

**WHITE VS. BLACK TURKS: THE CIVILISING PROCESS
IN TURKEY IN THE 1990S**

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DECEMBER 2003

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

BY

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**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

DECEMBER 2003

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ABSTRACT

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December 2003, 128 Pages

This thesis analyses the formation of “White” and “Black” Turks distinction in terms of the civilising process which operates on the differentiation between “civilised” and “uncivilised/grotesque” bodies and corresponds to the formation of the high/low hierarchy in Turkey in the 1990s. The particular construction of civilised bodies is delineated with respect to the continuity and discontinuity of the Ottoman modernisation and the Kemalist project of Westernisation. The social, political and ideological context of “White” Turks is examined in detail by a textual analysis and with reference to the articles in daily newspapers and magazines of the 1990s. The urbanisation experience of Turkey, particularly in İstanbul with respect to the formation of civic culture against *varoş* culture is investigated. The construction of ideal modern individual against *maganda* is examined and it is argued that the features attributed to *maganda* like moustache, *arabesk* music, *lahmacun* and bad smell had become objects of symbolic hate.

ÖZ

BEYAZ TÜRKLER SİYAH TÜRKLERE KARŞI: TÜRKİYE’DE 1990’LI YILLARDA MEDENİLEŞME SÜRECİ

Sumer, Beyza

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd.Doç.Dr. Necmi Erdoğan

Aralık 2003, 128 Sayfa

Bu tez, medeni ve medeni olmayan bedenler arasında yapılan ayırım üzerinden işleyen ve 1990’larda Türkiye’de aşağı ve yukarı hiyerarşilerinin kuruluşuna tekabül eden “Beyaz” ve “Siyah” Türkler arasında yapılan ayırımı medenileşme süreci bağlamında incelemektedir. Medeni bedenlerin kuruluşu, Osmanlı modernleşmesi ve Kemalist Batılılaşma projesi arasındaki süreklilikler ve kopuşlar bağlamında betimlenmektedir. “Beyaz” Türklerin toplumsal, siyasi ve ideolojik bağlamı, 1990’ların gazete ve dergilerinde yayımlanan haber ve köşe yazılarının metin analizi yapılarak incelenmektedir. Türkiye’nin kentleşme deneyimi, özellikle İstanbul özelinde kent kültürüne karşı varoş kültürünün kuruluşu bağlamında araştırılmaktadır. İdeal modern bireye karşı maganda tipinin kuruluşu incelenmekte ve maganda tipine atfedilen bıyık, arabesk müzik, lahmacun ve kötü koku gibi özelliklerin sembolik bir nefretin nesnelere haline geldiği iddia edilmektedir.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I feel deeply grateful to my supervisor Assist.Prof.Dr. Necmi Erdoğan for his intellectual and psychological support, guidance and patience from the very beginning to the very end of this study. I would like to give my thanks to my examining committee members Assist.Prof.Dr. Kürşat Ertuğrul and Assoc.Prof.Dr. Mesut Yeğen for their comments. I would like to thank to my big family consisting of my dear friends, my colleagues and my relatives for their help and concern. I also would like to thank to my dear daddy Hasan Nadir Sumer, my elder sister Esra Ünsay and her husband M.Ali Ünsay and younger sister Feyza Sumer, to my mother Nuran Sumer who dedicated her life to her family yet left us too early, to beşibiryerde –Seval Yaman, Ö. Özgül Yılmaz, Aysun Uyanık, Selen Uluç- who supported my academic career passion from the very beginning of the university, to my only love, my husband, my spouse Levent Aydaş who has been right beside me for six years and finally to my cat Sütlaç who make me feel relieved with her fuzzy presence.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
ÖZ	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER	
1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	7
1.1. Norbert Elias and “The Civilising Process”	8
1.2. The Established and The Outsiders	12
1.3. “Civilised” and “Grotesque” Bodies	15
1.4. Pierre Bourdieu: Distinction and “Habitus”	17
1.5. Critical Assessment	22
2. THE TURKISH MODERNISATION FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE 1990s	25
2.1. “West” and “Westernisation” as a Universal Cultural Code	26
2.2. Ottoman Modernisation	27
2.3. Republican Modernisation	30
2.4. Cultural Climate of Turkey Until the 1990s	36
2.4.1. Urbanisation Experience of Turkey since the 1950s	36
2.4.2. New Right Policies, Rising Values, Yuppies and Turgut Özal	37

2.4.3.	Everyday Life in Turkey During the 1980s	39
3.	A SOCIAL HIERARCHY FORMED IN URBAN SPACE:	
	CIVIC CULTURE VS. <i>VAROŞ</i> CULTURE	45
3.1.	The Urbanisation Experience of Turkey	45
3.1.1.	Dangerous Classes	50
3.1.2.	Modern Places: Luxury Life Complexes	53
3.2.	The Case of İstanbul and Beyoğlu Nostalgia	56
4.	THE SYMBOLIC HATE INSCRIBED ON THE BODY;	
	THE BEAUTY VS. THE BEAST OR	
	IDEAL MODERN INDIVIDUAL VS. <i>MAGANDA</i>	66
4.1.	General Characteristics of “Ideal Modern Individual”	67
4.1.1.	Role Models of Society	70
4.1.2.	“Don’t Smoke, Look Good, Love Animals and Be Nationalist”	74
4.1.3.	Ertuğrul Özkök and New Turkish Nationalism	76
4.1.4.	Objects of Symbolic Hate	81
4.2.	Five Sensed Insult and Disgust	83
4.2.1.	A Stereotype Offending The Eyes: <i>Maganda</i>	84
4.2.1.A.	Social Anatomy of An Advertisement	88
4.2.1.B.	Moustache	91
4.2.2.	A Musical Genre Offending The Ears: <i>Arabesk</i>	98
4.2.3.	A Taste Disturbing Our Understanding of Gusto:	
	<i>Lahmacun</i> vs. Sushi	105

4.2.4. Bad Smelling Bodies and Places	
Disturbing Our Noses	107
4.2.5. The Fear of Being Touched	110
4.3. “People are Divided into Two; Turks Too: White vs. Black Turks”	112
CONCLUSION	117
REFERENCES	123

INTRODUCTION

This study aims at analysing the transformation of social hierarchies inscribed on body and urban space in Turkey by focusing on the construction of the figures of White and Black Turks. The social, cultural and ideological context of this duality, the mentality lying behind it, the discourses for and against the duality will be examined in detail with reference to the articles published in daily newspapers and magazines during the 1990s.

In Western societies, a differentiation is made between “civilised” and “grotesque” bodies. While the concept of “civilised body” is formed as the body appropriate to the dominant rules in the society with respect to its physical appearance and manners; the “grotesque body” is presented as the body that contrasts with the social and moral norms and the rules of manners. I will focus on how and on what basis this differentiation is made between “civilised” and “grotesque” bodies is corresponding to the construction of high and low in Turkey. In this respect, one of the main questions posed is how the social and cultural hierarchies are constructed by distinguishing White and Black Turks. Another question posed in the thesis is how this differentiation is represented and what are the main discourses propagating this differentiation.

The distinction made between “White” and “Black” Turks will be discussed with respect to the concept of “civilised bodies”, a concept developed from Norbert Elias’ *The Civilising Process* which operates on the differentiation of “civilised” and “uncivilised/grotesque” bodies and corresponds to the construction of high and low in Turkey in the 1990s. The particular construction of civilised bodies will be delineated with respect to the continuity and discontinuity of the Ottoman modernisation and the Kemalist project of Westernisation and it will be argued that the particular construction of civilised bodies has to do with the nature of the Kemalist project of Westernisation, thus “the other” had to be created from within.

Turkish society has undergone and is still undergoing a deep social transformation that has been defined as the process of modernisation. This process, having its roots in early 19th century, effected and changed all spheres of life from economy to politics, from culture to institutions, from ideas to daily life practices. However, having its sources mainly in the West, this process had its own peculiarities and antagonisms. This study aims to understand the social processes through which new hierarchies have been constructed in Turkish society. For this aim, it will focus on the construction of the figuration of “White” and “Black” Turks in order to follow the traces of the formation of new hierarchies. This figuration is specific to the 1990s.

The cultural duality in the cities started in the 1950s as a result of the immigration to big cities. Until the end of the 1970s, a lot of things changed but the difference between the city culture and village culture has not been transformed into a serious conflict. But during the 1980s, people migrated to the cities were accused of dirtying

and invading the cities and its culture and the real effect of this period was mainly felt during the 1990s. The two main struggle areas of modernity, namely urban space and body where the cultural codes inscribed onto became surfaces where the practices of exclusion and ignorance were experienced in the harshest way in the 1990s. Not only most of the reference points of the society changed but also the valid status symbols of the society were replaced with the new ones.

The elements defining richness and poverty started to include cultural and symbolic capital beyond the position taken during the production process. During the 1990s in Turkey, while the principal factor determining one's place within the social hierarchy was still a puffy wallet or a bulky bank account or various reflections of it, whether you have a moustache, whether you know how to behave in what setting, the musical genre you prefer, the places you make shopping, your clothes, physical appearance, your talking and even being blond or brunette started to designate the person's position within the social pyramid.

The signifier of the economic capital is obvious, but how and by whom the appropriate physical and cultural capital is determined? At this point, means of mass communication that enter every house, every work place and infiltrate every section of life and have a place in every sort of spare time activity; more specifically "opinion makers", newspaper columnists who direct the views and opinions construct the new, modern Turkish men through their daily columns comes to the fore. During the 1990s, the appropriate symbolic, cultural and physical capital and life-style was created under the leadership of these "opinion makers".

The dominant mission of intellectuals to transform and to change the masses exists since the Tanzimat period when the civilising process of Turkey has started. As will be discussed in the Chapter 2, during the Tanzimat period, Ahmet Mithat Efendi was trying to impose the practical knowledge of everyday life in order to make people adopt to the new practices easier. Not only Ahmet Mithat Efendi but also many other columnists were trying to teach the masses about which clothes they should wear in which places and how to behave in what setting in their etiquette columns. Also during the early Republican period, writers on the nation's most serious problems were devoting their columns to modern etiquette; it was therefore inevitable that they fell into the tradition of Ahmet Mithat Efendi. Abdullah Cevdet undoubtedly followed Mithat Efendi's encyclopedist method in passing along the direct connection between European fashion and modern etiquette as a consistent whole to Turkish society, yet in a rather elitist tendency.

However during the 1990s, this mission of the intellectuals was replaced with hate felt towards the masses and dark crowds. The masses were regarded as hopeless and the etiquette that particularly the upper strata of the society needs started to be taught. In other words, elitism against the populist tendency won a victory. The hate towards masses, to the East and being Eastern, a racist elitism, separation from the uneducated dark crowds and integration with the civilised West found expression in many "White" newspaper columnists' columns repeatedly. The ideal modern individual had been constructed and reconstructed against "the urban other" *maganda*, and this distinction which corresponds to the construction of high and low

in Turkish society was transformed to the figuration of “White” and “Black” Turks during the 1990s.

In this study, “textual analysis” of the columns and the news from daily newspapers of the 1990s such as *Hürriyet*, *Sabah*, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, *Radikal*, *Radikal İki*, *Akşam*, *Güneş*, *Milliyet*, *Milliyet Gazete Pazar* and magazines such as *Aktüel*, *Nokta*, *Ekonomik Panaroma* and *Para* is made as well as the review of available literature.

In the first chapter, I will present my appropriate theoretical tools which will be used to support or explain my arguments. Instead of a theoretical discussion over the axis of one theory, an eclectic theoretical presentation of Norbert Elias’ “The Civilising Process”, his concept of “civilised bodies” in contrast to Michel Bakhtin’s “grotesque, animalistic body”, his “established-outsiders” figuration as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of “Distinction” and concept of “habitus” will be briefly examined.

The second chapter will focus on the modernisation experience of Turkey from a historical perspective. Starting with the meanings attributed to “West” and “Westernisation”, this traumatic adventure will be looked upon by dividing it into mainly four periods, which I believe are turning points for both society as a whole and individual in particular. Turkey’s Westernisation process has started during the 19th century with mainly superficial changes in the army, finance, and everyday life and continued during the early Republican period without losing its superficial characteristic as well as gaining an official feature. Yet, continuities and discontinuities, similarities and differences between these two periods gain significance for following the main line extending as far as today. The third period

will be the 1950s, as it is a turning point for the history of urbanisation in Turkey with the existence of a new phenomenon, namely *gecekondu*. The last period to be examined will be the 1980s which, with Turgut Özal, introduction of the new right policies, rising values and Yuppies, have original contributions that have serious implications for the present-day Turkey. All of these will be done to illuminate the way for the 1990s which is the main investigation period of this study.

Hierarchical inscription at the urban level will be the focus of the third chapter. In this chapter, I am going to examine the urbanisation experience of Turkey, particularly in İstanbul with respect to the formation and transformation of upper and lower hierarchies in the cities. To do that, the relationship between the established and the outsiders, in other words urban elites and newcomers; strategies and discourses that urban elites has developed to maintain both their established order and privileges and the formation of civic culture against *varoş* culture will be examined.

In the last and most significant part of the study, I will focus on the hierarchical inscription upon the body. The construction of ideal modern individual against *maganda*, or the construction of the stereotype *maganda* against the ideal modern individual will be examined with respect to their general characteristics and role models. It will be argued that the features attributed to *maganda* like moustache, *arabesk* music, *lahmacun* and bad smell had become objects of symbolic hate. By arguing this hate consists our five sense, namely seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling and touching, I will reach the construction of the figuration of “White” and “Black” Turks specific to the 1990s.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the modern age, it is not possible to reduce the formation of social hierarchies to the class differences. Power relations start to be organised around the representation of social prestige and civilisation as a power relationship predisposes tastes to function as markers of “class” and cultural distinction. The body, its physical appearance and manners has become the reference points of this distinction. On the one hand, body is built as “the other”; on the other hand it has become the basic object of hedonist structure of the consumption society. It is both loved and hated; it has become both an object of desire and disgust. The beginning point of any search for superiority has become our bodies, its appearance and our manners. This determines the identity formation of the self, our view of the others and ourselves and people’s view of themselves and us. However this is not a natural process, as it seems to be, instead; it is a historical process and thus it is not wrong to say, every period has a different ideal body image and different codes of manners.

In this chapter, while keeping in mind the general assumptions posed above, instead of a theoretical discussion over the axis of one theory, an eclectic theoretical presentation of Norbert Elias’ “The Civilising Process”, his concept of “civilised bodies” in contrast to Michel Bakhtin’s “grotesque, animalistic body”, his

“established-outsiders” figuration as well as Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of “Distinction” and concept of “habitus” will be made briefly. With the acceptance that these concepts, figurations and theories can be regarded as problematic within themselves, they will only be used as theoretical tools to support this study and explain the relevant parts of this study.

1.1. Norbert Elias and “The Civilising Process”

A civilised person knows that there are rules about when, where and how you should blow your nose, spit, sneeze, scratch yourself, enjoy sex, throw a punch, break wind and defecate. Norbert Elias shows that, over the centuries these rules have changed, standards have become more “delicate”, do’s and don’ts have become more detailed and behaviours have become more tightly regulated. And then he asks, how our ways of blowing our noses, eating with a knife and fork, making love and making war have changed over the last few hundred years and what these changes imply for the individual and for society.

According to Elias, the centralisation of power and containment of violence in the state and modulations in the codes of conduct of individuals and groups are two aspects of the same process of social change, namely the civilising process. For Elias, the formation of the state and individuality are simultaneous, tightly linked and complementary social processes.

Elias argues that the appearance of civilised patterns of behaviour is closely related to reorganisation of Western societies as a state. One of the institutions constituting the social organisation called state is the monopolisation of the right to apply

physical violence. He suggests that with the monopolisation of the application of physical violence, the functional form of all the mechanisms determining the individual, social requirements and prohibitions exposing the individual's social structure and especially the form of fears that has a significant place in the life of individual has changed on a large scale (Elias, 1978).

Elias, traces the changes in human behaviour over a century long historical process. He argues that patterns of behaviour which seem typical for Western civilised man are indeed historical. The norms, borders of avoidance and fear are socially determined and do shift. In other words no one come into the world as civilised in civilised societies (Elias, 1978). Everything that we consider natural according to the standards of our society which we are raised and trained within, is gained and absorbed very slowly and in a difficult way –such as the use of fork. Thus the Western model which is assumed to have experienced a coherent history of modernity has actually undergone a “civilisation process”.

In the civilising process of Europe, excessiveness, which was a rule in everyday life throughout the Middle Ages, slowly left its place to moderation. Restraining feelings and impulses, the feelings of shame and guilt and presence of these feelings, even when the individual is alone, in other words replacement of external factors that were limiting behaviours with internal moral arrangements, were the building stones of the civilising process (Elias, 1978).

The main idea of “The Civilising Process” is the transformation of social discipline into self-discipline. According to Elias, the formation of personality structures and social structures develop within a mutual relationship. He tries to answer the

questions how and why individual self-control which is today called adaptation and internalisation developed starting from the periods of late Middle Ages and early Renaissance.

Elias found that as time went on, the standards applied to violence, sexual behaviour, bodily functions, eating habits, table manners and forms of speech became gradually more sophisticated, with an increasing threshold of shame, embarrassment and repugnance. The result was a particular kind of habitus or “second nature”, an “automatic self-restraint; a habit that within certain limits, also functions when person is alone” (Krieken, 1998: 98). He suggests that what we experience as “civilisation” is founded on a particular habitus, a particular psychic structure which has changed over time and which can only be understood in connection with changes in the forms taken by broader social relationships. The concept of habit or habitus, which Elias called “second nature” is referred as “an automatic, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control” (Krieken, 1998: 59). According to Elias, the roots of civilisation are firmly seeded in the soil of shame. As civilised people get more self-disciplined and self-aware, the “threshold of repugnance” shifts. They become more disgusted by their bodies. Natural functions become more and more distasteful. (Smith, 2001).

For all these arguments, Elias’s reference point is the etiquette books that give information about habits, social prohibitions and taboos, desirable and forbidden things of the period by disapproving and praising. None of these rules are natural as they are regarded by following generations and with the investigation of this period it can be seen that how a rule can turn into an internal habit or interior constraint as

time passes. Elias emphasises that the social knowledge, which is recorded symbolically, is transmitted from generation to generation and sets up the relationship between the social knowledge and the human body.

Norbert Elias uses a host of specific examples to show how the social control of body functions such as eating, yawning, spitting, ejecting mucus, fidgeting, touching, inflicting pain and so forth, has a long and complex history. Referring to the early 18th century in general and the conduct books of the period in particular he writes:

Now habits are condemned more and more as such, not in regard to others. In this way, socially undesirable impulses or inclinations are more radically repressed. They are associated with embarrassment, fear, shame or guilt, even when one is alone... Moulding by such means aims at making socially desirable behaviour automatic, a matter of self-control, causing to appear in the consciousness of the individual as the result of his own free will, and the interest of his own health or human dignity (Elias, 1978: 50).

The disgust we feel towards items that other people have touched with their hands or mouths, or the boredom we feel because of seeing the others' bodily activities are all depending on different symbolic structures of different periods. The dynamic behind the civilisation of manners is never the reason or rationality. Cleanliness and hygiene are the rational grounds of today's behaviours and the replacement of health or medical books with etiquette books signifies this.

Elias's theory is also supported with the detailed study of George Vigarello. He examines the history of changing habits of cleaning and body care in his book; *Purity and Dirt* (1996). He investigates the existence and appearance and the transformation of the norms about purity. According to Vigarello, the history of purity is the history of polishing our behaviours and it is the history of self-control. He mostly focuses

upon the issues of bathing habits, changing usage of perfume and powder, the differentiating features of the clothes and physical appearance, usage of the word cleanness interchangeably with politeness, the replacement of medical books with the etiquette books, the dirt associated with the poor, the birth of the concept “hygiene” etc. (Vigarello, 1996).

Elias’s theory is tried to be challenged by Hans Peter Duerr in his study *Myth of Civilising Process* (1999). By reexamining Elias’s sources, he reconstructs the history of sexual shame and morality. He argues that the sexual shame is an anthropological constant and adds that the sexual shame is the essence of being human. He says that Elias was mistaken because he used the erotic scenes or allegories as a source. For Duerr, the changes in the boundaries of shame and boredom are historical but they do not follow an evolutionary path. Nevertheless, Elias does not deny the feeling of shame and self-control that the other cultures have. In fact he just points out that during the periods, which he investigated, the threshold of shame and boredom had risen and the self-control had increased (Duerr, 1999). In other words, since the Medieval Ages, the restrictions put on the bodily activities and the internalisation of self-control coincides with the changes in the power structures which can also be supported by the theories of Foucault on sexuality, crime and governmentality.

1.2. The Established and the Outsiders

Elias prefers the contrast between the established and the outsiders to Marxist conceptualisations of class relations because it seems to capture more comprehensively the reality of day-to-day power relations and interdependencies

within the communities (Krieken, 1998). He suggests that a considerable amount of social conflict can be explained in terms of established-outsiders dynamics.

Elias's analysis of the relationship between established and outsiders as a power relationship between groups is an important and useful example of his figurational analysis. In the figuration established-outsiders, the power difference between the groups leads to a moralising and evacuative polarisation of "good" and "bad", which explains how power is created and how communal self-images are created (Olofsson, 2000: 373-374).

The ability of one group to assert the inferiority of another group is due to the power relations between two groups. The central element in the established-outsiders figuration is unequal power balance and the tensions this gives rise to. To label one group, as "less valuable" is an instrument in the struggle between groups whereby the established group can maintain its social superiority. What makes this instrument so effective is that the label also affects the self-image and identity of the other group and as a consequence makes it weaker.

Elias, in his study of "Winston Parva", investigates the relations between three different communities. The major distinction between these communities are related to the length of time spent there which leads to a relatively strong collective "we" identity. The newcomers are seen as a threat to established norms, values, the life style and manners of the established group. By exclusivist measures the established group confirms its own identity, creates differences in the way in which the two groups are viewed, at the same time as group cohesion is the power instrument that made it possible to maintain the difference. An important aspect for Elias is the

complementary relationship between the charisma of the individual's own group and the disgrace of the other. This is the basis for emotional barrier to contact between the two groups (Olofsson, 2000).

The established group avoids all contact with the outsiders, apart from the necessary interaction. The established group ascribes superior qualities to itself which motivated the social exclusion of the other group. Power is maintained by the established group through its greater capacity for cohesion and ability to use social control mechanisms. The cohesion of the group is its power base (Olofsson, 2000).

