

**A STUDY ON THE CONNECTION
BETWEEN JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH**

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ABSTRACT

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In this thesis, I analyze the classical tripartite definition of knowledge. According to this definition there are three conditions for a knowledge claim to arise, namely, belief, truth and justification conditions. The main problem with this definition is even if these three conditions are satisfied one may not know a proposition p because of the fact that the justification of the proposition p may not be relevant in showing that p is true. Therefore, my primary purpose is to establish a strong conceptual connection between justification and truth conditions. To realize this, first, I defend a three-way interrelation between these three conditions. Second, I inquire as to which kind of justification should lead us to which kind of truth. To answer to this question, I postulate three kinds of realities, namely, Subjective Reality, Inter-Subjective Reality, and Allegedly Pure Reality. Furthermore, I re-define the justification condition in such way that there is a kind of “whole justification” and it requires both internal and external justification. According to this conception of reality and re-definition of

justification there already exists a strong conceptual connection between internal justification and Subjective Reality which is completely subject-relative. And I defend the existence of such a connection also between the whole justification and Inter-Subjective Reality. Finally, I argue that no conception of justification can lead us to an Allegedly Pure Reality that the hardest version of skepticism claims to exist.

Keywords: Justification, Kinds of Justification, Truth, Truth Connection, Reality, Kinds of Reality, Knowledge, Conditions of Knowledge

ÖZ

GEREKÇELENĐİRME VE DOĞRULUK ARASINDAKİ İLİŐKİ ÜZERİNE BİR ÇALIŐMA

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Bu tezde bilginin klasik üç koşullu tanımını inceliyorum. Bu tanıma göre bir bilgi iddiasının ortaya çıkabilmesi için üç koşul gereklidir; özetle bunlar inanç, doğruluk ve gerekçelendirme koşullarıdır. Bu tanımla ilgili temel problem ise bu üç koşul sağlandığı halde bir öznenin p gibi bir önermeyi hala bilmeyebileceğidir. Çünkü, p önermesi için öne sürülen gerekçelendirme gerçekte p 'nin doğru olduğu yönünde bir gerekçe olmayabilir. Bu nedenle bu tezdeki temel amacım gerekçelendirme ve doğruluk koşulları arasında güçlü kavramsal bir ilişki kurmak. Bu amacı gerçekleştirmek için ilk olarak sözkonusu üç koşul arasında üç yönlü karşılıklı bir ilişki olduğunu savunuyorum. Ardından ne tür bir gerekçelendirmenin bizi ne tür bir doğruluğa götürmesi gerektiğini araştırıyorum. Bu soruya cevap vermek için de üç tür gerçekliğin, yani Özel Gerçeklik, Özneler-Arası Gerçeklik ve Sözde Saf Gerçeklik'in var olduğunu ortaya atıyorum. Ayrıca gerekçelendirme koşulunu, bir tür “tam gerekçelendirme” vardır ve bu hem içsel hem de dışsal gerekçelendirmeyi

gerekli kılar şeklinde yeniden tanımlıyorum. Bu gerçeklik anlayışına ve gerekçelendirme koşulunun yeniden tanımına göre içsel gerekçelendirme ile tamamıyla özne-bağımlı olan Özne Gerçeklik arasında zaten güçlü kavramsal bir ilişki vardır; ve ben böyle bir ilişkinin tam gerekçelendirme ile Özneler-Arası Gerçeklik arasında da var olduğunu savunuyorum. Son olarak hiç bir gerekçelendirme anlayışının bizi, şüpheciliğin en katı türünün var olduğunu iddia ettiği Sözde Saf Gerçeklik'e götüremeyeceğini savunuyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Gerekçelendirme, Gerekçelendirme Türleri, Doğruluk, Doğruluk Bağlantısı, Gerçeklik, Gerçeklik Türleri, Bilgi, Bilginin Şartları

To My Parents

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEFS TOWARD ACCIDENTAL TRUTH AND SKEPTICISM

1.1 True Beliefs

Let us suppose you are reading a philosophy book on your desk. Suddenly you desire to get some fruit juice. However, you are not sure whether or not there is some in the icebox in the kitchen, and you want to find this out. The first way you think you can find this out without any trouble is to call out your mother by shouting and asking “Is there any juice in the icebox mummy?” Suppose you got the answer from your mother “Yes, there is.” Now, you produce an epistemological question: For the present moment, can I correctly say or use the sentence, “I know that there is some juice in the icebox?”

In such a case, your intuitions answer to the above question probably with a “yes”. But you may interrogate yourself and go on asking the questions: How do I know that there is some juice in the icebox? Do I trust my mother’s affirmative sentence? Keep this how-question in your mind and let us focus on other challenging questions such as: Does your saying that You know there is some juice in the icebox also mean that you believe there is some juice in the icebox? If you think you cannot say that “I know there is, but I do not believe there is,” then the answer to the last question must be “yes.” Because if you

cannot conceive of knowing such and such is the case, and yet not believing such and such is the case at the same time, it follows from this that knowing such and such is the case entails believing such and such is the case.

Consider another case in which in fact there is not any juice in the icebox. Now can you still reasonably utter the sentence “I know there is some juice”? You will undoubtedly admit you cannot. It is clearly nonsense that you know such and such is the case and such and such is the case is false.

Hence, when you utter a sentence like “I know such and such is the case”, you also mean that you believe such and such is the case and that such and such is the case is true. If you claim you have the knowledge of a fact, you must both believe in that fact and that factual claim must be true. So, knowledge implies true belief. But not all true beliefs are knowledge.

1.2 Propositional Knowledge

We use the word “know” in many varieties. We can know how to perform tasks; we can know people, places and things; and we can know facts. In particular, you can know how to draw a picture; you can know the prime minister of Turkey; and you can know that walking with bare feet in a rainy weather on the street is unhealthy. In the first case, you possess a skill. In the second, you are acquainted with a famous person, and in the third, you know a fact. The interrelationships between these types of knowledge are not an issue on which epistemologists have agreed. They have tried to reduce one form of the above kinds of knowledge to another, but they have not reached an agreement. For example, some argue for that knowing a person should be construed as

knowing certain facts about that person and possessing the skill of being able to distinguish that person from other objects. On the other hand, some others claim that knowing facts depends upon being acquainted with particular objects.¹

Nonetheless, the central concern of epistemologists has been the knowledge of facts, i.e. the so-called propositional knowledge, not the knowledge by acquaintance or the possession of skills. The reason lies in the fact that the content of propositional knowledge explicitly contains truth bearers as opposed to alternative usages of the word “know”; that is, it is capable of being true or false.² By the way, knowledge is one of the most central concepts in philosophy. And epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned with the concept of knowledge, is one of the core areas of philosophy. Philosophers are often concerned with the concept of knowledge in terms of its nature, sources and limits. And in this thesis, my main concern will be its nature. In addition, I will specifically try to analyze the conditions that are required in order for a truth bearer to be known by a subject S, and more specifically attempt to connect one of those conditions, called justification, to the condition of being true for a truth bearer. That is almost the most notorious problem for epistemologists and it will be explained in the following two sections.

¹ R. Fumerton, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Description”, *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge (1998).

² I will often use the terms ‘proposition’ and ‘truth bearers’ in this thesis. The meaning of ‘truth bearer’ can be construed as the linguistic entities such as sentences and statements that can be true or false. On the other hand, the meaning of the term ‘proposition’ is not an issue that is agreed on by philosophers. There has been much debate on it, but it is not within the scope of this thesis, and I will use the term to mean what a truth bearer states, that is, it is independent of all linguistic, more generally representational, entities, and represents a structure or state of affairs in the conceptual framework.

