

**A DEMOCRATISATION PROJECT IN THE AGE OF NEOLIBERALISM:
THE HISTORICAL SPECIFICITY OF THE TŪSIAD REPORTS**

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ABSTRACT

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By the late 1990s, a democratisation project has come to the agenda in Turkey in relation to a possible membership to the European Union. This thesis analyses this democratisation project with special reference to the reports published by TÜSİAD accordingly. Within the scope of the thesis, as well as the theoretical bases of the reports, the motives behind TÜSİAD's support for this project will also be dealt with. It will be argued that, in order to grasp the specificity of both the democratisation project and TÜSİAD's support for it, it is necessary to take into account the characteristics of the historical process that these take place in; and, some key developments at the national and international contexts will be investigated in this direction. For this investigation, a relational approach based upon Nicos Poulantzas's state theory and Bob Jessop's conceptualisation of "hegemonic project" will be made use of. The implications that the subject matters have for the form of state, form of regime, and class relations will be elaborated on.

Keywords: Democratisation in Turkey, TÜSİAD, Poulantzas, form of state, form of regime, hegemonic project.

ÖZ

NEOLİBEREALİZM ÇAĞINDA BİR DEMOKRATİKLEŞME PROJESİ: TÜSİAD RAPORLARININ TARİHSEL ÖZGÜLLÜĞÜ

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1990'ların sonlarına doğru Türkiye'de, Avrupa Birliği'ne olası bir üyeliğe bağlı olarak bir demokratikleşme projesi gündeme gelmiştir. Bu tez, bu demokratikleşme projesini buna ilişkin olarak TÜSİAD tarafından yayımlanmış olan raporlara referansla değerlendirmektedir. Tez kapsamında, raporların kuramsal temellerinin yanı sıra TÜSİAD'ın bu projeye verdiği desteğin arkasındaki saikler de ele alınacaktır. Hem TÜSİAD'ın bu desteğinin hem de demokratikleşme projesinin kendisinin özgüllüğünün anlaşılabilmesi için bunların yer aldığı tarihsel sürecin özelliklerinin hesaba katılmasının gerekli olduğu savunulacak ve bu doğrultuda, ulusal ve uluslararası bağlamdaki belli başlı gelişmeler incelenecektir. Bu inceleme için Nicos Poulantzas'ın devlet kuramına dayanan ilişkisel bir yaklaşımdan ve Bob Jessop'un "hegemonya projesi" kavramsallaştırmasından faydalanılacaktır. Ele alınan konuların, devlet biçimi, rejim biçimi ve sınıfsal ilişkiler açısından ne gibi anlamları olduğu değerlendirilecektir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Türkiye'de demokratikleşme, TÜSİAD, Poulantzas, devlet biçimi, rejim biçimi, hegemonya projesi.

Beni var eden iki kadına,

Keriman Güveloğlu'na

ve

Mine'ye

ve anısına saygı duyduğum bir adama,

Recep Güveloğlu'na

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And Mine, my beloved... No words can tell my indebtedness to her.

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Date:

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INTRODUCTION

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Turkish political life has undergone a problematic path in regard to democracy. The coup d'état in 1980 gave a break to the parliamentary regime and the military took over the government itself. The Constitution of 1961, which has been known as the most liberal and democratic Constitution of the Republic, was replaced by a new and much more conservative one, the Constitution of 1982. The consequent military rule between 1980 and 1983 and the following period under the aegis of this Constitution were marked by a quite restrictive and anti-democratic regime. Despite these regressive developments encompassing the society, there was an almost complete docility on the part of the masses in the 1980s, in contrast with the period before the coup. There had been some oppositions favouring democracy, but they were far from being effective on critical segments of society, let alone forcing a democratisation in the country. Some mass movements of the workers occurred through the end of the 1980s; however, the basic orientation of these movements was the level of wages, rather than an agenda of democratisation.

Starting by the late 1980s, the PKK movement in the south-eastern part of the country became the primary determinant of actual Turkish politics. The dramatic consequences of the associated armed struggle, and a perceived danger of separation formed the basis for a move towards nationalism throughout the country. After a decade of de-politicisation of the masses, which started with the coup, a process of

politicisation occurred under the heavy influence of these developments. In such a context, democratisation was far from being an issue for the majority of the population. On the contrary, in this period, deepened relations in the matrix of politicians, bureaucrats, secret services, and mafia came to the front. Such relations were perceived and presented as somehow legitimate by even the Prime Minister of the time. Some activities of the armed forces and police were kept out of civilian control, based upon the “low intensity war”. Until 1998, when Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, was arrested and the PKK ceased fire, the political life remained intensely affected by the related issues.

However, by the second half of the 1990s, the picture started to change. Criticisms against the 1982 Constitution, the taboo of the preceding period, have increasingly been expressed. In 1995, TOBB (Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchanges), a semi-official organisation of all businessmen in the country, published a report entitled “the South-Eastern Report”. The report proposed extra-military solutions to the problems in the region and was exceeding the usual limits of criticism echoed at the time about this issue. In 1997, TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) published a report, which depicted a detailed list of democratic deficits of the country and proposed solutions to them. The remarkable thing about these was that the demand for change and democratisation was coming from primarily the organisations of the business circles, which had been less willing before to support such demands if not totally against them.

In December 1999, Turkey’s candidacy to EU membership was approved at the Helsinki summit of the European Council. This remarkable event was assumed as

one of the most important developments in Turkish history. It marked a certain change in the aura of politics. Meeting the requirements of accession to the EU has become a grand national project. As a result, many important political actors aligned themselves with this project, and they almost univocally started to support Turkey's "harmonisation" with the EU *acquis communautaire*. Within this context, what may be called a "democratisation project" took start in Turkey.

This thesis deals with the analysis of the historical specificity of this democratisation project, with special reference to the reports published by TÜSİAD in accordance. It will be argued that in order to explicate this specificity it is necessary to take into account the concurrent political economic processes, which involve significant transformations related to the form of state.

The first chapter aims at a delineation of the approach in the reports of TÜSİAD related to democracy and democratisation. Additionally, a review of TÜSİAD reports' approach to economic issues will be supplemented in this chapter. Although, as will be discussed, economics in general is not considered within the scope of democracy and democratisation, how economic issues are handled in the reports has direct implications for assessing the historical specificity of the approach towards democratisation.

It will be argued in the second chapter that the understanding of democracy and democratisation in the reports of TÜSİAD is based upon a specific theoretical approach towards these issues. This approach is embodied in the theoretical framework of a body of literature which has become the mainstream in the 1990s. Therefore, the specific theoretical framework of this body of literature will be reviewed in this chapter in order to make clear the theoretical bases of the TÜSİAD

reports. It will be argued that there are significant correspondences and similarities between the reports and the basic theoretical framework that the approaches discussed in this chapter build upon.

The methodological issues related to the analysis of the historical specificity of the democratisation project and TÜSİAD's support for it are discussed in the third chapter. In the first section of this chapter, the relationship of capitalism and bourgeoisie with democracy and democratisation is discussed. This section elaborates specifically on the role of bourgeoisie in promoting democracy, and discusses the specificity of bourgeois democracy. In the second section, a relational approach is introduced in particular reference to Nicos Poulantzas' state theory. What is aimed here is not a full account of Poulantzas' state theory; but rather, it is aimed to outline a relational approach which makes use of the basic ideas and the concepts of his theory. His conception of "authoritarian statism" is described in detail, since it is related to the transformations related to the form of state, which will be discussed in the fourth chapter. This section also discusses Bob Jessop's conceptualisation of "hegemonic projects", as a supplement to the approach presented here in reference to Poulantzas' theory.

The relational approach thereby discussed will be made use of in the fourth chapter to analyse the historical process in which the democratisation project takes place. The transformations related to the form of state in the neoliberal decades of the 1980s and 1990s will be elaborated on in this chapter. It will be shown that similar transformations have occurred both in the advanced capitalist countries and the Third World countries. The specificity of the democratisation project will be discussed in its relation with the transformations related to the form of state. The process will be

handled in accordance with the dimensions related to the conception of hegemonic projects. It will be argued that the transformations related to the form of state are implemented in the accompaniment of a hegemonic project that involves the democratisation project in question associated with Turkey's accession to the EU.

CHAPTER 1

DEMOCRATISATION PROJECT IN TURKEY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF TÜSİAD REPORTS

By the late 1990s a “democratisation” project was due in Turkey in relation with Turkey’s candidacy and accession to the European Union. One of the most well-known and most effective organisations that support this project is the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD). This chapter aims at delineating the characteristics of the approach in the reports published by TÜSİAD in relation with this democratisation project (hereafter referred to as “the TÜSİAD reports” or “the reports”, briefly).

The democratisation project in Turkey has been introduced and developed in direct relation with Turkey’s candidacy to EU membership. As discussed below, TÜSİAD’s support to this project is also directly associated with this context. In other words, the conditionality of democratisation before Turkey’s accession to the Union has significant impacts on TÜSİAD’s support. Therefore, the first section of this chapter presents a brief outline of the conditions put in the legal documents published by the European Commission, which are related to Turkey’s accession to the Union. Then, in the second section, the approach of the TÜSİAD reports to the issues of democracy and democratisation is reviewed. As will be shown below, the reports take these issues as merely political so that economic issues are not dealt with. Therefore, in this section, a brief analysis of the approach to economic issues in

other publications of TÜSİAD will be supplemented. As will be argued in the fourth chapter, the specificity of the current democratisation project and of the approach adopted in the TÜSİAD reports can only be understood by considering the political economic processes and the approach to economic issues present in other publications of TÜSİAD.

1.1. Conditions Before Turkey's Accession to the EU

1.1.1. Copenhagen Criteria

For a country's accession to the European Union, the Union has put some conditions to be fulfilled by the candidate country. This conditionality has its origins in the principles set at the beginning of the European integration process:

the setting of at least political conditions for accession was far from new. The plans for a European Political Community in the early 1950s would have demanded that members of the putative Community were democracies. The Hague summit of 1969 established that it was the duty of any applicant state to adopt the *acquis* and the political aims of the treaties. With a view to possible southern enlargement, the Copenhagen summit of 1978 affirmed that respect for representative democracy and human rights were essential elements of membership. (Burton, 2002: 2)

Currently, these conditions before membership are embodied in what is called as "accession criteria", or "Copenhagen criteria" since they have been agreed upon at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993. These criteria are listed as

[having achieved]

- 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- 2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
- 3) the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

[and additionally, having created] the conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its administrative structures, so that European Community legislation transposed into national legislations implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and judicial structures. (E2003)

The fulfilment of the political criteria involved in the first item above is a pre-condition before the Union's starting the "negotiation phase" with a candidate country, whereas the other conditions are considered in the later stages of accession process. This chapter basically deals with these political criteria, since the conception of democracy and democratisation in the TÜSIAD reports is based upon them. As will be seen below, the three main sections of TÜSIAD's major reports on democratisation are entitled parallel to the formulation of political criteria here.

The Copenhagen political criteria involve some widely accepted problems. In the report of a workshop the participants of which were European specialists, the genuine problems regarding Copenhagen political criteria that have been identified in the relevant literature are listed as follows: "The moving target problem, i.e. the sense that meeting the accession conditions is almost impossible because their specific content keeps changing"; "the double standards problem", i.e. some conditions which are not fulfilled by existing members in full are set for candidates, e.g. Spain might be considered as a member which does not fulfil the requirements related to minority rights, which are expected from the candidates; "the measurement problem" of the criteria's adaptation; "the consistency problem" with regard to different treatment to different candidates; "the sufficiency problem ... [i.e.] the question of the minimum degree of fulfilment of the criteria which is necessary and sufficient for the attainment of each stage in the accession process, especially accession itself". (Burton, 2002: 3-4) Thus, it is problematic in general how the

criteria should be handled by the candidate and how this process is watched by the Union bodies.

The Copenhagen political criteria, which have been put broadly above, are specificised for the case of each candidate country in the accession partnership documents. Thus, the deficiencies of each candidate country's political structure are defined by the European Commission. It is stated that "[t]he main priority areas identified for each candidate State relate to their ability to take on the obligations of meeting the Copenhagen criteria". (AP2003-11) The fulfilment of the criteria by each candidate country is watched by the Commission so as to prepare regular progress reports once a year for each country. These reports form the basis for the Council's deciding about each country's accession to the Union. The accession partnership documents and regular progress reports prepared for Turkey by the Commission are reviewed briefly below, with special reference to the political criteria.

1.1.2. Accession Partnership Documents and Regular Progress Reports

In the Accession Partnership Document published in 2001, the political criteria are listed in two parts as short and medium terms. The short term political criteria are listed as; solving the Cyprus problem, improving the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of association and peaceful assembly, and thus encouraging development of civil society; fighting against torture, to "further align legal procedures concerning pre-trial detention with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and with recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture"; to "strengthen opportunities for legal redress against all violations of human rights"; intensifying training on human rights; to "improve the

functioning and efficiency of judiciary, including the State security court in line with international standards...”; “maintain the de facto moratorium on capital punishment”; removing the bans on broadcasting in mother tongue; reducing regional disparities, especially regarding the south-east. (AP2000: 16-17)

The medium-term criteria are listed as; striving for solving border disputes and related issues; guaranteeing the universal application of human rights and fundamental freedoms and making necessary changes in the Constitution and Laws in this direction; abolishing the death penalty and signing and ratifying the relevant protocol; to “ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its optional Protocol and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights”; to “adjust detention conditions in prisons to bring them into line with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and other international norms”; to “align the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the Government in accordance with the practice of EU Member States”; to “lift the remaining state of emergency in the south-east”; to “ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin” also regarding education. (AP2000: 19)

As of 2003, a new Accession Partnership Document has been published by the Union. This version was a continuation of the one in 2000. The basic difference between the two Documents is that in the second one the short and medium terms regarding the political criteria have been unified under one general heading, as “Priorities”, targeting the years 2003 and 2004 together. (AP2003: 12-14) It is interesting that all except a few political criteria to be fulfilled have been repeated more or less in the same words in the latter Document. The only two items which are

not repeated are the ones about abrogating capital punishment and lifting the state of emergency, since the relevant decisions had already been made by the Turkish Parliament by the time the Document was published. The change regarding the criterion about the National Security Council is significant; while, in the first document, the necessary change was described as aligning the Council “as an advisory body to the Government”, in the second it is described as to “align civilian control of the military with practice in EU Member States” (AP2003: 13). This stems from the legal situation in Turkey at the time when the second accession partnership document was prepared. The laws of the time had already fulfilled the relevant requirement of the first accession partnership by posing the National Security Council as an advisory body; but at the time the second document was prepared, this “advisory” status was found to be inadequate by the European Commission in terms of regulating military-civilian relations in practice according to the “EU norms”.

Overall, the content of the two accession partnership documents with regard to political criteria are basically the same, despite some nuances. This content also forms the basis for the regular progress reports prepared for Turkey. It is possible to trace the European Union’s perception of the regime and political structure in Turkey from the Progress Reports having been published on an annual basis since 1998¹. In the first of these reports a summary of the previous opinions declared by the Union is supplied. As stated in the report, “Following the military coup d’état in Turkey in 1980, the Community decided to freeze its relations with Turkey and to block the 4th Financial Protocol. Relations were gradually normalised after the restoration of a

¹ The progress reports prepared in 1998 and 1999 are different in one respect from the later reports; they were prepared before Turkey’s candidacy to EU membership was approved in Helsinki in December 1999.

civilian government in 1983.” (PR1998: 5) By 1989, after Turkey’s application to become a member, the official opinion declared by the Commission

... stated that successive reforms had resulted in ‘a parliamentary democracy closer to Community models’. The opinion noted, however, that ‘although there have been developments in recent years in the human rights situation and in respect for the identity of minorities, these have not yet reached the level required in a democracy.’ (PR1998: 9)

That Turkey is a deficient democracy has remained a basic premise of the Commission (Rumford, 2001) until the last progress report published in 2002. After the designation of Copenhagen criteria as the conditions that the Union expects from candidate countries, the limits and content of deficiency have been put in comparison with these criteria. In other words, the relevant expressions changed from “reaching the level required in a democracy” as in the official opinion declared in 1989, to “meeting the Copenhagen political criteria” as in the progress reports. However, as shown above, the content of these criteria is put in very broad terms and what is specifically meant by them can only be understood through the reports and documents prepared by the Commission as a part of the process of candidate countries’ accession.

The progress reports after 1998 basically focus on the evaluation of the changes that took place since the publication of the preceding report and involve an overall assessment of the current situation in comparison with the Copenhagen criteria. The content and scope of the progress reports are along the same lines with the accession partnership documents. The issues handled are more or less the same, as well as the way they are approached. All of the five progress reports prepared by the Commission for the evaluation of the situation in Turkey are concluded by the argument that Turkey has not yet met the Copenhagen political criteria. However, it

would not be misleading to say that each report is written in a way which gives a more positive sense than the one before. In sum, all progress reports are based upon the formulation that the current situation at the time is better than before but still there is a long way to go in order to reach the accession criteria. (PR1998, PR1999, PR2000, PR2001, PR2002)

What is important for the matter of concern in this thesis is how the framework of democracy and democratisation is drawn in the publications of the EU Commission. As mentioned above, at this point the progress reports are in the same line with the conception in the accession partnership documents outlined above. What the progress reports show besides is that a gradual move towards a more positive perception of the situation in Turkey by the Commission is evident, as well as a continuing record of inadequacy of the current situation.

A difference within the progress reports is that in the reports of 2001 and 2002, unlike the previous ones, a section entitled “peaceful settlement of border disputes” has been added under the heading of political criteria in regard with the relations between Turkey and Greece (PR2001: 31; PR2002: 44). Having no border disputes with a neighbour country is an accession criterion applied to all candidate countries; however, in the reports before 2001 this issue had not been mentioned, whereas with the Accession Partnership Document of year 2000 it started to be counted as a political criterion for the case of Turkey.

In sum, the conception of democracy and democratisation adopted in the reports and documents published by the Commission relies heavily on a procedural template the borders of which have not been explicitly drawn. This procedural template, made up of Copenhagen criteria, is pronounced for each candidate state

separately according to the country's situation, in the accession partnership documents and progress reports. Literally, what is meant by "democracy" in these reports and documents is a much narrower conception than the political criteria imply in general. In all the progress reports, "Democracy and the Rule of Law" and "Human Rights and the Protection of Minority Rights" are handled as two separate sections under the general heading of "Political Criteria". Therefore, it is clear that the concept of "human rights" and partly "the rule of law" is not considered within the definition of "democracy" in the EU documents. Democracy is considered more as a set of procedures and institutions related to the functioning of the political. However, in this thesis the political criteria are considered in general as the basis to define the "democratisation project", since the form of regime targeted is broader than this conception of "democracy". Therefore, where the phrases of "type of democracy" or "understanding of democracy" are used below, this larger meaning indicating the form of regime is implied.

1.2. The Approach of TÜSİAD Reports to Democracy and Democratisation

In the reports of TÜSİAD, the organisation itself is defined as "a non-governmental organisation working for the public interest." It is characterised by the following words:

Committed to the universal principles of democracy and human rights, together with the freedoms of enterprise, belief and opinion, TÜSİAD tries to foster the development of a social structure which conforms to Atatürk's principles and reforms, and strives to fortify the concept of a democratic civil society and a secular state of law in Turkey, where the government primarily attends to its main functional duties. (e.g., P1999: 5)

TÜSİAD published its first detailed report on the deficiencies of democracy and the requirements for democratisation in Turkey in 1997. It was a detailed report,

published both in Turkish and English, which aimed to highlight these deficiencies and requirements with reference to specific Laws and articles, and putting direct and clear suggestions. It found widespread positive and negative echoes from diverse circles. Indeed, some negative reactions came from some members of TÜSİAD, itself. However, these negative reactions from within the organisation do not seem to have affected the general lines of TÜSİAD's pro-democratic stance, so that this report is followed by two progress reports which share the main characteristics with it - one published in 1999 and the other in 2001. A significant point about these reports was that, as Ayşe Buğra denotes in regard with the 1997 report, they do not include the standard note of the previous TÜSİAD reports, which is put to disclaim any responsibility about the views of the writer of the reports (Buğra, 1998: 527). On the contrary, in the foreword, it is expressed with the signature of TÜSİAD Board of Directors that the report was proposing appropriate solutions for democratisation in Turkey.

The reports published in 1999 and 2001 aimed at keeping track of the steps taken by the government and persisting problems within the framework of the report published in 1997, and making suggestions about them. Beside these three main reports, TÜSİAD published numerous documents about specific topics related to democratisation. However, the 1997 report, as being the first comprehensive report on democratisation, draws the general lines of the approach of the reports in general. Therefore, special reference is given to it in the review below, while references are made to other reports where necessary.² One thing to note, in order to give a fuller

² The 1997 report was written by Bülent Tanör. Then, in 1999 and 2001 two progress reports, which were again written by Tanör, were published to keep the "balance sheet" of the suggestions made in the 1997 report. The 1999 report had also a task of defending the previous one against the criticisms

account of this approach, the subsections under the title of “*Suggestions for Democratisation*” below are designed in more or less direct accordance with the subsections in the reports.

1.2.1. Understanding of the Conjuncture and the Motives of Support

It is a basic premise that the type of democracy in Turkey is a deficient type when compared to the Western European countries. Indeed,

European countries which have recently undergone system changes ... [and which] are not much better than Turkey in terms of economic conditions are now ahead of Turkey on the path of pluralistic-liberal democracy based on human rights and on the supremacy of law. The same observation applies even for certain countries of Latin America which have in the past constantly alternated between democracy and military regimes. (P1997, B0: 1)³

It is observed that “transparency has all but disappeared on the level of state and administration and ...channels of political and judicial control have become clogged up”; because of these and others, “the alarm bells are ringing for democracy” in Turkey. (P1997, B0: 2)

One reason behind the deficiency of democracy in Turkey is put as Turkey’s democratic experience being a relatively short one. It is argued that the problems regarding the establishment and prosperity of capitalism and democracy, which have been encountered by the European countries in three centuries, have been

directed to it. This defence is made in the foreword with the signature of “TÜSİAD Board of Directors”, as well as by Tanör himself inside the report. In 2001, another TÜSİAD report was written by Süheyl Batum (P2001b). This report was also in the same direction and it elaborated on the level of fulfilment of EU criteria as set in the accession partnership documents and regular progress reports.

³ The English version of the 1997 report is downloaded from the Internet site of TÜSİAD. The report was put on the site in Microsoft Word format (with a file extension of “.doc”). Each main section of the report was put in a separate Microsoft Word file and each of them starts with a page number of 1. The documentation style here is used to make reference to these separate files all of which belong to the same report. Thus, for example, the documentation style (P1997, B2: 15) means that the relevant material is cited from the 15th page of the file “Bolum2.doc” which includes the 2nd section of the report. Likewise, the abbreviations I6, B0, B1, B2, B3 correspond to the files “ilk6.doc”, “Bolum0.doc”, “Bolum1.doc”, “Bolum2.doc”, “Bolum3.doc”, respectively.

encountered by Turkey in the last 70 years. (P1997, B0: 2) However, it is also argued that “[t]he major obstacle in the way of democratisation is not the legacy of history but a lack of political will to overcome it” (P1997, B0: 1) and that “it seems that democracy will develop not because it is an inevitable process but to the extent that it is fought for.” (P1997, B0: 3) This belief of the necessity of will seems to be the main reason behind TÜSIAD’s publishing these reports.

The most significant justification ground for the need to democratisation in Turkey is put as this being a precondition for Turkey’s accession to the EU: “TÜSIAD is committed to monitor and to promote Turkey’s political, economic and institutional reform process, within the framework of the membership process to the EU”. (FM2002: 1) Again, many of the proposals related to the elements of the democratisation agenda are justified in the same direction. The interrelation between the need to democratisation and international relations is manifest: “Turkey's failure to carry out the programme of democratisation would mean her break with and exclusion from major centres of the international community.” (P1997, B0: 3) Therefore, it has been argued that necessary adjustments should be made to the furthest extent, even in terms of sovereignty: “In order to fulfil the requirements for full membership in the European Union and other international institutions, a clause has to be added to the Constitution relating to sovereignty and the use of sovereignty by authorized agencies.” (P2001a: 18) It is also argued that the place of the European Court of Human Rights should be acknowledged by law: “A bill must be enacted to provide that judgements of the European Court of Human Rights may serve as a basis for retrial and the correction of judgements.” (P2001a: 18)

Another justifying ground for democratisation is related with the overall development of the country: “‘Development’ is now a concept that also involves the political model [beside socioeconomic development]. From this point of view, whether the regime of a country is democratic or not is closely related also to the level of development of that country.” (P1997, B0: 1) This point also counts for Turkey’s accession to the EU. Like many supporters of accession to the EU, TÜSİAD takes this process as a requirement that must be fulfilled for economic development. It is argued that “[b]eing a member to the EU is a major national project for Turkey, which will have vital implications in its foreign as well as in Turkey’s domestic policy.” (FM2002: 3) Thus, accession to the EU, democratisation and economic development all become the components of a grand project. Justification for one of these components is made in reference to other(s).

In this regard, TÜSİAD, while trying to find ways for strengthening and stabilising the economy, also emphasises the need to eliminate the deficiencies of the Turkish democracy so that political instability would no longer be an obstacle in the path of economic development. (P1999, I6: 2) It is observed that “malfunctioning political structure was one of the fundamental reasons behind the recent economic crisis [in February 2001] in Turkey.” (BD2001: 1) The issue of political stability forms the basic justification ground for the proposal made by TÜSİAD related to a new electoral system (ES2000: 8-14) Democracy is conceived as a tool of “good governance”: “An authoritarian alternative with a military or civilian appearance would not have the capability of running such a complex country.” (P1997, B0: 3)

In sum, as is manifest in the reports, TÜSİAD has an “instrumental view” of democratisation (Öniş and Türem, 2001). The basic motives behind its support to the

democratisation project are put in the reports as, first, Turkey's accession to the EU and integration to international economy, and second, democracy's capacity of good governance. Tülin Öngen argues that TÜSİAD's pro-democratic stance is a result of bourgeoisie's search for the "restoration of the system" (Aren et al., 1997: 30). She argues that the 1997 report deals more with the limitation of power than the source of power, although the definition of democracy is made in the report according to the source of power. The discussions and standpoints in the report were complying with the needs of the bourgeoisie (Aren et al., 1997: 32-34). Filiz Zabcı also believes that TÜSİAD's support to democratisation in Turkey is an instrumental one, since what it actually aims is maintaining the stability and the sustainability of market economy, through a social consensus. (2000: 79-80) She takes this process as a part of the overall process of democratisation which took place in the "developing countries" in order, first, to implement a political structure satisfying the needs of market economy, and second, to contain the possible reactions against the inequalities and problems that structural adjustment programs engender. (2000: 66)

1.2.2. Conceptualisation of Democracy

Democracy is broadly defined as the regime in which "[p]olitical power must conform to the will of citizens." (P1997, BO: 3) The model of representative democracy is distinguished from direct democracy and further discussions are based upon it as it is "the main model of democracy in our age". The boundaries surrounding the political power, which are inherent to representative democracy are put as the "human rights" and the "rule of law":

democracy is not simply a regime where the source of political power is the people's will, but also a system where this power is limited by human rights. Another element introduced by democratic theory and practice with regard to

the limitation of the state and of political power is the concept of State of Law / Rule of Law”. (P1997, BO: 3)

Thus, the three main axes of the “perspectives”⁴ are presented as political power, human rights and rule of law. (P1997, BO: 4) As indicated above, these are also the components of the Copenhagen political criteria. It is believed that there are deficiencies in all three axes in Turkish democracy.

