

URBAN ALEVILIK:
SELF PERCEPTIONS OF THE TWO NEIGHBORHOODS IN ANKARA

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ABSTRACT

URBAN ALEVILIK: SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF THE TWO NEIGHBORHOODS IN ANKARA

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Based on field research carried out in two neighborhoods of Ankara, the primary aim of this study is to explore urban Alevilik and its basic characteristics as perceived by the Alevis which is compared with traditional Alevilik and its features as perceived by the Alevis in urban setting. Additionally, this study is to examine the basic factors that are behind the differences in perceptions of the Alevis, if there are some significant differences in the perception of Alevis regarding these subjects. In this context, a field research that consisted of 208 questionnaires that were applied to the Alevis who are syncretistic religious community and 6 in-depth interviews was carried out in order to examine the basic questions of this study in Ankara. Furthermore, I divided the respondents into four groups, according to whether state of membership of any Alevi association or not and the place of residence which based on different class positions, so that I could make a comparison between these groups. Besides age, educational level and ethnic origin of the respondents, whether or not state of membership of any Alevi association significantly affect the contents of Alevilik, its social and religious institutions and basic rituals as perceived by the Alevis. On the other hand, there is no meaningful relationship between the perceptions of Alevilik and its religious and social institutions and rituals and the place of residence of the respondents.

Keywords: Urbanization, Alevilik, Musahiplik, Dedelik, Cem ceremony

ÖZ

KENTSEL ALEVİLİK: ANKARADAKİ İKİ SEMT BAĞLAMINDA ALEVİLERİN ALEVİLİK ALGISI

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Bu çalışmada, Ankara'nın Dikmen ve Mamak semtlerinde Alevilerle yapılan görüşmelerde ve uygulanan anketlerde elde edilen bilgiler aracılığıyla Aleviliğin mahiyetinin, onun temel dinsel ve sosyal kurumlarının ve ritüellerinin kentsel ortam içinde Aleviler tarafından algılanma ve yorumlanma biçimleri ve bu biçimlere etkide bulunan sosyo-ekonomik, siyasal, kültürel ve etnik faktörlerin rolü araştırılmıştır. Araştırmanın amacı şudur: Kent ortamında yaşayan Alevilerin Aleviliği ve onun temel kurum ve ritüellerini algılama biçimlerinde anlamlı farklılıklar var mıdır? Eğer varsa, bu farklılıklara yol açan etmenler hangileridir? Bu amaçla toplam 208 anket uygulanmış ve 6 denekle de derinlemesine mülakat yapılmıştır. Bunun yanında denekler, herhangi bir Alevi kurumuna üye olup olmadığı baz alınarak, iki gruba ayrılmış ve aralarında kıyaslama yapma imkanı sağlanmıştır. Sonuçta, Aleviliğin ve onun temel kurum ve ritüellerinin algılanmasında anlamlı bir farklılaşma süreci olduğu görülmüş ve eğitim düzeyi, yaş, etnik köken ve bir Alevi kurumuna üye olup olmama durumunun Alevilerin farklı algılama ve yorumlama biçimlerinde anlamlı bir etkiye sahip olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kentleşme, Alevilik, Dedelik, Musahiplik, Ayin-i Cem

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- 2: The size of the population of Ankara 1927-2000

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DRA	:Directorate Religious Affairs
RPP	:Republican People Party
DPP	:Democratic People Party
FSP	:Freedom and Solidarity Party
TCP	:Turkish Communist Party
UP	:Union Party
YP	:Young Party

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Based on field research carried out in two neighbourhoods of Ankara, the primary aim of this study is to explore urban Alevilik and its basic characteristics as perceived by Alevis. This study argues that two interrelated socio-economic transformations experienced since the 1950s have not only altered traditional Alevilik but also led to the emergence of urban Alevilik. Thus, I will try to analyse the main institutions and rituals of traditional Alevilik in order to understand the transformation of traditional Alevilik and to explore how this transformation is perceived by the Alevis living in two neighbourhoods of Ankara. Additionally, based on findings of the field research, I will attempt to examine how religio-social boundaries that determined traditional Alevi identity have been changed within the last two decades. I will also try to analyse the perceptions of Alevis regarding the transformation of traditional Alevi institutions and rituals and to understand the basic factors that influence the perceptions of the Alevis.

There are two main Muslim groups in Turkey: Sunnis and Alevis. Alevilik is the second largest religious belief after Sunni version of Islam in Turkey. However, Alevilik does not refer to a homogeneous religious group. On the contrary, Alevilik is used as an umbrella term which refers to a large number of different heterodox communities, including Nusayris, Bektahsis, Abdals, Tahtacis, Yörük and Kurdish Alevis.

Alevilik is generally used as an umbrella term to define a large number of different heterodox communities, whose actual beliefs and ritual practices differ greatly, and whose members can be found in Turkey and smaller numbers in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Balkans (Van Bruinessen, 2001).

Although Alevilik receives some religious and cultural components from different religions and cultures, Shi'ism has important impact on its basic cults, rituals and institutions. Alevis venerate Ali, the cousin of Prophet Mohammed and the fourth caliph, and the Twelve Imam (Ocak, 2002). In addition to these, it has some religious rituals that distinguish it from Sunni form of Islam such as fasting in twelve days, participation to the Cem ceremony that is the basic religious ritual of Alevilik. Also Alevis who belong to Alevilik don't go to Cami, Church, for prayer, don't fast during the Ramadan, and don't pilgrimage to Mecca as just Sunnis do.

Although there is no reliable data, some scholars predict that the number of Alevi population is about 15 million, the Alevis account for some 25 percent of Turkey's population (Kehl-Bodgogi, 1997; Zeidan, 1999). Additionally, they can be divided ethnically into three groups: Most Alevis are ethnically and linguistically Turkish. The second largest group in Alevis is ethnically and linguistically Kurdish. The third group is ethnically and linguistically Arabic. However, almost all Alevis usually use Turkish in the Cem ceremony.

Alevi communities are scattered around Turkey. However, a significant number of Alevi inhabit Central and Eastern Anatolia. Turkish Alevis traditionally inhabit Sivas, Corum, Amasya, Tokat, and Yozgat. Moreover, some tribal settlement of Tahtaci and Cepni exist on the Mediterranean Coast. Kurdish Alevis are mainly found in Tunceli, Erzincan, Elazig, Maras, Kigi, Varto and Hınıs. Arabian Alevis traditionally inhabit some provinces of Southern Anatolia such as Hatay, Tarsus and Adana.

In the past, Alevis had mainly lived in semi-closed rural communities for hundreds of years. However, the Republican period has witnessed the gradual erosion of the socio-religious boundaries that had distinguished Alevis from outside world. Beginning from the early 1950s, rural to urban migration has opened a new era for Alevis as well as all religious and ethnic groups of Turkey. It can be argued that rural to urban migration has fundamentally changed the

traditional conditions of Alevilik. This is because Alevilik and its institutions were mainly organized according to rural society and rural way of life. Thus, it is possible to state that two interrelated socio-economic processes, internal and international migration and urbanization, which have been underplay since the early 1950s, have had a substantial role in weakening traditional institutions of Alevilik. Some scholars have argued that loosing its traditional institutions, Alevilik has become a cultural form for the Alevis; a great majority of them are now living in urban places. Even some has claimed that Alevilik, as a religious understanding different from Sunni and Shi'a version of Islam, has been faced with a historical crisis due to the devastating impacts of urbanization and modernization. They are convinced that the traditional Alevilik has not been compatible with modernization brought by migration and urbanization. Therefore, its traditional institutions have been replaced by modern institutions. For instance, as noted by Çamuroğlu (1997: 25), some people within and outside of the Alevis have claimed that Alevilik, not only as a religious understanding but also as an identity, would completely disappear in the urban settings. However, I argue that it would be misleading to think that Alevilik is disappearing in the urban setting. Indeed, it is possible to observe that traditional Alevilik has been modified in the context of urban way of life. At least, as will be discussed in the following chapter, a group of Alevis sees Alevilik as a culture or as a way of life, specific to Anatolia. But, for some Alevis, Alevilik is still basically a religious understanding different from other versions of Islam. What should be emphasized is that Alevis are willing to discuss institutions, contents and history of Alevilik.

This study will focus on three specific domains in order to understand urban Alevilik. First of all, it will try to scrutinize the diverse meanings of Alevilik for individual Alevis. This can help us understand the significance of Alevilik for urban Alevis as a religious belief. Further, this can enable us to analyze the impacts of transformation of traditional Alevilik on the perception of urban Alevis.

Second and related to the first one, this study will try to explore ways of transformation of traditional institutions of Alevilik that had regulated the Alevi communities for ages. The question is whether the traditional institutions of Alevilik can function in the urban contexts and respond to the needs of urban life. Ayin-i Cem (the Cem ceremony), Dedelik, and Musahiplik are main institutions of traditional Alevilik. The Cem ceremony is the main ritual of Alevilik. Further Dedelik is the spiritual leadership of Alevilik, and Musahiplik is a kind of religious brotherhood in Alevilik. It is possible to argue that Dedelik and Musahiplik have lost its significance in the urban contexts. First of all, Dedes have lost their control over the Alevi communities since the early 1950s. Mass migration and urbanization have caused in the transformation of Dedelik as a religious institution. Before the 1950s, Dedes had not only played a pivotal role in maintaining traditional-rural Alevi communities but they had also established a wide range networks among semi-isolated Alevi communities scattered in different parts of Turkey. In short, although dedes were not alien to urban life and many of them had diverse connections with urban places, Dedelik was mainly organized according to conditions of rural life. Thus, the increasing pace of migration and urbanization has led to the erosion of religio-social networks established and maintained by dedes and of their relationships with talips, belong to a holy lineage in religious sense, pupils. These have made Dedelik obsolete for the majority of the Alevis living in urban areas. However, there was another factor that had played a significant role in undermining Dedelik as a religio-social institution. It should be noted that urbanization has also transformed the political attitudes and behaviors of the Alevis. This has important consequences for Dedelik. Many Alevis, especially youngersters, have supported and become members of leftist and socialist political parties/groups. These groups have traditionally put great emphasis on secularism and modernism and have always been unsympathetic to and suspicious of religious figures and leaders. Especially, trained in leftist and socialist groups, young Alevis have begun to challenge authority and leadership of dedes. For them, dedes were exploiters who used archaic feelings of the Alevi peasants and dedelik was a feudal backward-looking institution.

Musahiplik was another basic institution of traditional Alevilik. Like dedelik, this institution has also been dismantled because of the process of migration and urbanization. It is likely to argue that as a religio-social institution, musahiplik was also developed according to the circumstances of rural society. It is in major difficulty to fulfill the needs of the Alevis who are now living in the urban environments.

Lastly, the role of the relationship between the state-religion in the transformation of Alevilik should be considered as an important area. More clearly, from the beginning, the Turkish state did not openly and officially recognize Alevilik as a religious belief. Furthermore, it is likely to argue that the Turkish state has rejected all forms of beliefs that can be included under Alevilik. However, the Republic of Turkey founded Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) in 1924. Since then, DRA has been financed by the secular state and it has been responsible for administrating and controlling all religious affairs in Turkey. Practically, since its establishment, DRA has been a religious organization that represents only Sunni-Hanefi version of Islam. Thus, one can argue that the establishment of DRA has provided a secure and firm shelter with Sunni Islam in the secular state structure. However, what must be underlined is that during the whole republican period, although Alevis are ardent supporters of secularism, Alevilik has been always excluded from the state structure and Alevis are deprived of any financial and institutional support for religious purposes. In short, it is legitimate to argue that this fact has also contributed to the erosion of institutions of Alevilik.

As will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, the late 1980s witnessed the growing activism of the Alevis. This activism can be considered as a turning point in the history of Alevi movement in terms of its urban character. It is likely to state that one of the most important motives behind this activism was to protect Alevilik against the rise of Sunni fundamentalism with indirect support of the 1980 military regime and the failure of leftist and socialist political groups. Many Alevis have considered both trends as direct threats to their existence as a religio-

cultural group. In other words, for the majority of the Alevis, disappointed from the leftist political groups and threatened by Sunni fundamentalism and assimilative practices led by the state, the question of how to maintain Alevilik in urban contexts has become an urgent issue. In this endeavor, some Alevi intellectuals, largely trained in the socialist groups and experienced in urban way of life, have taken a leading role in exploring, understanding and reformulating different aspects of Alevilik. This has not only contributed to the creation of a huge literature on Alevilik but also given a great impetus to the establishment of Alevi associations and organizations. However, there was another factor that contributed to Alevi activism: urbanization which has many consequences for Alevis. First of all, in the condition of rural society, Alevis were linked by the networks of dedes. The possibility of direct contact between Alevis living in different parts of Turkey was very limited due to lack of transportation and communication channels that could be used by the Alevi masses. However, urban environment has provided many possibilities with Alevis for direct contact among them. In short, Alevis from different parts of Turkey have become familiarized with each other. Living in urban places for forty years, Alevis have had a chance to move upwardly in the social ladder of Turkish society. However, urbanization has put a new agenda in front of Alevis. More clearly, it is likely to state that the issue at the agenda was whether Alevilik could respond to the needs, desires, dangers, and possibilities created by urbanization.

It is likely to argue that Alevilik has become public since the late 1980s. Since then hundreds of books on Alevilik have been published. Alevi periodicals, print houses and radio station have emerged; newspaper series on Alevilik have appeared in the major newspapers. Additionally, hundreds of Alevi associations have been set up and a large of cemevis, cem houses, which is a new type of building for religious rituals of Alevilik have been established. In addition to these, Alevi cultural festivals have been organized and various programs that described and discussed Alevilik and its ritual practices have been broadcasted on national and commercial TV (Sahin, 2001:3). Furthermore two violent attacks against the Alevi community that happened in Sivas and Istanbul in 1993 and

1995¹ respectively brought together the Alevis under Alevi associations and encouraged them to organize and unify against the rise of political Islam.

Another dimension of the appearance of Alevilik in the public sphere was related to features of political and social atmospheres of Turkey in the late 1980's. Some significant characteristics of this period were related to the relative liberalization in economic and political spheres by the revoking of bans that had been imposed by the 1980 military coup over political activities including bans over opportunities of organization and expression. As Ocak (2002) pointed out that several groups that based on religious and ethnic identity which were hidden in the history of the Republic have appeared in the public sphere due to the economic and political liberalization in the late 1980's. As a result of these changes that came with the relative liberalization in economic and political spheres, there was a new awareness of complexity and diversity within Turkish identity in the place of the previous assumed uniformity (Sahin, 2001). Besides these changes at national level, the replacement of the politics of class with politics of identity, and the effects of the post-modern philosophy at the international level reinforced the constitution of a similar process in Turkey.

The Method of Study

The methods for the collection and the use of data were both qualitative and quantitative. The dissertation data came from three major research techniques: questionnaire, in-depth interview and participant observation. What' s more, I used SSPS program, namely Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, for analyzing the data that came from the field research. Using these techniques has made it possible to understand and interpret the different aspects of the self-perceptions of the respondents from different standpoints.

¹ On July 1993, a mob, which had dispersed from various mosques after Friday prayers set fire to the hotel hosting attendees of an Alevi cultural festival in Sivas. 37 people of participants were burned and 60 persons were injured. Then on March 12 1995, three gunmen in a taxicab randomly shot into coffeehouses and a patisserie in the poor Alevi neighborhood of Gazi in Istanbul. Two people were killed (Sahin: 15).

This study is based on a fieldwork. My fieldwork consists of on a survey study and in-depth interview. The survey study which based on field research conducted in the two neighborhoods of Ankara consists of 208 questionnaires and 6 in depth interviews in order to collect the data about perceptions of Alevis regarding the basic goals of this thesis. The questionnaire consists of several sub-sections. The first part aimed to analyze socio-demographic and socio-economic features of the respondents. The second part included the questions that aimed to understand the respondents' perception concerning the transformation of Alevilik, thus it focused on religious identity, religious institutions and rituals, and religious policy of the state. The last part was on political attitudes of the Alevis as well as it has the questions about Alevi perception of Sunnilik and formation of political identity.

While Alevilik has been conceptualized as a subject from different standpoint of views for two last decades, some basic questions that are related to what do Alevis think about Alevilik and its social, religious institutions and rituals through what reasoning and strategies mainly have been ignored. I think that this study give us some basic clues about the patterns of perception of the Alevis in an urban setting through the contents of basic questions of this thesis. Also it may motivate new studies that will concern Alevis in their historical, social, cultural, economical and political domains.

Organization of Dissertation Chapters

The second chapter of the dissertation aims to briefly evaluate the transformation of Alevilik. It identifies three major historical periods. The first period refers to sixteenth century in which Alevis were organized as semi-closed rural communities. The second period corresponds to the second half of the twentieth century in which the Alevis has begun to migrate from rural areas to urban centers. This period signified the end of semi-closed rural communities. In this period, Alevis have concentrated in urban areas. The last period refers to the rise of Alevi activism since the late 1980s. In this period, the institutions and rituals of traditional Alevilik have been reconstructed in urban settings. Also, this chapter

attempts to explain the changes of the socio-religious borderlines that distinguish the Alevis from the out world since sixteenth century. The theoretical model is mainly based on Barth's approach to the borderlines that distinguish one ethnic group from another.

The third chapter deals with the methodology of the dissertation. This chapter consists of two sections. The first section concerns on the epistemological bases of the dissertation, and the second section covers research techniques that were used in the research fieldwork.

The following chapter deals with socio-demographic and economic features of the respondents. These are related to gender, age, educational level, occupational status, marital status and migratory process of the respondents. Also these variables are constructed as independent variables for understanding the differences in the Alevi perception of Alevilik and its traditional institutions and rituals and other aspects of the Alevis mentioned previously.

The chapter five deals with the question of how the Alevis perceive Alevilik, their religious identity, traditional institutions and religious rituals of Alevilik, the religious policy of the state, Sunnilik, formation of their political identity. The chapter also makes inquiry about political attitudes of the respondents.

The concluding chapter summarizes and highlights the major arguments and outcomes of the dissertation. Specific attention is given to the roles played by age, educational level, ethnic origin and attachment to any Alevi organization.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2. 1. Introduction

The Anatolian Alevis, who spent centuries in the rural areas, are gradually participating in the urban life, mainly in some big cities of Turkey in the last two decades. Today, urbanization, modernization, social differentiation, secularization and education are the essential concepts which represent the domain of material life of Alevis. The fact that the Alevi identity gained an important self-consciousness, with an unavoidable tendency to claim for a recognition in the public sphere, attracted attention from a variety of point of views. In this manner, together with a drastic increase in the amount of publications about Alevis in the last years, Alevilik became a subject of emic and etic knowledge, in terms of its historical course, ethnic origin, religious mentality and forms of basic rituals. The extreme increase² in the amount of studies about Alevilik can be formulated in relation to two main axes: The “discovery”, so to speak, of Alevilik, and the social process of self-construction of Alevilik around a political identity. The theoretical attempt of “discovering” Alevilik goes on two main ways: Emic and etic. In spite of the apparent increase in the amount of publications about Alevilik, one cannot still talk of a common and compact conception of Alevilik implied by these emic and etic attempts. This is due primarily to the fact that the relatively compact studies about Alevilik as a belief system is somewhat young (and one should add here that the number of these studies are not many anyway), and that these studies

² For a survey that classified studies on Alevilik, see, Vorhoff, Karin 1999, “ Türkiye’de Alevilik ve Bektaşilikle İlgili Akademik ve Gazetecilik Nitelikli Yayınlar”, In Alevi Kimliği, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Press.

are based upon different methodological, epistemological and ideological positions. On the other hand, the growth and the change of traditional Alevi institutions brought about some divergence which ultimately gave rise to a variety of ‘local’ Alevi understandings. This made the situation all the more complicated. Although Alevis achieved ultimately to a collective religious retrospection, the traditional Alevi culture carries in itself a spectrum of different localities, and this makes the Alevi movement lack a common theological background. Since, with all its possible threats, the question of ‘what ‘local’ version among the varying spectrum will be installed to the center, and, accordingly, which ones will be excluded?’ seems to compose the most effective problem of the Alevi movement. In this respect, it seems that the Alevi movement is on a historical turning point: A common theology can provide political demands of Alevis with a central attention, as it may provide them with a script of a modern rhetoric, which they long have been in need for. Yet, regarding the syncretistic character of belief system of Alevilik, one cannot but face the question of how a variety of structural components, which are obtained and adopted from different cultures and religions, can be influenced in such a process of centralization. Whether or not Alevis will overcome this paradox, or in what way they will do this is a matter of time.

In this chapter, the focus will primarily be on the social and religious components that traditionally characterize Alevilik, as well as those that constitute the boundaries of Alevilik as a community. The second part of the chapter will be devoted to an attempt of conceptualisation of the process of dissolution of traditional religious and social structures that Alevis possess, a dissolution which is brought about and given rise by the fact that Alevis are faced with a new form of life with such processes as modernization, urbanization, and immigration. The third part will be on the characteristics of “Alevi reanimation”,³ as it is named by some researchers, to denote to a current stream in the Alevi community, which

³ Kehl-Bodrogi, K. 1996, ‘Tarih Mitosu ve Kollektif Kimlik’, Birikim, No: 88, pp, 52 -63. Furthermore, there are some metaphors to describe the new Alevi movement that have accelerated in the last two decades. For examples, Alevilik that cries out its identity and return the repressed. For implications of these metaphors see Kaleli, Lutfi 1990, *Kimliğini Haykıran Alevilik*, İstanbul: Habora Kitabevi and Sener, Cemal 1998, *Yasayan Alevilik*, İstanbul: Ant Yayınları. I will return implications of these metaphors in later.

emerged in recent times, as a direct response to the dissolution which is referred to above. This part is intended to be the central axis of the chapter, since the main theme of the study is essentially about the urban form of Alevilik. The new Alevi movement that, through a variety of institutions, appears in the public sphere to express itself in a form of mass, constitutes the very essence of what I call the urban form of Alevilik.

2. 2. The Ethnic Boundaries and the Alevi Ethnic

We know that the approaches in Anthropology diverges on the point about how and through what sets of concepts the term ethnicity should be conceptualized. Yet, one can still talk about two main tendencies: The representatives of the first tendency argue that, the term ethnicity should be defined on a common culture, which can be a theme of an “objective” analysis. According to this approach, such an objective analysis, taking a common culture as a base, can help us to distinguish the particular characteristics of each ethnic group. In such an approach, two important points that are crucial in understanding ethnic groups are missed: The first point is about the way ethnic groups as social arrangements arise, and the second one is of the manner in which the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms of ethnic cultures emerge. There are anthropological approaches which claim that the maintenance of group boundaries is a key component in ethnicity. Such an approach treats the common culture that is supposed to be shared by an ethnic group not as a cause that gives rise to ethnic group, but as a consequence (or rather product) of formation of ethnic group. Culture of an ethnic group may undergo an internal shift with a change in environmental conditions, and may accordingly experience a significant modification through time. However, none of these factors has as significant effect on the ethnic identity as long as the group keeps a tangible border between its members and its environment. According to Barth, what makes a certain group of people an ethnic group is maintenance of a certain border, rather than subsistence of a specific cultural component (Barth, 2001: 11).

Another crucial point in the discussions on identity, boundary and discourse is about the nature of the boundaries that differentiate the ethnies, classes and religious groups. Alevilik as a historical category (together with its metaphysical components) went through an institutionalization process within a set of historical and social conditions, borrowed some cultural and religious elements from a variety of social, cultural and religious systems, and adopted these components to its uniqueness in a certain historical and social environment (Ocak, 2002: 210-211). In other words, the roots of belief in Alevilik as a syncretistic system of faith is based on a vast religious spectrum which ‘has been launched by the ancient belief system of Turks of Middle Asia, turned to have a spiritual character with the effects of Shamanism and Buddhism, fed by Zoroastrism and Manheism, had the stigmata of Islam and Sufi version of Islam via Yesevi cult, joined to Qalandarian attitude of Khorasan Malamatiyya, met and granted some Anatolian versions of Neo-Platonism and local cultural styles of Christianity, took some patterns of Iranian Hurifiyya in 15th and motifs of Safavid Shi‘ism in 16th century” (Ocak, 2002: 222-223). The fact that the heterodox tradition that gave rise to the contemporary Alevilik frequently absorbed some new elements throughout history makes us reach some conclusions about the characteristics of the margins of this tradition. First, through the fact that elements of a set of diverse belief systems have been “articulated”⁴ to the heterodoxy, I can conclude that the boundaries between these groups and their environments are relational, rather than blocked. Second, I can say that the incoming elements are modified, or rather, restructured within heterodox imagination. Thus, I have the case in which neither the incoming elements maintain their meanings that they used to convey in their original milieu, nor the belief system that accept them (i.e. heterodoxy) keeps on its direction without any change. Third, the historical and social conditions that surrounded heterodox groups had dramatic effects on the relationships that heterodoxy established so far with its environment. The centralization tendencies of Ottoman Empire in the 15th century, in addition to the tactic and strategic competition between the two rival Islamic states in the 16th

⁴ Articulation is a basic category of hegemonic practice. In this sense, it is obvious that hegemony is one of constructive components of an open social system. Also, it is obvious that here I talk about the relationships and terms that relate to pre-modernization period. In this context, articulation word is used in the quotation mark. For the basic implications of hegemony and articulation categories see, Laclau, Ernesto, Mouffe 1992, Chantal, Hegemony ve Sosyalist Strateji, İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları.

century, damaged the relational boundaries that heterodox groups had hitherto established with their environment, and forced these groups, as a result, to form a sterile community which is closed to the outside world. The strict boundaries of heterodoxy that were established in that historical period against the “outside world” held on to exist until recent times. Lastly, the fact that with the establishment of Republic, the factors that hitherto threatened the heterodox groups’ existence were abolished, and that, the nation state took action in a variety of forms (like communication, transportation and the like) for the sake of national market, and due to such social experiences as urbanization, immigration, education and dramatic development in communications, the heterodox groups that up till then were closed to the “outside” would expose itself to different interactions. And today, a considerable part of Alevis can be said to be living in an open society. A period approximately of 500 years of seclusion of Alevi community is now replaced by contact, interaction and relational boundaries, in today’s capitalistic society. In other words, after a long episode of isolation, Alevis are now on their guards for social mechanisms and boundaries which will secure their identities and existence, and which will also arrange their in-faction relations, protecting them against any radical change in today’s modern capitalistic urban environment. Today, as different from the past, a variety of categories are operative in the process of formation of the boundaries. While, in the past, the main criteria for the configuration of the boundaries was determined merely by social and religious categories, today, in addition to these, some other categories such as politics and ideology are also effective.

The tensions and troubles arose due to the dissolution and replacement of mechanisms and boundaries and in the urban conditions will be under arrest for a new conceptualization in the last part of this chapter.

2.3. Traditional Alevilik and Its Margins

We know that in Ottoman Empire the borderlines between communities corresponded to the margins of different religions. I can also say that in the Ottoman Empire, which was composed of a sort of mix of different religions and ethnies, the borders were constructed not according language criteria, but according to religious measure. Looking at this, I can see that the most fundamental borderlines were between Muslims and Christians (or Jews)⁵ (Vergin, 2000: 75-76). Such an ethnic system provided the religious constituents of Ottoman Empire with a legitimate existence, by assigning them to their spiritual leaders for the religious matters, and in this way, implicitly granting them a sort of unidentified partial autonomy within an unequivocal political system (Lewis, Bernard 1968: 17). The religious borders were so clear and sharp that the borderlines between different ethnic groups in a certain religious community could hardly be distinguished (Yeğen, 1999: 38-39).⁶ This is why Turks, Arabs and Kurds are seen as a part of the same ethnic system. Thus, the ethnic borders among these groups could almost not be called a border at all. According to Van Bruinessen (2001: 70), although there are clear-cut borders that distinguish the heterodox groups from orthodox ones, these borders were very smoothed comparing to the borders set against the non-Muslims. In fact, whenever the awareness of ‘non-Muslim threat’ took an actual character, the borderlines among Muslim groups lost their sharpness, and whenever actual threat that came from non-Muslims disappeared, the borderlines that distinguished the official form of Islam from others forms of Islam appeared sharply again.

In my account, the arrangements that the Ottoman Empire needed are pragmatic in their character, rather than being essential to the very governmental matters –like the

⁵According to Vergin, millet system referred to a legal distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Vergin added that all forms of Islam Are in a non- entity status except for Sunni or official form of Islam. Nevertheless, the basic point that I want to underline is that all forms of Islam Are described as Kizilbas, Redhead, and Rafizi etc. in pejorative meaning from official standpoint view apart from a certain Sunni version of Islam. In this regard, there was a boundary line between official form of Islam and other forms of Islam in Ottoman period, and this seems that exclusion of an ethnic or religious group in discursive level may point out something about the boundary line that distinguished official form of Islam from other forms of Islam.

