

THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION UPON EUROPEAN IDENTITY

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION UPON EUROPEAN IDENTITY

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This study examines the making of the European identity concept under the impact of the European Union (EU) project. In order to define the structure of the European identity, theoretical and historical aspects have been scrutinised. Besides, the Eurobarometers (EBs) have been used to analyse the condition of European identity perception among the people of the member countries. The results of the EBs data show that the popularisation of the European identity is limited and the elite character of this identity seems dominant. The EU still lacks its common political identity, which forms a political agenda, and a supranational political identity. This thesis has concluded that the popularisation of the European identity can ensure more political unity for the EU, and this unity can be realised only with a multiple identity perception including current strong identities of the Europe.

Keywords: Europe, European, European Union, EU, European Identity, Identity.

ÖZ

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ’NİN AVRUPA KİMLİĞİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ

Görgün, Tuğrul

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı

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Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa, Avrupa Birliği, AB, Avrupa Kimliği, Kimlik.

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I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

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“... it is not a question of setting a collective identity against individual identities. All identity is individual, but there is no individual identity that is not historical or, in other words, constructed within a field of social values, norms of behaviour and collective symbols. The real question is how dominant reference points of individual identity change over time and with the changing institutional environment”.

E. Balibar

INTRODUCTION

Elitism is a significant factor in the context of making the European identity but it is not enough for establishing a successful identity structure for the European Union (EU) without the popularisation of the identity. It can be said that this sentence shows the main foresight and the argument of this study.

Today, as in the forming of nation-states, the nature of the European integration is still elite-driven at the core of it. EU still lacks its common political identity, which forms a political agenda and a supranational political unity. The popularisation of the European identity can ensure more political unity for the EU. But up to now, the EU integration has not had a wide European identity concept. This thesis seeks for answers to these questions: Does the EU lead to a consolidated elite identity? Or Does the EU contribute to European identity being transformed into a popular identity? And in this context there can be asked a significant normative question: What kind of identity can bring a substance structure for the success of the unification of the Old Continent under the process of EU?

We can see all the aspects of elite and popular identity structures. EU is still at its beginning process, therefore the widening and the deepening of the EU is still continue, nevertheless elite character of the political identity of Europe seems dominant. But the success of the unification process of the EU will bring more common identity to the Europeans and the created new political identity will in turn feed the success of the EU. It may not occur in a short time. It may necessitate hundred years. May be it is a long time for human life but it is indeed short enough in the context of the life of a society.

Since the beginning of the European project, the supporters of the European integration have seen the promotion of a European consciousness and the creation of a European identity as a crucial policy goal. If we mention shortly about the historical periods; it was in the early 1970s when the emphasis on the improvement of a supranational identity was placed on the political agenda for the stable and successful future of the European integration. In this period “a common European consciousness was seen as an inevitable factor for the successful transformation of the EU into a solid supranational political union”.¹

In the 1980s, although the idea of the political union gradually lost importance in favour of the project of a single European economic field, the goal of a strong European identity was continued. Then, in the early 1990s the economic union had slowly reached its maturity and the development of European identity gained momentum. In addition to this, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty have played a significant role through the introduction of the European citizenship and since the early new century, putting into circulation a single currency has ensured a significant common identity perception, even if it is also at least symbolic. But the process of European unification is still at its beginning process, so there remains more need to bring together Europeans beyond the economic grounds.

This thesis consists of three main chapters. Firstly a section is reserved for the general definitions on identity, European identity, Europe and EU. Within this framework, the theoretical, cultural, social and political developments of the European identity are examined shortly in a historical context and then the cultural diversity in Europe is scrutinised, mainly based on the language

¹ Dirk Jacobs & Robert Maier. “European Identity: Construct, Fact and Fiction”, eds. Gasteelaars, M & de Ruijter, A. **A United Europe: The Quest for a Multifaceted Identity**. Maastricht, Shaker Publishing, 1998, p. 13.

diversity, in the context of whether it is an obstacle or a prerequisite for a European identity.

In chapter two, the efforts in order to create a European identity are shown under the development process of the European unification and the concept of European identity is examined under the light of European Treaties in general and under the Maastricht Treaty in particular.

Nevertheless within this chapter, the concept of European citizenship as a concrete reflection of the European identity, which spreads to masses, is analysed. In this context the determinant contribution of the Maastricht Treaty is examined broadly both its effects and the criticisms on the concept of European citizenship.

In chapter three, in the context of visibility of European citizenship and identity, the Eurobarometers (EB) results are analysed in order to show the public opinions over the concept of European identity. These results will show us that the continuing dimension of the elite character of the European identity on the one hand, the process of its popularisation - even if it is at the beginning stage- on the other hand.

And after the section on 'general evaluation of the opinion polls', it is emphasised in the conclusion that there is a need for strengthening a popular European identity as a European soul beyond the elite identity. Finally, evaluations and suggestions have been made on a European identity for the solid future of the EU.

As a conclusion, it may be argued that the main question is whether the integration project of the EU will reach its success or not without a solid common identity structure. And the answer of the thesis, is the necessity of a more common European identity, which includes the current identities of Europe without any exclusion. Therefore, the elite structure of the European identity has to spread to the masses in order to constitute more stable future for the most

significant integration project of our era. The elite character of the European identity may seem dominant but it is due to the top-down strategies of the beginning process of this integration. In this context, it is argued in this thesis that the popularisation of the European identity is necessary and indispensable for the success of the political integration and a multiple identity perception under the framework of being European will be able to ensure this.

CHAPTER I

EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND EUROPEAN UNION: GENERAL DEFINITIONS

Identity is a concept concerning identifying oneself to and from the others. Identity, first of all, is a perception of our mind in a determined society that derives from the history, culture, custom and political, social and economic perception or/and ideology. More theoretically speaking identity is a relationship between the object and subject in the context of identification. Object is the identified and the subject is the identifier. But in addition to this subject is identified by itself through the object. And no identity can exist without its other, there is a identification process of the self and the other.

As regards the European identity, it is probably the most significant disputes of our time. It has historical, geographical, cultural, political and intellectual roots, and it can be said that it is an elite-based civilizational and a large-scale identity of the Western Europe, but it is created - and still imagined-identity, that is, still immature.

For a strong civilizational identity, there must be some objective elements: common descent, language, religion, territory and geography, style (distinguish superiorities), common history which causes a creation of traditions, customs, institutions, and characteristics.² These elements are internalized through a historical and subjective process.

²A. Nuri Yurdusev. **International Relations and The Philosophy of History: A Civilizational Approach**, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 128.

However, European identity shows a complex character and structure. Morin, in his book *Thinking Europe*, concludes that the complex identity of Europe can only be formulated by taking into account all the uncertainties, ambiguities and contradictions. According to him “the unity of Europe can only be conceived as multiple and complex, bringing together many contradictions, such as law and force, democracy and oppression, spirituality and materialism, reason and myth.”³

Today ‘unity in diversity’ has come to exist as a basic definition of European identity under the integration process of the EU. The history, culture, religion and ethnic backgrounds have compelled this kind of unification under the name of ‘European’. In order to reinforce the basis of Europeanism on the continent of diversity, which has a significant historical roots, this kind of identification has been necessary. Though European identity is said to have been characterized by diversity in Europe, it was perceived with a conception of superiority vis-à-vis non-Europe, a conception that has ancient roots.

1.1 Ancient History and The Roots of the Concept of Superiority

One of the most important characteristics of the European identity is the thought of its superiority, which derives from the historical and religious facts and thoughts. Historically speaking, the determination of the division of the three continent; Asia, Libya (Africa) and Europe goes back to ancient history. Greek historian Herodotus who lived in the fifth century BC proved this circumstance with astonishment:

...no one has ever determined whether or not there is sea either to the east or to the north of Europe. All we know is that it is equal to Asia and Libya combined. Another thing that puzzles me is why three distinct women’s names should have been given to

³ Jacobs & Maier, p. 13. (see also Edgar Morin. *Avrupa’yı Düşünmek*, AFA Yayınları, 1995.)

what is really a single landmass, and why to the Nile and the Phasis - or according to some, the Maeatic Tanais and the Cimmerian Strait - should have been fixed upon for the boundaries. Nor have I been able to learn who it was that first marked the boundaries or where they got the names from.⁴

Mythologically speaking, Europa is the daughter of a Phonician king who ruled the territories today known as Lebanon. Zeus, the God of the Gods in Greek mythology, transforms himself into a white bull and influences Europa and abducts her to Crete.⁵ She never backs to her fatherland and her name is gradually identified with the territories, which the sun sets. With the widening of Greek colonies, the name Europa widens to the west and the north side of the Greek land.⁶ Etymologically speaking, as the land of the setting sun, Europe means ‘evening land’ and ‘the dark-looking one’.⁷

As a basic core of the thought of superiority for the European identity, the culture and the world-view of the European administrative elites and the intelligentsia go back to Aristotelian perception of world which occurred after Alexander the Great had invaded the land which started from Greek homeland to the far east side of the Asia Minor.

In the thought of Aristotles the peoples of the Europe and Asia had a different characteristic specialities:

The peoples of Europe, product of a cold climate, are courageous but not particularly skilled or wise. This is why they are usually independent, there is little cohesion between them, and they are unable to rule others. Inhabitants of Asia, on the other hand, have

⁴ Quoted in Pim den Boer, “Europe to 1914: The Making of The Idea”, eds. Kevin Wilson & Jan van der Dussen, **The History of The Idea of Europe**, 1995, p. 15. (see also Heredotus, **The Histories**, p. 285.)

⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

⁶ A. Nuri Yurdusev, “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği”, ed. Atilla Eralp, **Türkiye ve Avrupa**, İMGE, Ankara, 1997, p. 31.

⁷ Pim den Boer, p. 15.

the brain and the skills, but lack the courage and strength of will. That is why they remain servile and subject peoples.⁸

Nevertheless the Greeks distinguished themselves from the Europeans and the Asians. They saw themselves that neither European nor Asian. With a climatic based explanation deriving from the thought of Hippocrate, the father of medicine, according to Aristotles:

The Greeks have an intermediate geographical position between the Europeans and the Asians. That is why they combine in themselves the positive characteristics of the peoples of both continents. The Greeks are free, they have the best political institutions and they are capable of ruling all other people.⁹

Consequently under this circumstances the ‘Europeans’ under the command of Alexander the Great, were conquered by the intellectuality of Greeks whose lands had invaded by the ‘Europeans’ and with the military power of Alexander the dominancy of the Greek thought widened to the known world.

For the European aristocracy, administrative elites and the intelligentsia who read the distinguished works of the ancient Greek, especially the Aristotelian political thoughts, have connected their past to this above-mentioned Aristotelian synthesis very naturally. Because this connection have brought superior identity to the Europeans that consolidated with the modern age developments; Renaissance, Reform and Enlightenment.

After the collapse of the Roman Empire, Christianity remained only cohesive identity in the European continent. The dominancy of the concept of superiority now showed itself in formulation of the religious genesis history accordance with the Greeks tripartite division of the world; Asia, Europe and

⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

Libya (Africa). In this context, after the Flood, Noah's three sons Shem, Ham and Japheth have been sit as a basic root of this tripartite:

In the framework of the Ancient Greek's geography the seven sons of Japheth spread to north as far as the River Don from the mountains of Asia Minor and also spread to Europe as far as Cadiz. Nevertheless, according to this narration the descendants of Ham inhabited in Africa and the descendants of Shem settled in Asia, from the Euphrates to the Indian Ocean.¹⁰

The meaning of the name Japheth, who was the ancestor of the Europeans, has been 'enlargement' or 'spreading out'. This meaning was used for the legitimization of the 'Geographical Conquests' with the concept of the superiority of the European through the religious narration. This was the religious foot of the superiority concept of the Europeans. Then with the Christian ideology, trade and colonisation were "the elements in European expansion, which formed the basis for unequivocal feelings of superiority".¹¹ The perception of European superiority has been accompanied with a conception of the other.

1.2 The Impact of 'Others'

If we look at the history in the context of 'otherness', the impact of Arabs and Turks has been seen explicitly in the Middle Ages. With the expansion of the Muslim Arabs, Europe entered a period of lost dominancy on the Mediterranean basin, and was prisoned in the north side of Europe that starts behind the Pirennnes.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 20.

¹¹ Gerard Delanty. **Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality**, Macmillan, 1995, p. 48.

With the expansion of Muslim religion firstly by the Arabs and then by the Turks through Europe in order to teach the new and a different religion but of the same God, caused a defensive behaviour which matured the Christian unity and then brought about an aggressive thought, as best exemplified in the Crusades which aims religiously “to liberate the ‘Holy Spelchru’ in Jerusalem”.¹²

But this so-called unification was dispersed with the Crusade in 1204, which caused the invasion of the Constantinople by the Latin Christendom. With this historical event Christianity was seriously divided between the Catholicism and Orthodoxism.