An important point is that it is repeatedly expressed that the subject of the reports do not cover social and economic fields. (e.g. P1997, B2: 40) In this sense, as is argued in this thesis, it is clear in the TÜSİAD reports that the issue of democratisation is taken as merely a “political” matter, so that “perspectives on democratisation” could have been formed more or less regardless of social and economic dimensions. On the other hand, culture is a concept referred to in many respects. For example, “the maturing of democratic culture within the society” is listed as a condition for political stability. (ES2000: 30) Again, intraparty democracy is found to be related to political culture more than being a legal issue (P1997, B1: 9). As shown below, cultural rights are seen as quite important human rights so that some major changes in this field, some of which had been quite controversial because of the problems in the South East, are suggested. In general, and especially with regard to “the Kurdish question”, culture is taken as more central than socioeconomic dimensions.

There are frequent references in the reports to the articles of 1961 Constitution as better alternatives to the current Constitution. Generally, many articles inserted in “the extraordinary regime” between 1980 and 1983 are criticised

⁴ TÜSİAD’s main reports involve the expression “Perspectives on Democratisation” in the title.

of being not compatible with democratic standards. (e.g. P1997, B1: 30) This point is interesting since the 1980 coup was celebrated by TÛSİAD and its members as a necessary action by military at the time. Again, 1961 Constitution was involving liberal elements most of which had been criticised by the members of TÛSİAD during seventies. In this sense, these reports well represent the organisation's changed attitude towards political issues and specifically towards the issue of democracy. However, it should be underlined that it would be misleading to think that the framework of democratisation that is followed in the reports complies totally with the 1961 Constitution.

1.2.3. Suggestions for Democratisation in Turkey

1.2.3.1. Political Power

1.2.3.1.1. Political Parties

Moving from the point that political parties are a basic requirement for democracy, and important organisations of civil society (P1997, B1: 7) they are regarded as quite important in the reports of TÛSİAD. What the reports stress with regard to this topic can be broadly classified under two headings; first, the adjustment of the Law on Political Parties to democratic standards, second, intraparty democracy. It is observed that there are serious problems about the relation between the center and local bodies of the political parties and that “[l]eadership dominance or leadership oligarchy is a phenomenon observed in many parties.” (P1997, B1: 8) However, while finding some correlation between the issue of lack of intraparty democracy and the related Law, the former is basically associated with the political culture in Turkey (P1997, B1: 8-9 and P1999: 13) and it is argued that “the holding

of primaries open to all members, and if possible with a mandatory participation should become the rule.” (P1999: 14)

With regard to the Law on Political Parties, the TÜSIAD reports propose radical changes. With an observation that the “separatist terrorist movement” lost its effect as a threat on the unity of the country it is argued that the justification grounds for the anti-democratic aspects of the Law have thus disappeared. Furthermore, the Law is criticized to have reverse effects on the solution of problems arising from this movement: “The law in question should be removed due to the fact that it has resulted in the dissolution of political parties which have been loyal to the unitary state, and were conciliatory but have attempted to represent cultural identities.” (P1999: 13) Some other dimensions of the issue of “separatist movement” are handled in detail in the 1997 report under a separate heading, “The Kurdish Question”, as shown below.

Some examples to the proposed changes are as follows: The statement “.... goal for the nation is to reach the level of contemporary civilisation...” in Article 3 should be removed since it is both meaningless and against the principle of political and party pluralism. (P1997, B1: 2) Likewise, the expression that “[political parties] operate in loyalty to the principles and reforms of Atatürk” should be removed from Article 4 since “[it represents an] unacceptable, excessively oppressive mentality and arrangement.” (P1997, B1: 3). The restriction regarding the “involvement in ideological or anarchistic activities or incitement and encouragement of such activities” of and by the parties should be deleted both from the Constitution and the Law; since, among others, in practice it results in antidemocratic acts against the parties. (P1997, B1: 4-5) Again, “Article 81 of the Law on Political Parties (entitled

‘Prevention of Creation of Minorities’) must be repealed in its entirety [since] Article 81 has been used as legal grounds for dissolving political parties loyal to the unitary state.” (P2001a: 16) Such detailed proposals well illustrate the urge and determination of the TÜSIAD reports about emphasising the relevant adjustments to the Law on Political Parties.

1.2.3.1.2. Elections

The standards contemporarily accepted as making an election democratic are listed as; universal suffrage, i.e. everyone has the right to vote; the principle of equal vote, i.e. everyone’s vote is equal; the principle of direct voting, i.e. citizens elect representatives directly; the principle that elections are held in pre-determined intervals; the principle of secret vote; the principle of free and equal competition; the principle of judicial administration and supervision of elections. (P1997, B1: 16-18) These standards are in the same lines with the “procedural minimal conditions” of Robert Dahl as discussed in the next chapter, and with the definitions of “formal democracy” made by various writers. It is observed that all except one of these standards are practically acknowledged under the Laws and apply to the electoral practice in Turkey, by the time 1997 report was written. It is the principle of free and equal competition which is found problematic. For this, it is suggested that, the party in government should not have additional propaganda time, limitations before the cooperation of parties in elections should be abolished, deadline for publishing opinion polls should be protracted, and the treasury financial assistance to the parties should be given not according to the seats in the parliament but to their shares of vote. (P1997, B1: 18) It is also proposed that the interval of elections designed in the

Laws should be reduced from 5 to 4 years in order to comply with the actual situation of frequently made elections. (P1997, B1: 17)

With regard to the electoral system, a significant suggestion is reducing the national threshold from 10% to around 5%. (P1997, B1: 20; P1999: 13 and P2001a: 16) This is important in that it may pave the way for the parliamentary representation of the party that is believed to be representing the Kurdish minority, which had a share around 6% in recent elections. It has been one of the most controversial topics in Turkish politics in recent years. Another significant proposal is the election of mayors with a two-round system. (P1997, B1: 20; P1999: 13 and P2001a: 16) “This proposal aims in particular at overcoming the divisions within the centre-right and within the centre-left.” (P1997, B1: 19) Thus, here, TŪSİAD happens to have declared a preference regarding political position as strengthening “centre right and left”.

1.2.3.1.3. Turkish Grand National Assembly

It is stressed that the limits of eligibility to parliamentary representation should be broadened. From this point of view, it is suggested that the minimum age to be elected should be reduced, like in Western democracies, to 25. Besides, the eligibility limits of the previously convicted persons should be broadened especially for those politically convicted. (P1997, B1: 22)

The main point that the TŪSİAD reports stress upon with regard to the parliament and parliamentary representatives is the issue of parliamentary immunity. The reports indicate to the fact that the current legal framework of parliamentary irresponsibility allows the representatives to hide their criminal activities and their

possible crimes to remain out of jurisdiction. Therefore, it is suggested that the legal heading for this issue should be changed as parliamentary irresponsibility and inviolability. The TÜSİAD reports propose that while parliamentary irresponsibility should be preserved and enlarged, parliamentary inviolability should be regulated in the direction that the judicial examination of members should be easier. (P1997, B1: 25-28)

1.2.3.1.4. The System of Government

The proposals suggesting presidential or semi-presidential systems are clearly rejected on the basis that Turkish political culture does not comply with these systems as they have a great possibility of violating democracy in such conditions (P1997, B1: 33-35). While admitting that the election of the president by popular vote would be more democratic, such a change in the election process is rejected since it has a “high probability of bringing the administration to a ‘two-headed’ state in a negative meaning of the term”, and since it would not be more resistant to *coups d’etat*, to contrast to the proponents of this view. (P1997, B1: 35) Overall, it would not be misleading to argue that there is no significant suggestion in the reports to change the current status of Presidency in Turkey.

1.2.3.1.5. The Issue of Civilianisation

It is asserted that democracy in Turkey has a “problem of civilianisation.” (P1997, B1: 36) In general it is argued that the military authority should be subject to civilian authority, and that “military authority is to be concerned solely with national defence, and the responsibility for domestic security is to be undertaken by the civilian authority and relevant ministries”. (P1997, B1: 36) In this regard, it is

proposed that the Chief of the General Staff should be subordinate to the Minister of National Defence, “the NSC [National Security Council] should be eliminated as a constitutional agency”, and “the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Centre ... which has a high probability of lending itself to a quasimilitary regime, should be abolished”. (P1997, B1: 37-39) These all sum up to a radical redefinition of the political status of the military.

Another suggestion is about the democratisation of universities. It is proposed that the deans and rectors as well as the majority of the members of the Higher Education Council should be elected by the academic staff (P1997, B1: 40). At the time the reports were published, the administration of the universities and the Higher Education Council were criticised of being anti-democratic.

A basic criticism against Turkish public administration is directed to its excessively centralised character; an empowerment of the “local” is found necessary. (P1997, B1: 41) For the solution of this problem a specific understanding of the concept of “participation” is emphasised: “The general perspective is that local participation can be achieved through the development of local administrations (decentralisation) instead of a “widening of authority” (deconcentration).” Specifically, it is exerted that the obstacles constraining the political activities at local level should be abolished (P1997, B1: 41). Another key concept defended for better public administration is “transparency”. The current “closed box” character of the Turkish public administrative structure is suggested to be changed in order to reach to a transparent state (P1997, B1: 41-42).

1.2.3.2. Human Rights

The issue of human rights is conceived as essential to democracy in the TÜSİAD reports: “democracy is not simply a regime where the source of political power is the people's will, but also a system where this power is limited by human rights.” (P1997, BO: 3) It is expressed that “those human rights which are most closely related to democracy” are dealt with in the reports (P1997, B2: 1). Therefore, the issues handled here are significant in that they indicate to the particular understanding of democracy that is argued for by the TÜSİAD reports. In other words, which rights are “not closely related to democracy” have significant implications for the definition of democracy. With regard to the 1997 report, it is expressed that “this report relates not to *social rights* but to democratisation and *classical rights* [italics mine].” (P1997, B2: 37) This point, which can be observable from the content of the reports, and as discussed below, is a key to understand the formalistic or procedural conception of democracy, predominant in the reports. It also underlines the understanding of democracy as a merely “political” subject.

The criticisms against the current legal structure regarding human rights are directed radically to the Constitution. Because of their anti-liberal character, some main articles of the Constitution are proposed to be changed or totally abrogated. Some expressions in the Constitution, such as “Turkish national interests, Turkish existence, Turkish historical and moral values, Atatürk civilisationism” are seen as legally unclear and open to various interpretations. The usage of these concepts in the Constitution and their practical appliance are found as contrary to liberal ideals. It is argued that there are statements that open the way for redefining what “human rights” actually are and that make the grounds for cancelling the practical appliance

of any fundamental human right. It is stressed that “human rights” is – just like democracy is – a universal concept and these rights’ practical applicability should be taken under Constitutional guarantee. (P1997, B2: 1-5)

A basic theme that is discussed within the scope of human rights is the freedom of expression and thought. It is put that there is a lack in terms of this human right regarding both the acknowledgement in the Laws and its exercise in practice. The Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act is proposed to be abrogated, and the Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code is proposed to “be revised so as not to permit the possibility of punishing ideas” (P1997, B1: 21; P1999: 14; P2001a: 15). These two articles, which have been practically used to penalize a wide range of critical political thoughts, are seen as serious obstacles curtailing intellectual freedoms.

While in the 1997 report the issue of religious education was considered under the title of freedoms of religion, in the 2001 report “[t]he regulation necessary for religious education is considered under the item ‘freedom of expression’ since it is thought to be related to ‘freedom of thought’.” (P2001a: 15). The approach to the issue has two aspects: “In the field of religious education, one can speak of both a liberalization, on one hand, and practices that infringe on laicism and the freedom of belief, on the other.” (P1997, B2: 15) It is proposed that mandatory religious education should be ended (P1997, B2: 15; P1999: 14; P2001a: 15) since it “is contrary to secularism, secular education, freedom of religion and conscience and the rights and freedoms of children and parents.” (P1997, B2: 17) The rise of political Islam has been perceived as a serious threat on democracy in the 1990s, and therefore suggestions related to this field should also be considered as directed to the

prevention of such a threat. Thus, the proposal, “The Highschools for the Training of Religious Functionaries [*Imam Hatips*] should be provided with a structure that conforms to the status of vocational highschools; those which are in excess of the real need for such schools should be converted to general or technical highschools.” (P1997, B2: 18) should be understood in this sense. This suggestion is a part of the general aim of fighting against the political Islam, and thus shows that the political Islam is seen as damaging to democracy.

Another critical issue related to human rights is capital punishment, which is taken in relation with the “right to life”. It is proposed that capital punishment should be limited to war and warlike conditions. (P1997: 6; P1999: 14; P2001a: 14) This suggestion is significant since at the time the reports were published it came to mean a stance against the execution of Abdullah Öcalan.

A significant point is that “the Kurdish question” is handled under the title of human rights. It is argued that “even if indirectly stated, provisions and provisions whose outcome is discrimination and rejection may be found.” (P1997, B2: 40) and “Turkey should not be made vulnerable to accusations of as being ‘cultural genocide’” (P1997, B2: 44). Thus, some regulations in this field are proposed, such as, removing the bans on Kurdish personal names and names of places of settlements, removing the bans on Kurdish as a language, acknowledging mother tongues other than Turkish, removing the obstacles in front of press and broadcasting in Kurdish, and removing the bans on separatist thought. (P1997, B2: 40-45) All these mount up to an admission of the “Kurdish identity” as a cultural phenomenon. While admitting that “‘the Kurdish question’ also has social and economic causes” these causes are not dealt with since “the subject of this study does not cover social

and economic fields.” (P1997, B2: 40) Thus, it is manifest that attention is paid merely to the cultural and political side of “the Kurdish question” and the socioeconomic dimensions are ignored in terms of suggesting clear solutions.

Under the title of “personal inviolability, liberty and security”, of which the right to life is seen as a part, the issues of excesses of the security forces and torture are also handled and it is stressed that these should be prevented with necessary adjustments in Laws and the Constitution. Also, the legal procedures of arrest, detention and security inquiry are argued to be made compatible with human rights. (P1997, B2: 6-14) It is argued that guarantees provided by the Criminal Procedure Law should be extended to involve State Security Courts, under which political suspects are tried. (P1999: 14; P2001a: 17-18)

Issues conceived under the title of human rights are put in general as freedom of belief, freedom of worship, freedom of thought, freedom of science and arts, freedom of press and publication, freedom of audio-visual communication, which are all taken as intellectual freedoms; and, freedom of association, freedom of meeting and demonstration marches, trade union freedoms, which are taken as collective freedoms. (P1997, B2)

Trade unions are defined as civil society organisations to act as pressure groups. Therefore, the removal of the bans on their political activity, which took place in 1995 is appreciated. However, an interesting point is that while public servants’ right to establish and to be a member of trade unions – which was taken under Constitutional guarantee before – is supported, it is argued that they should be subjected to another Law different than that workers and employers are subject to. Furthermore, their right to make collective bargaining and strikes is seen as having

“far greater relevance to social rights, which do not enter the scope of this report, than to human rights.”, and is not emphasised as other rights are done. (P1997, B2: 36-40) Rather, the relevant European and ILO conventions are indicated to and it is proposed that “in the drafting of the law relating to the trade union rights of civil servants, these international standards and commitments should be *taken into consideration* [italics mine].” (P1997, B2: 40) While detailed and clear proposals were made for many other issues this point seems to be somehow overlooked with a justification ground as this being a “social right”, which is technically out of the scope of the report.

Economic inequality, a topic which is related to economic and social rights, is analysed by TÜSİAD reports with reference to its causes, dimensions and the recent developments in this field. (I2000) However, it is obvious that no clear suggestions are made in order to resolve the grave problems around this issue. Unlike problems related to political and cultural rights, problems related to economic or social rights are left intact in the reports in terms of proposing clear solutions. (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 106) Rather, general principles or solutions are pronounced; for example, “transfer mechanisms such as insurance of unemployment and child allowance practices can be utilized. Current state transfer practices should also be made for effective so that it could reduce inequality and poverty.” (I2000: 24); or, “the tax base should be broadened” (I2000: 39). Above and beyond, the issue of economic inequality is not regarded in relation with democracy and democratisation; in other words, it is handled and discussed vaguely but not as a component of the process of democratisation.

A basic reason behind the lack of clear and strict suggestions with regard to reducing economic inequality is that the fulfilment or acknowledgement of economic rights is not a prerequisite for accession to the EU. There are some economic criteria for accession, however these criteria are not directly related with the notion of economic equality. They are basically about the issues related to the healthy functioning of market economy and “competitive capacity of the national economy”.

1.2.3.3. Rule of Law

It is observed that there are significant differences between the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions with regard to the principle of rule of law and the latter is found more restrictive and negative in many aspects. It is argued that “the laws of the military regime of 1980-1983 are in the position of a kind of ‘second constitution’ alongside the Constitution”; furthermore, since these laws are completely out of judicial review they are found to be even “stronger than the provisions of the Constitution”. (P1997, B3: 9) Another basic deficit is shown about Constitutional jurisdiction; the frame set in 1982 in this regard is far from being adequate to supervise a state based on rule of law and human rights. (P1997, B3: 10)

The National Security Council is another main topic handled under the principle of rule of law. The Council is criticised of being antidemocratic in many aspects and reform of it is found necessary. It is argued that “the Council has a very broad interpretation of the ‘concept of national security’ and shows interest in all problems encompassing the political, economic, cultural and legal areas.” (P2001b: 26) Therefore it is suggested that the scope of the Council should be narrowed with relevant reforms, rather than totally abolishing it. (P2001b: 28) Increasing the number of civilian members, which was proposed by the Prime Ministry of the time,

is not seen as an adequate solution. (P2001b: 27) On the other hand, it is argued that it was possible to limit the Council's authority by certain changes in the Laws, without making any changes in the Constitution. (P2001a: 17)

The "lack of judicial review" on some state officials and on some provisions of Law, and the "lack of judiciary independence" are issues frequently emphasised in the reports. These two problems are found to be damaging to the rule of law. "Establishment of a judicial police organisation, extension of guarantees provided by the Criminal Procedure Law to suspects being tried by State Security Courts, and constitutional changes to provide for an independent judiciary" are shown as essential fields of reform to establish the rule of law. (P2001a: 17-18)

Some regulations about the issue of "State of emergency" are suggested so that the limits on administrative jurisdiction under State of emergency should be removed. (P1997, B3: 15) It is proposed that the "decrees forcing law" should not be able to regulate the periods of martial law and state of emergency (P1997, B1: 31). It is suggested that as well as the proclamation of state of emergency, its scope should also be restricted, in terms of which fundamental human rights can be restricted. (P1997, B1: 42-44)

"Transparency" and "accountability" are the key concepts underlying the suggestions related to the rule of law in the reports. Extending the separation of judiciary from the legislative and executive branches to an adequate level is found essential for the fulfilment of the principles of rule of law. The need for independence of judiciary from both of these branches and other external factors is especially emphasised.

1.2.4. TÜSİAD and Economics

It is manifest in the TÜSİAD reports discussed above that the concept of democracy is taken as a merely political issue and that economics is considered out of the scope of it. On the other hand, TÜSİAD supports the IMF guided economic programs implemented in Turkey with even more enthusiasm than it supports the democratisation project. It publishes weekly bulletins (*Ekonomide Gündem*) covering basically the developments related to the economic program, and a quarterly economic survey (*Konjonktür*). It also makes frequent public announcements about economic issues via press and mass media. Also, it pays special regard to the reform of public administration which deals with issues about the relations of political power with economics.

TÜSİAD is an adherent supporter of the current economic program implemented in Turkey with the guidance of the IMF. It is frequently stressed in the publications of the organisation that the “current economic program is the sole reference” (Q2003: 1) in solving the economic problems and reaching economic stability. The supported content of this program is described in general lines as:

In the letter [of intent submitted to the IMF], Turkish government declares that the fiscal austerity will be maintained from 2003 onwards with 6.5% of primary surplus, the priority will be given to disinflation, public employment will be reduced, the BSSR⁵ will be strengthened, structural reforms will continue with the new schedule and the privatization will gain pace. (Q2003: 1-2)

Therefore, as is obvious in the above description, the economic program supported in the reports of TÜSİAD is along quite the same lines with the neoliberal

⁵ This should have been “BRSA”, the abbreviation for “the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency”.

frame of *Washington consensus*⁶. TÜSIAD published a report before the general elections of November 2002, which involved suggestions to the new government that would be established after these elections. (HO2002, 2002) The list of issues handled in this comprehensive report is almost in one-to-one correspondence with the items of the Washington consensus. Suggestions are composed of topics such as, maintaining fiscal discipline within the frame of IMF program, increasing the competitive capacity of economy, making legal regulations to attract foreign direct investments, promoting private sector through privatisations, etc., and lowering tax rates. (HO2002, 2002)

The neoliberal paradigm underlies the approach towards any economically related issue. For example, against the problem of unemployment and the social problems it engenders, the solution is seen in economic growth which may indirectly open opportunities of employment, in reducing the labour costs with relevant regulations, or in enabling flexible employment; but not in, for example, increasing transfer payments as the paradigm of welfare state suggests. (U2002: 234-5) Parallel to the neoliberal economic program, the TÜSIAD reports indicate to a need of redefinition of state's role in regard with economy; therefore, a public administration reform is found necessary. It is observed that globalisation has made it necessary a redefinition and restructuring of the state. The new role of the state is described in reference to the approaches of the World Bank and the OECD as “effective

⁶ The concept, which is discussed in the fourth chapter, defines the neoliberal frame that the institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank adopt in their relation with Latin American countries. It has become a generally accepted description of neoliberal principles.

regulation and supervision with the least intervention” (KR2002: 1). In a report which is prepared in the name of UNICE⁷ by TÜSİAD, it is argued that

Turkey’s integration, both into the global economy and the EU requires an effective public administration reform that defines *the new role of the state* [italics mine]. This requires the re-definition of state’s functions in economic activities with relation to the private sector, as well as of its relation to the civil society that would re-describe the relation between the state and the individual. (TU2003: 3)

Thus, it is manifest that a substantial restructuring is aimed at, which encompasses many aspects of the state. It is suggested that the Constitution should be targeted as well as all codes and laws. With means to achieve this redefinition a threefold strategy is suggested: privatisations, abolition of state monopolies and rule of law. (TU2003: 3-4) The main focus of the state should be to give public service more effectively with less cost and make more use of technology. For this, it is stressed that the public administration reform should deal with the effective use of present resources and with producing effective solutions to changing problems, but not with the question of which services should be supplied by the state and which not. (KR2002: 1-3) The basic principles of reform are put as, first, maintaining transparency and accountability; second, respecting merit in human resources management; third, increasing executive capacity and efficiency; and fourth, maintaining participation of civil society in regard with the functions of state. (KR2002: 3-4) As the tools of an effective reform of public administration three methods are suggested; first, making regulatory reforms in such a way that assures the effective performance of market mechanisms in the field of services instead of supplying these services; second, implementation of the principles of “total quality

⁷ The organisation of business organised on the scale of Europe, of which TÜSİAD is a member. In the publications of UNICE, the organisation itself is defined as “The Voice of Business in Europe”.

management”; and third, making effective use of technology in establishing an “e-state”. (KR2002: 4-9)

In sum, the new role of state that is argued for in the TÜSİAD reports involves a modified relation of the state with the economic realm. As will be discussed, this modified relation complies with the transformations related to the form of state, which are discussed in the fourth chapter.

1.3. Concluding Remarks

As mentioned above, the TÜSİAD reports take the issues of democracy and democratisation as merely political and as separate from the economic issues. Putting for now the handling of the economic issues aside, it will be summed up here that the approach in the TÜSİAD reports towards the issues of democracy and democratisation had the following characteristics:

- taking democracy as a merely political issue, in the sense that economics and politics are separate realms;
- conceiving of civil society – of which TÜSİAD is considered as a member – as distinct from the state, and as having a pro-democratic character;
- building upon a formal conception of democracy, which takes the concept as a set of legal procedures and institutions;
- taking liberal democracy as the *best* regime in terms of both individual liberty and effective governance;
- considering the military regime in a negative sense and supporting civilianisation of the political system;

- considering culture as an important factor in relation with democracy and democratisation; and meanwhile, taking political Islam as damaging to democracy and considering the Turkish political culture as not fully compliant with democracy;
- seeing political institutionalisation as a must for democratisation, and therefore suggesting specific solutions in this direction;
- taking close relations with the advanced capitalist countries in a positive sense.

As will be seen in the next chapter, these characteristics comply with a certain understanding of the issues of democracy and democratisation which has become dominant in the 1990s.

The basic motives behind the support for democratisation expressed in the TÜSIAD reports have an instrumental character. Democratisation is taken as directly related with factors such as Turkey's accession to the EU, economic development, integration to world economy, good governance, and stability. Especially, the conditionality of democratisation before Turkey's possible accession to the EU forms the primary motive of the support. The general outline of the reports and the range of topics covered in them are designed in direct accordance with the accession criteria put for Turkey in the accession partnership documents and regular progress reports.

CHAPTER 2

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATISATION: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE MAINSTREAM APPROACHES

This chapter reviews the literature on democracy and democratisation that is produced mainly in the 1990s concerning the democracies in the countries that are broadly classified under groupings such as Third World, Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa. The approaches to this “non-Western” world within which the subject matter of this thesis is considered, will be briefly assessed. By this scope of review, it is aimed, first, to sketch out in general lines how the cases like the one this thesis is concerned with have been discussed in the last decade on; and second, to make clear a specific theoretical framework which constitutes the theoretical bases of TÜSİAD reports’ approach to the issues of democracy and democratisation. It will be argued that there are significant correspondences and similarities between the reports and the basic framework that the approaches discussed in this chapter build upon.

With such a focus, there are some restrictions on the scope of review of literature on democracy and democratisation below: First, as mentioned above, mainly the part of literature produced in recent years will be handled.

Second restriction on the scope of review is that mainly the theory that deals with the “non-Western” world will be centred around. It may seem somehow problematic at first sight to speak of literature concerning such a vast geography together at one. However, as will be discussed below, the totalising of countries

under broad groupings belongs not to the analysis here but to the approaches themselves. The part of literature produced in recent years is already condensed in the analysis of non-Western cases.

