THE QUESTION OF URBAN INTEGRATION AND FORCED MIGRATION FROM EAST AND SOUTHEAST ANATOLIAN REGIONS AFTER 1980: THE CASE OF MERSIN

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

THE QUESTION OF URBAN INTEGRATION AND FORCED MIGRATION FROM EAST AND SOUTHEAST ANATOLIAN REGIONS AFTER 1980: THE CASE OF MERSIN

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The aim in this study is to find the variables that caused differentiation in the urban integration levels of families who migrated from East and Southeast Anatolian Regions after the 1980's due to ethno-political reasons, forcedly. Thus, demographic, socioeconomic, socio-spatial, solidarity networks (social, political, organizational,) and criminal variables have been evaluated, to see whether they caused differentiation in the urban integration levels of forced migrants or not. A total number of 175 household heads, who have migrated to Mersin due to ethno-political reasons, have been interviewed. We found that the urban integration level of forced migrants differentiates according to their socioeconomic status in village and whether they commit crime or not. In conclusion, we presented a political plan shaped around these two variables.

Keywords: Urban Integration, Forced Migration

ÖZ

KENTSEL BÜTÜNLEŞME SORUNU VE 1980 SONRASI DOĞU VE GÜNEYDOĞU ANADOLU BÖLGELERİNDE YAŞANAN ZORUNLU GÖÇ: MERSİN ÖRNEĞİ

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Yüksek Lisans, Kentsel Politika Planlaması ve Yerel Yönetimler Bölümü

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Bu çalışmada amaç, 1980'den sonra Doğu ve Güneydoğu Anadolu bölgelerinden Mersin'e etno-politik nedenlerle zorunlu olarak göç eden ailelerin kentsel bütünleşme düzeylerini ve bu düzeylerde farklılaşmaya neden olan değişkenleri bulmak ve buna göre politik bir plan önerisi sunmaktır. Demografik, sosyoekonomik, sosyo-mekansal, dayanışma (politik, sosyal, örgütsel, ekonomik) ve suç değişkenlerinin zorunlu göçmenlerin kentsel bütünleşme düzeylerinde bir farklılaşma sağlayıp sağlamadıkları değerlendirilmiştir. Bu amaçla Mersin'e etno-politik nedenlerle zorunlu göç eden 175 hane halkı reisiyle görüşülmüştür. Sonuç olarak Mersin'deki zorunlu göçmenlerin kentsel bütünleşme düzeylerinin köydeki sosyoekonomik statüleri ve suç (bu suçların büyük bir oranı siyasi suçlardır) işleme durumlarına göre farklılaştığı ortaya çıkmıştır. Yapılan politik plan önerisi bu iki değişken etrafında şekillendirilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kentsel Bütünleşme, Zorunlu Göç.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date: 13 May 2004   Signature:

TO THE ALL FORCED MIGRANTS IN THE WORLD, ESPECIALLY THOSE IN TURKEY.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Purpose of the Study

The main aim in studying this subject is the consideration of international and internal political developments as dynamics of forced migration. Firstly, international developments include political, national and ethnic crises in the world, in some cases affecting those living in close proximity to Turkey. Secondly, internal political developments indicate internal dynamics, and the unique history of forced migration in Turkey.

The ethno-political crises in the world could easily affect the international and internal politics of nation-states. When we examine international political developments, we see that many regional disintegrated ethnic structures generated the questions of forced migration, international and internal political crises. These ethno-political struggles have spread all over the world, during various historical events. Firstly, after World War II many new nation-states won their independence from the disintegrating European colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These new nation-states were in search of a model of development, to promote their economy, and enhance their political independence (So, 1994:17). After establishing their independence, these new nation-states were faced with the question of disintegrated political ethnic structures.

The second important event happened after the collapse of the Soviet Union. New nation-states, such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, were established on the northwest border of Turkey, in Caucasia. Finally, especially during last two decades, a major crisis concerning the national identity of neighbors of Turkey's Caucasian,

Balkan, and Middle Eastern Neighbors arose. In this geography, a struggle started between Azerbaijan and Armenia on the issue of Karabag. In the Balkans, we witnessed the collapse of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia and Kosova were established as new ethnic-based states in the early 1990's. In these states political crises resulted in separation and establishment of new states as well.

The situation in the Middle East was a bit different from the crises in Caucasia and the Balkan Peninsula. Although the Gulf crises were not resulted with the establishment of ethnic-based states, they indicated new ethnic-based crises among Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and Persians in Iraq on the south border of Turkey. The crises in 1991 resulted with the improvement of the PKK (Kurdistan Worker Party) movement. After this period, armed conflict increased in the East and Southeast Regions of Turkey, and the people of these regions started to identify themselves on their ethnic structure; namely as Kurds more densitively than before. This means that the ethno-political struggles would be seen in the contemporary history of the Republic of Turkey. Although all armed struggles in the near vicinity of Turkey, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia resulted with the collapse, and establishment of new nation states, the armed conflict in Turkey resulted in the weakening of the PKK as an armed organization as the relative improvement of the democratic rights in the region. In the case of Turkey, a massive forced migration realized from the Eastern, towards Western cities after the political crises in the East and Southeast regions. Thus, we see that there is an urban integration question, which is one of sub product of national integration crises.

As for the internal political developments, there are two main terms of forced migration in the history of Turkey. The first term realized between 1921 and 1938. Turkey was one of the first Third World[1] countries to become independent, and utilize the modernization model for the establishment of national unity after World War I. Atatürk established the new republic with the definitions of 'Turkish, secular, united and modern' (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2003:15).

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[1] "Wallerstein criticized the conception of a bimodal system of Dependency school. He argues that the world is too complicated to be classified as a bimodal system, with cores

Authoritarianism was became the main feature of young Republic of Turkey. Especially at the beginning, Turkey had a tension based on ethnicity and region as roots of inequalities, due to the scarcity of human rights and freedom, and the establishment of Republic of Turkey as a nation-state. Through these experiences, Turkey tried to establish its national unity and integration as a young republic. When the Forced Replacement[2] and Tunceli Punishment[3] Laws were passed, thousands of Kurds were forced to migrate to rural parts of western Anatolia and Syria between 1921 and 1938 (Göç-Der, 1999:2). In this period the migration flows were from rural to rural, because of the dominance of agriculture in the Turkish economy. Thus, due to the low level of industrialization and urbanization, urban integration problems were not an issue for forced migrants.

The second term, starting after 12th September 1980, resulted particularly in the 1990's with a mass migration of internal displaced population to the Western cities. "The once voluntary migration from Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian regions has become forced since 1992, following the conflicts, the displacement measures, the growing environment of insecurity and lessened economic activities" (Yılmaz, 2003: 9). We see that all these conflicts produced forced migration and new social states (village guards) in East and Southeast Anatolian regions. Afterwards, 'internal forced migration' reappeared as a question in the western urban areas in the form of integration problems. In other words, the rural question in these regions transferred itself as an urban integration question.

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and peripheries only. There are many in-between nations that do not fit into either the core or the periphery category. Consequently, Wallerstein proposes a trimodal system consisting of core, semi periphery, and periphery." (So, 1994:180).

[2] This law was accepted in The Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1934 as a result of a series of Kurdish rebellions in East and Southeast Anatolian regions. The name of this law in Turkish is Mecburi Iskan Kanunu.

[3] This law was accepted in The Grand National Assembly of Turkey in 1937 as a result of Seyyid Rıza Rebellion in Tunceli Province. The name of this law in Turkish is Tunceli Tenkil Kanunu.

The author thinks that any social scientist should be curious about any social, political, economic and cultural changes that have the potential to change the structures of urban development in the world and in Turkey. The social, political, economic, regional and cultural disintegration causes additional urban problems after migration, and more severely after forced migration. Now we come to the purpose for choosing the case of Turkey, and specifically, the city of Mersin. Mersin received an important volume of migrants after the 'forced displacement practices' (Yılmaz, 2003: 10). After forced migration, struggles occurred between these inadaptable migrants and police forces on 21st March[4] every year, as we observed on the news. Although other western cities also received an important portion of forced migrants, there was less of news of this kind than in Mersin. In political elections, Mersin was seen as a concentration area of migration from East and Southeast regions, and especially a city with a high concentration of forced migrants. According to the research conducted by Kızılçelik (1997: 663) 51,6 % of migrants that came to Mersin from the East and Southeast regions, migrated because of armed struggles and security issues. Again, according to the same research (Kızılçelik, 1997) we see that 35,8 % of the migrants came to Mersin after the 1990's, 33,6 % of migrants migrated to Mersin between 1985 and 1989 and 25,1 % of them migrated to Mersin between 1980 and 1984. It is clear that Mersin is one of the main destination points of forced migration caused by political movements, and armed struggles between the PKK (Kurdistan Worker Party) and Turkish Security Forces after the 1980's and more densely after the 1990's.

The problem of forced migrants is a problem of national integration, which was mostly resulted in division in many states around Turkey. Nowadays, it seems that the second Gulf crisis, which started on 20th March 2003, has more potential to create ethnic-based division in Iraq. We all observe AKP's (Justice and Development Party) policies that aim to continue the current ethnic strategies concerning Iraq. With this political strategy, while Turkmen's are accepted as allies and relatives, any developments that may give

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[4] Kurdish political movements and many of Kurds celebrate this date as a national festival. Kurds have celebrated this festival more dense since 1980's. They have also densely celebrated this festival due to legal permission since 2000.

Kurds' political rights are rejected. Turkish national foreign policies reject any development that may endanger the unity of the Republic of Turkey. Turkey is afraid that if Kurds gain political rights (like a federation) in Iraq, the example may trigger similar demands in Turkey. Thus, Turkey aims to be an actor in Iraq, to ensure the safety of the unity of Iraq, thus to protect itself. The author believes that if Turkey is looking to improve the democratic process regarding the 'Kurdish question', firstly it has to establish an appropriate environment for the integration of 'forced Kurdish migrants' who live in the squatter areas of the Western cities.

Thus, the author aimed to examine the concentration of forced migrants in Mersin and to point out the root causes and processes of urban dis/integration between natives and forced migrants. The author is curious about whether they tend to integrate themselves into urban life or not. If they tend to integrate into urban life, what kind of conditions provide for their urban integration? But on the other hand, because of inferior living conditions and unemployment, many of the migrants may consider migrating back to their villages. Thus, the levels of participation of forced migrants in urban life become an important subject for the future of Mersin.

1.2 The Reason of the Study

While Kurds have traditionally lived as a rural society for hundreds of years, they have been forced to live in western urban areas since the 1980's. The main causes of this massive forced migration were martial law of 12th September 1980, state of emergency[5] practices, evacuation of villages for security reasons, armed struggles, pressure of village guards and PKK guerillas, prohibition of moving to plateaus in summer, food embargo toward villages and killings by unknown assailants in the last two decades. While according to the official numbers 378,335 people migrated, some NGO's (GÖÇ-DER and IHD) suggest that over 3 million people were forced to migrate, and leave their home, land and work behind.

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[5] The state of Emergency had started on 19 July 1987 in Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Tunceli, Siirt, Elazığ, Bingöl and Van provinces. It was completely terminated on 30 November 2002.

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There are two vital reasons for choosing this subject. The first one concerns the infrastructure of these regions, and especially the negative effects of forced migration on their scarce urban resources. The second and more important reason for this study is about the living conditions of forced migrants in western urban areas, which can prevent migrants from integrating to urban life. Firstly, the armed conflicts had adverse effects on the region and its infrastructure.

> The armed conflict has disrupted the region, which even before had been one of the poorest and least economically developed regions of Turkey with rates of illiteracy, poverty etc. much higher than in the rest of the country. Systematic destruction of the infrastructure, economic resources, livestock, crops, houses, and farming machinery has made large areas of the region uninhabitable. The infrastructure of the rural economy has been paralyzed. The cultivable land and the irrigation channels have fallen into disuse, numerous landmines add to the problem. Deprived of a market economy and industry, the region has also lost its more traditional forms of economic activity, namely livestock rearing and agriculture. Leaving their homes the peasants had to abandon all farming machinery and sell off their livestock at very low prices (if their animals had not been killed or taken away by the PKK beforehand). Unemployment in overcrowded cities and towns is disastrous (Council of Europe, 2002: Matter 26).

The economic conditions in East and Southeast Anatolian regions deteriorated significantly because of the conflicts. "Industrial and agricultural production has stopped, stock-farming activity is hit seriously, forests are burned down, lives had been in danger and 'forced displacement' policies made living conditions unbearable" (TMMOB, 1998: 5). The cities witnessing forced migration were faced with the problems of urban integration, housing, poverty, unemployment, and urban infrastructure.

> The majority of the displaced rural population of Kurdish origin now lives in urban centers in dramatic conditions and extreme poverty, creating specific integration problems for local communities. Overcrowded places have usually inadequate heating, no sanitation and inadequate infrastructure. Malnutrition, insufficient and dirty drinking water, improper disposal of sewage and garbage are common problems. (Council of Europe, 2002: Matter 23).

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Another important point for the region concerns urban development in the East and Southeast regions of Turkey. While the poorer forced migrants had to prefer the nearest regional cities, the migrants who had better economic opportunities moved to the Western cities. The populations of all of the regional cities in the Southeast of Anatolia have doubled or tripled in size in the past decade. According to some estimation, the main city of the region, Diyarbakir, grew from 400.000 in 1990 to about 1,5 million in 1997 (Council of Europe, 2002: Matter 24). But on the other hand many of forced migrants have left the region. We can easily observe that the East and Southeast regions are behind the rest of the country, when we examine indicators of health and education.

> Inadequate health care is a big problem for the displaced persons. The region is far behind the rest of the country in several important indicators of health care. Lack of adequate infrastructure, and shortage of doctors and nurses (in particular those speaking Kurdish) make it extremely difficult to efficiently combat health problems resulting from poor living conditions. Moreover, prescribed medicines are usually unaffordable for the displaced. A number of communicable diseases such as typhoid, para-typhoid, trachoma, brucellosis and amoebic dysentery are endemic throughout the region (Council of Europe, 2002: Matter 27).

> Forced migration has obviously disruptive effects on education. Although schools have remained open in most urban centers in the southeast, rapid migration led to severe overcrowding of classrooms and teacher shortages. In contrast to the national average of 45 children per classroom, there are 60 to 90 children in southeastern provinces and as many as 80 to 100 in Diyarbakir. Although many of the problems faced by the displaced children are common for other poor parts of Turkey the indicators in this region are alarming. The displaced children benefit, like all Turkish children, from free public education but many parents claim they cannot afford to buy uniforms, books, notebooks and other material, and consequently they do not send their children to school at all (Council of Europe, 2002: Matter 28).

As for the second reason, forced migrants have different ethnic structures and rural characteristics, as they had originally in their hometowns. In urban spheres they would face with adaptation problems, which include economic, political, social, cultural, ethnic and linguistic problems. These problems can delay the integration of forced migrants to urban life. The integration of forced migrants is more difficult than the integration of voluntary economic migrants, due to the forced migration process and the different

social structures. As research shows, forced migration processes caused radicalization and criminal threats (Özdağ, 1995). Armed struggles between PKK and Turkish Security Forces brought about the formation of various stereotypes of the Kurdish ethnic structure and Turkish society. There are also such problems between migrants and natives in the urban spheres.

Compared with previous economic voluntary migration flows, this involuntary migration brought different economic, political, social, regional, and ethnic problems and social structures into the urban sphere. The social inadaptation of forced migrants may affect their urban adaptation. It may be suggested that there are many social problems between forced displaced persons and natives, especially in the western cities, due to the alien social structures of forced migrants and their internal problems in migration process. Their social adaptation will determine their urban integration level.

1.3 Statement of the Problem

In the history of migration in Turkey, the first generation migrated voluntarily. They had prepared for a difficult migration processes. These voluntary migrants integrated into urban life as a result of long term residence in urban areas. The new 'displaced population' tended to disintegrate in urban life due to their different social, economic, political and ethnic structures. These newcomers show different political, economic, social and cultural characteristics, which prevent social and urban adaptation. They are more out of system than in it. Thus, although they live in urban areas, they are too 'distant' to integrate into urban life.

This new migration process is completely dissimilar to its voluntary precedents. The previous migrants were part of chain migration process. The success of pioneers, from the same place of origin, finding employment, and settling down in the new city determines the success of the later migrants in this method. In other words the pioneers provide networks for the others to migrate. Unlike voluntary migrants, forced migrants

had to leave their villages unprepared, both materialistically and psychologically. They had to migrate as whole families to the cities in the overnight (Yılmaz, 2003: 9).

> All contact with the villages is cut off, since either the village is destroyed completely, or it is practically inaccessible. Consequently they are deprived of the subsistence-provision from the village, an important resource of subsistence for rural-to-urban migrants. We lack information on the properties and scope of the new migration that has been taking place recently towards big cities, especially towards Istanbul, without the slightest institutional organization, completely through an informal process and under the pressure of extraordinary conditions. This forced migration is highly dissimilar to the voluntary migration even though the places of departure are the same (Erder, 1997: 151) (Yılmaz, 2003: 9).

After forced migration from East and Southeast Anatolia, the social structure of region cities and cities closed to the region like Mersin and Adana changed rapidly and population in urban centers rose to high numbers. The population of these cities increased between 150 % and 200 % (Bilgili, 1997: 328). This high growth rate of population brought socioeconomic problems which local governments and municipalities cannot stand.

The socioeconomic and political differentiation of 'displaced population' resulted with spatial differentiation in urban sphere. There are 11 large migrant districts in Mersin, 19 large districts in Adana and 2 districts in Diyarbakir (Yavuz, 1996). Illegal organizations replaced legal ones as the migrants participation in legal activities decreased. This situation causes a lack of confidence, anomie and alienation that are results of spatial and cultural differentiation in urban spheres (Bayhan, 1997:185-186).

Moreover, the behavior of 'displaced population' is more radical than the behavior of voluntary migrants from the same region. The persons who migrated because of economic difficulties behave more elastically than 'displaced persons'. If we examine the urban characters of the new forced migrants, we will see that they tend to disintegrate in urban life more than voluntary migrants. Especially forced migrants create "ghettoes" in urban areas. Moreover the tendency for radical movements is higher among forced migrants.

14,9 % of people who migrated to the west couldn't integrate to western people; in this situation researching their ethnic differences caused them to be more radical. As opening to out, urbanization yields tribalism together. When it joins reaction to some social destruction, this process can turn to radicalism. Some of these forced displaced people came from Southeast in bad conditions feel themselves in "immigrant psychology" and participate "ghettoes" of their townsmenships live in it closely. This process prevents people to integrate the region they came. So, Eastern and Southeastern migrants in the western region tend to be in radical movements than settled population in East and Southeast. This situation carries the high potential of crime and violence (Özdağ, 1995:437).

As for the situation in Mersin, there is a difference between regional cities and Mersin, where migrants feel themselves at a physical and cultural distance to native population. The examination of physical distance indicates that there is a border between forced migrants districts and other districts. The main cause of cultural distance is that they cannot construct close relations with native population of Mersin (Gündüz and Yetim, 1997:113). These two kinds of distance indicate many social, economic and political problems in urban spheres of Turkey and so, do in Mersin.

Actually, the density of migration caused to many social, economic and political deformations among forced migrants. Due to poverty and the high unemployment rate, child labor is substantial for the family economy in many families. According to research carried out by Açıkalın (1997: 617) on the problems of children workers in Mersin, 79,4 % of child workers and 50,5 % of children working in petty industrial firms are from East and Southeast Anatolian regions. According to the same research, 18 % of children from East and Southeast regions had linguistic difficulties at schools. Some of these children cannot succeed in Turkish lessons and some of them had learnt Turkish after starting school. Generally, families of these children speak their native language in their household, and 48 % of the mothers of these children do not know Turkish. This research also shows that 69,2 % of these children do not read any material except for course books, and 26,1 % of them only read the storybooks given by their teachers and their religious books (Açıkalın, 1997: 617).

Many research found that these migrants didn't tend to integrate into urban life (Özdağ, 1995, Mutioğlu, 1997). Now, the main questions are: what kinds of facts cause them to participate in radical movements? Why are they outsiders in the urban economic, political and social system? Why didn't the government pass appropriate migration and settlement policies? Was this the policy of state?

1.4 Methodology of the Study

The study of the related literature showed that the 'displaced population' had different social, economic, political and cultural characteristics than voluntary economic migrants. Especially the extensive survey of Barut (2002) was very enlightening. By reviewing forced migration in the world and in Turkey, we decided to study the difficulties that forced migrants have experienced in urban integration and life in general. We knew from our own life experiences that massive economic migration started from Southeast and East Regions of Anatolia to the Mediterranean Region, especially to the cities of Mersin and Adana after the 1980's. So, we decided to study the city of Mersin, because of its proximity to these regions, the city being the target of previous voluntaristic migration flows, and having a concentration of forced migrants.

In this study, we aimed to evaluate the factors that affect urban integration of forced migrants in Mersin. Moreover, we aimed to find whether forced migrants have a tendency to integrate in the city of Mersin or not. Because of the negative aspects of forced migration these, factors are accepted as negative. There are two essential sources of knowledge for our study. The first one is academic material and research on forced migration. Using these resources, we constructed our theoretical framework, which includes migration, forced migration, urban integration and related studies on Mersin and other cities of Turkey.

During the literature review we distinguished that this population flow had its roots from 1970's (Kaygalak, 1997 and Yılmaz, 2003). It was found out that there is a multicultural, plural and multiethnic social structure of Mersin. Besides Kurdish

migration, Toros Armenian and Nile Arabs, who traditionally were cotton farmers migrated to Mersin in late 19th and early 20th centuries (Özer, 2000:113). Moreover, Turkmen and Yoruks have been living in Mersin for hundreds of years. So, when someone decides to research the city of Mersin, s/he has to be knowledgeable about the multicultural and multiethnic social structure of Mersin the province, because the specifity of the social variables affects the urban integration question.

The second source is our questionnaire, which we prepared to collect data on forced migrants in Mersin. Thus, methodologically, the project was designed on quantitative research techniques. The respondents in this study are forced migrants, who migrated from the East and Southeast regions of Anatolia to the city of Mersin, due to political movements in these regions after 1980. The questionnaire was developed on the economic, social and political adaptation of participants to the urban sphere. Solidarity networks and survival strategies of the forcibly 'displaced population' have also a vital position in integration of forced migrants to urban life.

We prepared the questionnaire, which is comprised of 162 questions, to be answered by the head of the household. These questions were examined and discussed with different members of the different fields of the social sciences. 10 questionnaires were applied as a pilot study in the field in Mersin to understand whether the questionnaire would work well or not. The total number of forced migrants in the sample is 175.

While the demographic variables in our questionnaire are usually categorical, a few of them are interval variables (age, size of households, income, acres of land, etc…). The questions that are related to the urban and social integrations of forced migrants are coded into a scale (1=Fully approve-yes, 2=No idea, 3=Not approve-No). All stressors of urban and social integration have negative meanings. Thus, if the answers of forced migrants are yes, they are accepted not to have tendencies of integration. If their answers are no, they are accepted to have tendencies of integration.

In our study, we used SPSS for data analysis on forced migrants in Mersin. We used the t-test and ANOVA statistics on the SPSS package version 11.05, in order to test the differences between urban and social integration levels of forced migrants in Mersin, according to their demographic and socioeconomic status, spatial and housing conditions, solidarity networks and crime variables, which are accepted as indicators of integration in related theories.

The definite population of forced migrants in Mersin is not known, due to political reasons. Because of sampling difficulties, we used the snowball technique to reach appropriate respondents. We were forced to go about sample in this way, because, the migrants were in a very untrusting state of mind concerning anyone and everyone the considered to be a foreigner. They only trusted people who had the reference of someone that they knew. So, we had no choice but to apply a new research technique, which is used in sociological research: the snowball technique. We started to found participants for our research with the aid of acquaintances who migrated from our hometown, Diyarbakir, to Mersin.

It was difficult for the author to carry out questionnaires alone, so, after the pilot study the author decided to recruit surveyors who spoke Kurdish in order to carry out questionnaires with the household heads who were not fluent in Turkish. Thus, apart from the author there were 5 surveyors who spoke Kurdish fluently. We knew from previous research that an important portion of the 'displaced population' doesn't speak Turkish (Barut, 2002, Özer, 2000, Peker, 2000, TMMOB, 1998, Göç-Der, 1999-2001).

1.4.1 Hypotheses about Urban and Social Integration of Forced Migrants in Mersin.

The hypotheses given below are tested in chapter before conclusion. These hypotheses concern demographic, socioeconomic, sociospatial, solidarity and political and criminal characteristics of forced migrants.

1.4.1.1 Demographic Hypothesis

H1: Migrants who came to Mersin before 1990 are more integrated into urban life than forced migrants who came to Mersin after 1990

H2: Forced migrants who came to Mersin before 1990 are more integrated into society than those who came to Mersin after 1990.

H3: The urban integration level of forced migrants who are from nucleic families is higher than the urban integration level of forced migrants who are from extended families.

H4: The social integration level of forced migrants who are from nucleic families is higher than the social integration level of forced migrants who are from extended families.

H5: The urban integration level of forced migrants who migrated from urban locations is higher than of who migrated from rural locations.

H6: The social integration level of forced migrants who migrated from urban locations is higher than of who migrated from rural locations.

H7: There is difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the number of person per room.

H8: There is difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to the number of person per room.

H9: There is difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their age.

H10: There is difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their age.

1.4.1.2 Socioeconomic Hypothesis

H11: The urban integration level of employed forced migrants is higher than the urban integration level of unemployed forced migrants.

H12: The social integration level of employed forced migrants is higher than the social integration level of unemployed forced migrants.

H13: There is a difference between urban integration level of forced migrants who had survival difficulties at first and those who had language and cultural difficulties.

H14: There is difference between the social integration level of forced migrants who had survival difficulties at first and those who had language and cultural difficulties.

H15: There is difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their income.

H16: There is difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their income.

H17: There is difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the amount (in acres) of land owned in their villages.

H18: There is difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to the amount (in acres) of land owned in their villages. .

H19: There is income difference between forced migrants according to their time of migration.

1.4.1.3 Sociospatial Hypothesis

H20: The urban integration level of forced migrants who own houses is higher than the urban integration level of forced migrants who do not own houses.

H21: The social integration level of forced migrants who own houses is higher than the social integration level of forced migrants who do not own houses.

H22: The urban integration level of forced migrants who live in flats is higher than the urban integration level of forced migrants who live in gecekondus.

H23: The social integration level of forced migrants who live in flats is higher than the social integration level of forced migrants who live in gecekondus.

H24: There is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who changed their district and those who didn't change districts.

H25: There is a difference between the social integration levels+ of forced migrants who change their district and those who didn't change districts.

H26: There is a difference between the urban integration level of forced migrants who changed their house and those who did not change their house.

H27: There is a difference between the social integration level of forced migrants who changed their house and those who did not change their house.

H28: There is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who are satisfied with the urban services in their district and those who are dissatisfied with the urban services in their district.

H29: There is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who are satisfied with the urban services in their district and those who are dissatisfied with the urban services in their district.

1.4.1.4 Solidarity Networks and Political Behavior Hypothesis

H30: The urban integration level of forced migrants who are members of any foundation is higher than the urban integration level of forced migrants who are not members of any foundation.

H31: The social integration level of forced migrants who are members of any foundation is higher than social integration level of forced migrants who are not members of any foundation.

H32: The urban integration level of forced migrants who are members of the political party that they voted for is higher than the urban integration level of forced migrants who are not members of the political party that they voted for.

H33: The social integration level of forced migrants who are members of the political party that they voted for is higher than the social integration level of forced migrants who are not members of the political party that they voted for.

H34: The urban integration level of forced migrants differs according to level of application to local authorities concerning local problems.

H35: The social integration level of forced migrants differs according to level of application to local authorities concerning local problems.

H36: There is a difference between urban integration levels of forced migrants who discuss local problems and those who don't.

H37: There is a difference between social integration levels of forced migrants who discuss local problems and those who don't.

H38: There is difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who reported a change in their relations with their relatives, townsmenships and co-villagers and those who reported no change.

H39: There is difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who reported a change in their relations with their relatives, townsmenships and co-villagers and those who reported no change.

1.4.1.5 Crime Hypothesis

H40: There is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who have any condemned family members and those who do not.

H41: There is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who have any condemned family members and those who do not.

H42: There is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who have had family members detained and those who have not.

H43: There is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who have had family members detained and those who have not.

H44: There is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who have had anyone in their close environment commit suicide and those who have not.

H45: There is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who have had anyone in their close environment commit suicide and those who have not.

H46: There is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who have had anyone from their close environment attempt to commit suicide and those who have not.

H47: There is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who have had anyone from their close environment attempt to commit suicide and those who have not.

1.5 Organization of the Study

This study is planned as two parts, which is the theoretical framework of forced migration, and the urban integration and findings of our field research. First three

chapters indicate the framework of our study. The other seven chapters are about the findings of field research. In the introduction chapter, we explain our purpose, reason, statement, methodology and organization of the study. The second chapter includes a literature review and the theoretical framework of the forced migration and urban integration. In the third chapter we are going to present the situation forced migration in Turkey and in the city of Mersin.

The second part of our study includes our field research findings. The fourth chapter includes the demographic characteristics of forced migrants in Mersin, which are the size of households, family type, number of married couples, sex, birthplace, age, marital status, and educational status of forced migrants and the household heads. In the fifth chapter we are going to analyze the migration processes and socioeconomic status of forced migrants when they were in village, and their ideas about the solution to the question of forced migration. The sixth chapter includes socioeconomic status of forced migrants in the city of Mersin after migration. Their income level, occupational status, employment status, social security, and sectoral distributions are explained.

The seventh chapter includes housing and spatial characteristics of forced migrants in the city of Mersin. Here, we explain spatial conditions of forced migrants according to their accommodation, districts and urban services. In chapter eight we analyze ethnic structure, solidarity networks, urban organizations, and the political behavior of forced migrants in Mersin. The ninth chapter includes the criminal behavior of forced migrants in Mersin. In this chapter we are going to analyze the criminal status of forced migrants.

As for the tenth chapter, we test our hypothesis analysis, as indicated in introduction chapter. We test all hypotheses according to the order of chapters. By these hypotheses, we try to find which variables affect the urban and social integration level of forced migrants. In the last chapter, we propose a plan of action for the question of forced migration according to those meaningful variables.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH: FORCED MIGRATION AND THE QUESTION OF URBAN INTEGRATION

2.1 Theories of Forced Migration

When migration literature is examined carefully, it will be seen that there are three main dichotomies present. This differentiation is grounded in the theoretical division of dualistic explanations of migration. First, there is a dichotomy between 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' migrants in traditional migration studies. While 'voluntary' economic migration realizes as a result of 'push' and 'pull' factors, 'involuntary' migration, by which the questions of forced migration and refugees is indicated, realizes as a result of 'structural global inequalities and the violence associated with nationalism and independence movements' (Richmond, 1993:7-8). Such differentiation between 'voluntary' (economic) and 'involuntary' (not only political but developmental, and as a result of natural disasters) migrants can be more clearly understood by examining the migration policies of the recipient countries, and the internal regions of countries in which internal displacement has realized.

The second theorization of the contemporary migration process is based on the dichotomy between 'structure' and 'agent' (Richmond, 1994). The classical model of migration suggests that migration occurs by way of rational choices that are results of economic hardships. Thus, migration occurs either from rural to urban areas, or from underdeveloped regions or countries to developed regions or countries. This analysis of migration places emphasis on the 'push' and 'pull' factors that affect individuals. In this analysis social and economic forces at the place of origin push the individual to the destinations that attract them (pull factors). This approach suggests that individuals

make rational decisions based on objective conditions. The alternative to the voluntary approach is the structuralist framework. The structuralist approach to migration focuses on the macro-economic processes that produce socio-spatial inequalities. According to this approach such processes force the individual, who is a member of specific a social group in particular places, to migrate. Thus, this approach suggests that migration is not a consequence of rational choices of individuals, but of socio-spatial inequalities that are reproduced within global and national economies.

The last dichotomy concerns the level of analysis of migration processes, namely macro, and micro levels (Richmond, 1993:10). It is the macro level of analysis, which has dominated the literature of involuntary forced migration. This literature seeks kinds of migration describing the socioeconomic, demographic and ethnic characteristics of migrants. The studies of migrant adaptation at the macro level (economic, social and cultural integration) are not so common. Micro level analysis of migration is interested in socio-psychological or socio-cultural elements, affective in the making of the decision to migrate. In general, micro level studies of migration focus on the 'push' and 'pull' factors as well.

There are two basic models that examine the concept of migration: the classical economic model, and the neo-Marxist political economy.

2.1.1 Classical Economic Approach

Until the 1970's the most influential theories were the works of neo-classical theorists who viewed individual migration decisions as the result of push-pull factors. Early students of migration, utilizing this approach, primarily focused on understanding the reasons behind migration. Rather than examining wider social units, they located the decision-making process at the individual level. They conceptualized the reasons for migration within a reductive economist framework. It was seen that migration is a product of rational decisions, made by individuals (Todaro, 1969).

According to the classical economic model, human beings migrate as result of various reasons, such as poverty, displacement from land, and income differentials between the area of origin, and the target area. In this model, the decision to migrate is influenced by these elements. Migrants may perceive migration as a means of resisting and escaping from at least some of the aspects of the oppressive structures in which they live. It may also provide the opportunity to improve their own and their families' financial situation.

Students of the classical economic approaches studying migration appreciate the importance of the relation between micro level structures, and individual agency for understanding the migration process better. These approaches focus on the family and household as the key social and micro level structures (for example Stark, 1984). Thus, they studied 'the decision to migrate' as a part of household strategies. The structuralist approaches treated the homogenous households as the primary unit of analysis. So, migration decisions reflect the power relations within the family and household, and are influenced by both individual and collective interests. For such approaches, social networks are also important in the continuation of migration flows, especially in the aspect of factors such as providing information, employment and accommodation.

2.1.1.1 Modernization School

Many developing countries were recommended to apply the classical economic approach that can be called modernization. Especially after World War II, many of the disintegrated colonials in Asia, Africa and Latin America gained their independency. These new nation-states were seeking a model of development to promote their economy, and enhance their political independence. Thus, modernization was seen as a model of development and progress by these "Third World" countries (So, 1994:17). Firstly, these new nation-states started to work towards establishing their national integration, and to achieve this goal they used the modernization model.

Development is the problem of many states that want to enhance their economy.[6] Most of these new states followed the modernization process of the United States as a model of development. Although this model had many advantages for development, it faced many problems when put into practice. The first and most important problem faced was the problem of national integration. The plurality of their society and culture brings regional, ethnic, social, development and planning problems in the urban spheres, and slowed down the modernization project.

In social sciences, modernization school has an important effect on migration researches. According to this paradigm, it is generally suggested that migration mechanism contribute to the labor equilibrium between regions and spatial units in convenient environment for working of market mechanism. According to this school, necessity to labor in developed regions is provided from developing regions. While in developing regions the pressure of employment decrease and production increase, in developed regions the necessity to labor is provided. As a result, in long term population equilibrium between regions is provided. So, migration is evaluated as a positive mechanism that abolishes differences between regions.

In this framework, Todaro suggest that migration is related with wage differentiation among regions, and migration contributes to the providing of equilibrium among regions. According to the model of Todaro, migration from rural to urban is function of two basic variables, which are the real wage differentiation between urban and rural and

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[6] The Modernization school can be seen as a historical product of three important events after the World War II. First, there was the rise of the United States as a superpower. Second, there was the spread of a united world communist movement. Third, there was the disintegration of the European colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, giving birth to many new nation-states in the "Third World". These new nation-states were in seeking of a model of development for promoting their economy and enhance their political independence. Thus, Modernization was seen as a model of development by Third World countries. (So, 1994:17) At first these new states started to seek for providing their national integration. For achieving this aim they followed the way of modernized countries.

possibility of finding job in formal sector. According to Todaro, migration is a result of expected income differentiation rather than of real differentiation between urban and rural. So, migration is a rational decision (quoted by Ersoy, 1985: 10).

2.1.2 Neo-Marxist Political Economy

From the mid to late 1970's there were efforts heavily utilizing the Marxist political economy: dependency theory and world system theory. Castells (1975), Castles and Kosack (1973), and Miles (1980) were all representatives of this approach. This political economy approach focused on the unequal distribution of economic and political power on a worldwide basis. Representatives of this school defined migration as a mechanism for mobilizing cheap labor for capital. Castles and Kosack argued that labor migration is a form of development aid, given to the rich countries by the poor countries. According to them it is naivety to assume that individuals have free choice over migration, causing the reproduction of inequalities in economic and political power. Moreover, according to this approach economically dominant states control migration to provide cheap labor for their supply needs.

2.1.2.1 Dependency Theory

The Dependency school was a historical response to the modernization school and crisis of orthodox Marxism in Latin America in the early 1960's. All the views of this school were the exact opposite of the views of the modernization school. All the theoretical bases of this school were derived from neo-Marxism. This theory depended on the analysis of the 'core' and the 'periphery'. This school sees imperialism from a 'peripheral' point of view. It can be said that the Dependency school sees developments from the perspective of the 'Third World'. The dependency school suggests that the 'core' exploits the 'periphery' through the migration process. The migration flows are from underdeveloped regions and countries, to developed ones. Thus, migration is a process of materialistic and human resources' exploitation. As a representative of this school, 'Frank formulates a "metropolis-satellite" model to explain how the mechanisms

of underdevelopment work.' (So, 1994: 97). As a product of the colonial period, 'the national cities then became the satellites of the western metropolis.' (So, 1994: 97). Such kind of relations could also be viewed in the regional and local levels of the 'Third World' countries. According to this analysis, 'the economic surplus of the 'Third World' villages flow to local capitals, to regional capitals, to national capitals, and to the cities of western countries.' (So, 1994: 97).

2.1.2.2 World System Theory

The World System Theory was a response to the Dependency school in 1970's. Wallerstein as a representative of this school assumed that the Dependency school could not explain new activities in the capitalist World economy. He criticized the bimodal conceptualization of the Dependency school. Instead, he proposed a trimodal system consisting of the 'core', the 'semi periphery' and the 'periphery'. Whereas the Dependency school focuses on the national level, the World System Theory treats the whole world as a unit of analysis. This school is curious about the history of the capitalist world economy since the 16th century. Wallerstein divides the history of the world economy into periods from the 16th century to 1945, and from 1945 to the present. Thus, the World System Theory examined the global dynamics of world. It deals with migration in the framework of trimodal conceptualization, locating all national economies in the global analysis of the 'core', the 'semi periphery' and the 'periphery'.

2.2 Forced Migration

While social scientists examine forced migration, they have to make clear that what they mean by forced migration and population displacement. Many social scientists consider forced migration as being under duress, as subject to persecution and being within some sort of crisis. There are many situations where people don't leave their homes, while choice is still a possibility; the deportation of migrants is obviously forced. The main motivator of forced migration is shown to be a crisis, making them flee.

If forced migration is examined by its causes, it can be divided into four classes: caused by the state, which resulted with political problems, terrorist groups, commercial entities and natural disasters (Kuhlman, 2000:3-4). Historians and political scientists made the most of the literature on forced migration and 'population displacement', which involves violence and persecution as the causes of flight rather than natural disasters or development projects (Adelman 1989). It is generally accepted that most of the forced migration which has taken place in history, is closely linked to the emergence of the nation-state (Zolberg 1989, Smith 1994, Cohen 1997).