⁶ The emergence of linguistical boundary that tended to centralize an ethnic language in meaning map in the circle of Islam was related to conjunctures of modernization, nationalization and centralization, and has very short history. Additionally, for this subject, see, Zürcher, Erik Jan 1998, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 3rd edition, Istanbul: İletişim.

basic principles that are effective in administration. What concluded on the relationship between the Ottoman state structure and the variety of heterodox groups was this pragmatist approach. Some academicians, besides many Alevi writers, conceptualize the nature of relationship between Ottoman state structure and the variety of heterodox groups in an essentialist perspective. Vergin (2000: 80), for instance, constructed two different homogenous typologies through the dichotomy of center-periphery, affixes the center to Sunni Islam (Urban Islam) and periphery to the folk Islam or Alevilik (or urban Islam). Thus, Vergin presents the relative conflict in Ottoman between the central and the peripheral as a clash between Alevilik and Sünnilik. Addition to these, Vergin, goes to employ the set of concepts that emerged only after modernization and capitalization processes to understand the internal relationship of a pre-modern society, and thus follows an anachronic line in methodological sense: Center as a category which has lost its Turkishness and Alevilik as the watchman of Turkish language and culture (i.e. Turkomen). This analysis, there is no doubt, includes a problem with many aspects. First, as I have already denoted, it includes an essentialist approach. Second, it limits the centrifugal tendencies in Ottoman society to the activities of the heterodox groups⁷. Thirdly, it codifies many characteristics of the Sunni tradition with the pursuits of the ulema. Thus, it ignores the sociological diversity among the Sunni tradition, identifying all the Sunni tradition with the official religious mentality of the state⁸. The fourth problem is that, the intense relationship of the urban heterodoxy with the Ottoman state structure is ignored.⁹ At this juncture, a couple of points about some dimensions of the relationship between urban heterodoxy and the Ottoman state structure can be highlighted.

⁷ For a study that examined nature of relationship between core and periphery with social, economic and political terms in Ottoman Empire, see Yücel, Yaşar 1974, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Desantralizasyona Dair Genel Gözlemler*, Belteten, and Cilt XLIX, No. 193-195. furthermore, for a study that examined social bases and histoical context of uprisings in Sulcuk and Ottoman periods, see Ocak, Ahmet Yaşar 2002, “ Babailer İsyanından Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da İslam Heteredoksisinin Doğuş ve Gelişim Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakış” In *Türk Sufiliğine Bakışlar*, İstanbul: İletişim, pp, 252-290

⁸ For a study that examined this subject see: Aktay, Yasin 2000, “Alevilik: Mitler ve Gerçekler”, *Türk Dininin Sosyolojik İmkânı*, 2nd, İstanbul: İletişim, pp, 85-90.

⁹ For the contents of relationship between urbanized heterodox groups and Ottaman Empire, see Yalçınkaya, Ayhan 1996, *Alevilikte Toplumsal Kurumlar ve İktidar*, Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Press, pp. 152-156 and Bozkurt, Fuat 1993, *Aleviliğin Toplumsal Boyutları*, 1st edition, İstanbul: Yön Press, pp: 29-32.

Bozkurt (1993:29-31) and Yalçınkaya (1996: 146-152) point out that until the abolition of Janissaries in 1826, the Bektashi community has been in collaboration with the Ottoman state. Also, in the next historical period, the Bektashi religious group built up good relations with İttihat-Terakki and mobilized its members accordingly. Thus, the fact that Bektashi community established different modes of relations with the state in spite of the fact that it shared the religious outlook of the heterodox groups, wakes up doubts about the theses that heterodox groups were in a common “averse” attitude against the state and that the Ottoman state held a single and consistent stance vis-à-vis the heterodoxy as a total body. In our opinion, it is a fact that the Ottoman attitudes against the heterodox groups change in different circumstances, just as the feelings of the heterodoxy about the state differs in various ages of the Empire. This relationship had different characters in different periods. As some other studies maintain, locating a sort of relationship, which can only be found between two modern parties, in such categories of pre-modern era and basing conceptualizations on such an account is problematical in both logical and methodological terms. The methodological fault here is brought about the fact that the relationship between Ottoman state and the heterodox groups had a dynamic character is ignored, as well as about the attitude which tries to employ such terms as nation, national language, planning, ideology and hegemony, which emerged only in modern times, to describe the relationships that emerged in Ottoman society¹⁰.

A detailed study of the extent and the means of the Ottoman religious policy is not supposed to be a part of this study, yet, some basic characteristics of this policy should be roughly pointed out here. There is no doubt, the passage of Caliphate in 1517 to the Ottoman has critical implications for the Muslim communities, in terms their position vis-à-vis the state. After this historical point, the Ottoman state became a state with an “official religion” and establishment of an official theological view followed, with “proper” form of worship. In other words, from

¹⁰ Furthermore, the flexible nature of relationship between dervish groups and Ottoman state in the process of establishment of Ottoman, see, Köprülü, M.Fuad 1986, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Kuruluşu*, 2nd edition, İstanbul: Ötüken, pp, 130-160.

that period on, the state began to classify the mentality of its subjects in terms of such dichotomies as right/wrong, good act/sin and muslim/non-muslim, which were defined in accordance with the official state doctrine. Thus, the way of drawing lines among Muslim communities and legalizing these lines is officialized. It is clear that the accomplishment of classification of different mentalities that originate from an Islamic outlook was revised and reshaped under the light of the periodical needs of the Empire. As the Empire's perception of threat was shaped by a possibility of a rival Islamic mentality (this is what happened in the 16th century), the criteria of classification of the Muslim subjects hardened accordingly. Such an unyielding categorization brought about some dramatic consequences¹¹.

The fact that the 16th century is critical, as I referred above, is not merely because of the passage of Caliphate to the Ottoman. The period is significant, besides, since the Safavid state was established in 1501 and Shi'ism of 12 Imams was declared to be the 'official religion' of that state. The contact established between a variety of Anatolian Dervishes and Safavid state brought about a modification in the religious mentality of Dervishes, as well as in the relationship these groups set up with the Ottoman state¹². Thus, the two rival states in Islamic world rendered two main religious mentalities their 'official religions' and hence, went up against one another to become the one and only political, military, cultural and

¹¹ For conflict between Ottoman state and Safavids and its impacts on dervish groups who lived in Anatolia, see, Ocak, Ahmet Yaşar 2002 and Bozkurt, Fuat 1993.

¹² The cults of Ali and Twelve Imams penetrated to mental world of dervish groups in this period. For more information on this subject, see, Melikof, İrene 1999a, "Aleviliğin ve Bektaşiliğin Tarihsel Kökenleri, Bektaşî-Kızılbaş Bölünmesi ve Neticeleri", In Türkiye'de Aleviler, Bektaşiler, Nusayriler, İstanbul: Ensar Press, pp, 17-23; Ocak, Ahmet Yaşar 1999, "Aleviliğin Tarihsel Sosyal Tabanı ile Teolojisi Arasındaki İlişki Problemine Dair", In Türkiye'de Aleviler, Bektaşiler, Nusayriler, İstanbul: Ensar Press, 385-398; Melikof, İrene 1999b, "Bektaşilik/Kızılbaşlık: Tarihsel Bölünme ve Sonuçları" In Alevi Kimliği, İstanbul: Türk Vakfı Yurt Press, pp, 3-12.. Furthermore, the relationship between periphery and core was stretched with the impact of centralization process that was started by the first Mehmet. This tension reached its peak in 16.century as a result of developments that mentioned above. For this subject, see, Ocak, Ahmet Yaşar 2002, "Alevilik ve Bektaşilik Hakkındaki Son Yayınlar Üzerine (1990) Genel Bir Bakış ve Bazı Gerçekler", In Türk Sufiliğine Bakışlar, İstanbul: İletişim, pp, 203- 236. Also, for the impacts of this challenge between two rivalry states on religious attitudes of Anatolian people, in the case of Kurdish population, see, Bruinessen, Martin Van 1992 , "Kürt Aşaretleri ve İran Devleti: Simko Ayaklanması", In Kürdistan Üzerine Yazılar, İstanbul: İletişim, pp, 205-250.

“ideological”¹³ power of Islamic world. I know the consequences of this challenge. The defeat of Safavids in this competition brought about dreadful consequences for the Ottoman Kızılbaş or Redhead community: They were subjected to a heavy injustice, some of them were expelled, while some others got away to reside in areas where the central authority could hardly reach (David, Zeidan 1999: 75) and (Şener, Cemal 2002:95).

Due to these experiences, Alevis got marginalized territorially and socially in the 16th century (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1996: 56). In these new conditions, Alevis began to develop new forms of relationships of ethnic-religious identity with firm margins in order to survive. Their achievement in establishing secure social-religious web of relations provided them with the possibility of survival in a hostile environment. The intense religious borders that have been driven between inner and outer world reduced the extent of interaction between the group and the political/religious center to the lowest degree. The group’s awareness of threat brought about a total prohibition of any vital relationship with a non-Alevi, including marriage, economic corporation and application to irreligious judgment. These kinds of definite restrictions against the outer world made it almost impossible to have new members. Thus, the state of belonging to the community would totally be based on the legitimate patrilinearity.¹⁴

One can talk of five main points that designate these firm limits (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1991: 21-24; 1997: 11-13): First, the measure of group membership is dependent upon descent (Alevilik, in this sense, is a feature that is gained through birth merely).

¹³ The term ideology is one of the concepts that emerged in the context of capitalist transformation and it has a history just as all other concepts. Before the emergence of this concept in scene of history I should use another concept that functioned like ideology concept, and it may be called as a shadow concept. Therefore, I used it in quotation mark. For information that related to historical emergence and evolution of ideology concept, see, Larrain, Jorge 1979, *The Concept of Ideology*, London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publisher) Ltd.

¹⁴ Bektashis differ from Alevis in this subject. Bektashis had flexible borderlines that distinguished them from outside world and to be a member of Bektashi lodge wasn’t necessary to come from a Bektashi lineage contrary to Alevis. For more information about contents of distinctions between Alevilik and Bektasilik, see, Melikoff, Irene 1999a, 1999b.

Second, the reproduction depends on endogamy. The third point implying the firm boundaries is the conscience of “wholeness” among the members. The fourth point is about the existence and maintenance of the boundaries between Alevis and other groups. The last point which relates to these heterodox groups as ‘other’ perceived and codified by others is one of the components of a borderline. From the 16th century to the republican era, even to the recent period of rural-to-urban migration of the group, the main features that I referred above have been decisive factors in definition of distinct social, political, religious, cultural and economic boundaries of Alevi communities.

Another factor which characterizes Alevilik is the lack of a common, central religious authority (Shankland, 1999: 319-328; Kehl-Bodrogi, 1991: 21-23). There is not any religious institution which could stand in for them, nor do they have a class of religious representatives to speak for them and to decide in doctrinal matters in their stead when necessary. Religious knowledge and rituals forwarded verbally from one generation to another through certain lineages (*ocak*) which have been ascribed holiness. Members of these families are in charge of leading the community in religious and social affairs. Lack of a central religious authority and a manuscript brought about local diversifications in the interpretations of Alevi doctrine and rituals. This point raises many problems for Alevis as a community, in the process of urbanization. At this juncture, the criterion to distinguish Alevilik from other religious communities has lots to do with the following claim: In spite of the arguments which could in one sentence be summarized as “the ontological structure of Alevilik has compulsorily determined the formation of a variety of perceptions and mentalities”,¹⁵ it seems that Alevis failed to form a collective theology because of a spatial and social marginalization. One can also argue that the current demands of Alevis to have a common theology and a central institutionalization support the thesis that the question is about historical processes rather than any ontological subject matter. Lack of a shared theology brought about local segregations in religious mentalities and rituals. Hence, the term “traditional Alevilik” ignores the

¹⁵ As expressed in the aphorism: “Y ol bir sürek bin birden hareketle” literally meaning “let us go on one path depending on one thousand and one” which could be translated as “let us become one in many”.

variety of domains of differences among Alevi communities, as long as the term consists of a consideration of a compact Alevi history. Indeed, the phenomenon I have here is not related to a religious mentality and a set of rituals which can be formulated in a single phrase. Rather, it is a matter of a variety of different mentalities and rituals that share some joint aspects. For that reason, the term “traditional Alevilik” is not adequate to express the situation. Instead, I may suggest here, the phrase “set of traditional Alevi modes” is more appropriate.¹⁶

2.4. The Republic, Urbanization, Migration and Dissolution

The first signs of dissolution of Alevilik appeared at the beginning of the 20th century as a result of turmoil brought about by the war, and because of the gradual expansion of rural-to-urban migration (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997: 11-13). In due course, the general condition of disorder in the country after the establishment of Republic set off some radical changes for the Alevi community as well. Alevi people, who have been living in isolated social conditions since the 16th century, would gradually get in touch, so to speak, with the external world, because of a set of developments in the Republican era: Construction of the roads to Alevis’ isolated residential areas that they once took refuge; introduction of compulsory primary education; the secular character of the new regime; the dissemination of the means of communication and the dramatical developments in the technology of communication. Thus, the border lines that Alevis drawn to dissociate from the outer world would get a flexible character. In other words, the thick borderlines that have hindered upon any possible contact with the non-Alevis since the 16th century would be replaced by a mode of communication and relational margins. In the ensuing Republican period, the Alevi people would step by step move in some new life domains, and the strict border lines and institutions of a closed community would radically be overthrown in the new life conditions, as the social and religious categories that have made up the old strict margins would be substituted by new frontiers which were determined according to political and ideological measures (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1996; Zeidan, 1999). In this sense, the mobility and flexibility in early 1900s of religious/ethnic borders would be

¹⁶ I will return this subject in section of reconstruction of Alevilik later.

devastated in the open politics and conjuncture of 1960s, and the traditional religious-social borders that have been constructed according to the needs of closed society would remain significant for only a certain number of people.

Besides these changes, it is likely to argue that the Kemalist secularization policy had twofold impact upon Alevi communities. With this policy, on the one hand, the power blocks that have been threatening Alevi existence would be legally abolished, while the social/mental codes and institutions of Alevilik as a religious community would be dramatically turmoil to a certain extent, on the other.

Zürcher (1998: 271-272) traces the roots of Kemalist mentality of secularism in three main aspects: The first aspect is about the secularization of the law. The judicial secularization has an historical significance for Alevi people who have been historically marginalized. Second aspect counts on the secularization of the public sphere. This experience of secularization seems to have more remarkable consequences for Alevis than any other religious groups. This is because the prohibition of religious symbols would mean the abolition of symbolic sphere of influence of Alevis, who are in a sort of evolution from the mode of closed society to open society, and, indeed this is what happened. Lastly, the secularization of social pattern made up the final basic chain of Kemalist operation of secularization. Through this aspect of secularization, the effective Alevi institutions (such as Dedelik, Musahiplik as well as the religious rituals and the social relations that secure these rituals, etc.) would be forced to reduce their efficiency, not to say that they totally disappeared. Here, one point about the last two aspects should be underlined: Alevis had to be aware of the social ‘principles’ of Kemalist secularization policy, as long as they cared for participating in the domain of relations and institutions whose legality was affirmed by the new system. Alevilik, with its traditional web of relations and institutions, had to be given up for the sake of participating in the secular relations and institutions (Shankland, 1993: 5, 12).

Basically, there are two resounding approaches about the effects of Kemalist secularization policies on Alevilik as a religious community. The first approach, which rather can be said to be represented by non-Alevi (Sunni) researchers (like

Subaşı, (2003), Aktaş, (2000), Üzüm (2000), etc.),¹⁷ underlines that besides Sünnilik, Alevilik also has been under the heavy injurious impacts of the Kemalist abolishment of traditional religious institutions. The second approach, which is spoken for by Alevi authors to a significant extent (Şener (1998), Bozkurt (1993), and the like),¹⁸ highlights the argument that Kemalist policy of secularization brought about a legal security for Alevilik. Yet, this approach takes no notice of the extent to which Alevilik as a religious system has been influenced by the Kemalist policies of secularization. At this juncture, I will argue that these two different approaches fail to build a theoretical position to conceptualize the different characteristics of Alevi question. Because, supporters of the first group seem to be too far from understanding the intense meaning that is historically implied by the problem of Alevi subsistence. Defenders of the second approach, on the other hand, seem to be ignorant of the expense of Kemalist policy of secularization for Alevis, focusing merely on the advantages of that policy (advantages in the sense that Kemalist policy guaranteed the blockage of the traditional anti-Alevi threats). As it is seen, the points that are ignored by the two approaches make up the two main components of historical experiences of Alevis.

A couple of additional remarks might be worthwhile here. The Kemalist policy of secularization had more striking influences on Bektashis than Alevis in the short run. Because, what the most of the Sunni religious groups experienced would happen to the Bektashis too: The actions and institutions of Bektashis, who had established their traditional institutions in urban areas, are prohibited. Alevis, on the other hand, can be said to have been under the influence of the oppression to a lesser extent, compared to the Bektashi population. This is because Alevis, as a community, have been living in the rural regions and thus have been able to maintain their religious and social functions, even under the most difficult conditions. This is not to say, of course, that there are traditional Alevi institutions that have been established to freely fulfil certain functions in the public; rather, the case is that the Alevi institutions and web of relations are thinly distributed throughout the society. In this sense, it can

¹⁷ Subaşı, Necdet 2003, "Alevi Modernleşmesi: Geleneksel Kültürün Modern Sunumları", in Kültür ve Modernite, İstanbul: Tetragon Press, Aktay, Yasin 2000; Üzüm, İlyas 2000, Gunumuz Aleviliği, İstanbul: Turk Diyanet Vakfı.

¹⁸ Şener, Cemal 1998, Bozkurt, Fuat 1993.

hardly be said that social and symbolic spheres of Alevi population had happened to be affected by the social components of Kemalist secularization policies to a significant degree, until the historical period in which the processes of secularization and migration picked up the pace.

With the beginning of urbanization and migration course, the social components of Kemalist policy of secularization started to have a noteworthy impact on Alevi populace. The Republic legally guaranteed the religious freedom of its citizens, yet limiting the rights to this freedom to the ‘private sphere’ opposed to the ‘public sphere’. Furthermore, traditional Sunni form of Islam organizationally and theologically was reconstructed with impact of replacement of Directorate of Religious Affairs in institution of Sheik Islamlik (Seyhuislamlik) in 1924 (Zurcher, 1998). The foundation of Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) brought about a legalization of Hanafi mentality and rituals in the public sphere by the hands of the State, at the time when such sects as Nakşibendi are being outlawed. What was at stake in this course was a sort of re-arrangement of the relationship between the State and religious affairs through a process which is based on a dichotomy of inclusion-exclusion, rather than a pure hostile exclusion between the two parties. The manner in which these institutions were founded and functioned clearly show that what Kemalist understanding of secularization meant was to have, in a way, a control over religion, rather than to provide a separation between religion and the state. The fact that the officially authorized religious adaptation was in favor of Sünnilik (in fact, in favor of a special version of Sünnilik namely Hanefilik) was legally limiting the religious preference of the citizens in the public sphere. In this sense, what defined the nature and form of the connections of the religious groups to the state and governmental organs would turn to be the scope and limits of the ‘official religion’, which was re-shaped by the state per se. Alevilik was not considered to be in the span of the ‘official religion’. For that reason, Alevilik could not be a reference point in the process of establishment of connection with the modern system. Alevilik could get use of the system on condition that it hid the Alevi identity in the public sphere in other words, as long as Taqiyya was used as a strategy (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997:12).

It seems that a body of works on the nature and scope of the attachment that Sunni and Alevi community established with the new regime has already been generated. Among these works, Shankland's study is the most recognized one.¹⁹ I observe that Shankland's arguments concerning this subject have received a general appreciation. Yet, it seems that Shankland's presuppositions of formulation of the difference between Alevi and Sunni experiences (which are shared by some other authors as well) of modernization is very problematical. Shankland's main argument can be framed as follows: The traditional social order within the Sunni villages is compatible with their being absorbed gradually into the national, centralized administrative system, in contrast to this, the Alevi cannot integrate into the modern Turkish state without relinquishing literal belief in their myths, rituals, and ideal because these undermine the legitimacy of the central government (Shankland, 1993: 5, 12). In other words, in Shankland's account, the Sunni version of Islam is more compatible with modernization process than Alevi interpretation. Shankland's thesis seems to be vulnerable to a series of criticisms: First, his field observations are not based on the history of modernization of Turkey. Second, his formulation of modernization practice is limited to the form of relations that he articulates between the "modern" state and different religious groups. Third, he ignores the different aspects of Kemalist policy of secularization and the possible effects of this policy on different religious positions. He almost regards the Kemalist policy of secularization as the single possible form of secularization. Fourth, in the field that he conducted the research, Alevi people make up the religious minority, and the extent to which the way these Alevi people get in touch with modernity might be generalized to those fields in which Alevi inhabitants are the major section, is quite arguable. Lastly, he pays no attention to the extent to which the ethnic diversity among Alevi people affects the relationship they establish with modernity. Here, since the main concern of this study is not about modernization and urbanization strategies of Sunni and Alevi populations, I must content ourselves with the following claim: The nature of different relationships that Alevi people established with the new life conditions cannot be accounted for by referring merely to the traditional Alevi mentality and the apparatuses that they constructed according to this mentality. Besides this, one must

¹⁹ Shankland, David 1993.

refer to the other dynamics that transcend the total power of all communities, that is, the “modernizing” authorities, which propose and design the various forms of the relationship between religious groups and modernity. The question of according to what ethnic and religious criteria the public sphere, which is created by the young Republic by means of the Constitution and other laws, was established, has dramatically affected the way the (central or peripheral) ethnic and religious groups made contact with such categories as the state, policy, economy, education, and the like.²⁰

Thus, Alevi people, who are in an urbanization process, just like Sunni people, carried on “living”²¹ their hidden religion because of Kemalist secularization policy and the obliged religious identity of public sphere. It was not for the first time in the Alevi history that Alevilik was not defined as a legitimate belief system in the newly introduced laws. In fact, Alevilik has never been a “legal” way of belief in its history. However, the manner in which Alevi people are disregarded in spite of all secular protection mechanisms in the period of the Republic was denoting something new. Different from the past, Alevi people are gradually congregating in the urban space. Yet, since their religious belief was banned, they lacked social and religious mechanisms to maintain their religious beliefs in the new life conditions (of the urban areas). The social and religious institutions that they had established in the past conditions of life brought about by the processes of urbanization, secularization and migration, could no more work as the means of justification. The main character of the social and historical context which meant a new era in the history of Alevis was consisted of these experiences. As Kehl-Bodrogi (1996:58-59) pointed out, Alevilik was facing with a modern context which would bring about a radical shift in the internal structure of the community, as well as in their religious practice and

²⁰ For the impacts of the classifying and describing practices of the Republic in the case of Kurdish community in discursive level, see, Yeğen, Mesut 1999.

²¹ The reason of this word that was used in quotation mark is about that the Alevis who lived in an urban setting didn't have social and religious institutions that could fulfilled needs of the new social, cultural, and political circumstances. It's obvious that absence of these institutions was obstacle to practice religious rituals. For a study that detailed examined the basic functions of these institutions in the Alevi community, see, Yalçinkaya, Ayhan 1996, and Bozkurt, Fuat 1993.

collective self-conscious. This process of dissolution went faster with the immigration course that picked up the pace in the 1950's.

With the process of disclosure of Alevi communities to the external world, secularization gained speed among Alevis who, parallel to this tendency, had a palpable position in the left-side in polarization of leftist-rightist tendencies. When the mode of social-religious organization, which was determined according to the marginal conditions, broke up in the urban conditions, Alevis began to gather around the most "compatible" modern alternatives in the urban conditions (Kehl -Bodrogi, 1996:52-63 and 1997; Shankland, 1999b: 132-169). Social life of Alevis began to evade the effect of religious institutions to a significant extent. The Alevi social institutions faced with the danger of extinction. The Talip, Pupil, who strictly belong to a particular Dede lineage (*ocak*) in religious sense, migrated to cities in a disordered fashion and this caused a loss in the central role of holy lineages in the Alevi communities. The threat of extinction of these blessed families was not limited to the urban spaces. A similar danger was at work in the rural areas too, because of the attitude of the young population (an attitude shaped, especially, by the political conjuncture of the 70's and 80's). Besides, emergence of the local representatives of the growing central authority in the villages (like headman of a village, the Imam and teacher) caused a modification in the social and political structure of Alevi villages (Shankland, 1993: 101-102). Hence, the social, political and educational functions which have traditionally been accomplished by the Dede would be taken on by the intuitions that were the extension of the central state. By modernization and urbanization processes, the social, juridical, political power and roles of the Dede in the closed Alevi communities would be claimed for by the modern institutions. (Shankland, 1999a: 320-322). Shankland claimed that the Dedelik has been transformed into a symbolic category as a result of modernization and urbanization processes. In fact, the Dedelik as a one of the basic institutions of traditional Alevilik have lost most of its traditional functions and was transformed into a symbolic category in the new urban setting. What is more, their religious roles gradually became useless. In short, the central social institutions which founded Alevilik in the form of an urban community, together with the limits that are depicted by these institutions, was in a moment of crisis.

The religious, social, economic and political signs of crisis were getting clearer. Alevilik was in crisis in terms of religion, since the religious rituals that have been designed according to the rural conditions of a closed society disappeared in the urban conditions. In the urban conditions, Alevis began to live in a disorganized way in different places, and thus, a loss in the possibility of contact and control among Alevis became inevitable. This was even the case for those Alevis who lived in the same neighborhood too: They lacked a shared authority who might establish a control over means of solidarity, who could coordinate Alevi residents in terms of religious affairs. What is more, residents of the same neighborhood could not have the required social mechanisms to manage the social life which was established according to modern division of labor. The break of traditional relationships between the Dede and the Talip lineages due to migration and dissolution caused intensification in the non-religious activities of urban Alevis. The Talip had no possibility of getting through to a Dede or a Musahip (religious-relative) to talk about their problems and to search for solutions to those problems. The Talip resorted to the apparatuses of the modern life, like unions, political parties, students' associations, local councils of solidarity, in order to cope with the problems of the modern world.

The central institution of traditional Alevilik, namely the Dedelik, which had undertaken the political, social, juridical and intellectual functions, was compelled to leave all of its functions except religious affairs to the related organs of the modern state in the modern urban conditions. This does not mean, yet, there was no problem in fulfilling the religious functions. There are two main problems for the Dede, about accomplishing the religious affairs: The first problem was about the dissolution of the basic institutions of traditional Alevilik in the urban conditions. The second problem was that, there was not any legal procedure to assume the existence of Alevilik as a system of beliefs, securing its religious contents and functions. Thus, the process of integration, which gained speed with urbanization, was providing Alevis with the use of modern economic, social, political and educational resources,

yet, at the expense of restriction of the Dedelik to the symbolic religious domain, robbing it of its traditional social, political and economic abilities.

The urban Alevi population, being released from the effects of basic institutions of traditional Alevilik, has politically got a leftist position in the nation-wide polarization with the influence of events of 1960's and 1970's (Schüler, Harald 1999: 157-186). This is not because the leftist paradigm had a special agenda devoted to the Alevi question (indeed, the left in Turkey kept away from ethnic and religious matters, even in 1970's, when it had its greatest social support). The reason why Alevis went in with the left should be sought in the Alevi dynamics per se. First of all, such leftist political discourses as equality and freedom can be said to have been compatible with the Alevi demands, since such terms as "exclusion" and "subjugation" was key to critical Alevi discourse. An important amount of Alevi intellectuals draw a parallel between the basic leftist arguments and Alevi discourse of equality and freedom, and thus they explain the joint between Alevilik and the left wing.²² (The "encounter" between Alevilik and left -wing cannot be an "alliance", since an "alliance" implies an agreement and harmony between the symmetrical participants. However, the parties of junction in the case of Alevi-left wing cooperation lacks a symmetry, since an Alevi individual had to give up the symbols of Alevilik in order to be a good leftist). It is quite clear that this point of view is questionable. First of all, such terms as equality, freedom and secularism appeared as the outcomes of modernity. I know through the historical works on Alevilik, however, that the traditional patterns that make up Alevilik has a historical roots of thousands years. Second, this point of view works on an essentialist perspective, that is to say, it strives to find an ahistorical essence to attach to Alevilik. However, I can simply argue here that, despite its metaphysical contents, Alevilik is constructed historically, has been perceived accordingly and reshaped in changing historical contexts, just like any belief system.²³ Also, I should keep in mind that although the domain of politics is/ can be formulated as a reflection of material conditions of life, that is to say, while it is true that politics is bound to a certain historical and social

²² See, for instance, Şener, Cemal 1998, *Aleviler Ne Yapmalı*, İstanbul: Ant, Yörükoğlu, R 1990, *Okunacak En Büyük Kitap İnsandır*, 1st edition, İstanbul: Alev Press.

²³ For historical and social evolution of religions, see: Iber, Max 1998, "Dünya Dinlerinin Toplumsal Psikolojisi", In *Din Sosyolojisi*, 2nd edition, Ankara: Vadi, pp, 165-177

context, it is not an immediate imagination or reflection of that conditions; it is something that is constructed historically and socially.

Second factor that affected the political attitudes of Alevis was related to secular character of the Republic. As Kehl-Bodrogi claimed (1997:13) that Alevis welcomed the Republic, because of that they considered the basic principles of laicism and nationalism as the best guarantors for putting an end to their religious discrimination, however they were still denied official recognition as a religious community. The Alevis were given the opportunity to advance on the social, economical and political level on condition that they didn't make a public issue of their religious and social identity. This historical perception that the Alevis shared had led to ally between the Alevis and political parties that emphasized laicism regardless their political stance as the left or the right until the closing down of Democrat Party in 1960. As Schüler explained (1999:163) that the Alevis who had voted for DP in the beginning of the 1950 went away from DP as a result of several factors that were related to the very close relationship between this party and Sunni communities, some declarations of Nur community, is one of the biggest religious orders that based on Sünnilik in Turkey, to support DP and some expressions of several ministers of DP that included respect for leaders of this community. In this context, the issue of existence of the Alevis seemed to forward to their economic, social, political and cultural demands.

The last factor was about political distinction that emerged in 1960s in the Alevis. As also Melikoff interpreted (1999c: 317-338) one the one hand, Alevis who were conservative and less educated tended to vote for RPP (RPP), Republican People Party, on the other hand, young Alevis who were educated in modern schools, and opened to new thoughts were divided into the different sections of the socialist left. While the conservative Alevis considered Kemalism as a guarantor for putting an end their social, economic and politic exclusions; the young Alevis, as Kehl-Bodrogi expressed (1997: 8) that took up once again the non-conformist tradition of the community by devoting themselves to egalitarian revolutionary ideologies. This led to change the borderline that had distinguished the community from outside world from a religious to an ideological level that referred to a historical transformation in

the collective definition of identity. And it was one of the basic clues that indicated the historical and social crisis of Alevilik in the new conditions of urban settings in its long history.