All intercourse with the outsider group threatens the position within the established group. There is a risk of "contagious infection" as the outsider group by definition is seen as of inferior moral status. The terms for describing the outsider group are in themselves powerful expressions of subordination and stigmatisation (Olofsson, 2000). The stigmatisation, that is the outcome of the established-outsider figuration has a strong impact on the self-image. The self-image of individuals in the outsider group is affected by the sense of belonging to a stigmatised and excluded group (Olofsson, 2000: 371).

The important linkage between Elias's theory of established-outsiders relations and his theory of civilising process is the observation that the established almost invariably experience and present themselves as more "civilised", decent and outsiders are constructed as more "barbaric" and rough (Krieken, 1998: 151). Outsiders are seen as less restrained in their leisure time, more boisterous in their local pub, and inclined to drink more than they "should" and use "coarse" language, more inclined to fight among themselves, less restrained in their sexual conduct,

inclined to delinquency and crime, exercising little control over their children and above all “dirty”.

“Most of the residents are foreigners and criminals” type of merging of categories (criminal, violent, working class, black, homosexual, foreign, mentally ill) is a characteristic mechanism of constructing group stigma, presenting one’s own established group as the bearer of human civilisation itself, and the contrasting outsiders as containing all that threatens to undermine civilisation (Krieken, 1998: 151-152).

Although Elias’ figuration of the established and the outsiders mostly points out to a collective “we” identity based on the length of time spent there and the disturbance felt towards the strangers, the discourses and strategies that the established group has developed to maintain its superiority and privileges are similar to that of “true owners” of İstanbul against the *gecekondu* people. Moreover when it is accompanied with the difference made between the "civilised" and “grotesque” bodies as Stallybrass and White do, it also figure outs to a certain class habitus and social hierarchy in relation to social classes formed in a city between the true owners of the city and the newcomers which will be examined in Chapter 3 in detail with respect to the relationship between İstanbul residents and the villagers migrated to cities.

1.3. “Civilised” vs. “Grotesque” Bodies

Peter Stallybrass and Allon White in their book, *The Politics and the Poetics of Transgression* (1986), argue that human body, psychic forms, geographical space and the social formation are all constructed within interrelated and dependent

hierarchies of high and low in a broader and complex cultural process. They stress the divisions between the high and low, the polite and the vulgar, which according to them simultaneously maps out the divisions between the civilised and the grotesque body, between social purity and social hybridisation. No absolute borderline can be drawn between body and meaning in the sphere of culture. The “grotesque” designates the marginal, the low and the outside from the perspective of a classical body situated as high, inside and central by virtue of its very exclusions. In addition, since the high discourses are normally associated with the most powerful socio-economic groups existing at the centre of cultural power, it is them, which generally gain the authority to designate what is to be taken as high and low in the society.

Civilising process operates on the differentiation of “civilised” and “uncivilised” bodies and this corresponds to the construction of high and low in the society. In Western societies a differentiation is made between civilised and grotesque bodies. While the concept of civilised body is constructed as a body suited to the dominant rules of the society with respect to its appearance and behaviours, grotesque body is presented as a body difficult to oversee, not suitable for social and moral norms, right behaviour rules and because of these perceived as bestial (Yumul, 2000).

This body which makes sensorial pleasures and momentary enjoyments the only aim of life, is deprived of self-control that makes the civilisation project possible. It opposes to every kind of social norms; it challenges every assertion and ideology leaning on the system by the ways it is performing its natural functions such as sneezing, burping and defecating. It is struggling with system and reason with its lower stratum in Bakhtin’s words. It is also inverting the hierarchical relation

between body and mind. People who have these kinds of bodies have not reached to the level of being “abhorrent to body and its functions” which starts with the civilising process (Stallybrass&White, 1986).

The difference is determined by distaste. The differences made within the social realm such as lower-upper, polite-rude, correspond to the differentiation of the grotesque and civilised body. The exclusion is also the basis of one’s own subject formation. So that the lower one is internalised (Stallybrass&White, 1986). Everything about the low other, constructed ideologically, not only determines the upper one but also it constitutes the object of desire and fantasy world of the upper. Thus the socially excluded becomes symbolically central (Stallybrass&White, 1986). Everything that is excluded in the formation of the self becomes objects of desire.

Stallybrass and White show both how the “low” and the “high” are constructed through the content elements such as the pig, the rat and the maid and how these elements take on meaning according to the shifting historical nature of class relations. Similarly, I will try to analyse how the low and the high are constructed through the figure of *maganda* and what do moustache, *arabesk* music, *lahmacun*, and smell as agents of class differentiation mean according to this context in Chapter 4.

1.4. Pierre Bourdieu: Distinction and “Habitus”

Bourdieu makes the analysis of life-style and taste in relation to social classes. His central argument is that, struggles about the meaning of things, and specifically the meaning of the social world, are aspects of class struggle. What is at stake in the struggles about the meaning of the social world is power over the classificatory

schemes and systems which are the basis of the representations of groups and therefore of their mobilisation. Only in struggle do the internalised limits become boundaries and barriers that have to be moved.

The social reproduction of the established order is largely secured by symbolic violence (imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning i.e., culture, upon groups or classes in such a way that they are experienced as legitimate), a process of cultural reproduction. The process of cultural reproduction reproduces the class relations of social structure. In his words;

Taste is a natural class culture, this culture which is materialised helps to shape the class based body... When tastes have to be justified, they are asserted purely negatively by the refusal of the other tastes. Distaste and disgust provoked by horror or visceral intolerance of the tastes of others... Being the product of the conditions associated with a particular class of conditions of existence, it unites all those who are the product of similar conditions while distinguishing them from all others... Aversion to different life styles is perhaps one of the strongest barriers between the classes... (Bourdieu, 1984: 56).

According to Bourdieu, every sort of taste unites and separates. Being the product of the conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence, it unites all those who are the product of similar conditions while distinguishing them from all others. And it distinguishes in an essential way, since taste is the basis of all that one has and all that one is for others, whereby one classifies oneself and is classified by others (Bourdieu, 1984: 56).

If a group's whole life style can be read off from the style it adopts in furnishing or clothing, this is not only because these properties are the objectification of the economic and cultural necessity which determined their selection, but also because the social relations objectified in familiar objects, in their luxury or poverty, their

distinction or vulgarity, their beauty and ugliness, impress themselves through bodily experiences which may be profoundly unconscious (Bourdieu, 1984: 77). He says;

Taste classifies and it classifies the classifier. Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the distinctions they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar in which their position in the objective classification is expressed or betrayed (Bourdieu, 1984: 6).

Taste is an acquired disposition to differentiate and appreciate. It marks differences by a process of distinction which is not a distinct knowledge. All knowledge of the social world is an act of construction implementing schemes of thought and expression. The principle of this structuring activity of agents is not a system of universal categories but a system of internalised schemes which having been constituted collectively and historically are acquired in the course of individuals' practical lives.

Consumption for Bourdieu, is a stage in a process of communication, that is, an act of deciphering, decoding, which presupposes practical or explicit mastery of a cipher or code. Bourdieu's analysis transcends the usual analysis of conspicuous consumption in two ways: by showing that specific judgments and choices matter less than aesthetic outlook in general and by showing, moreover, that the acquisition of an aesthetic outlook not only advertises upper-class prestige but helps to keep the lower orders in line. In other words, the aesthetic worldview serves as an instrument of domination. It serves the interests not merely of status but of power. It does this, according to Bourdieu, by emphasising individuality, rivalry, and 'distinction' and by devaluing the well being of society as a whole.

It is found in all the properties with which individuals and groups surround themselves, houses, furniture, paintings, books, cars, spirits, cigarettes, perfume, clothes and in the practices in which they manifest their distinction, sports, games, entertainments, only because it is in the synthetic unity of the habitus, the unifying, generative principle of all practices. Taste, the propensity and capacity to appropriate (materially or symbolically) a given class of classified, classifying objects or practices, is the generative formula of life style, a unitary set of distinctive preferences which express the same expressive intention in the specific logic of each of the symbolic sub-spaces, furniture, clothing, language or body hexis. Each dimension of life style ‘symbolises with’ the others and symbolises them (Bourdieu, 1984: 173).

Taste is a class culture. It follows that the body is the most indisputable materialisation of class taste which it manifests in several ways. The “sign-bearing” and “sign-wearing” body is also a producer of signs which are physically marked by the relationship to the body. The body, a social product which is the only tangible manifestation of the person, is commonly perceived as the most natural expression of innermost nature (Bourdieu, 1984: 192).

For Bourdieu¹, habitus refers to socially acquired, embodied systems of dispositions and/or predispositions. Hence it refers not to character, morality or socialisation per se but to “deep structural” classificatory and assessment propensities, socially acquired and manifested in outlooks, opinions and embodied phenomena such as

¹Bourdieu has developed a distinctive theory of social and cultural reproduction. Bourdieu’s central contribution to sociological theory is his attempt to find a middle ground between individual agency and structural determinacy. Central to that middle ground is his concept of human habitus. Habitus is a Latin word which refers to a habitual or typical condition, state or appearance, particularly of the body. “It is an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions in which it is constituted” (Jenkins, 1992: 74).

deportment, posture, ways of walking, sitting, spitting, blowing the nose and so forth. The power of habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules and principles, in other words, what they do has more meaning than they know.

The habitus is both the generative principle of objectively classifiable judgements and the system of classification of these practices. It is in the relationship between the two capacities which define the habitus, the capacity to produce classifiable practices and works and the capacity to differentiate and appreciate these practices and products (taste), that the represented social world; i.e. the space of life styles, is constituted (Bourdieu, 1984: 170).

Class habitus is a collective phenomena reflecting group adaptations and adjustments to historical necessity and struggles won and lost. With respect to the relationship between class habitus and life styles, the underlying model is as follows: “Objective conditions of existence combine with position in social structure to produce the habitus, ‘a structured and structuring structure’, which consists of a ‘system of schemes generating classifiable practices and works’ and a ‘system of schemes of perception and appreciation’ or taste, which between them produce ‘classifiable practices and works’, resulting in a life style, ‘a system of classified and classifying practices’, i.e. distinctive signs” (Jenkins, 1992: 141-142).

Social identity is defined and asserted through difference. Life styles are thus the systematic products of habitus, which, perceived in their mutual relations through the scheme of the habitus, become sign systems that are socially qualified (as distinguished, vulgar etc.) (Bourdieu, 1984: 172).

For Bourdieu, the body is a mnemonic device upon and in which the very basics of culture, the practical taxonomies of the habitus are imprinted and encoded in a socialising or learning process which commences during early childhood (Jenkins, 1992: 75-76). Bourdieu has argued that the apparently superficial reformation of manners is in fact one of the most powerful ways in which a culture inculcates its metaphysical, moral and political scheme of things. He writes;

If all societies... that seek to produce a new man through a process of 'deculturation' and 'reculturation' set such store on the seemingly most insignificant details of dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners, the reason is that, treating the body as a memory, they entrust to it in abbreviated and practical i.e., mnemonic, form the fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of the culture. The principles embodied in this way are places beyond the grasp of consciousness, and hence cannot be touched by voluntary, deliberate transformation... The whole trick of pedagogic reason lies precisely in the way it extorts the essential while seeming to demand the insignificant... the concessions of politeness always contain political concessions (Bourdieu, 1984: 94-5).

The creation of ideal modern individual in Turkey against the figure of *maganda* through "deculturation" and "reculturation" processes exactly matches with Bourdieu's definition above. These processes in addition to particular class habitus of White Turks and their arguments of stylisation of life on the basis of distinction will be the focus of Chapter 4.

1.5. Critical Assessment

Whilst Bourdieu connects the regulation of manners to the operation of the whole metaphysical and ideological outlook of a culture Elias connects manners to the internal construction of the subject, to the historical formation of self, repudiating

any possibility of a separation of the physical and the social. Manners, regulations of the body thus become the site of a profound interconnection of ideology and subjectivity.

Although Elias's study is criticised for being Euro-centrist and having an orientalist tendency, I believe that it is very useful for partially explaining the identity formation of the modern Turkish individual from Ottoman period till today. In this study, the modernisation and Westernisation experience of Turkey will be analysed with respect to the Elias' "civilising process". In addition, while the distinction made between "White" and "Black" Turks is discussed with respect to the concept of "civilised bodies", the discussion over the dualistic cultural life and social conflicts in the cities, particularly in İstanbul is supported with his "established-outsiders" figuration.

Stallybrass and White argue that the body is territorialised in accordance with hierarchies and explain the formation of hierarchies and the process through which it is represented. Their arguments on how the difference between "civilised" and "grotesque" bodies is formed and civilised behaviour code had become the symbol of distinction and superiority of upper classes and represented will be used to explain the presentation of ideal modern individual in the media.

One of the main arguments of the study, "civilisation as a power relationship predisposes tastes to function as markers of class and cultural distinction" is based on Bourdieu's theory of Distinction and his concept of habitus. While examining the cultural climate in the 1990s, the representation of civilised and uncivilised bodies such as *maganda*, some tastes developed as a class habitus and exclusion of others like *arabesk* and *lahmacun*, his analysis of life style and taste in relation to social

classes, his definition of taste as a class culture, the relationship between class habitus and life styles are used.

CHAPTER II

THE TURKISH MODERNISATION

FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:

FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE 1990s

This chapter focuses on the modernisation experience of Turkey from a historical perspective. Starting with the meanings attributed to “West” and “Westernisation”, this traumatic adventure will be looked upon by dividing it into mainly four periods. Turkey’s Westernisation process has started during the 19th century with mainly changes in the army, finance, and everyday life and continued during the early Republican period by gaining an official feature. Yet, continuities and discontinuities, similarities and differences between these two periods gain significance for following the main line extending as far as today. The third period will be the 1950s, as it is a turning point for the history of urbanisation in Turkey with the existence of a new phenomenon, namely *gecekondu*. The last period to be examined will be the 1980s which, with Turgut Özal, introduction of new right policies, rising values and Yuppies, have had serious implications. All of these will be done to provide a historical background for the 1990s which is the main investigation period of this study.

2.1. “West” and “Westernisation” as a Universal Cultural Code

Elias argues that, while civilised behaviour code had become the symbol of distinction and superiority of upper classes in the West, when it comes to non-Western countries, this superiority is attributed to the whole Western world. In other words it can be said that West is positioned as the upper class of the world. In non-Western societies, modernity is perceived as an ideal to be reached and the concepts of West and Westernisation become “value judgements” (Göle, 1998). Edward Said defines this situation as “global hegemony of modernity” and argues that non-Western countries are constructed as the “other” and seen as “cultural objects” which has to be transformed. In other words this hegemony functions as a “universal code” (Said, 1979).

Turkish modernisation from the beginning has accepted the hegemony of the West, aimed to reach the “level of contemporary civilisations” and implemented its own modernity project with this aim. Turkish modernisation in this respect, is a part of nation-building process that has been carried out by state elites who saw modernity as a total social transformation project which would be imposed from above. In addition, this modernisation can be interpreted as a civilisation change.

Within the framework of Turkish modernisation, a superior value was attributed to West and everything reconciling with the Eastern was seen as inferior. In Turkish experience, the radical rejection of the Ottoman period has become an ideology in the name of “newness” and together with this process, Turks have started to see and qualify their everyday life from the eyes of Europeans. Furthermore, many breakings have been experienced within the social-historical continuity and cultural changes have been the realm where these breakings have been experienced in the harshest way.

2.2. Ottoman Modernisation

The Ottoman elite who adopted the Western way of life, in other words *alafranga*, accepted this as the only principle of “civilised behaviour” for Ottomans. Western etiquette was deemed necessary for being accepted and recognised by the West. Thus Ottoman Westernisation can be partially defined as an effort to create a new social image based on the external dynamics instead of internal ones. During the modernisation process, while the elites and upper class families acted as civilisation bearers, the remaining part of the society was far from this new kind of everyday life; so the changes in the fashion, music, and architecture created contrasting and excluding life styles. Obviously, the usage of Western cultural elements brought new tensions for the modern individual based on the dual life in which Western culture and traditional culture started to exist together.

The Ottoman elite’s decision to adopt European styles first started in the military to update the army because of the insecure situation caused by wars that were lost and then expanded to the other realms. Sultan and elites hoped that they could take a share and at least could save a part of the empire by applying European styles however as can be seen from the satirical piece of writings on young snobs and their gallant life styles, the experience of European styles sometimes became only superficial games (Faroqhi, 2000).

The Tanzimat period aimed to stop the territory losses started with the flamed up Balkan nationalism through military, financial, administrative and judicial reforms. Apart from the state centralisation, the recognition of equal rights for all subjects etc., the Tanzimat modernisation also introduced the adaptation of Western etiquette

in everyday life (Meriç, 2000). Thus, changes took place in everyday life creating different and conflicting life styles.

In Ottoman society, the everyday life was organised around *mahalle* (neighbourhood) and religious differences instead of economic ones were determining the framework of these neighbourhoods. In other words, rich and poor people belong to the same religion could live in the same neighbourhood. However together with the 19th century, as a result of increasing population and economic factors, the socio-cultural framework of *mahalle* was broken and the traditional content of everyday life started to melt within the new conditions of urban life.

With the Tanzimat period, the state started to look at to İstanbul more carefully in aesthetic sense and worked for to make the city more presentable. Pastry shops, restaurants, hotels, mass transportation, parks and excursion spots became the new social sites and parallel to the differentiation of places, the behaviours specific to the places were also differentiated (Meriç, 2000).

During the 19th century, the conspicuous consumption, which seeks distinction in the crude display of ill-mastered luxury has come to the fore (Mardin, 1974). Aesthetic objects based on importation entered to the İstanbul market. Owning these kinds of objects served to increase the status and determine the distinction from the other social groups. The fashionable patterns of everyday life were used to determine the status quo.

The science columns that appeared in the daily newspapers and magazines were virtual university courses in which muddle-headed students were taught science,

sometimes per se, sometimes through advertising. The subject of instruction was the practical knowledge of everyday life, with the result that Ottoman man experienced the 19th century, to which he was in thrall, as a schoolboy memorising his lessons (Işın, 2001: 135).

One of the main figures of this period was Ahmet Mithat Efendi. His book called *Avrupa Adab-ı Muaşeret-i Yahud Alafranga* (European Etiquette or Alafranga) was published in 1894 which can be defined as the first example of trying to find an answer to the question “how can we become a modern society?”(Meriç, 2000). This book was very significant with respect to the information it gives about the social structure of the Ottoman society, Ottoman modernisation, and changes in the thought of Ottoman elite. Although it was written to provide help for people going to Europe, the real aim was to teach the European etiquette.

Ahmet Mithat Efendi defines etiquette as practical knowledge of everyday life and defends the necessity for sufficiently correct understanding of this subject in order to eliminate the conflict between traditional and modern culture (Mithat, 2001). Ahmet Mithat Efendi, who accepted the dualistic thinking and living characteristic of the Tanzimat period, was supporter of the cooperation between West and East, old and new. He was arguing for the adaptation of science and art of the West but not the morality, Islamic morality and tradition being to be preserved.

Etiquette for Ahmet Mithat Efendi was a concept invented for the purpose of reducing the friction between traditional and modern fabrics to the minimum. His attempt to interpret European etiquette is aimed at giving Ottomans a working knowledge of the practical side of everyday life in the shortest time possible and to

solve the problem of dissonance of the Ottoman people to the modern fabric of everyday life in many aspects (Işın, 1987a).

An extreme example of over-Westernisation of upper class men finds its classical expression in Recaizade Ekrem's (1846-1913) *Araba Sevdası* (1896). Bihruz Bey, the hero of this novel is the archetypical Westernised fop (Mardin, 1974). His most striking attitude is his infatuation with the material aspects of Western civilisation and he has only contempt for old Turkish ways as "barbaric" and is disgusted with the crowds of popular culture. The three components of the Bihruz Bey syndrome are; an attempt at Westernisation, accompanied by an infatuation with the material aspects of Western civilisation and a popular reaction branding this attempt as wicked and sinful.

The Republican ideology incorporated certain Bihruz traits. This appears in Atatürk's disgust with the fez, in his proscribing of a la Turca music and in his laicism. He, too, thought that baggy pants were part of a carnival. But he was anti-Bihruz at the deeper level of his support for a populist ideology and a nationalist activism (Mardin, 1974: 440). Bihruz Bey syndrome gives critical clues for understanding the over-Westernisation of upper class men both during the Tanzimat period and the early Republican period and even during the 1990s.

2.3. Republican Modernisation

Republican modernisation was based on the rejection of Ottoman period and the social differentiation. Past was constructed as "the other" and the everyday life was seen as an object that should be modernised. For Turkey, Westernisation was a

civilisation change. The Turkish State which had taken over the Westernisation policy tried to get rid of the Ottoman political and cultural heritage. With the founding of the Republic, the Westernisation became the main policy of the state and as a result a Western life style was tried to be established. But this time the aim was to make the Western style of life to be spread all levels of society.

Kemalism as the founding ideology of the Republic symbolises the effort of radicalisation of the modernisation process, to perceive modernisation as a “total project” that would transform society, to create a modern nation on the basis of nation-state, industrialisation and modern secular national identity. While the Republican government believed that it lived up the modern utopia that could prompt the social energy, when it came to the 1930s, this program was perceived as a danger to their existence by many groups of people. This understanding made the official discourse to radicalise its implementations and to exclude everything traditional from the civilisation project and creating its own “other” within itself (Işın, 2001).

The Ottoman elites and bureaucrats had wanted to maintain their traditional culture and tried to keep Westernisation limited to material life and technology. At this point the early Republican ideology diverged from the Ottoman thought. During the early Republican era, Westernisation policy was radicalised, having been implemented from above.

The early Republican etiquette was shaped by the official model and developed in a more simple but at the same time more disciplinary way. The main feature that distinguishes the concept of etiquette of the new period from the mentality of the 19th century is that the past civilian nature of everyday life now takes on an official

dimension (Işın, 2001). The primary factor responsible for the civilian character of Ottoman etiquette was the absence of a centralising motivation and, parallel with this, the fact that every sector of society was free to apply its own norms to the contemporary image. On the contrary, modernisation project caused the official state policy of Republic to be solidly centralist (Işın, 2001). The early Republican etiquette developed and spreaded together with political and military authority. In this respect, we can say that the official characteristic of the early Republican era was one of the most important line that differentiate the Republican etiquette from the civil and multi-cultural characteristic of the previous period (Meriç, 2000).

Another significant characteristic of the early Republican etiquette was the importance it gave to integral composition of soul and body. It was seeking to arrange the physical appearance of the modern Turkish individual in accordance with the Western standard. The administrators and bureaucrats in public offices turned out to be a modern community with suits and ties.

