

**AN INQUIRY INTO RURAL-DEVELOPMENT
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY:
DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMPLOYEES**

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ABSTRACT

AN INQUIRY INTO RURAL-DEVELOPMENT NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN TURKEY: DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMPLOYEES

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This study is examining the institutionalization degree of the rural development nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and the social-economic status of the employees in those NGOs. The development NGO sector has enormously grown within last three decades. It has also been a period of reorganization for capitalism. The neo-liberal political economy has replaced the Keynesianism/Fordism, integrating the national economies into the global economy. This integration has resulted in increasing income inequalities, poverty, and unemployment. Middle classes have lost their jobs, and their life standards have eroded. In the period, the international funds channeled to the NGOs have increased to a great extent. The growth of the development NGO sector is closely linked to those consequences of

the neo-liberal reorganization. Poverty, qualified but unemployed individuals, and the international funds have made it possible, inevitable in fact, for the NGOs to proliferate and enlarge. As they enlarge their scope, they have to develop institutional structures, which in turn employ more qualified people. In addition to their role in the struggle against poverty and in the, more or less radical, criticism of the social and economic order, NGOs have acquired a new function, creating employment and a certain level of social-economic status, a status of middle class, for those employed. What we have been observing in Turkey is similar to the developments in the other parts of the world: economic crisis in 1970s, military junta, liberalization of economy, poverty and unemployment. Within this political economy, the rural development NGO sector of Turkey seems not institutionalized but having turned into an employment opportunity for middle class. Nevertheless, its role in the democratization process of the country is still important as far as the critical perspective is kept in effect.

Keywords: Nongovernmental organizations, neo-liberalism, rationalization, institutionalization, social-economic status, development

ÖZ

KIRSAL-KALKINMA ALANINDA ÇALIŞAN TÜRKİYE'DEKİ SİVİL TOPLUM KURULUŞLARI ÜZERİNE BİR İNCELEME: KURUMSALLAŞMA DÜZEYİ VE ÇALIŞANLARIN SOSYO-EKONOMİK ÖZELLİKLERİ

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Bu çalışmada kırsal kalkınma alanında çalışan sivil toplum kuruluşlarının (STK) kurumsallaşma düzeyleri ve STK çalışanlarının sosyo-ekonomik konumları incelenmektedir. Kalkınma STK'ları sektörü son otuz yıl içinde büyük bir büyüme göstermiştir. Bu, aynı zamanda, kapitalizmin yeniden yapılanma dönemidir. Neoliberal politik ekonomi, ulusal ekonomileri küresel ekonomiye eklemleyerek, Keynesçi/Fordist modelin yerini almıştır. Büyüyen gelir eşitsizliği, yoksulluk ve işsizlik küresel bütünleşmenin sonuçları olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Orta sınıflar işsizlikle tanışmışlar ve yaşam standartları belirgin şekilde düşmüştür. Bu dönemin bir başka özelliği de STK'lara yönelik uluslararası yardımların büyük miktarlarda

artmasıdır. Kalkınma STK'ları sektörünün büyümesi, neoliberal yeniden yapılanmanın bu sonuçlarıyla yakından bağlantılıdır. Yoksulluk, nitelikli fakat işsiz bireyler ve uluslararası yardımlar STK'ların çoğalmasını ve büyümesini sağlamıştır. STK'lar kapsamaları genişledikçe kurumsal yapılar geliştirmek durumunda kalmakta ve bunun sonucunda daha fazla nitelikli bireyi istihdam etmektedirler. Yoksulluğa karşı mücadelede ve ekonomik ve sosyal yapının eleştirilmesinde üstlendikleri rolün yanısıra, STK'lar çalışanları için istihdam ve belirli bir sosyo-ekonomik konum -orta sınıf konumu- yaratarak yeni bir işlev edinmişlerdir. Türkiye'de gözlemlenen dünyanın diğer bölgelerinde olanlarla benzerlikler içermektedir: 1970'lerdeki ekonomik kriz, askeri darbe ve cunta rejimi, ekonominin serbestleştirilmesi, yoksulluk ve işsizlik. Türkiye politik ekonomisinin bu koşullarında, kırsal kalkınma STK'larının kurumsallaştığını söyleyemesek de, orta sınıflar için istihdam yaratıcı yapılara dönüştüğü izlenimi edinilmektedir. Yine de, eleştirel bakış açılarını korudukları sürece STK'ların ülkenin demokratikleşme sürecindeki rolü büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları, neoliberalizm, rasyonalizasyon, kurumsallaşma, sosyo-ekonomik konum, kalkınma

to my mother, my brother,
and
the memory of my father

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Without the endless support and love of my family and Hilal, my beloved Figen, and my close friends, Direnç, Eylem, Özgür, and Utkan, it would not be possible to make it. Thanks for living my life and letting me live yours.

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date: _____

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKV: Anadolu Kalkınma Vakfı (Anatolian Development Foundation)

ANAP: Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)

DHKV: Doğal Hayatı Koruma Vakfı (WWF-Turkey)

DİE: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (State Statistics Institute)

DİSK: Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions)

EU: European Union

GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GNP: Gross National Product

IMF: International Monetary Fund

KÇOSAD: Kırsal Çevre ve Ormancılık Sorunları Araştırma Derneği (Research Association of Rural Environment and Forestry)

KKGV: Kırsal ve Kentsel Gelişme Vakfı (Rural and Urban Development Foundation)

NGO: Nongovernmental Organization

SAP: Structural Adjustment Program

STÇYD: Sürdürülebilir Tarım ve Çiftçi Yardımlaşma Derneği (Association of Sustainable Agriculture and Assistance for Farmers)

STK: Sivil Toplum Kuruluşu (Civil Society Organization)

SÜRKAL: Sürdürülebilir Kırsal ve Kentsel Kalkınma Derneği (Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Association)

TKV: Türkiye Kalkınma Vakfı (Development Foundation of Turkey)

UN: United Nations

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF: United Nations Children's Fund

US: United States

UYD: Ulaşılabilir Yaşam Derneği (Accessible Life Association)

ÜKD: Üniversiteli Kadınlar Derneği (Association of University Women)

WTO: World Trade Organization

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The capital accumulation of the last three decades has its roots in a new global order. With its most decisive move, capitalism has become a global economic system, once-and-for-all, encompassing all parts of the world. It has been the period when the nature of capital becomes so much clear as did in its very early times of the 18th century. The period has been marked by the term “neo-liberalism”. Neo-liberalism was a so-called treatment for the crisis of the Keynesian/Fordist system, reversing the latter and turning to its very root. It was the pure form of capitalism, hence, the elements of economy or the factors of production, were left to the free functioning of economy, without or with minimum intervention by government. This is the reason why it is called new liberalism.

Under the neo-liberal economy, financial and real markets have been liberalized. Protectionist measures, subsidies to domestic products, and tariffs have been significantly reduced. State economic institutions have been privatized. The process is managed by the international institutions, mainly the World Bank and IMF. The aim is to create a single global market that integrates the national economies. In the integration process, the structural adjustment programs have been applied through those institutions. The programs have contracted the government sector and social spending, repressed real wages, devalued national currencies. Price stability has the

priority over unemployment and poverty. The process began in turkey with the introduction of the January 24 decisions and was backed by the military junta in its initial years, and an anti-democratic constitution preventing possible oppositions in the following years.

For a great majority of people, the most important result of neo-liberal economic policies has been an ever-increasing income inequality. Middle classes have met with poverty while working classes have lost the minimum standards of a human life. The period has witnessed another rise, the rise of the nongovernmental organizations (NGO) sector. It is no coincidence that the rise of income inequality and the rise of the NGOs have taken place within the last 30 years. Neo-liberalism has matured those conditions of existence for both ideologically and economically. There were NGOs before the period. But, they had never been as many and effective as in the period. The process of globalization and the consequent problems that cannot be solved within national borders, the political representation crisis that has become acute with the globalization, and the new social movements initiated by the 68 protests were influential for the expansion of the NGO sector (Sancar, 2000: 24-25-26). The most important factor, though, is poverty. It has become a fertile land for the NGOs, especially in the development sector, to grow up, providing as well the necessary factors of production in the form of qualified, but now unemployed, individuals. It has also posed a significant challenge, that is, the unavoidable expansion of poverty. The development NGOs have to expand their operations and set up institutional structures to deal with the huge problems. Otherwise they may be

far from alleviating poverty, let alone reducing it considerably. The expansion is also a requirement of international financial institutions and donors to provide funds.

The primary task of the development NGOs seems to cease the pain of the poor. But, the resources of NGOs are very little compared to the size of poverty (Corsino, 2001: 54). According to Hearn, most donors support NGOs committed to the promotion of liberal democracy and economic liberalism (Mohan, 2002: 129). The funds of the developed world donors are allocated in line with the political considerations of the donors' home country. International financial institutions consider the development NGOs as a tool against poverty resulted by the structural adjustment programs (Lopez and Petras, 2001: 98). NGOs do not simply channel the funds from donors to the poor. When struggling against poverty, they try to build up the economic and social capacity of the poor so that they can handle with their problems with the continuous support of neither the NGOs nor the government agencies. It is ironic to put forward NGOs against such a serious problem. Admittedly, what is expected from the development NGOs is alleviate poverty, not wither it away. As a result, only a privileged minority of the poor can benefit from the activities of the development NGOs.

Replacing the social functions of governments as suggested by neo-liberal paradigm, the NGOs are ideologically correct choices on the part of international donors, governments in the process of contraction, and business firms supporting neo-liberal reforms while engaging in public relations activities at the same time (Bali, 2000: 38). Within the NGO sector as well, donors seek safe NGOs with a good record to

“invest in” (Fyvie and Ager, 1999: 1392). The record should be good politically and financially. As the scale of development efforts and the necessary funds to finance them expand, the NGOs need to professionalize and bureaucratize their structures. The institutionalization intends to operate income-generating activities within NGO and to obtain funds from donors that demand professional work. Basically, institutionalization provides NGO with organizational and financial sustainability. There is a competition for the limited funds on the international scale. The more professional institution may possibly be the winner.

But with the professionalization, it is likely that the beneficiaries will be replaced by the customers in the NGO sector (Bejar, 2001: 197). The service may possibly be directed to the profitable poor on the basis of cost-benefit calculation that ensures sustainability. However, when ensuring the financial and organizational sustainability, NGO may not sustain its mission and may lose the direction. Hence, the jargon of the private sector may dominate the perspectives of NGO. As the private sector is more involved in the NGO sector, the competition may become intense. NGOs may have to get more professionalized and profit-oriented in order to compete with the private firms and with each other. They may have to set up separate marketing, finance, and measurement/control departments to reach the standards required by donors. Measurement/control may also be the requirement of the general public to assess the NGO activities and provide funds. Nevertheless, donors are the primary source of income for the NGO work. In fact, the dependence of the development NGOs to the fund of the developed world has become structural (Bejar, 2001: 194).

On the other hand, income-generation through profit-operations may create a different problem. NGOs may turn into non-profit business firms when being involved in income-generating activities (Stiles, 2002: 843). Many development NGOs are employment firms for the urban professional classes (Lopez and Petras, 2001: 99). They are also a way of social mobility for lower classes into middle ranks. The local people for whom the NGOs work may be employed for their local knowledge and as a part of participation issue. Through this employment, they increase their status and chance of finding job after the NGO leaves the field. The conditions of the NGO work are not as hard as those in the private sector, and the work necessitates qualified labor, meaning a high pay level (İnsel, 2002).

Neo-liberalism points out NGOs as the new representative mechanisms instead of nation-states, which have lost its power to the global capital (Sancar, 2000: 28). Against global capital and at the ranks of the international institutions like UN, WTO, and the World Bank, NGOs seem to be the only alternative representing the peoples. In this way, neo-liberal system hopes to overcome the legitimacy crisis emerging with the deterioration of the state power and the representative institutions and to avoid the popular movements (Türkeş, 2000: 49). It may also result in public functions out of political control. Formal political channels may be neutralized by NGOs (Gordon R., 2001: 184). Informalization of politics may disturb the operation of control mechanisms like elections and in that may marginalize the majority of people that are not represented by effective and powerful NGOs. It is not possible for all sections of the population to find a powerful NGO representing their interests.

Furthermore, the basis of representation and its mechanisms are not clear. Formal political channels should be reformed rather than bypassed.

NGOs, especially of development, function on two interdependent planes. These are political representation, which necessitates a macro view, and service delivery, the view of which focuses mostly on micro aspects of life. As we have seen, the role neo-liberal political economy gives NGOs is in line with those planes. But, the micro side appears to be more evident and the macro level is never expected to be a total criticism. Nevertheless, that expectation may not turn out to be true. NGOs and development NGOs are not totally functionaries of the neo-liberal economy. They may be very significant actors for democratization and an equitable income distribution. In Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, the NGOs have undertaken important roles against the undemocratic development process (Encarnacion, 2001: 128). In their struggle for democratization and other macro level issues, they may deal with the micro side, the everyday lives, the immediate needs of people. In other words, they may work on both planes, integrating those two sides. The task of NGOs is not to compensate for government failure or market deficiency or to manage development projects (Uvin et al, 2000: 1418). If they try to take on the functions of government or market, they will have to scale up to the point of the destruction of their NGO status and will become pure bureaucracies. In fact, those tasks are beyond the capacity of NGOs. They cannot become the sole representative of people, either, replacing traditional mechanisms. NGOs should participate in politics, but they cannot be political parties. Different from political parties, they are supposed to not represent particular interests.

Either way the NGO of development chooses may compel a rationalization in the process of becoming effective. And it has to employ qualified people in either way. In this study, we will try to find out the degree of rationalization of the rural development nongovernmental organizations and the social-economic status levels of the employees in the rural development NGO sector. The neo-liberal political and economic system forms the framework of the study. It will provide us with the ground for presenting a realistic picture of the development NGOs instead of sticking to an idealistic conception as nonprofit, nongovernmental, and voluntary organizations. We do not put forward something that can be tested. Our goal is to describe the current situation in the development sector and to trace the future tendencies. We believe that both the present and the future of the NGO sector have been shaped by the neo-liberal political economy and by its most important outcome -for this study-, that is, poverty. We expect that the institutional characteristics and the employee composition of the rural development NGOs will reflect the neo-liberal turn in Turkey.

In the first two chapters, we will describe the political economy of the world and our country after the Keynesian period, and the NGO sector with an emphasis on the development NGOs and their relation to the neo-liberal economy. The following chapter is about the rise of the NGO sector in Turkey. These sections will concretize what will be abstracted in the theory of rationalization. Through these sections, we will be able to locate the rationalization process and its effect on the social-economic composition of the NGO employees in the age that we live. It is not possible to

understand the nature of the NGO sector in the current epoch without a historical-material analysis. The next chapter is the theory of rationalization. It will explain how the processes of institutionalization and bureaucratization take place in society and in an organization. We will also examine the aspects of an institutionalized structure including the social-economic composition of its employees. The chapters before the conclusion will be reserved for the mechanics of the study, details of the research process, and results including the discussions on those results. The final chapter will conclude the study, possibly with modest suggestions. The NGOs that have participated in the study are Anatolian Development Foundation (AKV), Development Foundation of Turkey (TKV), Rural and Urban Development Foundation (KKGV), Research Association of Rural Environment and Forestry (KÇOSAD), Association of Sustainable Agriculture and Assistance for Farmers (STÇYD), Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Association (SÜRKAL), Accessible, Life Association (UYD), World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF-Turkey) (DHKV), Youth for Habitat-Turkey, and Association of University Women (ÜKD).

CHAPTER 2

NEO-LIBERALISM AND POVERTY

2.1. Introduction

In this section, we will examine the emergence of neo-liberalism as the world economy's leading paradigm. This is the period, at the same time, in which non-governmental organizations have proliferated. It seems there is a link between the neo-liberal economy and the growth of the development NGO sector both in the world and in our country. Furthermore, we believe that any event should be placed within the general framework of society in order to understand its nature. The general framework of the concern of this study is the globalized world and Turkish economies through the implementation of neo-liberal policies. The consequences of those policies have been devastating for the majority of peoples in the world, preparing the ground for the increasing number of the development NGOs. The development is also in line with the neo-liberal ideology, which proposes to substitute civil initiatives or NGOs for state.

The chapter on neo-liberalism will complete our theoretical chapter on rationalization in that it is the political economy of that phenomenon. That abstract process takes place in the framework of the neo-liberal world. Neo-liberalism is not simply an economic formation. Its effects on the other spheres of life are undeniable. It shapes the world, in which we live, and those abstractions of our theoretical

chapter take their specific forms in the circumstances that neo-liberalism has been creating. The chapter will explain how those circumstances have come into being in the world and Turkey. The contraction of government and its spending -especially social-, the increasing unemployment and poverty, the unprecedented inequality in income distribution are the characteristics of the neo-liberal period. At the same time, national economies have been integrated to the world economy competing for the same resources and markets. The globalization of economy has made national problems the object of global concern. The proliferation of development NGOs should be located in that concern. The increasing institutionalization and the resulting employment structure, in turn, are the consequences of the NGO proliferation.

2.2. Neo-liberal Economy and Poverty

The Great Depression and the destruction of the Second World War resulted in a new economic order all around the world. The rationale behind the Keynesian economics, which dominated the world especially after the War through the early 1970s, was the critique of the central assumption of neo-classical economic theory. Keynes demonstrated that the economic equilibrium may not guarantee full employment and unemployment may persist for a long time even at that equilibrium (Pratt, 1997: 32). This is to say that government should actively intervene in economy to ensure full employment. Based on this principle and the Fordist mass production techniques, the world economy grew unprecedentedly. The economy operated on the fixed exchange rates, which were supported by the Bretton Woods Institutions and structures like the World Bank, IMF, and GATT. The Keynesian model proposed a mixed economy

aiming at social welfare through full employment (Maitra, 1996: 111). The accumulated capital, by this model, in the developed world was transferred to the developing world as investment. In addition, the military aids and expenditures of the US in the cold war atmosphere provided the liquidity for the economic growth (Arrighi, 1999: 12). The developing world countries adopted the import-substitution industrialization model in this period. State participation in industrialization and social welfare was a crucial aspect of the system (Maitra, 1996: 111). The “golden age of capitalism” ended at the beginning of 1970s. The Vietnam War and the spending of the US governments on this war, the oil crisis, and the end of Keynesian economic growth with the Fordist techniques signified the crisis and collapse of the mixed economic system. The fixed exchange rate was replaced with the fluctuating rates. Arrighi states that the crisis was of over-accumulation accompanied by intensified competition, that is, “an accumulation of capital over and above what could be reinvested profitably in established channels of trade and production” (Arrighi, 1999: 13). The result was a transfer of huge amount of capital to financial markets. But the financial expansion did not rebuild the profitability and resolve the crisis (Arrighi, 1999: 14). In the developing world, import-substitution industrialization resulted in a concentration of capital in the hands of local and foreign capitalists, who could not invest profitably (Maitra, 1996: 113) in domestic markets. All these developments led to the emergence of a so-called new economic regime, that is, neo-liberalism.

The assumptions of neo-liberalism are threefold: methodological individualism, stating that all phenomena are reducible to individuals, rationality, emphasizing

rational and informed self-interest, and the supremacy of the free market, asserting that market/exchange relations are superior to any other relations such as political ones (Pratt, 1997: 34). In its economic theory, neo-liberalism claims that market is the best institution for economic activity. Government, far from coping with the complexity of the modern societies, should not intervene in the operation of markets (Pratt, 1997: 35). The last crisis is a consequence of such an intervention for over 30 years in the Keynesian period, it is claimed. Government should limit its activities to a very narrowly defined “public goods”. Its most crucial function is to make sure that market operates freely. The minimal state also means minimal bureaucracy, which is efficient and effective, and the condition of individual’s free, and as a result, valid choice in market (Pratt, 1997: 35). When government is involved in market activities, it is in competition with private sector, decreasing the overall efficiency of the economy. Government with established welfare regimes constantly runs budget deficits, increasing taxes and borrowing, the result of which is inflation. It is a vicious circle of deficit and inflation. High welfare transfers cause unemployment by decreasing the motivation of unemployed people towards low-paid jobs. Another cause of unemployment is market distortions created by government through work and minimum wage regulations and trade unions through their strike threat (Pratt, 1997: 38).

The liberty conception of neo-liberals excludes the rights of education, health and income. It is a formal definition, emphasizing formal legal and political rights. Liberty is the liberty of market and its actors, on which there is no government control. There is inequality but this may not be labeled as social injustice since

market outcomes are unintended (Pratt, 1997: 42). Furthermore, poverty as a form of social injustice is not caused by the economic and social system but by the values and mores of dependency, especially on state. Individual self-responsibility is the norm of neo-liberalism. Dependency values should be struggled by removing welfare regimes. Ineffective political market, which operates in line with the “irrational” demands of electors, loses one of its tools with this removal and economy emancipates partially from those irrational demands. Neo-liberalism sees economy and politics as two separate realms (Pratt, 1997: 45).

Neo-liberalism is associated with the decline of the welfare state, which is one of the causes of increased inequality (Coburn, 2000: 138). According to neo-liberal view, the welfare state interferes with the normal functioning of the market. Any form of intervention is rejected since it damages the most efficient production, consumption, and distribution (Coburn, 2000: 138). The welfare state creates market distortions. What the welfare state actually did was to partially prevent the income inequalities. Inequality is much more noticeable in countries characterized by neo-liberal regimes than in less-market oriented economies (Coburn, 2000: 140). Neo-liberalism prevents the redistribution of income through welfare regimes. It undermines the welfare institutions that may reduce poverty and income inequality. As in the case of inequality, countries with neo-liberal policies display more people in absolute and relative poverty than do more social democratic nations (Coburn, 2004: 54). The restructuring of the welfare regimes has intensified poverty and exclusion of the poor groups. Market has become the primary mechanism that provides welfare services only to those having the purchasing power. The cuts in public spending and tax

transfers to the wealthiest people by means of significant reduction in tax rates have increased the growing polarities between the rich and the poor.

Under neo-liberal regime, the industrialization of the developing world has continued through the export-oriented model as opposed to the import-substitution model, which is based on the production basically for domestic market. Rather than concentrate on the certain export products, economy is organized to satisfy the overall domestic demand, producing every item as much as possible. In the export-oriented model, foreign currency is crucial for obtaining the inputs. National currency is devalued to encourage exports, but at the same time it leads to an increase in the prices of inputs, which are imported. In fact, there occurs a constant deficit in the balance of payments (Dos Santos, 1993: 201). Highly competitive markets lower the prices of exports and increase those of imports/inputs including machinery, patent rights and raw materials. The deficit is financed by the foreign capital, mostly speculative in nature. The industrialization is conditioned by the needs of this foreign capital. Its entry and exit to country are liberalized to finance the balance of payments deficit. The economic system creates and fills the gap, raising the national debt and the fragility of the national economy. As the national debt, specifically of public, increases, borrowing by government increases, the way and consequence of which is a rise in interest rates. This means more public debt or financing debt with debt. Government is no longer free to carry out welfare functions, which may harm the debt management and the confidence of foreign investors (Rodrik, 1997: 33). Its power on economic policy, to a large extent, disappears. The redistribution of income as a precaution to poverty is no longer

viable. In these circumstances, the benefit that accrues is of very few. With their increasing investment in the developed world, the developing world bourgeoisies are integrated into the global capitalism (Burbach and Robinson, 1999: 17). Masses of workers are under the pressure of cost-effectiveness in order to compete with other developing world producers. Poverty and income inequality have severely increased. The exploitation of labor, through decreasing wages, increasing work hours, and flexible work arrangements becomes a vital strategy of export-oriented industrialization. The concentration on the export sectors limits the potential of many developing world countries toward a more balanced and technology-centered development. The developing world, with its cheap and deregulated labor, has turned into the manufacturing centers of the multinational companies in the export-orientation period (Maitra, 1996: 116).

The multinational companies have not invested huge amounts for those manufacturing centers. Most of the state enterprises have been privatized in the neo-liberal period, foreign direct investment comprising only a small fraction of the investment in the developing world (Burbach and Robinson, 1999: 17). Privatization has been imposed upon the governments as a way of effectiveness, the cost of which is unemployment for both blue- and white-collar employees. The mobility of capital far exceeds that of labor after the deregulations again imposed by international institutions like IMF, the World Bank, and WTO. It gives capital an enormous power over labor (Rodrik, 1997: 31). This power grows continuously with the increasing centralization and concentration of capital. Labor mobility occurs in some sectors, where the cost of labor is relatively high, so that the cost decreases (Chossudovsky,

1998: 96). Capital is free to roam to find the most favorable –the most deregulated, sometimes authoritarian over working classes but stable, and the least factor costs including of labor- conditions (Burbach and Robinson, 1999: 17). The labor living below the poverty line provides the most suitable factor until a more cost-effective one is discovered.

Governments try to create those favorable conditions to the disadvantage of the working masses. There is a competition between governments, the only winners of which are international capital and governments' short-term financial needs. The result is the contraction of wages, the disappearance of job security, the fall in unionization, and the decreased living standards. Even in Japan, where lifetime employment is a distinctive characteristic of the economy, job security starts to be dissolved (Rodrik, 1997: 29). National boundaries, along with their social and political organizations, begin to be blurred behind the global structures of capitalism. The worker rights and workplace regulations of nations are structured according to the needs of transnational corporations. Public interest is left to the mercy of market. The authority of state, supposed to be the bearer of that interest, is in a process of erosion (Dombrowski and Mansbach, 1999: 3). The policies that directly affect nations are determined by supranational structures, which are beyond the control of popular vote. As Karl Polanyi pointed out the international market is the only market that is not regulated by an overarching political authority (Rodrik, 1997: 38). Its legitimacy -the legitimacy of international market transactions- is, then, in question. The solution of neo-liberalism to the problem of legitimacy is the civil initiatives,

that is, non-governmental organizations, which, instead of governments, can hold the responsibility of public interest or self-interest.

One of the most important policies of the neo-liberal regime is the financial liberalization. The argument for the financial liberalization is that it would lead to lower interest rates and higher investment levels (Crotty, 2000: 362). But the result is different. The capital mobility has increased the fragility of financial as well as real sector (Wolfson, 2000: 375). Fluctuating currencies with capital inflows and outflows has added more to the instability. To be able to attract and keep foreign capital, domestic interest rates have been raised. The tax burden has shifted to the immobile factors and from direct to indirect composition, which is mostly paid by domestic residents (Schulze and Unsprung, 1999: 299). Tax rates have decreased to keep mobile capital in. As a result, public goods are underprovided (Schulze and Unsprung, 1999: 309). High real interest rates have taken away domestic capital from the real economy. Moreover, what the real economy produces is overabundant in world markets due to customs deregulations and competition between many exporters of the same product. Crotty states that weak aggregate demand is a fundamental characteristic of the global neo-liberal regime, leading to stagnant growth (Crotty, 2000: 362). For Crotty, global demand is constrained by six factors, which are deeply rooted in the structures of the neo-liberal economy. These are slow growth of wages and mass consumption, high real interest rates, restrictive fiscal policy, slow growth in investment, the economic programs of IMF and the World Bank, and the abolishment of state-guided development models. These all sum to an excess capacity in many industries, giving rise to further competitive pressures.

These pressures result in more cuts in wages, pressures on unions, and pressures on governments to generate budget surpluses, all contract aggregate demand. Sluggish aggregate demand and chronic excess supply reinforce one another in a vicious circle (Crotty, 2000: 367). Within this circle take place unemployment, income inequality, and poverty.

