

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND CONSTRUCTIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION
AMONG TURKISH UNIVERSITY YOUTH

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

JULY 2003

ABSTRACT

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July, 2003, 113 pages

The aim of this study was twofold: to investigate (i) the relationship between values, social identities, constructions of European Union (EU) and (ii) reactions to December 12th Copenhagen decision concerning Turkey. In order to fullfil the aim, two methodologically different analyses were carried out: A qualitative analysis of newspapers representing different ideologies, and a quantitative analysis of Turkish university students' responses to questionaries. The qualitative analysis revealed different constructions of Turkey's relationship with EU: Advantages of joining the union in terms of human rights and economic development were made in the newspapers as well as disadvantages in terms of emperalism. In additon, historical references to Tanzimat and Islahat decrees were

made. The quantitative analyses performed on university students' responses to questionnaires revealed three social identities: Nationalist-Islam, Turk, and European; three different constructions of EU: Europe As Different, Impermeable Boundaries, and Dissimilar but Advantageous; and two reactions to the decision, Justification and Attribution of decision to Differences and Conflict, as well as negative evaluation of decision. Further analyses revealed that values of patriotism, ethnocentrism, and antisecularism were significant predictors of Nationalist-Islam social identity. Patriotism was a significant predictor of Turk social identity and antisecularism was a significant predictor of European social identity. Seeing EU boundaries as impermeable was related to negative evaluation of the decision and Europe As Different was a significant predictor seeing the decision as a result of differences and conflict. Viewing Europe as dissimilar but advantageous was associated with justifying the decision and ethnocentrism was related to low justification (rejection) of the decision. European and Turk Identity emerged as a significant predictor of the construction of EU. Endorsement of European identity was related negatively to Europe As Different and to seeing EU boundaries as impermeable. High endorsement of European Identity was also negatively related to seeing Europe as dissimilar but advantageous.

Keywords: Social Identity, European Union, Values

ÖZ

SOSYAL KİMLİK VE TÜRK ÖĞRENCİLERİNİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NE İLİŞKİN İNŞAASI

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July, 2003, 113 sayfa

Bu çalışma, (i) sosyal kimlikler, değerler ve Avrupa Birliği (AB) inşası arasındaki ilişkiyi ve (ii) AB'nin 12 Aralık Kopenhag toplantısında Türkiye'ye ilişkin verilen kararlara yönelik tepkileri araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, iki farklı yöntemsel çözümleme yapılmıştır: farklı ideolojileri temsil eden gazetelerin niteliksel çözümlemesi ve üniversite öğrencilerine uygulanan sormacının niceliksel çözümlemesi. Farklı ideolojilerin temsilcisi olan gazetelerin niteliksel çözümlemesinden elde edilen bulgular Türkiye'nin AB ile ilişkisine yönelik farklı inşaların kurgulandığını göstermiştir. Gazetelerde, AB'nin inşası ile ilgili geçmişe, Tanzimat Bildirgesi ve bağımsızlık savaşı gibi modernleşme çabalarına, insan hakları, ekonomik gelişme gibi AB'ye üyeliğin getireceği

avantajlara gönderim gözlenmektedir. Üniversite öğrencilerinin sormacaya verdikleri yanıtların niceliksel çözümlemesi sonucunda, Milliyetçi-İslam, Türk ve Avrupalı olmak üzere üç sosyal kimlik; “Avrupa Farklıdır”, “Sınırlar Geçirgen Değildir” ve “Avrupa Farklı ama Avantajlıdır” olmak üzere üç farklı Avrupa Birliği inşası; kararın Farklılıklar ve Çatışma nedeniyle ortaya çıktığı ve bunun da yerinde bir karar olduğu ve kararın olumsuz olarak değerlendirilmesi olmak üzere Kopenhag kararlarına verilen iki tepki ortaya çıkmıştır. Sormacalar üzerine yapılan ileri çözümlemeler yurtseverlik, etnosentrizm ve anti-laik değerlerin Milliyetçi-İslam sosyal kimliğini anlamlı bir şekilde öngördüğü göstermiştir. Yurtseverlik, Türk sosyal kimliğinin, anti-laiklik ise Avrupalı sosyal kimliğinin anlamlı biçimde öngördüğü bulunmuştur. AB sınırlarını geçirimsiz olarak değerlendirmenin kararın olumsuz olarak değerlendirilmesi ile ilişkili olduğu, “Avrupa Farklıdır”ın ise kararın farklılıklar ve çatışmalar nedeniyle ortaya çıkması ile ilişkili olduğu saptanmıştır. Avrupa’yı farklı ama avantajlı olarak görmenin kararı onaylama ile ilişkili, etnosentrizmin ise kararın fazla onaylanmaması (reddi) ile ilişkili olduğu görülmektedir. Avrupalı ve Türk kimliği AB’nin inşasını anlamlı bir şekilde öngördüğü bulunmuştur. Avrupalı kimliğinin onayının, “Avrupa Farklıdır” ve “AB sınırları geçirgen değildir” ile, Avrupalı kimliğinin tamamıyla onayının ise Avrupa’yı farklı fakat avantajlı olarak görmek ile ters ilişkili olduğu saptanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Kimlik, Avrupa Birliği, Değerler.

To my family in gratitude, faith and love

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deep gratitude and sincere appreciation to Prof. Dr. Nuran Hortaçsu for her admirable supervision and enthusiasm throughout the study. I will always remember her patience and broad point of view. I would like to thank to

Assoc.Prof. Ercan Alp, Assoc. Prof. Melek Göregenli, Assoc. Prof. Bengi Öner,
Assoc. Prof.Aysen Cem- Değer and Bengi Ergüner for collecting the data. I would
like to reveal my sincere appreciation to Prof. Dr. Gürkan Tekman and Mert Teközel
for their comments and criticisms throughout the research. Special thanks to my mom,
dad, my sister and brother for their support. I am grateful to them forever.

I hereby declare that the research and the results presented herein are fully based on my own work. The resources consulted and included within this work have been fully cited and referenced in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct.

Signature _____

Date _____

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1.Aims of the Study

The aim of the study was to investigate the relation between existing social identities in Turkey and construction of European Union (EU). Qualitative and quantitative studies were conducted for this purpose. The qualitative study analysed references to EU in columns from newspapers representing different socio-political ideologies. The quantitative study aimed to investigate university students' constructions of EU and reactions to December 12th Copenhagen decision concerning Turkey from the point of view of Social Identity Theory. In accordance with Social Identity Theory premises, the investigation originated from an assumption that constructions of EU and reactions to its decision would be related to adoption of different religious-political social identities and to endorsement of various values associated with these identities. The various social identities in turn should reflect Turkey's past relations with Europe and her inner controversies with respect to attempts at westernisation.

Specifically, the study had several aims. One aim was to investigate dimensions of constructions concerning EU among Turkish university youth.

Another aim was to show that dimensions of these constructions would be related differential social identities based on historical developments. A third aim was to show that various social identities adopted by university students would be related to authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, patriotism and secularism, values associated with ideological issues in Turkey's recent past. A last aim was to investigate relations between values and two indicators of modernity, parental education and parental rural-urban origin.

In the following sections, basic concepts and premises of Social Identity Theory will be provided first followed by discussions of effects of status differences between groups on intergroup relations. The next section will report on variations in the image of Turkey from the point of view of Europe over time. A section on Turkey's attempts at westernisation, providing the background for the various social identities currently in effect in Turkey, will follow. A brief overview of developmental stages of EU and Turkey's journey toward full membership will also be provided.

1.2. Basic Concepts and Premises of Social Identity Theory

Social Identity Theory argues that human beings are social and have a motive for evaluating themselves positively (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994). Human beings have both personal and social identities. Personal identity refers to definition of individuals according their unique individual characteristics, whereas social identity refers to a person's self definition in terms of some social group membership

and values related to this group. These two identities are distinct, however they also influence one another. If a person's social identity is negatively valued, his/her personal identity also suffers.

According to SIT, (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 1999) social behaviour occurs along a continuum, ranging from interpersonal to intergroup. At the interpersonal extreme, all behaviours are determined by personal relationships between individuals and personal identity is salient. At the intergroup end of the dimension, all behaviours are determined by group affiliations and loyalties and social identity is salient. Shift along the interpersonal-intergroup continuum is a result of interaction between psychological and social forces. Depending on the context, people shift between individual and social identities. People may have different social identities. The relevant social identity depends on the context. When social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, people see themselves less as unique individuals and more as a prototypical member of their group. This 'depersonalisation' of the self transforms individual acts into collective behaviour and, when social identity is activated, people act according to their shared collective conceptualisation of self.

Social identity may be construed at different levels of abstraction. Level of abstraction might be at the superordinate level, that is human being as opposed to animal; at the intermediate social level, as an ingroup member (woman) as opposed to an outgroup member (men); and, at subordinate personal level, as a unique individual who is different from the others. Different social categories may or may

not be compatible at any point in time (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994). Compatibility of different social categories depends on historical factors. For example, Breakwell (1996) showed that European identity was more compatible with national identity of Germans than with national identity of UK and Ireland citizens. Haven (Haven, Stones, Sibayi & Le Roux, 2000) found that black South Africans in South Africa identified more with South Africa and Africa and less with global citizen than did Afrikaans. Trew and Benson (1996) demonstrated that, in Northern Ireland, British were related to Protestant whereas Irish was related to Northern Irish, Catholic, and Ulster. The regional 'Northern Irish' was accepted as a common identity by both Catholics and Protestants. In Scotland, separatists, consider Scot was incompatible with British because they equated British with English (Hopkins & Reicher, 1996). Conservatives, on the other hand, accepted British, as a superordinate category combining Scot, Irish, and English. Thus, they considered Scot and British as subcategories of a superordinate category.

1.2.1. Categorization and Social Identity

The salience of any kind of self-category is determined by comparisons between stimuli. Self Categorization Theory (a derivative of Social Identity Theory) explains the salience of any given level of categorization as a result of interaction between the relative accessibility of a particular category and the 'fit' between category specifications and reality (Ellemers, et.al.1999). Relative accessibility is influenced by factors such as a person's past experience, present expectations,

motives, goals, and needs that a person uses for self definition in a specific situation. Relative accessibility also depends on person's degree of identification with the group and the degree to which a particular identity is central to his self definition and the degree to which it is valued.

The principle of 'fit' has two aspects: comparative fit and normative fit. Comparative fit is defined by the meta contrast ratio (MCR). MCR is the ratio of within group variation to between groups variation on a given dimension. Other things being equal, the dimension which results in the largest meta contrast ratio, will be chosen in any context. For example, religion rather than ethnicity may be chosen as the dimension differentiating European and Middle Eastern countries because most European countries are Christian and most Middle East countries are Muslim and because both European and Middle Eastern countries show variation with respect to ethnicity. Range and distribution of stimuli are also important for MCR. Two stimuli, which are close together on the relevant dimension, may be categorized into different categories if the range is small but they may be placed in the same category if the range is large. For instance, Europeans may view Turkey as closer to Europe if they include Middle Eastern countries among the countries they consider, and less European if they do not take Middle Eastern countries into consideration. Thus, Social Identity Theory views self-categorization as a dynamic, context dependent process determined by comparative relations within a certain context.

‘ Normative fit’ is the perception of the match between category and the content characteristics of stimuli. In other words, it is a fit between characteristics of the stimulus and expectations about characteristics of the category. Expectations concerning category content are often based on contents of social representations and stereotypes. According to Social Identity Theory, content of stereotypes are based on historical and current relations between groups comprising the categories. Contents of stereotypes or social representations may be construed as contents of identities.

1.2.2.Stereotypes as the Content of Identities

Although both social representations and stereotypes are based on historical and current relationships, the two concepts originate from different theoretical backgrounds. Research on stereotype has a long history in social psychology and stereotypes are defined as “individual schemas which include emotional content as positive or negative and are associated with our perceptions of social groups” (p, 464, Brewer and Crano, 1994).

Stereo means ‘printing’ and implies rigidity. However ‘rigidity’ of stereotypes is a controversial issue in social psychology. Social cognition tradition argues for their rigidity whereas Sherif and Social Identity Theory argue that their contents are context dependent (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994). Sherif (1966) states that the psychology of intergroup attitudes and behaviours should specify the contemporary events within the framework of both past relationships between people and their future goals. The past and historical events are evaluated as important since they

enter into the definition of the problem of intergroup attitudes and the images of our own and other groups. Sherif claimed that the content of stereotypes might change to a more favourable direction if two rival groups expect to cooperate. This argument proposed by Sherif provides an explanation for the European countries, which decided to cooperate and tried to form a 'supra-national identity' even if some of them were rivals in the history. Tajfel (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994) also claimed that stereotypes are context dependent and can change. He cited research that provided support for the changing nature of the stereotypes and effects of the 'social representations of the history' on the stereotype change.

Studies by Buchanan showed that stereotypes were vulnerable to changes in international relations brought about by WW II. Stereotypes of Japanese were intelligent and industrious and progressive in 1933 but changed to imitative, sly and extremely nationalistic as a result of WWII (1951; cited in Oakes, Haslam and Turner 1994). Buchanan also (1951) stated that Americans' stereotypes of Russian changed markedly in the post-war context such that Russian were perceived as less brave and hardworking but more cruel and conceited in 1948 than 1942. Prothro and Melikian (1955; cited in Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994) studied the changes in Arab students' stereotypes as a result of American presence in the city of Beirut. The representations of other groups were not changed but stereotypes of Americans changed considerably. Americans were viewed as sociable and superficial after their presence in Beirut. Thus, stereotypes may change as the international relations between the countries change.

Theory of social representations enriched the scope of stereotypes and linked sociology, anthropology and history to the field of social psychology (Farr, 1993). Social representation theory was a step from an individual to a macro and collective level of explanation. Theory of social representations is a sociological form of social psychology. Moscovici chose Durkheim as the ancestor for his theory. Social representations take into account history and culture of the society. Moscovici emphasized changing nature of stereotypes from culture to culture and time to time within any one culture. Social representations are related to other essential concepts in the social sciences such as attitudes, public opinion and ideology.

Lyons (1996; cited in Breakwell, 1996), discussed the role of social memories in reconstruction of identities. She stated that large scale social events affect the formation of collective memories and argued that group's ways of sustaining and reconstructing information interact with contextual factors in the construction of group identities. Thus, groups gather information and reconstruct them in such a way as to show their continuity, collective self-esteem, distinctiveness and efficacy. For instance, although a group wants to forget an event that happened in history other groups may not allow this event to be forgotten and keep it alive. In addition, Lyons argued that mass media played an important role in the construction of the past. Dominant groups often manipulated what the society remembers or how they remember certain events by propaganda and/or censorship. Furthermore, Lyons argued that the way of constructing the past was not free from existing social representational systems and other groups' construction of the past. Because

contents of stereotypes are context dependent, they often reflect status differences between groups. Dimension defining status, in turn, often reflects the dominant groups' constructions.

1.2.3. Contents of National Stereotypes

Poppe and Linssen (1999), analysed contents of national stereotypes of six Central and Eastern European countries. In this study countries were rated on a number of traits and on dimensions related to economic and political features. The traits were intelligent, efficient, competitive, self-confident, clumsy, slow, honest, tolerant, modest, aggressive, rude, and selfish. The features rated were size, economic status, cultural relations with other nation states, relational features of nation states, and, geographical location. Two dimensions emerged from factor analysis of trait ratings. The dimensions were competence and morality. Traits such as self-confident, competitive, efficient, intelligent; clumsy, slow, loaded on the first dimension. Traits such as honest, tolerant, modest, aggressive, rude, selfish loaded on morality dimension. They found that the two dimensions differentiated the countries and that the content of nationality stereotypes were related to perceived economic, political, cultural, geographical, and relational features of the nation states. Size of the country and perceived conflict between the states affected the content of national stereotypes in terms of morality whereas economic status of the country affected the content of national stereotypes in terms of competence.

1.2.4. Consequences of Categorization

Definition of self or others in terms of category membership results in accentuation of intragroup similarities and intergroup differences on the relevant dimension. It also has emotional and behavioural consequences. Social Identity Theory postulates that social comparisons between groups which are relevant to an assessment of one's social identity produce pressures for intergroup differentiation and a need to maintain positive evaluation in terms of that identity, i.e positive distinctiveness seeking. Therefore, people feel a need to evaluate their group more favourably than outgroups on the relevant dimensions (Oakes, Haslam and Turner, 1994). This psychological analysis is applicable to various real life intergroup situations. Thus, unlike Sherif, SIT argued that realistic competition between groups is not a necessary condition for intergroup differentiation or discrimination against outgroups. Turner (1975; cited in Capozza and Brown, 2000) stated that social categorization and intergroup differentiation are the basic causes of competition between ingroups and outgroups.