Reaching the power of the Ottomans its zenith in the sixteenth century, the importance of a cohesive identity for Europe came to fore again in general Christianity and in particular Catholicism. In this context it is seen from the writings of the humanist Erasmus. He called for a unity of the Christians beyond the artificial borders of geographical base:

How very wrong this is! A geographical name of no importance divides them...In earlier times the Rhine divided the French and the Germans, but it does not separate one Christian from another. The Pyreness separate Spaniards and Frenchmen, but they do not undo the communality of the Church. The sea flows between the English and the French but can in no way split the unity of faith.¹³

But from the thirteenth century the concept of Europe was gradually secularised after the invasion of the Constantinople by the Latins thanks to the new religious oppositions. This event has been the deep cleavage, which continues now between the two sectarians. Consequently at the end of the separation process of the Christianity “there was division not only between Catholics and Protestants, but particularly within Protestantism itself, where far-reaching fragmentation came about due to the secession of a large number of

¹² Den Boer, p. 27.

¹³ Quoted in den Boer, p. 37.

religious groupings”.¹⁴ And with this division, fragmentation and disunity, making a simplistic identification of Europe with Christendom was increasingly difficult to sustain.¹⁵

In line with these developments, instead of the Christendom concept, Europe was set as the thing that belongs to no particular one only. Every power in Europe wanted to possess and to rule this continent. So a system of balance of power brought about with the modern age in the context of struggle for power.

During the modern ages, European powers made the continent as if a world and consequently these ‘world powers’ started to change the remaining world under their perceptions in order to reach the power deriving from their rival relations among them. One of the important substructures of the European superiority was the Renaissance, Reform and then the Enlightenment in the modern ages. In this respect, I argue that probably the most important developments concerning the concept of European unity and European identity was the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment. With the Reformation the coercive Catholicism, which dominated the Western Europe since the schism between Catholicism and Orthodoxism had consolidated in 1204, lost his domination on the western part of the continent.

The unity of Christendom declined with the Reformation and the Renaissance, the concept of Europe occurred as a secularised identity beyond the concept of Christendom. The Renaissance and the Enlightenment provided the basis for a new secular identity. The idea of Europe henceforth became the cultural model of the West and served as a unifying theme of modernity.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 38.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 38.

According to Delanty “the idea of Europe is a creation of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries”.¹⁶ Unlike the view of Delanty, I argue that the secularisation of Europe with the declining Christendom started with the ascending of the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century. Ottoman Empire had sat on the East Roman Empire and widened to Europe through the Balkans.

The most important side of this ascendancy of the new empire was her power that the governing of the Christians and other people in the Empire. At the beginning period of the new ‘Roman Empire’, Christian population was dominant among the others. With this respect, I argue that the secularisation of the West under the name of Europe as a unifying concept was started with the fear of the governmental power of the new Empire over its people. So for the security of Europe, the unifying concept of the Christendom would not have been enough. Therefore the emphasis on the concept of Europe as a unifying identity was gradually started with the Ottoman impact. Of course the Renaissance, the Reformation and then Enlightenment consolidated the Europe beyond the Christendom.

1.3 The Consolidation of Europe as a Secular Identity

With the Enlightenment, which based on the Newtonian physic world perception, the positivist thought placed gradually and within this perspective “the idea of Europe became increasingly focused on the idea of progress, which became synonymous with European modernity”.¹⁷

1789 French Revolution was an important step for the political formation of European states, with this development the process of the most bloody war

¹⁶ Delanty, p. 65.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 65.

periods gradually started. Identification of the people with the state more directly than before compelled the stable political structure of the future. The power relations between the European states, which became the most powerful world states beginning with the eighteenth century, increased the war technologies towards the more destructive and deadly way. So, as imperialist war machines, European nation-states could not have been a stable structure in Europe on the previous territories of the old empires.

The continuity divergence of the Christendom reached a more plurality after the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism with its Puritan sects occurred in the period after the Reformation. But unlike the division between the Latin Christianity from Greek Christianity, this separation did not cause a great gap, because it is essentially a political problem and a political division, so it did not occurred a civilisation difference. Christianity, therefore, continued to be the principle source of cultural identity even if the secularisation process had gained important steps.¹⁸ It should be emphasized that in the period beginning from the Renaissance to the American and French revolutions “the idea of Europe consolidated as the cultural model of the West and became increasingly important as its political identity”.¹⁹

In eighteenth and early nineteenth century the superiority thought of the Europeaness was gradually focused on the French culture. In this respect, as Delanty emphasized that “the concept of Europe was thoroughly French affair and proclaimed the superiority of the European religion, the elite race, and the French language”.²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 68.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 71. (see also D. de Rougement. **The Idea of Europe**, Macmillan, New York, 1966, p. 157.)

Within this period French replaced Latin as the language of diplomacy and of polite society. “To be European’ was to speak French”.²¹ It was this thought that gave rise to the famous words of Bismarck who was the chancellor of the rising German State Prussia: “I have always found the word ‘Europe’ on the lips of those statesmen who want something from a foreign power, which they would never venture to ask for in their own name”.²²

In the age of nationalism, “the idea of ‘the people’ evolved from the original notion of the French Revolution to the more narrow the idea of nation. In this context national communities were discovered by the intelligentsia and subsequently politicised by patriots and nationalist movements”.²³

That the developments after these thoughts and structures, the French and German struggle over the Europe brought about seriously. But the history shown us the Europe could have belonged to only neither French nor German. Finally, this struggle caused the most destructive wars of the human history in the twentieth century.

At the beginning period of the twentieth century, the German perception of Europe; Mitteleuropa became dominant with the rising of German supremacy both political, economical and militarily. This idea was the product of the ‘fin-de-siecle’ period, when the concept of Europe sought to live, it was a Euro-pessimism era. Within this context, “Mitteleuropa has generally been considered to apply not only to a region but also to a cultural political idea. The term is much more ideological than the idea of Europe”.²⁴ In this respect, according to the vision of Naumann, the concept of ‘Mittleeuropa’: “is the fruit of war. We

²¹ Ibid., p. 72.

²² Ibid., p. 72.

²³ Ibid., p. 75.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 100.

have sat together in the war's economic prison, we have fought together, we are determined to live together".²⁵

The First World War left the idea of common -European or universal- values in crisis and with the end of the Second World War both these European and universal values was dead by its formulators. As Jean-Baptiste Duroselle states that "from 1914 to 1918, there was no Europe".²⁶

After the First World War the emphasis on European identity was gradually increased in order to avoid from a new destruction in Europe. According to Delanty;

European identity was born in the inter-wars years out of the experience of cultural pessimism and decadence. In a sense it was the cross-cultural avant-garde and the modernist movement in art and literature that really gave Europe an identity that was more associated with European cities –London, Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, Zurich- than with nations which had engendered a war psychosis.²⁷

So in the first half of the twentieth century "a European identity had certainly consolidated as a personal identity of intellectuals and was closely linked to the contemporary 'Zeitgeist' of decadence and pessimism".²⁸

In that period "the notion of the essential unity of Europe was central to fascist ideology. Fascism in its classic Italian and Nazi forms was a supra-national ideology".²⁹ In the light of this perception, it can be said that with the words of Delanty "the One–Thousand -Year Reich was to be a European Order,

²⁵ Peter Bugge. "The Nation Supreme: The Idea of Europe 1914-1945", eds. Kevin Wilson & Jan van der Dussen. **The History of The Idea of Europe**, 1995, p. 90.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 89.

²⁷ Delanty, pp. 110-111.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 111.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 111.

not just a German Reich, and the annihilation of the Jews was seen as part of a cleansing of Europe of an Asiatic race”.³⁰

In modern era the feelings of superiority was satisfied beyond the borders of Europe until the 1914, except the Napoleonic wars. For a long time, the notion of the nationalism reached the notion of racism and with its zenith, it brought about as a deathful for the others: in interior against the Jewish, in exterior against the other civilisations in the less development world.

After the Second World War “one of the most decisive conditions for the project of European integration was the temporary rebuff of nationalism had been associated with the regimes that had led the nations into war, defeat and destruction”.³¹ In this respect the words of Stanley Hoffman was very explanatory:

The collapse of two national ideologies that had been bellicose, aggressive and imperialistic brought about an almost total discrediting of nationalism in every guise. Among the nations of western Europe that were on the Allied side, the most remarkable thing was that the terrible years of occupation and resistance had not resulted in a resurgence of chauvinism.³²

The hope for the European concept of the future brought about in the traumatic years of Second World War, E. P. Thompson’s description which derives from the letters between he and his brother, who dies fighting with Bulgarian partisans, is very significant in order to understand of the mood of that

³⁰ Ibid., p. 112.

³¹ Ole Weaver. “Europe since 1945: Crisis to Renewal”, eds. Kevin Wilson & Jan van der Dussen. **The History of The Idea of Europe**, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p. 152.

³² Quoted in Weaver, p. 152. (see also S. Hoffman. “Obstinate or Obsolote? The Fate of The Nation-state and The Case of Western Europe”, **Deadalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences**, Summer 1966, p. 870.)

years even if in the narrow area of European intelligentsia.³³ His brother wrote in 1943:

How wonderful it would be to call Europe one's fatherland, and think of Krakow, Munich, Rome, Arles, Madrid as one's own cities. I am not yet educated to a broader nationalism, but for a United States of Europe I could feel a patriotism far transcending my love for England.

And after one year he wrote:

There is a spirit abroad in Europe which is finer and braver than any dogma. It is the confident will of whole peoples, who have known the utmost humiliation and suffering and have triumphed over it, to build their own lives once and for all.³⁴

At the end of the war, which destroyed the Europe with both winners and losers brought about a new era that the Phoenix born again from its death. This huge destruction brought a huge promise to Europe and in particular Western Europe found a fruitful soil to grow in the Cold War period. As Delanty emphasized "the Cold War was undoubtedly the single most important event in the history of the twentieth century that shaped the identity of Europe".³⁵

Under the conditions of the post-war period the North Atlantic concept was born as a new historical category and with this new concept Europe was reduced to an economic community between the capitalist states and an eastern bulwark against communism.³⁶ Nevertheless "the construction of Europe along Cold War lines was not only designed to serve as a bulwark against the Red

³³ Ibid., p. 152.

³⁴ Quoted in Weaver, p. 152. (see also Thompson. **Beyond the Cold War**, Merlin Press, London, 1982, p. 4.)

³⁵ Delanty, p. 120.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 122.

Army and as a guarantee of American hegemony, but it was also an attempt to prevent a future revival of the Third Reich”.³⁷

Winston Churchill was the key figure both war and post-war period in Europe. In 1940 before the fall of France, he had proposed that “there shall be no longer be two nations, but one Franco-British Union”.³⁸ But at the end of the war his thoughts changed to the necessity of a Franco-German based cooperation. Along with Monnet, Adenauer, he now believed that this reconciliation had to be the starting point, and he said in the Zurich speech in 1946:

The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany...Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia....must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and champion its right to live and shine.³⁹

Churchill was generally right; America played an important role in the economic and political integration of Europe, Great Britain has entered in this integration process, even if she has been seen as a Trojan horse in the eyes of continental Europe. In the context of reverse side, Soviet Russia played an opposite role, which gave power to unification process as an opposite powerful identity for the Western Europe in the context of politic, economic and social integration.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 123.

³⁸ Quoted in Weaver, p. 163 (see also D. W. Urwin. **The Community of Europe: A history of European Integration Since 1945**, Longman, London, 1991, pp. 29-35.)

³⁹ Quoted in Weaver, p. 165.

1.4 The Process of the Integration of Europe

After the theoretical thoughts on the future of Europe, the first empirical step brought about as a first supra-national organization with the signing of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). In this step the major motive was political rather than an economical. It was aimed “to guarantee a lasting peace between France and Germany. War between the two should be made not only unimaginable- but also materially impractical”.⁴⁰ In this respect, the coal and steel union has been the first step towards political integration.

In 1958 an important step forward was marked with the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom deriving from the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The first president of EEC, Walter Hallstein emphasized the vision of the new community as: “We are not just integrating economies, we are integrating politics. We are not sharing our furniture, we are building a new and bigger house”.⁴¹

In post-war period, the American impact was very significant on the integration project of the EU. An ideological difference under the umbrella of the same terminator guns (nuclear bombs) were a fertile soil for the idea of Europe. The power of nuclear guns divided Europe into two parts with wall-like borders. The post-war economic difficulties and the traumatic impacts of the war on the continent standard the calendars again with the concept of ‘stunde null’, especially for the Germans. When western Europeans was searching a new future embedding the war wholly in past, the eastern part found its destiny ready by the socio-economic ideology of the USSR.

Of course the saviors would have determined the fate of the peoples whom they saved. The destiny of the Western Europe was tied to the United

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 167-168.

⁴¹ Quoted in Weaver, p. 168.

States of America (USA) in the new chessboard. So the USA played a crucial role in the recovery of Western European countries with the Marshall Plan and Organization for the European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), but it also supported the principle of European union/integration.⁴²

In addition to its political construction Europe has also been a cultural construction. In the promotion of the cultural construction, the USA played a leading role. In that period, according to Americans Europe was a unitary and homogeneous entity and served as a racial myth of national origins.⁴³ For the cultural construct of Europeanism, it was given significance to the culture of everyday life instead of the elitist high culture in Europe.⁴⁴

So American popular culture had a homogenising influence on Europe, which found a new identity in the culture industry and new middle-class materialism of the post-war decades. Finally from California to Vienna the same culture area has emerged.⁴⁵

In line with the conditions of the Cold War and the American politic, economic and social influences over the Western Europe with using its historically cultural relationship, the new notion of Europe with the collaboration concept became an increasingly bureaucratic entity centred in Brussels. The bureaucratic centralism and the ideological consolidation of Western Europe as a trading bloc and the emergence of new political institutions helped to shape the new Europe. These were the Organisation for European Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1948), the Council of Europe (1949), European Coal and

⁴² Ibid., p. 161.