Third and the most specific restriction on the scope is that the part of theory in question will be discussed with special reference to the works published in the *Journal of Democracy* and the authors writing in it. The journal is started to be published in 1990, just after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc. It seems to have undertaken a mission of analysing and proposing solutions to the problems of democracy and democratisation in the above-mentioned non-Western countries. The *Journal of Democracy* also appears as an influential agora of prominent writers such as, Marc Plattner and Larry Diamond – the editors – and Samuel P. Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Seymour Martin Lipset, Robert Dahl, Guillermo O'Donnell, David Potter, Juan Linz, Alfred Stepan, etc., most of whom are also in the editorial board of it. Thus, the journal may be considered as a sphere of mainstream discussions held in recent years.

2.1. A Brief History of the Mainstream Theory on Democracy and Democratisation before the 1990s

As the starting point of the contemporary theory on democracy and democratisation, usually, the “modernisation school” is taken. By the theorists of this school, the two issues were handled in terms of the political development of underdeveloped societies, which they considered to be parallel to their economic development. According to this school, the issues of democracy and democratisation were something highly associated with the level of capitalist development.

Examining the development of “original” democracies in advanced capitalist societies the proponents of modernisation school reached to a conclusion that unless a substantial advance in capitalism had occurred it was impossible for democracy to come into being. Then, they suggested, non-democratic societies had to give priority to economic development in order to become democratic. This course of thought predominated both political theory and practice. However, many historical cases and alternative approaches developed counterposed a deep controversy to the basic foundations of this theory.

From the critiques of modernisation approach another body of literature which is called as “dependency school” emerged. The theorists of this current stressed the importance of international conjuncture in approaching to and assessing concrete cases of democratisation. They argued that cases could not be analysed without regarding the founding relations between more and less developed regions of the world. Many adherents of this school believed that the characteristics of the particles could not be grasped disregarding the whole, which they called “the world capitalist system”. Each and every region of the world had a definite function in the global division of labour, which made it impossible to consider any country without her interactions with other countries involved in this global system. Then, it would be nonsense to expect democratisation in the less developed regions of the world by solely depending upon the internal economic development of these countries; the impact of the advanced capitalist countries on them should be taken into consideration. More clearly stated, for many theorists of the dependency school, the presence of advanced capitalist societies was itself predominantly the very obstacle in front of the democratisation of economically less developed societies.

As Paul Cammack notes, especially regarding the Latin American cases, by the end of the 1970s another approach overcame the structural account of the dependency school. Affected by passages to authoritarian regimes in the region, this approach was characterised by an interest in transition and political process, with an emphasis on concepts like leadership and choice. He argues that this approach also regarded the procedural and institutional requirements for democratisation, and at the same time it “was a direct challenge to the structural determinism of earlier work.” (1997: 154)

Gerardo Munck groups the contemporary literature on democratisation in three. Munck’s criteria for distinguishing between periods are highly dependent upon the geographical focus of the literature in question. The first group consists of the works generated in the 1960s and 1970s, which includes classics such as Seymour Lipset’s *Political Man*, Barrington Moore’s *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Robert Dahl’s *Polyarchy*, and Reinhard Bendix’s *Kings or People*. (2001: 119) He presents the main characteristics of them as, first, their “large nation bias”, that is, their focus on large nations, such as England, the USA, France, Prussia/Germany, Russia, Japan, China, and India; and second, their usually taking cases which belong to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. (2001: 119-120)

The second group of literature on democratisation, according to Munck, refers to the works published since the late 1980s. The main characteristic of this body of literature is that it “broadens the intra-European scope, by adding lesser-known small cases to the set of analyzed cases.” (2001: 120) Another important

feature of this group is that it contains the negative experiences in Europe, as well as the positive ones.

Munck defines the third group as the bulk of research on democracy produced in recent years. The distinguishing characteristic of this group is that “this literature looks to the large set of cases that made transitions to democracy in the post-1974 years, thus shifting the empirical focus of analysis to Southern Europe, East-Central Europe, Southeast Europe, and the vast Soviet empire and to Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, and Africa.” The starting point of this body of literature is suggested by Munck as Guillermo O’Donnell et al.’s *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. (2001: 121) This last group includes the mainstream theory in the 1990s that is discussed below.

2.2. Mainstream Theory on Democracy and Democratisation in the 1990s

As denoted above, there are some restrictions on the review below of the mainstream theory in the 1990s; and the most specific one was that the main focus is on the works published in the *Journal of Democracy*, which is taken as representing the mainstream theory on democracy and democratisation in the 1990s. The review is carried out under four sections: The first section deals with the general attitude dominant in the mainstream theory towards democracy as a regime, since it has certain affects on the approach developed and the way cases are handled. Secondly, various redefinitions of types of democracy in the journal are discussed. This section aims at analysing a certain way of approaching to the regimes in the non-Western world most of which have a claim to be democracies though not in the way Western countries are. Such regimes which have fundamental differences from the ideal type

of democracy are distinguished with various labels. And, third and fourth sections evaluate the importance given to and the handling of the concepts of civil society and culture, respectively. The concepts of civil society and culture form the basis of the methodology dominant in this mainstream theory.

2.2.1. The Liberal Triumph and The Problems of Democracy as a Regime

When one talks about liberal triumphalism perhaps the first figure coming to mind has long been Francis Fukuyama with his radical and provocative assertion of “the end of history”. Although Fukuyama was criticized of extremism in various writings, most of his observations about the triumph of liberalism are shared by many writers of the *Journal of Democracy*⁸ - hereafter referred to as JOD (see, for example, Plattner, 1991 and 1992; Huntington 1991 and 1997; Diamond 1990). Such observations have of course a substantial degree of validity, considered the recent developments throughout most of the world. However, when these observations are combined with a pure advocacy to liberal ideology it may lead to a sense of implicit triumphalism – as can be inferred from the words of Huntington, “The Comintern is dead. The time for a Demintern has arrived.” (1997: 12) – that may pave the way for exaggeration or distortion of historical reality. One significant outcome of this triumphalism is that it seems to have led the authors in concern to perceive the situation as the proof of democracy’s being the *best* regime.

It is a main tenet among most of the writers of JOD that liberal democracy is ethically and politically the *best* political regime. However, it is not clear enough

⁸ By the phrase of “the writers of JOD”, it is not meant, of course, a group of people that is theoretically and politically coherent in every aspect. It is obvious that there are sometimes intense discrepancies among the views of writers writing in the journal. However, as will be detailed below, it seems possible to delineate a more or less definite outline of a certain methodological and political *attitude*, regarded here as representing the mainstream approach to the issues of democracy and democratisation in the 1990s.

which concrete case(s) are directly referred to each and every time by this *best* regime. There is a sense that the democracies of the Western world in general are idealized and constitute the basis to the overall ideal type of democracy. On the other hand, although new democracies are criticised intensely from various aspects they are seen as more favourable than the “authoritarian” regimes such as the former Soviet republics and the military regimes. Then, one thinks that, for the writers, the worst type of democracy is better than any other regime. That is, an implicit – and sometimes explicit – dedication to liberal democracy particularly underlies the most of the approaches.

Marc Plattner, one of the two editors of the journal, is one of those who manifest this dedication to liberal democracy in various ways. His article entitled “The Democratic Moment” (1991) starts with a celebration of the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and continues with the observation that by the eighties “democracy was experiencing a true resurgence. The democratic tide swept through most of Latin America, reached such key Asian countries as the Philippines, Korea, Taiwan and Pakistan, and by decade’s ends was beginning to make ripples in sub-Saharan Africa and even the Middle East.” (1991: 35) This “resurgence of democracy” is traced through not only such regime changes but also the transformations and changes in ideological realm and real political practices. He argues that alternatives to democracy are also ideologically abandoned throughout the world, and especially “antidemocratic left” was experiencing a real defeat. Furthermore, the rest of the left was also in trouble even in Western Europe and a move towards the US model of politics was on the rise. In such a conjuncture, “[w]ithout too much exaggeration, one might say that today there is no Left left.” (1991: 37)

Larry Diamond writes that “[n]ever have democrats worldwide seemed to have so much cause for rejoicing. But committed democrats would do well to restrain their impulse to celebrate.” (1990: 111) Such a cautious attitude seems to be adopted by most of the writers of the journal. Thus is their interest in exploring the risky sides of democracy explicable. They have an effort to identify not only the emergent but also the potential problems that democracy does and may encounter. Plattner shows nationalism and religious doctrines – mainly Islam – as the two primary challenges and competitors to democracy. He argues that nationalism is not in principle incompatible with democracy and does not entail a specific regime, and that hardly could it become an overall alternative to democracy since it is not a universalist ideology. (1991: 43) According to Plattner, what is a more dangerous and a vital competitor is radical or fundamentalist Islam. Since, it is affective in a wide geography, and since opposition in Islamic countries usually emerges in Islamist rather than democratic forms. However, neither does Islam seem to be able to pose a global challenge since it does not appear to be attracting many adherents outside the Islamic world. (1991: 44) That is, while admitting the presence of such dangers, Plattner is still optimistic about the near future of democracy.

On the other hand, not everyone among the JOD writers is as comfortable as Plattner is with the future of democracy. Schmitter is one of those who regard the dangers involved in and threats against democracy more cautiously. He argues that “[f]or the world’s established democracies, the very absence in the present context of a credible systemic alternative is bound to generate new strains.” (1994: 57) He is quite suspicious about the future of especially the newly emerging democracies, and about the irreversibility of the processes of democratisation in

these countries. Beyond a dichotomy of regression to autocracy and progression to democracy, he defines two other viable alternatives: First, “a hybrid regime that combines elements of autocracy and democracy”, which he refers to with the neologism of *dictablanda* (1994: 59); and second, a “persistent but unconsolidated democracy”, which he calls with another neologism of *democradura* (1994: 60). The former is identified with liberalisation without democratisation, i.e. certain individual rights are acknowledged while accountability to citizens lacks; and the latter is characterised by democratisation without liberalisation, i.e., “where elections are held, but under conditions that guarantee the victory of the governing party, that exclude specific sociopolitical groups from participating, or that deprive those elected of the effective capacity to govern.” (1994: 59-60) *Dictablandas* and especially *democraduras* could be observable throughout the formerly non-democratic regions such as the Central and South America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia, without promising to become real democracies in the near future. (1994: 60-61)

Schmitter’s emphasis on the possibility of *hybrid* and *persistently unconsolidated regimes* seems to have found echoes in such a way that a new vein of analysis has been formed in JOD in the later issues of the journal. Many cases have been analysed with regard to these conceptualisations. For example, among many, Shevtsova and Eckert (2001) and McFaul (2001) define the regime in Russia, and Case (2001) that in Malaysia, as being neither exactly democratic nor totally authoritarian, but a mixture of the both. And unlike the modernisation school writers they do not share the belief that history shall in some way take them to a really democratic regime.

Beyond the deficiencies of and the problems encountered by the concrete cases of democracy in the non-Western world, the JOD writers have an interest in analysing the structurally risky and weak sides of democracy as a regime in general, considered to be valid for both the established as well as newly emerging democracies. Schmitter distinguishes two sets of dilemmas of democracy, as intrinsic and extrinsic ones. Intrinsic dilemmas are also due in established democracies as well as hybrid and non-consolidated ones. These are, first, *oligarchy*, since parties, associations and movements are becoming increasingly oligarchic with a displacement of competition; second, *free-riding*, which means the empowerment of professional “political entrepreneurs” acting more or less independently of their stakeholders because of citizens’ unwillingness to contribute to every decision making activity; third, *policy-cycling*, where majority vote – instead of unanimity – produces unstable majorities formed of groups with incompatible preferences on other issues than the one constituting the coalition among them; fourth, *functional autonomy*, which arises as a problem when essentially non-democratic institutions such as the armed forces and the central bank become more effective with various causes; and finally, *interdependence*, which may reduce the sovereign power of national authorities against some international powers. (1994: 62-3)

As the extrinsic dilemmas, which are more due in the new democracies than the established ones, the following are enumerated by Schmitter: First, a *nation* should be defined for democracy while “there is simply no democratic way of deciding what a nation and its corresponding political unit should be”; second, capitalism is necessary for democracy while it should be significantly modified to become compatible with democracy; third, new democracies “need legitimacy to

build institutions, and institutions in order to establish legitimacy”; fourth, while an empowerment of elected officials is necessary there is no guarantee of preventing them from abuses such as corruption and decay; and finally, since democracy does not guarantee national security, external security and internal insecurity necessitates a degree of power for military and police, while for democracy to get established the armed forces should be extricated from power. (1994: 65-72) Schmitter argues that dealing with such problems depends mostly on the conditions created by the mode of transition that is experienced by the country in question.

Like Schmitter, Larry Diamond also identifies paradoxes that are inherent to democracy’s very nature, which he characterises as having been the cause of problems experienced in the developing world: First, the paradox between *conflict* and *consensus*: “Democracy requires conflict – but not too much; competition there must be, but only with carefully defined and universally accepted boundaries.” Second, the paradox between *representativeness* and *governability*: While democracy implies the less power of elites compared to the populace, governability requires a more or less autonomy of these elites. And third, the paradox between *consent* and *effectiveness*: “Democracy requires consent. Consent requires legitimacy. Legitimacy requires effective performance.” (1990: 112-3)

Although Seymour Martin Lipset also observes that alternatives to democracy – especially communism – are in a deep regression he, unlike Plattner and Schmitter, perceives socialism – or left in general – as still alive and argues that the competition between socialism and capitalism, and between left and right, seems to persist. He argues that Marxism is being left even by Western intelligentsia, which he sees as the “last bastion” of it, and that in ex-communist countries the meanings of left and right

changed places in such a way that left came to represent advocacy to free market and democracy; however, he argues, capitalism, failing to generate effective community values, gives an opportunity for opposition to socialists who can adopt a strategy building upon the cultural values belonging to socialism, such as egalitarianism and social justice. (1993: 45-55)

2.2.2. Types of Democracy

As long as one talks about the deficient types of democracy a non-deficient type happens to be called for. The contemporary attempts to define such an ideal type of democracy, which are shared by some writers of JOD, date as far back as at least 1950s. According to Robert Dahl, one of the most prominent figures of early literature on democracy and democratisation, what he terms the “procedural minimal” conditions that must be present for modern political democracy (or as he puts “polyarchy”) to exist are:

- 1) Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
- 2) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
- 3) Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
- 4) Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government.
- 5) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined ...
- 6) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.
- 7) Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups. (cited in Schmitter and Karl, 1991)

Although Dahl defined these criteria at another historical context, his criteria constitute a basic framework for the contemporary definitions of ideal type of

democracy. Yet, the content of this ideal type change from time to time in relation with the emerging political developments.

What Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl do is a good example of this issue of changing ideal types. Schmitter and Karl suggest two new items to the “procedural minimal” conditions presented by Dahl: first, “[p]opularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials [i.e. military officers, entrenched civil servants, or state managers].” (1991, 55) They tell that this item was a refinement of the first condition put by Dahl, and that the second one might have been called an implicit prior condition to the all above: “[t]he polity must be self-governing: it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system.” They argue that this condition became necessary with the development of blocs, alliances and spheres of influence, and a variety of “neocolonial” arrangements, since Dahl referred to formally sovereign nation-states. (1991, 55-6)

These conditions are obviously not fully compatible with the non-Western cases of democracy. Even though many of the countries have laws related to the satisfaction of these conditions, some of them are exercised differently or not exercised at all. As mentioned above, Schmitter uses the terms “democradura” and “dictablanda” to refer to the regimes in these countries. However, such regimes are not simply excluded from the scope of democracy, either. In order to indicate the differences and similarities between these regimes and the “original” ideal type(s) of democracy, many authors employ the concept of “formal democracy” in differentiation from more advanced types. David Potter, for example, defines formal

democracy as a political system that includes such features: “competition (through elections based on universal adult suffrage and involving multiple political parties) for political offices, at regular intervals, excluding the use of force; accountability of rulers to the ruled through modes of representation and the rule of law; civil and political liberties sufficient to ensure competition and accountability.”(1993: 356) Potter puts it in differentiation from “substantive democracy”, which includes genuine participation in rule by the majority of citizens.

Guillermo O’Donnell argues that democracies in Latin America, Korea and many postcommunist countries in the 1980s and 1990s meet Robert Dahl’s criteria of polyarchy, however they fall far too short to be counted as or to give hope of becoming *representative* democracies, in the sense relevant for highly developed capitalist countries. He suggests the concept of “*delegative* democracy” to refer to these contemporary cases of democracy. (1994: 95) He notes that “delegative” is not the polar opposite of “representative”, but the characteristic of accountability they involve differ: In representative democracies both vertical and horizontal accountability⁹ is involved, whereas in delegative democracies only vertical accountability exists. (1994: 100) He continues that these democracies are not representative in the full sense of the word, but have a form of representation which works as giving the full authority to the elected representatives. Once the official is elected, then he / she is perceived as having the right to do whatever he finds appropriate: “[w]hoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations

⁹ By “horizontal accountability” O’Donnell refers to the effective operation of the system of checks and balances and due process in governmental decision making, while he uses “vertical accountability” to refer to the means – such as elections – that citizens use to control their government. (O’Donnell, G., 1999: 180)

and by a constitutionally limited term of office.” (1994: 98) However, according to O’Donnell, delegative democracy is not less democratic than representative democracy.

[Since delegative democracy satisfies the formation of a great majority] it is more democratic, but less liberal, than representative democracy. ... Furthermore, delegative democracy is strongly individualistic, but more in a Hobbesian than a Lockean way: voters are supposed to choose, irrespective of their identities and affiliations, the individual who is most fit to take responsibility for the destiny of the country.” (1994: 99)

O’Donnell finds it necessary an institutionalisation of democracy as has occurred in highly developed capitalist countries. He defines these political democratic institutions, which are essential for the development of delegative democracies to become representative democracies, as the institutions that provide “a crucial level of mediation and aggregation between, on one side, structural factors and, on the other, not only individuals but also the diverse groupings under which society organizes its multiple interests and identities.” (1994: 98) O’Donnell admits that his description was ideal typical but was necessary to contrast the peculiarities of a situation where there is a dearth of democratic institutions. (1994: 98)

While making redefinitions of various types of democracy, one common attitude predominates the approaches of the writers of JOD. It is that the notions of civil and political equality are acknowledged in such a way that various types of democracy are defined in reference to them, whereas the notion of social and economic equality is simply disregarded at this point. In other words, various types of democracy are conceived in merely political terms. This exclusion of economic equality and economics in general from the realm of democracy is also quite characteristic of the neoliberal political practice of the 1980s and the 1990s, as will

be elaborated on in the fourth chapter. As discussed in the previous chapter, these points apply to the TÜSIAD reports, too, since they also dealt with merely political issues in regard with democracy. Besides, the TÜSIAD reports stressed more upon the procedural and institutional aspects, and therefore build more upon the notion of “formal democracy” than the notion of “substantive democracy”, as discussed above. As was shown in the previous chapter, the TÜSIAD reports also took democracy as a merely political issue and disregard social and economic rights.

On the other hand, despite having been produced in the realm of same political atmosphere, not all the contemporary democratic theory shares this theoretical attitude of excluding socioeconomic dimensions from the scope of democracy. For example, Rueschemeyer et al.¹⁰ stress upon the notion of economic equality and attribute it a founding role in defining the most advanced form of liberal democracy. What Rueschemeyer and his colleagues refer to with the concept of “formal democracy” is similar to the definitions made by the writers of JOD: the characterising conditions of formal democracy are “regular free and fair elections, universal suffrage, accountability of the state’s administrative organs to the elected representatives, and effective guarantees for freedom of expression and association as well as protection against arbitrary state action.” (Huber, et al., 1997: 323) Their definition of “participative democracy” is also along the same lines with the concept of “substantive democracy” as defined by Potter. They define participative democracy as the political system which involves an additional criterion to the criteria for formal democracy: “high levels of participation without systematic

¹⁰ Rueschemeyer et al. stand at a distinct position from the writers of JOD, in many respects. They are taken here as an example of the social democratic literature which acknowledges the notion of economic equality, something most of the writers of JOD disregard.

differences across social categories (for example, class, ethnicity, gender)". (Huber, et al., 1997: 324) However, after defining participative democracy, they move one step further and refer to the concept of "social democracy". This last type includes all the features of participative democracy and one more: social and economic equality. (Huber, et al., 1997: 324) They also note that the term "social democracy" here does not refer specifically to the (European) political movement bearing the same name, it is used "as the designation of policies that effectively advance social and economic equality". (Huber, et al., 1997: 340n)

2.2.3. The Significance of Civil Society and Political Institutionalisation

A particularly significant suggestion made by the writers of JOD regarding democratisation in the non-Western world is about the establishment or empowerment of "civil society" and the enhancement of political institutionalisation, this or that way. For example, as presented above, O'Donnell suggests that an institutionalisation of democracy as has occurred in highly developed capitalist countries was necessary in the world of delegative democracies. The institutions in question are defined as providing "a crucial level of mediation and aggregation between, on one side, structural factors and on the other, not only individuals but also the diverse groupings under which society organizes its multiple interests and identities". (O'Donnell, 1994: 98) The phrase "diverse groupings under which society organises its multiple interests and identities" corresponds to a certain definition of civil society, which is discussed below. That is, O'Donnell's suggestion in regard with delegative democracies implies a strategy of democratisation associated with civil society and political institutionalisation. As an example of the understanding that associates civil society with democratisation, Amen M. Khalifa

asserts that “a major reason for the slow and uneven pace of democratisation in the region [‘the Arab world’] is the relative weakness of civil society.” (1995: 155) Mario Soares, who had also served as prime minister and president in Portuguese, attributes an international role to civil societies as providing in the future “the needed counterweight to globalization” (1999: 112), where he indicates to the inequalities engendered by the process of “globalization”. Robert Putnam (1995) argues that just like for the post-communist and developing countries civil society was also of significance for the democracy of the USA, where civil society had been losing power.

As many of the writers of JOD admit, the concept of civil society is one of the most controversial topics of political theory, for by the same concept too diverse meanings are addressed by various theorists. Therefore, while dealing with an approach employing the concept, it is necessary to specify how it is conceived. Wilmot James and Daria Caliguire broadly define the concept of civil society as “the space between the family and the state in which citizens can initiate independent action to uphold civil liberties, a bill of rights, freedom, and justice.” (1996: 61) While this basic definition tells the basics of the consensual usage of the concept in the journal, a more detailed description, which is still more or less consensual, can be found in Diamond’s definition:

Civil society is conceived here as the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self generating, (largely) self-supporting autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal rule or set of shared rules. It is distinct from society in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere ... Civil society is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state. (1996: 228)

As well as civil society is considered as distinct from the private sphere and the state, it is also considered as distinct from *political society*, with which Diamond means the party system. (1996: 230) However, still some other restrictions are put on the scope of the concept of civil society by Diamond. He argues that “maximalist, uncompromising interest groups or groups with antidemocratic goals and methods” cannot be regarded within the scope of civil society. He writes, “[t]o the extent that a group seeks to conquer the state or other competitors, or rejects the rule of law and the authority of the democratic state it is not a component of civil society at all.” (1996: 234) However, he also argues that “[c]ivil society must be autonomous from the state, but not alienated from it. It must be watchful but respectful of state authority”. (1996: 238) It is unclear, however, how the dividing line should be drawn between a watchful but respectful group on the one hand, and an uncompromising group that rejects the authority of the democratic state on the other.

Another writer of the journal, Alison Brysk diverges in some respects from the definition of Diamond, while his definition is principally along the same lines with it. He defines the concept as the “*public* and *political* association outside the state, not a residual category or a list of types of actors.” (2000: 153) By this definition, he differentiates his approach from some “highly inclusive” definitions that gather almost all organisations in the public and private spheres under one general heading of civil society. While Brysk expresses that his definition builds on the definition of Diamond, he puts two reservations on Diamond’s account: First, according to Brysk, some of the activities and groups considered in the private sphere, especially religious groups, may also have connotations on the domain of civil society; and second, civil society does not necessarily involve market activity,

some antimarket protests can also be considered within the scope of the concept. (2000: 165n) In this sense, Brysk is more tolerant than Diamond in including the radical oppositions against the state. However, it still remains that the distinguishing criterion/criteria is/are not clear, in terms of assessing which “*public* and *political* organisation” could not be considered within the scope of the concept.

Brysk does not consider a relation of direct determinacy between civil society and democratisation, however, he argues, a democratic state is unlikely to be sustainable without the presence of a democratic civil society. Neither does Diamond consider the development of civil society as the only provider of a democratic state. On the other hand, both accept that it is a necessary but not adequate condition. Diamond enumerates the democratic functions of civil society as limiting the state power; stimulating political participation; stimulating democratic attributes such as tolerance, moderation, etc.; creating channels other than political parties for the articulation, aggregation, and representation of interests; mitigating the principal polarities of political conflict; recruiting and training new political leaders; sometimes directly working for democratic establishment; disseminating information; contributing to the formation of coalitions within society that can back economic reforms; and finally, depending on the success of the above democratic functions, creating respect for state and positive engagement with it (1996: 230-234). In other words, the success of civil society organisations respecting the state shall in turn create respect for the state, and shall further democratisation.

However, since “organisations respecting the state” cannot be seen as given in any society, there remains a question about how such organisations essential for democratisation should or could be created. This leads to a problem of agency with

regard to the process of democratisation, since it is unclear which organisations could be seen as the actors of this process and since there is no suggestion of strategy about how such actors could be created in their absence. This problem of agency undermines the functionality of suggestions tying democratisation to the development of civil society, in general.

It is obvious that the conceptions of civil society above take it as distinct from the state. This course of conceptualisation underlies the approach of many writings published in the journal. Beside this consensually assumed distinction, the civil society and the state are usually considered as counterposed entities. For example, among many, Emmanuel Sivan, in the article discussing the regimes in “the Arab world”, argues that “[a]s the state retreats, civil society advances” (1997: 106). The same theme of the retreat of state before civil society is employed by Laith Kubba, too. He writes, “a new era is emerging in Arab politics today, one in which the state will increasingly be forced to retreat before a vibrant civil society.” (2000: 85). Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi argues that “despite the much-touted vibrancy of African associational life” (1996: 119) civil society in the African countries, “is too weak to redress state-society relations in favor of the latter.” (1996: 120). Likewise, James and Caliguire, while discussing the case of South Africa, attribute a role to civil society as “to check the power of government” (1996: 60).

In sum, within this course of thought civil society is perceived as both the womb and carrier of democratisation, where its ontological status is assigned as distinct from and counterposed to the state. It is thought to be composed of some – not all – extra-state organisations but it is unclear which organisations compose civil society and which not. The problem of agency arising from here also involves how

these organisations could be created in the absence of them, since not all such organisations are “*natural-born democratisers*”. It is also left intact a formulation of a general – or other – strategy that should be followed by these organisations in the way that leads to democratisation.

The understanding of TÜSİAD as a non-governmental organisation which fortifies the concept of a democratic civil society is in the same lines with the role attributed to civil society organisations and civil society by the MTD. This democratic role undertaken by TÜSİAD as a civil society organisation is emphasised with the signature of “TÜSİAD Board of Directors” in the foreword of the major reports.