Mummendey, Klink and Brown (2001) examined the relationship between national identification, ingroup evaluation and outgroup rejection. They found that identification with one's ingroup was associated with derogation of foreigners under intergroup comparison situations. In addition, regardless of whether participants were induced to compare their own nation with other nations or compare their own nation's present with its past, ingroup evaluation covaried with strong national identification. Intergroup comparison implied a negative relationship between

positive evaluation of one's own group and devaluation of the other group. On the contrary, temporal comparisons such as 'how the country had fared in the past or might do in the future' did not bring about this kind of negative interdependence between ingroup and outgroup evaluation. Under those conditions, positive evaluation of ingroup was found to be independent of outgroup derogation.

Mummendey, Klink and Brown (2001) argued that the concepts of 'patriotism' and 'nationalism' were associated with different types of comparisons. They made a distinction between nationalism and patriotism. Nationalism is defined as positive feelings towards one's nation and is similar to the concepts of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism in that it involves outgroup derogation and rejection. On the other hand, patriotism was defined as an essentially positively valued concept since it represents feelings of attachment to one's country independent of derogation of the outgroup. They stated that inducing an intergroup comparison lead to intergroup behaviour that corresponds to 'nationalism' and 'blind patriotism'. Moreover, temporal comparison situations in the absence of explicit outgroup and comparison of the country with its past situation was associated with 'constructive patriotism'. Thus, they suggested that a way to avoid outgroup exclusion and derogation might be a positive evaluation of one's own nation not on intergroup comparisons but on temporal comparisons (evaluation of the country on a self-referential basis).

However, Kagitcibaşı (1973) found a significant correlation between patriotism and authoritarianism values in 1973 in a Turkish sample.

Oudenhoven and his co-workers (2002) examined asymmetrical international attitudes. They stated that asymmetrical attitudes should occur most between countries that are linguistically related but differ in size. Participants were from Belgium (Dutch and French speaking), The Netherlands, France, Great Britain and Denmark. Results showed that members of smaller nations perceived the larger nations as less sympathetic than the smaller nations however larger nations did not show asympathy toward the smaller nations. The reasons for this were traced back to historical conflicts and to perceived threats to social identity. It was argued that larger nations that are linguistically similar were threatening to smaller countries. As predicted, French speaking Belgians described the French as less sympathetic and more arrogant than vice versa. They also perceived the French as less similar to Belgians than the French perceived Belgians to themselves. The same was true for Dutch speaking Belgians and the linguistically related Germans. Results from Belgian and Dutch participants were interesting since Dutch-speaking Belgians perceived the Dutch as less sympathetic and attributed much more arrogance to the Dutch than Dutch did towards the Belgians and Dutch-speaking Belgians also perceived themselves as less similar to the Dutch than vice versa. However, French-speaking Belgians did not perceive the Dutch as arrogant. In this sense, common language is a factor of similarity but brings about a source of differentiation and striving for distinctive social identity.

As demonstrated in Poppe and Linsen's study (1999) creating an alternative dimension might be a way for overcoming threats to distinctive social identity

resulting from resemblance in terms of language. When, the comparison is made on a multidimensional basis, groups reach a consensus that certain traits and abilities are more characteristics of one group whereas the other dimension may characterize the other group (Ellemers; et.al, 1999). Poppe and Linsey study, discussed above, provided an example for this occurrence. Outgroup favouritism was found to depend on the economic status and size of the out group on status dimension so that citizens of smaller and poorer nations did not perceive their nation as competent. Yet, ingroup favouritism on a new/alternate dimension, that is morality, increased as a function of economic status and size of out groups. The above finding is an example of how low status groups use social creativity in intergroup relations in order to increase intergroup distinctiveness. In some situations reality is a kind of a barrier that constrains the ability to define ingroup as 'better'. In these situations, individuals engage in more subtle ways to reject the unfavourable image of the ingroup.

Doosje, Spears and Koomen (1995; cited in Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 1999) emphasized individuals' need to view their ingroup as superior and also their need to consider existing social reality. They presented participants information about their ingroups' behaviours and the behaviours of outgroups. The behaviours were either superior or inferior and the reality status of the information was manipulated by the variability of the ingroup and outgroup behaviour as homogenous or heterogeneous. When ingroup was superior to the outgroup, participants accepted this difference regardless of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of their groups' performance. When group members were told that their group was inferior,

participants accepted this information only when the group was homogenous. When groups were presented as heterogeneous, participants perceived the situation as nonrepresentative and, therefore, evaluated the information as less reliable. In other words, individuals seek a balance between positive identity and a need to stay in touch with reality. When positive identity of ingroup was questioned, they stressed homogeneity as an indicator of reliability. When positive identity of ingroup was implied they were not very particular about reliability.

1.2.5. Status Differences

Although members of groups try to maintain positive distinctiveness, reality constraints may work against this tendency. Because stereotypes reflect status differences between groups, low status groups often accept the existing negative content of their stereotypes. For instance, black college students accepted their lower status and characterized themselves with negative adjectives such as lazy, loud, superstitious, and ostentatious. Minority groups may also accept their low status and behave in terms of stereotypes that are in line with their low status (Bayton, 1941 cited in; Oakes et.al, 1994).

Stereotypes not only reflect status differences between groups but also reflect dominant groups' constructions. Constructions of dominant groups are generally accepted through the process of 'system justification' (Tajfel, 1972; cited in Oakes et.al, 1994). Sidanus (1999) elaborates on the concept of 'system justification' in his Social Dominance Theory and uses the term 'legitimising myths'. Legitimising

myths consist of attitudes, values, beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies that bring about justifications of social practices. Social Dominance Theory states that authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, nationalism, and sexism are different expressions of the same basic human predisposition toward group based social hierarchy. Thus social hierarchy is justified by the legitimising myths (Sidanus, 1999).

SIT argues that perception of low ingroup status as illegitimate causes feelings of anger and that low status members may try to enhance their status position (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 1999). Perceptions of legitimacy do not only affect low status groups but also affect high status groups. For instance, White South Africans who perceived the status difference between themselves and Black South Africans as illegitimate displayed more positive attitudes toward Blacks than White South Africans perceiving the status relations as 'just' (Finchilescu and Delarey, 1991, cited in; Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 1999). On the other hand, there is also research showing that perception of the ingroup's status position as legitimately low leads to enhanced intergroup conflict (Ellemers Baretto and Spears, 1999).

Weber, Mummendey and Walczus (2002) examined perception of legitimacy. They stated that the perception of legitimacy of status differences was related to relative prototypicality of the ingroup. The more the ingroup was perceived as prototypical in relation to a superordinate category the more group differences were perceived as legitimate. In addition, they found that the relationship between prototypicality and perceived legitimacy was moderated by the valence of the inclusive category. In other words, relative prototypicality for the inclusive category

justified the ingroup's high status position when the inclusive category was valued positively; when the inclusive category was valued negatively, relative prototypicality had the opposite effect. Thus, countries that value EU and view their nation as prototypical of Europe may perceive rejection of less prototypical countries as legitimate.

Wenzel's (2001) study about judgements of entitlements and representation of the superordinate category is directly related with Turkey's membership to EU. Wenzel (2001) argued that social categorizations influenced judgements of entitlement. He stated that, representatives of the superordinate category and views about potential recipients of distribution are important for evaluations about entitlements. According to Wenzel the superordinate category draws the boundaries of justice concerns and differentiates the potential recipients from the others who are excluded from the allocation. The recipients who are more prototypical for the superordinate category evaluate themselves as more deserving than the others. How the superordinate category is represented in a social context and perceiver's social identity are important while making entitlement judgements. Thus, justice and identity are related to each other. Entitlement judgements reflect categorizations that we use in order to define ourselves in a given social context and to structure and understand the situation.

Wenzel's study provided support for those arguments. When German participants defined themselves relatively as more Europeans than Turks, they evaluated EU's decision to deny Turkey positively and considered Turkey as less

entitled to EU membership than other countries. This evaluation included perception of Turkey outside the superordinate category of Europe. Thus, the less prototypical Turkey was evaluated relative to Germany for the primary category of Europe the more Germans regarded the decision to deny Turkey's candidature to EU membership as just. In the light of Wenzel's (2001) findings it can be stated that justice and identity are related to each other. Thus, entitlement judgements are the reflections of categorizations and identity-relevant assessments.

SIT argues that identification with the ingroup and permeability of ingroup boundaries play important roles in group members' responses to the status quo versus change. For instance, when group boundaries were flexible and open people in low status groups showed a low level of identification with ingroup compared to a situation where boundaries were fixed and not permeable (Ellemers, Spears and Doosje, 1999). Permeability of group boundaries and identification with ingroup influence whether individuals will engage in individual action toward social mobility or collective action aiming social change. Permeability of boundaries may also influence group identification such that low permeability may be associated with high identification for low status group members.

Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam (1990) analysed the conditions in which disadvantaged group members either accept their situation, take individual action, or make an attempt at collective action. Permeability was used as an independent variable in their research. When entrance into an advantaged group was perceived to be completely open, people had a tendency to engage in individual rather than

collective action. However, when entrance to an advantaged group was perceived as completely closed, collective action was more likely to take place. Individual action took place and little interest was shown in collective action even when only a mere token percentage (2 % quato condition) of the disadvantaged group was allowed access to advantaged group. Furthermore, individuals who believed that they were near the criterion for entrance into the advantaged group were more likely to show individual than collective action. When the advantaged group was perceived as completely closed, collective nonnormative action took place. The most striking result of this study was that in the 2 % quato condition, when disadvantaged group members were explicitly treated like outsiders, these members still showed efforts to improve their situation rather than engage in collective action.

Level of identification is also likely to influence the inclination to leave a group in order to become a member of another group regardless of whether boundaries are permeable or not. Specifically, in low status groups, high identifiers are less likely to engage in upward mobility than low identifiers. Effects of ingroup identification and permeability of group boundaries on group commitment were investigated by Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (1999). Results of the study revealed that low and high identifiers differed in their readiness for individual mobility and this did not depend on objective reality, that is, impermeability of the group boundaries. Low identifiers wanted to change their groups even though impossibility of changing group membership was mentioned. On the other hand, high identifiers did not attempt to leave their low status group when the possibility to leave the group

was indicated. In the absence of threat to identity, low and high identifiers showed different patterns of behavioural preference in terms of individual mobility. High identifiers were more likely to stick to their group than low identifiers. This showed that the structural-contextual variables such as group status and permeability of group boundaries are less important than level of identification and people's behavioural preference in terms of individual mobility depends upon their level of identification with their group. In the light of these research findings it can be stated that, group identification is both a determinant and a result of contextual changes (Ellemers, et.al.1999).

1.2.6. Superordinate Identity and Superordinate Norms

Brewer (2000; cited in Capozza and Brown, 2000) argued that cooperative interdependence between different groups may bring about superordinate identity that reduces outgroup derogation and ingroup favouritism. Common identity and cooperative interdependence between groups may decrease subjective competition between groups and lead to superordinate categorization. This argument and evidence from research have implications for large scale intergroup relations. For instance, the unity of European countries under the EU umbrella is a form of creating a superordinate identity by cooperative interdependence. As suggested by Breakwell (1996), history of international relations may be seen as barriers for this unity and national identities may be viewed as incompatible with the superordinate identity.

Hornsey and Hogg (1998) examined the motivation for distinctiveness seeking when subgroups were included in a superordinate category. They argued that participants who did not feel distinctive in their superordinate category would display more bias against the other subgroup. Humanities and math science students were included as subgroups in a superordinate category, University of Queensland. The results showed that the more inclusive the superordinate category (University of Queensland) was assessed to be, the more bias was shown by math science students toward humanities students or vice versa. This supports the argument that individuals in overly inclusive groups are motivated to achieve greater distinctiveness and membership in an overly inclusive group can motivate individuals to seek distinctiveness at the sub-group level.

Mlicki and Ellemers (1996) examined Polish and Dutch in order to test the basic premises of self-categorization and SIT theories. In the European context, the Netherlands and Poland were stated to be the two countries with different historical and background and political aspirations. These differences were likely to play a role in the way national and social identities were expressed. Therefore, national and European identifications of Poles and Dutch were expected to differ. The results showed that Polish students had a more negative national stereotype than the Dutch but they had a strong sense of national identity. For Polish students, having a distinct national identity was more important than creating a positive national image. These results showed that, 'positive group distinctiveness' as SIT argued was not an universal phenomenon and it can be stated that in some situations individuals may

prefer negative distinctiveness to a lack of a distinct identity. The most striking result of this research was that accentuation of national identification as Polish did not hinder Poles' identification as Europeans. Close levels of identifications with subordinate and superordinate category did not inhibit each other as Social Categorization Theory argues.

However, there is some evidence that identification with the superordinate category may lead to distinctiveness seeking at another level. Kessler and Mummendey (2001) examined the categorization process at superordinate and subgroup levels and pointed to the impact of level of categorization on reducing tension between groups. In their research, East and West German participants belonged to high and low status groups and their study provided evidence that self-categorizations at subgroup level of inclusiveness is related to inter-group conflict.

In this study, categorization as 'East Germans' enhances public protest against status inferiority to West Germans but categorization as 'German' perpetuated xenophobia resulting in negative evaluation of non-Germans. Thus, different levels of categorization brought about different levels of intergroup conflict. Stronger salience of subgroup identity may lead to public protest by low status group whereas recategorization in a common ingroup identity perpetuated intergroup conflict towards a new outgroup through xenophobia. In the light of this, 'other' was always needed for categorization to take place. Thus, EU's attempts for creation of supranational identity may bring about advantages for member states but there will always be outsiders that the European identity is defined against.

Worchel (1999) argued that being a poor member of a high status group was most disturbing and brought about a desire to leave the group. However, being a poor member of a low status group did not bring about a desire to leave the group but led to outgroup derogation. Thus it may be expected that low SES members of a low status nations (such as Turkey in the European context) may indicate higher rejection of outgroups and display more ethnocentric values.

1.3. Historical Overview of the Image of ‘Turk’

Researchers investigating the image of the Turk in Europe argue Turk and Islam are inseparable from the point of view of Europe. Soykut (2003) argues that Arabs’ conquest of Spain and Sicily in the eighth and the ninth centuries has perpetuated Europe’s definition of itself through Christendom and construction of Islam as the ‘other’. Thus, in terms of Social Identity Theory, religion has become an important dimension of differentiation between Europe and Turkey. Soykut (2003) identified three elements underlying the image of Islam in Europe. The first one was the military. It was based on Arabs' conquests of the Middle East, North Africa, Spain and Sicily. In addition the Ottoman conquest in the Balkans, Central and Southern Europe. The conquests of the Araps were important since these lands were considered to belong to Christendom. The second element is Theological. Islam was problematic for Christianity because it claimed to replace it. The third element was related to the structure of Europe. Christendom lacked political unity and Europe was not united. The Holy Roman Empire had the ‘Emperor’ and ‘Pope’ who often did

not agree with each other. This situation brought about political separation in Christian Europe. Furthermore, after the collapse of the Roman Empire, the territories of the Byzantine Empire in Eastern Europe were politically separated from Western Christendom and Western Christendom was governed by a loose political system. The East was characterised by a somewhat more unitary political structure, that is 'feudalism', and Islam had unitary political structure based on religion.

Historians and imagologists seem to agree on several milestones and related phases in the creation of Islamic and Western images (Burçoğlu-Kuran, 2003; Soykut, 2003). They also seem to agree that Turk has always been conceptualised as the 'other' by Europeans. Consistent with SIT's arguments concerning contextual relations on national stereotyping. The image of the Turk was formed, transformed, and manipulated according to the political agenda, international relationships, conflicts, and interests between nations. The media also played an enormous role in shaping and spreading the image. In spite of some fluctuations and variations due to historical events and changes in power relations, the Turk has represented the negative end of the good-bad/moral-immoral dimension for Europe. As predicted by Social Identity Theory, the image of the outgroup was construed as qualitatively and evaluative distinct from the ingroup, European.

The Malazgirt victory in 1071 by the Seljukide Turks against the Eastern Romans was the indication of the newly appearing Muslim power. A year later, in 1072, Palermo city in Sicily was reconquered by the Normans from the Arabs, ending a three hundred year domination of Sicily by an Arab Emirate. According to

Burçoğlu-Kuran (2003), who studied the image of ‘Turk’ by combining research in diverse fields such as comparative literature, history, anthropology, and social psychology and who took into account socio-cultural, economical and historical background variables, the image of the ‘Turk’ in Europe first emerged in 11th century after the victory of Malazgirt. During the expansion period that lasted until the 15th century, Turks created great horror. This horror was perpetuated by victories in Nicopolis (1396), Varna (1444), and Kosovo (1448).