⁴³ Delanty, p. 115.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 116.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 124.

Steel Community (ECSC) (1951) Euratom (1957). After the establishment of these organisations the EEC was born in 1958.⁴⁶

Two significant developments collided in 1989. First, the end of the Cold War, with the unification of two Germany, the fall the communist governments in Eastern Europe and the final collapse of the USSR itself. Second, the emergence of the increased momentum in the European integration process.⁴⁷

Following the end of the Cold War deriving from the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were significant developments brought to fore: German unification, rediscovery of Mittleuropa, transiton of the former communist world from communism to capitalism and liberal democracy, increase in the unification process in Western Europe and the rise of nationalism and racism in the context of old struggles and problems.

Approximately forty years, the conditions of the Cold War period provided a secure framework for the identity of Europe (Western Europe) “whose professed goal was the recovery of Eastern Europe and the restoration of a supposedly historical Europe”.⁴⁸

With the post - Cold War period, the fall of the imagined enemy caused an instable period for the West. So a whole new programme of reconstruction had to be mobilised after the dismantling of the Cold War edifice.⁴⁹ At the same time, for the Eastern Europe, the post-Cold War period was “not only an attempt to negate the heritage of 1917 but also a belated attempted to catch up on the

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 126.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 141.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p 132.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p 133.

West”.⁵⁰ With these new developments the concept of ‘North versus South’ has emerged as the new polarity instead of the old poles of ‘West versus East’.⁵¹

It can be said that the most important event for the future of the European integration was the unification of the Germany. Without any burden of defensive cost, Germany had concentrated on the export-oriented economy with a high standard of living, and the German democracy, which derives from the concept of ‘*stunde null*’ and the post war American established economic structure, has been one of the most stable democracy in the world. So the success of this unification was a hope for the future unification of the Europe in politic, economic and social sense. And nevertheless the circumstances of 1990 were very different from 1871 when Bismarck unified the country after the wars against Denmark, Austria and France.⁵² Because, today the concept of rivalry has changed significantly in world politics in comparison with the conditions of the nineteenth century.

With the beginning of the post-Cold War period, there has been an increased emphasis on the concept of ‘Europe’ and the integration of the Europe shifted increasingly to the political and cultural side from the economic dominancy integration of the previous process. In this respect, the EEC became in time the EC, and after 1993, the EU has formed, so the myth of community concept was abandoned. With these developments the truth has emerged that “the idea of Europe as a liberal democratic community was essentially a foil for the pursuit of a new programme in political and economic engineering, for economics cannot work without morality and politics”.⁵³

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 133.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 130.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 134-135.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 127-128.

After the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by the member states, Europe entered a new period with a bold step via an emphasis on the political integration including the concept of EU citizenship. Nevertheless, probably the most important step in the context of economic integration realised with the single currency: Euro. This successful step can be regarded as one of the significant substructure for the more deep-rooted political integration. With this development, the one of the important sovereign symbols of the nations-states could have been surpassed on the way of political integration and the more strong European identity. Nevertheless, all these attempts for unification should not underestimate the cultural diversity in Europe.

1.5 A Short Analysis on the Cultural Diversity

The cultural diversity in Europe has been seen as the unifying principle and strength for the integration of EU. And nonetheless this emphasis has shown itself with the words of ‘unity in diversity’. However, although the diversity of the old continent is considered as a basic unifying principle, there appear some important problems deriving from this diversity. In this context, European linguistic diversity has emerged as the greatest obstacle standing in the way of the emergence of a common European identity.⁵⁴

The continued existence of numerous national languages as the official languages used at the supranational or common level is a major barrier to cultural integration, which can ensure a solid European identity. Although it can be said that all European languages derives from the same language roots, the searching of a common language and determining this kind of language above is very hard and causes many problems among the nations that have strong

⁵⁴ Karlsson, p. 68.

languages which reflects their identity, for example French, English, German, Spanish, Italian and etc.

In this context it could be said that in practice, English has been developing as a 'de facto lingua franca' in Europe. But the spreading of the Anglo-Saxon culture both in politic and economic areas with the power of English language in world bring about some discontents in the other States – especially the States that possess a strong historical and cultural background like France and Germany- of Europe. In this respect, the dominance of English causes a strong resistance from both France and increasingly from Germany against the elevation of the English to the de facto status of the common language of the EU.⁵⁵ Probably, the most important reason is the fear of the Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony that derives from the contemporary, politic, economic and military hegemonic power of the USA in the world.

This linguistic diversity has caused significant difficulties in the introduction of the common communication channels. As a result of this;

There is not one European newspaper exists and there is no European television programme apart from Eurosport, and most of its viewers watch matches between nations. In short, there is no public European debate, no European political discourse because the political process is still tied to language.⁵⁶

It is seen from the realities of today, the problem of interpreting is becoming insurmountable. "Over 40 percent of the EU administrative budget are already spent on language services. Eleven languages make 132 combinations possible in the translator booths".⁵⁷ Since May 2004 with the addition of another 10 Eastern and Central European languages and Maltese has brought this figure

⁵⁵ Heather Field. "EU Cultural Policy and The Creation of a Common European Identity" p. 6. <<http://www.pols.canterbury.ac.nz/ECSANZ/papers/Field.htm>>

⁵⁶ Karlsson, p. 68.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 68.

to 462 combinations. Although this would bring about a negative effect in the small member nations of the EU, some form of functional differentiation will be necessary in making some languages more equal than the others.⁵⁸ However, this is the destiny of the weak languages in the all kind of political unification, even if it is the most democratic political integration process.

For the more successful integration, the using of the languages of Europe is significant. At present, “while 10 percent speak at least two foreign languages an average 66 percent of EU citizens are monolingual. On the one side, in Ireland these percentages are three and 80 respectively. On the other side, in Luxembourg only one percent of the population is monolingual while a huge percentage (no less than 80 percent) speaking at least two foreign languages.⁵⁹ Avoiding from the language problem would therefore not be easy in the short and middle term.

In the context of cultural diversity, the future of the Europe can bring about the danger of the discrimination between the Europeans and non-Europeans especially in line with the concept of ‘clash of civilisation’. Therefore the creation of a pan-European identity could easily take the form of demarcation against ‘the others’. This will be one of the major risk for the political integration process and stable identity structure for the citizens of the EU.

In order not to run the cultural exclusion mechanism and to persuade citizens to feel part of a supra-national community and identity, a European identity must be distinctive and all embracing, differentiate and assimilate at the same time. Because it is a question of integrating the nations of Europe who has

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 68.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 68.

a strong national and regional identities.⁶⁰ It appears to be very hard, but EU, for its own future must do this.

Nevertheless, in order to avoid the problems and risks of the cultural diversity on the way of the common European identity, European supra-nationality will be accepted first in situations where there is no hierarchy of national, regional and local identities but even every individual knows about them as self-evident and as part of their daily life. As Karlsson emphasized that “a policy for preserving diversity will thus be a precondition for creating a European identity that neither should or would become a replacement for a national identity but which can create support and strength for political institutions that are neither national nor the framework of a European superstate”⁶¹, which can insist a homogeneity over its citizens.

And in order to transform the cultural diversity for the advantage of the integration of EU, cultural nations should become divorced from a territory. In this context, “people will have a sense of belonging to a special area and its cultural and political history, but this area needs not necessarily be linked to a nation-state with defined territorial boundaries”.⁶²

EU needs a secure and solid cultural ground that contributes to and ensures its unification process with success. And by standing on secure and solid cultural ground, every people in Europe with its own distinctive character and cultural capacity achievements will contribute to a supranational community.

Consequently, the building of the common identity perception appears very important for the integration of the EU and as a new supranational political structure, EU has played a significant role, at least it has striven to form the

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 69.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 71.

⁶² Ibid., p. 71.

substructure of the popularisation of the European identity. Now, we will examine the efforts of the EU for this purpose historically.

CHAPTER II

THE EFFORTS TO MAKE EUROPEAN IDENTITY POPULAR AND THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN UNION

2.1 Historical Background

Now, we know from the valuable works of Gellner⁶³ and Anderson⁶⁴ on national identity that the notion of identity is an artificial construction under the necessities of the politic, economic and social conditions. As Boxhoorn stressed “national identity is no more and no less than a shared and usually artificially constructed historical experience, memory, or myth, or a combination of the three”.⁶⁵

After the triumph of the French Revolution in 1789, the forming of imagined nation-state was started by the political decisions at that era. The nation-building process with a gradually rising borders collided with the wall with the Second World War. And with the traumatic conditions of the post war period, the basic aspects of the nation-building project have gradually been applied to the new project: the unification of Europe. The European integration project therefore started without such a thing as a European people.

⁶³ For more detailed information see Ernest Gellner. **Nations and Nationalism**, NY, Cornell University Press, 1983.

⁶⁴ For more detailed information see Benedict Anderson. **Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism**, Verso, London, 1983.

⁶⁵ Bram Boxhoorn. “European Identity and the Process of European Unification: Compatible Notions?”, ed. Michael Wintle. **Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present**, Aldershot, Avebury, p. 140.

Maastricht Treaty, probably is the most significant development and step in the integration history of Europe with its Article 128, states that *'action by the Community shall be aimed.... In the following areas:....improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples'*.⁶⁶

Nevertheless, long before the Maastricht Treaty, there were many initiatives "to promote integration in the sphere of culture by enhancing what it saw as the European identity".⁶⁷

With economic problems based on the petrol shocks and the ideological struggle and challenge under the context of Cold War, 1970s was the time of Euro-pessimism. Therefore, in this period "identity was seen as a panacea for all problems in the EC".⁶⁸ In this context, the first significant step towards defining a cultural basis for European unification brought about with signing of the 'Declaration on the European Identity'. With this declaration;

The nine member states shared 'the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society, which measures up to the needs of the individual', that each wished to ensure that the 'cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected; and that all were determined to defend 'the principles of representative democracy, the rule of law, social justice and respect for human rights'.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Maastricht Treaty, (Article 128). <<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title2.html>>

⁶⁷ Chris Shore. **Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration**, Routledge, 2000, p. 44.

⁶⁸ Boxhoorn, p. 140.

⁶⁹ Quoted in Shore, p. 44.

At the European summit in 1974, the European heads of state agreed to a study into the special rights which could be granted to citizens of the member states as members of the Community.⁷⁰

After one year, the ‘Tindemans Report’ recommended that “Europe must be close to its citizens and that a European Union could only become reality if people supported the idea”.⁷¹ And nonetheless, the report also recommended “measures for protecting rights of Europeans and a specific policy for forging a ‘People’s Europe through concrete manifestations of the European solidarity in everyday life”.⁷²

The following step was the ‘Solemn Declaration’ in 1983. With this declaration the member states was invited to “promote European awareness and to undertake joint action in various cultural areas”.⁷³

In 1984 one of the most significant meeting was held in Fontainbleu. European Council stressed that “the Community fulfil the expectations of the European people and take measures to strengthen and promote the identity and image of the Community vis-a-vis its citizens and the rest of the world”.⁷⁴

With this summit in Fontainbleu, the Committee, which chaired by the Italian MEP Pietro Adonnino, was set up with the task of starting a campaign on the theme of ‘People’s Europe’. The emphasize on the culture and communication was important in Adonnino’s words:

Through action in the areas of culture and communication, which are essential to European identity and the Community’s image in

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 44-45.

⁷¹ Karlsson, p. 65.

⁷² Shore, p. 45.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 45.

⁷⁴ Karlsson, p. 65.

the minds of its people, that support for the advancement of Europe can and must be sought.⁷⁵

In addition to the cultural subjects the Committee's proposals and recommendations was made in other areas including simplifying border-crossing formalities, providing reciprocal recognition of equivalent diplomas and professional qualifications, giving rights to those living abroad to participate in local and European elections in their country of residence and etc.⁷⁶

In addition to them the Committee stressed the importance of the community-based setting symbols;

Symbols play a key role in consciousness-raising but there is also a need to make the European citizen aware of the different elements that go to make up his European identity, of our cultural unity with all its diversity of expression, and of the historical ties which link the nations of Europe.⁷⁷

In the context of European wide symbols, one of the most significant outcomes of the work of this committee was the decision that the European Community should have its own flag. The flag was adopted in June 1985 and the shape of the flag was taken from the logo of the Council of Europe: a circle of twelve yellow stars set against an azure background.⁷⁸ The rationale for this emblem, as the Council of Europe described it, was that:

Twelve was a symbol of perfection and plenitude, associated equally with the apostles, the sun of Jacob, the tables of the Roman legislator, the labours of Hercules, the hours of the day,

⁷⁵ Quoted in Shore, p. 46, (see also P. Adonnino. "A People's Europe: Reports from the Ad Hoc Committee", **Bulletin of the European Communities**, Supplement 7/1985, p. 21.)