1.3 Epistemic Justification³

Let us return to the question we left unanswered in the first section. How do you know that there is some fruit juice in the icebox? By relying on your mother's reply? Suppose you have not asked this question to your mother. Now, you will agree that the knowledge of juice's being in the icebox did not arise in you; so you cannot say "I know there is some juice in the icebox". Before asking your mother, you may only have a guess. That is to say, you may say "I guess there is some juice in the icebox". And let us suppose the propositional content of this conjecture is true. In this case you are lucky and have made a true guess, but do not have any knowledge. On the other hand, when your mother assents that the icebox contains some juice then you are "justified" in believing that there is some juice in the icebox. So, you have knowledge. By this example, we can note that in addition to two conditions, which are mentioned in the first section as the subject's believing and the truth bearer's being true, for a subject S to know a proposition *p*, justification (the process of giving reasons) is necessary too. In other words, it is not sufficient for a subject S to believe that *p*, and *p* be true in order for knowledge to come into being; S should also have adequate evidence for (be justified in) believing that *p*. Before explaining the justification condition in a more detailed way, I should refer to the origin of the classical tripartite definition of propositional knowledge raised and explicated by Plato.⁴

³ There can be many kinds of justification. Decisions, actions, policies, procedures, punishments, laws, rules etc. can be justified or unjustified. Roughly, epistemic justification is concerned with justification of beliefs, and thereof with reasons for believing. Hereafter I refer to it as justification.

⁴ Plato, *Theaetetus*, 201D-202D. See the English translation by H. N. Fowler, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 223-225.

According to this classical definition, knowledge must satisfy three conditions.

We can express this by the following symbolization:

Subject S knows a proposition p , (KSp) if and only if (iff);

1) Subject S believes that p (BSp),

2) p is true (p),

3) Subject S must be justified in believing that p (JSp).

Now, the crucial question about this definition is whether or not these conditions are necessary or sufficient, or both. According to Plato justified true belief is necessary and sufficient⁵ in order for a knowledge claim to count as knowledge. That is:

KSp iff $BSp \ \& \ p \ \& \ JSp$.

However, much debate has been done on what the above formulation says, especially after E. Gettier's counter-examples intended to show that not all justified true beliefs are knowledge.⁶ To give an example, consider such a case in our initial example in which your mother misinterprets you, and she understands "jelly" instead of juice. Unfortunately, her reply is based on this misinterpretation and clearly does not indicate that there is some juice in the icebox. But you again are justified in believing that there is some juice in the icebox. Suppose further that, by chance, there is some juice in the icebox, or your sister has placed some in the icebox five minutes ago. Now, the three conditions

⁵ In fact, Plato suggests that a mere true opinion (belief) without a rational explanation (justification) cannot be knowledge. And, he distinguishes between knowable and unknowable by looking at whether or not they are true opinion accompanied by reason. (*Ibid.*)

⁶ E. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", *Analysis* 23 (1963), pp. 121-123.

of propositional knowledge are realized, but our intuitions force us to deny that you know there is some juice in the icebox.

In fact, Gettier's counter-examples indicated that our true beliefs may not always be such that we reach them by using an "ideal" justification that salvages us from making just a lucky guess or being exposed to accidental truth. Then it is time to further clarify this notorious problem.

1.4 Justification and Accidental Truth

Based on the foregoing discussions, we can easily conclude that propositional knowledge is a species of belief; but not all beliefs are knowledge. The first thing to note is that in order for a belief to count as knowledge it must be true. However, we have seen that it is clearly not enough even if you have somehow a justification.

In the first place, true beliefs can be based on faulty reasoning. For instance, suppose there are four universities in your city. And your city has a mayor. Suppose further that there are also four universities in your neighbor city. You infer from this that the neighbor city has a mayor too. Your belief that the neighbor city has a mayor is true. But your true belief cannot count as knowledge because your justification is surely based on a faulty reasoning, and it is not the kind that leads you to truth.

Secondly, our true beliefs can be based on false beliefs. To give an example, using the same structure of an example employed by Bertrand Russell, suppose you believe that the name of the Winner of the Eurovision Song Contest in 2003 begins with 'S'. Since Sertap Erener is the winner in that year, it is a true

belief. But suppose further that you have not heard her name before, and your belief is based on the belief that the winner is Sezen Aksu. Now, your true belief that the name of the winner in 2003 starts with 'S' cannot count as knowledge because this belief is based on a false belief, as in the case of Gettier's counter-examples.

Finally, there is the possibility that your true beliefs may be based completely upon your other true beliefs and your process of justification may not contain any faulty reasoning. But even in such a case, your true belief may not be labeled as knowledge. Let us use the example given by P.D. Klein.⁷ In this example you believe truly that your neighbors are at home. Your belief is based on a true belief that you see the lights on, and you are performing a good reasoning such that in the past, whenever you saw the lights on, your neighbors were always at home. But suppose further that this time a guest turned on the lights and that your neighbors had just come in the house, and when they enter the house the lights were already on. In this case, you do not know that your neighbors are at home. Your justification does not contain any faulty reasoning nor does it depend on a false proposition. But you definitely fail to know. That is, you cannot correctly utter the sentence that "I know that my neighbors are at home".

In all these examples, the common point is that the justification employed by the relevant subject is not truth conducive. In other words, the

⁷ D.K. Peter, "Knowledge, Concept of", *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Version 1.0, London and New York: Routledge (1998).

relevant proposition is accidentally true.⁸ So, a central problem arises here in our conception of the alleged necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. But before explicitly expressing it, we should also direct our attention to skeptical approaches.

1.5 Justification and Skepticism

To give an illustrative explanation for the account of skepticism, suppose, in our initial example, there is no family member in your house. You want to be certain that there is some juice in your kitchen. To realize this you go to the kitchen, open the door of the icebox, and see that there is some juice in the icebox. Now, you are more confident in believing the presence of juice in the icebox—(case 1). But unexpectedly a skeptical thought comes to your mind, and you distrust your perception; you think that your act of seeing the juice in the icebox might have resulted from a breakdown of your perception, or you might be hallucinating. To check whether your perception is accurate or not, the only way you can follow is to make other people confirm your perception. At this very moment, suppose your mother came home. And to make sure that your perception is not mistaken, you ask your mother whether or not there is any juice in the icebox. Your mother assents by saying “I see the juice, too.” You may be much more confident in your belief now. And you may increase your confidence in your belief by asking the same question to your sister, your father, your neighbors and so on. The more persons (epistemic agents) conform your belief,

⁸ A knowledge claim cannot be accidentally true. Almost all philosophers accept this idea. See E.S. Haldane, and G.R.T Ross, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1976, paragraph 11-13; J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1689, Ed. A.C. Fraser, Mineola, New York, NY: Dover Publications, 1959, pp. 413-427; H.G. Apostle, *Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, Grinnel, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press, 1981.

the more confidence you have in your belief—(case 2). However, suppose you are an incorrigible skeptic and start to think what if all these persons and you are hallucinating together? Or, what if we are all wired to a computer that directly stimulates our brains and is controlled by a malevolent scientist.⁹ And it is the computer that gives us the sensations of there being some juice in the icebox while in “fact” there is no fruit juice or icebox or even an external world? Or, what if there is an evil demon that deceives us completely not only in our perception but also in our memory and reasoning?—(case 3).

If this is the picture, and the main epistemic purpose of justification is attaining truth and avoiding error, what reality (implied by case 1, 2 and 3), should we take as our truth criterion? Can we have any kind of justification that takes us to the “real” truth represented by case 3, in which we are not deceived? I will answer these questions in the following chapters by returning the three cases and realities implied by them.

Now, let me express the central problem, as it is related to accidental truth and skepticism, by raising three questions, which will be focused in this thesis:

If the classical description of justification is not sufficient for a knowledge claim to arise,

1) What is missing in our true beliefs for them to count as knowledge?

2) What changes must be made in the definition of justification in order for it to convert true beliefs into knowledge? And,

⁹ J.L. Pollock, *Knowledge and Justification*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 3. Pollock starts his book with such a hypothesis.

3) Is there any possibility for justification to guarantee truth? Or, more simply, is there any conceptual connection between justification and truth?

In the meantime, I should point out that there is another word ‘warrant’ being often used by epistemologists recently. Though presently it is hard to determine what its exact definition is, it roughly means the property that, if added to true beliefs, converts them into knowledge. To illustrate, this word is mostly used, as in the case of reliabilist theory of knowledge, in the form, “A belief is warranted just in case it is produced by a reliable cognitive process (or just in case the process resulting in the belief produces true beliefs sufficiently often).” As it is easily seen, ‘being warranted’, in such definitions, means nothing more than “being known”.