Since the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, the existence of the state has been legitimized with the concept of the nation. It is difficult to find any state where 'the nation' actually corresponded with a historical and cultural reality in both the older and in the newer nation-states of Europe. There are a few European states that were historically, culturally and ethnically homogeneous. Hence, it can be easily suggested that there is nearly always an artificial boundary dividing an ethnic group between two states, even in ethnically homogeneous states. Nationalism excludes any so-called inconvenient ethnic structures, because they do not fit into the national identity. The idea of nation-state is very new in many developing countries that were established after World War II and collapse of the Communist Block. So, the idea of nation-state is less easily accepted. The rise of nation-states in the old European colonials will also help us to understand the root causes of refugee and internal 'displaced population' problems due to political conflict, rather than development or natural disasters. Thus, forced migration and population displacement caused by violence, persecution, and ethnic cleansing have became indicators of nation-state and national identity crises.

The contemporary situation of forced migration indicates that the roots of inequalities are generated between regions, ethnicities, races, religions and cultural divisions. When we examine the history of migration, we see that there is a population movement from underdeveloped regions, countries to developed ones. In countries, we see that forced migration stems from deeper inequalities, as a result of internal conflicts that are

symptomatic of the national identity crises in these countries (Deng, 2003:5). Social scientists defined ethno political forced migration in different ways. Bookman defined the concept of forced migration under ethnicity as:

> However, it is difficult to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary movements. Clearly, if someone is forced from their home at gunpoint and given two hours to pack a single bag, that person is an involuntary migrant. However, such Draconian measures do not constitute the principal conditions of migration, as much more subtle means of pressure and coercion are usually applied (Bookman, 1997:123).

There are three types of involuntary population transfers, two of which describe the movement of a target population into a region (ethnic dilution and ethnic consolidation) and one, which describes the movement out of a region (ethnic cleansing) (Bookman, 1997:125). It can be suggested that the larger part of forced political migration, whether international or within the borders of a country, is caused directly or indirectly by the state. Kuhlman described the role of state as follows:

> After all, the state claims a monopoly on violence, and this means that violence which is sustained enough to make people abandon their homes must be either committed or abetted by the state; examples of the latter case are the 'ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia in 1992/96, the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the 'Kalenjin warriors' in Kenya in 1992/94, and the 'pro-Indonesian militia' in East Timor in 1999. It is only where the state has ceased to function that groups can commit terror without government blessing - as in the recent civil wars in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Kuhlman, 2000:2).

All these examples do not mean that the state is the sole agent of forced migration. Kuhlman analyses the agents of forced migration as the state, terrorist groups, commercial entities and natural disasters. When the states are agents in development projects, people are moved for the greater benefit of the nation at large. But in the case of natural disasters they have to migrate for their own good (Kuhlman, 2000:2). Unlike forced migration realized by state, significantly, in the cases of development projects and natural disasters, displaced people nearly always remain within the borders of their own country (Kuhlman, 2000:2).

Table 1: A typology of Displacement

Agent	Motivation	Means	Destination
Government	Development	Direct compulsion	Resettlement area (internal)
	Ethnic cleansing	Direct	Internal (usually organized)
		Compulsion	International (usually a particular country)
		Random	First internal (random)
		Violence	Then international (random)
		Persecution	International (random)
	Eliminating dissidents	Direct	International (usually a particular country)
		Compulsion	Internal exile (organized)
		Random	First internal (random)
		Violence	Then international (random)
		Persecution	International (random)
	Deportation of foreigners	Direct compulsion	Country of origin
Terrorist Groups	Ethnic cleansing	Random	Internal (random)
(Sponsored by		Violence	International (random)
State or Acting	Eliminating dissidents	Random	Internal (random)
In Lieu of State)		Violence	International (random)
Commercial Entities (with State Backing)	Slave trade	Direct compulsion	Internal market
			World market
Natural Disasters	Fear, loss of home, loss of livelihood	Controlled evacuation	Resettlement area (internal)
		Flight	Internal (random)

(Source: Kuhlman, 2000: 3-4)

If the cause is ethnic cleansing, violence or famine as in the cases of Ethiopia in 1984-1985 and Bosnia in 1992-1996, it can be said that country generates international refugees (Kuhlman, 2000:2). Forced migration can be examined as internal population displacement and external forced migration. Internal population displacement indicates forced migration that terminates within national borders. External forced migration can be seen as a refugee problem, which realizes internationally. Internal displacement is associated with conflict, human rights violations, authoritarian governments and failed economic policies. Countries that witness internal and external forced migration are seen to be in transition from conflict to peace, and from authoritarian to democratic governments. People will usually attempt to stay within their home country, and leave only when they see no other possibility, when they are forced to abandon their homes because of persecution or random violence (Kuhlman, 2000:3). This type of tension, seen in these countries can be symptomatic of glitches in the democratization process.

Forced migration was defined in the reports of Association for Social Solidarity and Culture for Migrants (GÖÇ-DER, 1999:2), as migration realized as a result of natural disasters, earthquakes, drought, militaristic struggles, and political and religious pressures. Forced migration refers to a series of processes covering the depopulation and/or burning of villages for security reasons, or abandoning of villages by the inhabitants themselves for security and/or economic reasons (IHD, 1998; Cetin, 1999).

2.2.1 The Differentiation of Refugees and 'Internal Displaced Persons' (IDP's)

There are three main dates that are important in the history of forced migration: 1951, 1967 and 1989 when the cold war era ended. At first, there were no legal positions or definitions for international forced migrants. The 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees in Geneva identified them as people who are 'outside their own country, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion' (Black, 1993:7). Secondly, the New York Protocol of 1967 reformulated this definition.

There weren't any important developments in the situation of 'internal displaced persons' until the end of the cold war era. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the problem of internal displacement appeared. The conference of the Union of Independent States in 1996 on migration and displacement drew international attention to the nine categories of displaced persons (UNHCR, 2000: 281-282). The number of people falling into one category, 'Internal displaced persons' has risen incredibly over the last decade. At the end of the 1990's, because of the sensitive situation, the problem of internally displaced persons took an international aspect. According to some researchers, the distinction between refugees and internal displaced persons was hardly understandable. While, refugees were identified as people having some rights outside their countries of origin, in the framework of international law, internal displaced persons have no legal rights.

In January 2000, Richard Holbrooke, U.S.A. ambassador to the U.N., suggested that there is no meaningful distinction between refugee and internal displaced person. Now, the UNHCR takes responsibility to help internal displaced persons, with the approval of the government of the country of origin. In 1999, the UNHCR supported that there are about 5 million internal displaced persons in Africa, the Balkans, post-Soviet republics, Colombia, Sri Lanca and various other places (UNHCR, 2000: 282).

2.2.2 Globalization and Forced Migration

The dynamics of 'forced displacement' has diversified through 50 years, since the establishment of the UNHCR in 1951. Through 52 years, the answer given to the 'forced displacement' at the international level has changed. At the beginning of the 1990's, at the end of the cold war era, where two super powers had dominated the international political space, the political climate affected the type and field of forced migration, and internal displacement. Through globalization, the ideological motivation for struggles decreased in many situations. After the end of the cold war era, ideological motivation was replaced by identical struggles that based on religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, language, and region.

The process of globalization, that diminished the importance of national borders, affected the position of refugees and internal displaced persons. The framework of the legal structure for the protection of refugees, which was compatible with the central structures of nation-states, was accepted in 1951. Today nation-states cannot control their borders. Thus, individuals started to question the relationship between sovereignty and national borders. Because of the illegal entrance of individuals, states decided to control their national borders. On the other hand, the changes realized after the global market economy caused the inequalities between rich and poor countries to increase. This process caused an increase in marginalized social groups, anti-migrant ideas, and enmity towards migrants in developed countries and internal regions.

2.2.3 Demographic Situation of Forced Migrants in the World

At the end of 20th century, the number of refugees living in other countries reached 150 million (UNHCR, 2000:280). This is 2,5% of the world population. By the beginning of the 1990's, 'international migration' was no longer associated with primary and secondary labor migration, but had become synonymous with the term 'refugee crisis' (Salt, 1989:432). By 1992, there were 17 million officially registered refugees and asylum-seekers, 4 million in a 'refugee-like situation', and an estimated 23 million people 'internally displaced' (Overbeek, 1995:17). In 1999, the population of refugees is 22.335.440 and within this population the number of internal displaced persons was 4.080.800. (UNHCR, 2000: 309).

2.3 Three Cases of Forced Migration

Now, we are going to analyze three other states in the world, which also have experience of forced migration. The first is Russia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second is Burma, where there is an ethnopolitical struggle, and as a result, there has been forced migration. Finally, we will look at Colombia, where there has been a combination of economic and ethnopolitical struggles as causes of internal forced migration.

2.3.1 The Case of Russia

The collapse of Soviet Union created new international borders, potential refugees and 'internal displaced persons'. The collapse of Soviet Union didn't solve ethnic conflict in the post- Soviet region. The process of nation-state establishment in new independent states encouraged population displacement in the region. Since 1993 Russia has had an emigrational exchange with all of the new independent nation-states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were three important migration trends between the Russian Federation, and new independent nation-states. Firstly, since the 1990's Russia has received migration from the post-Soviet space. Secondly, except in the trans-Caucasian states, Russians have made up the majority of the migrants. Finally, non-Russian ethnic groups have chosen to migrate to Russia, too. In this process, whereas the Russian population migrating to Russia was 612.378 people in 1994: the population of migrants from other ethnic groups was 914.597 (Pilkington, 1998:4).

2.3.2 The Case of Colombia

Despite over 50 years of conflict, interpretations and operational responses to population displacement have focused on the role and importance of economic incentives in Colombia. The clashes between the Liberal and Conservative parties in the 1940's (La Violencia) resulted in internal conflict of unparalleled proportions in Colombia's history (Pearce, 1990). In spite of the high levels of political violence throughout the country, inter-regional variations in the levels of violent conflict are rarely mentioned as factors during population movements (quoted from Uverra by Muggah, 2000: 6). Instead, in spite of progressive normative responses to the question of return and resettlement, the Colombian government continues to construct displacement in economic terms, rather than exploring the implications of their own military policies. We also witnessed that forced migration was caused by economic and political factor together in the case of Colombia, as in many states of the world.

Forced migration that realized in the case of Colombia has different characteristics. Although there is no plan of resettlement after displacement in many states, Colombia developed a plan of resettlement for IDP's. The route from CID (conflict-induced displacement) to resettlement can be interpreted as occurring in various ways: rural to rural, rural to semi-urban (or urban), urban to urban, and urban/rural to return/resettlement. Rural-rural flight is typically the first form of CID in Colombia. As results of declining options for personal security, and violation of human rights, individuals, households and communities seek refuge in neighboring communities in order to be close to their abandoned homes and possessions. Although the movement from rural to semi-urban settlements is either forced, or often determined by kinship ties or family members, migrants seek alternative income-earning possibilities there. At this stage families are particularly traumatized and their vulnerability to impoverishment is high. Both rural-rural and rural to semi-urban CID can occur repetitively and interchangeably, depending on the severity of the conflict. According to CODHES (1999b), more than 80 per cent of IDP's relocate to urban regions and only 9 percent remain in rural zones.

2.3.3 The Case of Burma

Internal displacement in Burma has been associated with conflict, human rights violations, authoritarian governments and failed economic policies since the 1950's. Misguided social and economic developments are the main causes of internal displacement. Many of these conditions still exist in present-day Burma and large-scale population displacements have occurred. Although the internal conditions of conflict, coercion and failed economic policies within Burma are long standing, such massive displacement of people is being reported only now. Unlike other examples of internal displacement in the world, people have been forcibly relocated from urban and rural centers.

> According to a 1994 report of the US State Department, an estimated half a million residents in Rangoon have been forcibly relocated from the city center to new satellite settlements on the outskirts of the city

between 1988 to 1994. Prior to this, a 1990 UNCHS/Habitat report indicated that between 1989 and 1990 some 1.5 million people throughout the country (4 per cent of Burma's entire population) had been relocated or resettled. Given the nation's small urban population, this represents some 16 per cent of the urban population. More than half of this massive social engineering exercise took place in only four cities: Rangoon, Mandalay, Bago and Taunggyi (BERG, 1998). In secondary towns the population relocated accounted for 22 per cent of the total town population, in other words: 120,000 out of 754,520 people (Lanjouw, Bamforth and Mortimer, 2000).

In the case of Burma, all causes of rural population forced migration are violence, natural disasters, economic development projects, forced labor and conflict between the military and various ethnic armies. Some cases of rural displacement have been ethnically motivated. Many rural displacements are the result of systematic patterns of human rights abuses.

2.4 The Question of Integration

Before explaining the question of urban integration and relatedly the one of forced migrants, the term of integration should be examined. Integration is a dynamic process, which can be both positive and negative. The concept of integration is too comprehensive which include social, political, economic, physical and psychological structures of society. While Marxist theory suggest that the process of integration works for upper classes and dominant groups, modernization theory accept this process as positive that make life of migrants easier.

The authors who deal with the question of integration discuss about integration by the concepts closed with it. Multiculturalism, acculturation, articulation, adaptation, assimilation, separation, and marginalization are some concepts that have relation with integration. Multiculturalism and acculturation are the melting pot for all those processes that lived between the powerful and powerless groups namely ruling and ruled. In other words all those processes include power relations. Therefore, theoreticians who discuss integration with such kind of conceptualization suggest that this is a negative process.

Integration, adaptation, articulation, assimilation, separation, and marginalization are all related with this process that while integration, adaptation and articulation have positive meaning, assimilation, separation, and marginalization have negative meaning. Berry defines the term of integration as to retain cultural identity and move to join the dominant group. If this strategy is successful, it can be seen that a number of different ethnic groups cooperate within a larger social system. Berry defines adaptation as both strategies used during acculturation and to its outcome. In the case of adaptation changes in individual are in a direciton, which reduces conflict between environment and individual (Berry, 1992). The other suggests that social articulation is equal to integration. The articulation of migrants with urban life can solve the question of integration.

Berry defines the term of assimilation as the absorption of a non-dominant group into an established dominant group. That is; many groups form a new society. A traditional way of life outside of full participation in the larger society lead to an independent existence namely separation. When individuals feel of alienation and loss of identity, they will be marginalized from society. In such kind of process groups lose cultural and psychological contact with both their traditional culture and the larger society. Because of the nature of forced migration, forced migrants have a tendency toward disintegration, which include assimilation, separation and marginalization.

Although the terms of integration and assimilation are used as related with each other, integration is more extensive than assimilation. Assimilation means that the acceptance of another culture and adopt the language, values, and behaviors of the dominant group. But integration takes place in social, economic and political fields. Social integration includes assimilation. As a melting pot cultural pluralism keep the distinctiveness of cultures when they become a part of larger society. In economic integration there is income, occupation. In the political integration there is a political assimilation implies that social distinctiveness such as ethnicity and gender plays no part in politics. Thus, integration stresses what the groups have in common rather than their differences (Bookman, 1997:106-107).

The question of urban integration has been discussed for a long period of time among social scientists. Many members of different disciplines discussed the question of urban integration from their own perspectives. Whereas sociologists discuss urban integration under the subject of changes in the social relations of migrants, urban planners deal with how migrants use urban space. There is a difference between the habits of social scientists and urban planners. While urban planners examine the affects of new social relations on urban space, social scientists research social changes of migrants in the social environment of the urban context. Thus, social scientists deal with relations of relatives, neighbors, and townsmenship's as a way of coping with the new social environment of the urban context. The importance of these social relations on urban space cannot be rejected, and urban planners know that social relations have affects on the use of urban space.

As a dependent variable, urban integration is affected by employment, socioeconomic status, income, house ownership, participation to urban life, achieving urban services, organization and the kind and level of using organizations. Participation to political activities, being related to the necessities of district, applying to public offices for those necessities, and using urban mechanisms are indicators of urban participation. Thus, participation to urban functions provides interaction between migrants and the urban system.

In the case of Turkey, the question of urban integration has been discussed on the gecekondu family since 1950's. There are two kinds of approach about the integration of gecekondu family. One suggests that gecekondu is made up from different social and cultural groups. It is a different category, lying between rural and urban. The other suggests that social interaction is equal to integration. The interaction of gecekondu dwellers with urban life can solve the question of integration.

Some researchers (Şenyapili, 1978) suggest that relations with relatives and the hometown postpone the urban integration of migrants. On the other hand, Levine suggests that the migrants who have relationships with their townsmenships, relatives

and the hometown can adapt to urban environment easier than those who have no relations with them (quoted by Ersoy, 1985: 88). Migrants develop social relations and solidarity networks as alternative ways to cope with city and articulate urban life. The importance of these relations does not increase. These relations change in urban space and gain new functions.

There are two main suggestions about the question of the urban integration of migrants. Some researchers suggest that migration causes social disorder, disorganization and alienation in the urban social environment. Thus the migrants cannot integrate to urban life (Ersoy, 1985: 88). On the other hand some researchers suggest that migrants can integrate to urban life easily, if they have a secure job, house, and income. According to the integration theory, the more standing time, socioeconomic status, and education level the migrants achieve, the more integration they attain. To have a continuous job and a house, are the other determinants of urban integration (Şenyapili, 1981). The previous social abilities of migrants affect their integration to urban life.

According to Şenyapili, in the case of Turkey there are four processes of urban integration.
1. 1945-1950: Marginal functions of gecekondu (squatter) family.
2. 1950-1960: The spatial effects of earning nonmarginal economic status of gecekondu family.
3. 1960-1970: The gaining of consumption function of gecekondu family.
4. 1970-1980: The passing of gecekondu family to urban land speculation.

2.4.1 The Urban Integration of Forced Migrants

After industrial revolution and enlightenment, humanity was faced with the problem of national unity and national integration. In modern Europe, the establishment of nation-states like France, Germany, Italy and Spain finished the modernization process. Although these European nation-states finished their nationalization process, some of them still have the problem of disintegrated ethnic structures. There are the Corsican and

Bask questions in France, Bask and Catalan questions in Spain. While "First World" countries are still suffering from the effects of disintegrated ethnic structures, "Third World" countries have started to utilize the modernization project within their "national borders". The problem of national integration had been felt especially after global crises: World War I, II and the ending of the Cold War, which resulted in the establishment of many new nation-states.

After the World War II, many of disintegrated colonials in Africa, Asia and South America achieved national independent. The question of disintegration reappeared as ethnic struggles broke out in the new independent nation-states. The question of forced migration became more important when Third World nation-states couldn't achieve their integration. Forced migration was the result of disintegration of the Third World countries. Those with Social and ethnic differences became forced migrants, externally or internally according to the different examples. While external forced migration created the international refugee problem, internal forced migration caused to the question of urban integration in developing countries. Thus, the question of national disintegration reappeared as the question of urban disintegration.

Therefore, integration is one of the most important questions of modernization and development. European states solved this problem by the means of industrialization, education, and national unity. Many of the European states solved their integration question by providing linguistic unity that is one of the main indicators of national integration. Today the problem of integration is accented with ethnic, gender and social differences. Smaller ethnic groups have been assimilated into the dominant groups as a result of modernization and development.

As a consequence of ethnic struggles, forced migration appeared in the urban spaces as the question of disintegrated urban population. Forced migration has had a profound impact on the urban space and ecology, urban life, urban integration, livelihoods, identity, social, cultural and economic welfare and social relations of the affected peoples. In these countries the establishment of the rule of law, respect for human rights,

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and, reconstruction of destroyed infrastructures and housing are more crucial than economic opportunities for establishing integration. The social tensions of developing countries may cause an improvement in their democracy.

CHAPTER III

FORCED MIGRATION IN TURKEY AND THE SITUATION IN MERSIN

After the 1950's the mechanization and decreasing necessity for labor power in agriculture, industrialization in urban areas, better education opportunities, better health service and social life were the main causes of urbanization in Turkey. In the last 20 years migration occurred from the East, Southeast and Black Sea regions to the Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean regions (Göç-Der, 1999:3-4). However, after the 1980's the character of urbanization of Turkey dramatically changed due to the armed struggles in Southeast Anatolia (Göç-Der, 1999:3). Whereas, for many Turks, the reason for moving has been purely economic, Kurds were forced to leave their villages and their homes, after the 1980's and more frequently so after 1990 (Wayman, 1998).

The social and economic structure of the traditional rural productive system started to dissolve after World War II, when capitalist market system slowly started to spread in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian provinces (Yılmaz, 2003:8). The population of these regions integrated with the Western regions' population, due to the unequal development levels between regions and increase in transportation and communication (Sönmez, M. 1992). The Kurdish migration to the Western cities did not begin with the conflicts in the region. After the 1950's, Kurds started to migrate to Western urban areas. There is a major difference between the push factors of the previous Kurdish migration flows and recent ones. Whereas before the 1980's the migrations were realized only because of economic reasons, after the 1980's mass migration flows resulted mostly from political reasons combined with economic ones. In the words of Şen "since 1993, the number of those who migrated in a 'forced' manner increased" (Şen, 1996: 252). Much of forced migration has occurred since 1992 in Turkey. Forced

migrants have moved to squatter settlements in regional cities and Western urban areas. So, a more important differentiation between the voluntary and forced migration flows must be made.

3.1 The Causes of Forced Migration in Turkey

While we examine the causes of forced migration in Turkey, we will see that a considerable part of migration is related to the decline in economic conditions. The other important reasons of forced migration are revenge attacks from security forces, anxiety about safety, logistical arguments, and pressure to become village guards, pressure from village guards and food embargoes (Peker, 2000). Barut characterized the internal displacement as a tragedy resulting from a political structure lacking in pluralism, democratization and human rights in contemporary Turkey.

3.2 Assumptions about Numbers of Forced Migrants in Turkey

The exact number of internal 'displaced persons' is not known. Estimates of the number of displaced people differ widely. While government officials suggest that about 380.000 people have been affected, NGOs argue that the number of 'displaced persons' may be as high as 4.5 million between 1983 and 1999 (Barut, 2002: 5). In its human rights report for 2000, the U.S. Department of State said that "credible estimates" of internally displaced people in Turkeys range as high as one million (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2001).

3.3 The Situation of Forced Migrants in Urban Spaces of Turkey

The living conditions of forced migrants in urban spaces are more deteriorated than their living condition in the villages. Moreover, it is quite impossible for them to return to their village. No matter which city they migrate to, forced migrants are deprived of necessary skills to find a permanent wage employment. In Turkey, forced migrants are either unemployed or work in informal jobs. They have no choice but to consider

temporary work in the informal sector. Thus, the survival strategies of forced migrants depend on the temporary, daily jobs and on help from relatives. It can be suggested that many of forced migrants live under poverty line.

3.4 The Situation of Forced Migrants in Diyarbakır

At the beginning, it should be made clear that there are similarities between different cities that experienced the massive flow of forced migrants. Diyarbakir is probably the city that has been subjected to the largest migration flow. Although the city also witnessed an out migration flow, its population increased from 380.000 to 1 million after the massive migration between 1990 and 1995. According to the survey conducted by the Turkish Union of Chambers of Architects and Engineers (TMMOB) in 1996 in Diyarbakir:

> After 1990s the reasons of migration from the villages to the city have shifted from economic to more political reasons, such as the evacuation of villages, burning down of the villages or the incidents in the region. 73.7% of the interviewees who came to Diyarbakir after 1990 stated that they immigrated due to "compulsory reasons" (TMMOB, 1998: 28).

While economic reasons, unemployment, hardship of livelihood, and non-possession of land as pushing reason caused previous migration, returning to the village was out of the question. Today the majority of the forced migrants wish to return. 35% of the unemployed persons are forced migrants and 67% of them are unemployed in Diyarbakir (TMMOB, 1998). In Diyarbakir, 50% of informal workers, who work as street vendors, unskilled workers, shoe-shiners etc. are, forced migrants. Hence, we can state that the unemployment rate of the forced migrants is higher than it is statistically calculated (TMMOB, 1998: 34).

3.5 The Findings of Barut

Barut carried out the most comprehensive survey on forced migration in Turkey with the sponsorship of GÖÇ-DER (Association for Social Solidarity and Culture for Migrants)

(2002). This survey covered the major cities that received the largest part of the forcibly displaced migrants since the beginning of 1990s: Diyarbakir, Van, Batman, Istanbul, Izmir and Mersin. This survey indicates very important facts about the migrant people. The forced migrants are nearly homogeneous ethnically. Most of 'displaced population' has hardship of living conditions and lack of estates in order to cope with the urban life. We also derived from this survey that forced migrants are in deep social and economic segregation. According to this survey, of the displaced families who migrated to the cities:

1. 86.7% migrated between 1989-99.
2. 83.7% state the reason for migration as 'practices within the emergency rule, namely depopulation of villages, forcing to become village-guards, closing of pasture lands'.
3. 41% migrated with the totality of village.
4. 98.6% state to have material loss.
5. Kin (47.8%) and acquaintances from the hometown (45.6%) played important role in choosing the place of settlement.
6. 25% speak only Kurdish, while 66.5% speak both Turkish and Kurdish.
7. 42.3% are illiterate.
8. 43.4% have children at the compulsory school age, but not going to school.
9. 82.9% work in daily, temporary jobs in the informal sector.
10. 91.3% had unemployment problem.
11. 88% are not covered by social security.
12. 93.7% express their wish to return to their villages.

Again according to the same survey, the following conclusions can be reached. Forced migrants predominantly settled in shantytowns on the outskirts of cities. The average household size of forced migrants is 8. The main factor determining where forced migrants settled after migration were the existence of kin or co-villagers in that city, geographical proximity to the place of origin and the possibility of finding a job (Barut, 2002: Tables78-81). Forced migrants faced with serious problems relating to unemployment, health, nutrition, housing, safety, lack of public services and

discrimination after migration. (Barut, 2002: Tables 69-70; 104; 211-233). Thus, many of forced migrants settled in Western cities are waiting for the appropriate conditions to return to their villages.

3.6 Demographic Transformation of Mersin

The urban population in Turkey increased only 0.8% in relation to the rural population from 1927 until 1950 in 23 years. There has been an explosion in the urban population since the Turkish rural population migrated. The proportion of urban population in total population increased from 25% in 1950 to 28.8% in 1955, to 31.9% in 1960, and to 34.4% in 1965. While the urban population increased to 43.9%, the rural population decreased to 56.1% in 1980. The urban population increased from 43.9% to 53% between 1980 and 1985. It was the first time that the urban population was larger than the rural population in Turkey. Whereas the urban population increased to 64.6%, rural population decreased to 35.4% in 1997, the proportion of urbanization was 65.01% in 2000. The population in urban areas is over 44 million in Turkey now (Keleş, R. 2002:57).

As for the population movements in Mersin, it is seen that the population of province of Mersin was 1.266.995 in the census of 1990. The population is estimated to have increased to 1.612.715 in 1996. The population of Mersin province was 1.508.232 and the population city center of Mersin was 653.662 in the census of 1997 (DIE, 1990, 1997, 2000). Whereas according to estimations the population of Mersin should have increased by 345.720 from 1990 to 1996, the census of 1997 showed that the population of Mersin increased 241.237 from 1990 to 1997.

The yearly population growth rate of Mersin has been over the averages for Turkey since 1940 (MTSO, 1996). The population of the Içel province has increased rapidly and continuously since 1950, especially since 1970. In respect to the population, Içel was the 29th most crowded city of Turkey in 1950, 20th in 1960, 19th in 1970, 12th in 1980, 10th in 1985 and 6th in 1990. The average population growth rate was 0.36% between

1955 and 1960, 0.38% between 1970 and 1975, and 0.40% between 1985 and 1990 (DIE, 1990, 1997, 2000). The population of the Içel province doubled between 25 years, between 1945 and 1970. Although the population of Turkey doubled in 25-26 years, between 1970 and 1990, when economically initiated migration started from Southeast Anatolia, the population of Mersin doubled in 20 years (MTSO, 1996: 298).

When we analyze the urban population of Mersin through its migrational history, we will see that it was 221.861 in 1980, 314.350 in 1985 and 422.357 in 1990. The urban population of Mersin multiplied 7.3 times between 1940 and 1980 and with 8.6 times between 1950 and 1985. While the population of the province of Mersin doubled between 1950 and 1975, in 25 years, its urban population quadrupled. The population growth rate of province of Mersin was around 1.5, while its urban population doubled in ten years, between 1980 and 1990. Although population of Turkey doubled in 25-26 years, the population of province of Mersin doubled in 20 years, between 1970 and 1990 when the voluntary economic migration flows started from Southeast region of Turkey to the city of Mersin.

Establishment of a free trade region and the possibility of finding job were the main motivators in this migration, most of the migrants being from East and Southeast regions (Develi, 1991: 60). While 12.4% of the persons who transferred their "county of personal registration" to the center of Mersin were from its counties, 87.6% of them were from provinces of Sanliurfa, Mardin, Adana, Hatay and Malatya between 1983 and 1986. While only 47% of population of Mersin is native, 23% of it is from Southeast Anatolia, 17% from East Anatolia, 8% percent from Mediterranean Region, and 5% from Central Region of Anatolia. As it is shown in these statistics, heavy migration to Mersin occurred from Diyarbakir, Adiyaman, Malatya, Sanliurfa, Mardin, Siirt, and Mus. According to the data from the Mersin Province, we see that 45.3% of its population is originally from the East and Southeast Anatolian regions (Içel Valiligi, 1997:11-12).

There has been a mass population movement to city center of Mersin and its counties of Tarsus and Erdemli since the 1980's. While 59.763 persons, 14.759 families, changed their county of registration from their hometown to the center of Mersin between 1980 and 1985, 67.890 persons transferred their county of registration to Mersin, 5.710 persons to Tarsus and 1.860 persons to Erdemli between 1986 and 1995. The total of those people who changed their county of registration between 1986 and 1995 is 75.460 in all counties of Mersin. When we examine the distribution of regional origin of migrants in Mersin in 1996, 41.7% of them were from the Southeast Region of Anatolia, 18.8% from the Eastern Region of Anatolia, and 21.4% from the Mediterranean Region and its provinces and counties (MTSO, 1996: 300-301). These statistics changed, as in 1998, 34.7% of migrants are from the Southeast Region of Anatolia, 19.1% of them are from the Eastern Region of Anatolia, and 27.7% of them are from the Mediterranean Region and its provinces and counties. It can be concluded that about 55% of the migrants in Mersin are from East and Southeastern regions of Anatolia.

3.7 Forced Migrations and Urban Development in Mersin

Kurdish migrants have seen the city of Mersin as an attractive urban destination for settlement since the 1970's. Because of its geographical proximity to Southeastern Anatolia, and its character as a city to which the previous migration flows from the Southeast has been oriented, Mersin received an important part of this massive migration after the 'forced displacement' practices.

Migration policies of Turkey have brought negative results to the urban areas of Mersin. For all the attractiveness of Mersin as a target city for dense migration, the cities' urban and local agents were caught unprepared, and the integration level of migrants to urban life was affected. Migrants, especially Eastern and Southeastern migrants as members of rural societies, have been alien to the culture and consciousness of citizenship and urban life. Unprepared indigenous people, local institutions and the unconsciousness of new city dwellers caused urban disintegration in Mersin. Furthermore, high shantytown population growth rates, unprepared urban institutions, and lack of citizenship

consciousness were the other negative results of rapid urbanization. Thus, the growth rate of urbanization in Mersin caused unplanned growth, and infrastructural, housing, transportation, communication, security, employment, education and health service problems.

In her 2001 study, Kaygalak analyses the forced migration phenomenon in the framework of the port-city of Mersin (2001). She found from her survey, that forced migration is an important factor of the concentration of poverty and the segregation dynamics within the city. According to the same study, 47.6% of the respondents worked in the informal sector, while another 13.5% were unemployed. 25% of the informal sector workers migrated from the Southeast region, and 15% of them from the Eastern region of Anatolia during the last decade, because of 'forced displacement' (Kaygalak, 2001). They have been in deep poverty as a result of the low level of formal jobs and lack of social security.

Squatting in Mersin is mostly the result of migration and armed struggles in Southeast Anatolia after the 1980's. Today squatters make up a half of the housing stock in Mersin. That is; a half of population of Mersin live in shantytown areas. Thus, shantytowns are the main result of urban spatial differentiation, alienation, and disintegration in Mersin. Migrants also indicate economic, political, social and cultural differentiation in Mersin. Although they come to the urban areas of Mersin in order to find better employment opportunities, Mersin cannot meet the hopes of migrants. We can easily see the districts of hemsehris, who are from the same culture and ethnic origin, as a consequent urban spatial differentiation. Especially forced migrants, as a subcategory of migrants, have made their special districts, which are Demirtas, Çilek, Çay, Sevket Sümer, Yeni Hal and Yeni Mahalle since 1983. Comparing to voluntary migrants' districts, forced migrants' districts reflect different characteristics in Mersin. On the other hand there are also upper class districts, which are located on the Mediterranean coast. All this information can be considered as evidence of an obvious urban hierarchy in the spatial organization of urban areas of Mersin. It is obvious that disintegrated forced migrants have been negatively affected from the urban life in the

ways of unemployment, urban segregation, shantytown dwelling, lack of services, security problem and crime, which are results of different economic, political, cultural and social characteristics of the population.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-SPATIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FORCED MIGRANTS

It is possible to argue that forced migration has had many dramatic impacts on socio-demographic, socio-economic and socio-spatial structures of migrants based on the survey data. This chapter aims to analyze households at these three levels. First, it focuses on household and then on head of household according to household size and composition, age, sexual distribution, marital and educational status of household members and heads. Second, it focuses on the sources of income, their position in the labor market, their socio-economic status in village and consumption behaviors. Third, it focuses on housing, spatial and urban services conditions of forced migrants.

4.1. Socio-demographic Characteristics

It is obvious that forced migration has had many dramatic impacts on the households under consideration and the question of integration and relatedly urban integration are directly related with household. In order to understand household structure, one can focus on demographic characteristics of migrants for determining their urban integration levels. Forced migration has dramatic impacts on immigrant households' structures. Therefore, this chapter will try to analyze main characteristics of households that have experienced forced migration. This subject includes socio-demographic characteristics of household members and heads of households and composition of households in order to understand the changes in the family structures of forced migrants.

4.1.1. Socio-demographic Characteristics of Households

In many researches of poverty it was shown that the unit of analysis to understand any society is household. To understand the situation of forced migrants socio-demographic characteristics of households and its members are analyzed. The survey included many variables such as size of households, sex, birthplace, age, and marital and educational status of household members. All those variables will be examined for households' members and heads separately.

The mean size of households is 7. Standard deviation of size of households is 3,132, which indicates a homogenous group. The maximum household size is 21, and the minimum household size is 2 in the group. The median of household size is 7,0, and the mode of household size is 6. It can be suggested that the sizes of households are mostly made up around mean. As we can see in table 1 in appendix, 59,4% of the respondents live in households which have size smaller than the mean household size. We found that the size of 43,9% of households is between 5 and 7, which indicates the mean of research group. The second important size group is the one between 8 and 10 with 28,6%. While the most repeated household size is 6, a value less than the mean of group, the least repeated household size is 21. We also found from our survey that the households that have 10 or more members make up 19,3% of group.

The household size of forced migrants is significantly larger than urban average household size of Turkey. Ersoy research (2003) based on a focus group interviews carried out with 1197 displaced villagers from 297 evicted villages in 12 provinces including Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Muş, Tunceli, Siirt, Şırnak, Van. Ersoy found the average size of household as 7 persons in the city. The average household size for the province of İçel in 2000 census was 4,51. This shows that there is a huge difference between forced migrants and the rest of population of Mersin in terms of household size.

The mean age in the households is 23,13, whereas the average age in Mersin province is 27,3 (DIE, 2002: 78-80). This means that the mean age of forced migrants is relatively young. Furthermore, as the findings presented in the table suggest, more than two thirds of the forced migrants are younger than 30 years. In short, the population under study is very young.

Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Age of Household Members

Age	Frequency	Percent
0-9	270	21,11
10-19	405	31,67
20-29	243	18,99
30-39	124	9,7
40-49	127	9,93
50-59	61	4,77
60+	36	2,81
Missing	13	1,02
Total	1279	100,0

The sex distribution of the members of the household can be considered as an important indicator in analyzing household structure. The survey findings shows that 51,21% of the household members is male, and 48,08% of them is female. This is almost similar to sex distribution in Mersin. In other words, in 2000 census, while 50,25% of Mersin population is male, 49,75% of it is female (DİE, 2002: 28).

The survey has included variables about marital status of the household members. We collected information about marital status for persons at 12 years of age and over. Almost half of the forced migrants (48,16%) are married whereas a small section of the population (1,12%) is constituted by widows. However, it should be noted that the percentage of the never married among the forced migrants (48.60%) is considerably higher than that of İçel (35.88 %) (DİE, 2000). This can be stemmed from the fact that the forced migrants are younger than the population of İçel.

We collected information about education level for persons at 6 years of age and over. When we examine table below, we see that the educational status of the most of forced

migrants is very low. It was found from survey data that 62,97% of forced migrants have primary school education or lower. The main cause of this number is the deficiency of infrastructure of the east and southeast regions. According to 2000 census results, the proportion of the illiterate population in the province center of Mersin is 12%. This number for our research group is 28%. The illiteracy proportion among forced migrants is more than two times the illiteracy among province center of Mersin. The rate of not knowing the official language, Turkish, may affects the illiteracy rate among forced migrants. Female population constitutes the majority of those who do not know Turkish.

Table 3: Frequency Distribution of the Educational Status of Household Members

Educational Status	Frequency	Percent
Illiterate	309	27,96
Primary School Graduate	297	26,87
Still Going to School	288	26,07
Secondary School Graduate	60	5,43
Literate/Had No Schooling	49	4,43
Left Primary School	41	3,71
High School Graduate	27	2,44
University Graduate	9	0,82
Missing	25	2,26
Total	1105	100,0

We asked persons in the school age if they continue to attend school or not. We found that an important rate of forced migrants do not attend school. It is likely to say that poverty, migration and traditions are the main reasons of not attending to school. While 56,14% do not attend school because of poverty or seasonal employment, 11,4% of them do not attend because of migration, which also can be considered as a reason of poverty for many of them. It can be suggested that traditions are another important factor that hinders education of girls. It was found from survey data that 16,67% of persons who do not attend to school say that their fathers did not let them to attend to school and because of being girl. It is possible to argue that forced migrants tend to continiue with their social, traditional and rural structures. Forced migrants parents do not let them to attend to school, because they feel that they are going to lose their authority and control on their households.

Table 4: Frequency Distribution of Causes of Not Attending School

Causes of Not Attending School	Frequency	Percent
Poverty/ Seasonal Employment	64	56,14
Traditions	19	16,67
Migration	13	11,40
Him/herself	12	10,53
Expelled	2	1,75
No School	2	1,75
Not Having Registration	1	0,88
Political	1	0,88
Total	114	100,0

As we saw in the literature review, we found from our survey data that forced migration to the city of Mersin shaped according to traditional migration flows, which was coming from Siirt, Mardin, Diyarbakır and Şanlıurfa. While 26,33% of the members of the households was born outside of the East and Southeast regions, 72,96% of them were born in these regions. It was found that in the census of 2000 32,4% of the population of Mersin was born outside of Mersin. The persons who were born in Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa and Adıyaman have an important part among those who were born outside of Mersin. When we look at the birthplace of members of households, we see that 64,48% of the research group were born in the southeast region including Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, Sirnak, Batman and Şanlıurfa provinces. It can be derived from this finding that there had been lived another migration flow from these provinces to the city of Mersin. We also found that 8,74% of research group was born in the eastern provinces including Hakkari, Van, Bitlis, Tunceli, Elazig, and Agri.