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 46.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 47.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 47.

the months of the year, or the signs of the Zodiac. Lastly, the circular layout denoted union.⁷⁹

Another important step in the context of symbol was the creation of European passport. The others were, European driving licence and car number-plates and a European anthem, which was taken from the fourth movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony – the 'Ode to Joy'.⁸⁰

When the flag was raised for the first time at Berlaymont on 29 May 1986, the EC hymn - the 'Ode to Joy' was played for the first time. Thus, by means of a flag and European national hymn, the Union acquired the attributes of a nation-state. With the choice fell on 9 May, the date on which Robert Schumann held a speech in 1950 that resulted in the first community, the ECSC, a European day was also established.⁸¹

As a result, the Adonnino Committee has shown that the dominant role of the politicians and bureaucrats of the creation of European identity. The EU has thus attempted to create a European identity from above. Legitimacy for future integration would be created by invoking a common history and cultural heritage. In this respect, in 1988 the European Council decided to introduce a European dimension into school subjects including literature, history, geography, civics, languages and music. And in that period an important book '*Europe - A History of Its Peoples*', which covers a period from 5,000 years ago to tomorrow's news, was written by the French history professor, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle.⁸²

Nevertheless, the notion of European identity has appeared in the 'Single European Act' of 1987 as an external meaning of identity in the shape of the

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 47.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 48.

⁸¹ Karlsson, p. 65.

⁸² Ibid., p. 65.

defence identity of the Community for the first time in a Treaty. It states that *‘The High Contracting Parties consider that closer co-operation on questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to the development of a European identity in external matters.’*⁸³

The next important Treaty was the Maastricht in 1991. In the preamble it is read: *‘Resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and it’s the world’.*⁸⁴ Thus, through the establishment of a common defence, the European identity, and in particular its external identity will be reinforced.

Another reference to the external identity of the Union is made in the section entitled Common Provisions. In ‘Article B’ it is read that the Union sets as an objective *‘to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence’.*⁸⁵

Up to this point, the Maastricht Treaty uses the notion of ‘identity’ in an entirely consistent way, referring to a common defence and security policy. When it is moved to ‘Article F’ of the common Provisions, however, we encounter a quite different meaning. It states that *‘The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy’.*⁸⁶ Here, apparently, something different is meant by national identity. Since it mentions the ‘systems of government’, it

⁸³ Single European Act <<http://europa.eu.int/abc/obj/treaties/en/entr14a.htm#41>>.

⁸⁴ Treaty on European Union, Common Provisions (Article B).
<<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title1.html>>.

⁸⁵ Ibid., (Article B).

⁸⁶ Ibid., (Article F).

might mean the recognition of plurality of political institutions in the Community. But the term 'identity' may also refer to the international identity of the member states, arguing that the Union's policies will be compatible with their national identities.

On reading the Maastricht Treaty, one might expect more on the subject of identity in Chapter 3, dealing with education, vocational training, youth, and culture, but here no references are made either to the reinforcement of the European identity or to the recognition of national identities. Instead we read in 'Article 126(2)' that the '*Community action shall be aimed at: developing the European dimension in education*', and "Article 128(1)" that '*The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore*'. 'Article 138a', under Title XVII, Development Co-operation, is a new provision. It recognises that political parties at the European level are an important factor for integration within the Union: '*They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union*'. It is further resolved '*to encourage greater involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the European Union*'.

Clearly, the 'identity' concept is used differently from article to article. The use of identity in its external meaning, which refers to a common security and defence policy, is easily recognisable, and is compatible with earlier examples. References to identity in the internal meaning, however, referring to the 'essence' or 'substance' of the Union, is not to be found. Instead, it seems as if the EU's civil servants have substituted such expressions as 'European dimension' and 'European awareness', almost as if taken from a thesaurus. But in this context, it can be evaluated that both expressions show the intentions to establish a basis for European identity.

Of course the unification of Europe under the name of EU is not a simple process and also it will not be simple in the future. There are a lot of perceptions among the Europeans that derives from history, socio-politics, culture, religion, etc. Every European people have its more or less genuine historical myths, experiences and view of history. For example Karlsson stresses that the lack of powerful European icons:

There is no European equivalent to the ‘Académie Française’, ‘Bastille’, ‘Escorial’, ‘La Scala’, ‘Brandenburger Tor’ or the opening of ‘Parliament at Westminster’. There is no European ‘Unknown Soldier’. Jean Monnet rests at the ‘Panthéon’ in Paris. The fame of Robert Schumann's resting place at ‘Scy-Chazelles’ cannot compete with ‘Colombey-les-Deux-Églises’, where General de Gaulle lies buried.⁸⁷

In this context, it is seen from the above-mentioned examples that, common history has been experienced by many as against and not with each other in the great European wars. Therefore, the main task of the ‘Europe-makers’ cannot be to provide Europeans with a common identity originating in antique or medieval times but to develop political self-confidence and ability to act in line with the role of Europe in the twenty-first century.⁸⁸

One of the important steps in forming a common and a more concrete European identity has been the forming of a European citizenship. In the next section, European citizenship is therefore examined in the context of the Maastricht Treaty.

⁸⁷ Karlsson, p. 66.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 66.

2.2 The Concrete Reflection of the Popular European Identity: European Citizenship

The impacts of the European citizenship on the European identity with the question of whether it helps to develop the popularisation of European identity have been very significant. The concept of citizenship that formulated broadly in the Maastricht Treaty has emerged as a concrete relation between the Europeans and the supra-national state: EU. In the context of international law “citizenship defines the rights, privileges and duties an individual possesses by virtue of belonging to a state”.⁸⁹ As Shores stressed that “it is not membership of a community, but membership of a state that therefore marks citizenship in the modern era”.⁹⁰

The French Revolution that based on the bourgeoisie-democratic demands played an important role in the development of the citizenship concept. Since the 1789, the concept of citizenship has directly been related to the nation-state and therefore “citizenship has been an important conceptual arm of nation-building and instrument for governing the masses”.⁹¹ With this development, ‘the people’ were defined in terms of the ‘nation’ for the first time in history.

Nevertheless in the dynamic process after the French Revolution, “the notion of the citizen acquired a cluster of new meanings associated with the ideas of liberty, fraternity and equality”.⁹²

But European citizenship has emerged as symbol, as category of thought and as distinct type of subjectivity on supra-nationality and it was born as a

⁸⁹ Shore, p. 71.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 71.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 72.

⁹² Ibid., p. 71.

reaction and a challenge to the hegemonic principles of national sovereignty, which was and in some extent is the basic political framework of the European modernity.⁹³

In order to bring about more concrete impacts, the establishment of the European citizenship aimed to reduce the gap between the EU institutions and its nationals. So it has been welcomed by many scholars both for its high symbolic value and concrete effects.⁹⁴

In order to make the definition of the concept of European citizenship, European Commission declared that “the concept of European citizenship was central to its objective of strengthening democratic legitimacy, and it ‘explicitly noted the exclusion of the ‘people of Europe’ from the economic and neo-functional dynamic of the 1992 process’”.⁹⁵

According to Shore, the above-mentioned points give rise to two major evaluations. Firstly, “citizenship, was clearly promoted as the Spanish Presidency’s ‘Big Idea’ for maintaining momentum towards further integration and for galvanising popular support for the EU”.⁹⁶ And secondly, citizenship was listed in the final text of the Maastricht Treaty as one of the political objections of the Union.⁹⁷

The concept of European citizenship deriving from the Maastricht Treaty has not brought about merely a citizenship concept that substitutes for the

⁹³ Ibid., p. 72.

⁹⁴ Stefania Panebianco. “European Citizenship and European Identity: from the Treaty of Maastricht to Public Opinion Attitudes” **Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics**, University of Catania, December, 1996, p. 3.

⁹⁵ Shore, p. 74. (see also C. Closa. “The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union”, **Common Market Law Review**, 1992, p. 1155.)

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 74.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 74.

national citizenship. The member states therefore supported the idea once it was established that Union citizenship would be additional to national citizenship. As Shore emphasized that “Union citizenship would not involve a direct relationship between the individual and the Union; rather, it would be supplementary to - and contingent upon – the rights and obligation attached to every national as a citizen of their own member state.”⁹⁸

As a result of the Maastricht Treaty, “in theory citizenship rights were to be governed by Community law, in practice the nation-states retain the power to define who is – or is not – a European citizen”.⁹⁹ The ‘Four Fundamental Freedom’; the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital rights are attached to the EU citizenship, whereas previously they attached to citizenship of a member state.¹⁰⁰ But as it is clearly seen that the “citizenship of the Union was made obligatory for all member state nationals was itself highly symbolic”.¹⁰¹

In the context of the texts of the Maastricht Treaty, European citizenship appears among the main objectives of the EU listed at the beginning of the Treaty: *‘The Union shall set itself the following objectives: [...] to strengthen the protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the Union.’*¹⁰²

Part II in Title II establishes the ‘Citizenship of the Union’ stating that: *Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the*

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 74-75.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁰² Treaty on European Union, Title I, Common Provisions (Article B).

Union'.¹⁰³ The nationality of a member state becomes then the '*conditio sine qua non*' for European citizenship.

European citizenship gives the EU citizens some new rights, namely the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States (art. 8a). "In fact, this right to free movement is not as novel as universal as it appears. Whereas in the past the right to move freely was limited to the 'economically active', the Maastricht Treaty extends this right to include three categories of economically inactive persons: 'pensioners, students and persons who does not burden on the member state's social assistance schemes'.¹⁰⁴

With the Article 8b the European citizens have received the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections and in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which one resides under the same conditions as nationals of that State. Nonetheless, this right "was intended as a new expression of political citizenship and is often said to be the most significant concession, as there are over four million 'EU nationals' residing in other member states".¹⁰⁵

The other right has been the diplomatic protection of any Member State in a third country (art. 8c). And with the Article 8d, European citizens received the rights to petition to the European Parliament¹⁰⁶ and appeal to the ombudsman. And as final, Article 8e "allows for the European Council to adopt provisions to strengthen or to add to the rights laid down in this Part' in future, as the EU's sphere of jurisdiction expands".¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Ibid., Title II Part II. <<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/title2.html>>

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁰⁶ Panebianco, p. 2.

¹⁰⁷ Shore, pp. 76-77.

The aim of the establishment of the concept of European citizenship in the Maastricht Treaty was to make the Treaty more palatable and to use as an instrument for instilling European consciousness among the masses European citizenship.¹⁰⁸

Nevertheless, there has been and is serious criticism on the concept of European citizenship. In this context, Shore formulates these criticisms on the concept of European citizenship, which was brought about by the Maastricht Treaty under the four parts. Firstly, he stresses that “the EU concept of citizenship focuses exclusively voting, taxation, and military service, there is little consensus – as to what ‘duty’ might include in the European context”.¹⁰⁹ In this respect, there is no enough consensus on voting, taxation and military service concerned with the duty part of the European citizenship concept. “Since classical times the main obligation of citizens was not simply to participate actively in the life of the polis, but to take up arms when called to its defence”.¹¹⁰

The second major criticism is that; “it is still unclear whether Union citizenship is meant to codify existing practice or be a catalyst for further integration”.¹¹¹

The third criticism is the “perpetuating the conflation of nationality and citizenship. The status of Union citizenship is subordinate to, and wholly dependent upon, the framework of the nation-state”.¹¹² So without being a citizen of a member state, gaining the citizenship of EU is impossible.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 77.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 78.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 78.

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp. 78-79.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 79.

As to the fourth and the last criticism, it emphasised that European citizenship discriminates against non-EU nationals so non-EU nationals effectively become second-class citizens.¹¹³ Consequently of this structure, xenophobia and racism throughout the Europe has been emerged by creating an economic underclass that constitutes by foreigners and the unemployment at the same time while the European Parliament carries out the championship of the notion of the anti-racism.¹¹⁴ As a result of these practical development when “national barriers within Europe have come down, the walls separating the EU from its ‘Others’ have grown higher”.¹¹⁵

In general the concept of the European citizenship aims to develop a framework of a ‘European consumer’. So the economic aspects of the concept of the European citizenship are dominant. “Indeed EU policy-makers now consistently conflate the two domains such that ‘consumer’ and ‘citizens’ are increasingly conceived as essentially one and the same thing”.¹¹⁶ A heading in the EU booklet ‘*A Citizen’s Europe*’ announces that: ‘every citizen a consumer’.¹¹⁷

In this context J.G.A Pocock emphasized the economic structure of the European construction. The logic that derives European construction is fundamentally economic. What is being constructed, he says, is an empire of the market’. It is an economic community based on:

A set of arrangements for ensuring the surrender by states of their power to control the movement of economic forces which exercise the ultimate authority in human affairs. The institutions

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 79.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.79.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 80.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 84.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 80.

jointly operated, and/or obeyed, by member states would then not be political institutions bringing about a redistribution of sovereignty, but administrative or entrepreneurial institutions designed to ensure that no sovereign authority can interfere with the omnipotence of a market exercising 'sovereignty' in a metaphorical because non-political sense.¹¹⁸

In the context of feeling European, EU took its one of the boldest step towards the integration and at the same time against the national sovereignty when eleven member states except UK, Denmark and Sweden, renounced their sovereignty over monetary policy and adopted the 'euro' as their new common currency.¹¹⁹

All the promotion activities in order to develop the European citizenship has shown that the perception of EU is to develop and spread a broader concept of European identity as the only way to cope with the clash between identities in an era of globalization and fragmentation.¹²⁰

In order to reach this aim the Maastricht Treaty established a 'multiple citizenship'. In a similar way, we can refer to a European 'multiple identity' by considering local, regional, and national identities as compatible without excluding the one from the other.