While the concept of civil society is considered as having significant importance with regard to the issue of democratisation and sustainability of democracy, usually, it is not taken as the sole and adequate factor. Beside the affects of the factors like the level of economic development, the international context, etc., one particular concept is generally emphasised more than any other: culture. Khalifa argues that “[u]nless they are rooted in a democratic political culture (which presupposes a vibrant and free civil society), even the most brilliantly designed democratic procedures and institutions can be all too easily undermined or hollowed out by undemocratic forces.” (1995: 162)

2.2.4. The Primacy of Culture

The issue of culture is regarded by most of the writers of JOD as having a determinative power, in this or that way. Usually, the concept is not defined explicitly but taken as given and self-evident. Francis Fukuyama defines the concept

of culture as the “a-rational, ethical habit passed on through tradition” (1995: 8). However, there is a difficulty in distinguishing this definition from the concept of ideology as defined by him in the same text as “the level of *normative beliefs* about the rightness or wrongness of democratic institutions and their supporting market structures” (1995: 7). Beyond the discussion of the precision of these definitions, one wonders whether it is impossible for the members of a society to traditionally and habitually believe that democratic institutions and their supporting market structures are right or wrong, without making rational judgement. In other words, the definitions of culture and ideology are not exclusive and are not distinguishing. This confusion between the concepts undermines Fukuyama’s following inferences. He defines four levels “on which the consolidation of democracy must occur”: First, ideology; second, institutions, which include “constitutions, legal systems, party systems, market structures and the like”; third, civil society, which he defines as “the realm of spontaneously created social structures separate from the state that underlie democratic political institutions”; and finally, culture (1995: 7-8). He asserts that while “modern Western political thought tries to construct a just social order from the top down, emphasizing levels 1 and 2, traditional Asian cultures start from levels 4 and 3 and work upward” (1995: 11). However, because of the above-mentioned confusion this comparison is enigmatic. For the definitions of ideology and culture seem to intersect, the bottom and the top of the list become questionable. Since Fukuyama perceives the “paternalistic Asian authoritarianism” as the basic competitor to liberal democracy (1995: 10) and since he draws the Asian path as starting from culture he concludes that “[t]he real battles will occur at the levels of

civil society and culture” (1995: 14). This last inference by Fukuyama is shared by Samuel P. Huntington, as by many others.

Huntington observes that

[h]istorically, there has been a strong correlation between Western Christianity and democracy. By the early 1970s, most of the Protestant countries in the world had already become democratic. The third wave of the 1970s and 1980s was overwhelmingly a catholic wave.” (1991: 13)

He argues that most of the more than one hundred countries which lacked democratic regimes as of 1990 fell into four “sometimes overlapping geocultural categories”, which he puts as, first, “home-grown Marxist-Leninist regimes, including the Soviet Union”; second, “sub-Saharan African countries”; third, “Islamic countries stretching from Morocco to Indonesia, which, except for Turkey and perhaps Pakistan had no democratic regimes”; and fourth, “East Asian countries, from Burma through Southeast Asia to China and North Korea”. (1991: 20) He stresses that, in these countries, besides economic and political ones there were also cultural obstacles to democratisation. (1991: 21) He is in favour of the view that “an extremely high correlation exists between levels of democracy and levels of economic development” (1997: 5), but what distinguishes him from modernisation school writers is his emphasis on the relation between democratisation and culture. The modernisation school considered a more direct relationship between the degree of economic development and democracy but less relationship regarding culture.

Huntington focuses on the question of compatibility of democracy to cultures other than Western Christianity. According to him, Confucianism has in practice been inhospitable to democracy. Where the two exceptional cases occurred, in Japan and Philippines, democratisation was an outcome of American presence, and for the

case of Philippines, a consequence of the country's being an "overwhelmingly Catholic" country. (Huntington, 1991: 24) Huntington explains the emergence of democracy in the non-Western world through these societies' interaction with the Western culture. According to him, "the extent to which non-Western societies are receptive to either liberal democracy or electoral democracy varies with the extent to which they have been influenced by the West." (1997: 9) Although he admits that liberal democracy is "not inherently incompatible with major non-Western cultures", with which he means mainly Confucianism and Islam, he still explains the examples of democracy – "a Western product" – in these societies by mainly referring to the Western culture somehow effective on these societies.

Still, in East Asian countries where there is a democratic regime, like Japan and Taiwan, the type of democracy is radically different from Western democracy. Parallel to Schmitter's definition of *democradura*, Huntington defines this type as "dominant-party democracy" that always reproduces the government of the dominant party, and which depends on East Asian values such as consensus and stability instead of Western values of competition and change. (1991: 26-7)

With regard to Islam, unlike to Confucianism, Huntington thinks that in theory it is compatible with democracy. Some central Islamic values such as egalitarianism and voluntarism "are presumably congruent with the requirements of democracy". On the other hand, he continues, Islam has some features which are incompatible with democracy such as rejecting any distinction between religious community and political community. (1991: 28) However, Huntington observes, although it has theoretically compatible features, practically Islam has rarely got even with democracy. As well as those in power, the popular oppositions have

usually been anti-democratic and more pro-Islam in most of the Islamic countries.
(1991: 28-9)

Although Huntington seems unconvinced with the possibility that Confucianism can ever be compatible with democracy he also admits that “[a]rguments that particular cultures are permanent obstacles to change should be viewed with a certain skepticism.” (1991: 30) However, his argumentations imply that the prosperity of democracy in Confucian countries depends on the possible retreat of Confucianism for the favour of Western culture in general, or specifically Christianity where it exists, e.g. as in the cases of Japan and Philippines. Yet, he accepts both that “cultures historically are dynamic, not stagnant” and that “great cultural traditions like Islam and Confucianism are highly complex bodies of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, assumptions, and behavior patterns”. (1991: 30) On the other hand, it is unclear how Huntington’s such argumentations could be compatible with his analysis of Confucian and Islamic societies. For, he refers to the general notions of Confucianism and Islam, and thus takes them in a totalistic way disregarding their “complexity”. Nor does he consider them as specifically “dynamic” since he disregards the possibility of change of these “great traditions”. One could hardly think that Huntington himself adopts a “certain skepticism” towards Confucianism’s incompatibility with democracy, which he asserts to be necessary.

Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s methodological emphases on culture is no doubt shared by many writers of JOD. Their judgments are varying in such a way that a certain society’s culture is considered by some authors as an obstacle while some others take it as a catalyst. What is less varying is the methodological attitude that takes culture as an important *explanan*. For example, Fukuyama in his article

(1995b) on Asia and Confucianism, Brzezinski (2001) on former Soviet republics, Lagos (1997) on Latin America, Lee (1995) on Taiwan, Monga (1997) on Sub-Saharan Africa, Blum Valenzuela (1997) and Bailey and Valenzuela (1997) on Mexico, Pop-Eleches (2001) on Romania, Chaibong (2000) on East Asia, Smith (2001) on Mali, Krnjevic-Miskovic, (2001) on Serbia, Norris and Inglehart (2001) on gender and democracy, Tripp (2001) on women in Africa consider culture as an important factor in dealing with the issues of democracy and democratisation, in this or that way. As discussed above regarding Huntington's approach, this emphasis does not mean a disregard of other factors than culture; that is, the writers usually do not employ the concept of culture as the mere *explanan*, but, for them it is an important by-factor. For example, Lagos argues that

in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the way in which democracy has become rooted in Latin America, one must consider not only the formal and institutional bases of politics, but also the nonrational and prerational cultural traits that form such an important part of the region's soul. (1997: 125)

As denoted above, not all the approaches that take culture as an important factor consider non-Western cultures as an obstacle to democratisation. For example, Hahm Chaibong, unlike Huntington, argues that "[w]hatever its merits, the 'Asian values' argument represents a *cultural* challenge to individualism, not an ideological and systemic attack on democracy *per se*." (2000: 134) Furthermore, he asserts that democratic individualism – which is considered as originally Western – poses an obstacle to civil society, the womb and carrier of democratisation. (2000: 129) Again, Ramin Jahanbegloo argues that Iranian intellectual tradition is an advantage on the way to democracy in Iran. (2000: 134, 137) However, as noted above, although the judgments and political outcomes may vary, it still remains that culture

is regarded as one of the most important factors in explaining why democracies in the non-Western world are somehow deficient or in proposing solutions to this deficiency.

2.3. Concluding Remarks

The above discussions about the approaches of the writers of JOD provide a common theoretical framework, which is determined by the more or less consensual viewpoints and by the specific theoretical bases that the issues of democracy and democratisation are handled. The main foundations constituting the bases of the theoretical framework adopted by this mainstream theory are as follows:

- Liberal democracy is ethically and politically the best regime that humankind has ever created and can ever reach.
- The best forms among the contemporarily existing examples of liberal democracy are the ones established in the advanced capitalist societies of the West. However, there still exist some weak points, dilemmas and dangers that this form involves.
- It is quite welcome that many authoritarian regimes dissolved into some types of democracy in the non-Western world. Although these newly emerging types of democracy are better than any form of previous authoritarian regimes – namely, the military regimes and socialism as well – there is no guarantee that these types shall evolve in the future into ultimately liberal democracies. Scholars should elaborate on the divergences from the ideal type of liberal democracy that these tender cases hold, and if possible should propose solutions to existing problems emerging from these divergences.

- There are some grave obstacles in front of liberalisation and further democratisation of these contemporary cases of democracy in the non-Western world. Culture, as well as the level of economic development, is a key issue that is predominantly related to the prospects for further democratisation, if not inherently an obstacle. Islam and Confucianism, as the two major cultural traditions prevalent in the regions in concern, should be well analysed in order to grasp the possible causes of failure of proper democratisation.

- For the establishment and/or consolidation of democracy in the non-Western world, the establishment and/or empowerment of “civil society” against the state and the enhancement of political institutionalisation are of great importance. While civil society is not itself adequate to guarantee the consolidation of democracy it is a requirement for sustainable democratisation, whereas political institutionalisation is, above all, a must.

And, the basic characteristics of this course of thought can be listed as follows:

- taking democracy as a merely political issue, in the sense that economics and politics are separate realms;
- conceiving of the state and civil society as distinct from each other, and usually as opposites;
- involving a problem of agency with regard to the process of democratisation, i.e. not clearly addressing the actors of this process;
- approaching to the non-Western democracies through a set of procedures, which build “formal democracy”, since any form of “substantive democracy” is seen as far from being an issue in these cases.

The items above are obviously along the same lines with the characteristics of the understanding in the TÜSİAD reports. In other words, the TÜSİAD reports can be considered within the framework of this mainstream theory. This specific theoretical framework became dominant since the beginning of the 1990s. It represents the dominant logic of approaching to the issues of democracy and democratisation in the squares of policymakers and for major political actors in the neoliberal era of capitalism. Considering the content of it and its representing the dominant logic in the neoliberal era of capitalism, the body of literature building upon this theoretical framework will be hereafter referred to as *the MTD*, an abbreviation for “the mainstream theory on democracy and democratisation in the 1990s”. The specificity of this account, together with the approach of TÜSİAD, will be discussed in the next chapters of this thesis.

The differences and similarities between the MTD and the mainstream theory on democracy and democratisation in earlier decades are noteworthy in order to show the particularity of the former. The MTD shares much in common with the argumentations and foundations of the modernisation school. First, both are characterised by an advocacy to liberalism and a presumption that liberal democracy is the best regime ever possible. Second, both consider a positive relationship between the level of economic development and the level of democratic consolidation. Third, the two approaches differ in that while modernisation theorists perceived a more direct relation of determinacy between them the MTD is quite suspicious about the determining power of this relation. Finally, the MTD gives a central place to the issue of culture, whereas the concept of culture had little significance for the majority of the modernisation theorists.

Compared to the dependency school, however, the MTD has almost nothing in common. Yet, a fundamental difference between the two is remarkable; while the majority of the dependency theorists had taken the relation between the advanced capitalist countries and the less developed ones as an obstacle in front of the economic and political development of the latter, the MTD takes it in a particularly positive sense.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

This chapter deals with the discussion of the approach that will be employed in the next chapter for the analysis of the political economy of the 1980s and the 1990s. In the first section below, the relationship of capitalism and bourgeoisie with democracy and democratisation is discussed. This section elaborates specifically on the role of bourgeoisie in promoting democracy, and discusses the specificity of bourgeois democracy.

In the second section, a relational approach is introduced with particular reference to Nicos Poulantzas' state theory. What is aimed here is not a full account of Poulantzas' state theory, but rather, to outline a relational approach which makes use of the basic ideas and the concepts of it. Since Poulantzas' concept of authoritarian statism involves the discussion of the dimensions related to the form of state relevant for the contemporary times, a review of these discussions is presented below. This section also discusses Bob Jessop's conceptualisation of "hegemonic project" as a supplement to Poulantzas' conception of authoritarian statism, and generally to the concepts defined below in regard with a relational approach.

3.1. Capitalism, Bourgeoisie and Democratisation

Is the support of TÜSİAD to the current democratisation project in Turkey an outcome of the bourgeoisie's structural characteristic of promoting democracy and

democratisation? Whether the bourgeoisie has been the main agent or the carrier of the process of democratisation is a much disputed subject in the related literature. It is generally assumed that there is a structural relation between capitalism and democracy and therefore between bourgeois domination and democratisation. Some argue that the bourgeoisie has always been the main agent of democratisation, while for some others the presence of bourgeois domination is a structural requirement for democracy whether it is the agent or not. Feridun Ergut shows Barrington Moore – and Çağlar Keyder among the Turkish scholars – as the leader of the course of thought that sees the bourgeoisie as the primary promoter of democracy (1994: 207), while he puts Rueschemeyer et al. on the other end of the spectrum that takes the working class as “the subject of the history of democracy” (1994). While Moore’s and Rueschemeyer et al.’s approaches overlap in regard to the incapacity of agricultural societies under the domination of large landlords in realising democracy, Rueschemeyer et al., contrary to Moore, see bourgeoisie as an obstacle for democracy. (Ergut, 1994: 220) According to Ergut, this contradiction arises from the priorities in defining democracy. While for Rueschemeyer et al. the notion of “participation” – which bears the involvement of “the lowest” in decision making processes – is the key determinant in defining democracy, those who attribute the primary role to the bourgeoisie take it secondarily and stress upon the notions of “freedom of expression” and “protection of individual against the state”. (Ergut, 1994: 208) As will be discussed below, these latter are originally the principles of liberalism and have played an important role in reducing the democratic essence from “rule by people” to “limitation of the state power”. (Wood, 1994)

The MTD discussed in the second chapter assumes a relation of causality between capitalism – or bourgeois domination – and democracy so that they celebrate the dissolution of the Soviet bloc per se as favourable to liberal democracy. The discussion of this issue has obvious implications for understanding TÜSİAD's current pro-democratic stance, as a representative of the interests of the monopoly capital.

3.1.1. The Role of Bourgeoisie in Promoting Democracy

According to Rueschemeyer et al. the bourgeoisie has been more an obstacle for democratisation throughout history, rather than a supporting force (1992).

According to Huber¹¹ and Stephens,

democracy was established in most countries in these regions [Western Europe, Latin America, and the Caribbean] despite the efforts of the bourgeoisie, because capitalist development strengthened the working and middle classes and weakened large landlords. (Huber and Stephens, 1999: 760)

They argue that in the period before 1918, during which many of the European countries lived their transition to democracy, the working class was the most consistently pro-democratic force and was the main agent of democratisation. It found its allies in the urban middle classes and the independent small farming population. (1999: 763)

Göran Therborn moves one step further than Huber and Stephens and defines the labour movement not the “most consistent” but “the only consistent democratic force”. The points that the working class was not strong enough to achieve bourgeois

¹¹ As known, Evelyne Huber and Evelyne Stephens are the names of the same person, a member of the trio of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens. Huber and Stephens declare that their article quoted here is based upon the book *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Therefore their discussions in this article, too, are taken as representing the approach of the trio in main lines.

democracy on its own and that it had to find allies are stressed by him, too. (1983: 261-2) Adam Przeworski, however, attributes a distinct role for the working class in regard to democratisation:

It seems as if an almost complete docility and patience on the part of organized workers are needed for a democratic transformation to succeed. Here again it may be worth noting that the democratic system was solidified in Belgium, Sweden, France and Great Britain only after organized workers were badly defeated in mass strikes and adopted a docile posture as a result. We cannot avoid the possibility that a transition to democracy can be made only at the cost of leaving economic relations intact, not only the structure of production but even the distribution of income. (1986: 63)

Paul Cammack contends that Przeworski's argument could not be applied to the cases of Latin America. He argues that in the European cases that Przeworski deals with a move towards hegemony from domination could become possible, on the other hand, the Latin American cases lacked the "material and institutional resources" that are necessary for such a move. (1994: 188) Cammack also argues, in a more general sense, that Przeworski's argument was contradictory in itself since it suggested "workers' voluntary renouncement of all hope of material advance which in turn would lead to the election of the candidates offering material improvement." (1994: 189)

Therborn puts three historical factors as the contributory factors to democratisation. These are, national mobilisation, "the independent strength of the agrarian petty and small bourgeois landowners, and divisions within the ruling-class (or power) bloc." (1983: 266-8) However, he stresses that these were only the supporting factors and the struggle for democratisation belonged to the activation of the working class. Therborn indicates a point which he finds striking: "none of the great bourgeois revolutions established bourgeois democracy." (1983: 264) That is,

bourgeois democracies were established not through bourgeois revolutions but through struggles against bourgeoisie. On the other hand, Therborn finds some “inherent tendencies” in capitalism, which makes it suitable for democracy. Among these are, “the conditions favouring popular struggle”, such as legal emancipation of labour and the creation of a free labour market; industrialisation and concentration of capital; the historical need of bourgeoisie to national unification and liberation “for the development and protection of trade and industry and the breaking of feudal dynastic power”; “feverish development of the productive forces”, which provided bourgeoisie a wide room for manoeuvre; the “separation of state from civil society”, which enabled the state not to be managed by bourgeois persons; the character of capitalist relations of production as tending “to create an *internally competing, peacefully disunited ruling class*”. (1983: 268-70) Yet, he explains the compatibility of capitalism with democracy neither in terms of “the positive tendencies of capitalism”, nor as “a historical accident”, but in terms of “the contradictions of capitalism”. (1983: 271) Therefore, according to Therborn, neither bourgeoisie has historically been the main agent of democratisation nor capitalism inherently favours democracy. Instead, some characteristics of bourgeois domination and some contradictions of capitalism make democracy possible; and the historical cases where this possibility turned into reality have occurred as a result of active struggle held under the leadership of working classes.

Huber and Stephens share the same grounds with Therborn about the role of bourgeoisie as well as that of the working class. They determine that “[i]n only three of the 13 European countries studied – France, Switzerland, and Britain – did any significant segment of the bourgeoisie play a leading role in promoting full

democracy.” (1999: 763) In the rest, working class was the leading actor, and bourgeoisie was an obstacle. The reason behind the situation in these three countries is explained as follows:

Significantly, in all three of these cases, the bourgeoisie did not face a working class politically organized by socialist parties at the time of democratic transition; in ten of the other eleven countries, it did face such an opponent. Fear of challenges to property rights certainly played an important role in the reticence of propertied upper classes to support political inclusion of the working class. (1999: 763)

In sum, the precise and detailed historical analyses of both Therborn and Rueschemeyer et al. reach to the same conclusion that historically bourgeoisie has not been a promoter of democracy as widely argued. Instead, in most of the cases, it was the working class which had been the most adherent supporter of democratisation and it was the middle classes which had been the primary ally of it in the struggle for bourgeois democracy. This does not follow, of course, that bourgeoisie can never be pro-democratic, but history shows that it had rarely been so.

In the light of the analyses of Therborn and Rueschemeyer et al. it is clear that TÛSIAD’s support to the democratisation project – as a bourgeois organisation – cannot be considered in terms of the structuralist thesis regarding bourgeoisie as inherently pro-democratic, since this thesis is historically wrong. The three decades history of TÛSIAD does not represent a contradictory example, either, i.e. the organisation has not always been – at least manifestly – pro-democratic. Then, if TÛSIAD’s support is not an outcome of a structural class characteristic, the question becomes a historical one. In order to assess the content of and the reasons behind this historically specific support it is necessary to analyse the historical process in which this phenomenon takes place. However, before this, it is necessary to sketch out the

specificity of bourgeois democracy, since it has direct implications for understanding the dynamics of the historical process in question.

3.1.2. The Specificity of Bourgeois Democracy

Ellen Meiksins Wood questions how democratic the contemporary liberal democracy is. She argues that in today's capitalism democracy has been reduced to what was originally defined as liberalism. (1994) While admitting that liberalism has some benefits which should not be ignored she argues that this should not "obscure the fact that the reduction of democracy to liberalism was a counter-revolutionary project – or at least a means of containing revolutions already underway, stopping them short of exceeding acceptable boundaries." (1994: 51) Although historically liberalism and constitutionalism emerged as a substitute to democracy "[c]onstitutionalism as a check on state power has taken the place of democracy in its literal definition as 'rule by the people', the demos." (1994: 51) According to Wood, modern democracy has its roots not in the Ancient Athens¹² but in the European feudalism:

In the canons of English-speaking liberalism, the main road to modern democracy runs through oligarchic Rome, Magna Carta, the Petition of Right and the Glorious Revolution, not democratic Athens, the Levellers, Diggers and Chartism." (1994: 53)

In this sense, "liberalism is a modern idea based on pre-modern, pre-capitalist forms of power." (1994: 53) She indicates that the themes of "limited or constitutional government" and "inviolable liberties against the state", which "have

¹² Anthony Arblaster (1999) presents a comprehensive account of democracy in the Ancient Athens in such a way that clears out its differences from the contemporary democracy. He shows how direct democracy was established and how the first forms of representative democracy arose in Greece and he traces the evolution of democracy up to today to a situation where democracy is understood as equivalent to the "system of representation" (1999: 119). In other words, Arblaster's historical analysis is a good guide to differentiate the contemporary meaning of democracy from its original meaning in the Ancient Greece.

their origins in the assertion of independent powers of lordship from European aristocracies, in the late medieval and early modern periods, against encroachment by centralising monarchies” (1994: 51), originally belong to liberalism but today have become perceived as inherent to democracy.

In sum, what is called today as democracy and democratisation in the bourgeois world is more related to liberalism and constitutionalism than to democracy in the sense its original meaning, “rule by people” implies. Wood also deals with the causes and the logic of this redefinition of democracy. She argues that certain characteristics of capitalism enabled this identification of democracy with liberalism under the name of “liberal democracy”. Since capitalism enables and necessitates the impersonal rule of market and property, it makes exclusive political privilege of the ruling class unnecessary: “Only capitalism allows an equality of juridical status and a universality of political rights which leaves the dominant property relations fundamentally intact.” (1994: 53) She argues that it is capitalism which poses economics and politics as separate realms and it is this separation that makes the reduction of democracy to liberalism possible. Thus, argues Wood, a kind of democracy called “formal democracy”, which is “confined to a separate political sphere in which rights could be universally distributed without affecting property relations and the whole sphere of power and domination associated with them”, could become possible. (1994: 53) However, the exclusion of any sphere of society from the control of “demos” is contrary to the original idea of democracy. On the other hand, today, protecting economic sphere’s “invulnerability to democratic power ... has even become an essential criterion of democracy.” (1994: 54)

Wood's discussion shows that bourgeois democracy is much more liberal than democratic. This liberal character of it, which is an outcome of the distinction between the economic and the political in capitalism, has significant implications for the discussions below, since the separation of the economic and political realms stands at the very core of the transformations taking place in the current historical process.

Wood's elaborations on contemporary liberal democracy apply in full to the neoliberal conception discussed in the previous chapters. Given also the glorification of contemporary liberal democracy, it is clear that what is meant by "democracy" is precisely within the borders that Wood draws in regard with contemporary liberal democracy. In other words, democracy is conceived in the TÜSİAD reports and within the theoretical framework of the MTD, parallel to "democracy reduced to liberalism". It has been argued that both of the approaches outlined in the previous chapters were taking democracy merely as a political issue and that the economic issues as well as social and economic rights were considered out of the scope of democracy. This fundamental theoretical attitude stands at the base of the road heading to the identification of democracy with liberalism.

3.2. A Relational Approach Based Upon Poulantzas' Theory of State

As the separation of the economic and the political realms is a characteristic of bourgeois democracy, taking this separation for granted is a characteristic of liberal theory. In other words, liberal theory takes the economic and political realms as if they were externally related to each other.

It is here necessary to clarify what is meant by “internal” and “external” relations. The discussions here regarding the philosophy of internal relations are based upon Bertell Ollman’s approach. (Ollman, 1976: 26-39; 1993: 9-81) However, these discussions do not give a full account of Ollman’s approach; nor do they cover all the insights involved in it. Instead, it is aimed to outline what is meant in this thesis by a “relational” approach.

For the sake of simplicity let us assume two social phenomena, A and B, which are related to each other. If the relation between A and B is an internal relation then it means that the phenomena of A and B are dialectically constituted by this relation. In other words, the very ontology of A and B is determined by this internal relation. There is no other existence of A different from “A in internal relation with B”, and vice versa. If A and B are internally related then it means that they are the counterparts of the same whole constituted by this internal relation, although A and B may be in contradiction. Therefore, the internal relations approach builds upon a dialectical understanding. If, for example, the economic and the political realms are considered as internally related then this means that there is no economic reality independent from the political realm, and that the economic and political realms are constituted by the internal relation between them. Put differently, it is impossible to consider an economic phenomenon which does not have any political implications, and vice versa.

When, on the other hand, the relation between A and B is an external one it means that A and B are two phenomena which are ontologically distinct from each other, and that the relation between them is a contingent one. In case of an external relation, A has an effect on B but it is quite possible that A may not have such an

effect at another context. Also, A and B may exist independently from each other. If, for example, the economic and political realms are conceived as externally related then this means that either of them can be considered regardless of the other. In other words, an economic issue may occur without any implications for the political realm, and vice versa.

Liberal theory's conceptualisation of economic and political realms reflects such a conception of them as if they were externally related to each other. Where the relations between these two realms are considered, they are taken as external relations, i.e. these relations are considered as existing between distinctly established entities. In the previous chapter, it was argued that the MTD took democracy as a merely political issue and it considered the issues related to democracy and democratisation regardless of the economic dimensions. In this sense, it builds upon this conception of liberal theory which separates the economic and political realms. Such a theoretical attitude masks the real dynamics of social reality and social change, since there cannot be any single political matter, which does not have any direct or indirect implications for the economic realm, and vice versa. The separation of "the economic" and "the political" in theory can be transcended by a relational understanding of the both. In other words, an approach regarding the internal relations between them can overcome the negative outcomes of conceiving them as externally related to each other. Unless the internal relations between the economic and political realms are considered it is impossible to grasp the real dynamics of social reality and social change.