Not surprisingly, under the pressure of unemployment and poverty, the demand for social transfers increases with the economic integration (Schulze and Unsprung, 1999: 335). Governments may respond to this demand for political concerns even if they are restricted by the mobility of capital. The response may create short-term improvements and are political in nature, supporting particular groups. Alternatively, social democratic governments may not cut the social spending as expected, supporting society as a whole. They may rise to power as a consequence of the negative impacts of globalization. In fact, social policy need arises with globalization (Rieger and Leibfried, 1998: 364). But in no way these governments keep the size of a welfare state like that in the periods of “golden age”. The institutionalized structures of welfare states may impede the integration process of national economy to global economy since they are centered on the needs of the residents rather than on the needs of market (Rieger and Leibfried, 1998: 364). The deep-rooted problem is left unsolved.

2.3. Structural Adjustment Programs

Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) emerged in Africa as a response to the debt crisis in 1970s. It was designed to reduce the role of state in economy, maintain

macroeconomic stability and avoid overvalued exchange rates for the export competitiveness (Lopes, 1999: 512). SAPs have been adopted to apply in the other developing countries. Most of the countries that applied the program experienced deterioration in capital accumulation, public investment, direct foreign investment, and industrial and export growth (Lopes, 1999: 512). SAPs go hand in hand with global integration. More countries have to apply them as they are integrated to the global economy and as the countries apply, they become more interdependent to the international economy. SAPs generally include three aims: first, to get macroeconomic policies right by keeping budget deficits small, avoiding overvalued exchange rates, and keeping inflation low; second, to liberalize markets and avoid price control, reduce subsidies and the protection of industry; third, to encourage competition through domestic regulation, trade reform, and the privatization of public enterprises (Lopes, 1999: 513). The results are devastating. Instability in exchange rates, unemployment, dislocation of social service systems, and poverty are the outcomes. The income distribution has significantly deteriorated, wealth flowing from the poor to the rich. The burden of adjustment has fallen on the working and middle classes. Furthermore, SAPs create inflation, which is supposed to be countered by SAPs. The World Bank report notes that poverty is getting worse in sub-Saharan Africa (Lopes, 1999: 514), indicating the failure of SAPs in this region.

SAPs are designed specifically to encourage exports and financial liberalization. In order to realize those goals, domestic demand and purchasing power are repressed. Poverty is an input for the success of SAPs (Chossudovsky, 1998: 17). Then, domestic product should be supplied to international markets. Devaluation of

national currency and repressed wages facilitate this strategy. Through financial liberalization, international capital flows into economy to exploit cheap labor and to realize speculative gains. Indebted countries have to comply with the “conditionalities” of SAPs to secure the loans from the World Bank and IMF. One consequence of the “conditionalities” is the growing public debt. The developing economies become capital-transfer structures to the developed world through debt services (Chossudovsky, 1998: 51).

In addition to financial liberalization, international trade has been also liberalized. Import quotas and tariffs are eliminated. As a result, domestic manufacturing, mostly not as competitive as the multinationals entering domestic market, loses its market to the latter or tries to compete, exploiting already-cheap labor more extensively. In line with SAPs, government gives independence to central bank. Doing so, government loses its power on monetary policy, which is an important tool for domestic demand and employment. Credit to domestic manufacturing is severely limited. The dependence on the international financial institutions and on their conditions increases (Chossudovsky, 1998: 17). The balance of payments crisis, resulting from trade liberalization, stands as an ongoing possibility, which is avoided by that dependence. The social impacts of SAPs are their most visible aspect. Educational and health services are in the process of marketization. They are to be provided by market mechanisms. This means that many cannot benefit from these services in the developing countries (Chossudovsky, 1998: 70). Lower strata, with little, and middle strata, with diminished purchasing power, are mostly excluded from these services.

Without public backing, especially lower classes may not reach the minimum health standards (Chossudovsky, 1998: 72).

In Latin America, the transformation through SAPs was headed by the military regimes supported by the US. In Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, popular governments were overthrown and free market policies, privatization and liberalization were enforced (Petras and Veltmeyer, 1999: 35). It was no coincidence when considered the consequences of neo-liberal transformation. In the period of structural reforms, the interest payments of Latin America to the international banks significantly increased. It was about 45 % of the regional GNP (Petras and Veltmeyer, 1999: 36). Similarly portfolio investments increased in this period. Foreign direct investment was generally in the form of purchasing privatized public enterprises and local private companies, creating very little or no employment. The profits of foreign-based companies flew to the developed countries, the result of which was little capital formation in the developing world (Petras and Veltmeyer, 1999: 39). Specialization on some certain export products has left Latin America with fluctuating prices, overdependence on a limited range of products for foreign currency, and intense competition for the same markets. SAPs imposed by IMF have created dependence, on the part of Latin America, on the financial resources of the developed world. The problems that are the results of SAPs have triggered more SAPs, but in larger scales, deepening the dependence. Economic policy has turned to be a tool to manage this dependence. The satisfaction of popular needs is blamed as irresponsibility and “populism”. The social legislations in favor of labor, for instance, have been reversed (Petras and Veltmeyer, 1999:43). The share of labor and

lower strata in national income has decreased considerably in 1980s and 1990s. The power of the working class organizations has been undermined through labor market reforms of the World Bank (Petras and Veltmeyer, 1999: 45). Middle classes have begun to experience poverty. Latin Americans have been clearly separated into two different worlds, “first and fourth” (Petras and Veltmeyer, 1999: 47).

IMF prescriptions of SAP are the same for any developing economy in problem. It was the same for the Philippines as well. Initiated by the World Bank and IMF, the Philippines applied an export-oriented industrialization program under the martial law of Marcos, beginning at early 1970s. Till the end of 1986, the debt-to-GNP ratio reached to 90 % (Scipes, 1999: 8). Real wages collapsed in this period. After the overthrow of the dictator Marcos, the program continued. National debt increased with the loans of IMF and the World Bank. Work got a more flexible character, decreasing the power of unions and job security. Given the insufficiency of wages, very few employment opportunities emerged. In 1990s, 75 % of the population lived below the poverty line (Scipes, 1999: 14). Turning to a social disaster, the neo-liberal SAP of the Philippines succeeded to integrate the economy to the global world. The benefit accrued, once more, to a few local capitalists and to the global capitalism.

Authoritarian governments facilitate the implementation of SAPs. The social cost of these programs necessitates such cooperation. Singapore and South Korea are two examples (Mittelman and Pasha, 1997: 70). IMF loans are provided only if a standard set of conditions are accepted and implemented by the government of crisis economy. These are retrenchment in government sector, enhancement of market

mechanisms, cuts in social spending, elimination of subsidies, restriction on money supply, increase in taxes and interest rates, and devaluation. The inevitable social cost is borne by mostly urban and rural working classes. Authoritarian governments keep masses under control and repress the potential opposition. Nevertheless, the structural problems of the developing economies are not solved. There is a net and constant capital transfer from the developing world to the developed (Mittelman and Pasha, 1997: 225). This is the reason behind the structural problems of the developing world economies. The implementation of SAPs and IMF-led programs does nothing more than institutionalizing those problems.

One last case is from the developed world. In Britain, what was observed under Thatcher's neo-liberal regime has been a shift from direct taxes to indirect taxes, the tax proportion in GNP staying the same. This means that the tax burden is now on the general public, rather than on who makes money. Public expenditure has not decreased as a proportion of GNP, as expected by the neo-liberal assumptions and unemployment is now accompanied by a deregulated labor market (Pratt, 1997: 49). Income inequality and poverty have also increased and reached their peak under Thatcher regime (Kearns, 1997: 26). The middle classes are in the process of proletarianization.

2.4. The Liberalization of the Turkish Economy and Poverty

Before 1980, the industrialization strategy of Turkey was import-substitution. In the crisis environment of 1970s, the Turkey economy experienced severe problems. After the oil shock, the cost of inputs and imports rose sharply. The generation of

foreign currency was limited because of the import-substitution character of the economy. The industrial production was mostly for domestic market though its inputs were imported from foreign markets. There occurred a shortage of foreign currency and energy. Agricultural production was also adversely affected by these shortages. Inflation was another outcome of the crisis in 1970s. The sudden growth in short-term debts after the oil shock resulted in an added pressure on inflation (Şahin, 2000: 176). Running out of foreign exchange reserves, Turkey faced the risk of inability to pay her debts. Added to these, social disorder spread in the country, political groups struggling against one another by means of overt violence. The period ended up with the January 24 economic decisions and the September 12 military coup in 1980.

January 24 decisions are the turning point of the economy. The bearers of the decisions are the large-scale capital, the state, and the international institutions, specifically the World Bank and IMF (Ercan, 2002: 25). This fact reveals itself in the character of the decisions. Their economic, rather than social, character is dominant (Kılıçbay, 1992: 161). Beginning with the implementation of the decisions, Turkey abandoned the import-substitution model. The open economy began to replace protectionism. The development model has become export-orientation. Although the main goals of the January 24 program seem to be the fall in inflation, to overcome the shortage of foreign exchange, and to restore balance of payments, it marks the start of new-right policies (Sezer, 1999: 201), what we can call the neo-liberal period of the Turkish economy.

The assumption of neo-classical idea is that as the developed countries go towards to the exports of sophisticated, in terms of skill and technology, products, the developing countries take their place for the exports of the less sophisticated or simple products (Öniş, 1992: 1). But the reluctance of the developed world to abandon the production of some simple products and protectionism and the world market's inability to absorb the supply of many of the developing world exporters show that the assumption is not realistic. The transformation process in Turkey took place in line with this unrealistic assumption. Goods and service markets, capital and foreign exchange markets have been liberalized. Money and credit supply have been restricted to keep inflation under control. Governments tried to limit public spending with the aim of balanced budget. Within the framework of the program, real wages were decreased to boost investment, production, and profitability (Tecer, 2003: 76). The decrease in real wages would lead also to a contraction of domestic demand and a consequent growth of exports. The national currency was devalued again for the competitiveness of exports. In addition, high interest-rate policy was pursued to attract foreign capital to invest in the country.

All these dimensions of the economic transformation, which has had a significant social cost, were backed by the military junta in the first couple of years and by the governments, which took their power from the constitution prepared under the influence of the junta, in the following periods. In the implementation period, the social opposition was largely repressed and political rights were restricted to a great extent. The most politicized labor union, DİSK, was banned on the very first day of the coup (Akkaya, 2002: 136). The Motherland Party (ANAP) ruled the country with

a majority in the parliament until the early 1990s. The party program was based completely on the new-right politics (Sezer, 1999: 203). Though the integration to the global economy was not completed in the period, the economy was irreversibly directed to that radical transformation.

The basic aim of the January 24 decisions is to end the dominance of state in the economy and to leave it to the market with the government 's minimum intervention. The exclusion of government from the economy has many social consequences as well as economic ones. But the neo-liberal programs generally ignore the social aspects, focusing on macroeconomic variables (Şahin, 2000: 186). The decreasing real wages and salaries, the cuts in social spending including health and education services, and the restriction of union activities are the social cost, paid by the large majority, to attain the economic goals. Despite the social costs, the program has never reached the goal of price stability -a low level of inflation-, the primary indicator of the success (Şahin, 2000: 191).

Closely tied to the high inflation is the increasing debt of the country. Turkey is able to pay its debts only by new debts, enlarging its debt stock. The growing debt fuels the inflation towards high and chronic levels. The increasing gap between imports and exports and the short-term capital movements with no restriction have contributed to the vulnerability of the economy. As a result, the real interest rates have remained high throughout the neo-liberal period. The central bank is forced to hold significant foreign exchange as a precaution rather than to finance production sector (Balkan and Yeldan, 2002: 49). They have a negative impact on the

investment levels and the public debt. Money has been directed to the tax-free and secure government securities with high returns instead of productive investments that can create new employment (Tecer, 2003: 91). The banking sector has lost its main objective, that is, to provide investment funds to the real sector, and begun to fund the public debt. Artun describes the situation as a return to the debt banking in the dissolution period of the Ottoman Empire (Artun, 1986: 44). The problem is to make sure that debts will be regularly paid. The growth rate is no concern if it does not affect the ability to pay the debts. Exports should be increased without a decrease in imports for the debt payments. Therefore, the debt banking is a necessity for the economy to finance the gap between exports and imports. Artun points the growing numbers of the foreign banks after 1980 and the liberalization of foreign exchange regime, which has given a way for the short-term borrowing (Artun, 1986: 47-49). The debt banking led to the consolidation of the oligopolistic structure in the Turkish banking sector and the unification of the financial and industrial/trade capitals. The rather frequent bankrupts of the private banks after the deregulation of the sector brought about a large burden on the treasury and the economy. The public banks, which are entitled to serve certain sectors like agriculture, construction and petty production have not been able to finance these sectors due to the growing debt of governments, growing rural poverty and urban unemployment. The Turkish economy has become a mechanism, in its most naked form, which transfers the resources from the majority to the minority, from the country to the developed world countries (Artun, 1986: 59).

Yeldan makes a similar comment on the globalization of the economy. The dominant role of state in the accumulation and distribution processes has continued throughout the export-oriented period (Yeldan, 2001: 55). With the tools of the export subsidies, the repressed wages, and then financial operations through high real interest rates, the governments managed the integration process, transferring the accumulated value to the big capital. The use of informal or -in the word of Yeldan- marginal labor is one way of this transfer. Almost half of the working people are in this category, without social security (Yeldan, 2001: 96). Sub-contracting makes it possible to use extensively such kind of labor. At the same time, sub-contracting is a way of preventing unionization. The labor market begins to include more temporary labor in this period (Özar and Ercan, 2002: 171). The new regulations limit the union activities as well. The formal sector developed mechanisms to avoid those regulations in favor of labor (Onaran, 2002: 184). The result is a decrease in the cost of labor with a consequent increase in the profitability. But the increase in profitability is not materialized in terms of new investments (Özar and Ercan, 2002: 175). As a consequence, the unemployment rate has not decreased although there is no rigidity in the labor market. Contrary to the neo-liberal assertion that anticipates an increase in employment when there is no rigidity in labor market, the employment has not improved (Onaran, 2002: 189).

The pricing mechanisms of public sector and export subsidies that resulted in budget deficits are other tools to protect the income of capital. After 1990 the huge debts and their services have become the principal mechanism of the protectionism. The governments gave what they collected and more back through interest payments. The

integration between the financial and productive capital should be mentioned to understand the nature of the transfer. Yeldan states that the protectionism of the import-substitution period continues with a different face under the export-oriented regime (Yeldan, 2001: 103).

The institutional framework of the state has also changed in the process. The independence of central bank and other independent institutions responsible for monitoring market are largely free from the political influence. This may be helpful for the rational operation of the economy, but also means that the authorities are not politically accountable for their decisions. The popular vote is not reflected in these decisions. The situation is not surprising when we consider the neo-liberal thinking of the separation of economy and politics. The irresponsible politician is replaced with the irresponsible bureaucrat. At the lower levels of state employment, a new concept has emerged. The contractual employment has spread. The job security and unionization rights have lost their ground with the spread of the contractual work agreements among the public officials and workers (Sezer, 1999: 219). That kind of work has created a basis for the privatization of state enterprises.

Privatization is one aspect of the contraction of state and its withdrawal from the economy. It is also a means of getting rid of unionized workers, weakening the worker movements against the neo-liberal program. The deunionization is only possible by privatization since the majority of the unionized workers are employed in the public sector (Akkaya, 2002: 137). Another aim is to provide income for the treasury. It should be mentioned that the informal sector, which might be the best

single source of revenue for the government if it was taxed, has grown in this period (Sezer, 1999: 239). If privatized, the irrationally operated public enterprises would become profitable, creating value for the economy and tax for the government. The privatization would break the monopolistic structures in the market, decreasing the prices. The privatization process has not been completed yet. But its affects, as it occurred, are most observable on the part of workers in terms of unemployment, not on the parts of consumers in terms of decreasing prices and a more competitive market.

Privatization also indicates a shift in the understanding of public service (Sezer, 1999: 226). The beneficiaries are transformed into the consumers. That is to say that they have to pay, at the market rates, for those services. The paid services of state hospitals and the changing nature of education, especially of higher education, towards a student-paid institution demonstrate the paradigmatic shift. The quality education in state schools diminished considerably after the implementation of the neo-liberal program (Gök, 2002: 97). The funds allocated to the national education were well below the needs of a growing mass of students. At the same time, the private educational institutions increased in number. The differential quality of education in public and private schools reinforced and furthered the social-economic stratification. Added to this is the large amount of expenditures for preparation of the college and university exams, attainable only for the well-to-do families (Gök, 2002: 101). The most important mechanism of social mobility was severely damaged. The existing inequality in the educational system and in the society worsened with the implementation of the neo-liberal policies. Trying to leave those sectors like

education and health to market, the state begins to concentrate its efforts on the infrastructure like energy and communication facilities (Morrissey, 1996: 97).

In a developing country like Turkey, the development that decreases or balances the inequalities between the regions is very difficult to attain without the pioneer role of state (Tecer, 2003: 79). As a matter of fact, the income inequality has worsened in Turkey in the last 20 years (Tecer, 2003: 90). Although the economic programs succeeded in increasing exports and integrating the economy to the world, it could not prevent the increase in inflation, public debt, and current account deficit. The differences in the life-standard between the different regions and between the different strata within the same regions have become considerable. The cuts in agricultural transfers are of specific importance in this sense, deepening the rural poverty. After the liberalization, protection rates for imported goods have been reduced significantly without any adjustment period for the domestic producers. According to Türel, the number of supported products and the value of support purchases significantly dropped after 1980 (Oyan, 2002: 60). The input subsidies were abolished except in a few minor products (Kazgan, 1999: 33). The public institutions regulating the agricultural market lost their monopoly power in the period. Some of them were privatized. Turkey has become a net importer of the agricultural products, losing its self-sufficiency in agriculture. Backed by the military regime, the IMF-guided program led to the most comprehensive decline of agricultural incomes (Oyan, 2002: 60). In the late 1990s, the share of agricultural sector in income was 15 % while its share in employment was 40 % (Oyan, 2002: 69). In 1990, 40 % of the population was living in rural regions. In 2000, this number

decreased to 35 % (DİE, 2004). The percentage of the economically active population in agriculture to the total economically active population was 71.92 % in 1965, 59.95 % in 1980, and 53.66 % in 1990 (DİE, 2004). What we try to demonstrate is that the rural population and those working in the sector are still considerable. The share of agriculture in GNP was 30.7 % in 1970, 24.2 % in 1980, and 15.8 in 1992 (DİE, 2004). The share of agriculture in exports was 75.3 % in 1970, 57.5 % in 1980, and 15.4 % in 1992. Despite the considerable number of rural population, its share in national income has been decreasing in an accelerating way. The per capita income ratio of non-agriculture sector to agriculture sector was 2.7 in 1970. It became 3.7 in 1997 (DİE, 2004). We should add that the rural population is not a homogeneous whole. The income inequality is severe. 30 % have no land (DİE, 2004). In villages, semi-feudal relations continue to exist especially in eastern part of the country. Neo-liberalism worsened the traditionally unequal structures in those rural regions. A great number of people in rural regions are not covered by the social security system of the state. Urban regions cannot absorb the excess population of rural regions. Yet, in these circumstances, it is highly likely that rural unemployment will result in another mass migration from the rural to the urban regions, bringing about new social and economic problems. The differences are also reflected in the composition of tax revenues. They are comprised mostly of indirect taxes, which amount to 60 % of all the revenue (Tecer, 2003: 101). Indirect taxes are collected through the increases in consumer prices. Inflation is, then, one way of taxing the people. The salaried or waged middle and working classes are heavily taxed through inflation. In addition, the below-inflation pay raises and above-inflation interest rates together with the debt services inflicted upon the those classes again through

inflation marginalize the waged/salaried classes towards the lower end of the social spectrum, numbering that end in its poverty (Kuruç, 1986: 23). In fact, the pay decreases restore the profitability by compensating the increasing cost of capital, that is, interest rates. Consequently, employment does not improve. The widespread unemployment, which is an almost natural outcome of the economic programs after 1980, pressures down wages further. It indicates the unequal distribution of national income (Kuruç, 1986: 34).

2.5. Conclusion

The world economy has been completely organized according to the needs of the global capital. Neo-liberalism is the treatment of the capitalist system to its recent crisis. But, it has nothing to do with the problems of the peoples. The growing development NGO sector has its roots in the consequences of the neo-liberal economy. Other factors, like the end of the Cold War, civil society movements in the former Eastern Block and in the developing world, have certainly affected the NGO sector. Nevertheless, the primary role belongs to the poverty worsening as a result of neo-liberal economic policies. The operation of market economy without the interruption by governments, which may favor the peoples, has left them in the mercy of market. Governments determine their policies to attract and keep the global capital in their borders. They ignore the needs of masses of people. The social spending and the transfers to social security systems have been severely cut. The tax system and interest payments have become mechanisms for further accumulation of capital. Education and health systems are in the process of privatization in many countries. The reforms have been applied under the structural adjustment programs

in the developing world. SAPs do not aim at creating employment, but price stability and the integration of national economies to the global economy. Turkey has been included in the process after the January 24 decisions. The result of the process all over the world is poverty becoming structural day by day. The development NGOs are both a popular response against poverty on the part of peoples and an ideologically sustainable remedy leaving the causes untouched on the part of the global economic actors. It seems that the latter part has taken the lead in the development NGO movement. The global economic actors try to compensate the retrenchment of welfare state and welfare functions during a period of extraordinary poverty by employing NGOs in welfare activities. Although it is evident that the NGO sector will never be able to satisfy the welfare needs even at a minimum degree, they may work as the safety belt of the neo-liberal system and may spread the ideological assertion that individual, not society, is responsible for the good of individual.

CHAPTER 3

NGO SECTOR AND DEVELOPMENT NGOS

In this chapter, we will go through the concepts of NGO and development NGO. The main characteristics of the NGO sector, especially development NGOs, will be summarized. We will also investigate the link between the development NGOs and neo-liberal economy. It will be demonstrated that the recent proliferation of the development NGOs is directly related to the poverty and the funds to struggle against that poverty, both created by the neo-liberal policies and the policy-makers such as the World Bank and IMF. Neo-liberalism tries to substitute the development NGOs for the welfare state, which has lost its redistribution function for the sake of poor people.

3.1. NGOs and Development NGOs

The term NGO is a post-World War II expression, which was initially used by the UN to refer to international societal bodies (Martens, 2002: 271). Since 1980s, the term contains both international and national bodies. Though there are various definitions of NGOs in the literature, some general aspects may be outlined. NGOs are self-governing, private, and not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people (Vakil, 1997: 2060). They may own profit-generating enterprises but do not distribute that profit to the shareholders. NGOs are formal and independent organizations whose primary aim is to promote

common goals at the national or the international level (Martens, 2002: 282). They are independent from both state and market (market comprises of private economic actors including business firms and employees/workers). NGOs may be provided funds by state and market, but are theoretically free from the influences of either. They have a universal perspective, working for common goals, not for specific interests (Martens, 2002: 282). They are permanent organizations, different from social movements. They have a sort of continuity with their formal structures. NGOs are volunteer-based organizations though they generally employ permanent staff. The bearers of the mission, the board of trustees for example, do not benefit from the activities of NGO (Gümüş, 2002a). It is very likely that the salaried employees have a sincere commitment to the goals of their organizations, or because of their beliefs they prefer working in the NGO sector.

At this point, it is better to briefly define development. In the most general sense, development is the improvement of society (Clark, 1990: 36). Development makes it possible for people to get what they desire (Clark, 1990: 36). Clark (1990) mentions three aspects of the concept. Every model of development should be based on democracy so that what people want can be known. Development is a political process, including political choices that determine which groups come first in taking the benefits of the development activity. The last aspect is that development is not to provide the poor what they need, but to make it possible for them to own it on their own. Development is not a service to individuals. It is a work carried out with individuals (Clark, 1990: 13). The fundamental principle of development is to remove poverty and its reasons (Clark, 1990: 31). Development is not simply

economic growth and poverty is not simply related to the material wellbeing. Social and cultural qualities of life, access to health and education services, access to adequate infrastructure, protection from power inequalities, from patriarchal and traditional structures, and entertainment and consumption possibilities are included in the definition of poverty.

NGOs are a part of the sphere of civil society. We will touch on the concept, and not on its historical development, very briefly to understand the features of NGOs. Civil society aims at expanding the autonomous social sphere against state. Its actors, while searching for individual autonomy, are restricted by the norms of equality and universality. They do not make others accept their norms, rather are ready to discuss on them. The actors do not oppose the concept of market economy. They defend the regulation of capitalist market. What the civil society actors are against is the uncontrolled market (9. STK Sempozyumu, 2002: 7). To influence, not manipulate, public opinion is the main objective of the activities of civil society organizations (9. STK Sempozyumu, 2002: 7). These organizations should not have a hierarchical structure since that structure is detrimental to the free speech and discussion, which is innate to civil society. Their organizational structure should be as flat as possible to encourage free sharing of ideas.

Lopez and Petras outline the characteristics of the development NGOs in what they call “seven dogmas” legitimizing the activities of NGOs (Lopez and Petras, 2001: 115). First, they reach the poor. Contrary to the bureaucratic government structures, the NGOs are flexible responding instantly to the needs of the poor. Instead of

serving, they work with the poor, acting from within, not from a superior position of a government official. Second, they make sure the local participation to development. This is why they are a part of civil society. They conceive of development as a process of capacity building of the poor rather than of project implementation. The NGOs do not simply serve to the poor. They work on the principle of human-to-human relations, not government-to-government relations. Individual is the point of reference. The NGOs try to solve the problems at the individual level. They are flexible and empirical, keeping in touch with the poor. It is easy for them to strengthen the local and private institutions due to their proximity to and one-to-one relations with those institutions. Lastly, they cost less than a government. Some dogmas may be true to some extent, and some may be truly dogma.

Although there is little evidence or reporting regarding those strengths of NGOs (Riley, 2002: 72), NGOs are internationally known for their role in providing services that governments have failed to provide. In fact, international donors have found increased flexibility, improved supervision and responsiveness, and fewer political problems working with the nonprofit sector than with the public sector (Meyer, 1997: 1128). The availability of new donor funding is typically the key factor in expanding coverage and size (Uvin, Jain, and Brown, 2000: 1409). As many NGOs become more involved in large-scale service delivery, they have increasingly been obliged to complicate and bureaucratize their structures (Fyvie and Ager, 1999: 1394). When official agents finance service delivery, they expect contracted outputs to be achieved and are less interested in a learning process. Expansion results in a

larger organization that is professionally managed, more efficient, and programmatic. When NGOs do not choose to scale up, the NGO work provides very little to the poor in a wider economic and institutional environment, which is detrimental to the poor (Uvin, Jain, and Brown, 2000: 1409).

There is a great heterogeneity and variety among development NGOs (Atack, 1999: 855). When classifying NGOs, Vakil differentiates essential and contingent factors. Essential descriptors for classifying NGOs are orientation and level of operation (Vakil, 1997: 2063). Orientations are welfare, development, advocacy, development education, networking, and research. There are two distinct types of development organizations (Vakil, 1997: 2063). In development membership organizations, beneficiaries are members. In service organizations, members provide service to other people. Level of operation ranges between international, national, regional, and community-based. The first three are generally service organization while the last one is membership organization (Vakil, 1997: 2064). Contingent descriptors, which may not have broad applications for all types of NGOs, are sectoral focus and evaluative attributes like accountability, efficiency, gender equality, level of participation, and control over resources (Vakil, 1997: 2064).

NGOs can also be classified according to their areas of interest. NGO activities can be grouped under the two headings of “change and development” and “care and welfare”, with a range of sub-activities (Bağcı, 47). These two functions are not mutually exclusive. Many NGOs are involved in both, describing themselves as

multi-functional (Bağcı, 1999: 47). The activities are summarized in Table 3.1 (Bağcı, 1999: 48).