It is argued that this project has five main principles. First of all, Kemalism as a modernity project is a way of looking at and analysing the society. In other words, social engineers recognise everything the society has as a database to be used within the project. The other principle is the pioneer role of the state. State produces and reproduces the social life, in other words social life with all its aspects is under the domination of the state. Another characteristic of this project is its implementation from above. State as an active subject acts as an organiser and transformer. Fourth principle is the idea of “organic society”. This rather than being a thought of sociological unity and homogeneity, is the superiority of the benefit of the society

defined by state elites over interests of groups or classes. The last principle is the understanding of citizenship. Citizen in this project perceived as both the “carrier agent” of Westernisation and “cultural object” that should be westernised (Kahraman&Keyman, 1998: 73-74). So it is not wrong to say that this modernisation project functioned within the axis of rationalism-positivism for all institutions and practices implemented “for the people, against the people”.

While adopting modern etiquette was a personal experience during the Ottoman period it had become more collective activity during the Republican era. Women experienced the most significant change. According to the Republican ideology they should wrapped up in totally new identity and started to dress and live like their Western equals. Another important change in social life after the Tanzimat period was defined as “saloon etiquette”. While it was limited to members of upper and middle class families during the Ottoman modernisation, with the Republican modernisation it was accepted as a necessity of social life. The saloon life, special saloon dresses and behaviours specific to men and women were continuously explained at the newspapers and women magazines.

Balls were also used like ideological tools to provide the cultural and social change. Balls started to be organised in the late 19th century for the first time gained importance and an official characteristic after the founding of the Republic and became a significant part of social life (Duman, 1997). There is no doubt that Republican balls addressed to very small and limited part of the society. But these activities were important with respect to being tools of imposition of the Western life style from above in cultural realm.

The everyday life in the streets was also the focus of Republicans as much as it was for the Ottoman elite. The streets were far more colourful in the everyday life of the 1930s than they had been in the past. The wealth of authentic costume and dialect melted away into a multitude of men sporting hats and ties. Official populism tried to bring the appearance of society into conformity with 1930s European standards by eliminating differences in the dress between the bureaucrat and the man in the street. To go out to the streets meant to represent the modern image of the country against European world for Republicans so the streets were organised like shopwindows of the society.

Education agents were one of the public realms that the early Republican modernisation made use of for social change. The best example of the education agents of Republican period are the People's Houses but as the forerunners of them, the establishment of *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearts) should be mentioned first. In accordance with the 1900s nationalistic movements, in Ottoman Empire, *Türk Ocakları* were established to "formulate and disseminate nationalism" (Karpas, 1963). Their main goal was to awake cultural consciousness and a feeling of cultural unity among all Turks. With the establishment of Republic, their political and cultural ideas were absorbed in the philosophy of new regime, but they could not adopt the new conditions. After the establishment of the Turkish State, People's Houses were founded during the 1930s as one of the best examples of the modernisation attempts of the Republican elites. The aim of these Houses was to teach and to expand the new national culture and the idea of modernisation to the masses of Anatolia. Karpas argued that, "the decision to establish the Houses was an

action supplementing Kemal's ideological orientation with the ultimate purpose of expanding modernisation in all fields" (Karpas, 1963). With this attempt, it was tried to be created a new modern, civilised people in accordance with the new modern Turkish state.

However, the populist activities of the early Republican regime were not fully welcomed and supported by some circles. It must be pointed out that the encyclopedist circles, who appeared to perpetuate the elitist attitude adopted by Ottoman palace culture in the face of Republican etiquette but whose real object was nostalgia for the dynasty, did not entirely approve of the official populism of the new period. Within this intellectual circle, which took up the Ottoman mission of *tenvir* or enlightenment in the Republican era as well, Abdullah Cevdet's concept of etiquette takes concrete form as the elitist tradition defending itself against the populist tendency that emerges in the modern Turkish utopia (Işın, 2001).

Abdullah Cevdet regarded the official populism of the regime as an alaturca version of cultural modernisation. In 1927 Abdullah Cevdet published his *Mükemmel ve Resimli Adab-ı Muaşeret Rehberi* (A Perfect and Illustrated Manual of Etiquette). With respect to the topics covered, this weighty tome is little different from 19th century Ottoman etiquette manuals. In fact, when compared with an Ottoman classic like Ahmed Midhat Efendi's *Adab-ı Muaşeret Yahud Alafranga*, it appears not to devote enough pages to practical knowledge of everyday life; this is precisely wherein its importance lies.

Modern etiquette, which was a matter of personal experience in the Ottoman period, is constructed by Republican administrators as the reflection in everyday life of a

model of civilisation open to collective participation. Abdullah Cevdet regards the opening up of modern etiquette to the collective participation of an entire society as populism, which involves the risk of undermining the elitist spirit he attempted to create. His own concept of etiquette is therefore oriented more towards making a person an elite member of polite society than towards imparting to him some practical knowledge of everyday life. According to him, administrative elite modernised in accordance with the European standards guarantees the mission of modernising the society (Işın, 1987b).

2.4. Cultural Climate in Turkey Until the 1990s

2.4.1. Urbanisation Experience of Turkey since the 1950s

In Turkey, similar to the other underdeveloped countries, urbanisation of cities and people were not experienced simultaneously. With the start of migration to cities during the 1950s, urban population raised dramatically and this rate was more than the double of population increase in Turkey (Tekeli&Gülöksüz, 1983: 1233). During this period, *gecekondu*² came into being as a basic form of housing for masses migrated to cities and it was covertly supported by the government as a type of self-help housing (Kurtuluş, 2003: 84).

During the 1970s, second generation of *gecekondu* started but this time it had an exchange value and it became a commodity whose users and sellers were different. During the 1980s, *gecekondu* turned out to be means of speculation. In addition as a result of the policies of this period, it was supported this time overtly by the

government with the acceptance of four amnesty laws for the illegal buildings and it had gone totally out of control (Işık, 1983). Later, these areas tended to break up from the cities not only with their environmental features but also with the everyday life and culture they offered to their residents and regarded as an important part of the cultural fragmentation process that is seen in the cities of Turkey.

This new phenomenon, namely *gecekondu* and *gecekondulular*, particularly in İstanbul was the starting point of changing relations between city dwellers and villagers who migrated to cities. Until the end of the 1970s, a lot of things had changed in the cities, second and third generation of suburbs were established but the difference between the urban culture and village culture has not been transformed into a serious conflict.

During this period, these new residents of the city who were stranger to the urban culture were named as “*kıro, keko, hanzo*” with a little degradation but not hate. However while city dwellers were trying to protect their privileges, these people were increasingly becoming a threat for their established culture. During the 1980s, they were started to be accused for dirtying the cities with their *lahmacun* smells, pessimistic music and vulgar behaviours.

2.4.2. New Right Policies, Rising Values, Yuppies and Turgut Özal

The 1980s were a period that the new right trend which made economic reason superior to everything was increasing across the world with figures like Thatcher and Reagan. Özal was also a typical representative of new right who was totally committed to economic reason, and was both a pro-Western and conservative politician.

² Shanty towns surrounding the cities were known as *gecekondu* and shanty towners living in these

Özal was a leader who affected Turkey deeply, who left his mark upon that time and who contributed to the formation of new individual types. Özal won the support of the masses with a discourse advocate of change and based on solving economic problems as well as media-oriented presentation of his personal style far away from the seriousness of the state.

The November 1983 general elections in Turkey marked the beginning of a very significant era in the history of the country, because the new right, under the political leadership of Turgut Özal and Motherland Party (MP) initiated a campaign to solve the ongoing hegemonic crisis. This new right clearly tried to establish a new hegemony after the 1980 military takeover (Tünay, 1993).

The new right after 1983 tried to shape a new ideological system by harmonising all the contradictory elements of the traditional ideologies, and strove for the formation of an “organic ideology” which would be at the heart of the constitution and provide an expansive hegemony that had never existed in Turkish society before (Tünay, 1993: 21). His mission was to create a synthesis of nationalist, conservative, free market and social justice ideologies.

Özal’s hegemonic project owed its popularity to be able to articulate different groups such as well-educated, pro-Western, pro-liberal, young, new professionals; business circles that maintained their Islamist cultural conservative values and gained an increased economic status quo during the 1980s and *gecekondulular* people. Özal, blessing material values brought these heterogeneous groups together.

areas were named as *gecekondulular*.

However the bid of new right to define a new national unity and identity on the basis of economic liberalism, political authoritarianism and cultural conservatism, divided the society into rival and conflicting powers both economically, culturally and ideologically instead of unifying the society. In other words, his hegemonic project was a failure (Tünay, 1993).

All over the world, one of the original contributions of those years to the universal culture is the concept of “yuppie”. Young people who are modern, urban, professional, know how to earn money but more importantly know how to spend money.³ In very general terms, being a yuppie can be defined as a life and consumption style. These were “young, urban professionals” that adopted the Özal version of capitalist values of the 1980s. Their ideology can be summarised as “worship to power, compulsion to success, obsession to rising” (Kozanoğlu, 1993: 12).

2.4.3. Everyday Life in Turkey after the 1980s

Everyday life has witnessed a rapid change from the 1980s onwards. Everyday life from consumption patterns, entertainment styles, to language, art, sports, took an interest from this rapid change. Change and consumption were the defining concepts of this period. Consumption was dominant during this period with respect to its two meanings. First consuming had become a virtue and a symbol of status. Meanwhile many concepts, trends, approaches, words and thoughts had been consumed rapidly. Western, partially European but especially American life styles have become widespread.

³ “80’lerden 90’lara Yuppiler”, *Ekonomik Panorama*, 20-27 October 1991, Year 4, No:43, p. 3.

In this period of the 1980s to the 1990s, Turkey changed a lot. The social determination power of the media increased. Change affected all parts and levels of society. People swearing in English came to the fore. Knowing English has become a privilege, a status. *Arabesk* culture has undergone an interesting diversification process. Purchasing power has become the highest symbol of status. The difference between the real and the image has blurred while there were images in great quantity. It was also the decade that the world of wealth and capability and world of poverty and preclusion separated by high cultural walls in a way that they would almost never get in touch (both physically and mentally) again (Gürbilek, 2001a). During the 1980s the places that brought different people together, grounds that people from different classes could meet almost totally disappeared. The replacement of ethnic based traditional neighbourhoods with class based ones is not new. Moreover the differentiation of neighbourhoods where rich, middle class and poor live is also not new. However the difference of the 1980s was almost the complete disappearance of common places and spaces that people from different classes could meet and communicate as well as the total separation of these neighbourhoods.

Not only neighbourhoods but also shopping centres, entertainment areas and business places of rich and poor also decomposed. People going to İstanbul Festival and Gülhane Festival, Fame City and amusement park, Beşiktaş market and Galleria would rarely meet again. Many places in the cities had been left to the poor and rich people have withdrawn to particular neighbourhoods or private sites surrounded with mental and real walls (Gürbilek, 2001a).

Gecekondu has become the object of hostility in cities since the 1980s. The difference started to be replaced by conflict. Nostalgia started to be dominant in the cities. Especially old İstanbul stories became widespread. *Arabesk* culture started to be recognised as the killer of this life style. Rude/uncivilised people dirtying the cities with their painful music and *lahmacun* smells started to be humiliated. Palatal taste has gained status when bourgeois values are increasing.

The early Republican project of Westernisation from above is replaced with the aim of “being like Western” which is again from above but this time indirectly because of proficiency of the media. Turkey, which is far from Europe with respect to democracy, welfare, production, and social development, tried to stylise its shopwindow. Bülent Eczacıbaşı, Cem Boyner, Cem Hakkı, Leyla Alaton, Güler Sabancı, Cefi Kamhi, Mustafa Koç are representing “the new ideal type”. Athletes, dancers, businessmen are presented as young, dynamic, clever, elegant and having “gusto”. Media elites are not only supporting but also creating, marketing and promoting all these new values, new images and social trends. Tastes have started to take form depending not on personal choices but rather according to standard status symbols repulsed from communication channels (Kozanoğlu, 2001). During the 1980s and the 1990s there was such identity confusion that old identities, old definitions and old concepts were no more valid.

As a result of the developments of the 1980s and the 1990s, the schizophrenic and unstable structure of Turkish nationalism swinging between the feelings of hostility and admiration towards the West deepened (Bora, 1993). On the one hand a self-confident, extrovert, modern and a Western nationalism was developing, on the other

hand ethnic-cultural, chauvenist and isolationist tendencies were getting stronger. The rise of Kurdish issue and the Islamist movement were important factors feeding these tendencies (Bora, 1993: 10). Moreover the tension of Turkey's Westernisation was another factor. While being a European and part of Europe is an endless ambition, a reaction towards West is accompanying this ambition. As a result a more popular and mediatic nationalist discourse came to the fore, the oral and symbolic elements of nationalism transformed into popular culture and many national symbols became popular marks. All the popular figures from TV stars to football players started to use this pop-nationalist discourse. According to Kozanoğlu, this pop-nationalism defined as "new liberal nationalism" by Tanıl Bora is corresponding to the Western, modern identity of "White" Turks.⁴ Because this new nationalism is more nationalist towards its own people by praising blonde and beautiful people without moustache which will be examined in detail in Chapter 4.

The rapid change experienced during these years also affected the food culture. The 1980s when food culture was the subject of public discussions and *lahmacun*, *çiğ köfte* and *şalgam* were the object of serious attacks from the upper sections of the society followed by the 1990s when *lahmacun* became popular again. Also during these years, international hamburger chains such as McDonald's, Wendy's, Burger King settled in Turkey and spreaded especially at big cities as representatives of cultural symbols besides food culture. There were also Chinese, Italian, Mexican restaurants during this period of alternatives and variety. During the 1990s "entel bars", high society bars, youth bars, rock bars, jazz bars started to be seen everywhere. It was said that to know a people, it is enough to learn the bar he gets

⁴ "Can Kozanoğlu, 'Pop Çağı'nı Anlatıyor: Pop Saçığı, Kör Şiddet", *Express*, 15.04.1994, pp.2-5.

hung up in. During the same period entertainment centres, discotheques equipped with high-tech came into service at metropolises and holiday resorts. However the frequenters of these kinds of places were not having so much variety.

The importance of huge concert organisations, festivals and “sponsorship” of big firms, their support for the art was highlighted. Violence has become an ordinary part of everyday life although during this period every kind of love and affection from love of nature to love of animals repeatedly spoken out. However during the period from the 1980s to the 1990s, events like murder, rape and lynching has become “practically” most ordinary parts of everyday life (Kozanoğlu, 1983).

Everything that Turkey repressed while establishing its modern culture returned in a different form. How, where and in what form these repressed contents come back during the 1980s? The reflection of the cruel conditions of the struggle in the cities during these uncanny years to the cultural realm was inevitable. Orhan Gencebay’s reproachful words based on renunciation and patience and his dignified and decent characteristic in the 1970s replaced with İbrahim Tatlıses’ more rural and more desirous voice during the 1980s. His song, “*Ben de isterem*” (I want too), was more appropriate for these years when everything repressed for being modern came back in a different form and content (Gürbilek 2001b).

The 1980s were the stage of two different political projects and two different cultural strategies. On the one hand it was a period of oppression and prohibition, on the other hand those were the years that more modern, more founding, more surrounding cultural strategy which aimed to transform and include instead of forbidding, destroying and repressing started to exist. The distinction of the 1980s was not only the existence of all

these conflicts together but also its ability to make them exist in reconciliation (Gürbilek, 2001a). These years showed that culture does not necessarily organised with principles like repression or exclusion. It can also be organised in a more surrounding way.

CHAPTER III

A SOCIAL HIERARCHY FORMED IN URBAN SPACE CIVIC CULTURE VS. *VAROŞ* CULTURE

In a complex cultural process, the human body, physic forms, geographical space and the social formation are all constructed within interrelating and dependent hierarchies of high and low. Urban space and body are the two surfaces that these hierarchies of high and low are inscribed. In this chapter I am going to examine the urbanisation experience of Turkey, İstanbul in particular with respect to the formation and transformation of high/low hierarchy in the cities. In this context, the relationship between established and outsiders (i.e., urban elites and newcomers), strategies and discourses that urban elites have developed so as to maintain both their established order and privileges, and the formation of civic culture against *varoş* culture will be examined.

3.1. The Urbanisation Experience of Turkey

The specific characteristic of the cities is that, they are the fundamental space that relations defining capitalism are experienced. Because of this, modernity displays itself in the most concrete form in the cities and the entire tensions of the modern life are reflected at urban space. Urbanisation is considered as the inevitable prerequisite

of modernisation process and thus cities and urban life are praised by modernisation tradition. While in advanced capitalist countries, urbanisation was experienced concurrently at the urban and individual level, the situation is totally different in underdeveloped third world countries which have experienced modernisation process generally with the effect of external dynamics.

Cities, from the beginning of their existence are settlements, which are sheltering social inequalities and spatial decomposition, which is the expression of urban-class identities of city residents in the space. In other words “losers and champions of the cities” are clearly reflected in the space (Kurtuluş, 2003: 96). The behaviours or strategies of class based, ethnic, religious, cultural and gender identities in the cities for choosing a place in the city is shaping the spatial decomposition of the city.

Almost in every period, space is formed depending on owning of income, power and esteem in the cities. The bigness of houses, the quality of the materials used for the building, the difference of the furniture and life styles, all of them prove that the social inequalities are existing in the nature of the cities. However while the determining factor for spatial decomposition was religious and ethnic identities, which were also the source of social inequalities before capitalism, after that, income, class and taste have become the determining factors. In other words before the capitalist city, poor and rich people belonging to the same ethnic or religious group could live together in the cities, which is not so much possible today. With the existence of capitalist cities, a new social-spatial organisation which is based on class and new hierarchies has come to the fore (Kurtuluş, 2003).

Urbanisation process involves a series of economic, social and cultural changes as well as population movements. Urbanisation is often associated with the appropriation of particular values, behaviours and attitudes, i.e., “civic culture”. Thus, being a city dweller is defined as a life-style (Işık, 1983).

Urban elites who consider themselves as the true owners of the cities and have enough power to determine what is to be a city dweller always define what is “in” and what is “out” within the civic culture. For example Erdal Bilallar, the editor of daily *Sabah* İstanbul defines being a city dweller, actually who can not be defined as a city dweller as follows:

If you are not paying your checks on time, jabbering the words, insistently asking how much money people are earning a month, scraping your name to the tables at picnic places, crushing out your cigarette in the coffee cup, sending letters without signature, lapping your mouth when you are eating, keeping bad smelling food in the refrigerator without covering it, calling the answering machine and not leaving a message, using your partners perfume, and not having a shower in the morning, than you are not a city dweller. (Quoted by, Rıfat Bali, 2002: 137.)

In Turkey, similar to the other underdeveloped countries, cities and people have not urbanised simultaneously. With the start of migration during the 1950s, *gecekondu* areas had started to surround the cities. These areas tended to break up from the cities not only with their environmental features but also with the everyday life and culture they offered to their residents and *gecekondus* became important part of the cultural fragmentation process that is seen in the cities of Turkey (Işık, 1983: 794).

At the beginning, foreign attitudes of these people, who were not city dwellers towards urban life were seen as a problem and it was thought that migration of these people to cities should be hindered. As a solution to this problem, a destruction

process started towards these new housing forms. However people whose *gecekondus* were knocked down ten times were building it for the eleventh time and urbanisation was continuing with all its momentum (Tekeli&Gülöksüz, 1983).

Gecekondulaşma continued and these new residents of cities started to be effective in political processes with their votes. Thus the axis of this problem shifted from “should they stay or should they go” to “what would happen to these people”. The half of the big cities was consisting of *gecekondu* neighbourhoods. This situation was especially disturbing for the “true owners” of the city. Therefore although migration could not have been hindered, the privileges of city dwellers should have been protected (Tekeli&Gülöksüz, 1983: 1233).

Their existence in the city was disturbing for urban elites because they were threatening their established order. Mine Kırıkkanat who sees herself as the mouthpiece of urban elites and deserves specific attention with her hate against masses and with her racist and exclusionary elitism, repeatedly raises an outcry against these *gecekondu* masses in her articles. In one of them she writes;

...I also get angry when I watch people who had seized the state area and fuck up to our, your drinking water with their sewerage system, struggling desperately on the floor when their illegal electric wires were cut. It is not our duty to clean their dirt, to pay the electricity of the *televole* program they are watching, to feed their children, which they made for ‘government to look after them’ and left to the streets. But this state forced them to migrate. And this democracy gave them the right to vote, to choose the politician of the cities where they settled without permission and the areas they had seized. They chose these politicians and they protected them and we the citizens who are respectful to the laws were defeated. They are

the products of this democracy, this democracy is theirs. Unfortunately we share the bitter end.”⁵

Approaching urbanisation problem as a cultural difference was emptying the class based content of the problem, which was another result of this new situation in the cities. When the issue was accepted as a problem of cultural transformation, it would be only a matter of time for these new comers to learn the civic culture. They would learn it in time and they would not be a problem anymore. However this approach was proved to be wrong in time because the dualistic structure in the cities persisted. As a result it was accepted that this was not a cultural but a structural problem. In Turkey, the dualistic structure in the cities is started to be considered as a result of the development process experienced by a country in the periphery (Tekeli&Gülöksüz, 1983).

With the realisation that these newcomers, namely the villagers, would not adopt the city values and reconcile with the facts of the urban life style, city dwellers started to seek for the maintenance of their superiority by highlighting these outsiders’ inferiority which is an effective strategy for preserving the status quo. The concept of being a city dweller and the values of urban culture has started to be used more widely and people who could not be urban were insulted as not belonging to the city and its established order. Thus different life styles and different tastes representing different class cultures became the main source of social conflict in the cities.

During this period, these new residents of the city who were stranger to urban culture were named as “*kıro, keko, hanzo*” with a degradation but not hate. However while

⁵ Mine Kırıkkanat, “The End”, *Radikal*, 18.07.2001. Some of her other articles about the same subject with similar approaches are; “Gençlik ve Yaşlılık”, 28.02.1998; “Bin Yıl Sonra Tarih”, 14.10.2001; “Gasp ve Kommünizm, 03.07.2002 in *Radikal*.

city dwellers were trying to protect their privileges, these people had increasingly become a threat for their established culture. During the 1980s, they were started to be accused for dirtying the cities with their *lahmacun* smells, pessimistic music and vulgar behaviours. In addition, some of these people who gained economic power without changing their cultural class started to be seen everywhere. This new “90 model people” started to be renamed as “*zonta, maganda*” and at this point, a reaction from the city residents has come to the fore and emphasis to the urban values excluding the villagers led to a creation of a group of people excluded from the cultural and social life of the cities. They were considered as a danger for civic culture and for its shared meanings. By this and these kinds of definitions, the borders between civilised and vulgar, high and low were drawn and everyday life started to operate between these lines.

3.1.1. Dangerous Classes

Since the 1980s, as a result of deepening social inequalities and dramatic deterioration of income distribution prejudicial to lower classes, significant transformations have been experienced in urban identities. On the one hand, *gecekondu* identity which was not forming a threat for city dwellers during the 1960s and the 1970s was replaced with the *varoş* identity that is including reaction and violence.