To the extent that the internal relations between social phenomena are considered as constituting the ontology of the related phenomena, a specific

understanding of social ontology comes to front. According to this understanding, the ontology of social phenomena is established through processes and relations that these phenomena involve and are involved in. It should be noted that there are different conceptualisations of the term “internal relation” than the one adopted here based upon Ollmann’s approach.¹³ For example, Andrew Sayer, moving from Roy Bhaskar’s “realist interpretation” of internal relations, distinguishes between various types of relations such as substantial versus formal, internal (necessary) versus external (formal) and symmetric versus asymmetric relations (Sayer: 1992: 88-91). Within this approach, the notion of internal relations, as one type among others, is conceptualised as an analytical category, not an ontological one. However, in this thesis, the notion is taken as an ontological category. As mentioned above, conceiving the relations between social phenomena as external relations attributes distinct ontologies to them. In other words, it considers these social phenomena as separate “things”, or, put differently, as distinct entities. According to such a conception, an entity has an essence distinct from another entity; and, the impacts of other phenomena with which it is externally related do not change this essence. These impacts may cause modifications and changes in that social phenomenon but it still remains that what goes into modification and change has a certain essence. On the other hand, when social ontology is defined through processes and relations that the social phenomena involve and are involved in, such modifications and changes become inherent to the very essence of these social phenomena. In other words, there is no other existence of a certain social phenomenon which is regardless of the

¹³ For different conceptualisations of internal relations and for a detailed examination of the notion of “internal relation” within the tradition of philosophy of internal relations, see (Çelik, 2002: 23-57). Çelik (2002) compares the philosophy of internal relations with the “atomistic way of conceiving reality”, which he takes as dwelling upon external relations.

process(es) that it involves and is involved in. In this thesis, the methodology that builds upon such a social ontology and such an understanding of internal relations will be referred to by the phrases such as “relational approach”, “relational account”, “relational understanding”, etc.

Below is aimed to present a relational approach, which takes regard of the internal relations between the economic and political realms, and which builds upon a relational social ontology. For this, the state theory of Nicos Poulantzas will be visited. As discussed below, Poulantzas’ triple conceptualisation of the capitalist state and his definition of “power bloc” are quite functional for a relational approach. However, it should be noted that there are some difficulties with the total compatibility of Poulantzas’ theory to a relational account.¹⁴ As Poulantzas already admits, Althusserian¹⁵ impacts were existent in his earlier works. Yet, he adopted a clear critical position against Althusserianism in his later works. However, some concepts which Poulantzas formerly defined under these Althusserian impacts are not redefined by him clearly in his later works, although he continues to make use of them. Therefore, below, such basic concepts are defined according to their compatibility with the relational approach to be employed here. In this sense, these definitions do not give a full account of how Poulantzas himself conceived of these concepts in his earlier writings where he clearly discussed them. Rather, the concepts are defined so as to comply with a relational approach argued for here. It will be seen that in order to understand Poulantzas’ conceptualisation of authoritarian statism,

¹⁴ For the incompatibility of Poulantzas’ theory to a relational framework, see (Clarke, 1991) and (Wood, 1983). Here, this incompatibility will not be discussed in detail; instead, the possibility of a relational account derived from Poulantzas’ conceptualisations will be argued for.

¹⁵ Here, Althusserianism will not be discussed in detail, but Althusserian methodology is regarded as not complying with a relational approach. For example, the separation of the economic and political realms, which is contradictory to the relational approach argued for here, stays at the base of the Althusserian methodology.

which is examined in detail below, such a definition of the concepts will be adequate. He theorises authoritarian statism in his last book (SPS), where he manifestly adopts a relational approach. However, beyond arguing for the total compatibility of Poulantzas' theory with a relational account, it is aimed here to delineate a relational approach which is based upon his state theory. Poulantzas' state theory not only favours such a relational account but also becomes more explanatory when understood this way. In this sense, what is aimed here is a selective review of Poulantzas' state theory, rather than a full account of it.

3.2.1. Form of State and Form of Regime

Poulantzas' triple conception of the capitalist state – i.e. “type of state”, “form of state”, and “form of regime” – is first defined comprehensively in his book PPSC (PPSC: 142-157, 307-321). In some of his later works, he moves from this definition and makes reference to it where necessary (e.g. FD: 324n). However, as mentioned above, he does not redefine these concepts clearly in his later works.

“Forms of regime” are related to the institutional structure; the examples of it are American presidential regime, British two-party parliamentary regime, or European multi-party parliamentary regimes. Put differently, forms of regime are related to the “formal”, or procedural, aspects of a political system. In this sense, it can be said that the MTD approach examined in the previous chapter deals merely with the issues related to the form of regime. Although it is an analytical tool that makes it possible to depict certain aspects of the state, form of regime is not an adequate tool to understand all the processes and relations involved in the capitalist state at a particular historical context. For the task of grasping these processes and

relations it is necessary to take into account the dimensions related to the “form of state”.

“Forms of state” of a capitalist type of state are defined according to the characteristics that the specific relation between the economic and political realms takes:

If the capitalist type of state involves in the first place a specific autonomy of economic and political structures, which can be located in the autonomy of the state from socioeconomic relations, *the form of state of this type will have to be grasped by reference to a modification of the relation of the State to these relations* [italics mine].” (PPSC: 148)

In other words, “form of state” is a theoretical tool which deals with the form of the internal relation between the economic and political realms. In this sense, a relational approach which deals with the internal relations between these realms takes into account the processes and relations which give rise to the forms of state.

What is meant by the relation between the economic and political realms is not simply “state’s intervention into economy”. Such an understanding of this relation which reduces it to “forms of intervention” might be compatible with an approach building upon external relations, which takes state and economy as distinct entities. However, conceiving the relation between the economic and political realms as an internal one implies that what is called as “forms of intervention” is only an aspect of the internal relation between the economic and political realms. According to Poulantzas, there is no one to one correspondence between the form of state and the forms of intervention. The same forms of intervention into economy can be observed, for example, both in democratic and fascist forms of state.

The analysis of the form of state, therefore, requires more than assessing the forms of intervention. Poulantzas considers the forms of state as corresponding to certain stages or phases¹⁶ of capitalism (PPSC: 154). For example, liberal state is a form of state corresponding to the competitive stage of capitalism and interventionist state is a form of state corresponding to the monopoly stage. The determination of stages and phases requires the analysis of the constitution of the power bloc and the relations between classes and class fractions. Therefore, what is important about Poulantzas' conceptualisation of stages and phases for a relational understanding is that, in order to correctly assess the form of state, it is necessary to analyse the dimensions involving the relative positions of classes and class fractions. In this sense, if the dominant fraction in a certain social formation changes then this situation bears implications for the form of state.

One important thing that should be noted is that there is no relation of direct determination among the type of state, form of state and the form of regime. For example, capitalist type of state does not necessarily entail a liberal form of state, nor does liberal form of state necessarily indicate a multiparty parliamentary regime. Poulantzas emphasises that in case of a change in the form of capitalist state what is changing is the *form* that the capitalist relations of production assume; the very matrix of these relations, i.e. the capitalist character of the relations of production, remains unchanged. In other words, a change in the form of state does not directly

¹⁶ Poulantzas uses the concepts of "stage" and "phase" for the periodisation of the capitalist state. These periods are determined according to the certain modifications in the capitalist mode of production that involve different relations between classes and class fractions. For example, the monopoly stage is marked by the emergence of monopoly capital and the dominance of it over the other fractions and classes, while the competitive stage did not involve such a fraction of capital as the dominant fraction. For a chart outlining the stages and phases of capitalism, and their basic features, see (CCC: 134-5).

imply a change in the type of state. Similarly, a change in the form of regime does not directly imply a change in the form of state, and vice versa.

The triple conception of Poulantzas is in no sense taken here as an ideal-typical template which historical reality should be fit into. Rather, it is considered as a functional theoretical toolbox which presents criteria to assess various dimensions of the state. It was mentioned above that the concepts of Poulantzas were not taken here totally as they had been originally defined in his earlier works, but rather, the basic concepts were defined according to their compatibility with a relational approach. In this sense, some aspects of Poulantzas' definition of form of state and form of regime are excluded here. Instead, those aspects compatible with and adequate for a relational account are outlined. Among these, particularly, the differentiation between the form of state and the form of regime is functional for the concerns of this thesis. This differentiation can be formulated as follows: Modifications related to the internal relation between the economic and political realms define a change in the form of state; on the other hand, modifications related merely to the institutional structure and the procedures define a change in the form of regime. Besides, the point that the form of state should be defined according to the relative positions of the classes and class fractions, i.e. according to which class or fraction is dominant over others, is also functional for a relational approach to the state. Again, as mentioned above, there is no relation of direct determination among the type of state, form of state and form of regime.

3.2.2. Power Bloc

The “power bloc” (PPSC: 296-307) is a particular feature of the capitalist state, compared with other types of states. Although, according to Poulantzas, power

bloc may occur in other types of state, capitalist state fosters the constitution of it. The main point that the concept of power bloc builds upon is that class struggle in capitalist societies does not have a dualist character. In other words, there is no single dominant or single subordinate class. This dualist conception, according to Poulantzas, is a historicist one. Different from this orthodox view that conceives the state as a uniform instrument of a unique bourgeoisie, power bloc implies the coexistence of several classes and class fractions in political power as a field of class struggles. This understanding is insightful for a relational account since it takes the concept of class struggles to the heart of the political power and thus defines the ontology of the state through the relations among classes and class fractions.

The power bloc is neither a fusion nor an alliance between dominant classes and fractions, but rather, it constitutes a contradictory unity of politically dominant classes and fractions under the protection of the hegemonic fraction. The class struggle, the rivalry between the interests of these classes and class fractions is constantly present since these interests retain their specific character of antagonism. On the other hand, it should be stressed that it is not a pluralist realm where any class or fraction exists on an equivalent basis. The power bloc is established from several politically dominant classes or fractions but under the concrete dominance of hegemonic class or fraction. (PPSC: 141)¹⁷.

Poulantzas' definition of the character and functioning of power bloc – where he clearly defined it – involves some Althusserian impacts; however, the concept of

¹⁷ Then, Poulantzas conceives of hegemony in a more systematic way than Gramsci does (Hall, 1980: 62). Since, the power bloc, a structural feature of the capitalist state – the characteristics of which, though, are concretely determined – is itself constituted through the concept of hegemony. One important aspect of the relation between hegemony and power bloc is that the political implications of hegemony change according to whether the hegemony of the hegemonic fraction is established only on the other fractions of the power bloc or the ensemble of society in general.

power bloc is not tied to how these relations were defined by Poulantzas, himself, in his rather earlier works (e.g. PPSC or FD). For a relational approach, what is remarkable about the concept of power bloc is that it defines the ontology of political power through the relations among classes and class fractions. This conception of power bloc involves the unequal coexistence of several classes and/or fractions in the field of political power, under the hegemony of a certain class or class fraction. Such an understanding attributes a central place to class struggles in the constitution of the ontology of political power. This conception is also insightful since it indicates to the significance of the contradictions between the fractions of the capitalist class, as well as the contradictions between the capitalist class and others.

3.2.3. Finance / Monopoly Capital

Since Poulantzas takes “finance / monopoly capital” as the hegemonic fraction of the historical phase that authoritarian statism corresponds to, it is also necessary to show how he conceives of this fraction. Poulantzas’ conception of finance capital is along the same lines with Lenin’s conception that he quotes:

It is the characteristic of capitalism in general that the ownership of capital is separated from the application of capital to production, that money capital is separated from industrial or productive capital, and that the rentier who lives entirely on income obtained from money capital, is separated from the entrepreneur and from all who are directly concerned in the management of capital. Imperialism, or the domination of finance capital, is that highest stage of capitalism at which this separation reaches vast proportions.” (Lenin, V.I. (1964) Collected Works, Vol.22, Moscow, p. 238, quoted in CCC: 110)

Poulantzas argues that finance capital is formed with a process of centralisation and concentration of fractions of capital: “finance capital is not a fraction of capital in the same sense as industrial or banking capital; it is the form assumed by their relationship within the process of their merger itself, through which

they are reproduced.” (CCC: 109) Furthermore, “‘mergers’ within productive capital (concentration) and within money capital (centralization), which go to form monopoly capital, are already themselves ‘merged’ processes, in the sense that the centralization of one is involved in the concentration of other, and vice versa.” (CCC: 110)

Poulantzas’ explanation of why he did not use the term “big capital”¹⁸ instead of “monopoly capital” makes clearer what he means by the latter. The reasons are, first, it could mask the split within the bourgeoisie since it might give a sense that there was a continuum between monopoly and non-monopoly capital; and second, it might blur the class barrier between capital and the petty bourgeoisie. He stresses that the definition of this fraction was not a matter of magnitude but the relations of production involved in the formation of the fractions. (CCC: 138-41) However he also admits that the dividing lines between monopoly and non-monopoly capital are variable and relative since concentration and centralisation of capital, which forms the monopoly capital, is a constant process. (CCC: 140) But basically, “the basis of the differentiation between monopoly capital and non-monopoly capital lies in the specific relations of production which characterize these two forms of capital in their articulation with the labour process.” (CCC: 141)

According to Poulantzas, besides the contradictions between monopoly and non-monopoly capital, the existence of a restricted sector of non-monopoly capital is advantageous to monopoly capital so that it preserves and reproduces that sector. However, even in other circumstances where this advantage does not exist

¹⁸ However, there is a usage of “big capital” instead of “monopoly capital” in SPS. (SPS: 234)

“competitive capitalism [which non-monopoly capital is based in (CCC: 140)] constantly reproduces itself under the domination of monopoly”¹⁹. (CCC: 142-3)

3.2.4. Emergence of a New Form of State: Authoritarian Statism

Having clarified the basic concepts of Poulantzas’ theory from a relational perspective, it is now possible to get into his analysis of the form of state related to the contemporary times. Poulantzas argues that a new form of state was emerging by the late seventies in the dominant capitalist countries of the West:

In Western capitalist societies, the State is undergoing considerable modification. A new form of State is currently being imposed ... I shall refer to this state form as *authoritarian statism*. This will perhaps indicate the general direction of change: namely, intensified state control over every sphere of socioeconomic life *combined with* radical decline of the institutions of political democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called ‘formal’ liberties, whose reality is being discovered now that they are going overboard. Although some of these changes have been operating for a long time, the present-day State marks a veritable turn in relation to previous state forms. (SPS: 203-4)

As Jessop rightly puts, Poulantzas’ discussion of authoritarian statism has been more relevant after the time he conceived it. (Jessop, 1991: 97) In this sense, the discussion below is relevant to the 1980s and the 1990s, as well as to the late 1970s. The implications of Poulantzas’ discussion of authoritarian statism on these decades will be dealt with in the fourth chapter.

Poulantzas thinks that the forms of State vary for the groups of “dominant and dominated countries” and distinguishes this form – authoritarian statism – from the form he thinks to be emerging in the “dominated countries of the imperialist chain”: “we are witnessing the emergence of *a new form of dependent State* which, itself

¹⁹ This point can be understood when Poulantzas’ conception of modes of production is considered; according to him, various modes of production may coexist at a certain historical conjuncture. He defines the capitalist state not as the state of capitalist mode of production but as the type of state capitalist mode of production is dominant. (PPSC: 144)

manifested in diverse regimes, involves significant points of dissimilarity with the new form of State in the dominant countries.”²⁰ (SPS: 204) By the time Poulantzas wrote SPS, most of the dominated countries, e.g. Latin American countries, were in a process of passage from military to civilian rule. This is most probably why he did not include these cases in his analysis. As will be discussed in the fourth chapter, the main characteristics of authoritarian statism as put by Poulantzas are observable in these countries no less than the dominant countries.

As mentioned above, Poulantzas considers the forms of state in relation with the periodisation of capitalism, as corresponding to certain stages and phases of capitalism. Authoritarian statism, as a form of state

seems to correspond to the current phase of imperialism and monopoly capitalism in the dominant countries, in the way that the liberal State referred to the competitive stage of capitalism and various forms of interventionist State to the previous phases of monopoly capitalism. Authoritarian statism is thus dependent upon those structural modifications in the relations of production and the processes and social division of labour which characterize the present phase at both the world and national levels. (SPS: 204)

Poulantzas takes finance / monopoly capital as the hegemonic fraction of the historical phase that authoritarian statism corresponds to.

An important point is that, despite the possible connotations of the term “authoritarian”, Poulantzas does not consider “authoritarian statism” as an exceptional form of state²¹: “The present-day State is neither the new form of genuine exceptional State nor in itself, a transitional form on the road to such a State:

²⁰ However, Jessop argues that Poulantzas used the concept in order to refer to both “metropolitan and dependent capitalist states alike”. (1991: 99)

²¹ Poulantzas employs the concept of “exceptional form of State” in order to refer to forms of state such as fascism and Bonapartism. He uses the term in a way that differentiates it from non-capitalist forms of state as well as from other forms of capitalist state. In other words, he makes this definition to show not only that this form is different from other forms of capitalist state but also that it belongs to the capitalist type of state but no other type. This is why he stresses the features of these forms characteristic of the capitalist state.

it rather represents the new 'democratic' form of the bourgeois republic in the current phase of capitalism." (SPS: 209) It cannot be thought identical with fascism or neo-corporatism. (SPS: 233, 239) Authoritarian statism shares a totalitarian aspect with the exceptional fascist form of state; however "[e]very democratic form of capitalist State itself carries totalitarian tendencies." (SPS: 209) On the other hand, authoritarian statism is different from previous democratic forms in this respect: "Probably for the first time in the history of democratic States, the present form [authoritarian statism] not only contains scattered elements of totalitarianism, but crystallizes their organic disposition in a permanent structure running parallel to the official State." (SPS: 210) In this sense, it is a democratic form of state radically different from the previous ones.

Poulantzas observes that "authoritarian statism therefore points, via changes at the level of the relations of production and the processes and social division of labour, to a considerable shift in class relations." (SPS: 210) This is why the process is defined by a change in the form of state but not merely a change in the form of regime. As mentioned above, changes in the forms of regime per se do not affect class relations. These changing class relations are marked by, first, a permanent sharpening of the contradictions within the dominant classes – especially between monopoly and non-monopoly capital – and second, a permanent instability of bourgeoisie's hegemony over subordinate classes.

Therefore, the phase that authoritarian statism is based in is characterised by structural modifications of class relations and by sharpening of the political crisis (SPS: 211-4). It is remarkable that Poulantzas defines the conjuncture that generates authoritarian statism with a crisis of State, while he stresses that authoritarian statism

itself generates crisis in such a way that this crisis becomes permanent; he argues that “the transformations which mark the State sharpen the generic elements of political crisis.” (SPS: 241)

Poulantzas defines the most evident features of change in the State as “the decline of parliament, the strengthening of the Executive, the political role currently assumed by the state administration”. (SPS: 217) The strengthening of Executive is a characteristic feature of the stage of monopoly capitalism, with a specificity that marks the passage from liberal to interventionist state. (SPS: 217) However, it becomes quite remarkable in the form of authoritarian statism. He argues that these developments in the role of parliament, Executive and state administration corresponds to “the decline of law” in such a way that law does not become defunct but it is “undergoing a clear retreat”. (SPS: 219-20) The same retreat is valid in regard with the place and role of both the deputies and political parties of power, too. Poulantzas argues that while “*the ties of representation between deputies and State are being broken*”, the function of reproduction of hegemony passes from political parties to the executive and the state administration. (SPS: 222-3) However, this hegemonic function is handled differently from before; for example, public knowledge is left in favour of secrecy, and “administrative apparatus is materially organized in such a way as to exclude popular needs from its field of perception”. (SPS: 226-7)

Poulantzas does not define these new roles undertaken by the Executive and the state administration in such a way that attributes these bodies the character of a uniform subject. That is, it still remains that state is a field of class struggles: “Contradictions between monopoly and other fractions of capital, or between the

power bloc and the popular masses, *are expressed right at the heart of the State, in its central regions and summits.*” (SPS: 229) This understanding of the state is a characteristic feature of the relational conception that Poulantzas adopts, which Jessop defines as understanding the state as a social relation, as “an institutionally-mediated condensation of the changing balance of forces” which are not class-neutral (Jessop, 1991: 93).

Poulantzas argues that in authoritarian statism there is a “tendency of power to be personalized in the man at the top of the Executive” but in the light of this multitude of class forces expressed in the state, this man at the top becomes “not *one* president, but *several in one*”. (SPS: 228-9) This is a typical expression of Poulantzas’ relational conception of state which takes it as a condensation of balance of class forces.

The changing roles of the political parties, the executive and the state administration go hand in hand with a redefinition of the relations among them. The parties losing their traditional functions get more dependent on and more committed to the Executive and state administration:

Today, they [parties] differ over little more than the aspect of administrative-executive policy that should be popularized: their propaganda takes up one and the same policy of the administration and the Executive, differentiated according to the class which they address. This, then, is the famous ‘end of ideology’, the obliteration of distinctive ideological features and the transformation of parties into catch-all organizations. ...[major parties] are not the sites where such contradictions [among fractions of power bloc] are really handled. They are rather the sounding-boards for contradictions at work in the dominant centre, namely the administration and the Executive.” (SPS: 230)

The change in the role and place of political parties leads to considerable changes in the competitive aspect of liberal politics. In this regard, Poulantzas

presents “dominant mass party”²² as a structural characteristic of authoritarian statism:

The present changes at the level of the State also entail the emergence and specific role of a *dominant mass party* as the *state party par excellence*. In the case of an alternation of two parties, this role fails successively on the one and the other. But contrary to certain superficial analyses, such alternation does not change in the slightest the current phenomenon of the dominant mass party, which is structurally necessary for the functioning of authoritarian statism. (SPS: 232)

The role of the dominant mass party is

to unify and homogenize the state administration; to control and propel (in the direction of general government policy) the cohesiveness of its various branches and sub-apparatuses – both horizontal (inter-branch) and vertical (central apparatus, regional apparatuses); and finally, to ensure the administration’s loyalty to the summits of the Executive.” (SPS: 233)

It does not have a role of representing the interests of big capital [sic] since this is already directly done. There is a chain of control between the summits of the Executive, dominant mass party and state administration, in which the former controls the latter respectively. (SPS: 234-6) Here, the party “functions as a parallel network, placing the entire administration in a relationship of strict political subordination to the summits of the Executive.” (SPS: 233)

The changes that mark authoritarian statism is accompanied by a “weakening of the state”, dialectically²³. The weakening of the State has three dimensions: First, “the changing role of the administration leads to its direct politicization”, which in turn removes the illusion concerning administration’s political neutrality (SPS: 241); second, because of “the elaboration of government policy within the administrative

²² Jessop suggests that “it would be better to describe dominant mass party (sic) as the dominant *state* party. ...[in order to] highlight further the alleged confusion between the party and the state.” (1985: 103) but Poulantzas already uses them interchangeably (e.g. SPS: 233).

²³ Poulantzas does not use the term “dialectical” here but what he means has a dialectical characteristic. Since, the same characteristics that “strengthen the state” also cause to a weakening of it.

apparatus” instead of political parties, a lack of hegemonic function occurs (SPS: 245); and third, “authoritarian statism is itself partially responsible for creating new forms of popular struggle ... [which] have in view the exercise of direct, rank-and-file democracy ... [and which] exhibit a characteristic anti-statism.” (SPS: 246) These are the features of authoritarian statism which make the “crisis of state” a permanent issue. Poulantzas argues that the predominance of the executive, which is a fundamental characteristic of authoritarian statism, signifies the failure of monopoly capital in establishing its hegemony vis-à-vis the other components of the power bloc and the subordinate classes. (PPSC: 315) Therefore, this form of state is weak in terms of hegemony.

In sum, Poulantzas’ discussions about authoritarian statism point out that a transformation of the form of state is due in the dominant capitalist countries. In this new form of state, the executive and the state administration gain power more than ever before in the history of democratic forms of state. According to him, this trend had ever been inherent to the stage of monopoly capitalism but it has now come to a point which marks a transformation of the phase of this stage. In this phase, political parties are weaker and less important than before and they lose their representing function. These changes in the branches of the state is so important that Poulantzas sees it possible an evolution of power towards Bonapartism, also taking into account the considerable restriction of democratic liberties (SPS: 231). The competitive party politics in the previous liberal way leaves its place to the emergence of a dominant mass party. And all these take place parallel to a dialectical weakening of the state.

3.2.3. Hegemonic Projects

While having defined the characteristics of authoritarian statism in detail, Poulantzas has not described clearly the dynamics of the implementation process of this new form of state. Stuart Hall argues that “the thesis of ‘authoritarian statism’ needs to be complemented by a theory of ‘authoritarian populism’.” (SPS, Foreword: xvii) Hall, here rightly indicates to the lack of a strategic and ideological dimension of the thesis of authoritarian statism. In regard with this lacking dimension, here, Bob Jessop’s conceptualisation of “hegemonic project” will be referred to in order to supplement Poulantzas’ conceptualisation of authoritarian statism, and generally the concepts defined above in regard with the relational approach argued for here.

Jessop proposes a tool in order to analyse the construction process of hegemony, the concept of “hegemonic project”, which is composed of strategies towards establishing hegemony. He argues that the field of class struggles should be examined in terms of competing hegemonic projects. (1991: 344) The construction of a successful hegemonic project and the realisation of it involves three dimensions; first, structural privileges inscribed in a given state form; second, the strategic orientation of the project, which involves “integration of strategically significant forces as subjects with specific interests”, “formulation of a general, national popular project” and “specification of a ‘policy paradigm’ within which conflicts over competing interests and demands can be negotiated without threatening the overall project”; and third, the relation of the project to an appropriate capital accumulation strategy. (1990: 209-10) Jessop attributes the hegemonic project of the dominant class a role of changing the “formal unity” of the state apparatus to a “substantive unity”, which overcomes the possible conflicts between various branches of the state

apparatus in a way that reproduces the system of political domination. (1990: 210) A successful hegemonic project also builds “a historical bloc involving an organic relation between base and superstructure”, and thus promotes capital accumulation. (1990: 214)

An insightful contribution that Jessop makes to the theory of hegemony is his definition of one-nation and two-nations hegemonic projects. Jessop explains the difference between the two as that while a one-nation hegemonic project aims at an expansive hegemony encompassing the whole of society, a two-nations hegemonic project aims at “a more limited hegemony concerned to mobilize the support of strategically significant sectors of the population and to pass the costs of the project to the other sectors.” (1990: 211) He classifies the hegemonic aspect of Thatcherism in the “two-nations” side, together with that of fascism. Hegemonic projects can only be considered within their historical specificity in particular reference to each historical case. (1990: 211-2)

Jessop emphasises the importance of “non-class forces” in securing the hegemony of the dominant class; and he stresses that

The class character of a given hegemonic project does not depend on the a priori class belonging of its elements or any self-professed class identity of its proponents. It depends instead on the effects of pursuing that project in a definite conjuncture. (1990: 217)

In this sense, hegemonic projects should be understood through their implications for class struggles and on the relative positions of classes.

3.3. Concluding Remarks

The discussions in the first section of this chapter showed that the view that bourgeoisie had a structural characteristic favouring the establishment or promotion of democracy was historically not defensible. As of the concerns of this thesis, the pro-democratic stance that TÜSİAD adopts cannot therefore be regarded as a manifestation of the contentions of this view. Another conclusion of this section was related to the specificity of bourgeois democracy which builds upon the separation of the economic and political realms, characteristic of capitalism. Under the rubric of liberal democracy, democracy has historically been reduced to what was originally called as liberalism, in the bourgeois world. In this sense, the variant of democracy that the current democratisation project in Turkey builds upon involves characteristics inherent to liberalism, rather than democracy, in the sense “rule by people” implies. This, by nature, applies to the approach in the reports of TÜSİAD, and the theoretical framework of the MTD.