Hence, I will prefer not to use this unclear word for two reasons. First, it seems to have been put forward because of the misinterpretation of justification based on its alleged inadequacy. Second, using this word does not reveal the exact content of the concept of knowledge. Besides, neither does it remove the ambiguity from the concept of knowledge, nor does it bring us closer to a complete understanding of knowledge. It is just an empty part of the answer to the question of what knowledge is, or re-stating the same question.¹⁰

Returning to the above three questions, their importance lies in the fact that there is a common underlying conviction by epistemologist that in order to be certifiable as knowledge, a true belief should not be possessed by any epistemic agent on the basis of mere cognitive luck. In other words, a truth

¹⁰ See for ‘warrant’, for example, A. Plantinga, *Warrant and Proper Function*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993, Chapter 1, pp. 3-20. In his accounts of warrant, he invokes the term “properly functioning cognitive system”.

bearer is known if and only if it is not an accident, from the cognitive point of view, that it is both believed and true. I think the plausible answers we can give to these three questions will most probably make a belief non-accidentally true. In addition, it should be noticed that if we succeed in correctly answering the last question, we will have accomplished answering the first two questions. And in this thesis, I will defend the claim that all the three questions can be satisfactorily answered; there is a conceptual connection between the concepts of justification and truth, and by a more insightful understanding of justification and truth, we can be guaranteed that our justified true beliefs do always constitute knowledge.

Based on these, in trying to connect the justification condition to the truth condition, one cannot disregard any conditions of knowledge or the very concept of knowledge itself. Therefore, after setting a limit to the scope of my thesis and making clear some basic notions and determining my approach to the problem in Chapter 2, I will analyze the conditions of the classical tripartite definition of knowledge in terms of the “three-way interrelation” between them in Chapter 3. Then in Chapter 4, I will discuss some contemporary theories of knowledge in terms of how they approach to the central problem particularly expressed in the third question above, by classifying them into theories of normative epistemology and those of naturalized epistemology specifically regarding their internalist and externalist characteristics. And, in Chapter 5, I will attempt to offer a solution to the problem, which may be called “truth connection problem”. My solution will be based on the ideas suggested in relation to the analysis of the three conditions (belief, truth and justification conditions—BC,

TC, JC) offered in Chapter 3 and a different understanding of each condition by a holistic approach. Besides, my classification of reality that I will put forward in Chapter 3 in the section called “Truth and Belief” and at beginning of Chapter 5, will be the most fundamental basis for my solution of the problem.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE AND WHICH USES OF 'KNOW' ARE THERE AND HOW TO ANALYZE THEM?

We use the word “know” in many different cases for many different subjects in ordinary language. If we intend to discover the exact conceptual content of the word “know”, we must first determine which uses of it we will analyze. We can classify those uses according to subject matter related to their sources; and subjects who are claimed to know.

2.1 Kinds of Knowledge

I want to use the classification suggested by J.L. Pollock as an example.¹¹ According to him, human knowledge can be divided into several areas. These areas include:

- i) Knowledge of the physical world. (E.g. I know that the sky is blue.)
- ii) Knowledge of the past. (E.g. I know that I was at home yesterday.)
- iii) Knowledge of contingent general truths. (E.g. I know that all bees can fly.)
- iv) Knowledge of other minds. (E.g. I know that she is crying.)
- v) A priori knowledge. (E.g. I know that $2 + 2 = 4$.)
- vi) (Possibly) knowledge of moral truths. (E.g. honesty is a virtue.)

¹¹ Pollock, p. 6.

We may add to these types of knowledge some other alleged kinds of knowledge: introspective knowledge, innate knowledge, and more disputably, intuitive knowledge, conversational contextual knowledge and tacit knowledge.

Now, the point of all these types of knowledge, which are claimed to exist, is that they gain their intrinsic characteristics in accordance with their sources, clear or unclear, from which we acquire them in addition to the fact that many of them are also separable according to their subject matters. For example, outer perception, inner perception (introspection), memory and reason can be said here as the main clear sources of the some types of knowledge above. The relation between the subject matter of a knowledge claim and its sources is an important point in terms of justification condition, as related to our main goal. The crucial question is this: Do these sources of knowledge claims correctly mirror the world in such a way that the world really is? I believe that this question is unanswerable. To test whether a possible answer given to this question is true or not, necessitates an omniscient epistemic agent, who is able to go beyond the limits of an ordinary epistemic agent. The skeptical person in case 3 described in the example in section 1.5 searches for such an answer. But in this inquiry he cannot use any empirical premise because if he uses, he begs the question. He has been already questioning whether the source of his belief, and also of the empirical premise, is reliable or not. In any inquiry, we cannot go

beyond the sources of our knowledge.¹² Hence, we must answer this question by looking at from another perspective, which I will establish in chapter 5.

For our present purpose, if we are seeking for the conceptual connection between justification and truth, we should be concerned with all the above kinds of knowledge, except the last one, insofar as they claim that their contents represent a fact, so that they express a factual proposition. On the other hand, the type of alleged tacit knowledge involves certain problems since its first defender, M. Polanyi, maintains that it is implicit and unformalizable as opposed to all other kinds of knowledge, which are explicit.¹³ I tend to think that if there is no verbal expression or proposition to talk about its truth, then, for conceptual analysis, we cannot even complete like a sentence “I know that...” Of course, the statement asserted by Polanyi “we know much more than we can tell” should not be disregarded immediately. In his account of tacit knowledge, he seems to be right in asserting that knowledge has an ineliminable subjective dimension. But, I believe that he is too strict in this notion, since, for him, tacit knowledge is not just one kind of knowing we are capable of; it is absolutely fundamental: “all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge”.¹⁴ However he is not alone. His notion of tacit knowledge has been used by N. Chomsky too, as an important element of his rationalist account of language learning.¹⁵ Nonetheless,

¹² Laurence Bonjour cites such a circulation in his investigation of a metajustificatory argument. See Bonjour, L., *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 11.

¹³ M. Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. ix-xi.

¹⁴ M. Polanyi, *Knowing and Being*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1969, p. 144.

¹⁵ N. Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965, Chapter 1. In this chapter he discusses the differences between the empiricist and the rationalist accounts of language.

my primary concern focuses on the explicit verbal uses of the word “know” just for the reason expressed above. And in chapter 4, I will consider the relation between justification and truth by regarding all the main groups of kinds of knowledge.

2.2 Uses of ‘Know’ according to Subjects

I want to separate the subjects who may be said for them to be able to suitably use the word ‘know’ into five groups:

(i) Use for adult human beings. (E.g. my grandfather surprisingly knows the calculations of integral equations in my math course.)

(ii) Use for infant children. (E.g. the baby knows that its feeding bottle is in its bed.)

(iii) Use for animals. (E.g. my cat usually knows when I give her food.)

(iv) Use for assumed alien beings, say, from another planet. (E.g. the creature that I saw in the movie coming from Venus knew that human beings are weaker than them.)

(v) Use for the things that are not alive. (Like computers, calculators or any machine that might be alleged to know a fact. E.g. let us ask to my computer, it may know where the capital of Turkey is located.)

Now, the question is which uses above we should consider in analyzing the conditions of knowledge so that we come to correctly understand the very concept of knowledge as well as a correct imagination of “epistemic agent” our minds conceive. If we are not able to discriminate between those alleged

knowers, or determine their similarities, then we cannot come to remove the ambiguity and unclarity from the concept of knowledge.

Let us roughly look at all the above uses, and then try to describe an epistemic agent for the first use. It is certain that ordinary adult human beings, typically, are undoubtedly epistemic agents. They are the ones who probably generates the concept itself; and who make use of the word most appropriately and make inquiries about it.

On the other hand, we can straightforwardly eliminate, in searching the true description of epistemic agent, the last case in which computers, calculators etc. are alleged to know since it definitely represents a “figurative” use. The meaning of the sentence “My computer knows where the capital of Turkey is located” is not different from the meaning of the sentence “Trees in my garden are crying” in terms of the possibility that the subject of the sentence possess the related property. So we should notice, and I strictly claim, that “consciousness” is the key, at least necessary, element in defining epistemic agent.