The 1980s were the years that social disintegration, fragmentation and gulf between the rich and the poor become more obvious. The group of people who are excluded as a result of the social changes began during the 1980s have started to be clearly named as “*varoşlular*” during the 1990s and started to be displayed and presented as the source of the threat in the cities. They were defined as people who invaded first

the cities, than the culture and at the end Turkey (Etöz, 2000). This classification has become one of the most significant line drawn between the “lower” and “upper” in the cities and it has started to operate as the name of the “urban other”.

As Etöz (2000) emphasises, in contrast to *gecekonduklar* and *gecekondulular* who are considered as a phenomenon tried to be understood or a problem tried to be solved, *varoşlar* and *varoşlular* are constructed as a totally negative image and as a sign of violence and wildness threatening the cities (Etöz, 2000). On the other hand unpretentious city dwellers which are in harmony with the city was replaced with a exclusionary one which wants to go away from the dangers, environmental and visual dirtiness of the city and reduce its spatial and physical contact with lower classes (Kurtuluş, 2003).

Frederich Engels in his book *The Condition in Working Class in England 1844* (1968) clearly showed this new spatial decomposition based on class in Manchester which was an industrial city during the 19th century (cited in Kurtuluş, 2003: 77). According to Engels’ observations, in Manchester, working class neighbourhoods which were in bad condition and middle class neighbourhoods which are relatively in good condition were separated and due to the organisation of the city, these classes were able to live together in the city by not coinciding too much. On the other hand upper classes were living in the luxury residences outside the cities far from the dirtiness of the city and they could only see the poverty and misery of working classes of the city while going to their work place at the centre of the city by their horse carts or buses.

It is interesting that, Aydın Demirer in an editorial echoes Engels’ observations:

We, in other words people living in metropolis and having high or middle level income, are largely living in our worlds. All of our partners and friends are members of our world. We go to certain restaurants, cinemas and bookstores in certain neighbourhoods. Our consumption patterns, habits and hobbies are nearly the same. Moreover we are minority. There is a huge world outside us. We name that other world briefly as '*varoşlar*'. Mostly we see this world from the windows of our cars when we are going to work or outside the city. And the things we know about this world is mostly consisting of third page news of big newspapers.⁶

While *varoşlular* are the general name of people who are not able to consume not only the goods and the services but also the dominant culture and life style, *varoşlar* is the name of the place where these people are living. These people were defined as poor of the city who are unable to consume both economic and cultural products of the new economic system (Etöz, 2000: 51). However the borders of these places can not be drawn easily. In addition, this inability to draw lines is valid not only spatially but also culturally because they are everywhere:

“It seems like some of them suppose that the *varoş* culture is only valid at *varoşlar*. These people are either not aware of or desperate about the subject that Bağdat Avenue, Nişantaşı, Etiler and such like neighbourhoods are taken over by the *varoş* culture... However all of us are ignoring a serious development! Turkey is rapidly and with an unavoidable rise, invaded by *varoşlar*.”⁷

Mümin Sekman in his book “*Türk Usulü Başarı*”, tells one of his memories as an example of the change experienced in İstanbul. He quotes a lady’s answer, who lived 10 years in France and married with a French man when he asked how did she find İstanbul: “*Once we were going to the Bosphorus with my husband and had a good time there. The only place we loved was the Bosphorus. Now we don’t go there. We*

⁶ “Varoşlara Yatırım Zamanı”, *Para*, 14-20.02.1999, 233, p. 3.

⁷ Cüneyt Ülsever, “Reyting Hamdilerin Önlenemez Yükselişi”, *Hürriyet*, 06.02.1999, quoted by Zeliha Etöz, 2000, pp. 51-52.

really repine. Now when we go there we see many weird men. Black skinned men with cellular phones in their hands. Believe me, when I saw these kinds of people, I really repine. Sitting side by side with him makes me feel ill at ease. Because he assaults me, threatens me!" When Sekman asks if they are really attacking her physically she continues like this: *"No, no! Being side by side with them is annoying me and disturbs me physiologically."* (Sekman, 2002: 262).

This lady's feeling indisposed for being side by side with a group of people living in her own country and her feeling of disturbance when they come to her own entertainment places, telling that *"they are assaulting me"*, all of these were pointing out to something. "The others" were threatening the status quo, identity of this lady and thus the value she assessed for herself.

"The urban other" has become a source of threat for urban elites especially during the 1980s. They were threatening their status quo, identity and established order and being violent both physically and psychologically. Thus the elites wanted to go away from the dangers, environmental and visual dirtiness of the city and reduce their spatial and physical contact with the others by inhabiting closed, secure and luxury housing sites. As a result the cities started to be segregate into dangerous and secure areas.

3.1.2. Modern Places and Luxury Life Complexes

Together with the implementation of Turgut Özal's free market economy, during the last twenty years the process of urbanisation passed through dramatic changes. After the 1980s, the income of a group of people increased incredibly so that a crowd of people existed who had the opportunity to spend and consume in great amounts. The

1990s were the years that people who are considering themselves as “true owners” of the cities did not want to live together, even did not want to breath the same air with “villagers migrated from provinces”. City elites who were feeling themselves under the pressure of “dark crowds” were finding their way at taking shelter in their luxury housing complexes and social clubs (Bali, 2002: 121-122). The target audience of the new housing complexes was this new group of people and the design, representation and advertisements of these new modern places were planned for them.

The most significant characteristic of these new housing complexes is that money is not enough to buy these houses. Because they also require a distinguished life style far from ordinary crowds and people who are rich and yet have no cultural capital. These housing complexes are the materialisation of the desire of people with equal cultural and economic capital to live together. Their slogan is “*You are not buying a house, you are buying a life style*” (Bali, 2002: 115). As a result luxury housing complexes which has a name usually ending with “country” or “city” in English have become widespread particularly in İstanbul. The designers of these complexes tried to find answers to the questions like; “Can we create a civilised neighbourhood within nature? Can we give İstanbul back to İstanbul residents? Can we arouse the feeling of belonging again?” (Bali, 2002: 116).

In an article written by Sunay Babahan in *Ekonomik Panorama*, it is said that the number of housing complexes is increasing fast. He suggests that the reason for rich people to prefer this type of housing is that, these privileged complexes are displaying a different life style. In the article, Public Relations Director of Alarko

Holding Leyla Alaton's statements are quoted who argues that living in these kinds of complexes will civilise people:

I have friends who left their houses at Yeniköy having a view of the Bosphorus and move to Alkent. Because people are not only want a view but also a civilised life. Apartment life is a social one. People have to live together and have to share some things. Recently apartment life has changed a lot. There was no quality notion before...But people started to look for another things. The view is not enough. People's value judgements have changed. Things once considered as luxury are now normal. We tried to make this real at Alkent. Here, shopping is done in civilised conditions.⁸

In addition to these privileged houses, the other preferential places that has become the symbols of the 1990s were residence type houses, the target masses of which are people whose time is little yet income is high and offering all even more services available in a hotel; new and huge work centres, plazas covered with glass or mirror and the offices of which are different from the depressive ones at old block of offices; restaurants similar to clubs with not being open to people and again addressed to the elites; Chinese, Japanese, Mexican, Argentina restaurants the number of which are increasing day by day; huge shopping malls where trademarks are appearing with their majestic shop windows (Bali, 2002). These new modern places are primary places of haven designed for new elites of the city who are getting bored of common people and offering joyous moments far away from the dark crowds.

A newspaper advertisement, addressing to people who want to be far away from the dark crowds and offering a haven for them says;

We are waiting for to see everybody at the Beymen Akmerkez who thinks the reason for leaving in İstanbul becomes less day

⁸ Sunay Babahan, "Lüküs Hayat Siteleri", *Ekonomik Panorama*, no:18, 17.06.1990, pp.22-23.

by day...A city place where you can rest your eyes get tired
from crowd and ugliness, an oasis to escape from city...⁹

Thus, urban space has become part of the struggle between the established and outsiders. Newcomers have been accused of invading and dirtying first the cities and then the culture. There also emerged a “nostalgia” especially among the İstanbul residents and it has become evident in the discussions about “what happened to Beyoğlu of good, old days ” and continues with “what happened to Turkey?”

3.2. The Case of İstanbul and Beyoğlu Nostalgia

With the start of rapid industrialisation İstanbul became the principal target of migration during the 1950s. Because the city’s available housings were not enough, new settlements around the industrial centres existed. These new settlements were called *gecekondu* and this new phenomenon, in spite of the qualitative changes it had passed determined the dominant city identity until the 1980s (Kurtuluş, 2003).

During this period, the spatial segregation of the city was not radical, rather the urbanisation was “reconciled with society, soft and gradual” (Pınarcıoğlu&Işık, 2001: 119; Kurtuluş, 2003: 84). The most important determining factor for upper classes’ choice of place was being close to the work place, not being far from the lower classes. Kurtuluş gives two examples for this period. First one is the togetherness of Bağdat Avenue which had apartment blocks or detached houses and parallel to it, Ziverbey Road where the dominant settlement form was *gecekondu*. Second example is, Kadıköy Bazaar where Vakko, Yeni Karamürsel and Sümerbank which address to different classes existed together (Kurtuluş, 2003: 85-86). However

⁹ *Sabah*, 26.12.1993. quoted by Can Kozanoğlu, 1995, p.111.

this kind of proximity broke down during the 1980s as a result of new liberal economic policies which changed the income distribution and consequently the spatial organisation of the cities. Hierarchical positions of new riches, poor and new middle classes became evident in their consumption styles and tastes, and the exclusionary practices started to dominate everyday life.

Kurtuluş divides these new identities existing in the city into four main categories: *varoşlar* where lower class and poorest of the city called underclass are living; hygienic and luxury housing complexes where middle and upper-middle classes prefer; “welfare enclaves” where new rich people who get richer and richer live; and lastly the old city spaces offered to intellectuals such as popular authors, members of media sector, artists and architects by gentrification (Kurtuluş, 2003: 87).

The spread of *gecekondular* and *gecekondulular* in the cities as well as their tastes, values and life styles was described as the invasion and ruralisation of İstanbul by urban elites. Their “one and only İstanbul” was experiencing a weird change and they were feeling threatened by these changes. An old city dweller explains the change İstanbul experienced in the following way:

İstanbul, 500 years after the victory of Fatih Sultan Mehmet, has been conquered again. It has been invaded by Anatolia. Instead of getting harmonised with my city, they have brought their own civilisation. I have no doubt that none of these people had ever gone to a gallery in their lives. All they think about is to save money to buy a summerhouse. We have become a country where people are eating *lahmacun*. 50 years ago, we didn't know what *lahmacun* was... (Bartu, 2000: 50).

The discourse that İstanbul has been invaded by people from Anatolia and dominated by Anatolia became more and more widespread. People reacted against the “invasion” of İstanbul. One of them was Rauf Tamer:

This is the victory of Anatolia...Congratulations. İstanbul is defeated. Residents of İstanbul are crushed, disjointed, they feel afraid and uneasy...¹⁰

The length of time spent in İstanbul leads to a collective “we” identity among the city residents and this makes them see themselves as the true owners of the city and others as threat to their order although they are the real owners of the city. Okan Bayülgen, defines himself as a city dweller for living in İstanbul for generations and this gives him the right to despise villagers:

I hate villagers because I am a city dweller. I like the blessings of the city. I grew up in a family living in İstanbul for generations. I define people unaware of themselves, in other words do not know the gusto, taste of being a Turkish as villagers; I hate them and I despise them. They are idiots! They came to cities from their villages and want to compete with me by reading two books. You can't kid me. I like being a İstanbul resident and despise people who are not. I like people living in Paris or London. We don't let them open *kebab* restaurants in Bebek for example. I want to live together with civilised people.¹¹

The power relations between the groups living in the same city leads to a moralising polarisation of “good” and “bad”. Labelling one group as “less valuable” is an instrument in the struggle whereby the established group can maintain its social superiority. The pullout *Sabah* İstanbul, the slogan of which was “There is no other İstanbul”, reported that “Now there is the MKK trouble”:

Some of the İstanbul residents who do not know the city culture, uneducated, incalculable, cruel and unfair are burning

¹⁰ Rauf Tamer, “İstanbul Mağlup”, *Hürriyet*, 02.06.1992, quoted by Rıfat Bali, 2002, p. 138.

¹¹ Senem Altan, “Önsevişmede Tedirginim”, *Aktüel*, 11-17 April 2002, no:560, pp.32-34.

forests when they are trying to have brazier pleasure and leave them burning instead of trying to extinguish it. Municipality strike, exposed these people's -who are qualified by İstanbul residents as MKK (Modern Kentin Kıroları)- opprobrium activities; it has showed how dirty their souls are. MKKs who do not deserve to live in İstanbul but invading the city, are turning the parks, gardens into a rubbish sea.¹²

Here the allusion to the abbreviation PKK is self-evident. Civilising process works through the differentiation of “civilised” and “uncivilised” bodies and this corresponds to the construction of high and low in the society. Established group, namely the İstanbul residents, almost invariably experience and present themselves as more civilised and decent while contrasting outsiders as containing all that threats to undermine civilisation by labelling the villagers as animalistic, barbaric, rough and dirty. Cenk Koray expresses this in a very rough way like this:

When I'm going out to İstiklal Avenue, I take out my tie and put it into my pocket for not being regarded as a stranger. Two feeted creatures who are disrespectful, not care for anybody and regarding themselves as the centre of the world going around near by you. Cavemen who are seeing every female being as their own property and looking at them by pouring saliva.¹³

The situation in İstanbul was increasingly becoming disturbing for İstanbul residents and thus people started to offer some solutions to the problem. One of them was Serdar Turgut who urged people who have a rural origin to go back to their villages:

I do not like songs, books and stories about villages. Because I am a city child and as a result I have too many problems, I have neither time nor desire to think about village life. But I absolutely want the song calling for 'Let's go back to our village' by Ferdi Tayfur to be considered seriously at least by some people...I have two reasons: Today the quality of life is very low in İstanbul. People who believe that their lives will be more qualified and will live more humane are coming particularly to İstanbul in waves. At the end, physics rules starts to function and as the crowds increase, the quality of life starts

¹² *Sabah İstanbul*, 22.08.2000, quated by Rıfat Bali, 2002, p.139.

¹³ Cenk Koray, “İstanbul, İstanbul, Sen Gerçekten İstanbul musun?”, *Akşam*, 15.02.1999.

to decrease...Because the crowds are continuously increasing, the life gets worse and because we have nowhere to escape, we have to content with only watching the oncoming disaster. So please, if you have the opportunity, take Ferdi Tayfur's call into consideration seriously and go back to your village...¹⁴

It is ironic that Turgut was also the one who opened up the discussion about "Other Turkey" in the late 1990s. Another columnist Mine G. Kırıkkanat who fears because of what she sees during her visits to İstanbul, proposes a more radical and with her own words "racist" solution for the salvation of the city:

Yes, my racism is completely awakening in İstanbul. I want to sit on the control device of a huge scoop and exile some inhabitants out of the city. However recently this idea of huge exile is replaced with a more modest madness. Because during this time, that population has extremely increased. It has become impossible to cope with it. So now, I am dreaming of rescuing one neighbourhood. For example Beyoğlu and its surroundings. I wish it has been given to us, I wish to surround it with new İstanbul city walls and definitely not to take some inhabitants in...Also friends, dispersed all around and crouched down to tiny corners for not to coincide with those inhabitants would come too. How nice, how happy we shall be together. My racism is not based on religion, colour or class. *I differentiate good people as polite and bad people as rude.* There is no other definition for politeness. However there are many for rudeness. There are bears and uncles; there are a lot of *maganda, zonta, angut*, animals, sewers, and lumbers...It is clear that some inhabitants in İstanbul do not care about anybody except themselves. Thus they do not thank to and apologise from anybody. Because they are blind... I want to send this inattentive race from Beyoğlu and its surroundings...I am very racist for two days that I spent in İstanbul. As well as people coming in spite of the inscription 'city dwellers only', I also want to chuck out those who left this city doorless.¹⁵

There started a discussion about the true "*İstanbullu*" (İstanbul-er) and his/her characteristics. According to Öncü (2000), true "*İstanbullu*" is a myth because in a city where three forth of its population consists of migrants born somewhere else, the question who is the true *İstanbullu* cannot go far from being a rhetoric question. The

¹⁴ Serdar Turgut, "Haydi Gelin Köyünüze Dönün", *Hürriyet*, 18.04.1995.

¹⁵ Mine Kırıkkanat, "Centilmenlik", *Radikal*, 27.12.1997, 16.10.2000. The emphasis belongs to me.

word “*İstanbul*” in everyday usage reminds a series of privileges, superior quality, and perfection. The word “*İstanbul*” is a point for the conflict between the elite culture and popular culture, in other words between high and low. (Öncü, 2000: 117). It is the expression of cultural hierarchies in İstanbul and it both determines and determined by the characteristics of the “other stereotypes”. It can be said that this is a word highlighting the distinction of one group with its habitus from the others.

A new “nostalgia” existed among the İstanbul residents and has become evident in the discussions about what happened to Beyoğlu. During the 19th century, Beyoğlu was the model of European life style; it was the neighbourhood that Ottoman intellectuals were observing Europe and “it was the east for the west and the west for the east” (Ortaylı, 1987: 98).

This was a place where people wearing different kind of clothes were walking around, different foods were eaten, variety of entertainment was seen, many different languages were spoken and foreign newspapers and magazines were sold. Here, privilege was not based on language or religion but wealth. Meanwhile, welfare and misery, poverty and wealth were existing side by side. During the 19th century the life style in Beyoğlu was the copy of other metropolises all around the world. However conservative İstanbul at the opposite was seeing Beyoğlu (Pera) always as a place that should be stayed away since Byzantine period. Yet to stay away from this place was not that easy (Ortaylı, 1987).

For Ottomans, Pera was the “European” part of İstanbul. The symbols of the modern life such as office buildings, banks, theatres, hotels, big stores, multiple storey apartment blocks first appeared at Pera. During the transformation period from the

Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, İstanbul lost its position as the capital of the country. However even in this period, Pera remained as the symbol of “civilisation” and “Europe in İstanbul” for Turkish bourgeoisie (Bartu, 2000).

According to Bali (2002), during the 1984 local elections, Dalan’s victory was a turning point for İstanbul. He organised some operations to change the view of the city. The operation called “the destruction of Tarlabası” resulted in discussion between Dalan and Association of Architects. While Dalan was suggesting that Beyoğlu should be cleaned, rehabilitated and partially demolished, The Association of Architects was struggling against neo-liberal policies of Dalan and his party. These discussions led to the existence of the nostalgia phenomena along the elites of İstanbul.

The nostalgia for İstanbul imagined very different from what it actually was and idealised as the symbol of civilisation has emerged and has got the concrete form of Beyoğlu nostalgia. The restoration of Çiçek Pasajı, the attempts by “Beyoğlu’nu Güzelleştirme ve Yaşatma Derneği” founded by Vitali Hakko and a group of İstanbul lovers in 1985 to restore Beyoğlu and the restart of tram travel in 1990 are some of the activities geared to reanimate İstanbul which had totally remained at the past. The nostalgia of “old İstanbul” has awakened the consciousness of “being a city dweller” and being a İstanbul dweller has started to be considered as a privilege. (Bartu, 2000: 47-48; Bali, 2002: 134-135).

What was Beyoğlu actually symbolising? Civilisation, elegance, den of vice or a foreign cultural heritage? In fact since 1980s, it was symbolising the “ruralisation of the city” for the residents of İstanbul. Beyoğlu was not the same place as Grand Rue

de Pera anymore where only “stylish ladies and gentlemen” could be seen. Beyoğlu has become the realm of nostalgia felt for “this lost city” (Bartu, 2000: 49-50).

During the 1994 local elections, the candidate Zülfü Livaneli defined these elections as a choice which would be made between İstanbul being as an European or Middle East city. However, while İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality election was won by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Beyoğlu Municipality election was also won by the Welfare Party and this was defined as the victory of *gecekondu*. Then the struggle over İstanbul become the struggle of Kemalist heritage against İslamists as well as being a struggle between city residents and *gecekondulular* (Bartu, 2000: 53). In his talk show program Cem Özer humiliated Tayyip Erdoğan as representing “people who live in İstanbul but have not become İstanbul dwellers” and thus highlight the identity image of the masses supported Erdoğan in the eyes of the city residents (Bora, 2000: 68). Also Haldun Dormen, an actor, expressed his anger at the outlook of İstanbul and Beyoğlu:

Who did this to Beyoğlu of my childhood? I gave up Beyoğlu, who made İstanbul such a disgusting city? Who alienated me and people like me from our own city? Where did they come from and how come did they become so dominant? Why for so many years nobody rebelled? Why everybody withdrew to their corner and accepted to be humiliated in his own city? Who are these monsters coming from mountains and expelling us from our vineyards?...Really who are they?¹⁶

The principal residents of İstanbul started to feel themselves as a minority and as a result, they identified themselves with the minorities living in İstanbul before and identified them with civilisation. İstanbul where non-Muslim minorities had lived

¹⁶ Haldun Dormen, “Beyoğlu ve Kim Bunlar?”, *Güneş*, 14.12.1990, quoted by Rıfat Bali, 2002, pp.136-137.

became a significant part of the nostalgia (Bali, 2002: 141-146). For city elites who are complaining about the invasion of İstanbul and particularly of Beyoğlu, the concepts of “civilisation” and “minorities” became synonymous words. Because of this, many İstanbul analysts and journalists complaining about the ruralisation of İstanbul and “cultural degeneration” argued that there is a relationship between this situation and the migration of minorities from İstanbul. An aspiration for minorities living in İstanbul came to the fore. For example Baskın Oran suggested that it would not be so easy for İstanbul to become a “*Lahmacun* Republic” if Greeks had not left the city or forced to do so (Bali, 2002: 143). Also Mine Kırıkkanat complained about the same problem like this:

If we had repaired the churches in Cunda, if we had not missed the last Greeks, if we understood Rebetiko, maybe it would not be like this. And İstanbul streets, İzmir streets would not be full of reactionaries, Ticani, *maganda* and pillagers called terrorists. The owner of the Anatolia was Greeks before us. Turks came and exiled the Greeks. Now some people are exiling us. I am leaving to name them to you...I missed my Greeks. I want Greeks of my İstanbul, my İzmir.¹⁷

People coming to big cities in waves starting from the 1950s led to enormous changes in the cities, particularly in İstanbul. Two different cultures, two different life styles and different tastes came up against. While until the 1980s this encounter did not result in serious conflict, with the contribution of dramatic cultural and economic changes, this new situation led to the formation of two different cultures especially in İstanbul, namely civic and *varoş* culture. İstanbul residents, seeing themselves as the true owners of the city as a result of the length of time spent there started to see these newcomers, outsiders as a threat to their established order, values,

¹⁷ Mine Kırıkkanat, “Rebetiko”, *Radikal*, 10.11.1996.

life styles and privileges and as a result by exclusivist measures, they confirmed their identity and created differences.