In the second section of this chapter, the approach to be used in this thesis for historical analysis has been introduced. A relational approach has been outlined based upon Poulantzas’ theory of state, which has been discussed in particular reference to his conception of authoritarian statism. The discussions in the fourth chapter will make use of this relational approach, which builds upon a relational understanding of social ontology in general. The way Poulantzas distinguished between the form of state and form of regime, and the contemporary developments that he indicated in terms of a change in the form of state are inspiring to the discussions in the next chapter.

Finally, Jessop's conceptualisation of "hegemonic projects" is introduced as a supplement to the relational approach discussed, in order to take account of the strategic dimensions of class struggles. The concept of hegemonic projects is important for analysing the relations between the current transformations related to the form of state and those related to the form of regime, in historically specific contexts. In particular, it allows us to come to terms with the specific ways in which these struggles unfold.

CHAPTER 4

PUTTING THE 1980S AND 1990S IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

As discussed in the first and second chapters, the TŰSIAD reports and the MTD took democracy and democratisation as merely political issues. In this sense, they deal exclusively with the changes in the form of regime. However, such a theoretical attitude masks the real dynamics of the current historical process. The characteristics of this historical process can only be grasped when the accompanying changes in the form of state are taken into consideration. Thus, the characteristics of relationship between the economic and political realms become explicable in terms of internal relations. That is, the separation of the economic and political realms under capitalism, and the specific forms that separation might take can only be accounted for on the basis of their conception as internally related phenomena. In other words, as discussed in the previous chapter, the very ontology of these realms is established through this relation; there is no other existence of either of them independent from the other. In this sense, considering any political issue regardless of its ties with the economic realm falls short of explaining the characteristics of it, and furthermore such a theoretical attitude masks these characteristics. Therefore, this chapter aims at examining the current historical process in regard to its implications for the form of state. Thus, according to the definition of the concept of “form of state” in the previous chapter, the dimensions related to the modification of

the relation between the economic and political realms, and to the relative positions of classes and class fractions will be dealt with in this chapter.

While doing this, the characteristics of Poulantzas' definition of authoritarian statism will be particularly referred to. A remarkable point is that, it will not be argued that the current political economic developments lead to a form of state which completely fits into a template of authoritarian statism. Rather, the discussions will be carried out in a way that outlines the *transformations related to the form of state* in the direction that the conception of authoritarian statism also indicates. These discussions will be based upon the relational approach discussed in the previous chapter.

4.1. The Internal Relation Between “The National” and “The International”

It has already been shown in the first chapter that it was manifest in the TÜSiAD reports that the organisation's basic motive of support to the democratisation project was the conditional status of democratisation before Turkey's accession to the EU. However, saying this does not explain the historical phenomenon in full, since a basic question remains unanswered: “What is it that makes this project – but no other – a condition before accession to the EU?” The answer to this question requires a clarification of the conceptualisation of the relation between the national and international contexts. Also, the discussions below focusing on the analysis of the current historical processes build upon this conceptualisation.

It is a common theoretical attitude to conceive of the nation state as an entity which has an ontology distinct from other nation states. Such an attitude, taking the nation state as the sovereign authority of its territory, conceives of the relations

involved in and among the societies of various territories through the relations between the nation states. Although the concept of “nation state” corresponds to a meaningful level of analysis, taking it as an entity distinct from other nation states is a misleading theoretical attitude. Such a conception takes the relations between the nation states as external relations, and thus conceives of the international relations as the relations between distinct subjects solidified in the name of nation states. However, the social relations involved in and between different territories cannot be reduced to the relations between the nation states. Because, the nation state cannot be considered as a homogeneous entity representing a homogeneous unity of society located in a territory. Capitalist society which is interwoven by class contradictions is not a homogeneous unity that can be represented by a unique will. Furthermore, these class contradictions involve relations which go beyond the limits that can be understood in terms of the nation states.

The relational approach that is used here conceives of the national and international contexts as internally related to each other. In other words, moving from the definition of internal relations in the previous chapter, the social relations involved in the national and international contexts are the counterparts of the same whole. What I call “*the nexus of the national and international contexts*” refers to the internally related conception of the two contexts. According to this conception, there is no ontology of the national context apart from the international context, and vice versa. Any international issue has to be considered through its ties with the national context, and vice versa again. Such a relational approach does not conceive of the nation states as distinct entities; but it takes them as constituted of relations and processes. The nation state is not a thing in itself but a field of social relations –

namely, of the class struggles. The process(es) which the nation state involves and is involved in is (are) inherent to the ontology of it. The critical thing here is that these social relations and processes, which constitute the nation state, themselves involve the international context. In other words, it is necessary to deal with the international dimensions that class struggles involve; and likewise, it is necessary to analyse the historical processes according to their implications for the international context.

Defining the national context in internal relation with the international context does not mean, of course, that the nation state is a meaningless concept. The nation state is the form how the state is organised in contemporary capitalism, and therefore has to be regarded for analytical concerns. What is stressed upon here is that there are aspects of social reality that can only be grasped beyond a conceptualisation of nation states that assumes external relations between them. Such a relational approach searches for the aspects of social reality which is not explicable – and sometimes is masked by – the notion of nation states.

Thus, it is clear that the relational approach employed here requires the analysis of the national context together with the international one, since the ontology of the former involves the latter. The discussions below are therefore handled in a way that focuses on the nexus of the national and international contexts. The analyses of the advanced capitalist countries and the Third World countries are aimed at depicting the matrix of social relations and historical processes in which the contemporary case of Turkey is involved. Put differently, in order to understand the historical specificity of the current democratisation project it is necessary to get into the task of analysing the aspects of the accompanying historical processes and relations that makes this project viable and/or necessary.

4.2. Defining Neoliberalism, The “Washington Consensus”

Neoliberalism is a key concept that has been pronounced frequently in regard with the political economy of the recent decades, which makes it necessary to define it. There is almost a general consensus in the relevant literature that the so-called “Washington consensus” well outlines the neoliberal agenda that the IMF and the World Bank follows. John Williamson, the designer of the concept, says that he refers by “Washington consensus” to “the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989” (2000: 251). The elements of this “consensus” as put by Williamson are as follows:

- Fiscal discipline
- A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure
- Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base)
- Interest rate liberalization
- A competitive exchange rate
- Trade liberalization
- Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment
- Privatization
- Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit)
- Secure property rights. (Williamson, 2000: 252-3)

Despite some objections of Williamson, these items have been accepted as drawing the frame of the dominant neoliberal economic agenda throughout the capitalist world in recent decades. However, it is obvious that the second item stands at a distinct place from others since it is not much considered in this period; it had been more a priority for welfare capitalism. Williamson, too, admits that in the concrete cases “the least progress had been made in implementing the second policy, redirecting public expenditure policies.” (2000: 253) Leaving this item aside, the

remaining is a good outline of the neoliberal economic policies of the recent decades. As accepted in the literature, the “Washington consensus” applies not only to the cases of Third World countries, which get “policy advice” from “the Washington-based institutions”, but also to the capitalist world in general. It should be noted that what is meant here is a limited definition of the concept of neoliberalism; an analysis of the ideological and theoretical sources of neoliberalism is out of concern for now, here. However, below is made an examination of the historical processes that are built up with the ideals and practices of neoliberalism.

4.3. The Historical Process

4.3.1. Advanced Capitalist Countries: the Case of Britain

The recent decades have accommodated some transformations related to the form of state in the advanced capitalist countries. In other words, there have occurred some modifications in the relation between the economic and political realms in these countries. Of course, this was neither a homogeneous nor a unidirectional historical process, but it is quite possible to talk about some common changes encompassing them. However, the examination of the advanced capitalist countries is carried out here in special reference to the case of Britain since, first, it well illustrates the transformations in these countries, and second, the discussion of the differences between the various cases exceeds the limits of this thesis. The specificity of the British case is that it has been the first in experiencing many of the transformations discussed below. It will be argued that these transformations are neither contingent nor peculiar to the British case, but they represent a common and

consistent process that involves both the advanced capitalist countries and the Third World countries, alike.

For the 1980s and 1990s in the advanced capitalist countries – and especially in Britain – have been dominated by the New Right and Third Way governments, the analysis of these decades below is made in special reference to the ideology and practice of these political genres. Under the New Right and Third Way governments, neoliberalism as defined above constituted the dominant mode of policy making. Of course, the roots of neoliberalism in these countries date earlier than the 1980s. According to Mark Pollack, for example, the European treaties²⁴ from Rome to Maastricht constitute a neoliberal project, and this neoliberal project has been the core of European integration (Pollack, 1998). Neoliberalism has constituted the main logic of the Maastricht Treaty, the Treaty that renamed “the European Community” as “the European Union”. It “ratified and accelerated” the measures related to the resolution of the welfare state in the EU countries (Erkiner, 1999: 27), which are discussed below in special reference to the British case.

4.3.1.1. The New Right and The Third Way

The end of the period of welfare capitalism became manifest in the New Right of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thatcher in Britain and Reagan in the USA implemented the New Right policies in the core of capitalism. Most of the Western European countries also followed this new path under the rule of both New Right parties, and, as will be discussed below, of social democratic parties, which reproduced the basic elements of the New Right ideology and practice later under the

²⁴ Pollack argues that the Amsterdam Treaty, however, was shaped by the influence of Blair, whom he defines as leftist but affected from the neoliberalism of Thatcher and Major. (1998)

rubric of “Third Way”. Hence, the new era of capitalism is primarily marked by the ideology and practice of this specific political genre.

Leo Panitch argues that what is called as globalisation took place under the ideological aegis of the New Right, which he conceives as being built upon neoclassical economics. The New Right ideology showed itself as reducing the state’s role in both domestic and international economic spheres, but actually the New Right involved the active role of states in establishing the main lines of globalisation and also in shifting the balance of class forces (Panitch, 1998: 13).

The first New Right program was carried out in Britain by the Thatcher government. The basic characteristics of this program, which constituted what has been called as Thatcherism – well illustrates the content of the New Right in general. According to Jessop, Thatcherism – including both Thatcher and Major governments – “combined a distinctive 'two nations' authoritarian populist hegemonic project, a centralizing 'strong state' project, and a neo-liberal accumulation strategy.” (2003: 4) He defines the principal elements of this neoliberal accumulation strategy as

(a) *liberalization*, promoting free market (as opposed to monopolistic or state monopolistic) forms of competition as the most efficient basis for market forces; (b) *deregulation*, giving economic agents greater freedom from state control and legal restrictions; (c) *privatization*, reducing the public sector's share in the direct or indirect provision of goods and services to business and community alike; (d) *(re-)commodification* of the residual public sector, to promote the role of market forces, either directly or through market proxies; (e) *internationalization*, encouraging the mobility of capital and labour, stimulating global market forces, and importing more advanced processes and products into Britain as a means of economic modernization; and (f) *reduced direct taxes* to expand the scope for the operation of market forces through enhanced investor and consumer choice (2003: 5)

The similarity of the characteristics above to the Washington consensus is obvious, which makes it clear that the neoliberal policies “advised” to the Third

World countries have been implemented in Britain, too. Such policies had of course implications for the class contradictions, however the New Right of Thatcherism involved more direct changes which downgraded the working class. These changes were

(a) deindustrialization, with a consequent weakening of the strongest and most militant trade unions; (b) legislation directed at trade unions' capacity to engage in strike action and collective bargaining, and to represent their members in other respects; (c) a general de-legitimization of corporatism and tripartism as means of co-making and co-implementing economic, social, and political policy; (d) the flexibilization and de-regulation of labour markets; and (e) the development of neo-liberal 'welfare-to-work' strategies. (Jessop, 2003: 10-1)

Thus, Thatcherism was built upon a neoliberal agenda which worked against the interests of the working class. Adherence to neoliberal economics and an attack on the status and rights of the working class also define the basic characteristics of the New Right, in general. These were implemented through an accompanying hegemonic project. Main characteristics of both the neoliberal agenda and the hegemony of the New Right were inherited by the successive New Labour government.

As much as the 1980s were characterised by the New Right, the 1990s were dominated by the ideology and practice of the Third Way, in Britain and generally in the advanced capitalist countries. James Petras (2000) uses the term “Euro-American Third Wave” to refer to the Third Way approach that Tony Blair and Anthony Giddens argue for, and which was also followed by Clinton, Schröder and other Western prime ministers. He distinguishes this version from other three contemporary versions that he defines and also from the two previous “waves” of Third Way, “reform socialist approach” and “welfare capitalism”. He argues that

The Euro-American Third Way provides a rhetorical gloss over a new style of right-wing politics. Essentially, the Euro-American variant of the Third Way builds on and extends the Old Right²⁵ Thatcher-Reagan doctrines of privatization and the promotion of concentrated, centralized capital. (2000: 29)

He argues that this version of Third Way was clearly regressive and it had a stance closer to the position of the right-wing opponents of the previous Third Ways. (2000: 34) Petras shows Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky as the representatives of “reform socialism”, the first Third Way which had been effective between the turn of the twentieth century and the end of the Second World War; and puts its adversaries as savage capitalism and revolutionary socialism. “Reform socialists” aimed at an economic democracy within capitalism, through socialist socioeconomic reforms and liberal capitalist political institutions. (Petras, 2000: 21-2) On the other hand, welfare capitalism, the second wave of Third Way which started just after the second world war and lasted until the mid-1980s, redefined the Third Way from reform socialism to reform capitalism. It suggested better living conditions for the working class but did not question capitalist property relations. It was counterposed against state socialism and liberal capitalism. (Petras, 2000: 25-6) Petras, thus, shows the move of the Third Way currents to the right in historical process. However, “the Euro-American Third Way is a dramatic shift from reformist socialism and welfare capitalism to neoliberalism”, more than a simple move. (Petras, 2000: 30) It is closer to the Right-wing politics than to the Left. It goes beyond the “Old Right” both in extending the “Old Right” agenda – into fields such as education and health, in the case of Britain, which even Thatcherism could not touch (Berry, 2002: 2) – and in extending the hegemonic rule of the dominant capitalist countries over the rest of the

²⁵ What Petras means by the term “Old Right” is what has usually been called as the “New Right”.

world “via armed interventions, NATO bombings, military occupations, and concerted economic strategies that facilitate Euro-American economic domination.” (Petras, 2000: 30) Jessop argues the same point that Third Way extended the agenda of New Right in reference to the British case. (2003)

Galip Yalman (1999) shows two differences between the Third Way and the New Right, in the case of Britain. A theme that differentiated New Labour as a Third Way party from the New Right was that the New Labour – “in order to become the champion of market economy” – suggested an alternative strategy which involved preserving the market as the basic resource allocation mechanism and employing political power with the task of providing the functioning of the market to the benefit of society, whereas the New Right did not assign such a task to the political power. The second ideological theme that differentiated New Labour was its conception of individual-society relations, which posed the two in harmony but not in contradiction, an understanding which had its roots in the “social liberalism” of the early twentieth century. (1999: 65)

Petras’ observations below about the Third Way policies implemented throughout the dominant capitalist countries comply with the framework of authoritarian statism. To the extent that the Third Way is seen as a continuation of the New Right in regard with its economic policies and the implications it has on the class contradictions, this compliance applies to the New Right, too. Petras observes that the Third Way governments led to a deterioration of social programs, “concentration of economic power among a decreasing number of monopolistic giants”, prosperity confined to “the speculative-financial and real estate sectors of the capitalist class – not to the productive, innovative sectors”; and he argues that the

Third Way politics are marked by oligarchic and less responsive parties, which have been turned into “authoritarian instruments of personal rule”, by becoming more dependent on relations with big business²⁶, by “greater influence of the financial sectors of civil society over the strategic institutions of the state”, and remarkably, by resembling to authoritarian political systems in a process which involves the strengthening of the executive and the decrease of public check on political practices. (2000: 31-3) It is obvious that Petras’ observations of Euro-American Third Way are along quite the same lines with the basic themes of authoritarian statism, such as, the hegemony of monopoly capital, the strengthening of the executive, emergence of a dominant mass party and strengthening of its higher ranks against the lower. This point is remarkable considered the wide range of advanced capitalist countries in which the Third Way governments have been effective.

As regards the strategic dimensions involved in the implementation process of the New Right and Third Way policies, it is necessary to deal with the concept of hegemonic projects. Jessop, while defining Thatcherism in reference to a “two-nations hegemonic project”, refers to a “one-nation” hegemonic project in the case of New Labour. The latter still involves an authoritarian populism but is more socially inclusive. (Jessop, 2003: 4) Then, the strategic dimensions differ between the New Right and the Third Way. While the former depends upon the strategic sections of society against the other sections, the latter builds upon an expansive hegemony.

Yalman (1999) analyses the case of Labour Party of Britain as an example of the contemporary transformation of European social democratic parties. He defines

²⁶ Gaye Yılmaz shows convincing examples of the deep interrelations between the business organisations and the state bureaucracy on the European scale. She argues that business organisations such as ERT and UNICE are directly effective on the actual policies of the European Union. (2000: 29-37)

this transformation in terms of political economic conditions and employing the concept of hegemonic project. According to him, the Third Way is the hegemonic project that the Labour adopted at a historical conjuncture in which the New Right had established a hegemony in regard with the role and character of the state. This new role was built upon a complementing relation between the state and market instead of a contradictory one; in other words, the question was no longer the classical liberal one, i.e. how the state could be minimized against the market, but it was how the state's forms of intervention could be functionalised for the effective performance of the market (Yalman, 1999: 56). With the justification of the inevitable need to adjust to the structural transformations led by globalisation, this hegemonic role of the state was adopted by the New Labour ideology as a combination of social democracy and neoliberalism. (Yalman, 1999: 57) As well as the content of this ideology, Yalman indicates to the importance of the process in which this ideology articulated social reality, i.e. the process of construction of hegemony. In this regard, the changing relations between the party and the trade unions, and the working class in general, is instructive; the party, as the Western European social democratic parties did in the post-war period, detached itself clearly from its image of representing the working class as a means to achieve a new "historical bloc" by focusing on the middle classes. (Yalman, 1999: 59-63) The transformation of the party was marked by a submission to the hegemony and to the ideological attack of the New Right in both the conceptualisation of state-market relations and downgrading class-based politics.

4.3.1.2. Depoliticisation of Economic Management

As discussed above, under the New Right and Third Way governments there have been significant changes in the relation between the political and the economic in recent decades. Peter Burnham's discussion offers a conceptual framework for understanding the transformations in this relation. Burnham's discussion is centred on the case of Britain, however, he thinks it to be valid in varying degrees for the whole of globe. He argues that a passage to "depoliticised form of economic management" has taken scene by the late 1980s from the "politicized form of economic management" of the period between 1945-76. He defines depoliticised economic management as "the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision making" (2001: 128). However, he stresses that

'depoliticisation' should not be taken to mean the direct removal of politics from social and economic spheres or the simple withdrawal of political power or influence. Rather, depoliticisation is understood here as a governing strategy and, in that sense, remains highly political. (2001: 136)

As a governing strategy, depoliticised management provided the governments a place of manoeuvre which made their freedom from economic responsibility possible and in a sense necessary, and therefore reduced the risk of being directly effected by economic crisis and reasserted the "operational autonomy" of the political executive. (Burnham, 2001: 131) The politicised management of the period 1945-76, however, involved government's publicly accepting the responsibility for economic management. Thus, governments had been affected in both positive and negative ways from the outcomes of economic policies. (Burnham, 2001: 130) Burnham argues that such a move towards depoliticised management became possible as a result of developments such as the higher unemployment rates in a

more “flexible” labour market, reduced control over movement of capital and the integration of financial markets. Depoliticised management involves such trends as “the reordering and reassignment of tasks from the party in office”, “moves to increase accountability, transparency and external validation of policy”, and “the acceptance of binding rules (constrained discretion) limiting government room for manoeuvre”; and it has such characteristics as “relaxation / abolition of direct controls” over economy, “decentralisation and devolution of policy making”, “privatisation, deregulation and the recomposition of management hierarchies within states”, and downgrading of income policies”. (2001: 131)

Burnham’s conceptualisation of depoliticised management gains increasing applicability to the whole of the capitalist world. The strengthening of the central banks as the independent organisations solely responsible for monetary policy is an issue almost all around the world. Likewise, the transfer of authority in many – especially economic – fields to independent agencies²⁷ is almost a global phenomenon. On the other side, the agreements of GATT and GATS are good examples of “constrained discretion”, which bind the national governments in many aspects regarding both domestic and international economic affairs. GATT aims at the liberalisation of international trade in such a way that reduces the national governments’ control. And GATS involves the re-regulation²⁸ of the field of services in a way that excludes the state as a service provider from each of the related sectors including health and education, and in a direction disadvantageous to the working

²⁷ The so-called “independent agencies” are not in fact “independent” from classes. The principle of “governance”, which builds the functioning mechanism of these agencies, paves the way for increased effectiveness and control of bourgeoisie directly on the economic field that the agency is related to. (Güler, 2003)

²⁸ Güzelsarı argues that GATS involves a re-regulation rather than a “de-regulation” as put in the agreement itself. (2003: 139)

classes. (Güzelsarı, 2003) Considered the wide range of countries having signed these agreements, they can be seen as the general logic of contemporary capitalism throughout the world. The concept of “depoliticised management”, which is related to a modification of the relation between the economic and political realms, addresses a transformation related to the form of state throughout the capitalist world.

In sum, the New Right and the Third Way can be defined as two closely related hegemonic projects, or indeed, as the counterparts of a grand hegemonic project, since they aimed at and to a substantial extent have succeeded the construction of hegemony vis-à-vis the subordinate classes. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Jessop puts that the class character of a hegemonic project should be identified according to its implications for class struggles but not to the class origin of the actors that undertake the formulation and implementation of it. In other words, to which class or class fraction the realisation of a hegemonic project benefits determines the class character of that hegemonic project. In this sense, when the fact that the major neoliberal transformations related to the form of state have been most to the benefit of monopoly capital and to the disadvantage of the working class, it can be argued that the hegemonic project(s) in question belong(s) to this fraction of capital.

The neoliberal program of the New Right and Third Way governments resulted in transformations related to the form of state in Britain as an advanced capitalist country. Poulantzas had already defined the concept of authoritarian statism in reference to advanced capitalist countries; besides, as mentioned above, his discussions apply even better to the period after he made this discussion. As

discussed above, the developments such as the strengthening of the executive and state administration; the strengthening of the heads of the major parties, especially of those in the government, against the lower levels; exclusion of subordinate classes from the field of policymaking, especially from the field of economic management; extended hegemony and dominance of monopoly capital over the other classes and class fractions, especially over the working class; constitute the major dynamics of the political economy of recent decades in the advanced capitalist countries, in general. For example, Reaganism of the USA shared many characteristics with Thatcherism, both in ideology and practice (Green, 1987). On the part of the continental European countries, the EU has often been criticised of being not democratic since its mechanisms involved the superiority of the Council – which can be seen as the Executive body of the Union – and the relative effectiveness of the Commission, or the Eurocracy – which can be seen as identical to the state administration (Carchedi, 2001). The Maastricht Treaty provides the legal basis for the strength of the Executive vis-à-vis the European Parliament and other organs of the Union (Erkiner, 1999: 26, 31-36). Such developments are compatible with the direction that Poulantzas' conceptualisation of authoritarian statism indicates. These in total indicate a series of transformations directly addressing the form of state.

It is interesting that these transformations take place in the advanced capitalist countries without a change in the form of regime. Therefore, approaches merely focusing on the changes in the form of regime are inadequate in explaining such dimensions which have significance for the processes that the states of the advanced capitalist countries involve and are involved in. Thus, it is obvious that Poulantzas'

conceptualisations of form of state and form of regime are functional in better understanding these aspects of the capitalist state.

4.3.2. The Third World

In the recent decades, the Third World politics got increasingly determined by the relations with the international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. The mechanisms of debt and financial aid constitute the central dynamic of the relations of the Third World countries with the advanced capitalist countries. However, the real character of these relations is obviously beyond the literal meaning of the words “debt” and “aid”. It would not be misleading to argue that the relevant mechanisms work to the advantage of the debt or aid giving countries. (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2002)

William Graf argues that the state in the Third World, the region which now came to include the Eastern Europe, too, moves towards a type what he calls “a law-and-order-state”²⁹ (1995: 150). Graf emphasises the changes in the relations between the dominant and subordinate countries, from a perspective of “world capitalist system”, and asserts that the subjection of the subordinate countries to the dominant ones got deepened in the neoliberal process of so-called globalisation, to the furthest extent since the colonial times. (1995: 159) He defines the basic dimensions of the current transformation as follows:

From the perspective of the Third World state, the phenomenon of globalisation can, I think, be usefully cast in terms of a primarily economic

²⁹ Graf does not suggest the term as a generic term encompassing the whole of the phenomena he describes about the Third World state; however, I prefer to use it in a more inclusive way than he does since the term seems to be defining the very core of his discussions.

dimension, *recommodification*³⁰, and a very closely related, mainly political one, formal-liberal *democratization*. (1995: 143)

Graf's description of the current transformations in the structure of capitalist state is based upon the effects of neoliberalism on the state structure. He observes that in the *recommodification* process, the market has become the central institution and the state has increasingly become subjected to the needs of the market. The typical characteristics of the new Third World state are, state support to the market, a law-and-order-state ensuring the continued reproduction of favourable conditions for both "domestic" and "transnational" capital, strong state authority which neoliberal insistence on free trade requires, deepened economic inequality between "the North and the South", increased possibility of instability led by unequal competition, discrediting and dismantling the Third World state as the one agency open to nationalist aspirations. (Graf, 1995: 149-152)

A remarkable argumentation that Graf follows establishes that "a formal-liberal variant" of democracy "turns out to be the political form [in 'the South'] most compatible with recommodification and new globalism." This variant, he argues, "allows for (and justifies) both tolerance of social inequality and a separation of economic from political democracy." (1995: 146) According to Graf, the ideological companions of this variant of democracy are the concepts of "good governance", "a form of commodified management", and "civil society", the locus of plural opposition of extra-state groups. These concepts together imply an economic and political liberalism, though they mean something different in practice from their ideological manifestation. (1995: 147-8) In sum, Graf delineates a state of the Third

³⁰ Graf writes that he uses the term in order to refer to the reverse of the concept of "decommodification" which was used by Claus Offe in reference to the welfare state. (1995: 143)

World, which is charged of maintaining law and order in the service of market, in an authoritarian way and under the rubric of formal-liberal democratisation. He argues that the economic functions of this state is transferred to international agencies and organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF (1995: 152).

