "West" it was capitalism and bourgeoisie which created the modern state, but in the Ottoman- Turkish case state was to invent "the nation", "the bourgeoisie" and capitalism. Kemalist étatism of the 1920s and especially the 1930s is mostly conceived as a result of bureaucratic elites' desire to control every sphere of social, economic and political life.[118] The other levels of Kemalist modernization process again approve the ever-lasting cultural cleavage between the center and the periphery. Moves towards (further) secularization, reforms in the daily life of the 'citizens', reforms in education, all of which have been hold in the republican era extended the so-called cleavage.[119] According to İnsel, the Republican elites divorced the emancipatory and liberalizing side of the modernism from their westernization project.[120] Kemalist cadres associated any unrest towards westernization movements with reactionary identifications, and saw extermination of those movements as the precondition of the consolidation of the regime.[121]

To summarize, the hegemonic paradigm among the Turkish politics evaluates the early republican period as a continuation of the Ottoman ruling *ethos* and *eidos*.[122] It is the landslide electoral victory of the Democratic Party over the Republican People's Party in 1950,[123] which the consolidation paradigm refers as a dramatic shift in Ottoman-Turkish political history. Özbudun defines the social composition of the DP as a coalition among politicians which have played an important role in the single party period and various opposition forces; "it brought together urban liberals and religious conservatives, commercial middle classes and the urban poor, and more modern (mobilized) sections of the rural population."[124] Many of the writers suggest that there is not so much ideological difference between these two parties; but, "the common denominator of the DP supporters was their

---

[117] Keyder, *Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 101-126; 147-162.
[118] İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma*.
[119] Mardin, "Center Periphery", 284; Keyder, *Devlet ve Sınıflar*; İnsel, *Düzen ve Kalkınma*.
[120] İnsel, *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, 21-22.
[121] See, Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, (1999, İstanbul) for "Kemalist consolidation"
[122] Mardin, *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*.
[123] We will hold the history of and debates over the transition to multi-party politics in the following chapters.
[124] Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democractic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations", in (ed.) Özbudun, E., *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, (1988, Ankara), 16.

opposition to state officials,"[125] in this sense the rise of the DP considered as a victory of the periphery over center.[126]

Frey proposes that the new multi-party politics, with introduction of populism and patronage networks into Turkish politics, was characterized by an increasing tendency towards "localism". First, the rising interparty competition increased localism and political parties increasingly presented higher degrees of localism in those areas where the party was most dubious of its strength; and second,

> *the deputies have changes from being primarily a national elite group, oriented toward the tutelary development of the country, to being a primarily an assemblage of local politicians, oriented toward more immediate local and political advantages.* [127]

The 'new man in Turkish politics' accorded main emphasis to local considerations, rather than national problems and pressures. In this sense, for many of the students of Turkish politics the Democrats' victory signified a revolutionary break, even more crucial than declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923.[128] However, there are some others who identify the DP victory as nothing more than a "cosmetic change."[129]

According to Sunar, the DP Governments found themselves in a contradictory environment. There was an ever lasting tension between the requirements of "the electoral support" and the statist project of Turkish bureaucratic elites; "the trick was to incorporate "the people" without re-traditionalizing the state, and to uphold modernization without getting isolated from "the people".[130] 'The new man in Turkish politics" introduced populism and patronage as the new *ethos* and *eidos* of government; and although they have failed, their heritage survived in the following decades of the Turkish politics.

The DP's political discourse, different from Kemalist populism (*halkçılık*), sought to articulate an inclusionary version of populism that would mobilize "the

---

[125] ibid.. 16.
[126] Mardin, "Center Periphery"; Keyder, *Devlet ve Sınıflar*; Sunar and Sayarı, ""Democracy in Turkey; Sunar, "Populism and Patronage".
[127] Frey, F.V., *Turkish Political Elite*, (1963, Cambridge), 195-7, *emphasis* are in the original text.

[129] Frank Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy", *Turkish Studies*, vol.1, no.1 Spring 2000, 131. Also see İnsel 2002.
[130] Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", 747.

people", and establish a tie with them.[131] The DP leaders carried the socio-economic issues, which the centralist tradition from the Ottoman rule to Republican era downplayed its role, and the problems of daily life into high-politics. While the CHP oriented elite had a more tutelary concept of development, the DP put emphasis on private initiative and "immediate satisfaction of local expectations."[132] They have de-emphasized secularism, which for many researchers created one of the most important sources of the friction between the DP and the secularist central bureaucracy.

Emphasis over "the popular will" and "immediate satisfaction of local expectations" followed by the emergence of patronage networks within the country. In general patronage and clientalistic relations are mostly characterized by disposition of resources on particularistic basis; "what underlines clientalist distribution of resources is a logic of partisan loyalty, not a logic of productivity", plan, or discipline.[133] Blood ties, lineage relations, regional bonds (*hemşehrilik*), and other primordial affiliations play a crucial role in constitution and performance of political, economic, administrative and social organizations.[134] Thus, through these formulations, by the introduction of populism and patronage as new principles and new sources of legitimacy, Turkey in the 1950s started to fit to the model of "delegative democracy" of O'Donnell, which I have discussed before.

All these exacerbated the so-called cultural cleavage and tension. More than that, it carried the cleavage to the political level. 1950s, for the writers I am dealing with, were mostly characterized by the rising tension between "the statist-elitist intelligentsia and bureaucracy, on the one hand, and the entrepreneurial, free economy oriented group, the power which had begun to reach into the larger towns and cities, on the other."[135] For Kalaycıoğlu, by the dominance of patronage networks in political rivalry, democracy and the rule of law, despite having a symbiotic relationship, started to be considered as two opposed poles: "(bu tırnak

---

[131] Sunar, "Populism and Patronage"; Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy".
[132] Frey, *Turkish Political Elite*, 297; Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government": 18; Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", 748-9.
[133] Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", 750.
[134] Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy", 62.
[135] Kemal H. Karpat "The Republican People's Party 1923-1945", in eds., Metin Heper, and Jacob M. Landau, *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, (1988, London), 144.

nerde kapanıyo?) the popular image of democracy in Turkey has been tilted toward an understanding that democracy allows people greater access to the resources of the "State" through the help of political parties.[136] Political parties (idealized above as instruments for rational-democratic tools of decision-making, and instruments for citizens' inclusion to democratic procedures) turned out to be the "formal" institutions of "informal" relations. Patronage networks, as a rule, worked and developed as economic successes, which continued in the first years of the DP government.[137] The second half of the 1950s witnessed dramatic decline in growth rates and incomes of the middle classes. This process caused many segments of the society to become more critical of the Democratic Party rule. The DP's response to these criticisms was reflecting their understanding of politics in absolutist terms. The DP cadres tried to oppress the opposition; even the opposition within the party ranks. The Freedom Party emerged as a by-product of this absolutist politics; and the attempt of specifying the place of the FP in Turkish political structure cannot be divorced from a general discussion of the problems of democratic government in Turkey in the 1950s.

---

[136] Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy", 62.
[137] Sunar, "Populism and Patronage"; Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy".

CHAPTER 3

THE NEVER-ENDING TRANSITION TO "DEMOCRACY" IN TURKEY

Any debate over the nature of the Democratic Party era should take into account basic characteristics of transition to "multi-party politics" in Turkey. For the purposes of my study, this section will only highlight some characteristic features of this transition with reference to the writings of prominent students of Turkish politics.

Different readings of transition lead the researchers to reach different conclusions on the nature of social and political conflicts of the 1950s. If one conceptualizes the transition period and following electoral victory of the DP in May 1950 as a victory of "centrifugal" or "peripheral forces" over the "centre", the problems between the DP and opposition parties will be conceptualized within the logic of that tension. Here I do not suggest an alternative reading of the transition period –a task which is beyond the scope of this thesis; but I will try to critically evaluate various positions *vis-à-vis* the problem of transition and basic characteristics of the period. This point is directly related with our main subject matter: the birth and evolution of the Freedom Party, and its specific place in Turkish political history. The place of the HP in Turkish history cannot be understood without locating the DP in particular and the route of democratic development in Turkey in general.

3.1 Some Preliminary Notes on the Nature of the Kemalist Regime and the Early Republican Era

3.1.1 The Kemalist Ideology[138]

The nature of Kemalist regime has been one of the most controversial issues for the students of Turkish political history. Kemalism, as an ideology and as a political movement, had a problematic relationship with the idea and practice of democracy. 1920s of the single party period witnessed a violent contestation between the Kemalist ruling bloc and opposition forces. The opposition of the Second Group in the First Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) (1920-1923) –which formed the Progressive Republican Party in 1924– and other channels of opposition were dissolved by Kemalist bloc in late 1920s. The end of 1920s pointed to the absolute control of Kemalist cadres and CHP over the political sphere. Those years also witnessed a series of reforms in political, constitutional, legal, and cultural realms, aiming at modernizing and westernizing the basis of the Turkish state, and to some extent the society.[139]

The third congress of the Republican People's Party, in May 1931, pointed a shift in Turkish political structure. The new political program, mainly guided by one of the prominent Kemalist leaders, Recep Peker, aimed at constituting Republican People's Party's monopoly over all aspects of political life.[140] The existence and

---

[138] I consider Kemalism as an ideology. Although some argue that Kemalism does not constitute a coherent and consistent worldview, I suggest that Kemalism is more than mere political pragmatism. As an ideology it rests upon "a way" of understanding the social, economic and political universes. The fact that Kemalism gives much importance to "practice" and requisites of "the real life" does not make Kemalism less ideological. This fact can better be understood if it is taken as one of the characteristics of the Kemalist ideology. For further discussion, see, Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları cilt 3: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Ok'u*, (1992, İstanbul), 21-24 and *Türkiye'de Siyasi Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları cilt 1: Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u*, (1994, İstanbul), 9-19.
[139] Here I do not mean to underestimate the importance of the Kemalist reforms, but it can be said that the reform period, to use an old terminology, was mostly focused on 'the super-structural' aspects, and did not introduce "real" socio-economic changes in the lives of "real" men and women.
[140] Cemil Koçak, "Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)", in (ed.), Sina Akşin, *Türkiye Tarihi IV: Çağdaş Türkiye*, (1997, İstanbul), 114.

dominance of "one party" was not the only significant feature of the early republican era; "more important than that was the absence of a separation between the party and the government: in fact, the party was the government."[141] In 1935, the CHP was not only a political party; it became a "state party."[142] With Ayşe Ayata's words, "party, as a notion, was within the same category with the state; it was the driving force of the state."[143] For the CHP, this transformation meant the destruction of the party itself: the party was being absorbed by the state organization and "its very doubtful independent existence and organization was being exterminated officially, practically and legally."[144]

During this period, among the six principles of Kemalism –namely, secularism (*laiklik*), reformism (*inkılâpçılık*), republicanism (*cumhuriyetçilik*), nationalism (*milliyetçilik*), étatism (*devletçilik*) and populism (*halkçılık*)– the last two principles, *devletçilik* and *halkçılık* are critical for the purposes of our study. These two principles are crucial for understanding the relationship between Kemalism and democracy; and also for understanding the main characteristics and dynamics of transition to multi-party politics in Turkey. *Halkçılık* referred to Kemalist understanding of social and political totality; and *devletçilik*, both in economic and

---

[141] Feroz Ahmad, *Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, (1977, London), 1.

[142] Recep Peker, *C.H.P. Genel Sekreteri Recep Peker'in Söylevleri*, (1935, İstanbul), 9.

[143] Ayşe Ayata, *CHP: Örgüt ve İdeoloji*, (1992, İstanbul), 73. ". . . during the CHP congress of 1935, the marriage between party and the state was formalized. . . The party provided the ideology for the state, and its Secretary-General assumed the position of the Minister of the Interior in the cabinet, while the chairman of the provincial party organizations became the governors of their provinces. . . During these years the activities of the Republican People's Party confirmed 'fairly closely, in form perhaps more than in content, to what became the pattern pf the role of the party in the one-party state in Europe at that time –the Fascist Party in Italy, the Communist Party in Russia, the Nazi Party in Germany.'" Ahmad, *Experiment*, 6.

[144] Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1935-1945)*, vol.2. (1996, İstanbul), 16. After years of this experience, this point became one of the most important drawbacks for the Republicans. The deprivation of political dynamism both within the party and society will trouble the Republicans in the following decades. In multi-party politics and in their opposition years the Republicans will have to discover the meaning of the "political party." In late 1930s and early 1940s İnönü tried to overcome this drawback by loosening the tie between party and the state (see below). Aydemir's and Karaosmanoğlu's formulations of the problem are worth of quoting: "In 14 May 1950 İnönü faced with a future full of ambiguities. . . İnönü had a great deficiency in the new struggle that he was about to begin: Party! . . . Because, by some means the CHP was not a real political party. The CHP was not founded for this [*political competition*] aim." Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam (1950-1964)*, vol.3, (2000, İstanbul). "Though there was a People's Party that I know, after its organization was transferred into the hands of the governors and kaimakams the party became alienated to the people and took a totally bureaucratic shape." Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl*, (2002, İstanbul), 158.

political spheres, draws the limits and extent of state's authority. 1935 Party Program defines *halkçılık* as such:

> We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the Law, and who recognize no privileges for any individual, family, class or community, to be of the people and for the people (*halktan ve halkçı*).
>
> It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labor for the individual and social life of the Turkish people.
>
> The farmers, handicraftsmen, laborers and workmen, people exercising free professions, industrialists, merchants, and public servants are the main groups of work constituting the Turkish community. The functioning of each of these groups is essential to the life and happiness of the others and of the community.
>
> The aims of our party, with this principle, are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests. The benefits are to be proportionate to the aptitude to the amount of work.[145]

The principle of *halkçılık* did not only refer to the process of nationalization, or interpellation of "the people" as the sole source of sovereignty; as Ayata notes, it was also "legitimating the existence of one party within the political system."[146] For there were no social classes and antagonisms rising out of any kind of stratification, there was also no need for any political party other than the CHP.[147] Recep Peker labeled liberal parliamentary democracy and multi-party system as a "state of degeneration" (*tefessüh hali*).[148] As the Secretary General of the CHP, he proposed "the feeling of a disciplined community, rested upon love and belief,"[149] and the system of "demands"; "that is all requests were to be directed to the party, which would decide whether or not such requests could be met."[150] This was the exact definition of democracy for Peker; a further step, (e.g. formation of a rival political party) meant nothing but anarchy.

---

[145] *CHP Programı*, (1935, Ankara), pp.8-9. Ahmad, *Experiment*, 4.
[146] Ayata, *CHP*, 69.
[147] *ibid.* 69.
[148] Recep Peker, *İnkılap Dersleri*, (1998, İstanbul), pp. 27-34.
[149] Recep Peker, *Söylevler*, pp. 5-6
[150] Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, (1959, Princeton), 396; also see, Ayata, *CHP*, 74.

Kemalist understanding of political universe and the principle of *halkçılık* had its roots in the writings of a prominent Turkish sociologist and political thinker, Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924). Gökalp's political philosophy, which was deeply inspired by Emile Durkheim, in a way set the basic parameters of Kemalist vision of political and social life.[151] Specifically, the principle of *halkçılık* found its earlier expressions in writings of Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp was rejecting the liberal individualist conception of social being which grasps society as nothing but a total sum of individuals.[152] This, however, did not lead Gökalp to give credit to Marxist class analysis, which, like liberalism, envisaged the destruction of social totality and solidarity. The solidarist corporatist philosophical outline of Ziya Gökalp found its expressions in theoretical and historical repertoire of Kemalist ruling bloc throughout the single party era.[153]

Devletçilik referred to state's existence in economic affairs both as a regulator and an investor. The nature and dynamics of the etatist policies in one party era is out of our concern; but at the same time étatism is crucial in understanding the liberal opposition of the Democratic Party to the Republican People's Party. We will deal with this issue in the following parts.

3.1.2 Kemalism and Opposition: the Free Republican Party (*Serbest Fırka*) Experiment and the "Independent Group"

The principle of *Halkçılık* (and its political implications), as I have stated above, excluded the idea of parliamentary democracy in the early Republican era. However, two different experiences of this period are worth of consideration for understanding the problematic relationship between Kemalism and democracy, and

---

[151] For an excellent survey of the relationship between Kemalist ideology and philosophy of Ziya Gökalp see, Taha Parla, *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm* (1999, İstanbul).

[152] Uriel Heyd, *Türk Ulusçuluğunun Temelleri,* (2002, Ankara), pp. 42-47.

[153] We can go further. This corporatist outline found its expressions throughout the history of Turkish Politics. In my opinion, the DP era and Menderes's 'authoritarian democracy' can be considered within this context.

for understanding the development of the idea and practice of democracy in Turkey: the formation of the Free Republican Party in 1930 and formation of an "opposition" group within the CHP, namely the Independent Group, in 1939.

Mostly, the Free Republican Party, which was founded through orders and guidance of Atatürk and headed by Fethi Okyar, is quoted as a case for proving the Kemalist cadres' willingness to constitute a liberal democratic order and their commitment to multi-party rule just from the beginning. But a closer examination of this experiment shows us that the formation of this party was nothing but a tactical move.[154] The economic condition of the masses, especially the small peasantry strongly deteriorated during the years of the Great Depression. The discontent did not have only economic dimension, but also the anti-democratic and oppressive measures of single-party governments worsened the situation. The solution proposed by Atatürk to the rising popular discontent was a political one: "the initiation of the Free Republican Party to hear and voice the demands of the troubled citizenry."[155] However, as Aydemir states, "there [were] things that Mustafa Kemal [could] control, and things he [could] not."[156] The practice of the FRP and the huge mass support[157] given to the party caused a shift from original political-tactical intentions:

> The ruling elite, threatened by local branch development and the scenes of mass support they saw during the party tour, implemented a two-fold plan against the FRP in the municipal elections. While propaganda efforts focusing on the theme of "non-Republican elements in the FRP" were aimed at de-legitimizing the party, the interference of the bureaucratic apparatus through every possible means guaranteed the victory of the government party.[158]

[154] Şevket Süreyya Aydemir labels the Free Party experiment as an attempt for taking some political soundings. *Menderes'in Dramı?*, (2000, İstanbul), 72

[155] Cem Emrence, "Politics of Discontent in the Midst of the Great Depression: The Free Republican Party of Turkey (1930)", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 23, Fall (web source, page numbers are not available).

[156] Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, 74.

[157] "The Free Republican Party became the voice of the social groups which were not involved in the coalition shaped by the CHP and the ones which were most experienced the authoritarian aspects of the Republican reforms." Çağlar Keyder, "Türkiye Demokrasisinin Ekonomi Politiği", in (eds.) I. C. Shick and E. A. Tonak, *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, (1998, İstanbul), 49.

[158] Emrence, *Politics of Discontent*.

The FRP experiment was immediately dissolved by the orders of the Kemalist leaders "under the pretense that Turkish people were not yet ready to rule themselves."[159] As Ahmet Emin Yalman points out,

> The real state of things was that those in control of the vested interests established as a result of the one-party system were terrified at the prospect of establishment of an era of equal opportunity which would put an end to privilege and favoritism.[160]

After the failure of the FRP experiment, the idea of opposition (even a fake one) was postponed to an unknown future. Until the death of Atatürk in 1938, the CHP ruled the country without any significant social or political opposition under one party rule. As the successor of Atatürk, İsmet İnönü became the leader of the CHP and, as a natural outcome of the existing regime, of the state. The Extraordinary Congress of the CHP, which is held on 26 December 1938, named İsmet Pasha as the Permanent Chairman of the Party and the National Leader (*Milli Şef*) of the country. Thus, the monolithic form of the party was again approved with the slogan of "one party, one nation, one leader."[161]

At the Fifth Great Congress of the CHP (29 May- 3 June 1939) and in the following months there were some moves towards loosening the ties between the state and the party.[162] The congress also decided to form the Independent Group (*Müstakil Grup*), a group composed of 21 Republican deputies to play the role of a

---

[159] Ahmet Emin Yalman, "The Struggle For Multi–Party Government In Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, (1), 1947, 49.

[160] ibid. 49.

[161] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 7. To quote from one of the famous Democrats, Ali Fuat Başgil: "In this respect [İnönü's understanding of étatism] was closely related with Mussolini's famous definition of fascism: "Everything is within the State, nothing is out of the State and nothing is against the State."" *27 Mayıs İhtilalinin Sebepleri*, (İstanbul, 1966). I am quoting just for pointing the irony of history (especially the *extent* of this irony in Turkey). It was the same person, Ali Fuat Başgil, just a few decades ago (in 1935) was pronouncing this phrase, in one of his speeches. But this time he was one of the delegates in the Fourth Congress of the CHP and his speech was on the virtues of étatism in Turkey: "Everything is within the state, nothing is out of the state and nothing is against the state. . . Gentlemen, this is the formula of étatism for today." "Dördüncü Kurultay Münasebetile", *Siyasal Bilgiler*, 50 (May 1935), 3, see Parla, *Ziya Gökalp*, 212.

[162] One month after the congress it was decided that the titles of governorship and provincial party organization chairmanship shall not be held by the same person. According to this arrangement, the governors were to resign from their roles of provincial party organization chairmanship. Cemil Koçak, "Siyasi Tarih", 127-128; Koçak, *Milli Şef*, 91-93.

loyal opposition to government's policies. In fact, the Independent Group was deprived of any tools for fulfilling the task of opposition. The members of the Group had the right to attend the meetings of CHP Parliamentary Group but they were not allowed to express their opinions on the debates; and they neither had the right to give speeches nor the right to vote.[163] It must be noted that the formation of the Independent Group had nothing to do with the idea of "opposition", or with the idea of multi-party politics.[164] What İnönü aimed with formation of the Group was to increase the political supervision over the cabinet.[165] Also it can be considered as a move towards overcoming the identity crisis of the CHP, and an attempt for bringing a more dynamic appearance to the party.[166] Criticisms towards formation of an "opposition" group without any tools for opposition[167] and the activities of the Independent Group in the following years proved that the experience had failed.[168] The Group provided only token opposition and criticism.

These two examples (the FRP and the formation of the Independent Group) and their failure show us that during the single-party era in Turkey the Kemalist power-bloc did not consider competitive politics as an alternative to the existing system. Thus, the official view on the nature of the Kemalist regime does not reflect the real historical process which was experienced.

---

[163] Koçak, *Milli Şef*, 73. According to the regulations of the Republican People's Party the main decisions were made in the Parliamentary Group's Meetings and all the Republican deputies were obliged to vote according to the opinion of the Parliamentary Group. So, it was impossible for the Independent Group members to have an influence on these decisions for they had no right to express their opinions or to vote during the Parliamentary Group's meetings.

[164] Mostly, the formation of the Independent Group is quoted as the first initiative towards transition to multi-party politics. Even in critical texts the historical meaning of the group is exaggerated: ". . . the significance of the Independent Group can be explained as such: Turkey did not leave the idea of organized opposition even in a period when in Europe "one-party, one-leader" systems were active. . ." *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, (2003, Ankara), 13.

[165] Cemil Koçak, *Milli Şef*, 78-79.

[166] Secretary General of the Republican People's Party, Fikri Tuzer, after designating one-party rule as the most appropriate system for Turkey, defined the Independent Group as a vigorous force and an energetic tool for accomplishing the task of parliamentary control. Cemil Koçak, *Milli Şef*, 74.

[167] Hikmet Bayur (Manisa), Haşim Gür (Manisa), Sırrı İçöz (Yozgat), Abdurrahman Naci Demirağ (Sivas) and *Hakkı* Yılancıoğlu (Kütahya) were among the CHP deputies who criticized the restrictions and reservations. Cemil Koçak, *Milli Şef*, 74-78.

[168] Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasal Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin Mevkii*, (1965, Ankara), 149; Tarık *Zafer* Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952*, (1952, İstanbul), 562-563. The Group was dissolved by the Extraordinary Congress decision on 26 August 1946.

3.1.3 The Second World War and the Politics of Neutrality

When the Second World War broke out the Turkish government followed the path of neutrality. This path consequently had a price to be paid by the Turkish people. Although there were many influential circles in the country which were for entering the war nearby the German forces, *Milli Şef*, referring to the still alive memories of the First World War, avoided this option. The war-time stagnation deeply affected the Turkish economy. The relatively stable period of planned development between 1933 and 1938 was distorted by the war-time economic difficulties.[169] The popular discontent was increasing mainly due to war-time economic and political arrangements.[170] "The exigencies of war-time neutrality forced the state to intervene in almost every aspect of Turkish life."[171] The government was using police-state measures as a reply to popular discontent and as a tool to overcome economic difficulties.[172] National Defense Law (*Milli Koruma Kanunu*)[173] of 18 January 1940, the capital levy (*Varlık Vergisi*)[174] of November 1942 and payment-in-kind tax (*Ayniyat Vergisi*) were critical legal measures of the period which caused various social classes to become more and more critical of the CHP rule.[175]

---

[169] Tevik Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi (1839-1950)*, (1995, Ankara), 370.

[170] Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party 1946-1960", in (eds.) Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau, *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, (1988, London), 532.

[171] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 8.

[172] Mahmut Goloğlu, *Demokrasiye Geçiş 1946-1950*, (1982, İstanbul), 25-27.

[173] By enactment of the National Defense Law especially the workers and peasants faced great difficulties. Whereas, the Republican rule was sensitive about the profits of the private initiatives. İlhan Tekeli, "1946 Planı ya da 'İvedili Sanayi Planı'", in (ed.) Oya Baydar, *75 Yılda Çarklardan Chip'lere*, (1999, İstanbul), 155. Although the law was containing strict measures against speculation and black marketing it could not manage to do so. Tevfik Çavdar, *Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*, 377. "The statist economic policies which encourage the industrial initiatives and the state monopoly over trade which was supported by bi-lateral trade agreements nourished an economy of bribery and profiteering." Keyder, "Türkiye Demokrasisi", 51. For the negative developments in social security field see, Cahit Talas, *Türkiye'nin Açıklamalı Sosyal Politika* Tarihi, (1992, Ankara), 132-133. In mid-1950s the Democratic Party will execute the same law for overcoming the economic crises of the period.

[174] "I confess that I am not against the essence of this law. Bu I have never found its application as civilized, legal or humanitarian." Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl*, 155.

[175] Also these measures shaped the democratization attempts of the following years. See, Çavdar, *Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*, 373-393.

The single-party rule of Republican governments is mostly quoted as a coalition of various social forces.[176] As Feroz Ahmad notes:

> The Turkish political system of the 1940s was rooted in the period of national struggle of the early 1920s. It was the result of a tacit alliance between the urban middle class and the intelligentsia, army officers and state officials, and the landowners and notables of Anatolia.[177]

The members of this power bloc were disturbed by excessive state intervention in economic and social life:

> Statism, through its excesses and derivations from its initial social purpose, had become an obstacle to the development and the interests of all social groups. The benevolent paternalism of the Republican Party no longer corresponded with the need of any group. Their common purpose, not expressly stated but manifest in complaints, was to limit the government's harmful functions and authority and then use the government for their own purposes. The middle class demanded freedom in economy. The peasants and workers demanded liberation from a system in which, though established to promote the welfare of all groups, had aided only some specific groups.[178]

It can be said that the Republican People's Party in mid-1940s mostly lost its creditability in the eye of the people. The price of the "politics of neutrality" was mostly paid by ordinary people. In addition, war-time arrangements of the state changed the relative positions of classes within the country. The so-called coalition

---

[176] See, Ayata, *CHP*, 66; Çavdar, *Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*, 394 and Taner Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, (2003, Ankara), pp. 23-24.