In this context, Telo underlines a peculiar aspect of the European citizenship as dual citizenship:

A dual citizenship is usually destined to transform into a federal citizenship. However, the European citizenship is a special case, because the evolution towards a unique supranational citizenship is clearly excluded in the declaration on the nationality of a member state annexed to the Maastricht. European citizenship is

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 85 (see also J.G.A Pocock, "Deconstructing Europe", London Review of Books 19, 19 December 1991.)

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.87.

¹²⁰ Panebianco, p. 1.

not comprehensive of national and local citizenship, but it goes along with them.¹²¹

As it will be seen from the EB graphics below, recent empirical results indicate that the majority of Europeans declare having both a national and a European identity, demonstrating that they consider them compatible. But when asked to make a choice, the national attachment prevails. In reality, in the Maastricht, the citizens are not asked to choose to have either a national identity or a European one. Identity cannot be analysed in terms of zero-sum games.¹²²

After having examined the historical, theoretical, political, cultural and the constitutional substructure of the European identity which reflects from the European legal texts, now we can pass to show and analyse the results of the public opinion polls (EBs).

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 3. (see also, Mario Telo ed. **Démocratie et Construction Européenne**, Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1995, p. 49.)

¹²² Ibid., p. 2.

CHAPTER III

THE VISIBILITY OF EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY: PUBLIC OPINION POLLS

3.1 A Short Historical Overview

The creation of the EU is rightly often considered as the result of the project of a strict group of pro-European administrative and political elites who generally did not take any account of European public opinion.¹²³ In fact the European Union project has been an elite affair. But with increasing demands towards the more integration, the dominance of the public opinion will gradually increase in the integration process of the EU.

Historically speaking, the public support for 'Europe' was quite high and increased from the late 1940s to the late 1960s. The tragedy of the Second World War deriving from the struggles between the nation-states in Europe caused unification demands for the lasting peace in the old continent. The sentiments of peace and security were dominant in the thoughts of both elites and the public. Therefore there was remarkable support in that period.

In general, in that period, there was a 'permissive consensus' and restricted knowledge on the implications and effects on the unification of Europe. In this context, according to Slater, "public opinion was in favour of

¹²³ Panebianco, p. 4. (see also R. J. Shephard. **Public Opinion and European Integration**, Saxon House, 1975. p. 1.)

European integration, but without any knowledge of the connected implications”.¹²⁴

In the 1970s, both due to the international economic crisis and to the internal impact of the first enlargement of the EU in 1973 support for European integration suddenly decreased.¹²⁵

Since the early 1980s, specific EB surveys have been systematically conducted in order to measure public support for the European Community. In this context, a general pattern of public support for Europe has emerged from the results of these surveys. Generally this support was characterised by a rise until 1989, a downturn continuing until late 1992, followed by a consolidation at lower levels of support beginning at early 1994 and, as of late 1994, by the first signals of recovery.¹²⁶

In order to understand this trend better, some concepts could be necessary which are often used in public opinion analysis: ‘Utilitarian support’ and ‘Affective support’ “Utilitarian support for supranational institutions is support for integration which stems from a recognition of common interests and positive, mutual benefits that will result.”¹²⁷ Nevertheless, “affective support is emotional support which may exist between peoples, and which may also comprise a sense of common identity”.¹²⁸

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 4, (see also M. Slater. “Political Elites, Popular Indifference and Community Building”, **Journal of Common Market Studies**, 1982, p. 21.)

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 4, (see also D. Handley. “Public Opinion and European Integration: the crisis of the 1970s”, **European Journal of Political Research** -4, 1981, p. 335.)

¹²⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 39, (Table. 1.7). (see also following EB data.)

¹²⁷ Panebianco, p. 5. (see also Lindberg & Scheingold. **Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community**, Prentice Hall, 1970).

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

With the collapse of the Soviet Russia, and the promising development of the European integration, the early 1990s were characterised by a certain degree of optimism. So, the curves ‘support for unification’ (81%), ‘EC membership’ (72%) and ‘benefits from the EC’ (59%) were all at their highest levels in spring 1991.¹²⁹ But the emerging security problem in Europe with the dissolution of the Yugoslavia, the reluctance in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in the national parliaments, which has brought a significant changing to the nation-state structure of the member states, and entering an economic recession in western Europe accompanied by high levels of unemployment suddenly decreased the public support.

In generally, the true concept has been the ‘utilitarian’ in the context of the support for European integration. Public attitudes towards integration reflect the perceived costs and benefits of EC membership: “support for the EU does not translate into a willingness to make sacrifices for other member states in economic difficulties”.¹³⁰ Empirical evidence to the utilitarian support showed the worries of the European public opinion. When asked, in your opinion, which of the following should be the most important objective of the European Union policies towards less favoured regions? The great majority of the respondents indicate the creation of jobs as the most important (44%).¹³¹

As the debate on the ratification of the Maastricht revealed, European public opinion was now more attentive to what happens in Brussels. Political events during that process demonstrate that “the public is neither as supportive of European integration nor as deferential to elites on EU issues as previously assumed. European integration is not merely an elite process, but depends on

¹²⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 39, (Table. 1.7).

¹³⁰ Brigid Laffan. **Integration and Co-operation in Europe**, Routledge, London, 1992, p. 123.

¹³¹ Standard Eurobarometer 44, (Table. 7.6).

fluctuations in public sentiments as well”.¹³² The period after the Maastricht Treaty, consensus does not seem then to be as permissive as in the past, because it is very much influenced by the events. As Franklin, Marsh and McLaren argue that “Maastricht pushed the ‘permissive consensus’ regarding Europe beyond its limits”.¹³³

As EB surveys demonstrate, European support for European integration is influenced by the events that affect the lives of Europeans directly. International migration, economic crisis and unemployment might negatively influence the attitudes towards European integration.¹³⁴ The continued support for integration will depend on the EU’s ability to respond to the economic demands of its citizens.¹³⁵

Passing from the above-mentioned general economic and political considerations and dissatisfactions to a more ideal level, which forms the main subject of the thesis, the EB surveys offer a different picture of the European public opinion. In order to reach the main target of the thesis, the subjects have been limited some specific areas: ‘European identity versus National identity’, ‘Whether a European cultural identity shared by all Europeans’, ‘How attached do people feel to....’, and ‘Pride in Being European’.

And in this context, in order to understand the reflections of surveys, analysis period of surveys has been divided three main periods: ‘1980 - 1991’, ‘1992 - 1998’, ‘1999 - 2002’.

¹³²Matthew Gabel, & Harvey D. Palmer. “Understanding Variation in Public Support for European Integration”, **European Journal of Political Research**, vol. 27, no. 1, 1995, p. 3.

¹³³Mark Franklin, Michael Marsh & Lauren McLaren. “Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht”, **Journal of Common Market Studies**, vol. 32, no. 4, 1994, pp. 458-9.

¹³⁴ Panebianco, p. 6.

¹³⁵ Gabel & Palmer, p. 13.

3.2 Opinion Polls: 1982-1991

**Table 1. “Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe?
Often, sometimes or never”**

	1982	1983	1987	1988	1989	1990
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Often	16	16	14	16	14	15
Sometimes	37	34	34	37	34	31
Never	43	46	49	44	48	51
No reply	4	4	3	3	3	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

In this period the main question is: “*Do you ever think of yourself as a citizen of Europe? Often, sometimes or never*” As it is seen in the table above, there is not significant change in the proportions particularly in the context of ‘often’ part.

Persons who answer this question changed their thoughts between ‘sometimes’ and ‘never’. If we take ‘never’ in the concept of national part, we see that the national identity was a few dominants (51%) in 1990. For the detailed information for the results of the years of this period see ‘Appendix I’.

3.3 Opinion Polls 1992-1998

This period is important since it is between the Maastricht Treaty and the emergence of the single currency: Euro. These years were passed with the integration process under the decisions of the Maastricht. In the context of this thesis, it is firstly examined the feeling European and national identity concepts.

3.3.1 European and National Identity

Since 1992, the Eurobarometer has been tracking the development of a shared 'European' identity among the citizens of the EU by regularly asking the following question:

“In the near future, do you see yourself as?”

National only
Nationality and European
European and nationality
European only

It is seen from the results of the EB 42, identification of the EU population with 'Europe' (in addition to their own nationality, or even instead of) appears to be increasing. More than six out of ten EU citizens (63%) would characterise themselves in the near future as either 'European only' or 'Nationality and European', or 'European and Nationality'.

This European feeling is highest in Luxembourg 76%, France 75%, Italy 71%, Germany 67%, Belgium 66% and the Netherlands 65%. Union-wide the number of people who describe themselves first at European, and only then with their nationality, has increased by 7% in Germany, by 5% in Belgium, and by 4% in France and Luxembourg over the last year.

Those who see themselves as 'Europeans only' represent 7% of the EU population (a 3% increase from a year ago). This growth came from

Luxembourg (+8%), Belgium and France (+6%) and from Germany and the Netherlands (both +5%).




Figure 1. European and National Identity - 1994¹³⁶

Analysis of the EB 46 survey shows that 51% of those interviewed feel to some extent 'European', an identical figure to that of two years ago. However, amongst the remainder a net drop is found in those expressing feeling 'European' to some degree, this is matched by a rise (6%) in the 'nationality' only score over the past year.

National trends remain constant, although at a lower level. Luxembourg continues to record the highest level of Europeaness, with seven in ten residents feeling to some degree European and only 26% feeling their nationality only.

¹³⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 42, December 1994, (Table 9.6), p. 66. (* for all the graphics; percentage 'don't know' not shown.)

This higher than usual European score is in part attributable to the very sizeable foreign population resident within the Grand Duchy, some 34%. The French, Italians, Spanish and Dutch all feel more European than overall EU average scores.

Those countries where feelings tend to be more ‘national’ have not changed over the past year. In Sweden 64% feel only their nationality, in Greece 61%, the United Kingdom 60%, Finland 59%, Denmark 57%, Austria 53% and Portugal 52%.¹³⁷




Figure 2. European and National Identity - 1996¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Ibid., (Tables 4.1 & 4.2).

¹³⁸ Standard Eurobarometer 46, October-November 1996, (Table.4.1), p. 40.

Demographic analysis shows that men are more in favour than women (54% to 48%), the young, 15-24 year olds 58% while the older (55+) age group record 40%. Level of education achieved likewise is a clear indicator: amongst those completing their education after the age of 20, 66% feel European compared with 36% for those having completed their education by the age of 16.¹³⁹

Political persuasion is also a strong indicator, those defining themselves to the left of the political spectrum are more European than those who consider themselves to the right: 58% compared to 38%. Other indicators such as media usage and 'feeling informed' reveal lower levels of usage and feeling 'ill-informed' correlate with greater feelings of 'nationality only' scores.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 41.




Figure 3. European and National Identity – 1997¹⁴⁰

After a year, EB 47 survey shows that the rank order among countries that has been established in previous surveys is largely the same, namely Luxembourg residents continue to be the most European of all. As we have observed in previous editions, the significant presence of non-Luxembourgers resident in the Grand Duchy undoubtedly contributes to this finding.

Italy, France, the Netherlands and Spain all lie above the EU average in feeling European, while ‘nationality only’ scores remain high in Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, each with 57% ‘nationality only’ scores. The one significant change is observed in Portugal where the ‘nationality only’ figure has increased by 16 points in the last eighteen months, from 42% in Autumn 1995 to 58% in the Spring of 1997.

¹⁴⁰ Standard Eurobarometer 47, February – June 1997, (Table 5.1), p. 56.

And EB 49 analysis shows that the rank order among countries that had been established in previous surveys has now changed slightly. Although Luxembourg residents are at 13% still by far the most likely to feel European only, the number of people who now feel Luxembourgish only has increased significantly (+8) so that Italians (67%) are now most likely to feel to some extent European. In Portugal (62%), the UK (60%) and Sweden (59%), people are still most likely to see themselves as their own nationality only.




Figure 4. European and National Identity – 1998/1¹⁴¹

The sense of feeling to some extent European has increased significantly in Belgium (+6), Denmark (+5), Spain (+4) and Italy (+3). Apart from

¹⁴¹ Standard Eurobarometer 49, April – May 1998, (Table. 2.8), p. 42.

Luxembourg, the sense of identifying with one's own nationality only has increased significantly in Portugal (+4), Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK (all + 3) since the spring of 1997.




Figure 5. European and National Identity – 1998/2¹⁴²

In the context of demographic analyses 54% of men and 50% of women feel to some extent European. People aged 55 and over (42%) stand out as significantly less likely to feel to some extent European than the other age

¹⁴² Standard Eurobarometer 50, October-November 1998, (Table 3.9), p. 59.

groups. An above average sense of feeling European is found among well-educated people (69%), students and managers (both 66%).¹⁴³

And also in the context of the last year of this period, overall it is found that 43% of respondents see themselves as ‘nationality only’, 43% as their own ‘nationality and European’, 7% as ‘European and nationality’ and a further 4 % as ‘European only’.