From another perspective, Paul Cammack argues that the specific type of democracy that has emerged in “the non-Western world” is not simply a defective type of democracy peculiar to these regions. He asserts that this type, which he calls “state orchestrated electoralism” or “state-managed democracy”, is much more compatible with neoliberalism – which he sees as capitalism’s current form – than liberal democracy is. The states built upon this type, such as Malaysia and Mexico, bear great competitive advantage for their bourgeoisie. It is because of this compatibility and such advantages belonging to this type that Cammack prophesises a move towards this type from liberal democracy in the West. (1998) That is, contrary to the traditional expectations, Cammack argues that the regime change was likely to occur from the Western to the non-Western, to state-managed democracy, possibly the only viable form of democracy (1998: 262). As outlined in the first chapter some writers of the MTD also define hybrid regimes which give signals of persisting. For example, Schmitter’s concepts of *democradura* and *dictablanda* indicate to such regimes which are not totally authoritarian, nor totally democratic in the way liberal democracy is, but at the same time which are not promising to become perfect democracies at any time in the foreseeable future. However, Schmitter’s approach is different from that of Cammack since, first, as the concepts he offers also suggest, he takes them in a somehow exceptional sense; and second, he

does not define them as capitalism's favourite type of democracy for the near future, let alone the Western democracies' move towards such a type.

Cammack defines three basic characteristics belonging to "state-managed democracy"; executive predominance over legislation and judiciary, a state orchestrated clientelism, and a party of the state. (1998: 250, 257-8) He argues that these are the positive assets of state-managed democracy for the requirements of the contemporary era of capitalism. Both Cammack's and Graf's observations of the state in the non-Western world are obviously along the same lines with Poulantzas' definition of authoritarian statism. The transformations they indicate are also in line with the transformations discussed above in reference to the advanced capitalist countries. The strengthening of the executive with regard to other branches of state is, as discussed, a constructive element of authoritarian statism. Besides, Cammack's definition of "party of the state", whose function is to endorse and promote the program of the executive, matches the definition of "dominant mass / state party" of authoritarian statism.

Yet, the second characteristic of "state managed democracy" that Cammack defines, "state-orchestrated clientelism", seems problematic. Cammack defines it as "the vital link between the executive and the electoral system" and bases it on the monopoly of the state over the allocation of certain valued goods. However, the concept of state's monopoly of allocation of goods is contradictory with neoliberalism, which Cammack sees as the current form of capitalism that favours this type of democracy. That is, the neoliberal political agenda is characterised by a new relation between the realms of economics and politics, which deprives the state of the tools to be used to "allocate goods" in the way that might appeal to the

electorate. In other words the process of depoliticisation of economic management under neoliberalism makes such a clientelistic relation impossible. Nonetheless, Cammack might have observed in the concrete cases of state-managed democracy, e.g. in Mexico, some aspects of the state what he conceives of as clientelism; but, this does not mean that in the neoliberal future such aspects may endure. These aspects should be rather understood as the remnants of the previous form of state in these countries, but not as the coherent characteristic of a new form of state.

Cammack's other observations of "state-managed democracy" and especially his argument that locates this type of democracy in the possible future of the countries known to be liberal democracies are inspiring. He shows Mexico and Malaysia as the concrete cases of longstanding and successful state-managed democracy. And he offers "two [examples], from many possible candidates, chosen to emphasize the *genuinely global range of the concept* [italics mine]" as Ukraine and South Africa (1998: 260-1). He argues that

if social democracy with its liberal polity in a framework of state intervention in economic and social life, has been an appropriate point of reference in the past, state-managed democracy, with its liberal economy in a framework of state intervention in political life, is a better guide to the future. (1998: 262)

Put differently, Cammack indicates to a structural change in the form of state in the new era of capitalism, namely neoliberalism, which he considers to be going to encompass the whole of the capitalist world, including both the advanced and new democracies. Although Cammack does not discuss state-managed democracy with reference to authoritarian statism he defines quite similar characteristics, such as the executive predominance and the party of the state, as mentioned above. The basic difference between the conceptualisations of Cammack and Poulantzas is that

Cammack defines the phenomenon in primary reference to the Third World, while Poulantzas defined it in reference to the dominant countries of the West³¹. From any side to the other, it is interesting that the same transformations related to the form of state seem to be emerging in almost all around the world. There remain, of course, significant differences between the Third World countries and the advanced capitalist countries in terms of dependency. Another difference is related to the changes in the form of regime. While the transformations related to the form of state take place in the advanced capitalist countries without a change in the form of regime, they are accompanied by changes in the form of regime in the Third World countries.

4.3.3. Turkey at the Nexus of “the National” and “the International”

As discussed adopt above, there are internal relations between the national and international contexts. Therefore, the discussions held thus far, which are related to the historical processes in the advanced capitalist countries and the Third World countries, are inherent to the historical processes involved at the national context of Turkey. In other words, the very national context of Turkey can only be understood in the light of these discussions. In the historical process in which the current democratisation project came into play in Turkey, there have occurred significant transformations related to the form of state in both the “Western” and “non-Western” capitalist countries. In the light of the discussions above, these transformations can be listed as, the strengthening of the Executive and state administration with regard to legislation and judiciary; the publicly elected governments’ being deprived of the

³¹ Jessop argues that Poulantzas “treated authoritarian statism as a new form of the capitalist state in the current period of capitalism that characterised metropolitan and dependent capitalist states alike.” (1991: 99) However, as mentioned above, Poulantzas notes that he defines the concept exclusively in regard with the dominant capitalist countries, in his book SPS. (SPS: 204) The concept is taken here, like Jessop does, also in reference to the Third World countries, which Poulantzas excluded in SPS.

tools of intervention into economics, which has been carried out through privatisations and transfer of authority; exclusion of the subordinate classes from the field of policymaking, especially from the fields related to economic management; resolution of competitive party politics, and in general, representational institutions' losing power; the strengthening of the heads of the major parties – especially of those in the government – against the lower levels, resulting in a lowered representational control on the parties; extended hegemony and dominance of monopoly capital over the other classes and fractions, especially over the working class. As denoted above, these transformations take place in the Third World countries in the accompaniment of changes in the form of regime, while in the advanced capitalist countries this is not so.

These transformations altogether mean a modification in the relation between the economic and political realms, which are separated under capitalism. They decrease the effect of the people on the decision making process, especially in regard with the economic policies. In this sense, they represent a deepening of the separation between the economic and political realms. As was described in the previous chapter, another criterion to differentiate between the forms of state was the relative positions of the classes and class fractions. Thus, the promotion of the status of the monopoly capital according to the other classes and fractions, and especially the downgrading of the working class, imply that the overall process results in the transformations which characterise the form of state increasingly with the extended domination of bourgeoisie and of especially its dominant fraction. It is remarkable that “the separation of the economic and political realms”, which got deepened with the recent transformations related to the form of state, and “involving and

reproducing the hegemony and dominance of bourgeoisie”, which got extended by these transformations, are both the specific characteristics of bourgeois democracy. Therefore, what I call a *radicalisation of bourgeois democracy* is taking place as a result of the recent transformations, since the very specific characteristics of bourgeois democracy get extended. As Ellen Wood argues, “if we are confronting the ‘End of History’, it may not be in the sense that liberal democracy has triumphed, but rather in the sense that it has very nearly reached its limits.” (1994: 55) It is in such a process of radicalisation of democracy that the democratisation project in Turkey takes place; and TÜSIAD, as a bourgeois organisation supports this project in such a context.

Among the items above, “The publicly elected governments’ being deprived of the tools of intervention into economics” is a crucial aspect of these transformations. However, the item does not mean that the state in general gets deprived of the forms of intervention that it previously had. It was mentioned that economic management was being transferred to “independent agencies” in many sectors; thus, the authority to intervene into economics is transferred to these agencies. Besides, the central banks are nominated as the only authority of monetary policy in an “autonomous” and “independent” manner from the elected governments. The point is that, whether dependent upon the publicly elected governments or not, the functions of these so-called independent institutions are still inherent to the field of state. While undertaking the functions inherent to the field of state, they serve as the means to exclude the representational government from the field of policymaking in the sense that representative democracy provided. In other words, state still has forms of intervention into economics, but these forms now become excluding “the

people” from having effect on policies as it had through the means that the institutions of representative democracy involved. In this sense, the separation between the economic and the political gets deepened; and, as far as this occurs, the bourgeois rule gets more dependent upon this specific separation. Put differently, we have been witnessing a radicalisation of bourgeois democracy, which builds upon the deepening of the separation of the economic and political realms.

The specificity of these transformations related to the form of state is that they encompass the advanced capitalist countries as well as the Third World countries. They have been and are currently being implemented in the whole of the capitalist world. Turkey is of course not immune from this process. To specify, for example, the depoliticisation of economic management applies to the Turkish case, too. Major privatisations have been made in many fields, the central bank is nominated as the sole independent authority of monetary policy, governing authority is transferred to the “independent agencies” especially in the fields related to economic management, and measures have been taken against the rights and status of the working class. Besides, the country’s subordination to the international organisations of imperialism, such as the IMF and the World Bank, increased – or, became obvious. Thus, it is clear that the major transformations in the rest of the world related to the form of state have taken place in the Turkish case, too, in the direction that Poulantzas’ conception of authoritarian statism indicates³².

The nexus of the national and international contexts involves in particular the international agreements that are directed to regulate the national economy and politics. In this sense, the agreements of GATT and GATS, which were signed by

³² For another analysis of the 1990s Turkey, which deals with Poulantzas’ conceptualisation of authoritarian statism and his relational theory of state, see Yılmaz (2003).

Turkey and which have been encompassing almost all the capitalist countries, have been crucial in implementing the transformations related to the form of state that downgrade the representational national government. As mentioned above, the principles of GATT reduces the national governments' control on the international trade; and GATS excludes the state as a service provider from the sectors of services including health and education, and in a direction disadvantageous to the working classes (Güzelsarı, 2003). Likewise, the "regulatory reforms" tried to be implemented in Turkey under the guidance of OECD, are primarily based upon the aim of "providing the good functioning of market economy", which means that the state is subordinated to the market in such a way that works to the disadvantage of labour (Bayramoğlu, 2003: 151). The depoliticisation of economic management has been taking place in Turkey in relation with such processes. The fields that have been regulated by the agreements of GATT, GATS and the regulatory reforms of OECD had previously been regulated by the national government. However, this does not mean that the national government has become defunct; on the contrary, the implementation of such processes is done by the national government, itself.

The transformations related to the form of state mentioned above have taken place in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s in the accompaniment of some major developments specific to the Turkish case. These can be listed as the military coup of 1980, the PKK movement, and the rise of political Islam. It should be noted that this "specific" character does not imply that these were developments "unique" to Turkey. For example, the military coup was not something peculiar to the Turkish case; many Latin American countries had also experienced military governments in the late 1970s. And likewise, the Latin American regimes turned into civilian ones by

the early 1980s. On the other hand, the PKK movement and the rise of political Islam seem at first sight as if they were unique to the Turkish case. However, these should be considered in the light of the changing face of politics all around the world, which has been increasingly involving dimensions such as religious and national identity, ethnicity, culture, etc. As the cases of Kosovo, the Caucasian Region, and very recently the case of September 11 altogether show, such identity-based factors have become increasingly pronounced in recent times. It is not implied here that these factors were the main determinants of the occurrences that they characterise; these occurrences, of course, have had socioeconomic dimensions, too, and perhaps these dimensions were even more important. However, what has been changing is that major political developments have increasingly become centred around ideologies and formations characterised by such identity-based factors, from whatever source they may be stemming. In this sense, the PKK movement and the political Islam, which have become issues in the recent Turkish political history, should be considered as the specific cases of this changing face of politics all around the world. Though, this specificity, of course, implies that these took place at the very national context of Turkey. Thus, the importance of the nexus of the national and international contexts again comes to front.

The military coup in 1980 is very important in that it marked a break from the politics of the 1960s and 1970s, and accelerated the implementation of the neoliberal economic policies under an authoritarian rule. The “January 24 Decisions”, which had a neoliberal content, constituted the guideline of the military rule; and the associated neoliberal economic policies were started to be implemented by the

beginning of the 1980s. The military regime left behind a new Constitution as its legacy to the following period of civilian governments.

The PKK movement and the associated “low intensity war”³³ had been determinative on many aspects of the Turkish politics from the second half of 1980s till the late 1990s. The “low intensity war” had remarkable impacts on economy and politics. According to Taylan Doğan (1998), bad economic conditions in the 1990s including the 1994 economic crisis were directly a result of this factor, so that, he argues, the economy of the period between 1990 and 1997 should be named after it, as “low intensity war economy” (1998: 17). Leaving the discussion of the extents to which it had become effective aside for now, it is no doubt that the “low intensity war” had significant socioeconomic impacts. Beside these socioeconomic dimensions, it is remarkable that the conditions born by the war was used by the major parties and governments for their own political objectives. The associated process led to a remarkable move towards nationalism on the part of the masses. As a result, the process was made functional for the establishment of a nationalist hegemony by the major parties and the governments.

Another major development was the resurgence of political Islam in the 1990s. The rise of the Welfare Party, an Islamist party, especially in the mid 1990s took place together with a decline of the parties of the centre. The party became the leading party in the 1995 elections by collecting the 21% of the votes and took place as the big counterpart of a government coalition with the True Path Party. The rise of the party was accompanied by a spread and exposition of the Islamic lifestyle in the society, especially in the suburb and in the periphery of the metropolitan cities.

³³ Doğan Güreş, the President of the General Staff of the time used the expression “low intensity war” in order to refer to the struggle between the state and the PKK.

Under such circumstances, the secular character of the state were seen by certain circles as under serious threat. In the meeting of the National Security Council on February 28 of 1997, the representatives of the armed forces expressed the military's "worries" about laicism. The concurrent process which has come to be known as "the process of February 28" resulted in the resignation of the government and later the closure of the Welfare Party. The rise of political Islam has also been used as a justification point for the need to achieve Turkey's alignment with the West and accession to the EU³⁴. As discussed below, the February 28 process was successful in establishing hegemony in this direction.

4.3.3.1. The Hegemonic Projects in the 1980s and 1990s

In recent literature, the concept of "hegemonic project" has been started to be employed in the analysis of the Turkish case. In order to clarify how the transformations related to the form of state have been implemented in the recent decades, this subheading examines the works that explain the 1980s and 1990s Turkey through the concept of "hegemonic project".

Muharrem Tünay explains the 1980s of Turkey in terms of a New Right hegemonic project carried out in this period. He argues that there were significant similarities between the New Right hegemonic projects carried out in the Western capitalist countries and Turkey, despite the historical and socioeconomic differences. (2002: 184) He defines ANAP (the Motherland Party), the governing party between the years 1983 and 1991, as an uneasy coalition of liberals, pan-Turkist extreme

³⁴ Paradoxically, today, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the members of which are heavily composed of the cadres of the Welfare Party, has become one of the most adherent supporters of the democratisation project and Turkey's accession to the EU, as the party of the government. Major attempts at reforming the laws have taken place under the ongoing government of the AKP. However, concurrently, the party constructs its identity in an increasing distance from the political Islam. Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the party, defines it as a "conservative democratic" party.

rightists, Islamist radicals and social democrats. (2002: 188) Tünay maintains that the Turkish New Right under the leadership of Turgut Özal's ANAP aimed at an expansive hegemony – the type of hegemony that encompasses the whole of society. To establish a “one-nation” hegemonic project, it tried to cement the often contradictory ideological components, such as anti-statism³⁵, a refined version of nationalism, anti-communism, Islam, anti-class based ideologies, liberalism; however, measures taken against the rights of the working class at the very beginning of the New Right rule showed that it would be a “two-nations” hegemonic project. (Tünay, 2002: 189-90) The “first nation” of this project was composed of “a few monopolies, capital depending on interests, a group of rentiers and speculators” (Tünay, 2002: 193). The accumulation strategy of the New Right was the export-oriented development model, which was characterised by monetarism and supply-side economics, based upon the promotion of one sector of bourgeoisie. (2002: 190-1) Tünay asserts that the New Right was not able to gain a political success, and that its attempt at hegemony failed. The main reason of its failure according to Tünay was the narrowness of its first nation against the second nation which was composed of large masses of workers, public servants, the unemployed, the retired, small and middle scale businesses, artisans, together with a group of liberals and radical Islamists. He argues that the Turkish New Right changed its strategy remarkably from “expansive hegemony” to “passive revolution” after the 1987 elections, but it did not have a chance of success since passive revolution required the neutralisation of the interests and demands of subordinate classes in relation with the dominant classes, which did not seem possible in the Turkish case. (2002: 193)

³⁵ This anti-statism had a specific content that it did not exclude state's intervention into economy; it meant more, reducing the bureaucratic procedures (Tünay, 2002: 191), and acted as a basis for the justification of privatisations.

Tünay outlines the historically specific characteristics of the Turkish New Right through the conception of hegemonic projects, in a quite inspiring fashion. However, his analysis is undermined by his identification of the New Right with the ANAP governments of the 1980s. He does not adequately regard the continuity of the New Right policies under the military rule, the ANAP governments³⁶, and its successors. His exclusive identification of ANAP with the New Right may be an outcome of the party's continuous period of government between 1983 and 1991 (and his article was originally published in 1993). However, the military coup itself has functioned in favour of bourgeois hegemony (Topal, 2002: 74) in establishing that "There is no alternative"³⁷ to capitalism and to Turkey's alignment with the West.

Aylin Topal rightly emphasises the authoritarian aspect of the New Right in the case of Turkey. She shows that the New Right policies have been implemented in Turkey in the period starting with the 1980 military coup and continuing up to date, under both the military and civilian rule – particularly under the governments of ANAP. She argues that the 1980 military coup aimed directly at the establishment of this hegemonic project and that it has been the 1982 Constitution produced by this military rule that formed the legal and institutional bases for the sustainment of this project. (2002: 74, 75-8) Topal also stresses the class character of the New Right and outlines three dimensions that bear implications for the class struggles in Turkey. These are, first, the legal and institutional regulations involving the prohibition of trade union rights and the exclusion of the working classes from the political sphere;

³⁶ ANAP have participated in some of the coalition governments after its continuous period of government ended in 1991.

³⁷ This phrase has been a theme that characterises the ideology of the New Right, which presents the policies implemented and the New Right program itself as having no alternative.

second, privatisations accompanied by the dissolution of welfare state practices; and third, the dissolution of the once organised political movement of the working class, which was realised with means of a hegemonic project that voided the nation scale organisation of it. (2002: 82-3) Such developments are in line with the developments in the British case, which Jessop (2003) outlines as quoted above.

All the governments in Turkey since the 1980 military coup remained substantially loyal to the neoliberal economic program of the New Right. The parties of government have usually been the right wing parties which adopted a market-oriented ideology. Despite some divergences, neoliberalism has drawn the main lines of the economic policies since the 1980 coup up to now. Turkey has signed stand-by agreements with the IMF in the years 1978, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1984, 1994 and 2000³⁸. The one in 2000 was renewed after the consequent financial crises (Eğilmez, 2002). Also, many programs have been carried out in cooperation with the World Bank. The economic policies implemented in the direction that these agreements and programs suggested were by definition in line with the “Washington consensus”; thus the application of them resulted in similar neoliberal transformations related to the form of state outlined above. The neoliberal agenda of the New Right has been effective in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s. However, different from most of the countries where New Right programs have been implemented, in Turkey there has never been a Third Way government following the New Right.³⁹

³⁸ Before these, 10 agreements were signed in each year between 1961 and 1970, though the one in 1965 was not practiced. (Eğilmez, 2002)

³⁹ Political parties adopting some strategies and policies of Third Way have been present in Turkey, however, hardly can any party in Turkey – including CHP – be defined as a Third Way party. It would not be misleading to classify all of the governments after 1980 in Turkey under New Right.

Yalman argues that the concepts of “structural adjustment” and “free-market” constituted the hegemonic strategies of the hegemonic project carried out in Turkey since the 1980s. “Structural adjustment”, with the unquestioned aim of integration to the world economy, took the place of “industrialisation” which had a central place in the hegemonic strategies of the previous period. He argues that the discourse of market has become the determinant of social reality, to the extent that it became effective in society, and in this sense, has been functional in the construction of a new historical bloc (2002: 19-21). The structural adjustments and the establishment and promotion of free market have been realised through the recipes of the IMF standby agreements. In this sense, these hegemonic strategies belonged to neoliberalism.

The transformations related to the form of state, which downgraded the representational national government, have gone hand in hand with the transfer of authority from the central government to the bodies of the local state. However, as Tarık Şengül argues, this transfer of authority has not altered the general direction of the changes which have been to the disadvantage of the working classes. Şengül argues that the neoliberal transformations have taken place at the level of local state, too, as well as at the level of central state (2003). He argues that, since the 1980s, the restructuring of the state occurs in a conjuncture in which the city-state relation is characterised primarily by the “reproduction of capital” in contrast with the previous period (1945 - mid 1970s) in which this relation was constructed primarily in the process of reproduction of labour. (2003: 190) According to Şengül, in the last twenty years, market oriented hegemonic projects paved the way for a transformation of the state structures in both the national and local contexts, and in both the

advanced and less developed capitalist countries, alike. (2003: 216) Two main characteristics of the transformations about the relation between the central and local state, which have been taking place in Turkey, could be listed as, the presentation of the local as the locus of democracy and participation, and transfer of authority from the central to the local for the sake of democratisation (Şengül, 2003). However, in effect, Şengül argues, the outcomes of the current transformations have been to the disadvantage of the working classes, particularly since they make class based representation impossible (2003: 215).

In sum, hegemonic projects of the Turkish New Right have achieved a substantial degree of success in implementing the transformations related to the form of state and in establishing hegemony. This success is evident in the changed basis of politics in recent decades; none of the major parties diverge from the neoliberal conception of the state, it is almost a general consensus, for example, that “The state should not produce pyjamas”, the motto symbolising the principle that state should not intervene into economy. The situation of persistent political crisis in Turkey in the 1990s does not negate the establishment of this hegemony. The establishment of hegemony is evident in the situation that social reality has been articulated by the foundations of this hegemony; in other words, the establishment of hegemony is evident in what is perceived as the unquestionable fact, such as that “the state should retreat from economy”, as the example of “producing pyjamas” illustrates.

4.3.3.2. A New Hegemonic Project: Democratisation and Accession to the EU

As mentioned above, in the Turkish case significant transformations related to the form of state have occurred parallel to the rest of the capitalist world, in a way compatible with Poulantzas’ conceptualisation of authoritarian statism and to

Cammack's conceptualisation of state managed democracy. What is remarkable about this process is that since the late 1990s these transformations related to the form of state have been implemented together with a hegemonic project involving changes in the form of regime.

It was argued that the issues of Turkey's accession to the EU, the associated democratisation project and the accompanying neoliberal economic program were altogether handled as the necessary counterparts of a grand project. They are presented as one requiring the other. In other words, the transformations related to the form of state are implemented under the aegis of the changes in the form of regime. In this sense, the current democratisation project and the issue of EU membership constitute a hegemonic project that goes hand in hand with the transformations related to the form of state in Turkey. It is a one-nation hegemonic project, since it aims at an expansive hegemony encompassing the whole of society. It is claimed that the EU membership and the associated democratisation project will promote the political and economic welfare of the whole of society, there is no second nation proclaimed to be significantly defeated or downgraded by the realisation of this project.

The changes in the form of regime that this hegemonic project involves have been realised to a substantial extent recently, so that TÜSİAD has recently declared that Turkey has come to fully meet the requirements of the accession to the EU and the ball is on the side of EU now. Radikal, a daily newspaper which supports Turkey's accession to the EU and which has undertaken the task of watching the associated developments, listed the changes in the laws made by the 57th, 58th and the current 59th governments, after the 7th package of harmonisation was passed from

the Parliament. The process involving these changes was called as “the Silent Revolution of Democracy” in the headline of the newspaper. The detailed list can be summarised as follows: There is no capital punishment and state of emergency any more, the laws limiting the freedom of thought have decreased, education and broadcasting in mother language became possible, the influence of the military is being decreased to the EU norms, freedom of expression is developed, the detention period is decreased and the detention process is regulated in a way that preserves the rights of the detainee, “zero tolerance” to torture has been established, freedom of press and media and the freedom of association is developed, the judiciary is reformed, the restrictions and control on the political parties decreased. (Radikal, 2003, August 2) It is clear that the items are directly in line with the content of the TÜSiAD reports discussed in the first chapter.

It is a very important aspect of the recent changes in the form of regime that these are not simply a compromise granted to the subordinate classes, they have broader implications than merely gaining the consent of the masses. The changes in the form of regime involving the enhancement of liberal individual rights and the promotion of the rule of law are inherent to the same historical process that the transformations related to the form of state are involved in. As well as the changes in the form of regime legitimate the separation of the economic and political realms, they also reproduce it. Thus, they complement the transformations related to the form of state. For example, as much as the liberal individual rights are acknowledged and promoted, the notion of freedom becomes hegemonically defined within the narrow limits of these rights. As much as the notion of civil and political equality is acknowledged, the notion of social and economic equality – which is disregarded by

the recent transformations related to the form of state – is downgraded. As well as the realisation and the development of “rule of law” neutralises the class based laws and regulations – and thus extends the hegemony of dominant classes with means of a more “just” rule – it also guarantees the political power’s detachment from the means of intervention into economy. Again, as much as the cultural rights are acknowledged, the social problems are detached from their socioeconomic causes. To sum up, the radicalisation of bourgeois democracy involves both the recent transformations related to the form of state and recent changes in the form of regime in the Turkish case, which have been involved in the hegemonic project outlined above.

4.3.3.3. The Class Character of the New Hegemonic Project

So, which class or class fraction does the hegemonic project in question belong to? As denoted in the third chapter, Jessop argues that the class character of a hegemonic project depends not on the “a priori class belonging of its elements or any self-professed class identity of its proponents. It depends instead on the effects of pursuing that project in a definite conjuncture.” (1990: 217) Then, in order to assess the class character of the hegemonic project, it is necessary to get into the analysis of the effects of it on the status of classes. It has been thus far argued that all the transformations related to the form of state took place in an environment where monopolisation of capital reached to the greatest extents and where monopoly capital became more dominant with regard to the other classes and class fractions. In this sense, the transformations related to the form of state both stem from and reproduce the hegemony and dominance of monopoly capital.

As discussed above, the above-mentioned transformations have been generally to the disadvantage of the working class throughout the capitalist world. Socioeconomic equality has been increasingly deemphasised, state interventions into economy for redistributive purposes have been denounced. While class based politics happens to be withering away, the rights of the workers have been curtailed, and the working class has got weakened through the processes of privatisation, deunionisation, flexibilisation, recommodification, etc. As a result, it is no doubt that the working class in particular, and the subordinate classes and class fractions in general, have deteriorated against the dominant fraction of capital.

To completely assess the class character of the hegemonic project, however, it is necessary to deal with the intra-class relations within capital. The capitalist class is not a coherent unity, there are contradictions within it, and these contradictions may sometimes be even more determinative than the inter-class contradictions in certain conjunctures. Thus, the examination of these intra-class relations have significant implications for various aspects of the associated historical process. To specify this in the context of Turkey, a brief analysis of the implications of this hegemonic project on the capital in general and of the intra-capital relations will be illuminating.