[177] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 1-2.

[178] Karpat, *Politics*, 132. But it should be repeatedly noted that étatism can not be considered as a set of policies 'against' the social forces, or against private capital as many works on Turkish politics does. "On the contrary, there is a convergence of opinion that the relations between the public and private sectors were complementary rather than antagonistic during the implementation of etatist policies, as promised by the key policymakers of the time." Galip Yalman, *Bourgeoisie and the State: Changing Forms of Interest Representation within the Context of Economic Crisis and Structural Adjustment: Turkey during the 1980s*, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, University of Manchester, UK, 2001, 119. Especially the war-time economic and socio-political measures were mostly against the working classes and small peasantry; "there were crucial increase in incomes and capital accumulations of merchants, industrialists and the farmers who could benefit from the new conditions of the market." İlhan Tekeli, "İvedili Sanayi Planı", 155; Keyder, "Türkiye Demokrasisi", 49-50. The period, with its all legislative and executive arrangements can be read as a period of capital transfer. Thus, the war-time exigencies of the state was not a consequence of the dominance of the "strong state tradition" of Turkey; nor the period of democratic transition and the following victory of the Democratic Party in 1950 was a consequence of the struggle between statist and anti-statist (or, central and peripheral) forces. We will discuss this point below.

of the early Republican era was now ready to unite under a different project: the anti-statist and populist project of the Democratic Party.

3.2 Multi-Party Politics and the Formation of the Democratic Party

3.2.1 Dissidents within the Republican People's Party and the Formation of the Democratic Party

The end of the Second World War introduced drastic changes both for Turkey and for the international community. "The climate of the post-war Turkey was ripe for change and almost all politicians, even the hard-liners in the ruling party, recognized this."[179] The victory of the "democratic" forces and the following arrangements for setting the new rules of the game surely had crucial impacts on Turkish politics:

> It appeared certain at the end of the war that Turkey's political and economic interests lay in the West, and that these could be best served by a closer rapprochement to it. Thus, the destruction of the one-party regimes in Italy and Germany, the adherence of Turkey to the United Nations Declaration, and her closer rapprochement to the West considerably weakened the foundations of one-party rule at home. Moreover, the political atmosphere abroad, especially in the United States, made it apparent that without a democratization in her political system Turkey would not be able to gain in the West the proper moral recognition she desired and needed. Furthermore, the strains of discontent at home, stemming from various political, social, and economic measures taken during the war, had become so serious that it was necessary to "open a safety-vale" to prevent a general upheaval.[180]

---

[179] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 10.
[180] Karpat, *Politics*, 140-141. We should also note the detoriation of Turkish-Soviet relations during 1945-1946, which "had been instrumental in affecting the Turkish policymakers' decision" to approach to the West.

There is an ongoing debate over the dynamics of Turkey's transition to multi-party politics. For some writers transition to multi-party politics should be considered as a further step of Kemalist modernization process. The well known argument follows as such: Kemalism, from its beginning, aimed at achieving a democratic order, but the internal and external threats against the very foundations of a secular and unitary Turkey and the political immaturity of the Turkish people were impeding the steps towards democratization.[181] Once those obstacles were eradicated, there was no reason to continue the single-party rule. As opposed to this, there are also arguments which hold the question of transition as a necessary response to external dynamics. For example, Asaf Savaş Akat argues that transition to multi-party politics in 1945 is an externally defined event which does not reflect the internal dynamics of Turkish society and which has nothing to do with the demands and struggles of the social forces.[182] He further states that "even it [was] hardly to see a serious intention for transition to a democratic rule. Multi-party politics [has been] declared to the society one morning as something necessary for 'state's interests.'"[183]

In the preceding sections I have tried to show the problematic relationship between Kemalism and democracy both in theoretical and practical terms. So, the argument[184] which explains transition to multi-party politics as an outcome of the aspirations of Kemalist leaders, especially İsmet İnönü, does not seem reliable. But, seeing transition period as totally externally determined and deprived of any social basis is equally problematic. I propose that (although not being an original proposition) a shift of balance of power both in domestic and international spheres, together with the deprivation of the creditability of single-party rule were determinate in transition to democracy in Turkey. The single-party rule was ended just because it came to its end. And, in evaluating this process, a combination of internal and external determinants should be taken into consideration. But also I should note that this transition period does not imply a qualitative change in the

---

[181] See, Ergun Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey", 16.

[182] Asaf Savaş Akat, "İdris Küçükömer'in Mirası", in *Anılar ve Düşünceler* (İstanbul, 1994), 18-19.

[183] ibid. 19.

[184] Metin Toker's description of İnönü's belief in democracy can be taken as the most appropriate example of this point of view. Especially see, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları: Tek Partiden Çok Partiye 1944-1950*, (1990, İstanbul).

social composition of the state.[185] Rather, it can be read as a historical articulation of the dominant classes in Turkey to new anti-etatist discourse of the second half of the 1940s.

It was impossible for the CHP to remain isolated from the changes in domestic and international environment. In parliamentary debates on 1944 budget Celal Bayar and Hikmet Bayur together with Adnan Menderes, Feridun Fikri Düşünsel and Emin Sazak raised their criticisms.[186] In fact, before 1944 there were also criticisms towards government's economic policies; the difference was that those criticisms in 1944 found their reflections in public opinion.[187] Especially Hikmet Bayur soundly criticized government's economic and political arrangements.

In his presidential speeches in 1944 and 1945 İsmet İnönü hinted that the Republican People's Party (and the composition of the parliament) was on the edge of a dramatic change. The bulk of his speech on 1 November 1945 "was an apology for the generation of rule by the Republican People's Party, of which he was the chairman."[188]

> He agreed that the main deficiency in the system was lack of an opposition party and he declared that 'in keeping with the needs of the country and in the proper functioning of the atmosphere of freedom and democracy, it would be possible to form another political party.[189]

But still one sees the continuation of the essentialist and relativist definition of democracy, which in the early republican era found its expression by the phrase "*biz bize benzeriz.*" İsmet İnönü,

> expressed his hope that such an opposition party might be established in accordance with the principles of democracy and the country's needs. This democracy, however, had to suit the character and culture of the Turkish people, and the structure of the country. İnönü had in mind at this stage a rather limited

---

[185] Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1980)", in (ed.) Sina Akşin, Sina Akşin, *Türkiye Tarihi IV: Çağdaş Türkiye*, (1997, İstanbul), 311.

[186] Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, (1998, Ankara), 28. Çavdar, *Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*, 401.

[187] Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, 31.

[188] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 9.

[189] ibid. 9. also see Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, 36-39; Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, (1998, Ankara), 23.

democracy that would not challenge the Republican Party's rule.[190]

Inönü's speech had found great reflections within the parliament. It was explicitly encouraging the formation of an opposition party and transition to a multi-party political regime. Only a few months later, on 7 January 1946, the formation of the Democratic Party was officially announced.[191]

The land reform Bill of January 1945 was crucial in the process of the crystallization of opposition. The Ministry of Agriculture presented a bill to the Assembly, entitled "A Law Providing for Land Distribution and Establishing Farmers' Homesteads." The Bill "was to provide land and means for peasants with none or too little, and to ensure the full and effective use of arable lands of the country."[192] The Bill was passed on 11 June 1955 *unanimously*, only after bitter debates, "but the section dealing with homesteads was dropped and other provisions were changed" due to strong opposition; its new title was "A Law Making the Farmer a Land Owner."[193] "The method was to grant land to such peasants, together with twenty-year, interest-free loans for development, and other material help:"[194] "by giving them credits, material and technical assistance."[195] "However, it did not deal with fragmentation, improving and regulating the conditions of tenancy and sharecropping, claiming and improving waste lands for distribution, or organizing the newly created small farmers for self-assistance and agricultural resettlement."[196]

The land reform Bill caused the dissidents within the party to raise their voices and to become tangible.[197] Especially the Article 17 of the original Bill caused big farmers to feel threatened and they did not hesitate to show their distaste. The dissidents initially criticized the government's policy on economic grounds. For them, first of all, the Land Reform would cause a decline in production. More than

---

[190] Karpat, *Politics*, 147.
[191] But, the Democratic Party was not the first political party of the multi-party era. In August 1945 an İstanbul industrialist, Nuri Demirağ, got permission to form National Development Party (*Milli Kalkınma Partisi*).
[192] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (1968, London), 474. Also see, Reşat Aktan, "Problems of Land Reform in Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, 20 (1966), 320.
[193] Aktan, "Land Reform", 320.
[194] Lewis, *Emergence*, 474-475.
[195] Aktan, "Land Reform", 320.
[196] ibid. 320.
[197] Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, 40.

that, nationalization of farms over 500 *dönüms* would create insecurity among farmers and would be against the fundamental principle of right to property; and, lastly, the dissidents criticized the land reform Bill for implying a return to pre-capitalist household economy, for it included the breaking up of big estates.[198] There were many critics debating the issue around these points; but, as Taner Timur notes, among the critics it was only Adnan Menderes who succeeded in articulating the problem of land reform with the principles of "democratic regime", "supremacy of the Assembly" and "national will."[199]

The tangible opposition became formal in the midst of the debates on Land Reform. On 7 June 1945 (four days before the passing of the "Law Making the Farmer a Land Owner" on June 11) four signatories within the CHP submitted a proposal to CHP Parliamentary Group, namely *Dörtlü Takrir* (Proposal of the Four). The signatories were ex-premier Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan. By the proposal, the four signatories:

> mentioned the democratic nature of the Turkish Constitution, the attempts of Atatürk to give a more liberal character to the government, and finally the fact that the fear of reaction had necessitated the imposition of restrictions on the Constitution and that the Second World War had prolonged the enforcement of these restrictions. Now, since the war was over and the intellectuals and peasants were ready for democracy, they proposed to restore to the National Assembly effective powers of control over the government, grant to individuals the rights and freedoms which had been prescribed in the Constitution, and finally allow the development of political activity based on more than one party.[200]

Dörtlü Takrir was submitted just after İnönü's speech on 19 May 1945. Also, it should be remembered that the San Francisco Conference, one month ago, in April 1945, decided to form the United Nations and Turkey attended the conference with a big committee chaired by Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[201] But the CHP Parliamentary Group rejected the proposal for it required constitutional and legal amendments and

---

[198] Ahmad, *Experiment*, pp. 10-112.
[199] Taner Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, (2003, Ankara), 15.
[200] Karpat, *Politics,* 145. Also see Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, 17-18, Ahmad, *Experiment*, 12 and Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 29-31.
[201] Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, 14.

changes in the bylaws of the party program.[202] The rejection of the proposal can be interpreted in two different ways: first, as a consequence of the resistance of a group within the CHP (the radicals) which was against rapid political liberalization; and second, as a political maneuver to encourage the formation of a genuine opposition party.[203] The first interpretation seems reliable, and, the second one also makes sense, as it is stated by Metin Toker that in CHP's meeting held on June 12, İnönü decided to reject *Dörtlü Takrir* for letting the signatories to defend their case by forming an alternative political party.[204]

As the signatories of the proposal, mainly Menderes and Köprülü, kept up their opposition within the parliament and through writing critical articles in newspapers like *Tan* and *Vatan*,[205] the relationship between them and the CHP was severed. Köprülü, Menderes and Koraltan were expelled from the CHP in September 1945. Thereafter, Bayar resigned his seat in the Assembly and left the party in December. Signatories of the proposal had decided to form an opposition party. On 7 January 1946, the Democratic Party was formally founded under the leadership of Celal Bayar.

3.2.2 The Democratic Party

At first sight it was difficult to identify the differences between the programmes of the DP and the CHP. Ahmet Emin Yalman described the DP's program as such:

> The program, as finally drafted, was not very different from that of the People's Party, for the latter's six fundamental principles had been incorporated into the constitution of the Turkish

---

[202] *Demokrat Parti*, 29; Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, 18.
[203] Karpat, *Politics*, 146.
[204] Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, 67.
[205] *Tan* was being run by two prominent socialists Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel and *Vatan* by Ahmet Emin Yalman.

republic and no association disagreeing with them could be legally established.[206]

The party program was a reinterpretation of six principles of Kemalism (especially the one related with economic policies, namely *devletçilik*) through an articulation of them to Democrat Party's "historical mission of advancing democracy."[207] There was such a great similarity between two parties that even a prominent Democrat, Samet Ağaoğlu, needed to write a book on this issue: *İki Parti Arasındaki Farklar* (The Differences Between Two Parties).[208] The fact is that, Ağaoğlu, after debating the issue for 77 pages, could not give a satisfactory answer to the question. The transformation within the CHP in the second half of the 1940s also caused this close affinity. By transition to multi-party politics, the CHP, to some extent, both in ideological and legal-institutional terms, had to adapt itself to the new regime.[209] Apart from liberalization of economic and political system, the party itself has undergone a process of liberalization. In the Extraordinary Congress of 1946 and in Congress of 1947 the titles of "National Leader" and "Permanent Chairman" were abolished; the party accepted direct elections; the Independent Group was also abolished because of formation of an opposition party; étatism was redefined in moderate terms; and it was decided that party chairman should leave his office in case of presidency.[210]

The eclectic nature of the DP Programme is in need of examination. As noted above, the programme had to incorporate officially and constitutionally defined six principles of Kemalism. In addition to that, some ideas and principles which had dominance during the single party era –and which were not compatible with multi-party politics– were inherited by the Democratic Party.[211] As briefly discussed above, the official Republican ideology in first decades of the republic, among other things, was based upon a critique of liberal individualist and Marxist ideologies. The

---

[206] Ahmet Emin Yalman, "The Struggle For Multi–Party Government In Turkey", 54.
[207] See, Ahmad, *Experiment*, 13.
[208] Samet Ağaoğlu, *İki Parti Arasındaki Farklar*, (1947, Ankara).
[209] "The program of the party actually was an eclectic constitution. It was drafted originally in order to satisfy ass social groups, and incorporated all political tendencies from socialism to liberalism. But now by the end of 1947, the situation had radically changed. Confronting the Republicans was the Democratic Party which did not differ in program and basic ideas, but in terms of practical policies, methods, organization and the interests it defended. It resembled more closely to a political party." Karpat, *Politics*, 204.
[210] Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 575-576.
[211] Ahmet Makal, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Dönemde Çalışma İlişkileri*, (2002, Ankara), 62-63.

Democratic Party from its beginning criticized this point and defined the task of defending individual rights and freedoms both in political and economic spheres as one of its primary objectives.[212] For the Democrats, the CHP, which was deprived of a political programme or ideology, saw the state as a *metaphysical* and *mystical* entity which is above 'the individual' and 'the society'.[213] For Ağaoğlu, as against to the Republican ideology "which imprisoned rights and freedoms of the individual within the scope and limits of state's existence and authority", the DP's aim was to *demystify* the state and grant individuals their indispensable rights and freedoms.[214]

While sublimating the "individual", the party programme also maintained the solidarist framework of the single-party era.[215] This solidarist framework made party's understanding of social and political universe and its approach to the question of "advancing democracy" in Turkey ambiguous. As a preliminary statement, it can be argued that one of the causes of anti-democratic rule of the Democrats especially in the second half of the 1950s was this ambiguity. The sublime elements of the DP discourse, like "individual rights", "national will" and "advance of democracy" were so blurred that the party, in 1950s, even used these phrases for legitimating some anti-democratic laws and actions.

Both the Republicans (especially the ones who welcomed the establishment of the DP[216]) and the Democrats had to face a crucial problem: the widespread conviction that the DP, like the FRP of Fethi Okyar, was not born from genuine opposition.

---

[212] See Article 4 of the Party Programme. *Demokrat Parti Programı*, 662.
[213] Ağaoğlu, *İki Parti Arasındaki Farklar*, 63.
[214] ibid. 36, 39, 63.
[215] See, articles 5 and 6. "Article 6 – "As a natural outcome of social division of labor, we believe in possibility and need of harmonization of reciprocal relations and interests of work and profession groups –which are formed by citizens– like farmers, workers, merchants, industrialists, lawyers and employees within the framework of common good and in line with the principles of social justice and human solidarity." *Demokrat Parti Programı*, 662.
[216] We should note that there were also some radicals within the party who were skeptical about multi-party politics. In a way, the period between the launch of multi-party politics and the electoral victory of the DP in 1950 can be read as the struggle between radicals and moderates within both parties.

This belief was widespread, and in order to shatter it the Republicans and Democrats had to assert repeatedly the genuine character of the opposition.[217]

The claims of collusion (*muvazaa isnatları*) caused the Democrats to severe their relationship with the Republicans.[218] The Democrats immediately have realized that the mass support given to the party was dependent upon the severity of their opposition to the government. As people recognized that the new party was not a work of collusion, the interest shown to the DP rapidly increased. Only a few months after its formation, the DP came to represent almost the entire opposition; however, the only distinctive character of the party became its opposition to the government.[219] After 1945, and until at least 1955, Democrat party gathered the enthusiastic support of almost all groups (intelligentsia, workers, businessmen, and even the military) in Turkey. It became the party of all those who wanted to end one-party rule.

'The advance of democracy in Turkey' was the motto of the DP. Although the social composition and ideological background of the party were not much different from that of the CHP, the DP defined itself as a totally different and genuine political movement. Within the ups and downs of the first years of multi-party experiment, the Democrats, rather than putting forward alternative political and economic policies, defined the task of criticizing the single-party rule and the CHP as its primary political strategy. In doing this, they have successfully articulated needs and demands of the people to their anti-statist political discourse. The "administrative tool" of the single-party era has been the main target of the DP in its years of opposition.[220] Democrats' political strategy was based on dichotomization of the relationship between "the people" (as an empty signifier) and "the bureaucratic apparatus."

---

[217] Karpat, *Politics,* 152. Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu underlines the same point: "While searching for members to found party branches in the districts and members for the ones which were already founded, we were always facing with the experiment of Free Party, which was still alive in the memories of the people. It was hard to eliminate the fear that the Democratic Party was an organization (founded by the government itself) to identify the opponents of the government, as it was in the case of the Free Party. This specific concern was widespread especially among the people who lived in cities." See, *Demokrat Parti Masalı*, (1996, İstanbul), 13.

[218] Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, 135.

[219] Karpat, *Politics*, 153; Ahmet Makal,*Çalışma İlişikileri*, 62-63. As it is put forward by Ağaoğlu: "Thus, the Democratic Party is the powerful reaction of free man in Turkey." *İki Parti Arasındaki Farklar*, 61.

[220] Timur, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, 39.

The Democrats, who were sensitive about the issue of national unity and who left aside the question of class distinctions, were only considering this differentiation, and they were trying to relieve the "*kasketli*" people from the oppression of "*kravatli*" administrator.[221]

"The people", as an empty signifier, constituted the basic theme of the DP's political discourse. "The people" signified "employer and employee", "agha and shepherd", and "landowner and small peasant" at one and the same time.[222] The Democratic Party, from its early days, at least at discursive level, declined to be called as representative of a particular social class. As against to the widespread conviction of the time "that the Democratic Party was the party of big business and the up-and-coming business groups which had grown rich during the war," Menderes claimed that "the proportion of these groups in both parties was probably about the same" and "the Democrats were not representatives of groups striving for their selfish interests: they represented all those who wanted to put an end to one-party system."[223]

As the "real" and "genuine" representatives of the whole nation and "popular will", the Democrats efficiently propagandized their democratic framework in the second half the 1940s. But, their understanding of democracy is in need of examination. The Democrats had represented their opposition to the CHP as a search for possibility of advancing democracy and liberalism in Turkey. This strategy so well suited the anti-statist economic discourse of the party, which denounced the excessive role of the state in economics and which sublimated the role of private initiative in development process. Just after foundation of the party, the liberal-individualist critique of the "State" was replaced by a more conservative version. The alienation of the regime from "the people" and its denial of traditions and rituals for decades became the central theme. In 1950, Adnan Menderes, as the Prime Minister, in his speech on the Government Programme made a distinction between the reforms which were adopted and appropriated by people and the ones which were not.[224] The

---

[221] ibid. 39. *Kasketli*: a person who wears a cap. *Kravatlı*: a person who wears a tie.
[222] ibid, 39.
[223] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 16. Also see, Ağaoğlu, *İki Parti Arasındaki Farklar*, 10-11.
[224] For the full text of the Government Programme see, Adnan Menderes, *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları*, vol. 1, (ed.) Mustafa Doğan, (1957, İstanbul), 7-16. Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, 37-38. This religious-conservative emphasis caused many students of Turkish politics

religious-conservative tone of the DP's discourse became another source of support given to the opposition. But, more importantly, this shift in opposition strategy introduced a peculiar democratic discourse into Turkish political life, which persists even today, what Nuray Mert calls as "authentic representation."[225] By this phrase Mert refers to a peculiar way of interpretation of the question of democracy by right-wing (more precisely, centre-right) politicians. The centre-right politics see and represent the question of democracy within the framework of authentic representation of the 'nation', which is described as a homogeneous community.[226] First and foremost, this makes the borderline between the moderate and radical (nationalist or religious right) streams of right-wing politics blurred, for the problem of 'representation' is itself ambiguous enough. And secondly, which is closely related with the first one, this peculiar interpretation leaves the problem of constitutional, legal and institutional basis of a democratic government intact. Thus, what the Democrats achieved was demystification of the state at discursive level; but they have replaced this by mystification of the people and the "popular will." As it will be seen in the following parts, the second half of the 1950s in general, and the story the Freedom Party in particular, can be read as the history of the struggle between the DP's interpretation of democratic representation and opposition's alternative project.

3.2.3 1946 Elections and its Aftermath

The Republican People's Party decided to hold the general elections in 1946, instead of 1947. The newly formed opposition party was not ready for 1946 elections. The Democratic Party threatened the CHP with boycotting the elections.

---

to label the DP as a counter-revolutionary force; See, Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları: Demokrat Parti'nin Altın Yılları 1950-1954*, (1992, İstanbul); Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, 16 and Suna Kili, *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, (2001, İstanbul), 354-357.
[225] Nuray Mert, "Türkiye'de Merkez Sağ Siyaset: Merkez Sağ Politikaların Oluşumu", in, (eds.) S. Yerasimos, G. Seufert and K. Vorhoff, *Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik*, (2001, İstanbul), 60.
[226] ibid, 60.

As a part of carrot and stick politics, İnönü firstly made some steps towards liberalization, which is called by Ahmad as "paying dividends."[227] Then after, İnönü stated that boycotting the elections would damage the international prestige of Turkey; and it would also be a disrespectful move against Turkish people.[228]

The election campaign developed at a fast tempo. It was seen that "the bulk of the opposition in the country had centered almost exclusively around the Democratic Party and took the form of a crusade for liberation, a march against "despotism", as the Democrats described it, which was epitomized in their famous poster –a raised hand with the caption *artık yeter!,* it is enough!"[229]

The most crucial aspect of the election process was the "active participation of the people in the campaign and their enthusiastic support of the opposition."[230] The extent of the DP's ability to mobilize the people was surprising for the Republicans.[231] The Republicans mostly envisaged that the DP would be the junior partner; although they did not seek for a fake opposition, they wanted the DP to play the game with respect to the rules set by the Republicans.[232] But, the entrance of the Democrats into the political scene as a dynamic, challenging force caused a change in the relationship between the candidates and the people –named by Frey as the "localization of the politics."[233] Karpat described the new rules of the game as such:

> For the first time, candidates who, during one-party rule, had seldom visited their constituencies, had to go into their election districts as early as possible, to talk to people and ask for their votes, promising in return whatever the people needed.[234]

---

[227] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 17. The most important of liberalization step was the elimination of Article 50 of the Press Law, which gave the Council of Ministers to close newspapers and journals. See, Hıfzı Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, (1973, İstanbul), 152.

[228] Metin Toker, *Tek Partiden Çok Partiye*, 105.

[229] Karpat, *Politics*, 161.

[230] ibid. 161-162

[231] İlkay Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", 749.

[232] Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*, 402.

[233] Frey, F.V., "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey", in G. Lenczowski (ed.) *Political Elites in the Middle East*, (1975, Washington D. C.), 195-197, and, *Turkish Political Elite*, Cambridge, (1963, Massachusetts).

[234] Karpat, *Politics*, 162-163. "The politicians were visiting their electorates in their districts. This was a recent development in Turkey. In the preceding period there was not such a communication; in the single-party era the candidates were determined by Ankara." Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 79.

The Democratic Party's election campaign rested upon some key themes. The criticism of the single-party period –especially the *Milli Şef* era– was in the center of the campaign. Because the founders of the party were, just a few years ago, within the ranks of the CHP they have mostly focused on the personality of İsmet İnönü and his period. For example, Celal Bayar expressed the Democrats' view on étatism as such:

> In Atatürk era, étatism meant 'public service'. To confess, it did not work as such. It turned into something just opposite of this original aim. And you know this better than me. The problem is not with the principle of étatism; the problem is about the application of this principle. Just because of this, the Democratic Party is for étatism . . . When a citizen constructs a factory, the state capital should not compete with him.[235]

The still alive structures and habits of the single party era was another crucial theme for the Democrats. They accused the Republicans for not sustaining free space for opposition to work and for taking advantage of the state apparatuses. In one of his speeches in İzmir on 17 July 1947, Bayar condemned this situation as such:

> What is the main source of these difficulties [that the opposition party is facing]? The mentality of single-party, which can not still be destroyed. This mentality, implicitly or explicitly suggests that the nation is not mature enough. . . The government and administrative tool, which should have worked totally impartial, is in service of this mentality. What we oppose is a political party which unites the titles of party chairmanship and presidency in one person. Thus, what we face is a political party which holds and uses both the state power and entire governmental tools.[236]

Critique of the CHP's elitist attitude, economic difficulties, need for free elections, abolishment of anti-democratic laws and indispensability of parliamentary control over government's actions were among other subjects of the DP's electoral campaign.[237] Locating the criticism of the single-party era and excessive state intervention in economic and social life, the DP successfully defended its case. It was true that they did not have an alternative political program; nor did they seek for

---

[235] Celal Bayar, *Celal Bayar'ın Seçim Kampanyalarındaki Söylev ve Demeçleri 1946-1950-1954*, (ed.) Özel Şahingiray, (1999, İstanbul), 20. Celal Bayar's speech in Osmaniye-Ceyhan on 1 July 1946.

[236] Celal Bayar, *Celal Bayar'ın Seçim Kampanyalarındaki Söylev ve Demeçleri 1946-1950-1954*, (ed.) Özel Şahingiray, (1999, İstanbul), 25. 16-17 July 1946 İzmir

[237] ibid. 16-36.

detailing their arguments in legal or institutional terms. But at that time the first precondition of a successful opposition was opposing successfully.