Different life styles and different tastes representing different class cultures i.e., class habitus have become the main source of conflict in the cities. Being a city dweller, namely *İstanbulu* has become a privilege, a status symbol and newcomers and their life styles regarded as a threat against the established order and urban elites started to seek for the maintenance of their superiority by highlighting these outsiders' inferiority and thus *varoş* identity including reaction and violence has been built as the urban other.

CHAPTER IV

THE SYMBOLIC HATE INSCRIBED ON THE BODY; THE BEAUTY VS. THE BEAST OR IDEAL MODERN INDIVIDUAL VS. *MAGANDA*

As is discussed in Chapter 1, in Western societies, a differentiation is made between “civilised” and “grotesque” bodies. While the concept of “civilised body” is formed as the body appropriate to the dominant rules in the society with respect to its physical appearance and manners; the “grotesque body” is presented as the body that contrasts with the social and moral norms, the rules of manners and as a result defined as “animalistic” (Stallybrass&White, 1986). Civilising process operates on the differentiation of “civilised” and “uncivilised” bodies and this corresponds to the construction of high and low in the society. In this chapter, I will focus on the hierarchical inscription upon the body. The construction of ideal modern individual against *maganda* will be examined and the formation of “White” and “Black” Turks distinction which is specific to the 1990s will be analysed.

4.1. General Characteristics of “Ideal Modern Individual”

“Saçım sarı, gözüüm mavi, güzelliğim Avrupai”

Ideal modern individual is constructed as a civilised body which is appropriate to the modernisation ideal both with its physical appearance and manners. Since the life style adopted as the model was a Western one, Turkish people had to have an appearance appropriate to this new style. Thus, traditional Turkish men should be replaced with a new one. Again they were the newspaper columnists who prepared a specification over how should new Turkish men look like. Like in everything, columnists assumed the leading role again. The portrait of the ideal modern individual is basically the portrait of city elites propagated and partly given shape by newspaper columnists. They cannot be differentiated from their European and American fellows both with their physical appearance and education. We can say that, this attempt can be traced back to the Özalism of the 1980s but in time, it has become more influential.

Ideal modern individual corresponds to the people who are Westernised, adopted a European life style, urban, well educated and generally belong to middle or upper classes. The physical appearance has a significant place in the image of the ideal modern individual. To be handsome or beautiful, young, blond and without moustache are the most evident physical features of ideal modern individual. As a result, the stereotype of *maganda*, which is the “anti” of ideal modern individual both physically and symbolically, is presented as ugly, black, brunette and with moustache and thus symbolic hate is materialised in the figure of “*maganda*”.

Actually, whether what is excluded from the characteristics of the ideal modern individual determines the features of *maganda*, or as a result of considering the characteristics of *maganda*, the ideal modern individual has been formed is not clear. However one thing is obvious: The polarisation between the “ideal modern individual” and “*maganda*” which is expressed with the differentiation made between “White and Black Turks” in the 1990s, is a differentiation made between people who have passed through the civilising process and who have not. In addition to “civilised vs. grotesque”, it also corresponds to the symbolic polarisation of upper and lower (Stallybrass&White, 1986).

With the aim of increasing consumption and presenting the proper products for the consumer, market surveys had become widespread. These surveys were also indicating the place of Turkish man/woman in the “civilisation scale”. According to the result of these surveys, the consumption habits of Turkish people and the fact that they are getting closer to the Western values with respect to their physical appearance are accepted as the affirmation of the fact that Turkey was on the way to modernisation. In addition, urban elites started to consider Anatolia oriented people as “*maganda*” and “*zonta*” who were demolishing the image of modern Turkey.

Benetton Company during the 1990s made a survey of the characteristics of “Modern man” and “Modern woman” and asked to 100 women that what are the characteristics of the modern man and asked 100 men that what are the characteristics of the modern woman. According to the results men listed the characteristics of modern woman like this:

Who does not use all of her jewellery at the same time/ does not need feminism for equality/ does not make cooncan a life style/ does not keep television open until the end of the closing announcement/ does not compete with her daughters/ instead of trying to lose weight with popular methods, can nourish right and does sports/ does not consider men only obliged to look herself/ can make her phone call fit to minutes/ knows that the most important condition of the beauty is naturality and simplicity/ does not demolish her elegance when she uses alcohol/ knows the importance of the quantity used as well as the choice of perfume/ can have a friendship with men without setting up classical dreams/ and knows to smile in spite of everything.¹⁸ (Bali, 2002: 50-51).

On the other hand, women defined the characteristics of modern man like this:

Who does not go around with ruled pyjamas at home/ who does not find it strange to coincide with his wife at the restaurant he went/ who believes he can be a man without moustache/ who does not drink whisky with *kebab*/ who does not force women working under his instruction to go out for a meal/ who brushes his teeth instead of his dentist / who does not stand up before the doors of the plane has opened/ who is not Western when buying technology but Eastern when using it/ who can go to the theatre with ticket instead of invitations/ who does not show his golden necklace amid his bristle by opening his shirt up to his paunch/ who can change his child's cloth together with his wife/ who knows how and where to park/ who does not start explaining how we invaded İstanbul during a discussion on the dirtiness of toilets¹⁹

When we accept that the general understanding in the society is like this, we can say that the newspaper columnists were pretty much successful in their mission. The characteristics like wearing ruled pyjamas, having a moustache, drinking whisky with *kebab* and showing his golden necklace amid his bristle by opening his shirt up to his paunch are seen as specific features of *maganda*.

¹⁸ Çetin Özbayrak & Hayri Birlir, "Modern Tipler", *Hürriyet*, 4.12.1990, quoted by Rifat Bali, 2002, pp.50-51.

4.1.1. Role Models of Society

Newspaper columnists, portrait and urge for the image of ideal modern individual, present some role models for society to make them understand how an ideal modern individual should look like and how he behaves more concretely. Especially preferred role models are usually sportsmen or soldiers, for being national symbols of the society.

Ertuğrul Özkök is one of these columnists who assumes this mission most willingly, in Rifat Bali's words, "the sculpture of the new Turkish man"²⁰. He is an "opinion maker" who dedicates almost all of his weekend articles to life style, pleasure in life and shaping of the new Turkish man. According to him, ideal modern individual or "New Turkish man" would be the one who lives in İstanbul, and is well educated and familiar to American culture, preferably having a degree in America. According to him, one of the most important characteristics of "role models of society" is their physical appearance. They are described as young and beautiful. Ertuğrul Özkök in one of his articles says;

"Look around. You will see that a new Turkey is appearing and new Turks are started to be dominant at this country's image. The Young Turks period is over. Now, New Turks' period is beginning all over the world. And we will often see that new Turks at the sectors which will determine the 21. century. In sports, health, culture, fun, media and new economy... We saw the faces of these people at a stadium at Copenhagen the day before. They are young and beautiful people. New Turks who are not different from the developed countries, moreover going forward in many areas with their behaviour, physical appearance, clothing are promising a magnificent future to this country."²¹

¹⁹ Ibid., pp.50-51.

²⁰ The discourses over ideal modern individual as well as *maganda* define men and represented by men. It is argued this has to do with the patriarchal structure of society but it is not the subject of this study.

²¹ Ertuğrul Özkök, "Bu Yeni Türkler de Fazla Oluyorlar", *Hürriyet*, 19.05.2000.

He presents the salesperson as an example for the new people of new Turkey, killing two birds with one stone. While praising their physical appearance and minds as modern, he also blesses shopping as a joyous part of life.

We used to call them clerk. Now we call them salesperson. At the big stores, at Galeria, Akmerkez, pay attention. You will immediately recognise them. They have short-cut hair, and usually their hair is combed to back. Their faces are very clean. They are so chummy. They immediately start a close relationship. Their speech is cosy and chummy as well but not too free and easy...We talk about everything. I like their clothes. Both girls and boys are modern. I am not talking about only their clothes. Their minds are also modern. They also inform you when they are trying to sell a product. All of them are merry...Because of that I love them very much. They are the new people of new Turkey. I admire these people who are making shopping a joyous part of life.²²

Ertuğrul Özkök also portray basketball, football players and wrestlers as the representatives of the new Turkish man. Choosing especially sportsman as role models is a conscious one, because these are usually national figures. By this way he both feeds his understanding of new nationalism which I will explain later, and make it easier for people to accept the characteristics of the new Turkish man. Turkish people's extraordinary love for pop stars and ball stars could be another reason as well. He draws a portrait of modern sportsman with the figure World Wrestling Champion Sabahattin Öztürk by highlighting his modernity and beauty:

At the head of the young man, there is a headband which is the most beautiful accessory of the young aesthetic recently. The headband brings a new aesthetic dimension to the sport he does that we are not familiar before. When his dispersed but short and dense hair falls down to the headband, we see a modern face. Modern and beautiful. Without moustache, huge, young and modern. This young wrestler who brought world championship to Turkey after 23 years is giving the magnificent pleasure of the mixture of national sport and modernism. I am thinking...Are the sportsmen at World Athleticism

²² Ertuğrul Özkök, "Günlük Hayattan Zarif Çizgiler", *Hürriyet*, 18.09.1994.

Championship I watched a week ago at the TV different from this young man? Quite the contrary, our champion is more handsome and more modern than all of them.²³

Every part of life from consumption to feelings, life style to view point, should gain aesthetic and beauty for him. Anything done by a young and beautiful person is aesthetic and modern for him. For example politics, when it is done by Tansu Çiller, becomes aesthetic and beautiful. Wrestling and weightlifting are unaesthetic sports because until now these were done by ugly, clumsy sportsmen usually having moustache. But now young and beautiful sportsmen are representing the country at the international competitions so sports has developed aesthetically in this sense:

Reyhan Arabacıoğlu, exposes a new weightlifter profile. In a more correct way, the aesthetic development of weightlifting started with Naim Süleymanoğlu is continuing...Because the sports thought to belong to another kind of human are slowly entering into the sovereignty of the modern aesthetic mentality...Naim Süleymanoğlu took our attention to the dumbbell...Also Naim not only had brought success but also the aesthetic of a beautiful face to this sport... Turkish sport is entering into an aesthetic age. And the sports we neglected until now are opening its doors to young, beautiful and intelligent people.²⁴

Ertuğrul Özkök's frame of reference is always the West, particularly United States of America. He wants everything in Turkey to be similar to the Hollywood films. He wants our police departments and police officers to look similar to that of Los Angeles Police Department. However he again emphasises only the physical similarity because he believes change in the clothing will bring the mentality change at the end. In other words he believes, young, beautiful and handsome police officers wearing black eyeglasses and without moustache will eventually change mentally!

²³ Ertuğrul Özkök, "Hani Sivaslılar Sadece Otel Yakardı?", *Hürriyet*, 29.08.1993.

²⁴ Ertuğrul Özkök, "Jöle Saçlı 'Saklı' Bir Çocuk", *Hürriyet*, 8.11.2001.

The Police Chief is telling. They are bringing mounted police to Antalya for the first time. They will make all guards wear black eyeglasses. Police uniforms had been reformed. That means, the city is preparing to reach police aesthetic proper to its beauty. I say ‘Everything should be similar to that of San Fransisco and Los Angeles’. Like LAPD we saw in films. Like Los Angeles Police Department. ANPD; Antalya Police Department. Recently there has been a significant development at police aesthetic. It started first in İstanbul. Moustaches have gone. Western standards had been brought to clothes. The police type has started to change with *Yunuslar*. Young, handsome boys, beautiful girls taken away the classical police type whose belt was falling under his hub from the metropolis. When I look at all of these I remember deceased Özal’s words. During his visits, he was taking my attention to the change at the clothing of Turkish people. ‘This change will bring mentality change’ he said. I also agree. Clothing is not only something that covers human. It also determines the mentality.²⁵

Ertuğrul Özkök, although the leading one, is not the only person writing specifications about how the “New Turkish Man” should look like. Many other columnists also take the responsibility of educating on how the New Turkish man can keep in step with modern age and as a result they are propagating the new image of modern Turks. For example Mehmet Barlas in an article entitled “It is necessary to be well kept and clean for an urban and civilised society”, tells about a seminar on clothing organised for the staff of Garanti Bank and wrote:

...If we want to be a peaceful and civilised society, we cannot do this only by changing constitutions in every 10 years. First of all, individuals and institutions should start education programs teaching the right manners. People only copying physical appearance of dressy and make-uped actresses but not having bath every morning, not brushing their teeth, not using deodorants, only leave sweat smells in the society. Garanti Bank has a video study aiming to educate human resources in every subject...A bank employee gives the first impression about herself with her clothes, care, hair style and cleanness...One of the basic elements of good physical appearance is clean clothes with a colour harmony...Man and Woman should take a shower every morning. Man should shave and comb their hair everyday. Teeth should be brushed, a deodorant should be used. Man should cut his nails...etc...This

²⁵ Ertuğrul Özkök, “Türk Rivierası’da Atlı Polisler”, *Hürriyet*, 20.10.1996.

is a summary from the videos of Garanti Bank, we found this beneficial.²⁶

Another columnist Güneri Civaoglu praises young professionals not only for their education, clothing and etiquette but also for their cultural tastes. According to him, well-qualified bourgeoisie should follow books, concerts and world of art and also know about food and wine culture as well as the stock market at Wall Street.

Look at banks... All of them are young people who are well-educated, know at least one foreign language well, doing sports, having world etiquette, sportsman and have no complex...During my foreign visits, I am together with these young businessmen and their very young managers....They not only know stock market at Wall Street but also following closely recent books, concerts, the world of art. I should emphasise their tastes on best foods and wine culture. They know which ballet in Moscow, which theatre in London, which musical in New York they need to watch. In other words, it is seen that bourgeoisie is making a cultural revolution in their own brains.²⁷

Physical appearance, clothing, behaviours and tastes become the most important basis of distinction during the 1990s. National figures like sportsman and soldiers are praised to have the characteristics of ideal modern individual and given as the examples of new Turkish man who, according to these columnists, are the young and beautiful people on whose shoulders new Turkey will advance.

4.1.2. “Don’t Smoke, Look Good, Love Animals and Be Nationalist”

Rıfat Bali (2002) argues that there are four distinctive qualities of a New Turkish Man commonly prescribed by columnists: not smoking, looking good, loving animals and nationalism. (Bali, 2002:310). The opinion that civilised people do not smoke in West is accepted by Turkish elites and the act on non-smoking at the closed

²⁶ Mehmet Barlas, “Kentli ve Uygur Toplum için Temiz, Bakımlı ve Özenli İnsan Şart”, *Hürriyet*, 13.03.1993.

²⁷ Güneri Civaoglu, “Değişim”, *Sabah*, 20.03.1991.

areas was accepted. For the new Turkish man who quitted smoking the other step is to change his physical appearance.

The differences between the traditional Turkish man and the modern one are; men should be without moustache or beard and women should be blond like Tansu Çiller. Their common feature is to be “white”. Advertisements lead the movement for the change observed at the new Turkish man. People taking part at the advertisements are generally blond, have coloured eye (preferably blue) and white. (Bali, 2002: 310). Moreover, they are generally at their thirties, have a life style above the standard, well-educated, and smiling because they are satisfied with their lives.

In addition, loving animals is propagated at the newspapers as a condition for being civilised and Western. In a few years, with their selling points, food, magazines, veterinarian, clinic, hospital, animal hotels, a significant pet industry has developed. Newspaper columnists started to talk about their pets in their articles. Another reason for the development of animal love is that especially adaptation of loving dogs by people who are trying to show that they are secular and accepted a pro-European life style. (Bali, 2002:312). Ertuğrul Özkök explains why he and his newspaper allocate such a big place for animals like this: *“Hürriyet is a newspaper, which allocates a lot of space for animals because we think that loving animals is very related to the development level.”*²⁸

²⁸ Ertuğrul Özkök, “Siyaset Dışı Duyarlılıklar”, *Hürriyet*, 07.02.1999. Özkök reserves a large amount of space for animals in his daily column. Some of them are; “Kedim Beni 9 Yıl Önce Seçmişti”, 26.06.1994; “Tenis Topu Yiyen Köpeğin Macerası”, 04.02.1996; “Acaba Biz Kedilerden mi Geldik?”, 01.03.1998; “Köpek Bakışı”, 26.04.1998; “Veda Miyavlaması”, 19.07.1998; “Kedi Ahlakı, Miyav Budizmi”, 23.05.1999; “Falez’in Bıçkın Kedileri”, 08.06.1997; “Donmuş Kediler Bahçesi”, 14.01.2001; “Yavru Domuzla Kangalın Hikayesi”, 27.05.2001; “Atina’nın Sokak Köpekleri”, 06.02.2000; “Ya O Panda Ölürse”, 20.02.2000; “Fil Dersleri”, 01.10.2000.

According to Rıfat Bali, nationalism is another characteristic of New Turkish Man. However this nationalism is different from its classical meaning. This is nationalism fed with rising values and new pro-western standards. The champion of this nationalism is again Ertuğrul Özkök who named it as “New Turkish Nationalism”.

4.1.3. Ertuğrul Özkök and The New Turkish Nationalism

When we accept identity as not a pre-given but a historically constructed and continuously reconstructed category, we can say that national identity is constantly reshaped, redrawn and reconstructed by the nation state and its apparatuses. We should also emphasise that national identity is also constructed with respect to the image of “the other” and vice versa. In the formation of Turkish nation and Turkish national identity, relations with “the other” have a determining effect. However rather than Western, Kurdish and non-Muslims, we can say that the “past” is constructed as “the other” with respect to the national identity. The feelings of love and hate or admiration and anger towards the West, prevent the construction of West as the other. In addition, it is difficult to say the other image of the Turkish national identity is Kurds or non-Muslims. The “other” image of Turkish national identity is namely the old Turkey, in other words the Ottoman period, the old civilisation and everything belong to it which is internal to the historical and social reality of Turkey (Bora, 1999:41). Also many features of local style and form carrying Arab and Persian impression both in religion and language, in literature, music and cultural life tried to be eliminated such as *arabesk* (Bora, 1999: 42-43).

During the 1980s, under the rule of Özal, the national identity was based on self-confidence and westernisation and integration with the world capitalism was the

priority. However during the 1990s, as a result of the changes over international conjuncture, developments at the Middle East and Central Asia and economic crisis the Özalist claim that Turkey is a big power was shaken. In addition, the belief that Western world would not let Turkey to become an international power and with the rise of Kurdish problem, while pro-western nationalist elements decreased, ethnic-cultural nationalism became more radical (Bora, 1993; Bora,1994: 9-11).

Meanwhile, a liberal nationalist approach which carries marks of self-confidence of the 1980s and sees the national interest at the articulation to the globalisation process has continued to exist during the 1990s. This approach has found support among sections of new urban middle classes, big capital and media elites. Liberal nationalist approach which has focused on the Kemalist target of “reaching the level of contemporary civilisation”, has put the economic success to its centre. The export performance, enterprising potential, the development of consumption and life standard has become national pride. Consumption culture has become the signifier of the ‘contemporary civilisation level’. To be open to the world, to have a passion of enjoying life, to be aware of civic culture, to have the outfits of information society like computer and English has become the elements of the new national identity. This new modern and new Turkish identity is defined as “Euro Turk” by its supporters and “White Turk” by its critics with reference to its elitism. This new image of Turkish man generally illustrated as urban, well-educated, white, tall, beautiful/handsome and without moustache is based on the exclusion of and contempt for backward and uncivilised people.

With respect to the tendencies and significant elements of “New Turkish Nationalism”, Ertuğrul Özkök has an exceptional position. For example as Bora argues, his article called “New Nationalism” is like the “manifesto” of this new nationalist approach (Bora, 1993: 12). The best-fit typology of this new “national man” for this new type of nationalism is young people ubiquitous at Fly-Inn/Etiler/İstanbul. The elements such as a photograph of Atatürk dancing with a woman which was published at The London Illustrated News in the middle of the place, a Turkish flag waving at the entrance and the Turkish pop music being played are under the scope of Özkök’s understanding of “new nationalism”:

All three of them are young. All three of them are Western. The clothing of all of them is comfortable and similar to the kind which American young wear. Their haircut is modern. The coupe rising at the back of the neck of one of them is exposing the portrait of new universal young. The others’ albatross type of haircut is introducing the prototype of a new human type that American soldier started at the Vietnam and has become a world citizen during the Gulf War. In summary, three of them are universal. Three of them are universal but all of them are more national than we suppose. The Turkish flag waving at the entrance, the photograph of Atatürk inside and their approaches to the Turkey’s vital problems exposes a new type of ‘National man’. Turkey is creating a new type that no one has discovered yet and will discover ever. This new type is totally Western with his life style, values, clothing and cultural consumption....They have a significant difference. They have no complexes. They do not believe that they absolutely need to have a moustache, wear brown and grey clothes to be a Turk. They are wearing like Americans, they listen to their music but they also like Harun Kolçak...They appreciate everything beautiful...They are thinking themselves. They want to earn good money and want to live better. And they do not feel ashamed of this...They believe in this country, its future. Because of this they wear blue jeans, listen American music, have a haircut like GIs, wearing baseball hats. But at the same time they are proudly setting up Turkish flags to the doors of most ‘in’ bars, hanging the photographs of Atatürk inside the buildings, ultra modern interiors, dancing with the same pleasure with Harun Kolçak, Sertap, Sezen Aksu. Because this

generation for the first time in Turkish history is discovering national feeling without complex...²⁹

The new generation adopted this new nationalism is the one that will make the revolution that socialists could not do in the eyes of Özkök: “*They are doing what the 68 generation could not do. They are walking towards a radical mentality revolution with flags in their hands.*”³⁰

New, pro-Western liberal nationalism which displays itself through the codes of pop singer cult and young civic culture hedonism feels proud of “*being able to see the brand marks that we see at Paris, Washington, Tokyo*” and being able to catch up with the universal “*shopping and window aesthetic.*”³¹ It feels proud of “*providing not only nature and history but fun*” in tourism, the spread of credit cards, bars, discos, McDonald’s, international pizza chain which are representatives of “*international life style*” or as Güneri Civaoglu says are showing to be “*a country that has provided a philosophy and institutionalisation equivalent to West.*”³² The modernisation discourse of new nationalism which adopts the aim of “*reaching the level of contemporary civilisation*” to the market fetishism defines the national identity on the basis of modern life style. “*We the Turks have started to learn to love music, animals, environment.*”³³

It is mentioned above, the national hero, i.e., “*new Turk*”, “*Euro Turk*” or “*White Turk*” is youth, especially urban higher and middle class youth. It is also the most dynamic consumer of media which is the chief agent of modern/global life style. The physical appearance of the youth is also a source of pride. Ertuğrul Özkök heralds

²⁹ Ertuğrul Özkök, “Yeni Milliyetçilik”, *Hürriyet*, 21.12.1992.