Ziya Öniş and Umut Türem (2001) assess the pro-democratic attitude of four nationally organised business organisations in Turkey. They argue that all of the four organisations, namely, TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association), TOBB (Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchanges), and TİSK (Turkish Employers' Confederation) are behind the democratisation project. However, Öniş and Türem indicate to the fact that there are important discrepancies among the attitudes of the organisations. (2001: 112) TOBB,

which is a semi-official organisation of all businessmen, had published a report in 1995 about the minority rights, entitled “the Southeastern Report” which was quite liberal and had then become rather provocative. After this pro-democratic attempt it collected reactions both from its members and from outside; and it has been standing less vocal ever since, while still being pro-democratic. With regard to TİSK, Öniş and Türem argue that it is quite passive and focused on its group interests, i.e. collective bargaining and relations with labour, while supporting the democratisation project and membership to the EU (2001: 102).

Öniş and Türem rightly put that all the four business associations tend to regard democracy interpreted as “better governance”, “as a precondition for reaping the benefits of market-driven globalisation” (2001: 103). In this sense, their observations are parallel to that of Öngen (Aren et. Al, 1997) and Zabcı (2000), as quoted in the first chapter, who believe that the support of TÜSİAD to democratisation is instrumental. Öniş and Türem observe that none of the organisations care much about the “civil and human rights” dimension of the democratisation agenda. Although all, except TİSK, have published reports in the direction that support these rights, none had been much willing to do more (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 104, 114). For example, in the actual cases of the violation of these rights, which took place on the press and mass media, none of the organisations undertook a specific action.

Öniş and Türem’s analysis shows that all major organisations of business circles are behind the hegemonic project that involves Turkey’s accession to the EU and the associated democratisation project, though in varying degrees. However, since the class character of a hegemonic project cannot be determined according to

the supporters of it, this wide support does not imply that the hegemonic project belongs to the totality of bourgeoisie. It is necessary to go beyond this empirical situation and search for the dimensions related to the relevant positions of fractions of capital. These four organisations do not themselves represent different fractions of capital. Therefore, their alignment with the same political positions does not imply a perfect unity among the fractions of capital. Rather, the support of all sections of bourgeoisie to the hegemonic project should be understood in terms of the hegemony of the dominant fraction of capital *within the power bloc*. To illuminate the construction of this hegemony, it is necessary to deal with the recent developments regarding the intra-class relations within the capitalist class.

Sedat Aybar and Costas Lapavistas (2001) focus on the intra-class contradictions within bourgeoisie in Turkey, namely between the sector of Anatolian tigers and what they call the “Istanbul bourgeoisie”. They refer by “Istanbul bourgeoisie” to the “large private conglomerates with a variety of industrial, banking and trading interests, which have an international orientation and are headquartered in Istanbul.” (2001: 300) These conglomerates, like Sabancı and Koç, had “an uneasy symbiotic relationship with the bureaucracy”, which provided them the means to make use of state resources more than any other section of bourgeoisie. Thus could have they been able to remain less affected from the recent crises. On the other hand, the Anatolian tigers were deprived of such a relation, which made them highly vulnerable to the same crises. Aybar and Lapavistas define the Anatolian tigers as “the rising capitalist class of Anatolia, which is more strongly local and culturally traditional than the ‘Istanbul bourgeoisie’.” (2001: 302n) This section of bourgeoisie had developed later than the Istanbul bourgeoisie through activities in textile

manufacture and export, and therefore had to deal with the relevant problems of this delay. (2001: 302)

Aybar and Lapavitsas argue that the current liberalisation in Turkey, which was accompanied by the recent financial crises, was supported by the Istanbul bourgeoisie; on the other hand, the Anatolian tigers were the ones who were affected by these crises most negatively among the sections of the bourgeoisie. These latter, having difficulty in obtaining credits, had acquired banks recently but these banks went bankrupt after the crises. Therefore, they argue, this section of capital would no longer be willing to support liberalisation; and in such a context, where liberalisation was supported by a powerful but small section of bourgeoisie, namely the Istanbul bourgeoisie, an authoritarian rule was necessary to carry out the overall process. (2001: 306-7) Aybar and Lapavitsas use the term “free-market authoritarianism” to define this authoritarian rule, which is composed of a “mixture of democratic verbiage, authoritarian political practice and free-market economic policy [which] appears to be spreading across the developing world.” (2001: 299)

The conglomerates, which Aybar and Lapavitsas refer to by “Istanbul bourgeoisie”, correspond more or less to the members of TÜSİAD. Ayşe Buğra’s differentiation of the characteristics of the members of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD is along quite the same lines with that of Aybar and Lapavitsas about the Istanbul bourgeoisie and the Anatolian tigers. (Buğra, 1998) However, Aybar and Lapavitsas’ definition of the sections of bourgeoisie cannot be taken as directly representing the fractions of capital; since their definition is based upon some criteria which are not directly derived from social production relations. If the geographical status of corporations and the cultural orientation and sociological roots of the owners of

corporations were the appropriate criteria to define the fractions of class – as Aybar and Lapavitsas take in defining the Istanbul bourgeoisie and the Anatolian tigers – it would be impossible to determine the class character of conglomerates that are rooted in Anatolia and the owners of which have a conservative orientation, e.g. *Ülker* or *Kombassan*. On the other hand, it is true that there is a struggle within the bourgeoisie between the fractions of it. And most of the observations of Aybar and Lapavitsas are quite relevant to the contradictions and struggle between the fractions of capital. The point is that they do not put the sides in a way theoretically compliant with the fractions of capital which are defined through social production relations. On the other hand, some dimensions that Aybar and Lapavitsas use are determinative in distinguishing these fractions. For example, such characteristics of “the Istanbul bourgeoisie” as functioning in the fields of industry, banking and trading altogether, and having an international as well as national orientation, make the definition of it to an extent comply with Poulantzas’ definition of finance / monopoly capital – and also with Lenin’s, since Poulantzas adopts from him. On the other side, the Anatolian tigers, functioning in the field of textile manufacture and export involve a kind of relationing with the labour process different from the monopoly capital. Such a different relationing is a feature distinguishing between the monopoly and non-monopoly capital in the conception of Poulantzas, discussed above. In sum, the basics of the contradiction that Aybar and Lapavitsas define between the Istanbul bourgeoisie and the Anatolian tigers corresponds to the contradiction between monopoly and non-monopoly capital, put in different terms. However, because of the difference in the theoretical basis of these two different terminologies, there is not a full compatibility. It can rather be said that the phenomena that Aybar and Lapavitsas

observe are more or less relevant to the contradiction between monopoly and non-monopoly capital, despite the differences of their conceptualisation. This similarity stems from dealing with the same phenomena in different terms.

Then, such conclusions can be interpreted from their discussion to the contradiction between monopoly and non-monopoly capital: first, there is a fractioning of capital which involves contradictory interests within the capitalist class; second, one of these fractions, the monopoly capital has control and effectiveness on the state bureaucracy; third, the other fraction, non-monopoly capital is excluded from such relations with state bureaucracy; fourth, while monopoly capital backs up the current liberalisation process in Turkey, the non-monopoly capital is likely to oppose this process; and finally, the current dominance of monopoly capital requires a form of authoritarianism based upon free market ideology and practice.

However, as denoted above, the sections that Aybar and Lapavitsas discussed do not correspond directly to the fractions of capital. In other words, the Istanbul bourgeoisie does not directly correspond to monopoly capital. Inasmuch as the definition of fractions of classes is made through social production relations, it is necessary to consider relations involved beyond the national context. As discussed above, there are internal relations between the national and international contexts. Capitalism has always had a character of internationalism, however, today this character has become obvious and determinative more than ever before. This does not mean, of course, that the national context disappeared, but rather, the internal relations between the national and international came to front. Nor does it mean that “the international” happens to be dominating “the national”, but rather, monopoly

capital became more dominant at the nexus of the national and international contexts. In such a conjuncture, nation states – which have ever been class states – do not lose but gain power in another direction. They undertake the task of making necessary regulations and structural adjustments in such a way that extends the hegemony and dominance of monopoly capital within the neoliberal agenda. The basic locus of transformations related to the form of state described above is the nation states. Thus, the strengthening of the executive and state administration, and the depoliticisation of economic management in such a way that excludes subordinate classes from the field of policymaking make the steps towards a strengthened nation-state, in a different way.

Such an understanding of the contexts of the national and the international requires that the dominant fraction of capital in the case of Turkey cannot be considered as a “national fraction” as such. In other words, the dominant fraction of capital in the case of Turkey does not directly and exclusively correspond to the conglomerates such as Koç and Sabancı. It is not true, either, that these conglomerates are subordinated by an “international bourgeoisie”, considered as the dominant fraction. Rather, the dominant fraction of capital is the monopoly capital at the very nexus of the national and international contexts. Or, put differently, as much as TÜSİAD represents “the national” monopoly capital, it represents “the international” monopoly capital, too. The internal relations between these two contexts make it necessary to define the dominant fraction of capital at the nexus of them.

Among the organisations of business, MÜSİAD is significant since it is generally assumed to represent the *KOBİs* (“small and medium scale enterprises”), a

certain section of capital which constitutes “the Anatolian tigers” (Buğra, 1998). MÜSİAD has always been perceived as having an affiliation with the parties which have been characterised by the political Islam. The Welfare Party, for example, stood closer to the MÜSİAD and at a distance from the TÜSİAD (Buğra, 1998: 534). Tülin Öngen argues that there was an organic link between the Welfare Party and the *KOBİs* (namely, “the small and medium scale enterprises”), though the class base of the party cannot be reduced to this section (Aren et al., 1997: 36). MÜSİAD’s representation of this section of non-monopoly capital is not an exclusive and stagnant one. In other words, its attitude has not always been clearly and directly derived from the economic-corporate interests of this section. However, despite the theoretical impossibility of a perfect proof of this representing relation, it is insightful to take it in this manner. The organisation was established against TÜSİAD, and has been in close relation with this section of capital. For example, it is declared in a report published by MÜSİAD that the status quo based on the “interest system” should be changed in favour of “real economy”, i.e. the production sector (MÜSİAD, 2003: 4,5). This point is remarkable since the non-monopoly fraction that MÜSİAD depends upon does not involve banking activities by the time the report was published. On the other hand, it should be noted that MÜSİAD does not represent the whole of non-monopoly capital inclusively. As discussed above, the four nationwide organisations of business circles currently share a common ground in their attitude towards key issues such as the current democratisation project in relation with accession to the EU, and the neoliberal economic program implemented with the guidance of the IMF. However, this does not mean that there is no intra-class contradiction within bourgeoisie. This situation is an outcome of the success of the

hegemonic project discussed above, which involves the establishment of hegemony of monopoly capital over the other fractions of capital, as well as over other classes and fractions. MÜSİAD, for example, had been formerly against Turkey's accession to the EU and democratisation in the country, but after the process of February 28 it radically changed its attitude towards these issues (Öniş and Türem, 2001: 101). This change of attitude, which was a consequence of the pressure from the military in the February 28 process, should still be considered in terms of the establishment of hegemony, since the construction of hegemony does not exclude the use of force. In this sense, the process of February 28 led by the military is inherent to the success of the hegemonic project discussed above, since it promoted the status of the monopoly fraction vis-à-vis the non-monopoly fraction of capital. Meral Akşener, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the time, argues that the February 28 process had dimensions which go beyond merely preserving the secular character of the state, as it had been proclaimed by the proponents of the military intervention. According to her, the process involved the realisation of the interests of a certain section of capital which lost its ties with the state that it had in the import substitution era (Düzel, 2003). Akşener here indicates to the section that is usually assumed to be represented by TÜSİAD.

Seeing the February 28 process as a direct reflection of the struggle between this section of capital and the section assumed to be represented by MÜSİAD would be misleading, however, it is for sure that the process had remarkable implications for the contradiction between these sections. In the period after February 28, MÜSİAD became pro- EU membership, and prominent politicians who are known to be involved in political Islamist circles became the advocates of Turkey's accession

to the EU and democratisation. To sum up, the hegemonic project in question has been successful in establishing hegemony of the monopoly capital over the other fractions of capital, and the February 28 process has been functional in the establishment of this hegemony.

4.3.3.4. The Success of the New Hegemonic Project

As discussed in the third chapter, according to Jessop, the construction of a successful hegemonic project and the realisation of it involves “integration of strategically significant forces as subjects with specific interests”, “formulation of a general, national popular project” and “specification of a ‘policy paradigm’ within which conflicts over competing interests and demands can be negotiated without threatening the overall project” (1990: 209). The current hegemonic project carried out since the late 1990s in Turkey satisfies all these conditions. The second condition, the formulation of a general national popular project, is realised in the formulation that accession to the EU and democratisation project would promote the whole of society. The hegemonic project is established in such a way that the realisation of the overall changes, involving also the transformations in the form of state, would be to the interest of all of the key sectors of society. The workers would benefit since, for example, working conditions would be promoted to the European standards; the unemployed would have the opportunity to find jobs in the new employment areas; and the non-monopoly fractions of capital would be active in a wider market; and all of them would benefit from more democratic conditions, which entail equality and freedom. Hence, the first condition of success of hegemonic project is also satisfied. The policy paradigm, the third condition, is constructed in such a way that locates any single political issue in direct or indirect accordance with

the membership to EU and democratisation, interrelatedly. Thus, any political issue becomes a factor related to upgrading or downgrading the components of this national project. Therefore, it can be called as a successful hegemonic project.

The success of the hegemonic project in establishing hegemony is also evident in the characteristics of the dominant course of actual politics. The need both to accession to the EU and to democratisation is considered as given, it is not much questioned. A characteristic of hegemony is that it obscures the class character of the state and the policies; in the current situation, accession to the EU and the associated democratisation project are rarely seen as class-based projects there seems to be a widespread support behind them.

However, the current success of the hegemonic project does not imply that the hegemony of the monopoly capital has been established in an irreversible manner. Currently, there have been arising alternative hegemonic projects that question some foundations of the hegemonic project in question. As an example, the Young Party may be shown as undertaking an alternative hegemonic project. The party adopts a populist nationalism and some populist ideological elements which include a radical opposition against the economic program implemented under the guidance of the IMF.

4.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter outlined the transformations related to the form of state, which have taken place in the 1980s and 1990s in both the advanced capitalist countries and the Third World countries, alike. The democratisation project in Turkey took place in an environment where significant transformations related to the form of state brought

about a radicalisation of bourgeois democracy, throughout the capitalist world. In other words, the deepening of the separation of the economic and political realms has been realised through the changes in the form of regime and the transformations related to the form of state; besides, the hegemony and dominance of the monopoly capital has been extended vis-à-vis the other classes and class fractions. It is argued above that the specificity of the democratisation project in Turkey could only be grasped considering these accompanying transformations related to the form of state.

The democratisation project and Turkey's accession to the EU are the interrelated components of the hegemonic project which has accompanied the transformations related to the form of state and changes in the form of regime. As discussed above, this hegemonic project stems from and reproduces the hegemony and dominance of monopoly capital, the dominant fraction of capital which is defined here beyond the national and international contexts but as standing at the nexus of the two. The hegemonic project in question has proved successful in establishing the hegemony of the monopoly capital both over the subordinate classes and class fractions and over other fractions of capital.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, it was argued that the historical specificity of the TÜSİAD reports could only be understood when the political economic processes in which the democratisation project took place were taken into consideration. The organisation's support to the democratisation project in Turkey is closely associated with the characteristics of these processes. In essence, the historical specificity of the reports has broader implications than merely outlining how the project was perceived by an ordinary social actor. TÜSİAD is taken in this thesis as representing the monopoly capital, the dominant class fraction of the historical process in question. Therefore, the characteristics of its support are significant since they have implications for the hegemonic dimensions of the relations among the classes and class fractions. In this sense, the historical specificity of the support of TÜSİAD is functional in understanding the very characteristics of the democratisation project itself. The democratisation project and the accompanying political economic processes have brought about significant transformations related to the form of state and remarkable changes in the form of regime. Below are presented the conclusions of the discussions held in this thesis.

The TÜSİAD reports have been published in a historical conjuncture in which Turkey's candidacy to the EU membership increasingly became an issue. The organisation, as an adherent supporter of the country's accession to the EU, has

referred frequently to the necessity of this accession and the need to fulfil the requirements of it. In the late 1990s, TÜSİAD frequently expressed its support to the democratisation project in Turkey, which was carried out in association with fulfilling the requirements of the country's accession to the EU. Besides, the organisation has always been a supporter of the neoliberal economic programs implemented in Turkey under the guidance of the IMF. In the relevant publications, this support is manifest. The basic premise of the publications of TÜSİAD has been that the issues of Turkey's accession to the EU, democratisation in the country, and the liberalisation of economy under the aegis of the neoliberal economic programs were all the necessary targets that should be achieved, both for the development of the country and for its integration with the rest of the world. The failure in realising any of these targets would result in an isolation and a backward movement in terms of both economic and political fate of the country. As made clear below, this thesis argued that the association between these targets and between the related dimensions of the concurrent historical process was critical in understanding the specificity of the TÜSİAD's support to the democratisation project.

A significant characteristic of the TÜSİAD reports is that they deal with the economic and political issues separately. In the reports on democratisation, it is manifest that socioeconomic dimensions are considered as beyond the scope of these studies. In this sense, democratisation is taken as a merely political subject. This point is also quite characteristic of a body of literature produced in the 1990s, which has been described as the MTD (the mainstream theory on democracy and democratisation in the 1990s) in this thesis. In general, the TÜSİAD reports reflect the theoretical framework of the MTD, which was outlined in the second chapter

through a discussion of the basic methodological attitudes and the theoretical elements consensually adopted by the writers of the Journal of Democracy. The compliance of the TÜSİAD reports with the framework of the MTD is maintained also by the common political attitudes adopted, beyond the correspondence of their theoretical frameworks. To spell out, first, both the TÜSİAD reports and the MTD take bourgeois democracy as the best political regime for the realisation of human emancipation and for the good functioning of political system; second, it is generally assumed that the best form of democracy exists in the advanced capitalist countries of the West; and third, the establishment and promotion of democracy in the non-Western world is taken as requiring good relations with these Western countries. The TÜSİAD reports' approach to the question of democratisation in Turkey reflects such a standpoint, as the prospect for democratisation is closely associated with the country's accession to the EU.

In line with the framework of the MTD, the TÜSİAD reports disregard the notion of social and economic equality as a requisite to the establishment and promotion of democracy. The issues of democracy and democratisation are handled in the reports predominantly in reference to a set of procedural and institutional criteria that regulate the functioning mechanisms of politics. These criteria are directly derived from the Copenhagen political criteria which have been adjusted to the case of Turkey in order to specify the conditions before the country's accession to the EU. Within this framework, culture and cultural rights are regarded as essential to democracy. However, this brings about de-emphasising the socioeconomic dimensions of the related problems, as in the case of "the Kurdish question" in the TÜSİAD reports. This attitude of de-emphasising the socioeconomic dimensions is

not accidental but a coherent characteristic of the theoretical framework of the MTD, upon which the reports are built. The socioeconomic dimensions are dealt with by both the MTD and the TÜSİAD reports but this is done in a way that conceives them beyond the scope of the democratisation process. Thus, the MTD and the TÜSİAD reports take for granted the separation of the economic and political realms, which is a characteristic of capitalism.

Building upon the separation of the economic and political realms masks the real dynamics of social reality and social change, since these two realms are internally related to each other. Therefore, simply put, there cannot be any political issue which does not have any implications for the economic realm, and vice versa. In order to grasp the implications of the conception of the relations between the economic and political realms as an internal relation, the political economic dimensions of the relevant historical processes should be taken into account. In this sense, for the task of explicating the historical specificity of the democratisation project in Turkey it is necessary to deal with the accompanying political economic processes. Poulantzas' triple conceptualisation of the capitalist state – i.e. type of state, form of state, and form of regime – is insightful for a relational approach dealing with the internal relations between the economic and political realms. Especially, the analytical distinction between the concepts of form of state and form of regime is functional in pointing out various aspects of the state. The suggestions of the TÜSİAD reports and the theoretical framework of the MTD deal merely with the issues related to the form of regime; however, it is necessary to take into account the dimensions related to the form of state in order to make sense of the internal relations between the economic and political realms.

The conditionality of the democratisation project before Turkey's accession to the EU is acknowledged in the TÜSİAD reports as a legitimate reason for the necessity of this project. However, it is not adequate to explain either this necessity or TÜSİAD's support to the project merely in terms of this conditionality. The democratisation project in question cannot be considered as simply an imposition of a structural template to Turkey by the EU. It is true that the content of the project is directed to the fulfilment of the requirements of the accession to the EU, and it is also true that this situation is one of the primary motives of TÜSİAD's support; but for clarifying the specificity of this content and this support, it is necessary to go beyond what is seen at first sight. This thesis argued that the relational approach adopted here was functional in illuminating the dimensions beyond this empirical level. According to this relational approach, which takes the notion of internal relations as an ontological category, the national and international contexts have no existence separate from each other. Therefore, the real dynamics of social reality and social change can only be grasped by an understanding that takes these contexts as internally related, as the counterparts of the same ontological whole. For such a relational account, the conception of the nation states as externally related to each other should be transcended in such a way that considers the field of international relations as inherent to the ontology of the nation state. Thus, the democratisation project in Turkey cannot be conceived as something imposed from outside but as something produced at *the nexus of the national and international contexts*, which is used in this thesis to refer to this relational understanding of these contexts. Therefore, the specificity of the content of the democratisation project and of TÜSİAD's support to it can be understood by dealing with the historical processes

involved at this nexus. In this sense, “the European Union” is not something external to “Turkey”, and therefore the phenomena should not be understood in terms of the *effects* of an entity named “the European Union” on a distinct entity named “Turkey”. The task of dealing with the historical processes involved at the nexus of the national and international contexts, thus, requires a relational understanding of social ontology.

Hence, in this thesis, the historical processes in which the democratisation project in Turkey is involved are considered in such a way that deals also with the developments outside the national borders of Turkey. This analysis concluded that, in the 1980s and 1990s, similar transformations related to the form of state have occurred in both the Western and non-Western capitalist countries, despite the differences between their existing forms of state. As the case of Britain well illustrates, neoliberalism has been the dominant mode of policymaking in the advanced capitalist countries in recent decades. Likewise, the neoliberal economic programs have been implemented throughout the Third World countries, especially with the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank. Also, the “depoliticisation of economic management” has taken place in both the Western and non-Western capitalist countries. The transformations related to the form of state in these countries have generally been in the direction that Poulantzas’ conception of authoritarian statism indicates. The basic transformations can be listed as follows:

- the strengthening of the Executive and state administration with regard to the legislation and judiciary;

- the publicly elected governments' being deprived of the tools of intervention into economics, which has been carried out through privatisations and transfer of authority;
- exclusion of the subordinate classes from the field of policymaking, especially from the field of economic management;
- resolution of competitive party politics, and in general, representational institutions' losing power;
- the strengthening of the heads of the major parties – especially of those in the government – against the lower levels, resulting in a lowered representational control on the parties;
- extended hegemony and dominance of monopoly capital over the other classes and class fractions, especially over the working class.

These transformations altogether mount up to a decreased control and effectiveness of the people on the processes of policymaking, especially in regard to economic issues. In this sense, it is possible to argue that the separation of the economic and political realms, characteristic of capitalism, gets deepened by these recent transformations. Besides, these transformations enhance the hegemony and dominance of the dominant fraction of capital both within the power bloc and vis-à-vis the classes and class fractions outside the power bloc. The separation of the economic and political realms and the reproduction of hegemony and dominance of capital are the two basic and specific characteristics of bourgeois democracy. Therefore, the deepening of the former and the enhancement of the latter together imply what has been called a “*radicalisation of bourgeois democracy*” in this thesis. The concept of “radicalisation of bourgeois democracy” asserts that the essential

characteristics of bourgeois democracy happen to be realised to further extents as a result of the recent transformations. This process has marked the historical conjuncture in which the democratisation project in Turkey has come to the agenda.

The above-mentioned transformations related to the form of state in the rest of the world have also taken place in Turkey, by nature. A significant point about these transformations is that they have been accompanied by changes in the form of regime in the Third World countries, while the form of regime did not change in the advanced capitalist countries in this period. In the Turkish case, changes in the form of regime have been carried out via the democratisation project in question. In Turkey, the transformations related to the form of state and changes in the form of regime, of course, occurred in the accompaniment of developments specific to the Turkish case, such as the 1980 military coup, the PKK movement and the rise of political Islam. However, this specificity does not imply that these developments were unique to Turkey; parallel developments have occurred in other countries, too. This close correlation between the national context of Turkey and the international context points to the importance of the *nexus* of the two contexts. The 1980 military coup, which resembles the coups in the Latin American countries in the 1970s, accelerated the implementation of the neoliberal economic policies under an authoritarian rule. The military regime left behind a new Constitution as its legacy to the following period of civilian governments. These civilian governments continued to implement the neoliberal economic agenda in the country, with little divergence. The developments associated with the PKK movement have been utilised by the major political parties and the governments for the establishment of a nationalist hegemony. Likewise, the rise of political Islam has been used as a justification point

for the need to achieve Turkey's alignment with the West and accession to the EU. Beside the importance of other aspects of these developments, it is remarkable that the hegemonic dimensions of them were made functional by the governments and political parties in creating a political environment favouring the implementation of the neoliberal economic policies for the sake of "national interests".

In recent years, Turkey's accession to the EU and the associated democratisation project have been functional in establishing the hegemony of the monopoly capital. They constitute the counterparts of a hegemonic project which has been carried out in Turkey in the accompaniment of the transformations related to the form of state. This hegemonic project belongs to the monopoly capital, since the project stems from and reproduces the hegemony and dominance of this dominant fraction of capital. The hegemonic project has been successful in establishing the hegemony of this fraction both within the power bloc and vis-à-vis the other classes and class fractions outside the power bloc. Thus, the transformations related to the form of state have taken place together with the changes in the form of regime that have been involved in the democratisation project. However, it is of significance that the changes in the form of regime cannot be seen simply as a compromise granted to the subordinate classes in order to gain consent of the masses. Rather, they comply with the transformations related to the form of state. The changes in the form of regime that the democratisation project has been bringing about are quite functional in reproducing and guaranteeing the accompanying transformations related to the form of state. For example, as well as the realisation and the development of "rule of law" protects "the citizens" from unlawful activities of those in power, it both neutralises the class based laws and guarantees the political power's detachment

from the means of intervention into economy. Also, as well as the notion of political equality is acknowledged, the notion of social and economic equality is deemphasised. In other words, changes in the form of regime and transformations related to form of state go hand in hand in an environment where bourgeois democracy gets radicalised.

To sum up very briefly, this thesis argued that the democratisation project and Turkey's accession to the EU were the interrelated components of the hegemonic project which has been accompanied by the transformations related to the form of state and changes in the form of regime. This hegemonic project stems from and reproduces the domination of monopoly capital, the dominant fraction of capital which was defined here beyond the national and international contexts but as standing at the nexus of the two. The hegemonic project in question has gained success to a substantial extent in establishing the hegemony of the monopoly capital both over the subordinate classes and within the power bloc.

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