Meanwhile, the Republicans constructed their election strategy around two basic themes. Politics of neutrality was the first pillar of Republican campaign. For them, İnönü's strategy helped Turkey to avoid the Second World War and its disastrous results. The decision to implement multi-party politics was the other election theme of the Republicans. According to the Republicans, by this, the CHP had proved its commitment to democracy.

I do not think that, in Turkish political history, there is another election which has been debated as much as the one held in 1946. Throughout the second half of the 1940s, and 1950s, the spectre of the 21 July 1946 elections has never left the political arena. It was even so difficult for the Republicans to claim the legitimacy of the elections.[238]

Kemal Karpat, in his excellent work on transition period, states that the period between the elections of July 21 to the declaration of İnönü on July 12, 1947 (namely, *12 Temmuz Beyannamesi[239]*) was the most important period to root the multi-party system in Turkey. This period ended with "providing the opposition parties freedom action and equality with the Republican Party."[240] Indeed, the following years after the 1946 elections witnessed a great contestation. The radical Republican circle, leaded by Recep Peker, struggled both against the Democrats and moderates within the CHP. The end of this contestation implied the elimination of radical Republicans.

The First and Second Congresses of the Democratic Party laid out the basic themes of opposition between 1946 and 1950. The First Congress, held in July 1947, formulated three basic conditions for the establishment of a real democracy: the amendment of the anti-constitutional laws restricting rights and freedoms of the individual; an election law to assure the safety of the ballot –juridical supervision

---

[238] See, Toker, *Demokrat Parti'nin Altın Yılları*, 9; Çavdar, *Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*, 403; Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*. The Repubublicans won 390 seats out of 465, with 65 Democrats and 7 independents. Ahmad, *Experiment*, 18. "Despite the lopsided result, the CHP was shaken by the inauguration of a legal opposition."
[239] For the full text of this document see, Tunaya, "12 Temmuz Beyannamesi", in, *Siyasi Partiler*, 688-689.
[240] Karpat, *Politics*, 169. For similar remarks see, Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 291-292.

over the elections; and the separation of the Presidency from the chairmanship of the CHP. These three points were expressed both in Bayar's speech and in *Hürriyet Misakı* (Freedom Pact).[241] In the Second General Congress of June 1949, the DP intensified its opposition and issued the well known *Milli Husumet Andı* (National Hostility Oath). With this document the Democrats claimed that "any infringement upon the Election Law was equivalent to a violation of the individual's natural rights which placed the citizens in a position of self-defense."[242] Anyone who does not refrain from any action violating political rights and freedoms of the citizens "will be subjected to national hostility."[243] The Republicans responded to this declaration immediately; they blamed the opposition for using revolutionary measures.

It would be unfair to say that the Republicans did not positively respond to the demands of the opposition. Especially after the elimination of extremists within the CHP,[244] important moves towards liberalization of the system were seen. This process also implied the liberalization of the party itself. In the following years, the CHP with moderate figures like Hasan Saka and Şemsettin Günaltay, tried to reduce the level of confrontation between two parties.[245] The most important development before the forthcoming elections in 1950 was the amendment of election law. In February 1950 a commission to reform the election law was formed under the chairmanship of Nihat Erim.[246] After the meetings of the commission and

---

[241] Orhan Mete, *Bütün Tafsilat ve Akisleriyle Demokrat Partinin Birinci Büyük Kongresi*, (Ankara, 1947), 5-15, 5-54; Karpat, *Politics*, 180; Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 650-651; Ahmad, *Experiment*, 21-22.

[242] Karpat, *Politics*, 233.

[243] "İkinci Büyük Kongrede İttifakla Kabul Edilen Ana Davalar Komisyonu Raporu", in, Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 684.

[244] There was alos a tension between the moderates and extremists within the Democratic Party. In the midst of 1948 a group of dissidents broke away in protest against the domination of the founders of the Democratic Party and formed the Nation Party (*Millet Partisi*). This party was abolished by the Menderes Government in 1953; however the party was re-formed under the name of Republican Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*).

[245] Saka and Günaltay governments, apart from taking democratic measures, tried to increase the prestige of the Republican People's Party by adhering to populist measures. The most striking measures were taken in the field of organized religion. For instance, the government reinstated religious instruction in schools and established a faculty of divinity at the University of Ankara. "Clearly, the CHP was responding to the new situation in which it had to compete for rural votes, and was in danger of losing its traditional support among local notables and landowners." Frank Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections", 131.

[246] Nihat Erim was one of the prominent members of a faction in the Republican People's Party, namely *Otuzbeşler* (Thirty Fives). This faction was formed against the circle leaded by Recep Peker and their main objective was to eliminate extremists within the CHP and give the party an optimum liberal-democratic shape. Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Hamdullah Suphi

parliamentary debates, the new election law was passed by the Assembly. The two major parties, the CHP and the DP voted for the new election law. The elections, which were based on the majority system, were to be direct, based on the principle of secret ballot-open count, and supervised by the judiciary.[247] Apart from this the state radio was to be used equally by all political parties for propaganda.[248]

The Republicans envisaged that their recent records will be enough to gain popular support.[249] As Ahmad states they had good reason for their optimism. But at the same time;

> This mood of optimism symbolized the single-party, elitist mentality and reflected the view that the voter should be grateful for the reforms bestowed from the top and forget the oppression that accompanied them. It was precisely this memory which the Republicans were not able to eradicate, an impossibility while İsmet İnönü led the party.[250]

3.3 Democrats in Power

On 14 May 1954 the majority of the people voted for the Democratic Party.[251] But, in line with Rıfkı Salim Burçak, in my opinion, the surprising fact about the elections was the huge support given to the CHP.[252] After years of single-party rule, nearly 40 per cent of the registered voters voted for the CHP. But as a

---

Tanrıöver, Memduh Şevket Esendal, İsmail Rüştü Aksal were amaong other names. See, Tunaya, *Siyasi Partiler*, 564; and Tevfik Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi (1950-1995)*, (2000, Ankara), 16. The deputies of the Nation Party declined to attend the meetings of the commission. Seeing the Democratic Party as a controlled opposition, the Nation Party argued that they would not believe in sincerity of the Republicans unless the government officials who had committed crimes and distorted the election process were trialed. Rıfkı Salim Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları, 1950-1960*, (1998, Ankara).

[247] Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 40-41.

[248] Çavdar, *Demokrasi Tarihi (1950-1995)*, 17.

[249] Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 41.

[250] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 30.

[251] When compared with the preceding "elections", the participation was too high (% 88.88 of the registered voters – 7.916.091 out of 8.905.576). 4.242.831 citizens voted the Democratic Party (%53); 3.165.096 the CHP (%39.98) and 240.209 the Nation Party (% 3.03). 267.955 citizens voted independent candidates (% 3.4). *Ulus*, November 17, 1957.

[252] Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 48.

consequence of the majority system –which the CHP declined to change in February 1950 meetings– the Republicans won 69 seats in the parliament. Whereas, 408 seats in the Assembly belonged to the Democrats. The election system, which was defended by Nihat Erim in February 1950 commission meetings, exaggerated the victory of the DP, and in the following years this fact became one of the most important causes of the DP's anti-democratic turn.[253]

For many writers, the mass support given to the DP was not a surprising fact. As early as in 1947, Ahmed Emin Yalman remarked that "dissatisfaction was so general that any opposition party of a serious character was sure to get quick response."[254] For Yalman,

> the broad minded spirit displayed by the organizers of the Democratic Party, coupled with the strong support of a majority of the independent daily papers, created such a favorable atmosphere that branches of the party soon sprang up throughout the country, thus assuring it a wide popular support.[255]

It can be said that almost all groups (intelligentsia, workers, businessmen), even the military was backing the Democratic Party, and this support continued until 1955.[256] With its promises on freedom of press, DP nearly gathered the full support of the press.[257]

As stated above, the DP –leaving aside the question whether it differed from the CHP or not– became the party of all those who want to see the end of single-party rule. As Karpat states, although the CHP were pushing for further liberalization, "the average citizen thought that a real political liberalization could not be achieved except by sending the Republican Party into opposition."[258] The Democrats successfully exploited the elements of popular discontent with mobilizing the masses by its populist[259] political discourse:

---

[253] Kalaycıoğlu, "Turkish Democracy", 55.

[254] Yalman, "The Struggle for Multi Party Government in Turkey", 56.

[255] ibid. 56.

[256] Even the son–in–law of İsmet İnönü, Metin Toker stated that he would vote for the Democratic Party if he could. *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları 1944-1973-DP Yokuş Aşağı 1954-1957*, (1991, İstanbul).

[257] Topuz, *Türk Basın Tarihi*, 177.

[258] Karpat, *Politics*, 232.

[259] "The official-Kemalist version was, in short, the **exclusionary** variant of populism. What the DP attempted to do was to articulate an **inclusionary** version that would mobilize "the

> What was the biggest fault of People's Party, which the Democratic Party dwelled upon most? What was agitating the people most in public demonstrations? The cries of the people: 'You left us in hunger, you left us naked!'[260]

What the Democrats tried to achieve was the elimination of Kemalist pedagogy which, at one and the same time defined "the people" as the sole source of sovereignty and snubbed it.[261] The elitist Kemalist ideology was referring to 'the people' as the only legitimate source of political power; but while doing this, Kemalist ruling cadres were *constructing* and *inventing* their object of reference. This process (call it nationalization of the masses, or modernization) comprised the elimination of traditional, superstitious, irritating and disgusting aspects of 'the people'.[262] The result of purification[263] of Turkish culture through the motto of "westernization and modernization of the society" was the total alienation of the regime from the people. The carriers of this alienated regime, together with more than frequent use of oppressive measures, had no chance to survive under multi-party politics. The Democrats were to replace this elitist discourse with its own populist framework by attributing "the people" a necessarily affirmative essence; and they successfully presented themselves as the "real" representatives of 'the people'.

But there is a more important question to be raised. Until now I have only referred to a shift in political strategy and my reference points were mostly about the discursive aspects of the transition period. To ask the question more precisely: What was the meaning of May 14 for overall political development of Turkey? To some extent, I have dealt with this issue in my chapter on 'consolidation paradigm'. To quote from Çağlar Keyder:

---

people" (*halk*) and bind them to the party. In terms of these neo-populist intentions of the DP, the old populism was both a resource to draw from and an obstacle to be overcome." İlkay Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", 749 (emphasis added).

[260] Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl*, 157.

[261] We should note that this process is not peculiar to Kemalism only. For an excellent examination of a similar process in Europe see Peter Burke, *Yeniçağ Başında Avrupa Halk Kültürü*, trans. G. Aksan, (1996, Ankara).

[262] See, Michel De Certeau, "The Beauty of the Dead: Nisard", in, *Heterologies, Discourse on the Other*, (1986, Berkeley). Also see, Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji*, (1986, İstanbul), 110.

[263] For purification of folk culture, see Sami Zubaida, *İslam, Halk ve Devlet*, translated by Sami Oğuz, (1994, İstanbul) and Necmi Erdoğan, "Popüler Anlatılar ve Kemalist Pedagoji", *Birikim*, 105-106. For the relationship between Turkish nationalism and Turkish popular culture see Arzu Öztürkmen, *Türkiye'de Folklor ve Milliyetçilik*, (1998, İstanbul).

The elections of 1950 constitute a watershed in Turkish history. Until then the politics had been the business of the elite, with power being transferred within the bureaucracy, or shared with a bourgeoisie who were few enough to permit face-to-face negotiation. Politics had not been differentiated as a profession within the bureaucratic polity; parliaments served as an extension of administration, as had the boards of public and private concerns. With the decision to introduce a multi-party parliament in 1945, however, universal suffrage and electoral politics arrived together to articulate the split in the ruling coalition. The parliament was transformed into a forum of debate, and when the ruling party attempted to constrain the opposition by decree, it felt itself justified in 'going to the people'. In the parlance of the 1946-1950 period, 'going to the people' became the formula announcing an entire constellation of novel political activity. Its practitioners implicitly denied that the parliament had any representative legitimacy and declared themselves to be the only politicians voicing the will of the people. They thus introduced to the scene new dimension of populist contestation.[264]

By his formulations, Keyder is in line with the "widespread consensus among historians that the Democratic Party's landslide election victory in May 1950 is a watershed in modern Turkish political history."[265] For many writers, the DP's electoral victory was "absolutely a turning-point in Turkey."[266] The election results implied a crucial divide in Turkish Political history, "even more important than the more commonly recognized official demise of the Ottoman Empire and declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923."[267] As a natural outcome of the approach which conceptualizes all political developments in Turkey as "aspects of elite contestations", the electoral victory of the DP is seen as a shift in the political basis of the system: "from the 'statist' to the 'political' elites."[268] From this perspective, "the rise of the DP was a victory of the periphery over the center."[269]

But there is an alternative way of reading the story. Although it would be a crucial mistake to underestimate the importance of 1950 elections (and Menderes era as well) in Turkey, it would also "be an error, however, to interpret the 1950 election

---

[264] Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey*, (1987, London), 117.
[265] Eric J. Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, (1993, New York), 231.
[266] Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party", 531.
[267] Zürcher, *Turkey, A Moden History*, 228.
[268] Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party", 531.
[269] Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations", 304-308; also see, Özbudun, "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey", 16 and İlkay Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", 748-750.

as a one-dimensional political victory of the countryside over the urban-based national elite."[270] To quote from Tachau,

> In some respects, the remarkable 1950 election results could be viewed as no more than a cosmetic change. The leaders of the DP, after all, had been prominent members of the CHP before they went into opposition (or, more accurately, were allowed to go into opposition) nor did the DP's policies (as contrasted with formally proclaimed goals) diverge all that much from those of the CHP in the years preceding the critical election.[271]

The electoral victory of the Democratic Party, in essence, neither implied a critical change in social basis of the Turkish state, nor a shift in authoritarian nature of Turkish politics:

> Moreover, this change of government was rather exaggerated in terms of paving the ground for a process of economic as well as political liberalization. First of all, it is a well-known fact that the two main political parties which had vied for political power in this election had both campaigned for the liberalization of the economy. . . More fundamentally, this change of government hardly involved any change in the balance of forces either within the Turkish power bloc or between the latter and the masses. In fact, such an exaggerated evaluation helped to conceal the fact that the authoritarian form of the state which had prevailed since the foundation of the Republic, remained intact despite a change in the political regime from a one-party rule to a multi-party parliamentary system.[272]

After the elections, the new Assembly elected Celal Bayar as the new President of the Republic. The first days of the Adnan Menderes Government, in fact, signalled that the relationship between the opposition and the political power will not be peaceful at all. After the debates over the government program the Republican deputies walked out the Assembly in protest.[273] In his government program, Menderes, as the head of the cabinet, stated that the Ninth Grand National Assembly had a unique place in Turkish history.[274]

---

[270] Frank Tachau, "Turkish Political Parties and Elections", 131. Although being still within the "political elite paradigm" Tachau's warnings are worth of quoting.
[271] ibid. 131. For similar remarks, see Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, 13-14.
[272] Galip Yalman, *Bourgeoisie and the State*, 145. Tunçay and İnsel locates the authoritarian turn of the DP in the second half of the 1950s within the context of continuation of authoritarian tradition. See, Tunçay, *Siyasi Tarih*,184-187 and Ahmet İnsel, "*Cumhuriyet Tarihinde Otaritarizmin Sürekliliği*", (unpublished text)
[273] Cihad Baban, *Politika Galerisi (Büstler ve Portreler)*, (1970, İstanbul), 143-144.
[274] Menderes, *Konuşmalar,* (vol.1), 7.

It is for the first time in our history that, as a result of a full and free expression of the national will, this distinguished Assembly had come to a position where it can shape the nation's destiny. We shall remember that historic day as the day of victory not only for our party but for Turkish democracy.[275]

The new rules of the game were set as such: the Democrats after the 1950 elections undoubtedly saw themselves as the sole representative of the popular will. As the CHP has done in the preceding period, the Democrats expected the opposition to be "the junior partner" in this process.[276] It was so hard for both parties to adopt their new roles.[277] As it was stated by Samet Ağaoğlu, democracy was "a regime of numbers"; it was the regime in which the wishes of the masses were carried out:

We, as the responsible ones in power, are obliged to take into consideration the wishes of the people; not the shouts and criticisms of a handful of intellectuals.[278]

Meanwhile, the situation of the CHP can be best described as a "condition of disarray."[279] Most of the Republicans were shocked after the elections and they could not give a meaning to the results. The post-election pessimism made the CHP a party without any political strategy. As a result, the Republicans, from their first months in opposition, started a campaign of heavy criticism. Their basic theme was the "myth of political insecurity."[280] In turn, the Republicans were criticized for not giving the new government an opportunity to perform its task.[281] By the 10th Great Congress of the CHP in June 1953, the Republicans tried to reform the party by giving priority to social issues.[282] But as it will be seen, the Republicans were far from the political prestige that they sought for. It continued at least until the second half of the 1950s.

---

[275] ibid.. 7. Ahmad, *Experiment*, 35.
[276] Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, 232.
[277] Ağaoğlu states that after the election results the Democrats have realized that the task of opposition was quite easier when compared with holding the political power. See, Arkadaşım Menderes, İpin Gölgesindeki Günler, (2004, İstanbul), 47.
[278] Quoted in, Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Gördüklerim Geçirdiklerim 1945-1971*, iv (1971, İstanbul), 23-239.
[279] Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, 232.
[280] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 43.
[281] ibid. 41. Tevfik Çavdar, *Demokrasi Tarihi (1950-1995)*, 46.
[282] One of the themes in the Congress was workers' rights. In the Congress the Republican People's Party accepted the workers' right to strike as a party principle. See Makal, *Çalışma İlişkileri* and Fuat Andıç, "Development of Labor Legislation in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, 8, 1959, 368.

The first political achievement of the DP was amendment of the press law on July 15, 1950. Compared to the preceding ones, the new press law was liberal enough and welcomed by the newspapers of the time.[283] But the Democrats left many of the problems of the time, which they kept in the agenda in years of opposition, intact.[284] Indeed, the new press law was a dividend paid to the press; just a few years later, the Democrats were to discover that the 1950 press law did not fit to the country. Apart from this, their main promise about amendment of anti-constitutional laws which were against individual rights and freedoms seemed to be forgotten. On the contrary, in February 1954, the Assembly, which was dominated by the Democrats, passed a new press law which suited "the needs" of the country. For the Democrats, the former press law was ended with the abuse of freedoms by the irresponsible newspapermen.[285]

Although the Article 39 of the DP Program was promising to grant administrative and scientific autonomy to the universities, the Democrats on July 21, 1953 amended the Universities Law. The de-politicization of the university members was the main motive behind this law. But, on the contrary, this new law caused the university professors to become more critical of the Democratic Party and over-politicized them. The Democrats made a distinction between 'dealing with country's political and social problems', and active participation in politics.[286] For them, the law aimed at preventing university professors from entering into active politics. In December 1953, the Assembly requestioned all the CHP's material assets which were not indispensable for the continuation of party activities, and handed them to the treasury.[287] This was a great strike for the Republicans both in material and moral terms.

On the other hand, the first years of the DP power witnessed a struggle between the Menderes cabinets and the parliamentary group. In spring of 1951, Refik Şevket İnce resigned his role as the Chairman of DP Parliamentary Group. He

---

[283] Topuz, *Türk Basın Tarihi*, 178-181.
[284] Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 109.
[285] Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 329.
[286] Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 157. It was Rıfkı Salim Burçak who defended the law in the Assembly. For his parliamentary speech see, *On Yılın Anıları*, 160-164.
[287] Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, 233; Ahmad, *Experiment*, 48; Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*; 83.

claimed that Menderes was seeing the Group as a political organ which unquestionably ratifies government's decisions.[288] Before that, in first months of 1951 the tension between the parliamentary group and Menderes created the opposition of *61'ler Hareketi* (Movement of 'the Sixty-one'). In the DP Parliamentary Group's meeting held on 29 March, 61 DP deputy voted against the program of Second Menderes Cabinet.[289] They have criticized Menderes for making too little changes in the program and for being lenient towards the religious reactionaries; "and four men close to him (Hasan Polatkan, Sıtkı Yırcalı, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Mükerrem Sarol) were accused of peddling political influence."[290] In essence, the main aim of the faction was preventing the oligarchy of the founders of the Party (*kurucular oligarşisi*).[291] Later, on October 18, 1955, Menderes in the Forth Great Congress of the DP claimed that the "Sixty-one" movement was led by Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu.[292] Although the opposition faction could not succeed in overthrowing the cabinet, it had in a way signalled the developments of the mid-1950s.

The golden years of the Democratic Party power (1950-1954) recorded crucial achievements in the economic field.[293] "The DP's economic success guaranteed it the support of the mass of the population, especially in the countryside and the central theme of the CHP campaign –the lack of freedom and the government's authoritarian tendencies– lacked creditability coming, as it is, from a party so closely identified with the authoritarian regime of the past.[294] The elections held in 2 May 1954 approved this fact.

---

[288] Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 117.
[289] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 80-81.
[290] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 80-81.
[291] Erdoğan Örtülü, "İspat *Hakkı* Nasıl Doğdu Nasıl Gelişti", *Ulus*, October 25, 1955.
[292] *Zafer*, October 19, 1955. Also see Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 81. Fethi Çelikbaş, Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ, Muammer Alakant, Enver Güreli, and Sıtkı Yırcalı were among the other names of the movement. As it will be seen below these prominent party member will lead the "*ispat hakkı*" movement.
[293] Economics under the DP will be examined closely in the following parts of the thesis.
[294] Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, 233-234.

3.3.1 The Rise and Fall of the Democrats

The results of the 1954 elections were pointing to the great victory of the DP and were approving the hegemonic position of the party. This victory, at one and the same time, pointed to the rise and fall of the Democrats in Turkey. The elections had proved that the DP with its achievements increased its popular support; but, more important than that, the majority system created a parliament nearly without any opposition.[295] This had caused some Democrats to propose that:

> In 1950 elections, the people overthrew the CHP from power; and in 2 May 1954 from the opposition.[296]

It was Celal Bayar himself in 1949 who had firmly stated that "it [was] Democrats' intention to achieve a system in which the opposition's rights were firmly consolidated."[297] And, Adnan Menderes, with his historical words *"Devr-i sabık yaratmayacağız!"* (We will not question the past) intended to relieve the Republicans who were anxious about the possible consequences of loss of political power. But, as it will be seen, the Democrats' actions, especially after the 1954 elections, had proved the invalidity of their promises. It was not only the Republicans who experienced political (and in some cases physical) violence, but also the dissidents within the Democratic Party faced the reality of deterioration of the democratic ideals within the Democratic Party.

The election results[298] pointed to an Assembly totally dominated by the DP deputies; there was a little difference between the Parliamentary Group meetings of the DP and Parliamentary sessions. But in the following years the Democrats did not

---

[295] A prominent DP deputy of the time wrote: "After the election results, I could not share the happiness of my friends in İzmir. Although I have been elected as deputy, I had so many doubts about the new period. . . I was telling to myself "Now it is impossible to control Menderes." Baban, *Politika* Galerisi, 177.

[296] Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları: DP Yokuş Aşağı 1954-1957*, 56.

[297] *Vatan*, 04.10.1949; Karpat, *Politics*, 236. Also see, Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay Ahmad, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi 1945-1971*, (1976, İstanbul) 57.

[298] 9.095.617 citizens voted out of 10.105.178 registered voters, which this referred to a considerably high level of participation (%90). The DP gained 503 seats (%93 of the overall seats in the Assembly) in the Assembly by taking the % 58.42 of the votes (5.313.659). The CHP, with % 35 of the votes, was to be represented in the Assembly by 31 seats (% 5.7); and the Republican National Party with % 5.28 of the votes was to be represented by 5 seats. *Ulus*, November 17, 1957.

use this majority for implementing their original objectives. On the contrary, they have adhered to authoritarian measures against the opposition parties and dissidents within the DP itself. The new measures which were taken after the 1954 elections dominated the agenda of the second half of the 1950s. Of course the Democrats did not mean it, but they have contributed to the formation of an organized and dynamic opposition by their policies. The Democrats have gone so far that in the second half of the 1950s the CHP started to become a credible and prestigious alternative to the DP. I should also note that the inflationary side of the economic "miracle" played a great role in this process.

Here I will not deal with the historical issues of the period after the elections in detail. I will only highlight some crucial developments of the period for understanding the composition of the anti-DP politics in the second half of the 1950s. After 2 May 1954 elections, the DP issued a series of anti-democratic laws aiming at limiting the space of opposition and eliminating the Republicans from the state apparatuses. The end of 1953 and first months of 1954 was signalling that the economic boom of the first years of the DP power was slowing down. The decrease in national income and agricultural output started to challenge the hegemonic position of the Democrats. The intellectual circles were also becoming more critical of the Democrats; who, while in opposition, promised to abolish all anti-constitutional and anti-democratic laws, but when came to power became irrelevant to these issues.

In 1954, the Menderes Government tightened the Press Law; and in June made some amendments in the Election Law,[299] which prevented the opposition parties to use state radio for campaign purposes. The Law on Government Officials of 2 July 1954 was also another crucial measure taken by the Democrats. Sarıbay describes the nature of this law as such:

> The bureaucracy's autonomy from the executive branch was curtailed by a law empowering the latter to suspend, and after a period of suspension, to retire civil servants, including university

---

[299] Fevzi Lüfti Karaosmanoğlu, Turan Güneş, Kemal Özçoban, Sırrı Atalay, Kamil Gündeş, Cavit Oral and İhsan Aktürel were the DP deputies who opposed the anti-democratic articles of the new election law. See Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 29-31.

professors and judges who either had twenty-five years' service or were over sixty.[300]

Democrats, by these measures determined the main framework of opposition movements. In 1954 two journals, *Forum* and *Akis* began to be published. Especially the *Forum* circle, which was the "new" representative of Anglo-Saxon liberal ideology, provided the opposition parties, especially the Freedom Party, with sufficient materials to defend their case. By its anti-democratic measures and irrational economic policies, the Democrats also contributed to the transformation of the CHP. The situation was so interesting that, *Milli Şef* of the single-party era become one of the most enthusiastic supporters of democratic principles.

Meanwhile, the above-mentioned tension between "Menderes circle" and the party's parliamentary group reached its peak after 1954 elections. Although not being organized and publicized, the distaste with the recent measures taken by the party and the economic problems that the country was facing caused the intra-party struggle to become mild.[301]

3.4 The Freedom Party

3.4.1 *"İspat Hakkı"* (Right of Proof) and the Formation of the Freedom Party

Three crucial headlines severed the relationship between "Menderes circle" and the dissidents within the DP in 1955. The issue of *"ispat hakkı"* (right of proof); the large-scale riots took place in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir on 6-7 September (*6/7 Eylül Olayları*); and the crisis of Turkish economy.

---

[300] Sarıbay, *The Democratic Party*, 126. Also see, Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 165-166; Çavdar, *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi (1950-1995)*, 16; Ahmad, *Experiment*, 53 and Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, 241.
[301] Buçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 224-225.