Consider the second case. The infant children can roughly be described, I think, as ones who are not able to use a language properly because they are too young to do so. They are, however, undoubtedly conscious beings. Nevertheless, our intuitions deny that they are proper epistemic agents. At this point we should distinguish the two uses: (1) “I know that my feeding bottle is in my bed” and (2) “It (the baby) knows that its feeding bottle is in its bed”. These are the two points of view. One is the point of view of the subject itself and the other is the point of view another epistemic agent. Though we properly use such a sentence like (2), I

tend to accept that infants cannot be regarded as epistemic agents. The reason is that they cannot properly utter a sentence like (1), because they do not have the concept of knowledge itself. Granted, they must have somehow a primitive cognitive system, and they are undoubtedly conscious beings. But an infant does not adequately participate in our conceptual framework to which the concept of knowledge belongs. Nor it does adequately share a language with its environment. The lack of adequate participation in a conceptual framework, and thus of using a language, also holds for animals. Moreover, we cannot be sure that animals have a consciousness like ours. They may be claimed to be aware of a fact at any level. But they are unlikely being aware of that they are aware of something. And, neither can we be certain that they have a cognitive system like ours.

To sum up, it seems to me apparent that there are three necessary conditions for a subject to be an epistemic agent:

i) Being conscious in such a way that the subject is aware of that she is aware of a fact.)

ii) Having a cognitive system whose functions are similar to those of ordinary human beings.¹⁶

iii) Adequate participating in “our” conceptual framework via a language (or any representational system that enables the subject to communicate with other subjects.)

¹⁶ Alvin Plantinga introduces the notion of “properly functioning cognitive system” to invoke in his theory of knowledge. There are many debates about this notion. But clearly it is rather different from the notion I expressed above. See Plantinga, 1993, pp. 3-11.

The first necessary condition may be the ground for the first two ones. And of course, they are all strictly related to each other. Meanwhile, I should express that I do not aim at giving a complete set of necessary and sufficient conditions of one's being an epistemic agent. My purpose in describing such conditions is that without an unambiguous conception of "epistemic agent", I firmly believe that we can neither truly construe the concept of knowledge, and thus neither the conditions, nor the connection between justification and truth. Hence, a correct understanding of "epistemic agent" can help us also understand the concept of knowledge. Therefore, in chapter 5, it will be a crucial element in my proposal of classification of reality, and based on this classification, in re-defining the concept of justification and truth in order to make the justification condition truth conducive in a certain way.

2.3 How to Analyze "Know"

Roughly speaking, I understand from "conceptual analysis" the activity of removing ambiguity and unclarity from a concept. And in fulfilling this, I agree that our intuitions are the primary criteria in deciding whether or not knowledge arises in a case of a subject. But there is an important point here. By using such a criterion of intuition we come to assume that we, all the knowers, would have the same intuitions in any case, based on the assumption that there exist other minds. I believe that this assumption is needed mandatorily since without such an assumption there would not be an endeavor of discovering the nature of the concept of knowledge. The reason is that we share a certain language; we think in a similar way; and the concepts in our minds seem to be

qualitatively identical with those of others because of sharing the same conceptual framework. However, it is the case that there sometimes appear conflicts of intuitions even among epistemologists, as is in the example of Mr. Truetemp presented by K. Lehrer¹⁷, between normative epistemologists and non-normative reliabilists. And this is because knowledge has two fundamental faces: normative and natural characters. That is why I prefer to establish a balance between particularist and methodist; normativist and non-normativists; internalist and externalist approaches. This means that I accept that our intuitions are the fundamental basis in analyzing the concept of knowledge, as particularists says, but that we need a method to employ our prima facie intuitions in many extreme cases. I acknowledge that knowledge has an inevitable normative character, and we cognizers are epistemically responsible. But since our primary goal is to obtain truth and to avoid error, I believe, from the point of view of non-normativist naturalized epistemology, that the environments of an individual epistemic agent, the nature of cognition and thus the other epistemic agents, cannot be neglected when we try to discover the true nature of knowledge. Finally, I defend the requirement of internal processes (the process of giving reasons or having adequate evidences by rational explanation on the ground of consciousness) for an epistemic agent to know a fact, but also that the external character of knowledge, by its truth condition, cannot be disregarded. Hence, these approaches will be the ground, in the following chapters, in both seeking

¹⁷ See for this example, K. Lehrer, *Theory of Knowledge*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p. 163. It will be stated in section 4.2.

necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge; and, thereby, establishing a true relation between justification and truth condition.

CHAPTER 3

A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF TRUTH AND THREE-WAY INTERRELATION BETWEEN THE THREE CONDITIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

3.1 A Holistic Approach

The conditions of knowledge are usually defined independently. Epistemologists have been considering the classical three conditions (TC, BC, JC) allocating to them separate chapters in their books. However, they have seldom elaborated about the conceptual relations between these three conditions. In my view, the most notorious problems (like ours: “How should we be guaranteed that the form of justification we accept necessarily leads us to truth?”) are in fact nourished from ignoring not only relations, but also the three-way interrelation between these three conditions. I believe that if we correctly characterize each of conditions themselves and the three-way interrelation between them we will most likely answer our difficult questions. For me, there are two reasons to think so. First, as I stated in the previous chapter, I construe conceptual analysis¹⁸ as removing ambiguity and unclarity from a concept; and exposing the implicit relations of the concept to a set of external (actual or possible) objects or to other concepts. Based on this understanding, if we cannot

¹⁸ There are several different understandings of “conceptual analysis”. Investigation of them is beyond the scope of my thesis. For a further information, see, e.g., C.I. Lewis, ‘Modes of Meaning’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 4 (1943), pp. 236-285. He gives an outline of basic principles of conceptual-intensional semantics.

satisfactorily explain the relational structures occurring in the concept, the concept of knowledge in our case, as related to other concepts then, almost certainly, we do not get the true conception or understanding of knowledge. Second, it is an undeniable fact that the fundamental problems in discovering the nature of knowledge mostly arise from an inadequate understanding of the conditions of knowledge. But we also believe that those problems are not caused by a nomological fact. Rather, they are brought about by the lack of a correct characterization of conditions of knowledge. And this requires also a careful analysis of the three-way interrelation between those conceptual components of knowledge.

So, this is the reason why I used the word “holistic” in title of this section. What I imply by using this word is that we should understand the very concept of knowledge holistically. That is, we should analyze the conceptual components of knowledge not only separately but also three-way interrelatedly, comprehending them as mutually related. My attempt to answer the central question of this thesis—how justification is connected to (interrelated with) truth—will hinge on such an understanding of conceptual analysis. Now, let us make some remarks about the three-way interrelation of the conditions of knowledge in the way we described.

3.2 Truth and Belief

Since Plato, the truth condition has been taken to be an uncontroversial requirement for a belief to be known. The reason for this appears to be an intuition that we have. We cannot even conceive of a case in which subject S

knows that “human beings have three legs.” We doubtlessly deny the accuracy of such a statement since our intuitions immediately say that what this sentence states does not fit with the way the world is. As a result, epistemologists often used a classical realist account of truth as a relation of correspondence between belief and the world. As it is seen clearly, the vital assumption in this conception of truth is that it is fully independent of our cognitive activity. That is, we can never interfere in truth occurring outside of us. I believe, however, that such a conception of truth is flawed from the point of view of epistemic activity. It neglects the very unavoidable relation between truth and its cognizers or the cognitive system of knowers.

To put it in a different way, it seems clear to me that the word “truth” and “apple” do not have the same status in terms of mind-dependency. The word “apple” appears to denote a material object or a set of material objects as opposed to the word “truth”. In this specific sense, I tend to think that the word “truth” is a label for a purely mind-dependent concept. However this implies the assertion: “There is no truth in the external world”. And this sentence needs some clarification.

Suppose there has never been any human being in the world. Can the statement “The rainy weather occurs in southern areas in summer” be true or false in such a world? The answer is “No.” The reason is this: In such a world there would be no concepts of “southern” and “summer”. Admittedly, such a world would certainly be the same as ours. However, the possible identity of such a world to ours does not show that the truth-value of the above sentence is

independent of human mind. It only proves that the existence of objects and natural phenomena is independent of human being's mind. So, it can be said that there are two sorts of realm in terms of mind-dependency in our epistemic activity: "the realm of object"¹⁹ and "the realm of truth". The former is purely independent of our minds and the latter is dependent on our minds. At this point, it should be noticed that I do not claim that truth is "person relative". I only maintain that truth is relative to or dependent on the "conceptual framework,"²⁰ which is created by the species of human beings. It means that it is the conceptual framework that makes a proposition true or false. On the other hand, a person (epistemic agent) is not capable of making a proposition true or false. She is only capable of checking out that a proposition is true or false in accordance with the conceptual framework, which she is participating in via a language or any representational system.