It should be careful about the rate of persons who were born in Mersin and other provinces of Turkey too. It was found that 25,03% of research group was born in Mersin. This is related with the age character of research group. The last important finding is that there are persons who were born in Adiyaman, Gaziantep, Adana, Erzincan, Izmir and Artvin with the 1,3% in the households of forced migrants. This situation shows that forced migrants have relations with non-eastern people.

4.1.2. Composition of Households

Although size of households, age, sex, birthplace, marital and educational status of forced migrants are vital variables for their integration to the urban life, those variable are not enough for us to understand their integration situation. Based on survey data it is possible to produce new variables such as family type, family size and number of married couples. To understand their situation better, we should analyze their household composition based on who live in the households of forced migrants, their family type and number of married couples in their households.

Household composition, which means that who live together, is another important variable. Family type and married couples in the forced migrants households are created. Forced migrants households show diversity in family. It was found from survey data that 60,05% of research group are children of household heads and 12,74% of them are spouses of household heads. But on the other hand in their importance order 12,91% of members are grandchildren, in-laws, brothers, parents, nephews, second wife and aunt of household heads. Diversification in households can easily effect their integration to urban life.

Table 5: Frequency Distribution of Composition of Household

Household Members	Frequency	Percent
Respondent	175	13,68
Spouse	163	12,74
Children	768	60,05
Grandchildren	72	5,63
In-laws	40	3,13
Brother	28	2,19
Parents	18	1,40
Nephew	5	0,39
Second wife	2	0,16
Missing	8	0,62
Total	1279	100,0

The family types of respondents are divided into two groups: nuclear and extended family. Whereas we accepted the nuclear family as mother, father and their children, we

defined the extended family as the nuclear family with a grandmother, grandfather, grandchildren, brother, sister, aunt etc. We found that most of the respondents live in nuclear family (66.9%). The second category, extended family includes 33.1% of the households. Although nuclear family seen as the first category, extended family has an important rate.

When we examine Eastern and Southeastern rural families, it can be easily suggest that there are more than one married couples in many households. We found that forced migrants from these regions continue to have this characteristic in Mersin. While we found that most of the households have one married couple (77,1%), 18,3% of respondent reported that there were two married couples in their households, 4% of respondents reported that there were three married couple in their households and 0,6% respondents reported that there were four married couples in his/her household.

4.1.3. Heads of Household

It is difficult to reach an idea about the households' structure by analyzing socio-demographic characteristics of households and their members. To reach an idea those characteristics should be analyzed for household heads too. Socio-demographic characteristics of household heads of forced migrants are analyzed in the order of evaluation of household members. Age, sex, marital and educational status and birthplace of household heads are analyzed too. Furthermore, educational and occupational status of the fathers and mothers of the household heads are analyzed in this chapter.

While the mean of the age of household members is 23,13, the mean age of the household heads is 43,9. When we look at the age of household heads of forced migrants, we see that 16,0% of the household heads are between 23 and 32, 30,85% are between 33 and 31,44% are between 43 and 52, 19,42% 53 and over. We see that most of household heads (62,29%) are between 33 and 52.

Table 6: Frequency Distribution of the Age of Household Heads

Age of Household Heads	Frequency	Percent
23-32	28	16,0
33-42	54	30,85
43-52	55	31,44
53+	34	19,42
Missing	4	2,29
Total	175	100,0

It was found from survey data that while 92,6% of household heads of forced migrants are male, 7,4% of household heads are female. As we found from our survey, most of household heads of forced migrants are male. The rate of female household heads is another important findings. The female household heads reported themselves as household heads, because almost all their husbands were in prison or dead.

The marital status of household heads is too different from the marital status of household members. This is related with the age structure of household members. When we analyzed the marital status of household heads, we found that most of the household heads are married, with 94,9%. While only 1,1% of households heads are single, 3,4% of them are widows.

Findings about educational status of forced migrants could easily effect their integration to urban life. In the examining of educational status of household heads, it was found that most of them (89,1%) are whether primary school graduates or less educated. While we compare the educational status of household heads with household members, we see that the education level of household heads is very low according to the level of household members. The illiteracy rate of household heads (29,1%) is also higher than the illiteracy rate of household members (27,96%). It was also found that only the education level of 8,0% of household heads is over primary school.

Table 7: Frequency Distribution of Educational Status of Household Heads

Educational Status of Household Heads	Frequency	Percent
Primary School Graduate	87	49,7
Illiterate	51	29,1
Literate	18	10,3
Secondary School Graduate	9	5,1
High School Graduate	4	2,3
University Graduate	1	0,6
Missing	5	2,9
Total	175	100,0

As it can be derived from literature review, voluntary migration flows have lived from the provinces of the Southeast Anatolia to the city of Mersin and its closed environment since 1970's. Unlike forced migrants, those migrants were economically motivated. That is; they have searched for the employment opportunities and better economic conditions. Forced migrants followed those voluntary migrants after 1980's. In many field researches it is suggested that there is a relationship between voluntary economic migration and forced migration from East and Southeast regions of Anatolia.

When the table below is examined, it is seen that the city of Mersin takes more migration from Southeast region of Turkey than east region. While 87,5% of household were born in Southeast region provinces including Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, Şirnak, Şanliurfa and Batman, 12,5% of household heads were born in east region including Tunceli, Van, Bitlis, Hakkari and Ağrı. It is possible to argue that Diyarbakır, Mardin and Siirt gave the most important part of forced migration to the city of Mersin due to previous migration flows. Previous migration flows from those provinces and their proximity to the city of Mersin are the main causes behind those numbers.

Table 8: Frequency Distribution of the Birthplace of Household Heads

Birthplace of Household Heads	Frequency	Percent
Diyarbakır	50	28,6
Mardin	47	26,9
Siirt	32	18,3
Şırnak	12	6,9
Şanlıurfa	10	5,7
Batman	2	1,1
Tunceli	7	4,0
Van	5	2,9
Hakkari	4	2,3
Bitlis	4	2,3
Ağrı	2	1,1
Total	175	100,0

To see the social transformation, we asked the educational status of the fathers of household heads. It was found that while most of fathers of household heads (78,9%) are illiterate, only 9,7% of them are literate, 8,6% of them are primary school graduates, 1,1% are secondary school graduates, and 1,1% are high school graduates. The educational status of mothers of household heads is worse than the educational status of their fathers. It was found that while almost all mothers (95,4%) of household heads are illiterate, 2,3% of them are graduated from primary school and 0,6% of them are graduated from secondary school.

The occupational status of the fathers of household heads shows that the most important part of research group (52,0%) worked in agriculture. Although trader, self-employed, states officials, artisan and worker categories indicate an occupational differentiation among research group; each of those categories has no important rate. The finding for mothers of household heads is too different that there is no occupational differentiation among them. While we look at occupational status of their mothers, we see that whereas almost all of mothers (97,7%) of households heads are housewives, 1,7% of them are farmers.

Table 9: Frequency Distribution of the Occupational Status of the Fathers of Household Heads

Occupation of Fathers of Household Heads	Frequency	Percent
Farmer/ Shepherd	91	52,0
Unemployed	10	5,7
Trader	9	5,1
Self-employed	8	4,6
State Officials	6	3,4
Artisan	6	3,4
Worker	5	2,9
Other	14	8,0
Missing	26	14,9
Total	175	100,0

4.2. Socio-Economic Status of Forced Migrants

The literature of integration focused on socio-economic status of migrants. After socio-demographic variables another important variable is socio-economic status for integration of migrant to urban life. While we examine socio-economic status of forced migrants, we should be careful about their income, their consumption habits and their expected income. It is argued that the situations of migrants in the labor market, their working and occupational status are the factors that affect their income level and urban adaptation. Thus, we look at their income, their situation in labor market, their work and occupational status, consumption and expected income in order to be able to demonstrate their socio-economic status.

4.2.1. Income

In the question of integration one of the most important indicators is income, which is also one of determinant of urban integration of migrants. If those newcomers do not have enough amount of income, they cannot stand on the economic difficulties of urban life. Most of migrants live in poverty, when they new come to the city. Thus, for the first years migrants tend to disintegrate to urban life due to low income.

When we examine the income of forced migrants who participate our field research, we found that the mean of monthly income of forced migrants as 377.045.169 TL (Turkish Lira). We also see that the median and mode of monthly income as 300.000.000 TL. We found that the standard deviation of the monthly income of forced migrants is 247.481.872 TL. While we found the minimum value of monthly income as 20.000.000. TL, we found the maximum value of monthly income as 2.000.000.000. TL.

Table 10: Statistics of Income

	Monthly Income/TL	Monthly Consumption/TL	Expected Monthly Income/TL
N	155	172	175
Missing	20	3	0
Mean	377.045.160	404.825.580	1.128.857.140
Median	300.000.000	400.000.000	1.000.000.000
Mode	300.000.000	300.000.000	1.000.000.000
Std. Deviation	247.481.872	184.020.956	789.648.443
Minimum	20.000.000	100.000.000	250.000.000
Maximum	2.000.000.000	1.000.000.000	7.000.000.000

It should be careful about income differentiation among forced migrants. We transferred our sample into three groups in order to see income distribution among forced migrants in city. We found that about 50% of the households have an income between 250.000.000 TL and 499.000.000 TL, which includes mean, mode and median of income. While 27,7% of the sample lived on an income (0-249.999.000 TL), which is too below of the average income, 22,6% of the sample live on an income, which is over the average income among forced migrants. We should be careful about the first group, which have to live under poverty line in the table below.

Table 11: Frequency Distribution of Income Groups

Income Groups	Frequency	Percent
0-249.999.000	43	27,7
250.000.000-499.999.000	77	49,7
500.000.000+	35	22,6
Total	155	100,0

Many researches found that an important part of the migrant population lives in poverty. The research of Ersoy (2003) indicates that monthly income of the 75% of the respondents stated to be less than 100 U.S. dollars per household. Again according to the same research only a negligible minority (3%) earned more than 250 U.S. dollars per month. Ersoy (2003) found that 80% of displaced villagers lived under the absolute poverty line in cities.

The number of working persons in the households is an important factor that effect amount of income. When we examine the socio-economic status of any group, the number of working people in the household is one of indicator that displays their situation. While in the 57,7% of household only one person is working, in 22,9% of households two people work, in 13,1% of households three people work, 2,9% of the households 4 people work. In 3,4% of households of forced migrants there is no one who is working now. When we look at the working situation of working people in the households at the moment, we found that while 85,15% of workers in the households work now, 12,68% of them do not work.

Who contribute to the budget of family is another factor that effect amount of income in the households of forced migrants. We found that while 50,5% of working members of the household are households heads, 32,4% of working members of the households are sons of the household head, 8,6% are daughters of the households head, 4,6% are brothers of the household head, and 2,5% are the household heads' spouses. The other working people are the household heads' parents, second wives and daughter in-law. If we read the table below carefully, we see that there is about 12% women labor. In the difficult urban life women labor is needed as substantial labor in survival strategies.

Table 12: Frequency Distribution of the Relations of Working Household Members to the Household Head

Household Heads'	Frequency	Percent
Respondent	139	50,5
Son	89	32,4
Daughter	24	8,6
Brother	13	4,6
Spouse	7	2,5
Other	4	1,40
Total	276	100,0

4.2.2. Work, Occupation and Forced Migrants

It is possible to argue that position of forced migrants in the labor market can affect their integration to urban life. Therefore, it should be focused on work and occupational status for working members of households and heads in market. It can be decided about their economic conditions by analyzing their working and occupational status.

The income types of the working members of the household and their position in the labor market are directly effective on the amount of migrants' income. While 45,65% of the working members of the household are wage earners, 44 of them are household heads, 26,09% are currently unemployed, 25% are self-employed in informal sector, 43 of those are household heads, and 1,81% are retired. Research of Ersoy (2003) indicates that "most of the migrant population work either in irregular, seasonal and informal jobs (54%) or unemployed." (Ersoy, 2003: 4). Those findings are closed with our foundlings.

Table 13: Frequency Distribution of the Type of Income of Working Persons

Kind of Income	Frequency	Percent
Wage Earners	126	45,65
Currently Unemployed	72	26,09
Self Employed	69	25,0
Retired	5	1,81
Missing	4	1,45
Total	276	100,0

The position of forced migrants in the labor market (work and occupational status) affects their income. While we look at their occupational status in labor market, we saw that most of them work in informal and marginalized jobs. While we look at the distribution of the occupations of the working members of the household from the most to least frequently observed, we see that construction workers come first with 13,77%, temporary employment second with 7,97%, manufacture and petty producer joint third with 6,88%, porters fourth with 6,51%, watchman and seasonal agricultural workers fifth with 5,44%, municipality workers sixth with 4,34%, waiters seventh with 3,99%, unskilled workers eighth with 3,99%, informal jobs in production ninth with 3,99%, street vendors tenth with 3,27%, cooks eleventh with 2,54%, drivers twelfth with 1,08%, and textile workers and officers thirteenth with 0,73%. In our field research, while 40,95% of working persons work in irregular, seasonal and informal jobs, 26,09% of them are currently unemployed (look at table 47). Most of those occupations do not have regular income opportunity. The occupations, which are seen below table, are almost all are unskilled jobs.

Table 14: Frequency Distribution of the Occupations of the Working Members of the Household

Occupations	Frequency	Percent
Construction Jobs	38	13,77
Temporary Jobs	22	7,97
Manufacture	19	6,88
Porter	18	6,51
Petty Producer	19	6,88
Watchman	15	5,44
Seasonal Agriculture Worker	15	5,44
Worker in Municipality	12	4,34
Waiter	11	3,99
Unskilled Worker	11	3,99
Informal Jobs in Production	11	3,99
Street Vendor	9	3,27
Cook	7	2,54
Driver	3	1,08
Textile Worker	2	0,73
Officer	2	0,73
Missing	62	22,45
Total	276	100,0

Social security of forced migrants should be analyzed. It was found that there is a relationship between their occupational status in labor market and social security status. Related with their occupational status, which are almost all unskilled. 79,71% of working members of the household work without social security. Moreover, those occupations can be easily labeled as informal sector occupations, which usually don't have social security. Not having social security means that majority of forced migrants work in informal and marginal works. While 11,6% of working members of the household have social security from SSK, 2,17% have social security from Bağ-Kur, 1,45% have insurance from the Emekli Sandığı and 0,73% have their insurance from other institutions.

Table 15: Frequency Distribution of Social Security of Working Members of the Household

Social Security	Frequency	Percent
No Security	220	79,71
SSK	32	11,6
Emekli Sandığı	4	1,45
Bağ-Kur	6	2,17
Other	2	0,73
Missing	12	4,34
Total	276	100,0

Although the numbers above about working people in households of forced migrants include the situation of household heads, we should look at those numbers for household heads separately. It is not enough to decided about economic situation of forced migrants only by looking their working members. It should be also analyzed working and occupational status of household heads. When we look at the working status of the household heads, we see that 47,4% of them are unemployed, 25,1% work with salary, 24,6% are self-employed and 2,9% are retired. If we classify them as employed and currently unemployed, we see that 49,7% of household heads are employed and 50,3% are unemployed.

Table 16: Frequency Distribution of the Working Status of Household Heads

Working Status of Household Heads	Frequency	Percent
Wage Earner	44	25,1
Self-Employed	43	24,6
Retired	5	2,9
Unemployed	83	47,4
Total	175	100,0

Sectorel distribution of jobs of household heads of forced migrants (wage earners) should be examined too. Those who have wage are generally employed in Akdeniz municipality and temporary jobs. We found that 36,36% of wage earners (household heads) works in the Akdeniz Municipality/DEHAP, 18,18% work in seasonal employment, 15,91% work in construction, and 6,82% of them work in other places.

Table 17: Frequency Distribution of Work Place of Households' Heads Who Work with Salary

Work Places of Household Heads Who Work for Salary	Frequency	Percent
Akdeniz Municipality/DEHAP	16	36,36
Private Company	8	18,18
In Seasonal Employment	7	15,91
Construction	7	15,91
Other	3	6,82
Missing	3	6,82
Total	44	100,0

Table below indicates frequency distribution of the occupations of forced migrants prior to migration. It was found that while most of them (66,3%) were working in agricultural works, 7,4% of them were artisans, 7,4% were workers/ shepherds, 2,3% were traders and 10,9% of them were from other occupations. Comparing their occupational status after migration with prior to migration, we found that forced migrants transformed from agricultural workers to urban seasonal workers.

Table 18: Frequency Distribution of the Occupations of Forced Migrants Prior to Migration

Occupational Status of Migrants Prior to Migration	Frequency	Percent
Farmer / Stock-breeder	116	66,3
Artisan	13	7,4
Worker / Shepherd	13	7,4
Trader	4	2,3
Other	19	10,9
Missing	10	5,7
Total	175	100,0

The situation of household heads in labor market should be examined too. It was found from survey data that like other working members of households household heads work in informal sector and marginal jobs. When we analyze the field of work of the household heads, we see that 19,54% of them work in construction, 24,15% work in the service sector (cleaning worker, waiter, etc…), 20,69% work in seasonal employments (agricultural), 21,84% work as artisans, 1,14% work in manufacture jobs, 3,45% work as self-employed and 9,19% work in other field of employment.

It was evaluated that whether household heads who work for somebody, or in an institution for wage have additional income or not. It was found that while 20,4% of them have additional income, 77,3% have no additional income. When we look at the kind of additional income, we see that 7 of them take help from their relatives, 1 has flat rent and 1 has other kind of additional income.

The causes of unemployement show that there is a structural unemployment among household heads of forced migrants. Almost half of household heads are unemployed (see table 19). It was found that having no profession comes first with 30,12%, followed by having no employment opportunities with 19,29% health problems with 16,86%, being refused employment with 12,05, old age with 10,85%, unable to find work with social security with 4,82% and other causes with 3,61%. The unprofessionalization is the main cause that behind the unemployment of forced migrants.

Table 19: Frequency Distribution of Causes of Unemployment among Forced Migrants

Causes of Unemployment	Frequency	Percent
Having No Profession	25	30,12
No Employment Opportunity	16	19,29
Health Problems	14	16,86
Refused Employment	10	12,05
Being Old	9	10,85
No Job with Social Security	4	4,82
Other	3	3,61
Missing	2	2,4
Total	83	100,0

The duration of unemployment in years give us an idea about their unemployment situation. We coded the duration of unemployment into 5 groups, with 5 intervals. It was found that 43,37% of household heads have been unemployed for between 0 and 4 years, 22,89% between 10 and 14 years, 16,88% between 5 and 9 years, 7,23% have been unemployed for 15 to 19 years or more, and 3,61% of them are unemployed for at least 20 years. While we ask those unemployed household heads search for job or not we see that 69,88% of them are looking for a job, 30,12% are not. We see in table 20 that there is structural and long time unemployment among forced migrants.

Table 20: Frequency Distribution of Unemployment Duration of Household Heads

Years	Frequency	Percent
0-4	36	43,37
5-9	14	16,88
10-14	19	22,89
15+	9	10,84
Missing	5	6,02
Total	83	100,0

The survey included the kind of jobs that households' heads are looking for too. Whereas 69,88% of unemployed households heads are looking for a job, 30,12% of them are not looking for a job. When the kind of employment desired, we see that while 32,76% of them are looking for construction jobs, 22,41% are looking for seasonal employment, 12,08% don't mind about the type of job, 10,34% are looking for jobs that don't require qualification, 8,62% seek agricultural employment, 5,17% are looking for

independent business employment, and 1,72 are looking for continuous employment. It is an interesting that still those unemployed forced migrants search seasonal and agricultural jobs.

Table 21: Frequency Distribution of the Employment Type Desired by the Unemployed Households Heads

Type of Employment Desired	Frequency	Percent
Construction	19	32,76
Seasonal Employment	13	22,41
Don't Mind	7	12,08
Unqualified Employment	6	10,34
Agricultural	5	8,62
To Start his/her Own Business	3	5,17
Continuous	1	1,72
Missing	4	6,9
Total	58	100,0

It can be seen in table 16 that 47,4% of household heads are unemployed. Anyone should be curious about how those unemployed survive. Therefore, survey included the questions about the survival source of those unemployed forced migrants. It was found from survey data that whereas 38,56% of unemployed household heads survive with the help of his/her children who were separated from them, 36,16% survive by working in temporary jobs, 8,43% survive with his/her spouse and children working, 7,23% survive by taking in seasonal employment, 3,61% survive with the help of his/her relatives and neighbors, 3,61% survive with debts and 1,2% survive by consuming his/her savings. All those survival sources are vital for new urban poor, forced migrants. Table 22 shows that child and spouse labor are seen as substantial in survival strategies of unemployed households.

Table 22: Frequency Distribution of the Survival Sources of Unemployed Forced Migrants

Survival Source	Frequency	Percent
Help of his/her Children	32	38,56
Temporary Employment	30	36,16
Help of his/her Relatives and Neighbors	3	3,61
Seasonal Employment	6	7,23
Consumption of Savings / Debts	4	4,81
His/her Spouse and Children Working	7	8,43
Other	1	1,2
Total	83	100,0

Unemployed people are generally in the search of additional income sources. The first source of additional income is family labor. It was found from many researches that unemployed households exploit the labor of their members. While we look at the survival strategies of forced migrants, we examine whether household heads, their children and spouses temporarily work in other jobs, in order to survive, or to gain additional income or not. While 34,94% of households heads said that their children and spouses work sometimes in other jobs in order to survive, or to gain additional income, 65,06% of them said that none takes temporary employment.

We look for the temporary jobs that unemployed household heads, their children and spouses do. While 3,45% of them work as shoe shiners, 13,79% work in other temporary jobs, 17,24% work in construction jobs, 34,49% work in seasonal agricultural jobs, 10,34% works in independent businesses and 13,79% works as street vendors. When we look at the temporary employers of the household heads, their children and spouses, we see that while 6,9% of them are employed by garden owners, 10,33% are employed by farmers, 6,9% are employed by brokers, 6,9% are employed by building owners, 6,9% are self-employed, 3,45% are employed by neighbors and 10,33% are employed by acquaintances. We also examine who help unemployed household heads, their children and spouses to find these jobs. Their relatives (37,93%), neighbors (6,9%), townsmens (17,24%), friends (3,45%), DEHAP (Democratic Republic Party) (3,45%) and brokers (6,9%) help them to find these jobs. 13,79% of them said they found these jobs by themselves.

4.2.3. Socio-economic Status of Forced Migrants in Village

In order to understand socio-economic status of forced migrants in village, amount of land and animals that they have will be examined. Comparison of the socio-economic status of forced migrants in village and in city indicates that forced migrants totally became poor in the process migration. It can be argued that whereas economically they were heterogeneous society in village, they became a more homogenous one in city. We found from survey data that amount of economic lost affect their urban and social integration levels.

We added amount of land, garden and vineyard in acres into one variable as in the table below. We found that while 15,22 % of forced migrants had no land in village, 26,09% of them have land between 1 and 49 acres. We found that 41,31% of forced migrants have less than 50 acres of land. The other important categories are the one between 50 and 99 acres of land with 17,39% and the one between 100 and 149 acres of land with 16,66%.

Table 23: Frequency Distribution of the Acres of Land That Forced Migrants Owned

Total Acres of Land	Frequency	Percent
0	21	15,22
1-49	36	26,09
50-99	24	17,39
100-149	23	16,66
150-199	12	8,7
200-249	7	5,07
250-299	2	1,45
300+	13	9,42
Total	138	100,0

The amount of cattle that a forced migrant owned in their villages is also an indicator of their socio-economic status. Having cattle, sheep and goats is generally substantial for rural household economies for their survival strategies. It was found that most of the forced migrants had between 0 and 10 cattle with 80,43%. 5,8% had between 11 and 20 animals, 2,9% had between 21 and 30 animals, 0,72% had between 31 and 40 animals,

2,17% had between 41 and 50 animals, and 7,98 % had 51 or more animals, when they were in their villages.

Table 24: Frequency Distribution of the Amount of Cattle That Forced Migrants Owned

Number of Animals	Frequency	Percent
0-10	111	80,43
11-20	8	5,8
21-30	4	2,9
31-40	1	0,72
41-50	3	2,17
51+	11	7,98
Total	138	100,0

The number of sheep/goats that forced migrants had in their villages should be examined too. It is seen in table 25 that 48,9% of forced migrants had between 0 and 25 sheep/goats. 14,6% had between 26 and 50, 7,3% had between 51 and 75, 13,14% had between 76 and 100, 1,46% had between 101 and 125, 5,84% had between 126 and 150, 5,11% had between 151 and 200, and 3,65% had 201 and more, when they were in their villages. Table 24 and 25 show that there was a relative economic differentiation among forced migrants.

Table 25: Frequency Distribution of the Amount of Sheep/Goats That Forced Migrants Owned

Number of Animals	Frequency	Percent
0-25	67	48,9
26-50	20	14,6
51-75	10	7,3
76-100	18	13,14
101-125	2	1,46
126-150	8	5,84
151-200	7	5,11
201 +	5	3,65
Total	137	100,0

4.2.4 Consumption

Income is not enough in order to decide about integration of migrants. We should also analyze amount of consumption and consumption habits of forced migrants. We found that the mean of their monthly consumption is 404.825.580 TL, whereas the average amount of monthly income is 377.045.160 TL. It is seen that there is 27.480.720 TL between amount of monthly consumption and income. We found the median of monthly amount of consumption of migrants as 1.000.000.000 TL and the mode of monthly amount of consumption as 300.000.000 TL. We found the standard deviation of their monthly amount of consumption as 184.020.956 TL. Whereas the minimum value of monthly consumption is 100.000.000 TL, the maximum value of it is 1.000.000.000 TL.

The amount of differences between income and consumption and income and expected income can affect the integration of forced migrants. While the mean of monthly-expected income is 1.128.857.140 TL, the mode of monthly-expected income is 1.000.000.000 TL and the standard deviation of their monthly-expected income is 789.648.443 TL. When we examine these numbers, we see that there is 27.780.420 TL between their mean of monthly income and monthly consumption, and 751.811.980 TL between their monthly income and monthly-expected income that they think they can survive on.

When the consumption habits of forced migrants are examined, it is seen that they prefer to consume for durable goods. Durable goods are the first resources of consumption. We examined the situation of ownership of durable goods among forced migrants before migration and now. The numbers of ownership of durable goods among forced migrants are so closed with the average number of Turkey.

While 48,0% of forced migrants had a refrigerator before migration, 52,0% of them didn't, but whereas 94,9% of forced migrants have refrigerators now, 5,1% of them do not. We also see that 4,8% of the refrigerators owned by the forced migrants do not work. When we look at color TV's, we see that 20,0% of forced migrants had color

TV's, and 80,0% of them didn't before migration. But now, while 91,4% of forced migrants have color TV's, 8,6% of them still don't. When we asked them if their color TV works, we saw that 4,4% of them don't work. Whereas only 1,7% of forced migrants had videos before migration, 14,4% of them do now. However, 8,0% of these videos don't work.

The possession of vacuum cleaner, washing machine and dishwasher is too important for women. Women have more time for other activities, if they have those machines. On the other hand they make domestic jobs easier for women. When we look at the possession of vacuum cleaners, we found that whereas 4,6% of forced migrants had them, 95,4% of them didn't before migration. When we asked forced migrants if they have vacuum cleaners now, 47,4% of them answered positively, of which 9,6% do not work, and 52,6% answered negatively. While 9,7% of forced migrants had washing machines before migration, 24,0% of them have now. 2,4% of these machines don't work. When we asked the same question for automatic washing machine, we see that while only 1,7% of forced migrants had before migration, 38,3% of them have now, and 4,5% of these machines don't work. When we look at dishwashers, we see that 0,6% of forced migrants had dishwashers before migration, and 2,9% have now.

We see the highest frequencies in the possession of radios and tape players. Whereas 56,6% of forced migrants had radios or tape players before migration, 66,9% of them have now, and 3,4% of these don't work. While 20,0% of forced migrants had telephones in their house before migration, 72,0% of them have now, but 4,0% of these telephones don't work. If we look at mobile phone possession, whereas only 1,1% of forced migrants had mobile phones in their hometown, 41,1% of them own mobile phones now in Mersin. Finally, while 6,9% of forced migrant's had cars in their hometown, 8,6% of them have cars now.

Table 26: Frequency Distribution of Durable Goods of Forced Migrants

Durable Goods That Are Used in House	Did you have before migration?		Do you have now?	
	Yes %	No %	Yes %	No %
Refrigerator	84 48,0	91 52,0	166 94,9	9 5,1
Vacuum cleaner	8 4,6	167 95,4	83 47,4	92 52,6
Color TV	35 20,0	140 80,0	160 91,4	15 8,6
Video	3 1,7	172 98,3	25 14,4	149 85,6
Normal washing machine	17 9,7	158 90,3	42 24,0	133 76,0
Automatic washing machine	3 1,7	172 98,3	67 38,3	108 61,7
Dishwasher	1 0,6	174 99,4	5 2,9	170 97,1
Radios-Tape players	99 56,6	76 43,4	117 66,9	58 33,1
Telephone	35 20,0	140 80,0	126 72,0	49 28,0
Mobile phone	2 1,1	173 98,9	72 41,1	103 58,9
Car	12 6,9	163 93,1	15 8,6	159 91,4

We can know about the consumption habits of forced migrants and their economic situation by examining the most recently purchased durable. While 20,0% of forced migrants bought color TV's most recently, 19,4% bought automatic washing machines, 14,5% bought mobile phones, 13,9% bought refrigerators, 7,9% bought radios or tape players, 6,1% bought vacuum cleaners, 4,8% bought telephones, 4,2% bought normal washing machines, 4,2% bought cars, 3,6% bought videos and 1,2% of them dishwashers. When we look at the time of purchasing durable goods, we see that most of them were purchased in 2000 or later. We can know the last situation of households' economies from the time of purchasing of the most recently purchased durable goods. Whereas 2,5% of forced migrants bought household electronic most recently between

1988 and 1991, 7,6% bought between 1992 and 1995, 18,4% bought between 1996 and 1999 and 71,5% bought in 2000 or later.

Table 27: Frequency Distribution the Time of Purchase of the Most Recently Purchased Durable Goods by Forced Migrants

Year of Purchase	Frequency	Percent
1988-1991	4	2,5
1992-1995	12	7,6
1996-1999	29	18,4
2000 or later	112	71,5
Total	157	100,0

4.3. Housing and Spatial Characteristics

Generally, there are two main characteristics of the urban territories where forced migrants replaced: one territories where there is no urban development and infrastructure, the other dough being in the center of urban where underclass live in and urban infrastructure is exhausted. In the periphery of the city of Mersin there are forced migrants territories where the urban infrastructures are insufficient. In those territories there some other questions. It is important that how migrants territories are perceived by the natives citizens. Wacquant (1993: 370) develops the concept of residential discrimination which means that territory of migrants prevent them to join labor market and caused to their joblessness. Territorial stigmatization affects the interaction of migrants not only with employers but also with the police, the courts, street-level welfare bureaucracies (Wacquant, 1993: 371). Any citizen percept those migrants as potential criminals due to their ethnic differences. Such kind of perceptions forms urban space based on ethno-racial segregation.

One of the most important subjects for the integration of forced migrants is about their housing and spatial conditions in urban centers. Spatial conditions of forced migrants in the city of Mersin can be defined as above. Therefore, there is spatial segregation between forced migrants territories and the rest of the city. This chapter is going to

examine the housing and spatial characteristics of forced migrants in Mersin. We will look into their housing ownership and type district conditions, and the situation of urban services, which are presented to their districts.

4.3.1. Housing Condition

We examined the time of house buying, how the house was bought, amount of rent paid monthly, the time lived in the house, the number of floors of apartments and/or of the house, the number of rooms in house or flat, how hot water is obtained, other families who live in house, times of moving house, the causes of not moving house, and preferred house type under the subject of housing condition.

Housing conditions of forced migrants can affect their adaptation to urban life. When we look at forced migrants housing ownership, we see that while 54,3% own houses, 45,7% do not have a house. Whereas 41,7% of forced migrants live in rented accommodation, 57,7% live in houses they own. It was also found that 0,6% of forced migrants live in their relative houses without paying rent. In the research of Ersoy (2003) it was found that "almost half of the displaced villagers had the ownership of the houses they live in cities." (Ersoy, 2003: 4).

When we look the urban services in their houses, we see that 3,4% of them have no running water, 9,1% of them have no toilet, 2,3% of them have no electric meter, and 3,4% of them have no water meter in their houses. While 33,7% of them have no regular electricity, 18,3% of them have no regular water services to their houses. Ersoy (2003) found that "main infrastructural services provided by state are not satisfactory, that is power cuts and breakdowns in sewerage system are usual." (Ersoy, 2003: 5). In some cases more than one forced migrants families live in one house. When we asked them if there are any other families who live in their houses, 28,0% responded positively. While 20,6% of forced migrants have stayed in the same house, 79,4% of them have moved house at least once since they came to Mersin. Whereas 37,1% of forced migrants thinks of changing their current residence, 62,9% of them don't.

Table 28: Frequency Distribution of the Questions That Are Related with Housing Conditions of Forced Migrants

Questions Related to the Housing Conditions of Forced Migrants	Yes %	No %	Missing %	Total %
Is there water in your house?	169 96,6	6 3,4	- -	175 100,0
Is there a toilet in your house?	159 90,9	16 9,1	- -	175 100,0
Is there an electric meter in your house?	171 97,7	4 2,3	- -	175 100,0
Is there a water meter in your house?	169 96,6	6 3,4	- -	175 100,0
Do you have regular electricity?	115 65,7	59 33,7	1 0,6	175 100,0
Do you have regular water?	142 81,1	32 18,3	1 0,6	175 100,0
Are there any other families that live in your house or shelter except you?	49 28,0	122 69,7	4 2,3	175 100,0
Have you been living in the same house since you came to Mersin (since you got married)?	36 20,6	139 79,4	- -	175 100,0
Do you think of changing the residence you are living in now?	65 37,1	110 62,9	- -	175 100,0

The land upon which forced migrants construct their houses is generally not open to public construction. The title deeds that forced migrants hold is not to their houses, but to the land upon which the houses stand. The kind of title deeds of the houses of forced migrants should be examined. While 51,6% of forced migrants have personal title deeds, 34,1% of them have shared title deeds, 1,1% of them has title deed allocation document, 2,2% of them has other type of title deed, and 11,0% of them haven't any kind of title deeds. When we analyze the house type, we see that while 81,3% of forced migrants live in gecekondu's (shelter), 18,7% live in apartment/flats where representatives of the middle class generally live.

Table 29: Frequency Distribution of Kind of the Title Deeds Held by Forced Migrants

Title Deed of the Houses	Frequency	Percent
Personal Title Deeds	47	51,6
Shared Title Deeds	31	34,1
Title Deed Allocation Document	1	1,1
None	10	11,0
Other	2	2,2
Total	91	100,0

We see when forced migrants bought their houses in Mersin in table 30. While 3,26% of forced migrants bought their houses between 1978 and 1983, 8,7% bought between 1984 and 1989, 29,34% bought between 1990 and 1995, 50,0% bought between 1996 and 2001, and 8,7% bought in 2002 or later. When we look at the numbers carefully, we see that most of forced migrants (88,04%) bought their houses in 1990 or later, when many of forced migrants started to migrate.

Table 30: Frequency Distribution of the Time of Buying Houses of Forced Migrants

Time of Buying	Frequency	Percent
1978-1983	3	3,26
1984-1989	8	8,7
1990-1995	27	29,34
1996-2001	46	50,0
2002 or Later	8	8,7
Total	92	100,0

It can be seen that how forced migrants have acquired their houses in table 31. While 20,41% of forced migrants acquired their houses by buying building land constructing the house themselves, 17,35% acquired their houses by selling their house, animals, and land in their hometowns, 15,31% acquired their houses through working, 14,29% acquired their houses through debt, 11,22% acquired their houses by spending their savings, 9,8% acquired their houses through purchase, 8,16% acquired their houses with the help of their relatives and neighbors, 3,06% acquired their houses through paying installments, and 1,02% acquired their houses with their retirement bonus..

Table 31: Frequency Distribution of How Forced Migrants Acquired Their Houses

How Forced Migrants Acquired Their Houses	Frequency	Percent
By Buying Building Land and Building Themselves	20	20,41
By Selling Their Houses, Animals, and land in Their Hometowns	17	17,35
By Working	15	15,31
By Debt	14	14,29
By his/her Savings	11	11,22
By Buying	9	9,18
By Help of their Relatives and Neighbors	8	8,16
By Installment	3	3,06
By Retirement Bonus	1	1,02
Total	98	100,0

It was founded that almost a half of forced migrants stay in rented houses. The amount of rent paid monthly by forced migrants is vital for them due to their economic scarcities. We found that while 5,9% of forced migrants pay between 20 and 39 million TL, 41,2% pay between 40 and 59 million TL, 35,3% between 60 and 79 Million TL, 7,4% pay between 80 and 99 million TL, and 10,3% pay 100 million TL or higher as monthly rent. The average rent was calculated as 32 U.S. dollars in the research of Ersoy (2003).

Table 32: Frequency Distribution of Amount of Rent Paid Monthly by Forced Migrants

Amount of Rent	Frequency	Percent
20-39 Million	4	5,9
40-59 Million	28	41,1
60-79 Million	24	35,3
80-99 Million	5	7,4
100 Million or Higher	7	10,3
Total	68	100,0

Any student of forced migration should be curious about the amount of time, which forced migrants have lived in their current houses. It was found from survey data that whereas 30,99% of forced migrants have lived between 1 and 3 year sin their current houses, 28,65% have lived between 4 and 6 years, 18,71% have lived between 7 and 9

years, 12,88% have lived between 10 and 12 years, 4,68% have lived between 13 and 15 years and 4,09% have lived for 16 years or more in their current houses.

Survey includes questions about the number of rooms and floors of the house/apartments of forced migrants too. We found that whereas 6,3% of forced migrants have only one room, 43,9% have two rooms, 39,9% have three rooms, 6,9% have four rooms, and 3,0% of them have five or more rooms in their houses/flats, except the living room. The mean of the number of persons per room among forced migrants is 3,1957. This number in the research of Ersoy (2003) is 2. While 44,1% of forced migrants live in houses with one floor, 39,4% live in houses with two floors, 8,2% live in houses with three floors, 2,9% live in houses with four floors, and 5,4% live in houses with five floors or more in Mersin.

Table 33: Frequency Distribution of the Number of Rooms in the House/Flat of Forced Migrants

Number of Rooms in the House	Frequency	Percent
1	11	6,3
2	76	43,9
3	69	39,9
4	12	6,9
5 or More	5	3,0
Total	173	100,0

How forced migrants obtain hot water is shown in table 34. It was founded that while 42,3% of forced migrants obtain hot water from bath cauldrons by fireplace heating, 38,3% use solar energy, 9,1% of them have electric and other hot-water boilers, 1,7% obtain hot water from their neighbors, and 8,6% obtain hot water in other ways, which are mostly traditional, in their house.