The boundaries between political activity and personal interest had always been blurred in Turkey. For the period that I am dealing with, especially after 1953 and 1954 (the years in which the economic triumph of the early 1950s started to show its inflationary face), the prominent members of the Democratic Party (mainly Mükerrem Sarol[302]) were being blamed for peddling political influence. As early as in 1951, a group within the DP Parliamentary Group demanded from Menderes to check figures such like Mükerrem Sarol (see *61'ler Hareketi* above). As a response to the claims of malpractice, a group of DP deputies, in May 1955, brought the Assembly a Bill for providing the newspapermen's 'right of proof' (*ispat hakkı*). The deputies demanded that "journalists who were taken to the court under the restrictive press law should have the right to prove the truth of what they had written and this should be admitted as evidence in the courts."[303] The demand for *ispat hakkı* was debated by the Parliamentary Group immediately, and the Group declined to accept the proposal. The deputies, who signed the proposal, insisted on defending their case; thus, the move of 11 DP (*11'ler*)[304] deputies turned out to be an explicit challenge to the "Menderes circle". Turkish Press responded to this recent development immediately. The issue of *ispat hakkı* in a few moths became one of the most important topics of the agenda. As Toker put forward,

> "*İspat hakkı*" issue just form its beginning found its reflections in public opinion. For the opposition (particularly for the dissidents within the Democratic Party) it became a way of saying "no" to the anti-democratic disposals of the Democratic Party ruling cadres. In the summer of 1955, the issue of "*ispat hakkı*" became so popular that it was even being discussed in the villages.[305]

In the beginning, "Menderes circle" did not see this movement as a threatening force. Menderes was strongly against "*ispat hakkı*"; for him this right could be used as a weapon against the DP by opposition parties. Also, for Menderes, the irresponsible newspapermen could use it as a tool of slandering and

---

[302] See, Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 105.
[303] Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, 242; Ahmad, *Experiment*, 88; Sarıbay, *The Democratic Party*, 129; Toker, Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 10-135; Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 328-350; Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 177.
[304] The eleven deputies were Fethi Çelikbaş, Enver Güreli, Kasım Küfrevi, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, Şeref Kamil Mengü, Seyfi Kurtbek, Ekrem Alican, Turan Güneş, İbrahim Öktem, Raif Aybar, and Mustafa Ekinci.
[305] Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 167.

blackmailing.[306] Although Menderes held a meeting with the signatories to solve the problem, it helped nothing but raising the tension within the party.[307] The interesting point was that "Menderes circle" underestimated the importance of the issue.[308] But when in summer of 1955, two prominent members of the party, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ declared their support for *11'ler*, the political climate suddenly changed.[309] Together with Karaosmanoğlu and Üstündağ, a group of Democratic Party deputies[310] signed the 2 May Bill, which the group now had 19 members (*19'lar*, 'the-Nineteen'). In addition, the divide within the party was also finding its reflections in provincial DP organizations. In May 1955 a group of DP members criticized government's economic policies in Manisa Congress.[311] Similar criticisms were also raised in İstanbul and İzmir Congresses.

Meanwhile, in first days of August, the two major opposition parties –the CHP and the CMP[312]– had announced their withdrawal from forthcoming local elections.[313] Against criticisms,[314] the Republicans referred to Democrats' decision to

---

[306] "Indeed, Menderes had grounds for his complaints", Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 148.

[307] Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 107.

[308] Atıf Bendirlioğlu in inauguration of a nitrogen factory was giving his speech to the press as such: "In these days, can one say that the luxury of '*ispat hakkı*' is more important than founding a nitrogen factory?", Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 111. Meanwhile Adnan Menderes was making fun of the *ispat çılar* (the supporters of right of proof) by his words: "Evet, neymiş *ispat hakkı* mı? İsmail *Hakkı* mı ne ise onun iddiasiyle ortaya çıktılar. . ." Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 197.

[309] *Cumhuriyet*, July 22, 1955. Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 388. Baban, "Büyük İnsan Ekrem Hayri", *Yeni Gün*, June 15, 1957. Feridun Ergin was another prominent figure who declared his support in July.

[310] Sabahattin Çıracıoğlu, Ziyad Ebuzziya, Behçet Kayaalp, Muzaffer Timur, İsmail *Hakkı* Akyüz, Safaaddin Karanakçı, and Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu. Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları, 328*.

[311] The shortages of import goods, black-marketing and absence of an economic plan were the main headlines of dissidents' criticisms. See, *Ulus*, May 30-31, 1955.

[312] The approach between two parties started in June 1955. Ahmet Tahtakılıç (Chairman of the CMP) called the opposition parties to co-operate for achieving the most primitive conditions of a democratic rule. Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 118. Also see, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Birleşme Noktası", *Ulus*, June 24, 1955.

[313] See, *Cumhuriyet* and *Ulus*, August 4-7, 1955. The Republican People's Party, in line with the Republican Nation Party, was showing the change in the political atmosphere after May 1954 elections as the main reason behind their decision. For the Republicans, the new measures taken by the Democratic Party after the general elections (tightening of the press law, the law which made the former province Kırşehir a district (because of the political support given to Bölükbaşı), the laws on university professors and judges) made free and fair elections impossible for the country.

[314] For Democrats' response see, *Zafer*, Agust 8-9, 1955 and *Ulus*, August 11, 1955. For Köprülü this was an "act of treason", and had no difference from communist propaganda which tries to end up with a political crisis situation. *Ulus*, August 14, 1955

withdraw from by-elections of 1948.[315] Another event, caused already raised tension to reach at its peak. On 13 August, the Secretary General of the CHP, Kasım Gülek, was arrested in Sinop because of one of his speeches which "degraded" the status of the Turkish Assembly. It is true that this was not a desirable event in a "democratic" country, but, in fact, all these events were ending up with a considerable increase in dynamism of the CHP. One can easily observe this solely by reading the party's newspaper *Ulus*.[316]

The Cyprus issue in the summer of 1955 suddenly dominated the political agenda. In 29 August 1955 London Conference was going to be held for solving the problem. The opposition parties declared their full support to the government in meetings, and they declared that "they were putting aside unilaterally the debate on internal politics as a sign of solidarity with the government."[317] The large-scale riots which took place in three big cities of Turkey –İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir– on 6-7 September 1955, put an end to this era of peaceful co-existence. It was rumored that the demonstrations were organized by the government[318] as a response to the bombing of Turkish consulate in Salonica, Greece (the place where Atatürk was born); and the general aim of the demonstrations was to show to the international community how strongly the Turkish people opposed *enosis*.[319] The organized demonstrations of high school and university students got completely out of hand and degenerated into a riot. The nationalist demonstrations quickly turned into a mass reaction against "wealth" at all[320] and security forces did not intervene into the course of events. For Tachau it was the rebellion of the İstanbul *lumpenproletariat*: the bootblacks, porters, apartment janitors, and mendicants.[321]

---

[315] *Ulus*, August 6, 1955.
[316] See *Ulus*, August 14-16, 1955. For Toker, the summer of 1955 was critical for the CHP. He also states that dynamic opposition campaign o the CMP was the major source of the CHP's dynamism. Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 118-120.
[317] *Ulus*, August 26, 1955.
[318] See Fuat Köprülü's faux pas on 12 September 1955: "We were informed about the demonstrations but we could not find out at what time they will occur.", *Ulus*, September 13, 1955.
[319] Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, 242; Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 222.
[320] Topuz, *Türk Basın Tarihi*, 195.
[321] Quoted in, Ahmad, *Experiment*, 54. Also see, Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 145.

Government's first response was accusing the communists.[322] Of course this argument had no basis and far from solving the problem. The government immediately declared marital law in İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir; and the Democratic Party used marital law as a tool to overcome opposition.[323] By Ahmad's words, the government was visibly shaken by the turn of the events.[324] Again it was the DP who triggered the opposition parties. More important than that, 6/7 September events encouraged the dissidents within the party. As a result of criticisms of the DP Parliamentary Group, the Minister of the Interior, Namık Gedik, resigned on 10 September 1955. This was not enough for the dissidents within the DP; for some DP deputies, all members of government, including Menderes, must have resigned.[325]

6/7 September events considerably damaged the prestige of the DP, and shaken the position of Menderes within the party. In the following months, Menderes had to face another crucial problem, namely, the *ispatçılar*. I am in line with Metin Toker's argument that *ispat hakkı* movement, in its beginning, was not aiming at overthrowing Menderes. It is true that these DP members were mostly dissatisfied with political and economic performance of the DP governments. As early as in January 1955, four DP deputies[326] issued a report which criticized the economic polices of the DP governments. The dissidents in this report were pointing to the maladies of inflationary financing and underlining the urgent need for price stability. According to the report, to overcome inflation the government should have changed it emission and credit policies.[327] In August 1955 Feridun Ergin was expelled from the Democratic Party for publicly criticizing government's economic policies. In his article in *Cumhuriyet* on 1 August 1955[328] Ergin was criticizing the DP Government's investment policies; for Ergin the Democratic Party seemed as a party without a comprehensive investment policy and existing investments were causing

---

[322] *Zafer*, September 7, 1955.
[323] In 12 September 1955 government declared that the marital law was extended for another six months. The opposition parties criticized the DP government for using marital law as a tool against criticism. See İnönü's speech, *Ulus*, September 13, 1955. For interesting (anti-democratic) measures taken by marital law see, Topuz, *Türk Basın Tarihi*, 195-197.
[324] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 54.
[325] See Osman Alişiroğlu's speech on 12 September. *Ulus*, September 13, 1955. On 2 March 1956 Alşiroğlu joined the CHP. *Ulus*, March 3, 1956.
[326] Haluk Timurtaş, Ekrem Cenani, Feridun Ergin, Kenan Akmalar.
[327] *Cumhuriyet*, January 19, 1955.
[328] "Siyasi Hava", *Cumhuriyet*, August 1, 1955. Also see Baban, *Portreler*, 164-165 and Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 112.

inflationary pressures on Turkish economy. It is also known that the former Minister of Enterprises Fethi Çelikbaş was resigned from his role in 1954 because of his disagreement with Menderes on economic policies. It is mostly quoted that Çelikbaş was the voice of industrial fraction of Istanbul bourgeoisie and he was leading the *laissez-faire* lobby within the Democratic Party.[329] We will further discuss this point in analyzing the socio-economic and class composition of the Freedom Party. But as a preliminary statement, it would be erroneous to assume a one dimensional instrumentalist relationship between "newly rising İstanbul industrial bourgeoisie" and the birth of the HP. But it was only after the summer of 1955 that the members of the movement were convinced that the only way to overcome political and economic crisis was to remove "Menderes circle" from power.[330]

6/7 September events dominated the political agenda in the rest of the month. Menderes was trying to hold the party together by giving messages of solidarity. In his speeches, he was blaming the dissidents for following their selfish interests.[331] In the first days of October, the dissidents again raised the issue of 'right of proof' and Karaosmanoğlu and Çelikbaş presented an amendment to the General Administrative Council (GAC). Administrative Council immediately responded by sending 19 signatories to the Disciplinary Committee. In its declaration the Council referred to the signatories as "a defeatist group who spoiled solidarity within the party and whose only political capital is 'the right of proof'."[332] The timing of disciplinary action is critical, for it was just one week before the opening of the General Congress on 15 October 1955. The Disciplinary Committee decided to expel nine dissidents and asked others to withdraw their proposal.[333] Menderes's tactical move to divide the movement did not work, and ten dissidents resigned immediately.

---

[329] See, Ahmad, *Experiment*,88; Sungur Savran, "1960, 1971, 1980: Toplumsal Mücadeleler, Askeri Müdahaleler", *Onbirinci Tez*, (6), 1987; Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, (İstanbul, 1996);

[330] Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 113. Also see, Erdoğan Örtülü, "İspat *Hakkı* Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Gelişti? -I- ", *Ulus*, October 24, 1955.

[331] See *Zafer*, September 29, 1955.

[332] For the full text of the declaration, see *Zafer*, October 13, 1955.

[333] *Zafer*, October 15, 1955. By this move, the Disciplinary Committee made a distinction between 10 deputies who signed the proposal in May 1995 and the ones who declared their support for the proposal in spite of General Administrative Council's denial of "the right of proof". In its declaration, the Disciplinary Committee blamed 9 dissidents for acting as a clique –a clique which acts against the decisions of the GAC and the DP at all.

The incident dominated the General Congress. Before the congress Mükerrem Sarol resigned from his office. This was a dividend paid by Menderes to the dissidents within the party.[334] 'Solidarity' was the main theme of the General Congress and it ended with the total domination "Menderes circle" over the party. He was re-elected Party Chairman and the GAC was consisted of men close to him. For Feroz Ahmad "the dissidents had made a tactical error by taking the offensive prematurely and presenting Menderes with the opportunity to expel their leaders."[335] During the congress it was only Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu who defended the case of the *ispatçılar*. For her, expulsion of the signatories was against the rules and regulations of the DP.[336]

The last day of the congress witnessed an interesting incident, which is another striking example to show Menderes's interpretation of democracy. The congress had decided that any Representative who left his party also must have resigned his seat in the Parliament (*ıskat tasarısı*).[337] Later on, Menderes brought this decision before the Assembly Group as a Bill and the parliamentary group rejected it. Even the members of the "Menderes circle" noticed the absurdity of this proposition.[338]

The dissidents, who remained silent during the General Congress, started to raise their criticisms towards the Government in the following months. Also the provincial party organizations were told to be in disarray because of 'right of proof'

---

[334] Erdoğan Örtülü, "İspat *Hakkı* Nasıl Doğdu, Nasıl Gelişti? -3-", *Ulus*, October 26, 1955.

[335] *Experiment*, 89.

[336] See Cerrahoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Masalı*, 75, 78-81; Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, "4'üncü Demokrat Parti Kongresi Münasebetile", *Ulus*, October 23, 1955. Metin Toker states that things could have changed if the DP deputies in the congress could find the courage to raise their voices against Menderes. *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 154. After the Congress, Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu was sent to the Disciplinary Committee. She later joined the Freedom Party.

[338] Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 350. Just for not loosing the originality of Menderes's historical words I am quoting in Turkish: "Bir insan, partimizin bayrağı altında mebus seçilecek, sonra ayrılacak ve bir anonim şirket veyahut da dağda bir zeybek topluluğu kurar gibi bir hizip kuracak. Bu haraket ahlak kaidelerine uygun olmaz." *Zafer*, October 19, 1955. Also see, Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 162. Whereas, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu offended Menderes for he betrayed the genuine ideals of the DP. "Being elected Representative does not imply an absolute loyalty to the party or to Menderes; it means an absolute loyalty to the country, nation and basic principles of the Republic", *Cumhuriyet*, October 26, 1955.

and *ıskat tasarısı*.[339] As a response, Menderes began to rearrenge the party organization through eliminating the members of the opposition faction. Meanwhile the opposition parties were also following up the recent developments. The Republican People's Party and the Republican Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi*) were sending messages of solidarity to the dissidents within the party and criticizing the DP for its overall anti-democratic attitude.

The political developments after the DP's General Congress constitute a critical turning point for the opposition parties and movements. Critical in two senses: first, the idea of gathering the opposition parties under one project (acquiring minimum requirements of democracy and overcoming economic crises), although being prematurely, began to be discussed;[340] second, it is in this period that one apparently realizes that the intellectual circles began to turn their backs on the DP. Mistreatment of *ispatçılar* by "Menderes circle" made them so popular, especially within the intellectual circles.

The Democratic Party Parliamentary Group held a meeting on October 29 for electing the Assembly officers. Against Menderes's candidate, Refik Koraltan, the dissidents presented Fahri Belen as their candidate, and Belen received 147 votes to Koraltan's 198. But Menderes's candidate Tevfik İleri was defeated by Burhanettin Onat and elected as the leader of Parliamentary Group.[341] In the following weeks, especially after 'the Nineteen' held a press conference and declared their decision to form a political party, the Parliamentary Group meetings witnessed violent debates. The ongoing economic crisis was the main subject of these discussions and the dissidents bitterly criticized government's economic policies on several grounds.[342] Menderes appeared before the Group on 29 November and the dissidents offended the government angrily. As a result of sharp criticisms Menderes accepted to resign.

---

[339] *Ulus* reports that in many provinces (İzmir, Burdur, Mardin) these two issues divided the party into two different camps. October 25-27, 1955. On 24 December 1955, *Cumhuriyet* reported that İstanbul organization was in a condition of disarray.

[340] Especially see Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın's article in *Ulus*, December 1, 1955, "Hürriyet Cephesi". Yalçın in his article called the opposition forces (the CHP, the CMP, the Peasant's Party, *ispat çılar* and impartial citizens) to unite under the "Freedom Front". For him this does not mean melting all parties in the same pot, but a cooperation among the parties around shared objectives.

[341] *Cumhuriyet*, October 31 and November 1, 1955.

[342] *Cumhuriyet*, November 23, 1955. Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti*, 181.

Mükerrem Sarol's original idea (also known as the *Sarol Formula*) came to Menderes's help. Menderes allowed the members of the cabinet to resign and sought vote of confidence for himself.[343] Sarol Formula worked and only nine voted against.

> Menderes emerged temporarily chastened from this experience. But the long-term effect of the compromise proved to be disastrous for Menderes, the party and the nation. He came to see himself as indispensable; the entire cabinet could be sacrificed, but not Menderes. In accepting this compromise the Assembly Group had violated the principle of cabinet responsibility, so necessary for democratic government.[344]

The total domination of Menderes over the party was approved with this incident. The dissidents continued their criticisms in Parliamentary Group meetings. Although having problems in forming the new cabinet, Menderes presented his new cabinet and Government Program on 13 December. The Government Program was promising to abolish all anti-democratic laws through constitutional amendments, to remove the anti-democratic articles of the election law and to grant the right of proof.[345] However neither the dissidents within the party nor the opposition parties found Menderes's promises reliable.[346] The Parliament gave vote of confidence to the new government but in the parliamentary debates the Program of 4th Menderes Cabinet was bitterly and soundly criticized by the opposition, especially by the "Nineteen".[347] On 14 December 1955 Emrullah Nutku, Muhlis Ete ve Asım Okur resigned from the party.[348]

On October 26, *Ulus* announced that 'the Nineteen" were going the form a political party. The possible names for the new party were *the Republican*

---

[343] *Ulus*, December 1, 1955.

[344] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 54. Also see, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, "Durum Tasfiye Edilmelidir -1", *Ulus*, January 5, 1956 and "Durum Tasfiye Edilmelidir -2", *Ulus*, January 6, 1956.

[345] "Dördüncü Menderes Kabinesinin Programı", *Menderes'in Konuşmaları*, vol 2, (ed.) Mustafa Doğan, (1957, İstanbul), 154-158.

[346] The spat between Ziya Termen and Adnan Menderes in the DP Parliamentary Group debates over the new program raised the tension. Termen was shouting in the middle of Menderes's speech: "We do not believe, we do not need promises!" *Ulus*, December 12, 1955.

[347] According to Toker the 'Nineteen' brought considerable dynamism to the Assembly. Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 189. Especially the sound criticisms raised by Ekrem Alican, Turan Güneş and Kasım Küfrevi in Parliamentary debates over the new Government Program were impressive. For parliamentary debates see, Erdoğan Örtülü "BM Meclisi Görüşmeleri", *Ulus*, December 17, 1955; *Cumhuriyet*, December 17-18, 1955. Also see, Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 534 and *Menderes'in Konuşmaları*, 154-175.

[348] *Ulus*, December 15, 1955.

Democratic Party and *the Freedom Party*; and on 20 December 1955 they officially announce the formation of the Freedom Party.[349]

As I have told above, together with 6/7 September events and 'the right of proof' incident, the deterioration of economic condition played a crucial role in crystallization of opposition movement within the DP. The inflationary side of the DP's "never-seen-before" development was the main dynamic of authoritarian tendencies of the Menderes governments. As it is put forward by Ahmad:

> There is an intimate relationship between deteriorating economic situation and politics. As prices rose and shortages of increased, the public became more responsive to the criticisms of the opposition; Menderes responded by taking measures to isolate the public from politics. After the repressive measures, political activity outside the framework of the Assembly virtually became impossible. The law against public meetings made it difficult for a population whose literacy level was low to learn the views and criticism of the opposition. Those who were literate were left face to face with a muzzled press. Only discussion in the Assembly remained free, and later the government put pressure on the press to stop publishing reports of Assembly debates.[350]

Before examining the HP, I will try to give an outline of main dynamics of economic crisis in the second half of the 1950s. This is crucial for understanding the criticisms directed towards the economic policies of the Democratic Party by the HP, other opposition parties and intellectuals as well.

3.4.2 From Development to Crisis.

There is a widespread tendency to define the main agency of economic liberalization of the post-war era as the DP. Mostly, the Democrats were blamed for introducing foreign intervention into domestic economic affairs, and for increasing

---

[349] The founders had two names in their mind for leadership: Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ. Both men were influential figures in formation and development of the DP. Despite his health problems, members of the new party elected Üstündağ Party Chariman; Üstündağ declined to accept Chairmanship for he was too old for political struggle. Thereupon, Karaosmanoğlu was unanimously elected Party Chairman. Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 391. This incident alone tells us many things about the peculiarity of HP in Turkish political history.
[350] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 55.

the dependency of the country on imperialist power blocs. In fact, the decisive breaking point in economic history of Turkey in the post-war era goes back to 1946, not the electoral victory of the Democrats in May 1950.[351] Korkut Boratav analyses the period between the end of the Second World War and the end of the DP rule under two headlines. The first period (1946–1953) is named as "an attempt for a new way of articulation to the world economy"; and the second (1953–1961) is the period of "crises and readjustment".[352]

In mid 1940s there were signs towards liberalization in Turkish economy. As told before, the political liberalization of the period cannot be taken as isolated from this shift in the economic policies. In 1944, the government appointed a committee[353] to create a five year economic development plan. Five Years Industrial Development Plan of 1946,[354] however, was null and void when the changing international and domestic conditions were considered:

> The changes both in the internal and external balances of Turkey forced the Republican People's Party to leave aside the bureaucratic-etatist policies. . . It was clear that the United States would not support an idea of economics and state which is embedded in the industrialization policy of Aydemir's 'Original Report.'[355]

İvedili Sanayi Planı was detailed and comprehensive when compared to the First and Second Five Years Industrialization Plans; it was resting on the assumption that Turkey, after the Second World War, will continue its politics of neutrality and the country will preserve its autarchic economic structure. As a reflection of the corporatist and solidarist tendencies of the *Kadro* circle, the plan was giving priority to state investments in industrial development. However, the developments in the following years had proved this assumption wrong. In 1947, the government abolished the 1946 plan and replaced it with Turkey's Development Plan. The new plan gave priority to private investment in economic affairs and emphasized the role

---

[351] Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1908–1980)", in (ed.) Sina Akşin, Türkiye Tarihi IV: Çağdaş Türkiye (1997, İstanbul) p. 313.
[352] ibid. p. 311, 319.
[353] Two prominent members of this committee were Şevket Süreyya Aydemir and İsmail Hüsrev Tökin of the *Kadro* movement. Also known as "The Urgent Industrial Plan" (*İvedili Sanayi Planı*), this plan is crucial for understanding the ideology of the *Kadro* Movement. See, İlhan Tekeli, "İvedili Sanayi Planı", 154.
[354] ibid.154.
[355] Yahya Sezai Tezel, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi'nin İktisadi Tarihi*, (1986, Ankara), 276.

of new sectors such like agriculture, transportation and energy.[356] The government program which was declared in June 1948 pronounced the need for "foreign credits for launching economic development."[357] Six months later, Günaltay Government defined "encouragement of private investments and enterprises as government's principle goal."[358]

The Republican People's Party governments from 1946-47 to 1950 took crucial steps towards liberalizing Turkish economy. In other words, as against to the general conviction, the DP power in the midst of the period between 1946 and 1953 did not cause a considerable change in the overall economic direction of Turkish economy.[359] But, it was the DP who 'benefited' from outcomes of new economic 'dynamism'. The Marshall Plan (1948) encouraged mechanization and the use of tractors in agriculture;[360] in addition to that, the rise in the prices of agricultural goods because of the Korean War (together with good weather conditions) caused a sharp increase in incomes of agricultural classes, which constitute the vast majority of the general population.[361] New economic dynamism and optimism continued until 1953-54; and this constituted one of the most important dynamics of the support given to the Democratic Party in the first half of the 1950s.

The Democratic Party saw the agricultural sector as the driving force of economic modernization in Turkey. The CHP signaled this turn as early as in 1947. Enthusiastically taking its part in the new international division of labor, Menderes governments gave priority to agricultural sector. "The basic instruments of this

---

[356] Boratav, *İktisat Tarihi*, 313-314.
[357] *II. Saka Hükümeti Programı*, (10.06.1948-16.01.1949), web source, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/HP17.htm
[358] *Günaltay Hükümeti Programı* (16.01.1949-22.05.1950), web source, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/HP18.htm
[359] Boratav, *İktisat Tarihi*, 313.
[360] Between 1948 and 1955 the index of machinery and agricultural tools drastically increases to 330,8 (1948=100). See *Zafer* Toprak, "Türkiye Tarımı ve Yapısal Gelişmeler 1900-1950," in (eds.) Ş. Pamuk and Z. Toprak, *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar 1923-2000*, (1988: İstanbul), p.19.
[361] At this point *Zafer* Toprak's contribution is worth of noting. It is true that these "conjectural" changes were crucial in the growth of agricultural output in the first half of the 1950s. But, more than that, the structural transformation of Turkish agriculture in the fist half of the 20th century was more decisive in this process. Institutional and legal developments, developments in education and technical know-how and positive interventions of the state in agricultural economy, all these were decisive in structural transformation of agriculture in Turkey. Therefore, the agricultural records of the 'golden years' of the Democratic Party was not rootless at all. *Zafer* Toprak, "Türkiye Tarımı," p.35.

policy were provision of cheap credits to the farmers and the maintenance of –
artificially– high prices for agricultural products through the TMO, the government
buying agency."[362] As a result of this, especially between the years 1950 and 1953,
an impressive development in agricultural production was recorded.[363]

As discussed above, anti-étatism was the constituting element of the DP's
opposition to the CHP. The Democrats' overemphasis over private investment and
foreign capital, and their unquestioned belief in free floating market mechanism
pointed to an unsophisticated economic ideology. The Democratic Party
governments took further steps in economic liberalization by enacting a law to
encourage foreign investment in Turkey in 1951.[364] In the same year the Industrial
Development Bank of Turkey was founded. This new bank, as the most highly
capitalized bank of its time was devoted exclusively to the financing of private
industry.[365] In addition to these measures, the trade regime was liberalized and a law
granted foreign and domestic companies to participate in the development of Turkish
petroleum resources.[366] The "never-seen-before" development of the Democrats
(which is guided by their unsophisticated economic ideology) just a few years later
saw its limits. Dwight Simpson defines the "basic crudity and naïveté of the 'science'
of development economics" in 1950s as such:

> Massive injections of capital, the importation of a few squads of
> foreign technicians and advisors, forced draft industrialization,
> and, of course, the creation of great amounts of the evidences of

---

[362] Zürcher, *Turkey, A Moden History*, 234.
[363] Between the years 1948 and 1956 the acreage under cultivation was increased to 22.5 hectares from 14.5 million. The economy as a whole grew at a rapid rate between 11 and 13 per cent, and agricultural sector grew more rapidly than the industry. Whereas, the share of total industry in the national income had declined to 13,4 (in 1952-53) from 15,2 (in 1946-47). For more statistical data, see Boratav, *İktisat Tarihi*, 315-316.
[364] Following a study by an American Mission headed by Clarence Randall a new "Foreign Investment Encouragement Law was passed by the Assembly" on m January 18, 1954. In spite of all the encouragement, domestic private investment and foreign investment remained extremely limited. "During the Democrat decade no more than 30 firms invested in Turkey and their share never exceeded 1 per cent of total private investment. As a result, between 40 and 50 per cent of had to come from the state, all the liberal rhetoric notwithstanding. Total investment rose by 256 per cent in 1950-54. the most important areas in which this investment was concentrated were the road network, the building industry and agro-industries." Zürcher, *Turkey, A Modern History*, 235.
[365] William Diamond, "The Industrial development Bank of Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, 4 (1950), 349.
[366] "Indeed, Turkey may be said to have become the first country in the world to "denationalize" oil." George C. McGhee, "Turkey Joins the West", *Foreign Affairs*, (32), 1953-54, 628.

development or of a developed nation: factories, roads, public buildings, etc. – this was what widely understood in 1950 as comprising 'economic development.'[367]

The government –to accomplish its developmental aims– applied to inflationary financing.[368] The basic purpose behind this policy was "the government's desire to quicken the process of economic development, to achieve in five or ten years what would normally take fifty years."[369] For achieving this, the DP governments speeded up the building of "infra-structure" installations (such as dams, ports, roads and bridges), "while at the same time pushing through a countrywide industrialization program, mainly in the fields of cement, sugar and textiles, with the state the principle owner and manager of the newly created enterprises."[370] Deficit financing was the source of 'never-seen-before' development –which this caused productivity to fell behind increase in money supply. After 1953-54 the Turkish economy entered into a new phase: 'crisis and re-adjustment".[371] A large excess of total demand over total supply was lasting and dominant characteristics of this period: "The response of production to the continuing injections of money and credit into the economy became more and more sluggish as the years went by, thus intensifying the inflationary pressure."[372] After 1953, a sharp fall in agricultural output (so in exports), 10 percent annual rise of price indices, shortages of goods and decrease in national income per capita became one of the most important topics of the opposition. The Democrats, neglecting the existence of a structural economic problem, referred to their 'achievements' to overcome the criticisms. Menderes was

---

[367] Dwight J. Simpson, "Development as a Process: The Menderes Phase in Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, 19, (1965), 142. Simpson also adds: "But to be fair to both men [Menderes and Bayar], it must be pointed out that the program upon which they embarked raised no initial objections and it began to elicit criticism only very much later when painful effects were noticeable."