In this picture, the responsibility of an epistemic agent, therefore, is only to find out whether or not a proposition is true by applying to the conceptual framework, in which she is participating, not to assign a truth-value to the

¹⁹ Realism defending the mind-independency of objects is also called "metaphysical realism." See, for example, L. Bonjour, p. 161.

²⁰ For a very similar use of the word "framework", see M. Baç, "Propositional Knowledge and The Enigma of Realism", *Philosophia* 27: 1-2 (1999), p. 206. He defines "framework" as follows: "A framework is defined as a constellation (or, rather, network) of linguistic/social practices which, by way of a symbolic system, enables the practitioners situated in it to form and employ various tokens of symbols (e.g., sentences) that have assertoric contents – or, more generally, that are about external reality." However, there is a fundamental difference between the concept of "framework" and my understanding of "conceptual framework". According to the above definition, "it is possible, it seems, to impose several (perhaps infinitely many) frameworks upon a certain part/aspect of reality – hence, one can talk about the overlap of frameworks." (p. 207). But, to me, there is only one "conceptual framework"—though there are actually and possibly many languages—that have been created by the totality of and shared by each of human beings by virtue of the similarity of their bio-based cognitive systems. I will make more remarks on this in Chapter 5.

proposition. However, it is possible that she fails in this responsibility intentionally or unintentionally. That is to say, if she is short of information needed in agreement with the conceptual framework by the lack of communication with other epistemic agents, she will come to accept a false proposition. But, she will suppose that the proposition in question is true in accordance with the conceptual framework. It is for this deceptive supposition that she “believes” the truth of the proposition in question. This is an important point. Let me remind one of the examples I gave in section 1.4. In this example the epistemic agent believes that the name of the winner of European Song Contest in 2003 begins with ‘S’. And, the belief underlying this belief is that the name of the winner is Sezen Aksu. Clearly, this is false in accordance with the “reality” represented by our actual conceptual framework. But, the epistemic agent believes this proposition since she supposes it to be true in accordance with the “assumed reality” accepted by the very epistemic agent herself. Otherwise, we would have to claim that one can believe a proposition p while one is also informed that p is false. I think this makes little or no sense.²¹ And this conceptual relation is also connected to the concept of justification or justification condition. Before explaining this in the following section, let me draw attention to another central point.

How do we make sure that the conceptual framework by means of which we determine the truth-value of a proposition does “correctly” represent

²¹ Donald Davidson argues more than this. He claims that belief is by its nature veridical so that it is impossible for many of our beliefs to be false. See D. Davidson, “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”, in *Kant Oder Hegel*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta Buchhandlung, 1983, pp. 432-437.

the world, which is completely independent of us, epistemic agents? Apparently, it is not possible to answer such a question since it requires “God’s Eye point of view.”²² This term implies an “allegedly pure reality” to which we have no access. And, any possible answer to this question is far beyond our epistemic ability because the conceptual framework itself is created by means of our cognitive apparatus and mental capabilities. Surely, we are not able to go beyond our limitations.

If all these are the case, the question we are supposed to raise is what kind of “truth” established by a reality do we consider when we try to connect our concept of justification to “truth”. Indeed, the three cases (Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3) mentioned in section 1.3 also correspond to each kind of reality that I postulated above. And, the question at hand will be answered in Chapter 5 as also related to these three cases.

3.3 Belief and Justification

For a subject *S* to believe that *p* seems to be an uncontroversial condition of knowledge as well. While there have been some philosophers who argue against the standard view, it is widely accepted that for people to know that such and such is the case, they must have something like a belief that such and such is the case. This view may be called entailment thesis. That is, knowledge entails belief though belief does not entail knowledge. The converse

²² H. Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 49. He uses this term in the sense of the epistemic position of a hypothetical omniscient cognizer.

is not an appealing view except for D. Davidson.²³ The point lies in the question “What does to believe mean?”

I argue that being capable of believing requires and entails being capable of knowing and vice versa. But, “to believe” does not entail “to know”, though the converse does. To believe also implies having a cognitive system. It does not make sense that one is able to know something but one does not have any cognitive system.

Since machines are not capable of believing, they are not capable of knowing either. Machines are not capable of knowing also because of the lack of consciousness. There exists a conceptual relation also between belief and consciousness.

Another point is that belief is a psychological and/or a mental state, which certainly implies the existence of a conscious being. So, it seems that our epistemic agent that we tried to describe in Chapter 2 is the only subject who realizes the act of believing. Some philosophers would claim that while knowledge entails belief-like states, it is not precisely belief states that are entailed.

Instead, various terms have been suggested. For example, it can be said that to believe means to be “psychologically certain” that such and such is the case and not being at all disposed to doubt it. To defend this idea, A. J. Ayer says: “...to say of oneself that one knew that such and such a statement was true but that one was not altogether sure of it would be self-contradictory.”²⁴

²³ Davidson, pp. 432-437.

²⁴ A. J. Ayer, *The Problem of Knowledge*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1956, p. 16.

Keith Lehrer has suggested two terms in place of belief. According to him, if one claims to know something, then one must be convinced that one does know it, but more importantly, one must be convinced that it is the case. Therefore, knowledge entails “conviction.”²⁵ But, later on, Lehrer suggested another term instead of conviction in his revised book.²⁶ He claims that we need only to accept that something is the case in order to know that it is the case. The use of “acceptance” rather than conviction provides us to realize the fundamental purpose of epistemic agent, namely, pursuit of truth. Moreover, a belief can be the product of entirely irrational factors, such as wishful thinking, and one can believe things against one’s better judgment. On the other hand, acceptance is governed by epistemic norms.²⁷

I disagree with these claims. First, there is aspect of the act of believing that is not controlled by the epistemic agent herself. It is the aspect that the subject who believes something cannot lead himself to direct against truth or to contradict with truth, at least in her “assumed reality”, in a deep epistemological sense. I argue that epistemic attitudes, especially believing, intrinsically are not fully manageable by or in command of the subject. Belief in essence is not the same as pure opinion or action. We can fully control our thoughts; completely conduct our action; but never eliminate the natural tendency, in the act of believing, to psychologically concede the truths in believing at least in our “assumed reality”. Surely, we may believe a proposition that is false—according to the “reality” represented by the conceptual framework—but we do this only

²⁵ K. Lehrer, *Knowledge*, Oxford: Newyork: Clarendon Press, 1974, p. 63-69.

²⁶ K. Lerher, *Theory of Knowledge*, Second Edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p. 13.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

assuming that it is true in accordance with our “assumed reality”. In this respect, it makes no sense to me that we can believe something while we are also informed of its falsity, even if there is a factor forcing us to do opposite, like a killer who compels us to believe that the sky is red and threatens to kill us if we do not. Wishful thinking says in such a case we believe that the sky is red. That can happen only in appearance for the purpose of deceiving the killer and saving our life, but in our deep “epistemo-psychological” state, we are forced not to believe such a statement, and we cannot escape from this “inner-epistemo-psychological-truth-seeking-behavior”. For these reasons, I am inclined to think that “acceptance” could not mirror the psychological content of believing. It can only be a second order state most probably based on any other non-epistemo-psychological state. In the above case, for instance, we can accept that the sky is red, but we can definitely not believe this proposition in the sense just explained.

Second, based on the above explanation, we can say that when we believe something, we naturally tend to find a reason that is a ground for our belief. This is because we conceive such a reason as taking us to truth. Since, as I argued above, the act of believing can be best understood as the inner-epistemo-psychological-truth-seeking-behaviour, the reason we try to find is the very means that realizes this goal, which this behavior aims at. And this is the heart of my point. The inner-epistemo-psychological-truth-seeking-behavior just explained above (hereafter I will refer to it as the inner-epts-behavior) seeks, naturally and without our supervision, truth initially belonging to “assumed

reality” and while doing this, it tries to find a grounding reason just to correctly reach that truth. So, this is the picture:

Belief \leftrightarrow trying to find grounding reason (justification) \leftrightarrow truth.