TABLE 3.1: NGO Activities

<p><u>Care and Welfare</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service and delivery • Mobilizing resources • Research and innovation • Human resource development • Public information <p><u>Change and Development</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Welfare organizations • Development organizations • Environmental organizations • Indigenous people's organizations • Women's organizations • Youth organizations • Human right organizations • Environmental groups • Income generating projects • Job creation programs • Children organizations • Disabilities organizations • Workers organizations <p>Source: CWF, 1995: 8</p>
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As we have stated, our concern is the development NGOs. Korten identifies four generations of development NGO strategy. These are relief and welfare, local self-reliance, sustainable systems development, and support for people's movement promoting a broader social vision (Atack, 1999: 856). Historically, NGOs operated outside the sphere of government activities, focusing on the provision of disaster relief services, welfare activities, and charity work (Riley, 2002: 74). These first

generation strategies involve NGO in the direct delivery of services to meet an immediate needs experienced by the beneficiary population. Efforts are directed to the symptoms of poverty, not to its causes. Second generation strategies concern NGO involvement in long-term development work or capacity building so that benefits would be sustained beyond the period of NGO assistance. NGOs focus on the causes of poverty (Riley, 2002: 75). Third generation activity concerns the larger institutional and policy context affecting development NGO work, or participation in the process of policy formation by governments and multilateral organizations. NGOs take into account the outside forces that affect development. Fourth generation involves political advocacy and campaigning. Many development NGOs began in response to a pressing human catastrophe or crisis, and their activities moved from one generation to the next (Atack, 1999: 856). Korten argues that NGO participation in policy formation is necessary for first and second generations activities to be effective. All remain important for development NGO work.

The availability of funding recently has promoted a return to first generation activity. With the introduction of large-scale donor support in the 1990s, political mobilization and anti-hegemonic programs, which may be perceived as second and third generation strategies, have become less and less common (Stiles, 2002: 838). The concentration on the welfare activities has restructured the development NGOs. NGOs work well at the micro level, but cannot replace governments at the macro level (Atack, 1999: 855). In order to be effective at the macro level, NGOs and their donors have included financial sustainability and professionalism in their agendas as their main concerns. The typical NGO structure based on a web of informal and

personal connections are in the process of revision (Atack, 1999: 855). It has become commonplace to hear NGOs being advised to professionalize their operations, borrow management and strategic planning techniques from corporate sector, standardize their procedures, and routinize the operations (Edwards, 1999: 372). The development NGOs are organizing themselves as a service provider rather than a catalyst for institutional development (Edwards, 1999: 373).

3.2. Neo-liberalism and Development NGOs

In the initial years of the development NGOs, between 1945 and 1960, the main factor for development aids to those organizations in the developing world was cold war (Arellano-Lopez et al, 2001: 19). To prevent the spread of communism and to politically tie the developing world to the capitalist bloc were the motivations. The gap between the two would have been closed through the replication of the industrialization model of the developed world. Between 1960 and 1975, NGOs obtained a political character, struggling against the anti-democratic governments (Arellano-Lopez et al, 2001: 20). They also began to support structural changes through social struggles and people's movements. Development was a broad issue, going beyond the limits of micro projects. After 1975, the bipolar world has ended, giving way to the dominance of neo-liberal model (Arellano-Lopez et al, 2001: 22). The new model has been applied in both the developed and developing worlds. Poverty has dramatically increased as a result of the neo-liberal SAPs. NGOs were ideal partners in the struggle against poverty for not only their proximity to the poor and flexible/informal organizational structures, but also, and more importantly, filling the gap created by the withdrawal of the state (Arellano-Lopez et al, 2001:

24). Their proliferation was in response to the austerity measures of the SAPs (Mohan, 2002: 139).

With the rise of neo-liberalism the notion of the state as society's problem-solver has become weak. In this context, NGOs are seen as the preferred channel for social welfare. In fact, the NGO explosion is directly related to minimizing the direct role of government in the neo-liberal economy (Bağcı, 1999: 55). The emphasis on self-help serves to place the burden for poverty alleviation on the structurally poor, leaving NGOs legitimizing SAPs by filling the welfare gap (Mohan, 2002: 149). Accompanied by multimillion-dollar grants from the institutions like the World Bank, NGOs are expanding at rates, which are unknown in history (Edwards, 1999: 372). The NGOs financed by the most donors tend to be welfare organizations, which support the withdrawal of the state from social provisioning. A general trend towards focusing on donor-funded service provision at the expense of political activities has been noted in the development NGO sector. NGOs are taking up greater roles in social welfare activities as more donor-funds become available (Mercer, 2002: 14). They are increasingly assigned the role of replacing the functions of the welfare state as the latter more and more contracts.

As the aid market has multiplied the development NGOs, it has tightened its funding criteria, which make it difficult for smaller and less professionalized organizations to succeed (Mohan, 2002: 148). In addition to this competitive market, the macro level problems that the public sector left unsolved have made inevitable such a professionalization and bureaucratization (Lopez and Petras, 2001: 98). The foreign

fundings demand NGOs to have sufficiently trained staff to manage substantial funding, reporting, and monitoring. As a consequence, the NGO staff has generally been composed of technical experts rather than social scientists (Lopez and Petras, 2001: 110). The social workers of the welfare state are reproduced in the development NGOs.

The World Bank has increasingly embraced the NGO sector as a part of SAPs (Mohan, 2002: 130). The Bank explicitly declares the various benefits of strengthening NGOs in the fields of representation, service delivery, and capacity building (Mohan, 2002: 129). It recognizes NGOs as articulating people's aspirations and responding to governments' pressures (Mercer, 2002: 9). The autonomous government action would be prevented and the wider monitoring of state would be encouraged. The concept of governance refers to the involvement of civil society actors in the administration of government policies (İnsel, 23.9.01). According to the World Bank and IMF, good governance is a way of succeeding what government has failed to succeed. UN agencies such as UNHCR and UNICEF not only rely on for service provision, but also try to involve NGOs in project formulation and policy consultations (Atack, 1999: 857). NGOs are seen as an instrument of empowerment that will enable ordinary people to take control of development decisions.

In contrast to the picture of NGOs by the World Bank, these major constituents of civil society are often internally anti-democratic, characterized by authoritarian or charismatic personalized leadership, competitive, ideologically and socially fragmented, steered by state or donors (Mercer, 2002: 13). In other words, the social,

political, cultural, and economic cleavages of the society are more likely to replicate in NGOs than they are to be challenged. Participation, as way of empowering people to mobilize their own capacities and be social actors rather than passive subjects, is more myth than reality in many development projects (Bağcı, 1999: 61). The real participation of uneducated, illiterate masses in investment planning, decision-making and evaluation process of the projects are very limited. Governance as a way of participation may be an ideological tool of neo-liberalism to contract the state (İnsel, 23.9.01). The political space would be narrowed with the inclusion of NGOs and private sector. NGOs have many stakeholders, including the World Bank itself in many cases, and their multiple accountabilities -downwards to partners, beneficiaries, staff, and supporters, and upwards to trustees, donors, and host governments- are not balanced.

Many NGOs are staffed by urban educated middle classes with no substantive roots in the poor groups (Mercer, 2002: 14). Furthermore, NGOs are adopting formal procedures required by donors. Increased size and formalization mean increased distance from the poor with the dominating organization principle of efficiency (Mercer, 2002: 16). The state-sponsored social funds, which usually carry the World Bank and donor backing, have used NGOs to implement state development plans designed to mitigate the harshest effects of SAPs (Mercer, 2002: 16). There is no longer a welfare state to take care of its citizens in the application process of SAP. Instead, NGOs work for the beneficiaries, supporting the retrenchment of the welfare regime and the status of the neo-liberal regime. NGO participation serves to legitimize the status quo, not to challenge it.

The basic convergence between NGOs and the World Bank is their common opposition to statism. The World Bank, the neo-liberal regimes, and Western foundations have encouraged NGOs to undermine the national welfare state (Petras, 1997). The result of anti-statism is the end of the redistribution function of the state. Income inequality and poverty are the inevitable consequences of the withdrawal of the welfare state. The growth of NGOs coincides with increased funding under neo-liberalism and the deepening of poverty everywhere (Petras, 1997). The proportion of total bilateral aid channeled through NGOs from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries increased from 0.7 % in 1975 to 3.6 % in 1985 and to 5 % in 1994 (Ebrahim, 2001: 95). Fund transfers from the developed world NGOs to the developing world's increased fourfold from 1970 to 1985 (Ebrahim, 2001: 95). NGOs have become the community face of neo-liberalism. Neo-liberalism from above (the World Bank and IMF) is complemented from below (Petras, 1997). State power is argued to be distant from citizens, autonomous, and arbitrary as opposed to local power that is responsive and closer to citizens. In reality, NGOs depoliticize sectors of population (Petras, 1997). They shift people's attention and struggles away from the national budget and toward self-exploitation to secure local social services. They mobilize people to produce at the margins, but not to struggle to control the basic means of production and wealth. NGOs discuss "the excluded" or "the powerless", not the classes and the social system (Petras, 1997). This allows the neo-liberals to cut social budgets. Against the notion of public responsibility, NGOs foster the neo-liberal idea of private responsibility for social problems (Petras, 1997). The poor people continue to pay

taxes to finance the neo-liberal state financing the rich and are left alone to take care of their own needs. Not surprisingly, the overall power of neo-liberalism stands unchallenged and NGOs increasingly search for niches in the margins of power. Nevertheless, there is small minority of NGOs, which do not receive funds from the World Bank and the developed world's agencies, and which defend an anti-imperialist strategy and class politics (Petras, 1997).

CHAPTER 4

NGO SECTOR IN TURKEY

4.1. Introduction

This chapter will show us the parallelism of the development of the neo-liberal policies and the development NGO proliferation in Turkey. We claim that these policies have resulted in structural poverty, especially in the rural regions. The period has witnessed the privatization state enterprises, the cuts in social budgets and public investments except for infrastructure. In line with the neo-liberal paradigm and the integration to the global economy, government is neither willing nor able to help the poor in a large scale. The previous chapter has demonstrated these developments, mainly the link between neo-liberalism and poverty. In this chapter we will examine the increase in the NGOs working in the sector of the poverty, which has been enlarged by the recent political-economic shift.

The democratization of political system and the crises that are marked by extraordinary uncertainty contribute to the proliferation of NGOs (Alkan, 1998: 128). In Turkey, the factor that created the extraordinary uncertainty for masses and somewhat political liberalization via the Özal governments, as opposed to the military junta, is neo-liberalism. Looking at the figures, in the period from the early 1970s to the late 1990s, in which the NGO sector has grown enormously not seen

before, we claim that that expansion is a consequence mainly of the neo-liberal political economy, among other secondary factors.

4.2. The NGO Sector of Turkey

The two organizational types of the Turkish NGO sector are association and foundation. Associations are the organizations that do not pursue economic goals like profit or income- sharing (Yücekök, 1998c: 147). They are established for ideal goals, uneconomic in nature. Foundations, on the other hand, are established by the allocation of a property or of the right to a property (Yücekök, 1998c: 157). It is not based on a group of individuals devoted to the same goal.

Throughout the one-party period, NGOs were very few and under the direction of the government (Alkan, 1998: 116). They were largely restricted with a concern of repressing possible oppositions while the institutionalization of the new republic was in its early days. In 1946, the law of associations was liberalized, and beginning in 1950, the country experienced an intensive industrialization, which differentiated and pluralized social forces (Yücekök, 1998b: 75). The differentiation within the bourgeoisie, the bureaucrat elites, and the intelligentsia, which was created by the capitalist development, brought about a considerable increase in the numbers of NGOs (Yücekök, 1998a: 43). After 1970, the nature of these organizations has corresponded to the social and economic development process of the country (Yücekök, 1998a: 43). The 1961 constitution furthered this liberalization, accelerating the association formation. The process was interrupted by the March 12 military regime in 1970 and the formation of associations was restricted once more.

The 1980 constitution set up by the September 12 junta created additional restrictions and control mechanisms over associations. There are fewer restrictions and controls on foundations as opposed to those on associations. In addition, they have some tax privileges. The control on foundations examines financial issues whereas it is mostly about whether an association is a threat to the national security. This difference makes it easier for foundations to find external funds (Yücekök, 1998a: 22). Below are the numbers of foundations and associations established in the period (Bağcı, 1999: 97). We should mention that a quarter of the new foundations were established by the state (Bağcı, 1999: 97).

TABLE 4.1: Foundations established 1981-98

Years	Numbers	Cumulative	% Change
1981-1983	85	85	
1984	36	121	42,4
1985	76	197	62,8
1986	777	974	394,4
1987	113	1087	11,6
1988	185	1272	17
1989	142	1414	11,2
1990	230	1644	16,3
1991	264	1908	16,1
1992	189	2097	9,9
1993	189	2286	9
1994	282	2568	12,3
1995	421	2989	16,4
1996	374	3363	12,5
1997	158	3521	4,7
1998	140	3661	4
TOTAL	3661		

General Directorate of Foundations, Unpublished Records (1996, 1997, 1999), Ankara (Bağcı, 1999: 97)

TABLE 4.2: Associations Established 1980-98

Years	Numbers	Cumulative	% Change
1980	598	598	
1981	471	1069	78,8
1982	478	1547	44,7
1983	413	1960	26,7
1984	2830	4790	144,4
1985	2675	7465	55,8
1986	2742	10210	36,8
1987	2366	12576	23,2
1988	2539	15115	20,2
1989	2920	18035	19,3
1990	3244	21279	18
1991	3335	24614	12,2
1992	3696	28310	15
1993	4305	32615	15,2
1994	5289	37904	16,2
1995	5766	43670	15,2
1996	5310	48980	12,2
1997	5907	54887	12,1
1998	6312	61199	11,5
Total	611969		

Ministry of Internal Affairs, Unpublished Records, 1997, 1999, Ankara

(Bağcı, 1999: 99)

The state was perceived as the sole bearer of the development before 1980 (Turan, 1998: 206). In that period, most organizations were established to give an additional support for the realization of the state services. Another reason was the requirement that the state cooperate with NGOs in the use of external funds (Turan, 1998: 207). The situation has not changed much, following the 1980s economic liberalization. The NGO involvement can, in no way and not even minimally, bear the burden of development, considering the huge needs of the population. According to Bağcı, for

instance, within the agricultural sector, the NGO intervention is usually focused on one or more activities aimed at raising income levels, generally by providing technical advice, generating very little employment (Bağcı, 1999: 111). But, different from that of state, the bottom-up approach of NGOs, which emphasizes community participation and cooperation, makes them necessary partners in the development efforts. Their partnership is also a requirement for an external fund to be used by the state. This requirement has been accompanied by the growth in numbers, scale and professionalization of the NGOs concerned with development (Bağcı, 1999: 112).

Another outcome of the liberal period is that the private sector has expanded and a new professional class with a relatively high income has come into being (Turan, 1998: 203). Since then, the private sector has considered public relations as an important part of the economic activity and involved in the voluntary activities (Turan, 1998: 203). NGOs have also substituted for the political organizations after 1980, channeling the political energy from a field of large restrictions to that of fewer restrictions (İnsel, 2002). Much more important is the link between the economic liberalization, which benefits the private sector, and the NGO sector. The spread of the NGO activity provides a kind of legitimization for the neo-liberal policies, alleviating consequent poverty and increasing citizen participation. NGOs are the organizations that compensate the consequences of the market economy (İnsel, 2004). On the other hand, the NGO sector needs the funds from the private sector to keep the operations going. In this neo-liberal period, the human resources needed for the development of the voluntary organizations have matured (Turan, 1998: 204). Instead of expecting direction from the state, those individuals began to initiate their

organizations concerning social and economic issues. The expansion of the NGO sector in the international scale and their prestige compared to governments added more to this enlarging sector of the country.

In his study of the associations in Turkey between 1972 and 1996, İlder Turan considers the developments in İstanbul as the representative for the country (Turan, 1998: 213). This is because of the central role that İstanbul plays in the social and economic life of the country. Though it is not the political capital, it is still the cultural and economic capital of Turkey. It is the most appropriate place for associations to establish their headquarters. What we are interested in the findings of the study is the increase in the number of social assistance associations and foundations in İstanbul. In 1971, the number of the former was 416, 576 in 1980, 1021 in 1990, and 2481 in 1995 (Turan, 1998: 211). Foundations are also in the rise. Their number was 90 in 1970, 205 in 1980, 485 in 1990, and 881 in 1995 (Turan, 1998: 211). Within the same period, the proportion of the associations of social assistance rose to 20 % from a level of 11 %, while the proportion of foundations to 7.1 % from 2.3 % (Turan, 1998: 212). This proportional increase in those foundations is identified by Bağcı as well (Bağcı, 1999: 97). In the table below, it is seen that 32.4 % of foundations are of social assistance. The increase in the number of the social assistance associations and foundations, Turan mentions, is clearly much more than that of other kinds of associations (Turan, 1998: 217). Turan explains the growth of the social assistance associations by referring to the ongoing migration to İstanbul. The population of the country has been regularly growing since the foundation of the republic. The migration of the population that was not

sustained by the rural regions to the urban areas has intensified the existing problems of the cities. It has been also a problem of the people that migrated. Their integration to the urban life is not a straight process. The rural unemployment was moved to the cities. Consequently, economic and social problems have exacerbated. The associations should be a response to the problems. Foundations, on the other hand, have the goals that are considered important by the general public (Turan, 1998: 221).

TABLE 4.3: Distribution of Foundations According to Field of Activity (1996)

Field of Activity	Number	%
Education	817	21,2
Religious Education	116	3
Religious	380	9,9
Health	280	5,4
Social Assistance	1246	32,4
Social Service	62	1,6
Art-Cultural Act	113	2,9
Science and Technology	83	2,2
Help to Members	181	4,7
History-tourism-sport	53	1,4
Socio- and Historical-Cultural	53	1,4
Vocational Training	37	1
Regional Development	224	5,8
Social and political Research	63	1,6
Environmental	93	2,4
Others	126	3,4
TOTAL	3927	100

General Directorate of Foundations, Unpublished Records (1996), Ankara

(Bağcı, 1999: 98)

The proliferation of the NGOs in general and in the development sector is the direct result of the neo-liberal policies applied globally and nationally. The effects of those policies have been examined in the section of the neo-liberalism in Turkey. It is very likely that the neo-liberal program has worsened the historical unequal development of the regions of the country, increasing poverty. The income distribution, the education level, and the open value system all influence the activities of the NGOs, and the influence changes from positive to negative, as we move from the West and South-coast regions to the Central and North-coast regions, and to the East and South-east Anatolia (Uğur, 1998: 225), reflecting the ongoing disparity between the regions. That the citizen participation has improved in those regions may be partly true, but it cannot explain the NGO proliferation. Despite the increase in the number of the civil society organizations, a large majority of the people are not interested in the membership of those organizations. Furthermore, only a small minority of the members are actively involved in the organizations (Ünsal, 1998: 26). Those involved have to work in the organizations, not actually civil in character. Many NGOs work within the patronage relations, without organizing the public interest where they work, and many are no different from the traditional elite structures, without any responsibility to enhance democratization (Uğur, 1998: 226). The patriarchal family structure, which makes individuals prone to the authority, is reproduced within many NGOs.

The major revenue sources of Turkish associations and foundations are membership fees, service charges, private donations, fund arising events, and foreign grants (in the form of direct donations or project financing), while only membership fees

provide continuity of revenue (Bağcı, 1999: 114). The increased foreign donations after 1980 are another reason for the growth of the sector. The foreign donations, large amount of which are supplied by the developed world governments to their national donor agencies, are directly linked to the neo-liberal political economy and its effects on the developing world economies. Within the country, on the other hand, the accumulation of capital, a minute part of which may be allocated to the NGOs, is realized mostly by the private sector after the withdrawal of the state from the economy in line with the structural adjustment programs of neo-liberalism. We should also mention again that the government itself established many social assistance foundations in the period.

4.3. Conclusion

Among other secondary factors, the neo-liberal policies are the primary reason for the development NGO proliferation in the country. The increasing poverty, especially in the rural regions, and the funds from the developed world donors and institutions made it possible to establish new NGOs. The link between the developed world governments and international NGOs, which are the donors of the developing world NGOs, is crucial to understand the recent proliferation in the framework of neo-liberalism. The contributions of governments to international NGOs were 1.5 % in 1970, increasing 35 % in 1988 (Clark, 1990: 54). The US government provides half of those contributions to the NGO sector. Its contribution is as much as 85 % of total civil society assistance (Mohan, 2002: 130). The foreign aids of the developed world governments via NGOs increased from \$200 million in 1970 to \$2.2 billion in 1990 (Baylosis, 2001: 91). Canadian NGOs receive large amount of funds from the

government and the private sector (Tandon, 2001: 76). EU also provides the European NGOs with considerable funds (Tandon, 2001: 77). Our interviews also pointed out the fact that the donor funds keep the development NGOs in the operation.

We cannot explain the expansion of the sector by the political mobilization of the population. In Turkey, NGOs have not taken part in politics (Gümüő, 2002b). They think that the decisions on public services and their applications are beyond politics (Gümüő, 2002b). They do not worry about information-sharing, local participation, and transparency (Gümüő, 2002b). The NGOs of Turkey are not political actors. They stay within the dominant paradigm. The neo-liberal paradigm has created those conditions of poverty in Turkey as in the other parts of the world and those funds to manage that poverty.

CHAPTER 5

THE THEORY OF RATIONZALIZATION AND BUREAUCRACY

5.1. Introduction

The rationalization theory is the framework, within which the institutionalization of the development NGOs will be examined. The process of institutionalization and the development of bureaucratic structures are the part of a more general phenomenon, that is, rationalization. We will use those concepts interchangeably throughout this study. The results of neo-liberal economy on the poor and the development NGOs may integrate the NGOs firmly to the process of rationalization. The growth of poverty should be accompanied by a growth of counter-structures. In the current conditions of political economy, the NGOs are given an important role in the struggle against poverty. This is to say that the development NGOs will have to scale up. They will have to rationalize their structures to deal with the increasing complexity they are exposed to. The rationalization means, at the same time, to employ more qualified/skilled individuals that can deal with the administrative tasks. The institutional structure may draw its workforce from the mass of highly skilled people unemployed by the neo-liberal economic policies. In other words, social-economic composition of the employees is an outcome of both the existing rationalization process, which initiated by neo-liberalism, and the process of neo-liberal reorganization itself. This theory section explains how life and its elements respond to complexity by rationalization, how bureaucracy has developed as the

general principle of organizing life elements. In addition, we will search for the social-economic statuses of the employees, assuming that they are mainly determined by the rationalized structure. We believe that the bureaucratization of the development NGOs historically initiated by the neo-liberal economy can be thoroughly understood via only the examination of the general process of rationalization, specifically of that theorized by Max Weber. The reason why we have chosen Weber is his direct concern with bureaucracy, not only as an organizing principle of life but also as the most effective organizational type. We will use his ideal typical formulation bureaucracy in this study.

The judicial personality is an entity that seems specific to the area of law. It has some rights and obligations as real personalities do. It may possess assets, make contracts and be sued for breaking those contracts. In these respects, as if it was real, it may interact with real individuals. The judicial personality is never simply a phenomenon of law. In fact, it is a typical representation of the modern culture, the culture of bureaucracy. This specific personality exemplifies the extent of the objectification of culture. The cultural elements are objectified into macro or micro bureaucracies. These forms live a life without the necessity of having a spirit. The spirit, the value, or the meaning is of no use in the modern culture. The formal regulation of cultural elements leaves no space for such irrationalities to determine life. It is a life of calculability, predictability, and punctuality. Formal bureaucracy penetrates into charismatic life to the point of the destruction of the latter.

Max Weber conceives of this culture as the iron cage. The modern culture is an entity in-itself that is devoid of cultural significance from the humanly point of view. It is a reproduction machine that reproduces itself. In this sense, it is an end-in-itself. Culture goes through a path from being a means to an end of human life. What dominates cultural elements is the impersonal relations that depersonalize even human beings. Depersonalized individuals, functional interconnections, and specialized spheres all amount to the objective culture of bureaucracy. The theory of cultural change in Weber analyzes the emergence of, in general, bureaucracy as the main type of social organization, both individually and structurally.

According to Weber, the modern culture is an outcome of the process of rationalization. This process is an ever-lasting one that should reproduce its bases on enlarging degrees. This is because the development of culture leads to the increase in complexities, which can only be included by further rationalization. Therefore, every aspect of life is confined within specialized systems of rationality and is freed from the free will of individuality. Between the historical extremes of cultural change, the struggle between charisma and routine in Weber is solved by the victory of routine. Bureaucracy as described by Weber concretizes this victory. It is not simply an administration mechanism. It is the way that our existences experience reality and the way that they are experienced by that reality.

In order to analyze the theory of rationalization and the emergence of bureaucracy as the organizing principle of the modern culture, first we should examine how Weber conceptualizes cultural change. We will then apply the theory of cultural change to

discuss how Weber comprehends rationalization and bureaucratization. On the basis of that discussion, we will try to construct the definition of rationalization to be utilized operationally.

5.2. The Struggle of Charisma and Routine

There is not an explicit theory of cultural change in Weber. Weber never states that charisma and routinization are the two bases of the historical change. Nevertheless, it can be said that in Weber's theory these two antagonistic forces are utilized to explain the rationalization process in various periods and spheres. Throughout history, what takes place again and again is the struggle between charisma and routinization (Schroeder, 1996: 34). Charisma and routine tend to turn into each other. But the charismatic element is generally restricted by the routine. Routine is a state, which is not so much a tendency to renew as the preservation of what it is.

Routinization is not an ever-lasting fixation. It may trigger social change as well. Within the framework of institutionalized structures and with their rationalized tools, individuals can transform the existing conditions of society. In addition to this evolutionary change of culture, it can also be transformed by revolutionary acts, by the destruction of institutions, or by charismatic upheavals (Eisenstadt, 1968: xvii). The tension between constrictive and creative aspects of culture and its institutions gives way to the history of cultural change.

To Weber, charisma is a certain quality of individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from the ordinary men and treated as an exceptional or superhuman

being (Weber, 1995: 352). Charisma is not peculiar to individuals (Giddens, 1971: 170). It may be a quality of groups. The distinctive character of charisma is its opposition to the systematic procedures and strong tendency towards the destruction of institutions (Eisenstadt, 1968: xix). It is inherently creative though this creativity may not have a definite path. Its determination of path as a charisma is a function of the needs of the conditions. This is to say that cultural change occurs as a consequence of the mutual effect of charisma and its institutional setting. Objective forces prepare the infrastructure, with which charisma interacts to transform culture (Eisenstadt, 1968: xxxii).

The charisma-routine antagonism is without solution. That charisma is the creative aspect of culture does not denote that culture begins with charisma and ends with routine. The historical process may be described as a descent from a predominantly charismatic form, through traditional, to bureaucratic forms of life, interrupted again and again and directed into new courses by the new eruptions of charisma (Mommsen, 1970: 184). Charisma arises out of the needs of its time. It is not an ahistorical quality that can appear in any period. In any set of institutionalized conditions, new problems may arise, which cannot be handled with routine. Institutionalization could have been realized without consensus and currently have conflicts within. In addition, structural differentiation may take place internally. In such conditions, charisma can find a room to break routine. Actually, charisma is latent even in the most institutional structures (Eisenstadt, 1968: xxxiv). It may interrupt the system when it gets that chance. Nevertheless, routine may be so strong that charisma cannot take part in the shaping of culture. The modern age, for

instance, is one of those periods that hardly ever give birth to the charismatic colors. It is a culture of rational discipline that leaves a very small room for undisciplined charisma.