[368] "The first sign of inflationary pressures in economy was noted as early as in 1952. this was mainly due to the method of financing the agricultural subsidy and the rise in the volume of bank credit." Osman Okyar, "Economic Framework for industrialization: Turkish Experiences in Retrospect", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, (9), 1958, Aug-Sep, 264.

[369] Osman Okyar, "The Turkish Stabilization *Experiment* – Before and After", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, (11), 1960, 242. Baban states that even the men closest to Menderes (like Hasan Polatkan) were aware of maladies of inflationary financing. *Politika Galerisi*, 146.

[370] ibid. 242.

[371] Boratav, *İktisat Tarihi*, 319.

[372] Osman Okyar, "The Turkish Stabilization *Experiment*", 239. In 1955, against a 7,5 % increase in production, money supply was increased by 25 % (in 1956, 8,3 % increase in production and 24 % in money supply; in 1957, 3,2 % increase in production and 26 % increase in money supply).

publicly denying the existence of inflation: "We do not have inflation . . . we have expansion, progress and development."[373]   Meanwhile, the Democrats realized the importance of state economic enterprises and state's control over economic transactions as a tool to overcome economic deadlock.[374] The liberal trade regime was tightened to overcome trade deficits[375] and the government used direct price and profit control to stop inflation. In 1955, Menderes government brought into force the National Defense Law (of 1948) to protect the value of currency and to prohibit the act of black-marketing. Meanwhile, the opposition was criticizing Menderes for he saw the problem as a legislative one.[376] The criticisms of the opposition parties, intelligentsia and dissidents within the DP can be summarized as such:

> i. there was no fundamental integrated economic thinking behind the government's efforts. The allocation of the resources did not follow the lines of a comprehensive and interrelated plan. Cost considerations as well as profit-making opportunities were often ignored. The human aspects of economic development –such as investment in education, health and training– were sadly neglected,
>
> ii. the total costs of the various projects undertaken were, and remained, far in excess of the real resources available to finance them. This led to the use of large-scale inflationary financing.[377]

In the early months of 1958 the situation deteriorated further. 1957 elections had already questioned the hegemonic position of the DP. In 1958 the democrats had to face two crucial problems: shortages of foreign and local goods became extremely acute and widespread, and no international credit of any sort was available.[378] In the second half of 1958, Menderes government had to negotiate with the OECD and the International Monetary Fund to obtain foreign economic assistance. 1958 OECD report detected the irrational and excessive use of Central Bank's resources to

---

[373] Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 191.
[374] For Boratav this referred to an understanding of a new "mixed economy". Boratav, *İktisat Tarihi*, 320. It was against this background that the DP government turned its attention to industrial sector, especially sugar and cement industry. Okyar, "Economic Framework for Industrialization", 264-265.
[375] By the new trade regime, Menderes governments unintentionally referred to "import substitution" policies.
[376] See Fethi Çelikbaş's declaration in *Yeni Gün*, July 22, 1957.
[377] Okyar, "The Turkish Stabilization *Experiment*, 242.
[378] ibid. 243.

overcome economic difficulties and deficit problems as the main motive behind the emergent economic crises.[379] The stabilization program was resting on,

        i.   De facto devaluation of the currency

        ii.   Control of money supply

        iii.   Financial equilibrium in the public sector

        iv.   Financing investment in the public sector

        v.   Investment planning

        vi.   Price Controls

        vii.   Consolidation of foreign debts

        viii.   Liberalization of the trade regime

        ix.   Annulment of the National Defense Law[380]

In return, the Western states, primarily the United States, promised for a new credit of 359 million dollars and to postpone 600 million dollars debt of Turkey.[381] This meant a compulsory shift in economic policy of the Democrats. The Democrats had no chance to continue deficit financing and in the following years and it was the CHP's turn to articulate popular discontent to its opposition strategy.

---

[379] Nazif Ekzen, "1980 Stabilizasyon Paketinin 1958, 1970 ve 1978-1979 Paketleri İle Karşılaştırmalı Analizi", in, *Türkiye'de ve Dünyada Yaşanan Ekonomik Bunalım*, (1984, Ankara), 174.

[380] Okyar, "The Turkish Stabilization *Experiment*", 243-245; Boratav, *İkitisat Tarihi*, 322; Ekzen, "1980 Stabilizasyon…", 175; Eroğul, *Demokrat* Parti, 245-248. Also see, *Ulus*, August 5, 1958; Yakup Kepenek and Nurhan Yentürk, *Türkiye Ekonomisi*, (İstanbul, 2000), 122.

[381] Boratav, *İktisat Tarihi*, 322. 75 million dolar of overall credit was to be provided by the OECD, 25 million dollars by the IMF and the USA was to provide the rest. Keoenek and Yentürk, *Türkiye Ekonomisi*, 123.

3.4.3 The Freedom Party

The Democrats, in the second half of the 1940s organized their political campaign around dichotomizing the relationship between the ruler and the ruled; 'the people' and the privileged elites; the democrats and authoritarians; the Democrats and the Republicans. The only way of establishing democratic rule in Turkey was sending the CHP in opposition. It is only through this way that the 'real democracy' could be achieved. Only in the second half of the 1950s all sections of the society (except the Democrats) began to ask the question: What is democracy indeed? The second half of the 1950s, by some means, can be read as the history of struggle over the signs of 'democracy' and 'development',[382] and the Freedom Party, although mostly quoted as an insignificant minor political party, became one of the major actors of this struggle. Backed by *Forum* journal, the entrance of the HP into Turkish political life immediately found its reflections. The members and supporters of the HP (*Hürriyetçiler*) introduced a new understanding of politics, democracy and development. I will analyze this new perspective in Chapter 4 in a more detailed manner. In this part I will mostly deal with main characteristics of the party and its historical evolution.

In their Founding Declaration, the HP presented itself as a consequence of the ongoing political, economic and social crisis. The deterioration of Turkish economy and the authoritarian turn of the DP was the main motive behind birth of the party.[383] Founders of the party abstained from defining the HP as totally different from the DP. This had both practical and ideological grounds. First, the Freedom Party's main target was the DP electorate and they have tried to represent themselves as the 'real Democrats'. The Freedom Party blamed "Menderes circle" for betraying the genuine ideals of the DP and the 'spirit of 1946'. Ideologically, it was hard, at least in the beginning, to draw a clear line between two parties.

---

[382] See, Volosinov, V. N., *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, trans. Matejka, L. and Titunik, I. R., (1973, Harvard).

[383] HP, *Hürriyet Partisi Kuruluş Beyannamesi*, (1956, Ankara) "The Freedom Party is the party of the citizens who believe that the current power stands as an obstacle to development of democracy. . . the Freedom Party is the party of the citizens who realize that the main source of our current economic and social problems is anti-democratic personal and arbitrary rule." 4.

The Freedom Party is mostly neglected by scholars examining the political and socioeconomic features of the 1950s. In addition to being neglected, the party mostly found its place in narrations of Turkish political history with a cliché:[384] the Freedom Party is considered as an extension of the Istanbul industrial bourgeoisie in the second half of the 1950s.

This thesis on the HP takes the tension between the industrial bourgeoisie and the DP in the second half of the 1950s as its departing point. As I have discussed above, the DP was primarily involved with the development of the agricultural sector. But whether this development strategy was at the expense of the industrial development or not is crucial for questioning the validity of this cliché. According to Sungur Savran the Democrats, throughout the 1950s, have always abstained from prioritizing the interests of industrial bourgeoisie through its policies.[385] Mainly the agricultural credit policy, government's deficit financing and legislative measures (such as the National Defense Law) are quoted as the sources of the tension between industrial bourgeoisie and the DP. Thus, the industrial fraction of İstanbul bourgeoisie, which started to denounce the populist economic policies of Menderes, had played an important role in formation of the HP as an alternative to étatism of the CHP and petit bourgeoisie ideology of the DP.[386]

This evaluation can be criticized in several grounds. First, it presupposes an instrumentalist and functionalist account of formation of the HP. Secondly, it holds the 'tension between industrialist faction of industrial bourgeoisie and the DP' as an *a priori* statement. Third, it attributes a homogenous ideological stand to the actors of the period; as if one could talk about 'the ideology of industrial fraction of the İstanbul bourgeoisie."

I will firstly deal with my second statement. The statement on the tension between industrial bourgeoisie and the DP is in need of examination. It is true that the second half of the 1950s was experiencing great difficulties in sustaining economic stability. But the policies of the DP governments never tended to be against the interests of the so-called industrial bourgeoisie. Galip Yalman shows the

---

[384] I am grateful to Galip Yalman for his contributions. This part of my thesis was just going to re-produce this cliché without his contributions.
[385] Sungur Savran, "Toplumsal Mücadeleler, Askeri Müdahaleler", 137-138.
[386] Keyder, *Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 196.

close affinity between the Report prepared for the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 1956 and government's economic policies. Government's deficit financing and resistance to devaluation of currency is mostly picked up as common features of populist economic policies. As Simpson states:

> Devaluation in the long run could increase the comparative advantage of the country and might have been a cure. But the Democrats were more concerned with the short term effects of devaluation, the increase in domestic prices, which this would have political consequences.[387]

Simpson was right that devaluation had political consequences. But this resistance also shows the degree of Menderes governments' commitment to the advices of industrial bourgeoisie. According to the 1956 Report of the ICC devaluation was not a desirable option "as it would either increase the future costs of imports or reduce the import capacity of the economy, given its limited export capacity."[388]

Deficit financing or the legislative measures of the DP governments also cannot be taken as points of divergence between the DP and the industrial bourgeoisie.

> Although the reintroduction of the wartime price control measures such as the Law of National Protection in 1956 did make life difficult for the importers in particular . . . the private sector in general by no means perceived such measures as a threat to its well-being. Nor is there any basis to hypothesize that the lack of macroeconomic stability had dented 'business confidence'. For the 1950s in general, and the crisis years in particular, witnessed an increase in private sector investments, especially in the manufacturing industry.[389]

Also, the deficit financing should not imply a policy at the expense of the industrial bourgeoisie. On the contrary,

> "by using deficit financing as a means of forced savings, the DP government was, in fact, initiating a process of capital accumulation at the expense of those sections of the society which were most vulnerable to the soaring inflation . . . It was,

[387] "Development as a Process", 248.

[388] Yalman, *Bourgeoisie and the State*, 152. "So it becomes clear that the DP government was not acting on its own in resisting the demands of the US policymakers for the devaluation of the Turkish currency"

[389] ibid. 154.

therefore, perfectly understandable why DP's promises on the freedom of trade unionism and the right to strike, made during the years of opposition, had never materialized during its ten years in government."[390]

The casual relationship between the birth of the HP and discontent of the industrial bourgeoisie is also in need of closer examination. It seems that this assumption is logical, rather than relying on historical evidences. As far as I have researched, it is not possible to drive such a conclusion. Ekrem Alican's closeness to İstanbul bourgeoisie cannot be taken as an evidence of that casual relationship. It is true that the HP emerged out of the persistent economic and political crisis of the period; it is also true that the HP, by time, tried to develop an alternative understanding of politics and economic policy. And also it is true that the Freedom Party, different from the DP, put emphasis on development of Turkish industry together with the agricultural sector. But, after stating these points, it will be only a logical conclusion to assume that the Freedom Party was extension of industrial bourgeoisie in the second half of the 1950s. These points were mostly shared by all opposition parties in the second half of the 1950s, and the *HP-Forum* circle set the main parameters of criticisms towards the DP rule. The main fallacy of this instrumentalist assumption is that it attributes a coherent worldview to the industrial bourgeoisie of the second half of the 1950s. This worldview is used by the same writers as an analytical tool to explain the class basis of 27 May 1960 military intervention and socioeconomic and constitutional arrangements of the succeeding peiod.[391]

The Freedom Party does not have a class basis as such. However, this does not mean that the HP is totally a free-floating political movement without any social basis. Rather than seeing the HP as an instrument of class interests, one may consider it *together with* socioeconomic and political developments of the second half of the 1950s.

---

[390] ibid. 155.
[391] See, Sungur Savran, "Toplumsal Mücadeleler, Askeri Müdahaleler", 138-9; Keyder, "Türkiye Demokrasisi" and *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*. For a recent study, see, İsmet Akça, "Kollektif Bir Sermayedar Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri", *Birikim*, (160-161), Aug-Sept 2002. "Feridun Ergin in the Freedom Party and Osman Okyar in *Forum* were formulating the views on import substitution industrialization and economic planning. Both men later took their places in OYAK [Army Mutual Assistance Association]." 82.

The Program of the HP is consisted of basic themes of the opposition which dominated the political agenda in the second half of the 1950s.[392] The Program defines the mission of constituting a democratic regime as the HP's primary objective, and democracy in this sense considered as the cure for all social, political and economic diseases (Art. 1). The citizens' participation into political decision making processes –through opening channels for deliberation– lies at the heart of the HP's definition of democracy (Art. 2). Individual is accepted as a value in and on itself (Art. 2). The Program includes promises to adopt proportional representation (Art. 4), to make constitutional arrangements for sustaining intra-party democracy[393] (Art. 7), to establish an upper legislative house (Art. 5), to obtain the independence and freedom of the judiciary (Art. 14), to constitute a non-partisan public bureaucracy (Art. 19) and to form a Constitutional Court (Art. 8). Also, the Program promised restoration and consolidation of all the basic freedoms, such as the autonomy of the universities (Art. 9), the freedom of the press (Art. 10), the autonomy of radio and television (Art. 12), freedom of trade-unions (Art. 11), and right to strike (Art. 103-105).

Article 50 of the HP Program expresses the general economic philosophy of the party as such:

> Article 50 – Our party stipulates an economic order based on private property, which protects the economic freedoms of the individual, recognizes the guidance of the State, and defines social justice as its main goal.[394]

According to the Program, prioritizing private initiative should not imply the negation of state initiatives. The state must exist in sectors, which the private initiative can not handle (Art. 85).

> Article 52 – Our party considers the economy of the country as a totality.
>
> Article 53 – We see formation of an "institute for economic research and coordination" necessary for regulating and researching a sound and stable economic policy.[395]

---

[392] HP, *Hürriyet Partisi Ana Nizamnamesi ve Programı*, (1956, Ankara)
[393] This point was also stressed in Founding Declaration , HP, *Beyanname*, 5.
[394] HP, *Ana Nizamname ve Program*, 85.
[395] ibid.. 86.

The Program defines protection of industry as one of the Party's objectives (Art. 92), and promises to regulate the relations between labor and capital through the principle of social justice. The Party Program gives a considerable place to issues of social justice: the development of living and working conditions of individuals (Art. 102) and protection of economically disadvantaged citizens (Art. 101) are the main principles of social justice policy of the HP. For achieving these objectives the Program promised to help the development of free and independent trade unions (Art. 103) and to grant the right to strike (Art. 103); all these innovations were to be supported by an extensive social security network (Art. 104). For achieving these goals, the TGNA must be formed as a Constituent Assembly (Art. 3), which this became another theme of the opposition in the second half of the 1950s.

One specific point in writing down the Party Regulations became a bone of contention among the founders of the HP. The first group proposed that the party should not accept any membership application without an investigation process. Whereas, some founders argued that such a process would cause a tension between party organization and the grassroots of the party. The first suggestion, mainly defended by Enver Adakan and Nihat Reşat Belger, became dominant; 4th article of the Party Regulations stipulated an investigation process in membership applications.[396] This, for Baban, became one of the biggest drawbacks for the Freedom Party; "the Freedom Party started to select the Democrats who wanted to join them."[397] This attitude of the founders was pointing to their elitist outlook. By the 4th article of the regulations, the HP, in its initial phases, signaled that it was to introduce a new understanding of political competition. The main characteristics of this new stance will be examined in the following chapter. But, in line with Baban, such a strategy was far from being realistic; it turned out to be one of the main impediments to party's development, and as a result, the party could not succeed in transforming itself into a mass political movement.

The birth of the HP was welcomed by the opposition forces, especially by critical intellectual circles and the press. Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın expressed his thoughts by stating that all opposition forces welcomed the birth of the HP and

---

[396] ibid.. 5-6.
[397] *Politika Galerisi*, 389.

congratulated the founders for their bravery.[398] The cocktail party of the HP signaled the developments of the following years; throughout the meeting the main issue was cooperation among the parties for overcoming regime crisis.[399]

As stated, intellectuals and the press, in the second half of the 1950s started to withdraw their support for the DP. The anti-democratic turn of the DP caused these circles to become more and more critical of the DP governments. Also it was really hard for many members of these circles to support the Republicans, for the memories of the single party era were still alive.[400] Thus, the HP became an alternative for intellectuals and the press.[401] However, the enthusiastic support given to the HP caused the founders and members of the party to exaggerate their importance. As Baban stated:

> The central organization of the party was receiving hundreds of telegraphs everyday. The founders of the Freedom Party started to ask themselves: 'Are we taking the place of the Democratic Party?'[402]

The following year, 1956, witnessed a considerable increase in the tension between opposition and the DP. Formation of the HP, together with deepening of economic and political crisis, made Democrats more sensitive to criticisms. The main target of Menderes was the HP.[403] The instability within the party was also continuing for Menderes reneged on his promises, which he declared in the Government Program of 4th DP Cabinet. In the following months the dissidents

---

[398] *Ulus*, December 23, 1955.

[399] For speeches of İsmet İnönü, Ekrem Alican, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ and Turgut Göle, see, *Ulus*, December 23, 1955 and *Cumhuriyet*, December 23, 1955.

[400] See, "Yeni Bir Parti Kurulması", *Forum* (editorial), 4 (40), (November 15, 1955). But as we shall see, the CHP's dynamic opposition campaign, especially after the birth of the HP, will cause the intellectuals to approach to the party.

[401] Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 182. The Freedom Party especially gained the support of university professors. For example, The Rector of Ankara University, İzzet Birand was present in inauguration of HP Ankara organization. *Ulus*, February 12, 1956.

[402] *Politika Galerisi*, 389.

[403] For speeches of Menderes, see, *Zafer*, January 6-9, 1956. In one of his speeches, Menders called the HP as a political 'gang' (*siyasi çete*), *Ulus*, February 23, 1956; for the HP's response see, *Ulus*, January 7-8, 1956. In Assembly Group meeting on 2 March 1956 Yusuf Azizoğlu declared that Adnan Menderes was in need of a rest, and Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu stated that it was an honor for him to be offended by Menderes. March 3, 1956.

within the DP joined the HP and by December 19 the HP had become the chief opposition party with 32 members in the assembly.[404]

On 11 March 1956 Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu called the opposition parties to co-operate for overthrowing the DP government in the next elections. Underlining the urgent need for a Constitutional Court, he proposed to form a constitutive assembly in cooperation with opposition parties.[405] The Republican People's Party responded by publishing a party declaration which supported the proposition of the HP. In line with the HP's proposal, the CHP underlined the importance of next general elections and appropriated the idea of constitutive assembly.[406] The Freedom Party officially replied the CHP on 17 April 1956.[407] And, as early as on 17 April 1956, *Ulus* was announcing that the possibility of cooperation among opposition parties was getting stronger after the CMP declaration. Three days later, on 21 April 1956 the Justice Commission rejected the 'right of proof',[408] which this decision caused the opposition to raise their voices. In addition to this it was being rumored that the Government was preparing further amendments for tightening the press law. In first days of May 1955, an influential Democrat, Orhan Köprülü (the Chairman of the DP İstanbul Organization and the son of Fuad Köprülü) bitterly criticized the Government for its impatient attitude towards opposition parties.[409] On May 11 he resigned his office. Although Orhan Köprülü was stating that his resignation had nothing to do with his father, this was seen as a prelude to Fuad Köprülü's resignation from the DP.[410]

In June 1955 the Assembly started to debate on amendment of some articles of the press law, and in the same month the Government introduced a law prohibiting

---

[404] *Cumhuriyet*, December 5, 1956.
[405] *Ulus* and *Cumhuriyet*, March 12, 1956.
[406] *Ulus*, April 9, 1956.
[407] *Cumhuriyet*, April 15, 1956.
[408] *Ulus*, April 21, 1956
[409] "The government must realize that there must be a difference between power and opposition . . . the current government holds any criticisms as a threat against its existence . . . also economic development should not be considered as a regime issue. There are many non-democratic regimes who have considerable record of development." *Ulus*, May 4, 1956.
[410] Ahmad, *Experiment*, 94.

public meetings and demonstrations.[411] The Freedom Party raised its objections immediately:

> Incapable governments always try to justify their actions through condemning the press, for they do not have the power to handle and solve big social problems.[412]

Against criticisms, Mekki Sait (DP Deputy and a newspaperman), was declaring that any extensions in freedom of press would be against the interests of the country.[413]

For the Freedom Party, recent developments underlined the urgent need for cooperation among opposition parties.[414] On 7-8 July the representatives of three opposition parties held a meeting in Ankara. In this meeting the opposition parties determined the general outline of anti-DP politics. Constitution of a consistent democratic regime lied at the heart of the joint declaration delivered to press.[415]

In the summer of 1956 the HP focused on developing its party organization. In many cases, the new law prohibiting political meetings troubled the HP members.[416] Even a private meeting, which was going to be hold in Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu's house was prohibited by Ankara Governor.[417] In September 1956, he HP General Administrative Board issued a declaration, which caused cooperation to become the main topic of the agenda again.[418] Through the end of the year it was being rumored that the Democrats will hold the general elections earlier. The Democrats were realizing that they had lost their prestige in last few years and if the elections were to be held in 1958 they would have no chance. Menderes also wanted to hamper the cooperation among the opposition parties; and holding elections earlier was going to be a great strike against the *Hürriyetçiler*, whose political organization was not ready to handle vote politics.

---

[411] *Cumhuriyet*, June 23, 1955. Burçak, *On Yılın* Anıları, 367. See İsmet İnönü's speech in the parliament, *Ulus*, June 28, 1955.
[412] Turan Güneş's parliamentary speech, *Ulus*, June 4, 1956.
[413] *Ulus*, February 15, 1956.
[414] See, HP, *Hürriyet Partisinin Rejim Mevzuunda Partiler Arası İşbirliğine Dair Tebliği*, (June 26, 1956).
[415] *Cumhuriyet*, July 8,9, 1956.
[416] *Ulus*, August 11, 13, 1956.
[417] *Ulus*, August 12, 1956.
[418] *Ulus*, September 15, 1956.

3.4.4 The Attempts for Uniting the Opposition: 1957 Elections and its Aftermath

As the possibility of early elections grew, bulk of the political parties started their election campaign as early as in the first months of 1957. Cihad Baban, who had resigned from the DP in December 1956 joined the HP and started to publish *Yeni Gün* as party's newspaper on 1 April 1957. Meanwhile the cooperation among opposition parties, with it ups and downs, was still the dominant topic of the agenda. The Freedom Party defined cooperation as a national duty to overthrow the single-party mentality of the Democrats.[419] More than that, cooperation must have aimed at constituting a democratic regime with its all requirements.

The Republican People's Party, however, seems to have lost its enthusiasm for cooperation. This was mainly due to the dramatic increase in party's prestige. There were many Republican's who were confident that the CHP in the next elections could defeat the DP by its own.[420] And also within the HP there were some skeptics who assumed that cooperation with the CHP would damage the HP because of the "İsmet İnönü factor".[421] In some cases these factors raised the tension between opposition parties.[422] In the first days of September 1957 the opposition parties hold a series of meetings and drafted a joint declaration. They could not agree on a practical election formula because of insincerity of all the participants. Mainly the CHP wanted the other two parties to be the junior partners in cooperation. The tactical move of Menderes came by his amendments in the election law. In order to pre-empt the possibility of electoral cooperation between the CHP, the CMP and the HP, opposition parties were forbidden from putting forward joints lists by the new election law.[423] Also, a candidate rejected or resigned from a party could not stand for another party in a subsequent election. This article of the new election law was directed towards Fuad Köprülü who resigned on 7 September 1957 from the DP.

---

[419] *Yeni Gün*, August 5, 1957.
[420] Cihad Baban, "Açık Konuşma Zamanı Geldi", *Yeni Gün*, August 8, 1957.
[421] Baban, "Açık Konuşma Zamanı Geldi –II", *Yeni Gün*, August 9, 1955. Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 182.
[422] See speeches of Kasım Gülek (Secretary General of the CHP) and İlhami Sancar in *Ulus* on 2 August 1957.
[423] *Ulus*, September 11, 1957.