This is the idea behind the term ‘three-way interrelation’ that I used at the beginning of this chapter. Let me make these remarks more concrete with an example.

Suppose you are taking an important exam. Many questions you are answering, but you are not sure of the answer to the question “Who was the Prime Minister of Turkey in 1958?” You finished the exam marking one of the available options, “Adnan Menderes,” to the question. Now, do you know the proposition “The Prime Minister of Turkey in 1953 was Adnan Menderes”? No, because if one of your friends asked the following questions:

- Do you have any justification for believing this proposition?
- Do you believe this proposition?
- Is it true?

You would answer the first two as “No,” and the third one as “I am not informed of its truth.” But in spite of this, you have also marked the option of “Adnan Menderes”, which means that you have a guess or “pre-belief.” Suppose further that you go to the library and see in several books that it was Adnan Menderes. Surely, now you will say “I know that it was Adnan Menderes.” What converted your “pre-belief” into knowledge?

It seems clear to me that what converted your “pre-belief” into knowledge is the approval of the conceptual framework (or of the reality it

represents) which is shared, via a language, by the people of your country, historians, or all human beings in the world. When you saw it was Adnan Menderes, that is, when you got the approval of the conceptual framework, you had a grounding reason or justification, and thereof you came to believe (in the sense that I explicated above as the inner behavior), and you came to be informed of the truth of this proposition. That is to say, the three conditions happened altogether simultaneously, and you came to have the knowledge. This seems to show that because of the three-way interrelation or conceptual links between TC, BC and JC, knowledge arose and vice versa.

Hence, I can say that there is also a conceptual link between belief and justification. When we believe something, we have also a justification (having a grounding reason). We can express it or not; we may be aware of it or not. But, I claim, there must be a grounding reason in order for a belief candidate to be belief of us. It is a requirement at least initially for our personal “assumed reality”. And this is the conceptual connection between personal/subjective justification and personal “assumed reality.” It is a purely internalist account of justification and so of the connection.

Of course, we are more interested in a kind of justification that leads us not only to our personal “assumed reality” but also to the “reality” represented by the conceptual framework or to the “allegedly pure reality” if there exists one. And this requires the externalist accounts of justification. Hopefully, it is also achievable, because for an epistemic agent, justification means, in some other sense, searching evidence for making her “assumed reality” compatible with the

“reality” represented by the conceptual framework she participated in. And this is another part of my answer to our main problem and will be discussed in the following two chapters.

CHAPTER 4

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH IN CONTEMPORARY THEORIES

If the issue is how to connect justification to truth, contemporary theories of knowledge can be best divided into groups first as internalist and externalist, and second roughly normative and non-normative theories. Before dealing with the theories with regard to this classification, let me make some remarks about the nature of this connection.²⁸

One may think that the connection between the concepts of justification and truth must be a logical connection. There must be a conceptual relation between these two concepts in such a way that without one, we cannot conceive the other.²⁹

One may also think that the connection in question must be construed only nomologically. That is, there must be some nomological principles that actually lead us to truth. Such a kind of connection gives a warranty that by these principles we can be sure of all those beliefs we count as knowledge.

²⁸ Some philosophers focus on the issue from the point of view of the condition of justification. I will question the truth condition as well. See W.P. Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification", *The Monist* **68** (1985), pp. 57-83; W.P. Alston, "Epistemic Circularity", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, (1986), pp. 1-30; E. Sosa, "The Foundations of Foundationalism", *Nous* **14** (1980), pp. 547-562.

²⁹ K. Lehrer, and S. Cohen, "Justification, truth, and Coherence", *Synthese* **55** (1983), pp. 191-192. They cite two types of "truth connection", but say that both are impossible.

Robert Audi refers to another distinction regarding the connection between these concepts. He mentions two kinds of view concerning this connection, namely, ontological and teleological view. On the ontological view, he says, "...when something (such as what Judy cites) justifies a belief, then, in a suitable range of relevantly similar possible worlds, notably worlds like ours where the same sort of thing is believed on the same sort of basis, this belief is true."³⁰ Therefore, this understanding of connection ties justification to *indicating truth*. On the teleological view, the conceptual connection is a matter of aiming at truth. That is, the proper aim of giving a justification for a belief is to show its truth. Therefore, this view ties justification to *seeking truth*.³¹

As I emphasized in the previous chapter, my assertion is that there is, and should be, a conceptual connection between justification, as a property, and truth. This implies a logical connection, and thus indicates truth. However, I also defend that justification, as a process, is nomologically linked to truth. And these claims were partly sustained in the previous chapter and will be fully supported in the next chapter. Now let us see how contemporary theories approach to the problem.

4.1 Normative and Non-Normative Theories

To understand best how normative and non-normative theories of knowledge regard the problem, consider the following well-known example:³²

³⁰ R. Audi, "Justification, Truth and Reliability", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. XLIX, No. I, (1988), p. 3.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Peter, section 5.

Suppose that you know Tom Grabit well and you see what appears to you, that is, Tom is stealing a library book. You come to believe that Tom stole a library book. And, let us suppose that Tom did indeed steal the book. In this picture, the defenders of the two main normative theories of justification, namely foundationalism and coherentism, could deploy their accounts in order to show that your belief is justified. Their accounts of justification allow that your belief is justified, because your belief is claimed to be both based on a basic belief with a good reasoning (foundationalism) and be a member of your coherent set of beliefs (coherentism.) But suppose further that, unknown to you, Tom has an identical twin, John, who is a kleptomaniac and was in the library on the day in question and stole a copy of the same book. Even though you reached a true belief as a result of good reasoning and based upon true propositions, you do not know that Tom stole the book since it is accidental, from the cognitive point of view, that you reached the truth. You could just as easily have based your belief on having seen John stealing the book.

The case is also problematic for the normativist theories or the defenders of naturalized epistemology. For instance, for a supporter of causal theory of warrant, the state of affairs represented in your belief is appropriately causally related to your belief. So, their standards are satisfied. But clearly you do not have knowledge.

Consider the reliabilists, the most prominent defenders of naturalized epistemology. They say that a belief is warranted just in case the process resulting in the belief produces true beliefs sufficiently often. However, in the

above example they have problem in both options. Either they will claim that the process that produced your belief is reliable or it is not. They cannot defend the former, since your belief is not knowledge. If they say that the process is not reliable and your belief is not knowledge in order to adopt themselves to our intuitions, then they have to provide us with a convincing reply to the question: “How many times should a process produce true beliefs in order to be a reliable process”. Since your belief that Tom Grabit stole a book arises only once in the history of the world, they have to determine which types of process produces which types of belief sufficiently often.

Similar remarks can be made for the above theories of justification or warrant also in the neighbor/light case illustrated in section 1. 4. So, as it is seen, they all fail in escaping from accidental truth. Their accounts of justification or warrant do not necessarily convey us to truth. However, another normative theory, defeasibility theory of justification seems to realize this aim. They claim that in order for a belief to be warranted it must not only be justified (in the sense that is required by either foundationalists or coherentists), but its justification must be such that there is no truth which, if added to the reasons that justify the belief, is such that the belief would no longer be justified. If this is the case, defeasibility theory seems to succeed in the above goal. Its defenders would point out that in both cases there are defeaters that defeat the justification. Your belief that Tom stole the book is defeated. If the true proposition describing John were added to your beliefs, you would no longer be justified in believing Tom stole the book. At first sight, defeasibility theory seems to save us from

accidentally true beliefs. But there are some problems also for them. The defeaters may not be always genuine. For example, Tom's mother's saying that Tom has an identical twin with the intention of deceiving while there is no twin in reality.

Nonetheless, the crucial point that we should notice in the claims of the causal theory is that it uses an external factor to rule out accidental truth. And this external aspect of knowledge (or justification) is the thing that causes accidental truth. Then, let us deal with the distinction of internalism/externalism.

4.2 Internalism vs. Externalism

Most foundationalists and coherentists are also internalists. This view roughly claims that one can always determine by careful introspection whether one's beliefs are justified. On the other hand, some of the internalists think that epistemic justification supervenes upon internal psychological conditions, whether or not these conditions are introspectively accessible to the believer.