Table 34: Frequency Distribution of how Hot Water is obtained by Forced Migrants

How Hot Water is Obtained in the House	Frequency	Percent
Bath Cauldron with Wood Fireplace	74	42,3
Solar Energy	67	38,3
Electric and other Hot-Water Boilers	16	9,1
Neighbors	3	1,7
Other	15	8,6
Total	175	100,0

Survey includes question about the other families who live in the house/shelters of forced migrants. We found that while almost a half (48,98%) of such families live with their sons or daughters, 18,37% live with their brothers, 14,29% live with their tenants, 6,12% live with their mothers and fathers, 4,08% live with their landlords, and 8,16% live with their other relatives in their house/shelters.

Our survey also includes question about times of moving house by forced migrants. While 6,8% of them moved house one times, 27,8% moved two times, 26,3% moved three times, 15,0% moved changed four times, 13,05% moved five times, and 10,6% moved six times and more, since they came to Mersin. When we examined why forced migrants did not move house, we found that whereas 32,6% of forced migrants indicate house ownership, 22,8% show economic impossibilities, 17,4% show being happy with his/her house, 9,8% shows their landlord, 7,6% show the cheapness of their rent, 5,4% show it being his/her fathers, mothers, or brothers house, and 4,4% show other factors as causes of not moving house. When we asked forced migrants which kind of housing they preferred, if they have economic power, 16,15% of them prefer gecekondu's (shelter), 65,84% prefer apartments, 13,04% prefer detached housing, and 4,97% prefer other housing types

Table 35: Frequency Distribution of the Causes of not Moving House

Causes of not Changing House/Shelter	Frequency	Percent
His/her Own House	30	32,6
Economic Impossibilities	21	22,8
Being Happy with his/her House	16	17,4
Landlord	9	9,8
Cheapness of Rent	7	7,6
Father/Mother/Brothers House	5	5,4
Other	4	4,4
Total	92	100,0

4.3.2. Districts Condition

It was found from survey data that forced migrants deprived from *residential discrimination and territorial stigmatization* (Wacquant, 1993:370). There is an obvious territorial segregation between forced migrants and natives of the city of Mersin. While forced migrants live in concentrated districts in shantytowns, which are in the border of Akdeniz Municipality out of the city, natives live in the modern apartment in the city center on the Mediterranean coast.

Districts where forced migrants live in Mersin should be analyzed too. All districts of forced migrants are concentrated on the northeast of the city of Mersin. While 21,3% of forced migrants who migrated to Mersin live in the Çilek district, 12,2% live in the Çay district, 11,6% live in the Güneş district, 7,9% live in the Şevket Sümer district, 7,4% live in the Demirtaş district, 6,6% live in the Yeni Hal district, 4,2% live in the Kurdali district, 3,6% live in the Karaduvar district, 3,0% live in the Alsancak district, 3,0% live in the Özgürlük district, 2,4% live in the Siteler district, 1,8% live in the Gündoğdu district, 1,8% live in the Akbelen district, 1,8% live in the Turunçlu district, 1,8% live in the Yeşil Çimen district, 1,8% live in the Barbaros district, 1,2% live in the Toroslar district, 1,2% live in the Yeni Pazar district, 1,2% live in the Halkkent district, 0,6% live in the Eğriçam district, 0,6% live in the Ihsaniye district, 0,6% live in the Bahçe district, 0,6% live in the Yenitaş kent beldesi district, 0,6% live in the Selçuklar district, 0,6% live in the Yeni Mahalle district, and 0,6% live in the Tozkoparan district. All of these districts can be seen on the city map of Mersin in appendix d.

The remaining questions are related with the spatial (district and urban services) characteristics of forced migrants. While 52,0% of forced migrants changed their districts at least once, 46,3% of them haven't changed districts since they came to Mersin. Whereas only 2,9% of forced migrants says there is association, a vaqif, that is concerned with the solution of district problems to do with roads, schools, water, electricity, sewerage, telephone, the demolition of gecekondus, and the transformation of apartments, 96,0% of them say that there is no available association. While 41,7% of forced migrants come together and discuss their problems with the people in their district, 53,7% of them do not.

Table 36: Frequency Distribution of the Questions That Are Related with Spatial Conditions of Forced Migrants

Questions Related to the Spatial Conditions of Forced Migrants	Yes %	No %	Missing %	Total %
Have you ever changed your district since you came to Mersin?	91 52,0	81 46,3	3 1,7	175 100,0
Do you come together and discuss your problems with the people in your district?	73 41,7	94 53,7	8 4,6	175 100,0
Are you pleased with the quality of the urban services in your district?	73 41,7	100 57,1	2 1,1	175 100,0
Are there any urban services that you use collectively with your neighbors such as drinking water, electricity, and sewerage?	36 20,6	136 77,7	3 1,7	175 100,0
Is there any association, vaqif that is concerned with the solution of the problems in your district to do with roads, schools, water, electricity, sewerage, telephone, the demolition of gecekondus, and the transformation of apartments?	5 2,9	168 96,0	2 1,1	175 100,0

We also looked into the number of districts that forced migrants moved to, the causes of moving to other districts, the causes of not moving to other districts, and the widely discussed district problems under this subject. We found that while 13,2% of forced migrants moved to one district, 47,1% changed districts twice, 32,4% changed districts three times, and 7,3% changed districts four or more times since they came to Mersin. The causes of district changing by forced migrants should be examined. Whereas most

of forced migrants (67,0%) changed districts because of economic impossibilities, 8,4% moved because of political pressure, 4,3% moved because of house buying, 4,3% moved because of their relatives and social environment, 4,3% moved because of division of family or leaving his/her father, 4,3% moved because of disagreement with neighbors, 4,3% moved due to being happy about their district, and 3,1% moved because of other traditional causes.

Table 37: Frequency Distribution of Causes of Moving out of the District by Forced Migrants

Causes of District Changing	Frequency	Percent
Economic Impossibilities and House Renting	63	67,0
Political Pressure	8	8,4
House Buying	4	4,3
Relatives and Social Environment	4	4,3
Division of Family or Leaving from his/her Father	4	4,3
Disagreement with Neighbors	4	4,3
Not Being Happy about his/her District	4	4,3
Other	3	3,1
Total	94	100,0

The causes of not changing districts are also important for the structure of districts. While 42,0% of forced migrants didn't change their districts because of their relatives, neighbors, and townsmenships, 33,0% didn't move out because of economic impossibilities and house renting, 8,0% move because of their landlords, 4,5% didn't move to be near his/her workplace or bazaar, and 12,5% didn't move as they were happy about their houses and districts.

Table 38: Frequency Distribution of Causes of not Changing Districts by Forced Migrants

Causes of not Changing District	Frequency	Percent
Relatives, Neighbors and Townsmenships	37	42,0
Economic Impossibilities and House Renting	29	33,0
Landlord	7	8,0
Being Near Workplace or Bazaar	4	4,5
Being happy with his/her House and District	11	12,5
Total	88	100,0

It was found in much research that the districts of migrants have many district problems. The most widely discussed district problems among forced migrants can be seen in table 39. While 13,9% of forced migrants discuss political problems, 12,9% discuss water and sewerage problems, 11,9% discuss infrastructural problems, 12,9% discusses fighting, burglary, and street children, 10,9% discuss electricity problems, 8,9% discuss rubbish, medication, and environmental cleaning problems, 6,9% discuss roadway and pavement problems, 5,0% discuss poverty and economic problems, 4,0% discuss migration and returning to the village, 4,0% discuss daily subjects, 2,0% discuss school problems, 2,0% discuss health center problem, and 5,0% of them discuss other problems.

Table 39: Frequency Distribution of Widely Discussed District Problems by Forced Migrants

Mostly Discussed District Problems	Frequency	Percent
Political Problems	14	13,9
Water and Sewerage	13	12,9
Infrastructure	12	11,9
Fighting, Burglary and Street Children	13	12,9
Electricity	11	10,9
Rubbish, Medication and Environmental Cleaning	9	8,9
Roads and Pavement	7	6,9
Poverty and Economic Problems	5	5,0
Migration and Returning to the Village	4	4,0
Daily Subjects	4	4,0
School Problem	2	2,0
Health Center Problem	2	2,0
Other Problems	5	5,0
Total	101	100,0

4.3.3. Conditions of Urban Services

It can be argued that there is a relationship between urban integration level of forced migrants and their satisfaction with urban services. In other words the quality of urban services presented to the districts of migrants affect their integration to urban life. We were also curious about how forced migrants use urban services. While 41,7% of forced migrants are pleased with the quality of the urban services in their districts, 57,1% are not pleased with the quality. Causes of dissatisfaction with urban services presented to

the districts of forced migrants are shown in table 40. Whereas 28,4% of forced migrants show inadequate and unqualified infrastructure, 21,7% show discrimination, 11,7% show power cuts, 10,8% show damaged roads and pavements, 10,8% show unqualified sewerage and water, 9,2% inadequate medicating and rubbish services, 3,3% show unemployment, 1,7% show having no school or educational facilities, and 2,4% show other causes as causes of dissatisfaction with urban services.

Table 40: Frequency Distribution of Causes of Dissatisfaction with Urban Services Presented to the Districts of Forced Migrants

Causes of Dissatisfaction with Urban Services That Presented to Districts	Frequency	Percent
Inadequate and Unqualified Infrastructure	34	28,4
Discrimination	26	21,7
Power Cuts	14	11,7
Damaged Roadways and Pavements	13	10,8
Unqualified Sewerage and Water	13	10,8
No Rubbish Services and Inadequate Medicating	11	9,2
Unemployment	4	3,3
No School and Educational Facilities	2	1,7
Others	3	2,4
Total	120	100,0

It should be examined that whether forced migrants use urban services together or not, which urban services they use together. Whereas most of forced migrants (78,4%) have never used urban services collectively, 20,3% have used urban services collectively before, but they are not currently, and 1,3% of them still use urban services collectively. Urban services that are used collectively by forced migrants are shown in table 41. While 34,7% of forced migrants uses drinking water together, 18,4% use electricity, 44,9% use sewerage, and 2,0% use hot water. As it is seen in table 41, local government and municipality should take care about sewerage, drinking water and electricity services presented to the forced migrants districts.

Table 41: Frequency Distribution of Urban Services Collectively Used by Forced Migrants

Urban Services That Are Used Collectively	Frequency	Percent
Sewerage	22	44,9
Drinking Water	17	34,7
Electricity	9	18,4
Hot Water	1	2,0
Total	49	100,0

CHAPTER V

MIGRATION PROCESS, SOLIDARITY NETWORKS AND CRIMINALIZATION

This chapter aims to analyze migration process, solidarity networks, criminalization of forced migrants and their opinions about the solution of the question of forced migration. First, migration process includes places of origin, migration time, original hometown, the causes of migration and the causes of settling in Mersin. Second, it is argued that solidarity networks include ethnic structure, relations with hometown, relatives, neighbors and townsmen, support relations, organized and political behavior of forced migrants. Third, it will be focused on the criminalization of forced migrants that is related with their political structure. Four, this chapter examines the conditions of solution for the question of forced migration.

It was noticed that there is a relationship among migration process, solidarity networks, criminalization of forced migrants and their opinion about the solution of the question of forced migration. Especially, there is a clear relationship between the criminalization of forced migrants and their opinion about the solution of forced migration. Therefore, this chapter includes all those subjects together.

5.1. Migration Process

We evaluated the time of migration and the places where migrants came from, causes of migration, the causes of settling in Mersin, under the migration process. When we evaluate the time of migration in intervals, we see that 10,3% of forced migrants came to Mersin between 1983 and 1985, 14,3% migrated between 1986 and 1988, 16,6%

migrated between 1989 and 1991, 42,2% migrated between 1992 and 1994, 11,5% migrated between 1995 and 1997, and 5,1% migrated after 1998. If we divide their migration time into two periods; before and after 1990, we see that most of forced migrants came to Mersin after 1990 with 73,1%, and 26,9% of them migrated to Mersin before 1990. We see that this number in the research of Ersoy (2003) is 77% between 1992 and 1995.

Another important variable on the integration of forced migrants to urban life is the place where they came from. Rural and urban originality and the places of origin affect the adaptation of migrants. When we examine the distribution of the place of origin, we see that while 71,4% of them came from rural areas, 28,6% of them came from the urban centers of the East and Southeast regions of Anatolia. We see that while the most of the forced migrants (86,9%) came to Mersin from provinces of Southeast region of Anatolia including Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, Şirnak, Şanliurfa and Batman, 13,1% of them came to Mersin from provinces of east region of Anatolia including Tunceli, Van, Bitlis, Hakkari, Ağrı, Elaziğ and Muş. 72,6% of forced migrants came to Mersin from the provinces of Diyarbakır (27,4%), Mardin (26,3%) and Siirt (18,9%). Mersin pulled the majority of forced migrants from the provinces of Diyarbakır, Mardin and Siirt.

The causes of migration of forced migrants are shown in table 42. We asked this question aiming for a multiple response, so the total frequency of this question (234) is higher than the number of respondents. Whereas 32,5% of migrants show the state as the cause of migration, 16,7% of them show pressure to become village guards as the cause of migration. 12,0% of them migrated because of economic deterioration, 11,1% of them migrated because of an unidentified murderer, 8,1% of them migrated because of pressure from village guards, 7,3 of them migrated because of other reasons, 6,8% of them migrated because of unemployment 3,8% of them migrated because of illegal organizations and 1,7% of them migrated because of vendetta.

Table 42: Frequency Distribution of the Causes of Migration

Causes of Migration	Frequency	Percent
State	76	32,5
Illegal Organizations	9	3,8
Pressure to Become Village Guard	39	16,7
Pressure of Village Guards	19	8,1
Unidentified Murderer	26	11,1
Economic Deterioration	28	12,0
Unemployment	16	6,8
Vendetta	4	1,7
Other	17	7,3
Total	234	100,0

The causes of settling in Mersin are shown in table 43. When we evaluate the causes of their settling in Mersin, we see that 57,6% of forced migrants show the causes of their settling in Mersin as of the previous settling of their relatives, 25% show "employment, education, health and social possibilities", 10,9% show "appropriateness of its survival conditions", 2,2% show "knowing the region" and 4,3% of them show other causes for settling in Mersin. Ersoy (2003) indicate "majority of the displaced villagers pointed that the spatial proximity to their village and the existence of relatives and friends in the target city are the main reasons behind the choice of future settlement." (Ersoy, 2003: 4). When we compare our field research with the research of Ersoy (2003), which was made in southeastern region provinces, we also found that "relatively well off groups moved outside the region to the large metropolitan centers." (Ersoy, 2003: 4).

Table 43: Frequency Distribution of the Causes of Settling in Mersin

Causes of Settling in Mersin	Frequency	Percent
Previous Settling of Relatives	106	57,6
Employment, Education, Health and Social Possibilities	46	25,0
Appropriateness of Survival Conditions	20	10,9
Knowing The Region	4	2,2
Other	8	4,3
Total	184	100,0

5.2. Solidarity Networks

It is known from the literature of integration that solidarity networks include ethnic structure of migrants, their relations with hometowns, relatives, townsmen, friends and neighbors, debt relations and their organizational and political behavior. This study accepts solidarity networks of forced migrants as including those subjects. Ethnic and relation networks of migrants are the bases of their solidarity.

5.2.1. Ethnic Structure of Forced Migrants

The survey of the study presents data regarding ethnicity, mother tongues, and most widely spoken languages in the households, and household members who don't know Turkish under the subject of ethnic structures of forced migrants in Mersin. When we evaluate ethnic structure of forced migrants, we found that whereas 98,3% of forced migrants feels themselves as Kurdish, 1,1% of them feel as Zaza and 0,6% of them feel as Arabic origin. We see that while the mother tongue of 94,9% of forced migrants is Kurdish, 4,6% is Zaza and 0,6% is Arabic. We also found that while 89,1% of forced migrants mostly speak Kurdish in their households, 2,9% speak Zaza, 7,4% Turkish, and 0,6% speak Arabic.

Households in which at least one member does not speak Turkish, as the language of integration, is another important indicator of integration with the rest of society. While in 58,3% of households there are members who do not speak Turkish, in 40,6% of the households, all of the members speak Turkish. Whereas 13,2% of household members who don't speak Turkish is the household head, 52,9% are their spouses, 20,7% are their mothers, 3,3% are their fathers, 1,7% are their sons, 1,7% are their daughters, 5,0% are their daughters in-law, 0,8% are their grandmothers and 0,8% of the distribution encompasses the whole family.

Table 44: Frequency Distribution of Household Members Who Don't Speak Turkish

People Who Don't Know Turkish	Frequency	Percent
Respondent	16	13,2
His/her Spouse	64	52,9
His/her Mother	25	20,7
His/her Father	4	3,3
His/her Son	2	1,7
His/her Daughter	2	1,7
His/her Daughter in-law	6	5,0
His/her Grandmother	1	0,8
All of the Family	1	0,8
Total	121	100,0

5.2.2. Relations with Hometowns, Relatives, Townsmenships and Neighbors

We are going to examine the relations of forced migrants with their hometowns, relatives, townsmenships and neighbors, their support relations in order to be able to decide about their urban integration. The frequency distribution consisting of yes/no questions, regarding forced migrants relations with their hometowns, relatives, townsmen and neighbors is shown in table 45. While 66,9% of forced migrants maintain their relations with their hometowns, 44,0% of them still visit their relatives in their hometowns. But only 9,1% obtain support from their relatives in their hometown. When we asked them if they have relations with their relatives and friends who stayed in their villages, we see that 52,0% of them still have relations with their village. Whereas 91,4% of forced migrants say that they have relatives and townsmen in the district that they live in now, 78,3% of them say that there were their relatives and townsmen in their district when they first came to Mersin. While 46,9% of forced migrants think that their relations with their neighbors, townsmen, and villagers have change in terms of support after migration, 52,6% of them don't think so.

Table 45: Frequency Distribution of Questions Regarding the Relations of Forced Migrants with their Hometowns, Relatives, Townsmen and Neighbors

Questions about Relations of Forced Migrants with their Hometown, Relatives, Townsmen and Neighbors	Yes %	No %	Missing %	Total %
Do you maintain your relations with your hometown, relatives, neighbors and friends?	117 66,9	57 32,6	1 0,6	175 100,0
Do you visit your relatives in your hometown?	77 44,0	41 23,4	57 32,6	175 100,0
Do your relatives in your hometown support you?	16 9,1	102 58,3	57 32,6	175 100,0
Do you have relations with your relatives and friends who stayed in your village?	65 52,0	46 36,8	14 11,2	125 100,0
Do you have relatives and townsmen in the districts you live in now?	160 91,4	14 8,0	1 0,6	175 100,0
Were there your relatives and townsmen in your district when you first came to Mersin?	137 78,3	38 21,7	- -	175 100,0
Did your relations with your neighbors, townsmen, and villagers' change in terms of support after migration?	82 46,9	92 52,6	1 0,6	175 100,0

It should be also evaluated that how forced migrants maintain communications with their relatives in their villages. While 52,5% of 'forced migrants who maintain communication with their relatives in their village' maintain communication with them by visiting, 38,75% of them maintain communication by telephone, and 8,75% of them say that they maintain communication with them by their coming to the city. Visiting repetition of relatives in the hometowns of forced migrants indicates their relations with their hometown. While 52,6% of forced migrants visit their relatives in their hometowns once a year, 5,4% visit twice a year, 8,1% visit once every two years, 8,1% visit once every three years, 1,4% visit once every three months, 14,8% visit sometimes, 4,1% visit if it is possible, 4,1% visit when someone dies, and 1,4% visit once a month.

Table 46: Frequency Distribution of How Forced Migrants Maintain Communications with their Relatives in the Village

How Forced Migrants Maintain Communications with their Relatives in the Village	Frequency	Percent
By Visiting	42	52,5
By Telephone	31	38,75
They Come	7	8,75
Total	80	100,0

The comparison of support relations of forced migrants with their neighbors, townsmenships and villagers with the situation before migration are shown in table 95. Whereas 36,7% of forced migrants who have support relations with their neighbors, townsmenships and villagers say that their support relations are better than before migration, 32,9% say that they are worse than before migration. When 26,6% say that they have no relation with them, 3,8% of them says that they see each other more often than before migration. Only 9,1% of forced migrants get provisions from their hometown, namely wheat, boiled wheat, lentils, flour, cheese, and money.

The frequency distribution of yes/no questions, concerning the support relations of forced Migrants can be seen in table 47. While 56,0% of forced migrants ask for help when they are in a difficult situation, 77,7% help people who are in a difficult situation. We see that 74,3% of forced migrants make tinned food, tomato sauce, tarhana, pickles, and jam at home, but only 8,6% of forced migrants make their children who are younger than 14 work. We also see that 77,7% of forced migrants are in debt. While 2,9% of forced migrants get disability or poverty aid, none of them get help from any community or vaqıf. We find that 14,3% of forced migrants have a green card, as a kind of social security.

Table 47: Frequency Distribution of Questions Concerning the Support Relations of Forced Migrants

Questions Concerning the Support Relations of Forced Migrants	Yes %	No %	Missing %	Total %
Do you ask for help when you are in a difficult situation?	98 56,0	77 44,0	- -	175 100,0
Do you help people who are in a difficult situation?	136 77,7	39 22,3	- -	175 100,0
Do you make tinned food, tomato sauce, tarhana, pickle, jam, etc at home?	130 74,3	44 25,1	1 0,6	175 100,0
Do you have children younger than 14 works?	15 8,6	160 91,4	- -	175 100,0
Do you have any debts?	136 77,7	38 21,7	1 0,6	175 100,0
Do you get help from any communities or vaqıfs?	- -	173 98,9	2 1,1	175 100,0
Do you get disability or poverty aid?	5 2,9	170 97,1	- -	175 100,0
Do you have a green card?	25 14,3	149 85,1	1 0,6	175 100,0

The frequency distribution of people who forced migrants request support from may also indicate their solidarity networks. We see that 62,6% of them request support from their relatives, 10,3% from their townsmenships, 13,1% from their neighbors, 3,7% from their friends, 4,7% from the state, 2,8% from the Democratic Peoples Party, and 2,8% from other people and institutions, when they are in a difficult situation.

Table 48: Frequency Distribution of People Who Forced Migrants Request Support From

People Who Forced Migrants Request Support From	Frequency	Percent
Relatives	67	62,6
Neighbors	14	13,1
Townsmenships	11	10,3
Friends	4	3,7
State	5	4,7
Democratic People Party	3	2,8
Other	3	2,8
Total	107	100,0

The kinds of support that forced migrants grant people in difficult situations are also vital for integration of migrants. 13,1% of forced migrants find jobs for people in difficult situation, 1,8% teach occupational ability, 26, % give money, 10,8% lend money or be guarantors for them, 3,2% give lodgings, 1,8% help them repair, 3,6% do housework and cleaning, 0,9% help in domestic production, 4,5% become watchmen for their house, 1,8% look after their children, 9,5% help them when there is marriage, illness and death in the family, 20,3% do whatever they can, and 2,7% give provisions and clothing.

Table 49: Frequency Distribution of the Kinds of Support That Forced Migrants Grant People in Difficult Situation

Kind of Support That Forced Migrants Grant People in Difficult Situation	Frequency	Percent
Giving Money	58	26,1
Whatever They can Do	45	20,3
Finding a Job	29	13,1
Lending or Being Guarantor	24	10,8
Helping in Marriage, Illness, Death	21	9,5
Watchman for Their House	10	4,5
Housework and Cleaning	8	3,6
Let them Stay in His/her Home	7	3,2
Provisions and Clothing	6	2,7
Other	14	6,3
Total	222	100,0

The Frequency distribution of the kinds of help that forced migrants accept when they are in difficult situations is shown in table 50. While 40,8% accept money, 20,4% accepts a loan or having a guarantor, 19,1% accept finding a job for them, 10,8% accepts help when there is marriage, illness, or death in the family, 1,9% accept a place to stay, 1,3% accept help in repairing, 1,3% accept help in housework and cleaning, 2,5% accept people being watchmen for their houses, 1,3% accept provisions and clothing from people and 0,6% accept being taught an occupational ability, when they are in difficult situations.

Table 50: Frequency Distribution of Kinds of Help That Forced Migrants Accept When They Are in Difficult Situations

Kinds of Help That Forced Migrants Accept When They Are in Difficult Situations	Frequency	Percent
Taking Money	64	40,8
Loan or Guarantor	32	20,4
Finding a Job	30	19,1
Help in Marriage, Illness, Death	17	10,8
Watchman for Their House	14	8,9
Total	157	100,0

We see the frequency distribution of people who lend to forced migrants in table 51. When 62,22% of forced migrants borrow from their relatives, 14,07% borrow from the market, 8,9% borrow from artisans, 2,22% borrow from their employers, 1,48% owes his/her landlord due to unpaid rent, and 11,11% borrow from other people. We see that most of forced migrants (62,22%) who have debts prefer their relatives if they must borrow. It should be also examined the frequency distribution of kinds of job that children under 14 do. When 30,8% of working children work in shoe shining, 15,4% work as apprentices, 38,5% work in seasonal agricultural jobs, 7,7% work in the manufacture sector, and 7,7% work in temporary, daily jobs.

Table 51: Frequency Distribution of People Who Lend to Forced Migrants

People Who Lend to Forced Migrants	Frequency	Percent
Their Relatives	84	62,22
Market	19	14,07
Artisan	12	8,9
Their Employers	3	2,22
Landlord (rent)	2	1,48
Other	15	11,11
Total	135	100,0

5.2.3. Organized and Political Behavior

The frequency distribution of yes/no questions regarding the organized and political behavior of forced migrants is shown in table 52. While 54,9% of forced migrants meet with their friends and relatives outside of the home and organize activities, 34,3% of the

women organize meeting among themselves. We see that 41,7% of forced migrants discuss their problems with people in their district. Whereas 19,4% of forced migrant are members of associations, only in 2,9% are affiliated with associations concerned with the solution of the problems in their district such as road, school, water, electricity, sewerage, telephone, the demolition of gecekondus, and the transformation of apartments. We see a high participation in political elections among forced migrants. While 95,4% of forced migrants voted in 3rd November 2002 general election, 91,4% of them voted in the last local election, and 96,6 % are considering to vote, if there was a general election today. Despite their high political participation, only 37,7% of forced migrants have membership or delegateship relations with political parties.

Table 52: Frequency Distribution of Questions Regarding Organized Behavior Among Forced Migrants

Questions about Organized and Political Behavior among Forced Migrants	Yes %	No %	Missing %	Total %
Do you meet with your friends, relatives outside your home and organize activities?	96 54,9	75 42,9	4 2,3	175 100,0
Do women organize meetings among themselves?	60 34,3	106 60,6	9 5,1	175 100,0
Do you discuss your problems with the people in your district?	73 41,7	94 53,7	8 4,6	175 100,0
Are you a member of any association?	34 19,4	140 80,0	1 0,6	175 100,0
Is there any association that is concerned with the solution of the problems in your district like road, school, water, electricity, sewerage, telephone, demolition of gecekondus, transformation of apartments?	5 2,9	168 96,0	2 1,1	175 100,0
Did you vote in 3rd November 2002 general election?	167 95,4	8 4,6	- -	175 100,0
Did you vote in the last local election?	160 91,4	14 8,0	1 0,6	175 100,0
Would you consider voting if there were a general election now?	169 96,6	4 2,3	2 1,1	175 100,0
Do you have a membership, delegateship relation with the political party that you voted for?	66 37,7	103 58,9	6 3,4	175 100,0

The frequency distributions of institutions to which forced migrants apply in order to solve their district problems are shown in table 53. While 1,9% of forced migrants apply to their relatives, neighbors, and friends, 20,1% apply to the municipality, 35,0% apply to the elder (headman) of district, 17,3% apply to the district committee of DEHAP, 3,3% apply to the police, 4,2% apply to related institutions, 15,9% don't apply anywhere (themselves), and 2,4% apply to other institutions in order to solve their district problems.

Table 53: Frequency Distribution of Institutions Which Forced Migrants Apply to in order to Solve Their District Problems

Institutions Which Forced Migrants Apply to in Order to Solve Their District Problems	Frequency	Percent
Elder of District	75	35,0
Municipality	43	20,1
District Committee of DEHAP	37	17,3
Themselves	34	15,9
Related Institutions	9	4,2
Police Station	7	3,3
Relatives, Neighbors, and Friends	4	1,9
Other Institutions	5	2,4
Total	214	100,0

The subjects of discussion, apart from district problems, among forced migrants are should be analyzed. We see that whereas 44,6% of forced migrants who participate in discussions discuss political problems, 12,3% discuss daily problems, 4,6% discuss the Kurdish question, 12,3% discuss returning to their villages, 6,2% discuss poverty, unemployment, and economic problems, 6,2% discuss criminal problems, 6,2% discuss urban problems and education, and 7,7% discuss other problems like human rights, and unity.

The kinds of activities that forced migrants do outside of their homes indicate their social relations. Whereas 12,5% of forced migrants who participate in activities outside their home visit their relatives and parents, 15,0% go to cafes (kahvehane), 17,5% go to meetings, concerts, and seminars, 11,25% go traveling and to picnics, 27,5% participate in political activities, and 16,25% make conversations. While 56,0% of women who

participate in discussions discuss political problems, 14,0% gossip and make conversation, 12,0% discuss traditional subjects, 4,0% discuss survival problems, 6,0% discuss women's problems, 4,0% discuss district problems, and 4,0% discuss cultural subjects.

The associations to which forced migrants are members are shown in table 54. While 34,1% of forced migrants who are members of any organization, are members of the Democratic People's Party, 22,7% are members of the Solidarity Association of Families of Arrested People, 18,1% are members of Human Rights Associations, 4,5% are members of the Justice and Development Party, 4,5% are members of Chamber of Bakers, 2,3% are members of the Motherland Party, 2,3% are members of the Diyarbakır Solidarity Association, 2,3% are members of the Chamber of Tradesmen Guaranty, 2,3% are members of the association for the support of blind people, 2,3% are members of the Association of Tradesmen and Artisans, 2,3% are member of a trade union, and 2,3% are members of SAYDER.

Table 54: Frequency Distribution of Associations, Which Forced Migrant Are Their Member

Associations Which Forced Migrants Are their Member	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Democratic People's Party	15	34,1
Solidarity Association of Families of Arrested People	10	22,7
Human Rights Association	8	18,1
Justice and Development Party	2	4,5
Chamber of Bakers	2	4,5
Motherland Party	1	2,3
Diyarbakır Solidarity Association	1	2,3
Chamber of Tradesmen Guaranty	1	2,3
Association for the support of blind people	1	2,3
Association of Tradesmen and Artisans	1	2,3
Trade Union	1	2,3
SAYDER	1	2,3
Total	44	100,0

While we examined the political parties that forced migrants voted for in 3rd November 2002 elections, we found that 96,4% of forced migrants voted for the Democratic

People's Party, only 3,0% of them voted for the Justice and Development Party, and 0,6% of them voted for the Motherland Party in 3rd November 2002 election. These values are almost the same for the local election. Whereas 96,3% of forced migrants voted for the Democratic People's Party, only 0,6% voted for the Republican People's Party, 1,3% voted for the Virtue Party, 1,3% voted for the Motherland Party, and 0,6% voted for the True Path Party in the last local elections. We found that forced migrants do not tend to change their political parties that they vote for. While 97,6% of forced migrants would vote for the Democratic People's Party, only 1,8% would vote for the Justice and Development Party, and 0,6% would vote for the Motherland Party, if there is a general elections today.

5.3. Criminalization of Forced Migrants

It is important that how migrants territories are percepted by the natives citizens. Wacquant (1993: 370) develops the concept of residential discrimination which means that territory of migrants prevent them to join labor market, criminal potentials and caused to their joblessness. Territorial stigmatization affects the interaction of migrants not only with employers but also with the police, the courts, street-level welfare bureaucracies (Wacquant, 1993: 371). Any citizen percept those migrants as potential criminals due to their ethno-political differences.

Therefore, it is possible to argue that there is a relationship between criminalization of forced migrants and their political choices. The rest of the citizen of Mersin percept them as ethno-political guilties. We found from survey data that there is a relationship between criminalization of forced migrants and their political choices. It was also found that the rate of crime (burglary, murdering etc…) is too low. It should be stressed that the criminalization of forced migrants is a result of deteriorated political environment rather than policizing events.

5.3.1. Criminal Status of Forced Migrants

We are going to present the statistics that we compiled during field research about the criminal situations of forced migrants. While we examine their criminal status it was founded that it is mostly related with their ethno-political structures. Firstly, we will give the percentages of violence in the family, committing suicide, and alcohol use, gambling, and being arrested or detained. Secondly, we are going to present their causes and solutions.

While members of 62,3% of the households of forced migrants in Mersin had been taken to police station, members of 49,7% of the households had been arrested and/or sentenced. 69,1% of household heads said any of their neighbors had been arrested and/or sentenced. Although the family statistics show a lower proportion of alcoholics among forced migrants, 70,3% of household heads reported there to be alcoholics in their district and/or environment.

Table 55: Frequency Distributions of Taken to Police Station and Being Arrested

Questions about Taken to the Police Station and Being Arrested	Yes %	No %	Missing %	Total %
Have you or any of the members of your family ever been taken to police station?	109 62,3	62 35,4	4 2,3	175 100,0
Has anybody from your family been arrested and/or sentenced?	87 49,7	85 48,6	3 1,7	175 100,0
Have any of your neighbors been arrested and/or sentenced?	121 69,1	47 26,9	7 4,0	175 100,0

Family members who were taken to the police station are an indicator of criminal status of forced migrants. While 55,6% of family members who were taken to police station are the household heads, 23,0% are sons of household heads, 7,1% are their brothers, 6,3% are their daughters, 6,3% are their spouses, 0,8% are their fathers, and 0,8% are their nephews. While we look at the causes of being taken police station, we see that whereas 71,6% were taken to the police station because of political causes, 10,8% were taken because they were found to be suspicious, 6,9% were taken for fighting, 2,9%

were taken for being Kurdish and having Kurdish identity, 2,9% were taken for being military smugglers, 1,0% were because for burglary, 1,0% were taken for aiding illegal organizations, 1,0% were taken for narcotic causes, and 2,0% were taken because for financial causes such as fraud.

The other important indicator of criminal status of forced migrants is family member who were arrested. While 37,6% of family members who were arrested were household heads, 22,4% were their sons, 15,3% were their brothers, 5,9% were the spouses of the household heads, 4,7% were their fathers, 3,5% were their uncles, 2,4% were their daughters, 2,4% were their nephews, 1,2% were their brothers-in-law, 2,4% were their cousins, and 2,4% were their other relatives. We also examined the causes of the arrest of family members of forced migrants. We see that most of family members of forced migrants (78,9%) were arrested because of political causes (demonstration, being Kurdish, wanting political rights). Whereas 5,3% were arrested for aiding illegal organizations, 3,9% were arrested for burglary, 2,6% were arrested for vendetta, 1,3% were arrested for murder, 1,3% were arrested after confession, 1,3% were arrested for slander, 1,3% were arrested for smuggling, 1,3% were arrested for narcotic causes, 1,3% were arrested upon complaint, and 1,3% were arrested for fighting.

While 45,1% of the household heads of forced migrants said there have been people in close environment that have attempted to commit suicide, 32,6% reported that there have been people in their close environment who has committed suicide. Furthermore, 70,9% of households' heads said there have been people who are suffering from depression and/or who have experienced depression among their close relatives and friends.

Table 56: Frequency Distributions of Commit Suicide and Depression

Questions about Commit Suicide and Depression	Yes %	No %	Missing %	Total %
There has been somebody in my close environment who attempted to commit suicide.	79 45,1	86 49,1	10 5,8	175 100,0
There has been somebody among my close environment who committed suicide.	57 32,6	114 65,1	4 2,3	175 100,0
Has there ever been anybody who is in depression and/or who have you experienced depression among your close relatives and friends?	124 70,9	46 26,3	5 2,8	175 100,0

Committing suicide is another indicator for the criminal status among forced migrants. When we examine the causes of committing suicide among forced migrants, we found that While 43,9% of household heads of forced migrants see poverty and unemployment as causes for committing suicide, 17,2% see stress, depression, and psychological causes, 9,6% see family pressure, 7,9% see disagreement, 3,8% see uneducation, 3,3% see unreturned love, 2,9% see political pressures, 2,5% see prosecution, 2,5% see honor and aggression, 1,7% see violence and problems in the family, 1,7% see being not able to find response to his/her expectations, 1,7% see deficiency of struggle, and 1,3% see unadaptation to urban as causes of committing suicide.

Like committing suicide, depression is also important indicator of criminal status. When we examine the causes of being in depression among forced migrants, we found that while 53,2% of household heads of forced migrants see survival problems and unemployment as the causes of depression, 13,4% see psychological problems and stress, 9,1% see violence and disagreement in the family, 5,2% see pressure, 4,3% see not being able to find response to his/her expectations, 3,5% see cultural problems and unadaptation to urban life, 3,0% see political pressure, 2,6% see hopelessness and loneliness, 1,7% see insensibility and disinterestedness, 1,3% see unreturned love, 0,9% see illness and infirmity, 0,9% see uneducation, and 0,9% see ideological deficiency as causes of being in depression among forced migrants.

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When we examined alcohol using, gambling in family and district, we found that whereas in almost all family members don't use alcohol (90,3%) and gambling (97,1%), 70,3% of household heads suggest that there are alcohol user in their district.

Table 57: Frequency Distributions of Alcohol Addiction and Gambling

Questions about Alcohol Addiction and Gambling	Yes %	No %	Missing %	Total %
Is there anybody who is addicted to alcohol in your family?	14 8,0	158 90,3	3 1,7	175 100,0
Is there anybody who gambles in your family?	1 0,6	170 97,1	4 2,3	175 100,0
Is there anybody who is addicted to alcohol in your district or environment?	123 70,3	41 23,4	11 6,3	175 100,0

While there is disagreement in 42,3% of households of forced migrants in Mersin, in 42,9% of them violence has increased in last years. Moreover, 92,0% of the forced migrants suggests that economic difficulties influence their relationships in the family negatively. Whereas 32,0% of household heads beat their spouses, 48,0% beat their children in order to educate or 'show them the truth'. We also see that there are alcoholics in 8,0% of the households, and gamblers in only 0,6% of the households.

Table 58: Frequency Distributions of Violence in Families of Forced Migrants

Questions about Violence in Family	Yes %	No %	Missing %	Total %
There is disagreement in our family	74 42,3	100 57,1	1 0,6	175 100,0
In the last years, violence in our family has increased.	75 42,9	99 56,5	1 0,6	175 100,0
Economic difficulties influence the relationships in the family negatively	161 92,0	13 7,4	1 0,6	75 100,0
I beat my spouse	56 32,0	114 65,1	5 2,9	175 100,0
I beat my children in order to educate them and show them the truth.	84 48,0	88 50,3	3 1,7	175 100,0

In our field research we found that there is a structural poverty among forced migrants, which deteriorate their relationship among household members. The causes of violence in families of forced migrants are shown in table 112. While 67,1% of household heads of forced migrants see economical problems and unemployment as causes of violence, 12,3% see disagreement in the family and survival problems, 8,2% see uneducation and unconsciousness, 3,7% see psychological problems, 3,7% see disagreement and cultural differences, 2,7% see social problems and immorality, 1,4% see political problems, and 0,9% see pressure and prosecution as causes of violence in their families.