In the context of feeling ‘European only’ like the previous years we see Luxembourg at the top. However, at 15%, these people represent only a minority. In all other countries, 10% or less of the population feel European only. Nonetheless, there are 7 countries where people who feel to some extent European are in the majority. Apart from Luxembourg (73%), these countries are Italy (69%), France (65%), Spain (63%), the Netherlands (59%), Belgium (53%) and Germany (50%). In Greece, the population is equally split between people who feel to some extent European (50%) and people who feel only Greek (50%). In the other 7 countries, people who identify only with their own nationality are in the majority, although in Austria, Denmark, Ireland and Finland, this majority is very small. The only three countries where national identity is clearly the prevalent sentiment are the UK (62%), Sweden (60%) and, to a slightly lesser extent, Portugal (56%).

As to socio-demographic factors, it is first of all clearly a generational issue with people who came into adulthood prior to the 1950’s significantly less likely to feel to some extent European than people who grew up after the first European treaty was signed. At the moment, it also still appears to be an issue of age, meaning that as people become older they tend to identify more strongly with their own country. Education is another important factor, it is found that people who left school by the age of 15 or younger –of whom many belong to the older generation – are most likely to have a strong sense of national identity,

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 42.

while this is least likely among people who are still studying. On the economic activity scale, it is found that managers are most likely to feel European while retired people who look after the home are most likely to identify solely with their own nationality.¹⁴⁴

**Table 2. European and National Identity Trends
from 1992 to 1998 – EC 12 / EU 15¹⁴⁵**

	EB 37 Spring 1992	EB 40 Autumn 1993	EB 42 Autumn 1994	EB 46 Spring 1996	EB 47 Spring 1997	EB 49 Spring 1998	EB 50 Autumn 1998
Nationality only	38	40	33	46	45	44	43
Nationality & European	48	45	46	40	40	41	43
European & Nationality	7	7	10	6	6	6	7
European only	4	4	7	5	5	5	4

At the end of this period, with an optimistic view, it can be said that, although one can still not speak of the existence of a common European identity, the majority of EU citizens feels to some extent European. However, since this is an issue where opinions differ greatly between countries, generalisations can be deceiving and as the table above shows, the sense of sharing a common identity does not appear to have become more widespread over the years.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 59.

¹⁴⁵ Standard Eurobarometer 49, April – May 98, p. 41.

3.4 Opinion Polls 1999-2002

3.4.1 European and National Identity

In the light of the results of the EB 52 in 1999, it is seen that there are many EU citizens who say they feel European when asked how they see themselves in the near future. Although only 4 % of EU citizens view themselves as exclusively European; in 8 of the 15 member states the majority of people feel somewhat European.




Figure 6. European and National Identity – 1999¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 52, October – November 1999, (Table 1.7), p.10.

Like the results of the previous years, it is once again found that people in Luxembourg are most likely to feel European only since Luxembourg contains a high proportion of citizens from other EU countries. At 20 % these people represent a significant minority. In all other countries, less than 10% of the population feels European only. Apart from Luxembourg (72%), the 7 other countries where a majority of people feel to some extent European are Italy (71%), Spain (63%), France (59%), Belgium (57%), the Netherlands (55%), Austria (50%) and Germany (49%). In the other 7 countries, a majority of people identify only with their own nationality, although in Portugal (52%) and Ireland (53%) this majority is very small. In the UK (67%), Sweden, Finland (both 61%), Greece (60%) and, to a slightly lesser extent, Denmark (56%), national identity is clearly the prevalent sentiment.

Looking at time-trends, it is seen that this issue is very static and that the public generally does not become more likely to feel more European and less likely to identify with their own nation (or vice versa) from one measurement to the next unless a specific event occurs in between measurements which influences their views.¹⁴⁷ This is, for instance, the case in Greece where people are now significantly more likely to identify with their own nationality than they were in the autumn of 1998 (+10). A likely explanation for this increase is the Kosovo war, which sparked anti-EU sentiments among the Greek population.¹⁴⁸

In the 2000, EB 53 survey shows that in 9 of the 15 Member States, the majority of people say they feel European when asked how they see themselves in the near future, though most people do not regard themselves as exclusively European.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., (Table 1.7).




Figure 7. European and National Identity – 2000/1¹⁴⁹

As it was in the results of the last year EB survey, due to containing a high proportion of citizens from other EU countries, people of Luxembourg are most likely to feel European only. But there is a 10% significant decrease when compare to the last year result. In all other countries, less than 10% of the population share this feeling. When we include people who feel somewhat European, Italians is at the top of the list with 74%, followed by Spain (71%), France (69%) and Luxembourg (68%). The 5 other countries where people who feel (to some extent) European are in the majority are the Netherlands (61%), Belgium (58%), Portugal (53%), Denmark (52%) and Germany (51%). In the other 6 countries, people who identify only with their own nationality are in the

¹⁴⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 53, April – May 2000, (Table 6.3), p. 80.

majority, although in some of these countries this majority is very small. National identity is clearly the prevalent sentiment in the UK (64%) and Sweden (60%).¹⁵⁰

As it is mentioned, the time-trend analysis shows that the development of feeling European is very static so that there is usually very little movement from one measurement to the next. Exceptionally, in the results of this EB there are quite significant shifts. In France and Denmark, for instance, the proportion of people that only identifies with the nationality has dropped by 12 and 10 percentage points, respectively, whilst in Luxembourg there is a shift towards increased national identity. However, as usual, there is very little movement in the proportion of people that feels European only except in Luxembourg (-10).¹⁵¹

The demographic analysis shows that managers and people who left full-time education by the age of 20 or older are most likely to feel to some extent European (both 75%). Retired people (54%) and people who left school before the age of 15 (53%) are most likely to identify with their own nationality.¹⁵²

As to the results of the EB 54 survey in 2000, it shows that ‘feeling European’ is in the majority: 9 of the 15 member states, though most do not regard themselves as exclusively European.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., (Table 6.3a).

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 82.




Figure 8. European and National Identity – 2000/2¹⁵³

In this survey, it is again found that people in Luxembourg are most likely to feel European (13%), it is followed by people in Belgium (7%). In all other countries, 5% or less of the population shares this feeling. When we include people who feel somewhat European, Spain tops the list at 76%, followed by Italy (75%) and Luxembourg (74%). The 6 other countries where people who feel (to some extent) European are in the majority are France (67%), Germany (60%), the Netherlands (58%), Belgium (55%), Denmark (50%) and Ireland (49%).

¹⁵³ Standard Eurobarometer 54, November – December 2000, (Table 2.2), p. 13.

In the other 6 countries, people who identify only with their own nationality are in the majority, although in some of these countries this majority is very small. However, in the UK (62%), national identity is clearly the prevailing sentiment.¹⁵⁴

Although the proportion of people who identify solely with Europe has remained low over time, recent measurements show that people are becoming less likely to identify solely with their own nationality. Consequently, we find that in a number of countries people are more and more likely to have a shared sense of identity with their own nationality on the one hand and with Europe on the other hand. In Luxembourg and Ireland, for instance, the proportion of people that only identifies with their nationality has dropped by 12 and 10 percentage points, respectively since spring 2000. France (+5), Denmark and Portugal (both +3) are the only countries where the proportion of people who identify solely with their own nationality has increased.

The demographic analysis show that people who are still studying (74%) and those who left full-time education by the age of 20 or older (71%) and managers (69%) are most likely to feel to some extent European. Retired people (50%) and people who left school before the age of 15 (49%) are most likely to identify with their own nationality.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 13.

According to the results of the EB 56 in 2001, 53% of EU citizens feel to some extent European, compared with 44% who only identify with their own nationality. In 9 of the 15 Member States, the European sentiment outweighs the exclusive identification with one's nationality.




Figure 9. European and National Identity – 2001¹⁵⁶

The proportion of people who don't identify with their own nationality and who feel European only is highest in Luxembourg (16%), which has the highest proportion of citizens from other EU countries. A further 59% feel European as well as Luxembourgish. In the other Member States, the proportion

¹⁵⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 56, October- November 2001, (Table 2.1). p. 14.

of people who feel European to some extent ranges from 28% in the UK to 66% in Italy.

Despite the widespread sense of being European, it is found that in many member States there are now more people who identify only with their own nationality than in Autumn 2000. In Spain, an 18 percentage point increase has been recorded in this respect, followed by a 9 percentage point increase in the UK and Ireland, an 8 percentage point rise in Greece and Italy and a 7 percentage point increase in Luxembourg. Denmark (-8), Austria (-5) and Sweden (-4) are the only countries where the proportion of people who identify solely with their own nationality has gone down since Autumn 2000.¹⁵⁷

In the context of the demographic analysis, it is seen that who left full-time education at the age of 20 or older, those who are still studying (69% each) and managers (68%) are most likely to feel to some extent European. Retired people (54%) and people look after the home (53%) are most likely to identify with their own nationality.¹⁵⁸

As to the EB 57 of spring 2002, 59 % percent of the people surveyed feel to some extent European: 4% feel European only, 7% see themselves in the first place as European and in the second place as citizens of their own country and 48% see themselves as citizens of their own country in the first place and European in the second place. In 12 of the 15 Member States the European sentiment outweighs the exclusive identity with one's own nationality. In autumn 2001, this was the case in 9 of the 15 Member States and on average 53% of EU citizens felt to some extent European.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 14.




Figure 10. European and National Identity – 2002/1¹⁵⁹

The proportion of people who feel to some extent European is most widespread in Italy (78%), followed by Luxembourg (70%), where people are most likely to feel European only (14%). In the other Member States, the proportion of people who feel to some extent European ranges from 36% in the UK to 68% in Spain.

The country results indicate that in comparison to autumn 2001, people in many countries are now much more likely to feel to some extent European. The attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001 increased people's trust in all forms of government, including the European Union. With life returning to normal, this need is less strong.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 57, March – May 2002, (Table 4.5), p. 60.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 60.

The largest increases in the proportion of the population that feels to some extent European have been recorded in Italy (+12), Greece (+11), followed by Spain (+9), the UK (+8), Portugal and Ireland (+7 each). Luxembourg and Sweden are the only countries where people are now significantly more likely to identify with their own nationality (+4) than they were in autumn 2001.

The demographic analyses show that more than 7 in 10 respondents who are still studying, who left full-time education by the age of 20 or older (73% each) and who are managers (71%) feel to some extent European. Respondents who completed their full-time education before reaching age 16 (51%) and retired respondents (50%) are most likely to identify with their own nationality.¹⁶¹

As a result of this section, according to the EB 58 of Autumn 2002, 59 % of the citizens interviewed feel European to some extent: 3 % feel European only, 7 % feel first European then citizens of their own country and 49 % feel first citizens of their own country and then EU citizens. The results are almost identical to those of Spring 2002 (which were respectively 4%, 7% and 48%). In eleven of the fifteen Member States, the feeling of being European goes beyond the exclusive identification of nationality. In the Spring of 2002, this was the case in twelve of the fifteen Member States.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 60.




Figure 11. European and National Identity – 2002/2¹⁶²

The proportion of people feeling European to some extent is greatest in Luxembourg (80%), followed by Italy (76%). It is also in Luxembourg that citizens are the most likely to feel European only (14%). In the other Member States the proportion of people feeling European to some extent ranges from 33% in the United Kingdom to 66% in France.

The main increases in the proportion of people feeling European to one degree or another were recorded in Luxembourg (+10), in Ireland (+7), followed by Austria (+6) and Sweden (+5). In contrast a decrease is noticed in Greece (-4) as well as in Belgium and the United Kingdom (-3 each).

¹⁶² Standard Eurobarometer 58, October - November 2002, (Table 1.7), p. 28.

The demographic analyses show that more than 7 respondents in 10 who left full-time education at age 20 or older (74%), who are still studying (72%), who are self-employed (70%) or who are managers (75%) feel European to some extent. Respondents who left full-time education before the age of 16, people looking after the home (51% each) as well as retired people (50%) are the most likely to identify only with their own nationality.¹⁶³

Table 3. European and National Identity Trends 1999 - 2002

	EB 52 Spring 1999	EB 53 Spring 2000	EB 54 Autumn 2000	EB 56 Autumn 2001	EB 57 Spring 2002	EB 58 Autumn 2002
Nationality only	48	40	40	44	38	38
Nationality & European	42	45	49	44	48	49
European & Nationality	6	11	7	6	7	7
European only	4	4	4	3	4	3

The ‘feeling European and national identity’ trends between 1999 and 2002 shows that, like the previous period, there have been more people who feel to some extent European than people who identify themselves as only having their own nationality. But the sense of a sharing common identity does not appear to have become more widespread until today. For this period, we see a relatively stable decrease in ‘nationality only’ part (from 48 to 38). But if we look the situation in 1992 and 2002 we do not see any significant difference in the opinions. Nevertheless in this period some changes have occurred due to some politic and economic developments in EU and in the world. But the graphic above shows that there has not been any significant change within these years.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 28.

3.4.2 A European Cultural Identity Shared by All Europeans

For the first time in 1998, EB 50 has measured “*whether people agree or disagree that there is a European cultural identity that is shared by all Europeans*”.