2.5. Alevi Movement as Reconstruction of Alevilik

It seems that Alevilik has lost its traditional institutions and social /historical bases in which it had existed and it has been reconstructed under the new conditions of urbanity and modernity for the last decades that gradually collapsed the traditional socio-religious organization with its specific forms of religious life, which could only function in a face to face society (Kehl-Bodrogi 1997: 13). Oral transmission of knowledge within the holy lineages, whose members had generally lost their authority, was interrupted. In this context, toward the end of the 1970's Alevilik was secularized to an important extent and its disappearance as a distinctive community appeared to be simply a matter of time (Camuroglu, 1997: 26). Additionally, urbanized generations grew up without being initiated into the esoteric doctrine contrary to those who had grown up in the circumstances of a closed society in which all aspects of Alevis' life were organized in regards to rules of the Alevi theology. Their Alevilik was reduced to the awareness of a common historical legacy, which defined them as victims of history but also as unbending fighters against injustice and suppression (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997:12).

The manifold radical social and political changes following the proclamation of the Republic divested the outside world of its hostile character and led to a gradual opening of the community. Additionally, Massive urban flow of the Alevis reinforced this process in the mid 1950's (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997: 12). As the community opened up to the outside world, it produced some outcomes that dramatically affected the community. The first outcome was related to changes in cultural map of Alevis. Therefore, Alevis became increasingly secular and left leaning, neglecting their traditional institutions due to the quality of the new conditions of urbanity and modernity (Zeidan, David 1999: 77). In this context, solidarity loosened, ritual and ceremony lost some of their meaning, and the Holy Lineages gradually lost their authority. The second outcome was related to changes

in the material circumstances of Alevis. The agriculture production and stockbreeding that characterized the essential components of Alevis' economic production was replaced by mode of capitalist production. This means that this transformation also signified an evolution from a closed society to an open society. It seems that the impacts of the transformation in the material circumstances of the Alevis Are more effective than the impacts of political, cultural, and educational dimensions of urbanity and modernity. On the one hand, the social and historical changes in the circumstances of the traditional Alevilik dramatically started to collapse the traditional organizations of Alevilik with their specific forms of religious life, on the other hand, cultural and political effects of modernity and urbanity gradually started to affect the community. During this period, there was another factor which needs to be explored that was related to no official recognition for Alevilik as a religious belief. Because, the state generally banned region from the public sphere and therefore also radically curtailed Sunni religious activities and institutions except for a specific form of Sunni Islam that was constructed as the official religion of state. The Alevis are given the opportunity to advance on the social, economical and political level on condition that they didn't make a public issue of their religious and social identity (Kehl-Bodrogi 1997: 10). The retention of the custom of taqiyya under the new circumstances turned to be out a convenient means to participate in the affairs of society in general.

First Alevilik, which started to be constructed as a subject of books and articles by some of Alevi authors, started to appear in the public sphere in the last 1980's. Then it started to be one of the basic issues that appeared in the public sphere of Turkey by the way of various Alevi institutions in beginning of 1990's²⁴. It appeared the first time as a religious and social movement in public sphere with the demand of official recognition in its long history. The Alevis have been trying to reconstruct Alevilik which was shaped in the circumstances of a closed society in regards to the needs of a open society for the last two decades against the situation that referred to dissolution of traditional Alevilik that was determined by the proclamation of the Republic and then the beginning of processes of migration, urbanization and modernization.

²⁴ For more information about studies on Alevilik in this time, see these studies: Figlali, Ethem Ruhi 1996, Türkiye'de Alevilik and Bektaşilik, İstanbul: Selçuk Press, Sener, Cemal 1998, and Ocak, Ahmet Yasar 2002.

The new Alevi movement wishes to reconstruct new boundaries which will distinguish the community from the outside world to replace the old boundaries that maintained the community as a whole from the outside world, which was demolished parallel to opening of the community and under new conditions of urbanity and modernity as mentioned above. Today, the new Alevi movement reconstructs the old social and religious boundaries with regards to the needs of community under conditions of urbanity and modernity against political and ideological boundaries that dramatically affected the community in the crises period of Alevilik. In this context, Alevis discuss the question of how the old boundaries and institutions reply the needs of the new historical and social period. Although Alevis agree on some of the answers of questions that are raised by modernity and urbanity, there are different positions within the new Alevi movement. It seems that basically there are two factors which affect the differences within Alevis. The first factor relates to political and ideological bases of the different approaches which determine the process of reconstruction of traditional Alevilik. The second factor that includes which institutions and concepts of traditional Alevilik will be kept or left relates to the first factor. This, there is no doubt, includes a hard struggle for how Alevilik should be defined. Thus, the various institutions within the new Alevi movement may be seen as a clue about the effects of these factors which are behind the conflicts within the Alevis.

It seems that the rediscovery of the Alevi community depends on various factors at various levels. Among them it can be roughly distinguished as sociological and political factors (Camuroglu, 1997: 25-27). The first factor which is in the domain of sociology relates to processes of migration and urbanization. The boundaries which strictly had maintained the Alevi community against the outside world and kept the inner discipline and solidarity among the Alevis for ages collapsed with the impacts of migration, urbanity and modernity. During this period the new boundaries that were characterized by political and ideological grounds started to replace the old ones that had been characterized by social and religious grounds within Alevis. Alevis have been reconstructing the new boundaries which are characterized by social and religious terms as to maintain the community from the outside for the last

two decades. In this context, there are two leading points which need to be mentioned: the first point is about that the inevitable quality of a boundary in the construction of a ethnic and religious identity (Barth, 1991), and the second one relates to the nature of a boundary which refers to a historical field which is flexible, relational, disclosure and continually needs to be defined (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992).

The Alevis started to migrate to urban area parallel to social and economic evolution of Turkey in 1950's. This migration process that accelerated in 1950's reached its peak in 1970's for economic and political reasons. The basic property of historical and social transformation, which Alevis have experienced since 1950's, relates to migration from rural to urban areas. Most of Alevis had lived in rural settings since 1950. They started to integrate to urbanized environment due to economic and political factors after that time. Rapid urbanization led to fundamental changes in the social, cultural and economic structures of the community. Therefore, the great increase in the number of educated Alevis and the emergence of an Alevi bourgeoisie resulted in new social stratification (Camuroglu, 1997: 26).

The second factor which affects the new Alevi movement in sociological sense relates to historical and social transformation in Turkey, as well as in the world, in 1980's. The rapid urbanization, social and economic changes, and the appearances of ethnic and religious groups in the public sphere are some of the clues about the basic social and historical features of the 1980's (Ocak, 2002: 312; Raudvere, 1999: 241 - 259). Additionally, the nature of international conjuncture which was characterized by post-modern philosophy and the politics of identity seemed to make it easy for ethnic and religious groups to appear in the public sphere of Turkey. In this context, the new Alevi movement appeared in these historical and social circumstances of Turkey. The process of social and cultural integration of Alevilik to urbanized Turkey constituted social and historical framework of the new Alevi movement.

In very broad terms, the political factors can be reduced to four essential points. The first point was about the military coup of the 1980 which led to collapse the alliance between the political left and Alevis, which was set up in 1960's and reinforced in 1970's, and this led to Alevis to seek new approaches. It seems that there were two

factors that affected the Alevis to move in new directions. The first one was related to politically and bodily collapse of political left due to military coup, the second one was related to the religious policy of the political left which ignored all demands of suppressed religious groups and called them as obstacles to the progression of history. Moreover, after the military coup, all dynamics such as Kurdish, Feminist, and Alevi movements, which were ignored by the political left during 1970's, started to appear in the public sphere in the late 1980's. In this sense, it may be said that the new Alevi movement took place as an outcome of a challenge to the old arguments of the political left about the suppressed religious groups.

The second important factor was the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or political Islam in Turkey (Camuroglu, 1997: 26; Ocak, 2002: 313-315; Zeidan, 1999: 78). As Camuroglu stated (1997: 26) that because of their considerable and extensive historical inheritance, the Alevis are put on alert by the Islamic reassertion, which had gained a new impetus through the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Parallel to the growth of political Islam, Alevis started to accelerate the process of organization as to protect themselves against the threats which might come from political Islamists. Additionally, ` the event of Sivas` that took place in July 1993, and the event of the district of Gazi that took place in Istanbul in 1994 accelerated the process of politicization of Alevis.

The next important factor was about the collapse of the Soviet block, which increased Alevis' political activism (Camuroglu, 1997 and Ocak, 2002). In addition to the effects of the military coup in 1980, the collapse of the Soviet bloc dramatically affected the historical outlook of Alevis. As a result of this development, socialism, which in the previous two decades had an indisputable authority as an ideological alternative for the young and middle generations of Alevis, lost its former importance. So, most of Alevis began to seek other paths. In the late 1980's many of them went towards Alevilik, and started to redefine themselves as Alevi. In this regard, they started to reconstruct Alevilik with modern terms, most of which they had taken from the political left such as laicism, egalitarianism, justice, freedom etc. Also they used means and experiences that they

had acquired from the political left during 1970's for the new Alevi movement in 1990's.

The last important factor that affected the new Alevi movement was Kurdish separatist movement, which started to extend social bases in the late 1980's (Ocak, 2002 and Camuroglu, 1997). It seems that it affected Alevis in two senses. On the one hand, the rise of Kurdish separatist movement seemed to encourage Alevis in their political activisms. On the other hand, it basically started to divide the Alevi community into two parts because of Kurdish Alevi population. For Alevis religious identity had been more important than ethnic identity until modernity and urbanity periods. Nevertheless, when they faced modernization and urbanization, modern ideologies affected the Alevi individual to a greater extent than the past. Today, although Alevilik has a significant effect on most of Alevis, modern ideologies which basically are characterized by the political left and nationalism are getting strong within the Alevi community.

As a result of these factors, Alevilik started to be reconstructed by Alevis in the late 1980's. In this time, the most common demand that mobilized the different segments of Alevis was about legalization of Alevilik and its rituals and practices. Nevertheless, there was a common demand on which Alevis agreed, there was a polarization around the definition of Alevilik and its basic rituals. This means that Alevilik started to be constructed theoretically by the different ideological and political approaches within Alevis, and this situation is valid for today. Of course, there is no problem in the reconstruction of Alevilik from the different points of views. But, it seems that there is a leading problem with their reading and writing strategies. All these approaches tend to interpret and reconstruct Alevilik and its traditional concepts and institutions using modern terms such as secularism, democracy, contemporariness, egalitarianism, freedom, nation, and ethnic origin of Alevilik. It seems that Alevilik is under threat of modern concepts and apparatus.²⁵

²⁵ The process of reconstruction and conceptualization according to modern concepts is valid for all forms of identity. Thus, this threat that mentioned above is at least valid for all pre-modernization concepts and relations. But, this process is more dangerous for Alevis than the other ethnic and religious identities due to the lack of a common theology and a centralized religious institution in Alevilik. In this sense, every modern reading of Alevilik which is based on a certain religious interpretation or ethnic group, may harm the syncretistic nature of Alevilik.

Therefore, on the one hand, they ignore the syncretistic nature of Alevilik; on the other hand they neglect all terms that have a history. Now I am examining the arguments of these approaches about Alevilik and its traditional institutions and relations.

There are six political and ideological positions about the new Alevi movement.²⁶ The first position talks of an Alevilik which is based on Turkishness and Islam, with a demand for legitimacy as a unique Islamic community, with a claim for legalization of their religious rituals and practice, integration of their doctrine into the state education system. The Cem Foundation typically represents this kind of position.²⁷ The most leading argument of this position is that Alevilik is the interpretation of Turks and most of components of Alevilik, such as the rights of woman, assembly, democracy, came from the culture of Turks. Also it is a humanistic interpretation of Islam. In this regard, needless to say; its humanistic quality comes from its content of Turkishness.

The second position is constituted by an interpretation of Alevilik which is based on the political left. As Ocak said (2002: 324), this approach constructs Alevilik as a project which is based on freedom, secularism, egalitarianism and democracy²⁸. Some uprisings in the long history of Alevilik such as Babailer, Sheikh Bedrettin, are essential to this kind of approach. It seems that the Pir Sultan Association typically represents this kind of position.

The third position is constituted by an interpretation of Ulema which is based on the interpretations of the Sunni authors. Although this position has a set of varying outlooks on Alevilik, it reduces Alevilik to the respect for Ali. Also it tries to define Alevilik in the circle of Islam and neglects its historical, cultural and religious backgrounds. Instead of this, it sees Alevi as the people who went astray although

²⁶ There are some studies on various differences in the new Alevi movement. See Ocak, Ahmet Yasar 2002, Melikoff, Irene 1999, Camuroglu, Reha 2000, Uzum, Ilyas 2000.

²⁷ Although the CEM Foundation represent this position, and this approach dramatically affect most of authors who concern on Alevilik such as Cemal Sener, Orhan Turkdogan, Riza Zelyut, Fuat Bozkurt.

²⁸ Some of representatives of this position are Fuat Bozkurt, Cemal Sener, and Arene Melikoff etc.

they have good intention. So, it tries to integrate them in Sunni form of Islam.²⁹ Furthermore, some representatives of this position tend to classify Alevis with good and bad terms. For example, Uzum (2000) and Turkdogan (1995) classified Alevis into two groups: those who participated in activities of the Cem Association as Alevis in sincerity, and those who participated in activities of the Association of Pir Sultan Association as ideological groups that used Alevilik.

The next position that concerns Alevilik is represented by Kurdish nationalist groups.³⁰ This is similar to the first approach which is characterized by Turkish nationalist groups. It claims that Alevilik is the interpretation of the Kurds and it is a synthesis of Kurdishness and Islamic components. Moreover, it is a humanitarian interpretation of Islam; its humanitarian property comes from its content of Kurdishness, like the first approach claims. Another interesting point which needs to be clarified is that this position sees a genetic link between Sunni form of Islam and social and cultural aspects of Arabian society. This means that Sunni Islam is Arabian interpretation of Islam.

Another important position that concerns Alevilik and its social and religious institutions is represented by typically Faik Bulut. This position has two main characteristics: the first one is that it refuses a genetic link between Alevilik as a religion and a certain ethnic group, the second one relates to the claim which rejects the argument that is based Islamic character of Alevilik.³¹ He states that Ali, the cousin of Prophet Mohammed, cannot be evaluated in the Alevi cosmology, but only should be evaluated in the circle of Islamic orthodoxy. Additionally, he thinks that the origin of Alevilik which is a syncretistic belief should be explored in ancient Anatolia, not in the classic distinction of Islam. In this context, he claims that Alevilik should be seen as a syncretism, which have based on the different cultures and religions.

²⁹ For such a position, see Uzum, Ilyas 2000, and Aktay, Yasin 2000.

³⁰ One of famous representatives of this position is Cemsid Bender. See, Bender, Cemsid, Kurt Uyguriliginda Alevilik, Istanbul: Kaynak Press, 1991.

³¹ Bulut, Faik 1998, Alisiz Alevilik, 2nd edition, Istanbul: Berfin Press. .

The last position which needs to be clarified is characterized by the argument which includes that Alevilik is a version of Shi'ism. This position is characterized by typically Rıza Zelyut.³² This position, which distinguishes Alevilik from Bektasilik perceives Alevilik in the classic distinction of Islam. According this, Alevilik which based on Ali should be constructed as a version of Islam, and it doesn't base on non-Islamic sources. It seems that this approach constructs Alevilik as a form of Shi'ism which basically emerged in the classic distinction of Islam, and according to it, historically Alevilik is based on Caferi theology which dramatically affected Shi'a tradition.

Although all these approaches have the different theoretical and political references, it seems that they are based on similar methodological ground. All of them conceptualize Alevilik using modern terms and apparatus such as nationalism, secularism, democracy, rights of woman, assembly, and egalitarianism. In this regard, Alevilik historically is understood as a unique, homogenous, and unchangeable category. So, they think that all ethnic and religious categories signify the same signified or refer to the same meaning settings forever, such as Kurd, Turk, Islam, Alevilik, and Sünnilik. In this sense, they always ignore these concepts may have different meaning or signified in different social and cultural forms.³³ From these points of views, the multi-ethnic and syncretistic structure of Alevilik is seen as a small problem, which needs to be overcome. In this context, there is a significant relationship between their perception of traditional Alevilik and what Alevilik will be, as what they will want in the future, because, the nature of quality of conjuncture where they interpret and act determines the content of issue of Alevi identity, tradition and the sources of Alevilik. As a result of this, it cannot be said that there is only a unique form of Alevilik. Today, there are several definitions of Alevilik that appear in public sphere through magazines, associations and books.

³² See, Zelyut, Rıza 1999, In *Türkiye'de Aleviler, Bektasiler, Nusayriler*, İstanbul: Ensar Press. Another representative of this position is Ehli Beyt group that are active in Çorum district.

³³ For example, Turkishness more referred to a social category than the others in period of Ottoman. A similar relation is valid for Kurdishness. Although *Kirmanj* word referred to those who are not in the social and political order of a tribe and engaged in agriculture as a social category in period of Ottoman, it started to be used to define dominant ethnic group as a political category in the nationalist and modernist conjunctures by the nationalist Kurdish intellectuals. For more knowledge about this matter, see Van Bruinessen, Martin 2001, pp. 73-76.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCHING ALEVILIK

3.1. Method

The data, which is assumed to provide answers for the basic questions posed in the introduction of the main theme of this study, were obtained through fieldwork. The field research, as a part of the main thesis, was based on ethnographic and participant observation techniques, which are both well known in qualitative and quantitative methodologies.

No hierarchical relationship among the possible field research methods is postulated. A possible preference which method was based on its current advantages for example efficiency, acquiring more detailed information and accommodating a larger amount of the respondents, acknowledging that the two methods, with effective employment, can complement each other. A combination of the two methods led to command the research. As it is well known, different schools of social sciences have different concepts about research methods. At this point, I will outline some important details that are firmly tied to these concepts, which will provide the study with an epistemological and methodological background.

The epistemological assumption of this study is a tendency to reject a set of research methods, which are based on the metaphysical postulations that claim ‘genuine knowledge’, as they are ahistorical. Basically, epistemological assumption of this study is that, there is no research strategy within the social sciences (including the questionnaire and in- depth interview) to acquire the ‘absolute knowledge’ of the field. This, of course, is not to say that there is no point in going to the field. What I mean by this assertion is that, as Gadamer points out (1975), the researcher, either with social or natural interest, approaches his object of research from a historical

context, with the intellectual rigging that characterizes the specific historical period. The accent here clearly falls upon the historical constraints on the researcher. This methodological outlook will dominate, implicitly or explicitly, the epistemological ground of this study. Interpretation and understanding are not peculiar to the source, scope and reliability of knowledge (that is, they are not distinctive characteristics of epistemology merely). These two human accomplishments, in their very essence, mark the condition of human existence, and they relate to the mode of being.

In relation to these methodological remarks, another point that deserves attention is the metaphysical opposition of ‘explanation versus understanding’, an opposition that has been prevalent in the traditional scientific discourse. The advent of the dichotomy of nomotetic versus idiographic social sciences depends to a significant extent on this opposition and gains a theoretical justification via it (Wallerstein, 1997, 2000). In fact, these two approaches act in accordance to the Newtonian scientific model. The former treats the social sciences as the natural sciences, and the latter, without opposing the outlook of the former, underlines particular characteristics of the social sciences, hence, it proposes a new methodology and epistemology. Wallerstein asserts that a prerequisite of transcending the domination of the Newtonian paradigm is to reject this traditional opposition in social sciences. In fact, the essential point is not about the way to transcend, or at least, treat, the impact of Newtonian paradigm in social sciences. The problem is that, this paradigm is now encountering many problems even in the natural sciences. While the term ‘explanation’, as a product of Enlightenment philosophy, has essentially been used to point to the supposed ‘objective’ relationship between objects of the natural sciences, the terms understanding-interpretation have been attached to the social sciences, to allude to the supposed ‘unstable’ or ‘obscure’ character of human relations. Consequently, the term explanation, being employed to connote the objective relations, has been identified with the natural sciences, while the term understanding has hitherto been employed to serve the social sciences.

This study discommends this firm opposition and suggests instead that the two concepts can be employed to compliment one another. In other words, a careful collaboration can make them supplement each other. Bernstein (1983) states that ontological hermeneutics has very important implications for the mentality of the

social and natural sciences that I employ. If understanding and its necessary component, interpretation, have to do with the essence of being, as Heidegger formulates, then all scientific forms, natural or social, will inevitably contain features of interpretation and understanding. Such an approach challenges those scientific principles that have been serving as a set of axioms for the natural and social sciences, which have been proposed by the enlightenment philosophy. Based on these ideas this study will lay aside the traditional ‘division of labor’ traditionally found in the social and natural sciences, which is based upon a supposed demarcation line between explanation and understanding. No attempt of explanation can be achieved without ‘understanding’, and any endeavour of understanding will fail unless an appropriate explanation of the internal relations of its subjects is provided. What is more, every attempt of explanation and understanding inevitably includes interpretations, biases and fore-structures (Gadamer, 1975 and Bernstein, 1983). All these commentaries are to give a brief account of the study of the epistemological limits of science, which has hitherto been under the serious impact of positivism.

3.2. Research Techniques

3.2.1. Sampling

The fieldwork consisted of 208 questionnaires that were applied to the Alevis who are syncretistic religious community and 6 in-depth interviews conducted with selected the respondents from the population of the Alevi community in Ankara. In the survey the technique of sampling was used mainly in order to gather data about the Alevis. In the field two steps that are related to each other were followed: the first step was about selecting members of the Alevi associations by employing random sample. In this way 104 Alevis who are members or participating in Alevi associations were selected to participate in the questionnaires. There are several Alevi organizations in Ankara such as Pir Sultan Abdal Association, Hacı Bektaş Veli Foundation, and Cem Cultural House. In the selection of these organizations some criteria were considered: the first criteria was related to the number of Alevis, so the districts that had a considerable Alevi population were selected, these were Dikmen and Abidin Paşa. Because it was assumed that there is a strong relationship between these organizations and the Alevi masses in these areas. The districts that

were selected for fieldwork had several Alevi organizations such as the Pir Sultan Abdal Association, Hacı Bektaş Veli Foundation and Cem Cultural House. The second consideration was the religious content of the districts that are selected for the fieldwork. Since there are several Alevi organizations in these areas, some clues about the map of religious distributions becomes evident. In this context, the fieldwork was conducted in the Alevi organizations of these districts. These Alevi organizations are Hacı Bektaş Foundation established in Dikmen, Cem Cultural House, Pir Sultan Abdal and Hacı Bektaş Veli associations established in Abidin Paşa or Mamak³⁴.

The process of applying the questionnaires was based on the two steps that are related each other: The first one was selecting 104 the respondents randomly (the single numbers considered) from the lists of the members of the Alevi associations. Then the questionnaires were given to them. The second step was to establish a control group and 104 questionnaires were given to people who are not members or participating in any of the Alevi associations through contribution of each member of experiment group, that is each of them suggested us a respondent who wasn't member of any Alevi organization. In this study all the respondents were selected randomly, thereby avoiding the technique of quota which is based on the consideration of different independent categories such as age, ethnical origin, education etc.

3.2.2 Questionnaire

The questionnaire consisted of 125 questions with 7 different sections. The first section was related to the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents. The second was relevant to the socio-economic status of the respondents. The third sections included the questions regarding migration processes of the respondents. The fourth section included the different properties of the religious

³⁴ It may be say that there are some distinctions between Dikmen and Abidin Paşa regarding the types of house (apartment/ squatter), the class positions (middle class / working class), the amount of time spending in the city (the more / the less) etc. In the distinctions of these districts that are mentioned in the parenthesis the first one refers to Dikmen, the second one signs Abidin Paşa. For the comparative analysis about the Ankara district culturally, economically and socially, see Ayata, s; Ayata, A.G., 1996, "Kent Yaşamı ve Kent Kültürü" T.C. Başbakan, Toplu Konut İd. Başkan., Konut Araşt. Dizisi, 10, Ankara: ODTÜ Press.

dimensions that in the form of arise in the form of 9 subsections. The subsections were regarding: religious identity, holy men (dede), Musahiplik, fasting, aşura (a dessert with wheat grains), Muslim festival of sacrifice, the Cem house, the Alevi associations, and the religious policy of the state. The fifth section was investigating the features of the social life of the Alevis. The sixth section was related to the perceptions of identity of the Alevis and the last one was relevant to the political attitudes of the Alevis. Fieldwork was started in June of 2003 and was finished in January of 2004.³⁵

3.2.3 In-depth Interview

This technique that was constructed according to the method of this thesis was performed with the consideration of three basic criteria: The first criteria that was used to an in-depth interview select the respondents for was related to respondent who had migrated to Ankara from rural areas in the last decade and had a little experience in Ankara. The second criteria that was used was related to the respondent who had lived in rural areas, became socialized there, migrated to an urban place at his-her early years of youth. The last criteria that was used to select the respondents for in-depth interviews included the respondents who were born in urban places and hasn't experienced living in the rural areas. By using these three criteria I expected to understand the various forms of relationships between the different socialization processes and the different forms of circumstances of the Alevi population and their various attitudes towards religious institutions, rituals, politics, the construction of identity, and the perception of Alevilik within urban setting.

In addition to these areas, this technique was also used to provide information about the history, the basic characteristics, the basic forms of sources of finance,

³⁵ Three interviewers who are experienced in the fieldwork Are performed this project. It was carefully considered to fit the academic formation of the interviewers with the features of this fieldwork. As a matter of fact two of the interviewers graduated from the department of sociology at METU, Middle East Technical University, are now graduate students at the same department of the same university, another interviewer graduated from the Department of Folklore of Ankara University is now a student at the Department of Sociology of METU. Before administrating the questionnaires, the interviewers had been briefed about the peculiars of fieldwork, and studied the content of questionnaire in detail.

activities, the criteria of being an member of the Alevi associations that were used as a subject of this thesis, and how they distinguish themselves from other Alevi organizations, as well as investigating the written sources that they had. To this end, three representatives of different Alevi associations were interviewed to provide this information.

3.2.4. Participant Observation

One of the main concerns of this study was to understand how Alevis perceive and enact their religious institutions and rituals in the face of urbanity. In this context, understanding the atmosphere of the Cem ritual as the main ritual of the Alevi religious world was one of the main ways of providing the necessary information about both inner world of the Alevi who participated in these rituals, and the inner relationship among the participants during the Cem ritual. In this respect, the questions asked in order to understand the religious activities of these Alevi associations, were how they organized these activities, who participated in these activities their age, sex, education etc, and what was the inner relationship of the Cem ritual including the hierarchical relations, the order of sitting, the forms of entry and exit of participants etc³⁶.

3.3. Pilot Study

Before the fieldwork was performed, a pilot study had been made with 30 questionnaires at different Alevi associations in Dikmen and Mamak/Abidin Paşa. As a result of this pilot study became clear that the questions which were unfit for fieldwork, needed to be dropped. One question was whether or not the person was a member of trade union, and who they interacted with outside of the house etc. Some of questions on the questionnaire also were rewritten because of the result of the pilot study these questions were on the questionnaires uncoded and them transformed to the coded form. Furthermore, the questions regarding the attitude of religion that had been originally constructed as mixed on the questionnaire were transformed into different sections. For example, while the questions on the

³⁶ In order to understand these forms of relations during a cem ritual, I participated regularly in a cem ritual organized by the Cem Cultural House Association on Thursdays for five months in 2003.

questionnaire before the performance of the pilot study were constructed as mixed regardless of the peculiarities of fieldwork, these questions were later reconstructed into different sections in the questionnaire after pilot study. Thus the questions about the religious properties of the Alevis were reconstructed into different sections and became the sections of the dede, the Musahip, the fasting, the aşura, the festival of sacrifices etc.

Before I started to conduct the questionnaires, I interviewed the representatives of the Alevi associations about the history of the associations, the forms of their activities, the calendar of monthly activities, their sources of finance, the criteria of being a member of their association, and how they distinguish their association from other Alevi associations etc. In light of the information I received the content and framework and the process of planning of questionnaire was formed. As a result of this I finally constructed the questionnaire in its last form and customized to the fieldwork.

3.4.The Space of Field Work

As is understood from the title of this thesis the space of the thesis is urban places. In this respect, Ankara constitutes the boundary of the fieldwork. It is one of the cities in Turkey which has significant Alevi population. It cannot be known what the exact the population of Alevis are in Ankara or in Turkey because the demographic studies don't use religious and ethnic category in Turkey. Nevertheless, I can estimate the Alevi population in Ankara by looking at the religious properties of the cities that are giving the population to Ankara by way of migration.

The population of Ankara is 4.007.860 according to the census of 2000. In addition to this, the population of Ankara has been increasing steadily since it became the capital of Turkey (Tekeli, 1982). As it is seen from figure 1, the growth rate of the population of Ankara has varied from %62 to %21 in a five-year period.




Figure 1: Yearly the rate of increase in the population of Ankara 1927-2000

Source: 2000 Genel Nüfus Sayımı Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri 06-ANKARA T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2001 pp. 26.

The rate of growth in the population of Ankara has been stable for each of five years since 1980's at around 20 %. The rate of increase in the population of Ankara depends on the rate of migration in general. In this respect, while the population of Turkey has increased 5 times (from 14 to 70 millions), as it is seen from figure 2, the population of Ankara has increased 10 times from 1927 to 2000. Furthermore, the total numbers of migrants who migrated to Ankara was 397 753 during the time from 1985 to 1990. The census of 1990 had statistical data about the migrants, according to this data, the population of Ankara was 2 909 946 in 1985, and grew to 3 236 626 in 1990. During this period, the rate of increase in the population of Ankara was %21.28. As a result of this, around 10% of Ankara's total population is from migrants.