³⁰ *Hürriyet*, 21.12.1992.

³¹ Ertuğrul Özkök, *Hürriyet*, 19.12.1993.

³² Güneri Civaoglu, *Sabah*, 13.08.1993.

³³ Ertuğrul Özkök, *Hürriyet*, 13.06.1994.

that “*Turkish generation is becoming beautiful.*”³⁴ While telling about a soldier who lost his leg at southeast he emphasises “*the changing and modernising portrait of the new Turkish young with a slim face retouched with thin fibber framed eye glasses.*”³⁵ When describing Sabahattin Öztürk who brought Turkey first world wrestling championship after 23 years Özkök says that, “*Modern and beautiful. He has no moustache, huge, young and modern...Our Sabahattin is more handsome, more modern, more contemporary than the West*”³⁶

Thus such a nationalism is deeply exclusive as it has pro-civilisation, pro-modernist discourse having racist tendencies. The features of ideal modern individual is drawn and dark-skinned “Black Turks” having moustache are excluded. In addition liberal nationalism also makes Kurds ‘the other’. Mass culture starts to dominate the national culture and nationalism moves into popular culture. The place of pop music and pop singers in the discourse of liberal national ideology reflects this tendency: “*Turkey at the end is finding the great synthesis which it tries to find since 19th Century. We are discovering to live the East with the rhythm of the West*”³⁷ “*(Tarkan) is the first real east-west synthesis mega star of this country who unites Turkey from 7 to 70...The new music coming out of Tarkan’s shirt, the buttons of which is open is giving the first sign of transition to settlement of a mentality migration, aesthetic nomadism which is rejecting east but unable to step to land at the west*”³⁸. A satisfaction is felt when Turkish pop music is played at Balkans, Middle East even at

³⁴ *Hürriyet*, 04.11.1992.

³⁵ *Hürriyet*, 04.11.1992.

³⁶ *Hürriyet*, 29.08.1993.

³⁷ Ertuğrul Özkök, *Hürriyet*, 30.05.1993.

³⁸ Ertuğrul Özkök, *Hürriyet*, 03.07.1994.

the West and MTV. Liberal nationalism is narcissistic and it identifies itself as the nationalism of 21st century (Bora, 1994: 15-20).

One of the portraits of new Turkish man that Özkök is introducing as a model is officers, in other words members of Turkish Armed Forces. He usually highlights the fact that, Turkish military go beyond the civil elite with its mentality and behaviour and this establishment should be taken as a reference point in all parts of the society. When Özkök explains his observations and feelings about young soldiers, he takes West and America as a reference point and when doing this he highlights the physical similarities:

Yesterday morning, İstanbul-Ankara 8:00 plane...There are young people at almost one third of the plane. Some of them are wearing blue, yellow and red jackets, they are wearing wide blue jeans falling down to their boots. Their hairs are short cut. But it does not look like a soldier cut; rather it looks like the latest style American sailor haircut. Some of them are blond. Some of them look more familiar. Anatolian type...There is a soldier dispatching to the east and southeast. It looks like a basketball team is going an away game. It seems they will have the match and come back. All of them are from Trakya, İstanbul, Edirne. That is to say all of them are European.³⁹

The new nationalism is defined on the basis of modern, European life style. Thus such nationalism is deeply exclusive as it has pro-civilisation, pro-modernist discourse having racist tendencies. The features of ideal modern individual is drawn and dark-skinned “Black Turks” having moustache are excluded.

4.1.4. Objects of Symbolic Hate

While the ideal modern individual is praised, its “uncivilised” partner, *maganda* is disparaged and as a result the so called significant characteristics of *maganda* such as

³⁹ Ertuğrul Özkök, “08.00 İstanbul-Ankara Uçağı”, *Hürriyet*, 19.02.1995. His similar articles are; “Türk Subayı Traşsız İnmedi”, *Hürriyet*, 31.12.1995, “Arkadaş, Türkiye Bu Tadı Seviyor”, *Hürriyet*, 26.03.1995.

having a moustache, eating *lahmacun* and listening *arabesk* music have become the objects of symbolic hate. In addition these three objects were used to define the new people and their new culture in the cities.

Musician Timur Selçuk, while complaining about the “invasion” of İstanbul by Anatolia oriented people stresses his feeling of discomfort because of smell, *lahmacun* and *arabesk* culture:

This chaos effects the whole life of İstanbul. From clothing to eating, from moving around to entertainment, housing types to new architecture...We can observe this during the public transportation. Sometimes such bad smells can exist that, I want to break my trip on the half and find another way for myself. Only because of this I carry cologne. This also displays itself with respect to the foods. From people who eat *lahmacun* with whisky to places where American and French food is prepared, it is the same...That is to say, there is a very *arabesk* landscape in front of us.⁴⁰

One might argue that he thus expresses elite class habitus. In a similar tone, Neşe Düzel, a newspaper columnist, is complaining because of the ruralisation of İstanbul and invasion of the city by the triple of “*çiğköfte, lahmacun, moustache*”:

Beyoğlu had a very important place in the lives of the residents of İstanbul. People, both women and men, were ‘going out to Beyoğlu’. However Beyoğlu has changed in time. It is invaded by the ‘*çiğköfte, lahmacun, moustache*’ triple. It has become an Anatolian village...Residents of İstanbul who lost Beyoğlu recede to Şişli, Nişantaşı, Etiler fronts. But also these places are exposed to the attack of “*çiğköfte, lahmacun, moustache*” triple..⁴¹

As Bourdieu argues, taste is a class culture and source of social and cultural distinction and aesthetic worldview serves as an instrument of domination. While their tastes like jazz music, sushi, wine and cigar unites the ideal modern individuals as well as their economic status, it also separates them from their “grotesque” partner *maganda*. In a similar way, loving *lahmacun, kebab, arabesk* and moustache unites

⁴⁰ Quoted by Rifat Bali, 2002

people defined as *maganda* and separates them from ideal modern individual. However because the most powerful socio-economic groups designate what is to be taken as high and low in the society, moustache, *arabesk* and *lahmacun* are regarded as inferior tastes and becomes the objects of symbolic hate.

4.2. Five Sensed Insult and Disgust

While reading all the articles which are the main material of my study and thinking about the hate felt towards the people called *maganda*, I have realised that because body is the most indisputable materialisation of class taste, people whose tastes are different from us are offending our five sense at the same time. They are offending our eyes with their uncivilised images and vulgar behaviour, they are offending our ears with their pessimistic music, they are disturbing our gusto with their disgusting taste of *lahmacun* or *kebab*, their body and the places they are living are smelling bad and as a result of all these disturbances we are afraid of being touched by them and we do not want to live together, even breath the same air with these people. Here I will analyse social and class hierarchies experienced as a relationship of insult and disgust towards the other.

⁴¹ Neşe Düzel, “İstanbul Savaşları Devam Ediyor”, *Hürriyet*, 01.02.1992.

4.2.1. A Stereotype Offending The Eyes: *Maganda*

*“Tükürmezsen, geçirmezsen, yerleri hiç pisletmezsen,
aksırmazsan, tıksırmazsan,
Bıyıkları hiç uzatmazsan,
Kalın altın zincir takmazsan,
yakarı bağırını açmazsan,
Olur mu senden maganda”*
(Grup Vitamin)

The “*maganda*” identity is constructed as “the other” of the ideal modern individual. As the most significant differentiating characteristic of ideal modern individual is his physical appearance like being handsome/beautiful, white, blond, without moustache, the “*maganda*” is presented as ugly, brunette and particularly with moustache. In addition, he is regarded as uneducated, ill-mannered, rude, rough and dirty dark crowds. A few years ago the word *maganda* was used to describe people “who migrate to cities from the villages and could not be able to adjust”(Öncü, 2000). Of course this name was given to them by the people who have the hegemonic power to define and describe the “ideal modern individual”. By this and these kinds of definitions, the borders between civilised and vulgar, high and low are drawn and everyday life operates between these lines.

The word *maganda* reminds us a huge, hairy man inevitably with moustache, who leave three or four buttons of his shirt open, who spit on floors, who makes a pass at to women in the street with his impure Turkish, if have some money having a medallion hanging down from his hairy breast, a knight ring and golden bracelet. In addition, İlke Gürsoy argues that “*being a maganda requires an ability that you should be able to scratch your perineum while you are making slalom at the*

highway”⁴². The caricaturists who created the term “*maganda*” at the beginning of the 1990s, describe this stereotype like this:

...*Maganda* is an aesthetic defect...We created him. He is the animal inside us. He is a potential danger. He is harmful for health. He is an AIDS microbe. We let him to grow. He is a spot of dirt and can not be removed. He is like a plastic bottle. Does not melt, or disappear...He is infectious, spreads. He both kills, makes life miserable, leads to allergy. And unfortunately he is universal.⁴³

The words “*maganda*” and “*zonta*” which are invented by popular humour magazines also popularly used by urban elites. Metin Üstündağ argues that, these words, actually used to define ill-mannered, uneducated rich people later started to be used for ordinary poor people:

“The words *maganda* and *zonta* had been used to define people who were in cultural salad, cultural chaos. It is a phrase explaining especially the people created by Özal period...But because these people later become culturally dominant, these words were later used for ordinary poor people. It was actually the name of rich people who do not know ethics and aesthetics.” (Bali, 2002: 322).

Urban elites started to use these words by installing them exclusionary and discriminatory meanings. Thus it started to represent Anatolia oriented new rich usually caricaturised with moustache and golden bracelet. Baskın Oran lists the features of *maganda* like this:

In every period there are some symbols representing *magandas*. The symbols specific to today can be listed as egg-heel, wearing white socks under dark coloured trousers, golden necklace on a hairy breast which he had opened up to his hub, even starting every sentence with ‘I mean’ and finishing with ‘I mean’, walking around by waving rosary...(Bali, 2002: 323).

⁴², İlke Gürsoy, “99 Model Maganda”, *Milliyet Gazete Pazar* 14.03.1999.

⁴³ *Hürriyet Pazar Eki*, 12.01.1992, quoted by Ayşe Öncü, 2000, p. 136.

As Baskin Oran emphasises, every period, the symbols representing *maganda* changes and the difference between the words like *zonta*, *hurbo* and *maganda* lies in these changes. While the word *zonta* was used to define people who are disturbing with their inability to adjust to the urban life, the word *maganda* used for defining the “urban other” also involves a threatening characteristic and thus more exclusionary. Mehmet Barlas quotes the results of a research made by group of sociologists called “How to be a *maganda* and *zonta*”. According to the this so-called research to be a *maganda*;

Drink one or two glasses of *rakı* before driving...talk loudly, shout at crowded place...Eat *çiğköfte* with whisky...Do not go to business meetings without eating garlic...Emphasise that the school and lessons are not enough for being successful in life...Smoke cigarettes everywhere it is forbidden...When you are driving slowly go from the left. Do not give signals when you are turning left or right...Leave the toilet dirty where you go as a guest...Clean your shoes with bed sheet at hotel...Do not stay at queues during traffic and shopping. Jump into the beginning of the queue...Both at car and plane, do not have your seat belts before police or hostess warns you...Wait until the hair in your nose and ears lengthen and gush out...Listen nobody...Interrupt everyone’s word...Tell about yourself, your children, military service memories, how you become such a successful and good person...⁴⁴

According to the results of the same research to be a *zonta*;

Declare that you cannot come to a dinner invitation at the last minute...Serve red wine with fish...Answer the phone ‘what do you want’ instead of ‘Alo’...Put the fork on the right and knife on the left at the table...Write letters unsigned...Dance slowly at fast music, dance fast at slow music...Wear clothes that makes you look 15 years younger...Separate your hair from the middle...Believe that numbers, stars, colours and horoscope are effective in your life...Follow the fire brigade or the ambulances...Put out your cigarette at flower pot... Change the TV channel without asking people sitting in the saloon...⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Mehmet Barlas, “Nasıl Maganda Olunur”, *Hürriyet*, 20.08.1992.

⁴⁵ Mehmet Barlas, “Nasıl Zonta Olunur?”, *Hürriyet*, 21.08.1992.

Mine Kırıkkanat in one of her articles, emphasises the difference between *maganda* and *zonta*. Thereby she does not only humiliates them but also illustrates them as dangerous:

There is a kind of men that is specific to Turkey who is impossible to become a man anymore and should be crushed wherever seen: *Zontalık*. You know, *maganda* which is grown at the field and presented to the city market is called *zonta*. The difference of *zonta* from *maganda* is that when he comes to the city and becomes successful (relative) in an area including the art and becomes rich, he supposes he became a man. Consequently, the absence of hope for his recovery...Our this original vegetable type growing at the fields of Anatolia...Well what about our *zonta* who could not be exported and stays as a domestic product? They can become very bad things. For example they become the murders who attacked a handicapped tourist woman and crush her head with a stone. If they have no courage they only twist their moustache and crack their palate, but if they have they attack. When they find a poor to marry, they beat them. They kill children. They lose control when they are drunk. When they lose their control they cling to their guns and sometimes shot. If they have money and do not have guns, they have cars. When they do not crush the pedestrians, they horn. When they are bored of horn, they play their tapes...They could not go to Germany, they come to our cities. They exist! And they have to prove their existence, and should make it heard. No matter there is no manliness. What is more abundant than the *hırtlık*? And that is enough for *zonta*.⁴⁶

Here one can detect an image of “dangerous classes” noted in the previous chapter. *Maganda*, constructed as the urban other, symbolises the opposite of the ideal modern individual and have the characteristics, which the ideal modern individual should not have. What is distasteful and disturbing as well as threatening for urban elites is materialised in the stereotype of *maganda*.

⁴⁶ Mine Kırıkkanat, “Erkeklik ve Zontalık“, *Radikal*, 28.04.1999.

4.2.1.A. Social Anatomy of an Advertisement: “The Accessories That You Can Never Find in an Audi”

An advertisement broadcasted a few years ago and the discussions it led to are clearly displaying who are *maganda*, what are their characteristics, why are they so disturbing and what kind of things they are symbolising. Next to the spot of ‘the accessories that you can never find in an Audi’, there is a faceless man but which you can imagine what kind of man is he from his accessories. A medallion hanging down from the hairy breast, egg-heeled shoes and white socks, golden bracelet and knight ring. That picture giving the message that people who have these accessories do not have an Audi.

The message of this advertisement was that there are some people that we can call “*maganda*” and they wear clothes and use accessories that disturb our eyes because of the symbolic meaning that we have attached to them. Arus Yumul (2000) argues that, presentation of the person in the advertisement without a face not only represents that person is falling to the body part of the “body/mind” contrast but also it is the sign that he is not considered as an individual anymore but rather as an example of a “type” because with the erasing of the face, body is purified from its individuality (Yumul, 2000:45).

Can Dündar writing at daily Sabah when that advertisement was broadcasted, while criticising the Audi advertisement, figure outs the materialisation of symbolic objects of hate like *lahmacun*, *arabesk* and smell which I will touch upon in the name of *maganda*:

According to a survey called ‘Turkey Profile Survey’ that is made two years ago, %25 of Turkish people are dark skinned,

%48 of them are wheat skinned. %52.5 have black hair. The %63 of men has moustache, %10 has bracelet, and % 5 has golden necklace. You can be against *arabesk*. You may not like body hairs, necklaces; even if all people in the society use these, you may not use and criticise them but when you try to humiliate them totally in order to sell your car instead of asking ‘Why we could not achieve an urbanisation that would increase the aesthetic level of the society’, this becomes a “*kıro* advertisement” in İsmet Berkan’s words and an example of racism...it proclaims the subconscious of some people. This subconsciousness is sometimes seen behind a scripture hanged to an entrance of a bar ‘*Maganda* are not allowed’ and sometimes at the mentality that exiles glue-sniffing children outside the city for foreigners invited to Habitat not to see them. We do not like these ‘black heads’. They do not eat pizza even if they have money, they like *lahmacun*. They listen to *arabesk*, local version of it instead of Julio Iglesias. They do not know white socks should not be weared under black suits. And...I don’t know...they smell a bit bad. If they do not have money it is worse. They make queues in front of ‘halkekmek’ buvettes. They make their children clean car windows at traffic lights. They are migrating to our cities, spreading to our neighbourhoods, dirtying our floors. They are taking our lives from us. What can we do?...Either they resemble to us or we make them resemble...⁴⁷

Dündar criticises the advertisement for being humiliating and racist and yet the question is “why could we achieve an urbanisation that would increase the aesthetic level of the society”. According to him, *maganda* who lacks the aesthetic vision that a civilised society needs is a defect created by the problematic urbanisation process. He points out that it reflects the subconscious of some people but his own point implies an unconsciously settled class habitus he and his fellow urban elites have. General Director of Marka Advertisement Agency Hulusi Dericci rejects these kind of criticisms and argues that accessories are conscious choices which determine the taste and as a result the class habitus:

We fulfilled our social responsibility. *Maganda* being talked about consisting both the ministers at the parliament who

⁴⁷ Can Dündar, “Magandalar ve Arabaları”, *Sabah*, 10.03.1999.

throws *çiğköfte* to the ceiling and people who are celebrating a victory after a match by shooting with a gun. The civilised part of Turkey is uncomfortable with these. This campaign was their voice. In this advertisement, body hairs are not slandered, people migrated to cities from villages are not humiliated or an ethnic discrimination is not done...accessories are conscious choices, you know what they mean...We are responsible for this degeneration.⁴⁸

Orhan Tekelioğlu interprets the same advertisement as representing the self-styled etiquette of White Turks, which is the gift of the last ten years and criticises their elitist behaviours for not actually being elite. In other words, the reaction is not problematic for him but rather the owners of this reaction are problematic. By arguing that they do not have enough intelligence and culture to have the right to criticise these people, he suggests that he and real elites like him has this right:

Again we are face to face with the gift of the last ten years, White Turks who have a self-styled etiquette. White Turks, new cultural elites who are shopping at “Ak”merkez, who opens a “white” page forefront, who votes for women putting ‘cream’ scarfs to their shoulders, who are going ‘blue’ tour at “Ak”deniz...They do not want to have this culture snatched to nobody, particularly to people migrated from villages and black skinned...What about White Turks? They are plastic. They suppose themselves cultured but the only thing they know is Hollywood films, they look like they understand music but their only reference point is top ten lists. Moreover they do not have a cultural activity other than killing Turkish and rendering it similar to English. As if all these are not enough they are trying to be elitists.⁴⁹

This advertisement has a very critical meaning as physical capital in Bourdieu’s terms, is the most important characteristic of ideal modern individual. The period since the 1990s have been the one in which the image one has determines who he is. Our clothes, accessories and physical appearance materialise our life style and as a result our social status within the cultural scale. As far as physical capital is

⁴⁸ İlke Gürsoy, “99 Model Maganda”, *Milliyet Gazete Pazar*, 14.03.1999

⁴⁹ Orhan Tekelioğlu, “Magandaga”, *Milliyet Gazete Pazar*, 14.03.1999.

concerned, moustache has a specific importance for it is taken as a criterion of civilisation.

4.2.1.B. Moustache

In order to be included into the category of ideal modern individual or “White Turks”, one needs “physical capital” as well as “cultural capital” and “symbolic capital” (Bourdieu,1994). The acceptable “physical capital” is determined by the people who have the power to define specific body shapes and appearances as valuable. For example they exclude moustache from “physical capital” because it is considered as the symbol of “animalistic” masculinity by urban, educated people who see themselves as the bearers of “civilised body” (Yumul, 2000: 40).

For the elites who strive for the European Union membership, moustache as a sign of patriarchal society has been one of the most important handicaps. So, they have tried to replace the image of “Middle Eastern Turkish man” with that of the new Turkish man which cannot be distinguished from its Western equals. The first target in this frame was to erase the image of Turkish man with moustache and beard with which Turks are associated in the eyes of Westerners. Moustache which had represented locality and being Anatolian started to represent being a villager and rural with the strengthening of Westernisation and modernisation desire. Because of this it was necessary to cut moustache in order to have a civilised and urban image. As other cases, the media have Europe as the reference point and encouraged people to cut their moustache by hitting them from their weakest point, particularly emphasising that European women do not prefer men with moustache. (Bali, 2002).

When we define *maganda*, we especially emphasise his moustache and hairy body. Moustache is considered as an obstacle on the way of Westernisation as being particularly belong to the past and excluded from the image of ideal modern individual and became one of the objects of symbolic hate. During the 1990s, a campaign of cutting moustache has started and this gained a significant characteristic with the election of Tansu Çiller.

Moustache is particularly a problem for politicians who constitute the image of Turkey. When asked how she finds the clothing of Turkish men, Sümbül Naiboğlu, popular fashion designer said, “*First they should cut their moustache. And than if they want to be dressy, they should look at Atatürk.*”⁵⁰ Reha Muhtar in his article, congratulates Hikmet Çetin, the foreign minister of that period, because of his decision to cut his moustache and wrote;

At the world forums, the ministers with moustache are always representing Middle Eastern countries...The government, particularly the foreign minister of a country entering to the world forums with this kind of Middle Eastern images and that is saying it has accepted the values of the European Union, first of all go against his aim.⁵¹

Similarly foreign minister A. Kurtcebe Alptemoçin, a member of Motherland Party said, “*This looks more like Western*” when asked why he cut his moustache. (Bali, 2002: 182). News also emphasised the change in the Turkish parliament with respect to moustache:

Being without moustache trend is spreading at the parliament. Aşık from ANAP who came back from US where he went to learn language joined to MHP people cutting moustache...In the parliament with the new year, the number of MPs who are

⁵⁰ Nuriye Akman, “Türk Erkekleri Önce Bıyıklarını Kessin”, *Hürriyet*, 05.08.1990.

⁵¹ *Nokta*, 23.02.1992.

changing their images by cutting their moustache is increasing. ANAP Trabzon MP Eyüp Aşık has also joined to the MPs who said goodbye to their moustache...Aşık's image without moustache who has seen with his moustache for years took a lot of attention. Also MHP people has started to give up their "moustache passion". During the 10 day national holiday, two MHP MPs are 'putting an end to the party consisting of people with moustache image' by cutting their moustache...During the education seminars in MHP which has a leader without moustache, the image problem was emphasised and it is advised not to have moustache hanging down, not to wave rosary and to wear white socks.⁵²

The moustache is regarded as the symbol of Eastern, rural and uncivilised societies and thus accepted as one of the most important barriers before the country's membership to European Union. As Turkey is a country which accepted the European values, Turkish people should also look like European physically and especially the politicians representing the country abroad should take pain over the moustache issue.