The primary reason that causes the routinization of charisma is its maintenance (Lemmen, 1990: 138). Charisma compromises with the routine of life for its existence. As an anti-economic force (Lemmen, 1990: 138), charisma should make some concessions to live within the economically motivated lives of individuals. But this turns out to be a total transformation of charisma. It loses its distinctive quality of unpredictability. Every-day life is one of predictability and reinforces its predefined ways of experience. In this way, it facilitates existing life, which, once adopted, is no difficult to deal with. Charismatic movement is certain to give a new impetus to the course of every-day life. But only after it is routinized, the new impetus would become an ordinary part of life or be internalized. In its pure form, charisma is far from being internalized. It is inherently strange to individual, and in this regard it is creative. The process of transformation is, then, because of the attempts of the members of the charismatic movement to protect their ideal and material interests (Lemmen, 1990: 138). Charisma is institutionalized in the functions of its non-charismatic followers. It is modified according to the intellectual and material needs of the social sectors that have turned out to be the bearers of charisma (Weber, 1998: 99).

The problem of succession is one important factor on the transformation of charisma (Weber, 1995: 360). The authority of charisma should be transferred in one way or

another. What we observe in this process is that the selection of successor, since it imposes a system of selection, restricts the charismatic element. Selection process is very prone to be internalized, and the successor is selected not because of her inherent quality but due to the process itself. So, charisma becomes routinized or loses its quality. The authority is confined by the selection process to the advantage of a closed group of individuals not necessarily charismatic. The more the closure increases, the more this group tries to further its interests. When the complete closure is achieved, we can infer that the routinization process is complete.

Rationalization or routinization, unlike charisma, is basically an adaptation to the existing circumstances (Mommsen, 1989: 142). The innovative element of charisma is absent in rationalization. However, both can use the rational mechanisms, like bureaucracy, to pursue their goals. Institutional mechanisms are crucial for social change. But the direction of the change, whether it is an adaptation or an innovation, is determined by what motivates the change. Value-rationality is the motivation of charismatic action while instrumental-rationality is that of routinization (Mommsen, 1989: 151). The value orientation of charisma means that it challenges the existing conditions on the basis of its own values. In contrast, instrumental action is one of adaptation. The formal rationality of instrumental action seeks to exploit the situation for the self-interest (Mommsen, 1989: 152). Charismatic value-rationality, as opposed to the formal one, chases its goals regardless of the circumstances. So, the opposition between charisma and routine is reflected in the opposition between substantive and formal rationalities.

History is dominated by routinization and rationalization, and charismatic revolutions are the exception (Mommsen, 1989: 155). This should be related to the need of stability, even for the elements of charisma. It is the result of the reproduction power of instrumental-rational action. Charisma, in its nature, cannot be reproduced. On the other hand, the change based on rationalization realizes continuously the principles of the given social order. In this sense, it reproduces that order in such a manner that now it is more strong and resistant to the attacks of charisma. Rationalization systematically cripples charisma.

The struggle between charisma and routine is not a total process in the sense of creating a universal history. What is universal is the process of rationalization (Mommsen, 1989: 146). This process is not a special characteristic of the West. Rationalization may have different meanings in different cultures (Weber, 1997: 25). Within the same culture, rationalization levels of different spheres may differ as well. The point is the adaptation to and the further realization of existing conditions in line with the everyday needs. The process is a consequence of the mutual operation of three elements, which are collective conscious, normative socio-cultural order, and internalization by individuals (Lemmen, 1990: 146).

5.3. The Process of Rationalization

The rationalization of culture is what Weber concludes as a result of the antagonism between routine and charisma. In the modern culture, this antagonism seems to have disappeared to the benefit of routine. Cultural elements lose their meanings for life and gain an existence for their own sake. This situation of being in-itself, which

results from the process of objectification, has reached an extreme point and its ongoing reproduction does not appear to be over in the near future.

The modern culture has an ever-growing externality over individuals. It has logic of its own without taking into consideration of individuals that have made it up. It is the culture of instrumentally rationalized activity. The money economy is the most important force behind the process of rationalization. Charismatic activity is in a direct contradiction with the regular economic activity (Weber, 1998: 329). The methodical and institutionalized economic activity is impossible in the framework of unpredictable and unstable charisma. The regular money economy has imposed its rules and rationality on all spheres of life since anything that is not ordered may damage the functioning of the system.

Money alone is the accelerating factor of rationalization. Its divisibility provides the quantification of any aspect of life (Turner, 1994: 279). Quantified life is of calculability. As a result, it can be organized around the rational principles of the money economy. In fact, money is both the effect and condition of rationalization (Turner, 1994: 285). Rational economy increases the monetary dominance by comparing, and in this sense relating, everything on the basis of money. Institutions, public or private, can be rationalized due to the measurement of effectiveness by the objective scale of money. Money is the ultimate measure that nothing can escape from its horizon.

The institutions of money economy are structured rationally. The typical form of rational organization in capitalism is bureaucracy. Bureaucracy was not a new phenomenon for capitalism. What has occurred in capitalism is that bureaucracy has become the main type of organizations in all spheres of life (Brubaker, 1984: 20) and turned to be a mechanism that can hardly be changed. A certain level of development in money economy is the precondition of the regular functioning and permanence of bureaucracy (Weber, 1998: 302). In return of this permanent functioning, money economy obtains the vital elements of stability and predictability. Bureaucratic administration and capitalism reinforce each other. The dead machine of manufacture and the living machine of bureaucracy combine as the iron cage of person (Frisby, 1994: 227). The depersonalization of relations by use of money finds its exact correlate in the impersonal relations of bureaucracy. The unpredictable elements, like human qualities, are excluded as far as possible from the system. The more this exclusion occurs, the more bureaucracy matures as a system in-itself. Moreover, it gains an ability to resist to the changes initiated by irrational elements like human beings.

Within the framework of money economies, Weber deals with, not capitalism, but the rational capitalism. Rational capitalism is methodical and predictable, reducing all areas of production and distribution as much as possible to a routine (Collins, 1986: 83). There are four factors that lead to the development of this kind of capitalism. These are the private appropriation of all the means of production and their concentration of under the control of entrepreneurs, free labor meaning that workers are free to move in response to the demand and supply, the absence of

irrational restrictions such as traditions or conventions, and a calculable law (Collins, 1986: 84). These are the institutional foundations of rational capitalism. They are institutional in the sense that means of human activity, not merely of production, are expropriated from human (Brubaker, 1984: 13) so that its irrationality is of no concern to capitalism. The separation of workers from the control of the means of production and the separation of officials from the control of the means of administration are two parts of the same general process of rationalization. Much more important than these is the level of mechanization and corresponding level of mass production. These latter conditions necessitate a predictable environment (Collins, 1986: 86), which can be provided by the former institutional foundations. We must add that market is where rational activity of self-interest, which is free from conventions and based on an evaluation of means and end, is most easily realized (Brubaker, 1984: 10). Capitalism constructs a predictable circle of means and end to protect its very existence against the contingencies of the world.

In addition to money economy, religion also is an important factor for the emergence of rational culture. Since it is diffused thoroughly in society, any transformation in religion has important effects on individuals and cultural life as a whole. In this sphere, the charismatic movement of prophets is modified by priests. In fact, they are the most important bearers of the process of rationalization in religious sphere (Lemmen, 1990: 149). Priests interpret and systematize the religious dogmas. They accommodate these dogmas to the habits of life. On this systematized religion, the community of priests forms the religious aristocracy and furthers the rationalization and closure of religion as an autonomous sphere. But within religion, there occurs

new charismatic upheavals like Reformation. The success of new charismatic movement leads to a new rationalization process and a higher level of rationality. Because religion is socially and culturally diffused, this new level of rationality inevitably influences other life spheres. The capitalist spirit of the modern individual, for instance, is strongly influenced by the Protestant ethics (Weber, 1997: 158). This spirit has then turned into the instrumental-rationality.

The different spheres become rationalized differently and develop an independent existence. In each sphere, rationalization proceeds at different rates and for different interest (Brubaker, 1984: 9). The conditions, from which it takes nourishment, determine the nature of rationalization. Each sphere has particular values of its own, which are, in most cases, in antagonism. In the modern culture, the differentiation and conflict of life spheres are considerably intensified due to the nature of this culture, that is, complete specialization and division of labor. Spheres are internally autonomous depending on their special laws (Scaff, 1989: 94). Aesthetics, ethics, politics and economics have specific domains of applicability and each tries to expand this applicability to the loss of the others. With the increasing internal rationalization of these life spheres, their intolerance to the inputs from other spheres rises. The sharp contrast between them amounts to the paradox of meaninglessness in a culture that is abundant in meaning.

Formalization and depersonalization of life spheres go hand in hand. Spheres are emptied from the human element, for which they were originally designed. The main concerns are predictability and stability. Therefore, substantive meaning of any act or

rule is not so much a worry as its calculable nature is (Brubaker, 1984: 18). In fact, in a demystified world that has no coherent value of universal nature, the specific values and its corresponding formal norms are easy to establish. The relativized social world is given stability by formal laws (Holton and Turner, 1989: 109). The coherence within and among the spheres is secured by the artificial, but in no way dependent on something outside, rules. Rules are special as well as artificial. There is a professional specialization between life spheres (Holton and Turner, 1989: 119).

Independent development of spheres increases this specialization. Experts are the bearers of the specialization and resulting formalization. They are no more than the predefined parts of spheres. Expert emerges as a new type of personality. She has no value orientation other than the proper operation of the system, of which she is a part. Capitalism, and the supporting mechanisms including state that is the most important of all, are technocratic structures (Brubaker, 1984: 22). In this situation intellectualization is an expected outcome. The idea that anything is within the horizon of knowledge and calculability is internalized by people, and the specific areas of knowledge are dominated by experts. It is assumed that there is no mysterious force that cannot be mastered by calculation (Giddens, 1971: 184). Science becomes the ultimate measure. The logic of science, especially of natural sciences, fills the everyday life entirely (Turner, 1994: 285). Life is dehumanized and secularized by science. Unpredictable mystic forces and corresponding universal values are thrown outside the scope of life spheres. The result is the irrational organization of rationally organized life. The individual of capitalism is a combination of the expert without a spirit and the hedonist without a heart (Weber,

1997: 160). She is the member of a culture composed of self-regulated subsystems, each claiming autonomy as a system in-itself.

The self-regulated cultural elements and their human kind are reflected in the conflict between formal and substantive rationalities. Formal rationality refers primarily to the calculability of means and procedures, substantive rationality primarily to the value of ends or results (Brubaker, 1984: 36). The conflict between them cannot easily be pointed out due to the alienation of individuals. Functional rationality is adopted by individuals as the nature of being. The necessities of life are generally embedded in the functional operation of culture. So, alienation is not limited to the area of economy (Wrong, 1970: 27). Life in all aspects is instrumentalized and demystified by the process of rationalization (Wrong, 1970: 26). It is devalued in that it is changed into a senseless machine. The operation of life is ruthlessly indifferent to the substantive values, meanings and needs of life. Human is only the coal of this machine and will be used to the point of exhaustion (Weber, 1997: 159). The machine is indifferent to the particularities of individual unless they are functional. The ideal of this machine is its own reproduction. Namely, it does not have any ideal substantively. In this sense, it is not creative, either. The desirable human kind is one that conforms (Mommsen, 1970: 194).

The end of rational culture is to become the instrument of its instruments. The means-end duality is transformed in a way that human beings are controlled by their own creations (Löwith, 1993: 68). The instrumental-rational acts grow enormously since constant adaptation to, rather than challenging, the existing conditions are vital

for survival. People should adapt to the requirements of now independent means of life. They have no alternative for they have no power to control the means of life. Life is structured according to the needs of its former means. There emerges a domination of objects over subjects, which corresponds to the structure of economy (Faught, 1994: 242). Science, for instance, becomes an entity for its own sake and determines the lives in line with its norms and needs. Science, politics, economy and other spheres of culture reproduce the arbitrary rule of organization, of bureaucracy (Löwith, 1993: 69) and the irrationality at ever-increasing levels. Human activity is nullity in terms of humanness. The disenchanted world offers no alternative to the formal meaninglessness, which can embrace life as a whole. Science is far from justifying even its existence, and far from becoming the religion of the modern age. It is only the spirit of capitalism (Löwith, 1993: 53) just because of its unavoidable contribution to the principle of calculability. Science replaces the outdated spirit of asceticism. It substitutes its indifference and meaningless for the high values of asceticism. The result of this endless rationalization is the iron cage of capitalism and culture (Weber, 1997: 159).

5.4. Conclusion: The Definition of Rationalization

What we can conclude from the rationalization discussion of Weber is that rationalization is a process of becoming in-itself, ultimately realizing itself in the form of bureaucracy. The result of the rationalization or objectification of cultural spheres and elements is a certain kind of organization, that is, bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is the main characteristic of the modern culture. Individuals, life spheres, and culture as a whole have become bureaucratic entities. Bureaucracy, as a

general social type both at micro and macro levels, is a necessity to deal with the complicated and specialized culture. It is a human product, or a form, which enhance life. But the transformation occasioned by bureaucracy takes the lead of culture after a while and imprisons charismatic life into the iron cage. The very human creations rationalize into the autonomous entities that now create themselves as well as human beings as bureaucracy over and over again. The modern individual is a mathematician, a statistician, and an accountant rather than a human (Spykman, 1965: 235). All relations between individuals, between objects, and between individuals and objects are a “matter of fact”. Relations are between functions, occupational positions or more generally between objectively defined locations that we constantly fill. The modern management is impersonal. Obedience is not to other individuals, but to institutions, occupations and to the peculiar logic of cultural institutions (Aron, 1965: 139).

In the process of turning into being-in-itself, a structure becomes an internally coherent system. Its parts are formally organized, not necessarily with a meaning that instrumentalizes the formal organization. When there is no meaning that can bind people and stabilize the structure, bureaucracy with its eternal meaninglessness comes into being and ensures the coherence on purely formal grounds. Impersonal structures and depersonalized persons can function in harmony according to the rules of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is the meaning of the modern institution. The solution to meaninglessness is of functions and the functional operation of rational structures. Formally rational bureaucracy in general is substantively irrational. The problem with bureaucracy is, then, the dominance of, not rationality, but formal rationality

(Mommsen, 1989: 164). These instrumentally organized forms of culture get rid of what constitutes culture, that is, value.

Bureaucracy creates a mass from the individuals by individualizing them into the calculable creatures. Routines, predefined rules and ends, procedures, punctual and calculable interconnections control and utilize individuals much more effectively to extract the maximum value that is possible. The control is, at the same time, more reliable since it relies more on impersonal procedures rather than on irrational persons. Individual with her diminished knowledge of the whole, which compensated by the specialized knowledge of particular, becomes a mere part of the rational machine and operates without questioning its meaning. There is a self-enforcing mechanism. The measurement of results produced by this mechanism is objective and diffused on the basis of money. Weber conceives of money as the most crucial element of rationalization. Bureaucracy owes its existence as the dominant social type to money.

To sum up, a structure or an organization is rationalized to the extent that it is organized according to the impersonal rules, which are based on the principles of calculability, predictability, and stability. A rationalized organization reproduces itself, and in this sense is sustainable, regardless of whether it sticks to the goal, for which it was established. The measure of the effectiveness is instrumental, whether the regulations and the goals, the primary aim of which to ensure the existence of the organization, are obeyed and met. It is a self-regulated system with its specialized experts, and indifferent to the differences that may arise due to the irrational

elements. The structure reinforces “routine” over “charisma”. In every turn, it becomes more institutionalized, and maintains itself as an institution. This theoretical institution is operationally observed in the form and the qualities of bureaucracy.

At the micro level of the development NGOs, we will search for bureaucracy type and its qualities. To measure the extent to which the NGOs have been turned into in-itself structures or rationalized in short, we will look for whether those organizations have developed bureaucratic characteristics. The growth of the NGOs may have resulted in a specific kind of structure that reproduces itself. They may have lost their aims in a formal rational model giving its clues in the qualities of bureaucracy. Being in-itself is the ultimate point of institutionalization/bureaucratization as theorized by Weber. We believe that neo-liberalism may have pushed the development NGOs to that point. Their fit with the bureaucratic organizational model may reveal the effect of that push.

5.4.1. Bureaucracy

The type of organization designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals is called a bureaucracy (Blau and Meyer, 1971: 4). Bureaucracies are neutral instruments of rational administration. The main characteristics of a bureaucratic structure are as follows, according to Weber. First, there is a clear-cut division of labor (Weber, 1998: 290). Specialized experts are responsible for specific functions. Second, the structure is organized hierarchically (Weber, 1998: 290). Each level in the hierarchy is under the control of higher level and is accountable for the decisions of lower level. In line

with the first principle, the authority of each level is clearly defined. Third, operations are governed by a system of abstract rules and regulations (Weber, 1998: 290). Rules and regulations, which are applied uniformly, define the responsibilities of the hierarchical levels. These are predetermined standards. Fourth, bureaucrat performs formally (Weber, 1998: 292). The formal operation excludes the personal feelings and opinions to ensure impartiality. Fifth, the job positions are filled on the basis of technical quality that a position necessitates (Weber, 1998: 291). Recruitment, promotion, and dismissal are not arbitrary. The criteria for each are objective and impersonal. Sixth and the last, the pure bureaucratic organization is the most efficient organizational structure technically (Blau and Meyer, 1971: 21). The last characteristic is the inevitable consequence of the first five. These six define the ideal typical bureaucracy, which cannot be refuted by empirical evidence (Blau and Meyer, 1971: 24). In fact, it does not exist in reality. It is a tool of investigating reality, and will become our tool as well in this research.

5.5. The Social-economic Status of the Development NGO Employees

As in the case of institutionalization of the NGOs, neo-liberalism is what behind the social-economic composition of the development NGO employees. The contraction of government sector throughout the world as a result of the neo-liberal economic policies has left many qualified people unemployed. The NGO sector has become an important source of employment for those people. The NGO work generally requires a certain level of knowledge and skills. It is mostly a mental work and paid well above the average income of the particular country where the development NGO runs. In addition to the skilled character of the NGO jobs, the administrative tasks

needed by the growth of the organizational scope and size result in more qualified individuals employed in the development NGOs. We expect that the process of rationalization or institutionalization would create job positions that necessitate coordination skills and university education. Social economic statuses of the NGO employees must have been shaped by the double process of rationalization and unemployment, both of which have been initiated by the neo-liberal economy. As they are institutionalized and professionalized, the development NGOs are increasingly becoming alternative job markets for qualified/skilled individuals or professionals. In fact, we may observe the institutionalization of the NGO job market as a byproduct of the organizational institutionalization. The new organizational structure of the NGOs is associated with a skilled/qualified workforce, which incorporates employees with a certain social-economic status into the organization. This is the reason why we will try to describe the social-economic statuses of the employees. Since we have no previous data, we may not determine methodologically and precisely that neo-liberal economy and rationalization are the reasons of the current social-economic composition of the NGO employees. However, we should keep in mind that before the neo-liberal period there were a limited number of development NGOs, most of which worked in very small scale. Neither was there a need for rationalization nor there was a demand of the agencies like the international donors that forced rationalization. Theoretically, we can assume that the existing composition of the employees is a result of the process of rationalization and the neo-liberal economic policies. Our criteria of social-economic position are individual's occupation, level of education, whether she can speak a foreign language crucial for the NGO sector, the occupation and education level of parents and spouse, the place

where infancy and teens were lived, income level, career opportunity, and possessions and consumption patterns. The criteria are based on the questionnaires of Kalaycioğlu et al (1998) and Ayata et al (2001).

CHAPTER 6

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH

6.1. Introduction

The aim of this study is to picture the development NGO sector in terms of the rationalization level of the organizations and the social-economic statuses of the employees. There are two parts in the research of the study. First, the rationalization levels, as defined in the theory section, have been determined, to the extent possible. We have compared the characteristics of the organizations in the development sector with those of an ideal bureaucracy again outlined in the section of the rationalization theory. Rather than classify the organizations according to their bureaucratization levels, we have tried to find out the overall tendency of the sector and its reasons. In the first part, we have used interviews and questionnaires. Second, the social-economic statuses of the development NGO employees have been investigated. Our aim is to see the overall employee composition. The analysis of the second part is based on questionnaires only. Finally, we have tried to merge these two pictures into one as much as possible.

Before going into the details of the methodology, it is better to go over the operational definition of the concept of rationalization and social-economic status. We have defined a rationalized/institutionalized organization as one that is organized according to the impersonal rules of calculability, predictability, and stability. A

rationalized organization reproduces itself regardless of whether it sticks to the goal. The measure of the effectiveness is instrumental, ensuring the obedience to the institutional regulations. The institutional organization is a self-regulated system with its specialized experts. We have stated that this structure can be observed through the qualities of bureaucracy. In other words, we have searched for ideal bureaucratic type and its characteristics to measure the extent to which the NGOs have been turned into in-itself structures or rationalized. There are six characteristics of a bureaucracy. First, there is a clear-cut division of labor, in which specialized experts are responsible for specific functions. Second, each level in the hierarchically organized structure is under the control of higher level and is accountable for the decisions of lower level. The authority of each level is clearly defined. Third, operations are governed by a system of abstract rules and regulations. Fourth, bureaucrat performs formally, ignoring personal feelings and opinions to ensure impartiality. Fifth, the job positions are filled on the basis of technical quality. Recruitment, promotion, and dismissal are not arbitrary. Sixth and the last, the pure bureaucratic organization is the most efficient organizational structure.

When determining the social-economic statuses of the development NGO employees, rather than a clear-cut definition, we have a set of characteristics. As it is remembered, these characteristics are individual's occupation, level of education, whether she can speak a foreign language, the occupation and education level of parents and spouse, the place where infancy and teens were lived, income level, career opportunity, and possessions and consumption patterns. We simply present a picture of the employee composition.

6.2. Interview

Interview is our first tool to explore the characteristics of the organizations in the study (see appendix-a for the interview questions). The interview has been constructed on the basis of the qualities of an ideal bureaucracy defined in the theory of rationalization. 26 of a set of 49 questions, which we prepared before, have been chosen to put in the final interview. The selection has been according to the importance of the items determined by the criteria in the theory section. Highly related questions have been combined. We have made face-to-face interviews, taking two or three hours, with the key persons. The key persons are either a member of the board of directors, of the board of trustees, the general manager, or assistant to the manager. It is thought that key persons are at the best position to give the information on the organizational features. There is one exception, who is a freelancer and contributes a lot to this study by being involved from the beginning. In fact, it was the first interview, which was made with this friend and which has given the direction to the study. His answers were concerned with the general characteristics of the development NGOs. Totally, we have 9 interviews at hand. In order to complete the interviews, we have made 13 meetings in January, February, and March 2004, taking notes of the interview. The interview with WWF-Turkey was made via e-mail. The interview is rather detailed, not simply searching for the bureaucratic qualities. Mission and history of the organization, the general concern of the development NGOs, long-term goals and strategies, participation of those served and those serving in the important decisions, the continuity of the results of the NGO work, the characteristics of the professions, coordination/evaluation mechanisms, the conflict

points and solution tools, informal/formal relations, procedures and regulations, job descriptions, level of hierarchy, departments, accounting and budget systems, filing practices, division of labor, specialization, voluntary/salaried employees, the bearers of mission, income and expense items, organizational and financial sustainability, and the relations with the international institutions and private/public sectors have been investigated.

6.3. Questionnaire

Questionnaire technique has been used to explore the social-economic statuses of the employees and to determine the levels in four dimensions (see appendix-b for the final form of the questionnaire). The questionnaire has been applied to 39 employees from 7 different NGOs. They were collected in February and March 2004. 30 of the questionnaires were collected via e-mail, 4 via mail, and 5 directly from individuals. In the first section of questionnaire are those four scales, the institutionalization scale, which is composed of 15 statements, and three of Hofstede's four scales questioned with 10 items each. Each item rates the extent of approval of respondent on a 5-point likert scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".

Hofstede's three scales that were included are power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and individualism. The questions are based on Hofstede's own book "Culture's Consequences (1984)" and Storti's book "Figuring Foreigners Out (1999)". Though we have gathered the data of Hofstede dimensions, we will not analyze them. We have realized that they are a concern more of a psychological inquiry than of a

sociological thesis. Nevertheless, since we have included those three dimensions in our questionnaire, we had better look at the basics of Hofstede's study.

Hofstede's study aims at measuring cultural differences and their effects between 40 nations. There are four dimensions, through which cultural value systems are studied. These dimensions are power-distance, uncertainty-avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Power distance is the perceived difference between the extent to which the boss can determine the behavior of the subordinate and the extent to which the subordinate can determine the behavior of the boss (Hofstede, 1984: 72). Uncertainty avoidance measures tolerance for ambiguity (Hofstede, 1984: 112). Individualism defines to what degree individual identifies herself with any of the collectivities within a society (Hofstede, 1984: 70). Masculinity, which we have not included in our study from the beginning, searches for whether the biological differences between sexes have implications for the social roles of sexes (Hofstede, 1984: 176). The data of the study were collected from the employees of a multinational company operating in those countries, and from managers participating in international management development courses. Each country is scored on the four dimensions. On the basis of the scoring, Hofstede tries to show the cultural divisions and the possible reasons of the divisions. Hofstede compares cultures, not individuals.

The institutionalization scale is our second tool to determine the deviations of the organizations from the ideal bureaucracy. It is the extent to which an organization has developed a rational structure. An organization is institutionalized or rationalized to the extent that it operates on formal rules, has specialized division of labor, and is

financially and organizationally sustainable. We have defined the process of rationalization before and bureaucracy as the rational structure. The questions have been prepared on the qualities of an ideal bureaucracy and answered by employees, but not by managers. They were selected from a pool of 59 questions generated for this scale. The questions were reduced to 18 according to the importance of the items determined by the criteria in the theory section. We selected between similar statements and eliminated those poorly constructed. After the pilot application, the scale has included 15 items, 6th, 8th, and 10th, inversely related to the others. The reliability coefficient is 0,7167 for 18 items, 0,8008 for 15 items. By using this second tool, we have aimed at verifying what we have discovered in the interviews.

The reliability analyses of the four scales including institutionalization and Hofstede's dimensions have been made through a pilot study. The application was completed in December 2003. In the beginning of the study, there were five scales. The fifth one was the "macro-micro scale", which was supposed to measure the employee attitude whether she perceives individuals as capable of changing their immediate conditions or as mostly surrendering those conditions. The "macro-micro" scale was eliminated since the result of the result of reliability analyses was not significant for that scale. It was -0,2057 for 15 items. The reliability coefficients of 10 items were 0,7658 for power-distance, 0,8068 for uncertainty-avoidance, and 0,7657 for individualism. We also reduced the numbers of items for the remaining scales in line with the reliability results.

The purpose of the second section of the questionnaire is to determine the social-economic levels of the development NGO employees. The unit of analysis is individual. This section is based mainly on two questionnaires; one is of Ayata, Güneş-Ayata, Özcan, and Akçay (2001), the other of Kalaycıoğlu, Kardam, Tüzün, and Ulusoy (1998). The section has been prepared in such a way that the data can easily be analyzed by the program SPSS. In the section, the questions of the city and district where respondent lives have not been used since the data of plot prices are not available for all the districts, especially for those abroad. These questions are based on the study of Kalaycıoğlu et al (1998). Question 19, the possibility of finding a job if existing one is lost, and question 20, self-reported social-economic status, were received from Ayata et al (2001) in their original forms.

6.4. Sample

The sample is composed of the NGOs, the activities of which are completely or partially on the rural development. The organizations, as understood from their names, deal with the urban poverty as well. Many of them are involved in the emergency aid in addition to the development activity. But what concerns us is their function in the rural regions. The rural regions of the country are those parts that feel most severely poverty and the changes in economic policies occasioned by the SAPs. Turkey has still a considerable rural population though it has been decreasing since the early years of the Republic. We accept that the urban regions have also serious problems especially as a result of the migrations and the consequent poverty. Nevertheless, the urban regions provide far more means as opposed to the rural regions to struggle against poverty.