A second milestone was the Spanish conquest of Granada in 1492. Granada was the last place in Iberian Peninsula that was under Arab Muslim governance. Arabs were defeated and expelled after eight hundred years of co-existence with Christians. On the other hand, the peak of Renaissance in Italy and the fall of Constantinople in 1453 caused to an end in Muslim power that was associated with the Arabs in Europe for eight hundred years passed to the Ottoman Turks. The horror of the Turk reached its peak in 1453 with the conquest of Constantinople by the Turkish army under the leadership of Sultan Mehmet II. However, there existed variations in the images of different European countries due to the geographical proximity to the Ottoman Empire. In the Balkans and the Mediterranean countries, a negative image of ‘Turk’ appeared, whereas, a relatively more favourable image emerged in northern countries.

The negative image of the ‘Turk’ increased in Central Europe in 16th century. During this period stereotypes and images about the ‘Turks’ were negative.

However, there was also an admirable Turkish image because of its army and way of government. In this sense, the Image of the lustful Turk' was a threat in terms of social and ethical values of Europe and seemed to threaten the social as well as ethical values of Christianity. Ottoman army was defeated at the second Siege of Vienna towards the end of 17th century, and this caused a shift in the image of the Turk. The defeat of Ottoman army at the gates of Vienna against European armies caused feeling of relief in Europeans and changed the 'undefeteable' image of Turks. After that time, Turks were associated with adjectives such as 'ugly', 'cruel', 'treacherous', 'deceitful', 'unreliable', 'ridiculous' and 'sensual' (Burçoğlu-Kuran, 2003). Thus, after Vienna, negative aspects about the image of 'Turk' remained, whereas, the horror about Turks disappeared.

Eighteenth century brought Enlightenment and the idea of 'tolerance' and 'interest in religions' to Europe. The appreciation of great religions was thought as steps in the spiritual evolution of mankind. During this period, Europe showed an interest in Turkish art and indicated appreciation of the Turkish way of life. Tales with oriental and Turkish motifs became very popular and the Orient was associated with a world of fantasies. The concepts of 'Turk' and 'Oriental' were used interchangeably. Thus, a change in the positive direction occurred in the image of the Turk. However, Burçoğlu-Kuran (2003) notes variations in the images of different European countries due to the impact of colonization. Turks were sometimes seen as 'devil' who ignored God's commands; yet sometimes the Turk was evaluated almost positively and represented as someone of whom one could be

jealous. For example, 18th century German media overlooked negative aspects and mentioned favourable qualities.

In the late 18th and 19th centuries, colonisation brought about changes in Western perceptions of the Orient. Oriental studies gained importance in Europe. Paintings from the Orient became popular. A new school of painting, the Orientals School, evolved in countries such as France, England, Austria, Italy and the Netherlands with minor differences in terms of taste and manner. Paintings of this school reflected a new perspective which associated the orient with 'precious objects', 'wealth', 'comfort', 'sensuality' and 'sexual freedom' for 'men' 'beautiful women', 'free animals', 'laziness', 'idleness', 'a relaxed atmosphere', 'lack of discipline' and 'a slight backwardness' (Burçoğlu-Kuran, 2003).

After the Declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Turkey became a democratic and secular state and adopted Western norms. Atatürk tried to create a new image of Turkey, which was based on democracy and secularism. In other words, religion of Islam lost its significance for the new republic. Moreover, Turkey proclaimed that she would not claim lands outside its borders. With these proclamations, Atatürk wanted to put an end to the image of 'expansionist Turk'. After the Declaration of the Republic there was a positive shift in the image of the Turk in the minds of the Europeans (Burçoğlu-Kuran, 2003).

Buğday (2002) showed alterations in the image of 'Turk' in middle of the 1950s by analysing 'Der Spiegel Magazine'. He argued that until the mid 1950s

Turkey was perceived as a modern Westernised country. However, in 1950s this image changed in a negative direction and the military coup in 1960 accelerated negative attitudes. Turkey was associated with the undemocratic coup and violations of human rights. During this period, 'Der Spiegel' drew an image of Turks as oppressors of people under their governance, and specifically as oppressors of Kurds. Furthermore, Turks were depicted as racially and culturally different from Europeans and as inferior to Europeans. Criticisms about domestic affairs such as human rights, economy, bureaucracy, corruption, and crime were related in great detail by Der Spiegel in the fifties. Buğday asserted that the prejudices that were established in history were recalled and renewed and provided the basis of the negative image of the Turk in the fifties. He stated that, these images were made permanent and latent by the power of media and perpetuated stereotypes shared by the majority of people in Germany.

Aydin (2002) also explored how Western culture depicts a non-Western culture by examinations of Western writings. He highlighted the associations between discourse and politics and, more broadly, between discourse and culture. He selected some texts and tried to figure out the representations of the 'Turk' within these texts. Stereotypical images appeared in travel books and magazines and in other media sources such as cinema. These stereotypes were generally negative. They included religious conspiracy, military coup, the drug business, terrorist activity, antique smuggling, political espionage, ethnic genocide and torture. Turks were portrayed as dishonest people such as drug producers, smugglers, torturers,

genocidal killers, terrorists, conspirators, and barbarians. They were often described as immoral and smelly workers who did the meanist jobs.

To summarize, with some variation Turkey has been represented as the negatively evaluated 'other' by Europeans after 1950s. The image of 'Turk' is associated with low status both in terms of economic power and adherence to human rights and values. This image is directly opposite of criteria required for entry to EU.

1.4.Modernization of Turkey and the Roots of Various Social Identities.

Modernization in Europe emerged as an outgrowth of the rise of market economy. An important component of modernization was the nation state. The nation state was conceived as being responsible for the protection of the family and human rights of individuals. Protection of the nation state in the new modern world was at its peak at the end of the last quarter of the 20th century. Furthermore, there existed debates about new concepts such as human rights, patriotism, and sovereignty. Although, the market economy and protection of the society against this new economical system by the discourse of freedom and participation showed variations from society to society, the basis of the modernization process was nearly universal (Kasaba, 1999).

The basis of Western concept of nationality was the French concept, rooted in the movement of enlightenment. The ideology behind this was cosmopolitanism and universalism. On the other hand, German nationality was the anti-thesis of this ideology and shaped with Romantism, which emphasized ethniccity and cultur. The roots of Ottoman and Turkish reformists' ideology can be traced back to the French

revolution (Kadıoğlu, 1997). However, Turkish nationalism includes both the German ‘culture ‘ and French ‘civilisation’ meanings of the word. Thus, Turkish nationality was based on both enlightenment and romanticism; in other words, it was a synthesis of civilization and culture. Conceptualisation of nationalism by Ottoman elites and by the founders of the new Turkish republic included modernization as well as nationalism. Consistent with an ethnocentric position, the basis of this new nationalism as promoted by Ziya Gökalp and included adoption of science, technology and institutional forms from the west but protection of cultural heritage (Kadıoğlu, 1997).

Modernization of Turkey had two characteristics: the first one was that it involved top down application by elites. The political leaders during middle of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century defined modernization as a disciplined process. Their basic assumption was that the society can be altered by the reformulation of its' institutions. This conceptualisation increased the importance of elites' roles. The second characteristic of Turkish modernization was that it was superficial. The image of modernization was adopted rather than the ideas on which modern institutions were based (Kadıoğlu, 1997). Thus, it is argued that, the image of modernity was more important than the ideas of modernity for the Turkish elite. Many Ottoman, Jeune-Turque and Kemalist leaders equated modernization with the appearance of the people, cleanliness of the streets, and westernisation of institutions. For example, in 1829 ‘sarık’ was replaced by ‘fes’, but after 100 years ‘fes’ became a symbol of backwardness. In 1925 ‘fes’ was banned and ‘hat law’ was passed

(Kasaba, 1999). Ottoman / Turkish elites often used the terms ‘old/ new’ and ‘traditional/ westernised’ in order to introduce themselves as the essential forerunners of modernization.

Ataturk’s ideology of national identity included all people who fought against the enemies during the war of liberation. This conceptualisation was the French definition of nationality based on ‘voluntarily nationalism’ and was reflected in his famous saying ‘Happy is the one who says I am a Turk’. Bora (1999) claimed that although Turkish nationality was defined in a humanitarian and universal manner during the first years of Turkish republic but, in essence, it was not very different from ‘nationalism’ and ‘authoritarianism’. Bora (1999) discussed the ambivalent connotation of the ‘national identity’ during the first years of Turkish Republic. He argued that it included both patriotism and attachment to the political system by a patriarchal bond. Thus, ‘nationalism’ implied a sacred meaning, which had an ethnocentric basis. This ethnocentric viewpoint shows itself on construction of civilization. Turkish identity was seen as a component of national identity and innovations were introduced as ‘Turkish’. For example, Latin alphabet was introduced as the ‘new Turkish alphabet’. Although the roots of the innovations were from the West, they were introduced as ‘Turkish’ and this showed that the national identity included ‘Turkish identity’. This ideology did not wholly exclude the dimension of culture. Culture as conceptualised as ‘Turkish’ affected the formation of Turkish and National identity in Turkey. In other words, the ethnocentric

ideology of Ziya Gokalp, which recommended the adoption of science, technology and institutional forms from the west but protection of cultural heritage, was adopted.

After the Republic, Ottoman Empire was constructed as negatively as the 'old' rejected identity and 'Turkish' identity was adopted as the new positive identity. The cultural heritage with Ottoman Empire was denied and dimension of culture was based on Turkish identity. This view is consistent with Bora's (1999) assertion that the representation of the 'other' defined in the new Turkish republic was not non-Muslim minorities but that the 'other' was defined as the 'old' Turkey, that is Ottoman civilization dominated by Muslim ideology. Muslim ideology of the Ottoman Empire was also associated with 'Arab identity', and being betrayed by the Arabs during WW I contributed to the negative image of Arabs (Bora, 1999).

Keyder (1999) summarized the direction of modernization in Turkey during 1990s. He stated that, at the end of the 20th century, Turkish society was faced with a deep uncomfortable feeling that he viewed was the consequence of high sociological disorder and dissolution of institutions. He evaluated the situation of this disorder as bankruptcy of the modernization process. The basis of modernization in Turkey was conceptualised as becoming like the Western world. According to the forerunners of the modernization ideology, internalisation of Western cultural dimensions was really important in order to catch up with civic society. However, application of modernization from top to bottom brought about benefits to certain elites in the country.

Keyder (1999) stated that modernization from top to bottom is a kind of a limitation of the whole process that is abused by the elites of the society such as elitists. According to him, ‘modernization’ was an entire project that also contained Western values. These values were not only rationalism and bureaucracy but also secularism, gender equality, and autonomy of individuals. Thus, it was an ideology that aimed at transformation of the society. Turkish and Islamic values were unable to find place for themselves in the society in the process of modernization.

According to Keyder, bankruptcy of modernization process in Turkey resulted in the emergence of another ideology that accepted unwesternised modernization. It was like a post-modern viewpoint that highlighted cultural aspects of society. This ideology was defined with an Islamic viewpoint and called as ‘Islamic and modern’. The proponents argued that the normative ideals of the enlightenment movement were dead and modernization should take place in a local and authentic manner (Keyder, 1999). The rise of the ‘Islamic identity’ in Turkey is evaluated by Keyder as a consequence of top down application of modernization mentality. He also argued that, national progress and promises about economical welfare were achieved till the 1980s but economical improvements did not bring about autonomy of individuals. On the contrary, abuse of social rights weakened the concept of ‘patriotism’ and ‘populism’ turned out to be alternative strategy for state officials to strengthen their power. In other words, the direction of modernization in Turkey has taken an authoritarian and patriarchal rather than a patriotic path (Keyder, 1999).

This brief historical overview Turkey's recent past indicates the roots of various identities in present day Turkey. One type of identity appears to be a nationalistic identity that was aimed since the foundation of Turkish Republic. As previously stated, attempts at catching up with the Western civilizations were associated with National identity. Therefore, National identity is based on Turkish ethnicity (Kadıoğlu, 1997). As such it was associated with ethnocentric and authoritarian values that implied ingroup bias and outgroup derogation. This identity may be associated with distinctiveness seeking from the outgroup 'Europe'.

As Keyder (1999) stated, modernization in Turkey followed a different path and a new identity appeared with an argument of 'Islam and modern'. The main emphasis of this identity was on the religion of Islam. Therefore this identity is expected to be related to both antiseccular and religious beliefs. It is also likely to seek distinctiveness from Europe as the 'other', because, historically, religion has been a dimension of differentiation between Ottomans and Europe.

A third kind of identity is expected to be associated with humanistic values and a view of Turkey as a Western country. This identity would be associated with acceptance of lower status of Turkey relative to prototypical supranational European identity. Thus it would be associated with accepting legitimacy of lower status of Turkey vis a vis EU. This identity may also be associated with nonauthoritarian, nonethnocentric and patriotic values mentioned by Kagıtcıbaşı (1973) and Mummendey et.al (2001).

1.5. Foundation of European Union*

European Union is one the most important formations in the 20th century. European integration is the result of efforts of sovereign nations to delegate their sovereignty and to exercise it jointly. Thus in SIT terms it was an attempt to create a superordinate group that increased cooperation between numbers of countries.

In 1950, six countries Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and the Netherlands reached an agreement to produce and trade coal and steel. The main goal of this formation was to be economically influential in the world market economy. Soon after, this economical formation spread its aim and turned out to be an integration that also cooperated for political and security aims (Guttmann, 2001). The basis of this political cooperation can be traced back to the end of World War II when Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman and Paul-Henri Spaak initiated the process of unification of Europe. EU might also be evaluated as a political experiment.

The first expansion stage of the union was in 1961, with the application of England, Ireland, Norway and Denmark for full membership. President of France, De Gaulle, was against the membership of England since England cooperated with US about nuclear weapons. In 1967 England applied again. De Gaulle claimed that the structure of the EU would change with the membership of England. He stated that he was anxious about this change. After resignation of De Gaulle in 1969, La

*The parts in this research were written by the references from 2002 European Union Extension Period and Turey and "Europe in the New Century" Guttmann, 2001.

Haye summit convened and EU started the discussion for the integration of England, Denmark, Ireland and Norway. England, Denmark and Ireland were accepted to EU in 1972. Thus, number of members increased from 6 to 9 countries.

The Second expansion stage was in 1981 Greece applied for full membership in 1975. It was refused entry because of weakness of its economy. After the PASOK government in Greece, EU and Greece relationships accelerated, and in 1981, Greece was accepted as member.

The third expansion period was in 1986. Spain and Portugal applied for membership in 1962 but they were not accepted because of their dictatorship regime. After the democratic elections in 1978 in Spain, EU decided to start discussions regarding full membership of Spain. Portugal also started to apply democracy and applied for full membership in 1977. In 1986 both Spain and Portugal were accepted to EU and the number of member states in EU increased to 12.

Fourth expansion stage was in 1993, Austria, Finland, and Sweden applied to EU for full membership in 1989. These countries were more developed in terms of economy and the application of human rights than South European countries. The discussion process about the integration of these countries was shorter than the previously accepted countries since these northern countries were evaluated as sufficient in terms of EU criteria. These northern European countries were accepted as members in 1993. With four expansion periods EU increased its number of members to 15 states.

The fifth expansion stage was in 1996. At this stage EU was dealing with countries that were different from each other in economical, political and social means. In 1989, after unification of East and West German and dissolution of the Soviet block, central and Eastern European countries had changed their regimes. This depolarisation of the east and west European countries brought about an opportunity for central and eastern European countries to join EU. At the 5th extension stage, EU was considering the membership of new countries from the former Soviet block. Considering Croatia as a member state is worth mentioning since it serves as a gateway to Eastern Europe. At this point, EU was not only extending its size but also its geopolitical reach to the Balkans and discussions about whether EU should admit other members of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey were raised. EU experienced sixth, seventh, eight expansion stages from 1996 till today. In these stages, EU discussed about full membership of candidate states namely, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Cyprus.

Since EU has been doubling its size, Blair's statement that, 'Europe will divide into concentric circles' (p, 52, Gutmann, 2001) has become important. The first circle he mentions is the 'Euro zone' with the high power of economic cooperation. The second zone consists of members of Union waiting to join this previously mentioned macroeconomic policy coordination. The third zone will be formed by the countries that are willing but unable to join the EU. Thus in SIT terms, there emerged

subcategories of nations with respect to EU prototypically and thus status differences between countries.