The trend of cutting moustache also affected the business world. Zeynep Göğüş in her column in daily *Hürriyet* explains how the General Director of the Ege Seramik Bülent Zıhnalı who is really against moustache and beard, made the all staff close shaved.⁵³ Similarly, Alaton defines moustache as environmental pollution. (Bali, 2002: 184). One of the well-known names of the İstanbul high society Ender Mermerci in his article in *Alem* magazine suggests offering job opportunities for hairy people in the East:

My opinion is to offer job opportunities to our citizens, one half of his face covered by black hairs and the other half is covered by black moustache, at the places where they have born. If our southern, eastern businessmen direct their investments to their own homeland instead of İstanbul and around, neither people with moustache would invade İstanbul and other two big cities

⁵² "Vekiller Bıyığa Veda Ediyor", *Sabah*, 04.01.2001

⁵³ "Bıyiksız Takım Ruhü", *Hürriyet*, 29.01.1993.

nor the “black moustached” image could exist... (cited in Kozanoğlu, 1995: 113-114).

To show the seriousness of the issue, after giving the example that, to give a positive impression over the image of Turkey to the tourists, especially blond custom officers was selected, as Kozanoğlu (1995) suggests, in a country where the majority of the population is brunette, the practice of humiliation and calling the people of this country as “Black heads” by the people of this country can only be defined as racism (Kozanoğlu, 1995: 113).

The popularity of cutting moustache continued during the 1990s. Very few men with moustache could be seen in the advertisements. According to a 1993 survey, while the percentage of men with moustache was 77, it decreased to 62.80 percent in 1997. Another survey made in 2001 also showed that the percentage of men without moustache was still increasing and the percentage of men with moustache was 46 percent and the takeover by men without moustache was characterised as a turning point for Turkey. (Bali, 2002: 185).

The election of Tansu Çiller, a blond woman, to the leadership of the True Path Party (DYP) which was one of the most significant representatives of patriarchy and rural areas was another turning point for the moustache issue. Çiller was the proof of the opinion that an Islamic country can be both Muslim and modern at the same time. Her candidacy for the leadership of DYP had turned to a struggle between the urban and the rural. Newspaper columnists, city elites and business world supported her. So, her victory was welcomed by all of them. This victory was named as “White Revolution” by Ertuğrul Özkök:

A party which is known as the Demirel's villager party in Turkey, by making a revolution, elected a woman which has become the focus of the world as their leader. And did this in spite of its spiritual leader... Turkey is entering to a brand new mentality climate. This new mentality climate also draws the profile of the new Turkish man. I am paying attention to the delegates at the DYP convention the day before. At the convention once a moustache mass, there is a significant increase in the number of people without moustache. Everyday, a person is cutting his moustache at *Hürriyet*. New faces are appearing. And new faces are bringing new mentality climates. Nobody can stay outside this climate anymore. Everybody should see this reality. Everybody should take a share for himself from this great revolution of the changing people of the changing Turkey. And Özal should rest in peace now. In Turkey, taboos are collapsing, ideology of people with moustache is collapsing and modernisation ideology is going through our genes.⁵⁴

The other day Ertuğrul Özkök cut his moustache and put a photograph of himself without moustache at his column. Then many people within the party and the newspaper cut their moustache. They were really genuine in their acts and some of them were saying, "*A woman had become the leader of the party and we cut our moustache because we were believing that would contribute to the progress of the country.*" Cinema critic Atilla Dorsay explained the effects of Çiller's victory like this:

Since she has come to the leadership of the country, by replacing the Turkish men with black moustache image with Western, beautiful and attractive blond woman image, she has changed the image of Turkey which was trying to be changed for many years in one step.⁵⁵

Mehveş Evin in her article "Moustache, The Most Suitable For us" (*Bıyık ki En Çok Yakışandır Bize*), asks what is the understanding behind the 'White Revolution', what is the aim of it and what are the meanings that are attached to moustache which caused the 'White Revolution'? According to her, moustache which is the mirror of our Westernisation effort continuing more than two hundred years, is thought to be a

⁵⁴ Ertuğrul Özkök, "Beyaz Devrim Akşamında Gölbaşı", *Hürriyet*, 15.06.1993.

handicap in front of the “civilisation way”, although which is not more than a group of hair above lips. Moustaches have always been representing more and forward something what it actually is. Cutting it is considered as the sign of being civilised and Western.⁵⁶

Ertuğrul Özkök who argues the necessity of aesthetic touch in every section of life from consumption to politics suggests that the physical appearance, particularly the moustache is an important part of this aesthetisation:

I am looking at Ersin Faralyalı and Tansu Çiller. They are sitting side by side at the stand. Both of them are very civilised looking, beautiful people. They are easily recognised in a mass of moustache. Whatever they say, the physical appearance, a civilised touch, a relaxing behaviour and trustworthy relations affect people. This has nothing to do with ugliness, poverty or richness, or the education level. I think about this at the congress salon where I entered by grazing from the smells of meatball grill and anchovy and folklore players similar to Maraş ice cream sellers. Although I know some people will get angry, I can't keep my self from thinking like this. Our political life really needs an aesthetic operation, an elegant make up and a nice touch.⁵⁷

The conflict and the opposition within the DYP was affected by this symbolisation trend and while cutting moustache became the indispensable symbol of Westernisation and modernisation, the opposition was named as “The Lobby of Moustached” by Ertuğrul Özkök and Reha Muhtar. Reha Muhtar rejects any direct or indirect relation built between masculinity and moustache and suggests that it should be removed immediately:

With the Tansu Çiller's prime ministry, a new dilemma in the Turkish politics has come to the fore. On the one side, pro-Çiller western politicians, and on the other side, people who are basically defined as ‘lobby of moustached’ and smelling Anatolia in great quantities ...The writer of these lines had

⁵⁵ Atilla Dorsay, “Yeniden Bıyıklıların İktidarı Yaklaşırken”, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 03.12.1995

⁵⁶ Mehveş Evin, *Nokta*, 29.06.1995.

⁵⁷ Ertuğrul Özkök, “Telekrasinin Yeni Yıldız Çiller”, *Hürriyet*, 25.11.1990.

started a campaign “against moustache for Turkish men” one and a half years ago. With the thought that there is no relation directly or indirectly between the masculinity and ‘black hairs’ above the lips he said, moustache which had become a ‘masculinity uniform’ for Turkish men should be cut.⁵⁸

Nilüfer Göle, a sociologist says that Turkey assumed a causal relation between civilisation and development since Tanzimat and that it is assumed that Turkish people would develop if they get civilised. However, Göle asks, what if there is a reverse relation between development and civilisation? According to Göle, men in Turkey should not cut their moustache because Turkey has not passed over the sea yet. In other words, she is not against the relation build between civilisation and moustache and instead argues that Turkey is not civilised enough, so cutting moustache or not does not matter so much because vulgar or uncivilised people cannot become civilised by cutting their moustache.⁵⁹

The book written by Demirtaş Ceyhun called *Ah Şu Biz Kara Bıyıklı Türkler* (1988) in this respect seems to be trying to lift the crust of the wound. Ceyhun argues that Western caricaturists are still drawing the same figure when they think about Turks and Turkey. A man with a fez and moustache, wearing baggy trousers that seems vulgar, rude and primitive. This means we are still wearing fez, have black hairs, short, with moustache, bad smelling, primitive and ugly in the eyes of Westerners. (Ceyhun, 1988: 198). He argues that Westerners regarded Turks with reverence until the 19th century. What has changed their attitude toward us? According to Ceyhun, the change in the attitudes of Westerners towards Turks is very related to the change in the profile of Anatolian people since the 1970s. Turks they saw in Europe were with moustache and smelled bad.

⁵⁸ *Nokta*, 25-31.07.1993.

The moustache issue is not only a matter of hair. It is a reflection of a remarkable contradiction continuing from the Ottomans to the Young Turks, from Union and Progress Party to Republican regime. For example, according to the Young Turks “an Ottoman man without beard was a modern man”, according to İsmet İnönü “a Turkish man without moustache was a civilised man”.⁶⁰ Moustache, beyond being a symbol, is an indicator of cultural, economic and political power relationships which has historical roots.⁶¹

Moustache which has become one of the objects of symbolic hate, is accepted as the characteristic of uncivilised, Eastern and rural man and excluded from the physical capital which is necessary for being an ideal modern Turkish man. It is argued, to look like European, in other words civilised, the moustache should be erased from the picture of the modern man.

4.2.2. A Musical Genre Offending The Ears: *Arabesk*

Arabesk, pop, caz, alaturka
Sırtımda yamalı bir hurka
Yırtık pırtık blue jean
Haydi gidelim parka!
(Sertab Erener)

Arabesk is a popular musical genre that appealed to rural migrants living in *gecekondu* settlements. The term “*arabesk*” was originally coined to designate these popular songs but it later came to describe the entire migrant culture formed at the peripheries of Turkish cities (Özbek, 1997). *Arabesk* music which spreaded as a result of development of music technologies and the mobilisation of rural population can be defined as the first mass cultural formation from below and in addition it can

⁵⁹ Mehveş Evin, *Nokta*, 29.06.1995.

⁶⁰ “Bir Reklamın Toplumsal Anatomisi: Şekilde Görüldüğü Gibi”, *Express*, 15.10.1994, p.2.

also be defined as the music of ability to reconcile, survive in a different environment (Özbek, 2000). Since the late 1970s, various attempts have been made to explain the rise of *arabesk* music, culture and its social significance. In the majority of these explanations, *arabesk* was seen as a threat with its so-called impurity, fatalistic outlook and degeneration. It was said to be ruralising and contaminating the urban environment (Özbek, 1997: 211).

The form, content, production, consumption patterns and social meaning of *arabesk* have evolved during the last thirty years. At the beginning of the 1970s, the growth of the Turkish audiocassette industry and the importation and production of new music technology prepared the ground for the diffusion and proliferation of *arabesk* music. Although *arabesk* music was excluded from state-run radio and television, by the mid-1970s, it was everywhere. During the 1970s, it was often called “minibus music” or “*gecekondu* music” (Özbek, 1997: 218). This music was carried from slum areas to urban centres by minibuses.

At the end of the 1970s, it was realised that the migration from villages to cities was not temporary; they were not mere visitors but are coming to stay. As a result, cultural tensions and social conflicts came to the fore and the concept of *arabesk* had started to be used not only as a name of musical genre but also as the name of life style and mentality of both migrants and poor living in the *gecekondu*; it has become the name of “urban other” (Özbek, 1997: 219). Martin Stokes argues that besides being a musical form *arabesk* is a total anti-culture and it is usually defined as a life style displaying itself in an atmosphere of disorder and chaos that covers every section of

⁶¹ “Çayın Tadı, Teröristin Hüznü”, *Express*, 29.10.1994, p.23.

urban life from traffic to language, politics to kitsch. (Stokes, 1998: 17-18). Since the 1970s, *arabesk* became a concept which is generally used like a swearword. It started to be used to describe everything degenerated: *arabesk* economy, *arabesk* democracy, *arabesk* tastes, *arabesk* feelings etc. (Özbek, 2000: 21-22).

For example, according to Nazife Güngör, *arabesk* is the name of disharmony caused by coming across of modern life style of west with the traditional life style of the east with the start of modernisation process. According to her, *arabesk* music is a product of the transformation period. Some conditions led it to emerge and the disappearance of these conditions would result with the disappearance of this form of music and for this to happen, first of all people should get rid of *arabesk* pattern of thinking (Güngör, 1993). The general argument is that, as an underdeveloped country, Turkey followed a distorted way of modernisation and *arabesk* music is the reflection of this distortion as a “lower” form, as music of alienation and maladaptation. Zülfü Livaneli, as a musician and as a politician reflects this attitude:

...In every country there are popular music trends, lower cultures and even widespread lack of good tastes however, for the musical evaluation in that countries, the “slat” is put to the highest not to the lowest. The subject Turkish intellectuals are discussing because of the *arabesk* trend is not music, rather it is the identity problem of a country placed between east and west and unable to integrate anyone of them. *Arabesk* is always emphasising our eastern identity, the attitude of our people for traditional and the gulf between this and our intellectual tend towards west since Tanzimat period...There is the dominance of southeast at every section of the life of Turkish people from moustache to kitchen, from accent to thinking manner, to the relationship between man and woman.⁶²

⁶² Zülfü Livaneli, “*Arabesk ve Biz*”, quoted by Nazife Güngör, 1993, pp.11-12.

In the Encyclopedia of Music, *arabesk* is defined as “a music of alienation”- the rural migrants could not leave their traditional values behind, could not adapt to the urban environment, and so nourished hatred toward it. *Arabesk*, the article continues, which has no musical value, provides the means for these people to “yell out” their distress and depression. (Özbek, 1997: 223-224). The term “alienation” in the dominant discourse was used without scrutiny as a synonym for “anomie” or “degeneration”. Studies based on marginality theory that affirmed the existence of “alienation” in the migrant attitudes were not supported by the empirical findings on migrant attitudes. According to Özbek, these attitudes towards *arabesk* led studies of it to be restricted by the “integration perspective”. The musical characteristics of *arabesk* and the new life styles and subjectivity being constructed on the peripheries of urban culture have been left out of the research agenda (Özbek, 1997: 224).

Meral Özbek mainly argues that *arabesk* is not an anomaly but rather it is a historical formation of popular culture, constructed and lived through the process of spatial and symbolic migration in the Turkish path through modernity. The story of *arabesk* is also the story of Westernisation in Turkey and it is crucial for understanding the contradictions of the process and project of modernisation (Özbek, 1997: 211-212).

Mine Kırıkkanat also regards the rise of *arabesk* as a degeneration and explains her feelings like this:

I started to think about it. Where we come to small İbos, big İbos? From Kürdili hicazkar? How we reached to Müslüm Gürseses and sublimation that make people cut their chest and breast with razor? At the Acemaşiran? Was it the nihavent that caused the hint “gel seni becereyim” behind the lyrics of Mahsuns’ ‘Allahını seveyim, uğruna öleyim, bebeğim benim’ whose rose is red? Is mahur responsible for the cry ‘canısı

canısı, ömrümün yarısı'...Were Dede Efendi, Itri, Udi Cemal, Münir Nurettin guilty for Turkey where the values rising to lower level?⁶³

With the contribution of mass communication during the 1980s *arabesk* had gained the meaning that characterises the life style, tastes and sentiments of a newly rich group with provincial origins: new economic elites of finance, commerce and trade. The sensationalist media began broadcasting images of new rich displaying incompatible *arabesk* tastes, epitomised in the stereotype of their drinking *alafranga* (Western) whisky while eating *alaturka* (Turkish) *lahmacun*. The audience for *arabesk* music had expanded to include not only the masses of *gecekondu* dwellers and much of the rural population but also sections of the middle and ruling classes of the 1980s. Thus during the second half of 1980s, *arabesk* became the most widespread music across the country (Özbek, 1997: 220).

It has started to have very wide mass of listeners from lower classes to upper classes and it can be heard everywhere from luxury nightclubs to taverns. As Ünsal Oskay points out, when we define *arabesk* as a phenomenon belongs to “lumpen culture” of people at the lower stratum of the society with respect to their level of income and culture we cannot explain why cultured, educated and rich people like this musical genre. (Oskay, 2000: 23).

Arabesk has proven its ability to transcend class barriers and win approval from diverse sections of Turkish society. For example, a 1989 issue of the magazine *Tempo* featured an article on *arabesk* and how many intellectuals were finally willing to admit publicly that they loved the music (Stokes, 1998). In the past, members of

⁶³ Mine Kırıkkanat, “Zonta Makamında Ömrümüz”, *Radikal*, 16.08.2000.

the educated class were expected to respond to such cultural phenomena with disdain and negativity. Those who responded positively were ashamed to admit such preferences (Markoff, 1994: 234).

The responses of intellectuals to *arabesk* have themselves been a force in the journey of the genre. Their debates are important not because they explain the social underpinning of the *arabesk* formation but because they reveal the dominant aspirations of Turkish modernity. The labelling of the identities of the migrant and subordinated other as “*arabesk*” and the discourses and conflicts built around it helped to expand the story of *arabesk* from the cultural to the ideological arena. Thus, *arabesk* became a contentious topic after the 1980s in debates over national and urban identities and lifestyles. (Özbek, 1997: 213). For example Ertuğrul Özkök explains his struggle with his “intellectual class” and his reconciliation with *arabesk* music and shows that he is expanding his ideology by articulating things that he cannot exclude like this:

...We took the road to go back home by hitchhiking. A truck stops...The truck moves and we hear the sound coming from the type. ‘Once upon a time I also fall in love madly’. Oh my God *arabesk*...We are in the days that the intellectuals are organising crusades to *arabesk*. Orhan Gencebay is blowing like a storm. Intellectuals are making the last war in art of the republican ideology. *Arabesk* is being damn. Gencebay is crucified, Ferdi Tayfur is being fig in very troublesome situation... Everything I should hate as an intellectual is attacking to my brain in enormous concentration. But I can not stop myself... I do not know if it is the music, words, sound or the rhythm. Later sometimes I find myself singing this song inside. I am shamed of but can not stop myself. I can not confess, but I think I love this song. A betrayal feeling to my intellectual class covers me... Those years are too far now... I make peace. With my past, with my complexes, intellectual priggeries, stupid obsessions, with Orhan Gencebay, with everybody and everything.⁶⁴

⁶⁴ Ertuğrul Özkök, “Uğursuzluklar Yılına Seyahat”, *Hürriyet*, 06.03.1994. A similar article; Ertuğrul Özkök, “İbo Kazandı, Çelik Yelekli Aydınlar Kaybetti”, *Hürriyet*, 20.08.1995.

During the 1990s, with the principle of “whatever sells well gets air time” private TV stations started to broadcast *arabesk* music. The expanding neo-liberal atmosphere and the emergence of a new private mass media have provided fertile ground for a new appreciation of *arabesk* that competes with the earlier appraisal. During decades past, there is a more confident attitude that no longer fears everything from the East and is not obsessed with cultural purity. This new pragmatism however is indexed to market forces which dispense with the norms of public responsibility and social justice. Moreover, by hiding the asymmetrical power relations that make and cut through different tastes and identities, it leaves them untouched (Özbek, 1997: 226-227).

Cultural process and power always draws a line between the upper and lower and determines which elements are within upper cultural tradition and which are not in every period. *Arabesk* has an adventure in this sense both within and without this line. *Arabesk* gained a meaning beyond musical, which defines and describes a life style. It is defined as an anomaly and rendered as belonging to a transitional period.

The change in the meaning of *arabesk* reflects some changes in the society, although it is not one to one correspondence as Özbek puts it. Once it was excluded but now it is included and articulated. This style, reflecting the tension between modern and traditional, Turkish style and European style has been used both economically and politically as the politisation of culture is a significant element for Turkish modernisation project. The clothing, music style, white socks, egg-heeled shoes, and moustache and spitting unified and formed a “type”. *Arabesk* is emptied like everything and melted in the mortar of culture industry.

4.2.3. A Taste Disturbing Our Understanding of Gusto: *Lahmacun* vs. Sushi

“*Bandıra bandıra ye beni hiç doyamazsın tadıma*”

(Yonca Evcimik)

During the 1990s, enjoying life has become a life style and gusto/appetite has become one of the significant parts of this life style as a privileged characteristic. New restaurants opened at the selected neighbourhoods of big cities to meet this desire of elites. Eating at the restaurants serving Mexican, Chinese or Japanese has become a rising trend between urban elites. Ordering sushi instead of *lahmacun* or *kebab* became an ordinary habit with the effect of Hollywood films in which people are eating Chinese food from nice tiny boxes with sticks in every meal.

Güneri Cıvaoğlu points out to the difference between gorging on to have eaten one’s fill and to eat for taste and pleasure and argues that “*Similar to the cultural cliff between covering oneself and dressing oneself; there is also a cultural cliff between gorging on to have eaten one’s fill and getting pleasure out of eating.*”⁶⁵

On the other hand, Mehmet Y. Yılmaz, editor of *Milliyet* says that eating a sushi is a “matter of classy”. However he also admits that people eating sushi to show off later go to *alaturka* restaurants to be full up. He says White Turks have discovered sushi:

Sushi restaurants have been opening like cocklebur in İstanbul. People who have guests consider ordering sushi for them as the dimension of the value they attached to them. I am sure that, most of them stop by passing to *dürümcü* on their way to have eaten their fill after eating sushi. Because it is such a weird food that it does not matter how much you ate, it does not give a sense of satisfaction. On the other hand, the more you ate, the much you pay”⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Güneri Cıvaoğlu, “Lezzet ve Ötesi”, *Sabah*, 09.05.1990, quoted by Rıfat Bali, 2002, p. 130.

⁶⁶ Mehmet Y. Yılmaz, “Beyaz Türkler Suşi Yiyiyor”, *Radikal*, 27.05.2000, quoted by Rıfat Bali, 2002, p. 130.

Another level of eating qualified food is the spread of the consumption of olive oil. For increasing the level of consumption among their target mass urban elites, olive oils sold in special designed glass bottles having different tastes started to be offered. The biggest contribution for this is again came from the newspaper columnists and particularly from Ertuğrul Özkök.⁶⁷

Another significant change in the life style of the 1990s is the spread of even becoming ordinary of the consumption of wine and cigar which are representing the peak of pleasure according to Bali, particularly by businessmen, managers and bankers. As a result some newspaper columnists like Hıncal Uluç and Mehmet Barlas advanced to the position of “cigar or wine specialist” (Bali, 2002: 146-147). In addition raki culture is replaced with the wine culture and drinking raki with fish has become “out”, drinking wine with fish has become “in”.

Doğan Hızlan in one of his articles criticises the acceptance of everything coming from the West as modern and complaining about the hypocrisy of urban elites with respect to eating *lahmacun* although he also admits that eating *lahmacun* is not appropriate for his jacoben culture:

Look at me, I am defending *lahmacun* which I do not eat. Everybody who appear on television, suppose himself at the upper level of the civilisation table when he says one or two words snoring *lahmacun*. Recently, a friend from the transportation department made a nice fixation that reflects our double-faced life styles. He said ‘Look here, everybody is talking against *lahmacun*, İbrahim Tatlıses opened a *lahmacun* restaurant, all high society was there’. Because we haven’t pass over the complex of being a city dweller, we satisfy by believing we go up into a upper class in the aesthetic sense when we have peppermint in our mouths and speak ill of

⁶⁷ His articles on olive oil are; “Bugün Kutsal Zeytinyağı Günü”, 18.06.1995; “İkinci Zeytinyağı Devrimi”, 28.01.1996; “Zeytin Toplama Zamanı”, 29.11.1998; “Bir Akdeniz Masalı”, 05.01.1997.

lahmacun...Everything coming from the west is the symbol of modernity and local food in Turkey are the symbol of underdevelopment. Even Marx didn't guess that much alienation...Can you believe that the most of the people who are against *lahmacun* are people who came to İstanbul from villages. They suppose that, if they eat and defend *lahmacun*, their designation of origin becomes definite, let's deny it so that the smell of onion on us can disappear...⁶⁸

Eating *lahmacun* with whisky is generally given as a characteristic of *magandas* who have money but do not have culture. According to Özbek this metaphor of drinking whisky with *lahmacun*, in fact displays the structural characteristic of *arabesk* culture as togetherness of contrasting and different cultural elements but also used as a negative term for explaining every distorted feature of Turkey which has experienced a distorted way of capitalism. (Özbek, 2000: 12).