Figure 12. A European cultural identity shared by all Europeans-1998¹⁶⁴

From the findings of the graphic, it is seen that, People in Greece (50%) and Ireland (45%) are most likely to agree with the statement that there is a European cultural identity that is shared by all Europeans, followed by people in Austria (43%) and Germany (42%). People in Finland (60%), Spain (59%) and Netherlands (58%) are the most likely to disagree.

After one year, EB 52 also measures ‘whether people agree or disagree that there is a European cultural identity that is shared by all Europeans’.

¹⁶⁴ Standard Eurobarometer 50, (Table. 3.10), p. 60.




Figure 13. A European cultural identity shared by all Europeans-1999¹⁶⁵

According to the results of the graphics, people in Greece (49%) and Portugal (47%) are most likely to agree with the statement that there is a European cultural identity that is shared by all Europeans, followed by people in Germany (43%) and Italy (42%). People in Finland (65%), France and Denmark (both 59%) are the most likely to disagree.

Although it has been found lower levels of agreement among nations where there are more Eurosceptic people, feeling European and believing in the existence of a shared European cultural identity do not go hand in hand. For example in the context of Luxembourg, there appears a significant difference between these two results. In the light of this structure it can be said that in general, it may be a European cultural identity but it is not shared by all Europeans.

¹⁶⁵ Standard Eurobarometer 52, (Table. 1.7), p. 11.

3.4.3 People's Attachment to Their Locality, Their Region, Their Country and Europe

In 1999 with the EB 51 survey, “*the degree of attachment people have to their town or village, to their region, to their country and to Europe*” has been measured. The survey measures at the EU level, nearly nine in ten people feel attached to their country, their town or village and their region. More than half of EU citizens feels attached to Europe.




Figure 14. How attached do people feel to...?-1999¹⁶⁶

The country by country analyses show that 81% of the people in Greece feel very attached to their ‘town or village’, with a further 13% feeling fairly attached. Other countries where at least 9 in 10 people feel very or fairly attached are Spain (95%), Ireland, Portugal (both 93%), Austria (92%) and Italy (90%). At 71%, the Dutch are least likely to feel attached to their town or village.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 51, (Table. 1.5a), p. 8.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., (Table 1.5).

In Greece, 82% of the people feel very attached to their ‘region’ and a further 14% feel fairly attached. Other countries where more than 9 in 10 people feel very or fairly attached are Portugal, Spain (both 95%), Ireland (92%) and Austria (91%). At 72%, people in the Netherlands are least likely to feel attached to their region.¹⁶⁸

More than 8 in 10 people in Greece (85%) and Denmark (81%) feel very attached to their “country”. At 77%, Belgian respondents were least likely to say that they feel very or fairly attached to their country.




Figure 15. Feeling attached to Europe-1999¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., (Table 1.6).

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., (Table 1.7).

In terms of attachment levels to ‘Europe’, we find that people in Luxembourg (78%) are most likely to feel very or fairly attached, followed by people in Sweden and Denmark (both 71%). People in the UK are least likely to feel attached (37%), followed by people in Greece (41%) and the Netherlands (49%). More than half of the respondents living in the 9 remaining Member States say they feel very or fairly attached to Europe.¹⁷⁰




Figure 16. How attached do people feel to...?-2000¹⁷¹

According to the results of the EB 54 in 2000; at the EU level, nearly 9 in 10 people feel attached to their country and more than 8 in 10 feel attached to their town or village and their region. Attachment to Europe is also quite widespread, with nearly 6 in 10 EU citizens saying they feel very or fairly attached.

People’s attachment to their ‘town or village’ is still very strong in Europe at the end of the second millennium. The country by country analyses show that in 14 Member States more than 3 quarters of the population feels

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., (Table 1.5b, see also table 1.8).

¹⁷¹ Standard Eurobarometer 54, (Table. 2.1a), p. 11.

attached to their locality. Only in the Netherlands (66%) are the figures lower. Attachment levels are particularly high in Spain (95%), Portugal (93%), Greece (91%) and Ireland (90%). In Greece, 75% of respondents feel very attached to their town or village. 77% of people in Greece feel very attached to their “region” and a further 17% feel fairly attached. Other countries where more than 9 in 10 people feel very or fairly attached are Portugal, Spain (both 95%) and Ireland (91%). At 66%, people in the Netherlands are least likely to feel attached to their region.




Figure 17. Feeling attached to Europe-2000¹⁷²

Looking at the extent to which people feel attached to Europe, we find that 82% of people in Luxembourg feel very or fairly attached. Sweden (74%) comes second followed by Spain (72%). People in the UK (41%) and Greece

¹⁷² Ibid., (Table 2.1b).

(43%) are least likely to feel attached. In these two countries 55% of people feel not very or not at all attached to Europe. In the 10 remaining Member States more than half of the population feels very or fairly attached to Europe.¹⁷³

The table in page 60 shows that, in comparison to spring 1999 when the question was last asked, attachment levels to Europe have improved significantly in Luxembourg, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK (all +4), Sweden and France (both +3). Denmark and Ireland (both -5) are the only two countries where a significant negative shift has been recorded.¹⁷⁴

In respect to the results of the EB 58 in 2002, it shows that 45% of the population feels very or fairly attached to the European Union whereas 52% feels not very attached or not at all attached.




Figure 18. How attached do people feel to...?-2002¹⁷⁵

In comparison to the attachment indicators for other levels (country, town/village and region), the percentage of citizens attached to the European Union is relatively low. Nevertheless, 90% of these same citizens say they are

¹⁷³ Ibid., (Table. 2.1b).

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁷⁵ Standard Eurobarometer 58, (Table. 3.1a), p.26.

very or fairly attached to their country, 87% to their town or village and 86% to their region.

The chart below shows the very great disparities between the levels of attachment to the European Union in the different countries. Luxembourg and Finland show inverse levels of attachment (75% against 24% of people attached to the EU and 74% against 24% of people not very or not at all attached). Luxembourg, Italy, France and Ireland are the four countries where more than 50% of the population says it is very or fairly attached to the European Union (75 %, 62%, 53% and 50% respectively).




Figure 19. How attached do people feel to...?-2002¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., (Table 3.1b).

With respect to the demographic analysis, the results of the data indicates that men are more often attached to the European Union (49% against 42% of women) while 54% of women are not attached against 49% of men. The 55 and over age group is that which least often has a feeling of attachment and the 15 - 24 year old group is most frequently attached to the European Union (43% against 47%). As is often the case, education is an important explanatory variable. Levels of attachment to the European Union increase with the level of education: 39% for people having finished their education before the age of 15 against 54% for those who stayed in full-time education until the age of 20 or older. The analyses of the scale of economic activity show a difference of 22 percentage points in the levels of attachment between managers (56%) on the one hand, and the unemployed (34%) on the other.¹⁷⁷

Table 4. Feeling attached to Europe –‘% that feels very or fairly attached’

Country	Spring 1999	Autumn 2000	Autumn 2002
B	63	63	49
DK	71	66	46
D	58	58	46
GR	41	43	38
E	68	72	43
F	53	56	53
IRL	57	52	50
I	65	66	62
L	78	82	75
NL	49	53	29
A	62	64	49
P	61	61	49
FIN	64	62	24
S	71	74	34
UK	37	41	27
EU 15	56	58	45

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 27.

At first sight there is a significant difference between the first two survey and the third one. But we could not say that this significant decrease is a start of any trend. Because there is a one-word illusion in this results. In EB 58 of 2002 the phrase is 'feeling attached to the European Union'. But in the first two survey the phrase is 'feeling attached to the Europe'. It could be concluded from these structures that European Union is not the same thing with the concept of Europe in the thought of Europeans. It is clear that 'feeling attached to Europe' is more dominant than feeling attached to the European Union. This situation shows that the loyalty to Europe is more than loyalty to the European Union.

3.4.4 Pride in Being European

The EB 54 survey is the first to have measured the extent to which EU citizens feel proud to be Europeans. The wording of the question is as follows: “*Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud or not at all proud to be European?*”

The following graph shows that people who feel very or fairly proud are in the majority in all 15 Member States.




Figure 20. Pride in being European-2000¹⁷⁸

Levels of pride are most widespread in Spain (77%), Luxembourg (76% with one third of the population even feeling very proud), Italy (74%), Ireland (71%, with one quarter of the population feeling very proud), Austria (71%), Belgium and Sweden (both 70%). Levels of pride are lowest in the UK (45%) and Germany (51%). In the UK, 19% feels not at all proud. In Germany (11%), this figure is considerably lower.

In year 2001, as a second time, that the EB survey has measured the extent to which EU citizens feel proud to be European using the same question.

¹⁷⁸ Standard Eurobarometer 54, (Table. 2.5), p. 15.

It shows that 6 in 10 EU citizens feel very or fairly proud to be European, around 3 in 10 feel not very proud or not at all proud and 1 EU citizen in 10 lacks an opinion. The following graph shows that people who feel very proud or fairly proud are in the majority in all 15 Member States.




Figure 21. Pride in being European-2001¹⁷⁹

Pride in being European is most widespread in Italy (75%), Denmark (73%), Spain (72%), Sweden, Luxembourg (71% each) and Portugal (70%). The proportion of people that feels proud to be European is lowest in Germany and the UK (47% each). In the UK, 17% feel not at all proud to be European but in Germany (11%), this figure is considerably lower.

In comparison with Autumn 2000, people in Denmark are now more likely to feel proud to be European (+4). In the UK, Italy, Sweden, Portugal, Belgium and France no significant changes have been recorded whilst in the remaining countries people are now somewhat less likely to feel pride with the largest decreases recorded in Finland (-7), Greece, Luxembourg, Spain (-5 each) and Germany (-4).

¹⁷⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 56, (Table. 2.4a), p. 17.

And in 2002, EB 57 survey, as a third time, has measured the extent to which EU citizens feel proud to be European using the same question.

The following graph shows that people who feel very or fairly proud are in the majority in all Member States, except the UK where respondents are divided on the issue.




Figure 22. Pride in being European-2002¹⁸⁰

In the context of demographic and attitudinal analysis there is not any important differences among this three surveys. As an average of the three surveys, demographic analyses show no differences between men and women. Among the various age groups, it is found a significant difference between people aged below 25 and people aged 40 or older. Among the first group, 65% feel proud to be European compared to 58% among the latter group. Education is also an important determinant of people's pride: 69% of people who are still studying feel proud to be European, followed by 68% of people who stayed in full-time education until the age of 20 or older. Those who left school before they reached the age of 16 are at 56% the educational group least likely to feel pride in being European. Among the various occupational groups we find that

¹⁸⁰ Standard Eurobarometer 57, (Table. 4.7), p. 62.

other white-collar workers are most likely to feel pride (68%), followed by managers and self-employed people (65% each). Unemployed people (49%) are least likely to feel proud to be European.¹⁸¹

At the EU15 level the breakdown of responses is as follows:

Table 5. Pride in being European

	Autumn 00	Autumn 01	Spring 02
	%	%	%
Very proud	14	11	14
Fairly proud	48	49	48
Not very proud	19	19	17
Not at all proud	10	9	10
(Don't know)	10	12	11
Total	100	100	100

More than 6 in 10 respondents feel very or fairly proud to be European, slightly more than in autumn 2001 and the same as in autumn 2000. Just over a quarter feels not very or not at all proud and one EU citizen in ten lacks any opinion. Nonetheless, as to an overall analysis, it is seen that there is no any significant change during this short period, if we do not count the three-point decrease at 'very proud' section in Autumn 2001.

3.5 General Evaluation of the EB Surveys

As it is stressed above, the 'feeling European' survey indicates that in autumn 2002 the majority of the Europeans (59%) declared having a European identity.¹⁸² This majority is divided into three categories of identity: "national and European" (49%), "European and national" (7%), "only European" (3%).

¹⁸¹ Standard Eurobarometer 54, p. 15.

¹⁸² Standard Eurobarometer 58, (Table. 1.7.), p. 28.

The variables influencing the ‘feeling European’ are first of all age, sex and political ideas. In general young people, men and leftists are more pro-European than elderly people, women and rightists.

Although being aware that these data might be interpreted in negative terms, it would be stressed rather the importance of the coexistence of two identities, national and European. The ‘feeling European’ question is based on the assumption that one does not need to give up one’s national identification in order to adopt a European one. If citizens are asked to choose between having a European Identity and a national identity, they consider national ties stronger than the European ones. Feeling European does not mean to be ready ‘to die for the European Union’.¹⁸³

In this context, in the Maastricht Treaty also the relationship between national identity and European identity is defined according to a principle of respect and compatibility. As a matter of fact, Title I, art. F, states that: *The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democracy*. The EU does not aim then at substituting national and regional identities with a European one. As the results of the EBs data show, the multiple identity structure for the Europeans is more useful nevertheless European identity may be ‘primus inter pares’ among the national, regional and local identities in the middle term.