Currently, the most difficult task for EU is to reach an agreement on a new European constitution (cited in Gutman, 2001). In other words, there exist various views that reflect profound differences not only in national cultures and experiences but also in geography, religion, language, and economy. The striking thing is that these differences show their presence not just between countries but also within countries. Surveys that were carried out by European Commission showed that the better educated, the young, and men are more in favour of European integration. Eurobarometer surveys done by European Commission in March 1999 also confirmed these results. Overall, 54% of citizens in fifteen members of EU believed that 'EU is a great deal' (p, 49, Guttman, 2001). On the other hand, Eurobarometer surveys showed that supranational 'European identity' has been slow to emerge. That national identity was more dominant than European identity, that the British was the most nationalist and Luxembourg felt the most 'European. On the whole, 54% of citizens evaluated themselves as both European and belonging to their own nationality.

European community is changing with the addition of new member states. There are extended and very lengthy procedures that transform a non-member state into a member state. This lengthy process may affect perceived distinctiveness of 'European identity' and European Community identity and belief in the assumptions that membership and unification will bring about power and civil liberty. It may be

stated that European identity was developed in line with the needs to maintain continuity with past, to achieve distinctiveness and to establish efficacy and maintain esteem.

National identity is being eroded and migration is becoming inevitable with the creation of single market. In spite of the ideal compatibility of European Community and a national identity, economic changes and fears of loss of national identity were thought to create hostility between nations (Breakwell, 1996). This outcome is reminiscent of Horneys and Hogg (1998) findings that indicated that loss of subgroup distinctiveness within superordinate category may create hostility between subgroups. One way of overcoming hostility was by emphasizing European identity and rejecting countries outside the union.

Worchel's discussions of the relationship between stages of group development and identification are relevant to the development of European identity. Worchel (1999) stated that, groups show variability throughout time and that members' identification with group and their perceptions of outgroups show variability over time. At the initial stage of the group, the main focus is on establishing identity. At this stage, group permeability is low and new members are not welcomed as exemplified by developments in first stage of EU expansion. At this stage intergroup relations are minimum and group may isolate itself from outgroups. Derogation of outgroups and ingroup identification are very high at this stage. Members function at the level of social rather than personal identity. Interactions within the group or

between ingroup and outgroup emphasize social identity. Individuation of members is avoided at this stage.

After the identification stage, group members begin to figure out group's goals and often this goal is productivity. At the productivity stage, members begin to examine the differences among themselves but only differences that will affect group's productivity. Boundaries of the group become more permeable and new members are admitted to perform specific tasks. Comparisons with outgroups occur in some cases in order to determine how productive the ingroup is. Leadership depends on tasks of the group. Minority influence is high on task related issues, but minorities are still rejected if they pose threats to group identity. Group failures are attributed to external sources while success is attributed to internal group factors.

At the individuation stage, self focus is accelerated and members begin to assess their contribution to the group and rewards they receive from ingroup members. At this stage resource allocation is based on individual contribution to the group rather than simple group membership. Minority voice is not tolerated but may take place. Reactions toward minorities depend on group's previous experience with minorities. If aversive experiences were experienced, minorities are not influential. Social loafing, that is working less hard for group than for personal goals, become common. At this stage, individuals are more likely compare themselves with their ingroup members than with the outgroup.

When the formation of EU is considered in the light of these stages, expansion periods of EU provide good evidences for Worchel's views. For instance, at the

identification stage EU's boundaries were less open since the aim was to attain a supranational European identity. At the last expansion stage EU accepted many nations since the goal was gaining more economical cooperation and political power. However, as Blair argued, since the number of states increased, subcategories emerged within EU. This may serve as an example of individuation of the nations according to their qualities.

1.6. Turkey's Process of Full Membership*

Newly born Turkish Republic had a strong ambition to become a Western country. With this ideology Turkey joined the European Commission in 1949 and North Atlantic Pact in 1952. However, during its first years, Turkish Republic stood away from EU. However, after Greece's attempts to join European Common Market, Turkey changed her initial stand towards integration. Since Greece was exporting similar products as Turkey she was Turkey's rival throughout history. Thus, Turkey took serious steps to join EU. For Turkey, joining European Common Market would be a great opportunity for overcoming its economical difficulties. However, May 27 military revolution in 1960 slowed down the integration efforts of Turkey to EU for a while. Soon after, Atina Treaty, which was the first step for Greece's integration to EU, was followed as an example to formulate Ankara Treaty. Thus, it was hoped that the member countries would support Turkey's joining to EU. However military coups in 1970 and 1980 interrupted Turkey and EU relations.

*The parts in this research were written by the references from 2002 European Union Extension Period and Turkey and "Europe in the New Century" Gutmann, 2001.

After the military coup, European Commission required Turkey to apply full democracy and consequently, Turkey accelerated her attempts for a democracy plan in 1981.

However, this attempt was viewed as inadequate by European Commission and European Commission froze its relationships with Turkey till Turkey totally applied basic human rights and democracy. Meanwhile, EU was facing economic crisis. This crisis affected relation between EU and Turkey negatively. EU brought about some limitations to the import of textile products from Turkey.

EU and Turkish relations improved after the 1983 elections. In 1984 a new ideology dominated Turkey's political arena. Özal's views were articulated. In 1987, Turkey applied to EU for full membership. A new process started regarding Turkey and EU relations. In 1989, EU declared that the union had problems about its internal market and was incapable of accepting new members and Turkey was judged to be economically, socially and politically insufficient. EU advised Turkey to complete Customs Union process and in 1993 negotiations between EU and Turkey started again. Soon after, Customs Union was signed between EU and Turkey. After the end of the cold war in 1989, EU started negotiations with central and Eastern European countries and decided to increase the number of its members in favour of these countries. These developments slowed down Turkey's process of full membership.

At the summit of Luxemburg (1997), it was declared that Turkey should develop its norms and applications about human rights to EU standards, that she should have respect for her minorities, have stable relationships with Greece, and

should support the political solutions of the Security Council of United Nations about Cyprus. However, the party in power changed in Germany in the second half of the 1990s and this was evaluated as a step toward resolution of EU and Turkey relations. The party that came to power adopted more supportive policies about Turkey's integration than Christian Democrats.

At the summit of Helsinki (1999), Turkey's application for full membership was accepted and European Commission appreciated the reforms that Turkey made. With Helsinki summit, Turkey's relations with EU entered a new period and Turkey was evaluated as an applicant for full membership. Meanwhile, a national program was prepared in Turkey in order to improve the political, economic and social conditions. This national program was seen, as an explicit declaration of political will in the journey toward full membership. The evaluation of this national program in the 2001 progression report of EU was generally positive. However, European Commission declared that Turkey showed some improvements in some areas but she was insufficient in terms of EU criteria.

In 2002 Seville summit the necessity of the application of EU criteria was highlighted and it was stated that Turkey's full membership depended on the developments regarding fulfilling these criteria between the Seville and Copenhagen summits. At Copenhagen summit (2002), in spite of the fact that Turkey's new regulations were appreciated, it was declared that their applications needed to be seen. A date was assigned for discussions of Turkey's full membership.

The above review of Turkey's relations with respect to Europe and EU indicates that Turkey has been treated as a low status group viewing its low status as legitimate and hoping to achieve social mobility by gaining acceptance to the superordinate groups. The boundaries of the superordinate group EU seem to be fairly but not completely impermeable. Over time Turkey seems to feel that she is getting close to the criterion for entry. However, after the entrance of Eastern European countries doubts may have been raised as to the permeability of boundaries and to the fairness in evaluation of different countries with respect to entry criteria. In other words, some people may believe that the real reason for Turkey's rejection by EU is based on historical and religious differences and not on economic and human rights criteria.

1.7. Expectations of the Study

As enumerated in the introduction the study had several aims. The first aim of the study was to investigate various social identities based on historical review of modernization of Turkey. Three different social identities namely; Nationalist, Islamist, and European were expected. These social identities were expected to be associated with the values of authoritarianism, patriotism, ethnocentrism, antisecularism and religious facism. Nationalist identity was expected to be associated with values of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, patriotism, and secularism. Islamist social identity was expected to be associated with antisecularism. European identity was expected to be positively associated with

antiseccularism, patriotism and negatively associated with ethnocentrism and authoritarianism.

The second aim of the study was to investigate different constructions of EU. Positive and negative constructions were expected to be related to historical relations between Turkey and Europe. One type of construction was expected to be associated with acceptance of EU's superiority with respect economy and human rights. Another construction was expected to emphasize historical and religious differences and view Europe as a threat, attributing blame Europe for Turkey's inferior position.

The third aim of the study was to find associations between social identities and constructions of EU. The European identity should be positively associated with acceptance of Europe's superiority and negatively with stressing distinctions between Europe and Turkey, viewing EU as a threat, and with blame attribution to Europe. Nationalist and religious identities were expected to be related to negative constructions of EU and to stress of differences.

The fourth aim was to find association between constructions of EU and reactions to December 12 Copenhagen decision. Positive evaluation of EU was expected to be associated with positive evaluation of decision because such construction would imply acceptance of subordinate position of Turkey vis a vis Europe and acceptance of system justification beliefs. Negative construction of EU, on the other hand, was expected to be associated with negative reaction to the

decision and viewing it as discrimination and/or illegitimate attempts by EU to create impermeable boundaries.

The fifth aim was to investigate relations between values, social identities and two indicators of modernity and social status; that is, parental education and parental rural-urban origin. Nationalist social identity and the value of patriotism and secularism were expected to be associated with higher parental education and parental urban origin and lower modernity was expected to be associated with authoritarian and ethnocentric views as suggested by Worchel (1999).

CHAPTER II

PILOT STUDY ON THE EXAMINATION OF CONSTRUCTIONS OF EU BY NEWSPAPERS REPRESENTING DIFFERENT IDEOLOGIES

2.1.INTRODUCTION

Moscovici (1984), defines social representations as systems of values, ideas, and practices with a two-fold function: first to establish an order which will enable individuals to orient themselves in and master their material world, and second to facilitate communication among members of a community by providing them with a code for naming and classifying the various aspects of their world including their individual and group history. In this sense, social representations are means of constructing and understanding social reality. Since ambiguous things are threatening for us, social representations have an important function for making sense of social reality. The generation of social representations takes place by ‘anchoring’ and ‘objectification’ (Meier & Kircher, 1998). ‘Anchoring’ is putting novel occurrences into already existing social representation. In other words, strange ideas are reduced to ordinary categories and to familiar context. For instance, psychoanalysis could easily find a place in French people’s minds since it was linked with or anchored to the concept of confession which was an element of Catholicism.

‘Objectification’ is turning something abstract into something concrete. Turning abstract social reality into an objective common sense reality is a way of putting something which is difficult to understand into a meaningful form. One form of ‘objectification’ is ‘personification’, which is, linking the social object to a person or a group (Mier & Kircher, 1998). The social object may also be depicted as a metaphorical image such as ‘EU as a train that has to be caught’ (Sedat Sertoğlu, 9th

July, Sabah,). In this sense, people are making an ambiguous situation into a concrete thing and this is a form handling uncertainty that they experience.

Cinneralla (1996; cited in Breakwell, 1996) combined SIT and Moscovici's theory of social representations in dealing with European integration. He argued that the context for identity construction is afforded by social representations and therefore the changes in the construction of social identities are always associated with the changes in content or presentation of the social representations. Cinneralla dealt with the issue of European integration and analysed interactions between national and European identities within the context of existing social representations of nations and Europe. He emphasized the role of media in the construction of large-scale social categories and social representations. He provided examples from British mass media concerning European integration. British media viewed integration as a threat for the British culture and tradition; thus voiced anxiety about the future of traditional British sausage (Cinneralla, 1997; cited in Breakwell and Lyons, 1997). In contrast, Italian mass media had a more positive evaluation towards European integration and there appeared less concern about national sovereignty in Italian than in British media.

Cinneralla argued that individuals alter social representations in terms of the orientation or type of attachment they adopt towards the social identity. Some individuals may have sentimental attachments to the nation based on emotional ties to national culture and symbols; some on the other hand, may have instrumental attachments based on personal gains and benefits of their citizenship. In his study,

British sample demonstrated multi-dimensional British identity based on instrumental orientations such as satisfaction with the democratic state institutions but also strong sentimental orientations to Britain, deriving from an attachment to national culture and heritage. Italians, on the other hand, viewed their culture and historical heritage to be bound up with Europe. European identity for Italian respondents was like their national identity. Cinnerella explained these different perspectives adopted by citizens in Britain and Italy as coming from different identity constructions, ultimately derived from different social representations.

Identity constructions and social representations are discussed as inseparable concepts. Previous discussions of development of a Turkish identity indicated that different identities based on different historical causes might exist within present day Turkey. One aim of Study 1 was to examine social representations of EU by newspapers representing different ideologies within Turkey's context. Another aim was to select statements related EU constructions to be used in the main study.

Previous research with Turkish media revealed that newspapers representing different ideologies offered different social representations of socially controversial events. Yağcıoğlu and Cem-Değer (2002) showed that the religious Akit, as the voice of 'political islam', utilizes the mythos orientation giving way to blurring boundaries between the social (secular) and the sacred (anti secular) whereas Cumhuriyet, which as the voice of Kemalist ideology, employs rationality as a legitimation strategy.

2.2. METHOD

Four newspapers representing different views were included in the present study. Two of these were Vakit, which replaced Akit, and Cumhuriyet, the representative of Kemalism. Ortadoğu and Sabah were also included in the study as the representatives of nationalist and liberal identities respectively. The newspapers were collected from the 8th of July till the 22nd of August 2002. During this period, column writers were discussing the integration of Turkey to EU since summit of Copenhagen was close (December 12). Those days were viewed as a critical period because Parliament passed the adjustment rules for integration on August 3rd. These new regulations were evaluated as positive but at the same time there existed doubts about whether or not they would be wholly applied. Other important issues of that period were prime minister Ecevit's illness and discussions concerning his physical capacity for dealing with governmental issues. Activities by Ismail Cem, foreign minister, and Hüsamettin Özkan, minister of internal affairs toward establishment of a new party and Kemal Derviş's decision to join CHP after the failure of his attempts to unify Turkish left were also discussed during this period.

2.3. RESULTS

2.3.1. References to Historical Past

Content analysis of the columns showed that efforts for the integration into EU were traced back to our historical past. Some column writers from

Cumhuriyet and Vakit had doubts about the application of the new regulations and anchored integration efforts to tanzimat and ıslahat decrees. They argued that new regulations would not improve the negative situation existing in Turkey. The ideas stated in the above newspaper emphasized Turkey's and West's historical relations and included categorizations into ingroup and the outgroup. As it can be seen quotes 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3, 'Europe' was the 'other' and was seen as an enemy who always wanted to defeat and destroy Turkey. Social categorization of Europe as the outgroup and its derogation were obvious and efforts to become like 'Europe' were evaluated as useless and pointless. Current Turkish European relations today were anchored to historical events in this way and integration efforts were a subject for derogation.

Quote 1

ILHAN SELCUK (Cumhuriyet ,
6th August)

Allah bize akıl fikir versin. İdamı çoktan kaldırmıştık. Oysa ABD'de ölüm cezası var, Başkan Bush Teksas valisi iken bir sürü insanı öteki dünyaya yolladı... Apo'yu da gözümüz gibi koruyorduk. ... Biz Avrupalı olmaya Tanzimat'la başladık; halk bu işten ne anladı? ... Avrupalı'nın Türkiye'ye dönük bakışında Osmanlı'dan bu yana çarpıklık sürer gider, bu günkü kafa dünün mirasını taşır. Yine de Meclis çok iyi yaptı; Avrupalı'nın Türkiye'yi dışlamak için kullandığı mazereti kaldırdı; bundan böyle bekleyelim, görelim!

May God give us wisdom and good sense
We have already removed death penalty, however, death penalty is applied in USA
Bush himself send many people to the other world when he was a governor of Texas. We protected APO with great care.
... We started being European since Tanzimat but what did people understand from these efforts?
... Europeans' views about the image of Turkey have been distorted since the Ottomans. Today's mind is the legacy of yesterday.
Even so, the parliament has done very well; it removed the excuses that Europe was using for excluding Turkey. From now on lets wait and see!

Quote 2

İSMAİL MÜFTÜOĞLU (Vakit,
6th August)

Ülkemizin bu günkü hali, Osmanlı'nın son dönemleri ile tıpa tıp uyuşmaktadır. Nitekim, Osmanlı'nın son dönemlerinde, bu günlerde olduğu gibi, batıya entegre olmak için, çok sıkı politikalar üretilmişti. Tanzimat ve ıslahat fermanlarının muhtevasına bakıldığında, batıya yönelik keskin çizgiler görebiliriz...