Figure 2: The size of the population of Ankara 1927-2000

Source: 2000 Genel Nüfus Sayımı Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri 06-ANKARA T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2001.

As it can be seen in Table 1, the migratory population of Ankara has come mainly from Çorum, 174.084, Yozgat, 152.306, Çankırı, 110.262, Kırşehir, 94.080, and Sivas, 84.591. Also the rate of those were born in Çorum is %4.3, Yozgat is % 3.8, Çankırı is % 2.7, Kırşehir is % 2.3, and Sivas is % 2.1 in total population of Ankara. When I look carefully at those cities which were giving significant population to Ankara, there are three cities in which the Alevi population is most: Çorum, Sivas and Yozgat. The fieldwork was to prove this situation. Most of those who were given the questionnaires and in-depth interviews had migrated from one of these cities mentioned. Additionally, in the case of looking at other cities that had given the Alevi migration to Ankara, it can be said that there is a significant Alevi population in Ankara.

The population of Ankara with construction of born places.

Province	Population	Province	Population
ADANA	20 792	KONYA	45 578
ADIYAMAN	5 215	KÜTAHYA	5 842
AFYON	13 587	MALATYA	28 084
AĞRI	10 556	MANİSA	9 139
AMASYA	24 470	K.MARAŞ	15 785
ANKARA	2 106 146	MARDİN	12 616
ANTALYA	8 832	MUĞLA	5 036
ARTVİN	17 875	MUŞ	6 164
AYDIN	7 535	NEVŞEHİR	31 691
BALIKESİR	13 969	NİĞDE	27 819
BİLECİK	3 676	ORDU	28 803
BİNGÖL	3 439	RİZE	19 896
BİTLİS	6 171	SAKARYA	7 924
BOLU	47 621	SAMSUN	38 476
BURDUR	3 673	SIĞIRCI	5 600
BURSA	13 219	SİNOP	11 449
ÇANAKKALE	5 858	SİVAS	84 591
ÇANKIRI	110 262	TEKİRDAĞ	4 242
ÇORUM	174 084	TOKAT	32 854
DENİZLİ	7 916	TRABZON	27 324
DİYARBAKIR	18 753	TUNCELİ	8 328
EDİRNE	4 639	ŞANLIURFA	10 746
ELAZIĞ	15 681	UŞAK	4 099
ERZİNCAN	19 931	VAN	8 395
ERZURUM	57 267	YOZGAT	152 306
ESKİŞEHİR	28 470	ZONGULAK	13 111
GAZİANTEP	11 428	AKSARAY	22 892
GİRESUN	11 519	BAYBURT	8 309
GÜMÜŞHANE	18 427	KARAMAN	4 471
HAKKARİ	1 404	KIRIKKALE	85 530
HATAY	14 623	BATMAN	4 121
ISPARTA	12 223	ŞIRNAK	1 930
İÇEL	15 581	BARTIN	7 880
İSTANBUL	50 515	ARDAHAN	20 271
İZMİR	23 471	IĞDIR	4 325
KARS	47 867	YALOVA	805
KASTAMONU	20 498	KARABÜK	10 709
KAYSERİ	54 990	KİLİS	2 755
KIRKLARELİ	3 682	OSMANİYE	5 363
KIRŞEHİR	94 080	DÜZCE	4 188
KOCAELİ	7 442		

Table 1: The population of Ankara with construction of birthplace, 2000³⁷.

3.5. Some Problems faced in fieldwork.

One of the biggest problems that I had during the course of the fieldwork was that most of the representatives of the Alevi associations and the respondents were unwilling to help us understand perform the fieldwork, especially in the beginning of the fieldwork. This situation might be as a result of several reasons. The first reason is that the Alevi institutions and masses didn't have a lot of experiences about fieldworks like this. The second one, perhaps this is more crucial than the first one, might relate to the historical and social circumstances of the Alevi population in Turkey, the Alevis as a traditionally subordinated group hesitated to answer the questions of the questionnaire at the beginning of the fieldwork, because most of them feel still the fear due to threats that may come from the outside world.

Since we came there from the "outside", we were faced with a certain "distrust" state. Before we would give most of them the questionnaire, they wondered who we were, and why we were performing this fieldwork and for whom. After we explained who we were and had some conversations, most of them would believe that we were "good boys". Nevertheless, some of them insisted on calling us "agents of MIT³⁸". This situation of distrust against us was not limited to the attitudes of the representatives of the Alevi organizations and the members of these organizations during administering of the questionnaire at the Alevi associations, in addition to these, especially when we visited some of the respondents in their houses we were not allowed to give the questionnaire to them. But later, those who had rejected us give at their houses accepted to be given the questionnaire at the Alevi organizations. Later as we learnt from the

³⁷ Source: 2000 Genel Nüfus Sayımı Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri 06-ANKARA T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2001.

³⁸ MIT is the short for The Organization of National Intelligent of Turkey.

representatives of the Alevi organizations, those who had refused to be given the questionnaire tried to learn more information about us from the Alevi associations.

Another trouble that we faced during the fieldwork was that we sometimes encountered the accusation of some of being “separatist” by some of the Alevis. They claimed that the questions on the questionnaire were motivated by the separatist feeling among the Alevis, and they argued that they had no their problems with own identity, and they had no problems with the state’s religious policy and the Sunni community and that they were all Turks and Muslims. In these situations we avoided discussing these problems with them, and we tried to summarize the basic goals of this study several times. Many times we were able to overcome these problems with the help of the respondents that had already been given to the questionnaire.

In the last stage of the fieldwork we had established good relationships with the representatives and the participants of the Alevi associations, and sometimes some of them persuaded others to participate in the questionnaire.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIO- DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

4.1. General Description

The questionnaires were applied to 208 persons. The marital status of the respondents is: 66.3 percent are married, 26.4 are single and 6.3 percent are the divorced, widowed or widower. In addition to this, the number of women is 25 percent and the number of men is 75 percent. Further, while all of them do know Turkish, the rate of Turkish speaking is 69.2 percent, Kurdish speaking, including Zazaish, is 30.3 percent, and Arabic speaking is 0.5 percent taking into consideration their mother tongue.

4.2. Educational Features of the Respondents

It seems that lycee and university are two basic categories that characterize educational level of the respondents. While other categories of education take a significant place in educational level of the respondents, there is a significant inclination that indicates the impacts of modern education on the individual Alevi. It can be seen from Table 2, 7.2 percent of the sample express their educational status as illiterate, the rate of those who didn't participate in any school but are literate, is 6.3 percent. The rate of those who graduated from primary school is 17.8 percent, the rate of those who graduated from secondary school is 12.5 percent, of those who graduated from high school is 24.5 percent, and of those who graduated from a university is 22.6 percent, furthermore, 8.2 the respondents are currently students at a university. If this is added to the rate of those who already have graduated from a university, this rate will be around 30.8 percent, and if it is added to rate of those who graduated from high school, the rate of those who graduated from high school will be 32.7 percent. As a result of these statistics, it can be said that the rate of those who have graduated from high school and university is 55.3 percent, and the rest of the respondents have graduated from primary and secondary schools are illiteracy.

The Educational level of the Respondents' father is very different from the respondents. While high school and university are two main categories that characterize educational level of the respondents, illiterate, literate and primary school are main categories that dominantly characterize educational level of the respondents' fathers. As it is seen from Table 2, 22.9 percent of those who participated in the questionnaire expressed their father's educational level as illiterate, and 24 percent expressed their father's education level as not having schooling but are literate. The percentage of those who stated that their father's educational level as having graduated from primary school is 27.4 percent, those who graduated from secondary school is 7.7 percent, those who graduated from high school is 11.1 percent and those who graduated from university is only 1.9 percent.

Educational level of the respondents' mothers dramatically differs from the respondents' educational level and relatively differs from the respondents' fathers' educational level. It seems that illiterate is the basic category that characterizes educational level of the respondents' mother. In addition to this, the rest of the percentage consists of literate and primary school categories. As it is shown in Table 2, 54.8 percent of those who participated in the questionnaire expressed their mother's educational level as illiterate, 13.9 percent of the respondents stated that their mother had no schooling but was literate. The number of those who expressed their mother's educational status as having graduated from primary school is 20.2 percent, those who graduated from secondary school is 7.7 percent, those who graduated from high school is 2.9 percent and those who have graduated from a university is only 0.5 percent.

When we compare educational level of the respondents with their fathers' and mothers' educational level considering the outcome of the fieldwork, it seems that there is a dramatic shift due to migration, modernization and urbanization. These developments dramatically modify educational level of the Alevis.

Table 2: Educational Level of the respondents

	Education Level of the respondents	Education Level of the respondents' Fathers	Education Level of the respondents' Mothers
Illiterate	7,9	27,9	54,8
Literate	6,9	24,0	13,9
Primary School	19,6	27,4	20,2
Secondary School	13,8	7,7	7,7
Lycee	27,0	11,1	2,9
University	24,9	1,9	, 5
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0
Not applicable			
Unknown			
Total			
Grand Total			

4.3. Age of the Respondents

As it is shown in Table 3, 22.6 percent of the respondents were born before 1944, 33.2 percent of the respondents were born between 1945 and 1964, 40.4 percent of the respondents were born between 1965 and 1984, and rest of the respondents were born after 1985. This age interval is constructed regarding to the boundary that distinguishes one generation from another. From this table it can be said that of the respondents is located mostly from 1945 to 1985, this means that most of the respondents are between 19 and 59 years old.

Table 3: Age of the respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
1944 and under	47	22,6	22,6	22,6
1945-1964	69	33,2	33,2	55,8
1965-1984	84	40,4	40,4	96,2
1985 and above	8	3,8	3,8	100,0
Total	208	100,0	100,0	

4.4. The Size of the Respondents' Household

The size of the respondents' household consists of mostly 2, 3, or 4 persons. This number reflects 81.3 percent of all respondents. This percentage indicates that the

most of those who participated in the study live in a nuclear family setting. The number of the household which consists of 5,6, or 7 persons is only 17.3 percent. Nevertheless, this percentage does not refer to extend family exclusively because some of the nuclear families sometimes have more than 4 people residing. The rest of percentage, 1.4 percent, refers mostly to students living alone and away from their family. In this context, it can be said that migration, modernization and urbanization dramatically change the size of the respondents' household. While extend family dominantly characterized the family structure of the respondents pre-migration period, nuclear family is main category that characterize the family structure of the Alevis in an urban setting.

4.5. The Socio-Economical Characteristics

4.5.1. The Types of Work of The Respondents

As it is seen from Table 4, the most significant types of work that the respondents have relate to work as workers, which mean they work in other's businesses and earn a salary. The rate of this type of work is 36.5 percent. While 41.7 percent of them work at the public sector, 58.3 percent of them work in the private sector.

Table 4: Occupational Status of the respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Wage earners	76	36,5	36,5	36,5
Self-employed	10	4,8	4,8	41,3
Retired	61	29,3	29,3	70,7
Unemployed	18	8,7	8,7	79,3
Student	20	9,6	9,6	88,9
Housewife	23	11,1	11,1	100,0
Total	208	100,0	100,0	

The second significant percentage is that constituted by those who have retired from the public and private sectors, which represents 29.3 percent. 86.6 percent of those who were retired were retired another's business. Those who were self-employment and retired represent 13.4 percent. In this respect, if the rate of those who retired from at another's business is added to those who work at another's

business, the number becomes 60.5 percent. It can be said from this, which are not self-employment and are workers who receive a salary. Also if the rate of those who retired as a self employed is added to those who work as a self employed, the number becomes 10.1 percent.

The third significant trend in types of work consists of housewives that which is 11.1 percentage. During the process of the survey, I was faced with the respondents who stated that their job was a housewife, I asked for husband's job in order to understand the forms of work. Therefore, at the coding process of data the data about the housewife's work was distributed to the types of work with respect to their husband's job. In this state, the rate of those who work at another's workplace became 51.2 percent, the rate of those who are self-employed is 9.5 percent, and the rate of those who are retired becomes 36.3 percent. In this respect, if the rate of those who retired as a worker is added to the rate of those who currently work as a worker, the total is 86 percent.

The other the respondents reported their job as being a student; this rate is 9.6 percent. The unemployment rate is 8.7 percent, and those who own their own business is 4.8 percent. If I consider the housewives' husbands' job, the rate of those who are self-employed become 9.5 percent.

4.2.2.2. The Type of Housing

While 82.7 percent of the respondents inhabit an apartment, 17.2 percent of the respondents inhabit a squatter's house. This ratio corresponds to the where the questionnaires were given to the respondents, because more than half of the respondents live in Dikmen which is one of the districts in Ankara which are apartmentized. Those who stated that they inhabit a squatter's house mostly live in Tuzlucaıyir and Altındag that are less apartmentized.

65. 9 percent of the respondents stated they own their house, and 34.1 percent of them stated that their housing situation is that of a renter. Among the owners 48.9 percent stated that they have a separate title deed, 24.4 of them stated they have a title deed that divided the house and property into shares, and the rest stated to have the document of appropriation of the title deed. In addition to these, among the owners, only 32.3 percent of them claimed to have real estate other than the house. Nevertheless, it was too difficult to systemize because of a lack of information, and the mistrustful atmosphere between `us` and `them` etc.

4.2.2.3. The Size of Income of the respondents

Table 5: Level of Income

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
500 and under	50	24,0	24,8	24,8
501-1000	86	41,3	42,6	67,3
1001-1500	43	20,7	21,3	88,6
1501-2000	9	4,3	4,5	93,1
2001-2500	6	2,9	3,0	96,0
2501 and above	8	3,8	4,0	100,0
Total	202	97,1	100,0	
Not applicable	6	2,9		
	208	100,0		

As seen from Table 5, 24.8 percent of the respondents reported their monthly salary as being under 500 million Turkish Liras. The highest density in the distribution of salary was between 501 million and one billion Turkish Liras. 42.6 percent of the respondents reported that their monthly salary was between 501 million and one billion Turkish Liras. Also, the first two groups constitute 67.3 percent of the whole. Which means that 67.3 percent of the respondents live on fewer than one billion Turkish Liras. It can be said that most of the respondents who reported that their monthly salary was between 501 million and one billion inhabit Mamak considering the outcome of the fieldwork. In this sense, it seems that there is a significant relationship between income of the respondents and their place of residence. This means that those who earn less monthly tend to inhabit

Mamak rather than Dikmen. The next largest category consists of those who earn between 1 and 1.5 billion Turkish Liras monthly. The percent of this group is 21.3. It can be said that most of them inhabit Dikmen considering the outcome of the fieldwork. The rest of the respondents who earn more than 1.5 billion Turkish Liras constitute 11.4 percent of all. It seems that a great part of them inhabit Dikmen. This means that those who earn more monthly tend to inhabit Dikmen when I compare the two neighborhoods of Ankara with each other. It can be seen that this distribution of monthly salary may be classified into four parts in economic terms: the first category is constituted by those who share the minimum living standard, this group may be called the lower class of the Alevi community in Ankara. The second group which is the biggest group of the respondents constitutes the lower middle class of the Alevi community in Ankara. The third group, which is the third biggest group in the Alevi community of Ankara, constitutes the middle class, and the last group, which is the smallest group, constitutes the upper class of the Alevi community in Ankara. It seems that a socio-economic distinction within the Alevis is based on the socio-economic and educational grounds. In this case, there is a significant relationship between the level of income of the respondents and their place of residence, the educational level of the respondents and their place of residence and their educational level and their level of income. These distinctions seem to fit one of the assumptions of this thesis that include the distinction between Dikmen and Mamak based on socio-economic ground.

4.3. The ways of Migration Process of the Respondents

Those who were given to questionnaires came to Ankara from different regions of Turkey at various time periods. The distribution of the respondents to these different regions is: those who came to Ankara from Central Anatolia at 56.1 percent, those from Eastern of Anatolia at 36.7 percent, those who came from Black Sea at 2.6 percent, those who came from South-eastern of Anatolia at 1.5 percent, those from Mediterranean at 3.1 percent. Among these regions only two seem significant because of high numbers from the whole population: Central

Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia. These statistics seem to fit the distribution of the whole Alevi Population in Turkey, because most of the Alevi population traditionally in these regions.

Most of those who were given the questionnaires are born out of Ankara, and later to migrated to it. The percentage of those who are born in Ankara is 19,7. In addition to this, the percentage of those who stated that Ankara was their hometown is only 4,3. As the result of this data it can be said that these statistics dramatically refer to migration process in Turkey.

Also this data seems to fit the pattern of the process in Turkey that started in the 1950's. This geographical movement started to increase in the last years, especially between 1970 and 1980. The data regarding the time in which the respondents migrated to Ankara consistently show the general migration trend in Turkey in regards to the aspect of the time period. In this aspect, the peak of migration from rural to urban areas occurred between 1970 and 1980 as a general trend in Turkey. This migration trend is also valid for the Alevi migration to Ankara. The data shows us migration of the respondents reached its peak during the 1970's. The percentage at this time was 28, 8. Also the data shows us that the second biggest geographical movement occurred during the 1960's, its percentage was 22,6. Another point migration process that needs to be mentioned is that after the 1970's, the size of migration from rural to urban areas has been decreasing. The percentage of the respondents who migrated to Ankara was 15,9 in the 1980's, and was 15,4 percent after 1991.

The very short time in history in regards to the process of urbanization and modernization in Turkey led to dramatically restrict the interaction between individuals who started to live in the urban places and the urbanized environment. In this respect, the most of the respondents, about 80 percent of all, have very short histories with the urban experience, about 45 years. Furthermore, most of the samples, 76 percent, have relations with their hometown in various forms,

such as going there every year, several times a year, once time in several years etc. This data indicates a very clearly the strong relationship between migrants and their hometowns. As Keles pointed out (1990:359), the relationship between city and rural cannot be seen as discontinuity content, but can be read as continuity content especially in the developing countries. Nevertheless, the content of these relations cannot be reduced to only one category such as the economic relations. The relations between migrants and their hometown can be divided into three domains: the first domain contains the holiday activities, 79.5 percent of the respondents that reported to have relations to their hometown have leisure relations with their hometown. The second domain includes the economical relations between urban and rural places. In this respect, 9.6 percent of the respondents stated to having economical relations with their hometown. The food and money that is gained from the land constitute the content of the economic relations. The third domain is relevant to the funeral ceremony, 10.9 percent of the respondents reported going to their hometown to participate in funeral ceremonies.

This survey also gives information about the different ways of migration of the respondents to Ankara. It seems that the ways of migration that the Alevis followed can be classified in five points. The first way of migration to Ankara, which constitutes the highest percentage, was that of migrating alone. 43.2 percent of the respondents reported migrating to Ankara this way, and those who came this way to Ankara are usually men. This is the most significant way the respondents migrated. The second highest percentage the way of migration that includes a whole family migrating to Ankara. The percentage of is 31.6. The third way of migration is where the respondents migrated to Ankara with their relatives such as uncles, aunts, grandfathers, neighbours etc. the percentage of this inclination is 12.6. Another way of migration is through marriage and is often valid for women. In this way, some who inhabited rural areas migrated to Ankara. The rate of this pattern is 9.2 percent. The last way of migration, which is inferred from the Table 4, relates to those who came to Ankara to live with their children because of their old age. The rate of this inclination is 3.4 percent.

What are the dramatic changes that have occurred in the types of work related to the transformation of the social-economical structures? Before migrating to Ankara or other urban places, the most had occupations in agriculture and stockbreeding. In this respect, most of the samples, 89 percent, reported to have engaged in agriculture and stockbreeding occupations before coming to Ankara. 9.5 percent of the respondents reported to have worked as a civil servant and a laborer, the rest reported to engage in work as a tradesman before coming to Ankara. These patterns can be seen as the outcome of the traditional type of production. In this production order, the land is the main means of production. With the beginning of the process of migration and urbanization, the means and the logic of production started to change dramatically due to the mode of capitalist production. As was shown in the earlier discussion about the types of work the respondents in the urban place hold, this process led to changes in the types of work in the urban areas. While the respondents are engaged in agriculture and stockbreeding in the rural setting, they started to engaged in various work in the urban as a worker, civil servant, engineer, teacher, lawyer etc.

This trend in the types of the work can be seen in the transformation of the jobs among the different generations. 69.2 percent of the respondents expressed their father's occupation as a farmer or peasant that fit into the main type of agricultural production. 25 percent of them stated their father's job as civil servant and worker, and the rest of them reported them as tradesman. Nevertheless, approximately 86 percent of the respondents stated as to working at for another's business as a laborer or as a civil servant at the circumstances in the urban setting. This pattern displays that the forms of work have been changing dramatically with the end of the process of migration from rural to urban areas. This process not only changes the types of work that people have, but also modifies the work itself. So that there are a lot of different types of jobs that have emerged with the process of urbanization and modernization due to the logic of the capitalist mode of production.

CHAPTER V

SELF PERCEPTION OF THE RESPONDENTS

5.1. Introduction

Alevilik is one of the most important social and political movements in Turkey which has been emerging in the public sphere since the late 1980's. Of course, the political and social dynamics of this period have been varying with the rise of political Islam, the resistance of the Kurdish national movement, the feminist movement etc. Besides the inner dynamics of Turkey, the conjuncture of the world that was characterized by the politics of identity and the decrease of the importance of class politics stepped up this social and historical process in Turkey. In this context, the politics of religious and ethnic identities have been the main constitutive agents in the social and political life in Turkey for the last two decades.

It is obvious that the process of migration from rural to urban areas that began in beginning of 1950's affected the Alevis as well as the Sunnis. With the processes of migration, modernization and urbanization the Alevis started to live in the new social, political, economical and cultural circumstances of the urban places as the Sunnis did. The main features of this historical transformation in the material and spiritual circumstances of the Alevis were examined in the previous chapter. Thus, here these aspects will not be discussed again. In this respect, only one crucial point for the scope of this thesis needs to be emphasized.

I am going to concern with whether the religious community that had been constructed in the material and spiritual circumstances of the rural areas maintains its traditional mechanisms that had multi-functions or not in the new historical and social circumstances of the urban places. If it does maintain them, how does it

maintain them? If it doesn't maintain them, what kinds of mechanisms replaces them, and, in addition to these, how is the individual Alevi who lives in an urban place now perceive and conceptualize Alevilik as a religious understanding, and how does he/she define his or her religious identity and with what kinds of references and argumentations. Then I will examine the religious patterns of the respondents that are derived from the data regarding their philosophical, political, economical, and cultural grounds. How those patterns relate to the traditional mechanism of Alevilik, including the contraction between the Dede and the Talip, the contraction of Musahiplik, and the Cem ceremony as the basic ritual of Alevilik, fasting and sacrificing

In addition to these aspects, I will examine how the individual Alevi interprets the contents of religious policy of the state, and how he or she constructs his or her political identity through what kinds of referent systems that include religious, ethnic and ideological domains. Then, I will examine the relations of the individual Alevi with the Sunni and how he or she perceives a Sunni through the bond of marriage. Lastly I will examine political attitudes of the individual Alevi and what kinds of factors that affect the content of these political attitudes in this chapter.

Since the framework that is relevant to historical evaluation of Alevilik was given in the theoretical chapter, it will not be mentioned again if it is not necessary.

5.2 Alevilik as Perceived by the Respondents

As mentioned in the second chapter, there has been no agreement about the content of Alevilik because of the different criteria which has been used for its conceptualization. In this realm, basic meta theoretic positions for what Alevilik is can be divided into three areas. The first theoretic position constructs Alevilik as a belief within circle of the Islam in two ways; one includes it as a sect of Islam, the other as the Real Islam. This first approach constructs the origin of Alevilik within the classic conflict of Islam, namely the opposition between the supporters of the

Caliph Ali and the others.³⁹ As can be seen from Table 6, in this survey, 52.7 percent of the respondents view Alevilik as the Real Islam or a sect of Islam. This pattern is seen as the most significant inclination in the realm of the definition of Alevilik among others. The second significant tendency about the definition of Alevilik is a way of life or a culture.⁴⁰ This approach stresses the non-Islamic features of Alevilik, and constructs it as a sort of syncretism. 45.2 percent of the respondents construct it as a culture or a way of life. Besides, one of the most important points for this thesis that needs to be emphasized is that the social bases of next approach that constructs Alevilik as a separate religion from Islam within the Alevis⁴¹. According to the data, the percentage of those who claimed that Alevilik is distinct religion from Islam is only 1.9. This shows us that while the Alevis emphasize the differences that distinguish them from the Sunnis, most of them describe their religious understanding as Islam, even more the Real Islam. The main assertion of this meta-theoretical position that includes Alevilik as a distinct religion from Islam generally isn't accepted by most of the respondents because of some cultural, psychological and religious terms. During the survey most of the respondents rejected this claim strongly, as if it was immoral. For example İsmail dede, who performs the Cem ceremonies at the Cem Culture House Association every Thursday, said that this claim is not acceptable and only people who have very bad intentions can make such a claim intentionally.

Table 6: How do you define Alevilik?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Real Islam	109	52,4	52,7	52,7
A religion apart from Islam	4	1,9	1,9	54,6
Way of life and culture	94	45,2	45,4	100,0
Total	207	99,5	100,0	
Missing	1	0,5		
	208	100,0		

³⁹ See, Zelyut, Riza 1999, for arguments of this position. The main arguments of this approach are examined in the theoretical chapter.

⁴⁰ Also the main properties of this inclination are examined in the theoretical chapter.

⁴¹ To arguments of this approach may see Bulut's work, namely Alisiz Alevilik. Also the arguments of this approach are pointed out in the theoretic chapter.

5.3. Religious Identity as Perceived by the respondents

As can be seen from Table 7, most of the respondents define their religious identity as Muslim, Alevi or both Muslim and Alevi. The cumulative percentage of these is 78.6. This percentage seems to fit the percentage of those who define Alevilik as the Real Islam or a sect of Islam which is 52.7. The reason of the percentage of defining ones religious identity as Muslim is higher than the percentage of describing Alevilik as Real Islam is that 55 percent of those who defining their religious identity as Alevi perceive Alevilik as a culture or a type of define life. Therefore, there are two major tendencies within those who expressed their religious identity as the Alevi: Most of them, 55 percent of them, construct Alevilik as a culture, not a religion, but 41 percent of them perceive it as a religion and within the circle of Islam. Also there is a correspondence between those who expressed their religious identity as Muslim, and both Muslim and Alevi and those who describe Alevilik as Islam or Real Islam.

As also derived from Table 7, another point which needs to be clarified is the rate of those describing their religious identity as atheist which is higher than the percentage of those describing it as the only Muslim. It seems that while most of the respondents describe Alevilik in the circle of Islam, they are eager to underline their Alevi identity and Alevilik as the religious understanding under of title of Islam. In this sense, during the survey, several times I was faced with such experiences including the fact that most of the respondents reject the claim that includes their religious identity as only Muslim. As a result of this, they insisted that I marked the choice of only Alevi or both Alevi and Muslim as their religious identity. It seems that they used to Islam word in different two senses: as both the name of their own religion and of their own religious identity, due Muslim word was perceived by most of them as a word that identified with the Sunnis. Another factor may be that this word has been reconstructed politically by the representatives of the political Islamic movements for last two decades with the impacts of rise of the political Islam in Turkey. For this reason, the Alevis who define Alevilik in the circle of Islam may avoid describing their religious identity with this word.

The last issue about this matter that needs to be mentioned is relevant to those who expressed their religious identity as Bektashi or Kizilbash. It seems that there is a distance between this inclination and Islam as a religion and Muslim as a religious identity. As a result of this distance, most of them defined Alevilik as a way of life, and avoided describing their religious identity as Muslim. While the percentage of this tendency seems very small, 6.3 percent, it seems to have some crucial implications about their perception of religion and religious identity if the percentage of those describing their religious identity as only Alevi (the percentage of them is 34.1) is considered. Also if the percentage of those describing their religious identity as Atheist (the percentage of them is 14.4) then more than half of the respondents describe their religious identity as not being Muslim. In this sense, if the small percentage of those describing their religious identity as only Muslim (12 percent) is considered, it seems that most of the respondents need to underline their Alevi identity because of several reasons that will be examined later in the section of the Sunnis perceived by the Alevis.

Table- 7: How do you describe your religious identity?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Muslim	25	12,0	12,1	12,1
Alevi	71	34,1	34,5	46,6
Both Muslim and Alevi	66	31,7	32,0	78,6
Kizilbash	7	3,4	3,4	82,0
Bektashi	6	2,9	2,9	85,0
Atheist	30	14,4	14,6	99,5
Human Being	1	,5	,5	100,0
Total	206	99,0	100,0	
No answer	2	1,0		

5.3.1. The Factors Affect the Alevi Perception of Religious Identity and the Religion

It seems that there are several factors that affect the process of the perception of religious identity and Alevilik within the respondents. These factors seem to relate to age, the geographical district, level of education, ethnic origin of the respondents and state of membership of any Alevi organization.

The first significant point which needs to be understood is the distribution of the respondents in relation to these definitions age is a very important variable that affects the contents of Alevilik and the describing process of religious identity. . The more the age of the respondents increases, the more eager they are to express Alevilik as the Real Islam or a sect of Islam and to describe their religious identity as Muslim, or both Muslim and Alevi. In this sense, while 75 percent of the respondents who were born before 1964 define Alevilik as the Real Islam, only 23 percent of the respondents defined it as culture or a way of life. Contrary to this, 74 percent of the respondents who were born after 1964 see Alevilik as a culture or a way of life, and only 21 percent of the respondents who were born after 1964 construct it as the Real Islam.