Bourdieu (1994) argues that, the antithesis between quantity and quality, substance and form corresponds to the opposition between the “taste of necessity”, which favours the most filling and most economical foods, and the “taste of liberty” –or luxury- which shifts the emphasis to the manner (of presenting, serving, eating etc.) and tends to use stylised forms to deny function (Bourdieu, 1994: 448).

4.2.4 Bad Smelling Bodies and Places Disturbing Our Noses

The emphasis upon dirt and smell is also central to the discourse built upon ideal modern individual versus *maganda*. As Stallybrass and White argues, transgressing the boundaries through which the bourgeois reformers separated dirt from cleanliness, the lower classes are interpreted as also transgressing the boundaries of

⁶⁸ Doğan Hızlan, “Ben Bir LC Vatandaşım”, *Hürriyet*, 19. 03.1995.

the ‘civilised’ body and the boundaries which separated the human from the animal (Stallybrass&White, 1986: 132).

Smell although like touch, encoding revulsion, has a pervasive and invisible presence difficult to regulate. Smell is organised above all around disgust (Stallybrass& White, 1986: 139). Smell is re-formed as an agent of class differentiation. Disgust is inseparable from refinement: whilst it designated the ‘depraved’ domain of the poor, it simultaneously established the purified domain of the bourgeoisie (Stallybrass& White, 1986: 140).

Social and class hierarchies are experienced as a relationship of insult and disgust. Differentiation, in other words, is dependent upon disgust. Lower classes are also formed as distasteful. Social relations are smell centred, smelling relationships as well as being eye centred (Erdoğan, 2002: 44).

As a result smell and the discomfort felt against it continuously takes place in articles. One of the columnists who is really sensitive to this subject of smell and always writes about the troubles he experiences in a warning tone is Serdar Turgut. In one of his articles he talks about the rules and regulations over the usage of the new İstanbul underground and he especially gives place to the issue of smell:

Now there is democracy in public transportation vehicles. People from all classes will travel together through the underground. Because of this, everybody should first smell his own armpit before getting on to the underground. If it smells, do not get in to the underground, get on a bus...I suppose the smell of sweat is specific to our country...Do not tell me bullshit like we don't have money, there is no water etc. Deodorants are not more expensive than your imported cigarettes, which smells even worse when mixed with your smell of sweat. Smoke one less pocket of cigarette, go and buy a deodorant. If you can't buy it, buy powder. In the morning,

wet a piece of cloth and soap your armpit, first clean it with soap and than wash the soap with a little water. There is even no that much water, did İstanbul become a desert? If you could not find any water go and take it from the sea and rub it to your armpit, it would block the smell too. Okay? Comply these and then come to the underground...⁶⁹

In another article, he focuses on the foot smell and argues that it is the most important problem of this country together with the smell of sweat:

The most important news of last week again appeared in *Hürriyet*. A scientist at California University succeeded on producing socks that do not smell...The most important problem of this country is neither reactionary politics nor the defect of the distribution of income, as it is known. This country has two primary issues: smell of sweat and smell of foot. Unless these problems are solved, neither it is possible for Turkey to enter EU, nor there is the possibility of having a peaceful life in this country...Most probably, these new socks can solve this huge problem radically...However our experience has showed that, it is not possible to stop the reproduction of bacteria in our Turkish feet my brother...Because *dallamas* specific to our country, maybe sometimes wash their feet yet do not change their socks...Smells reach enormous levels. The years old French cheese is nothing compared to that smell...Now they should take those socks and strengthen the formula in the form that even when an athlete uses it for ten years it would not smell...After that I hope the turn will come to the invention of t-shirt killing the smell of armpit. I believe we will be able to see even those good days.⁷⁰

An important support to Serdar Turgut came from another columnist in daily *Hürriyet*, Hadi Uluengin. He uses animalistic metaphors for these people because according to him they are impinging upon the borders between human and animals:

If all of you are human drafts living alone with bears at the mountains and you do not feel indisposed of smelling like them because of lack of self-respect, you can replace your skin with a fur if you want and stick the shit of the animal to your armpit, I do not care. However, when you go to town, never bring that

⁶⁹ Serdar Turgut, “İstanbul Metrosu İçin Kurallarım”, *Hürriyet*, 02.10.2000.

⁷⁰ Serdar Turgut, “Kokmayan Çorap Türklere Uygun mu?”, *Hürriyet*, 17.10.2000. His another article about smell is “Kokulara Kesin Çözüm”, *Hürriyet*, 18.10.2000.

smell to me!... You can smell, I do not care, but stay away, very away, far away from me, my city and my underground! ⁷¹

Güneri Civaoglu on the other hand, in one of his articles in which he explains how the new Turkish man should contact with young women, especially advising men not to smell sweat, onion or garlic:

A proper job or education...To know at least one foreign language. Have culture of music, drawing, literature, art and cinema. To have a bath at least two times a day. Brush your teeth ever so often. Should not stink onion or garlic, should not smell sweat underarm. Clean and non-exaggerated clothes...For example a shirt, sports pants, soft and summer shoes...Instead of looking at her like you are going to eat her or going to provoke an unpleasant incident, inviting her for a drink, dance or meal with a soft voice. (cited in Bali, 2002: 309)

It is not only the people smelling bad but also the smell of the city that has become disturbing for the people considering themselves as the true owners of the city. An author living in Beyoğlu described this change as follows:

Beyoğlu was smelling sesame and perfume before. Now it is smelling *lahmacun*. When I was a child, 'going out to Beyoğlu' was an event. People shaved, wore clean, stylish clothes. Beyoğlu was a symbol for civilisation. (Bartu, 2000:50-51).

So these uncivilised people have not reached the level of disgusting from the body and its functions yet and they have not developed sensitivity towards the smell either. They were still "Turkish, moustached and smelling sweat" (Ceyhun, 1988: 199).

4.2.5 Fear of Being Touched

As I have indicated above, social and class hierarchies are experienced as a relationship of insult and disgust. Differentiation, in other words, is dependent upon disgust and as a result lower classes are also formed as distasteful. Together with civilising process a distance is created between the bodies. Lower classes are accepted as disgusting, unhealthy, dirty, smelling bad both with their bodies and with their life spaces and the relationship between lower and upper classes is based on the

⁷¹ Hadi Uluengin, "Kokarca", *Hürriyet*, 08.10.2000, quoted by Rifat Bali, 2002, p. 310.

fear of contact (Erdoğan, 2000: 36). Unless a total spatial isolation is provided, the fear to be contaminated comes to the fore (Erdoğan, 2002: 44). But since the promiscuity of public space is unavoidable, one must make all the greater effort not to touch and “undesirable” (Stallybrass&White, 1986: 136).

For example Stallybrass & White give the example of significance of the balcony in 19th century literature and painting. Symbolic significance of the balcony is underlined by contradictory concepts like the gaze/the touch and desire/contamination (Stallybrass&White, 1986: 136). According to them, the bourgeoisie on their balconies could both participate in the banquet of the streets and yet remain separated.

In our century urban spaces have been designed and organised to a large extent systematically for not to come up against with lower classes. Spatial relations not only are determining conditions of relationships among people, but are also symbolic of those relationships. As discussed in the previous chapter, upper classes especially in İstanbul want to avoid the dangers, environmental and visual dirtiness of the city and reduce its spatial and physical contact with lower classes. As a result the decomposition of cities as dangerous and secure areas led to the creation of closed, secure and luxury housing development.

The 1990s were the years that people who considered themselves as “principal owners” of the cities did not want to live together, even did not want to breath the same air with “villagers migrated from the country side”. City elites who felt

themselves under the pressure of “dark crowds” found their way at taking shelter in their luxury housing complexes and social clubs.

In an article published in *Aktüel* magazine, the changes and the new face of entertainment is considered and it is suggested that “White Turks took shelter to home”.⁷² The dominance of vague people at the entertainment areas has forced regular customers to escape. The ‘outsiders’ have become increasingly dominant in the nightlife. When the newcomers have brought the entertainment, culture and style of where they come from to clubs and bars, ‘the real customers’ who do not want to share their status quo with these newcomers withdraw from the nightlife. The new “dark skinned” face of nightlife of İstanbul has pushed people used to the old “white” face of it to new searches and thus their current entertainment places has become living rooms of their houses.

If you have a moustache, if you are listening *arabesk*, if you prefer eating *lahmacun* or *kebab*, if you don’t take pain over your physical care, it is open to question. Every sort of taste unites and separates. Taste as a natural class culture and product of habitus, are a source of social and cultural distinction and body is the most indisputable materialisation of class taste. Thus this operates on the differentiation of “civilised” and “uncivilised” bodies, in other words “*maganda*” and “ideal modern individual” and corresponds to the construction of high and low in the society. The differentiation made between *maganda* and ideal modern individual is replaced by the satirical expression of “White” and “Black” Turks which is specific to the 1990s.

⁷² Mine Akverdi, “Beyaz Türkler Eve Sığındı”, *Aktüel*, 5-11. 11.1998, pp. 32-36. Again in the same subject also look Nur Çintay&Çağdaş Ertuna, , “Sosyete Eve Çekildi”, *Aktüel*, 19-25.04.2001, no:509, pp. 25-28.

4.3 “People Are Divided Into Two; Turks Too:

White vs. Black Turks”⁷³

*“Anadolu insanının:
Bir ruhu vardı, nüfuz edemedin;
Bir kafası vardı, aydınlatamadın;
Bir vücudu vardı, besleyemedin;
Üstünde yaşadığı toprağı işleyemedin;
Ne ektin, ne biçecektin?
Sana ıstırap veren bu şey, senin kendi eserindir.”
(Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Yaban)*

Of course the classification of Turks as “White” and “Black” do not correspond to the skin colour of the people.⁷⁴ Although it is not a classification depending on the skin colour like in the USA, it depends on the features coming from birth. The main differentiating characteristic of the White Turks depends on the physical appearance; they are usually defined as handsome and beautiful, blond, white and without moustache.

The differentiation made between White and Black Turks should be considered as the expression of the dimensions that fragmentation and segregation between lower and upper classes has reached during the 1990s. The means of classification are clothing, music, eating habits, manners, consumption types and lifestyles. The differentiating characteristic of Whites is mainly their physical appearance; they are handsome, young and without moustache in addition to being Western, European, urban and well educated. They mainly belong to upper or middle strata, they have civilised bodies and polite manners. Rural, eastern and black skin is excluded from the scope of membership and constructed as the “other”.

⁷³ I borrow this title from an article, “Euro Türkler ve Milli Magandalar”, *Aktüel*, 14-20.05.1992, no:45, pp. 52-55.

⁷⁴ *Radikal İki*, “Beyaz Türkiye: Nereden Nereye?”, 30.05.2002.

The rise of White Turks has to do with the rising values, namely the new world order, free market economy, globalisation and the end of ideologies. It has become the signifier of the new conflict in the big cities, being used as a means of classification and defining the superior identity. In the first place it reminds the WASP (White, Anglo Saxon, Protestant) combination in America. In Turkish terms it means; civilised, educated, rich, Turkish, Sunni people.⁷⁵

The first person who introduced the concepts of “Euro/White” Turks and its opposite “Black” Turks was Çetin Altan. He compared the two sections and defined Euro Turks as having higher economic and cultural level and assimilated the Western culture. On the other hand, Black Turks or *maganda* are people who live in respect of *alaturka* norms, ill mannered and do not pay attention to culture.⁷⁶

Later, the concept of White Turks referring to pro-Western, cosmopolite elite city dwellers have been politicised and also gained the meaning of being committed to the secular principles of the Republic and Kemalism while Black Turks are defined as conservative and even Islamist and these concepts has become political symbols of the tension between modern secular people and conservative, Islamist section of the society (Keyder,2000). Although these political meanings attached to these concepts are outside the focus of this study, I should mention that the characteristics of being republican and secular added to these concepts points out to the basis of civilisation, Westernisation or modernisation ambition of Turkey which dates back to Tanzimat period.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* See also, “Bir Reklamın Toplumsal Anatomisi: Şekilde Görüldüğü Gibi”, *Express*, 15.10.1994, p.2.

⁷⁶ Çetin Altan, “Euro-Türkler ve Maganda Türkler”, *Sabah*, 15.04.1992. See also Haşim Akman “Yeni Türkler”, *Aktüel*, 28.07-03.08.1994, no:160, pp. 28-33.

Black Turks who are regarded as the main obstacle before the Westernisation and European Union ambition of Turkey were seen as dark crowds doing harm to the image of Turkey with their moustache and white socks, onion and garlic smell and ragged physical appearance. Because of the same reason, big shopping and entertainment centres, modern housing complexes and European style people without moustache or beard gains a symbolic meaning and regarded as the modern and urban face of Turkey. The motive of changing and transforming people who are not appropriate to modern Turkey was replaced with hate against these crowds as a result of regarding these crowds as hopeless and these feelings strongly expressed by newspaper columnists. Kürşad Oğuz explains the new cultural climate in the following way:

Their life areas, talking styles, discourses are different but there are 'Black Turks' everywhere. The seats once belong to light pop stars are now theirs. Their names are İbrahim, Mahsun, Hakan, Mükremin... Their image is 'to born as a blade, to be straight'. Their TV series are exploding the ratings, their cassettes trade off, there is always a jam at their concerts. They first 'captured' the cities, than culture and now Turkey. And White Turks congested between West and East drawback to their castles.⁷⁷

Can Kozanoğlu defines the humiliation of brunette people by the people who are brunette people again as unconscious social exclusion and racism. One may argue that it is the product of distinctive life styles and unconsciously settled class habitus.

The distinction made between "White" and "Black" Turks corresponds to the distinction made between "civilised" and "uncivilised" bodies and civilised bodies which are materialised generally in the bodies of urban elites who are pro-Western, well-educated, European styled and assimilated the modern norms in contrast to

“grotesque” *maganda* or Black Turks who are ill-mannered, uncultured and *alaturka* are propagated by the media-centred bourgeoisie-modernist approach. Moreover, the particular construction of civilised bodies has to do with the nature of the Kemalist project of Westernisation. The Turkish modernisation project aiming Westernisation created “the other” from inside by putting the Western figure to the centre of modernity discourse (Yumul, 2000).

The most important distinctive characteristic of White Turks is their physical appearance which is outlined as being beautiful, handsome, young, blond and without moustache and this makes “physical capital” as significant as economic, cultural (accumulation of cultural values which are regarded as superior) and symbolic (the status of people and groups in the eyes of the others) capital for the construction of high and low, valuable and worthless in the society. The physical, symbolic and cultural capital defined and determined by people who have the hegemonic power to designate, in other words “professionals of culture” in general includes newspaper columnists such as Ertuğrul Özkök. This ideal physical capital designated by culture professionals excludes moustache, white socks, necklaces and similar accessories and tastes if you like which I mentioned in detail under the title of *maganda*.

The differentiation made between White and Black Turks in Turkey corresponds to the differentiation made between the people who passed through the civilisation process and who did not and Black Turks are regarded as the main obstacle before the Westernisation and European Union ambition of Turkey

⁷⁷ Kürşad Oğuz, “Yok Öyle Beyaz Türkiye!”, *Aktüel*, 22-28.10.1998, pp.20-24.

CONCLUSION

This study begun as a bid of questioning my own class habitus and everything started when I let my consciosness to disturb me and try to keep this tension alive. I have friends living in a *gecekondu* but I had never lived in a *gecekondu* and my mother warned me to chose my friends more carefully when I become close to a person living in a *gecekondu*. I haven't listened arabesk music until the unversity years because this kind of music was despised in our home as being pessimistic and vulgar. When I was living in Gaziosmanpaşa, I never got on the bus coming from Kırkkonaklar, a *gecekondu* neighbourhood behind ours because it was smelling bad. I had never have a boyfriend with a moustache because I was thinking that a man with a moustache could not be modern enough but now I am married with a man who has magnificent moustache. These preferences and tastes were pointing out to something more historical and sociological and I decided to find out what it is.

Tastes and different life styles that are systematic products of habitus function as a source of social and cultural distinction and this corresponds to the construction of high and low in the society. Moreover taste as a natural class culture becomes one of the markers of class. Labelling one group as "less valuable" is an instrument in the struggle whereby the established group can maintain its social superiority.

However this subject is so complicated that it has very far reaching effects on cultural life from music to novel, from fashion to hygiene etc. Because of the insufficiency of the available literature on this subject and my limited formation on history and sociology, I had to limit my subject. So I chose to focus on the distinction made between “White” and “Black” Turks which is one of the expressions pointing out to a certain kind of hierarchy in Turkey and specific to the 1990s and deal with the presentations and representations of these stereotypes on the press and discuss the discourses developed with respect to this and struggles about the meaning behind it.

For this aim, I collected the relevant news and columns from the newspapers and the magazines of the 1990s and I tried to make the textual analysis of them. While choosing the articles, I especially preferred the articles of Ertuğrul Özkök, Mehmet Barlas, Güneri Civaoglu, Serdar Turgut, Hadi Uluengin and Mine Kırıkkanat for these newspaper columnists express their ideas so clearly and violently as well as being “White” Turks themselves.

The figuration of “White” and “Black” Turks obviously has a class content with specific class habituses. However as this study is not dealing with the formation of tastes, whether on the basis of education or family background, it does not have an intention to make a discussion on the class or a class analysis. With the pre-acceptance that this figuration corresponds to the formation of high and low in Turkey in the 1990s, I tried to investigate how this figuration is presented, represented and propagated and I found that I am face to face with a mentality the roots of which is based on a historical contradiction, namely the modernisation.

Turkish society has undergone and is still undergoing a deep social transformation that has been defined as the process of modernisation. This process, namely the civilising process, having its roots in the early 19th century, effected and changed all spheres of life from economy to politics, from culture to institutions, from ideas to daily life practices. This process operates on the differentiation of “civilised” and “uncivilised/grotesque” bodies and corresponds to the construction of high and low in Turkey.

Civilising process of Turkey dates back to the Tanzimat period and the particular construction of civilised bodies have to do with the nature of the Kemalist project of Westernisation. The Turkish modernisation project which aims Westernisation puts the Western figure to the centre of its modernity discourse and thus “the other” in opposition to whom identity is constructed had to be created from within.

The social process through which new hierarchies have been constructed in Turkish society are analysed with respect to the two main struggle areas of modernity, namely urban space and body. Cities from the beginning of their existence are settlements, which are sheltering social inequalities and spatial decomposition, which is the expression of urban-class identities of city residents in the space. The cultural duality in the cities started in the 1950s as a result of the migration to the cities. Until the 1970s, a lot of things changed but the difference between the city culture and village culture have not been transformed into a serious conflict. But during the 1980s, villagers were accused of dirtying and invading the cities and its culture.

This new situation led to the formation of two different cultures in İstanbul, namely civic culture and *varoş* culture. İstanbul residents, seeing themselves as the “true

owners” of the city as a result of the length of time spent there started to regard these newcomers, outsiders as a threat to their established order, values, life styles and privileges and as a result of this exclusion, they confirmed their identity and created differences on the basis of insult and disgust. The 1990s were the years that people who are considering themselves as the “true owners” of the cities did not want to live together, even did not want to breath the same air with the newcomers and urban elites who were feeling themselves under the pressure of “dark crowds” were finding their way at taking shelter in their luxury housing complexes and social clubs.

The other surface that social hierarchies are inscribed on is the body. The body, its physical appearance and manners are the reference point of social and cultural distinction. The distinction made between “civilised” and “grotesque” bodies corresponds to the construction of ideal modern individual and the figure of *maganda*. The physical appearance has a significant place within the distinguishing characteristics of the ideal modern individual. It is usually presented as handsome, beautiful, young, blond and without moustache as well as being urban, well educated and generally belonging to the middle or upper classes. As a result, the stereotype of *maganda*, the uncivilised partner of ideal modern individual is presented as ugly, black, brunette and with moustache and everything that is the object of symbolic hate materialised in the identity of *maganda*.

While the ideal modern individual is praised, its “grotesque” partner *maganda* is despised and national figures like sportsman and soldiers are praised to have the characteristics of ideal modern individual and given as the examples of new Turkish

man. On the contrary, tastes attributed to *maganda* such as *arabesk* music, *lahmacun* and moustache has become the objects of symbolic hate.

In addition emphasis upon dirt and smell is also central to the discourse built upon ideal modern individual versus *maganda*. Together with the civilising process, a distance is created between the bodies. Lower classes are accepted as disgusting, unhealthy, dirty, bad smelling both with their bodies and with their life spaces and the relationship between lower and upper classes is based on the fear of contact. The differentiation made between ideal modern individual and *maganda* transformed into the figuration of “White” versus “Black” Turks which is specific to the 1990s. The means of classification was again clothing, music, eating habits, manners, consumption types and life styles.

In order to be included in the category of ideal modern individual or “White Turks”, in addition to cultural and symbolic capital, physical capital is also necessary. The acceptable physical capital is determined by the people who have the power to define specific body shapes and appearances as valuable. Both the acceptable physical capital and life styles are created under the leadership of the “opinion makers”. Cultural process and power always draws a line between the upper and lower and determines which elements are within upper cultural tradition and which are not in every period.

The distinction made between “White” and “Black” Turks corresponds to the distinction made between “civilised” and “uncivilised” bodies and civilised bodies which are materialised generally at the bodies of urban elites who are pro-Western, well-educated, European styled and assimilated the modern norms in contrast to the

“grotesque” *maganda* or “Black” Turks who are ill-mannered, uncultured and *alaturka* are propagated by the media-centred bourgeoisie-modernist approach. “Black” Turks who are regarded as the main obstacle before the Westernisation and European Union ambition of Turkey are seen as dark crowds doing harm to the image of Turkey with their moustache and white socks, onion and garlic smell and ragged physical appearance. The motive of changing and transforming people who are not appropriate to modern Turkey was replaced with hate against these crowds as a result of regarding these crowds as hopeless and these feelings have been strongly expressed by newspaper columnists in their exclusionary, discriminative articles.

What is disturbing is the normalisation and internalisation of these exclusionary and discriminative attitudes.

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