...Osmanlı'yı yıkan komploların tamamı dış mihraklı idi. O zaman hürriyet, adalet, uhuvvet mefhumları istimal edilerek, millet aldatılmıştı. Bu günde milleti Avrupa Birliği hülyası ile avutmaktadır. O günde bu günde tuzağa düşen ve söylediklerinin farkında olmayan papağanlar gibi konuşan idareciler vardır. Batının asıl maksadı ise, Osmanlı'yı yıktıkları gibi, TC'yi de bitirmek ve tarihi öçlerini almaktır.

The current situation of our country is exactly like the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Like today, during the last period of Ottoman Empire produced policies in order to integrate to West. If we analyse the contents of the Tanzimat and Islahat decrees we can see clear lines directed toward the West...

... The conspiracies that destroyed the Ottoman Empire all originated from outside. At that time, freedom, equality justice, fraternity concepts were abused and the nation was deceived. Now, the nation is being soothed by the dreams of European Union. Just like those days there are now politicians and administrators speaking like parrots without awareness of what they are saying. The main goal of the West is to destroy the Turkish Republic just like they destroyed the Ottoman Empire and take their historical revenge.

Quote 3

İLHAN SELCUK (Cumhriyet, 9th
July)

Diyorlar ki Avrupa trenini kaçırsak Türkiye yaşayamaz. Bunlar tarihi bilmiyorlar. Türkiye Avrupa sayesinde kurulmadı Avrupa'ya rağmen, karşın kuruldu. Avrupa Sevr anlaşmasını yürürlüğe koyarak Türkiye'yi bölmeye ve paylaşmaya çalıştı. Dün, 11 milyon Türk Anadolu'yu düşman işgalinden kurtarmak için savaştı ve TC'yi kurdu. Bu gün, 70 milyon Türk mahvedilip yok mu edilecek?

They say that if we miss the Europe train Turkey will not be able to survive. They do not know history. Turkey was not established by the help of Europe, Turkish Republic was established in spite of Europe. Europe wanted to divide Turkey and share it by the Sevres treaty. Yesterday 11 million Turks living in Anatolia fought to save Anatolia from enemy occupation and founded Turkish Republic. Will 70 million Turks be destroyed and annihilated today?

2.3.2 Positive Attitude Toward EU and Seeing Integration with EU as a Must in terms of Economic Welfare.

EU is evaluated as a cooperation of the European countries for economical progression. Therefore; Turkey's main aim is seen as an effort to join this cooperation that would strengthen Turkey's economical situation. Except for Ortadoğu and some column writers in Cumhuriyet, EU was evaluated positively in terms of economical welfare of Turkey. Sabah emphasized economical benefits of EU more than the others and viewed joining EU as an important opportunity for overcoming economical difficulties. In addition, as maybe seen in Quote 4, Ali Kırca (Sabah, 21st August) viewed Turkish identity as very similar to European identity and very dissimilar to Eastern identity. Therefore he evaluated integration with EU as both possible and essential. In addition, insufficiency in terms of democracy was not accepted and innovations throughout time were emphasized. In this sense, Turkish society was assessed as deserving to join EU since she is competent enough in terms of democracy and survival in EU's single market economy. EU's market economy was also seen as a big opportunity that should not be missed and EU was objectified as a train that has to be caught.

As maybe seen in Quote 6, Ilker Sarier (Sabah, 26th July), exaggerated the percentage of people who are in favour of integration with EU. These exaggerations can be easily observed from the usage of 'everybody', 'every part of the society' phrases. Turkey was seen as similar and more close to the West than the East, but economical superiority of the West and Turkey's low status relative to the West were

accepted. However, the boundaries of EU were seen as permeable since Turkey was seen as similar to Europe. Therefore, efforts for integration were seen as essential but insufficient. This is reflected in the objectification of Europe as a ‘running train’ and the argument that Turkey should strive to catch it (See in Quote 6).

Quote 4

ALİ KIRCA (Sabah, 21st August)

Bizim çocukluğumuzda ve ilk gençlik yıllarımızda, Türkiye’nin demokrasi için bir bedel ödemediğinden söz edilirdi. Yitirilen onca candan sonra şu geçen kırk yılda bu bedelin ödenmediğini kim söyleyebilir? Bu seçimden sonra da geleceğe doğru yolculuğu devam edecek Türkiye’nin. Ve bu seçim, yeşil ışıklı radyodan sonra, Türkiye’nin internet ortamında izlenecek ilk seçim olacak. Bir de dönüp yazının başlığına bakın... Başlığın dediğini yapın. Sınırlarımızın Doğu yakasında bu şarkıları, bu kadar coşkuyla söylebilecek kaç ülke var ki! Ve unutmayın: Bizim hikayemiz aslında “Batı Yakasının Hikayesidir” ve şarkılarım da...

During the years of childhood and youth, it was stated that Turkey did not pay a price for democracy. After the loss of so many lives can one say that no price was paid in the past forty years?. Turkey’s journey to the future will continue after this election, and this election will be the first election that will be followed via Internet after the radios with green lights. Therefore, do not be pessimistic and look at the title of this article. Do what the title says...

How many countries can sing these songs with such zeal beyond our Eastern borders. Do not forget, in essence our story is “West Side Story” so are our songs...

Quote 5

SEDAT SERTOGLU(Sabah, 9th July)

Türkiye AB konusunda son derece kritik bir sürece girmiş iken, çünkü kala kala 3 ayımız kaldı. Sadece biz değil MHP’liler dışında herkes “AB treni kaçıyor” diye bağırıyor ama meclis tatile giriyor. Hemen hemen toplumun her kesimi ekonomik kalkınma için AB’ye girmeyi istiyor. Bu fırsatı kaçırmamalıyız, meclis s AB ile bütünleşme ile uğraşmalıdır.

Turkey has entered into a very critical period regarding EU issue because we have only 3 months left. Not only us but except for members MHP everybody is shouting “Europe train is running away” but the parliament is closing for vacation. Nearly all sections of the society want integration with EU for economic development. We should not miss this opportunity and the parliament should strive for the integration with EU.

Quote 6

İLKER SARIER (26th July, Sabah)

Herkes AB'yi istiyor, kamuoyu AB 'den yana gazeteciler aydınlar da istiyor AB'yi. Siyasetçiler de AB'den yana... Geriye kim kalıyor? AB'yi emperyalist görenler. Ancak vatandaş şunu biliyor AB demek, iş, zenginlik, özgürlük, kalkınma, anayasal hukuk devleti, bireysel özgürlük ve insan hakları demek.

... Seçimde AB'yi isteyenler cep delik cepken delik kalanlar, Çocuklarının istikbali için AB diyenler...

İşsizler, geçinemeyenler, itilip kakılanlar, yalana, dolana kurban gidenler oy kullanacaklar...

Everybody wants EU, public opinion, newspapermen, the media, the intellectuals. Politicians also favour EU. Who is left? The ones who evaluate EU as imperialist. However, the citizens know that EU means jobs, prosperity, development, constitutional state, individual freedom and human rights

... Those who want EU at the elections are those who are left penniless. Those who say EU for children's future...The unemployed, the poor the underdog victims of corruption and lies, those who will vote...

2.3.3. Positive attitude About EU and Assessing Integration with EU as a Must in terms of Human Rights and Democracy

Vakit and Cumhuriyet mentioned human rights and freedom in relation to EU. However human rights were associated with the ‘ problem of scarf’ by Vakit. Abdullah Dilipak, (Vakit, August 7th) evaluated one's freedom to live in line with his/her religious beliefs as a basic human right (See in Quote 7). On the other hand , Cumhuriyet stressed equality, absence of discriminatory practices, and equal application of human rights to everyone and decline in child mortality and illiteracy rates. Thus, EU was seen as an opportunity in order to increase the quality of life in Turkey by adoption of social welfare system applied in European countries (See in Quote 7).

As maybe seen in Quote 8, Işıl Özgentürk(Cumhuriyet, 18th August), stressed the privileges of some people resulting from their fame or high status and EU was seen as putting an end to these privileges. As Keyder (1999) stated top down

application of modernization by the elitists in Turkey eroded basic ideology of modernity and brought some privileges to some people in Turkish society. In this sense, Cumhuriyet differed from the other three newspapers by emphasizing the issue of equality and saw EU as an opportunity for bringing about the basic ideology of modernization, that is social welfare system in society.

Quote 7

ABDULLAH DİLİPAK(Vakit, August

7th)

İdam cezasının kaldırılmasına onay vermediğiniz zaman birçok teröristin Türkiye'ye iadesi, ölüm cezası sebebi ile gerçekleşmiyordu...Bu durumda da aslında teröristlerin işine yarıyordu... AB'ye evet ama diye başlayarak AB'nin olmazsa olmazlarına karşı çıkmayı anlamak zor... İkincisi de AB'ye karşı olmak adına en tabi insan haklarına ve özgürlüklerine bile karşı çıkmak tam bir fecaat...

...Bizim sorunumuz başörtüsü sorunu değil, insanların inandıkları gibi yaşayamama sorunu, Tayyip başörtüsü meselesi ile yüz yüze gelmekten korkuyor.

When we did not approve of prohibition of death penalties return of terrorists to Turkey was not realized because of death penalty...This situation really benefited terrorists...Therefore, it is hard to understand starting with saying 'Yes' to EU but objecting to the necessary conditions of EU. Second, it is a real disaster to object to most natural human rights and democracy in an effort to be against EU.

...Our problem is not a problem of scarf. It is a problem of people's not being able to live according to their beliefs. Tayyip is afraid of facing with the problem of scarf.

Quote 8

İŞİL ÖZGENTÜRK (Cumhuriyet,

August 18th)

AB' yi istiyorum çünkü herkes yasalar önünde eşit olacak. İbrahim Tatlıses tecavüzden yargılanabilecek. AB'nin insan hakları düzenlemeleri ile ayrımcılık son bulacak.

I want EU because everyone will be equal before laws. It will be possible for İbrahim Tatlıses to be trialed of rape. Discrimination will end with EU's regulations regarding human rights.

Quote 9

TÜRKAN SAYLAN (Cumhuriyet,

July 22th)

AB'ye girme girmeme tartışmaları tam bir siyah- beyaz vatansever-vatanhaini kamplaşması konumunda sürüyor. Oysa ortak aklı önümüze koyup önce bu ulusu oluşturan tüm insanların daha iyi daha onurlu özgür ve eşit olacakları hukukun yasaların herkese aynı şekilde uygulandığı eğitimin sağlık hizmetlerinin ülkenin her yanına eşit nitelikte dağılacağı üretimin ve paylaşımın ortak çaba olarak herkesçe birlikte yapılabileceği bir gelecek düşlediğimizde...Okuma yazma bilmeyenlerin ve çocuk ölümlerini azalacak.

Controversies on integration with EU are carried on the axes of black versus white and patriotic versus traitor. When we put our communal mind to the fore and dream of a future when all human beings constituting the nation are better, more free, and equal; where laws will be equally applied to everyone, where educational and health services will be equally good at all parts of the community, and where production and distribution will be produced together with all people... Illiteracy rates and child deaths will decrease

2.3.4. Negative Attitude About EU and Evaluation of EU as an Imperialist Union

Some column writers from Cumhuriyet assessed EU as a dominating power like IMF and did not see integration as a solution for economical welfare of the country.

Loans taken from IMF were seen as bringing about dependency to USA and integration efforts were also evaluated as a reflection of low self-esteem dependent mentality. As maybe seen in Quote 10 Ilhan Selcuk (10 July, Cumhuriyet) argued that this mentality was common to members of all political parties. He saw integration efforts as useless and non-beneficial to society.

Erol Manisalı (Cumhuriyet, 10th July) criticized Turgut Özal and argued that the reasons of today's economical dependence was caused by Turgut Özal's policies which increased the importation of many products to Turkey during 1980s. He evaluated this increase in importation as an exploitation of Turkey, which eroded Turkey's reputation. Europe was seen as an enemy of Turkey and historical events between Europe and Turkey were cited as efforts to erode Turkey's independence (See in Quote, 11). In this sense, Europe was seen as an outgroup that aimed to exploit Turkey and Turgut Özal was blamed as accelerating this exploitation process.

Ortadoğu was also against integration since integration efforts were seen as submissive mentality and acknowledgement of the powerless situation of our country and superiority of West. The ideology of this newspaper was the refusal of Europe's superiority over Turkey and human rights and democracy were stated as already being applied. The efforts for integration with EU were seen as acceptance of the superiority of the West. This was also evaluated as a situation that would lower the reputation of Turkish nation. EU's economic and democratic superiority were ignored. In addition, Ortadoğu was the only newspaper than was totally against integration and the arguments were united around Turkish identity and national values. Turkish nation was seen as superior to all other nations and political party MHP was seen as embracing people from urban to rural backgrounds, from different ethnic groups and religious sects. In this sense, their arguments did not reflect strong nationalist and ethicist views. However, Turkish identity and Turkish name were seen as a national identity (See in Quotes 12,13,14, 15,16).

Quote 10

İLHAN SELCUK(Cumhuriyet, 10th July)

Siyasi partilerimize bir bakın... Sözüm ona liderin söylediklerine kulak verin...
İşadamlarının çığlıklarını dinleyin...Medya köşelerinde ahkam kesen tetikçilerin yazdıklarını okuyun...
Özgüvenden yoksun ve yalnız dışarıdan medet uman bir yaşam felsefesinin iliklerimize dek işlediğini kolayca anlarsınız... IMF'ye borçlanarak yaşamak!
AB'ye girerek paçayı kurtarmak!
Sağcısı solcusu ortacısı, etnikçisi, dincisinin seçim sandığındaki koltuk kavgası bu durumda kime neye yarayacak, halka ne sağlayacak?...
O yalan bu yalan!

Look at our political parties, listen to the pseudo leaders' words...
Listen to the screams of businessmen...Read the views of gunmen who profess in media columns...
You can easily be aware that a philosophy of life, which lacks self-esteem and is totally dependent on the outside, has totally penetrated us... Living indepted to IMF!
Saving ourselves by entering EU
What good will people receive from the fight for political power of right-winged, left-winged, ethicist and islamists at the polls.
This is a lie! That is a lie!

Quote 11

EROL MANİSALI (Cumhuriyet, July 8th)

Özal dönemi ile birlikte Türkiye soğuk savaş sonrasının koşullarına yavaş yavaş hazırlanmaya başlıyordu. 1980'li yılların ortalarına doğru tarım ıslah istasyonları ortadan kaldırılıyordu. Aynen Köy ensitülerinin yok edilmesi gibi , çökuluslu şirketlerin de önü Türkiye'de tamamen açılıyordu. Yerli ve ulusal tesisler yabancıların eline geçmeli, içindeki büyük sermaye dışarıdaki ile el ele vererek Türkiye'yi yönetmeli idi. Elmadan çıkita muza, undan tütüne, şekerden elmaya çaya kadar her şey, bol bol dışarıdan gelmeli idi. Çiftçiye hiç gerek yoktu zaten...
AB ile ABD arasındaki muz savaşı, Fransa ile İngiltere arasındaki et savaşı bizi hiç ilgilendirmeyecekti. Bizim böyle lüzumsuz savaşlar ile ilgimiz olamazdı. 'Avrupalı olmak' isteyenler biraz Avrupalı'nın yaptıklarına bakmak zorundadır.

With the political term of Ozal , Turkey was preparing for the conditions of past Cold War. In the mid 1980s agriculture improvement stations institutions were being abolished just like abolishment of Village Institutions. Local and national institutions should be appropriated by foreign companies' capital and capital within Turkey should govern Turkey hand in hand with that outside. From apple to banana from flour to tobacco everything should be profusely imported from outside. There was no need for farmers anyway...
The banana fight between Europe and US and the meat fight between England and France were none of our business. We could not be interested in such unnecessary fights. The ones who want to be 'European' have to look at what Europeans do.

Quote 12

MURAT SÖKMENOĞLU (Ortadoğu, august 21th)

AB treninin kaçırılması kampanyaları ile karalayıcı ve teslimiyetçi yaklaşımlar ya da seçimle ilgili bir takım ‘korku üretim merkezlerinin kurulması’ çabaları, demokrasiye inançsızlığın, millete güvensizliğin göstergesidir. Bu tür çabaların demokratik anlayışla bağdaşması mümkün değildir. Türk demokrasisi, kendini güven altına alacak kurum ve kurallara, hukuka sahiptir. Türk milleti dün olduğu gibi bugün de, yüksek sağduyusu ile en doğru ve sağlıklı yolu gösterecek yeteneğe ve olgunluğa sahiptir. Korkuların, vehimlerin, kaygıların devlet ve millet hayatında yeri yoktur.