Also it seems that there is a link between the geographical district and the construction of the content of Alevilik as religion and religious identity as Alevi or Muslim. As it is shown in Table 8, it seems that there is a significant relationship between the respondents who were born in Central Anatolia and those who believed Alevilik was the Real Islam or a sect of Islam. 65 percent of those who were born in this region describe Alevilik as the Real Islam or a sect of Islam, and 56 percent of them define their religious identity as Muslim or both Muslim and Alevi. On the contrary this pattern, there is a link between those who were born in Eastern Anatolia and the description of Alevilik as a culture or a way of life, 63 percent of them describe it as a culture. It seems that this tendency fits the description of religious identity as Alevi. In this sense, 68 percent of them define their religious identity as Alevi, sometimes Kizilbash, and Atheist.

Table 8: Definition of Alevilik by Origin of Birthplace

		Real Islam	Apart from Islam	A way of life and a culture	
Central Anatolia	Count	72	1	37	110
	%	65,5%	0,9%	33,6%	100,0%
Eastern Anatolia	Count	26	2	43	71
	%	36,6%	2,8%	60,6%	100,0%
Black Sea	Count	1		4	5
	%	20,0%		80,0%	100,0%
South-eastern Anatolia	Count	2		1	3
	%	66,7%		33,3%	100,0%
Mediterranean	Count	3	1	2	6
	%	50,0%	16,7%	33,3%	100,0%
Total	Count	104	4	87	195
	%	53,3%	2,1%	44,6%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	23,897	8	,002
Likelihood Ratio	20,617	8	,008
Linear-by-Linear Association	4,674	1	,031
N of Valid Cases	195		

Moreover, as it is seen in Table 9, there is a significant relationship between perception of Alevilik and mother tongue of the respondents when the outcomes of the fieldwork are considered. It seems that while most of the Kurdish Alevis perceive Alevilik as a way of life, most of the Turkish Alevis perceive it as the Real Islam or a sect of Islam. A similar polarization between these two categories is valid for perception of religious identity. This means that while most of Kurdish Alevis describe their religious identity as Alevi and/or Atheist, most of the Turkish Alevis describe it as Muslim and both Muslim and Alevi. These outcomes are compatible with the content of relationship between perception of Alevilik and geographical district that was mentioned above. This can be seen as an outcome of the ethnic content of these geographical regions, because most of the Kurdish Alevis traditionally inhabit Eastern Anatolia.

The distinction between these two regions regarding perception of Alevilik and Alevi identity may be seen as an outcome of some differences between the beliefs and

practices of Turkish and Kurdish Alevi. In this context, it may be argued that there are some differences between the beliefs and practices of the Kurdish and Turkish Alevi. The beliefs and practices of the Kurdish Alevi, as they have been known from 19th and early 20th century sources, appear to be more heterodox and syncretistic than those of Turkish Alevi due to the fact that the latter have hidden their beliefs better or have gradually been further Islamicized. Some practices and beliefs that can be conceptualized out of Islam were more pronounced among the Kurdish Alevi. For example, sun and nature worship appear to have had a prominent place in the life of the Dersim besides the Cem ceremony that is well known as the central ritual of the Alevi belief, and other common Alevi rituals (Van Bruinessen, 2001: 91-92).

Because of the lack of respondents, the other regions that have a significant Alevi population are ignored.

Table 9: Definition of Alevilik by Mother Tongue

		Real Islam	Apart From Islam	A way of Life	
Turkish	Count	86	1	56	143
	%	60,1%	0,7%	39,2%	100,0%
Kurdish	Count	23	3	37	63
	%	36,5%	4,8%	58,7%	100,0%
Arabic	Count			1	1
	%			100,0%	100,0%
	Count	109	4	94	207
	%	52,7%	1,9%	45,4%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13,270	4	,010
Likelihood Ratio	13,413	4	,009
Linear-by-Linear Association	9,393	1	,002
N of Valid Cases	207		

Another significant factor that affects the Alevi perception of the contents of religion and religious identity is the education level of the respondents. In this sense, it seems that there is a significant relationship between the perception of religion and religious identity and education level of the respondents. As it is seen in Table 10, as the level of education rises, the respondents have a tendency to describe Alevilik as a culture or a way of life; their religious identity as Alevi and/or Atheist. In this respect, 68 per

cent of those who stated that their level of education was high school or university graduate describe Alevilik as a culture or way of life. Contrary to this, as the level of education decreases, it seems that the respondents are eager to define Alevilik as the Real Islam or a sect of Islam, and their religious identity as Muslim or both Muslim and Alevi. In this context, 93 per cent of the respondents who are illiterate describe Alevilik as the Real Islam or a sect of Islam. This percentage is 77 in those who are literate, and 73 percent in those who graduated from primary school, and 85 percent in those who graduated from secondary school.

Table –10: Definition of Alevilik by Level of Education

		Real Islam	Apart from Islam	A way of life and a culture	
Illiterate	Count	14		1	15
	%	93,3%		6,7%	100,0%
Literate	Count	10		3	13
	%	76,9%		23,1%	100,0%
Primary School	Count	27	2	8	37
	%	73,0%	5,4%	21,6%	100,0%
Secondary School	Count	22		4	26
	%	84,6%		15,4%	100,0%
Lycee	Count	16		34	50
	%	32,0%		68,0%	100,0%
University	Count	13	2	32	47
	%	27,7%	4,3%	68,1%	100,0%
	Count	102	4	82	188

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	56,107	10	, 000
Likelihood Ratio	61,376	10	, 000
Linear-by-Linear Association	39,264	1	, 000
N of Valid Cases	188		

A similar tendency like the relation between the level of education and the definition of religion seems to fit between the level of education of the respondents and the perception of religious identity, as it does in the relation between the illiterate and the perception of Alevilik, here seems to be a link between the illiterate the respondents and their religious identity as Muslim or both Muslim and Alevi. In this sense, as it is shown in Table 11, 80 percent of the respondents who are illeterate describe their religious identity as Muslim or both Muslim and Alevi. This percentage seems to fit

with those who graduated from primary and secondary school. The percent is 62 for those who graduated from primary school, and is 69 percent for those who graduated from secondary school. This is completely different for those who graduated from high school and university. Here, the main tendency seems to relate to, Alevi that is constituted as religious identity. The percentage of those who describe their religious identity as Alevi is 50 percent, as atheist is 20 percent, both as Muslim and Alevi is 30 percent at the high school level. At the university level, the percentage of those who describe their religious identity as only Alevi is 48 percent, both as Muslim and Alevi is 24 percent, as Atheist is 28 percent. These statistics show a significant relationship between the level of education and the different perceptions of religious identity and religion within the respondents.

Table 11: Definition of Religious Identity by Level of Education

		Muslim	Alevi	Both Muslim and Alevi	Kizilbash	Bektashi	Atheist	
Illiterate	Count	4	3	8				15
	%	26,7%	20,0%	53,3%				100,0%
Literate	Count	1	6	6				13
	%	7,7%	46,2%	46,2%				100,0%
Primary School	Count	10	10	13		3		37
	%	27,0%	27,0%	35,1%		8,1%		100,0%
Secondary School	Count	3	7	15			1	26
	%	11,5%	26,9%	57,7%			3,8%	100,0%
Lycee	Count	2	20	13	3	2	10	50
	%	4,0%	40,0%	26,0%	6,0%	4,0%	20,0%	100,0%
University	Count	3	19	8	2	1	13	46
	%	6,5%	41,3%	17,4%	4,3%	2,2%	28,3%	100,0%
	Count	23	65	63	5	6	24	187
	%	12,3%	34,8%	33,7%	2,7%	3,2%	12,8%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	56,107	10	,000
Likelihood Ratio	61,376	10	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	39,264	1	,000
N of Valid Cases	188		

One of the impacts of the processes of modernization and urbanization on the Alevi community is that it has changed the circumstances of education for the Alevis. As

examined in the section of the features of the respondents with regarding age and education, there was a dramatic transformation in the level of education for next generations after migration process. Due to the lack of Alevi institutions which transmit the religious codes to these new generations, those who are educated in modern school aren't able to access sources of Alevilik to learn. In this regard, during our fieldwork Kazim Alper, who is 56 years old told us an anecdote to point out the 'dramatic conditions' of the new Alevi generations:

When we migrated to Ankara, we got rid of teaching our religion to our children to save them from the dangerous environment. Then our children went to school where they would learn the theology of the Sunni. And they learnt it. In this respect, when my child was student at university, he asked me a question about what our religion was: 'why don't you fast during Ramadan, why don't you go to Cami? If we are Muslim', he said to me. I had to tell him the truth: we are Alevi, we don't go to Cami, and we don't fast during Ramadan. Again he asked me, 'what 's Alevilik, and what are the pillars of Alevilik, and are there any sources?' I told him I know only one thing: we are Alevi. Unfortunately, there are only a few books about it, they like stories, not scientific researches.

This anecdote seems to characterize the general properties of the circumstances in which the new generations of the Alevi community in urban places face. With the effects of several reasons, such as, modern education, the lack of modern Alevi institutions, the secular quality of urbanized environment etc. the Alevi youth seem to see Alevilik as a type of belief only with in a culture or way of life. In this context, it can be argued that three tendencies have emerged within the new generations of Alevis. The most significant tendency, relates to the effects of secularization, modernization and social mobility on the new generations. Since they have no experiences in rural life, and traditional Alevilik, and have had no opportunity to learn it from their family, they feel close to Alevilik emotionally, but do not practice it ritually. The more education they receive, the more apt they are to describe Alevilik in a cultural sense. Furthermore, it seems that they really more on the rational scheme than the spiritual scheme to understand and interpret the world due to the obtained the training from modern school. The second tendency is a reaction to the secularization process which implies the rational value, norms and apparatus in which to act and behave. Those who are expressing this tendency are also more educated, and they approach traditional Alevilik in rational terms that distinguishes them from the older ones who were born in a rural setting due to the emotional

reasons and ‘historical feelings’. As the result of this rationalization process, they claim that Alevilik is completely in the circle of Islam, and it can be viewed as a version of Shi‘ism⁴². This tendency that has a small impacts on the Alevis indicates a new path within the Alevis. The last tendency is relevant to those have come to an urban environment from a rural setting recently. It includes the basic characteristics of traditional Alevilik. They go to Cem houses if they have enough time, respect the Dede, fast during the Asura and Hizir, and have a bond with another adult for the contraction of the Musahiplik. They are followers of the traditional Alevilik and its social and religious institutions and basic rituals, yet they constitute a small part of the new generations. Of course, this cannot be reduced as the outcome as the only factor. It seems that there are several factors affecting these patterns.

Next factor that affect the Alevi perception of Alevilik and religious identity is relevant to the state of membership of any Alevi organization. Those who are member of any Alevi organization tend to perceive Alevilik as the Real Islam and describe their religious identity as Muslim or both Muslim and Alevi. As it is shown in Table 12, on the other hand, those who aren’t member of any Alevi organization tend to perceive Alevilik as a way of life and describe their religious identity as Alevi or Atheist. Moreover, there are some significant differences among those who are members of any Alevi organizations. These differences can be classified into three groups: the first group is constituted by those who are members of Haci Bektas Veli Foundation. While they stress Islamic character of Alevilik, they describe their religious identity as both Alevi and Muslim. The second group is constituted by those who are members of Pir Sultan and Haci Bektas Veli associations, but they have some noteworthy differences. While the members of these two associations tend to perceive Alevilik as a way of life, most of the members of Pir Sultan association describe their religious identity as Atheist. The third group is constituted by the members of Cem Cultural House Association. They tend to perceive Alevilik as the Real Islam and describe their religious identity as Muslim or both Muslim and Alevi.

⁴² For more information this tendency see Uzumlu 2000 and Genc Erenler Magazine.

It can be said that while those who believe strongly tend to participate to any Alevi organizations except for Pir Sultan Association, those who believe weakly tend to avoid participating to any Alevi organizations. While those who avoid participating to any Alevi organizations feel themselves very close to Alevilik culturally, they don't perceive it as the sources of their mental world.

Table 12: Definition of Alevilik by Membership of Any Alevi Organization

		Real Islam	Apart form Islam	A way of Life	
Yes	Count	74	1	31	106
	%	69,8%	, 9%	29,2%	100,0%
No	Count	34	3	63	100
	%	34,0%	3,0%	63,0%	100,0%
	Count	108	4	94	206
	%	52,4%	1,9%	45,6%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	42,757	7	, 000
Likelihood Ratio	46,873	7	, 000
Linear-by-Linear Association	34,869	1	, 000
N of Valid Cases	206		

Another factor that may affect the Alevi perception of Alevilik and religious identity is the level of the income of respondents. Nevertheless, as it's seen from Table 13, it cannot be derived that there is no a significant relationship between the conceptualization of the contents of Alevilik and the different levels of income. By examining this table carefully, only the first interval of income level seems to have any significant differences regarding the issue of what the contents of Alevilik is. In this regard, 66 percent of the respondents who are in the under 500 million Turkish Liras income group described Alevilik as the Real Islam, and 32 percent of them described it as a culture and way of life. The second and third interval of income groups seems to have no significant differences in the perception of Alevilik. Since the rest interval of the income groups have no adequate samples, to reach a valid explanation about the content of its perception of Alevilik. But if the last three intervals are combined into one group, the rate of those who described Alevilik as the Real Islam seems to be equal with the rate of those who described it as a culture and way of life. Consequently, regarding the

different intervals of the income level of the samples, significant differences only occur in the first interval of the respondents whose income is under 500 million Turkish Liras. Lastly, the content of relationship between income level of the respondents and the perception of religious identity seems to fit the content of relationship between income level and the perception of Alevilik. Indeed, it seems that there is no a significant relationship between the different levels of income that the respondents have and their perception of religious identity.

Table 13: Religious Identity by Level of Income

		Muslim	Alevi	Both Muslim and Alevi	Kizilbash	Bektashi	Atheist	
500 and under	Count	10	14	16	1	2	6	50
	%	20,0%	28,0%	32,0%	2,0%	4,0%	12,0%	100,0%
501-1000	Count	10	24	30	4	4	12	84
	%	11,9%	28,6%	35,7%	4,8%	4,8%	14,3%	100,0%
1001- 1500	Count	2	24	11	1		5	43
	%	4,7%	55,8%	25,6%	2,3%		11,6%	100,0%
1501- 2000	Count	1	5	2			1	9
	%	11,1%	55,6%	22,2%			11,1%	100,0%
2001 2500	Count	1		1	1		3	6
	%	16,7%		16,7%	16,7%		50,0%	100,0%
2501 and above	Count		3	2			3	8
	%		37,5%	25,0%			37,5%	100,0%
	Count	24	70	62	7	6	30	200
	%	12,0%	35,0%	31,0%	3,5%	3,0%	15,0%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8,282	10	, 601
Likelihood Ratio	8,830	10	, 548
Linear-by-Linear Association	2,990	1	, 084
N of Valid Cases	201		

In addition to level of income of the respondents, it seems that there is no relationship between perception of Alevilik and religious identity and place of residence that the respondents inhabit considering the outcome of the fieldwork.

5.4. The Attitudes of the respondents toward Alevi's Rituals

The rituals that are constitutive components of the traditional Alevilik are fasting, sacrificing, having a religious partnership known as the Musahip, having a religious leader known as the Dede, and participation in religious ceremonies known as the ritual of the Cem. Now, these components that constitute the scope

of the rituals of traditional Alevilik will be examined considering the outcome of the fieldwork.

5.4.1. Fasting as Perceived by the Respondents

In traditional Alevilik, fasting for certain period of time in the year is accepted as one of the significant religious practices. This practice includes the fast of the Asura, and Hızır that need to be fasted for the cosmology of Alevilik (Fuat, 1993:156). However, in some districts of Turkey where the Alevis inhabit, the fast of Ramadan is fasted in a different time of the month. But in fact, most of the Alevis, as it can be seen from this survey, refused to fast during Ramadan, because of the Sunni character. During our fieldwork, I realized that those who do fast during Ramadan were usually from Central Anatolia which, except for Çorum, that has a significant Alevi population. Those who came from the region of Eastern Anatolia refused to fast during Ramadan.

It seems that the processes of urbanization, secularization, and modernization affect the patterns of the fasting attitudes of the Alevis when a semi-closed conditions of rural life is considered, and how traditional Alevilik imposed on every Alevi the strict rules of the Alevi cosmology. In this sense, these developments have affected the Alevi community and have led to weaken the strict rules of the cosmology which have been constructed tightly. As a result of urbanization, modernization and secularization 61 percent of the respondents stated that they fast during the fast of the Alevi cosmology regularly or irregularly. The rest of the respondents avoided fasting during the fast because of several reasons that were expressed by them. The respondents who didn't fast can be grouped under three titles: those who have some health problems at 15.6 percent, those who don't believe this ritual was imposed by the cosmology at 60 percent, and those who believe in this ritual, but don't participate in it with 24.4 per cent.

There is a significant relationship between fasting and the social, and cultural environment of the respondents, such as the level of education, the culture environment in which the individual Alevi was born, and the age when the outcome of the fieldwork are considered. Those who are more educated are more unwilling to fast, and those who are less educated have more of a tendency to fast during the fasting of the Alevi cosmology. Nearly all of the respondents who graduated from secondary school the illiterate stated that they fast during the fasting. On the other hand, for those that graduated from high school, this rate is 47 percent, and is 34 percent for those who graduated from university. In addition to this factor, the age of the respondents seemed to affect the attitudes of whether they fasted. It can be said that those who are elder have tendency to fast more than the young ones. While the percentage of those who were born before 1964 and fast is 85 percent, this number decreases to 32 percent for those who were born after 1964. Further, when I search to see it there was a significant relationship between the types of work and the attitudes toward fasting, the dimension of age emerged again, although it seems that there is no significant relationship between the types of work and the inclination of fasting in general, only those who were retired or housewives stated that they fast. Also, although there is no meaningful relationship between the geographical region and the tendency to fast, the percentage of fasting is the highest in the region of Central Anatolia. This percentage is 67. This percentage declines to 51 for the region of the Eastern Anatolia

The last aspect of fasting that needs to be understood is what kinds of attitudes the respondents have towards fasting in Ramadan, which signifies the Sunni cosmology supposedly. It seems that the most of the respondents refused to fast during Ramadan because of several arguments about the meaning of it, which include the claim that it is fast of the Sunni, that is not in the customs of the Alevites, and not believing in it for the sake of the God etc. It seems that 88 per cent of the respondents stated that they do not to fast during Ramadan because of the arguments mentioned above. The rest of the respondents reported to fast during Ramadan due to several reasons, the first one is that they believe in fasting in

religious sense during Ramadan, another is that it has been their custom, and it's a religious duty etc.

5.4.2. Sacrificing as Perceived by the Respondents

This sacrificial custom has a significant place in many religions over the world. This custom is based on the myth which is in Pentateuch that reports that the prophet Abraham was forced to sacrifice his son for the sake of the God (Bozkurt: 129). The difference in the customs of the Alevis and the Sunni doesn't arise from the origin of the tradition, but relates to the ceremonies that begin from the cutting of the sacrificial animal to eating it.

There are several sorts of sacrifices in the Alevi tradition: a sacrificial animal is killed in the religious ceremony known as the Tercuman, a sacrificial animal is killed in the Muslim Festival of Sacrifices, a sacrificial animal is killed at the end of fasting the Hizir that is seen in some segments of the Alevis, and in the votive offering (adak). It is often accepted that these forms of the sacrifice constitute the sacrificial rituals of traditional Alevilik. In this context, I will examine the impacts of urbanization and modernization processes on the rituals of the sacrifice in urbanized Alevilik.

Most of the respondents stated that they sacrifice an animal in the Muslim Festival of The Sacrifices. The percent of this is 68.8. The rest of the respondents claimed not to sacrifice an animal during this time. It seems that the reasons of not doing the sacrifice during the Festival of the Sacrifices are various. Economic reasons take first place, with. 55.3. The atheistic attitude is the second place as a reason, as 31.9 percent of the respondents who do not do the sacrifice because of their disbelief. The third factor is relevant to the attitude of those who believe but do not implement this religious duty; this percent is 12.8 per cent.

Another significant point relates to who eats the meat of the sacrificial animal. Which is the point coming from a rule of traditional Alevilik: it strictly was banned for those who were not Alevi; it was immoral (*duskun*) and they have no *Musahip* to eat the meat of the sacrificial animal of the Alevi. It seems that this prohibition should be evaluated in two senses that are related to each other. The first one refers to the content of the strict boundary between the Alevi and the non-Alevi that was discussed in the theoretical chapter. The second signifies how the various mechanisms of a traditional Alevi community operate with inclusive and exclusive terms. So that the Alevi community maintains itself against any outside threats, which mostly come from the Sunnis, and sometimes the Ottoman Empire by the ways of inclusive and exclusive mechanisms.

In this respect, it seems that the strict boundary that was constituted in the marginalized circumstances of the Alevis has been loosing ground since the beginning of the migrations from rural to urban areas, and the process of urbanization and modernization. This can be seen by the distribution of meat from the Alevi's sacrificial animal to Sunnis as one of the evidences of this process. In this sense, most of the samples, 90.4 percent, who participate in the sacrifice during the Festival of Sacrifices stated as to have given the meat of the sacrificed animal to a Sunni neighbor as well as Alevis. Yet it cannot be said that the boundary between the Alevi and the Sunni has been disappeared completely due to the reasons that are mentioned above. Instead of this it may be said that the boundary that distinguishes the Alevi from the Sunni has started to change its traditional forms and contents because of some general reasons: the first reason seems to relate to the long history of contradictions between Sunnis and Alevis that involve some social, cultural, religious and political grounds. The second one, which is an outcome of the first fact, is relevant to the prejudices that both have mutually. In this sense, during the fieldwork many of the respondents believed that most of their Sunni neighbors threw the meat of the sacrificed animal in the garbage because it came from an Alevi. This belief shows that prejudices are still

operating in both sides. As Barth (2001: 33) stated that the prejudice among ethnic groups is one of the leading factors in the maintaining of ethnic boundaries.

The last aspect about this issue that needs to be pointed out is relevant to the attitudes of the Alevis towards the sacrifices imposed by the cosmology of the Alevilik⁴³. This may give us some clues about the dynamics of the continuity and discontinuity between past Alivilik and present Alevilik. Yet, it seems that the absence of this custom in some Alevi regions makes it difficult to draw adequate conclusions about the distinction between the past and the present. Because of this, I will examine the change in attitudes of those who come from the regions where the custom traditionally exists. In this context, while the percentage of those who say that to cut sacrificial animal is imposed by the Alevi cosmology is 41.3, the percent of those who don't do it reaches 58.7 percent. The distribution of this percentage to the different regions is: 46 percent of those from Central Anatolia stated they participate in the Alevi Sacrifices, this percent for the comers from Eastern Anatolia declines to 33. It seems that the percentage of those not participating in the sacrifice is higher than those who do in both of the regions. It seems that the factors that are behind this process are: the disbelieving attitudes of some of the respondents towards this practice, economic difficulties, even though some of the respondents believe in this practice, they often don't follow it, and this religious ritual isn't in some Alevi communities etc.

5.4.3. The Dede As The Holy Man as Perceived By The Alevis

Traditionally all Alevis belong to some holy lineages. Those who come from these holy lineages considered to be in the lineage of prophet Mohammed, and are called "dede" or "pir". Every son from the holy lineage is respected as dede. This

⁴³ The forms of the sacrifices imposed by the Alevi cosmology seem to vary from one region to another. For example, after fasting the Hizir sacrificial animal is killed in some Alevi regions such as Varto, Tunceli. Yet, this tradition cannot be seen in other parts of the Alevi regions such as Yozgat, Beypazari. As Ill the custom of fasting Hizir cannot be seen in some Alevi regions. This may be seen as the outcome of the common theology and a centralized religious institution that haven't been established by the Alevis.

means that this position isn't acquired by way of training or talented as it is in the Bektashi order. Yet, only the son from the holy lineage who is eager and talented undertakes the duty of holy man (Bozkurt: 98; Yalcinkaya: 92). Not all of the dedes in the dede lineage are active. Rather, one gradually becomes the most sought after, competent, and accepted by the rest of the lineage as the most fit to lead religious ceremonies (Shankland: 119-126). Further the endogamy is valid within the holy lineages because it maintains the purity of the dede lineage which signifies the prophet Mohammed. Additionally, there are some certain strict boundaries between the dede and the talip who traditionally belongs to a dede lineage. As a result of this, the marriage between the dede and the talip is strictly forbidden.

Also the dede lineages are tied to each other. Every dede lineage belongs to another one. As the result of this, every dede is accountable to another with his manners. Moreover, a form of organization was set up so that all talips belong to the dede lineages, and all dedes belong to each other by the way of this interdependence. Therefore, traditional Alevi communities have been informing, organizing and sharing with each other by the way of such a mode of society.

Furthermore, the dede fulfils not only the religious needs of the Alevi community. The dede also fulfils traditionally functions within the closed Alevi community. It can be said that the dede have traditionally fulfilled the roles of mediator, teacher, doctor, judge, and holy man (Shankland: 119-126; Bozkurt: 98-100 and Yalcinkaya: 92-98).

Most of the contradictions that emerged between different groups or persons are solved by the mediator role of the dede⁴⁴. In this sense, when a talip was faced with a difficult problem, he would consult the dede to solve these disputes. As Shankland pointed out (1993: 126) it, the mediator role of the holy man is not

⁴⁴ To see how a problem between different Alevi groups to be overcome, look at Shankland, 1993.

restricted to the Alevi community. The mediator role of the dede seems to resemble the one of the shaikh that was examined by Van Bruinessen.⁴⁵ As Van Bruinessen should with a wealth of data, the mediator and politician roles of the shaikh result from the segmentary structure that was created by the warring tribes in Kurdish society. Nevertheless, the need for exploring the contents and the forms of the relationship between the Kurdish dede and the Kurdish talip that make up the tribes structure is apparent

In the pre-modernization and urbanization period most of the Alevis were illiterate and lived in a closed society. Only a few of them, mostly dedes, were educated in the madrasa, theological school, which was established by the Sunnis. In this context, the dedes who were educated in the medrese held the monopoly of the knowledge about religious and non-religious things. As a result of his monopoly of the knowledge, he taught and guided them in different circumstances.

The curing of illnesses has been one of the traditional duties of the dede (Bozkurt: 99). It has been believed that the dede was able to treat the ill, those who were ill could be cured by touching the dede. Furthermore, the dede would write a charm and put a spell on it. It's believed that nearly all illnesses were overcome by the way of the written charm and with a spell.

Another function which was fulfilled by the dede is a judge. The dede judged his talips in the Cem ceremonies for their manners. If one talip committed a crime such as burglary, or murder etc, only the dede could punish him regarding the content of his or her crime. As a result of this procedure some of them might be excluded from the semi-closed society, they were called as duskun, immoral.

⁴⁵ Van Bruinessen, Martin 1999, *Aga, Seyh ve Devlet*, Ankara: Ozge Press, pp, 269-277. Yet, it hasn't been explored that the nature of the relationship between social organization and the religious thinking between the Turkish and Kurdish Alevis in Turkey. It seems that the mediator role of the dede fits more to the fragmented structure of the Kurdish Alevi because of the tribal bounds.

The last role of the dede was relevant to religious function which is more important than the other roles. The dede managed the religious ceremony. He also coordinated the other functions that should be fulfilled during the ceremony. He guided the talips in their daily manners teaching what is good or bad. He transmitted the knowledge of the Alevi cosmology to the talips who were mostly illiterate. If someone had a problem with religion, the dede guided him or her in regard to the grounds of Alevilik. Also he sanctified the link of Musahiplik that every individual Alevi man should have which signifies the transition from a natural membership of the Alevi society to a political membership of the Alevi society (Bozkurt: 174 and Yalcinkaya: 67).

With the impacts of modernization and urbanization process, the dede was faced with the new historical and social circumstances in the urbanized places. Due to the impacts of these processes on the status of the dede, the traditional roles of the dede as one of the basic institutions of Alevilik have been debated intensively since the late 1980's. Today, this subject is one of the most important aspects that need to be resolved with new needs of the urbanized Alevi community. Therefore, the contemporary perception of the dede by the Alevis is one of the subjects which needs to be more investigated for this study. In this respect, the subject of the dede was constructed into two different levels in the questionnaire: the first level dealt with whether the relationship between the dede and the talip existed in the urbanized areas, the second level included how the dede was perceived by the Alevis regardless of whether they belong to the dede or not, regarding the traditional functions of the dede in a contemporary context.

Due to the outcome of urbanization and modernization the relationship between the dede and the talip have been growing weaker; but most of the Alevis seem to be connected with the dede. As it is shown in Table 14, 87 percent of the respondents expressed to having a dede regardless of whether there is a real relationship between them and the dede, and only 13 percent stated not to have a dede.

Table 14: Do you have a dede?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	180	86,5	87,0	87,0
No	27	13,0	13,0	100,0
Total	207	99,5	100,0	
No answer	1	,5		
	208	100,0		

On the other hand, most of the respondents aren't actually connected with a dede due to the processes of migration, urbanization and modernization. As a matter of fact, most of the respondents stated that they lost this relationship because of migration which led to cut off the relation between them and the Dede. In this respect, 63.4 percent of the respondents stated to have no relationship between them and the Dede because of several reasons, which include living in different areas, the bond between the dede and the talip became ineffective in the new historical and social context, etc. In this context, while 72 percent of those who stated as to have no relation with the dede marked the reason for this fact as due to the migration, and the different districts where the dede and the talip live in, 22 percent of them claimed it wasn't fit to the content of this relation in the modern world. Lastly, the rest of the stated it was due to the death of their dede.