Democracy and prosperity was at the center of opposition parties' election campaign. The Freedom Party in its declaration listed its promises as such:

i. the new Assembly will be a Constitutive Assembly and immediately dissolve itself after taking crucial steps towards democratization of the constitution,

ii. the election system will be changed and the principle of proportional representation will be accepted,

iii. 'right of proof' will be granted and all anti-democratic articles of the press law will be removed,

iv. constitutional arrangements will be made for realizing inra-party democracy,

v. a Constitutional Court will be formed,

vi. the independence and freedom of the courts and judges will be sustained,

vii. the freedom of trade unions will be realized and workers will be granted the right to strike,

viii. the autonomy of the universities, radio and bureaucracy will be sustained.[424]

These were the common points among the opposition parties, especially the CHP and the HP. Later, in January 1959 these principles determined the framework of 'Proclamation of Primary Aims' (*İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi*).[425]

Meanwhile the Democratic Party's election campaign stressed the 'great' economic achievements of Menderes administration. Religion was .Democrats claimed that "their administration built 15,000 mosques in seven years and promised

---

[424] "Hürriyet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi", *Yeni Gün*, October 19, 1957.
[425] This CHP document is crucial in the sense that it points to the growing liberal spirit within CHP, and the extent of the influence of the former HP members within the party (see Conclusion).

to build better schools for the clergy and make Istanbul a second Kaaba, that is, a second place for Muslim pilgrimage."[426]

3.4.5 From "*cooperation*" to "*unity*": the Merge of the Freedom Party With the Republican People's Party

The election was held on Sunday, October 27, 1957. The Democrats won 424 seats in the Parliament with receiving 47,70 % (4.403.290) of the votes. This pointed to a considerable decrease in the DP's votes when compared to 1954 elections (58,42 %). However the Republicans won 178 seats by receiving 40,82 % of the votes (3.768.043). The Freedom Party only won 4 seats in the Parliament with receiving 3,86 % of the votes (356.419). Like the Freedom Part, with receiving 7,19 % of the votes the CMP was to be represented in the new Assembly by four seats.[427]

Hürriyetçiler were shocked by the election results. Indeed, the results were nor surprising at all. The party was not mature enough to handle vote politics. When compared to the CHP and the DP, the HP can be said to have entered into elections without a party organization. However, as Karpat states, the Freedom Party entered into the election campaign with an exaggerated belief in its own strength and importance.[428]

According to the party itself, there were several reasons behind the electoral defeat of the HP. They have accused the CHP for its withdrawal from "*işbirliği*" attempts. *Yeni Gün* wrote that the opposition could have won majority of the seats in the Assembly after the 1957 elections if "*işbirliği*" could have succeeded.[429] More important than that, for *Hürriyetçiler*, holding the elections earlier implied a great strike against their party, for they were not developed enough.[430] In addition to this,

---

[426] Kemal Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957", *The Western Political Quarterly*, (14), 1961.
[427] *Ulus*, November 17, 1957.
[428] Karpat, "Elections of 1957", 441.
[429] *Yeni Gün*, October 29, 1957. Also see *Yeni Gün*, October 19, 1957.
[430] *Yeni Gün*, November 5, 1957.

the HP argued that political parties competed under unequal circumstances due to anti-democratic and partisan administration of the Democratic Party. The anti-democratic election law, the anti-democratic law aiming at prohibition of public meetings, and abuse of state resources by the Democratic Party (especially the state radio and Treasury[431]) were listed as the main setbacks for the Freedom Party. Also, relatively low ratio of participation (% 76, which this was % 88 in 1950 elections and % 90 in 1954 elections) caused the opposition parties to question the legitimacy of 1957 elections.

Hürriyetçiler were claiming that the election results did not point to the failure of the HP, for the HP played a crucial role in the victory of the opposition (in general) over the DP. For them, they have succeeded in leaving aside their narrow party interests and bravely fought against the DP from early days of their establishment.[432] In the following months, the HP, just with 4 representatives in the Assembly turned to a passive-political circle. Against the rumors, the Party Chairman even had come to a position to declare that "the members of the Freedom Party will not leave the political arena."[433] Meanwhile, they have tried to hold their task of opposition as mush as possible, but it was hard to see the dynamism and optimism of the preceding two years. In addition to this, after the elections the prestige of the CHP also increased within the HP.[434]

In its historical extraordinary congress held on 24 November 1958, the Freedom Party dissolved itself and merged with the Republican People's Party.[435] Many of its members joined CHP and eight former HP members were elected to the Party Council.[436] Dissolution of the Freedom Party, however, did not mean the death of their new-liberal project. The cadres of the HP contributed to the transformation of the CHP in the following years, which will be discussed in Conclusion.

---

[431] The Republican Nation Party, by a declaration, argued that the Democratic Party has spent 1 billion Turkish Liras during her election campaign. *Yeni Gün*, November 12, 1957.
[432] *Yeni Gün*, November 11, 1957. It may sound as a 'cold comfort.' Indeed it is; but also there is an element of truth in this statement. See our general evaluation below.
[433] *Yeni Gün*, November 23, 1957.
[434] It is even possible to see this from the pages of *Yeni Gün*. I have observed that after 1957 elections, the news about the Republican People's Party and party declarations (especially İsmet İnönü's speeches) found more place within the pages of *Yeni Gün*.
[435] Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 371-372.
[436] Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, Turan Güneş, Enver Güreli, Cihat Baban, İbrahim Öktem, Emin Paksüt, Feridun Ergin, and Muammer Aksoy.

CHAPTER 4

AN EARLY BREAK IN TURKISH LIBERALISM: THE "NEW LIBERAL" OPPOSITION OF THE *FORUM* JOURNAL AGAINST THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

It was the first day of April 1954 when a group of liberal intellectuals started to publish a journal named *Forum* for drawing out the main political, moral, institutional and legal framework of Turkish democracy. The dissatisfaction they had with the main policies of the Democratic Party, which are chiefly related with economic development and developments against democratic principles, was the main motive behind organization of such a journal.

The ideological coordinates of the Freedom Party can be best determined through a detailed anaysis of the *Forum* journal. Simten Coşar briefly explains the nature of the relationship between *Forum* and HP as such: Initially, the *Forum*'s stand coulf be best described as advisory. The journal pointed at "the lack of an intellectual basis behind the existing political parties as the major deficiency of the Turkish political system," and subsequently published articles concerning the ought-to-be disposition of the new party with respect to the social, political, ideological and economic problems of the period. Through time, relations between the journal and FP proved to be more than a shared critical standing with respect to the policies of DP. This was first manifested in the remark about the propensity of *Forum* readers and subscribers among the party delegates. The identification was further ensured when Aydın Yalçın who was among the core group of the journal, and Muammer Aksoy and Munci Kapani, two prominent columnists, joined the party.[437] The group justified its support for FP, which was perceived by the DP as the politicization of

---

[437] See, "Siyasi Mücadeleye Katılan Forumcular", *Forum* (editorial), 8 (85) (October 1, 1957), 6.

intellectuals and thus the university, because of the party's devotion to the political responsibility of the intellectual and to the shared task of "protesting the divergence of the party in power from democratic imperatives.". . . "The group provided the party with an intellectual framework. In other words, the group found an opportunity for the realization of their long-aspired intellectually-framed game of politics."[438]

The name of the journal itself clearly referred to the idea and practice of deliberation and freedom of discussion of the classical ages:

> Today in most of the Western countries FORUM has become a symbolic term referring to any place whereby thoughts are expressed and discussed freely. In fact, today in those countries where democracy is successfully realized there are some organs of thought that mould, direct, and inspire public opinion, functions reminiscent of the FORUM of the Classical Ages.
>
> Gathering around the journal, we believe that Turkish democracy is in urgent need of centers of thought similar to the FORUM of the Classical Ages.
>
> Gathering of such an extensive intellectual group which is aware of its ideals in the history of thought of our country should be the evidence of an intense need. This need arises from the longing of the Republican generation and Turkish intellectuals for free and sophisticated discussion of the problems the country faces.[439]

Moral and intellectual leadership appeared to be a continuous theme within the pages of the journal. The *Forum* writers repeatedly called for intellectuals to hold on to their natural responsibilities. The journal, both politically and ideologically declared itself to hold on to the duty of leading masses "without exploiting their reactionary tendencies".[440] One can find the reflections of this principle in the organization of the journal itself. Apart for theoretical writings on political science, history, law and economics, the journal gives considerable place to daily political developments of the period. *Forum* describes itself as a scientific journal "which uses

---

[438] Simten Coşar, *State and Intellectuals in Turkey: Between Liberal Ethos and the Myth of Democracy*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Bilkent University Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara, June, 214-215.
[439] "*Forum*'un Davası", *Forum* (editorial), 1(1), (April 1, 1954), p.1
[440] "Aydınların Sorumluluğu", *Forum* (editorial), 4(37) (October 1, 1955), p.3. Also see "İlim Adamının Hürriyeti Davası", *Forum* (editorial), 2(16), (November 15, 1954); "İkinci Yılımıza Girerken", 3(25), (April 1, 1955); Cemal Yıldırım, "Bilimin Sosyal İlgileri", *Forum*, 3(37), (November 1, 1955) and Metin And, "Türkiye'de Aydınlar", *Forum* 4(42), (December 15, 1955), for definition of the functions of the intellectuals.

empirical method", as opposed to "a theoretical journal of philosophy and ideas, which relies on speculation."[441]

> In great democracies there is a division of labor among intellectuals. The scientists and philosophers mostly devote themselves to generation of knowledge and research facilities. The other part of the intellectuals, who are located within the cadres of newspapers, radios and journals are obliged to publicize the knowledge for the masses, which was created by the scientists. We, through notes on daily politics and through analysis sections, are trying to handle this dual function. In this sense *Forum* is both a science journal and also a journal aiming to contribute to the creation of an intellectual circle. Our target is mainly composed of intellectuals who are open-minded on the questions of state and political sciences.[442]

The political coordinates of the journal are also another crucial point which needed clarification by the *Forum* writers. The anti-Democratic Party attitude of the journal from very early months on caused many to associate *Forum* with opposition political parties. Yet, contrary to this, *Forum* repeatedly stated that the journal was not and would never become "a device of struggle for political power"; they, none the less, added that "impartiality should never refer to absence of any ideas or stands."[443] As stated by Simten Coşar, *Forum* put an excessive emphasis on the social and political responsibility of the intellectual as a natural derivative of his

---

[441] "İkinci Yılımıza Girerken", p.2. It must be noted that *Forum*'s emphasis on "empirical method" should not be identified with positivist tradition. Here at this point it would be appropriate to quote from Yalçın Küçük: "They treat political movements as microbe of plague; their research methods do not go beyond empiricism of the Cold War era . . . Refraining from theory becomes a way o looking to the world. Only examining the facts, it is considered to be enough." *Aydın Üzerine Tezler 1830-1980*, vol. 5 (1988, İstanbul).

[442] ibid. p.2

[443] "İşte *Forum* Budur", *Forum* (editorial), 4(46), (February 15, 1956, p.1). For arguments on impartiality of the journal see, "*Forum*'un Davası", *Forum* (editorial), 1(1), (April 1, 1954); "Cereyanlar Arasında Bağımsız *Forum*" (The Independent *Forum* Between the Currents), *Forum* (editorial), 1(11), (September 1, 1954). Bahri Savcı makes a distinction between "politics in its narrow sense" and politics in general; which the former refers to struggle for grasping the political power, and latter refers to freedom of thought and expression, "Memur-Politik Alan Münasebetleri", *Forum* 1(9), (September 1, 1954, p.9). Thus, for the *Forum* writers the journal is political in the second sense of the term. This point becomes ambiguous with the active political and organic support given by the journal to the Freedom Party and Republican People's Party. I will explore this point below.

scientific identity.[444] Scientific knowledge is a social product and a "science without social consciousness" can turn out to be an important threat against democracy.[445]

Through this consciousness of intellectual responsibility, the *Forum* writers proposed their vision of democracy and development for overcoming the difficulties of the mid-1950s. *Forum's* overall attempt can be briefly examined under two main headlines: first, deepening and strengthening the bases of Turkish democracy and second, structuring a sound and rational economic development strategy. Exploration of these two headlines will help us differentiate what I label as "the new liberal opposition" (*Forum*-Freedom Party line's opposition) from that of the Democratic Party.

4.1 Institutionalization of the Turkish Democracy: FORUM versus the "National Will"

The Democratic Party's understanding of democracy and national will was problematic as I have discussed in the previous chapters. DP's absolutist interpretation of political representation and national will which has its roots in the single-party years of the republic, caused them to pay more attention to the populist aspects of their political mission, rather than its liberal goals and issues.

Forum defined the strengthening of the fundamental liberal rhetoric in opposition to DP's "authoritarian" policies as its main mission. Policies which damaged the autonomy of institutions such like bureaucracy, judiciary, universities, associations and foundations; and which were against freedom of thought, freedom of the press etc. were considered as betrayal to the very founding principles of Democratic Party itself.[446] As opposed to the DP, *Forum* writers tried to develop an alternative path of democratic development for Turkey, as an essential component of

---

[444] Simten Coşar, *The State and Intellectuals in Turkey*, 203.
[445] Cemal Yıldırım, "Bilimin Sosyal İlgileri", *Forum*, 3(37), November 1, 1955, pp.19-20, "It is a fact that the scientists who left social issues to politicians, served for the dictators not the science."
[446] "Artık Vaatler Gerçekleşmelidir", *Forum* (editorial), 7(72), March 15, 1957

their intellectual responsibilities. This alternative path later became the main principles of a political party's program, namely that of the Freedom Party.

As discussed above, drawing the limits of state power stands as the most important "problematic" for *Forum*. Münci Kapani in one of his articles in the journal briefly presents the position of the journal with regard to this topic. For Kapani there are "legal" and "non-legal" restrictions to state power in modern democracies. Among the "non-legal" limitations, the moral limitation, which refers to an ethical commitment to democratic institutions and ideals comes first. The second important limitation is the pressure of the public opinion which is strengthened by the existence of a free press and autonomous radio. Interventions of various types of associations into daily politics and autonomous and free trade unions' existence as political forces also stand as other key "non-legal" limitations. And, autonomous and free universities play a crucial role in setting such "non-legal" limitations to state power. On the other hand, as needed "legal" limitations, free and fair elections, autonomy of the judiciary, establishment of a Constitutional Court and bi-cameral legislation are proposed. In short, Kapani's article can be taken as a summary of the main premises of the political and intellectual opposition the *Forum* journal waged against the Democratic Party.[447]

For analytical purposes only, three different facets of *Forum's* democratic vision can be delineated as: *moral, legal* and *institutional*. The first one is about the development of "a culture of democracy" within the country. The other two are about legal and institutional propositions for extending the limits of Turkish democracy. In the following two parts I will examine these three facets.

---

[447] Münci Kapani, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi", *Forum*, 7(76), May 15, 1957, pp.8-9; also see, Kapani, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi II", *Forum*, 7(77), June 1, 1957, pp.10-11

4.2 Setting the "Rules of the Game"

Forum's understanding of politics can be best described as an activity in which actors perform their roles through the notions of mutual recognition and respect to the *"rules of the game"*.[448] The phrase *"rules of the game"* refers to a common sense of *anti-radicalism*, a principle which is shared among the writers of the journal. Most generally it can be described as an overall shared belief in 'democracy' and constituting it as a customary code.[449] The boundaries of the *"rules of the game"* are drawn by moderate policy making and gentlemen policy makers.[450] At this point, and in other matters (as will be mentioned), the Anglo-Saxon policy making tradition, or, in other words, the operational principles of western liberal-democracies (especially England and the USA) are taken as models.

The new rules of the game have both moral and institutional aspects: the former refers to the policy making tradition of Turkey which gives no space to the recognition of opposition and critique; and the latter refers to the institutional and legal aspects of democracy,[451] among which the absence of intermediary structures of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, is often referred to. It should be noted that, *Forum*, after noting the centrality of this tradition is not willing to leave the democratic development alone on its existing course in Turkey. It talks about attempts in Turkish

---

[448] "Parlamento Adabına Dair", *Forum* (editorial), 2(17), December 1, 1954, p.1, italics in the original text. Feyzioğlu lists the main features of political discussion in Turkey as such: demagogary, diverting the attentions to another relevant or irrelevant issue, exaggeration, personalization, lack of judgment and rationality, lack of adequate data related with the issue debated, lack of a shared language among participants. Feyzioğlu, "Siyasi Münakaşa Usullerimiz", *Forum*, 4(43), January 1, 1956

[449] Şerif Mardin, "Politikanın İnanç Muhtevası", *Forum*, 1(7), July 1, 1954

[450] "Democratic life is always a life of war. . . But this is not a war of life or death. . . On the contrary, it is "a war among gentlemen" in which one gives the other the chance of searching, finding and using the means to win the war." Bahri Savcı, "Türkiye'de Demokratik Savaşın Şekli Prensipleri", *Forum*, 2(20), 15 January, 1955, p.8
    "… There must be a harmony among the political power and opposition." Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Gerçek Demokrasinin Temel Taşı", *Forum*, 1(1), April 1, 1954, p.10;
        "We sometimes forget that democracy is the regime of tolerance and recognition." "Üniversite ve Fonksiyonu", *Forum* (editorial), 1(12), September 15, 1954, p.2

[451] "İç Politikamızda Yeni Hava", *Forum* (editorial), 2(23), March 1, 1955, pp.1-2

history towards democratization and argues for activism that can be done to overcome this shortcoming.[452]

Forum writers accuse DP for ignoring 'the rules of the game'. They blame the leaders of the DP for showing no tolerance to criticisms, or alternative ideas. Although the legal and institutional aspects of democracy are crucial they are meaningless if not supported by a socio-cultural environment.

Related with the moral aspects of democratic order, the question about the legitimacy of opposition is a key point for *Forum.* As such, the existence of a culture of toleration and existence of channels for opposition to freely organize, act and express itself are crucial.[453] In many cases *Forum* implicitly accuses the DP government for adhering to totalitarian and even "fascist" measures for overcoming the ongoing socio-economic crises and the severe criticisms of the opposition. One can find many cases in *Forum* in which, an article after discussing same current problems, compares the situation with Fascist Italy, Peron's Argentina, or Hitler's Germany and warns the political leaders by pointing to the fate of these dictators.[454] Briefly, these political systems are described as regimes in which the 'absolute truth' about social issues is in the hands of a chief or a political oligarchy.

> In regimes that reject the principles of freedom and democracy there is no other truth apart from the officially accepted one. For them, the real source of truth is the chief or the government which is under his control. The official view is the only one which is real. So, this idea is the driving force of all of the fascist regimes.[455]

In *Forum*, the DP government is seen as interpreting any criticism towards its policies as a threat and a set up against the "national will", just because the

---

[452] "Rejimimizde Kararlı Muvazene", *Forum* (editorial), July15, 1956, pp.1-2; also see, Aydın Yalçın, "İçtimai Reformcu ve Gerçekler", *Forum*, 6(66), December 15, 1956, pp.14-15

[453] "The real foundation of democracy is the existence of a free and organized opposition", Turhan Feyzioğlu, *Forum*, 1(1), April 1, 1954, p.10

[454] See, "Diktatörlüğün Şaşmaz Akıbeti", *Forum* (editorial), 4(37), November 1, 1955; "Siyasi Rejimizin Temelleri", *Forum* (editorial), 5(55), July 1, 1955; "Ya Hürriyet, Ya Diktatörlük", *Forum* (editorial), 5(56), July 15, 1955; "Rejimimizde Kararlı Muvazene", *Forum* (editorial), 5(56), July 15, 1956; "İleri Toplum ve Şahsi Sorumluluk", *Forum* (editorial), 6(68), January 15, 1957

[455] "Siyasi Rejimizin Temelleri", *Forum* (editorial), 5(55), July 1, 1955, p.2

government identifies itself as one and the same with that *will*.[456] As against these authoritarian tendencies, *Forum* propagates the principles of tolerance, freedom of thought and discussion; and calls for moderate and rational policy makers. As it was the case for the intellectuals the policy-makers must be enlighteners for the society; it must be the scientific knowledge which guides the political line of the parties. The political party cadres,

> must be under the guidance and rule of intellectuals who had a sense of the direction of social development of the country. . . today political parties must rely on a scientific grasping of our social structure, not on bigotry or opportunism.[457]

4.3 Law and Institutions Against 'Politics'

One of the main considerations of the opposition parties during the second half of the 1950s was setting limits to absolute power of the party in power. As discussed, the ambiguous concept of "national will" caused the Democratic Party to ignore the legal and institutional aspects of democracy, which without the existence of those very institutions and rules the existence of democracy becomes doubtful. *Forum*, in the second half of the 1950s in addition to setting the moral "rules of the game", attempted to draw an alternative legal and institutional framework for democracy as a contribution to democratic development of the country.

> Our democracy, under the rule of the DP faced some political problems. We can label this problem as a move towards the dominance of a party oligarchy which concentrates the political power in its hands and retreats from any control mechanism.[458]

For *Forum*, this fact was mainly a natural outcome of, first the cultural aspects of Turkish democracy, some basic characteristics of which has already been

---

[456] "Bir İçtimai Değişme ve İktisadi Gelişme Sistemine İhtiyaç", *Forum* (editorial), October 1, 1956, p.1. This point has affinities with the term "authentic representation", which is discussed above.

[457] Bahri Savcı, "İktidarın Temerküzünden Doğan Tehlikeler ve Çaresi II", *Forum*, 2(18), December 15, 1954, p.9. This point also underlines the elitist outlook of the Freedom Party-*Forum* circle. See, Chapter 5.

[458] "DP İzmir Kongresi", *Forum* (editorial), 3(25), April 1, 1955, p.3

briefly touched upon. More importantly however, the absence of a democratic *legal framework* and absence of *intermediary structures* and *institutions,* which stand as forces against concentration of political power in the hands of some privileged policy makers was also a reason for the problems being faced.

The distinguishing property of the modern state, for *Forum* writers, is the increased involvement of the state in social, political and economic issues. This increase in the authority and power of the state and the more complex character of the modern state brought forth the questions of the possible dangers of such power, and its limits. Here one sees the most basic liberal problematic: the maintenance and persistence of individual rights and liberties against the state power.[459]

Forum criticizes the DP governments for enacting laws against the spirit of the Constitution. It is this type of stand that legitimized the need for a **Constitutional Court** in Turkey, because "the intellectuals and then the opposition parties tended to believe that judicial review would be the most effective guarantor of fundamental rights written down in the Constitution."[460] For *Forum*, the compatibility of laws with the Constitution, was a legal subject, not a political one.[461] Similarly, the right to enact laws by referring to electoral and parliamentary majority was not be used as a threat against the political minorities or opposition (political parties, press, institutions, individuals whatever it maybe). Hence, the need for a Constitutional Court is in line with one of the most basic liberal mottos: freeing citizens from abuse of political power in the name of majority, namely the "tyranny of the majority". In the absence of such an institution, namely the Constitutional Court, the political party in power,

> can not live with the idea of existence of some limits in political life and can not accept the existence of some limitations to political power, even the general will. . . However, democracy is not a regime in which the majority does whatever it wants. In real

---

[459] Münci Kapani, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi", *Forum*, 7(76), May 15, 1957, pp.8-9; also see, Kapani, "Devlet Kudretinin Tahdidi II", *Forum*, 7(77), June 1, 1957; Bahri Savcı, "İktidarın Temerküzünden Doğan Tehlikeler ve Çaresi ", *Forum*, 2(17), December 1, 1954, p.9; Bahri Savcı, "İktidarın Temerküzünden Doğan Tehlikeler ve Çaresi II", *Forum*, 2(18), December 15, 1954
[460] The official site of The Constitutional Court of Turkey, http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/court.htm
[461] Necip Bilge, "Kanunların Anayasaya Uygunluğu Kazai Murakabesi", *Forum* 1(4), May 15, 1954

democracies, which rely on the principle of the rule of law, the Laws and decisions of the Parliament must be compatible with the Constitution; and constitution itself must be compatible with human rights.[462]

Judiciary is seen by *Forum* as the most crucial barrier against the abuse of executive power. To perform this function, judiciary must be independent and free from political interventions. Quoting from Montesquieu, Feyzioğlu notes that "for overcoming the abuse of power, the political power must be balanced with another power. In this process the judiciary power takes the first place."[463] Briefly, realization of the autonomy of the judiciary and guarantee for the independence of the judges is crucial for the constitution of a democratic order. *Forum* writers agreed that the Turkey of the 1950s was far from realizing this objective.[464]

As it was the case in the second half of the 1940s the debate over **election system** continued to be one of the main themes of the opposition as well as that of *Forum* in the 1950's too. Being more than a technical issue, *Forum* writers assessed this matter together with the basic premises of their democratic outline. It should be noted that there is no one view shared by the *Forum* writers. It can however, be stated that the question, "which election system best fits our country?" and a variety of answers given to this question tell us many things about the democratic vision of the *Forum* writers.

The Anglo-Saxon model is again selected as the starting point. The shortcomings and insights of both systems (majority or proportional representation) are assessed with reference to the differences and similarities with the Anglo-Saxon political and social conditions.

For *Forum* "democratic regimes survive not through constitutions but institutions."[465] The existence of a neutral president, an independent and powerful judiciary mechanism, autonomous and free press, universities and a variety of

---

[462] "Uyanmalıyız Artık!", *Forum* (editorial), 7(80), July 15, 1957, p.2, also see, Bahri Savcı, "Meclis Herşeyi Yapabilir Mi?", *Forum*, 2(19), January 1, 1955, pp.10-11

[463] Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Hürriyet ve Mahkemeler", *Forum* 2(19), January 1, 1955, p.9

[464] For a detailed analysis of the condition in Turkey see, T. Feyzioğlu, "Hakimlerin İstiklaline Dair", *Forum*, 2(20), January 15, 1955 and "Hakimlerin İstiklaline Dair II", *Forum*, 2(21), February 15, 1955, Bahri Savcı, "Türkiye'de Demokratik Savaşın Şekli Prensipleri II", *Forum*, 2(21), February 1, 1955

[465] "Ekseriyet Sistemi Fakat ...", Turhan Feyzioğlu, *Forum* 2(14), October 15, 1954, p.9

associations and communities, tolerance towards opposition (and even more than that support given to opposition parties) and influential local governments; all these institutions are the guarantees for the political minorities to be free from arbitrary use of political power.[466] Given the distance of Turkey from such social and political institutions, the appropriateness of the majority system for Turkey is doubtful for *Forum* writers:[467]

> In Anglo-Saxon countries direct elections, majority system and existence of two major parties make a stable and fruitful democracy available. But in those countries there are powerful customs, traditions and institutions, which make majority respectful to criticisms directed against them and the rights of the minority. In Turkish history there is not such a problem as the instability of the executive power or its erosion through criticisms. Throughout the Turkish history our main problem was the political power holders' isolation from criticisms and control. The opposition always been oppressed.[468]

Intra-party democracy stands as another crucial theme for the *Forum* writers, and this point is directly liked with the birth of the Freedom Party. For *Forum*, "the Democratic Party just stands within the absolutist tradition of the single party era . . . we do not feel ourselves in a multi-party political environment."[469] They argued that firstly, there were no fair and free elections within the party. Secondly, the ideas and decisions of the higher rank party officials could not be discussed freely, which implied a decision making process from above. Furthermore, the candidacies for the parliament were mainly controlled by the center, which it was claimed, resulted in absolute control of the political futures of representatives by the party center. And lastly, for *Forum*, the DP did not tolerate any opposition or criticisms within the party.[470]

---

[466] ibid. 9

[467] "Ekseriyet Sistemi Fakat ...", Turhan Feyzioğlu, *Forum* 2(14), October 15, 1954, p.9; see also, Feyzioğlu, Turhan, "Seçim Sistemine Dair: II", *Forum* 1(10), August 15, 1954; "Seçim Sistemine Dair: I", Turhan Feyzioğlu, *Forum* 1(8), July 15, 1954; for counter-arguments within the pages of *Forum* see, "Ekseriyet Sistemini Terketmek Doğru Olur Mu?", İlhan Arsel, *Forum* 1(7), July 1, 1954; "Seçim Sistemi Üzerine Bir Diyalog", Bahri Savcı, *Forum* 1(5), June 1, 1954; Turhan Feyzioğlu, "İlk İhtiyaç: Serbest ve Adil Seçim", *Forum*, 6(67), January 1, 1957

[468] Feyzioğlu, Turhan, "Seçim Sistemine Dair: II", *Forum* 1 (10), August 15, 1954, p.10

[469] Bahri Savcı, "Parti Mutlakıyeti Üzerine", *Forum*, 4(42), December 15, 1955, p.9

[470] ibid. 9-11.