We have chosen our sample mostly from the Ankara-based NGOs for convenience purposes. Since the number of the rural development NGOs working in national scale is very limited, we believe that our sample is representative of the rural development sector (interview). The NGOs that have participated in the study are Anatolian Development Foundation (AKV), Development Foundation of Turkey (TKV), Rural and Urban Development Foundation (KKGV), Research Association of Rural Environment and Forestry (KÇOSAD), Association of Sustainable Agriculture and Assistance for Farmers (STÇYD), Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Association (SÜRKAL), Accessible Life Association (UYD), World Wild Fund for Nature (WWF-Turkey) (DHKV), Youth for Habitat-Turkey, and Association of University Women (ÜKD). WWF-Turkey, and Accessible Life Association have their main office in İstanbul, others in Ankara. Research Association of Rural Environment and Forestry and Association of Sustainable Agriculture and Assistance for Farmers could not be included in the application of the questionnaire since they have no salaried full-time employees. A number of employees from Youth for Habitat-Turkey and Association of University Women have completed the questionnaire though we have not made interviews with the key persons of those organizations.

CHAPTER 7

RESULTS

7.1. Introduction

This section will summarize the results of the study. First, we will have a look at, very briefly, the past and present of the NGOs participating in the interviews. In the next section, we will present the results of the interviews followed by the discussion of the interview results. Then we will present the questionnaire results. In the last section, we will discuss on the results of the questionnaires.

7.2. A Brief on the NGOs

Anatolian Development Foundation (AKV) was founded in 1981 as the Development Foundation of Van Region. Since its establishment, the head of board of director has been the same person. The earthquake of Van in 1976 was the reason for its establishment. In its first attempt, AKV aimed at helping the villagers, the victims of the earthquake. The initial purpose of the Foundation was to promote the rehabilitation and development of the Van region. After the earthquake of Erzurum-Kars in 1983, the foundation broadened its area of work and coverage, changing its name to AKV. In addition to rehabilitation and development assistance, the foundation started to provide emergency aid in the disaster areas. In response to the refugee flow into Turkey in 1993, the fields of human rights and refugee assistance have been added to the activities of AKV. AKV's head office was moved from Van

to Ankara in 1987. AKV has branches in Van, Kırklareli, Sarajevo, Pristine, Skopje, Belgrade, Novi Pazar, Islamabad, Tehran, and Kabul. The general aim of the foundation is to support the development of rural and urban areas with the participation and cooperation of local community as well as government and volunteer agencies. The foundation has been involved in agriculture and animal husbandry projects, health care and sanitation projects, education and training projects, assistance to refugees and those internally displaced, disaster relief and rehabilitation projects. The number of full time personnel is 8.

Sustainable Rural and Urban Development Association (SÜRKAL) was founded in June 2001. The aim is to contribute to development processes through human-centered small-scale projects that can be implemented in regions that require development most and that can produce replicable models. It is established by a group of field experts in rural development activities, academicians, and entrepreneurs. Despite the highly experienced members among its cadres, SÜRKAL is a new non-profit volunteer organization that works in development field. SÜRKAL implements various projects and provides field expertise or consultancy for projects. It is a professional organization, working with an amateur soul. Its target group is the poor, low-income households and small enterprises in regions that require development most, mostly in rural regions. Gender discrimination, child labor, and disadvantaged groups are included in the target population. SÜRKAL also tries to enhance grass-root democracy and human rights in the rural regions. The institutional objective of SÜRKAL is the generation of progressive and long lasting impacts on the society, local communities, organizations and agencies through its

development programs and projects. The goal of the establishment of a “Training Center for Sustainable Development” may be considered as the realization of the institutional objective. The head office of SÜRKAL is in Ankara. Currently, there are branches in Ezurum and Kars. There are 17 people working in the association.

The roots of Accessible Life Association (UYD) dated back to Düzce Earthquake. It was formally founded in January 2001. Most of the founders worked for Association of Solidarity Volunteers (Dayanışma Gönüllüleri Derneği). The program for the handicapped people and the organic farming program for the small farmers formed the basis of the Association. The directors, who are farmers, handicapped people, and volunteers, of the two programs initiated UYD. It has become a national organization in two years, including the rural development activities in Tunceli, the child labor in Diyarbakır, emergency aids in earthquakes in Afyon, Pülümür, and Bingöl. The aim of the organization is to encourage the cooperation and collective action of the deprived groups to pursue their rights and demands through equal and effective participation. To develop sustainable models that can be implemented in other regions and projects is an important aspect of the aim. The main areas of activity are rural development, poverty, disaster and emergency aids, rehabilitation for people handicapped and at risk, urban development, and minority rights and development. UYD is an İstanbul-based organization, with branches in Düzce and Tunceli. 19 people are employed full-time.

Research Association of Rural Environment and Forestry (KÇOSAD) was founded in 1989. The initial reason was to support a periodical published about the problems

of environment and forestry. First two years, it became the main activity of the association. The association started to be active in other areas in 1991. It is basically a research organization, and prefers being functional to popular. Research and training, guidance and support for the researches in the field, and sharing of the findings with the public first and with the experts next are the activities. The head and only office of the association is in Ankara. There is no full-time employee in KÇSOAD.

Rural and Urban Development Foundation (KKGV) is an Ankara-based NGO, founded in 1995, working generally in the Eastern regions of Turkey. The reason of establishment is help the people that have to move due to the development projects of government. Those projects generally result in the expropriation of immovable property by government. The objectives are the resettlement of households displaced due to development projects, the development of rehabilitation plans and employment opportunities, and the prevention of environmental damage. The areas of activity are resettlement/rehabilitation, valuation of immovable property, urban/rural infrastructure and poverty, social/economic researches, and environmental studies. The foundation has 3 people employed full-time.

Association of Sustainable Agriculture and Assistance for Farmers (STÇYD) was established by a group of agricultural engineers working in the Ministry of Agriculture in 1996. Currently, the association does not have a formal office. But the center of the activities and the board of directors are in Ankara. The damages of traditional farming to environment, its unproductive results, as well as the damages

of the modern techniques led to a development of a new concept, that is, sustainable farming. It is also called organic farming, which produces more with less input and is environment-sensitive. The organization tries to train farmers about this subject. This is the main activity. Farmers are trained in their fields, practicing the organic farming techniques. Conferences and publications are other activities. There is not full-time employment in the association.

Development Foundation of Turkey (TKV) is an indigenous, private, non-governmental, non-profit development organization that was incorporated in 1969 for promoting rural and agricultural development among Turkey's rural poor. The ultimate objectives of TKV's development programs are alleviating poverty and improving quality of life poor rural families by increasing their incomes in their own environments. In line with these objectives, the projects try to assist target groups obtain small loans, own productive assets, enhance their capacity for organized action and participation, and raise consciousness for environment. The target groups are smallholder farmers and landless households in the provinces of Eastern, Southeastern and Central Anatolia. Beekeeping for honey production, poultry production, animal husbandry, crops-vegetable-fruit production, and handcrafts are some of the examples. TKV implements a wide range of projects in many regions through its network of local and countrywide organizations. Staff consists of professional managers, subject matter specialists, and technicians, many of whom work as extension agents. The head office is in Ankara. The staff is composed of 30 employees.

WWF-Turkey (DHKV) is an NGO that aims to enhance the conservation of Turkey's biodiversity and promote the sustainable use of its natural resources. It was found in 1996. It was originally Association of Wild Life Protection (DHKD) founded in 1975. DHKV is a part of the global WWF network. Focusing on national priorities, DHKV adapts international conservation approaches to local circumstances. The areas of activity are marine life and coasts, forests, freshwater resources, and important plant and animal areas of Turkey. The head office is in İstanbul. DHKV has 40 employees.

7.3. Interview Results

In this section, we will present the results in line with the criteria of the rationalized organization. We will group our findings according to those criteria and to additional subheadings in the interview.

7.3.1. Goals

In all the organizations that we have studied, the members that founded the NGOs keep director positions since the establishment. These members generally have a secure and relatively high-paid job in public institutions. The members, not working full-time and as salaried, have similar jobs and income. All organizations except those of research are concerned with more than one area as outlined in their history. They are not regional organizations. The goals are various. Some are service organizations. Some aims at raising consciousness of the local people. The rural development is the general goal for all. Capacity building, filling the gap due to the partial withdrawal of state from the rural development, sustainable development,

using service activities to raise consciousness and capacity, developing models that can be used in other regions, mobilizing people to influence public and private authorities, and transforming people into active participants in civil society are mentioned as the goals of NGOs in the development sector. Whatever they look after, there is a service dimension in all. In the sector, we observe a concern for environment pronounced in the concept of sustainability.

Generally, the NGOs do not have a long-term goal. That they are not financially sustainable in long-term inhibits them to create and stick to a long-term plan. In addition to the financial sustainability, the capacity of workforce and political considerations are important to construct long-term goals. It is very difficult to foresee and be prepared against what may happen in the sector. Nevertheless, some of them have long-term goals such as to construct a school of development, to participate more in the EU projects, and to create development models.

7.3.2. Organizational Mission

The bearers of the organizational mission are generally the members that have directed the organization from the beginning. The members, who are employees at the same time, the board of trustees, the institutional structure (in the largest one) are other bearers. These are what are observed in practice. Legally, the organizations are under direct control by state authorities not to deviate from their missions. It seems the employees quitting will not affect the mission. The founders and directors quitting may have considerable effect on the direction of the NGOs. To renew

organizations, new employees may be needed though. All the NGOs claim that donors do not affect their missions and objectives.

7.3.3. Participation

Although all the NGOs see it very important whatever it costs, the participation of local people to decision-making process is limited. Mostly, the organizations gather information on the needs of people and integrate what they have found in the field to their decisions. In the light of the local knowledge, the basics of projects are determined by the organizations, considering the budget constraints of donors. Almost all projects include participation criteria, which should be fulfilled by the NGOs. It is an international standard. The local participation is also affected by local characteristics, social and economic structures and stratification. It is not possible to disregard local elites, for example (interview). The employee participation seems limited as well though employees are given a large autonomy in the field. There are some basics of projects, the primary of which is budget. Within those basics, the field workers determine the course of activities. It is a necessity of the sector. The fieldwork is the primary activity, which the head office cannot manage. Local knowledge and trust that can only be built by face-to-face relations are crucial for the NGO activities.

7.3.4. Sustainability

All the NGOs are highly interested in the sustainability of the projects' results. They try to measure the sustainability. Some have mechanisms and some are in the process of developing those mechanisms for measuring the sustainability. In most projects,

sustainable results are a criterion. But, when talking about other organizations, the NGOs criticize them for not producing sustainable works. It is a general opinion that when an NGO leaves the field, the result is the collapse of the system they established. In most cases, there is nothing left in the long-term when the NGO leaves the field (interview). In some cases, small and poor farmers cannot reach the benefit of the NGO work. There is sometimes a cost to benefit from the NGO activities. In addition to cost, small farmers are also hard to work with, lacking understanding and resources (interview).

The main financial resource is the international donors. Membership fees, private donations, sponsorship, and revenues from projects are other sources of funds. The funds from donors are mostly in the form of projects. In the smallest NGO, the main expenditure is oil for trips, mostly paid by the members. The trainings may be financed by the beneficiaries. Generally the service expenses of projects constitute the lion-share. Administrative expenses are a small percent. Long-term support is rare in the sector. The NGOs are financially dependent on donors and projects. The foundations use their enterprises in projects. Without external funds, very few NGO can survive (interview). Only one organization seems financially strong as opposed to the others. Government is suspicious about the collecting funds by the NGOs. The regulations are restrictive.

7.3.5. Professionalization

Voluntary activity is very rare in the development NGO sector. By voluntary activity or work, we mean the regular NGO work (office, project, coordination, etc.) that is

done without a regular salary. Even in the volunteer-based organizations, it is not high. A few individuals continue the operations. They are middle-aged or older, having job-security and high salaries. Young people are not generally involved in voluntary activities. All the organizations work with salaried staff. There are two exceptions. One of them temporarily employs unemployed agricultural engineers in the trainings, for which current voluntary members are not sufficient. These engineers are trained in the association and paid, per project, by the beneficiaries, generally middle and big farm-owners. They get the chance of applying organic farming in trainings with farmers and use that practice when looking for a permanent job. The turnover of agricultural engineers is not seen as a disadvantage.

Formal education is not sufficient to be an expert in the sector. In general, people work in jobs that they are specialized in. University education, on-job training, and experience in the sector are the ways of specialization. The last one is the most important in the development NGO sector. It is generally difficult to substitute new employees for the leaving ones. Experience in the field and trust of local people are hard to build. The process of recruitment is not defined in any of the NGOs.

7.3.6. Division of Labor

The works in the sector necessitates specialization to a great extent. Experience and on-job training are crucial as well. The NGO sector is somewhat different from private and public sectors and seniority in the sector, together with relationships with locals and other donors, brings effectiveness and success. In addition to permanent staff, the development NGOs employs temporary staff according to the needs of

projects. These people may be academicians, development experts, and other experts such as engineers, psychologists, and veterinarians. Local people are employed as well in projects. Specialization in the oldest development NGO has long been institutionalized.

In the larger NGOs, the positions are defined to a certain extent. In general, projects define the positions and qualities. Other positions outside the projects are not clear. Job descriptions cannot be very detailed because of the nature of the fieldwork. The initiative of employees is necessary in many cases. Employees should be flexible to respond to the changes. Larger NGOs have rather detailed job descriptions, but they give flexibility to employees at the same time. In all positions, especially in the field, there is a dimension of voluntarism although individuals are salaried.

7.3.7. Rules and Regulations

The NGOs generally do not have directives about the operations. Large ones have directives, but not detailed, giving autonomy to employees. Other organizations try to set up directives. Hierarchy is very narrow or absent. The general organizational structure is composed of two parts, head office and field offices. Smaller NGOs do not have branches or even head office. A separate accounting department exists in the two largest NGOs. Others have a part-time accounting consultant or one of the members do the accounting works. Accounting records are generally used for evaluation and planning purposes, and in the application to projects to indicate the financial strength and transparency of the NGO. In the two smallest NGOs, the

records are kept because of legal requirement. Marketing and public relations as a separate department is present only in the largest NGO.

Rules and regulations are written in the two largest organizations. The other NGOs have few written rules. Relatively large NGOs plan to form written rules more detailed than the existing ones. The NGOs file their activities. There is one exception, the smallest one. The information in the files are used and evaluated in the subsequent projects. It means institutional information accumulated over years. But it is difficult for the fieldworkers to file. Filing provides transparency for the activities.

The project-based work is the rule in the sector. In projects, goals and objectives are clear, concrete, and quantitative where applicable. They are quite detailed. Donors do not determine the details of projects. But the basics of projects are already within the existing development paradigm (interview). They may be subject to change according to the new knowledge and unexpected events in the field, but not in a major way. The results are evaluated and used for the following projects. The smallest NGO cannot have quantitative targets, like number of farmers to be reached, because of high demand for trainings.

7.3.8. Formal/Informal Operation

Primary relations are extensively used in coordinating activities. Informal relations are intense especially in the field. The organizations are relatively small in most cases and the fieldwork necessitates close interactions. Working with experts may be regarded as another tool. No organization has a separate institutional

evaluating/monitoring unit. Internal evaluations are project-based and made by directors. The success of projects are externally evaluated by donors or independent organizations approved by donors. In the largest NGO, employees are evaluated through face-to-face interviews semi-annually. Again in one of the largest NGOs, the work and projects are evaluated annually internally in addition to external evaluations. But generally, the performance of employees is not measured. It is a challenging task. The nature of work, especially of fieldwork, makes it difficult to form standards for performance. The evaluation is also dependent on the size of project. Periodical meetings of field and head office provide organization with significant feedback for evaluation. In larger organizations, these meetings are more frequent. The more the NGO gets larger, the more institutional its coordination and evaluation is. The relations between the field and head office are defined more clearly with regular meetings.

The problems between the field and headquarters are mainly about the use of funds. The large autonomy of field workers and the responsibility of head office in planning, communication, and budget may not coincide. There are problems because of the intellectual qualities of the employees and members that tend to question. There is not an institutional structure for the organizational disputes in any NGO. Dispute is fixed within the informal relations. The formal organization, that is, the board of trustees, is the last resort.

Project budgets are quite detailed. It is a requirement of donor institutions. Detailed budgets mean transparent activities. Transparency is a special concern of one NGO,

the financially strongest one. Trust and fund-raising are directly related to transparency. The budget items may be changed in response to the needs of the field. For smaller organizations, budgeting is more of a legal issue, not an organizational practice.

7.3.9. Employee Composition

Some employees have rural origin, and some urban origin. They are generally well educated. Almost half can speak a foreign language, mostly English. Some speak local languages, mostly Kurdish and its dialects. The employees are sensitive about different issues. Some of them are more concerned with environmental issues. Some are generally critical about the existing order. In one organization, it is accepted, as a member, any popular face for window-dressing. The target population, people in need, is the member base.

7.3.10. Relations with Public, Private, and International Institutions

Some of the NGOs have better relations with public sector compared to private sector. In rural areas the support of public authorities is important for projects. There are faithful public employees in the country. The relations of relatively critical NGO with independent NGOs are better than with the international economic and political institutions. One relatively larger organization cooperates with both public and private institutions. The relations of one of the largest NGOs are mainly with donors. The largest one is in cooperation with private sector and international NGOs while its relations with government institutions vary. Some NGOs have intensive relations with private sector. The financially strongest NGO has good relations with all three

sectors, public, private, and international NGOS. It is respectful to the laws of the countries where it works. It is hard to say that there is general pattern in the relations with the public, private, and international NGO sector. We can say that the political considerations and priorities of those sectors and the development NGOs affect the direction of the relations differently in each case.

7.4. Discussion on the Interviews

The interviews show that the development NGO sector is composed of organizations that cannot be seen as bureaucracy. The institutionalization scale has resulted in a similar outcome. The NGO employees perceive their organizations as somewhat institutional. The NGO sector has determined its path to the institutionalization though the process is slow. Most of the NGOs in the sector are small, employing a limited number of full-time personnel. In a few cases, organizations run through fully voluntary work. But the rule is professional work. Nevertheless, organizations do not have to deal with huge administrative tasks due to the limited size. The most an NGO employs is 40 people. The major part of the NGO work is on the field, not on the administration.

The division of labor in the development NGOs is a function of size, as expected. The size of the organizations is generally small. There are a few functions to be organized under separate departments. In larger NGOs, positions are clearer. Projects financed by external donor agencies are an important source of division of labor. Within projects, even for small organizations, what is expected from an employee is predetermined and clearly defined. In many cases, small organizations hire external

staff to participate in projects. Experts work in such projects. In general, job descriptions are not detailed if there is any. There is very little hierarchy. Authorities of levels are not formally determined except in larger organizations. But in those organizations, hierarchy, which again is very narrow, seems an issue of respect, not an organizational aspect.

There are not detailed regulations, directives, and predefined procedures. Whether any directive is applied uniformly or applied at all is not clear. The existing directives do not seem to be the primary reference for the NGO work. The field employees have great autonomy in their decisions except for regarding budget. But the limits of their autonomy are not defined. This is because of the nature of the NGO work. Personal relations are important for both internal and external linkages. Informal organization is the primary means of coordination within NGO. The fieldwork personnel should build personal linkages with local people, the beneficiaries of what they produce. The NGO work is very much based on mutual trust and participation of locals. Though the work is done by professionals in general, their involvement in local community and the absence of written regulations may impair impartiality. There are not detailed processes of recruitment, promotion, and dismissal in any of the NGOs. Nevertheless, personnel seem to be hired on the bases of objective qualifications by the headquarters and sometimes by field offices as in the case of hiring locals. Projects, which are the main workload, specify the qualities of personnel though they do not include the recruitment processes. The participation and evaluation processes are not institutional in any of the NGO. There is not an institutional dispute solution mechanism.

Therefore, according to the ideal bureaucratic type that we have defined in the theory of rationalization, the development NGOs are not close to being a rationalized organization. The smallest is at the lowest of the bureaucratic scale, so to speak. A volunteer-based organization comes next. At the highest point places the largest NGO. The next largest one is the next most rationalized organization. The two relatively large NGOs follow the oldest one and attempt to develop rational structures. The financially strongest NGO and a relatively small organization are between the couples of the two relatively large and the two smallest NGOs. The relatively small one also makes steps in the way of rationalization. The financially strongest one, on the other hand, declares openly its reluctance for being institutionalized. The institutionalization degree is affected by such factors as the relations with international donors, the participation in projects financed by external institutional agencies like donors, governments, and private sector, the size and the scope of NGO, the initiative of founder directors, and whether the activity is mainly based on voluntary work. Long-term financial resources are critical for institutionalization, but not sufficient alone. The financially strongest NGO is a typical case in this respect. It seems financially the most robust organization though its founder and general director rejects institutionalization on the ground that it would not be proper in the existing cultural and social conditions of the country. It is stated that democratic and institutional structures are abused (interview). We have been provided examples about those abuses. We should mention that in this NGO, the field employees have a large autonomy in their activities. But the director is at

the center of the relations with the external agencies. The trust on the organization is in fact a trust on the director.

As we have seen the NGOs do not have long-term goals, which may free the organization from its founders. Long-term goals may encourage a rational structure since they necessitate long-range planning. The NGOs in the sector are very much identified with their founders who are also directors. In their early years of development, the situation is not unexpected. But, in the following years, to be identified with the founders is in direct contradiction with the nature of the NGO sector and with what the NGOs try to produce. The dependence on the founders may harm the democratization and participation processes that the NGOs enthusiastically work for. It is also a factor that prevents proper rationalization and institutionalization of democratic process within organization. Furthermore, the bearers of the mission of the NGOs, the founders are crucial for the direction of the organizations. If they left the organizations, the mission may be lost. Normally, that mission should be maintained in the institutional structure to avoid that danger. It is the only way that an NGO outlives its founder.

In all the organizations, there is a tendency of growth, to move beyond what the founder initially established. This corresponds to the attempts of developing organizational routines. The two relatively large NGOs and one relatively small organization are at the early stages of institutionalization and probably continue in that way since they increase their coverage. The largest two NGOs are in the process of further rationalization. It is inevitable for the sector to work with the growing

needs and funds. The main motive for developing rationalized structures is the projects funded by the international donors and institutions like the World Bank, the EU, and the UN. The motive is external, but it is forceful. It is not simply a funding issue. The proper way of doing things is expected to be internalized by the development NGOs. This is the reason why the largest one is the most rationalized structure. Its relations with a major international NGO make it possible to internalize, or begin to internalize, that proper way.

After determining that the rural development NGOs are not institutionalized, but on the way, we may underline some points. In the NGOs, against the closure practices of the founders, there is not a resistance on the part of employees and people. Though the employees are not comfortable with the situation, they do not directly oppose the founder/directors. In her study of associations, Tosun has found that the organizations have a centralized decision-making, excluding members in its operation (Tosun, 2000: 56). She also notes that members are generally not uneasy with this situation (Tosun, 2000: 59). The traditional elitist and bureaucratic structure is the model of the NGOs in the country. We believe that institutionalization may create the tools of opposition and participation in this respect.

It is not clear to who is the accountability of NGOs. To put differently, which groups the NGOs represent and in what way the representation is observed are not evident. According to Insel, they have an ontological virtue, the basis of which is their very existence as NGO (İnsel, 2002). Without a clear basis of representation, they ontologically represent the people. As a result, they are perceived as legitimate

organizations of representation. It may be the case that the accountability to beneficiaries is generally weak since the people often have no other alternatives (Vakil, 1997: 2065). If not beneficiaries, the general public may be the group, which is not bound to NGO activities. Then, the problem is who constitutes the general public, citizens, business firms, and donors, even government agencies. We believe that the improvement of democracy with the increasing involvement of citizens be the first priority of an NGO. Only the macro level perspective can make a sustainable change in the lives of people. It should be accountable to all those groups including its own employees and beneficiaries within the framework of this priority. All the groups should be able to evaluate and criticize the NGO work. The point is that accountability and evaluation are not merely organizational issues. Much more important is their role in concretizing democracy. The institutionalization of evaluation mechanisms is crucial in this respect.

The collapse of the structures established by the work of the NGOs may show that what they do is a short-term service, rather than an activity transforming local people into political actors that demand and act for their well-being. Capacity building and political mobilization are possible outcomes, but they may not. In this respect, the process is more important than the result in development sector. How locals have participated in the process is the crucial point (interview). However, raising consciousness and building capacity are linked to the service activities at the first place. It is a way of building trust and including locals into the development process. Economically strong individuals may tend to be more equipped and interested in political affairs that may influence their life. But, service seems to occupy the

primary attention of the NGOs. The organizations take it for granted that government should be smaller in its effect on economy and social life. It is questionable, in that case, what capacity building, if it was the primary goal, can bring about against a private sector that is politically irresponsible. Institutionalization can work for either way, creating a service provider or a political mobilizer.

It is claimed that many organizations are under the guidance of the international NGOs, which in turn are under foreign governments. On the other hand, all the NGOs claim that donors do not affect their mission. We do not know what the truth is. But we definitely know that if the foreign funds stopped to flow, the development NGO sector of the country would disappear within a year. This is not to say that they do what they are told. What may happen in the sector is to define the mission in line with or, not so contrary to, the dominant paradigm and the goals of the international donors. One of the NGOs, the financially strong one, for example, can easily protect its mission since “to be respectful to the laws of the countries” is a part of that mission. It emphasizes its impartiality, having no political consideration. It is a typical service organization. One of the relatively large NGOs, on the other hand, is in a conflicting situation because of its relatively radical worldview. What it can do, as its representative states, is that radical NGOs should find alternative sources of funds and develop relations with independent NGOs or internal funding. But as it grows, as the scope of the organization widens, the director should balance more the relations with different sectors and stakeholders, switching to a less critical approach (interview). That NGO might lose its radical direction if it were more integrated to

the established network of development for doing more with the poor. The institutionalization of the radical NGO may end up with a different worldview and organization.

The professional work is the norm in the NGOs. Young people are not likely to take on volunteer work in the NGOs. They are generally not financially secure and they need to earn for those which old and middle-aged people have already got. The identification of the employee-members with the NGO is understandable in the light of their perception of the NGO as a workplace paying for their labor. The volunteer work is not widespread among those older generations, either. According to a representative, the problem is not with the concept of voluntarism. It is related more to the way volunteer work is consumed within the capitalist system. Volunteer activity in the form of spare time is directed to the consumption systems of capitalism (interview). Exhausted in the system, it cannot become a potential for the NGO work. Nevertheless, given the function of the development NGOs in a growing poverty sector, it is not feasible to make things done through only voluntary work. Voluntary work may be a barrier against institutional NGOs, which are urgently needed by the sector. The institutional structure is based on regular activities, which may be secured through salaried positions and formal regulations. There may develop hierarchy though not much. These features may not coexist with the voluntary work. It should be added that political mobilization is more likely through voluntary work, which would be the ideal case.

The NGOs seem to be elite-structures. The space of NGO is what has been left to the leftist “petty-bourgeoisie” after the September 12 military coup (interview). That people do not take initiative makes it possible for “petty-bourgeoisie” to monopolize that space (interview). In other cases, government fills the space of NGOs with state-founded institutions. The NGO sector has developed outside where it should develop, beyond the reach of ordinary people (interview). The beneficiaries do not have a say in the sector. Eventually, the sector has become the tool of the international restructuring. Their institutionalization is now shaped by the position of the NGOs in that restructuring.

The last point is that the development NGOs are perceived as employment-creating structures (interview), as we have mentioned before in various parts of the study. They are like business firms, managing their funds as profitably as possible. They have become income-generating non-profit organizations by “project-hunting” (Insel, 2002). There is even a tendency of leaving the NGO as inheritance to offspring as if the NGO was a holding company. The NGOs are not opposed to the system but they may be important actors in the democratization process. They work with the people, more or less on a voluntary basis and face-to-face relations. The workforce is from the qualified middle classes. The NGOs put the capacity building as one of the fundamental aims, defining the concept in such a way that may contain the political capacity building. Yet, considering the developments, it is difficult to be optimistic about the role of the development NGOs in democratization. The process of institutionalization may not result in those participation mechanisms.