On the other hand, the traditional functions of the dede are currently one of the leading subjects for the Alevis regarding whether or not they fit the needs of the urbanized Alevis. As it was examined in detail in the theoretical chapter, the most of the traditional functions of the dede were undertaken by institutions of the modern state such as judicial, educational, political etc. This process should be evaluated with the impacts of modernization, secularization and urbanization processes. In this regard, most of the Alevis started to avoid fulfilling religious duties of Alevilik because of the effects of modern education, political affiliation, and no official reorganization for Alevilik as a religion or a sect of religion. These developments in the social and historical circumstances of Alevilik started to scatter the Alevi community which has been living in the social, cultural and

religious grounds of Alevilik for ages in the new urban setting. In this context, most of the traditional functions of the dede were undertaken by different modern institutions which have very short history. Additionally religious role of the dede as it has been traditionally more important than the other functions of the dede started to be modified gradually in regards to the needs of an urban setting. As Shankland claims (Shankland, 1999a: 319), today the role of the dede seems to be transformed dramatically in the circumstances of urbanized society, that is as long as the Alevi community is faced with the change, the role of the dede will keep getting weak as an arbitrator role. Nevertheless, the dede was transformed into a leading symbol of the Alevi at the beginning of the systemization of the Alevi culture and still in its present.

In this context, the dede as perceived by the Alevis who live in the urbanized areas is one of the subjects of this study. The outcome of this fieldwork show the perception of the Alevis regarding the dede has changed dramatically. As shown from Table 15, only 27.8 percent of the respondents claim to maintain the institution of the dede as the basic component of Alevilik what it was traditionally. In addition to this 34.6 percent stated the need to reconstruct it in regards to the needs of urbanized Alevi community. Although there are some differences between the first and second approaches regarding the dede, both categories still consider ontologically the dede as being a basic category of the Alevilik, and connected with the cosmology of the Alevilik. The percentage of these two categories is 62.4, which shows that most of the respondents still consider the dede as one of the basic mechanisms of Alevilik, even though the dramatic changes that have emerged in their living conditions. The third and the fourth approaches are different from the first two in that the third category prefers to reject the privileged status of the dede in the cosmology of Alevilik. This group wishes for Alevi intellectuals to replace the dede because of the needs of the urbanized Alevi community. According to it, the traditional mechanisms of Alevilik that are constituted in the circumstances of the rural community don't correspond any more to the needs in the age of information, modernization and urbanization. While the supporters of this approach describe themselves as Alevi

and define Alevilik as way of life, they are investigating the traditional social mechanisms of Alevilik in regards to the needs of urbanized Alevi community. The percentage of this inclination is 26.3. The last approach claims that there is no need for dede or Alevi intellectuals considering the circumstances of the processes of modernization and urbanization. Also it claims that Alevilik is going to be reconstructed regarding the needs of the age that is characterized by information, commodity production, science and urbanization. While the last two approaches agree on the need for the reconstruction of Alevilik and its traditional mechanisms for the contemporary situation and for the content of Alevilik as the way of life, the last one completely rejects the need of the religion. The supporters of the last approach mostly define their religious identity as atheist, but they feel very close to Alevi category as the cultural identity.⁴⁶ It seems that this inclination is the smallest group regarding the number of supporters, at 11.2 percent. Furthermore, it seems that there is a strong relationship between the definition of what the dede and his role is and the level of education. That is as long as the level of the education is rising, the probability of the inclination to claim to reject the privileged position of the dede is rising. Reversely as the level of education decreases, the numbers of Alevis who claim that the privileged position of the dede should be maintaining the same manner it was maintained in the past increase.

Table 15: How do you assess the dedelik?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
It should be maintained as the same in the past	57	27,4	27,8	27,8
It should be redefined in regard of needs of an urban setting	71	34,1	34,6	62,4
There is no need of the dede anymore, the Alevi intellectuals play roles of the dedes	54	26,0	26,3	88,8
There is no need for dede or those undertake its traditional functions in this age	23	11,1	11,2	100,0
Total	205	98,6	100,0	
Not applicable	2	1,0		
No answer	1	,5		
Total	3	1,4		

⁴⁶ This subject will be mentioned again in the chapter the section of the political attitudes and cultural identity.

5.4.4. The Relation of The Musahiplik Perceived By The Alevis

Musahiplik or a kind of the partnership is one of the significant institutions of traditional Alevilik. This tradition exists in the cosmology of Alevilik that is one of the components that distinguishes it from the Bektashi order (Bozkurt, 1993: 174-184; Yalcinkaya, 1996: 67-73). This bond may be described as a kind of religious brotherhood that is sanctified by religious ceremony in the front of the dede. This bond is compulsory for Alevilik, because the bond of the Musahiplik as religious brotherhood is the basic condition for the participation of any ceremonies or meetings which decisions are made about the dimensions of daily life.⁴⁷ Also ideally, every Alevi man must marry according to the Alevi cosmology. Having married, he should form a partnership with another man who is also married, so that their two households are indissolubly linked. As a result of these obligations, every Alevi man must form partnership with another Alevi man.

The contraction of Musahiplik seems to refer to a multi-folded meaning of the Alevi cosmology. First of all, as Bozkurt (1993: 175) stated, this bond signifies the transition from natural membership of the society to an official membership of the society. In this sense, it has a political content that seems to refer to citizenship as it emerged in the modern historical context. Having participated in all dimensions of Alevi society, every man must form a brotherhood with another man. Otherwise, he is not allowed to participate in the affairs of society and is excluded from them by the society in the front of the dede. The second meaning of it includes the religious practice that signs the process of purification from the material world. Therefore, it also corresponds to the religious content of remembering the significance of sharing and the feeling of the responsibility toward the members of the society. Lastly, it operates as a means of social control and integration. In this way, all members of the political society are dependent on

⁴⁷ During the fieldwork, those who are elderly and migrated to Ankara recently evaluated frequently the origin of the Musahiplik as either presumably the religious brotherhood of Muhammad and Ali or the bond of Adam and Gabriel. Those who are younger expressed to have no idea about the origin and the contents of this bond.

each other in the presence of the dede. If some uneasiness occurs, the dede as an arbitrator interferes and settles the disagreement.

It seems that one of the leading impacts of modernization and urbanization on traditional Alevilik relates to the dissolution of the Musahiplikas a kind of religious brotherhood. Having emerged in the circumstances of a strictly closed society, Musahiplik was faced with some troubles that come from an open society in an urbanized environment. Because of the dissolution of the old circumstances of Alevilik, the Musahiplik as one of the leading components of the traditional Alevilik have been dramatically transformed and has become a symbolic category just as the dedelik. In addition to these changes in the circumstances of Alevilik with urbanization and modernization processes, it is becoming weak in the cultural memory of the individual Alevi due to modern education, politics and the process of secularization. As a result of these processes, the Alevis especially for the new generations born in the urban places are uninformed about the means of traditional Alevilik. In this regard, during the fieldwork I found that most of those born in Ankara seemed to be uninformed about concept of the Musahiplik and rituals of the traditional Alevilik.

The percentage of the respondents who expressed to have a Musahip as a religious brotherhood is 67.3. Although this percentage seems very high, it only shows this bond in the extended family not based in the individual. Also, a significant part of those who stated to have a Musahip said to have no relationship with them in reality because of several reasons which include the fact of migrating at 68.7 percent, it doesn't fit with the needs of modern life at 17.9 percent, the death of Musahip at 1.5 percent etc. The percentage of those who stated to have no relationship with the Musahip is 45. Also it seems that most of them, 87.5 percent, they had had a bond with a Musahip before migrating.

Although the most of the respondents have no relationship with a Musahip in their daily life, they believe that this tradition should be continued in the circumstances

of an urban setting due to its symbolic meaning that refers to sharing, friendship etc. In this context, 81.4 percent of the respondents said that it should be maintained. And, 63.3 percent of them support keeping it due to its cultural content, the rest believe in supporting as an obligatory category of the Alevi cosmology.

On the other hand, those who wished to reject the bond of the Musahiplik as it is maintained in the context of modernization and urbanization claim its traditional contents don't fit to the needs of the age of modernization. The percentage of them is 18.1. They believe that it fit the circumstances of traditional Alevilik that was constituted in the conditions of a closed society.

It seems that most of the respondents believe that the bond of the Musahiplik should be continued in the urbanized environment for different reasons. The main tendency for urbanized Alevilik seems to be that it is perceived as a cultural category by the Alevis who are getting educated and secularized. This means that the bond of the Musahiplik, as the one of the basic components of the traditional Alevilik, is being reconstructed by the Alevis who are completely socialized in an urbanized environment as sharing and friendship with secular terms.

5.4.5. The Ceremony of the Cem Perceived By The Alevis

The ceremony of the Cem may be seen the basic ritual of the Alevi cosmology.⁴⁸ The ceremony takes places everywhere irrespective in the home or in the place of the order. Traditionally it takes place in the winter, especially after the end of the harvest (Melikoff, 1999c: 261).

⁴⁸ There have been some discussions on the content of the ceremony of the Cem as a ritual form of Alevilik among researchers. Yalcinkaya rejects the claims of it as the basic ritual form of Alevilik because of the lack of certain religious institutions in traditional Alevilik. Instead of this, he stresses its social and historical contents. But, most of the researchers claim that it is the basic ritual form of Alevilik that means that several functions such as social control, making decision on the crucial aspects for the society. For the supporters of this position, see Bozkurt, Fuat, 1993; Melikoff, Arene, 1999c etc.

The ceremony of the Cem is administered by the dede or mursit who is at the highest position in the Bektashi order. Before the beginning of the ceremony, the dede distributes the twelve-services (Melikoff: 262; Bozkurt, 1993: 169). Additionally the ceremony of the Cem is perceived as it represents a religious ritual that was taken place many ages ago in the spiritual world regarding to Alevi theology. Every of twelve duties are also perceived by the Alevis as they represent symbolically services in a religious ritual that was taken place in the 'other world' (Melikoff: 262).

Furthermore this religious ceremony can be divided into several categories: the ceremony of Musahiplik, the ceremony of the Gorgu which is held for the solving problems within the Alevi community, and the ceremony of Abdal Musa, Newruz and Hızir etc. The last three ceremonies vary from region to region (Bozkurt: 169).

Although there are several types of the religious ceremonies in Alevilik, only two types of ceremonies seems important for this paper. The first one relates to the sanctifying of the bond of the religious brotherhood, the ceremony of the Musahiplik; the second one relates to the inner social control of the society and the judicial content of the functions of the dede and is known as the ceremony of the Gorgu. Although these ceremonies have transcendental ground, they seem to fulfil social and historical needs of the Alevi society that existed within the circumstances of a closed society. As it was examined in the section of the traditional functions of the dede, the bond of brotherhood refers to the transition from natural membership to political membership and is sanctioned by the dede, although it has significant religious content which is characterized by the process of purification. In addition to this, the ceremony of the Gorgu refers to the efforts of social concession within the Alevi society as the means of reconciliation in front of the dede, although it has a significant religious sense that symbolizes dying before death. In fact, the strict boundaries that distinguish the Alevi societies from the outside world are constructed by the use of these means that include religious bases.

It seems that one of the leading impacts of modernization and urbanization on the traditional means of Alevilik relate to the dissolution of the circumstances of the ceremony of the Cem as the basic religious ritual like the relation of Musahiplik did. With the effects of these developments the Alevi society has immersed in new conditions. In addition to these historical developments that affected the traditional Alevi society dramatically, since Alevilik wasn't accepted as legal structure of Turkey, it accelerated the process of dissolving the components of traditional Alevilik.

After a long time dissolving the traditional means of Alevilik, a new process which characterized a new period in the history of Alevilik appeared in the late 1980's. The contents of the new period of Alevilik was characterized by the demands of the Alevis that ranged from the encouragement fiscally to recognition legally as the Sunni form of the Islam did.

In this context, some institutions were set up in order to fulfil the needs of Alevis. At first, most of them were set up independently and had different points of view. Later these institutions would be centralized under different names such as CEM Foundation, Pir Sultan Abdal Association and Haci Bektash Foundation etc. Cem house was one of these institutions. It seemed to symbolize the content of the new Alevi movement more than the others, because it refers to both the central category of Alevilik as a place of rituals and has the capacity to gather the Alevis under the same roof irrespective of their political and socio-economical status. Therefore, it's still continuing as a privileged place among the other institutions.

Furthermore setting up the Cem house in urban area seems to indicate two crucial properties of the new Alevi movement: the first one is that the Alevi has tendency to go to a certain place in which religious services are fulfilled, which contrasts to the traditional Alevi cosmology. The traditional cosmology didn't include a specific place for religious services due to two reasons in Alevi theology that referred to the rejection of the religious places (Yalcinkaya, 1996: 74-83;

Shankland, 1993: 96), and the marginalized circumstances of the Alevi masses in geographical and spatial terms (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997: 8). In this respect, it seems that Alevilik has gone in to a new process for the fulfilment of the religious needs in the face of urbanization and modernization in three senses: the first one is that it may be seen as a gathering place for the Alevis to achieve for the certain goals. The second one is that it is a response to the needs of the written culture and rational organizations. The last one is so that some kind of sign or symbol will be erected so that people will recognize the Alevi existence in the public sphere, the same way the mosque (Cami) is a symbol of the Sunni existence.

Today Alevilik demands to be recognized legally as one of the legitimate religious beliefs in Turkey due to the dichotomies between namaz and the ceremony of the Cem; Cami and the Cem house. Due to the place of the Cem as the basic mode of ritual in Alevi cosmology, it seems that the Cem house takes the dominant place hierarchically among the other Alevi organizations at the symbolic level. On this point, there have been some debates on what the main functions of the Cem house should be within the Alevi community. It can be said that there are several attitudes on this subject from a conservative point of the view to socialist one. The traditional Alevis are eager to describe the Cem as the equivalent of the mosque in which the Sunni worship, and see it only as religious place where the Alevis worship. Also they perceive it as the sacred place where the ceremony of the Cem is fulfilled as the main religious ritual of the Alevilik. Considering the results of the fieldwork, the percentage of those who describe the main function of the Cem house form a conservative point of view is 19.2. Further, they are usually elderly and well educated. At the institutional level, Cem Foundation that was located in Istanbul and the Cem Cultural House Association that was located in Ankara represent a conservative point of view like the one mentioned above.

Another attitude on this subject is that it should be regarded as a place where Alevi culture is fulfilled which contrasts with the attitude above. It is based on the perspective that Alevilik is a culture and a way of life not just religious. From this approach, it can be seen that Alevilik that is removed from its religious content is

reduced to a secular and cultural content and form. The percentage of those who describe the leading function of the Cem house in only cultural terms is 13 percent.

There is the third approach which believes that the Cem house should be a place in which the Alevis both worship and the needs of the social and cultural aspects of the Alevis are fulfilled. It seems that the last approach is a syntheses of the first two approaches that were summarized above. According to this approach, Alevilik can be understood with its metaphysical grounds and its socio-historical mode of being. So, by this alternative theoretical framework, it represents a holistic point of view avoiding the aspects of Alevilik neglected by the first two approaches. The percentage of those who agree with the third approach is 67.3. This means that the last approach is more effective than the others in social links and social bases. Also at the institutional level it seems that Haci Bektas Foundation, that is located in Ankara, represents this attitude toward the place of the ceremony of the Cem in the Alevi cosmology. The question is which Alevi institutions represent the Alevis more. According to these outcomes, the percentage of those who marked the Cem Foundation as only the representative of the Alevis is 8.7; Pir Sultan Abdal Association as only the representative of the Alevis is 24.5; the Haci Bektash Veli Foundation as only the representative of the Alevis is 39.4; the Haci Bektash Association as only the representative of the Alevis is 19.2.

The ceremony of the Cem can be said to be the basic ritual of the Alevi cosmology. Therefore it's significant to understand the urbanized perception of the Alevis and how the Alevis construct the content of the Cem ceremony, whether or not they characterize it as the central ritual of Alevilik. In this context, the percentage of those who stated not to participate in any of the Cem ceremony is 23.6. The basic characteristic of this inclination is that nearly all of those who were born in Ankara and have had very little contact with their homeland and whose level education is high in comparison to others who constitute the other categories regarding the participation of the Cem ceremony. The percentage of

those who said to participate only the ceremony in rural areas is 15.4. With the process of migration and urbanization they migrated to an urban place at an early age, and gave up participating in the Cem ceremony because of the absence of any Alevi institutions. Furthermore, the percentage of those who stated to have participated in it newly in Ankara is 18.8 when Alevi institutions appeared in the public sphere within the last two decades. Also the percentage of those who stated to have participated in both rural and urban setting is 40.9. Most of them are born in rural areas and are socialized there and after migrating to Ankara they didn't participate in a Cem ceremony until the beginning of the new Alevi movement which was organized in the late 1980's. 57.1 percent of those who said that there are some differences between the Cem ceremony in the rural and in the urban settings.

The differences that mentioned above are mainly relevant to the different social and cultural conditions between rural and urban society and space. Most of them said that whereas there was strict social control in the rural areas, there is no social control in the urban ones. Therefore, they participate in the Cem ceremonies with other Alevis with whom they have little contact and where there is little information about who they are. Also the last significant difference between the Cem ceremony in the rural areas and in urban areas is that some of the participants stated that the Cem ceremony was practiced in the rural areas according to its rules. Furthermore, they said that there is no harmony in the Cem ceremony here because of the different cultures of the Alevis who participate in the Cem ceremony. Due to the different cultural backgrounds of the participants in the Cem ceremony, the forms of the religious services and their ways of fulfilment may vary. This fact leads to some problems during the Cem ceremony. In this context, it seems that those who centralize their old ceremony in the discussion as to the right form of the ceremony evaluate the ceremony in the urban setting with artificial and heretical terms.

5.5.The Directorate of Religious Affairs as Perceived by the Alevis.

Directorate of Religious Affairs was established in 1924. At the first, it consisted of a thousand officers, then it significantly increased under the Democrat Party from 1950 to 1956. It has continued developing since the establishment of the Religion Foundation, which was established in 1975 (Melikoff, 1999c: 334-335). There have been Alevi reactions towards the Directorate of Religious Affairs in different standpoints. The main contents of these reactions are the arguments toward the Religious Affairs as a department of the state, which consists of only Sunnis. Additionally The fact that the Directorate of Religion Affairs supported economically by the state has led to all the Alevis unifying around a common point: against the present bond between the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the state. But while there is a common agreement about the content of the Directorate of Religious Affairs within the Alevis, there are two basic attitudes towards it. The main arguments of the first position are that: the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) doesn't mention the Alevis because of its Sunni nature. So it needs to be democratized dramatically and the right of representation for the Alevis' needs to be guaranteed legally by the state. In addition to these grievances, the Alevi citizens should receive funds for their religious services from the national treasury like the Sunnis in accordance with the bulk of the Alevi population. The percentage of the respondents who wished to reconstruct the DRA in the direction that summarized above is 58.2. At the institutional level, the Cem Foundation holds such the position. Besides, the representatives of this foundation claim that the demand for abolishing the DRA completely as an imaginary desire in the present political and social circumstances of Turkey.

On the other hand, the second major position within the Alevi community claims that the existence of the DRA as a component of the state is contrary to the principle of secularism which is one of the constitutive components of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, it argues that it should be abolished completely. While this position states that Alevilik should be officially recognized just like the Sunni form of Islam, it offers a radical program that includes intransitive mechanisms between the state and religion irrespective of the nature of religion. Because it sees that religion is under control of the state in the present form of

government. It maintains that if Alevilik were connected to the Directorate of Religious Affairs in the present form, the direct outcome of this would be that Alevilik would be under the control of the state just like the Sunni form of Islam. The percentage of the respondents who believe this way is 36.5. In addition to these, at the institutional level the Pir Sultan Abdal Association in which the members are mostly social democratic and socialist holds to these arguments.

Similar dual attitudes within the Alevi community seem valid for the compulsory religion course in the state's schools. It seems that those who argue that Alevis should be represented in the Directorate of Religious Affairs by Alevis, also have as a basic demand that the present religion course constructed according to the Sunni cosmology needs to be reconstructed to include the Alevi cosmology. Instead of putting an end to this course completely, they think that it should be widened with the contents of Alevilik included. In this case Alevis would learn about Alevi theology and rituals in the schools. The percentage of the respondents which thinks in this way is 58.8. Also at the institutional level, the Cem Foundation holds this attitude in this subject.

There is another position on this subject. Which argues that the existence of the Religious Institution as one of the basic components of the state is against the principle of secularism, and claims that a compulsory religious course held in public schools is also contrary to the principle of secularism. In this respect, it claims that the need for a religious course for Alevis can be fulfilled in the Alevi institutions. It maintains that it may be more useful to take a course in the history of religion instead of a course in religion that is based on a certain form of belief, such as the Sunni or Alevi form of Islam. The percentage of supporters of this position is 40. At the institutional level, the Pir Sultan Abdal Association represents this position.

There is third position which has little effect on the Alevi communities regarding the nature of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the compulsory religion

course. It seems that this position supports the present form and content of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and the compulsory religion course in the public school. Even though the percentage of those support these two subjects is very low- for the first subject 1.9, for the second 2.4 percent, the content of its arguments will be considered.

This position claims that the Directorate of Religious Affairs represents all the Muslims and that includes Alevis, because Alevilik is in the circle of Islam. For this reason, the present form and content of the Directorate of Religious Affairs can be maintained as it has been in the past. In addition to this, it maintains that the compulsory religion course includes only the contents of Islam, and it can be maintained as well as the DRA. To quote an old woman who came from Beypazari-Karasar to Ankara, as it may be help to understand the reason of this position on subject of the compulsory religious course:

Our children learn the Koran and Islam at least in state's school. Also, they learn ritual worship (namaz), and prayer (dua) there. Unless there is a religion course in the school, all of them will be atheist. For this reason, I support it.

It seems that this point of view does not represent the Alevi cosmology; it may even be evaluated as a marginal position. It may also be an outcome of the uncertain boundaries between the Alevis and the Sunnis due to the minority status of the Alevis such as Beypazari. This point of view cannot be found in areas where the Alevis constitute a significant part of population such as Tunceli, Sivas, Corum. The stressing performing the ritual worship of Islam, the Ramadan fast, Koran and prayer does not correspond to the cosmology of the Alevis, rather than cosmology of the Sunni form of Islam.

It seems there are three factors that affect the contents of attitudes of the respondents toward Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA). These are educational level ethnic origin and age of of the respondents. It can be said that those who

have a higher education level tend to wish to put an end to DRA and they claimed that its functions will be given to religious communities due to the secular character of the state in the respondents. As it is seen Table 16, On the other hand, those who have a lower education level have a tendency to support DRA which will be widened with the Alevi population instead of its abolishment in the respondent.

Table 16: DRA by educational level of the respondents

		DRA completely abolished	DRA should be autonomous	DRA should be maintained as present form	DRA should be reorganized	
Illiterate	Count	1			14	15
	%	6,7%			93,3%	100,0%
Literate	Count	3		1	9	13
	%	23,1%		7,7%	69,2%	100,0%
Primary school	Count	12	4		21	37
	%	32,4%	10,8%		56,8%	100,0%
Secondary school	Count	3			23	26
	%	11,5%			88,5%	100,0%
Lycee	Count	23		2	26	51
	%	45,1%		3,9%	51,0%	100,0%
University	Count	26		1	19	47
	%	55,3%		2,1%	40,4%	100,0%
	Count	68	4	4	112	189
	%	36,0%	2,1%	2,1%	59,3%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	48,835	20	, 000
Likelihood Ratio	48,077	20	, 000
Linear-by-Linear Association	13,300	1	, 000
N of Valid Cases	189		

Another factor that influence the contents of attitudes of the respondents toward this issue is ethnic origin of the respondents. It seems that those who are Turks tend to support DRA that will include Alevis in the respondents. On the other hand, as it is seen Table 17, those who are Kurds having a tendency to abolish DRA instead of its continuation in the respondents. Due to lack of the respondents that are Arabian origin, they are ignored in this analysis.

Table 17: DRA by ethic origin of the respondents

		DRA completely abolished	DRA should be autonomous	DRA should be maintained as present form	DRA should be reorganized	
Turkish	Count	42	6	4	92	144
	%	29,2%	4,2%	2,8%	63,9%	100,0%
Kurdish	Count	33			29	63
	%	52,4%			46,0%	100,0%
Arabic	Count	1				1
	%	100,0%				100,0%
	Count	76	6	4	121	208
	%	36,5%	2,9%	1,9%	58,2%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	17,304	8	, 027
Likelihood Ratio	20,268	8	, 009
Linear-by-Linear Association	8,137	1	, 004
N of Valid Cases	208		

The last factor that influences the contents of attitudes of the respondents toward DRA is age of the respondents. As it is seen Table 18, It seems that there is a significant relationship between age and attitudes of the respondents toward DRA. Those who are older tend to support DRA that will be reorganized and democratized in the respondents. On the other hand, those who are young have a tendency to abolish DRA, and they believe that its functions should be given to religious communities due to secular character of the Republic of Turkey. Here, those who were born after 1985 are ignored due to the lack of the respondents who are in this age level.

Table 18: DRA by the age of the respondent

		DRA completely abolished	DRA should be autonomous	DRA should be maintained as present form	DRA should be reorganized	
1944 altı	Count	10	2	1	34	47
	%	21,3%	4,3%	2,1%	72,3%	100,0%
1945-1964	Count	18	2	2	47	69
	%	26,1%	2,9%	2,9%	68,1%	100,0%
1965-1984	Count	46	1	1	35	84
	%	54,8%	1,2%	1,2%	41,7%	100,0%
1985 +	Count	2	1		5	8
	%	25,0%	12,5%		62,5%	100,0%
	Count	76	6	4	121	208
	%	36,5%	2,9%	1,9%	58,2%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	25,662	12	, 012
Likelihood Ratio	25,208	12	, 014
Linear-by-Linear Association	11,264	1	, 001
N of Valid Cases	208		

It seems that income level, the state of membership of any Alevi organizations, the place of residence of the respondents have no any influence the contents of attitudes of the respondents toward DRA.

5.6. The Sunnis as Perceived by the Respondents

One of the main characteristics of traditional Alevilik was endogamy (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1991: 21-24; Camuroglu, 2000: 19-20). It seems that endogamy functioned as a boundary that protected the Alevi communities from the outside world in the long historical period of Alevis. In this context, it seems that a compulsory but not sufficient condition of being a member of the Alevi community was coming from an Alevi lineage. The other conditions that had to be fulfilled to be an Alevi were to accept the logic of the Alevi cosmology and perform the rituals according to the rules of Alevi theology. Additionally, it seems that the form of endogamy that is one of the components which constituted traditional Alevilik has distinguished Alevilik from Bektashism which is a Sufi order. Also, it seems that the stress of endogamy which was made strictly in the Alevi community and the taboo of marrying someone who is non-Alevi, effected the theoretical attempts of claiming that Alevilik is an ethnic category rather than religious one.

The manifold radical social and political changes following the proclamation of the Republic led to a gradual opening of the Alevi communities. Migration and urbanization inclinations in the mid 1950s reinforced this process. As a result of these changes in old circumstances of traditional Alevilik, it seems that today the issue for those who are to be called Alevi is one of the most important problems that the Alevi movement has to face. The question is who is Alevi? Is it only those who came from Alevi parents? Or do we include those who accept the Alevi cosmology, its religious rituals, and pillars regardless of their parents' religion? This is now one of the crucial problems that the Alevi movement has to face.

Regarding this historical and social background, and the perceptions of the Alevi about the practice of marriage seems to make it easy to answer the question of who is Alevi. In this issue, some questions were put into questionnaire to measure this situation. According to the outcomes of the fieldwork, it appears that most of the respondents have a positive attitude about their children marrying with a non-Alevi regardless of the sex of the children. The percentage of those expressed to have positive attitude about their children marrying someone who is from a different religion or sect is 69.4 percent. But, this percentage decreases for the girls, to 55.3 percent. It appears that the main argument of those who have a positive attitude about their children marrying someone who is not Alevi relates to whether they will marry someone who is moderate, intelligent and modern rather than his or her religious origin. The main argument of those who reject the idea of marriage between Alevi and non-Alevi is that it will produce disagreements because of the different cultures and traditions. Additionally, there is a point that needs to be mentioned here which is related to the anxiety that the Alevi girls will be discriminated against in a Sunni atmosphere. It seems that this anxiety is also valid for Alevi boys because they too will have some problems due to the different cultures and traditions. The words of Haydar Koc who is one of respondent interviewed indicate some clues about the distance between the two societies.

I refuse that my daughter marries to a Sunni boy, they, the Sunnis, usually have denigrated us with a set of inferior terms such as deviant and immoral. They aren't just, therefore they inferior our girls because of their cultural and religious backgrounds. Moreover, I have never given our girls to Sunnis up to now, and if one had gave his girl to a Sunni, he would been seen as an immoral and excluded form the Alevi society. On the other hand, I don't reject that my son marries to a Sunni girl because I never denigrate her due to her region or culture.

It seems that although these statement that a few the respondents share, in fact this anxiety is shared by most of them because of their historical and social backgrounds. But the increase in social and cultural contact between the two communities is decreasing the prejudices that they traditionally share in an urban setting. It seems that while some prejudices are continuing alive in the Alevi

community against the Sunni community and vice versa, the rate of inter group marriage between the two is increasing because of social and cultural contact in an urban setting.

Also there was another question on the questionnaire that asked whether there had ever been someone who was married to a Sunni within the respondents' relatives. It seems that there is high percentage of marriage between Alevis and Sunnis than would be expected when I consider the outcome of the fieldwork. The percentage of those who stated that they have a relative who is married to a Sunni is 76.8 percent. Additionally, there is intensive contact between the Alevis and Sunnis when I look at the outcome of the question that asks when you choose a friend, which categories is the most do you pay attention to. Because only one in three in the total the respondents stated that they pay attention to the fact that he or she must be Alevi. Consequently, it seems that endogamy as one of the crucial mechanisms of traditional Alevilik is dissolving as main function of a boundary line between Alevilik and Sünnilik and it is going to lose its significance more and more for the Alevi community.