As to the externalist accounts of epistemic justification, they are encouraged by the presupposition that when epistemic justification is added to true belief, knowledge is the result if there are no Gettier problems. In spite of the differences among externalists, they are eager to think that justification is basically a matter of there being a correct fit between one's environment on the one hand and one's cognitive processes and intellectual practices on the other. And a fit is correct if it has a tendency to produce true beliefs and not produce false beliefs. The most influential form of externalism is reliabilism. And the causal theory of warrant may also be seen a prominent form of externalism.

A well-known example presented by Keith Lehrer may best illustrate these two fundamentally distinct approaches, internalism and externalism.³³ It may be summarized as follows:

A certain Mr. Truetemp has a thermometer-with-temperature-belief-generator implanted in his head so that within certain ranges of temperatures he has perfectly reliable temperature beliefs. When it is 30 degrees, he comes to believe that it is 30 degrees. When it is not 30 degrees, he does not come to believe that it is 30 degrees. He holds these beliefs without knowing why he does.

The beliefs possessed by Mr. Truetemp about temperature would satisfy all of the conditions suggested by reliabilists and causal theorists of justification. However, an internalist naturally holds that although Mr. Truetemp has true beliefs and they are not accidentally true because his thermometer-with-temperature-belief-generator is reliable, they are accidentally true from the cognitive point of view, since he has no reason at all for his beliefs. And I agree with the view that what Mr. Truetemp possesses is a skill of telling the temperature, not propositional knowledge.

The debates between internalists and externalists indicate that they use the notion of epistemic justification in different senses. On the one hand, externalists are inclined to think that epistemic justification is by definition what has to be added to true beliefs in order for them to be serious candidates for knowledge. On the other hand, internalists tend to think that epistemic justification is a duty that a responsible epistemic agent should fulfill in terms of

³³ Lehrer, *Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 163-238.

whether or not certain internal psychological conditions are satisfied or whether or not an epistemic agent holds only the true beliefs for which she has adequate (internal) evidence.

The lesson we ought to take from all these debates is that the term ‘justification’ has distinct senses that mirror two fundamental aspects of knowledge. One represents the externalist, objective (or in my terminology inter-subjective) and human-independent aspect of knowledge, and the other represents the internalist, fully subjective and human-dependent aspect of knowledge.

As we have seen, no theories of justification or warrant successfully capture both aspects of knowledge. The normative and internalist theories of justification often fail in escaping from accidental truth. And the non-normative, externalist theories of warrant fail in satisfying the inevitable internal condition (that is required for our conception of ideal, non-omniscient epistemic agent) by disregarding what I called the inner-epistemico-psychological-truth-seeking-behavior.

CHAPTER 5

A PROPOSAL TO RE-DEFINE THE TRUTH AND JUSTIFICATION CONDITIONS

We have seen that neither the theories of justification, having internalist character in normative epistemology, nor the theories of warrant having externalist character in naturalized epistemology have satisfactorily solved the problem of the connection between justification and truth without losing any necessary conceptual part of knowledge. I think there are two reasons for this failure:

i) The truth condition in the classical tripartite definition is not insightfully interpreted by these theories. They have only one sense of “truth” on which their theories are based.

ii) The justification condition (or being warranted) they try to account for with an explicit definition is not capable of capturing both the internalist character (pertaining to the cognitive system of a particular epistemic agent) and the externalist character (pertaining to the accurate sense of truth outside of the skin of epistemic agent) of knowledge.

Then, my question is, can we escape from these two alarming defects in our conception of knowledge in a way that we can clearly distinguish knowledge

from non-knowledge? My answer is “yes”. If so, let me present my conception of both justification and truth condition.

5.1 Levels of Reality

Now, based on the new understanding of truth that I have accounted for in some detail in Chapter 3, I have postulated three kinds of realities, which are fundamentally different from each other in the epistemic-ontological sense. For more clarity, let me restate and classify them.

i) *Subjective Reality*: It is the reality which is assumed by a particular epistemic agent to represent the whole set of truth-bearers possessed by the epistemic agent with the supposition that it is most approximately the same as Inter-Subjective Reality.

ii) *Inter-Subjective Reality*: The reality which is represented by the “conceptual framework” created by the totality of epistemic agents, and actually shared by each of them.

iii) *Allegedly Pure Reality*: The reality which is supposed to exist and be independent of any possible conceptual framework.

So, “conceptual framework” and “epistemic agent” seem to be key elements in these definitions. I have already explained the latter one in Chapter 2. As to the former one, there are some further points that need to be made clear. Let us give some considerations.

Conceptual framework is the network of concepts of human beings (epistemic agents) that has been created by the totality of them and actually

shared by each of them via a language by virtue of the similarity of their bio-based cognitive systems.

The conceptual framework is independent of each epistemic agent. But certainly it was created by all of epistemic agents. That is, once the similarities of our cognitive system, by sharing or need for communication, have created it, it became an independent conceptual network from each of epistemic agent, but not all of epistemic agents.³⁴ Because of this, truth of a certain proposition p does not depend on any particular epistemic agent. Truth is not relative to individuals in this sense. Thus, the classification of realities in this way does not mean that it is an anti-realist classification. I claim that it is realist both in the metaphysical and epistemological senses.

The only reason why this notion *prima facie* seems anti-realist is the implication that truth is made or produced by a man-made entity, namely the conceptual framework. But this judgment appears to be false. Truth in this picture is not produced by an individual epistemic agent. On the contrary, truth is almost completely independent of any individual epistemic agent. It is a representational function of the man-made conceptual framework created by not an individual agent, but by the similarities of cognitive systems that all epistemic agents do possess. Granted, according to this classification of realities and the understanding of the “conceptual framework”, the world in itself does not have any truth-making power while an epistemic agent is indirectly a truth-maker. But, it is only by means of participating in the conceptual framework.

³⁴ For a similar use of the words “each” and “all” see Baç, p. 205.

Another significant point such a notion implies is that there is only one conceptual framework. The reason is that only by means of our similarities, the conceptual framework does exist. If there were more than one conceptual framework, which is completely different from each other, it would imply that there are completely different actual worlds (in the philosophical sense) and completely different actual communities of epistemic agents. But this is nomologically impossible. Surely, there may be two communities of epistemic agents who do not and did not have, any communication between them. But, it does not mean that they have different conceptual frameworks. All the communities of epistemic agents, who have the same type of cognitive systems, have to live in the same world, that is, confront with the same states of affairs which is the very subject-matter of the conceptual framework.

What if there were no human beings in the world? According to my classification and understanding of conceptual framework, there would not be any truth or reality in such a world since there would not be a conceptual framework because of the absence of human beings (epistemic agents) who are the creators of it. Suppose there is actually only one human being and before him the world has never seen any other epistemic agent. In such a world, again there would not be an Inter-Subjective Reality, but there would be one Subjective Reality belonging to that human being, since he would certainly have a network of concept, but not language.³⁵ And by virtue of her possible skeptical thoughts, there would also be an Allegedly Pure Reality.

³⁵ I use the word 'concept' to mean the mental representation of any kinds of entities pertaining to the external world. Besides, I accept that there is no private language.

Now, I would like to call your attention to our main goal again. We have been searching for a necessary conceptual (logical) connection between justification and truth. If the picture is so, and the above classification of realities is an accurate one, then before formulating a theory about this connection, we must determine which kind of epistemic justification we should connect to which kind of truth (in the sense of realities postulated). Without such a determination, we cannot be free of conceptual ambiguity and uncertainty.

Given this aim and the relevant remarks that I made at the end of Chapter 3, we can say that humans have an inescapable inner behavior that seeks the truth in a very epistemico-psychological sense. Call this “the internal aspect of justification.” If it is the case, and I claim it is, we have already had a conceptual or logical connection between this internal aspect of justification and Subjective Reality. For instance, in the example of the winner of the contest, our epistemic agent is justified (in the sense of the internal aspect of justification) in believing that the name of the winner begins with ‘S’. This belief in fact is the production of the internal aspect of justification. And, on this aspect the epistemic agent does base this belief on the belief that the name of the winner is Sezen Aksu. But this is a false belief. At this point, we should pay attention to the fact that the proposition that the name of the winner is Sezen Aksu is false not in the Subjective Reality possessed by the epistemic agent in question, but in Inter-Subjective Reality. Clearly, this proposition is true or supposed to be true by the epistemic agent in her Subjective Reality, since she will continue to say “I know that the name of the winner of the contest begins with ‘S.’” And in one

sense, she “knows” this proposition from the point of her view in her “momentary” Subjective Reality. And inescapably this is caused by her inner-epistemico-psychological-truth-seeking-behavior.