7.5. Questionnaire Results

In this section, we will present the results of the questionnaire with no or little comment. The results will be evaluated in the discussion section. In addition, by using cross-tabulations, correlations, ANOVA and difference tests, we will try to determine the relations between the items of the questionnaire. As we have mentioned in the methodology and research chapter, the questionnaire aims at measuring two things. The first is the institutionalization level of the NGO sector as perceived by the NGO employees. The second is the social class status of the employees. We have 39 respondents participating in the questionnaire.

7.5.1. Institutionalization Scale

The institutionalization scale is a measure constructed on the qualities of an ideal bureaucracy described in the rationalization chapter. It intends to measure to what extent the employees consider their organization as an ideal bureaucracy. It is a tool to verify the results of the interviews made with the key persons. The possible minimum value of the scale is 1, indicating minimum level of institutionalization, and the maximum value is 5, indicating maximum level of institutionalization. The mean of institutionalization scale is 3.2108, the median 3.2667, the mode 3.53, the minimum 2.13, and the maximum 4.40. The missing values for an item in the institutionalization scale have been replaced by the average of that item. Overall, the employee perception is that the rural development NGOs are not institutionalized/rationalized, but on the way. This is in line with the results of the interviews. The organizational practices are not perceived as the parts of an

institutional structure. But there are traces of institutionalization. Their reflection on the employees is seen from the score that is above the average level of “3”.

7.5.2. Demographic Profile

The average age of the respondents is 31.42 with the minimum 21 and the maximum 44. 3 individuals did not respond. 55.6 percent are at or below 30. 13.9 percent are at or above 40. 22 of the 39 respondents are female, 17 male. 13 people are married. There are 28 people with no child, 4 people with 1, 4 people with 2, 2 people with 3, and 1 person with 4. 67.6 percent of 34 respondents live alone or with at most 2 people.

TABLE 7.1: Gender, marital status, child number, number of people lived together

Gender	Frequency	percent
Female	22	56,4
Male	17	43,6
Total	39	100
marital status		
Married	13	33,3
Single	26	66,7
Total	39	100
Child number		
0	28	71,8
1	4	10,3
2	4	10,3
3	2	5,1
4	1	2,6
Total	39	100
home people		
1	9	26,5
2	8	23,5
3	6	17,6
4	5	14,7
5	5	14,7
6	1	2,9
Total	34	100

7.5.3. Economic Profile

The current or expected rent of residence is 326.35 million TL on average with 50 million TL at minimum and 1000 million TL at maximum. 13 individuals did not respond to this question. 57.7 percent of actual or expected rents are at or below 250 million TL. 23 percent are between 250 and 500 million TL. 19.2 percent are above 500 million TL.

The average income of 38 individuals that answered the question is 1100 million TL. The maximum is 3250 million TL and the minimum 300 million TL. Two modes are 800 and 1000 million TL. 76.3 percent earn at least 800 million TL, 44.7 percent at least 1000 million, 23.7 percent at least 1500 million TL.

The average home income of 33 respondents is 1984.85 million TL. The maximum is 12000 million and the minimum is 400 million TL. 87.9 percent earn at least 800 million, 72.7 percent at least 1000 million TL, and 42.4 percent at least 1500 million TL.

43.6 percent live at rent. 10.3 own a home, 20.5 live in their families' home. 12.8 live in employer-provided apartments. 12.8 are in the category of "other", one of which is paying for the apartment to own after the payments are over, one in a friend's apartment, and three in the employer-provided residences.

TABLE 7.2: Home status

home status	frequency	percent
Rent	17	43,6
employee-provided	5	12,8
belongs to family	8	20,5
belongs to you	4	10,3
Other	5	12,8
Total	39	100

7.5.4. Education and Foreign Language

5.1 (2 people) percent are primary school graduates. 10.3 percent are lise graduates, 7.7 percent yüksekokul (2-year education after lise), 59 percent university graduates, 10.3 percent master graduates, and 7.7 percent doctorate graduates. 48.7 percent can speak at least on foreign language, that is, English. “Local” in the table means Kurdish.

TABLE 7.3: Education level and foreign languages

Education	frequency	percent
primary	2	5,1
secondary	0	0
lycee	4	10,3
high school	3	7,7
university	23	59
master	4	10,3
doctorate	3	7,7
total	39	100
Language		
Turkish only	18	46,2
English	16	41
English+French	2	5,1
Local	2	5,1
Local+English	1	2,6
total	39	100

7.5.5. Employment Profile

There are various job positions defined by the respondents. We classify them in four groups. In the first group of upper-level directors are 2 people, in the group of project directors 26, in the group of project assistants 7, and in the group of office employees 4. According to their occupations we have set up five classes: engineering/architectural with 13 people of the 32 respondents, social scientists with 7, nature scientists with 4, other formal-education occupations with 4, and others (tailoring, tourism, project management) with 4.

TABLE 7.4: Current jobs (rearranged in 4 categories) and occupations (rearranged in 5 categories)

Job	frequency	percent
office employee	4	10,3
project assistant	7	17,9
project director	26	66,7
upper-level director	2	5,1
total	39	100
Occupation		
engineering-architectural	13	40,6
social science	7	21,9
nature science	4	12,5
other formal-educated	4	12,5
other	4	12,5
total	32	100

The average time spent abroad is 211.95 days, the maximum of which is 2880 days and the minimum 0 day. 56.4 percent have been to abroad for various reasons. Mostly, the developed world countries including the US, the European countries, Japan, and Israel are visited. 3 people have been to Asia (Afghanistan, India, and Bangladesh), and 1 in Georgia. The minimum stay is 4 days, the maximum 2880

days. 43.6 percent of the stays last more than 10 days. The reasons are 26.1 percent of 23 people work, 39.1 percent education/meeting/conference, 21.7 percent tourism, and 13 percent other (parent's job and workshop).

TABLE 7.5: Reason for being to abroad

reason for being to abroad	frequency	percent
not being to abroad	16	41
work	6	15,4
education	6	15,4
tourism	5	12,8
meeting/conference	3	7,7
other	3	7,7
total	39	100

The average time spent for work outside hometown, or we may say in the field, is 460.69 days with the maximum 2160 days and the minimum 0 days. 48.7 percent lived and worked for projects in regions outside the hometown. Of them, 10.5 percent lived and worked outside the country, 47.4 percent in the Southeast and East of the country, 26.3 percent in the Black Sea Region, and 15.8 percent in the Mediterranean Sea Region. The minimum stay is 14 days and the maximum is 2160 days. 79 percent lived in the field for at least 120 days.

TABLE 7.6: Place of work outside hometown rearranged in four categories

Place of work outside home	frequency	percent
Abroad	2	10,5
Southeast and East Anatolia	9	47,4
Black Sea Region	5	26,3
Mediterranean Sea Region	3	15,8
total	19	100

53.8 percent state that they would be in difficulty to find a job if they lost the existing one. 43.6 percent believe that they can easily find another one. Only one person believes that it is impossible.

TABLE 7.7: Perceived employment opportunity if the current one were lost

employment opportunity	frequency	percent
impossible	1	2,6
difficult	21	53,8
easy	17	43,6
total	39	100

7.5.6. Family and Social Mobility

Of the 35 respondents', 68.6 percent of mothers have at most primary education degree (5-year education). 11.4 percent have secondary education degree (8-year education). Only 2 mothers in 35 (5.7%) are university graduate. 12.8 percent (5/37) can speak a foreign language, English. The occupations of mothers have four categories; 48.7 percent are housewife, 7.7 percent teacher, 2.6 percent engineer (agricultural), 10.4 percent self-employed, 30.8 percent undefined. The jobs of mothers are classified by retired with 20.5 percent, housewife with 7.18 percent, self-employed with 7.8 percent, and undefined with 23.1.

TABLE 7.8: Education, language, occupation (rearranged in 4), and job (rearranged in 4) of mother

mother education	frequency	percent
illiterate	1	2,9
literate	12	34,3
primary	11	31,4
secondary	4	11,4
lise	2	5,7
High-school	3	8,6
university	2	5,7
total	35	100
mother language		
Turkish only	29	78,4
English	5	13,5
Local	3	8,1
total	37	100
mother occupation		
Housewife	19	70,4
Teacher	3	11,1
Engineer	1	3,7
self-employed	4	14,8
total	27	100
mother job		
Housewife	20	64,5
self-employed	3	9,7
Retired	8	25,8
total	31	100

54.1 percent of 37 fathers have at least lise degree. 24.3 percent are university graduates. 29.7 percent have primary education degree (5-year education). 18.9 percent (7/37) of fathers can speak at least a foreign language. 7.7 percent can speak both English and French. Of 29 respondents' the occupation categories of fathers are workers with 15.5 percent, military staff with 13 percent, self-employed with 10.4 percent, official (teacher, police, official) with 23.4 percent, formal-educated self-employed with 13 percent, undefined with 25.6 percent. Of 31 respondents' the jobs of fathers are workers with 2.6 percent, retired with 56.4 percent, formal-educated

self-employed with 5.1 percent, self-employed with 10.4 percent, military staff 5.1 percent, undefined with 20.5 percent.

TABLE 7.9: Education, language, occupation (rearranged in 5), and job (rearranged in 5) of father

father education	Frequenc y	percent
literate	3	8,1
primary	11	29,7
secondary	3	8,1
lise	7	18,9
high-school	4	10,8
university	9	24,3
total	37	100
father language		
Turkish only	27	73
English	4	10,8
Enlish+French	3	8,1
Local	3	8,1
total	37	100
father occupation		
worker	6	20,7
official	9	31
Military staff	5	17,2
other formal-educated	5	17,2
Self-employed	4	13,8
total	29	100
father job		
worker	1	3,2
Military staff	2	6,5
other formal-educated	2	6,5
Self-employed	4	12,9
retired	22	71
total	31	100

53.8 percent of 13 spouses have at least lise degree. 38.5 percent have university degree. 2/13, 15.4 percent can speak English. The categories of spouses' occupations are housewife with 15.4 percent, formal-educated with 30.8 percent, official/teacher with 30.4 percent, and other (accounting, coffeehouse) with 15.4 percent. One person

is not defined. The categories of jobs are housewife with 23.1 percent, official/teacher 38.5 percent, formal-educated with 23.1 percent. Two people are not defined.

TABLE 7.10: Education, language, occupation, and job of spouse

spouse education	frequency	percent
primary	2	15,4
secondary	4	30,8
lise	1	7,7
high-school	1	7,7
university	5	38,5
total	13	100
spouse language		
Turkish only	11	84,6
English	2	15,4
total	13	100
spouse occupation		
undefined	1	7,7
housewife	2	15,4
formal-educated	4	30,8
teacher-official	4	30,8
other	2	15,4
total	13	100
spouse job		
undefined	2	15,4
housewife	3	23,1
formal-educated	2	15,4
teacher-official	5	38,5
other	1	7,7
total	13	100

7.5.7. Place of Origin

46.2 percent of the respondents lived the first 12 years until they completed primary education in villages, small towns, and districts. 30.8 percent lived this period in metropolises. 66.7 percent lived the second part of the life, from the completion of primary degree till the age 20, in cities and metropolises.

TABLE 7.11: Places lived until the completion of primary school and then until 20

place of first 12 years	frequency	percent
village	4	10,3
small town	3	7,7
district	11	28,2
city	9	23,1
metropolis	12	30,8
total	39	100
place of next 8 years		
village	0	0
small town	3	7,7
district	10	25,6
city	9	23,1
metropolis	17	43,6
total	39	100

7.5.8. Perceived Social Class

The self-reported class statuses are 15.4 percent working/lower class, 66.7 percent middle class, and 17.9 percent upper-middle class. No one reports an upper class status.

TABLE 7.12: Self-reported class status

Class	frequency	Percent
lower/working	6	15,4
middle	26	66,7
above middle	7	17,9
upper	0	0
total	39	100

7.5.9. Consumption Patterns

82.1 percent of the respondents have access to washing machine, 12.8 percent to drying machine, 51.3 percent to dishwasher. 56.4 percent can reach desktop computer and 20.5 percent to laptop computer. 28.2 percent have DVD player, 23.1

percent connection to cable TV, 23.1 percent to connection to coded/paid TV channels, 43.6 percent connection to Internet, and 25.6 percent more than one color TV. None of the respondents has private retirement for himself/herself or for family members. 30.8 percent have personal private health insurance and 10.3 percent (of 39 respondents, not of 13 married people or 11 people with children though all 4 of 39 people are married) for family members. 10.3 percent have a car and 5.1 percent a car belonged to wife. 12.8 percent drive the family car. 10.3 percent have a summerhouse and 2.6 percent (only one respondent) has a second house. Only one person (2.6%) has the possibility of private education for his/her children. 12.8 percent have children with cellular phones. 46.2 percent can go holiday outside where they live (the question is flawed since it asks the possibility of holiday outside Ankara, not outside where people live as it should have been). 71.8 percent can go out for dinner at least once a month. 48.7 are subscriber to a monthly, 10.3 percent to a weekly.

7.6. Discussion on the Questionnaires

Our aim is to define the general picture. We will not determine each individual's social-economic status, giving scores to each on the bases of weights of all dimensions. It is almost impossible to correctly weigh the relative importance of the items, at least for this study.

The employees are generally below middle age and single. The directors, on the other hand, are generally above middle age. The founders and directors have already jobs in or retired from state or private institutions. This structure may be due to the

late development of the sector. It is relatively a new sector. The nature of work that includes extensive field experience may attract single rather than married people.

We can say that the employees earn relatively high income. The per capita income in Turkey is \$3400 (DİE, 2004). The average income of 38 individuals that answered the question is 1100 million TL per month or \$8800 per year (\$1=1.5 million TL). 76.3 percent earn at least 800 million TL per month or \$6400 per year, 44.7 percent at least 1000 million per month or \$8000 per year. Besides, the average home income of 33 respondents is 1984.85 million TL per month. Excluding two outliers of 11000 million TL and 12000 million TL, the average home-income is 1370 million TL per month for 31 respondents. It amounts to approximately \$11000 per year.

The education level of the respondents is quite high as well. In Turkey, the average education year in 1998 was 6 years (DİE, 2004), one more year to the primary degree. A great majority of the employees have at least university degree (82 %) This means that the average education year is approximately 14. That almost half can speak English is remarkable. These two are important factor for the skill differentiations. Foreign language is especially important for the interactions with the external parties and international donors. Almost all the NGOs have relations with those donors.

According to our classification, the employee occupations include the categories of engineering/architecture, social scientists, nature scientists, other formal-education occupations, and others (tailoring, tourism, project management). The majority of

occupations are to do with mental work. They are related, to a certain extent, with what the employees do in their jobs, at least with their mental orientations. The occupations are, in general, related to their education level and university education. Not so much fewer than half have field experience in a way that they lived and worked outside their hometowns. In addition, as understood from their jobs, many have got that experience in their hometowns. This kind of experience and the field experience in general are crucial to become competent in the development sector. Many employees have been to abroad for educational and work reasons, which may affect their skill level (65 percent of those been to abroad).

More than half of the respondents report that they would be in difficulty to find a new job if the existing one was lost. Only one individual says that it is impossible. It is probably related to the current situation of the Turkish economy. Nevertheless, 45 percent believe that they can find a new job.

From the analysis of the education, occupation, job, and foreign language of the parents and the employees, we can say that there is an upward mobility for the NGO employees. In all four dimensions, the employees surpass their parents without any doubt. We have searched the career opportunities by looking at the self-reported possibility of finding a new job if the current one is lost. The NGO employees are quite qualified according to our findings.

The differences between the education, foreign language, job, and occupation of fathers and mothers are not insignificant. Fathers generally have a relative superiority

over mothers in all dimensions. But, the employees rate significantly higher in all four dimensions. It is quite clear that the employees have socially moved into a higher social-economic status. 13 spouses are relatively lower in those dimensions. We may say that they do not create a difference in the social-economic statuses of the employees. It also seems that the educational, occupational and job characteristics of parents, and the very low rate of foreign language speaking must have done not much to improve the status of the employees. The family environment must have provided the initial guidance and continuing support in the way of their children to move up to higher status.

Most of the employees lived their first 12 years of life in villages, small towns, small districts and cities. The metropolis life is a phenomenon of the following years, probably associated with the university education and work. It is an indication of social mobility at the same time.

Washing machine and dinner-out at least once a month are the most accessible possessions. Dishwasher, desktop computer, one-week holiday, connection to Internet, and subscription to a monthly are possessed by almost half of the respondents. Approximately a quarter have the possibility of laptop computer, DVD player, connection to cable and coded/paid TV, more than one color TV, and personal private health insurance. Drying machine, private health insurance for family members (4 out of 13 married or parent individuals), car belonged to individual or family, summerhouse, cellular phones for children (5 out of 11 with children), and subscription to weekly are owned by one tenth of the individuals. The

least owned items are car belonged to wife, second house, and private education for children (1 out of 11 with children). Washing machine and dinner-out may not be so much a differentiating factor. But dishwasher, desktop computer, one-week holiday, connection to Internet, and subscription to a monthly may possibly indicate a relatively high social-economic status. Other possessions that are less likely to own, we believe, are clear indications of a high status.

We can say that the rural development NGO employees are highly skilled, educated, socially mobile, and have relatively high income and employment opportunities. As opposed to the general conditions of the country, they have a favorable market situation as defined by Lockwood, placing in middle class. Market situation refers to the source and size of income, degree of job security, and opportunity for upward social mobility (Hindess, 1987: 68). Their social mobility seems very much related to education. Giddens distinguishes middle classes by their educational qualifications and professional skills (Hindess, 1987: 42). The NGO employees may have gained a middle class status through education. Their professional skills are composed of coordination and organizing tasks. In terms of Mills, they are white-collar workers (Mills, 1956: 65). This point again may show that the social-economic statuses of the employees are considered middle class.

Our conclusion is that the development NGO employees belong to a certain stratum of the middle class. They do not constitute a very heterogeneous group. They show similar characteristics in many of the dimensions discussed above. In fact, when we look at the self-reported class status, we see that 15.4 percent state working/lower

class, 66.7 percent middle class, and 17.9 percent upper-middle class. Their perception gives clues about what are their relative positions in the class structure.

7.7. The Relations between the Items of the Questionnaire

In this section, we will analyze the results of cross-tabulations, anova tables, difference tests, and correlations. The aim is to determine the relations between the different items of the questionnaire.

Gender and jobs (rearranged in four categories mentioned above) of respondents are related. The significance level is 0.012 (Pearson Chi-Square). The relation is rather strong, 0.529 according to Cramer's V and 0.468 according to Contingency Coefficient. Gender and occupations (again rearranged, in five categories) are also related with the significance level of 0.034. The power of relation is 0.570 according to Cramer's V and 0.495 according to Contingency Coefficient. Below are the cross-tabulation results for job and occupation groups respectively. There seems to be gender-segregation in jobs and occupation (according to our rearrangement). The project positions are mostly filled by male employees. The major part of the projects is fieldwork. The NGOs may not prefer to employ female employees in the field. The two poles in occupation are the social scientists mostly female and engineers and nature scientists mostly male. These segregations are related to more general factors, not only the middle class or the NGO sector. Social and cultural conditions of Turkey may encourage women not to be involved in such occupations as engineering and veterinary (nature scientists are mostly veterinarian in the rural development NGOs) since they may be perceived as an obstacle to the domestic "duties" of women. They

generally include fieldwork, different from an office work, which may be thought as more suitable for women.

TABLE 7.13: Gender and job groups

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10,923 ^a	3	,012
Likelihood Ratio	14,278	3	,003
Linear-by-Linear Association	2,578	1	,108
N of Valid Cases	39		

a. 6 cells (75,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,87.

TABLE 7.14: Gender and occupation groups

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10,410 ^a	4	,034
Likelihood Ratio	12,403	4	,015
Linear-by-Linear Association	,881	1	,348
N of Valid Cases	32		

a. 8 cells (80,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,88.

Education and occupations of respondents have been found related. The significance level is 0.032. The power of relation is 0.510 according to Cramer's V and 0.714 according to Contingency Coefficient. Education and employment opportunity are related with a significance level of 0.006. The relation value is 0.564 according to Cramer's V and 0.623 according to Contingency Coefficient. Education, especially university, improves the market situation (in Lockwood's sense) of individuals and signifies the title of an occupation. Job, education of parents and spouse are not

related to education. The result may show that the employees are from different strata, increasing their status through education.

TABLE 7.15: Education and occupation groups

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	33,237 ^a	20	,032
Likelihood Ratio	32,423	20	,039
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,369	1	,242
N of Valid Cases	32		

a. 29 cells (96,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,13.

TABLE 7.16: Education and employment opportunity

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24,798 ^a	10	,006
Likelihood Ratio	14,134	10	,167
Linear-by-Linear Association	6,997	1	,008
N of Valid Cases	39		

a. 16 cells (88,9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,05.

Knowing a foreign language does not affect occupation, job, self-reported class and employment opportunity. We expect there would be. We comment that the NGO development sector is not homogeneous. In some sections, foreign language will be important.

TABLE 7.17: Foreign language and occupation groups

Chi-Square Tests

	value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2,908 ^a	4	,573
Likelihood Ratio	2,997	4	,558
Linear-by-Linear Association	,040	1	,842
N of Valid Cases	32		

a. 8 cells (80,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1,75.

TABLE 7.18: Foreign language and job groups

Chi-Square Tests

	value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2,273 ^a	3	,518
Likelihood Ratio	3,044	3	,385
Linear-by-Linear Association	,335	1	,562
N of Valid Cases	39		

a. 6 cells (75,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,97.

TABLE 7.19: Foreign language and employment opportunity

Chi-Square Tests

	value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3,638 ^a	2	,162
Likelihood Ratio	4,055	2	,132
Linear-by-Linear Association	3,503	1	,061
N of Valid Cases	39		

a. 2 cells (33,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,49.

TABLE 7.20: Foreign language and class

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	,938 ^a	2	,626
Likelihood Ratio	,951	2	,621
Linear-by-Linear Association	,079	1	,779
N of Valid Cases	39		

a. 4 cells (66,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2,92.

Jobs and self-reported classes are related. The significance level is 0.027. The power of relation is 0.427 according to Cramer's V and 0.517 according to Contingency Coefficient. Job position may be perceived as the ultimate measure to determine classes, justifying the three theories of middle class explained in the theoretical sections. Job and occupation are not related. The NGO work needs a different specialization mostly gained through fieldwork and on the mental ability developed in university education. Job is not related to education, job and occupation of parents. It may again show diverse backgrounds of the employees.

TABLE 7.21: Job groups and class

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14,230 ^a	6	,027
Likelihood Ratio	12,775	6	,047
Linear-by-Linear Association	2,661	1	,103
N of Valid Cases	39		

a. 11 cells (91,7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,31.

TABLE 7.22: Job groups and occupation groups

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11,828 ^a	12	,460
Likelihood Ratio	12,494	12	,407
Linear-by-Linear Association	,042	1	,838
N of Valid Cases	32		

a. 18 cells (90,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,25.

TABLE 7.23: Job groups and education

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21,975 ^a	15	,108
Likelihood Ratio	18,416	15	,241
Linear-by-Linear Association	8,185	1	,004
N of Valid Cases	39		

a. 23 cells (95,8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,10.

TABLE 7.24: Job groups and job groups of mothers

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2,568 ^a	6	,861
Likelihood Ratio	3,503	6	,744
Linear-by-Linear Association	,024	1	,877
N of Valid Cases	31		

a. 10 cells (83,3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,10.

TABLE 7.25: Job groups and occupation groups of mothers

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4,421 ^a	9	,882
Likelihood Ratio	5,715	9	,768
Linear-by-Linear Association	,373	1	,542
N of Valid Cases	27		

a. 15 cells (93,8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,04.

TABLE 7.26: Job groups and job groups of fathers

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11,191 ^a	12	,513
Likelihood Ratio	9,898	12	,625
Linear-by-Linear Association	2,097	1	,148
N of Valid Cases	31		

a. 19 cells (95,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,06.

TABLE 7.27: Job groups and occupation groups of fathers

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	18,009 ^a	12	,115
Likelihood Ratio	19,824	12	,070
Linear-by-Linear Association	1,083	1	,298
N of Valid Cases	29		

a. 19 cells (95,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,28.

Occupations of respondents and of their fathers (rearranged in five categories) are found dependent with 0.042. The power of relation is 0.541 according to Cramer's V and 0.735 according to Contingency Coefficient. Jobs of mothers and employment

opportunity of respondents are related with 0.015. The power of relation is 0.447 according to Cramer's V and 0.534 according to Contingency Coefficient. This is an indication of the continuity of social-economic status. Occupation does not relate with any other factor. Rather than what title one has, what one currently does is more important for social-economic position.

TABLE 7.28: Occupation groups and occupation groups of fathers

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	26,961 ^a	16	,042
Likelihood Ratio	30,592	16	,015
Linear-by-Linear Association	,283	1	,595
N of Valid Cases	23		

a. 25 cells (100,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is ,17.

The mean ages of self-reported class categories differ with the significance of 0.040. There is an average difference of 7.67 (alpha is 0.016 according to LSD and 0.042 according to Tukey HSD) between upper-middle and lower-working classes, upper-middle being older. The difference between upper-middle and middle classes is 5.17 (alpha is 0.035 according to LSD), upper-middle being older. Middle class seems a mixed group with younger and older ages. Age is certainly a factor to differentiate social classes. As we have stated in the theory section, the patriarchal relations may be a reason for the effect of age. It is possible as well that the aged individuals may have already accumulated the necessary capitals of social-economic status. The interesting point is whatever it signifies, people perceives more or less correctly the effect of age.

TABLE 7.29: Age and class

ANOVA					
AGE					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	212,112	2	106,056	3,569	,040
Within Groups	980,638	33	29,716		
Total	1192,750	35			

Income and home-income are different between self-reported classes (the alphas are 0.005 and 0.006 respectively). According to Tukey HSD, the mean difference is 1004.76 million TL between upper-middle and lower classes, 703.43 million TL between upper-middle and lower classes with the significance level of 0.005 and 0.006 respectively. According to Dunnett T3, the mean differences are not significant. According to Tukey HSD homogeneous subsets, lower and middle classes, and upper-middle class are two subsets for both income and home-income.

TABLE 7.30: Income, home-income, and class

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
INCOME	Between Groups	3752981	2	876490,476	6,245	,005
	Within Groups	0517019	35	300486,259		
	Total	4270000	37			
HOME INCOME	Between Groups	8772043	2	9386021,65	6,052	,006
	Within Groups	,46E+08	30	855846,032		
	Total	1,04E+08	32			

Income differs between self-reported employment opportunities with the alpha of 0.030.

TABLE 7.31: Income and employment opportunity

ANOVA					
INCOME					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2589412	2	1294705,882	3,879	,030
within Groups	11680588	35	333731,092		
Total	14270000	37			

Income and home-income are different according to the occupations of fathers with 0.050 and 0.000 respectively. According to LSD, the income difference between the individuals of military staff fathers and those of workers is 1204.17 million TL (the alpha is 0.007), 843.06 million TL between the formers and those of officials (the alpha is 0.036), 1227.50 between those of military staff and those of other formal-educated fathers (the alpha is 0.008), 1062.50 between the formers and those of self-employed fathers (the alpha is 0.026). According to Dunnett T3, the mean differences in home-income are not significant. According to Tukey HSD homogeneous subsets, other formal-educated and worker fathers form one group of income, military staff fathers the other group, and self-employed and official fathers included in both groups. Other formal-educated, worker, self-employed, and official fathers form one group of home-income, military staff fathers the one group.