5.7. The construction of Identity by the Alevis

Identity refers to a dynamic structure that has been constructed historically in different social contexts (Barth, 2001: 11; Tilic, 1999: 86-88). More clearly, every identity construction can be seen as the outcome of different power structures. As well, identity has flexible, uncertain and incomplete character. Additionally, there are two basic components of identity: objective and subjective components. As language, lineage, and religion characterize the objective components of identity, feeling of a state of belonging to a group that may be based on ethnic or religion constitutes the subjective one.

Every person has several identities at the same time. One feels itself belonging to an ethnic, religious, and political identity at the same time. It is possible to say that there is a dynamic relationship among them. Because of this, the nature of

relationship among them tends to change in different socio-historical contexts thanks to their hegemonic character. Hence, while religion was a hegemonic category in the construction of identity in the pre-modernized period (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997:12), language and nation have become the hegemonic category in the construction of identity in modern time. As a result of this change, all basic aspects of life were reconstructed in terms of the nationalism and secularism considering the needs of modernization, urbanization and nationhood.

In view of this historical background, the contents of political identity as perceived by the Alevis in the contexts of urbanization, capitalization and modernization will be examined in this section. In addition to this, I am going to scrutinize the factors affecting the contents of political identity of the Alevis through comparing their referent systems with each other. Moreover, I will compare the referent systems used by the Alevis for present with the old ones used by them for past. In this regard, the similar and dissimilar points between the present and past forms of the Alevi identity are also going to be examined by using the continuity and discontinuity dichotomy.

As a result of the impacts of modernization, secularization and urbanization most of the Alevis has started to reconstruct Alevilik and their religious identity taking into consideration the needs and dangers of the new socio-cultural period. That's why one of the major debates within the Alevi community has been pertinent to the ethnic origins of the Alevis since foundation of the Republic (Van Bruinessen, 1991; Şener, 2002).⁴⁹ It can be argued that modern ideologies are playing a significant role in the construction of political identity of the Alevis as a result of social and cultural circumstances of traditional Alevilik. For the period of pre-modernization, Alevilik as a religious understanding was the basic source of interpretation and understanding for the Alevis. Nevertheless, the fact of modernization ruined the monopoly of Alevilik on the ways of obtaining knowledge and understanding parallel to increase in literate persons within Alevis. That's why most of Alevis have started to seek for other paths to understand and interpret about nature, society and themselves. In this

⁴⁹ Also see Bahadır's article about the nationalist attempts that conceptualise Alevilik as a form of belief in terms of language, ethnical origin from the different point of views. Bahadır, İbrahim 2003, "Aleviliğe Milliyetçi Yaklaşımlar ve Aleviler Üzerindeki Etkileri", In Bilgi Toplumunda Alevilik, Ankara: Bielefeld Alevi K.M.Y.

context, it can be argued that although a great part of the Alevi population perceive themselves as a part of Alevilik, secular ideologies more affect the contents of the construction of political identity of the Alevis than it is expected that Alevilik does by some scholars. Contrary to Camuroglu's claim (2000: 16), that includes Alevilik as a religion is the most dominant factor in the construction Alevis' identity in the present, it is possible to argue that ethnic state of belonging and political affiliations are playing more leading role in the construction of the Alevi identity than religion when the outcomes of the fieldwork are considered. Additionally, on the hand, most of the respondents carefully underlined their Alevi identity; on the other hand they tend to stress their ethnic state of belonging in equal extent. Also, during my fieldwork, although most of the respondents remembered us one of the basic principles of Alevilik that relates to 'see seventy two nations by the same eye', they underlined their language, ethnic state of belonging at the same time. Now I will examine some features of the respondents considering their ethnical origin and construction of identity to better understand the crucial factors that play important role in the construction of their political identity.

Most of the respondents are of Turkish origin, at 69.2 percent. The second major category is constituted by Kurdish origin that consisted of the Kirmanji and Zaza speaking people. The percent of them is 30.3. The percentage of those with Arabian origins in the respondents is only 0.5. Here thanks to size of the respondents, I will only concern on Turkish and Kurdish Alevis.

The referent systems that are used by the Alevis to describe their content of their political identity can be divided into three realms: ethic origin, religion, and political preference. It seems that religion category is still leading factor in the construction of the Alevis' identity when it is compared with other referent categories when the outcome of the fieldwork are considered. Nevertheless, if the percentage of those who reported that they describe their political identity in nationalist terms is added to the percentage of those who reported that they describe their political identity in political leftist terms, modern ideologies become dominant factor in the construction of the Alevis' identity. In this context, as it can be followed in Table 19, the percentage of the respondents who describe their identity in ethnic origins through

using terms such as Turk and Kurt is 23.6; in religious terms such as Alevi and Islamic is 46.2; and in political terms such as Leftist is 30.3.

Table 19: How do you describe your political identity?

	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Alevilik or Islam	96	46,2	46,2
Turkishness/ Kurdishness	49	23,6	69,7
Political Left	63	30,3	100,0
Total	208	100,0	

It seems that what the factors that affect the referent systems which are used to describe the contents of the respondents' identity are the education level, the age, ethnic origin and the state of membership of any Alevi organization or not. Those who are older and have a lower educational level have a tendency to describe their identity in religious terms; those who are younger and have a higher educational level tend to describe their political identity in ethnic and political terms. It is likely to argue that the inclination of the construction of the Alevis' identity in ethnic and political terms is going to increase, considering the increasing educational level of the Alevis in urbanized circumstances. Moreover, it seems that there is a significant relationship between the construction of political identity and ethnic origin in the respondents when the outcomes of the fieldwork are considered. Whereas most of the respondents who reported their mother tongue as Turkish tend to describe their political identity in religious term, most of the respondents who stated their mother tongue as Kurdish have a tendency to describe their political identity in leftis and nationalist terms. The situation may be seen as an outcome of the impacts of the Kurdish separatist movement on the Kurdish Alevi population.⁵⁰ The last factor that affects the contents of the construction of the identity in the respondents is related to the state of a respondent who is member of any Alevi organization or not. More clearly, while most of the respondents who reported that they were members of any Alevi organizations tend to describe their political identities in religious terms, most

⁵⁰ Because of the lack of the Arabian respondents, they are ignored in this analysis.

of the respondents who stated that they weren't members of any Alevi organizations have a tendency to describe their political identity in leftist and nationalist terms.

5.7.1. Exclusive and inclusive terms in the construction of the respondents' identity

Every identity as a historical category has an inclusive and exclusive set of terms. That is it includes a set of terms that are mostly interrelated each other, and it excludes a set of terms that are also interconnected each other. From this point of view, the issue of which constitutive components of the identity of the Alevis that involve ethnic, religious and political terms seem very significant in order to better understand the logic of the construction of the Alevis' political identity.

While there is a significant polarization around ethnic state of belonging in the Alevi population, it can be argued that Alevilik and political left are more dominant than ethnic origin in the construction of the Alevis' identity, when looking at the outcome of the fieldwork. Having made the stress on the religious and political factors other than the ethnic one in the construction of the political identity indicates the effect of the religious and political implications on the contents of the construction of the Alevis' identity. Within the respondents, those who described their political identity in religious terms are eager to describe their identity's components using these concepts: Turk, nationalist, Alevi, Secular, Atatürkist, Muslim, Social Democrat, and *Turkiyeli*⁵¹. They are also eager to exclude these terms; *Ulkucu*, and Socialist. In addition this, those who described their identity basically around political terms such as the leftists, are eager to characterize their political identity's components using these terms: Secular, Alevi, Social Democrat, Socialist, *Turkiyeli* and Kurd. On the other hand, they mostly tended to exclude these terms *Ulkucu*⁵², Muslim, Nationalist, and Atatürkist.

⁵¹ This refers to place where different people who come from different religious and ethnic groups. That means that a person belongs to Turkey.

⁵² This word is used by only extreme nationalist or fascist groups to describe their political identity in Turkey.

Besides, it seems that those who describe their political identity using basically ethnic origin as a referent system, tended to define it with these set of sub--terms, Turkiyeli, Turk, Nationalist, Secular, Alevi, Ataturkist⁵³, Social Democrat and Muslim. As well, they tended to exclude these terms socialist, Ulkucu, Kurd or Turk regarding their ethnic origins.⁵⁴

As it is seen in Table 20, some concepts are used by the three positions that use different referent systems to describe their political identity. These are Alevi, Social Democrat, Secular, and Turkiyeli. It seems that these concepts characterize some features of a common field which is shared by these positions regardless their contents of political identity. It can be argued that while there are some significant differences in the construction of their political identity, these common points can be seen as the common ground of their cooperation with each other.

Lastly, there is a point that relates to this subject which needs to be explored in order to understand the impact of the nationalist movement on the Alevi identity. That is a significant part of those who described their identity within religious terms basically; often express their ethnic origin as the most significant category. From this point, while there is very significant tendency that stresses the religious category among the Alevis, the nationalist ideology seems to penetrate dramatically or them in the period of urbanization and modernization. In addition to these effects, the Kurdish separatist movement can be evaluated as another factor that has increased the level of the nationalist polarization among the Alevis for the last two decades. These changes in the mentality of most of the Alevis signals the transition from the religious point of view, which refers to all humans as equal in front of God to a nationalist one that distinguishes people around the polarization between us and them. In spite of increased effect of the nationalist point of view on the Alevis, nearly all of them

⁵³ It means that a person is follower of Ataturk's thoughts in Turkish.

⁵⁴ This classification that is based on exclusive and inclusive terms is obtained through using the analyzing technique of crosstab. I used it to understand the nature of relationship between constructive terms in the constitution of the respondents' political identity and referent systems that the respondents used to describe the contents of their political identity.

refuse the Ulkucu category of ethnic origin, which is characterized by a racist and chauvinist terms, and they carefully distinguish their nationalism from it.

On the other hand, there is another point that relates to the concept of Ataturkist that is one of the constitutive concepts in the construction of the identity in the Alevis who are elderly. They usually remember Ataturk who was the founder of the Republic of Turkey because of the threats to abolish existence of the Alevis, at least legally. In this case, they tend to construct the Ataturkist in the left-wing content and form. This form of respect to Ataturk seems to affect the political attitudes of the Alevis also the old ones. This subject is going to be examined in the section of on the political attitudes of the Alevis in more detail.

Table 20: How do you place yourselves according to following concepts?

	1. Strongly agree	2. Agree	3. Neutral	4. Disagree	Strongly disagree
Türkiyeli	58,2	32,7	6,3	2,4	0,5
Türk	32,7	25,0	24,0	13,5	4,8
Kurt	15,9	28,4	34,6	14,9	6,3
Social 1 Democra	48,1	36,5	7,2	6,3	1,9
Nationali	6,7	20,2	4,3	18,8	50,0
Socialist	20,7	38,9	12,0	24,0	4,3
Atatürkçü	51,4	22,1	2,9	11,1	12,5
Ülkücü	0,5	1,4	1,0	2,4	94,2
Muslim	21,6	34,6	5,3	22,6	15,9
Alevi	77,9	17,3	3,4	-	1,4
Secular	69,7	26,4	2,4	0,5	1,0

5.8. The Political Attitudes of the Respondents

In this section, the forms of the political attitudes that the Alevis traditionally had are going to be constructed. This doesn't mean that a common identity that the Alevis share is the only real factor that determines the content and form of the Alevi political attitudes. Although there are various political attitudes in the Alevi community, it is likely to argue that a common state of belonging of the Alevi community is one of crucial factors in the construction of the political attitudes of the Alevis. due to their suppression and isolation

It seems that some historical and social factors play a significant role in the shaping of the political attitudes of the Alevis. There has been a mobility in the tendencies of the vote of the Alevis during the history of the Republic. The Alevis always voted for the Republican People Party, (RPP), during under the monolithic party that finished in 1945, because they welcomed to Republic, considering the basic principles and nationalism as the best guarantors for putting an end to their religious discrimination (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997: 12). The tendency of the political attitudes of the Alevis then went towards the Democrat Party that came to power in 1950 during the process of the transition from the monolithic party system to multiparty one (Schuler, 1999: 157-174). Nevertheless, they would move away from this party due to the connection between the DP and the Sunni orders.

As a result of the liberal environment of the 1960's, the Union Party (UP) was set up in 1966. Although apparently there were no announcements of this party about the Alevis, it seems that the main goal of this party was to embody the Alevis in the political system. While UP didn't mention the Alevis and their demands in its official documents, it used their symbols that refer to the Alevi cosmology which included a lion, twelve stars etc⁵⁵. Nevertheless, when looking at the outcomes of the election, the percentage of the representation of the Alevis achieved by this party seemed limited. For example in the 1969 election the percentage of votes this party received was 2.8, 1.1 percent in the 1973 election, and 0.4 percent in the 1977 election. It is obvious that the percentage of Alevis in the total population of Turkey was higher than the numbers of this party received when looking at the outcomes of these elections. This shows that there was no correspondence between the Alevi population and certain political attitudes in these election period. Most of the Alevis tended to go towards the left-wing parties such as RPP and TIP, Turkey Labor Party, when I look at the outcomes of the 1977 election.

It is possible to argue that the changing political choices of the Alevi has been related to the contents and forms of the historical and social conjunctures of Turkey from the

⁵⁵ In the symbols of Union Party, the lion symbolizes Ali; every star also represents each Imam from the Twelve Imams in the Alevi cosmology.

beginning of the Republic. Nevertheless, it seems that there are some boundaries that have restricted the political attitudes of the Alevis when I examine the outcomes of the elections after the multiparty system. Secularism that has been one of these boundaries has determined the content of the political attitudes of the Alevis. Additionally, it can be stated that the Alevis as a whole moved towards the left-wing parties at the end of the 1960's, due to of several social and historical developments, which included the conjuncture of the world, and the processes of migration, urbanization and modernization in Turkey. It seems that this inclination in the voting patterns of the Alevis continued into the next decades.

With the impacts of several historical and social developments which included the collapse of the socialist block in the world, the rise of political Islam, and the Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey, as it examined previously in theoretical chapter, the Alevis started to stress the Alevi identity and some basic demands of the Alevi community in the 1990's. Additionally, it seems that the dominant factor that determined the contents of the political attitudes of the Alevis was the polarization around the secular and non-secular blocks more than the other factors in this time. The rise of political Islam led to Alevis bring together in various platforms such as magazine, association. Also for this reason, most of the Alevis politically went towards the RPP, which was seen as the guarantor of the secular character of the state in this period. This voting pattern of the Alevis was still going on in the last national and local elections due to the same reason, because, most of them still believe that political Islam currently is the biggest dangerous for them. Now I will examine the political features of the respondents through their voting patterns during the local and national elections, not ignoring the criteria that affected their political preferences.

As it was examined previously in section of the migratory features of the respondents, most of the respondents came to Ankara from areas where there had been polarization around the Alevi and Sunni communities in political terms such as Corum, Yozgat, and Sivas. As a matter of fact, Alevis were attacked by racists and Islamic fundamentalists groups in some of these regions during the 1970's. It seems that the conflicts between different sects of the Islam were reflected on the scene of

the different political camps which were characterized by the polarization between the socialist and extreme right camps in this period. As result of this polarization the Alevis as a whole went towards different sects of the left wing parties but especially the RPP

Bearing in mind this historical background, the Alevis continue to vote dominantly for the RPP in different social and political periods of Turkey. It seems that the political attitudes of the respondents fit the ones of Alevis in general. In this context, most of the respondents stated tha they voted for the RPP in the last national election, 64.4 percent. The second tendency in the respondents is constituted by those who voted for -Democrat People Party, DPP, in the last national election, 21.6 percent. The rest of the respondents seem to be distributed in different parties that are characterized by the left stance. Nevertheless, it seems that the situation is completely different in the local election, because nearly all of the respondents stated tht they voted for the RPP in the 1999 local election. This means that while the respondents tended to vote for different left- wing parties in the national election, nearly all of them went toward only one party, RPP, in local election. .

These patterns in previous elections will seem to continue in a new election when I look at the answers of the respondents to a question that relates to for which political parties they vote if now there is national election. The percentage of the respondents who stated to vote for RPP is 57.8 percent according to the outcome of the fieldwork. And the second significant category which is 22.1 percent is constituted by those who stated that they vote for DPP. The rest of the respondents seem to be distributed to other parties that are characterized by the left.

Another point that relates to the political attitudes of the Alevis is about what the Alevis perceive the Alevi political party with the impact of modern Alevi movement that have accelerated for two decades. When I look at the outcome of the fieldwork, it seems that most of the Alevis reject the idea of a party that is constituted by only Alevis because of basically two reasons: the first reason relates to its anti-secular content, the second reason relates to its separatist content from the rest of the whole

society. On the other hand, only a small part of the respondents stated that they support a Alevi party in two senses: the first sense refers that it must be constituted by only Alevis, the second one signs that its goals should represent the basic demands of the Alevi society. Consequently, although the religious dimension of Alevilik has a very significant impact on most of Alevis as an outcome of the recent developments in Turkey and in the world, most of the respondents seem to refuse an Alevi party as a separate political party because of the stressed made on the principles of secularism and unification of all the segments of the society in Turkey.

Another point that needs to be conceptualized is relevant the criteria which determine the political attitudes of the Alevis. It seems that the most crucial factor that determines the content of the political attitudes of the Alevis is whether the party is the left-stance or not. Most of the respondents reported that they vote for a party whether or not it is a left party; their percentage is 85.6 percent. Also, most of the respondents stated that the secular quality that a party has is not enough for them to vote for it. Additionally, most of the respondents stated that a left party is ontologically based on the secular ground. Thus, it seems that they tend to vote more easily for a left party than a right party. Besides, only a small part of the respondents stated that they tend to neglect the basic differences between the left and right; and they only notice the secular quality that a party has to vote for it regardless of its qualities. Their percentage is 5.8 percent.

Although it seems that most Alevis pay attention to the distinction between the left and right when they vote for RPP, there is another significant factor determining their political attitudes. It is relevant to Ataturk who is the founder of the Republic. Today most of Alevis are proud of their co-operation with him, and in fact they perceive him as a savior. In this context, since Ataturk was one of the founders of RRP, today most of them define RRP as Ataturk's party. Because of this, especially most of the respondents who are old always vote for RRP in the respondents. These statements of Selma Dogan who is one of the interviewers indicate the impact of Ataturk on her political attitude.

I traditionally vote for RRP, because it is Ataturk's party. He rescued Alevis from persecution, prejudices, darkness and misconceptions at the hands of the majority Sunnis. He is like Ali for Alevis, and as you know he is an Alevi. For these reasons, I vote for RRP forever.

During conducting this fieldwork, most of the respondents who almost are old age, talked about Ataturk and their sympathies to RRP with very similar words are quoted above. On the other hand, in general, this factor that stalwartly affect the content of political attitudes of those who are old age in the Alevi community seems to dwindle its significance for the young Alevis, because most of them told to us vote for the political left due to its left stance.

It seems that the different patterns of the political attitudes, which seem to fit ones of Alevis in general, within the respondents are very dependent on three factors: The first factor is the age of the respondent which seems to affect the political tendencies in the respondents. As it is shown in Table 21, those who are older have a tendency to vote for RPP, those who are younger have a tendency to vote mainly for other left parties, especially DPP. This means that RPP have a very strong impact on those who are older than younger when I look at the outcome of the fieldwork.

Table 21: Votes on December 3 in 2002 National Election by Age

		RPP	DPP	TCP	FSP	YP	No vote	
1944 and under	Count	43	1			1	2	47
	%	91,5 %	2,1%			2,1%	4,3%	100,0%
1945-1964	Count	57	9	1		1	1	69
	%	82,6 %	13,0%	1,4%		1,4%	1,4%	100,0%
1965-1984	Count	32	35	3	6	1	7	84
	%	38,1 %	41,7%	3,6%	7,1%	1,2%	8,3%	100,0%
1985 and above	Count	2			1		5	8
	%	25,0 %			12,5 %		62,5%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	97,669	15	, 000
Likelihood Ratio	86,738	15	, 000
Linear-by-Linear Association	31,469	1	, 000
N of Valid Cases	208		

The second factor that determines the content of the political attitudes of the respondents is relevant the educational level. As it is shown in Table 22, the political attitudes that the respondents have are various because of the different educational level. In this sense, those who have a lower educational level have a tendency to vote for RPP, on the other hand, those who have a higher educational level tend to vote for other left parties, especially DPP in the respondents.

Table 22: Vote on December 3 in 2002 National Election by Level of Education

		RPP	DPP	TCP	FSP	YP	No vote	
Illiterate	Count	14					1	15
	%	93,3%					6,7%	100,0%
Literate	Count	13						13
	%	100,0%						100,0%
Primary School	Count	32	1			1	3	37
	%	86,5%	2,7%			2,7%	8,1%	100,0%
Secondary School	Count	21	1		2	1	1	26
	%	80,8%	3,8%		7,7%	3,8%	3,8%	100,0%
Lycee	Count	26	15	3	3	1	3	51
	%	51,0%	29,4%	5,9%	5,9%	2,0%	5,9%	100,0%
University	Count	20	24	1			2	47
	%	42,6%	51,1%	2,1%			4,3%	100,0%

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	65,556	25	, 000
Likelihood Ratio	75,987	25	, 000
Linear-by-Linear Association	4,911	1	, 027
N of Valid Cases	189		

The last factor that seems to determine the content of the political attitudes of the respondents is ethnic origin. It seems that there is a significant relationship between the political attitudes and ethnic origin of the respondents when the outcome of the fieldwork are considered.

Table 23: Vote on December 3 in 2002 National Election by Mother Language

		RPP	DPP	TCP	FSP	YP	No vote	
Turkish	Count	113	8	3	6	3	11	144
	%	78,5%	5,6%	2,1%	4,2%	2,1%	7,6%	100,0 %
Kurdish	Count	20	37	1	1		4	63
	%	31,7%	58,7%	1,6%	1,6%		6,3%	100,0 %
Arabic	Count	1						1
	%	100,0%						100,0 %

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	75,029	10	,000
Likelihood Ratio	72,914	10	,000
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,434	1	,231
N of Valid Cases	208		

As it is shown in Table 23, those who described their mother language as Turkish have a tendency to vote for RPP. In this sense, the percentage of those who stated that they voted for RPP from Turkish origin as an ethnic group is 78.5 percent in 2002 national election. Additionally, the percentage of those who stated that they voted for DPP from Turkish origin is only 5.6 percent in the same election. On the other hand, the percentage of those who stated that they voted for DPP from Kurdish origin is 58.7 percent, and those who stated that they voted for RPP from Kurdish origin is 31.7 percent in the same election. But, while those who are older from Kurdish and Turkish origins and have a lower educational level tend to vote for RPP,

those who are younger and have a higher educational level from both ethnic origins tend to vote for other left parties, especially DPP.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

It can be said that contrary to the past, the identity politics started to constitute the main axis of the agenda's matters in the public sphere in the mid 1980's in Turkey. Up to that time, there had been a process of political polarization that was based on general politics and grand ideologies. The most crucial character of the new period that began in the mid 1980's was constituted by the form of politics that was based on certain identity politics. The contents of identity politics can be divided into three domains; ethnic, religion and gender. While it seems that the Kurds have been main actors of the politics of ethnic identity, the Alevi movement that constituted the Alevi identity with political terms, took its place in the public sphere as one of the most important movements in recent years in the Republic⁵⁶. These identities, which were hidden in the short history of the Republic that was set up on the remainder of the Ottoman Empire, appeared in the public sphere as crucial matters were related to the social and political conjunctures of the world and Turkey.

As it was explained in theoretical chapter broadly, it is possible to classify Alevilik in three periods. The first period that referred to the social and geographical marginality of Alevilik, is pre-modernization Alevilik. Also, it seems that the basic institutions and relationships of Alevilik were shaped mainly in this period. The boundaries that distinguished the Alevis from the outside world were so strict that there were many mechanisms that functioned with exclusive and inclusive terms.

⁵⁶ In addition to the Alevi movement, there are some approaches that evaluated political Islam in identity politics. For a case of these approaches see Ocak, 2002. Nevertheless, there are some troubles in this analysis. Since there are components of this movement that include the time of emergence of political Islam as a grand ideology, its contents of arguments, its level of analysis and its epistemological ground etc, it is more suitable to place it in the circle of the grand ideology.

The second period that started with the proclamation of the Republic, and was reinforced with the process of migration in the mid 1950's, was a gradual opening of the Alevi communities to the outside world. This period referred to conjuncture of crisis in which the traditional institutions and relationships of Alevilik started to be scattered and dissolved as a result of migration and urbanization. In this sense, the traditional institutions and relationships of Alevilik started to be replaced by a capitalist economy, modern education system, a contemporary state and its apparatus and ideologies. Accordingly, the functions of the traditional institutions of Alevilik started to be undertaken by the ones of modern state. Additionally, it seems that the crisis in the historical and social circumstances of Alevilik was dramatically deepened as a result of having no official recognition of Alevilik as a religious belief. These developments dramatically affected Alevilik and its socio-economical circumstances and social and religious institutions.

The third period, that started in the late 1980's and was accelerated with "the incident of Sivas in 1993", is the process of reconstruction and organization of Alevis in a new urban context. Also, it referred to some attempts to reconstruct Alevilik in contemporary terms by different points of view regarding the needs of the new social conditions. In this context, the crucial institutions and relationship of traditional Alevilik are being reconstructed as the main subjects of a new effort to define Alevilik. No doubt, there are various theoretical and political approaches in this process.

Alevilik has been reconstructed permanently as a subject of knowledge from different standpoints since it appeared in the public sphere and is related to the features of local and international conjuncture. There are a lot of studies that evaluated Alevilik. Nevertheless, it appears that most of these studies include the history of Alevilik, its theology, origin, institutions and rituals. Except for only a few studies on Alevilik in a new urban context regarding gender and social integration, there are no distinct studies on Alevis or Alevilik as a distinct subject of knowledge in a new urban context. Accordingly, the need for a study on urbanized Alevilik in the scientific sense is over due considering that most of the

Alevis living in urban places now. There was a need for a study that would examine the socio-economic conditions of the Alevis, their level of education, their perception of Alevilik, its traditional institutions and relations; their perception of the religious policy of the state, the political attitudes of the Alevis, their perception of their identity. This study should be viewed as a first step to contribute in order to fill in this space.

The aim of this study was to explore the forms of perceptions of Alevis who are living in an urban setting concerning the contents of Alevilik, its religious and social institutions and basic forms of rituals. Accordingly, this study was based on the following sub-questions that constructed the map of this study. : How do Alevis perceive Alevilik? How do they describe their religious identity? What attitudes do they have toward the basic rituals of Alevilik that consist of the ceremony of the Cem, fasting and sacrifice? How do they perceive the contents of the Dedelik and Musahiplik as the basic institutions of traditional Alevilik? How do they perceive the religious policy of the state and how do they interpret it? Which referent systems that include ethnic, religion and politics do they apply when they describe their political identity? Among these systems which is the most leading in the process of describing identity? What are the contents of their political attitudes, and what kind of factors are more effective in a making these political attitudes? Will the outcome of these questions correspond to significant differences within the Alevis? What kind of structures produces these differences?

There are some deficiencies that need to be mentioned in regard to the aim and framework of this study. The first shortage that this study has is relevant to Ankara, which was the location for this fieldwork. Although it has been receiving migrants from different regions of Turkey in different ratios, its main population is based on the Central Anatolia. Therefore I didn't attain enough data concerning those who came from different regions of Turkey. Consequently, it is important to do more fieldwork to attain the answers of the questions mentioned beforehand in Istanbul, which has a large population of Alevis from different regions of Turkey, in order to obtain sufficient data about Alevis from different regions of Turkey.

Another point that needs to be mentioned is that I didn't accomplish sufficient data about the Kurdish Alevi because of the lack of Kurdish Alevi population in Ankara. Although I could reach some differences in the perceptions between Kurdish and Turkish Alevi regarding the basic questions of this thesis, these are not sufficient to explain how they differently perceive Alevilik, its traditional institutions and rituals. Additionally, there is a leading blank in scientific investigation that compare the Turkish Alevi with the Kurdish Alevi in terms of various realms such as religious understanding, rituals, and institutions. It seems that there is a need for further surveys to fill this space.

Another lack of this thesis is in regards to Alevi women. In this survey the number of women that participated is only 25 of all the respondents. This situation should be seen as the outcome of the selected research technique, which was the random sample technique. Additionally, it should also be seen as a reflection of the fact that women attend the Alevi institutions less and appear less in the public sphere compared with men⁵⁷. In this context, it's obvious that there is need of further surveys that are concerned with how Alevi women perceive the practices of the process of urbanization and modernization; conceptualize Alevilik and its traditional institutions and relationships compared with Alevi men. There is a need that needs to be fulfilled by surveys based on Alevi women within the Alevi studies.

The last point that should be mentioned relates to every component that constituted the framework of this thesis. In order to draw a general picture that shows the impact of modernization and urbanization on Alevilik and Alevi, many variables about Alevilik and Alevi were constructed as the subject of this thesis. As mentioned previously, this study has several sub-questions that were related to the perceptions of Alevilik, the constitution and perception of religious identity, the perception and practice of religious rituals, the perception and interpretation of

⁵⁷ This situation is valid for all women who are from different religious and ethnic origins. Even the Alevi women are more active than the others in various senses.

the institutions of traditional Alevilik, the perception of the religious policy of the state, the perception of political identity and the contents of the political attitudes. The analyses of the sub-sections were made and some conclusions were reached that relate to every sub-sections keeping in mind the framework of this thesis. Nevertheless, it seems that every component that indicates different aspects of the Alevis' lives appears itself as a distinct subject of a research. Thus, there is a need for surveys that will examine these sub-questions as a distinct subject. Additionally, any new fieldwork that will study these questions will give us more information concerning the different aspects of Alevilik and its basic rituals and institutions as perceived by the Alevis who are in urban settings.