We asked household heads of forced migrants that how the question of violence in the family could be solved. We found that while 64,7% of household heads of forced migrants think that it can be prevented by economic development and employment, 22,9% think that education is the solution, 6,5% think that respect, love and presence is the solution, 2,5% think that democracy is the solution, 2,5% think that agreement and verbal exchange is the solution, 0,5% think that people's support is the solution, and 0,5% think there is no solution for violence in family.

5.3.2. Problems Faced After Migration and in the City

We saw that there is a relationship between the problems of forced migrants, which they faced with after migration and in the city, and their criminal status. Most of forced migrants (36,0%) suggest that natives treats them as guilty people. While 28,1% of forced migrants were put in jail, 17,4% of them suggests that they were followed. The other important category (10,1%) is poverty and unemployment. Whereas 2,2% of them were arrested, 2,2% of them were excluded and couldn't adapt, 2,2% were subject to psychological pressure, 0,6% were subject to physical pressure and torture, 0,6% of them had continued vendetta, and 0,6% of them had been in fear of being killed. Those kinds of problems make them feel in bad psychology.

Forced migrants also faced with urban problems. While 34,2% of forced migrants faced with the problem of unemployment in the city, 33,8% of them were treated as potential

criminals, 23,4% of them faced with cultural adaptation problems. Health problems (5,2%), urban infrastructural problems (2,2%), burglary (0,4%), being arrested (0,4%), and state pressure (0,4%) are the other problems, which they faced with, when they first came to the city.

5.4 Forced Migrants Opinions about The Solution of the Forced Migration

We are going to evaluate the ideas of forced migrants about the solution of the question of forced migration in this chapter. We will also evaluate their willingness to return to their villages. We asked forced migrants about their regional problems, forced migration and the conditions for the solutions of these problems. We are going to demonstrate their conditions for the solutions of these problems in this part. The theory of integration should be included the conditions and willingness of both sides of the problem. If the desires of migrants aren't responded, the integration process will return the process of disintegration.

Forced migrants have some expectations from the state for the solution of their questions. From our field research study, we found that forced migrants firstly expected from state to provide peace in the region (19,4%). The second most important expectation is about human rights. 15,9% of forced migrants expects from state to respect human rights. Life and property security (14,2%), increasing job and employment opportunities (13,9%), the removal of military, police and village guard pressure (12,7%), emphasis being placed on education (10,7%) and increasing regional investment and credit opportunities (9,4%) are the other important expectations of forced migrants from state.

We asked forced migrants how the security problem could be solved. We found that there is a relation between the desires of forced migrants and the security problem. Many of forced migrants suggest that the problem of security will be solved if the state gives cultural and political rights. By this question we found that the second important conditions for the solution of security problem is about the abolishment of village guard

system (26,8%). Thirdly, 25,4% of forced migrants thinks that ending the violations of human rights can solve the problem. Creating job areas and increasing investment in the region (7,3%) and increasing in the level of education (6,3%) are the other important conditions of forced migrants for the solution of the security problem. Apart from those conditions, they suggest that the dissolvement of illegal organizations, declaration of ceasefire, universal amnesty as the other conditions of security.

We were also curious about the suggestions of forced migrants on how regional problems can be solved. Most of forced migrants (78,0%) suggest that democratization is the solution. After democracy the second important solution of forced migrants (13,4%) is prevention of unemployment and underdevelopment. Except these two groups there is a group (2,7%), which suggest that their problem will never be solved. Migrants also talk about granting cultural and political rights (1,6%) transferring the power to the local administrations (1,1%), abolishment of the village guard system (1,1%), taking military precautions (0,5%), the provision of internal peace (0,5%), universal amnesty (0,5%), and prevention of migration (0,5%) as the other solution of the problem.

5.4.1. Willingness to Return to the Villages

Before field research we were curious about the rate of turning back to village among forced migrants. We suggest that these numbers reflect only desires of migrants. In reality the rate of turners will be less than the rate of desirers. We saw that almost all of forced migrants (86,9%) want to return to their villages, 10,3% of them definitely don't want to return. Whereas 13,7% of households of forced migrants have at least one member who doesn't want to return to the village, 80,6% of households have no members that don't want to return to the village. Furthermore, while 84,6% of forced migrants want to return to their villages as a whole family, 8,0% of them want to return to their villages without all of their family members.

The conditions demanded by forced migrants to return to their villages may be the solution of the question. Security is the most important conditions of forced migrants. 37,0% of forced migrants accepts to return if security is provided. While we examined these conditions, we found that the second most important conditions of forced migrants are satisfying of their loses and economic investment. 20,8% accepts to return if the state will help them and satisfies their losses. 20,8% accepts to return if the state gives them money and provides job opportunities. The other important categories are about state permission, village guard system and freedom and democracy. 13,5% of forced migrants who want to go back to their villages suggest that it will be enough if the state lets them go back to their village. 3,1% accepts to return if the state abolishes the village guard system, and 2,1% accept to return if the state provides democracy and freedom.

CHAPTER VI

URBAN AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF FORCED MIGRANTS

In this chapter, we will try to evaluate urban and social integration levels of forced migrants in Mersin. We defined 6 stressors, which indicate the urban integration level of forced migrants, and 8 stressors, which indicate their social integration level. We evaluated those 14 stressors on a scale from 1 to 3. All stressors were negatively formulated. If the means of urban and social integration stressors are close to 1, it means that they tend to disintegrate, and if they are close to 3, it means that they tend to integrate.

The statistics of the urban and social integration levels are shown in table 59. While the mean of urban integration is 1,2328, the mean of social integration is 1,2507. We see also the standard deviation of urban integration to be 0,40975, and the standard deviation of social integration is 0,36697.

Table 59: Statistics of Urban and Social Integration

Statistics	Urban Integration	Social Integration
Mean	1,2328	1,2507
Std. Deviation	0,40975	0,36697
Minimum	0,17	0,38
Maximum	2,83	2,75

6.1 Urban Integration

The mean and standard deviations of the urban integration stressors are shown in table 60. Firstly, we asked forced migrants if they have difficulties in getting used to urban life or not. The mean of this item is the highest among the urban integration stressors with a value of 1,45. The standard deviation of the same item is also the highest, with 0,837. The second stressor concerns their labor price. The mean of this item is the lowest with 1,05 and its standard deviation is 0,274. The mean of third stressor, which concerns exclusion, is 1,23 and its standard deviation is 0,645. The mean of fourth stressor, which is about feeling themselves under psychological pressure in Mersin, is 1,26 and its standard deviation is 0,670. Whereas the mean of fifth stressor is 1,27, its standard deviation is 0,679. The mean of last stressor is 1,24 and its standard deviation is 0,663.

Table 60: Means and Standard Deviations of Urban Integration Stressors

Urban Integration Stressors	Mean	Std. Dev.	Missing	Total
I have difficulties in getting used to urban life.	1,45	0,837	1	175
Urban employers make us work for cheap wages	1,05	0,274	7	175
Native people of Mersin exclude us	1,23	0,645	5	175
I feel myself under psychological pressure in this city	1,26	0,670	2	175
Employers from Mersin don't give us jobs	1,27	0,679	6	175
I do not used to live in Mersin and I am not happy	1,24	0,663	3	175

Table 61 indicates the frequency distributions of urban integration stressors. For the first stressor, whereas 77,01% of forced migrants have difficulties in getting used to urban life, 0,57% have no idea, and 22,42% haven't any difficulties. For the second stressor, 95,83% of forced migrants think that urban employers make them work for cheap wages, 2,97% have no idea, and 1,2% don't think so. For the third stressor, while 88,23% of forced migrants suggest that they are excluded by native people of Mersin, 1,77% have no idea, and 10,0% don't think so. For the fourth stressor, 86,71% of forced migrants feel themselves under psychological pressure in Mersin, 0,58% have no idea,

and 12,71% don't feel so. For the fifth stressor, we see that 85,8% of forced migrants suggest that employers from Mersin don't give them jobs, 1,18% have no idea, and 13,02% don't think so. For the final stressor, 88,37% of forced migrants weren't used to Mersin and they are not happy, 0,58% have no idea, and 11,05% don't think so.

Table 61: Frequency Distributions of Urban Integration Stressors

Urban Integration Stressors	Agree %	No idea %	Disagree %	Total N %
I have difficulties in getting used to urban life.	134 77,01	1 0,57	39 22,42	174 100,0
Urban employers make us work for cheap wages	161 95,83	5 2,97	2 1,2	168 100,0
Native people of Mersin exclude us	150 88,23	3 1,77	17 10,0	170 100,0
I feel myself under psychological pressure in this city	150 86,71	1 0,58	22 12,71	173 100,0
Employers from Mersin don't give us jobs	145 85,8	2 1,18	22 13,02	169 100,0
I was not used to Mersin and I am not happy	152 88,37	1 0,58	19 11,05	172 100,0

6.2 Social Integration

Table 62 indicates the mean and standard deviations of the social integration of forced migrants. In the first stressor, we see the willingness of forced migrants about their sons' and daughters' marriages with somebody from Mersin. While the mean is 1,25, the standard deviation is 0,632. While the mean of second stressor is 1,43, the standard deviation is 0,831. The mean of third stressor, which is about treatment of natives of Mersin, is 1,21 and the standard deviation is 0,617. The mean of fourth stressor is 1,24 and the standard deviations are 0,636. Whereas the mean of fifth stressor is 1,19, the standard deviation is 0,576. The mean of sixth stressor, which is about the feelings of forced migrants about security, is 1,45 and the standard deviation is 0,824. The mean and standard deviation of seventh stressor are 1,23 and 0,643. While the mean of the last stressor is 1,17, the standard deviation is 0,551.

Table 62: Means and Standard Deviations of Social Integration Stressors

Social Integration Stressors	Mean	Std.Dev.	Missing	Total
I wouldn't like my daughter or son to marry somebody from Mersin	1,25	0,632	2	175
I don't understand behavior and speech of the natives of Mersin	1,43	0,831	3	175
Natives of Mersin treat us as guilty people	1,21	0,617	5	175
They don't like us as we are Kurdish	1,24	0,636	3	175
I wouldn't like my children and grandchildren to stay here	1,19	0,576	5	175
I don't feel secure in Mersin	1,45	0,824	7	175
I feel far away from my culture in the city	1,23	0,643	3	175
I have adaptation problems in terms of economic, political, cultural and social senses to Mersin	1,17	0,551	2	175

The frequency distributions of the social integration stressors are shown in table 63. The first stressor indicates that 84,97% of forced migrants wouldn't like their daughters and sons to marry somebody from Mersin, 10,41% have no idea, and 4,62% don't think so. For the second stressor, whereas 78,49% of forced migrants suggest that they don't understand the behavior and speech of the natives of Mersin, 0,58% have no idea, and 20,93% don't think so. Third stressor indicates that 89,41% of forced migrants think that natives of Mersin treat them as guilty people, 10,41% have no idea. For the fourth stressor, while 87,21% of forced migrants think that natives of Mersin don't like them, due to the fact that they are Kurdish, 11,05% have no idea, and 1,74% don't think so. The fifth stressor shows us that while 90,0% of forced migrants wouldn't like their children and grandchildren to stay in Mersin, 8,82% have no idea, and 1,18% said they would. For the sixth stressor, we see that 76,79% of forced migrants don't feel secure in Mersin, 21,43% have no idea, and 1,78% feel so. Seventh stressor indicates that 88,37% of forced migrants feel far away from their culture in Mersin, and 11,63% have no idea about this subject. For the final stressor, we see that 91,33% of forced migrants have adaptation problems in terms of economic, political, cultural and social senses to Mersin, 8,09% have no idea, and 0,58% don't have such problems.

Table 63: Frequency Distributions of Social Integration Stressors

Social Integration Stressors	Agree %	No idea %	Disagree %	Total N %
I wouldn't like my daughter or son to marry with somebody from Mersin	147 84,97	18 10,41	8 4,62	173 100,0
I don't understand behavior and speech of the natives of Mersin	135 78,49	1 0,58	36 20,93	172 100,0
Natives of Mersin treat us as guilty people	152 89,41	18 10,59	- -	170 100,0
They don't like us as we are Kurdish	150 87,21	19 11,05	3 1,74	172 100,0
I wouldn't like my children and grandchildren to stay here	153 90,0	15 8,82	2 1,18	170 100,0
I don't feel secure in Mersin	129 76,79	36 21,43	3 1,78	168 100,0
I feel far away from my culture in the city	152 88,37	20 11,63	- -	172 100,0
I have adaptation problems in terms of economic, political, cultural and social senses to Mersin	158 91,33	14 8,09	1 0,58	173 100,0

6.3 Analysis of Socio-demographic Hypothesis

As it is explained in theory of urban integration, it is believed that the more migrants stay in the urban area, the more integration is achieved. Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their migration period can be seen in table 64. On this idea we, divided forced migrants into two groups according to their migration time, one group that migrated before 1990 and the other group migrated after 1990. In our hypothesis we suggest that those who migrated before 1990 integrated into urban life more successfully than those who migrated after 1990. While the number of people who migrated before 1990 is 60, the number of migrants who came to Mersin after 1990 is 114. Whereas the mean integration level of migrants before 1990 is 1,2639, the mean of migrants after 1990 is 1,2164. When we look at their std. Dev. We see that the std. Dev. Of migrants before 1990 is 0,41995 and std. Dev. Of migrants after 1990 is 0,40518. When we compare the mean of urban integration level of forced migrants before 1990 and after 1990, we see that although there is a mathematical difference between the means of urban integration of two groups (migrants before 1990 1,2639 and

migrants after 1990 1,2164), statistically this difference is not a meaningful difference (P>∝, 0,469>0,05). *So we rejected our hypothesis that proposed that forced migrants who came to Mersin before 1990 are more integrated than who came 1990 and after.*

Table 64: Differences Between Urban Integration Levels of Forced Migrants According to Their Migration Period

Migration period	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Before 1990	60	1,2639	0,41995	0,726	172	0,469
After 1990	114	1,2164	0,40518			

The differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their migration period are shown in table 65. When we are examined the social integration level of forced migrants, we see the mean of social integration of forced migrants who came before 1990 as 1,2542 and of forced migrants who came after 1990 as 1,2489. When we look at the standard deviation, the value for the social integration level of forced migrants who came to Mersin before 1990 is 0,38782 and that for forced migrants who came to Mersin after 1990 is 0,35725. The mathematical difference has not statistically any meaning. (P=0,929> ∝=0,05). *We reject our hypothesis in which we said that forced migrants who came to Mersin before 1990 are socially more integrated than forced migrants who came to Mersin after 1990.*

Table 65: Differences Between Social Integration Levels of Forced Migrants According to Their Migration Period

Migration period	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Before 1990	60	1,2542	0,38782	0,090	172	0,929
After 1990	114	1,2489	0,35725			

Another indicator of urban integration is the family type. The Modernization school suggested that the more modern institutions are accepted, the more integration is provided. When we look at the family type, we accepted the nucleic family as modernized, and accepted the extended family as the traditional type. Thus, we also

suggest on this theory that the urban integration levels of forced migrant who are from nucleic families are higher than forced migrants belonging to extended families.

Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their family type are shown in table 66. We found in our research, that 116 forced migrants household heads live in nucleic family, and 58 of them live in extended families. The mean of the urban integration level of forced migrants who live in nucleic families is 1,2586 and the mean of social integration of who live in extended families is 1,1810. When we compare their standard deviations we that the standard deviation of urban integration level of forced migrants who live in nucleic families is 0,45116 and the standard deviation for those who live in extended families is 0,30793. The T-value of the urban integration level for family type is 1,333 and the df is 155,968. When we look at the P value, we will see that it is 0,185 (>0,05), so we reject our hypothesis that proposed that "the urban integration level of forced migrants who live in nucleic families (1,2586) is higher than the social integration level of forced migrants who live in extended family (1,1810). *Statistically, the urban integration level of forced migrants who live in nucleic families, is not higher than the social integration level of forced migrants who live in extended families.*

Table 66: Differences Between the Urban Integration Levels of Forced Migrants According to Their Family Types

Family type	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Nucleic family	116	1,2586	0,45116	1,333	155,968	0,185
Extended family	58	1,1810	0,30793			

Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their family type can are shown in table 67. When we examine the social integration level of forced migrants according to their family types, we see 116 of forced migrants live in nucleic families and 58 of them live in extended families. The mean of social integration level of forced migrants who live in nucleic families is 1,2759 and the value for those who live in extended families is 1,2004. Whereas the standard deviation of social integration level of forced migrants who live in nucleic families is 0,40194, the value for

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those who live in extended families is 0,28092. The T-value is 1,438 and the df is 153,629. The P value is 0,153 (>0,05), which means that *there is no statistical difference between the social integration level of forced migrants who live in nucleic families and those who live in extended families. That is we reject our hypothesis.*

Table 67: Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to their family type

Family type	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Nucleic family	116	1,2759	0,40194	1,438	153,629	0,153
Extended family	58	1,2004	0,28092			

Theories of urban integration about migration suggest that the urban integration level of migrants who came from urban backgrounds is higher than those who came from rural backgrounds. So, we propose that the urban integration level of forced migrants who came from urban backgrounds is higher than those who came from rural backgrounds. We see differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the place where migrants came from in table 68. We accepted county and province center as urban and others as rural. We compared forced migrants according to this differentiation. We found that while 50 of them migrated from urban areas, 124 of them migrated from rural. Whereas the mean of urban integration level of forced migrants who came from urban areas is 1,3000, while the value for those who came from rural areas is 1,2056. Their standard deviations 1,378, df 172 and p value 0,170 (>0,05), means that we cannot verify our hypothesis. *In conclusion, the urban integration level of forced migrants who migrated from urban areas is not statistically higher than those who migrated from rural areas.*

Table 68: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the place where migrants came from

Place of Origin	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Urban	50	1,3000	0,48445	1,378	172	0,170
Rural	124	1,2056	0,37426			

Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to the places of origin are shown in table 69. We also compared forced migrants who came from urban areas and those who came from rural areas according to their social integration level. The means of two groups are 1,2900 and 1,2349. Their standard deviations are 0,41760 and 0,34504. The t value computed to 0,896, the df, 172 and the p value, 0,371 (>0,05), which brings us to reject our hypothesis. *Thus, the social integration level of forced migrants who came from urban areas is not statistically higher than of them who came from rural areas.*

Table 69: Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to the places of origin

Place of Origin	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Urban	50	1,2900	0,41760	0,896	172	0,371
Rural	124	1,2349	0,34504			

Table 70 indicates the urban integration level of forced migrants according to the number of persons per room. We divided the household sizes of forced migrants to the number of rooms, and we transformed this variable into three groups according to the number of persons per room. The means of urban integration levels of the 3 groups in order are 1,2417, 1,2202, and 1,2475. Their standard deviations are 0,47083, 0,33001, and 0,47529. We found that the f value is 0,073, df within group is 2, the between group value, 171, the total is 173, and the p value is 0,930 (> 0,05) which brings us to reject our hypothesis. The difference between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the number of persons per room is not statistically meaningful. *Thus, we reject our hypothesis, which suggest there is difference among them according to the number of person per room.*

Table 70: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the number of person per room

Number of Persons per Room	Urban integration level			F value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
0 - 2	60	1,2417	0,47083		2	
2,01 - 4	81	1,2202	0,33001	0,073	171	0,930
4,01 or more	33	1,2475	0,47529		173	
Total	174	1,2328	0,40975			

We can see differences among the social integration levels of forced migrants according to the number of persons per room in table 71. The means of social integration levels of three groups are 1,2583, 1,2577, and 1,2197. Their standard deviations are 0,41609, 0,33503, and 0,35635. When we compared three groups we found that the f value is 0,144, the df within group value is 2, the between group value is 171, the total is 173, and the p value is 0,866 (> 0,05) which doesn't confirm our hypothesis. *In conclusion, there is no statistical significant difference among the social integration levels of forced migrants, according to the number of persons per room.*

Table 71: Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to the number of persons per room

Number of Persons per Room	Social integration level			F Value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
0 – 2	60	1,2583	0,41609		2	
2,01 – 4	81	1,2577	0,33503	0,144	171	0,866
4 or more	33	1,2197	0,35635		173	
Total	174	1,2507	0,36697			

We can see differences among the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their ages in table 72. We transformed the ages of household heads into three groups: 23-34, 35-46, and 47 or more. We found that the means of urban integration levels of three groups are 1,2917, 12350, and 1,1826. Their standard deviations are 0,45839, 0,44553, and 0,30576. When we compared three groups, we found that the f value is 0,954, the df within group value is 2, the between groups value is 167, the total is 169, and the p value is 0,387 (> 0,05) which brings us to reject our hypothesis. Although there is a difference among the urban integration levels of three groups, this difference

isn't statistically meaningful. *Thus, we found that there is no statistically meaningful difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their age.*

Table 72: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the age groups of their household heads

Age Groups of Household Heads	Urban integration level			F Value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
23- 34	36	1,2917	0,45839		2	
35- 46	61	1,2350	0,44553	0,954	167	0,387
47 or more	73	1,1826	0,30576		169	
Total	170	1,2245	0,39443			

Table 73 indicates the differences among the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their age. We see that the means of social integration levels of the three groups are 1,3299, 1,2152, and 1,2329. Their standard deviations are 0,42379, 0,34995, and 0,33223. When we compared the means of three groups, we found that the f value is 1,252, the df within group value is 2, the between groups value is 167, the total is 169, and the p value is 0,289 (> 0,05) which doesn't confirm our hypothesis. *Thus, we found that there is no statistically significant difference between social integration levels of forced migrants according to their age.*

Table 73: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to the age groups of their household heads

Age Groups of Household Heads	Social integration level			F Value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
23- 34	36	1,3299	0,42379		2	
35 - 46	61	1,2152	0,34995	1,252	167	0,289
47 or more	73	1,2329	0,33223		169	
Total	170	1,2471	0,36002			

6.4 Analysis of Socio-economic Hypothesis

The theories of urban integration propose that the urban integration level of migrants who are employed is higher than of the migrants who are unemployed. From this idea, we developed hypothesis concerning the urban integration levels of employed and

unemployed forced migrants. We transformed 57 variables into various categories; namely 'employed', and 'unemployed', the former containing wageworkers and self employed migrants, the latter containing migrants who are retired or unemployed.

Table 74 indicates the differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their state of employment. While we look at the number of respondents, we see that the frequencies of employed and unemployed forced migrants in the sample are equal, the value being 87. When we look at their means, whereas we see that the mean of urban integration levels of employed forced migrants is 1,2854, the mean of urban integration levels of unemployed forced migrants is 1,1801. While the standard deviation of the urban integration level of the unemployed category is 0,41236, the value for the employed category is 0,40260. When we compare the means of urban Integration level of employed and unemployed forced migrants, we easily see that there is a difference between their urban integration levels, which has no statistical meaning. Since the P value (0,90) is higher than the ∝ value (0,05). *We reject our hypothesis, which suggests that "The urban integration level of employed forced migrants is higher than that of unemployed forced migrants."*

Table 74: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their states of employment

State of Employment	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Unemployed	87	1,1801	0,41236	-1,705	172	0,090
Employed	87	1,2854	0,40260			

We see the differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their states of employment in table 75. The number of respondents who are employed and unemployed is equal. When we examine the mean of social integration levels of employed and unemployed forced migrants, we see that the mean for employed forced migrants is 1,2730, and the value for the unemployed is 1,2284. Whereas the standard deviation of the social integration level of employed forced migrants is 0,35280, the value for unemployed forced migrants is 0,38135. Although we can see a

small difference between the social integration levels of employed and unemployed forced migrants, there is no statistical meaning for this difference between them. We found that the P value (0,425) is greater than the ∝ value (0,05). *So, we reject our hypothesis, which states. "The social integration level of employed forced migrants is higher than that of unemployed forced migrants."*

Table 75: Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to their states of employment

State of Employment	Social integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Unemployed	87	1,2284	0,38135	-0,800	172	0,425
Employed	87	1,2730	0,35280			

We suggested that there is a statistical difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to difficulties that they had faced when they migrated to Mersin. Table 76 indicates differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the most difficult issue that they faced with in city at first. We found that 77 of them had unemployment and survival difficulties, and 73 of them had language and cultural difficulties. The mean of the urban integration level of first group is 1,2251 and the mean for the second group is 1,1963. Their standard deviations are 0,37147 and 0,39611 respectively. When we compare their means, we found that the t value is 0,459 the df value is 148 and the p value is 0,647 (>0,05). We reject our hypothesis. *As a result, we found that there is no statistical significant difference between the urban integration level of forced migrants who had unemployment and survival difficulties and those who had language and cultural difficulties.*

Table 76: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the most difficult issue that they faced in the city at first

The most difficult issue that forced migrants faced in the city at first	Urban integration level			T Value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Unemployment and struggling to make a living	77	1,2251	0,37147	0,459	148	0,647
Language and cultural adaptation problems	73	1,1963	0,39611			

We also compared the social integration levels of forced migrants who had unemployment and survival difficulties and those who had language and cultural difficulties. We see the differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to the most difficult issue that they faced with in city at first in table 77. Whereas the mean of social integration of first group is 1,2240, the mean of the second group is 1,2414. Their standard deviations are 0,30975 and 0,39492 respectively. We found the t value to be –0,301, the df to be 148, and the p value to be 0,764 (>0,05) which does not verify our hypothesis. So, unlike we said in our hypothesis, *there is no statistical significant difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who were unemployed and had survival difficulties in the urban space and of those who had language and cultural difficulties.*

Table 77: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to the most difficult issue that they faced in city at first

The most difficult issue that forced migrants faced in the city at first	Social integration level			T Value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Unemployment and struggling to make a living	77	1,2240	0,30975	-0,301	148	0,764
Language and cultural adaptation problems	73	1,2414	0,39492			

We see the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their income in table 78. We transformed the monthly income of forced migrants into three groups:

249.999.000. or lower, 250.000.000 – 499.999.000., and 500.000.000 or more. We found that the means of urban integration levels of three groups are 1,2481, 1,2251, and 1,2696. Their standard deviations are 0,42782, 0,42126, and 0, 42840. When we compared the means of three groups, we found that the f value is 0,137, the df within group is 2, the between groups is 151, the total is 153, and the p value is 0,872 (> 0,05) which doesn't verify our hypothesis. Thus, we reject our hypothesis, which suggests that there is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their income. *In conclusion, we found that there is no statistically meaningful difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their income.*

Table 78: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their income levels

Groups of Income Level	Urban integration level			F Value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
249.999.000 and less	43	1,2481	0,42782		2	
250.000.000-499.999.000	77	1,2251	0,42126	0,137	151	0,872
500.000.000 and more	34	1,2696	0,42840		153	
Total	154	1,2413	0,42226			

Table 79 shows us the differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their income. We found that the means of social integration levels of three forced migrants groups are 1,2500, 1,2532 and 1,2463. Their Standard devotions are 0,38864, 0,38951 and 0,32926 respectively. When we compared the means of the social integration levels of forced migrants, we found that the f value is 0,004, the df within group is 2, the df between groups is 151, the df total is 153 and the p value is 0,996 (>0,05), which brings us to our hypothesis. *In conclusion, we found that there is no statistically significant difference between forced migrants according to their income.*

Table 79: Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to their income level

Groups of Income Level	Social integration level			F Value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
249.999.000 or less	43	1,2500	0,38864		2	
250.000.000-499.999.000	77	1,2532	0,38951	0,004	151	0,996
500.000.000 or more	34	1,2463	0,32926		153	
Total	154	1,2508	0,37445			

We see the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants, according to the amount of land owned in acres in their villages in table 80. We transformed the forced migrants into two groups according to their land possession: 49 access of land or less and 50 acres of land or more. When we compared the means of the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the amount of land owned in the village, we found that the mean of the first group is 1,2895, and the mean of the second group is 1,350. The standard deviations are 0,43703 and 0,31811 respectively. We found that the t value is 2,269, the df is 96,838 and the p value is 0,025 (<0,05), which verifies our hypothesis. There is a statistically meaningful difference between forced migrants according to the amount of land owned in the village. *In conclusion, the urban integration level of forced migrants who own 49 acres of or less land in the village is statistically higher than the urban integration of forced migrants who have 50 acres of land or more.*

Table 80: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the amount of land owned in the village

Groups of Amount of Land in Village	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
49 acres or less	57	1,2895	0,43703	2,269	96,838	0,025
50 acres or more	79	1,1350	0,31811			

Table 81 shows the difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to the amount of land owned in the village. We found that the mean of the social integration levels of forced migrants who own 49 acres of land or less in the village is 1,3202 and the mean value for those who have 50 or more acres of land in

village is 1,1915. Their Standard deviations are 0,44005 and 0,29542 respectively. When we compare the means of social integration levels of the two groups, we found that the t value is 1,918, the df is 91,402 and the P value is 0,058 (>0,05), which brings us to reject our hypothesis. Thus, there is no statistically meaningful difference between the social integration levels of two groups. *As a result, we found that social integration level of forced migrants who have 49 acres of land or less is not statistically higher than of those who have 50 acres of land or more.*

Table 81: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to the amount of land owned in the village

Groups of Amounts of Land in the Village	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
49 acres or less	57	1,3202	0,44005	1,918	91,402	0,058
50 acres or more	79	1,1915	0,29542			

We see the differences between the incomes of forced migrants according to their migration time in table 82. We transformed the forced migrants into two categories: those who migrated before 1990 and those who migrated in 1990 or after. We found that the mean of income of forced migrants who migrated before 1990 is 349.814.810 and of the mean for those who migrated in 1990 or after is 391.603.960. Their standard deviations are 237.113.067 and 252.800.992 respectively. When we compare the incomes of the two groups, we found that the t value is -1,002, the df is 153 and the p value is 0,318 (>0,05), which brings us to reject our hypothesis. *In conclusion, we found that there is no statistically meaningful difference between the incomes of forced migrants according to their migration time.*

Table 82: Differences between monthly income of forced migrants according to their migration period

Migration Period	Monthly income level			T Value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Before 1990	54	349814,81	237113,067	-1,002	153	0,318
After 1990	101	391603,96	252800,992			

6.5 Analysis of Socio-spatial Hypothesis

In the theory of urban integration, house ownership is another important indicator. In previous studies on gecekondu's, it was found that the urban integration level of house owners is higher than those who do not own houses. In these studies, house ownership was discussed as a connection of migrants to the urban life. Thus, under this subject we assume, that as in the theory, the integration levels of forced migrants who own houses is higher than of them who do not.

Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing ownership can be seen in table 83. Whereas 94 of the forced migrants in the sample who live in Mersin have houses, 80 of them do not. When we look at the mean of the urban integration levels, we see that the mean urban integration level of house owners is 1,2748 and the mean of those who do not have houses is 1,1833. While the standard deviation of urban integration level of house owners is 0,44042, the value for those who do not houses is 0,36707. The T value is 1,473 and the df is 172. We see that the P value is 0,143 (>0,05), which falsifies our hypothesis. Although, there is a mathematical difference between the urban integration levels of house owners (1,2748) and those who do not have houses (1,1883), because the P value (0,143) is higher than the $\propto$ value (0,05). *Thus we reject our hypothesis in which we stated that the urban integration level of forced migrants who have houses is higher than forced migrants who do not have houses.*

Table 83: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing ownership

House Owner	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	94	1,2748	0,44042	1,473	172	0,143
No	80	1,1833	0,36707			

We see differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing ownership in table 84. We see, that the mean of social integration of forced migrants who have houses is 1,2686 and of the value for those who do not have houses

is 1,2297. While the standard deviation of the social integration level of forced migrants who have houses is 0,38098, the value for those who do not have houses is 0,35100. The T value is 0,696 and the df is 172. The P value is 0,487 (>0,05), which does not confirm our hypothesis. Although, there is a mathematical difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who have houses and those who do not have houses, this difference does not mean that there is meaningful statistical difference between them. *Thus, we reject our hypothesis in which we assume that the social integration level of forced migrants who have houses is higher than of them who do not have houses.*

Table 84: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing ownership

House Owner	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	94	1,2686	0,38098	0,696	172	0,487
No	80	1,2297	0,35100			

In Turkey, theories of urban integration suggest that the housing type of migrants affect their urban integration level. Researchers who studied gecekondu's suggested that gecekondu migrants tend to disintegrate in urban settings. Thus, housing type is another important indicator of urban integration. Thus we propose that the urban integration level of forced migrants who live in flats is higher than those who live in gecekondu's.

Table 85 indicates the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing types. While 32 of forced migrants in Mersin in the sample live in flats, 114 of them live in gecekondu's. While the mean of the urban integration of forced migrants who live in flats is 1,3854, the mean for those who live in gecekondu's is 1,974. When we look at their standard deviation we see that the standard deviation of the urban integration level of forced migrants who live in flats is 0,52948 and the value for those who live in gecekondu's is 0,38184. The T value is –1,877 and the df is 40,475. The P value is 0,068 (>0,05), which brings us to reject our hypothesis. We see that there is a mathematical difference between the mean of the urban integration levels of forced migrants who live in flats and gecekondu's, but this difference is not

statistically meaningful. The P value (0,068) is higher than the ∝ value (0,05). We reject our hypothesis that suggests that the urban integration level of forced migrants who live in flats is higher of the urban integration level of those who live in gecekondu's. *Statistically, there is no meaningful difference between urban integration level of forced migrants who live in flat and of those who live in gecekondu's.*

Table 85: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing types

House Type	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Gecekondu	114	1,1974	0,38184	-1,877	40,475	0,068
Flat	32	1,3854	0,52948			

We used the t-test in order to determine whether there is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who live in flats and those who live in gecekondu's. Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing types are shown seen in table 86. When we examine the social integration level of forced migrants according to their housing type, we find that 32 of forced migrants live in flats and 114 of them live in gecekondu's. When we compared the two groups, we found that the t value is –1,422 and the df value is 144. The P value is 0,157 (>0,05), which brings us to reject our hypothesis. Although there is a mathematical difference between the social integration levels of the two groups, there is no statistically meaningful difference. *Namely, the social integration level of forced migrants who live in flats is not statistically higher than that of forced migrants who live in gecekondu's.*

Table 86: Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing types

House Type	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Gecekondu	114	1,2423	0,34735	-1,422	144	0,157
Flat	32	1,3477	0,44420			

We proposed a hypothesis stating that there is a difference between the means of urban integration levels of forced migrants who changed their district and of those who did not

change their districts. Table 87 shows the differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their district mobility. We found that 90 of the forced migrants changed their districts and 81 of them did not change their district. While the mean of the urban integration level of forced migrants who changed their districts is 1,1833, the value for those who did not change their districts is 1,2819. When we look at the standard deviations, we see that the standard deviation of urban integration level of forced migrants who changed their district is 0,38304 and of the value for those who did not change their district is 0,43192. When we compare means of urban integration level of two groups, we found a t value of –1,581 and a df of 169. The P value is 0,116 (>0,05). The P value (0,116) is higher than the ∝ value (0,05), and this means that we have to reject our hypothesis. *Thus, there is no statistically meaningful difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who changed their district and those who did not change their district.*

Table 87: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their district mobility

District Mobility	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	90	1,1833	0,38304	-1,581	169	0,116
No	81	1,2819	0,43192			

We proposed the hypothesis above for social integration, too. We suggest that there is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who changed their district and those who did not change their district. Table 88 indicates the differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their district mobility. We found that the number of forced migrants who changed their districts is 90, and those who did not change their districts is 81. The mean of the social integration level of forced migrants who changed their district is 1,2028 and the value for those who did not changed their district is 1,3040. Whereas the standard deviation of the social integration level of forced migrants who changed their district is 0,31721, the value for those who did not change their district is 0,41124. The T value for comparing the two groups is 1,812 and the df is 169. The difference that we see between the mean of the

social integration levels of two groups is not statistically meaningful, because the P value (0,072) is greater than the ∝ value (0,05). *Thus, we can conclude that there is no difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who changed their districts and those did not change their district.*

Table 88: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their district mobility

District Mobility	Social integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	90	1,2028	0,31721	-1,812	169	0,072
No	81	1,3040	0,41124			

In our hypothesis, we suggested that there is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who moved house and of them who did not move house. Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing mobility are shown in table 89. While the number of forced migrants who moved house is 36, of them who did not move house is 138. The mean of the urban integration level of forced migrants who moved house is 1,3333, and the value for those who did not move house is 1,2065. The standard deviation for forced migrants who changed their house is 0,45600 and the value for those who did not move house is 0,39438. When we compared both of the groups' means, we found a t value of 1,662 and a df of 172. The value that we found for the P value is 0,098, which is higher than ∝ value (0,05). Thus, the mathematical difference that we found between urban integration levels of two groups does not mean that there is a statistically meaningful difference between them. *That is; we reject our hypothesis, in which we proposed that there is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who moved house and those who did not move house.*

Table 89: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing mobility

Housing Mobility	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	36	1,3333	0,45600	1,662	172	0,098
No	138	1,2065	0,39438			

Under the subject of housing mobility, we had proposed another hypothesis; "there is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who moved house and those who did not move house." Table 90 indicates the differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing mobility. The number of forced migrants who moved house is 36, and the number of forced migrants who did not move house is 138. The mean of the social integration level of forced migrants who moved house is 1,3021 and the mean for those who did not move house is 1,2373. When we look at their standard deviations, we see that the standard deviation of the social integration level of forced migrants who moved house is 0,37126 and the value for those who did not move house is 0,36601. When we compare the two groups, we see that the T value is 0,943 and the df is 172. The P value is 0,347 (>0,05), which brings us to reject our hypothesis. *Namely, there is not statistically difference between the social integration level of forced migrants who changed their house and of them who did not change their house.*

Table 90: Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to their housing mobility

Housing Mobility	Social integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	36	1,3021	0,37126	0,943	172	0,347
No	138	1,2373	0,36601			

When we evaluate the urban integration level, we consider "satisfaction with urban services" as another criteria. We assume that if migrants are satisfied with urban services, they tend to integrate into urban life. We developed the hypothesis; "there is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who are satisfied with urban services and those who are dissatisfied with urban services". To test this hypothesis, we used t test to determine whether there is a difference between two groups or not.