The over-concentration of political power[471] in the hands of some party leaders and centralization of all aspects of political power in the hands of the government has always been the most crucial threat to realization of democracy in Turkey; and for *Forum* writers, this was still a potential threat. As Savcı states, it is most probable for inexperienced democracies like Turkey that the governments turn out to be the executive boards of the party oligarchies.[472] Constitution of a democratic order within the political parties, in addition to existence and strength of autonomous institutions to support democracy are proposed as two fundamental precautions to overcome this threat.

Within the liberal vocabulary of *Forum*, the word "**autonomy**" occupies a considerable place in their configuration of the ideal relationship between the state and the society. As stated above, *Forum* takes the most basic liberal question as its starting point: "how to limit the state's power and how to protect the basic universal rights and freedoms of the individuals." The existence of autonomous institutions such as universities, associations, trade-unions, radios, and especially the autonomy of the press are seen standing as crucial factors against the abuse of political power. As important as the opposition parties' actions in the parliament, these autonomous institutions will check and balance the executive power. The question about "autonomy" is not only conceived negatively; it is believed that strong and autonomous institutions will also provide people with democratic channels for participating in daily politics.

> In our times the essential strikes against the freedom of thought do not take place through direct pressures or castigatory measures. One-sided radio propaganda, containment of press through various means, domination over theaters and cinemas, over-penetration into the sphere of education, spectacular demonstrations which target the basic intuitions of the people and similar propaganda methods . . . all these are the key weapons which the modern dictators use against freedom.[473]

---

[471] Bahri Savcı, "İktidarın Temerküzünden Doğan Tehlikeler ve Çaresi", *Forum*, 2(17), December 1, 1954, pp.7-9, "Türkiye'de Demokratik Savaşın Şekli Prensipleri", *Forum*, 2(21), February 1, 1955, pp.9-10

[472] Bahri Savcı, "İktidarın Temerküzünden Doğan Tehlikeler ve Çaresi II", *Forum*, 2(18), December 15, 1954, p.9

[473] Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Fikir Hürriyetine Dair", *Forum* , September 1, 1955, p.8-9

Given the social character of knowledge and science, the university is seen as the cradle of critical thought by *Forum*. As a part of their intellectual responsibilities faculty members in the universities must be involved in daily politics for enlightening the politicians and masses. To achieve this end the universities must be free from any kind of political or fiscal pressure.[474] As it has been stated in the previous chapters, the Democratic Party, by the mid-1950s, had started to lose its support from intellectuals and the tension between the ruling cadres and intellectual circles had already started to rise.[475] As Coşar states, "due to its attribution of a dual identity to the university both as the cradle of scientific research and derivatively the center for intellectual contribution to democracy, *Forum* criticized the government for misinterpreting intellectuals' political responsibility as politicization" (1997: 212). As against such an interpretation of the distance between university and politics *Forum* had repeatedly supported the idea of autonomous and free universities, which hold science and producing knowledge as a social process.[476]

The principle of the **freedom of press** constitutes another key aspect of *Forum*'s liberal democratic stance. As Aksoy states, "in modern democracies there is another power, which controls the rulers: Free Press. . . if there is a democracy you will find free press also; and if there is no free press there will be no democracy."[477]

---

[474] "Universities can only perform their function of producing scientific knowledge with the absence of any external pressures," "Üniversite ve Fonksiyonu", *Forum* (editorial), 1(12), September 15, 1954, p.1. "The autonomy of the universities and the freedom of the scientists, in our country is a case of freedom and democracy", "Üniversite Açılırken", *Forum* (editorial), 2(15), November 1, 1954, p.2.

[475] The tension reached its peak when some critical faculty members were removed from their posts by the order of the ministry. Most notable among them was Turhan Feyziğlu. On removal of Osman Okyar from his duty by the order of the ministry see, "Osman Okyar Hadisesi", *Forum* (editorial), 3(35), Semptember 1, 1955. On removal of Turhan Feyzioğlu from his duty see, Muammer Aksoy, "Vekalet Emrine Alma Sebebi Olarak Açılış Konuşması", *Forum*, 6(67), January 1, 1957; Muammer Aksoy, "Vekalet Emrine Almanın Esas Sebebi", Muammer Aksoy, *Forum*, 6(69), February 1, 1957. For the speech of Feyzioğlu which was delivered in the opening ceremony of the new academic year see, "Prof. Dr. Turhan Feyzioğlu'nun 1956-1957 Ders Yılını Açış Nutku", *Forum*, 6(66), December, 15, 1956.

[476] Muammer Aksoy, "Profesörlerin Siyasi Yayınları Memnu Mudur?", *Forum*, 4(39), November 1, 1955,There are many cases in which *Forum* writers criticize intellectuals in the universities (and in general) who isolate themselves from the problems that the country faces. See, "Osman Okyar Hadisesi", *Forum* (editorial), *Forum* (editorial), 3(35), Semptember 1, 1955; Metin And "Türkiye'de Aydınlar I", *Forum*, 4(42), December 15, 1955, "Türkiye'de Aydınlar II", 4(43), January 1, 1956; Muammer Aksoy, "6435 Sayılı Kanun Karşısında Üniversite Muhtariyeti", *Forum*, 4(47), February 15, 1956.

[477] Muammer Aksoy, "Bizde Basının Kontrol Vazifesini İmkânsızlaştıran Sebepler", *Forum*, 7(84), September 15, 1957, p.9

Forum criticizes the DP governments for their anti-democratic attitude towards the press.[478] For them, in modern times the press functions as a medium in which the crucial social, economic and political developments are being discussed and criticized. Therefore, it must function as an independent power and must be free from any political and especially fiscal threats.[479] Also on the question of radio organization *Forum* accuses the DP for using the state-owned radio as a propaganda tool.[480]

4.4 Economic Planning and Democracy: Towards a Social-Liberal Synthesis?

> We believe that Turkey can only develop within
>
> an order which respects human rights and freedoms.[481]

After the early years of DP rule, and following the decline of the economic triumph of the early 1950s, the inadequacy of DP's economic policies became one of the key themes of the opposition. *Forum* writers, especially Osman Okyar and Aydın Yalçın, had pioneered this chorus with their critical articles on Turkey's economic development. In a comparative perspective, they assessed the main shortcomings of

---

[478] Detailed discussion of laws on press can be found in the section on the DP rule. Also for articles on the press see, T. Feyzioğlu, "Haberleşme Hürriyetine Dair Bir Rapor", *Forum*, 1(2), April 15, 1954; "Basına Bir Ümit Mi?", *Forum* (editorial), 2(25), April 1, 1955; "Basında Zihni Atalet", *Forum* (editorial), 4(38), October 15, 1955;

[479] The "Right of proof" dispute has a considerable place in the pages of *Forum*. *Forum* as an advocate of the "right of proof" sees the principle as an indispensable element of autonomy and freedom of the press. See, "İspat *Hakkı* ve Basın Hürriyeti", *Forum* (editorial), 2(22), February 15, 1955; "İspat *Hakkı*, Yahut Doğruyu Söylemek *Hakkı*", *Forum* (editorial), 4(41), December 1, 1955

[480] On the question of radio, especially see, Muammer Aksoy, *Partizan Radyo ve DP*, *Forum* Yayınları-1, Ankara, 1960. Aksoy compares the actions and speeches of the DP cadres, before and after 1950, related with the autonomy of the radios. On DP's violation of the principle of "fair elections" through one-sided use of the radio, see, Feyzioğlu, Turan, "Radyo Meselesi", *Forum*, 6(68), January 15, 1957; "Radyo Meselesi II", *Forum*, 6(70), February 15, 1957. Also see, Kocabaşoğlu, Uygur, *Şirket Telsizinden Devlet Radyosuna (TRT Öncesi Dönemde Radyonun Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri)*, Ankara, 1980, for a history of radio organization in Turkey and place of radio in Turkish political life.

[481] Turhan Feyzioğlu, "İnsan Hakları", *Forum*, 2(18), December 15, 1954, p.8

DP's economic policies through drawing a distinction line between the developed and underdeveloped countries. For them, Turkey was to be squarely placed in the latter group. *Forum's* analysis of DP's economic policies and policy alternatives would help us to differentiate between the liberalism of the DP and that of the Freedom Party-*Forum* line. As I have suggested; that Freedom Party-*Forum* line has introduced a new understanding of liberal politics, an indispensable part of this argument which rests on the "political economy" of *Forum* is worth scrutiny.

Forum criticizes the economic policies of the DP government for its irrational mentality, which not only pays no heed to the notion of planning but also identifies planning with totalitarianism. Yet, the same government who condemns the state's intervention into economic affairs on the one hand, and is also seen to constantly interrupt the so-called "free-floating mechanism", on the other.[482] For *Forum*, the government with "no rational understanding and ultimate direction of economic growth"[483] saw *ad hoc* and mostly contradicting arrangements as main tools to overcome the economic difficulties of the day:[484] So far as *Forum*, is concerned, for the DP "The issue of economic development lacks a detailed philosophical content."[485]

> The position of the government *vis-à-vis* the idea of planning is still ambiguous. Sometimes the government rejected the idea of

[482] "Meclise Verilen Yeni Bütçe", *Forum* (editorial), 2(18), December 15, 1954, p.2. Osman Okyar labels the Democratic Party's position as pseudo-liberalism. See "Economic Framework for Industrialization: Turkish Experiences in Retrospect," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, 9, 1958, August-September, p.264.

[483] For *Forum*, the DP governments' irrational and unscientific stance towards economic issues can clearly be seen in their budgetary policy. Yalçın criticizes the yearly DP budgets for their partisan nature. Yalçın grasps England as a model as most of the *Forum* writers do; unlike in England, in which the yearly budgets are being handled by qualified specialists and scientists through scientific merits and being debated by a variety of societal and political forces ranging from opposition parties to trade-unions before being proposed to the parliament; in Turkey the budgets are prepared through opportunistic and narrow minded political considerations. Aydın Yalçın, "İktisadi Durumun Tahlili", *Forum*, 2(19), January 1, 1955, p11-12; for similar criticisims see "Meclise Verilen Yeni Bütçe", *Forum* (editorial), December 15, 1954, "Bütçe Müzakereleri", *Forum* (editorial), 2(19), January 1, 1955, p.5. On government's investment politics, Osman Okyar states that "investment decisions are not made through taking into consideration their social consequences and economic results, but through political considerations", which this dramatically increases the inflationary pressures on Turkish economy. "Enflasyon ve Yatırım",*Forum*, 2(24), March 15, 1955, p.8

[484] "İktisat Politikamız İçin Yeni Hedefler", *Forum* (editorial), 1 (8), July 15, 1954, pp. 6-7 ; Osman Okyar, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik ve Liberalizm", *Forum*, 1 (8), July 15, 1954; Osman Okyar, "Planlı İktisat Rejimi", *Forum*, 2(16), November 15, 1954; "Geçen Yılın Hadiselerine Bir Bakış", *Forum* (editoral), 2(19) January 1, 1955, p.2

[485] Aydın Yalçın, "Köyü Kalkındırma Muamması", *Forum*, 4(43), January 1, 1956

planning through identifying the notion with totalitarianism and through declaring their commitment to liberalism; on the other hand, the same government argued that they are committed to an economic plan and program. This ambiguity itself shows us that the government does not have an economic plan and program.[486]

After setting two main different ways of economic model in the industrialized world, namely liberalism and authoritarian/totalitarian economic orders, Osman Okyar defines Turkey as a country "which has never applied the main principles of a totalitarian economic order."[487] Rather than being guided through a definite economic doctrine, the etatist period in Turkey was merely a consequence of practical necessities.[488] But also it is a common point among *Forum* writers that in an underdeveloped country such as Turkey the faith of economic development should not be left into the hands of free floating market mechanisms.[489] "In a liberal system, which gives no space to state intervention, a steady economic growth is not possible."[490] Planning for *Forum* implies the the necessity for a conscious and shared route towards economic development, a process which took place in the industrialized world "automatically".[491]

Pure liberalism or classical liberalism of the 18th and 19th centuries is defined as the "neutrality of the state vis-à-vis social disasters"; in such a system social peace, freedom and democracy had no chance to survive.[492] Thus there is a distinction made between the classical liberal age and the liberalism of the 20th century, in which the latter witnesses the increasing role of the state in social and economic issues.

---

[486] Osman Okyar, "İktisadi Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meseleleri," *Forum*, 3(31), July 1, 1955

[487] Osman Okyar, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik ve Liberalizm," *Forum*, 1 (8), July 15, 1954, p. 7

[488] ibid. 8. "To its initiators, étatism was neither socialism nor liberalism. It was born out of Turkey's needs and therefore represented a pragmatic compromise solution. . . Apart from its intrinsic contribution to economic activity, this intervention was also meant to have a certain pump-priming effect of private enterprise." Osman Okyar, "Economic Framework," p.264.

[489] "For a country such like Turkey to achieve a fast growth, the limited economic resources must be used with most appropriate and rational way," and for *Forum* the budgetary policy plays a key role in this rational plan, "Meclise Verilen Yeni Bütçe", *Forum* (editorial), 2(18), December 15, 1954, pp.1-2

[490] Osman Okyar, "Planlı İktisat Rejimi", *Forum*, 2(16), November 15, 1954, p.8

[491] Osman Okyar, "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar: İktisaden Feri Kalmış Memleketlerde Planlama Meseleleri", *Forum*, 8(89), December 1, 1957, p.15

[492] Cahit Talas, "Müessir Bir Soysal Politika Zarureti", *Forum*, 4(39), November 1, 1955, p.14

> The increase in states' sphere of action and intervention is one of the most important peculiarities of our age. . . Even in countries which are not so far from the liberalism of the 19th century, the states' involvement in economic affairs is obviously increased. . . Especially in less developed countries, the necessity for gearing up the economic development leaves those states alone with great responsibilities.[493]

Although the shift from liberal orthodoxy to use of government intervention as a remedy for economic crises in the inter-war period was a necessity, Okyar states that this peculiar period implied a decisive break in the history of economic ideas.[494] Especially the Keynesian revolution had shown that "a free floating capitalism would not necessarily bring an optimum balance for societies."[495]

> Keynes' ideas had great reflections on the history of economic thought and revealed that a conscious and planned government intervention into economic affairs has a function in capitalist economies. If you notice, the main objective of a Keynesian intervention *is not to destroy capitalist economic relations.* Contrary to that, the main goal is to overcome the deadlocks of the system and to better off its functioning.[496]

In developing states, the first critical responsibility of the state is to provide the adequate capital accumulation;[497] and planning will be about defining the sources of that accumulation.[498] Through measures taken both in public and private sectors, the state is obliged to rationally and systematically carry out this task.[499] The main objective of planning is to accelerate the capital accumulation within the country. For *Forum*, there are two basic tools for overcoming the economic difficulties of the mid-1950s; two measures, which the DP governments had always avoided to take. The first one is provision of fonds and the second one is budgetary policies. As Okyar states "in an economically underdeveloped country" like Turkey, "economic development has two prerequisites: first one is the acceleration of the capital

---

[493] Turhan Feyzioğlu, "Memur Meselesi", *Forum*, 3(25), April 1, 1955, p.10
[494] Osman Okyar, "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar I", *Forum* 7(78), June 15, 1957
[495] Osman Okyar, "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar (1918-1939)", *Forum*, 7(80), July 15, 1957, p.14
[496] Osman Okyar, "Planlama Tarihçesine Müteallik Notlar (1918-1939)", *Forum*, 7(80), July 15, 1957, p.15, *emphasis added.*
[497] Aydın Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir" , 4(45), February 1, 1956, p.12, Osman Okyar, "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı", *Forum* 3(34), August 15, 1955, p.6
[498] "Planın başlıca gayelerinden biri, daha hızlı bir sermaye terakümünü mümkün kılacak kaynakları tespit etmek olacaktır."
[499] Aydın Yalçın, "Gelişme Gayretlerimizde Aksayan Nedir" , 4(45), February 1, 1956, p.12

accumulation, and the second one is the compliance of the economic behaviors of the individuals with rationality and capitalist mentality."[500]

According to *Forum*, the relationship between planning and democracy is misinterpreted by the Democratic Party. Against DP's identification of the term with totalitarianism, *Forum* stresses that a successful planning can only proceed within a democratic order. Planning process through the guidance of science of economics has become a necessity for all liberal and democratic countries.[501] Without participation of various sectors of the society into the debates over planning, planning will have no legitimate and rational grounds. Also *Forum* criticizes DP for seeing democracy as an impediment to economic development: "Economic development must take place in a democratic order, and should not be seen as a substitute for basic freedoms."[502]

The over-emphasis of the *Forum* journal on *social justice* is one of the key factors that help us to explain the early break in Turkish liberalism. This emphasis on social justice leaves us with a complex situation in defining the political and ideological coordinates of *Forum.* In the following segment after discussing the main prepositions of *Forum* on the relationship between economic policies and social welfare, I will discuss its place with regard to the liberalism of the 1950s.

Again the example of the Anglo-Saxon countries is taken as the starting point in *Forum*'s support for socially just economic policies. For *Forum* writers, the need for social security politics does not have only ethical dimensions, but it is related with economic rationality. Talas states that any economy in which the wages and salaries are too low and the workers lack social security tools (such like health and education services, a sound retirement system) there would be difficulties in economic turnover. Both the productivity of the labor power and the demand for

---

[500] Osman Okyar, "İktisadi Plan İhtiyacı", *Forum* 3(34), August 15, 1955, p.7. In fact, the *Forum* writers, as experts in their fields, handle the economic and social issues in a detailed and mostly in a technical manner. Thus, it is mostly too hard for the writer of this thesis to penetrate into detailed debates especially on economic issues. For the purposes of our study I will only focus on the highlights of these debates.
[501] Aydın Yalçın, "Milli İktisadi Bütçe Anlayışı ve İktisadi Meselelerimiz", *Forum*, 2(22), January 15, 1955, p.12; also see, Osman Okyar, "Planlı İktisat Rejimi", *Forum*, 2(16), November 15, 1954, pp.8-9
[502] "İktisadi Tedbirler ve İçtimai Sonuçlar", *Forum* (editorial), 5(58), August 15, 1956, pp.3-4. Also see, Aydın Yalçın, "İktisadi Durumun Tahlili", *Forum*, 2(19), January 1, 1955, p11-12; "Tarihi Sorumluluğu Olan Bir Kongre", *Forum* (editorial), October 15, 1955, p.2

produced goods will be low. These two would be crucial obstacles for an economy which is developing.[503]

"Today, in an underdeveloped country like Turkey . . . no one can deny the necessity for a real social justice and welfare politics."[504] The principle of social justice brings the concept of redistribution of wealth within a given country, a task which needs to be under the supervision of the state; "otherwise, if the state retreats from the task of intervening into the process of distribution of wealth among its citizens through a firm budgetary, financial and social security policy, the groups which are economically weak would be deprived of some of their fundamental rights and instruments."[505] In the same passage the main logic and objective of economic activity is described as "bettering of the social conditions of the whole society."[506] For *Forum*, "the Democratic Party could not prove its loyalty to a just and comprehensive social politics."[507] Although the investments, infra-structural developments are crucial for developmental objectives, the so-called comprehensive social justice politics must be applied for maintenance of equality among various social groups.

Apart from the rationalistic premises of the notion of social justice, the notion is itself related with the democratic development of the given country. Thus, freedom is redefined through adding a *social dimension* to the concept:

> Today the necessities of the route of our social development fill freedom with a social content. As the idea of respect to individual refers to the basic freedoms of the individual, the freedom of the individual implies preventing those individuals from falling into economically and socially deprived positions. Thus an

---

[503] "Müessir Bir Sosyal Politika Zarureti", *Forum*, 4(39), November 1, 1955, p.15; also see, "Sosyal Politikaların Ana Meselelerini Düşünmek Zamanı Gelmiştir", *Forum*, 4(48), March 15, 1956, p.10-11
[504] "İktisat Politikamız İçin Yeni Hedefler", *Forum* (editorial), 1 (8), July 15, 1954, pp. 6-7; also see, Osman Okyar, "Planlı İktisat Rejimi", *Forum*, 2(16), November 15, 1954; Osman Okyar, "Türkiye'de Devletçilik ve Liberalizm", *Forum*, 1(8), July 15, 1954; Osman Okyar, "İktisadi Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meseleleri", *Forum* 3(31), July 1, 1955; Cahit Talas, "Müessir Bir Sosyal Politika Zarureti", *Forum*, 4(39), November 1, 1955
[505] "Grev-Sendika", *Forum* (editorial), 1 (10), August 15, 1954, p.2. Also see, "Feragat Zamanı", for an article proposing an alternative way of overcoming economic crisis and inequalities, *Forum* (editorial) 1 (11), September 1, 1954, p.2; Okyar handles the question of social justice with its ethical and moral aspects. [Osman Okyar, "Planlı İktisat Rejimi", *Forum*, 2(16), November 15, 1954]
[506] "Grev-Sendika", *Forum* (editorial), 1 (10), August 15, 1954, p.2
[507] "Gene Grev *Hakkı*na Dair", *Forum*(editorial), 3(33), August 1, 1955, p.6

113

understanding of freedom which does not take into consideration this social content is either living in the romanticism of 1789, or abusing the notion of freedom for preserving an economically and socially backward system.[508]

The existence of free, strong and autonomous trade-unions has a crucial role in achieving this goal of social justice. The issue of trade-unions is not only related with the principle of social justice, but also tied with the democratic development of the given country.

> In western democracies trade unionism constitutes one of the most important foundations of democratic order. . . democracy cannot be constituted only through elections. If one party takes the control of whole parliament, and if that party is dominated by a person or a clique, and if social conditions and institutions are not appropriate, in that country democracy can easily degenerate.[509]

The workers' right to strike is an indispensable element of a democratic order for *Forum*[510]. *Forum* writers criticize the government, whose party program recognizes the workers' right to go on strike, for using the excuse of "geographical and political conditions" of the country to prevent the enjoyment of this right.[511]

> Today in every free and democratic country which respects human rights and freedoms, believes in principle of social justice and rejects the exploitation of masses, the right and freedom to go on strike is recognized.[512]

---

[508] Bahri Savcı, "Batılı Demokrasinin Bazı Temel Kavramları Üzerine", *Forum*, 4(47), March 1, 1956, p.10

[509] "Türkiyede İlk Grev", *Forum* (editorial), 1 (9), August 1, 1954; also see, "Sendikalara Tahammülsüzlük Mü?", *Forum* (editorial), 2(23), March 1, 1955, p.6; "Evet, Hür ve Bağımsız Sendika", *Forum* (editorial), 4(41), December 1, 1955, p.4

[510] "In a way, democracy is the regime of institutions. Within this system, as well as free and fair elections, individual and public rights and freedom under the guarantee of constitution and law, the absolute independence of the courts, freedom of the press and autonomy of the universities the freedom and right to organize a trade-union has a unique place", *Forum* (editorial), 7(75), May 1, 1957, p.1

[511] "Grev Hürriyeti", *Forum* (editorial), 2(20), January 15, 1955, p.4

[512] "Gene Grev *Hakk*ına Dair", *Forum*(editorial), 3(33), August 1, 1955, p.6; Cahit Talas, "Müessir Bir Sosyal Politika Zarureti", *Forum*, 4(39), November 1, 1955, p.15

4.5 Locating *Forum*

Having noted these characteristics of the social, political and economic views, what will be the appropriate way of defining *Forum*'s identity? Are they liberals, social democrats, or liberal-socialists? For Coşar, "*Forum* group is liberal, for giving importance to individual and freedoms of the individual; and for affirming free market mechanisms." She also notes that, in some cases, *Forum* defined itself as liberal-socialist (not socialist) because, on the one hand it gave importance to social justice, and on the other hand, believed that the state's existence in economic affairs must be limited with actions which are exclusively aiming to consolidate free market mechanisms.[513]

Forum's overemphasis on the importance of state intervention and social justice make the journal's ideological position somehow imprecise. Keeping *Forum*'s emphasis on these two issues in mind, it is doubtful whether one can label *Forum*'s stance as *liberal-socialist*, as they have defined themselves. The critical stance of *Forum* towards economic liberalism can easily be seen. Yet, that critical stance towards liberalism still stands "within" liberalism; and the label of liberal-socialism may undervalue this fact.

Classical liberalism's atomistic and individualistic universe has been attacked by various rival ideologies for ages. The concept of utilitarian individual who seeks his\her interests only, has been questioned for ages and it was not only the alternative political and ideological stands such as socialism that criticized this "liberal universe". Within liberalism there were many crucial thinkers and movements who had tried to give liberalism a "social face". Levent Köker picks out the "neo-liberals" of 1890s as an example to a liberal critique of liberalism.[514] Similarly, *Forum* writers

---

[513] Simten Coşar, "Liberal-Sosyalist hal tarzından sosyal-liberal senteze: Tutunabilecek merkez arayışı", *Birikim,* 162, 2002.