Campaigns at missing the EU train and falsely accusing and submissive stands or elections-related attempts at ‘fear production centres’ are indicators of disbelief in democracy and mistrust in the people. These types of efforts cannot be reconciled with democratic beliefs. Turkish democracy possesses institutions, norms and justice system, which can protect its security. With the help of its high wisdom, today like yesterday, Turkish nation possesses the ability and maturity that will show her the most correct and healthiest way. Fears, apprehensions and anxieties have no place in the lives of nation and state.

Quote 13

ESRA DEMİR (Ortadoğu, 21th august)

AB ne ki? Kim ki? Türkiye üyesi olmaya hak kazansın, “ne diyor bunlar be?” diyen çıkmadı. Ekonomik anlamda güçsüz olanı, güçsüzlüğünü yüzüne vurup olduğundan daha fazla abartarak moral açısından tüketmek, yüceltirken bile aşağılmaktan geri kalmamak, herkesin her tür başarısından kendine pay çıkararak koyu bir narsizm içerisinde sömürmek, sömürmek. ... Bu alçakça tutumu onore edici birer artıymış gibi görme ve gösterme yanılgısına düşenler de bizim medyamız, bizim siyasimiz, bizim saf insanımız.

What is EU? Who is it that Turkey should win the right to be its member? Nobody said “What are these people saying?” Destroying the morale of the economically powerlessness, by exaggerating their powerlessness and confronting the with their own powerlessness, insulting even when praising, exploiting through the deepest narcissism by seeing oneself as part of every type of achievement. ...Those who see this low down attitude as an honouring plus are our media our politicians and our naive people.

Quote 14

ŞEFKAT ÇETİN (Ortadoğu, August 22th)

MHP Türkiye’nin tamamını kucaklar ne kırsal ne şehirli, ne etnik grup ne de mezhep... Atlantik ötesinden ithal edilmiş devşirmelerle Türkiye’nin gerçeğini yakalamak ve çözmek

MHP embraces all the people in Turkey not just the rural or urban or any ethnic group or sect... There is no credibility in the arguments of understanding Turkey’s reality and solving her

iddasının hiçbir inandırıcılığı yoktur. Milli birlik ve bütünlüğümüzden sürekli taviz verenler bir kesimin oyuna talip olurken ana kitleyi ihmalde bir sakınca görmediklerini bir kere daha belli ettiler. Türk adı bütün insanlarımızı içine alan bir üst kimlik haline gelmiştir

problems by imports from the other side of the Atlantic. The ones who compromise our national unity and solidarity have demonstrated that they see no reservations about neglecting the main mass while aspiring for the votes of a particular sector. The Turkish name has become a superordinate identity encompassing all our people.

Quote 15

BUĞRA BAŞKURT (Ortadoğu, August 21st)

Teslimiyetçi zihniyetle siyaset yapan partiler Türk milletinin çimentosu durumundaki milli değerler'i hiçe sayacak kararlar almaktadır. Medyanın milliyetçi direnişi yok etme amacı düpedüz kara propogandadır. Bu kara propogandanın ndeni MHP'nin AB karşısında izlediği haysiyetli politikadır.

The political parties who posses a submissive mentality take decisions that deny cementing national values. Media's aim to annihilate nationalist resistance is openly black propanga. The reason for this black propaganda is MHP's honourable politics against EU.

2.4. Discussion

The content analysis of four different newspapers namely; Cumhuriyet, Vakit, Sabah and Ortadoğu showed that EU is conceptualised in four different way. The first construction revealed a positive attitude toward EU and viewed integration as a must in terms of economic welfare. SIT's premises about 'distinctiveness seeking' was not part of this construction. On the contrary, Turkey was seen as similiar to 'West' and social categorization of Turkey was made on a superordinate basis. Dissimilarities between Turkey and ' East' were mentioned. Modernization in Turkey was assessed in terms of image and appearance as Keyder(1999) stated and the core values of modernization were not emphasized. The innovations that Turkey lived through such as passage from radios of green lights to elections via internet

were mentioned (Ali Kırca, Sabah 21th August. The percentage of people who are in favour of integration was exaggerated and EU was objectified as a ‘running away train’. These views expressed by Sabah represented joining to EU as instrumental for Turkish economy.

The second construction involved positive evaluation of EU in terms of human rights and democracy. Cumhuriyet emphasizes the core values of modernization and made criticisms in that these values were not internalized and therefore not applied in Turkey. The benefits of integration were seen as equal treatment for everyone before law. In addition, the superiority of the ‘West’ as possessing a social welfare system was appreciated and Turkey’s low status was accepted. These views were the statements of Kemalist identity which can be seen in Cumhuriyet. Vakit mentioned democratic benefits of integration with EU only in terms of religious beliefs. The prohibition against wearing scarf at universities was stressed often and democracy was mentioned only in relation to impossibilities of living according to religious beliefs. Thus, Cumhuriyet referred to human rights at a general and inclusive level whereas Vakit anchored them to a specific issue related to the issue of secularism.

The third construction supports social representations theory since it anchors efforts at integration with EU to westernisation efforts of Ottoman Empire. Tanzimat and Islahat decrees were given as examples and the insufficient applications of westernisation. İlhan Selçuk (Cumhuriyet, 6th August “Today’s mind is the legacy of yesterday” has a strong emphasis on historical past. Moreover,

conspiracy theories were evaluated as reasons for the collapse of Ottoman Empire. Europe was seen as the roots of these conspiracies and Europeans were seen Turks' everlasting enemies throughout the history. The main aim of the 'West' was seen as to destroy Turkey just like the Ottoman Empire. Vakit emphasizes the collapse of Ottoman Empire and the actors of this collapse were seen as the 'West'. On the other hand, Cumhuriyet mainly refers to the war of liberation and the strivings of the people in Anatolia to oppose enemy occupation. Although, Vakit and Cumhuriyet differed with respect to their references to history but both made references to the past and referred to Europe as the enemy.

The fourth construction referred to EU as an imperialist union that wants to exploit Turkey. İlhan Selçuk (Cumhuriyet, 10th July) evaluated integration efforts as a mentality lacking self-esteem and total dependency to the outside. On the other hand, Ortadoğu emphasized distinctiveness and superiority of the Turkish identity and evaluated this identity as a cement of national values. Turkish name was seen as a supranational identity that covers all the people and EU was perceived as threat to our cultural and national values. Cumhuriyet and Ortadoğu as representatives of Kemalist and Nationalist identities respectively had similar conceptualizations of seeing EU as an imperialist union that is a threat for national identity. In this sense, Bora's (1999) arguments concerning ethnocentric and authoritarian nature of Turkish identity was supported by this research. However, Cumhuriyet, which is the voice of Kemalist identity, emphasized the benefits of integration in terms of democracy but disagreed with integration since EU was a threat to our national

culture and national unity. Cumhuriyet's negative construction of EU as an imperialist union and its emphasis on historical past include ethnocentric views similar to the views of Ortadoğu. On the other hand, Sabah and Vakit showed positive constructions of EU in terms of its economical benefits. Sabah made social categorization at a superordinate level without deemphasizing Turkey's distinctiveness. Vakit saw Turkey as dissimilar to Europe but still highlighting EU's economical instrumentality. This is consistent with 'Islam and Modern' identity stated by Keyder (1999).

CHAPTER III

MAIN STUDY

3.1.METHOD

3.1.1.Participants

The sample consisted of 400 students (215 females and 154 males) from 5 different universities of Turkey located in three largest cities in Turkey; Middle East Technical (METU) and Gazi University (DU) from Ankara, The Bosphorous University (BU) from Istanbul and Aegean University (AU) and 9th September University (NSU) from İzmir. The ages of the students were ranged between 17-30 years and mean age of the participants was 19,86 with a standard deviation of 1,36. Further information about the participants may be seen in Table 3.1

Table 3.1 Demographic Variables

	SCHOOLS				
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES	METU	BU	GU	NSU	EU
Age					
Mean	19	20	20	19	19
SD	1,044	1,20	1,36	1,22	1,72
Gender					
Female	62%	55%	52%	40%	54%
Male	27%	41%	35%	54%	37%
Department					
Administrative Sciences	48%	26%			
Arts & Science	41%	17%	100%	99%	41%

Education		30%			
Engineering	9%	25%			58%
Architecture	9%				
Birth Place					
Village	2%	5%	20%	5%	6%
Small Town	7%	9%	18%	10%	11%
City	49%	46%	53%	51%	40%
Metropolitan	41%	40%	8%	32%	43%
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES	METU	BU	GU	NSU	AU
Small Town	3%		4%	4%	3%
City	8%	4%	42%	17%	9%
Metropolitan	88%	94%	50%	79%	87%
Mother's birth place					
Village	13%	23%	41%	23%	16%
Country	23%	19%	21%	11%	19%
City	43%	40%	31%	47%	23%
Metropolitan	20%	17%	3%	18%	43%
Father's birth place					
Village	22%	28%	47%	19%	17%
Country	16%	17%	25%	19%	19%
City	38%	37%	27%	43%	38%
Metropolitan	21%	17%		17%	24%
Mother's education					
Primary School	12%	36%	69%	35%	24%
Secondary School	9%	5%	15%	17%	16%
High School	37%	21%	8%	33%	34%
University	41%	36%	6%	14%	24%
Graduate					
Father's education					
Primary School	7%	21%	54%	14%	18%
Secondary School	6%	8%	23%	19%	7%
High School	24%	14%	12%	41%	22%
University	50%	50%	10%	23%	51%
Graduate	11%	6%		3%	1%

3.1.2. Questionnaires

The first part of the questionnaire included demographic questions; such as age, gender, birth place, place of residence of the participants, as well as and their mothers' and fathers' educational level, birth place, place of residence. Information about their school, about department and class were asked.

After demographic questions, there was a section inquiring about endorsement of each of eleven social identities. Participants were asked to evaluate their endorsement of eleven social identities (1= strongly agree, 4 = neither agree nor disagree, 7= strongly disagree). The identities were citizen of Turkish Republic, Muslim, world citizen, European/Western, conservative, nationalist, Kemalist, Turk, leftist, conservative-democrat ,and liberal.

Next, importance of political views for life and participants' political preference were assessed. The importance of political ideology for participants was assessed by the item “ My political idea affects my life very much”. This sentence was evaluated by a 7 point likert scale (1= strongly agree, 4= neither agree nor disagree, 7= strongly disagree). The other two questions asked about political party preference. The first question was ‘ Which party did you vote for at the November 3rd elections?’ Respondents were asked to check the party of their choice or indicate that they did not vote. The second question was ‘ Which party do you think reflects your political identity?’ Participants were asked to check one party or ‘no party’.

A section on a number of statements about EU followed. These statements were based on analysis of columns of newspapers in the pilot study. The next section

was about evaluations of December 12 Copenhagen decision. Participants indicated agreement with possible causes for the decision. Possible causes were economic situation of Turkey, conflict about Cyprus and European fear of unqualified manpower from Turkey (see Appendix, A).

A section measuring personal subjective utility of entrance to EU followed. In this section, participants were first asked to rate importance of a number of outcomes for themselves and, next, to indicate whether entrance to EU would increase or decrease the probability of attaining these outcomes (see Appendix, A). This section was not included in the analyses.

The next section included three scales. Authoritarianism, patriotism and ethnocentrism scales were adapted from Kağıtçıbaşı (1973). The wording of Kağıtçıbaşı's items was updated and a few new items were added because they seemed appropriate in the current situation. Items related to religious views were created in order to tap values associated with religious convictions. These items included views related to beliefs in necessity of religious beliefs for a moral life and beliefs in necessity of religious rules in governmental areas such as education and justice (secularism).

3.1.3. Procedure

Questionnaires were distributed during class hours to groups of students by instructors in 9th September, Aegean, Gazi and Middle East Technical University. At the Bosphorous University students responding to billboard adds participated in the research. Students received credit for their participation in METU and Bosphorous University.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS

The results will be presented under four sections. The first section will describe development of scales measuring identities, values, construction of EU, and reactions to the December 12th Copenhagen decision about Turkey's application to EU membership. This section will also provide information about scale reliabilities. The second section will present comparisons of schools with respect to endorsement of social identities, values, constructions of EU and reactions to December 12th Copenhagen decision. Last section will illustrate relationships between SES, values, identities, constructions of EU, and reactions toward December 12th Copenhagen decisions.

4.1 Factor Analyses and Scale Construction

4.1.1. Measures About Social Identities

Preliminary analyses on 11 social identity items showed that 30% of participants responded to items related to two social identities namely "I see myself as conservatist democrat" and "I see myself as liberal" with "4" meaning "it is

neither acceptable nor unacceptable”. These items were not included in further analyses because it appeared that they did not have much meaning for our participants. A factor analysis was performed on the remaining 9 items and the resulting 3 factors explained 65% of variance. National, Islam and conservative identities loaded on the first factor explaining 26% of variance. Kemalist, Türk, citizen of Turkish Republic loaded on the second factor explaining 23% of variance. The third factor loaded on European /Western and world citizen explaining 17% of variance. The item ‘ leftist’ loaded positively on the second factor and negatively on the first and third factors. Three scales were constructed based on these factors. Leftist was not included in any of the scales because it had fairly high loadings on all three factors. Factor loadings may be seen in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Results of Factor Analysis Performed on Identities

	NATIONALIST-ISLAM	TURK	EUROPEAN WORLD
Conservatist	.80	-.24	-.00
Muslim	.78	.20	.00
Nationalist	.71	.32	-.00
Kemalist	.00	.85	.22
Turk	.33	.71	.11
Citizen of Turkish	.22	.74	.14
Republic			
Leftist	-.44	.50	-.34
World citizen	.00	-.00	.80
European	-.13	.35	.70
Eigen value	2,08	1,82	1,33
Percent of variance	26%	23%	17%

4.1.2. Measures About Construction Related to EU

Preliminary analyses on items related to construction of EU revealed that 20% of participants rated the “I neither agree nor disagree” alternative for a number of statements (see Appendix, A). These statements were not included in further analyses because it appeared that they did not have much meaning for our participants. A factor analysis was performed on the remaining 20 items and resulted in 5 factors explaining 55% of the total variance. Examination of factor loadings and the scree plot led to the decision to adopt a 3 factor solution. The 3 factors of this solution were named Europe As Different, Impermeable Boundaries and Dissimilar but Advantageous constructions of EU. The first factor included items such as “Muslim Turkey does not have a place in Europe” and “ If we join to EU our culture will be invaded by foreign cultures” and explained 17% of the total variance. The second factor included items such as “I think that European countries are not willing to include us to EU” and “EU has an hypocritical politics toward Turkey” and explained 13% of variance. The third factor was composed of items such as “The fact that Turkey’s 99% population is Muslim is not an obstacle for integration to EU” and “Membership to EU will be an important step for getting closer to EU” and explained 11% of variance. The factor loadings may be seen in Table 4.2. . Three scales were constructed based on these factors.

Table 4.2 Results of Factor Analysis Performed on Constructions of EU

ITEMS	Europe Different	As Impermeable boundaries	Dissimilar- Advantageou s
31) Muslim Turkey does not have a place in EU.	.72	.00	-.00
5) If we join EU our culture will be invaded by foreign cultures	.71	.10	-.00
4) If we join EU our religious unity will be endangered.	.68	.00	.00
1) Integration with EU is a means of forgetting our history.	.66	.15	.00
6) Our historical past is the most important obstacle for integration with EU.	.64	.15	-.00
11) EU is a Christian club.	.46	.36	-.00
14) I think European Union countries are not willing to include us to EU.	.00	.73	-.00
30) EU has a hypocritical politics towards Turkey.	.00	.72	.00
9) EU is willing excessive demands just to make our integration harder.	.18	.60	-.00
8) EU will never accept Turkey	.37	.56	-.00
25) The ones who have hopes from EU have confidence in neither themselves nor their country.	.37	.47	-.00
18) Because EU is just like an imperialist union like World Bank and IMF, it is not going to bring a different system.	.27	.45	-.00
12) Turkey's beings 99% Muslim is not an obstacle for integration to EU.	-.22	-.00	.86
28) Integration to EU is an important step for getting close to EU.	-.00	-.00	.85
3) An European and a Turk cannot have a common point.	.46	-.00	.77
Eigen value	3,39	2,55	2,11
Percent of variance	%17	%13	%11

4.1.3. Measures About Religious Views

A factor analysis was performed on items related to religion. Three factors emerged explaining 58% of total variance. The first factor explained 26% of variance, included items such as “ A person who lacks religious beliefs also lacks responsibility”, “ A person who does not believe in religion can do any harm to the others “and was named “Religious Fascism”. The second factor explained 21% of

variance, included items such as “ State affairs should be ordered without the influence of religious rules” and “ The influence of religious rules on the justice system is wrong” and was named “Antisecular’. Factor loadings and eigen values and the reliabilities of the scales may be seen in Table 4.3. Items included in the third factor also cross loaded on the second factor. Therefore two scales were formed, one included items loading on the first factor and the other included items loading on second and third factors.