Table 91 indicates the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their satisfaction with urban services. While 73 of the forced migrants are satisfied with urban services, 99 of them are dissatisfied with urban

services. The mean of the urban integration level of forced migrants who are satisfied with urban services is 1,2671 and the mean for those who are dissatisfied with urban services is 1,2054. When we evaluate their standard deviations, we see that standard deviation of forced migrants who are satisfied with urban services is 0,48887, and the value for those who are dissatisfied with urban services is 0,34159. The T value is 0,925 and the df is 121,593. The P value is 0,357, which is higher than the ∝ value (0,05). Because P>∝ (0,357>0,05), we reject our hypothesis that suggests that there is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who are satisfied with urban services and those who are dissatisfied. *In conclusion, we found that there is no statistically meaningful difference between the urban integration levels of both groups of forced migrants.*

Table 91: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their satisfaction with urban services

Satisfaction with Urban Services	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Satisfied	73	1,2671	0,48887	0,925	121,593	0,357
Dissatisfied	99	1,2054	0,34159			

We see the differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their satisfaction with urban services in table 92. We suggested the hypothesis "there is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who are satisfied with urban services and those who are dissatisfied with urban services". The mean social integration value of the forced migrants who are satisfied with urban services is 1,2620 and the mean for who are not is 1,2412. The standard deviation of forced migrants who are satisfied with urban services is 0,42141 and the value for those who are dissatisfied is 0,32402. As a result of comparison between the two groups, we found a t value of 0,366 and a df of 170. The P value is 0,715 (>0,05), which does not verify our hypothesis. *Namely, we did not find a statistically meaningful difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who are satisfied and dissatisfied with urban services.*

Table 92: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their satisfaction with urban services

Satisfaction with Urban Services	Social integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Satisfied	73	1,2620	0,42141	0,366	170	0,715
Dissatisfied	99	1,2412	0,32402			

6.6 Analysis of Solidarity Networks and Political Behavior Hypothesis

Another criteria of the theory of urban integration are organization membership. In the theory, it is suggested that organized migrants integrate to urban life easier than disorganized migrants. It is proposed that organized migrants participate into urban life thus; we developed the hypothesis; "The urban integration level of forced migrants who are members of any foundation/organizations is higher than that of forced migrants who are not members of any foundation/organizations." Table 93 indicates the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them being members of any foundations. When asked if they are members of any foundations, 139 of respondents reported that they are not members of any foundation/organizations. The mean of the urban integration level of members of any foundations is 1,2353 and the value for those who are not members of any foundations is 1,2338. When we look at their standard deviations, we see that whereas standard deviation of the urban integration level of members of any foundations is 0,40849, the standard deviation of those who are not members of any foundations is 0,41253. When we compare the means of urban integration levels of forced migrants who are and are not members of any organizations, we see that they are nearly equal. Moreover, we found that the P value is greater than the $\propto$ value (0,985>0,05). Furthermore, we can say that there is no statistically meaningful difference between the urban integration level of forced migrants who are members of any foundations and of forced migrants who are not members of any foundations. *That is; we reject our hypothesis, which proposed that there is a difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who are members of any foundations and of forced migrants who are not members of any foundations.*

Table 93: Differences between urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them being members of any foundations

Being a Member of any Foundation	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	34	1,2353	0,40849	-0,019	171	0,985
No	139	1,2338	0,41253			

We also used the T test in order to determine whether we should accept our hypothesis, which assumes that "the social integration level of forced migrants who are members of any foundations is higher than that of forced migrants who are not members of any foundations". The differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to them being members of any foundations is shown in table 94. Whereas the number of members of any foundations is 34, the number of those who are not members of any foundations is 139. The mean of the social integration level of forced migrants who are members of any foundations is 1,2500 and the value for forced migrants who are not members of any foundations is 1,2473. When, we examine their standard deviations, we find that although the standard deviation of the social integration level of members of any foundations is 0,33710, of the value for those who are not members of any foundations is 0,37393. The value of the sum of social integration levels is –0,038 and the df value is 171. The P value in the social integration level of forced migrants who are and are not members of any foundations is 0,969 (>0,05), which brings us to reject our hypothesis. *We can conclude that the social integration level of forced migrants who are members of any foundations is not higher than that of forced migrants who are not members of any foundations.*

Table 94: The differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their membership to any foundations

Being a Member of any Foundations	Social integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	34	1,2500	0,33710	-0,038	171	0,969
No	139	1,2473	0,37393			

It is suggested that those who have relations with political parties are able to integrate into urban life more easily than those who have no relations with political parties. This

subject has been discussed in the theory under patronage relations. Such relations provide connections between gecekondu dwellers and political parties as representatives of the system. Thus, a connection is established between the 'periphery' (gecekondu) and 'core' (system). In our analysis we proposed that the urban integration level of forced migrants who are members of the political parties that they voted for, is higher than that of forced migrants who are not members of political parties that they voted for.

Table 95 shows the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their membership to political parties. We found that the frequency of forced migrants who are members of the party that they voted for is 65, and the frequency of forced migrants who are not members of any political parties is 103. When we examine the means, we see that the mean of the urban integration level of forced migrants who are members of political parties is 1,1564, and the value for forced migrants who are not members of political parties is 1,2702. While the standard deviation of the urban integration level of forced migrants who have membership to political parties is 0,34970, the value for those who are not members of political parties is 0,42850. The T value of sum of the urban integration level is 1,880 and the df value is 155,274. The P value of the urban integration level is 0,062 (>0,05), which brings us to reject our hypothesis. *Namely, there is no statistically meaningful difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who are members of the political parties that they voted for and forced migrants who are not members of the political parties that they voted for.*

Table 95: Differences between urban the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their membership to political parties

Being a Member of Party They That Voted for	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	65	1,1564	0,34970	1,880	155,274	0,062
No	103	1,2702	0,42850			

The approach to political participation in urban integration illustrated above is valid for the social integration level of forced migrants. The differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their membership to political parties is

shown in table 96. The number of forced migrants who are members of political parties is 65 and the numbers who are not member of political parties are 103. When we examine their mean of the social integration level, we see that the mean of members of political parties is 1,1827 and the value for those who are not members of political parties is 1,2852. While the standard deviation of the social integration level of members of political parties is 0,31567, the value for those who are not members of political parties is 0,37680. The T value for the social integration level concerning membership to political parties is 1,825 and the df is 166. The P value is 0,070 (>0,05), which brigs us to reject our hypothesis. *That is; the social integration level of forced migrants who are members of political parties, statistically is not higher than those who are not member of political parties.*

Table 96: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their membership to political parties

Being a Member of Party That They Voted for	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	65	1,1827	0,31567	1,825	166	0,070
No	103	1,2852	0,37680			

In urban integration, another important subject, which researchers have dealt with, is the institutions that migrants apply to for the solution to their district problems. It is suggested that the urban integration level of migrants differs according to the institutions that they apply to. Thus, we also suggest that the urban integration level of forced migrants differs according to the institutions that they apply to for the solution of their district problems.

Table 97 shows the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the institutions they apply to for the solution of their district problems. We used the ANOVA method in order to decide whether there is a difference between them. We found that 42 of forced migrants apply to the municipality, 47 apply to the district elder (headman); 31 apply to the district committee of DEHAP and 33 do not apply to any institutions. The mean of the urban integration levels of forced migrants according

to the institutions that they apply to for the solution of their district problems are ordered as follows; municipality 1,1786; elder of district 1,2943, district committee of DEHAP 1,1075 and nowhere 1,3283. The standard deviations of four groups are 038147, 0,49050, 0,19507 and 0,49033 respectively. When we compare the four groups, we see an f value of 2,090, a df between groups value of 3, a within groups value of 149 and totally as 152. The P value 0,104, which is higher than $\propto$ value (0,05). Because the P value $>\propto$ value, we could not verify our hypothesis. *That is; the urban integration level of forced migrants is not statistically different according to the institutions to which they apply for the solution of their district problems.*

Table 97: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the institution they apply to for the solution of their district problems

Institution Applied to	Urban integration level			F Value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Municipality	42	1,1786	0,38147		3	
Elder of Disrtrict	47	1,2943	0,49050			
District Committee of DEHAP	31	1,1075	0,19507	2,090	149	0,104
Themselves	33	1,3283	0,49033		152	
Total	153	1,2320	0,42113			

We suggested another hypothesis concerning the institutions applied to for the solution of district problems. We said that the social integration level of forced migrants is may differ according to the institutions that they applied to for the solution of their district problems. Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to the institution they applied to for their can be seen in table 98. We found that while 42 of forced migrants apply to the municipality, 47 apply to the elder of the district (headman), 31 apply to the district committee of DEHAP and 33 did not apply to any institution. The means of the social integration level are 1,1905, 1,3191, 1,1492 and 1,3295 respectively, whereas their standard deviations are 0,31507, 0,43050, 0,24243 and 0,43393 respectively. When we compare the means of the social integration level, we find an f value of 2,186, a df between groups value of 3, a within groups value of 149 and totally as 152. The P value is 0,92, which is higher than $\propto$ value (0,05). *Thus, we reject our hypothesis. In conclusion, we find that the social integration level of forced*

migrants is not statistically differentiated according to the institutions that they apply to for the solution of their district problems.

Table 98: Differences between social integration levels of forced migrants according to the institution they applied to for the solution of their district problems

Institution Applied to	Social integration level			F Value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Municipality	42	1,1905	0,31507		3	
Elder of District	47	1,3191	0,43050			
District Committee of DEHAP	31	1,1492	0,24243	2,186	149	0,092
Themselves	33	1,3295	0,43393		152	
Total	153	1,2516	0,37417			

In the theory, it is suggested that organized people integrate to urban life easier than disorganized people thus; we thought that there should be a difference between forced migrants who discuss their district problems and those who do not discuss their district problem. We proposed that there is difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants who discuss their district problems and those who do not discuss their district problems, moreover, the urban integration level of forced migrants who discuss their district problem is higher than that of those who do not discuss their district problems.

Table 99 shows differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their discussion on district problem. While 74 of forced migrants discuss their district problems, 94 of them do not discuss their district problem. We used the T test in order to determine whether there is difference between them or not. We found a t value of –2,831 and a df of 159,633. The P value is 0,005 (<0,05), which verifies our hypothesis. The mathematical difference that we see is statistically a meaningful difference. *That is; the urban integration level of forced migrants who discuss their district problem is higher than of them who do not discuss their district problems.*

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Table 99: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to their discussion on district problem

Discussion on District Problem	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	72	1,1319	0,28518	-2,831	159,633	0,005
No	94	1,2926	0,44311			

As we suggested above, we said in the hypothesis that there is a difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who discuss their district problems and of them who do not. We use the T test in order to determine whether our hypothesis is true or not. The differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their discussion on district problem is shown in table 100. Whereas 72 of respondents discuss their district problems, 94 of them do not. As a result of the comparison, we found a t value of –3,200 and a df of 163,777. When we look at the P value, we see that it is 0,002 (>0,05). We found that there is a statistical difference between the social integration levels of the two groups. *As a result, the social integration level of forced migrants who discuss their district problems is higher than of them who do not.*

Table 100: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to their discussion on district problem

Discussion on District Problem	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	72	1,1545	0,28341	-3,200	163,777	0,002
No	94	1,3205	0,38476			

As the theory of urban integration suggests, relations with neighbors, relative and townsmenships affect the urban integration level of forced migrants. We suggest that there is difference between the urban integration of forced migrants whose relations with their neighbors and co-villagers changed in the urban space and those whose relations did not change.

Table 101 shows the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to the changes in solidarity between them and their neighbors,

townsmenships, and co-villagers. While the relations of 82 forced migrants changed, of the relations of 91 of them did not change. The mean of the urban integration level of the first group is 1,1809 and the mean of the second group is 1,2747. Their standard deviations are 0,40079 and 0,41453 respectively. We found a T value of –1,510, and a df value of 171. The p value is 0,133 (>0,05), which does not verify our hypothesis. *Thus, we found that there is no statistically significant difference between the urban integration levels of forced migrants whose relations with relatives, neighbors, townsmenships and co-villagers have changed and those whose relations did not change.*

Table 101: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to change in solidarity between them and their neighbors, townsmenships, and co-villagers

Solidarity changing between migrants and their neighbors, townsmenships, and co-villagers	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	82	1,1809	0,40079	-1,510	171	0,133
No	91	1,2747	0,41453			

We see the differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to changes in solidarity between them and their neighbors, townsmenships, and co-villagers in table 102. When we compare the social integration levels of the two groups of forced migrants, we find that the mean of first group is 1,2302 and the mean of the second groups is 1,2706. Their standard deviations are 0,33820 and 0,39364 respectively. We found a t value of –0,721, a df value of 171 and a P value of 0,472 (>0,05), which brings us to reject our hypothesis. *Thus, as a result we found that there is no statistically significant difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants whose their with their relatives, townsmenships, neighbors and co-villagers have changed and those whose relations did not change.*

Table 102: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to the changes in solidarity between them and their neighbors, townsmenships, and co-villagers

Solidarity changing between migrants and their neighbours, townsmenships, and co-villagers	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	82	1,2302	0,33820	-0,721	171	0,472
No	91	1,2706	0,39364			

6.7 Analysis of Hypothesis About Criminalization

Theories of urban integration suggest that there is a relation between crime and the urban integration level. In the migration theory, there is a difference between the urban integration level of migrants who have criminal tendencies, and those who do not have criminal tendencies. Thus, the urban integration level of migrants who do not have criminal tendencies is higher than of them who do. We proposed a hypothesis, which suggests the same idea for forced migrants. We asked forced migrants if there are any persons in their family who have been arrested.

Table 103 indicates the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them having members of the family that have been arrested. While 86 of forced migrants reported that there is at least one member of family who has been arrested, 85 of them reported that no members of the family have been arrested. When we look at their urban integration levels, we see that the means of forced migrants who have had member of their family arrested is 1,415 and the mean of those who have not had members of their family arrested is 1,3098. The standard deviations are 0,28413 and 0,46587 respectively. When we compared the means of two groups, we found a T value of 2,849 and a df value of 138,605. The P value is 0,005 (<0,05), which confirm our hypothesis. *The urban integration levels of forced migrants who have not had any members of their family arrested is statistically higher the urban integration levels of forced migrants who have had any member of their family arrested.*

Table 103: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them having members of their family arrested

Have any Members of the Family been Arrested	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	86	1,1415	0,28413	2,849	138,605	0,005
No	85	1,3098	0,46587			

We proposed the same hypothesis for two groups concerning their social integration levels. The differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to them having of any members of their family arrested is shown in table 104. We found the means of the social integration levels of forced migrants who have had at least one member of their family arrested as 1,1715, and the mean of social integration for those who have not had any members of their family arrested is 1,3191. When we examine the standard deviations, we see that the value for the first group is 0,22772, and the value for the second group is 0,43708. When we compared these two groups, we found a t value of 2,765 and a df value of 126,145. The P value is 0,007 (<0,05), which verifies our hypothesis. *In conclusion, the social integration level of forced migrants who have not had any member of their family arrested is statistically higher than the social integration level of forced migrants who have had a member of their family arrested.*

Table 104: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to them having any member of their family arrested

Have any Members of the Family been Arrested	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	86	1,1715	0,22772	2,765	126,145	0,007
No	85	1,3191	0,43708			

Another indicator of crime is being taken to police station. We suggest that the urban integration level of forced migrants who have not taken to police station is higher than those who have been taken to police station. Table 105 shows the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them having members of

their family being taken to the police station. We found that while 62 of the forced migrants have not had members of their family taken to the police station, 108 of them have had members of their family taken to the police station. The mean of the first group is 1,3253 and of the mean of the second group is 1,590. The standard deviations for two groups are 0,47085 and 0,32094 respectively. We found a t value of -2,471, a df value of 94,064 and a P value of 0,015 (<0,05). Thus there is a statistically significant difference between the urban integration levels forced migrants who have not had members of their family taken to police station and those who have had members of their family taken to the police station. The mean of urban the integration level of those who have not had members of their family taken to the police station (1,3253) is higher than the mean of those who have had members of their family taken to police station (1,1590). *In conclusion, the urban integration level of forced migrants who have not had members of their family taken to the police station is statistically higher than of those who have had members of their family taken to police station.*

Table 105: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them having any members of their family taken to the police station

Have any members of your family been taken to the police station	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	108	1,1590	0,32094	-2,471	94,064	0,015
No	62	1,3253	0,47085			

Moreover, we also wanted compare the means of forced migrants who have had members of their family taken to police station with those who have not in regard to their social integration level. We see differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to them having any member of their family taken to the police station in table 106. The mean of the social integration levels of forced migrants who have not had members of their family taken to police station is 1,3327, and the value for those who have had members of their family taken to the police station is 1,1944. Their standard deviations are 0,41793 and 0,30730 respectively. There is a statistically significant difference between two groups since t value is –2,275, the df value is 00,289

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and the P value is 0,025 (<0,05), which confirms our hypothesis. The mean of first group (1,3327) is higher than the mean of the second group (1,1944). *Thus, we found that the social integration level of forced migrants who have not had members of their family taken to the police station is statistically higher than of the social integration level of forced migrants who have had members of their family taken to the police station.*

Table 106: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to them having any member of their family taken to the police station

Have any members of your family been taken to the police station	Social integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	108	1,1944	0,30730	-2,275	99,289	0,025
No	62	1,3327	0,41793			

Under this subject, we wanted to compare the means of the urban integration levels of forced migrants who have not had anyone from their close environment commit suicide and of the urban integration level of forced migrants who have had anyone from their close environment commit suicide.

Table 107 shows the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them having anyone from their close environment commit suicide. We found the mean of first group is 1,2360 and the mean of second group is 1,2047. Their standard deviations are 0,39948 and 0,38834 respectively. There is no statistical significant differences between forced migrants who haven't had anybody from their closed environment commit suicide, and those who have had anyone from their close environment commit suicide. Since we found a t value of –0,487, a df value of 168 and a P value 0,627 (>0,05), we must reject our hypothesis. *As a result, we can say that the urban integration levels of forced migrants do not differ due to having somebody in their close environment commit suicide.*

Table 107: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them having anyone in their close environment commit suicide

Has anyone in your close environment committed suicide	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	57	1,2047	0,38834	-0,487	168	0,627
No	113	1,2360	0,39948			

We also compared the social integration levels of forced migrants who have not had anyone in their close environment commit suicide and those who have. The differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to them having anyone in their close environment commit suicide are shown in table 108. The means of groups are as 1,2533 and 1,2171 respectively. The standard deviations are 0,38580 and 0,28886 respectively. The T value is –0,687, the df value is 143,875 and the P value is 0,493. (>0,005) which does not confirm our hypothesis. *There is no statistically significant difference between the social integration levels of forced migrants who haven't had anyone from their close environment commit suicide and those who have.*

Table 108: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to them having anyone in their close environment commit suicide

Has anyone in your close environment committed suicide	Social integration level			T value	Df	P Value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	57	1,2171	0,28886	-0,687	143,875	0,493
No	113	1,2533	0,38580			

Under the subject of suicide, we asked forced migrants if there is anyone who has attempted to commit suicide or not in order to compare their urban integration levels. Table 109 indicates the differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them having anyone in their close environment who has attempted suicide. The number of forced migrants who haven't had anyone in their close environment who has attempted suicide is 86 and the number of forced migrants who have had anyone in their close environment who has attempted suicide is 78. The mean of the urban integration level of first group is 1,2461 and the mean for the second group

is 1,1966. Their standard deviations are 0,39583 and 0,37772 respectively. When we compare the means of the two groups, we found that the T value is –0,818, the df value is 162 and the P value is 0,415 (>0,05) which falsifies our hypothesis. We could not found a statistically significant difference between the two groups. *In conclusion, the urban integration level of forced migrants who have had people in their close environments attempt suicide does not differ from the urban integration level of forced migrants who have nor had people in their close environment attempt suicide.*

Table 109: Differences between the urban integration levels of forced migrants according to them having people in their closed environment who have attempted suicide

Has anyone in your close environment attempted suicide	Urban integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	78	1,1966	0,37772	-0,818	162	0,415
No	86	1,2461	0,39583			

We also compared the social integration levels of forced migrants who have had people in their close environment attempt suicide and those who have not. The differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to them having people in their close environment attempting suicide is shown in table 110. The number of forced migrants in the first group is 86 and the number in the second group 78. The mean of social integration level of first group is 1,2485 and the mean of the second group is 1,2163. Their standard deviations are 0,31576 and 0,37056 respectively. When we compared the means of two groups, we found that the T value is –0,596, the df value is 162 and the P value is 0,552 (>0,05) which does not confirm our hypothesis. Thus, we could not find a statistically significant difference between two groups. So, we reject our hypothesis. We could not found a statistically significant difference between the two groups. *In conclusion, the social integration level of forced migrants who have had people in their close environments attempt suicide does not differ from the social integration level of forced migrants who have nor had people in their close environment attempt suicide.*

Table 110: Differences between the social integration levels of forced migrants according to them having people in their closed environment who have attempted suicide

Has anyone in your close environment attempted suicide	Social integration level			T value	Df	P value
	N	Mean	Std. Dev.			
Yes	78	1,2163	0,31576	-0,596	162	0,552
No	86	1,2485	0,37056			

Table 111: Differences between the urban and social integration levels of forced migrants according to different variables

Hypothesis	Urban Integration	Social Integration
H1, H2: migration period	Meaningless	Meaningless
H3, H4: family type	Meaningless	Meaningless
H5, H6: place of origin	Meaningless	Meaningless
H7, H8: number of person per room	Meaningless	Meaningless
H9, H10: age	Meaningless	Meaningless
H11, H12: state of employment	Meaningless	Meaningless
H13, H14: the most difficult issue	Meaningless	Meaningless
H15, H16: income	Meaningless	Meaningless
H17, H18: amount of land in village	Meaningful	Meaningless
H20, H21: house ownership	Meaningless	Meaningless
H22, H23: house type	Meaningless	Meaningless
H24, H25: district mobility	Meaningless	Meaningless
H26, H27: housing mobility	Meaningless	Meaningless
H28, H29: satisfaction with urban services	Meaningless	Meaningless
H30, H31: foundation membership	Meaningless	Meaningless
H32, H33: political party membership	Meaningless	Meaningless
H34, H35: institution applied to	Meaningless	Meaningless
H36, H37: discussion on district problem	Meaningful	Meaningful
H38, H39: changing in solidarity	Meaningless	Meaningless
H40, H41: being arrested	Meaningful	Meaningful
H42, H43: being taken to police station	Meaningful	Meaningful
H44, H45: committing suicide	Meaningless	Meaningless
H46, H47: attempt to commit suicide	Meaningless	Meaningless

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: AN ATTEPMT TO FORMULATE AN ACTION PLAN FOR FORCED MIGRANTS IN MERSIN

Although there have been many of studies in the field of migration, as with the fields of any social science, there is still a scarcity in the forced migration studies in the world, even more so in Turkey. In parallel to the history of human beings, there have been forced migrations due to different reasons, and there will be more in the future too. The continuing of forced migration, as a way of reproduction of poverty and disintegration, will definitely cause differentiation in urban structures in the future.

To be able to develop a political plan of action for solving the question of forced migration, which is one of the most important dynamics of urban poverty, and the question of urban integration/disintegration as its sub product, we should illustrate its reasons and results both for rural and urban spaces. To be able to reach such kind of action, we all should be aware about forced migration dynamics at both international and national levels. Holistic political, economic and social changes in the world may cause political instability and until the establishment of a new political, economic and social order, there is a high possibility of ethno-political forced migration. This assumption is also valid for such kind of changes at national levels. Thus, forced migration is experienced more easily in the process of globalization in political, economic and social spheres.

In the contemporary world internal forced migration constitutes a great political, social, and economic problem. By great international political developments after World War I, II, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the East European Block, and Yugoslavia, and the

end of the cold war era, the problem of forced migration reached its political place in the international policies, especially in the United Nations. Forced migration was widely seen, after World War I and II. In different parts of the world a set of political developments occurred, and humanity witnessed the establishment of new nation-states in Africa, the East, Latin America and Asia after World War I and II. As a result of the collapse of European colonial empires, third world countries that won their political independency started to strive to create (construct) their nations and development projects. When they practiced such kind of actions, they faced with the reality that they firstly had to provide their national unity/integration.

Looking through the history of forced migration, we see that there has been differentiation between the concept of refugees and internal forced migration. Although refugees won their legal position in the policies of United Nations, the problem of internal forced migrants was forgotten until the end of the 1980's. After that date, it was noticed that internal forced migrants were as important as the refugee problems, as they can be the cause of separatist movements. This means that the nation state was in danger. For the continuation of the international political order, United Nations has dealt with this question since 1990.

Although there is an important midpoint among those states, forced migration as a result of struggles and economic causes together, different processes of forced migration can be observed in different cases of internal forced migration. Russia has weathered this process as an heir of the Soviet Union, after a global political change: the collapse of East Block. While Russians in the former Soviet Republics migrated to Russia, an important part of the populations of other ethnic groups have migrated from their motherland to Russia. The crises in Colombia and Burma have been seen since World War II finished. In both cases the main reason of forced migration was failed economic policies in 1950's. While in Colombia the route from CID (conflict-induced displacement) to resettlement can be interpreted as occurring in various ways: rural to rural, rural to semi-urban (or urban), urban to urban, and urban/rural to return/resettlement, in Burma forced migration has occurred from city centers to new

satellite settlements on the outskirts of the cities (Lonjouw, Bomforth, and Mortimer, 2000). In both cases, Colombia and Burma, internal displacement has been associated with conflict, human rights violations, authoritarian governments and failed economic policies since the 1950's.

It is true that forced migration includes development projects and natural disasters. In such kind of problems, states generally plan for the losses of migrants. Generally, they have payment calendars for the loss of migrants and a plan of replacement in the case of development projects and natural disasters. As for the question of forced migration caused by ethno political struggles, it can be seen that many of states act, as agents of internal forced migration have no plan for internal forced migrants; neither for payment of their losses, nor for their replacement.

Turkey has been through such of development project and natural disasters. It is estimated that about 250.000 people have had to migrate from their villages as a result of Southeast Anatolian Region project. After earthquakes, a natural disaster, in August 1999 many people had to leave their homes. Turkey has an action plan of replacement, especially for development projects.

The most problematic forced migration in Turkey has occurred after rebellions and ethno-political struggles, since the country was established. Turkey has been through social disaster twice. While the first one saw migration from Eastern and Southeastern rural to western rural areas under replacement programmes between 1925 and 1938, after tension was created by of modernist practices, the second case occurred from Eastern and Southeastern rural to western urban areas without any plans or replacement programme. Armed struggles in East and Southeast Anatolian regions after 1980, when the East Block started to collapse. In 1990's we witnessed the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia and new nation states were established.

Though all these international developments, Turkey achieved to protect its unity. Many people had to migrate to western urban areas under unbearable conditions, and left their

homes and village due to armed struggle between the Turkish Military Forces and the PKK. Thus, this process has the result in the formation of concentrated urban areas of internal forced migrants in Diyarbakır, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Adana, and Mersin. Forced migrants from the East and Southeast Anatolian regions have lived through this process and ended up living in poverty in the shantytowns of western urban areas.

It was not possible to talk about problems when armed struggles were continuing. But, nowadays, there is a convenient political environment to talk about problems. We thought that we could contribute to urban studies and forced migration in this softer political environment. Thus, we carried out research on the urban integration question of forced migrants who migrated to Mersin, and their integration tendency with different variables.

We tried to measure the urban and social integration levels of forced migrants with a three answer scale: 1=Fully approve-yes, 2=No idea, 3=Not approve-No. As for the integration of forced migrants, we saw that while the total mean of urban integration is 1,2328, the total mean of social integration is 1,2507, which is very low. Because of negative formulation of integration stressors, those findings mean disintegration. We determined the minimum urban integration level of forced migrants in Mersin to be 0,17 and the maximum urban integration level to be 2,83. While the minimum social integration level is 0,38, the maximum social integration level is 2,75. Their urban and social integration levels are very close to 1. Because of the negative characters of the indicators, we found that they tend to not integrate to urban and social life in Mersin. It can be concluded that forced migrants are in an economic, social, political and spatial system that reproduce their disintegration to the city of Mersin and its society.

As we found from our field research, and we also know from other studies, which dealt with forced migration in Turkey, that forced migrants in different metropolises of Turkey could not integrate to the new urban and social environments. Forced migrants were deprived of their economic accumulations, social and political environments through the forced migration process. This kind of migration process and the loss of

their economic accumulations caused them to search for alternative networks and environments to continue their lives. They are going to be in their close environment, as an alternative to the market economy, as long as the policies concerning their situations are implemented. This contradictory situation causes them to reproduce disintegration in their urban and social life. Their economic, political and social disintegration reproduces their spatial disintegration (differentiation) in the urban spheres.

We found from our field research that demographic, socio-economic, socio-spatial, solidaristic, and criminal characteristics of forced migrants are different from those of the society. In the first chapter, we produced demographic data such as the mean of household size; the mean household size of forced migrants is 7,31, which is higher than Turkey and Mersin. The mean of their ages is 23,13, which indicates a very young population. These numbers indicate that forced migrants tend to sustain their traditional ways of life as an alternative to economic, social, political and cultural system. In this way, they try to guarantee themselves a future.

As it can be understood from chapters above, this study places importance on the urban integration of forced migrants. As we mentioned on the subject of integration, the levels of integration are economic, social, cultural, and political. Firstly, forced migrants should have more economic possibilities and the power to reach their economic integration. Thus, their employment situation, position in the labor market, occupational status, income and social insurance are the most important indicators of economic integration. Those variables determine their urban integration level. A high unemployment rate among forced migrants is a big problem. While 47,4% of household heads of forced migrants are unemployed, 49,7% are employed and 2,9% are retired. While there is no one working in 3,4% of households of forced migrants, there is only one working person in 57,7% of them, there are two working people in 22,9% of them, there are three working people in 13,1% of them and there are four working people in 2,9% of them.

When we examined the situation of those working members of households of forced migrants in labor market, we found that most of them work in unskilled jobs like porting, shoe shining, street vending, building work, temporary and seasonal jobs. While 13,77% work as construction laborers, 7,97% work as temporary workers, 6,88% work as manufacture workers, 6,88% work as artisans, 6,51% work as porters, 5,44% work as watchmen, 4,34% work as municipality worker, 3,99% work as waiters, 3,99% works as laborers, 8,99% work in independent business, 3,27% work as street vendors, 2,54% work as cooks, 1,08% work as drivers, 0,73% work as textile workers, and 0,73% work as officials. When we examined the situation of working household heads of forced migrants in labor market of Mersin, the percentages changed. We found that whereas 19,54% of households' heads of forced migrants work in construction, 24,15% work in service sector, 20,69% work in seasonal jobs, 21,84% work as artisans, 1,14% work in manufacture jobs, 3,45% work in independent businesses and 9,19% work in other fields.

When we examined the socioeconomic status of forced migrants, we saw that their mean monthly income is 377.045.160 TL; it can be interpreted as low. Taking into consideration that the legally binding minimum wage level is 403.000.000 TL. We found from our field research, that many working forced migrants have no social insurance. While 79,71% of the working members of household work without social security, 11,6% have social security from SSK (Social Insurance Institution), 2,17% have Bağ-Kur insurance (Insurance Institution for Farmer), 1,45% have Emekli Sandığı insurance (Insurance Institution for State Officials) and 0,73% of them has it from other institutions.

To be sure about the political integration of forced migrants, we have to have an idea about their political and organized behavior. We found that while 19,4% of forced migrants are member associations, generally they have membership relations with DEHAP (34,1%), Solidarity Association of Families of Arrested People (22,7%), and Human Rights Association (18,1%). Politically, they are close to DEHAP both in local and general elections. 37,7% have membership or delegateship relation with the political

party that they vote for, which is rather high in the Turkish context. While 19,4% of them are members of associations, only 2,9% of them reported that there is an association, that is concerned with the solution of local problems, such as road, school, water, electricity, sewerage, and telephone problems, the demolition of gecekondu's, and the transformation of apartments in their districts. But on the other hand most of forced migrants apply to local agents (Elder of District 35,0%, Municipality 20,1% and District Committee of DEHAP 17,3%) for their district problems. Whereas 44,6% of forced migrants who participate in discussions discuss political problems, 12,3% of them discuss returning to their villages.

We gain an insight about the social integration of forced migrants from their solidarity networks. While urban integration theoreticians discuss about relations of voluntary migrants with their hometown, relatives and neighbors, help and debt relations, they support that those variables delay their integration to urban life. They suggest that in the long run they will integrate to urban life. As for forced migrants, they see that social, political and economic solidarity networks are their way of surviving, because forced migrants were reproduced as the urban poor as a result of the forced migration process. In other words, while those networks delay the urban integration of voluntary migrants, they prevent forced migrants from integrating into urban life.

They live in close urban areas due to economic deprivations, political, social, cultural, linguistic and ethnic differences. Thus, they see those solidarity networks not as the way of surviving but as survival itself. Forced migrants have very close relationships with their townsmenships, relatives, hometowns and neighbors. While 66,9% of forced migrants maintain their relations with their hometown, 44,0% of them still visit relatives in their hometown. But only 9,1% of them gets help from their relatives in their hometown. Whereas 91,4% of forced migrants says that there are their relatives and townsmenships in the district that they live in now, 78,3% of them say that there were their relatives and townsmenships in their district when they first came to Mersin. While 46,9% of forced migrants think that their relations with their neighbors, townsmenships, and villagers have change in terms of support after migration, 52,6% don't think so. We found that 62,22% of forced migrants who have debts borrows from their relatives. We

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also found that while 62,6% of forced migrants requests support from their relatives, 10,3% request support from their townsmenships, and 13,1% request support from their neighbors. This means that they have limited space of action. Most of forced migrants don't go into city center in their spare time.

The proportion of forced migrants who don't speak Turkish is very high. The rate of women among them who don't speak Turkish is very high. We found that 13,2% of household members who don't speak Turkish are the household heads, 52,9% are their spouses, 20,7% are their mothers, 3,3% are their fathers, 1,7% are their sons, 1,7% are their daughters, 5,0% are their daughters in-law, 0,8% are their grandmothers and 0,8% is the entire family. The high rate of women not speaking Turkish means that there is no relationship between forced migrants households and the natives of the city. They cannot communicate with natives.

While we were looking at the criminal status of forced migrants we found that members of 62,3% of the households of forced migrants has been taken to the police station, and members of 49,7% have been arrested and/or sentenced. Moreover, 69,1% of the neighbors of forced migrants have been arrested and/or sentenced. We see that the main causes of their criminal status are political. While 71,6% of them has been taken to the police station, 78,9% of them have been arrested due to political reasons.

Economic, political and social levels of integration reflect on the urban space. Disintegration of forced migrants on those levels causes the reproduction of spatial disintegration of forced migrants. As other field research demonstrates, we also found that forced migrants couldn't integrate to urban life spatially. Generally, they live in outside districts of city, which can be defined as disintegrated spatial fields of forced migrants. Most of them choose a residential area on the borders of the Akdeniz Municipality, which has been won by HADEP/DEHAP in the 1999 local elections. This restricted area can be defined as a concentration area of forced migrants. Although there is still no permission of construction, they had to choose a place where they can easily built their houses over night (gecekondus) emergently due to their critical situation after

migration. Thus, urban services, which are presented to their districts, have no standard qualities. Water, sewerage, rubbish collection, electricity, health and educational services in forced migrants districts aren't qualified as much as other districts of Mersin, where rich and natives stay.

When we look at housing conditions of forced migrants, we found that they are in bad residences. We derived from our field research that while 81,3% of forced migrants stays in gecekondu's (shelter), 18,7% of them stays in apartment/flats. While 54,3% of forced migrants have their own houses, 41,7% live in rented houses and 4,0% live in their relatives' houses. We also found that 11,0% of house owners don't have any kind of title deed for their houses. Whereas 81,1% of them have no regular water service, 65,7% have no regular electricity service which are extremely high even in Turkish context. All these spatial disadvantages are reproduced as results of forced migrants position in the labor market.

We should propose an action plan for the solution of the question of urban disintegration of forced migrants. First of all, reasons of forced migration should be eradicated in democratic ways. Thus, there is need to improve the democracy and legal systems of Turkey. Through our hypothesis testing, we found that the urban and social integration levels of forced migrants are changeable according to their criminal status and discussion on their problems. The urban and social integration levels of forced migrants who haven't had family members arrested and taken to the police station are higher than those who have. While 71,6% have been taken to the police station, 78,9% have been arrested due to political reasons. We also found that the urban and social integration levels of forced migrants who don't discuss their problems are higher than of them who do. These findings indicate that there is a need to improve Turkish democracy. Because, most of the forced migrants commit crimes due to political reasons such as: to participate in illegal meetings, newroz celebrations etc…

Many of the projects for forced migrants have been carried out on the subject of relocation to their villages, since they migrated. Before that we should research life

conditions of forced migrants in the urban space and in the villages. We have to make a comparison between their survival conditions in urban and rural areas. We found that in many of villages there were no infrastructures like schools, health centers, etc. While made an economic analysis of forced migrants, we found that many of them have little possessions, and especially not much land. We even found that the urban and social integration levels of forced migrants who have 49 acres of land or less in village are higher than those who have 50 acres of land or more.

It can be easily understood, that if it is possible, firstly richer villagers will return because they had and will have better economic and survival conditions in the village than in the city. We support that forced migrants who had economic welfare in their hometown will prefer to turn back to their hometown or village. Thus, the relocation of the richer villagers should be facilitated. For their return, the Republic of Turkey should provide a convenient environment. Conditions providing their return are as follows:

1. The Republic of Turkey should abolish the village guard system, because village guards have cultivated the land of migrants since they migrated.
2. The Republic of Turkey should provide economic resources, aid or credit for forced migrants especially at the beginning of the relocation process and later.
3. We also believe that the Republic of Turkey should encourage forced migrants to be active in production, when they turn back their hometown.

When we carried out stratification analysis according to the socioeconomic status in the village, we found that many of the forced migrants were from the lower strata. We also found that many of them have bad economic and social conditions in the city of Mersin. Thus, we suggest that this majority will choose to live in bad economic and social conditions of urban areas to living in the same conditions in the village due to social, economic, health and education facilities present in the urban areas.

As for the poorer villagers, we support that if they have economic possibilities, they will not return. We also assume that they would migrate in any case. Thus, the Republic of Turkey should develop a rehabilitation program for the poorer forced migrants, who will not return. We are going to try to propose an action plan for forced migrants in Mersin, related to our field research findings. Their integration levels statistically changes according to a few variables. Thus, we should propose a well-developed action plan for their future. We propose a set of matters, which includes the process of this plan. If we want poorer forced migrants to integrate urban life, we should make their economic, education and health conditions better. In economic field, occupational courses could be opened for them and they should be employed. In the field of education, night education courses and reading courses could be provided. Because, while the rate of literacy among forced migrants is 72,04%, this figure for the population of province of Mersin center is 88%. We also found that most of forced migrants have no social security. While only 15,95% of working forced migrants have social security, 14,4% of them have green cards, which is a form of social security. Forced migrants the must be given green card status.

The other important point is about the criminal status of forced migrants. We found from our hypothesis testing that forced migrants who were condemned and taken to the police station tend to disintegrate to urban and society when compared to those who were not. For those migrants integration, Turkey should improve its democratic processes on the issues of policy such as demonstration law and freedom of expression etc…

We have to demonstrate some points concerning the infrastructure of forced migrants' in the villages and in the cities. Thus, we can make a comparison between the two units. This comparison has to include education, health, and rural services, transportation and economic variables so that we are able to assume the rate of forced migrants who tend to want to return to their villages and hometowns. In this way, we can reach the rate of tendencies to integrate into urban life. We assume that forced migrants who have arable land in their villages, those who are unemployed and those who have no chance to connect to urban life will choose to return to their villages and hometowns. Forced

migrants who are employed, and have no chance of survival in the village are not expected to return to the village. In our hypothesis testing we found that the urban and social integration levels of forced migrants who are from lower strata are higher than those who are from the upper strata.

We know that it is our duty to advise students who plan to study this subject. There are many fields of this subject that should be studied. If students of this field plan to study this subject with quantitative techniques, we advise them to study using both quantitative and qualitative techniques. Because in quantitative techniques, numbers suppress some dimensions of migrants. We advise them to make at least 5 in depth interviews.

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APPENDIX A: ÇALIŞMAMIZIN ANKET SORULARI
ZORUNLU GÖÇ VE KENTSEL BÜTÜNLEŞME: MERSİN ÖRNEĞİ

Bu anket, Ortadoğu Teknik Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Kentsel Politika Planlaması ve Yerel Yönetimler ana bilim dalı yüksek lisans programında yürütülmekte olan "Kentsel Bütünleşme ve 1980 Sonrası Zorunlu Göç: Mersin Örneği" adlı teze yönelik olarak hazırlanmıştır. Bu anket çalışmasından elde edilecek bilgiler sadece bu tez kapsamında değerlendirilecektir. Duyarlılığınız için teşekkür ederiz.