TABLE 7.32: Income, home-income, and occupation groups of fathers

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
INCOME	Between Groups	4466194	4	116548,611	2,801	,050
	Within Groups	9166931	23	398562,198		
	Total	3633125	27			
HOME INCOME	Between Groups	,35E+08	4	3859666,67	10,496	,000
	Within Groups	1291333	19	225859,649		
	Total	,97E+08	23			

Home-income differs according to the occupations of individuals (rearranged in five categories). According to Dunnett T3, the mean differences in home-income are not significant. According to Tukey HSD homogeneous subsets, the category of other forms one group, other categories the other group.

TABLE 7.33: Home-income and occupation groups

ANOVA					
HOME INCOME					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1,08E+08	4	26971362,27	6,667	,001
Within Groups	88996958	22	4045316,288		
Total	1,97E+08	26			

Home-income differs according to the foreign languages known with 0.000.

TABLE 7.34: Home-income and foreign languages

ANOVA					
HOME INCOME					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1,93E+08	4	48259290,96	118,425	,000
Within Groups	11410260	28	407509,301		
Total	2,04E+08	32			

Income and home-income differ according to the education levels of respondents with 0.001 and 0.000 respectively. According to Dunnett T3, the income of individual with PhD degree is 1550 million TL more than that of primary school graduate (the alpha is 0.007), 1237.50 more than that of lise graduate (the alpha is 0.004), 922.73 more than that of university graduate (the alpha is 0.010). The income of university graduate is 627.27 million TL more than that of primary school

graduate (the alpha is 0.001). According to Tukey HSD, the home-income of individual with PhD degree is 10925 million TL more than that of primary school graduate (the alpha is 0.000), 10200.50 more than that of lise graduate (the alpha is 0.000), 9900 more than that of high-school graduate (two-year education) (the alpha is 0.000), 10050 more than that of university graduate (the alpha is 0.000), 10150 more than that of master graduate (the alpha is 0.000). According to Tukey HSD homogeneous subsets, primary school and lise graduates form one group of income, PhD and master graduates the other group, university and high school graduates are in between. PhD graduates are one group for home-income, others the other group.

TABLE 7.35: Income, home-income and education

ANOVA						
		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
HOME INCOME	Between Groups	1,94E+08	5	8854234,85	103,089	,000
	within Groups	10176250	27	376898,148		
	Total	1,04E+08	32			
INCOME	Between Groups	6559489	5	311897,727	5,445	,001
	within Groups	7710511	32	240953,480		
	Total	14270000	37			

Income differs between two groups of individuals knowing foreign language and not knowing it with the significance level of 0.042.

TABLE 7.36: Income and foreign language

Independent Samples Test									
	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
INCOME	2,066	,159	-2,106	36	,042	-406,39	193,012	797,835	-14,943
			-2,065	29,758	,048	-406,39	196,774	808,392	-4,386

According to Kendall's tau_b, income is correlated with home-income (the correlation coefficient is 0.556 and the significance level is 0.000). According to Spearman's rho, Income is correlated with home-income (the correlation coefficient is 0.695 and the significance level is 0.000).

TABLE 7.37: Income and home-income

Correlations				
			INCOME	HOME INCOME
Kendall's tau_b	INCOME	Correlation Coefficient	1,000	,556*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
		N	38	33
	HOME INCOME	Correlation Coefficient	,556*	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
		N	33	33
Spearman's rho	INCOME	Correlation Coefficient	1,000	,695*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
		N	38	33
	HOME INCOME	Correlation Coefficient	,695*	1,000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	,000	,000
		N	33	33

**. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

Looking at the figures of income and home-income, income is different between self-reported classes, employment opportunities, the occupations of fathers, education levels, and those speaking a foreign language and those not. Home-income differs

between self-reported classes, the occupations of fathers, the education levels of fathers, education levels, occupations, and foreign languages known (not grouped into two as knowing and not knowing). In line with Lockwood's theory, income seems strongly to signify one's market situation. Home-income, we believe, indirectly affects one's class position, giving one additional resources. We have found that the two are associated. Its importance is justified as well. How education is important for class status signified by income and home-income can be seen from the relations. To speak a foreign language has been found to relate, contrasting to the results of its relation with self-reported class and employment opportunities. The more objective measures of income and home-income show the distinguishing quality of foreign language. The status link between generations is observed again in the occupations and educations of fathers. Income does not change with age. It may indicate that the association between self-reported classes and age is a perception of patriarchal power relations, not objectified in economic power relations.

It can be concluded that we have dealt with social-economic group having a middle class status in the development NGO sector. The influence of education and foreign language in differentiating social-economic status strengthen our conclusion. Occupation, job, father's occupation and education, income, home-income, and age seem to be the most important factors to determine social-economic position.

7.8. Limitations

There are certain limitations that we cannot cope with in the study. The scope of the study and the time constraints makes those inevitable to carry. The first one is the

sample. Though we believe that our sample reflects the limited number of rural development NGOs, it is a limitation to study mostly Ankara-based organization. The variety of the organizations may not have been reflected in the study. İstanbul-centered organizations may have contributed a broad view and we may have had the chance to take population instead of sample by including the other NGOs in İstanbul. Nevertheless, our sample is representative because of the limited size of the sector.

The rural development NGOs, as we call them, do not focus merely on the rural development. Almost all of them have interests in other activities like urban development and emergency aid. They receive funds from the international donors for those activities. What amount of those funds is spent on the rural development is not clear. The priorities of the NGO and the direction of those funds affect the institutionalization process and social-economic composition of the employees. But we would not be able to measure the direction of that effect precisely. We simply assume that the rural development sector necessitates going through the process of rationalization.

The measurement of the rationalization/institutionalization degree has to be based on the interviews. We questioned the matter to the employees as well. But its importance is very little since the employees can hardly have the information of the NGO in its entirety. Moreover, their perceptions are limited in their immediate work situations, differing for each employee. It also says very little about the variety between the NGOs. After all, the institutionalization scale is an aggregate measure and this is the reason why we did not work on it much. Other than the interviews and

the questionnaires, we could not reach the documents like organizational procedures, charts, and job descriptions. In many cases, they were absent, signaling the institutionalization degree. However, the interviews gave valuable insights though they are biased by the thoughts of the key individuals that we interviewed.

There may be other factors in the NGO proliferation in Turkey after 1980. The end of Cold War, new social movements as in the cases of environmentalists and anti-globalists, and non-labor politics are among them. The earthquakes are important specifically for Turkey in the establishments of the NGOs. But what we have concentrated on in this study is the initiation of the process of rationalization together with that of the rural development NGOs. It is unlikely that those other factors may force rationalization in the rural development NGOs. We assume that the neo-liberal political economy is the primary factor behind the rationalization process. But we did not question it in the interviews directly. Instead, we searched for the main motive of the NGO work, whether it is service provision or political mobilization, again assuming that service provision is directly related to the neo-liberal paradigm. It would have been better to listen to the thoughts about neo-liberalism even though it might create a tense situation. We should mention that one key individual was completely against talking about political issues.

We know that NGOs are organizationally flexible structures. Before neo-liberalism and post-fordist transformation, they were not different from what they have been after. In fact, their flexible organizational structure is one of the reasons why neo-liberal actors have preferred to cooperate with them though the cooperation results in

the loss of flexibility of the NGOs. The flexibility is related to the sector and its mode of operation. This structure may be rational in that it may create an in-itself structure, which focuses on self-existence. In fact, this is the case in the NGO sector. This is to say that rationalization may be defined not necessarily in Weberian terms. The rationality of Turkey, of the NGO sector, and of the rural development sector may differ. We had to choose of Weber since we did not know what the other two might be. The study is certainly Eurocentric, taking one of the major theories of European Sociology as its beginning point.

We do not have the information of the organizational structure and the employee composition of the NGOs of the previous years, especially before 1980, the year when the neo-liberal transformation began. Therefore, we could not compare our findings with the previous data to see whether our assumptions were correct or not. Neo-liberalism may not affect the process of rationalization and social-economic statuses of the employees though the literature claims the opposite. Nevertheless, it would be better to empirically test the effect of neo-liberalism, and we believe that this study will provide data for comparison in the following studies.

It may be suggested that a more comprehensive study can be undertaken, including the urban development sector and the development sector in general, in following years. The urban poverty is growing and has already become chronic. The time of the study is important since it might be possible to find out the effects of the rationalization process, if any, when the NGOs get completely involved in the development sector. This may take years.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The development NGOs have been already rationalized, before they are organizationally institutionalized, turning into in-itself structures, the structures of middle class employment. Their further institutionalization in the way defined by this study will probably consolidate the NGO sector as the employment sphere for middle class. The sector is a special field with its particular characteristics and qualified labor demand. It is important to get experienced in the sector. The monopolization of the development NGO sector by middle class reveals itself in the peculiar labor qualities, the most evident of which is the experience in the sector, and in the practices of the founder/directors. This does not mean middle class, as a class, monopolizes the NGO sphere. There is little sign of a common class-consciousness for middle classes, an awareness of belonging to a class with specific interests (King et al, 1981: 230).

The point is that this sphere is defined with the middle class characteristics. What make an NGO are middle class qualities as it makes individuals middle class. The decreasing employment opportunities of middle class have been partially substituted by that monopolization. Carter states that there is a reserve army of unemployed engineers, teachers, technicians, accountants, and petty managers, and those employed are subject to the rationalization process of the capitalist production

(Carter, 1985: 209). The proletarianization, then, is on the rise. The NGO sector may be viewed as an alternative way of reintegrating into the economic sphere. Middle class differentiates itself from lower classes economically and from upper classes intellectually through the NGOs. It is not only an economic but also a social-cultural status. This somewhat elitist structure may prevent the popularization of the NGO activities (Bali, 2000: 42). Without popular participation, the NGOs are more likely to turn into as a middle-class employment institution.

The development NGO sector will certainly grow. Poverty, middle class employment, and donor funds, the three inputs (we may call them land, labor, and capital) of the sector are growing as well. Official funds from governments and from international institutions have been on the rise since the mid 1970s. There is direct relation between the income of international NGOs and the number of disasters that happened in that year (İnsel, 2002). It is very likely that the NGOs will rationalize their structures in response these developments. The voluntary structures will possibly disappear. The growth and rationalization means more middle class positions that are paid for. Under the neo-liberal reorganization and expansion of the world economy, the rationalization-institutionalization of the NGO sector may result in the reestablishment of the existing in-itself situation (the employment sphere of middle class) on a more rational basis. The opposite direction towards a more democratic structure is not a strong alternative considering the neo-liberal practices in Latin America, South Korea, and Turkey where authoritarian governments took the lead in economic liberalization while giving no room to political liberalization. The three factors of production of the sector make as well the former more viable.

In general, the development NGOs generally have a critical perspective against the operation of the system though they do not have a problem with the capitalist mode of production as a whole. Most of them sincerely try to improve the democratic processes and to include the people in those processes. They work with the people in an informal environment where they can keep close contact with them and share the same conditions of life. We believe that in politically mobilizing the poor, they may be the most effective mechanisms. They can reach the regions that political parties and government agencies cannot reach. Reaching does not solely mean to go and serve. It is a matter of trust. Despite the difficulties to build trust, the development NGOs enthusiastically work for and on that basis. Their workforce mostly from middle class is qualified both for the NGO activity and for the democratic sensitivity. The NGOs have the potential to transform the system from within. Yet, democracy seems not the main focus of the NGOs. What they institutionalize may not be democracy. Institutionalization is the reproduction of the organization. The issue is whether it is of participation and democratic ideals or of a non-profit firm.

As we have seen in the theoretical section, poverty is an input to the neo-liberal economic system. It is a factor of production. The system should maintain poverty at a certain level so that it would neither be a threat to the operation of the system nor lose its productive feature. In other words, poverty should be subsidized. The development NGO sector is one way of the subsidies. The economic system should support this sector to support the poor. It is also ideologically appropriate to channel the funds via the NGOs. The funds do not aim one-time aid. They are used for

capacity building so that the poor makes it their own. They should not expect that government take care of them. The funds will help them be free individuals making their own choices without the limitations of government. We can say that there is an association between the sustainability of poverty and of the development NGO sector. Though individual NGOs may fail to continue its activities, the sector is almost impossible to disappear. The successful organizations will survive. After all, it is a matter of competition in a free market. It is hard to say that there is a culture of solidarity and cooperation among the development NGOs. Where there is little or no cooperation, on the contrary competition, the loss of democratic ideals may be unavoidable.

The fundamental quality of an NGO, the improvement of democracy, may be lost, or has already been lost. In Turkey, there are obstacles against the formation of a democratic culture in the civil society organizations, resulting from the cultural and social conditions (Türkiye’de STK Sempozyumu-9, 2002: 11-12). The authoritarian culture excludes the possibility of opposition within a group directed by an absolute leadership. The legal framework is restrictive. The traditional absence of civil society and the pioneer role of the Turkish state (state officials, state and military bureaucrats) in every social and cultural affair both in pre- and post-revolutionary periods impede the citizen initiative. Lastly, the organizations are based largely on primary relations and clientalism. Nevertheless, it would be expected that the NGOs struggle against these obstacles and become the participation mechanisms for ordinary people. The NGOs have the necessary capitals in that struggle. The middle class of the NGOs may institutionalize democratic culture through that struggle.

The institutionalization of democratic culture by developing it within and by rationalizing the organizational structure in the way of democracy is the distinctive feature of an NGO. It is not realistic to consider the development NGOs service entities. Whoever the beneficiary, the poor or middle class, it is a select group. Service and employment are provided to a select group. They should support the more general goal of transforming society in the way of democracy. A professionalized service organization can hardly produce politics and possibly depends on external politics determined independently of its influence (Türkiye’de STK Sempozyumu-9, 2002: 50). It is an employment opportunity rather than an entity with the public concern. Such an entity works like a subcontractor of those external political concerns. What they should do is to politically mobilize ordinary people for their rights, to mobilize them against poverty. In order to do that, the NGOs should accept that they are political organizations.

The neo-liberal paradigm assumes the separation of political and economic spheres. Within this paradigm, if the NGOs try to reduce poverty, they are in the economic sphere. Capacity building may be perceived as an economic issue. Yet, poverty is a political as well as an economic issue. Furthermore, it is impossible to deal with poverty outside the political realm. It is a macro level problem. The focus of the NGOs on the immediate results of poverty may postpone the struggle on a wider political and social scale (İnsel, 2002). While working on the micro side, on those immediate results, which are certainly an important part of the NGO activity, the NGOs should not and could not do what governments should. They can affect and

help build the capacity of people to affect the government policies. This is the only way not only to make political actors instead of customers and politics is the only way, through which the NGOs can enlarge the space where they can flourish. As Kadioğlu argues, the political space belongs both to political parties and to NGOs (Kadioğlu, 2002). It is the space of those elected, not of those appointed. The differentiation from the existing political field and political channels restricts the very space of NGOs and makes room for the anti-democratic interventions of appointees. It is not expected that the NGOs replace political parties as implicitly suggested by the neo-liberal paradigm. Rather they should be involved in politics, democratizing and improving the existing political channels so that ordinary people can reach and use those channels. Otherwise, the NGOs will possibly institutionalize the separation of economy and politics, taking their part in the service sector of the neo-liberal capitalism.

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APPENDIX A

Görüşme Soruları

1. Kuruluşun tarihçesi, kuruluş nedenleri, fikir nasıl ortaya çıktı, başlangıçta kapsam neydi? Uygulama alanının boyutu/yaygınlık, kuruluşa kim ön ayak oldu ve kurucu üyeler halen etkin şekilde yönetimdedir mi?
2. Kalkınmayla ilgili sivil toplum örgütlerinin temel amacı nedir? Üyelerinin katılımı (demokrasi/yurttaşlık bilinci geliştirme) önemli midir ya da hizmet götürmeye mi ağırlık verilir?
3. Kurumunuzun uzun dönemli hedefleri nelerdir, bu hedeflere yönelik stratejileriniz var mı, varsa ne ölçüde uyguluyabildiğiniz?
4. Hizmet götürülenlerin karar alma süreçlerinde etkisi var mı, bu etki mekanizması ne ölçüde kurumsal?
5. Terk edilen sahadaki çalışma yerel halk tarafından sürdürülmekte mi?
6. Hizmet götürülenlerin ve çalışanların karar alma süreçlerine katılımı ve etkililik bir arada yürütülebiliyor mu? Katılım karar alma süreçlerini ne kadar yavaşlatıyor, bu sizce ne ölçüde dezavantaj yaratıyor?
7. Yapılan işlerin uzmanlık niteliği, uzmanlık gerektiren işlerin oranı nedir, işler ne ölçüde kişilere bağlı (kişisel özellikler ve bağlantılar iç içe mi geçmiş), bir pozisyondaki (pozisyonlar tanımlı mı) kişi ayrılınca yeri nasıl dolduruluyor?
8. Ölçme ve değerlendirme mekanizmaları var mı, hedeflere ne ölçüde ve ne kadar zamanda ulaşıldığı denetleniyor mu, sayısal/somut hedefler konuyor mu ve bunlar denetim için kullanılıyor mu, çalışanların denetimi birincil ilişkilerle mi (arkadaşlık, kişisel ilişkiler) yoksa kurumsal pratikler mi (standart iş tanımları, hedef koyma, yönetmelikler, periyodik toplantılar) sağlanıyor, hangisi daha ön plana çıkıyor?
9. Çalışanlar/departmanlar arasındaki koordinasyon/denetim nasıl sağlanıyor, birincil ilişkilerle mi (arkadaşlık ve kişisel ilişkiler) kurumsal pratiklerle mi (periyodik toplantılar, yöneticikordinatör konumları, zaman çizelgeleri, iş tanımları, keskin/belirgin görev dağılımı, periyodik raporlama, danışmanlar ve müfettişler)?

10. En fazla hangi konularda kurum içi (çalışanlar veya departmanlar arasında) çatışma/anlaşmazlık yaşıyor (saha-merkez çatışması vb.), bunlar nasıl çözülüyor (bu iş için oluşturulmuş kurumsal mekanizma ya da yöneticinin araya girmesi vb. şekilde)?
11. İnsanlar genellikle birbirlerini tanıyorlar mı, kişisel ilişkiler/arkadaşlık ilişkileri yoğun mu, bunun göstergeleri neler?
12. Standart iş tanımları, prosedürleriniz ve belirli durumlar için önceden saptanmış belirli iş/davranış kalıpları var mı?
13. Kurumsal yapının göz ardı edildiği durumlar oluyor mu? Yönergeler ne derece izleniyor, yönergelere her zaman bağlı kalınıyor mu, yönergeler bütün olasılıklara cevap verecek kadar detaylı mı?
14. Hiyerarşi ne kadar sıkı uygulanıyor, aralardaki düzeyler atlanabiliyor mu, ne kadar hiyerarşi var?
15. Hangi departmanlar var/kaç tane?
16. Kurumunuzda ayrı bir muhasebe alt-bölümü var mı? Yoksa, gelir-gider tablosu nasıl tutuluyor; bu tablo sadece kayıt olarak mı tutuluyor, ya da ileriye dönük planlarda ve denetim amacıyla kullanılıyor mu?
17. Kurallar ne ölçüde yazıya dökülmüş durumda?
18. Dosyalama yapılıyor mu, amacı nedir, kurumsal bilgi birikimini ya da kanıt olarak bulundurma mı, saklanan bilgi kullanılıyor mu?
19. Bütçeleme nasıl yapılıyor, detaylı mı, yoksa sadece kayıt mı tutuluyor?
20. Çalışanların uzmanlığı çalıştıkları alanla mı ilgili, uzmanlık nasıl ediniliyor?
21. Maaşlı çalışanların sayısı ve yaptıkları işin niteliği nedir (sekreterlik, muhasebe, alan/saha/hizmet çalışması, yönetici, danışman)?
22. Kurumunuzdaki çalışanların profilini nasıl tanımlıyorsunuz? Belirgin bir ortak özellikleri var mı?
23. Kuruluşundan bu yana çalışan/üye profilinde belirgin bir değişiklik oldu mu (yaş değişkeni önemli), olmadıysa bunun nedeni sizce nedir, misyonun taşıyıcıları öncelikle bireyler mi yoksa kurumsal yapı mı?
24. Kurumun temel geliri nerden sağlanıyor, en büyük gider kalemi nedir?

25. Kurumun sürdürülebilirliđi nasıl sađlanıyor, finansal açıdan yeterlilik var mı, fon sađlayıcılar misyon üzerinde etkililer mi, sürdürülebilirlik konusunda bir strateji var mı?
26. Devlet, özel sektör ve uluslararası sivil toplum kuruluşları ile ilişkileriniz konusunda ne düşünüyorsunuz?

APPENDIX B

Interview Questions

1. Could you please tell us a little bit about the history of the organization, how the organization was initiated, what the scope was at the very beginning? What is the scope of the application now? Who initiated the organization? Are the members that founded the organization still working?
2. What is the fundamental aim of the nongovernmental organizations? Is it the participation of its members (raising consciousness of democracy and citizenship) or is it to serve people?
3. What are the long-term goals of your organization? Do you have strategies directed to those goals? If so, to what extent can you apply them?
4. Is there a mechanism, through which the people you serve can affect the decision process? To what extent is that institutional?
5. Do the local people that you served once continue the operations that you initiated and left to them?
6. Is it possible to make the participation of the employees and the local people, and the effective organization at the same time? How much does the participation slow down the decision process? In your opinion, how serious disadvantage is that?
7. Do the jobs necessitate specialization and to what extent? What is the proportion of the specialization jobs? To what extent are the jobs dependent on individuals? Are the personal characteristics/relations and the external/internal linkages are interdependent? Is each position clearly defined? How does the recruitment process work?
8. Are there mechanisms of evaluation and measurement for the goals? Are the goals realization controlled? Are the goals concrete/measurable/quantitative? Are they used for control purposes? What is the main control/coordination mechanism for the employees and the departments (head and field offices), primary/informal/personal relations or institutional practices (job descriptions, goal setting, regulations, meetings, etc.)?

9. What is the main coordination mechanism between the employees and the departments (head and field offices), primary relations or institutional practices?
10. On which subjects does conflict emerge between the departments (head and field offices) and the employees? How are they solved, by informal or formal channels?
11. Do the employees generally know each other? Are personal/informal relations common?
12. Are there standardized job descriptions, procedures, and predetermined job/behavior patterns for certain situations?
13. Are the institutional structure frequently ignored? How strictly do the employees follow the regulations? Are the regulations detailed enough to take into account all possibilities?
14. How many hierarchical levels are there in the organization? Are they strictly obeyed?
15. How many departments are there? What are those departments?
16. Is there a separate accounting department? If not, how do you keep the income statements? Are the income statements kept as a record only or used in the control of past events and in the projections of future plans?
17. To what extent are the regulations written?
18. Do you file what you have done? What is the reason for filing, record-keeping or institutional knowledge accumulation?
19. How do you budget? Is it detailed?
20. Are the specializations of the employees related to their jobs? How does an employee get specialization in the organization?
21. What is the proportion of the salaried or waged employees? What are their jobs?
22. How would you describe the profile of the employees? Is there any common feature that strikes you?
23. Since the establishment of the organization, have you observed an evident change in the profile of the members and employees? What may be the reason? Who bears the organizational mission, the members, the employees, the founders, or the institutional structure?

24. What is the main source of income? What is the main expense item?
25. How do you secure organizational sustainability? Is the organization financially sustainable? Do the financial donors influence the organizational mission? Is there a strategy about organizational/financial sustainability?
26. What do you think about the relations with the international NGOs, the private sector and the government?

APPENDIX C

Bu araştırma ODTÜ Sosyoloji Bölümü yüksek lisans tez çalışması kapsamında yapılmaktadır. Tezin konusu sivil toplum kuruluşlarında kurumsallaşma düzeyi, çalışanların profili ve bu iki değişken arasındaki ilişkilerdir. Elinizdeki anket iki bölümden oluşmaktadır. Birinci bölümde 45 ifade bulunmakta ve bu ifadelere ne ölçüde katıldığınız sorulmaktadır. İfadelerin doğru veya yanlış seçenekleri yoktur. İkinci bölüm ise demografik bilgilere yönelik 23 sorudan oluşmaktadır. Toplam cevaplama süresi ortalama 20 dakikadır. Vereceğiniz samimi cevaplar, STK'ların ve çalışanlarının sorunlarına ilişkin daha kapsamlı bir araştırmanın öncülü olabilecek bu çalışmadan alınacak sonucu etkileyecektir. Katkılarımız için şimdiden teşekkürler.

BÖLÜM-1:

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne ölçüde katıldığınızı belirtiniz. (Bilgisayarda dolduracak arkadaşlar için: lütfen A,B,C,D,E şıklarından size uygun olanı ifadenin sonuna büyük harfle yazınız).

1. Çalıştığım kurumda hedeflerin ne kadar gerçekleştiği düzenli bir şekilde ölçülüyor.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
2. Çalışanların, yöneticilerin kararlarını etkilemelerini sağlayan kurumsal mekanizmalar var ve bunlar düzenli şekilde çalışıyor.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
3. Kurumun işe almadaki temel ölçütleri uzmanlık ve tecrübedir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
4. Varolan çalışanlar ayrılrsa bile yeni alınan çalışanlar kurumsal birikime/sisteme dayanarak işlerin aksamadan yürütülmesini sağlayabilirler.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
5. Bir pozisyondaki çalışan ayrılınca yeni çalışanın işe alınma koşullarını ve sürecini tanımlayan kurallar vardır.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
6. Kurumda hemen herkes her işi yapabilir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum

7. Kurumdaki işlerin çoğunluğu uzmanlık ve tecrübe gerektiriyor.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
8. Çalışanların denetimi ve koordinasyonu kişisel ilişkiler ve arkadaşlık bağlarıyla yapılıyor.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
9. Çalışanların denetimi ve koordinasyonu kişisel olmayan (müfettişler, periyodik toplantılar ve performans analizi, standart iş tanımları, yönetmelikler vb.) mekanizmalarla yapılıyor.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
10. Yöneticiler çalışanlara keyfi görevler verebiliyorlar.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
11. Yöneticiler ve çalışanlar arasındaki ilişkiler genellikle resmidir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
12. Yöneticilerin ve çalışanların yetkileri/görevleri ve bu yetkilerin sınırları açıkça tanımlıdır.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
13. Muhasebe kayıtları denetimlerde ve kurumun hedeflerini belirlemede etkin olarak kullanılıyor.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
14. Kurumun uzun vadede varlığını korumasını sağlayabilecek gelir kaynakları bulunuyor.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
15. Kurumun detaylı bir bütçeleme sistemi var.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
16. Yönetici sorumluluklarını tek başına taşıyabilen kişidir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
17. İş ortamında işe ilişkin fikirlerimi açıkça belirtmek başıma dert açabilir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
18. Kararlar yöneticilerin tekelindedir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
19. Yöneticilerimle ilişkilerim resmidir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
20. Yöneticiler karar almadan önce bizim görüşlerimizi alırlar.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum

21. İyi yönetici benden beklediğini detaylı bir şekilde tanımlayan kişidir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
22. Yöneticilerim kararlarının sorgulanmasından hoşlanmazlar.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
23. Yöneticilerin bizlerden/çalışanlardan farklı olduklarını düşünürüm.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
24. Yöneticilerle aramızda içten içe bir çekişme olduğunu düşünürüm.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
25. Kurumun olumsuzluklarının yöneticilerin değişmesiyle giderilebileceğini düşünüyorum.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
26. Kurumun yararına olduğu düşünülse bile, kurum kurallarının dışına çıkılmamalıdır.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
27. Daha iyi koşullarda yeni bir iş fırsatım olsa da işimi değiştirmek istemem.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
28. Çalışanlar arası rekabet, kurum ve çalışanların gelişimi için yararlıdır.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
29. Alışılmışın dışına çıkmaktan hoşlanmam.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
30. Düzenli bir hayatı, heyecan verici ve sürprizlerle dolu bir hayata tercih ederim.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
31. Ödül/getirisi ne olursa olsun risk almak istemem.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
32. Farklı fikirlerin çatışması kurumda uyumu bozar.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
33. Yönetici değişikliği beni çok rahatsız eder.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
34. Toplum düzenini bozma riski taşıyan gösteriler, ne kadar haklı/demokratik olursa olsun, bastırılmalı ve gerekirse güç kullanılmalıdır.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
35. Çeşitlilik/farklılık/değişim her zaman için gerekli ve iyidir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
36. Kendimi tanımlarken ailem ve yakın dostlarım temel oluşturur.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum

37. Ailem ve yakın dostlarım için kişisel yaşamımdan/özgürlüğümünden ödün verebilirim.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
38. Kişisel özgürlüğüm her şeyin üzerindedir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
39. Ne kadar yakın olursa olsun, hiç kimse için kendimden ödün veremem.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
40. İnsanların beni değerlendirirken yakın çevremi dikkate almalarını isterim.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
41. Yakın çevremde biri hata yaparsa bu dışarıya yansıtılmaz, çünkü bu hata yalnızca bireyin değil o çevrenin de sorumlu olduğu bir durumdur.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
42. Bireyler toplum kurallarına ters düşecek olsalar bile kendi yollarında gitmek için özendirilmelidir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
43. Kurumla bağlarım karşılıklı çıkar ilişkilerinden ibarettir.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
44. Bireyin özel hayatı ailesinin ortak gereksinimlerinden/çıkarlarından daha önemli olamaz.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum
45. Davranışlarım sadece beni bağlar.
a. kesinlikle katılmıyorum b. katılmıyorum c. ne katılıyorum d. katılıyorum e. kesinlikle katılıyorum

SİZCE KURUMUNUZUN EN ÖNEMLİ SORUNU NEDİR? BİR VEYA İKİ CÜMLEYLE İFADE EDER MİSİNİZ?