The general conclusions that were drawn from this survey indicate that the present and possible tendencies of Alevilik may be classified as below in the urbanized context.

The first conclusion is that the form of the relationship that the Alevis had with work was transformed historically. Subsistence farming and stockbreeding characterized the basic economic forms that the Alevis undertook in the pre-modernization period, today most of the Alevis who live in urban areas work in the service and industry sectors which is related to the process of urbanization as a result of the mode of capitalist production.

Secondly, it seems that the process and level of education was modified dramatically in connection with the processes of modernization and urbanization. While the categories of illiterate and literate characterized the educational level of most of the Alevis in pre-modernization period, the following steps of education are becoming dominant with the impact of modernization and urbanization. Lycee and university are now seen as the basic categories that indicate the educational level of the second and third generations of those who are urbanized.

Thirdly, it can be said that there is polarization around the contents of Alevilik within the Alevi community. One side of the polarization is constituted by those who claim that Alevilik is both a sect of Islam and the Real Islam; the other side is

constituted by those who claim that it is a way of life and a culture. It appears that the ratio of both sides is nearly equal when examining the outcome of the fieldwork. There is another approach on the content of Alevilik in spite of having very small effects on the Alevi community. Its main argument is that it is a completely distinct religion. Therefore, it claims that it is outside of Islam.

The next conclusion is relevant to the forms of religious identity within the Alevi community in the context of reconstruction of Alevilik though using contemporary terms after 1980. Religious identity may be classified into four categories. The first category is constituted by those who describe their religious identity as only Alevi and at the same time most of them describe Alevilik as a way of life or a culture. The second category consists of those who describe their religious identity as both Muslim and Alevi, and it seems that nearly all of them describe Alevilik as either a sect of Islam and/or the Real Islam. The third category is constituted by those who describe their religious identity as Atheist and they also describe Alevilik as a culture or a way of life. The fourth category consists of those who describe their religious identity as only Muslim and all of them describe Alevilik as the Real Islam. Additionally, there is another important point that is mentioned: the percentage of those who describe their religious identity as Atheist is higher than the percentage of those who describe it as Muslim. The rest of the respondents, which is a very small population, describe their religious identity as Kizilbash, Redhead, and Bektashi.

Another conclusion was reached, is that although traditional Alevilik loose its most of social and religious institutions in the process of opening of community toward outside world, it seems that most of the Alevis practices the religious rituals of Alevilik. In this context, most of them reported that they fast during the Alevi fasting period, sacrifice an animal during the festival of Sacrifice, and attend the Cem ceremony. At least, in spite of the dissolution of the traditional religious and social institutions of Alevilik, it seems that Alevilik still has significant impacts on most of Alevis in urban settings.

The next conclusion is about the relationship between the Dede and the Talip; and the institution of the Musahiplik, which is a kind of spiritual relative. It appears that most of the Alevis belong to the Dede and have a Musahip. Nevertheless, although most of them belong to the Dede and have a Musahip, only small number of them have these relationship that are correlated to the basic institutions of the traditional Alevilik. In this sense, these categories have been transformed historically due to the impacts of migration, urbanization and modernization. It seems that these categories have turned from real categories to symbolic ones.

Another conclusion which was drawn is about the contents of the Dedelik as one of the basic institutions of traditional Alevilik as perceived by the Alevis who live in urban context. It seems that a small part of the respondents still wants to maintain the institution of the Dedelik in the traditional form and content. The percentage of this group is approximately 20 percent according to the outcome of this fieldwork. Another position in this debate claims that the Dedelik is being reconstructed to fit the circumstances of urbanized Alevilik and its percentage is 30. When I look at the percentages of these two categories, they show that more than half of the respondents still evaluate this institution as a crucial component of Alevilik. A significant part of the rest of the population claim that the Alevi intellectuals should undertake the functions of the Dedes as a traditional institution of Alevilik. The rest of the respondents claim that there is no need for this institution because of the features of the new age. The debate on the contents and forms of the Dedelik should be seen as the outcome of the polarization that is carried out in the new Alevi movement.

The next outcome is about the contents and forms of the Musahiplik as perceived by the Alevis who live in urban spaces. It seems that the Musahiplik, which is one of basic institutions of traditional Alevilik, has been losing its traditional contents since the beginning of migration and modernization era, and has been modified dramatically from a real category to a symbolic one. While only one in five of the respondents maintained to preserve it because of its place in the Alevi cosmology, nearly all of the respondents wished to protect it because of the

connotations of solidarity and friendship. In this context, it is being reconstructed in a new urban context and is perceived as a symbolic alternative preference against the scattering effects of modernization and urbanization by the most of the respondents.

The next conclusion relates to the contents of the Cem house as perceived by the Alevis. It seems that the Cem house is regarded as a basic institution that symbolically represents the Alevis in general. Nevertheless, its functions and contents are perceived differently by Alevis. These differences in the definition of the functions of the Cem house should be seen as the outcome of the differences in the perception of the contents of Alevilik. Those who tend to describe Alevilik in purely religious terms tend to describe the functions of the Cem house on the grounds of the religion, which is 20 percent. Also it seems that those who tend to describe Alevilik as a way of life or a culture tend to describe the functions of the Cem house in religious, cultural and social terms. It appears that most of the respondents are in the last tendency. Nevertheless, behind these debates, it should be noted that most functions of the Cem ceremony that were fulfilled everywhere in the semi-closed Alevi community are now being undertaken by the modern state. Also, there is another point that should be mentioned, which is that the Cem house has started to fulfil the religious needs of the Alevis just as the Cami does due to the impacts of an open society. Whereas the Cem house functioned as the basic mechanism of social control in the semi-closed Alevi society, it has lost most of its traditional functions including that of social- control, and has become a sacred place that started to bring to gather the Alevis, most of whom didn't recognize to each other, to fulfil religious and cultural needs which are connected to an open society. For this altering in its functions, it is likely to argue that it was transformed historically due to impacts of modernization and urbanization.

Another conclusion relates to the contents of the religious policy of the state as perceived by the Alevis. It appears that there are two basic positions on this subject within the Alevi community. The first position claims that the Directorate of Religious Affairs, which only represents the Sunnis, should be democratized so that Alevis are represented in its body. It seems that this position has a great social

basis within the Alevi community, because most of the respondents supported this position. The second position which is contrary to the first one, maintains that the Directorate of Religious Affairs should be completely abolished and that religious affairs should be left to the religious communities in regards to the principle of the laicism. The percentage of this position in the total of the respondents is approximately 40 percent. Also, there is another position that maintains the present form and content of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and yet it has very small social bases within the Alevi community.

The next conclusion is about the attitudes of the Alevis in regard to the form and contents of the compulsory religion course in public schools. It seems that there is a polarization around this subject within the Alevi community just as in the subject of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. One side of this polarization is constituted by those who claim that the curriculum should be democratized taking the components of Alevilik into this course. On the contrary, the other side of the polarization is constituted by those who maintain that the course should be left in the official school programme because of the principle of laicism. The percentages of both positions on this subject seem to equal when the outcomes of the fieldwork are considered. Also, there is another position on this subject that should be mentioned, which claims that the content and form of the compulsory religion course in public schools which is shaped completely in the Sunni theology of Islam should remain the same. This percentage is very small considering the total number of the respondents.

Another conclusion that was reached relates to the forms and contents of the political identities of the Alevis. It seems that the most significant factor in the shaping of Alevis' political identity is still religion when the outcomes of the fieldwork are considered. Nevertheless, it can be claimed that it has been losing its significant impacts on the Alevis due to modernization and urbanization. As a result of these processes modern ideologies such as nationalism and various left ideologies are becoming more influential in the Alevi community in the new urban context. More than half of the respondents described their political identity

using nationalist and various left referent systems. On the other hand less than half of the respondents described their identity with religious terms.

The next conclusion is about the forms and contents of the political attitudes of the Alevis. It seems that the Alevis mainly have political contact with various left parties when I examine the outcome of the fieldwork. It appears that the biggest political category that is supported by the respondents is RPP with more than half of the respondents. The second biggest political category is DPP with approximately 20 percent. It seems that three factors affect the contents of the political attitudes of the Alevis: the first factor is the age of the respondent. Those who are older tend to vote for RPP, and those who are younger tend to vote mainly other left parties, especially DPP. The second factor is the educational level. Those who have a lower educational level tend to vote for RPP, on the other hand those who have a higher educational level tend to vote other left parties, especially DPP. The last factor that seems to determine the content of the political attitudes of the Alevis relates to ethnic origin. It appears that while most of the respondents who come from Turkish origin tend to vote for RPP, most of the Kurdish Alevis tend to vote for DPP. In this context, there is another point that should be mentioned which is related to a distinct Alevi party as perceived by the Alevis. It seems that most of the Alevis tend to reject a separate Alevi party because of their secular character, only a small percentage of the respondents support it due to the interests of the Alevis.

The last conclusion is about the factors which affect the contents of the perceptions of the Alevis toward Alevilik and its social and religious institutions and its basic rituals. It seems that age, educational level, state of membership of any Alevi associations and ethnic origin of the respondents are the main factors that significantly affect the contents of the perception of the respondents. Although I have considered other independent variable such as income level, the place of residence, gender of the respondents, I haven't found any significant relationship between them and dependent variables such as the Alevi perception of Alevilik, religious identity, religious institutions and rituals.

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APPENDIX

A form of questionnaire which was used in the fieldwork.

I. Sosyo – Demografik Özellikler

1. Görüşülen kişinin medeni Hali : 1. Evli 2. Bekar 3. Dul 4. Ayrılmış 5. Nişanlı
2. Siz, kendinizi de sayarak oturduğunuz hanede sürekli yaşayanların sayısını söyler misiniz: kişi

Aşağıda yer alan çizelgeyi hanede sürekli yaşayan her kişi için bir satır kullanarak doldurunuz. **İlk sıraya görüşülen kişi ile ilgili bilgileri giriniz.**

	Görüşülen kişiye göre akrabalık derecesi (Eşi, kızı, oğlu, babası gibi)	Cinsiyeti 1-Kadın 2-Erkek	Doğum Yılı	Öğrenci mi? 1- Evet 2- Hayır	Öğrenci değilse son okuduğu okul	Okul çağında (7-22 yaş) olup okumayanlar için sorunuz. Okula neden devam etmedi? 1-başarısızlık 2-Parasızlık 3- Aile reisi izin vermiyor 4-Diğer
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						

3. Oturduğunuz hanede, evde ya da dışında, sürekli ya da zaman zaman çalışarak gelir getiren veya emekli olanlar kimler? Sırasıyla söyler misiniz?

	Görüşülen kişiye göre akrabalık derecesi (Eşi, kızı, oğlu, annesi gibi)	Emekli geliri var mı? Nereden? 0- Yok 1- SSK 2- Emekli Sandığı 3- Bağ- Kur 4- Diğer	Sürekli ya da zaman Zaman çalışıyorsa İŞİNİ yazınız. Çalışmıyorsa “0” koyup Diğer sütunları sormayınız.	Çalışma biçimi 1- Ücretli maaşlı 2- Kendi hesabına 3- Emekli 4- Öğrenci 5- İşsiz
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

Eğer Anne ve babası ile ilgili bilgiler yukarıda alınmadıysa, aşağıdaki soruları sorunuz.

4. Babanızın eğitim durumu	5. Annenizin eğitim durumu
Okur yazar değil	Okur yazar değil
Hiç okula gitmemiş, fakat okur yazar	Hiç okula gitmemiş, fakat okur yazar
İlkokul mezunu	İlkokul mezunu
Orta okul mezunu	Orta okul mezunu
Lise mezunu	Lise mezunu
Üniversite mezunu	Üniversite mezunu
Yüksek Lisans / Doktora	Yüksek Lisans / Doktora

II . Sosyo – Ekonomik Özellikler

6. Oturduğunuz evin tipi nedir?

1. Müstakil ev (gecekondü) 2. Apartman daaresi

7.Şu anda oturduğunuz ev size mi ait?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

8. Eđer ev size ait ise evin tapu durumu nedir?

1. M¼stakil tapulu 2. Hisseli tapusu var 3. Tapu tahsis belgesi 4. Hiçbirisi yok

9. Eđer ev size ait deęilse kime ait?

1. Babasına 2. Akrabasına c. Akrabası olmayan birisine

10. Kentte herhangi bir (ev sahibiyse bunun dıřında) menkul ve gayri menkulu var mı?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

11. Evetse, nesi var?

.....

12. řu anda iř durumunuz ařaęıdakilerden hangisine uyuyor?

13.¼cretli maařlı olarak birisinin yanında ya da bir kuruluřta alıřıyorum. **(13. soruya gidiniz.)**

1.Kendi hesabıma, serbest alıřıyorum **(17. soruya gidiniz)**

2.Emekliyim, hibir iřde alıřmıyorum. **(20. soruya gidiniz)**

3.İřsizim, arasıra iř bulduęumda alıřıyorum. **(23. sorya gidiniz)**

4.Öęrenciyim.

5.Ev hanımıym. **(Eřinin iřine ait zellikleri sorunuz)**

13-16 arasındaki soruları ¼cretli maařlı olanlara sorunuz.

13.Nerede çalışıyorsunuz? (Çalıştığı iş yerinin adını alınız, kamu-özel ayrımını ve iş kolunu özellikle belirtiniz.)

.....

14. Ne iş yapıyorsunuz? (Yaptığı işi açıkça tanımlayarak yazınız.)

.....

15. Kaç yıldır bu iş yerinde çalışıyorsunuz?

.....

16. Çalışarak kazandığınızın dışında bir geliriniz var mı? (Örneğin; kira vb.)

.....

17- 19 arasındaki soruları kendi hesabına çalışanlara sorunuz.

17. Yaptığınız işi bize anlatır mısınız?

.....

18. İşinize ortak başkası da var mı?

1.Evet, var –**Sorunuz-** Kaç ortak?

2.Hayır, yok

19. Yanınızda sürekli ya da geçici olarak çalıştırdığınız ücretli kişiler var mı?

1.Var -sorunuz- Kaç kişi?

2.Yok

20- 22 arasındaki soruları Emekli olanlara sorunuz.

20. Emekli olduğunuz işi açıkça tanımlar mısınız?

.....

21. Kaç yıl önce emekli oldunuz?

.....

22. Şu anda herhangi bir işde çalışıyor musunuz?

1. Evet - Sorunuz- ne iş yapıyorsunuz?.....

2. Hayır

23-26 arasındaki soruları şu anda belirli bir işi olmayanlara sorunuz.

23. Şu anda geçiminizi nasıl sağlıyorsunuz?

.....

24. Ne zamandan beri belirli bir işiniz yok?

.....

25. Son yaptığınız işi anlatır mısınız?

.....

26. Nasıl bir iş arıyorsunuz?

.....

27. Haneni aylık toplam geliri (maaş dışındaki kalemlerde hatırlatılacak) ne kadar?

.....

III. Göç – Kent Özellikleri

(Bu bölümdeki sorular siz ya da aileniz şeklinde sorulacaktır.)

28. Aslen nerelisiniz?

29. Nerede doğdunuz? (Doğum yerini il, ilçe, ve köy adlarını da sorarak belirtiniz)

İli İlçesi Köyü

30. Ankara'ya ilk kim göç etti?

.....

31. Ne zaman Ankara'ya geldi(niz)?

32. Ankara'ya gelmeden önce geçiminizi nasıl sağlıyordunuz?

.....

33. Babanız ne iş yapar(dı)? (Öldüyse ya da emekli olduysa ölmeden ya da emekli olmadan önceki son işini sorunuz

.....

34. Anneniz çalışıyor mu (idi)?

1.Evet –sorunuz- Ne iş yapar(dı)?

2. Hayır.

35. Memleketinize ne sıklıkla gidersiniz?

.....

36. Hangi amaçla memleketinize gidersiniz?

1.Tatil, dinlenmek için

2.İş için

3.Düğün, cenaze ve benzeri günler için

4.Diğer

37. Köyden düzenli olarak herhangi bir gelir/destek alıyor musunuz?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

38. Varsa ne tür?

..... Miktarı/büyüklüğü

39. Yurtdışından bazen ya da düzenli olarak herhangi bir gelir/ destek alıyor musunuz?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

40. Varsa ne tür?

..... Miktarı/büyüklüğü

IV. Din Özellikleri

41. Son yıllarda Aleviliğin kamusal alana çıkmasıyla birlikte, hem dışardan hem de Alevilerin içinden, Aleviliğin ne olduğuna ilişkin bir tartışma yaşıyor. Siz Aleviliği nasıl tanımlarsınız?

- 1.Hakiki İslam olarak
 - 2.islamiyetin bir mezhebi olarak
 - 3.İslam dışı müstakil bir din olarak
 - 4.Bir yaşam biçimi/kültürü olarak
 - 5.Bir felsefe olarak
 - 6.Diğer
42. Dinsel kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?

- 1.Müslüman
- 2.Alevi
- 3.Hem müslüman hem de Alevi olarak
- 4.Kızılbaş
- 5.Bektaşî
- 6.Diğer

43. Aleviliğe ilişkin dini vecibeleri yerine getiriyor musunuz?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

44. Evetse, hangi vecibelerini yerine getiriyorsunuz?

.....

45. Bunun dışında dini amaçlı toplantılara katılır mısınız?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

46. Evetse, ne gibi toplantılara ve ne sıklıkla katılıyorsunuz?

.....

47. Bu toplantılar kimler tarafından düzenleniyor?

.....

48. Çevrenizde din konusunda danıştığınız kimseler var mı?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

49. Köy derneğiniz var mı?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

50. Evetse, üye misiniz?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

51. Faaliyetlerine katılıyor musunuz?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

52. Evetse, ne tür faaliyetlerene katılıyorsunuz?

53. Köy derneklerinin Alevilikle ilgili faaliyetleri var mı?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

54. Varsa, ne tür faaliyetleri söz konusu?

.....

Dedeler ile ilgili

55. Dedeniz (ya da Babanız) var mı?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

56. Evetse, Alevi inancına göre bir dede-talip ilişkisi sürdürüyor musunuz?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

57. Hayırsa, neden?

.....

58. Dedelere çıralığ veriyor musunuz?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

59. Dede dini vazifesi gereği sizi ziyarete geliyor mu?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

60. Hayırsa, neden?

.....

.

61. Son yıllarda, Aleviler arasında kent koşullarında dedeliğin akıbetine ilişkin bir tartışma yaşıyor. Bu kuruma ilişkin farklı değerlendirmeler yapılıyor. Siz Dedelik kurumunu nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

- 1.Dedelik kurumu olduğu gibi korunmalı
- 2.Kent koşullarına göre yeniden tanımlanmalı
- 3.Artık dedelere gerek yok, onların yerini Alevi aydınları almalı
- 4.Çağımızda dedelere veya onların yerini alacak kişilere ihtiyaç yok
- 5.Diğer

Müşahiplik ile ilgili

62. Sizin ya da ailenizden birisinin müşahibi var mı?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

63. Evetse, ilişki sürüyor mu?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

64. Hayırsa, eskiden var mıydı?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

65. Evetse, neden koptu?

.....

66. Müşahiplik kurumu sizce korunmalı mı?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

67. Evetse, neden; hayırsa, neden?

.....

.

Oruç ile ilgili

68. Alevi inancı gereği tutulması gereken oruçları tutuyor musunuz?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

69. Hayırsa, neden?

70. Ramazan orucu tutar mısınız?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

71. Evetse, neden; hayırsa, neden?

.....

Cem Evleri ile ilgili

72. Sizce Cem evlerinin işlevleri nelerdir?

- 1.Alevi ritüellerinin gerçekleştirildiği yerlerdir
- 2.Esas olarak sosyal problemlerin müzakere edildiği yerlerdir.
- 3.Alevi kültürünün icra edildiği yerlerdir.
- 4.Hem Alevi ritüellerinin yerine getirildiği hem de sosyal ve kültürel faaliyetlerinin yürütüldüğü yerlerdir
- 5.Diğer

73. Cem Ayini'ne hiç katıldınız mı?

- 1.Hiç katılmadım
- 2.Köyde katıldım
- 3.Kentte yeni katılmaya başladım
- 4.Hem köyde katılırdım hem de şehirde katılmaya devam ediyorum
- 5.Diğer

74. (Eğer köyde de katılmışsa) köy ve kent cemleri arasında fark var mı?

1.Evet- sorunuz- Nasıl bir fark?

2. Hayır

75. Sizce Cami ile Cem evi arasında bir fark var mı?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

76. Evetse, nasıl bir fark var?

.....

77. Son dönemde Aleviler arasında Cem evlerinin Alevi inancı içindeki yerine ilişkin bir tartışma yaşıyor. Siz Cem evlerinin Alevi inancı içindeki yerini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

1.Cem evleri, Alevi inancında temel ritüel yerleridir

2.Cem evleri Alevi kültür faaliyetlerinin üretildiği ve aktarıldığı yerleridir

3.Cem evleri hem Alevi inancına ait ritüellerin hem Alevi kültürün icra yerleridir.

4.Cem evleri esas olarak Alevilerin güncel problemlerini tartıştığı ve dayanıştığı yerlerdir

5.Cem evleri dinsel, sosyal, kültürel fonksiyonları olan yerlerdir

6.Diğer

Aşure ile ilgili

78. Aşure 'nin sizin için anlamı nedir?

.....

79. Aşure yapar mısınız?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

80. Aşure'yi kimlere dağıtırsınız?

.....

Kurban ile ilgili

81. Adak kurban keser misiniz?

1.Evet –sorunuz- yılda kaç defa?

2.Hayır

82.Alevi inacına göre kurban kesilmesi gereken özel günlerde (hızır günleri, Kerbela Şehitleri için yas günlerinde vb) kurban kesiyor musunuz?

1. Evet

2. Hayır

83.Hayırsa, neden?

.....

84.Kurban Bayram'ında kurban keser misiniz?

1. Evet

2. Hayır

85.Evetse, neden; hayırsa, neden?

.....

86. Kurban bayramında kurbanı kimlere dağıtıyorsunuz? (Sünnilere dağıtılıp dağıtılmadığı özellikle sorulacak)

.....

Alevilik Kurumları ile ilgili

87. Bu Alevilik kurumuna (anketin yapıldığı kurum hangisi ise) ne zamandan beri geliyorsunuz?

.....

88.İlk kimin aracılığıyla bu kuruma geldiniz?

.....

89.Buraya ne sıklıkla gelirsiniz?

.....

90. Buraya ne amaçla geliyorsunuz?

1. Aleviliğin dini ritüellerini yerine getirmek için
2. Cenaze törenleri olduğu zaman
3. Sohbet ve arkadaşlar için
4. Çeşitli kültürel faaliyetler için
5. Diğer

91. (Eğer köyden göçmüşse sorulacak) Köy ve kent Aleviliği arasında ne gibi farklılıklar var, sizce?

.....

92. Sizce bu tür Alevi kurumları sadece dini kurumlar olarak mı kalmalı yoksa; Alevilerin günlük problemlerine de yanıt oluşturmaları mı?

1. Sadece dini kurumlar olarak kalmalı
2. Alevilerin günlük problemlerine de yanıt oluşturmaları

93. Neden?

94. Bu kurumlara maddi katkıda bulunuyor musunuz?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

95. Alevilik kurumları devletten maddi ve manevi destek almalı mı?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

96. Evetse, neden; hayırsa, neden?

.....

97. Sizce Alevi-Bektaşî kurumları içinde hangi kurum Aleviliği daha çok/daha iyi temsil etmektedir?

(Birden çok seçenek söylenirse sırasıyla yanına 1, 2, 3 vb konularak işaretlenecek)

1. Cem Vakfı
2. Hacıbektaş Dernekleri
3. Pir Sultan Abdal Dernekleri

4. Hacı Bektaş Vakfı

5. Diğer

98. Sizce, bu kurumlar arasında ne gibi farklılıklar var?

.....

99. Alevilik hakkında ki bilgilerinizi daha çok nereden öğreniyorsunuz?

1.Aile büyüklerinden

2.Dedelerden/ Babalardan

3.Aleviliğin kaynak kitaplarından (Buyruk vb.)

4.Kitaplardan, dergilerden

5.Dernek toplantılarından, Panellerden

6.Diğer

100. Son yıllarda Aleviler arasındaki en popüler tartışmalardan birisi de Diyanetle ilgili. Diyanet hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

1.Kaldırılmalıdır ve din işleri cemaatlere bırakılmalıdır

2.(Özerk) Bağımsız bir kurum olmalıdır

3.Bu günkü durumunu korumalıdır

4.Tüm mezheplerin temsil edildiği bir kurum olmalıdır

5.Diğer.....

101. Diyanet, Cem evlerinin kurulmasına yardım etmeli mi?

1.Camilerin yapımına nasıl destek oluyorsa, Cem evlerinin yapımına da öyle destek olmalı

2.Yardım etmemeli

3.Mali destek sağlamalı, gerisine karışmamalı

4.Diğer.....

102. Okullarda din derslerinin zorunlu olarak okutulmasını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

- 1.Doğru buluyorum, destekliyorum
- 2.Yanlış buluyorum, kaldırılmalı
- 3.Yanlı olduğu için karşıyım
- 4.Aleviliğide kapsayacak şekilde genişletilirse desteklerim
- 5.Diğer

103. Alevilik hakkında bir eğitim verilecekse sizce bunu hangi kurum ya da kişiler vermeli?

- 1.Aile
- 2.Devletin resmi okulları
- 3.Özel kurslar
- 4.Derneklerin açtığı kurslar
- 5.Benim için farketmez
- 6.Dini eğitim verilmesini istemiyorum
- 7.Dedeler/ Babalar
- 8.Diğer

104.Devletin farklı inanç gruplarına eşit mesafede olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?

1. Evet
2. Hayır

105. Evetse, neden; hayırsa, neden?

.....

V. Sosyal Yaşam İle İlgili Özellikler

106. İkamet ettiğiniz semtte yerleşmenizdeki en önemli neden nedir?

- 1.İşe yakın olması
- 2.Akrabalar, tanıdıklar oturuyor

3.Alt Yapısı daha iyi

4.Ev sahibi olması

5.Okul için

6.Diğer

107. Oğlunuzun (eğer varsa) farklı mezhep, din ve bölgeden insanlarla evlenmesini nasıl görüyorsunuz?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

108. Evetse, neden; hayırsa, neden?

.....

109.Kızınızın (eğer varsa) farklı mezhep, din ve bölgeden insanlarla evlenmesini nasıl görüyorsunuz?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

110.Evetse, neden; hayırsa, neden?

.....

111. Ailenizde ya da akrabalarınız arasında Sunni biri ile evli olan var mı?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

112. Türkiye’de yaşayan insanlar arasında ayrımcılık (sosyal, dinsel, etnik vb.) var mı?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

113. Evetse, ne gibi? (Örneklerle tek tek açıklamasını isteyin.)

.....

.

114. Alevi olmaktan kaynaklı müspet ya da menfi bir muameleye tabi tutuldunuz mu?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

115. Evetse, nasıl?

.....

116. Arkadaş seçerken aşağıdaki hususlardan hangisine öncelik verirsiniz?

- 1.Alevi olmasına
2.Siyasi görüşüne
3.Nereli olduğuna
4.Etnik kökenine
5.Diğer

VI. Kimlik İle İlgili Özellikler

118. Anadiliniz nedir?

- 1.Türkçe
2.Kürtçe
3.Zazaca
4.Arapça
5.Diğer

119. Kimliğinizi tanımlarken ilk olarak neye referansta bulunursunuz?

- 1.Alevilik
2.Türklük
3.Müslümanlık
4.Solculuk
5.Kürtlük
6.Diğer

120. “Ben kimim” sorusuna cevap verirken aşağıda sıraladığımız özelliklere olan yakınlık derecenizi belirtiniz.

	1.Çok Yakın	2. Yakın	3.Farketmez	4. Uzak	3. Çok Uzak
Türkiyeli					
Türk					
Kürt					
Sosyal Demokrat					
Milliyetçi					
Sosyalist					
Atatürkçü					
Ülkücü					
Müslüman					
Alevi					
Laik					

VII. Siyaset İle İlgili Özellikleri

121. 3 Kasım 2002’de yapılan son milletvekili seçimlerinde hangi partiye oy vermiştiniz?

.....

122. Son belediye seçimlerinde hangi partinin adayına oy vermiştiniz?

.....

123. Şimdi milletvekili seçimleri yapılsa hangi partiye oy vermeyi düşünürdünüz?

1..... Partisine veririm.

Henüz düşünmedim. –**sorunuz**- Şu anda size yakın gelen parti hangisi?

.....

124. Aleviler ayrı bir siyasi parti kurmalı mı?

1. Evet 2. Hayır

125. Evetse, neden; hayırsa, neden?

.....

126. Siyasal partilere oy verirken dikkat ettiğiniz en önemli husus nedir?

1.Sol ya da sağda yer alması

2.Yalnızca laik olması

3.Sol ya da sağda yer almasından ziyade Alevilere ilişkin tutumu

4.Diğer

127. Kesinlikle oy vermem dediğiniz bir parti var mı?

1.Evet, var – **sorunuz**- Hangi parti?.....

2.Hayır

128. Aşağıdaki kurumlardan hangisine üyesiniz?

Kurum	1. Evet	2. Hayır	Hangisi
Parti			
Sendika			
Alevi Derneği			
Köy Derneği			