Anket no	**:**
Anketör	**:**
Hane reisinin adı	**:**
Eşinin adı	**:**
Adres	**:**
Telefon	**:**

I. DEMOGRAFİK ÖZELLİKLER

1.   Siz kendinizi de sayarak oturduğunuz hanede sürekli yaşayanların sayısını söyler misiniz?...

HANE REİSİNE SORUNUZ!

	Görüşülen kişiye göre akrabalık derecesi	Cinsiyeti	Doğum yılı	Medeni durumu	Doğum yeri	Eğitim durumu*	Okul çağında olanlar için sorunuz . Okula neden devam etmedi
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							

10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
15					

DİKKAT: Göçten sonra doğan hane üyelerini özellikle sorunuz.

*İlkokula gitmemişse okur-yazarlık durumu ve okula gidilen yıl sayısını yazınız

2.　　Oturduğunuz hanede sürekli ya da zaman zaman çalışarak gelir getiren veya emekli olanlar kimler? Sırasıyla söyler misiniz?

	Görüşülen kişiye göre akrabalık derecesi	Emekli ise sorunuz; emekli geliri nereden? 1-SSK 2- Emekli Sandığı 3- Bağ-Kur 4- Diğer **Emekli değilse 0 koyup diğer kişiye geçiniz**	Çalışıyor ise sorunuz; sürekli ya da zaman zaman çalışıyorsa işini yazınız **Çalışmıyorsa 0 koyup diğer kişiye geçiniz**	Çalışma biçimi 1- Ücretli maaşlı 2- Kendi hesabına 3- Emekli 4- İşsiz
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

Eğer anne ve babasıyla ilgili bilgiler yukarıda alınmadıysa aşağıdaki soruları sorunuz. (Anne ve babası yaşamıyor olsa dahi sorunuz)

3.　　Babanızın eğitim durumu
　　　1. Okur yazar değil
　　　2. Hiç okula gitmemiş fakat okur yazar
　　　3. İlkokul mezunu
　　　4. Orta okul mezunu
　　　5. Lise mezunu
　　　6. Üniversite mezunu
　　　7. Yüksek lisans / Doktora

4.　　Babanızın işi nedir / neydi? ....

5.	Annenizin eğitim durumu
	1. Okur yazar değil
	2. Hiç okula gitmemiş fakat okur yazar
	3. İlkokul mezunu
	4. Orta okul mezunu
	5. Lise mezunu
	6. Üniversite mezunu
	7. Yüksek lisans / Doktora

6. Annenizin işi nedir / neydi? ....

II. SOSYO-EKONOMİK ÖZELLİKLER

7.	Şu anda iş durumunuz aşağıdakilerden hangisine uyuyor?
	1. Ücretli maaşlı olarak birisinin yanında ya da bir kuruluşta çalışıyorum
	(**8. soruya geçiniz**)
	2. Kendi hesabıma serbest çalışıyorum		(**12. soruya geçiniz**)
	3. Emekliyim, hiçbir işte çalışmıyorum		(**15. soruya geçiniz**)
	4. İşsizim, ara sıra iş bulduğumda çalışıyorum		(**18. soruya geçiniz**)

   8-11 arasındaki soruları ücretli maaşlı olanlara sorunuz
8.	Nerede çalışıyorsunuz? (Çalıştığı iş yerinin adını alınız, kamu-özel ayırımını ve iş kolunu özellikle belirtiniz.) ....

9.	Ne iş yapıyorsunuz? (Yaptığı işi açıkça tanımlayarak yazınız.) ....

10.	Kaç yıldır bu iş yerinde çalışıyorsunuz? ....

11.	Çalışarak kazandığınızın dışında bir geliriniz var mı? (Kira gibi)
....

12-14 arasındaki soruları kendi hesabına çalışanlara sorunuz
12.	Yaptığınız işi bize tanımlar mısınız?
....
13.	Ne zamandan beri bu işyerinde çalışıyorsunuz ?

14.	İş ortağınız var mı?
	1. Evet –**sorunuz**- Kaç ortak?.. 2. Hayır

15.	Yanınızda sürekli ya da geçici olarak çalıştırdığınız ücretli kişiler var mı?
	1. Var **–sorunuz-** Kaç kişi? .... 2. Yok

15-17 arasındaki soruları emekli olanlara sorunuz
16.	Emekli olduğunuz işi tanımlar mısınız? ....

17.	Kaç yıl önce emekli oldunuz? ....

18.   Şu anda herhangi bir işte çalışıyor musunuz?
1. Evet –**sorunuz-** Ne iş yapıyorsunuz?... 2. Hayır

18-26 arasındaki soruları işsiz olanlara sorunuz
18. Neden işsizsiniz?
        1. Mesleği yok
        2. Sosyal güvencesi olan iş bulamadığı için
        3. İşten atıldığı için
        4. Ücreti iyi bir iş bulamadığı için
        5. Sağlık problemleri nedeniyle
        6. İş kazası nedeniyle sakat kaldığı için
        7. Yaşlılık nedeniyle
        8. Askerlikten sonra
        9. Kimse iş vermek istemediği için
        10. Diğer ....

19. Ne zamandan beri belirli bir işiniz yok?..

20. Şu anda iş arıyor musunuz?
        1. Evet   2. Hayır

21. Ne tür işler arıyorsunuz?
        1. İnşaat   2. Tarım işçiliği   3. Mevsimlik işler
        4. Vasıfsız işler   5. Diğer

22. En son yaptığını işleri tanımlar mısınız?
1. İşiniz.. Ne zaman? ....

2. İşiniz.. Ne zaman? ....
3. İşiniz.. Ne zaman? ....

23. Şu anda geçiminizi nasıl sağlıyorsunuz?
        1. Kendi hesabına düzensiz işler yaparak
        2. Başkasının yanında geçici işler yaparak
        3. Çocuklarının yardımı ile
        4. Akraba, tanıdık ve komşu yardımı ile
        5. Geçici mevsimlik işlerde çalışarak
        6. Enformel işler yaparak
        7. Eski birikimlerini harcayarak
        8. Tanıdıklarımdan borç alarak
        9. Evdeki bazı eşyaları sattım
        10. Altın, ziynet eşyası sattım
        11. Eşim ve çocuklarımın çalıştıklarıyla
        12. Diğer ....

24. Şu anda geçinebilmek için ya da ek gelir sağlamak için, ara sıra da olsa, çocuklarınız, eşiniz ve siz başka işler yapıyor musunuz ?
    1. Evet   2. Hayır –**27. soruya geçiniz.**
    25. Ne tür işler yapıyorsunuz? ....
                25.1. Bu işler için siparişleri kimlerden alıyorsunuz? ....

26. Bu işinizi kimler aracılığıyla buldunuz?
    1. Akraba 2. Komşu   3. Townsmenship   4. Diğer ....

Buradan sonrasını herkese sorunuz!
27. Siz ve ailenizin, tüm giderlerinizi düşündüğünüzde, aylık ortalama harcamanız kaç liradır? ....

28. Hanenize giren aylık gelir ne kadardır?..

29. Sizin gibi bir ailenin rahat yaşayabilmesi için ayda ortalama ne kadar para gerekli?
....

30. Aşağıda sayacağım eşyalardan hangilerine göç etmeden önce sahiptiniz ve hangilerine şimdi sahipsiniz?

	Göçten önce var mıydı?	Şimdi var mı?	Çalışıyor mu?
Buzdolabı	1( )	1 ( )	1 ( )
Elektrikli süpürge	2 ( )	2 ( )	2 ( )
Siyah beyaz TV	3 ( )	3 ( )	3 ( )
Renkli TV	4 ( )	4 ( )	4 ( )
Video	5 ( )	5 ( )	5 ( )
Normal çamaşır makinesi	6 ( )	6 ( )	6 ( )
Otomatik çamaşır makinesi	7 ( )	7 ( )	7 ( )
Bulaşık makinesi	8 ( )	8 ( )	8 ( )
Radyo-teyp	9 ( )	9 ( )	9 ( )
Telefon	10 ( )	10 ( )	10 ( )
Cep telefonu	11 ( )	11 ( )	11 ( )
Araba	12 ( )	12 ( )	12 ( )

31. Yukarıda saydığım eşyalardan en son hangisini ne zaman aldınız? ....

32. Oturduğunuz evin tipi nedir?
        1. Gecekondu   2. Apartman dairesi   3. Diğer ....

33. Şu anda oturmakta olduğunuz ev size mi ait?
    1. Evet   2. Hayır **–37. soruya geçiniz.**

34. Evinizi ne zaman edindiniz?..

35.Evinizi nasıl edindiniz?..

36. Evinizin tapu durumu nedir?
    1. Müstakil tapulu   2. Hisseli tapulu

3. Tapu tahsis belgesi   4. Hiçbiri yok

37. Eviniz kira mı?
   1. Evet**- sorunuz**- Kira bedeli nedir?........................   2. Hayır

38. Kaç yıldır bu evde oturuyorsunuz? ....

39. Gecekondunun / apartman dairesinin kat sayısı nedir?....................................

40. Eviniz, salon dışında, kaç odadan oluşuyor?...

41. Aşağıdaki soruları cevaplandırır mısınız?

	Evet	Hayır
Evinizin içerisinde su var mı?		
Evinizin içerisinde tuvalet var mı?		
Evinizde elektrik sayacı var mı?		
Evinizde su sayacı var mı?		
Elektriği düzenli alabiliyor musunuz?		
Suyu düzenli alabiliyor musunuz?		

42. Evinizde kullandığınız sıcak suyu nasıl temin ediyorsunuz?
     1. Banyo kazanı (odunlu)   2. Ocakta ısıtıyorum
     3. Elektrikli termosifon   4. Şofben
     5. Soba   6. Diğer ....

43. Gecekondunuzda sizin hanenizden ayrı olarak yaşayan başka bir hane var mı?
     1. Evet -**sorunuz**- Bu hanenin size yakınlığı nedir? (kiracı,kızı..vb)................
     2. Hayır
44. Mersin'e geldiğinizden (Evlendiğinizden) bu yana aynı evde mi   oturuyorsunuz?
     1. Evet   2. Hayır –**sorunuz**- Kaç konut değiştirdiniz? ....

 45. Şu anda oturduğunuz konutu değiştirmeyi düşünüyor musunuz?
     1. Evet   2. Hayır –**sorunuz**- Neden? ....

46. Mersin'e geldiğinizden bu yana hiç mahalle değiştirdiniz mi?
     1. Evet –**sorunuz**- Şimdiye kadar kaç mahalle değiştirdiniz?...........................
     2. Hayır **-** Bu mahalleyi / mahalleleri en çok hangi nedenlerle değiştirme kararı
     verdiniz?
     1 ....
     2 ....
     3 ....

47. Mahallenizi değiştirmeme nedenleriniz nelerdir? **(önem sırasıyla belirtiniz)**
 1 ....
 2 ....
 3 ....

48. İçme suyu, elektrik, kanalizasyon...vb. kentsel servisler arasında komşularınızla ortak kullandığınız servisler var mı?

      1. Evet   2. Hayır **–50. soruya geçiniz.**

49. Hangilerini ortak kullanıyorsunuz?

      1. İçme suyu   2. Elektrik   3. Kanalizasyon   4. Diğer.................

50. Geçmişteki servis kullanımınız aşağıdakilerden hangisine uygun?

      1. Hiç kullanmadım

      2. Eskiden ortak kullanıyorduk. Şimdi bıraktım

51. Mahallenize sunulan kentsel hizmetlerin kalitesinden memnun musunuz?

      1. Evet

      2. Hayır **–sorunuz-** Nedenlerini önem sırası ile belirtiniz.

      1 ....

      2 ....

      3 ....

52. Mahallenin yol, okul, su, elektrik, kanalizasyon, telefon, gecekondu yıkımı, apartman dönüşümü...vb. sorunlarının çözümüyle ilgilenen bir dernek, vakıf... vb. var mı?

      1. Evet –**54. soruya geçiniz.**   2. Hayır

53. Mahalle sakinleri ile bir araya gelip sorunlarınızı tartıştığınız oluyor mu?

      1. Evet -**sorunuz** – En çok mahallenin hangi sorunlarını konuşuyorsunuz?

      ....

      2. Hayır **–sorunuz-** Nedenlerini belirtiniz. ....

54. Bu dernek / vakıf v. Mahallenin en çok hangi sorunları ile ilgileniyor? Ne tür faaliyetlerde bulunuyor?...

55. Siz bu derneğin / vakfın faaliyetlerine katılıyor musunuz?

      1. Evet

      2. Hayır **–sorunuz**- Neden? ....

56. Toplantılarınızda mahallenin sorunlarının ötesinde başka hangi sorunları tartışıyorsunuz? ....

57. Mahallenizin sorunlarını çözmek için nerelere başvuruyorsunuz? Kimlerin aracılığını kullanıyorsunuz?...

58. Maddi durumunuz yeterli olsa, gecekonduda mı yoksa apartmanda mı yaşamak istersiniz? Neden?...

III. GÖÇ SÜRECİ

59. Mersin'e ne zaman göç ettiniz?   Yıl:.................   Ay:......................

60. Nereden göç ettiniz? **(Aslen Nerelisiniz?)**
 İl:....................İlçe:...................Kasaba-köy:...................... Mezra:..............

61.   Mersin'e gelmeden önce başka bir yere yerleştiniz mi?....................................

62.   Neden göç ettiniz?
    1. Devletin baskısı   6. Ekonomik şartların bozulması
    2. Örgüt baskısıyla   7. İşsizlik
    3. Koruculuk dayatması   8. Kan davası
    4. Korucuların baskısı   9. Diğer ....
    5. Faili meçhul cinayetler

63. Neden Mersin'e yerleştiniz?
    1. Akrabalarımın önceden buraya yerleşmiş olması
    2. İş, eğitim, sağlık ve sosyal imkanlarının elverişli olması
    3. Memleketime yakın olması
    4. Köy halkının ortak kararı
    5. Önceden bu bölgeyi biliyor olmamız
    6. Geçim şartlarının elverişli olması
    7. Diğer...

64. Göç etmeden önce köyünüzde geçiminizi nasıl sağlıyordunuz?
    1. Çiftçi   4. Hayvan yetiştiricisi (Besic
    2. Çoban   5. Korucu
    3. Diğer...

65. Köyde iken   vardı?
    1. Kaç dönüm toprağınız   ....
    2. Kaç büyük baş hayvanınız ....
    3. Kaç küçük baş hayvanınız ....
    4. Kaç dönüm bahçeniz   ....
    5. Kaç dönüm bağınız   ....
    6. Evinizin toplam kaç odası ....
    7. Tuvalet (içerde/dışarıda) ....
    8. Köyünüzde kaç hane   ....

66. Köyünüzde aşağıdakilerden hangileri vardı?
    OKUL   ( )
    SAĞLIK OCAĞI   ( )
    DOKTOR   ( )
    ÖĞRETMEN   ( )

67. Köyünüzün bütünü mü yoksa bir kısmı mı göç etti?

1. Bir kısmı göçtü köyde hala kalanlar var.
2. Bütün köy göçtü, köyümüzde kimse kalmadı. - **71. soruya geçiniz**

68. Köyünüzde kalanlar neden göç etmediler?
   1. Yaşlılar kaldı   3. Onlar üzerinde herhangi bir baskı yok
   2. Ekonomik sorunları yok   4. Korucu oldular
   5. Diğer   6. Bilmiyorum

69. Köyünüzde kalan yakınlarınızla ilişkileriniz sürüyor mu?
   1. Evet   2. Hayır - **71. soruya geçiniz**

70. Köyünüzde kalan yakınlarınızla ilişkilerinizi nasıl sürdürüyorsunuz?
   1. Bazen gidiyoruz   2. Onlar şehre geldikçe uğruyorlar
   3. Telefonla   4. Mektupla

71. Köyünüzden göç edenler nereye yerleştiler?
   1. Buraya sadece biz geldik   2. Hepsi bu şehirde
   3. Çoğu burada bir kısmı başka şehirlere gittiler.   4. Diğerlerini bilmiyorum.

72. Aileden ayrılan, başka yere göç eden oldu mu?
   1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Nereye? ....   2. Hayır

73. Köyünüze geri dönmek istiyor musunuz?
   1. Evet   2. Hayır

74. Aile bireylerinizden köye dönmek istemeyen var mı?
   1. Evet   **-sorunuz-** Kimler? Neden? ....
   2. Hayır

75. Köye dönerseniz topluca mı yoksa bir bölümünüz mü dönecek?
   1. Topluca
   2. Bir bölümümüz **–sorunuz-** Kimler gidecek? ....

76. Göç etme sebepleriniz ortadan kalkarsa geri dönmeyi düşünür müsünüz?
   1. Evet   2. Hayır –**78. soruya geçiniz**   3. Bilmiyorum

77. Hangi şartlar sağlanırsa köyünüze dönersiniz?
   1. Devlet köyümüze dönmemize izin versin yeter
   2. Devlet yardım eder ve zararımızı karşılarsa
   3. Güvenliğimizin sağlanması yeterlidir.
   4. Devlet para verir, iş imkanı sağlarsa dönebilirim.

78. Neden köyünüze dönmeyi düşünmüyorsunuz?
   1. Köyümüzde güvenlik yok
   2. Burada iş sahibi olduk
   3. Çocuklar buralara alıştılar ve okula gidiyorlar
   4. İyi bir işim var

5. Köye dönecek maddi gücüm yok

6. Diğer ....

79. Devletten öncelikle neler bekliyorsunuz? **Cevapları önem sırasına göre yazın**

    1. Bölgede barışı ve huzuru bir an evvel sağlaması

    2. Can ve mal güvenliğini sağlaması

    3. İş ve istihdam imkanlarını artırması

    4. İnsan haklarına saygılı olması

    5. Asker, polis ve korucu baskısının kaldırılması

    6. Bölgesel yatırımları ve kredi imkanlarını artırması

    7. Eğitime önem verilmesi

    8. Diğer ....

80. Sizce köyünüze geri dönmenize engel olacak bir güvenlik problemi var mı?

    1. Evet   2. Hayır –**82. soruya geçiniz**   3. Kısmen

81. Sizce güvenlik sorununun çözümü neye bağlıdır?

    1. Devletin kültürel ve siyasal hakları tanıması

    2. İnsan hakları ihale ihlallerinin sona ermesi

    3. Örgütün yok edilmesi

    4. Koruculuk sisteminin kaldırılması

    5. Eğitim seviyesinin yükselmesi

    6. İş sahalarının açılması ve bölgeye yatırımların artması

    7. Örgütün silahı bırakması

    8. Diğer ....

82. Bölge sorunlarının nasıl çözüleceğini düşünüyorsunuz?

    1. İşsizlik ve geri kalmışlığın önlenmesi ile

    2. Demokratik bir Türkiye ile

    3. Askeri tedbirlerle

    4. Yerel yönetimlere yetki devri ile

    5. Sorunlarımız hiç çözülemez

    6. Diğer...

83. Göçten ettikten sonra göç etmenize neden olan olumsuzlulardan uzaklaşabildiniz mi?

    1. Evet – **85. soruya geçiniz**   2. Hayır   3. Kısmen

84. Ne tür olumsuzluklarla karşılaştınız?

    1. Suçlu muamelesi gördük

    2. Takibe uğradık

    3. Gözaltına alındık

    4. Diğer ....

85. Göç ettikten sonra kentte olumsuzluklarla karşılaştınız mı?

    1. Evet   2. Hayır – **87. soruya geçiniz.**

86. Kentte ne tür sorunlarla karşılaştınız?
1. Kültürel uyum sorunu   2. Potansiyel suçlu muamelesi
3. İşsizlik   4. Sağlık sorunları
5. Kentsel altyapı sorunları –elektrik, su, kanalizasyon, yol gibi-   6. Diğer

87. İlk yerleştiğiniz evi nasıl buldunuz? ....

88. İlk göç ettiğinizde herhangi bir devlet kuruluşu ya da belediye size yardım etti mi?
1. Evet   2. Hayır - **90. soruya geçiniz.**
89. Devlet ya da belediye ne tür yardımlarda bulundular?
1. Kalacak yer buldular   2. Gıda yardımı yaptılar
3. İş verdiler   4. Okul malzemesi verdiler
5. Tedavi olmamıza yardımcı oldular   6. Diğer.......................................

90. Evde en çok hangi dili konuşuyorsunuz?
1. Kürtçe   2. Zazaca   3. Arapça   4. Türkçe   5. Diğer.................

91. Ailenizde Türkçe bilmeyen var mı?
1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Kimler? ....   2. Hayır

92. Anadiliniz nedir?
1. Kürtçe   2. Zazaca   3. Arapça   4. Türkçe   5. Diğer.................

93. Etnik köken olarak kendinizi nasıl ifade ediyorsunuz?
1. Kürt   2. Zaza   3. Arap   4. Türk   5. Diğer.................

IV. DAYANIŞMA, GEÇİNME STRATEJİLERİ VE SOSYAL İLİŞKİLER

94. Aylık taksit ödemeniz var mı?
1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Nerelere? ....   2. Hayır

95. Herhangi bir borcunuz var mı?
1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Ne kadar? ....   2. Hayır- **98. soruya geçiniz.**

96. Neden Borçlandınız?
1. Ev aldım/yaptırdım,arsa aldım,   2. İş kurduğum için borçlandım.
3. Geçim sıkıntısı nedeni ile   4. Düğün ,sünnet nedeni ile
5. Diğer ....

97. Kime Borçlandınız?
1. Akrabalarımı,tanıdıklarıma   2. Tefeciye
3. Bankaya   4. Çalıştığım işyerine, patrona
5. Diğer ....

98. Geçim sıkıntısına düştüğünüzde öncelikle nelerden vazgeçersiniz?
1. Tatil   2. Eğlence   3. Eğitim
4. Giyim   5. Yiyecek

99. Daha önce düzenli olarak tükettiğiniz ama maddi zorluklar yüzünden alamadığınız herhangi bir şey var mı?

    1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Neler?..2. Hayır

100. Evde konserve, salça, tarhana, turşu, reçel gibi yiyecek maddeleri yapıyor musunuz?

    1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Kendi tüketiminiz için mi kullanıyorsunuz, dışarıya da pazarlıyor musunuz?...

    2. Hayır **–sorunuz-** Neden yapmıyorsunuz?...

101. 14 yaşından küçük çocuklarınız çalışıyor mu?

    1. Evet   2. Hayır –**104. soruya geçiniz.**

102. Ne tür işler yapıyorlar?

    1. Boyacılık

    2. Seyyar satıcılık

    3. Peçete satıyor

    4. Diğer ....

103. Çalışan çocuklarınız kazandıkları paraları kime veriyor?

    1. Kendisi harcıyor   2. Annesine veriyor

    3. Babasına veriyor   4. Diğer ....

104. Buraya göç etmeden önceki ekonomik imkanlarınızla şimdiki durumunuzu karşılaştırır mısınız?

    1. Durumum düzeldi şimdi daha iyi

    2. Durumum bozuldu, geçim sıkıntısı çekiyorum.

    3. Değişen bir şey yok

105. Gelecekte ailenizin ekonomik durumunun ne yönde değişeceğini düşünüyorsunuz?

    1. Daha iyi   2. Daha kötü   3. Aynı   4. Bilmiyorum

106. Hanenizde çocukları okuturken kız /erkek ayırımı yapılıyor mu ?

    1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Kızınızı okutmama nedeniniz nedir? ....

    2. Hayır

107. Memleketinizle akrabalarınız, komşularınız, tanıdıklarınız nedeniyle, ilişkileriniz sürüyor mu?

    1. Evet   2. Hayır – **110. soruya geçiniz.**

108. Memleketinizdeki yakınlarınızdan herhangi bir yardım alıyor musunuz?

    1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Ne tür ?..

            Düzenli alıyor musunuz? ....

    2. Hayır

109. Memleketteki yakınlarınızı ziyaret ediyor musunuz?
     1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Ne sıklıkta? ....   2. Hayır

110. Mersin'e ilk geldiğinizde oturduğunuz mahallede akraba ve townsmenshipleriniz var mıydı?
     1. Evet   2. Hayır

111. Mersin' e ilk geldiğinizde yardım gördünüz mü?
     1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Ne tür ve kimlerden? ....
     2. Hayır

112. Zor durumda kaldığınızda yardım istiyor musunuz?
     1. Evet   2. Hayır –**115. soruya geçiniz.**

113. Zor durumda kaldığınızda kimlerden yardım istiyorsunuz?
     1. Akraba   3. Komşu (akraba veya townsmenship olmayan komşular)
     2. Townsmenship   4. Diğer
     ....

114. Ne tür yardımlar alıyorsunuz? **Birden fazla şıkkı işaretleyebilirsiniz.**
     1. İş bulma   7. Ev işleri temizlik vb.
     2. Mesleki beceri kazandırma   8. Ev içi üretimde yardımlaşma
     3. Para yardımı alma   9. Eve göz kulak olma
     4. Borç alma kefil olma   10. Çocuk bakımı
     5. Evinde kalma   11. Evlilik, ölüm, hastalık vb. yardımlaşma
     6. Bakım onarım vb.   12. Diğer ....

115. Zor durumda kalan insanlara yardım ediyor musunuz?
     1. Evet   2. Hayır –**117. soruya geçiniz.**

116. Sizin bulunduğunuz yardımlar.
     1. İş bulma   7. Ev işleri temizlik vb.
     2. Mesleki beceri kazandırma   8. Ev içi üretimde yardımlaşma
     3. Para yardımı alma   9. Eve göz kulak olma
     4. Borç alma kefil olma   10. Çocuk bakımı
     5. Evinde kalma   11. Evlilik, ölüm, hastalık vb. yardımlaşma
     6. Bakım onarım vb.   12. Diğer ....

117. Şu an oturduğunuz mahallede akraba ve townsmenshipleriniz var mı?
     1. Evet   2. Hayır

118. Boş zamanınız olduğunda nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz ? (Tüm işler bittikten sonra)
....

119. Kadınlar kendi arasında toplantı yapar mı?
     1. Evet **–sorunuz–** Ne tür toplantılar ve hangi sıklıkta? ....
     2. Hayır

120. Arkadaşlarınızla,akrabalarınızla, ev dışında buluşup bir şeyler yapar mısınız?
       1. Evet – **sorunuz**– Neler ve hangi sıklıkta? Ve nerede ? ....
       2. Hayır

121.   Nerelere gidersiniz   Ne kadar sıklıkta
       Alışveriş için   ....
       Eğlence için   ....
       Eğitim için   ....
       Sağlık hizmetleri için...   ....
       Hukuki sorunlar için ....

122. Göç ettikten sonra komşularınız, townsmenshipleriniz ve köylülerinizle aranızdaki yardımlaşma ilişkilerinde bir değişim oldu mu?
       1. Evet **– sorunuz-** Ne yönde değişti? ....
       2. Hayır

123. Herhangi bir vakıf / dernek üyesi misiniz ?
       1. Evet – Kaç tane?.................................   2. Hayır -**126. soruya geçiniz**

124. Hangi derneğe / derneklere üyesiniz?
       1. Dernek ....
       2. Dernek ....

125. Dernek / vakıf üyeliğiniz aşağıda sayacaklarımdan hangisine uygundur?
       1. Dernek için   **2. Dernek için**
       1. Sadece üyeyim   1. Sadece üyeyim
       2. Ara sıra toplantılarına katılıyorum   2. Ara sıra toplantılarına katılıyorum
       3. Aktif üyeyim   3. Aktif üyeyim
       4. Yönetimde görev alıyorum   4. Yönetimde görev alıyorum

126. Herhangi bir cemaat veya vakıftan yardım alıyor musunuz?
       1. Evet **–sorunuz-** Ne Tür?... 2. Hayır

127. 3 Kasım 2002 genel seçimlerinde oy verdiniz mi?
       1. Evet **– sorunuz –** Hangi partiye?...
       2. Hayır **–sorunuz –** Neden?..

128. En son yerel seçimlerde oy verdiniz mi?
       1. Evet **– sorunuz –** Hangi partiye?...
       2. Hayır **–sorunuz –** Neden?..

129. Şimdi milletvekili seçimleri olsa oy vermeyi düşünür müsünüz?
       1. Evet **– sorunuz –** Hangi partiye?...
       2. Hayır **–sorunuz –** Neden?..

130. Oy verdiğiniz parti ile üyelik, delegelik vb. ilişkiniz var mı?
      1. Evet   2. Hayır   3. Söylemek istemiyorum

131. Gazete okuyabiliyor musunuz?
      1. Evet **– sorunuz –** Hangi gazete ne sıklıkta?..
      2. Hayır **–sorunuz –** Neden?..

132. Boş zamanlarınızı nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?...

133. TV'de en çok hangi programı seyrediyorsunuz? (**programın adını not ediniz**)
      1. Haber – tartışma programları   3. Yarışma programları
      2. Film ve/veya diziler   4. Magazin / eğlence programları

V. SAĞLIK

134. Sağlık sorunuyla karşılaştığınızda hemen doktora gider misiniz?
      1. Evet
      2. Hayır **–sorunuz**- Sağlık sorunlarınıza ilişkin çevrenizdeki insanlardan yardım alıyor musunuz?..

135. Sağlık sorununuz olduğunda hangi sağlık kuruluşlarına gidersiniz?
      1. Sağlık ocağına   2. Devlet hastanesine
      3. Özel muayenehaneye   4. Sağlık kabinlerine
      5. Diğer

136. Ailenizden en son hastalanan kişi hangi hastalığa yakalandı? ....

137. Ailenizde ciddi bir hastalığı ya da sakatlığı olan var mı?
      1. Evet **–sorunuz–** Ne tür hastalık ya da sakatlık ve kimde?
      Kendisi...
      Eşi...
      Çocukları/torunları..
      Yakın akrabaları..
      2. Hayır – **140. soruya geçiniz**

138. Hanenizde rahatsızlığı olan toplam kaç kişi bulunmaktadır?.........................

139. Sakatlık ya da yoksulluk yardımı alıyor musunuz?
      1. Evet   2. Hayır

140. Yeşil kartınız var mı?
      1. Evet   2. Hayır

141. Sizin çocuğunuzun kaç çocuğu olmasını istersiniz? Neden?
....

142. Doğum kontrol yöntemlerini biliyor musunuz?
   1. Evet   2. Hayır

143. Doğum kontrol yöntemlerini kullanıyor musunuz?
   1. Evet   2. Hayır

144. Sizin ailenizde, mahallenizde veya yakın çevrenizde insanlar en çok hangi hastalığa yakalanıyorlar? Neden? ....

VI. KENTSEL UYUM

145. Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtir misiniz?

	Evet	Fikrim yok	Hayır
Kente alışmakta zorluk çekiyorum			
Kızım ya da oğlumun Mersinli birisiyle evlenmesini istemem			
Kentli işverenler bizi ucuza çalıştırıyor			
Kentin altyapısı yetersizdir			
İnsanların kentte, gelir durumuna göre yer seçip oturmaları doğrudur.			
Zenginlerin ayrı mahallelerde oturmalarını doğru buluyorum			
Mersin'in yerlisi bizi dışlıyor.			
Mersin yerlisinin konuşmaları ve davranışlarını anlamıyorum.			
Mersinliler bize suçlu muamelesi yapıyorlar.			
Ben Mersin'de zorunlu olarak bulunuyorum.			
Kendimi bu şehirde psikolojik baskı altında hissediyorum.			
Mersinli işverenler bize iş vermiyor.			
Kürt olduğumuzdan bizi sevmiyorlar			
Çocuklarımın ve torunlarımın buralarda kalmasını istemem			
Buralarda zengin olma şansım olduğu için geri dönmek istemiyorum			
Mersin'e alışamadım, mutlu değilim.			
Mersin'de kendimi güvende hissetmiyorum.			
Sağlık sorunlarımızı kendimiz çözeriz.			
Kentte kendimi kültürümden uzak hissediyorum.			
Mersin'e ekonomik, politik, kültürel ve sosyal anlamda uyum sorunu çekiyorum.			
Mersin'e yerleştikten sonra beklentilerime cevap buldum.			

146. Kente ilk geldiğinizde en çok zorlandığınız konu ne oldu? ....

147. Mersin'in yerli halkı ile ilişkilerinizi nasıl tanımlıyorsunuz?
    1. Bizi kabullenemiyor, iş vermek istemiyor
    2. Bizi önce kabullenemiyorlardı, şimdi alıştılar
    3. Gayet iyi,kucak açtılar yardımcı oldular
    4. Önce ilişkilerimiz iyi idi, şimdi gergin
    5. Ne iyi ne kötü
    6. Bizim de "mağdur"olduğumuzu görüyorlar
    7. Bizi dışlıyorlar
    8. Diğer ....

148. Mersin'de kalarak yeni ve mutlu bir hayata sahip olabileceğinizi umuyor musunuz?
    1. Evet   2. Hayır   3. Belki

149. Kentte yaşamanın iyi ve kötü yanları nelerdir? ....

150. Köyde yaşamanın iyi ve kötü yanları nelerdir? ....

VII. SUÇ VE AİLE İÇİ ŞİDDET

151. Şimdi size okuyacağım cümlelere evet / hayır şeklinde cevap veriniz.

	Evet	Hayır	Fikrim yok
Aile içinde geçimsizlik oluyor.			
Ben eşimi dövdüm.			
Ben çocuklarımı terbiye etmek, doğruyu göstermek için döverim.			
Yakın çevremden intihar eden oldu.			
Geçim sıkıntısı aile içi ilişkileri kötü etkiliyor.			
Mahallemizde kumar oynayan kişiler var.			
Yakın çevremden intihara teşebbüs eden oldu			
Son yıllarda ailemizde yaşanan şiddet olayları arttı.			

152. Sizce aile içi şiddetin nedenleri nelerdir?

153. Sizce aile içi şiddet nasıl engellenir?

154. Sizin ya da ailenizin herhangi bir ferdi hiç karakolluk oldu mu?
    1. Evet **- sorunuz-** Kim? Neden? .... 2. Hayır

155. Ailenizden suç işleyip tutuklanan ve / veya hüküm giyen oldu mu?
    1. Evet **- sorunuz**- Kim? Neden? .... 2. Hayır

156. Ailenizde alkol alışkanlığı olan kişi var mı?
    1. Evet -**sorunuz**- Kim? Ne sıklıkta alkol kullanıyor? .... 2. Hayır

157. Mahallenizde ya da çevrenizde alkol alışkanlığı olan kişi ya da kişiler var mı?
   1. Evet   2. Hayır

158. Ailenizde kumar oynayan kişi var mı?
   1. Evet   **- sorunuz**- Kim? Ne sıklıkta kumar oynuyor? .... 2. Hayır

159. Komşularınızdan suç işleyip tutuklanan ve / veya hüküm giyen oldu mu?
   1. Evet   2. Hayır

160. Sizce bir insanın intihar edebilmesinin en önemli nedeni ya da nedenleri neler olabilir?

161. Sizce bir insanın bunalımda olabilmesinin en önemli nedeni ya da nedenleri nelerdir? Kısaca açıklayınız.

162. Yakın çevrenizde bunalımda olan ve / veya bunalım geçirmiş olan hiç oldu mu?
   1. Evet   2. Hayır

FORCED MIGRATION AND URBAN INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF MERSIN

This questionnaire has been prepared for the thesis "Urban Integration and Forced Migration After 1980: The Case of Mersin" which is being carried out in Middle East Technical University Institute of Social Sciences Urban Policy Planning and Local Government master program. The information obtained from this questionnaire will be evaluated only in the frame of this thesis. Thanks for your sensitivity.

Questionnaire number :
Interviewer :
Name of household head :
Ame of his/her spouse :
Address :
Telephone :

I. DEMOGRAFIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. Would you please tell the number of people living in this house permanently including yourself?...

ASK TO THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD!

	What is the relationship of .... to the interviewee?	Sex	Birth Year	Marital Status	Birth Place	Educatio nal Status	Ask about the people in school age. Why did not s/he continue to go to school?
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							
8							
9							

10					
11					
12					
13					
14					
15					

ATTENTION: Ask especially the household members who were born after the migration.

*If the household member did not go to primary school, write the literacy status and the number of years of schooling.

2. Who are the people that work continuously or occasionally or that are retired in your household? Would you tell in order?

	What is the relationship of .... to the interviewee?	If s/he is retired, ask what is the source of retirement payment? 1- SSK 2- Emekli Sandığı 3- Bağ-Kur 4- Other **If s/he is not retired, write 0 and pass to the other person**	I s/he works, ask; write the job if s/he works continuously or occasionally **If s/he doesn't work, write 0 and pass to the other person**	Type of work 1- Paid waged work 2- Self employed 3- Retired 4- Unemployed
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				

If information about the mother and father of the interviewee is not obtained above, ask the questions below. (Ask even if the mother and father of the interviewee are not alive)

3. What is your father's educational status?
   1. Illiterate
   2. No schooling but literate
   3. Primary school graduate
   4. Secondary school graduate
   5. High school graduate
   6. University graduate
   7. Master/Doctorate

4.　　　　What is/was your father's job?...

5.　　　　What is your mother's educational status?
　　　　　1. Illiterate
　　　　　2. No schooling but literate
　　　　　3. Primary school graduate
　　　　　4. Secondary school graduate
　　　　　5. High school graduate
　　　　　6. University graduate
　　　　　7. Master/Doctorate

6. What is/was your mother's job?...

II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

7. Which option is appropriate for your occupational status at the moment?
　　　　　1. I work for somebody or in an institution with salary　**(Go to question 8)**
　　　　　2. I am self employed　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　**(Go to question 12)**
　　　　　3. I am retired; I do not work　　　　　　　　　　　**(Go to question 15)**
　　　　　4. I am unemployed, I occasionally work when I find job **(Go to question 18)**

Ask the questions between 8-11 to the people who are wage/salary workers
8.　　Where do you work? (Write the name of the work place and state especially public-private differentiation and the branch of work.) ………………………

9.　　What is your job? (Write the job of the interviewee with a clear definition of the work s/he does.) ....

10. How long have you been working in this work place? ......………......................

11. Do you have any other source of income except the one you earn by working? (Like rent) …..

Ask the questions between 12-14 to the people who are self employed
12.　　　　Can you define your job? ....………............

13.　　　　Do you have a business partner?
　　　　　1. Yes –a**sk**- How many? ....　　2. No

14.　　　　Is there any person you employ with wage continuously or temporarily?
　　　　　1. Yes **–ask-** How many? ....　　2. No

Ask the questions between 15-17 to the people who are retired
15.　　　　Can you define the work that you are retired from? ...……..............................

16.　　　　How many years ago were you retired? ....

17.   Do you work in any job now?
   1. Yes –a**sk-** what is your job? .... 2. No

   Ask the questions between 18-26 to the people who are unemployed
18. Why are you unemployed?
      1. I do not have any occupation
      2. I cannot find any job that has social security
      3. I was fired
      4. I cannot find any work that has a high wage
      5. Because of health problems
      6. I am disabled because of a job accident
      7. Because of old age
      8. After military service
      9. Nobody wants to employ me
      10. Other ....……...