From the European integration process, it is seen an evolution towards a post-étatique entity of the EU comprise of different levels: local, regional, national, and supranational.¹⁸⁴ In this respect, Weaver clearly points out that

The complexity of the EU political system is strictly linked with the definition of European identity, as ‘the emerging complexity of various co-existing layers of identity forces us to rethink what

¹⁸³ Panebianco, p. 7.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

kinds of identity might be possible to function here. In a post-sovereign space like Europe, identity cannot be connected to the idea of primacy of the one 'real' identity.¹⁸⁵

As it is seen in the EB results, the emergence of a European identity does not imply the substitution of other identities. Identity cannot be thought in terms of zero-sum games. As they are used to adapting to different social roles in their life, Europeans should get used to different belongings/identities that live with each other. And all these different belongings / identities live with each other.¹⁸⁶

In addition, Smith clearly describes the relationship between national and European identity in terms of compatibility, he argues that national identity has become the cultural and political form, transcending other loyalties in scope and power. "Yet however dominant the nation and its national identification, human beings retain a multiplicity of allegiances in the contemporary world".¹⁸⁷

In Western Europe the intensity of nationalism is declining among the upcoming generations because a supranational consciousness is rising, by a progressive interaction at several levels: economic, military, social, cultural, and political.¹⁸⁸ The existence of the EU, and the perception of the EU, is then responsible for the decline of nationalism because "Western European countries having achieved their national integration a long time ago, find themselves today in a post-nationalistic phase".¹⁸⁹ And as the results of the EB data show that

¹⁸⁵ Ole Weaver. "European Security Identities", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, vol. 34, p. 103.

¹⁸⁶ Panebianco, p. 8.

¹⁸⁷ Anthony Smith. "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity", **International Affairs**, vol.1, 1992, p. 59.

¹⁸⁸ Quoted in Panebianco p. 9, (see also M. Dogan. The Decline of Nationalisms within Western Europe", **Comparative Politics**, vol. 26, no. 3, 1994, p. 294.)

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 281.

The decline in nationalism is typical in ‘mature’ Western European countries which have experienced before others the creation of liberal states where now sovereignty of the nation-states is slowly but progressively reduced by a kind of loose confederal sovereignty, vaguely called community.¹⁹⁰

As the supranational consciousness rises, the importance of the strengthening a more common European identity compatible with the contemporary national and regional identities, which could be a solid substructure for the European supranational consciousness appears necessary. In this respect it will be examined in the conclusion part as a framework of the arguments and thoughts of the thesis.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 301.

CONCLUSION

The long-term goal of the founders of the European project was not only to unite Europe's nation-states but also to unite the peoples of Europe. With the increasing politicizations of European integration, the problem of European identity has become essential. Unless the peoples of Europe feel some genuine attachment to the EU and to the objects of the European project, the possibilities for improving the effective supra-national state and a democratic Union will be constrained. In this context, the argument of Robert Schuman in 1964 is significant:

A true community requires at least some specific affinities. Countries do not combine when they do not feel among themselves something common, and what must above all be common is a minimum of confidence. There must also be a minimal identity of interests, without which one attains mere co-existence, not cooperation.¹⁹¹

It has been recognized that “something more exciting than coal and steel was needed to instill Europe with a sense of mystique”¹⁹² from the beginning of the European integration process. In this respect, Jacques Delors has famously noted that “Europeans will not fall in love with a Common Market”.¹⁹³

Especially since the European integration increasingly touches directly on the boundaries of traditional state sovereignty, there is a growing need to

¹⁹¹ Quoted in Peter Van Ham. “Identity Beyond the State: The Case of the European Union”, **Copenhagen Peace Research Institute**, Working Paper 15, June 2000, p. 11. (see also R. Schuman. **Pour l'Europe**, Paris, Nagel, 1964, pp. 195-6.)

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁹³ Quoted in Van Ham, p. 11.

strengthen the public's identification with Europe. The notion of the European identity must improve through the cultural politics.

In this respect, the process of creating a sense of European identity will likely remain an elite-driven project in the short term. Therefore EU institution should be a tool for helping the Europeans to become aware of their belonging to a common entity. At the same time this elite structure should help the development of a feeling of belonging to a common destiny to a common identity but not excluding the current identity structures of the Old Continent. As Wallace stressed that

Political integration is a matter of identity and loyalty: of the emergence of a political community based upon shared values and mutual trust out of previously separate and mistrustful groups [...] There is no simple or inexorable transition from contact through trade to the emergence of political community.¹⁹⁴

There is a need and necessity to develop and spread the idea of Europe and it is confirmed by EB 58 survey of 2002 on the attachment to different political levels: town, village, region, country, EU. There is a big difference between the degree of attachment to towns or villages (87%), regions (86%) and countries (90%), and rates referring to EU, which are much lower (45%).¹⁹⁵

As it is seen from the results of the EB surveys the attachment to the European identity generally low. This may be due to the fact that Europeanisation process is just at its beginning stages. But it can be said that it is caused by the large-scale identity character of the European identity. Since the large-scale identity structure of the European identity, there is and will be some disadvantages for a solid supra-national identity structure.

¹⁹⁴ Quoted in Panebianco, p. 8. (see also W. Wallace. **The Transformation of Western Europe**, Pinter RIIA, London, 1990. p 55.)

¹⁹⁵ Standard Eurobarometer 58, (Table. 3.1a), p. 26.

In general, large-scale identities have a spirit (Budusim) or have a God and a Prophet (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) or only a Prophet (Zarathustra) or have a universal socio-economic ideology with a worldly prophet (Marxism and its derivations, Leninism and Maoism) and beyond those the imperialistic culture of the Great Britainism and nonetheless Roman and Ottoman identity can be an example for the secular large-scale identity as well. And as an important example for today, we have the American identity that deriving from the discontents in the Old Continent with an economic and a survival rationality and with the concept of the cultural domination of the one conqueror (Protestant religion) as a new secular identity peculiar to the new land (world). Consequently the large-scale structure of the American identity has gradually transformed into a national identity thanks to particularly the war inside (Civil War) and the wars outside (the First and Second World Wars, Vietnam, etc.)

It may be given more examples in history and the other parts of the world now. But in defining and understanding European identity from the large-scale perspective, above-mentioned examples would be enough.

In the light of these examples, the large-scale character of the European identity is seen as the basic fragility. There has not been a shared political culture like the Americans. As it is repeatedly stressed the concept of diversity have determined the destiny of the continent. In addition, this large-scale character has hindered to transform the elite structure of the European identity to the masses. European identity therefore has no concrete impact on the EU citizens. Europe is still a 'promise'.

This means that for the time being, the question of 'identity' remains critical to the further development of the EU. Does the EU need its own culture and sense of belonging to assure the support for its policies? Will the EU be able to transcend the boundary-consciousness of the nation-state structure and adopt a more fluid notion of the inside/outside than the nation-state has adopted in the past? And will the EU become the new 'homeland' for European citizens or just

a ‘homeland of homelands’? If the ultimate problem of the role of European identity can not be answered all these questions will remain to be answered.¹⁹⁶

As the nineteenth century Italian nationalist Massimo d’Azeglio declared after the Reunification of Italy (Risorgimento): “We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians”.¹⁹⁷ At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the same question seems to emerge again. So European policy-makers understand that there is very little for them to make a solid supra-national entity via a common European soul. In order to gather momentum without falling into the hegemonic trappings of modern nation-building, the dialectic process of remembering the ‘European’ and forgetting the ‘national’ is needed first and foremost.¹⁹⁸

For the sake of European democracy and political affectivity, a more structured and cohesive EU will be required. “Dealing with European identity implies referring on the one hand to a convergence of cultural values among European citizens, on the other to a capacity of tolerating cultural diversity. But at the same time, there is an urgent need to build a European consciousness”¹⁹⁹, which can protect and feed the basic elements of the European culture.

But, as it is emphasised above, the analysis of the EB data indicate that the general efforts for developing the European identity and the establishment of the European citizenship apparently have not yet stimulated a stronger European identity. Defending and protecting diversities seem to be the only way for the EU to face the challenges of the global world economy and the moves towards

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁹⁷ Eric J. Hobsbawm. **Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality**, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p.44.

¹⁹⁸ Van Ham, p.15.

¹⁹⁹ Panebianco, p. 9.

fragmentation and regionalisation that might risk becoming separation and secession.²⁰⁰

In this respect, Meehan perfectly describes the present situation and indicates the path for the future:

A new kind of citizenship is emerging that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but which is multiple in enabling the various identities that we all possess to be expressed, and our rights to be exercised, through an increasingly complex configuration of common institutions, states, national and transnational interest groups and voluntary associations, local or provincial authorities, regions and alliances of regions... A multiple identity allows different identities to be expressed and different rights and duties to be exercised.²⁰¹

Finally, in the context of the stable identity substructure for the EU, it can be said that, Maastricht Treaty has played a crucial role as a main joint step, with its decisions and foresights, for the future Pax-European on the continent under the Western European values. In this context, the European identity is the most significant part of the establishing of New Great Europe. But being European, as it is seen in the EB surveys above, has not yet transformed into the concrete identity for the nations of Europe. As it is mentioned continuously in the thesis, the Europeanness idea still dominant in the elites of Europe. The historical process of the identity of Europe as a superior culture in the thought of the elites has not reached to the wide people masses. But EU, with the start of the integration process of Europe, has played a significant role via the top-down strategies of the elites.

Although it appears a process that consolidates an elite identity through the top-down strategies, there are serious efforts to create more popular identity.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁰¹ Quoted in Panebianco p. 10. (see also E. Meehan. "Citizenship and the European Community", **The Political Quarterly**, vol. 64, no. 2, 1993, p. 185.)

Besides these efforts, a multiple identity structure including the European identity as a ‘primus inter pares’ can provide a stable structure and success to the European unification project. But European history has shown that, “Europe as an entity can only be completed in agreement with and not against the will of the nation-states and what they consider to be their legitimate interests”.²⁰² As it is stressed above repeatedly, as being Europeanness, which compatible with the sub identities, spreads to the masses, this identity would be reified and the success of the future project of the EU would be reached.

²⁰² Karlsson, p. 66.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Opinion Polls: 1982-1991

(1982) ²⁰³	<i>B</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>IRL</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>GR</i>	<i>EC</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Often</i>	11	10	25	19	9	16	33	5	7	27	16
<i>Sometimes</i>	30	30	50	42	23	39	46	35	20	32	37
<i>Never</i>	53	55	18	37	64	41	15	57	72	35	43
<i>No reply</i>	6	5	7	2	4	4	6	3	1	6	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

(1983) ²⁰⁴	<i>B</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>IRL</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>GR</i>	<i>EC</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Often</i>	11	13	15	21	17	18	23	17	8	25	16
<i>Sometimes</i>	33	29	49	37	22	36	47	32	16	27	34
<i>Never</i>	48	46	26	40	68	45	27	47	74	44	46
<i>No reply</i>	8	12	10	2	1	3	4	2	4	4	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

²⁰³ Standard Eurobarometer 17, June 1982, (Table 16), p. 42.

²⁰⁴ Standard Eurobarometer 19 June 1983, (Table 24), p. 77.

(1987) ²⁰⁵	<i>B</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>GR</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>IRL</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>EC</i> <i>12</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Often</i>	10	10	11	20	21	17	7	16	19	8	12	10	14
<i>Sometimes</i>	36	31	41	33	38	36	31	34	41	25	24	24	34
<i>Never</i>	50	56	42	44	36	47	60	47	32	63	66	66	49
<i>No reply</i>	4	3	6	2	5	1	2	3	8	5	1	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

(1988) ²⁰⁶	<i>B</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>GR</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>IRL</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>EC</i> <i>12</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Often</i>	14	11	14	19	17	24	13	19	18	9	9	9	16
<i>Sometimes</i>	36	41	43	33	36	39	28	41	36	28	45	27	37
<i>Never</i>	47	47	36	41	42	36	58	39	42	59	39	62	44
<i>No reply</i>	4	2	7	7	5	1	2	3	8	5	7	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

²⁰⁵ Standard Eurobarometer 30, December 1988, (Table 2), p. 7.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 7

(1989) ²⁰⁷	<i>B</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>GR</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>IRL</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>EC</i> <i>12</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Often</i>	15	9	12	22	19	21	9	14	15	9	15	8	14
<i>Sometimes</i>	36	34	37	35	41	38	29	39	44	27	43	20	34
<i>Never</i>	44	54	44	38	36	40	59	46	39	61	34	69	48
<i>No reply</i>	5	3	6	5	4	1	3	2	3	3	7	2	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

(1990) ²⁰⁸	<i>B</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>GR</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>IRL</i>	<i>I</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>NL</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>UK</i>	<i>EC</i> <i>12</i>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
<i>Often</i>	14	16	12	28	16	19	11	20	17	8	7	12	15
<i>Sometimes</i>	38	32	27	28	36	38	21	37	35	29	40	16	31
<i>Never</i>	46	50	53	41	47	41	67	43	42	60	45	71	51
<i>No reply</i>	2	2	7	3	1	2	2	1	6	3	7	1	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

²⁰⁷ Standard Eurobarometer 33, December 1990, (Table 2), p. 2.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

APPENDIX B

EU 15 Countries

B	Belgium
DK	Denmark
D	Germany
GR	Greece
E	Spain
F	France
IRL	Ireland
I	Italy
L	Luxembourg
NL	The Netherlands
A	Austria
P	Portugal
F	Finland
S	Sweden
UK	United Kingdom

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