Let us say that our first successful reply to the questions this thesis aims to answer is realized. We seem to succeed in connecting justification to the truth of, at least, Subjective Reality. But we are much more interested in connecting justification to Inter-Subjective Reality, and moreover connecting it to Allegedly Pure Reality.

The only way to check out whether or not a proposition is true in Inter-Subjective Reality, i.e., whether it corresponds to the reality represented by the inter-subjective conceptual framework is to gain the approval of the members who participate in that conceptual framework. To achieve this, we need a classification of kinds of justification and, based on this, a new definition of justification as well, to fulfill the second goal above, namely, connecting the justification condition to truth imposed by Inter-Subjective Reality. Let me present my proposal related to both goals.

5.2 Re-Defining ‘Justification’ and ‘Truth Conditions’

To achieve our second and main goal, I propose to re-define both justification and truth conditions for both kinds of reality. Let us call knowing in Subjective Reality “ know_{SR} ” and knowing in Inter-Subjective Reality “ know_{ISR} ”, and assume that S is an epistemic agent and p is a proposition, then,

$S \text{ knows}_{\text{SR}} \text{ that } p \text{ iff}$

i) $S \text{ believes that } p$

ii) p is true in S's Subjective Reality

iii) S is internally justified in believing that p .

And we can cash (iii) out as follows:

iii') S is internally justified in believing that p iff S appropriately holds that p on the basis of suitable reasons available to him.

But, if we understand 'to believe' as 'to act' in accordance with the inner-epts-behavior, then if the subject S believes that p , then she is already internally justified in her belief, and p is already true in her Subjective Reality. So, the formulation changes simply as:

S knows_{SR} that p iff S believes that p .

Let us now see how the other kind of knowing activity is to be formulated:

S knows_{ISR} that p iff

i) S believes that p

ii) p is true in Inter-Subjective Reality

iii) S is "wholly-justified" in believing that p .

And,

iii') S is "wholly-justified" in believing that p iff both internal (subjective) and external (inter-subjective) conditions of "whole-justification" are satisfied, that is, S is both internally (subjectively) and externally (inter-subjectively) justified in believing that p .

iii')(1) S is internally justified in believing that p iff S appropriately holds that p on the basis of suitable reasons available to her.

iii')(2) S is externally justified in believing that p iff the internal justification processed by S is reasonably executable for the same circumstance by an adequate/ideal number of other epistemic agents who are in different states of affairs.

Alternatively,

iii')(2') S is externally justified in believing that p iff it is impossible that the internal justification processed by S is not reasonably executable for the same circumstance by at least one epistemic agent with normal cognitive capacities, who is in a different state of affairs.

Alternatively,

iii')(2'') S is externally justified in believing that p iff it is not the case that there are too many epistemic agents being in different states of affairs who cannot reasonably execute the internal justification processed by S for the same circumstance.

5.3 Implications and Consequences of the Re-definitions

(iii')(2') is a very much stringent alternative of (iii')(2), but (iii')(2'') is as modest as (iii')(2). Indeed, (iii')(2) and (iii')(2'') may be seen to express the same thing in different ways. Of course, there are some crucial assumptions in this conception of knowledge and justification. One ontological assumption is of the existence of other minds. And based on this, one another psychological assumption is that our cognitive systems are typically similar in both their essential properties and their actions. I believe that when doing epistemology, we cannot fully avoid psychological presuppositions. And the assumption that other

minds exist is inescapable for nomological reasons for almost every epistemologist.

If so, to see how this cluster of definitions works, let us recall the three skeptical cases that I mentioned in 1.5.

In Case 1, you doubt your belief that there is some juice in the icebox since you are searching for an internal justification to arrive at the truth of your Subjective Reality. And, you come to find it, that is, you are internally justified in believing the proposition, and as a result of this you believe the proposition, and thereby you know_{SR} the proposition. But you have not realized the external justification yet. Without the internal justification, you can neither believe, in the sense of the inner-epts-behavior, the proposition in question, nor do you need an external justification since a proposition p cannot be known_{ISR} by you if it is not also true in your Subjective Reality. You cannot be externally justified in believing that p if you are not internally justified in believing that p .

In Case 2, you have a grounding reason, namely that “I see there is some juice in the icebox”, so an internal justification to believe the proposition in question. But, you are trying to find the external justification to be “wholly justified” in order to reach Inter-Subjective Reality. And when you found it by asking your mother, your sister, your neighbors etc., you also came to know_{ISR} that there is some juice in the icebox. That is, when you got the approval of conceptual framework, you have attained an external justification as well for your belief or, in the sense of inner-epts-behavior, for your knowledge_{SR}. So, you are more confident in your belief now, because by a natural tendency you

implicitly and “correctly” think that “it is much more difficult that all the human beings are deceived altogether than that one of them, namely you, is deceived”.

To put it in a different way, in Case 2, it seems that you saved yourself from accidental truth. And this occurred by means of achieving the approval of the conceptual framework by asking other epistemic agents who have the same type of cognitive system, and have been participating in the same conceptual framework via a language or any representational system, which is either the same as yours or different from yours.

In Case 3, you simply ask: What if the conceptual framework does not correctly mirror the world that is completely independent of you? That is, you question the possibility that all human beings are altogether deceived in their perceptions, and if the case illustrates a rational belief or a belief based on your memory or an introspective report, in their reasoning, memory and introspection. But you miss the obvious fact that we cannot go beyond our sources of beliefs. If we have no access to our outside sources of beliefs, how do we construct an argument that is not circular against this hardest version of skepticism? That is, without using again the same sorts of beliefs that you attain from the same kinds of sources, can we design a conceivable argument against this version of skepticism? It is clear that it is impossible. We cannot reach an “Allegedly Pure Reality” even in principle. We are not omniscient cognizers. Nor can we look at the picture from the “God’s eye point of view.”

It is for this very reason that the external justification condition uses “the point of view of the conceptual framework” instead of “an omniscient

human cognizer” or “God’s eye point of view”. We human beings, human cognizers, ideal epistemic agents, created it by the similarity of our cognitive systems and have been sharing it via a language or a representational system. Because of this, it is more intelligible to test our knowledge claims by applying to other epistemic agents.

Furthermore, how can we possibly see an incidence of accidental truth? If there is only one epistemic agent in the world, and if he is in a Gettier’s counter-example kind of case, or in a suitably designed neighbor/light case, Tom Grabit case, who is supposed to find out the relevant accidental truth? It must not be God.

Finally, I can also say that this understanding of knowledge and justification can also rule out the counter-examples illustrated in the previous chapters. There is no need to analyze all of them in a detailed way. However, there can surely be some intermingled case needing some more clarifications as in the “juice-jelly” counter-example. But a complete analysis of this and other counter-examples of the same type, in which a linguistic misinterpretation or representational problem occurs, falls beyond the scope of this thesis.

I would like to express that I presented my proposal in a core form. It needs to be more explained than this. And many terms employed in the definitions need an extra-definition. I admit that there are many other points that should be further considered in my proposal. But in its core form, I believe that it is much nearer to the “truth”.

CONCLUSION

I defended what I believe is true. I believe what I believe because I am internally justified in believing what I believe. I am internally justified in believing what I believe by means of my inner-epts-behavior, and I can be justified in believing what I believe, only if I believe it is true.³⁶

I submit what I believe to you in order to be externally justified; because I wanted to be sure that what I believe is true by means of gaining your approval.³⁷

If I get the approval, I will be more confident in what I believe. And there is nothing to believe outside of my belief and your approval.³⁸

³⁶ “Three-way interrelation,” “the inner-epts-behavior,” “internal justification,” “Subjective Reality.”

³⁷ “External justification,” “Inter-Subjective Reality,” “non-accidental truth.”

³⁸ “Allegedly Pure Reality,” “unanswerable skepticism.”

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