Table 4.3. Results of Factor Analysis Performed on Values of Secularism and Religious Beliefs.

ITEMS	Religious facism	Antisecular	Third factor
18) A person who lacks religious beliefs also lacks responsibility.	.77	.19	.13
26) A person who does not believe in religion can do any kind of harm to the others.	.77	.25	-.00
6) A person who does not believe in religion is of no use for his/her country and nation.	.75	.19	-.00
49) A person who does not believe in religion can not raise children with moral values.	.71	.28	-.00
13) I can easily confide on people who do not believe in religion.	.53	.10	.17
38) People who do not believe in religion does not have feeling of pity for the others.	.36	-.00	-.00
1) State affairs should be ordered without the influence of religious rules.	.00	.86	-.00
21) The influence of religious rules on the justice system is wrong.	.21	.79	-.00
43) Educational system should be ordered without the influence of religious rules.	.18	.76	-.00
31) My religious belief does not restrict my freedom.	-.00	-.20	.80
34) Religiosity is a kind of opium that numbs people.	.18	.31	.67
Eigen value	2.81	2.32	1.18
Percent of variance	26%	21%	11%

4.1.4. Reactions to Copenhagen Decision

The first three items measuring evaluation of the decision were used as a scale named Evaluation. A factor analysis on the remaining 8 items resulted in 2

factors explaining 58% of the total variance. The 2 factors of this solution were named as “Different-Conflict” and “Justification”. Different –Conflict factor included items such as “The reason of the decision is, EU is the Union of Christianity from the beginning” “The reason of the decision is, the religious difference between us and Europe”. This factor explained 24% of the total variance. The second factor included items such as “The reason of the decision is the invasion of human rights in our country” “The reason of the decision is Turkey’s economical situation” and explained 19% of total variance. The items included in the two factors, their factor loadings may be seen in Table 4.4. Two scales were formed based on the above factors.

Table 4.4. Results of Factor Analysis Performed on Items Related Reactions Towards December 12th Copenhagen Decision.

ITEMS	Different Conflict	Justification
11) The reason of the decision is, EU is the Union of Christianity from the beginning.	.79	-.12
7)) The reason of the decision is, the religious difference between Europe & us.	.71	-.13
10) The reason of the decision is, hesitations of EU about the influence of Turkey on their decision taking mechanisms.	.52	.19
6) The reasons of the decision are, Turkey’s strong manner about Cyprus.	.49	.42
8) The reason of the decision is the invasion of human rights in our country.	-.21	.74
5) The reason of the decision is the Turkey’s economical situation.	.00	.69
9) The reason of the decision is Europe’s hesitations about the immigration unqualified man power.	.19	.61
Eigen value	1,97	1,55
Percent variance	24%	19%

4.2. Scale Reliabilities

Scale reliabilities were computed for all scales and may be seen in Table 4.5.

Alphas varied between .82 to .51. The reliability of Europe-World identity was unsatisfactory therefore the single item European was used in further analyses.

Table 4.5 Reliabilities of the Scales

RELIABILITIES	Alpha
VALUES	
Authoritarianism	.63
Patriotism	.80
Ethnocentrism	.72
Antisecularism	.80
Religious fascism	.77
CONSTRUCTS OF EU	
Europe As Different	.76
Impermeable boundaries	.71
Advantageous-advantageous	.78
SOCIAL IDENTITIES	
Nationalist Islam	.73
Türk	.77
European world	.44
REACTIONS TO DECISION	
Evaluation	.82
Different conflict	.55
Justification	.51

4.3. Comparison of Schools

A School (5) by Identity (National-Islam, Turk, European) ANOVA was conducted in order to compare schools with respect to acceptance of different identities. School was used as a between subjects variable, the three identities served as within subjects variable, degree of endorsement served as the dependent measure.

A significant identity and a significant School x Identity interaction emerged from this analysis, $F(2,378) = 126.41, p < .001, \eta^2 = .40$. $F(8,776) = 10.47, p < .001, \eta^2 =$

.10. The most highly endorsed identity was Turk followed by European and Nationalist Islam. All three identities differed from each other in terms of degree of endorsement. Post ANOVA analyses revealed that students at Gazi University showed greater endorsement of Nationalist-Islam identity than students from other universities and Egean University showed greater endorsement of European identity than students from Gazi University (Table 4.6)

School (5) by Values (Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism, Patriotism, Antisecularism, Religious facism) ANOVA was conducted in order to compare schools with respect to acceptance of different values. School was used as a between subjects variable and the scales of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, patriotism, anti-secularism and religious facism were used as within subject variable and degree of endorsement served as the dependent measure. A significant value, School x Values interaction emerged from this analysis, $F(4,384)= 293.89$ $p<.001$ $\eta^2 =.75$

$F(16,1530)=6.67$, $p<.001$ $\eta^2 = .07$. The most highly endorsed value was patriotism and the least endorsed value was religious facism. Both values differed from endorsement levels of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and antisecularism. The latter values did not differ from each other (Table 4.6). Post ANOVA analyses revealed that students of Gazi University indicated higher endorsement of ethnocentrism, anti-secularism and religious faiscism than students from other universities. Boğaziçi students were less patriotic than GU, NSU and EU students (Table 4.6)

A School (5) by Constructs (Europe As Different, Impermeable Boundaries, Different but Advantageous) ANOVA was conducted in order to compare schools

with respect to acceptance of different constructs. School was used as a between subjects variable and the scales of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, patriotism, anti-secularism and religious facism were used as within subject variable and degree of endorsement served as the dependent measure. A significant effect of construct emerged $F(2, 390) = 533.65$ $p < .001$ $\eta^2 = .73$. The most highly endorsed construct was Dissimilar but Advantageous followed by Impermeable Boundaries and Europe As Different.

Next, A School (5) by Reactions (Evaluation, Different Conflict, Justification) ANOVA was conducted. School was used as a between subjects variable and the three reaction were used as within subject variables and degree of endorsement as the dependent measure. A significant Reaction by School x Reactions to interaction emerged from this analysis, $F(2, 384) = 227.17$ $p < .001$ $\eta^2 = .54$, $F(8, 770) = 10.66$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .10$. The decision was evaluated quite negatively. It was more likely to be attributed to differences and conflict between Europe and Turkey than it was justified (Table 4.6).

Students from Gazi University gave more negative evaluations, endorsed Different Conflict reaction more than students from other schools. No differences between schools emerged with respect to justification of the decision (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6 Comparison of the schools with respect to endorsement of different social identities, Different, values, constructions of EU, and reactions to the decision

Table 4.6 Comparisons of the Schools

	GU	NSU	EU	METU	BU		
						F (4,388)	
IDENTITIES							
Nationalist-Islam	2.46a	3.74b	3.79b	4.25b	4.24b	13.78	3.14c
SD	1.15	1.55	1.71	1.51	1.60		1.80
Turk	2.61a	2.05a	2.08a	1.97a	2.75a	4.08	3.86a
SD	2.48	1.31	1.64	1.20	1.61		1.64
European world	3.14b	2.88ab	2.38a	2.63ab	2.93ab	3.03	3.34b
SD	.98	1.23	1.62	1.27	1.48		1.65
						F (4,387)	
VALUES							
Authoritarianism	3.33a	3.37a	3.07a	3.99a	3.24a	2.76	3.21ab
SD	.70	.74	.79	.65	.66		.71
Patriotism	5.16b	5.06b	5.20b	4.73ab	4.56a	7.06	4.90a
SD	.82	.96	1.07	.92	.88		.97
Ethnocentrism	3.85b	3.21a	2.97a	3.02a	3.07a	13.15	3.17ab
SD	.66	.69	.79	.73	.77		.78
Religious antisecular	4.50b	3.42a	3.15a	3.21a	3.43a	16.4	3.45ab
SD	1.27	.98	.88	.86	1.10		1.08
Religious facism	4.16b	2.31a	1.95a	1.91a	2.07a	4.82	2.32b
SD	8.58	1.27	1.08	1.03	1.15		3.27
						F (4,391)	
CONSTRUCTS							
Europe As Different							2.78c
SD							1.17
Impermeable boundaries							4.72b
SD							1.19

Dissimilar							
Advantageous							5.27a
SD							2.36
REACTIONS						F (4,389)	
Evaluation	1.83a	3.08cb	2.44ab	3.18c	3.51c	13.81	2.93a
SD	1.07	1.47	1.36	1.60	1.45		1.54
Different conflict	5.36b	4.42a	4.20a	4.34a	4.18a	8.11	4.44b
SD	1.23	1.14	1.80	1.17	1.07		1.34
Justification	4.69	5.11a	4.88	4.93	4.74	n.s	4.89c
SD	1.48	1.31	1.52	.96	1.06		1.25

4.4. Regression Analysis

4.4.1. Predictors of Values

Four regressions were performed in order to determine the predictors of values related to patriotism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, antiseccularism and religious fascism. Indicators of SES, namely, father's education, mother's education, mother's birthplace and father's birthplace served as independent variables and the four values served as dependent measures. As may be seen in Table 4.7 predictors explained 2 to 15 percent of the variance in the four values. Non-significant amounts of variance were explained for Authoritarianism and Religious Fascism. Mother's Education emerged as a significant predictor of Patriotism, Ethnocentrism and Antiseccularism. Low level of education was related to high levels of Patriotism, Ethnocentrism and Antiseccularism (See in Table 4.7).

Table 4.7. Regression Analyses of Values as Dependent Variables and SES as Independent Variables.

	Values									
	Patriotism 1=low		Authoritaria- Nism 1=low		Ethnocentrism 1=low		Antisecularis m 1=low		Religious Faiscism 1=low	
	β	t	B	t	β	T	β	t	B	t
Mother'S Education 1=primary 5=graduate	-.20	-2,89	-.12	n.s.	-.15	-2.14	-.28	-4,21	-.10	n.s.
Father's. Education	.01	n.s.	-.03	n.s.	-.12	n.s.	.019	n.s.	-.03	n.s.
Mother's Birth Place 1=village 4=metro pole	-.09	n.s.	-.01	n.s.	-.06	n.s.	-.18	-2,61	-.04	n.s.
Father's Birth Place	.07	n.s.	-.05	n.s.	-.04	n.s.	-.050	n.s.	-.02	n.s.
	.05		.03		.09		.15		.02 n.s	
F (4,364)=	4,38**		2.47**		8,70*		16,510*			

* p<.001

**p<.05

4.4.2. Predictors of Social Identities

A second set of 3 hierarchical regressions was performed in order to determine the predictors of different social identities. The three social identities served as the dependent measures in these regressions, The four indicators of SES served as independent variables in the first step and the five values, namely Patriotism, Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism, Antisecularism and Religious Fascism were entered in the second block. As may be seen in Table 4.8, the first block of SES indicators explained to .04 to 13 of the variance in the three social identities. The second block composed of values explained 38, 16, and 3 % of the variance for

Nationalist-Islam, Turk and European identities, respectively. As may be seen in Table 4.8, Mother's Education was a significant predictor of Nationalist-Islam identity in the first step but it was insignificant after the second block of variables were entered into the equation. None of the other SES indicators emerged as significant predictors of any of the social identities after values were entered in the equation. Thus, it was seen that the effect of Mother's Education on Nationalist-Islam identity was mediated through values. As may be seen in Table 4.8, Patriotism, Ethnocentrism, and Antisecularism were significant predictors of Nationalist-Islam social identity. High levels of these values were associated with high endorsement of Nationalist-Islam identity. Patriotism was a significant predictor of Turk social identity and showed a positive association with it. Antisecularism was a significant predictor of European social identity; those not endorsing antisecularism endorsed European identity more.

Table 4.8. Regression of Social Identities as Dependent Variables

1 BLOCK	Nationalist Islam 1=high		Turk 1=high		European 1=high	
Mother'S ed	B	t	β	t	β	T
	,231	3,48	,03	n.s.	-,18	n.s.
Father'S ed	,05	n.s.	-,06	n.s.	-,10	n.s.
Mother birth place	,12	n.s.	-,03	n.s.	-,04	n.s.
Father birth place	,08	n.s.	-,004	n.s.	-,00	n.s.
R ²	,14		,004		,07	
F(4,363)	14,205		.322 n.s.		7.142	

Second Step						
Mother's ed	,302	n.s.	-,042	n.s.	-,145	
Father's ed	,203	n.s.	-,069	n.s.	-,108	n.s.
Mother's B P.	,015	n.s.	-,062	n.s.	-,013	n.s.
Father's Birth Pl.	,075	n.s.	-,004	n.s.	,014	n.s.
Patriotism	-,277	-7,033	-,387	-7,447	-,079	n.s.
Authoritarianism	-,074	n.s.	,007	n.s.	,017	n.s.
Ethnocentrism	-,257	-5,480	-,114	n.s.	-,003	n.s.
Antisecularism	-,33	-7,880	,065	n.s.	,189	3,243
Religious Fascism	-,043	n.s.	,002	n.s.	-,065	n.s.
R ² Change	.386		.139		.039	
F Change (9,358)	57,81		6,58		4,91	

p<.001

4.4.3. Predictors of Construction of EU

A third set of hierarchical regression was performed in order to determine predictors of construction of EU. The three constructions of Europe namely; Europe As Different, Impermeable Boundaries and Dissimilar Advantageous were served as the dependent measures in these regressions. The four indicators of SES served as independent variables in the first step; the five values were entered in the second block and the three social identities were entered in the third block. As may be seen in Table 4.9 , the first block of SES indicators explained from .002 to .11 of variance of constructions of Europe. Only Mother's education was a significant predictor of Europe As Different, low mother's education being associated with higher levels of Europe As Different. None of the other SES indicators emerged as significant predictors of any of the other constructions.

The second block composed of values explained 26, 15 and 7 % of variance in constructions of Europe as; Europe As Different, Impermeable Boundaries and Dissimilar but Advantageous, respectively. None of the SES variables were significant after the second block of variables were entered into the equation. As maybe seen in Table 4.9, Authoritarianism and Ethnocentrism were significant predictors of Europe As Different, higher levels of these values being associated with higher levels of Europe As Different. Ethnocentrism was the only significant predictor of construction of EU as having Impermeable Boundaries, high levels of this value being associated with seeing Europe as creating boundaries. None of the values in the second block were significant predictors of Dissimilar but Advantageous constructions.

The third block composed of social identities explained 4, 4 and 2% of variance of endorsement of constructions as Europe As Different, Impermeable Boundaries and Dissimilar but Advantageous respectively. Only European Identity emerged as a significant predictor. Endorsement of European identity was related negatively to Europe As Different and to seeing EU boundaries as impermeable. High endorsement of European Identity was also negatively related to seeing Europe as dissimilar but advantageous. As maybe seen in Table 4.9, the predictive power of Ethnocentrism and Authoritarianism for Europe As Different did not diminish after the identities were entered into the equation. Similarly, Ethnocentrism was a significant predictor of Europe as setting Impermeable Boundaries the three social identities were entered into the equation. In short, these analyses revealed that values

were more important predictors of Europe As different and viewing Europe as setting impermeable boundaries. Social Identities and that their effects were direct rather than indirect, mediated through identities. However, values did not have direct effects on seeing Europe as Dissimilar Advantageous. European Identity was a significant predictor of endorsement of this construction. In this case, the value of antisecularism had indirect effects through European Identity.