[514] Mainly inspired by the writings of Thomas Paine and T. H. Green, the "neo-liberals" of the nineteenth century criticized the individualist and atomist universe of classical liberalism. They have rejected the idea of "individual" who is isolated from the society, and by this confronted one of the most basic assumptions of utilitarianism. The society gains an ontological importance, rather than just being conceptualized as a general sum of individuals. Thus, the concepts of 'freedom' and 'equality' are reconsidered, together with the

themselves, in many cases underline that their stress over the importance of the state intervention into economic sphere and their call for redistribution of wealth through the principle of social justice does not refer to an anti-liberal ideology. On the contrary, *Forum* repeatedly declares that they were trying to discuss and elaborate the main requirements of a modern "liberal economic and social" order. To sum up, the critique of liberalism within the pages of *Forum* can be best labeled as "a new (modern) liberal critique" of classical liberalism (or to call it in popular parlance "wild capitalism"), which found its expressions in the practices and main rhetoric of the DP governments.[515]

Forum's intellectual route through the second half of the 1950s refers to a crucial shift within the history of political thought in Turkey *from* the solidarist-authoritarian imagination[516] which locates the individual within "a unified mass without classes and privileges" *to* an attempt for articulating "a new individualism"[517] within the realities of Turkey. Within this pluralist milieu the individual is seen as only able to take control of his/her life through political participation.[518] In other words, democracy has no reason to be afraid of the people; it is just the emergence of masses without any individual content that constitutes the biggest threat against democracy. At this point a dictatorship can be best described as erosion of individuality and isolation of individuals from their personal and social-

---

redefinition of the place of the state within social and economic life. Green defines freedom as "a positive force or capacity, and something that we do with other people and something we like to do." (quoted in, Köker, 1992: 46-47). "The individual's desire for freedom is not a real one unless that individual is a part of a society which recognizes him\her" (Green, 1969: 152).

[515] Even while discussing the problem of trade-unions, *Forum* stands within the liberal discourse. *Forum*'s stress on these issues (social justice, state intervention and trade-unions) has neither Marxist nor socialist connotations. Such problems are debated with regards to preservation of basic individual rights and freedoms. In many cases these are taken as essential prerequisites of a liberal capitalist order.

[516] The political life and writings of Recep Peker, a prominent figure of the single party era, can be taken as the most impressive expressions of that "imagination". See, Peker, Recep, *Inklap Dersleri*, İstanbul, 1983. Also see, Parla, Taha, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, (1992, İstanbul) and Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, (1999, İstanbul).

[517] Şerif Mardin, "Kütle Ve Demokrasi Eğitimi", *Forum*, 2(20), January 15, 1955, p.7

[518] Şerif Mardin, "Devrimizde Amme Felsefesi", *Forum* 3(36), September 15, 1955, pp.11-12; also see, "Siyasetle Uğraşmak", *Forum* (editorial), 1 (8), July 15, 1954

political responsibilities. "A dictator, primarily, tries to destroy individuality for maintaining his reactionary and primitive rule."[519]

What distinguishes the *Forum*-Freedom Party line's individualism from Democrat Party's is that the former does not constitute its argument through the dichotomy between "the state" and "the individual". The leitmotif of Democrat Party's electoral victory in 1950 was *anti-statism*: bureaucracy was their main target and reversing the relationship between "the people" and "the bureaucracy" was the basic promise of DP.

For *Forum* writers, DP's attitude towards bureaucracy turned the state to an arena of patronage networks. *Forum* argued that bureaucracy must not be subordinated to political interests; to some extent it should have autonomy, and destruction of this autonomy would be a great strike against democracy.[520] *Forum*, although having considerable doubts about the abuse of state power, does not constitute its political and ideological position through a dichotomy between the "state" and the "people". For *Forum* writers, concepts and entities like "state", "democracy" and "people" are not necessarily good or evil unless they are supported by various legal, moral and institutional arrangements and developments. Political and administrative powers both can be hazardous if not limited by so-called democratic framework.

In some cases, *Forum* circle's overemphasis on the centrality of law and institutions reflects itself as a peculiar distaste with politics. This "anti-political" attitude found its expressions in the structure of the 1961 Constitution, and became as one of the main characteristic features of Turkish politics, which will be explored in the final chapter of this thesis. The distrust towards and distaste with politicians were the main dynamics of this attitude. This attitude, in time can ever be seen as contributing to an understanding of politics, that favors the "appointed" *vis-à-vis* the "elected". The 1960s and following decades has witnessed as to contemporary Turkey, the dominance of that theme. It was not the argument of his thesis that

---

[519] "İleri Toplum ve Şahsi Sorumluluk", *Forum* (editorial), 6(68), January 15, 1957, p.2
[520] Bahri Savcı, "Türkiye'de Demokratik Savaşın Şekli Prensipleri", *Forum*, 2(20), 15 January, 1955, p.8. Similar to several points that *Forum* underlines, *Forum*'s considerations about the autonomy of the bureaucracy found its reflections in the 1961 Constitution. This point will be discussed in the last chapter of this thesis.

Forum circle explicitly called for such an understanding, but their legacy is merely pointed out as a factor that contributed to the constitution of this "understanding of (anti-) politics".

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Founded on 20 December 1956, the Freedom Party failed to achieve an electoral success in 1957 elections and on 24 November 1958 merged with the CHP. Although mostly neglected by the students of Turkish politics, the HP (and *Forum* journal) has a specific and crucial place in Turkish political history. Conclusion will be mostly devoted to specific place of the HP and its effects on Turkey's overall political development.

The Freedom Party denounced the "Menderes circle" for betraying the genuine ideals of the DP so much so that it initially seemed that the new party did not differ from the original DP on ideological grounds. In the beginning, the founders of the HP, simply accused the DP with moving far from its original aim of sustaining democracy and prosperity in the country. Eventually, however in responding to the dynamics of political and economic crises of the period, the HP came to a point, which considerably differed from, the early ideals of the DP. The *Forum* journal had a crucial role in this differentiation and cyristallization of the HP's stance.

The Democrats' understanding of democracy in the second half of the 1940s had been based on the claim of "authentic representation" of the people. The Freedom Party, however, came to challenge such a simplistic understanding by questioning the legal, institutional and moral aspects of democracy. They tried to elaborate the DP's exclusive emphasis on "authentic representation" of the people by drawing the institutional and legal limits of government's power. This, in some cases, caused the Freedom Party-*Forum* circle to denounce political activity at all and to rely on 'the science of politics and economy'.

There were several themes which dominated the political agenda in Turkey, in 1950s. It can be claimed that these themes of the period were mostly formulated

and elaborated by the Freedom Party-*Forum* circle. This, in itself can be illustrative of the salience of the HP in Turkish politics. Furthermore, an overall examination of the constitutional, institutional and economic innovations after 1960 will show that such arrangements had their roots in the political culture and discourse of the preceding era. The formation of the Constitutional Court and State Planning Organization, liberalization of the press law, autonomy given to universities, freedom of associations and trade unions, formation of the Second Chamber in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, were all innovations based on ideas and issues debated throughout the 1950s. In fact, many members of the Freedom Party-*Forum* circle not only ideologically, but also individually contributed to constitution of the new legal and sociopolitical order after 1960. Figures as Muammer Aksoy, Turhan Feyzioğlu and Bahri Savcı who were among the founders of *Forum*, as well as İlhan Arsel whose articles also appeared in the journal, happened to be among the members of the three different commissions formed subsequently.[521] Two prominent figures from HP, Ekrem Alican and Cihad Baban took part in the new cabinet after the military intervention of 1960. Turan Güneş, Raif Aybar, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu were among the names who were selected for the new Constitutive Assembly.

The Freedom Party *merged* with the CHP, but it did not *dissolve* within it. In other words, the marriage between two parties helped transform the CHP, which was in urgent need of transformation itself. The former HP members brought a considerable dynamism to the CHP. Throughout the 1950s the main deficiency of the CHP had been absence of an alternative ideological stand. Although the Republican People's Party, especially in the second half of the 1950s, had tried to overcome this deficiency, and had in fact taken some significant strides, at the end of the decade, the ideology of the party none the less, remained eclectic and was not found sufficiently convincing and sincere by the masses. The Freedom Party both before and after merging with the CHP, contributed significantly to the ideological and structural transformation of the CHP.

There were also some HP members who were always critical of the CHP. This group, which was leaded by Ekrem Alican, has never lost its critical stance

---

[521] Coşar, *State and Intellectuals in Turkey*, 244.

towards CHP. For Alican, HP was not founded against the genuine ideals of the DP, and CHP was not the proper adress. Between 1958 and 1960 he did not deal with active politics. After the military intervention Alican formed the New Turkey Party (*Yeni Türkiye Partisi*).[522]

On the economic and political ideology platform the HP-*Forum* circle can be credited with developing a liberal-democratic version of Kemalism. Through its critique of Menderes's populism the Freedom Party attempted to define politics as an exalted activity that is based on the principles of a 'science of politics and economics'. In this sense, their elitist outlook had a close affinity with Kemalist modernization project. However, Kemalism, with its authoritarian connotations was also criticized, albeit implicitly, by the Freedom Party-*Forum* circle.

While the ideological and institutional transformation of the CHP in the second half of the 1950s made it possible for the HP to come closer to the Republican People's Party; articulation of the Kemalist modernization process with a social-liberal synthesis described the ideological stance of the HP. The Republicans' ideological turn after 1960 and their party's redefinition of its political stance as 'left-of-center' (*ortanın solu*) could thus better be comprehended within this context.

---

[522] Gül Tuba Taşpınar Dağcı, *Ekrem Alican'in Siyasal Hayatı*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis submitted to İstanbul Üniversitesi Atatürl İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürl İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Anabilim Dalı, 32.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Newspapers and Journals

Ulus

Cumhuriyet

Zafer

Yeni Gün

Forum

Party Documents

DP (1954) *Seçim Hürriyeti: Dün ve Bugün*, DP Ankara İl İdare Kurulu, Ankara

HP (1956) *Hürriyet Partisi Ana Nizamnamesi ve Programı*, Ankara

HP (1957) *Hürriyet Partisi Ankara Vilayeti İdare Heyeti 1956-1957 Seneleri Kongre Raporu*, Ankara

HP (1957) *İleriye Atılış, Hürriyet Partisi Birinci Umumi Kongresi Umumi İdare Heyeti Faaliyet Raporu ve Kongre Kararları*, Ankara

HP (1957) *Hürriyet ve Refah Yolu, Hürriyet Partisi'nin 5 Yıllık İktisadi Gelişme Planı*, Ankara

HP Meclis Grubu (1957) *Görüşümüz*, Ankara

CHP (1935) *CHP Programı*, Ankara

Boks and Articles

Abou-El-Haj, Rıfa'at Ali (2000) *Modern Devletin Doğası: 16. Yüzyıldan 18. Yüzyıla Osmanlı İmparatorluğu*, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara,

Agaoğlu Samet (2004a) "Marmara'da Bir Ada", in, *Arkadaşım Menderes – İpin Gölgesindeki Günler*, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul

De Certeau, Michel (1986) "The Beauty of the Dead: Nisard", in, *Heterologies, Discourse on the Other*, University of California Press: Berkeley

Ağaoğlu, Samet (1947) *İki Parti Arasındaki Farklar*, Ankara

Ağaoğlu, Samet (2004) *Arkadaşım Menderes – İpin Gölgesindeki Günler*, Alkım Yayınevi, İstanbul

Ahmad, Feroz (1977) *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy*, London

Ahmad, Feroz (1998) *Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye*, Hil Yayınevi, İstanbul

Ahmad, Feroz (1998a) *Türkiye'nin Yakın Tarihi*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul

Akça, İsmet (2002) "Kolektif Bir Sermayedar Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri", *Birikim, 160/161*

Aksoy, Muammer (1960) *Partizan Radyo ve DP*, Forum Yayınları, Ankara

Akşin, Sina (1994) *Türkiye Tarihi (1908-1980)*, İmaj Yayıncılık, Ankara

Ardouin, Sébastien (1998) *Parties and the improvement of democracy: A framework for analysis*, Paper presented to the Society for Latin American Studies Postgraduates in Latin American Studies (PILAS) 1998 Conference, The University of Newcastle, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, England.

Ayata, Ayşe (1992) *CHP: Örgüt ve İdeoloji*, Gündoğan, Ankara

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya (2000a) *Menderes'in Dramı?*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya (2000b) *İhtilalin Mantığı*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul

Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya (2000d) *İkinci Adam vol. 2*, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul

Aytekin, Attila (2001) "Yediyüz: Osmanlı Beyliğinden 28 Şubat'a Bir Devlet Geleneğinin Anatomisi", *Praksis*, 1

Baban, Cihat (1970), *Politika Galerisi,* Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul

Başgil, Ali Fuat (1966) *27 Mayıs İhtilalinin Sebepleri*, trans. M. A. Sebük and İ. H. Akın, İstanbul

Bayrı, Hakan (1998) *DP Döneminde İktidar-Muhalefet ilişkileri (1950-60),* Unpublished Mater's Thesis submitted to Ankara University

Bozdağ, İsmet, *Celal Bayar Anlatıyor: Başvekilim Adnan Menderes*, İstanbul, 1986

Bromley, Simon (1994) *Rethinking Middle East Politics*, University of Texas Press, Austin

Burçak, Rıfkı Salim (1997) *İdamların İçyüzü: A. Menderes, F.R. Zorlu, H.Polatkan*, Ankara Demokratlar Klubü

Burçak, Rıfkı Salim (1998) *On Yılın Anıları*, Ankara

Cammack, Paul (1998) "Globalization and the Death of Liberal Democracy", *European Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2.

Cerrahoğlu, Piyare Bigat (1996) *Demokrat Parti Masalı*, Milliyet Yayınları, İstanbul

Coşar, Simten & Özman, Aylin (2001) "Siyasal Tahayyülde Devletin Belirleyiciliği: Metin Heper Çalışmaları Üzerine Bir İnceleme", *Doğu Batı*

Coşar, Simten (1997) *The State and Intellectuals in Turkey: Between Liberal Ethos and the Myth of Democracy*, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Bilkent University Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ankara, June

Coşar, Simten (2002) "Liberal-Sosyalist hal tarzından sosyal-liberal senteze: Tutunabilecek merkez arayışı", *Birikim,* 162

Çavdar, Tevfik (1995) *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1839-1950*, Ankara

Çavdar, Tevfik (1996) *Türkiye'de Liberalizm*, Ankara

Çavdar, Tevfik (2001) *Türkiye'nin Demokrasi Tarihi 1950-2000*, Ankara

Diamond, L., Lipset, S. M., Linz, J., *Building and Sustaining Democratic Government in Developing Countries: Some Tentative Findings*, World Affairs, Vol. 150, No. 1.

Dodd, Clement Harris (1992) "The Revival of Turkish Democracy", *Assian Affairs*, (23), 3, Oct

Dodd, Clement, Harris, (1979) *Democracy and Development in Turkey*, England: The Eothen Press

Dodd, Clement, Harris, (1983) *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy,* England: The Eothen Press

Doğan Mustafa (1957) *Adnan Menderes'in Konuşmaları*, İstanbul, 2 vols.

Emrence, Cem (2000) "Politics of Discontent in the Midst of the Great Depression: The Free Republican Party of Turkey (1930)", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 23, Fall

Erdemir, Sebahat, *Muhalefette İsmet İnönü*, Ankara

Erer, Tekin (1963) *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, İstanbul

Erer, Tekin, *Türkiye'de Parti Kavgaları* (1963) İstanbul Ticaret Postası Matbaası

Eroğul, Cem (1998) "Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu", in, (eds.) I.C. Schick and A. Tonak, *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, İstanbul

Eroğul, Cem (2000) *DP: Tarihi ve İdelojisi*, Ankara

Frey, F.V. (1963), *Turkish Political Elite*, Cambridge, Massachusetts

Frey, F.V. (1975) "Patterns of Elite Politics in Turkey", in G. Lenczowski (ed.) *Political Elites in the Middle East*, Washington D.C. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

Goloğlu, Mahmut (1982) *Demokrasiye Geçiş 1946-1950*, İstanbul

Gökalp, Ziya (1997) *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, (ed.) M. Ünlü ve Y. Çotuksöken, İstanbul

Gülalp, Haldun (1993) *Kapitalizm, Devlet ve Sınıflar*, Belge, İstanbul

Hale, William (1996) *Türkiye'de Ordu ve Siyaset*, Hil, İstanbul

Halliday, Fred (1998) *İslam ve Çatışma Miti*, trans. Umut Özkırımlı-Gülberk Koç, Sarmal Yayınevi, İstanbul

Heper, M., and Landau, J. (eds.) (1988), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, London, New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd,

Heper, Metin (1992) "The strong state as a problem for the consolidation of democracy", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 25, Issue 2, Jul

Heper, Metin (1999), *İsmet İnönü: Yeni Bir Yorum Denemesi*, İstanbul, 1999

Heper, Metin (2000), "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics", *Journal of International Affairs*, (54) 1, Fall

Heper, Metin (2001) "Turkey: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow", *Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies*, Vol. 1, Issue 3, Sep

Heper, Metin, (1974) *Bürokratik Yönetim Geleneği: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Gelişimi ve Niteliği*, Ankara

Heper, Metin, (1980) "Osmanlı Siyasal Hayatında Merkez-Kenar İlişkisi", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 9-10

Heper, Metin, (1985) *The State Tradition in Turkey*, Walkington, England: The Eothen Press,

Heyd, Uriel (2002) *Türk Ulusçuluğunun Temelleri*, Ankara

Hirst, Paul (1975) "The Uniqueness of the West", *Economy and Society*, n.4 , vol.4, pp.446-475

Inalcık, Halil (1998) "Turkey Between Europe and the Middle East", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, March-May (web source, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/lll-1/inalc.htm)

İnalcık, Halil (1990) "Comments on 'Sultanism' Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity", *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies*, pp.49-72

İnönü İsmet (2002) *Defterler*, (edited by Ahmet Demirel), İstanbul

İnsel, Ahmet (1996) *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kıskacında Türkiye,* İstanbul

İnsel, Ahmet (1998) *Cumhuriyet Tarihinde Otaritarizmin Sürekliliği*, unpublıshed presentation

İnsel, Ahmet (2000) "Kaçan Devrim Fırsatı", *Radikal İKİ*, 14.05.2000

İnsel, Ahmet (2002) *Türkiye Toplumunun Bunalımı*, İstanbul

Kabacalı, Alpay (1994) *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, T. C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları

Kaçmazoğlu, Bayram (1996) *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Toplumsal Tartışmaları*, İstanbul

Karpat, H. Kemal (1961) "The Turkish Elections of 1957", *The Western Political Quarterly*, Winter

Karpat, Kemal (1959) *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, Princeton

Karpat, Kemal H. (1988), "The Republican People's Party 1923-1945", in eds., Metin Heper, and Jacob M. Landau, *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, London, New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd

Karpat, Kemal H (1998), "Military Interventions: Army Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", in,(eds.), Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s*, Walter de Gruyter

Karpat, Kemal H. (1970) "The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-1964: A Socio-cultural Analysis of a Revolution", in, *American Historical Review*, 75

Kepenek Yakup & Yentürk, Nurhan (1987) *Türkiye Ekonomisi*, Ankara

Keyder, Çağlar (1979) "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy", *New Left Review*, 115

Keyder, Çağlar (1987) "Class and State in the Transformation of Modern Turkey", in, Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds.), *State and Ideology in the Middle East*, New York: Monthly Review Press

Keyder, Çağlar (1987) *State and Class in Turkey*, Verso, London

Keyder, Çağlar (1988) "Türk Tarımında Küçük Meta Üretiminin Yerleşmesi 1946-1960", in, *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar (1923-2000)*, Ankara

Keyder, Çağlar (1998) "Türkiye Demokrasisinin Ekonomi Politiği", in, *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, İstanbul

Kili, Suna (2001) *Türk Devrim Tarihi*, İstanbul

Kocabaşoğlu, Uygur (1980) *Şirket Telsizinden Devlet Radyosuna – TRT Öncesi Dönemde Radyonun Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri*, Ankara

Koçak, Cemil (1996) *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi- vol. 2*, İstanbul

Koçak, Cemil (1997) "Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)", in (ed.), Akşin Sina, *Türkiye Tarihi IV: Çağdaş Türkiye*, İstanbul

Koçak, Cemil (2001) "Tek Parti Yönetimi, Kemalizm ve Şeflik Sistemi: Ebedi Şef \ Milli Şef", in (ed.) Ahmet İnsel, *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt 2, Kemalizm*, İstanbul

Akat, Asaf Savaş, "İdris Küçükömer'in Mirası", in *Anılar ve Düşünceler*, İstanbul, 1994

Küçükömer, İdris (2001) *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, İstanbul

Küçükömer, İdris (2001) *Sivil Toplum Yazıları*, İstanbul

Mardin, Şerif (1969), "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 11

Mardin, Şerif (1973) "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Understand Turkish Politics", *Daedalus*, Winter

Mardin, Şerif (1996) *Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesinin Doğuşu*, İstanbul

Mardin, Şerif (1999) *Türkiye'de Toplum ve Siyaset*, İstanbul

Mardin, Şerif (2000) *Türk Modernleşmesi*, İstanbul

Marx Karl & Engels Friedrich (1997) *Sömürgecilik Üzerine*, tran. Muzaffer Erdost, Sol Yayınları, Ankara

Mert, Nuray (2001) "Türkiye'de Merkez Sağ Siyaset: Merkez Sağ Politikaların Oluşumu", in, (eds.) S. Yerasimos, G. Seufert and K. Vorhoff, *Türkiye'de Sivil Toplum ve Milliyetçilik*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Öz, Esat (1998) "Türkiye'de Demokrasinin Gelişimi ve Demokrat Parti", Türkiye Günlüğü, sayı 51

Özbudun, Ergun (1988), "Development of Democractic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations", in (ed.) Özbudun, E., *Perpectives on Democracy in Turkey*, Ankara

Özbudun, Ergun (2003) *Çağdaş Türk Politikası: Demokratik Pekişmenin Önündeki Engeller*, trans. A. R. Usul, İstanbul

Parla, Taha (1991) *Türkiye'de Anayasalar*, İstanbul

Parla, Taha (1992) *Türkiye'de Siyasi Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları cilt 3: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Ok'u*, İstanbul

Parla, Taha (1994) *Türkiye'de Siyasi Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları cilt 1: Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

Parla, Taha (1995) *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Rejimi*, 1980-1989, İstanbul

Parla, Taha (1999) *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul

Peker, Recep (1935) *C.H.P. Genel Sekreteri Recep Peker'in Söylevleri*, Ankara

Peker, Recep (1946) *Başbakan Recep Peker'in Cumhuriyetin 23 üncü Yıl Dönümü Bayramını Açış Söylevi*, Başbakanlık Devlet Matbaası, Ankara

Peker, Recep (1998) *İnkılap Dersleri*, İstanbul

Sarıbay, Ali Yaşar, "The Democratic Party: 1946-1960", in Metin Heper and Jacob M. Landau (eds.), *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, London, New York: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988

Sarol, Mükerrem (1983) *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, İstanbul

Savran, Sungur (1986) "Toplumsal Mücadeleler, Askeri Müdahaleler: 1960, 1971, 1980", in, *11.Tez*

Schmitter, Philippe C. and Santiso, Javier, "Three temporal dimensions to the consolidations of democracy", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 19, Issue 1, Jan 1998

Schmitter, Philippe C., "The consolidation of democracy and representation of social groups", *American Behavioral Scientist*, , Vol. 35 Issue 4/5, Mar-Jun 1992

Sencer, Muzaffer (1973) *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Toplumsal Temelleri*, İstanbul.

Soysal, Mümtaz (1997) *100 Soruda Anayasanın Anlamı*, İstanbul

Sunar, İlkay (1990) "Populism and Patronage: The Democratic Party and Its Legacy in Turkey". *Il Politico*, 1990, anno LV, n.4

Şahingiray, Özel (1999) *Celal Bayar'ın Seçim Kampanyalarındaki Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1946-1950-1954*, İstanbul, 1999

Şahingiray, Özel (1999) *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1946-1950: DP'nin Kuruluşundan İktidara Kadar Politik Konuşmalar*, İstanbul

Tachau, Frank (2000) "Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy", *Turkish Studies*, vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring

Talas, Cahit (1992) *Türkiye'de Açıklamalı Sosyal Politika Tarihi*, Ankara

Tanör, Bülent (2002) *Osmanlı-Türk Anayasal Gelişmeleri*, İstanbul

Timur, Taner (2003) *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş*, Ankara

Toker, Metin (1990a) *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları (1944-1973): Tek Partiden Çok Partiye (1944-1950)*, İstanbul

Toker, Metin (1990b) *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları (1944-1973): DP'nin Altın Yılları (1950-1954)*, İstanbul

Toker, Metin (1990c) *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları (1944-1973): DP Yokuş Aşağı (1954-1957)*, İstanbul

Toker, Metin (1990d), *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları (1944-1973): Demokrasiden Darbeye (1957-1960)*, İstanbul

Topuz, Hıfzı (1973) *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, Ankara

Boratav, Korkut (1997) "İktisat Tarihi (1908–1980)", in (ed.) Sina Akşin, *Türkiye Tarihi IV: Çağdaş Türkiye*, 1997

Tuncay, Suavi (1996) *Parti İçi Demokrasi ve Türkiye*, Ankara

Tunçay, Mete (2000) *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, İstanbul

Tunçay, Mete (1997) "Siyasal Tarih, 1950-1960", in (ed.) Sina Akşin, *Türkiye Tarihi IV: Çağdaş Türkiye*, 1997

Turan, İlter (1988), "Stages of Political Development in the Turkish Republic", in (ed.) Özbudun, E., *Perpectives on Democracy in Turkey*, Ankara

Turan, Şerafettin (1999), *Türk Devrim Tarihi: Çağdaşlık Yolunda Yeni Türkiye (14 Mayıs 1950- 27 Mayıs 1960*, Ankara

Turgut, Nükhet (1984) *Siyasal Muhalefet*, Ankara 1984

Turner & Holton (1989) "Status Politics in Contemporary Capitalism", in, Max Weber On Economy and State, Routledge, London

Turner Bryan, S. (1978) "Marx and the End of Orientalism", London

Turner, Bryan, S. (1994),"Orientalism, Postmodernism, and Globalism", Routlegde, London

Valenzuela, Arturo (1997) *The Chilean Miracle: Lessons of South America's Success Story*, Harvard International Review, Vol. 19 Issue 4.

Weber, Max (1978) "Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology", edited by, Guenter Roth and Claus Wittich, University of California Press, 2 volumes

Weber, Max (2000) "Sosyoloji Yazıları", edited by Gerth and Mills, trans. Taha Parla, İstanbul

Weber, Max, (1997) "Protestan Ahlakı ve Kapitalizmin Ruhu", trans.Zeynep Aruoba, Hil, İstanbul

Yalman, Ahmet Emin (1947) "The Struggle For Multi–Party Government In Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, 1

Yalman, G. (2001) *Bourgeoisie and the State: Changing Forms of Interest Representation within the Context of Economic Crisis and Structural Adjustment : Turkey during the 1980s*, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, University of Manchester, UK.

Yalman, O. Galip (2002) "Hegemonya Projeleri Olarak Devletçilik", in, (ed.) Fuat Keyman, *Liberalizm, Devlet, Hegemonya*, İstanbul

Yücel, Serhan M (2001) *Demokrat Parti*, İstanbul, 2001

Zürcher, E. Jan (1999) *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1999