19. How long haven't you had a certain job? ....…….…...................

20. Are you looking for a job now?
      1. Yes   2. No

21. What kind of jobs are you looking for?
      1. Construction   2. Agricultural work   3. Seasonal work
      4. Unskilled jobs   5. Other

22. Can you define the last jobs that you were engaged in?
      1. Job... When? ....
      2. Job... When? ....
      3. Job... When? ....

23. How do you survive at the moment?
      1. I do irregular jobs, self-employed
      2. I work in temporary jobs for someone's service
      3. With the help of my children
      4. With the help of relatives, friends and neighbours
      5. Working in temporary seasonal jobs
      6. Working in informal jobs
      7. Spending the money that had been accumulated
      8. Borrowing money from my friends
      9. I sold some of the furniture in the house
      10. I sold gold to a jeweler
      11. With my spouse's and my children's wages
      12. Other ....……...

24. Do you; your children and your spouse sometimes work in other jobs in order to survive or to get additional income nowadays?

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1. Yes   2. No –**Go to question 27.**

25. What kind of jobs are you engaged in? ....…
       25.1. From whom do you receive the orders for these jobs? ....

26. With the help of who have you found this job?
    1. Relatives   2. Neighbours   3. Hemsehri   4. Other..………...

Ask the rest of the questions to everybody!
27. What is the amount of your monthly expenses on average, when you consider all of your and your family's expenses,? ....…….

28. What is the amount of monthly income in your household? ....

29. How much money on average is needed for a family like yours to live comfortably for a month? ....…..……

30. Which of the materials below did you have before migration and which of them do you have now?

	Present before migration?	Present now?	Does it work?
Refrigrator	1 ( )	1 ( )	1 ( )
Vacuum cleaner	2 ( )	2 ( )	2 ( )
Black-white TV	3 ( )	3 ( )	3 ( )
Coloured TV	4 ( )	4 ( )	4 ( )
Video	5 ( )	5 ( )	5 ( )
Normal washing machiene	6 ( )	6 ( )	6 ( )
Automatic washing machiene	7 ( )	7 ( )	7 ( )
Dishwasher	8 ( )	8 ( )	8 ( )
Radio-tape player	9 ( )	9 ( )	9 ( )
Telephone	10 ( )	10 ( )	10 ( )
Mobile phone	11 ( )	11 ( )	11 ( )
Car	12 ( )	12 ( )	12 ( )

31. Which of the materials above did you buy recently and when did you buy it?
....………...............................

32. What type of a house do you live in?
    1. Shelter (Gecekondu)   2. Flat   3.Other ....

33. Is the shelter that you live in now yours?
    1. Yes   2. No **–Go to question 37**

34. When did you buy your house?...

35. How did you buy your house? ....……......

36. What is the title deed status of your house?
    1. Personal title deed   2. Shared title deed

3. Title deed allocation document   4. None of them

37. Is your house rented from someone else?
   1. Yes**- ask**- what is the amount of rent?........................   2. No

38. How long have been living in this house? ....………..................................

39. What is the floor-number of your shelter/apartment? ....

40. How many rooms are there in your house except the living room? ....

41. Could you answer the following questions?

	Yes	No
Is there water in your house?		
Is there toilet in your house?		
Is there electric meter in your house?		
Is there water meter in your house?		
Do you have regular electricity?		
Do you have regular water?		

42. How do you supply the hot water that you use in your house?
     1. Bath cauldron (wood)   2. Fireplace
     3. Electric water heater   4. Geyser
     5. Stove   6.Other ....………....................

43. Is there any other family that lives in your shelter except you?
     1. Yes -a**sk**- what is the relationship of this household to you? (Tenant, daughter etc..)..........................
     2. No

44. Have you been living in the same house since you came to Mersin (since you got married)?
     1. Yes   2. No –**ask**- How many residences have you changed?..............

45. Do you think of changing the residence you are living now?
     1. Yes   2. No –**ask**- Why? ....…………..............................

46. Have you ever changed district since you came to Mersin?
     1. Yes –**ask**- How many districts have you changed till now?..........................
     2. No **–** Why did you decide to change this district/these districts?
     1 ....…
     2 ....……
     3 ....……...

47. Why did not you change your district? (**State the reasons in order of importance**)
     1 ....

2 ....…….
3 ....

48. Is there any services that you use together with your neighbours among the urban services such as drinking water, electricity, sewerage... etc.?
     1. Yes   2. No **–Go to question 50.**

49. Which of the services do you use together?
     1. Drinking water   2. Electricity 3. Sewerage 4. Other......................

50. How did you use these services in the past?
     1. I never used together
     2. We used them together in the past, now I don't.

51. Are you pleased with the quality of the urban services in your district?
     1. Yes
     2. No **–ask-** State the reasons in order of importance.
      1 ....………..
      2 ....
      3 ....

52. Is there any association, vaqif etc. that is concerned with the solution of the problems in your district such as roads, school, water, electricity, sewerage, telephone, demolition of gecekondu houses, transformation of apartments etc.?
     1. Yes –**Go to question 54.**   2. No

53. Do you come together and discuss your problems with the people in your district?
       1. Yes -a**sk** – Which problems of your district do you discuss mostly? ………
       2. No **–ask -** State the reasons. ....……..

54. Which problems of your district are this association/vaqif etc. concerned with? What kind of activities does it organize?...............…....................................

55. Do you participate in the activities of this association/vaqif?
     1. Yes
     2. No **–ask**- Why? ....

56. Which problems do you discuss in your meetings except the problems of your district? ....

57. Where do you apply in order to solve the problems of your district? Who do you consult? ....……….................

58. If you could afford, would you like to live in a gecekondu house or in an apartment? Why? ....……...........................

III. MIGRATION PROCESS

59. When did you migrate to Mersin?   Year:.......……..   Month:.........…....

60. Where did you migrate? **(Where are you actually from?)**
Province:...................District:.............. Town-village:...…… Arable field.........

63. Did you settle in another place before you came to Mersin?.............................

64. Why did you migrate?
      1. Pressure of the State   6. Bad economic conditions
      2. Pressure of the Organization   7. Unemployment
      3. Insistence of the rural guards   8. Blood feud
      4. Pressure of the rural guards   9. Other ....
      5. Murders committed by unknown people

63. Why did you settle in Mersin?
      1. My relatives had settled here previously
      2. Job, education, health and social opportunities are convenient here
      3. Mersin is close to my hometown
      4. It is the decision of village people
      5. We had known the region in advance
      6. Living conditions are convenient
      7. Other...

64. How did you earn your living in your village before you migrated?
      1. Farmer   4. Stockbreeding
      2. Shepherd   5. Rural guard
      3. Other...

65. When you were in your village
            1. How many acres of land did you have? ……….………...................
            2. How much cattle did you have?   ……….............................
            3. How many sheep/goats did you have?   ……….............................
            4. How many acres of garden did you have? ……..............................
            5. How many acres of vineyard/orchard did you have?.........................
            6. How many rooms were there in your house?…................................
            7. Was the toilet inside or outside?   ……...............................
            8. How many households were there in your village? ..……....................

66. Which of the below was present in your village?
      SCHOOL   ( )
      HEALTH CLINIC   ( )
      DOCTOR   ( )
      TEACHER   ( )

67. Did all of the people in your village or some of them migrate?
      1. Some of them migrated; there are still people in the village.
      2. All of the village people migrated, there is nobody left.-**Go to question 71.**

68. Why did the people who stayed in the village not migrate?
      1. Old people stayed   3. They don't have any pressure on them
      2. They don't have economic problems   4. They became rural guards
      5. Other   6. Don't know

69. Do you maintain your relationship with your relatives and friends who stayed in your village?
      1. Yes   2. No - **Go to question 71.**

70. How do you maintain your relationship with your relatives and friends who stayed in your village?
      1. We sometimes go there   2. They visit us when they come to the city
      3. By telephone   4. By writing letters

71. Where did the people who migrated from your village settle in?
      1. Only we came here
      2. All of them are in this city
      3. Most of them are here, some of them went to the other cities
      4. I don't know the others

72. Has there been anybody who left the family and migrated to another place?
      1. Yes **–ask-** Where? ....   2. No

73. Do you want to go back to your village?
    1. Yes   2. No

74. Is there any member of your family who does not want to go back to your village?
        1. Yes   **-ask-** who? Why? ....
        2. No

75. If you return to tour village, will you go back all together or partially?
      1. All together
      2. Some part of us will return **–ask-** who will go back? ....

76. Do you think of going back to your village if the reasons of your migration are removed?
      1. Yes   2. No –**Go to question 78.**   3. Don't know

77. Under which conditions do you go back to your village?
      1. It will be enough if the state lets us go back to our village.
      2. If the state helps us and satisfies our loss.
      3. It will be enough if our security is provided.
      4. If the state gives money and job opportunities.

78. Why don't you think of going back to your village?
> 1. There is not security in our village
> 2. I had a profession here
> 3. Children got used to here and they go to school
> 4. I have a good job
> 5. I don't have enough money to go back to my village
> 6. Other ....

79. What do you expect from the state firstly? **Write the answers in order of importance**
> 1. Providing peace and presence in the region immediately
> 2. Providing life and property security
> 3. Increasing job and employment opportunities
> 4. Showing respect to human rights
> 5. Removing the pressure of soldiers, police and village guards
> 6. Increasing regional investments and credit opportunities
> 7. Giving importance to education
> 8. Other ....

80. Is there any security problem that will prevent you from returning to your village in your view?
1. Yes   2. No –**Go to question 82**   3. Partially

81. How can the security problem be solved in your view?
> 1. If the state gives cultural and political rights
> 2. Ending the violation of human rights
> 3. Demolition of the organization
> 4. Abolition of the rural guarding system
> 5. Increase in the level of education
> 6. Creating job areas and increasing the investments to the region
> 7. If the organization's giving up weapon
> 8. Other ....

82. How do you think the problems of the region will be solved?
> 1. By preventing the unemployment and underdevelopment
> 2. By a democratic Turkey
> 3. By military precautions
> 4. By transferring the power to the local administrations
> 5. Our problems will never be solved
> 6. Other...

83. Have you got rid of the problems that made you migrate after migration?
> 1. Yes –**Go to question 85.**   2. No   3. Partially

84. What kind of problems have you faced after migration?
      1. We were treated as guilty people
      2. We were followed
      3. We were put in jail
      4. Other ....

85. Have you faced problems in the city after migration?
      1. Yes   2. No – **Go to question 87**

86. What kind of problems have you faced in the city?
      1. Cultural adaptation problem
      2. Being treated as potential criminal
      3. Unemployment
      4. Health problems
      5. Urban infrastructure problems –electricity, water, sewerage, road etc.
      6. Other

87. How did you find the first residence that you settled in Mersin?.....................

88. Did any state institution or municipality help you when you first migrate?
      1. Yes   2. No – **Go to question 90.**

89. What kind of help did state or municipality provide?
      1. They found place to stay   2. They provided food
      3. They employed us   4. They gave school equipment
      5. They helped us about medical treatment 6. Other.......……........................

90. Which language do you speak at home mostly?
      1. Kurdish   2. Zaza   3. Arabic 4.Turkish 5. Other.................

91. Is there anybody who does not know Turkish in your family?
      1. Yes **–ask-** who? ....   2. No

92. What is your mother tongue?
      1. Kurdish   2. Zaza   3. Arabic   4. Turkish   5. Other.................

93. How do you express yourself in terms of ethnic origin?
      1. Kurdish   2. Zaza   3. Arabic   4.Turkish   5.Other.......……....

IV. SOLIDARITY, SUBSISTENCE STRATEGIES AND SOCIAL RELATIONS

94. Do you have any monthly payment in installments?
      1. Yes **–ask-** Where? ....   2. No

95. Do you have any debts?
      1. Yes **–ask-** How much? ....   2. No- **Go to question 98.**

96. Why have you got into debt?
    1. I bought a house/building plot, had a house made.
    2. I started my own work
    3. Because of financial difficulties
    4. Because of marriage, circumcision
    5. Other ....

97. Whom do you owe money to?
    1. My relatives, friends 2. Usurer (Person who lends money at interest)
    3. Bank   4. My workplace, boss
    5. Other ....

98. What do you give up first when you have financial difficulties?
      1. Holiday   2. Entertainment   3. Education
      4. Clothing   5. Food

99. Is there anything that you consumed regularly before but can't buy because of economic difficulties?
      1. Yes **–ask-** what are they?.. 2. No

100. Do you make food such as tinned food, tomato sauce, tarhana, pickle, jam etc. at home?
    1. Yes **–ask-** do you make them for your own consumption or for sale? ....
    2. No **–ask-** Why don't you make? ....

101. Do you children under 14 years old work?
    1. Yes   2. No –**Go to question 104.**

102. What kind of jobs are they engage in?
    1. Painter
    2. Street hawker
    3. Selling tissues
    4. Other ....

103. Who do your working children give the money they earn?
    1. Herself/Himself spends   2. Mother
    3. Father   4. Other ....…...................

104. Could you please compare your present economic opportunities with before migration and your situation now?
    1. My situation improved, now it is better
    2. My situation become worse, I have economic difficulties
    3. Nothing has changed

105. How will the economic status of your family change in the future in your point of view?
      1. Better 2. Worse 3. The same. 4. Don't know

106. Is there sexual discrimination in the education of your children in your household?
   1.Yes **–ask-** why don't you let your daughters go to school? ....
   2.No

107. Does your relationship with your hometown go on by means of your relatives, neighbours, and friends?
   1. Yes   2. No –**Go to question 110.**

108. Do you get any help from your relatives in your hometown?
   1. Yes **–ask-** what kind of help? ....
          Do you get it regularly?...……...
   2. No

109. Do you visit your relatives in your hometown?
   1. Yes **–ask-** How often? ....   2. No

110. Were there any relatives and hemsehris of yours in your district when you first came to Mersin?
   1. Yes   2. No

111. Do you get any help when you first came to Mersin?
   1. Yes **–ask-** what kind of help and from whom? ....……...........................
   2. No

112. Do you ask for help when you are in a difficult situation?
   1. Yes   2. No – **Go to the question 115**

113. Who do you ask for help when you are in a difficult situation?
   1. Relatives   3. Neighbours (Neighbours who are not relatives or hemsehris)
   2. Hemsehri   4. Other ……...

114. What kind of help do you get? **More than one alternative can be marked.**
1. Finding job   7. Housework, cleaning etc.
2. Helping in acquiring professional skill   8.Helping in subsistence production
3. Getting money   9. Looking after the house
4. Borrowing money, going guarantor   10.Looking   after   children
5. Staying at each other's home   11. Helping at times of marriage, death,
illness etc.
6. Care, repair etc.   12. Other ....…...............

115. Do you help people who are in a difficult situation?
   1. Yes   2. No – **Go to the question 117**

116. Your aids.

1. Finding job	7. Housework, cleaning etc.
2. Helping in acquiring professional skill	8. Helping in subsistence production
3. Getting money	9. Looking after the house
4. Borrowing money, going guarantor	10. Looking after children
5. Staying at each other's home	11. Helping at times of marriage, death, illness etc.
6. Care, repair etc.	12. Other ....…........

117. Is there any your relatives and hemsehris in the district you live in now?
      1. Yes   2. No

118. How do you spend your spare time? (After all the work has finished)...........…

119. Do the women organize meetings by themselves?
      1. Yes **–ask–** What kind of meetings and how often? ....
      2. No

120. Do you meet with your friends, relatives outside the house and organize anything?
      1. Yes – **ask**– What kind of meetings and how often? And where? ......………..
      2. No

121.

	Where do you go?	How often?
For shopping	....	...................……..
For entertainment	....	…........................
For education	....	....
For health services	....	....
For judicial problems	....	....

122. Has there been any change in your relationship with your neighbours, hemsehris and villagers in terms of helping after the migration?
      1. Yes **– ask-** How did it change? ....…........................
      2. No

123. Are you a member of any association/vaqif?
      1. Yes – How many?................................   2. No -**Go to question 126.**

124. Which association/associations are you a member of?
      1. Association ....
      2. Association ....…..

125. Which of the below is appropriate for your association/vaqif membership?

1. Association	**2. Association**
1. I am only a member	1. I am only a member
2. I sometimes join the meetings	2. I sometimes join the meetings
3. I am an active member	3. I am an active member
4. I am in charge of administration	4.I am in charge of administration

126. Do you get help from any religious community or vaqif?

1. Yes **–ask-** what kind of help? .... 2. No

127. Did you vote in 3 November 2002 general elections?
      1. Yes **– ask –** Which political party?..............…..................................
      2. No **–ask –** Why?...

128. Did you vote in the last local election?
      1. Yes **– ask –** Which political party?...
      2. No **–ask –** Why?...

129. Do you think of voting if there is general election now?
      1. Yes **– ask –** Which political party?.............................…..................
      2. No **–ask –** Why?...
130. Do you have a membership, delegateship etc. relationship with the political party that you voted?
      1. Yes   2. No   3. Don't want to tell

131. Do you read newspaper?
     1. Yes **– ask –** Which newspaper and how often?...
     2. No **–ask –** Why?...

132. How do you spend your spare time?..

133. Which program do you watch mostly on TV? **(Note the name of the program)**
      1. News-discussion programs   3. Quiz shows
      2. Films and/or soap operas   4. Magazine / Entertainment programs

V. HEALTH

134. Do you immediately go to the doctor when you have any health problem?
      1. Yes
      2. No**–ask**- Do you get any help related to your health problems from the people around you? ....…………………………..............................

135. Which health institution do you go when you have health problems?
      1. Health Clinic   2. State Hospital
      3. Private Polyclinic   4. Health cabins
      5. Other

136. Which illness did the person from your family who had an illness recently   suffer from? ....

137. Is there anybody who has a serious illness or disability in your family?
      1. Yes **–ask–** What kind of illness or disability and who suffers?
      Herself/Himself...
      Spouse..

Children/Grandchildren...
Close relatives .. ..
2. No– **Go to Question 140**

138. How many people in total in your household have any health problem? ....

139. Do you get disability or poverty aid?
      1. Yes   2. No

140. Do you have Green Card?
    1. Yes   2. No

141. How many children do you want your children to have? Why?.....................
 ....………

142. Do you know birth control methods?
    1. Yes   2. No

143. Do you apply birth control methods?

144. Which illness do people in your family, district or environment suffer from mostly? Why? ....

VI. URBAN ADAPTATION

145. Could you place state if you agree or disagree with the statements below?

	Yes	No idea	No
I have difficulties in getting used to the city			
I wouldn't like my daughter or son to marry with somebody from Mersin			
Urban employers make us work for cheap wages			
Urban infrastructure is not enough			
It is correct for people in the city to choose space and live there according to their income levels.			
I think it is correct that rich people live in separate districts.			
Native people of Mersin exclude us			
I don't understand the behaviors and speech of the natives of Mersin			
People of Mersin treat us as guilty people			
I am here in Mersin compulsorily.			
I feel myself under psychological pressure in this city.			
Employers of Mersin don't give us jobs			
They don't like us as we are Kurdish			

I wouldn't like my children and grandchildren to stay here			
I don't want to go back because I have a chance of being rich here			
I am used to Mersin and happy			
I don't feel myself secure in Mersin			
We solve our health problems by ourselves			
I feel myself alienated from my culture in the city.			
I have adaptation problem to Mersin in terms of economic, political, cultural and social senses.			
I got answers to my expectations after I located in Mersin.			

146. What was the most difficult issue that you faced when you first came to the city?
....................................…………………………………………………….

147. How do you define your relationship with the native people of Mersin?
      1. They can't accept us; they don't want to employ us
      2. At first they couldn't accept us, now they got used to us
      3. Pretty well, they accepted and helped us
      4. At first our relationship was well, now it is tense
      5. So so
      6. They see that we are also 'mistreated'
      7. They exclude us
      8. Other ....

148. Do you expect to have a new and happy life if you stay in Mersin?
      1. Yes   2. No   3. Perhaps

149. What are the positive and negative sides of living in the city? ....…………...

150. What are the positive and negative sides of living in the village ....…………..

VII. CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY

151. Now please answer as yes/no/no idea to the sentences I will read to you.

	Yes	No idea	No
There is disagreement in our family.			
I have beaten my spouse.			
I beat my children in order to educate them and show them the truth.			
There has been somebody in my close environment who committed suicide.			
Economic difficulties influence the relationships in the family negatively.			
There are people gambling in our district.			
There has been somebody in my close environment who			

attempted to commit suicide.			
Violence in our family in the last years has increased.			

152. What are the reasons of family violence in your view?

153. How can violence in the family be prevented in your view?

154. Have you or any of the members of your family ever had any problem with the police?
     1. Yes **- ask-** who? Why? .... 2. No

155. Has anybody in your family been arrested and/or sentenced?
    1. Yes   **- ask**- who? Why? .... 2. No

156. Is there anybody who is addicted to alcohol in your family?
    1. Yes -**ask**- who? How often does s/he drink alcohol? .... 2. No

157. Is there anybody who is addicted to alcohol in your district or environment?
    1. Yes   2. No

158. Is there anybody who gambles in your family?
    1. Yes   **- ask**- who? How often does s/he gamble? .... 2. No

159. Has any of your neighbours been arrested and/or sentenced?
    1. Yes   2. No

160. What may be the most important reason or reasons of someone's committing suicide?

161. What are the most important reason or reasons of someone's being in depression in your view? Clarify shortly.

162. Has there ever been anybody who is in depression and/or who have experienced depression among your close relatives and friends?
     1. Yes   2. No

Table 1: Statistics of Household Size

N	175
Mean	7,31
Median	7,00
Mode	6
Std. Deviation	3,132
Minimum	2
Maximum	21

Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Household Size

Size Groups	Frequency	Percent
2-4	4	15,5
5-7	23	43,9
8-10	22	28,6
11+	4	13,0
Total	175	100,0

Table 3: Frequency Distribution of Sex of Household Members

Sex	Frequency	Percent
Male	655	51,21
Female	616	48,08
Missing	8	0,71
Total	1279	100,0

Table 4: Frequency Distribution of Marital Status of Household Members

Marital Status	Frequency	Percent
Married	432	48,16
Single	436	48,60
Widow	10	1,12
Missing	19	2,12
Total	897	100,0

Table 5: Frequency Distribution of Birth Place of Household Members

Birthplace	Frequency	Percent
Diyarbakır	268	20,86
Mardin	254	19,77
Siirt	188	14,71
Şırnak	52	4,05
Şanlıurfa	47	3,68
Batman	18	1,41
Van	26	2,33
Hakkari	26	2,03
Tunceli	23	1,80
Bitlis	21	1,72
Ağrı	8	0,62
Elazığ	3	0,24
Mersin	320	25,03
Adıyaman	1	0,08
Erzincan	1	0,08
Gaziantep	3	0,24
Adana	7	0,56
İzmir	3	0,25
Artvin	1	0,08
Missing	9	0,71
Total	1279	100,0

Table 6: Frequency Distribution of Family Type of Households

Family Type	Frequency	Percent
Nucleic Family	117	66,9
Extended Family	58	33,1
Total	175	100,0

Table 7: Frequency Distribution of Number of Married Couples in the Household

Number of Married Couple in the Households	Frequency	Percent
1	135	77,1
2	32	18,3
3	7	4,0
4	1	0,6
Total	175	100,0

Table 8: Frequency Distribution of the Sex of Household Heads

Sex of Households' Heads	Frequency	Percent
Male	162	92,6
Female	13	7,4
Total	175	100,0

Table 9: Frequency Distribution of the Educational Status of the Fathers of Household Heads

Educational Status of Fathers of Household Heads	Frequency	Percent
Illiterate	138	78,9
Literate	17	9,7
Primary School Graduate	15	8,6
Secondary School Graduate	2	1,1
High School Graduate	2	1,1
Missing	1	0,6
Total	175	100,0

Table 10: Frequency Distribution of the Educational Status of the Mothers of Household Heads

Educational Status of Household Heads' Mother	Frequency	Percent
Illiterate	167	95,4
Primary School Graduates	4	2,3
Secondary School Graduates	1	0, 6
Missing	3	1,7
Total	175	100,0

Table 11: Frequency Distribution of the Year of Migration

Year of Migration	Frequency	Percent
1983-1985	18	10,3
1986-1988	25	14,3
1989-1991	29	16,6
1992-1994	74	42,2
1995-1997	20	11,5
1998 and later	9	5,1
Total	175	100,0

Table 12: Frequency Distribution of Provinces Where Forced Migrants Came from

Province Where Migrants Came from	Frequency	Percent
Diyarbakır	48	27,4
Mardin	46	26,3
Siirt	33	18,9
Şırnak	12	6,9
Şanlıurfa	10	5,7
Batman	3	1,7
Tunceli	6	3,4
Van	5	2,9
Bitlis	4	2,3
Hakkari	4	2,3
Ağrı	2	1,1
Elazığ	1	0,6
Muş	1	0,6
Total	175	100,0

Table 13: Frequency Distribution of the Districts Where Forced Migrants Live

Districts Where Forced Migrants Live	Frequency	Percent
Çilek	35	21,3
Çay	20	12,2
Güneş	19	11,6
Şevket Sümer	13	7,9
Demirtaş	12	7,4
Yeni Hal	11	6,6
Kurdali	7	4,2
Karaduvar	6	3,6
Alsancak	5	3,0
Özgürlük	5	3,0
Siteler	4	2,4
Gündoğdu	3	1,8
Akbelen	3	1,8
Turunçlu	3	1,8
Yeşil Çimen	3	1,8
Barbaros	3	1,8
Toroslar	2	1,2
Yeni Pazar	2	1,2
Halkkent	2	1,2
Eğriçam	1	0,6
Ihsaniye	1	0,6
Bahçe	1	0,6
Yenitaş kent beldesi	1	0,6
Selçuklar	1	0,6
Yeni Mahalle	1	0,6
Tozkoparan	1	0,6
Total	165	100,0

Table 14: Frequency Distribution of the Type of House in which Forced Migrants Live

House Type	Frequency	Percent
Gecekondu (Shelter)	139	81,3
Flat	32	18,7
Total	171	100,0

Table 15: Frequency Distribution of the Time Lived in Current Accommodation

Number of Years that Forced Migrants Have Lived in their Current Houses	Frequency	Percent
1-3	53	30,99
4-6	49	28,65
7-9	32	18,71
10-12	22	12,88
13-15	8	4,68
16 or More	7	4,09
Total	171	100,0

Table 16: Frequency Distribution of Number of Floors of the House/Apartments of Forced Migrants

Number of Floors of House/Apartment	Frequency	Percent
1	75	44,1
2	67	39,4
3	14	8,2
4	5	2,9
5 or Higher	9	5,4
Total	170	100,0

Table 17: Frequency Distribution of How Many Times Forced Migrants Moved

Amount of Moving	Frequency	Percent
1	9	6,8
2	37	27,8
3	35	26,3
4	20	15,0
5	18	13,5
6 and More	14	10,6
Total	133	100,0

Table 18: Frequency Distribution of Preferred Housing Type by Forced Migrants

Preferred Housing Type	Frequency	Percent
Gecekondu (Shelter)	26	16,15
Apartment	106	65,84
Detached Housing	21	13,04
Other	8	4,97
Total	161	100,0

Table 19: Frequency Distribution of Number of the Districts That Forced Migrants Moved To

Number of Districts That Forced Migrants Moved To	Frequency	Percent
1	9	13,2
2	32	47,1
3	22	32,4
4 or More	5	7,3
Total	68	100,0

Table 20: Frequency Distribution of the Ethnic Structure of Forced Migrants

Ethnicity	Frequency	Percent
Kurdish	172	98,3
Zaza	2	1,1
Arabic	1	0,6
Total	175	100,0

Table 21: Frequency Distribution of Mother Tongues of Forced Migrants

Mother Tongue	Frequency	Percent
Kurdish	166	94,9
Zaza	8	4,6
Arabic	1	0,6
Total	175	100,0

Table 22: Frequency Distribution of the Language Spoken in the Households of Forced Migrants

Language Spoken in the Household	Frequency	Percent
Kurdish	156	89,1
Zaza	5	2,9
Turkish	13	7,4
Arabic	1	0,6
Total	175	100,0

Table 23: Frequency Distribution of Households in Which at least One Member Doesn't Speak Turkish

Are there any members of your family who don't Speak Turkish?	Frequency	Percent
Yes	102	58,3
No	71	40,6
Missing	2	1,1
Total	175	100,0

Table 24: Frequency Distribution of Visit Repetition of Relatives in the Hometown

Visit Repetition of Relatives in Hometown	Frequency	Percent
Once a year	39	52,6
Twice a year	4	5,4
Once every two years	6	8,1
Once every three years	6	8,1
Once every three month	1	1,4
Sometimes	11	14,8
If it is possible	3	4,1
When someone dies	3	4,1
Once a month	1	1,4
Total	74	100,0

Table 25: Frequency Distribution of Comparison of Support Relations of Forced Migrants With their Neighbours, Townsmenships and Villagers, Before and After Migration

Comparison of Support Relations of Forced Migrants with their Neighbours, Townsmenships and Villagers, Before and After Migration	Frequency	Percent
Better	29	36,7
Worse	26	32,9
No Relations	21	26,6
They See Each Other More Often	3	3,8
Total	79	100,0

Table 26: Frequency Distribution of Types of Employment of Children under 14

Jobs	Frequency	Percent
Shoe Shining	4	30,8
Apprenticeship	2	15,4
Seasonal Agricultural Jobs	5	38,5
Manufacture	1	7,7
Daily Jobs	1	7,7
Total	13	100,0

Table 27: Frequency Distribution of Subjects of Discussion Apart From District Problems Among Forced Migrants

Subjects of Discussions	Frequency	Percent
Political Problems	29	44,6
Daily Problems	8	12,3
Kurdish Question	3	4,6
Returning to the Village	8	12,3
Poverty, Unemployment and Economic Problems	4	6,2
Criminal Problems (Burglary, Fighting)	4	6,2
Urban Problems and Education	4	6,2
Other problems	5	7,7
Total	65	100,0

Table 28: Frequency Distribution of Kinds of Activities That Forced Migrants Do Outside Home

Kind of Activities That Forced Migrants Do Outside Home	Frequency	Percent
Visiting Relatives and Parents	10	12,5
Going to Cafe	12	15,0
Meetings, Concerts, Seminars	14	17,5
Traveling, Picnics	9	11,25
Political Activities	22	27,5
Conversations	13	16,25
Total	80	100,0

Table 29: Frequency Distribution of Discussed Subjects in Women Meetings

Discussed Subjects in Women's Meetings	Frequency	Percent
Political Subjects	28	56,0
Gossip and Conversation	7	14,0
Traditional Subjects	6	12,0
Survival Problems	2	4,0
Women's Problems	3	6,0
District Problems	2	4,0
Cultural Subjects	2	4,0
Total	50	100,0

Table 30: Frequency Distribution of Political Parties That Forced Migrants Voted for in 3rd November 2002 Election

Political Parties That Forced Migrants Voted for in 3rd November 2002 Elections	Frequency	Percent
Democratic People's Party	161	96,4
Justice and Development Party	5	3,0
Motherland Party	1	0,6
Total	167	100,0

Table 31: Frequency Distribution of the Political Parties That Forced Migrants Voted for in the Last Local Elections

Political Parties That Forced Migrants Voted in the Last Local Elections	Frequency	Percent
Democratic People's Party	154	96,3
Virtue Party	2	1,3
Motherland Party	2	1,3
Republican People's Party	1	0,6
True Path Party	1	0,6
Total	160	100,0

Table 32: Frequency Distribution of Political Parties That Forced Migrants Would Vote For If There is a General Election Today.

Political Parties That Forced Migrants Would Vote For is there was a General Election Today	Frequency	Percent
Democratic People's Party	164	97,6
Justice and Development Party	3	1,8
Motherland Party	1	0,6
Total	168	100,0

Table 33: Frequency Distribution of Expectations of Forced Migrants from the State

Expectations of Forced Migrants from State	Frequency	Percent
Providing peace and presence in the region immediately	145	19,4
Showing respect to human rights	119	15,9
Providing life and property security	106	14,2
Increasing jobs and employment opportunities	104	13,9
Removing the pressure of soldiers, police and village guards	95	12,7
Placing Emphasis on Education	80	10,7
Increasing regional investments and credit opportunities	70	9,4
Declaring Universal Amnesty	17	2,3
Placing Emphasis on Democracy	4	0,5
Recognizing Cultural and Political Rights	4	0,5
Recognizing Kurdish Identity	3	0,4
Total	747	100,0

Table 34: Frequency Distribution of the Solutions of Forced Migrants to the Security Problem in the Region

How the Security Problem can be solved	Frequency	Percent
If the state gives cultural and political rights	57	27,8
By the abolishment of the village guard system	55	26,8
By ending the violation of human rights	52	25,4
By creating job areas and increasing investment in the region	15	7,3
By increasing in the level of education	13	6,3
Through democracy	4	2,0
Through peace	4	2,0
By the dissolvent of Illegal Organizations	2	1,0
If the organizations declare a ceasefire	2	1,0
Through Universal Amnesty	1	0,5
Total	205	100,0

Table 35: Frequency Distribution of the Solutions of Forced Migrants to the Problems of the Region

How the Problems of Region Can Be Solved	Frequency	Percent
Through democracy	145	78,0
By preventing unemployment and underdevelopment	25	13,4
Our problems will never be solved	5	2,7
By granting Cultural and Political Rights	3	1,6
By transferring the power to the local administrations	2	1,1
By the Abolishment of the Village Guard System	2	1,1
By Providing Internal Peace	1	0,5
By General Forgiveness	1	0,5
By Preventing Migration	1	0,5
By taking military precautions	1	0,5
Total	186	100,0

Table 36: Frequency Distribution of Conditions That Forced Migrants Demand from the State to Return to Their Villages

Conditions That Forced Migrants Demand from the State to Return to Their Villages	Frequency	Percent
It will be enough if our security is provided	71	37,0
If the state helps us and satisfies our loss	40	20,8
If the state provides money and job opportunities	40	20,8
It will be enough if the state lets us go back to our village	26	13,5
If the state abolishes the village guard system	6	3,1
If the state provides democracy and freedom	4	2,1
Other	5	2,5
Total	192	100,0

Table 37: Frequency Distribution of Problems that Forced Migrants Faced After Migration

Kinds of Problems that Forced Migrants Faced After Migration	Frequency	Percent
Treatment as guilty people	64	36,0
Imprisonment	50	28,1
Being followed	31	17,4
Poverty and unemployment	18	10,1
Arrest	4	2,2
Exclusion and mal-adaptation	4	2,2
Psychological pressure	4	2,2
Physical pressure and torture	1	0,6
Continuing vendetta	1	0,6
Fear of being killed	1	0,6
Total	178	100,0

Table 38: Frequency Distribution of the Problems that Forced Migrants Faced in the City

Problems that Forced Migrants Faced in the City	Frequency	Percent
Cultural adaptation problem	54	23,4
Being treated as potential criminal	78	33,8
Unemployment	79	34,2
Health problems	12	5,2
Urban infrastructure problems –electricity, water, sewerage, road etc.	5	2,2
Burglary	1	0,4
Arrest	1	0,4
State Pressure	1	0,4
Total	231	100,0

Table 39: Frequency Distribution of Family Members Who Were Taken to the Police Station

Family Members of Forced Migrants Who Were Taken to the Police Station	Frequency	Percent
Respondent	70	55,6
His/her Son	29	23,0
His/her Brother	9	7,1
His/her Daughter	8	6,3
His/her Spouse	8	6,3
His/her Father	1	0,8
His/her Nephew	1	0,8
Total	126	100,0

Table 40: Frequency Distribution of Causes of Being Taken to Police Station

Causes of Being Taken to Police Station	Frequency	Percent
Political Causes	73	71,6
Being Suspicious	11	10,8
Fighting	7	6,9
Being Kurdish	3	2,9
Being a Military Smuggler	3	2,9
Burglary	1	1,0
Aiding Illegal Organizations	1	1,0
Narcotic Causes	1	1,0
Financial Offences	2	2,0
Total	102	100,0

Table 41: Frequency Distribution of Family Members Who Were Arrested

Family Members Who Were Arrested	Frequency	Percent
Respondent	32	37,6
His/her Son	19	22,4
His/her Brother	13	15,3
His/her Spouse	5	5,9
His/her Father	4	4,7
His/her Uncle	3	3,5
His/her Nephew	2	2,4
His/her Daughter	2	2,4
His/her Cousin	2	2,4
His/her Other Relatives	2	2,4
His/her Brother-in-law	1	1,2
Total	85	100,0

Table 42: Frequency Distribution of the Causes of the Arrest of Family Members of Forced Migrants

Causes of Arresting of Family Members of Forced Migrants	Frequency	Percent
Political Causes	60	78,9
Aiding Illegal Organizations	4	5,3
Burglary	3	3,9
Vendetta	2	2,6
Murder	1	1,3
Confession	1	1,3
Slander	1	1,3
Smuggling	1	1,3
Narcotic	1	1,3
Complaint	1	1,3
Fighting	1	1,3
Total	76	100,0

Table 43: Frequency Distribution of the Causes of Committing Suicide Among Forced Migrants

Causes of Committing Suicide among Forced Migrants	Frequency	Percent
Poverty and Unemployment	105	43,9
Stress, Depression, and Psychological Causes	41	17,2
Family Pressure	23	9,6
Disagreement	19	7,9
Uneducation	9	3,8
Unreturned Love	8	3,3
Political Pressures	7	2,9
Prosecution	6	2,5
Honor and Aggression	6	2,5
Violence and Problems in the Family	4	1,7
Being not Able to Find a Response to his/her Expectations	4	1,7
Deficiency of Struggle	4	1,7
Unadaptation to Urban	3	1,3
Total	239	100,0

Table 44: Frequency Distribution of Causes of Being in Depression Among Forced Migrants

Causes of Being in Depression among Forced Migrants	Frequency	Percent
Survival Problems and Unemployment	123	53,2
Psychological Problems and stress	31	13,4
Violence and disagreement in the family	21	9,1
Pressure	12	5,2
Being not able to find response to his/her expectations	10	4,3
Cultural Problems and unadaptation to urban life	8	3,5
Political pressure	7	3,0
Hopelessness and Loneliness	6	2,6
Insensibility and disinterestedness	4	1,7
Unreturned love	3	1,3
Illness and infirmity	2	0,9
Uneducation	2	0,9
Ideological deficiency	2	0,9
Total	231	100,0

Table 45: Frequency Distribution of Causes of Violence in the Families of Forced Migrants

Causes of Violence in the Family	Frequency	Percent
Economical Problems and Unemployment	147	67,1
Disagreement in Family and Survival Problems	27	12,3
Uneducation and Unconsciousness	18	8,2
Psychological Problems	8	3,7
Disagreement and Cultural Differences	8	3,7
Social problems and Immorality	6	2,7
Political Problems	3	1,4
Pressure and Prosecution	2	0,9
Total	219	100,0

Table 46: Frequency Distribution of the Ways of Preventing Violence in Family

The Ways of Preventing Violence in Family	Frequency	Percent
Economic Development and Employment	130	64,7
Education	46	22,9
Respect, Love and Presence	13	6,5
Democracy	5	2,5
Agreement and Dialog	5	2,5
People's Support	1	0,5
No Solution	1	0,5
Total	201	100,0

CITY MAP OF MERSIN AND DISTRICTS WHERE QUESTIONNAIRIES APPLIED

1. grup: 1-2 anket, 2. grup: 3-5 anket, 3. grup: 6-15 anket, 4. grup: 16-20 abket, 5. grup:21 anket ve fazla