BÖLÜM-2:

(Bilgisayarda dolduracak arkadaşlar için: Seçenekli sorularda lütfen size uygun rakamı sorunun sonuna yazınız; “Cinsiyetiniz? 1” gibi.)

1. Cinsiyetiniz?
 1. Kadın()
 2. Erkek()
2. Yaşınız?
.....
3. Eğitim durumunuz (lütfen mezun olduğunuz son düzeyi seçiniz)?
 1. sadece okur-yazar()
 2. ilkokul mezunu()
 3. ortaokul ve dengi mezunu()
 4. lise ve dengi mezunu()
 5. yüksek okul (iki yıllık) mezunu()
 6. üniversite mezunu()
 7. master-yüksek lisans mezunu()
 8. doktora mezunu()
4. İyi düzeyde kaç yabancı dil biliyorsunuz?
Dil sayısı:.....
4.1. Hangi dil veya diller:.....
5. Şu anki işinizi tanımlar mısınız? (muhassebe memuru, sekreter, proje koordinatörü, bilgisayar teknisyeni, vb gibi)
.....
6. Eğitiminizi/kursunu aldığınız ya da belirli bir süre çıraklık yaparak/çalışarak öğrendiğiniz asıl mesleğiniz olarak tanımlayabileceğiniz bir meslek var mı?
 1. evet() lütfen 7. soruya geçiniz
 2. hayır() lütfen 8. soruya geçiniz
7. Mesleğinizi tanımlar mısınız (elektrik mühendisi, makine teknisyeni, asker, sekreter, vb gibi)?
.....
8. Evli misiniz?
 1. evet()
 2. hayır()
9. Çocuğunuz var mı?
 1. evet() 9.1. kaç tane:.....
 2. hayır()
10. Evinizin statüsü nedir?
 1. kiralık ev()
 2. lojman()
 3. ailenize ait ev()
 4. kendinize ait ev()
 5. diğer (lütfen belirtiniz):.....

11. Eviniz hangi il ve semtte?

11.1.il:.....

11.2.semt:.....

12. Eviniz bugün kiraya verilse bedeli ne olur?

kira bedeli:.....

13. Evinizde siz dahil kaç kişi yaşıyor?

.....

14. Lütfen tablodaki aile bireylerinin eğitim düzeylerini, iyi derecede bildikleri yabancı dilleri, mesleklerini (eğitimini/kursunu aldıkları ya da belirli bir süre çıraklık yaparak/çalışarak öğrendikleri) ve aile bireyi hayattaysa şu anki işini (emekli, işsiz, çalışıyorsa yaptığı işin açık tanımını-özel bir şirkette muhasebe memuru, DSI'de müdür, Çankaya Belediyesinde işçi, Telekomda makine teknisyeni vb.) belirtiniz .

14.1. Yakınlık derecesi	14.2.Eğitim durumu (uygun seçeneğin sonuna, o seçeneğin rakamını tekrar yazınız)	14.3. yabancı diller	14.4. Meslek	14.5. Şu anki iş
Anne	1. sadece okur-yazar 2. ilkokul mezunu 3. ortaokul ve dengi mezunu 4. lise ve dengi mezunu 5. yüksek okul (2 yıllık) mezunu 6. üniversite mezunu 7. master-yüksek lisans mezunu 8. doktora mezunu			
Baba	1. sadece okur-yazar 2. ilkokul mezunu 3. ortaokul ve dengi mezunu 4. lise ve dengi mezunu 5. yüksek okul (2 yıllık) mezunu 6. üniversite mezunu 7. master-yüksek lisans mezunu 8. doktora mezunu			
Eşiniz	1. sadece okur-yazar 2. ilkokul mezunu 3. ortaokul ve dengi mezunu 4. lise ve dengi mezunu 5. yüksek okul (2 yıllık) mezunu 6. üniversite mezunu 7. master-yüksek lisans mezunu 8. doktora mezunu			

15. Yaşamınızın ilkokulu bitirene kadarki bölümünü çoğunlukla nerede geçirdiniz?

1. köy()
2. kasaba()
3. ilçe merkezi()
4. şehir merkezi()
5. metropol (Ankara, İstanbul veya İzmir)()

16. İlkokulu bitirdikten sonra 20 yaşına dek çoğunlukla nerede yaşadınız?

1. köy()
2. kasaba()
3. ilçe merkezi()
4. şehir merkezi()
5. metropol (Ankara, İstanbul veya İzmir)()

17. Yurtdışında hiç bulundunuz mu?

1. evet()

16.1. En uzun süre kaldığınız yer	16.2. Belirttiğiniz yerde kalış süreniz	16.3. Belirttiğiniz yerde bulunma nedeniniz (uygun seçeneğin sonuna, o seçeneğin rakamını tekrar yazınız.)
		1. iş 2. eğitim 3. turizm 4. sağlık 5. konferans/toplantı 6. diğer (lütfen belirtiniz):

2. hayır()

18. Çalıştığınız STK'ların projeleri için evinizden uzakta başka bir yerde uzun süre yaşadınız mı?

1. evet()

17.1. En uzun süre kaldığınız yer	17.2. Belirttiğiniz yerde kalış süreniz

2. hayır()

19. Şu anki işinizi kaybederseniz eşdeğer veya benzer bir iş bulma olasılığınız nedir?

- 1.yeni bir iş bulmam imkansız()
- 2.zor bulurum()
- 3.kolayca bulurum()

20. Eğer sosyal sınıfınız sorulsaydı, hangi sosyal sınıfa ait olduğunuzu söylerdiniz?
1. alt sınıf/işçi sınıfı()
 2. orta sınıf()
 3. orta sınıfın üstü()
 4. üst sınıf()
21. Aylık ortalama geliriniz ne kadardır?
-
22. Sizininki de dahil olmak üzere evinizin aylık ortalama geliri ne kadardır?
-
23. Aşağıdaki olanaklardan hangilerine sahipsiniz? (Bilgisayarda dolduracak arkadaşlar için: Lütfen sahip olduğunuz olanağın yanına büyük harfle, var anlamında, V yazınız, sahip olmadıklarınızı boş bırakınız)

23.1. Otomatik çamaşır makinesi	Var()	Yok()
23.2. Çamaşır kurutma makinesi	Var()	Yok()
23.3. Bulaşık makinesi	Var()	Yok()
23.4. Bilgisayar	Var()	Yok()
23.5. Dizüstü bilgisayar	Var()	Yok()
23.6. DVD çalıcısı (player)	Var()	Yok()
23.7. Kablo TV aboneliği	Var()	Yok()
23.8. Özel kanal (digitürk, cine-5, vb.) aboneliği	Var()	Yok()
23.9. İnternet bağlantısı	Var()	Yok()
23.10. Birden fazla renkli televizyon	Var()	Yok()
23.11. Özel emeklilik	Var()	Yok()
23.12. Özel sağlık sigortası	Var()	Yok()
23.13. Eşinize veya çocuklarınıza ait özel emeklilik	Var()	Yok()
23.14. Eşinize veya çocuklarınıza ait özel sağlık sigortası	Var()	Yok()
23.15. Size ait araba	Var()	Yok()
23.16. Eşinize ait araba	Var()	Yok()
23.17. Ailenize ait fakat çoğunlukla sizin kullandığınız araba	Var()	Yok()
23.18. Yazlık ev	Var()	Yok()
23.19. Size veya eşinize ait yazlık olarak kullanmadığınız ikinci bir ev	Var()	Yok()
23.20. Çocuklarınızdan en az birinin özel okulda eğitim alması	Var()	Yok()
23.21. Çocuklarınızın cep telefonu sahipliği	Var()	Yok()
23.22. Her yıl en az bir hafta Ankara dışında tatil (memleket ziyareti dışında)	Var()	Yok()
23.23. Ayda en az bir kere akşam yemeğini dışarda yemek	Var()	Yok()
23.24. Aylık bir dergiye abonelik	Var()	Yok()
23.25. Haftalık bir dergiye abonelik	Var()	Yok()

APPENDIX D

This research is the part of a master thesis study in the Department of Sociology at METU. The subject of the thesis is the level of institutionalization of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) the profile of the NGO employees, and the relations between the two. The questionnaire is composed of two parts. In the first part, there are 45 statements and it is asked the extent to which you agree with them. The statements do not have right or wrong answers. The second part includes 23 questions asking about the demographic information. The total response time is about 20 minutes. Your sincere answers will affect the result of the study, which may premise a more comprehensive research. Thanks for your contribution.

PART-1:

Please state the extent to which you agree with the statements. (Those filling the questionnaire on computer: Please type, in block, the letter proper for you).

1. In the organization that I work for, the realization of the goals are regularly measured.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
2. There are institutional mechanisms, through which the employees can affect the decisions of directors and those mechanisms work regularly.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
3. The main criteria in recruitment are expertise and experience.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
4. Even if the existing employees left the organization, the new ones would run the organization without a problem, using the institutional system and accumulation
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
5. When an employee leaves the organization, there are regulations that define the conditions and the process for filling the vacancy.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
6. In the organization, every one can do almost any job.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree

7. In the organization, most of the jobs necessitate expertise and experience.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
8. The coordination and the control of the employees are made through personal relations and friendship bonds.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
9. The coordination and control of the employees are made through impersonal mechanisms (inspectors, periodical meetings and performance evaluation, standardized job descriptions, regulations, and so on).
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
10. The directors may give arbitrary duties to the employees.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
11. The relations of the directors and the employees are generally formal.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
12. The authority/responsibility of the directors and the employees and their limits are clear defined.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
13. The accounting records are extensively used in the control and in determining the organizational goals.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
14. The organization has the sources of income to survive in the long-term.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
15. The organization has a detailed budgeting system.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
16. The director is the individual that can carry the burden of her responsibilities alone.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
17. To state my opinions frankly at work environment may cause problems for me.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
18. The decisions are completely at the directors' discretionary.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
19. My relations with the directors are formal.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
20. The directors consult with us before making a decision.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
21. The good director defines clearly what she expects from me.
 a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree

22. The directors do not like their decisions to be questioned.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
23. I think the directors are different from us/the employees.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
24. I think there is a covert rivalry between the directors and the employees.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
25. I think the problems of the organization can be solved by replacing the directors.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
26. Even if it were thought in favor of the organization, it would be wrong to move beyond the regulations of the organization.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
27. Even if I had an opportunity to get a better job, I would not change my job.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
28. The competition between the employees is useful for the improvement of the organization and the employees.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
29. I do not like to break my routines.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
30. I prefer a regular life to an exciting life full of surprises.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
31. Whatever the reward, I do not like to take risk.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
32. The dispute between different opinions disturbs the harmony in the organization.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
33. The change in the director positions disturbs me a lot.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
34. No matter how just or democratic a demonstration is, it should be suppressed -by force if necessary-, if it risked the public order.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
35. Variety/diversity/change is always required and welcome.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree
36. When defining myself, my bases are the family and the close friends.
a. Completely Disagree b. Disagree c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree d. Agree e. Completely Agree

37. I can make concessions from my personal life/freedom for my family and close friends.
- | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| a. Completely Disagree | b. Disagree | c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree | d. Agree | e. Completely Agree |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
38. My personal freedom is the most important thing in my life.
- | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| a. Completely Disagree | b. Disagree | c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree | d. Agree | e. Completely Agree |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
39. No matter how close one is to me, I cannot make concessions from myself for anyone.
- | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| a. Completely Disagree | b. Disagree | c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree | d. Agree | e. Completely Agree |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
40. I want people to consider my immediate environment and relations when they evaluate me.
- | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| a. Completely Disagree | b. Disagree | c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree | d. Agree | e. Completely Agree |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
41. If one of my friends or family members made a wrong, it would not be revealed, since that wrong would not be the wrong of that particular individual, but of the group, of which we are members.
- | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| a. Completely Disagree | b. Disagree | c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree | d. Agree | e. Completely Agree |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
42. Individuals should be encouraged to walk on their own way even if they would be in opposition to the norms of society.
- | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| a. Completely Disagree | b. Disagree | c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree | d. Agree | e. Completely Agree |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
43. My relations with the organization are based simply on mutual interest.
- | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| a. Completely Disagree | b. Disagree | c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree | d. Agree | e. Completely Agree |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
44. The private life of an individual cannot be more important than the common needs/interests of the family.
- | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| a. Completely Disagree | b. Disagree | c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree | d. Agree | e. Completely Agree |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
45. My behaviors do not concern anyone except me.
- | | | | | |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|
| a. Completely Disagree | b. Disagree | c. Neither Agree Nor Disagree | d. Agree | e. Completely Agree |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|----------|---------------------|

IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT IS THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM OF THE ORGANIZATION? COULD YOU PLEASE EXPLAIN IN A FEW SENTENCES?

PART-2:

(Those filling the questionnaire on computer: In the multiple-alternative questions, please type the number proper for you)

1. Gender?
 1. Female()
 2. Male()
2. Age?
.....
3. Education level (please choose the last level that you graduated)?
 1. literate()
 2. primary school graduate (5-year)()
 3. secondary school graduate (8-year)()
 4. high school (lise) graduate()
 5. high school graduate (2-year after lise)()
 6. university graduate()
 7. master graduate()
 8. PhD graduate()
4. Which foreign languages can you speak well?
The number:.....
 - 4.1. Languages:.....
5. Please state your current job? (accounting employee, secretary, project coordinator, computer technician, etc.)
.....
6. Do you have an occupation that you have learned through formal education, training, or apprenticeship for some time?
 1. yes() please go on with question 7
 2. no() please go on with question 8
7. What is your occupation? (electrical engineer, mechanical technician, soldier, secretary, etc.)?
.....
8. Are you married?
 1. yes()
 2. no()
9. Do you have children?
 1. yes() 9.1. How many:.....
 2. no()
10. What is the status of your home?
 1. rent()
 2. employer-provided ()
 3. belonged to family()
 4. your own()
 5. other (please state):.....

11. Which city and district is your home?

11.1.city:.....

11.2.district:.....

12. If your home were rented today, what would be the rent?

Rent:.....

13. How many people live at home?

.....

14. Please state the education level, foreign languages spoken well, occupation (learned through formal education, training, or apprenticeship for some time), and job (retired, unemployed, accounting employee in a private firm, manager in DSI, worker in the municipality of Çankaya, mechanical technician in Telekom, etc.) if the member is alive, of the members of your family.

14.1. Relation	14.2. Education level (retype/rewrite the number of your choice at the end of that choice)	14.3. foreign languages	14.4. occupation	14.5. job
Mother	1.literate 2.primary school graduate 3.secondary school graduate 4.high school (lise) graduate 5.high school graduate (2-year) 6.university graduate 7.master graduate 8.PhD graduate			
Father	1.literate 2.primary school graduate 3.secondary school graduate 4.high school (lise) graduate 5.high school graduate (2-year) 6.university graduate 7.master graduate 8.PhD graduate			
Spouse	1.literate 2.primary school graduate 3.secondary school graduate 4.high school (lise) graduate 5.high school graduate (2-year) 6.university graduate 7.master graduate 8.PhD graduate			

15. Mostly where did you live until you completed the primary school?

1. village()
2. town()
3. district()
4. city()
5. metropolis (Ankara, İstanbul veya İzmir)()

16. Mostly where did you live after the completion of the primary school until age 20?

1. village()
2. town()
3. district()
4. city()
5. metropolis (Ankara, İstanbul veya İzmir)()

17. Have you ever been to abroad?

1. yes()

17.1. The place where you stayed longest	17.2. The time of stay in that place	17.3.The reason of stay in that place (retype/rewrite the number of your choice at the end of that choice)
		1. work 2. education 3. tourism 4. health 5. conference/meeting 6. other (please state):

2. no()

18. Did you live for a long time in a place different from your hometown for the projects of your organization?

1. yes()

18.1. The place where you stayed longest	18.2.The time of stay in that place

2. no()

19. If you lost the current job, how likely would you find a new job?

1. it would be impossible to find a new one()
2. it would be difficult()
3. it would be easy()

20. If asked your social class, which class would you say you were in?
1. lower class/working class()
 2. middle class()
 3. above middle class()
 4. upper class()
21. What is your monthly income?
.....
22. What is the total home income including yours?
.....
23. Do you have the access to the items below? (Those filling the questionnaire on computer: Please type Y next to the item that you have and leave blank if you do not)

23.1. Washing machine	Yes()	No()
23.2. Drying machine	Yes()	No()
23.3. Dishwasher	Yes()	No()
23.4. Desktop computer	Yes()	No()
23.5. Laptop computer	Yes()	No()
23.6. DVD (player)	Yes()	No()
23.7. Cable TV	Yes()	No()
23.8. Coded/paid TV channels (digiturk, cine-5, etc.)	Yes()	No()
23.9. Internet	Yes()	No()
23.10. More than one color TV	Yes()	No()
23.11. Private retirement	Yes()	No()
23.12. Private health insurance	Yes()	No()
23.13. Private retirement of spouse or children	Yes()	No()
23.14. Private health insurance of spouse or children	Yes()	No()
23.15. Car	Yes()	No()
23.16. Spouse's car	Yes()	No()
23.17. Family's car that is used generally by you	Yes()	No()
23.18. Summerhouse	Yes()	No()
23.19. Second house belonged to you or spouse	Yes()	No()
23.20. Private education for at least one of your children	Yes()	No()
23.21. Mobile phones of your children	Yes()	No()
23.22. Every year an at least one-week holiday outside Ankara (not in the form of visiting fatherland or relatives)	Yes()	No()
23.23. At least once a month dinner-out	Yes()	No()
23.24. Subscription to a monthly	Yes()	No()
23.25. Subscription to a weekly	Yes()	No()

APPENDIX E

EMPLOYEE DATA

employee	gender	age	education	language	job
1	female	44	master	English	project assistant
2	male	24	university	English	secretary
3	male	39	university	turkish only	project coordinator
4	male	,	university	Local	field director
5	male	27	university	turkish only	project director
6	male	40	university	turkish only	project field director
7	male	43	high school	turkish only	project director
8	male	41	university	turkish only	project director
9	female	31	university	english+local	project director
10	female	41	university	turkish only	project director
11	female	27	high school	Local	project assistant
12	male	30	university	turkish only	project director
13	male	34	university	turkish only	project director
14	female	,	university	turkish only	project director
15	male	,	university	turkish only	project coordinator
16	female	32	doctorate	English	project assistant
17	female	32	university	turkish only	project coordinator
18	female	36	primary	turkish only	field project assistant
19	female	34	lycee	turkish only	accounting
20	female	21	lycee	turkish only	field director
21	female	37	primary	turkish only	secretary
22	female	27	university	English	project coordinator
23	female	28	university	turkish only	project coordinator
24	male	30	lycee	English	project coordinator
25	female	29	university	English	general coordinator
26	female	36	lycee	English	public relations
27	male	31	master	English	project coordinator
28	male	29	university	English	project coordinator
29	female	26	master	English	project coordinator
30	male	26	university	English	project coordinator
31	female	25	university	English	project coordinator
32	male	30	master	English	project coordinator
33	female	30	doctorate	English+french	vice-president
34	female	30	doctorate	English+french	project coordinator
35	male	29	high school	English	project coordinator
36	male	36	university	English	Kosovo Representative
37	female	27	university	turkish only	social service expert
38	female	25	university	English	project assistant
39	female	24	university	turkish only	sociologist

employee	occupation	marital status	m-education
1	agricultural engineer	Single	primary
2	civil engineer	Single	secondary
3	veterinarian	married	,
4	agricultural engineer	Single	secondary
5	agricultural engineer	Single	primary
6	agricultural engineer	married	literate
7	accounting	married	,
8	agricultural engineer	married	literate
9		married	literate
10	agricultural engineer	single	primary
11		single	literate
12	veterinarian	married	illiterate
13	agricultural engineer	single	literate
14	home economist	married	,
15	veterinarian	married	literate
16	social scientist	single	literate
17	anthropologist	single	primary
18	tailor	married	literate
19		married	primary
20		single	high school
21		married	literate
22	psychologist	single	lycee
23	historian	single	university
24	literature	single	literate
25	anthropologist	single	primary
26	journalist	married	,
27	urban planning	married	secondary
28	industrial engineer	single	lycee
29	landscape architecture	single	university
30	engineer	single	high school
31	urban planning	single	high school
32	biologist	single	primary
33	project director	single	primary
34	project director	single	primary
35	tourism	single	primary
36	journalist	single	secondary
37		single	primary
38	sociologist	single	literate
39		single	literate

employee	m-language	m-occupation	m-job	f-education
1	turkish only	housewife	housewife	lycee
2	turkish only	housewife	housewife	university
3	,			,
4	local	housewife	housewife	university
5	turkish only		retired	primary
6	turkish only	housewife	housewife	primary
7	turkish only	housewife	housewife	primary
8	turkish only			literate
9	local			primary
10	turkish only	housewife	housewife	primary
11	turkish only	housewife	housewife	lycee
12	turkish only	housewife	housewife	literate
13	turkish only			primary
14	turkish only			secondary
15	turkish only	housewife	housewife	secondary
16	turkish only	small entrepreneur	retired	primary
17	turkish only	tailor	tradesman	university
18	turkish only	bazaar seller	bazaar seller	literate
19	turkish only			primary
20	turkish only	accounting	tourism	primary
21	turkish only			primary
22	turkish only		retired	lycee
23	turkish only	agricultural engineer	retired	university
24	turkish only	housewife	housewife	secondary
25	local	housewife	housewife	university
26	,			,
27	english	housewife	housewife	university
28	english		retired	lycee
29	turkish only	teacher	retired	university
30	turkish only	teacher	retired	lycee
31	english	teacher	retired	high school
32	turkish only	housewife	housewife	primary
33	english	housewife	housewife	high school
34	english	housewife	housewife	high school
35	turkish only	housewife	housewife	lycee
36	turkish only	housewife	housewife	university
37	turkish only			lycee
38	turkish only	housewife	housewife	high school
39	turkish only	housewife	housewife	university

employee	f-language	f-occupation	f-job	s-education
1	turkish only	teacher	retired	not married
2	english	fiscal counsellor	retired	not married
3	,			secondary
4	local	teacher	retired	not married
5	turkish only		retired	not married
6	turkish only			university
7	turkish only	self-employed	self-employed	primary
8	turkish only			primary
9	local	metal work	metal work	lycee
10	turkish only	worker	retired	not married
11	turkish only	agricultural technician	retired	not married
12	turkish only		retired	university
13	turkish only			not married
14	turkish only	military	retired	university
15	turkish only	policeman	retired	university
16	turkish only	official	retired	not married
17	turkish only	technical painter		not married
18	turkish only	worker	retired	secondary
19	turkish only	tradesman	tradesman	secondary
20	turkish only	worker		not married
21	turkish only	self-employed	retired	secondary
22	turkish only		retired	not married
23	turkish only	agricultural engineer	retired	not married
24	turkish only	worker	retired	not married
25	local	teacher	retired	not married
26	,			university
27	english	economist	retired	high school
28	english		retired	not married
29	english	dentist	retired	not married
30	turkish only	official	retired	not married
31	turkish only	teacher	self-employed	not married
32	turkish only	industrialist	retired	not married
33	english+french	military official	military official	not married
34	english+french	military official	military official	not married
35	turkish only	military	retired	not married
36	english+french	military	manager	not married
37	turkish only			not married
38	turkish only	teacher	retired	not married
39	turkish only	teacher	retired	not married

employee	s-language	s-occupation	s-job	life-1
1	not married	not married	not married	small town
2	not married	not married	not married	district
3	turkish only	housewife	housewife	district
4	not married	not married	not married	village
5	not married	not married	not married	city
6	turkish only	agricultural engineer	teacher	district
7	turkish only	housewife	housewife	village
8	turkish only			village
9	turkish only	official	official	district
10	not married	not married	not married	city
11	not married	not married	not married	district
12	english	teacher	teacher	small town
13	not married	not married	not married	village
14	turkish only	veterinarian	project coordinator	small town
15	turkish only	home economist	project director	metropolis
16	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
17	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
18	turkish only	self-employed		city
19	turkish only	accounting	accounting	district
20	not married	not married	not married	city
21	turkish only	official	official	city
22	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
23	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
24	not married	not married	not married	district
25	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
26	english	teacher	teacher	district
27	turkish only	social scientist	housewife	district
28	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
29	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
30	not married	not married	not married	district
31	not married	not married	not married	city
32	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
33	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
34	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
35	not married	not married	not married	city
36	not married	not married	not married	city
37	not married	not married	not married	metropolis
38	not married	not married	not married	district
39	not married	not married	not married	city

employee	life-2	income	h-income
1	district	2500	2500
2	district	1250	2500
3	district	1500	1500
4	city	600	1000
5	city	850	,
6	district	1200	1600
7	small town	2000	2000
8	small town	1200	1200
9	district	850	1350
10	city	1800	1800
11	district	600	1200
12	small town	900	1700
13	city	850	850
14	metropolis	900	2500
15	metropolis	1500	2500
16	metropolis	1700	,
17	metropolis	600	600
18	city	400	400
19	district	500	1350
20	city	550	550
21	city	300	750
22	metropolis	800	800
23	metropolis	400	1200
24	district	800	1300
25	metropolis	1000	2000
26	metropolis	800	2000
27	district	900	900
28	metropolis	1000	1000
29	metropolis	900	900
30	district	1000	1600
31	metropolis	1000	1000
32	metropolis	1100	1100
33	metropolis	2000	11000
34	metropolis	2000	12000
35	metropolis	3250	,
36	metropolis	,	,
37	metropolis	850	850
38	city	800	,
39	city	650	,

ABBREVIATIONS	
m-education	education level of mother
m-language	foreign languages of mother
m-occupation	occupation of mother
m-job	job of mother
f-education	education level of father
f-language	foreign languages of father
f-occupation	occupation of father
f-job	job of father
s-education	education level of spouse
s-language	foreign languages of spouse
s-occupation	occupation of spouse
s-job	job of spouse
life-1	the place where employee lived until 12
life-2	the place where employee lived between 12 and 20
h-income	total home income