Table 4.9. Predictors of Constructions of EU

SES	CONSTRUCTS OF EU					
	Europe As Different		Impermeable Boundaries		Dissimilar Advantageous	
	β	t	B	T	β	t
Mother Ed 1= primary	-,223	-3,278	-,021	n.s.	,013	n.s.
Father Ed	-,030	n.s.	-,166	n.s.	-,019	n.s.
Mother's Birth Pl.	,023	n.s.	-,001	n.s.	-,046	n.s.
Father's Birth Pl.	-,189	n.s.	,021	n.s.	,058	n.s.
R ²	.112		.031		.002	
F _{Change} (4,356)	11,276		2,847		n.s.	
2 nd Block						
Patriotism	-,025	n.s.	,043	n.s.	,023	n.s.
Authoritarianism	,158	3,195	,124	n.s.	-,032	n.s.
Ethnocentrism	,394	7,285	,336	5,437	-,045	n.s.
Antisecular	,134	n.s.	-,072	n.s.	-,049	n.s.
Religious Fascism	-,002	n.s.	-,009	n.s.	-,004	n.s.
R ² change	.252		.129		.007	
F _{Change} (9,343)	27,49		(9,343)=7,68		(9,343)=.402	
3 rd Block						
Mother's edu.	-,079	n.s.	,048	n.s.	-,014	n.s.
Father edu	,048	n.s.	-,104	n.s.	-,012	n.s.
Mother birth place	,078	n.s.	,009	n.s.	-,027	n.s.
Father birth place	-,152	n.s.	,024	n.s.	,047	n.s.
Patriotism	-,034	n.s.	,078	n.s.	,176	3,037
Authoritarianism	,143	2,980	,127	n.s.	-,038	n.s.
Ethnocentrism	,361	6,618	,357	5,656	-,009	n.s.

Antisecular	,044	n.s.	-,082	n.s	-,067	n.s.
Religious Fascism	,004	n.s.	-,082	n.s	-,022	n.s.
Nationalist Islam	-,148	n.s.	,084	n.s	-,077	n.s.
Turk	,043	n.s.	-,012	n.s	,493	n.s.
European	,198	4,376	,202	3,854	-,212	-3,978
R^2_{Change} $F_{\text{Change}}(3,340)=$.046 8,89		.048 6,89		.237 35,67	

4.4.4. Reactions toward Copenhagen Decision

A fourth set of hierarchical regressions was performed in order to determine predictors of reactions to Copenhagen decision. The three reactions toward the decision namely; Evaluation, Different and Conflict and Justification served as the dependent measures. The four indicators of SES served as independent variables in the first step and explained .002 to .11 percent of variance. None of them were found to be significant predictors. The five values entered at the second block that explained 8, 6, and 5% of variance of different reactions to the decision, Evaluation, Different Conflict and Justification, respectively. As maybe seen in Table 4.10, Ethnocentrism was a significant predictor of Evaluation and Justification reactions.

Three identities namely Nationalist-Islam, Turk and European and explained 3, 2 and 1% of variance in different reactions to the decisions, Evaluation, Different Conflict and Justification respectively. Ethnocentrism was still a significant predictor of Evaluation and Justification decisions and none of the social identities were significant predictors of reactions to decisions.

Construction of Europe, namely; Europe As Different, Impermeable Boundaries and Dissimilar Advantageous were entered in the fourth block and explained 12, 10 and 4% of variance of different reactions, Evaluations, Different Conflict and Justification, respectively. As maybe seen from Table 4.10, seeing EU boundaries as impermeable was related to negative evaluation of the decision and Europe As Different was a significant predictor of seeing the decision as a result of differences and conflict. Viewing Europe as Dissimilar- Advantageous was associated with justifying the decision and ethnocentrism was related to low justification (rejection) of the decision.

Table 4.10 Predictors of Reactions to the Decision

	REACTIONS TOWARDS DECISION					
(SES)	Evaluation		Different-conflict		Justification	
Mother ed	β	t	β	T	β	t
	-,020	n.s.	-,069	n.s.	,057	n.s.
Fat ed	,152	n.s.	-,078	n.s.	-,022	n.s.
Mot birth place	-,009	n.s.	,056	n.s.	,104	n.s.
Father birth place	,040	n.s.	-,065	n.s.	-,083	n.s.
R ²	.023		.026		.008	
F(4,356)	(2,076)		2,374		n.s.	
2 nd BLOCK						
Patriotism	-,105	n.s.	,049	n.s.	-,053	n.s.
Authoritarianism	,068	n.s.	,086	n.s.	,082	n.s.
Ethnocentrism	-,273	-4,224	,168	n.s.	-,257	-3,878
Antisecularism	-,037	n.s.	,108	n.s.	,060	n.s.
Religious Fascism	-,009	n.s.	-,048	n.s.	-,010	n.s.
R ² change	.089		.061		.061	
F _{Change}	(5,351) =6,803		(5,351)=4,68		(5,351)=4,68	
3 rd BLOCK						
Patriotism	-,095	n.s.	,049	n.s.	-,036	n.s.
Authoritarianism	,073	n.s.	,086	n.s.	,091	n.s.
Ethnocentrism	-,259	-3,831	,168	n.s.	-,231	-3,341
Antisecularism	-,008	n.s.	,108	n.s.	,101	n.s.
Religious fascism	-,009	n.s.	-,048	n.s.	-,004	n.s.
Nationalist-Islam	,057	n.s.	,051	n.s.	,119	n.s.
Turk	-,005	n.s.	,016	n.s.	-,041	n.s.
European	-,047	n.s.	,130	n.s.	,006	n.s.
R ² change	.003		.019		.019	
F _{Change}	(3,348)=.403		(3,348)=2,46		(3,348)=2,46	
Final values						
Mother Ed	-,069	n.s.	,35	n.s.	,053	n.s.
Father Ed	,069	n.s.	-,052	n.s.	-,078	n.s.
Mother birth place	-,045	n.s.	,030	n.s.	,083	n.s.
Father birth place	,054	n.s.	-,020	n.s.	-,069	n.s.
Patriotism	-,053	n.s.	,048	n.s.	-,053	n.s.

Authoritarianism	,118	n.s	,022	n.s.	,092	n.s.
Ethnocentrism	-,126	n.s	-,002	n.s.	-,240	-3,284
Antisecularism	-,047	n.s	,102	n.s.	,095	n.s.
Religious Faiscism	-,044	n.s	-,040	n.s.	-,012	n.s.
REACTIONS TOWARD DECISION						
	Evaluation		Different Conflict		Justification	
	β	t	β	t	β	t
Nationalist-Islam	,095	n.s	,096	n.s.	,172	n.s.
Turk	010	n.s	-,009	n.s.	-,147	n.s.
European	,019	n.s	,041	n.s.	,043	n.s.
EuropeAs Different	,044	n.s	,360	5,272	,171	n.s.
Impermeable boundaries	-,416	-7,284	,111	n.s.	-,143	n.s.
Dissimilar Advantageous	-,045	n.s	,022	n.s.	,196	3,397
R ² change	.125		.102		.102	
F _{Change} (3,345)=	18,910		14,73		14,73	

To summarize, the four sets of regressions revealed that SES predicted values, values predicted identities and reactions. The Turk and European identities predicted constructions of EU, and constructions of EU predicted reactions to the Copenhagen decision. Adoption of European identity had both direct and indirect effect; through constructions of EU, on reactions to the decision. Values also exerted direct as well as indirect effects on constructions of Europe and reactions to the decisions. The value that had the most number of direct and indirect effects was ethnocentrism.

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION

The goal of this study was to examine the association between different values, social identities, constructions of EU and reactions to December 12th Copenhagen decision. Results revealed that values emerged as predictors of identities as well as of constructions of EU and reactions to December 12th decision. Social identities seemed to be less important predictors of constructions of Europe and reactions to the decision.

Three social identities emerged as a result of factor analysis. Namely, Nationalist-Islam, Turk and European. Nationalist and Islam social identities were expected to constitute different identities but they merged. This can be explained by the rising Islamic identity during the last years and emergence of religious branches of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the nationalist branches of the religious parties. Moreover patriarchy is both present in Islam and nationalism, and as such, it may be another explanation of the merger of these identities. Nationalist-Islam identity was found to be positively associated with the values of patriotism, ethnocentrism and antisecularism. Religious Fascism, a religious version of ethnocentrism was not associated with any of the social identities. Patriotism was significantly and positively correlated with ethnocentrism, antisecularism and authoritarianism. ($r = .30, .28$ and $.12, ps < .001$). The significant correlations

between patriotism and authoritarianism were consistent with correlations reported by Kağıtçıbaşı in 1973 and against Mummendey's distinction between nationalism and patriotism (Mummendey, Klink and Brown, 2001). They were also consistent with Bora's (1999) assertion that Turkish nationalism has an ambivalent connotation and that Turkish identity includes both German romanticism and French universalism and that it is influenced by Ziya Gökalp's ethnocentric stress on cultural heritage. However, the finding that patriotism but not authoritarianism and ethnocentrism were predictors of Turk social identity may be consistent with Atatürk's definition of 'nation' in a relatively more humanitarian and universal manner during the the first years of the Turkish Republic. The finding that patriotism was not associated with negative constructions of EU and with negative reactions to the decision may support Mummendey's (2001) argument that patriotism involves feelings of attachment to one's country rather than derogation of the outgroup.

Keyder's (1999), views about the top down application of modernization in Turkey is supported by a significant correlation between values of patriotism and authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and antisecularism. Keyder stated that top down application of modernization in Turkey weakened the value of patriotism. The disintegration of patriotic values such as secularism, gender equality, and autonomy of individuals brought about emergence of another ideology with an Islamic connotation. This postmodern viewpoint which highlighted cultural aspects of society and the ethnic component of national ideology is replaced by a Islamic viewpoint that emerged in relatively authentic manner. It is also consistent with

superficial meaning of modernization within the Turkish context. In this sense the direction of modernization in Turkey took in an authoritarian and patriarchal rather than a patriotic path (Kasaba, 1999).

The finding that European identity was predicted by the value of anti-secularism supports Soykut's (2003) argument that the primary dimension differentiating Turkey from Europe is the differing and opposing developments of Islamic and Christian history. It appears that the only way to be a European is to be secular. The secular basis for European identity is also consistent with Bora's (1999) assertion that Ottoman-and the antiseccular rather than nonmuslim minorities constituted the 'other' during the construction of the republican Turkish identity. Religious Facism, belief in necessity of religious beliefs was not a significant predictor of European identity probably because religious beliefs are not incompatible with being European although, secularism the core value of modernization, is essential for a European identity. The analyses indicated that European identity was negatively related to perception of Europe as different but advantageous and positively related to justification of Copenhagen decision. Thus, adoption of European identity meant seeing Turkey as a similar but a low status member of the superordinate category Europe, seeing its boundaries as permeable, and accepting system justification beliefs which justify denial of Turkey's entry to EU.

Three different constructions of Europe emerged; namely; Europe As Different, Impermeable Boundaries and Dissimilar- Advantageous. The first factor,

Europe As Different involves social categorization of Turkey and Europe as ingroup and outgroup based on religious and historical differences. In addition, Christian Club Europe is seen as a threat for our cultural and religious unity. The second construction was 'Impermeable Boundaries'. This construction was associated with views that EU was pursuing hypocritical politics towards Turkey, putting obstacles and using excuses for preventing Turkey's joining EU. These two constructions were related to in-outgroup differentiation and to seeing the intergroup situation as hostile and threatening. If Turkey's low status vis-à-vis EU is accepted, these constructions may be viewed as typical reactions of minority groups facing threats to social identity (Islam & Hewstone, 1993, Tropp & Wright, 1999). The third construction, Dissimilar but Advantageous is acknowledgement of low status of Turkey but also involves an effort at self differentiation. It represents viewing EU as instrumental for economic development, acknowledging religious differences, but not perceiving these differences as obstacles for integration.

It was expected that social identities would emerge as predictors of constructions of EU. Except for the association between European identity and not seeing Europe as dissimilar and advantageouss, this expectation was not supported. As mentioned above, endorsing European identity predicted rejection of dissimilarity and viewing EU as instrumental for gaining positive outcomes. It is possible that such instrumental concerns may seem hypocritical for individuals who already see themselves as Europeans. Ethnocentrism emerged as a significant predictor of both Europe As Different and seeing Europe as creating obstacles. In other words,

ethnocentrism was associated with rejection of system justification beliefs. Ethnocentrism is associated with outgroup derogation and as such serves the function of preserving group self esteem. Although a negatively valued concept in the history of social psychology, it may be instrumental for consciousness raising and rejection of the social order imposed by powerful groups (Taylor & McKirnen, 1984). Whether or not such consciousness raising will result in the change of the social order depends on a variety of factors.

It is difficult to explain why Nationalist-Islam and Turk identities did not emerge as significant predictors of constructions of EU. One reason may be that in the constantly changing socio-political scene of Turkey identities are in constant flux and have not had the opportunity to solidify. Another reason may be that economic concerns are paramount in today's Turkey and that social identities do not constitute coherent packages. A third explanation may be sought in the life-stage of our participants. It is possible that their socio-political identities are still in the process of emergence (Erickson, 1968). It is also possible that Turkish youth has been apoliticized during the recent past as media asserts. There is some support for this explanation. Mean score of the question asking about the importance of political ideology for participants by the item “ My political idea affects my life very much” was 3.4 on a 7 point likert scale. This showed that the importance of political ideology in the lives of our participants were not strong.

The results of the qualitative analysis of columnists from newspapers representing different sociopolitical views were consistent with the predictions that

particular social identities would be associated with corresponding constructions of EU. These results indicated the strongest ingroup bias and outgroup derogation for Ortadoğu, the proponent of nationalist identity. Ortadoğu made clear differentiations between ‘us’ and ‘them’ based on our cultural and historical background and employed ethnicist discourse. Cumhuriyet, the representative of Kemalist ideology also viewed EU as an imperialist Union and referred to history of conflict. However, consistent with a less ethnicist stand, Cumhuriyet also acknowledged some positive aspects of EU related to ‘civilization’ meaning of modernization (Kadioğlu, 1997). Sabah seemed closest to European identity but it seemed to represent a stand, which stresses the economic and superficial aspects of modernity. It represented a positive evaluation of integration with EU because of the economic advantages it might provide. The qualitative analysis revealed that the voice of political Islam ‘Vakit’ was closest to Dissimilar but Advantageous view of EU. It was not against joining EU because of its instrumental benefits. Although dissimilarity with Europe was emphasized, integration was seen as providing benefits. This viewpoint was similar to what Keyder (1999) stated ‘Islam and modern’ identity.

Evaluation of the December 12th Copenhagen decisions and reactions towards this decision showed that the decision received generally negative evaluations. Two reasons were offered for this rejection. One emphasized religious difference between Europe and Turkey and conflict arising from these differences. The second factor was related to the acceptance of the lower status of Turkey in relation to Europe both in terms of human rights and economic conditions. Constructions of EU emerged as

significant predictors of reactions to the decision. Seeing differences and intergroup conflict as responsible for the decision was predicted by viewing EU as distinct from Turkey. Thus, it appeared that the decision was construed as a continuation of historical conflicts between Europe and Turkey. In other words, it was part of the ongoing hostilities between the two worlds. The negative evaluation of the decision was associated with perceptions of Impermeable Boundaries between EU and Turkey and with the view that EU was discriminating against Turkey. Justifying the decision was predicted by viewing EU as Dissimilar but Advantageous and also by low levels of ethnocentrism. This was the only reason, which had an indirect association with endorsement of European identity. Thus, those who categorized themselves as members of the superordinate category Europe did not accept dissimilarity and accepted the decision as justified. This acceptance of low status and system justification was parallel to some of the results of Hine and Montiel's (1999) investigation of explanations for poverty in developing countries. They found that Filipinos blamed corruption of the third world governments rather than exploitation by superpowers. Thus, they blamed their own country for their inferior status and engaged in system justification. Hine and Montiel explained their results by arguing that the Filipino participants of their study were upper class students who probably had western rather than Filipino identification. Moreover the results of the Hine and Montiel (1999) showed that, ideology of the participants affected poverty attributions. Conservatives, blamed poverty on characteristics traits of the poor, whereas, liberals chose societal-level explanations such as blaming exploitation and

third world governments. Their measure of conservatism was similar to authoritarianism and acceptance of the status quo.

In conclusion, the present study aimed to provide a social psychological analysis to one of the most controversial topics in Turkey's current agenda. The analysis was based on theory and concepts at various levels, such as individual values, social identities, constructions of the outgroup, and reactions to outgroup's behaviour. Following Social Identity Theory prescriptions, the problem was conceptualised from a historical perspective. The results of the study with respect to social identities and construction of Europe showed some similarities to work and argument of scholars from different disciplines. As such, the present investigation was one of few, which integrated ideas from several disciplines toward analysis of a current issue. It also combined qualitative and quantitative methodologies and found similarities as well as differences between results obtained by two methods. One explanation for the stronger correspondence between social identities and constructions of EU in the qualitative and than the quantitative analysis probably was that the social identities of the columnists were crystallized while those of students were not. Korkmaz (2003, private communication) found that interest in political involvement among Turkish University youth was low. Another explanation may be that values did not constitute part of the analysis of columns. Rather they were implicit in the positions of the columnists.

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